


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A Comparative Analysis
of Participating Cities
Process, Product,
Performance, and Prediction

The Model Cities Program

25202
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

Office of Community Development
Evaluation Division

Department of Housing
and Urban Development
Washington, D.C.

A Comparative Analysis
of Participating Cities -
Process, Product,
Performance, and Prediction



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2524

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Contents

- 4 Introduction
- 5 Chapter One:
Summary of Findings
- 11 Chapter Two:
The Planning Process
- 21 Chapter Three:
Product—The Comprehensive
Demonstration Plan
- 27 Chapter Four:
Performance—Implementation
of the First Year Program
- 33 Chapter Five:
Predictions—Evaluation of
the Planning Grant Project
- 41 Appendices
 - 42 Appendix A:
Methodology
 - 44 Appendix B:
Interview Schedule
 - 47 Appendix C:
Questionnaire to
CDA Directors
- 51 Glossary

**Chapter One:
Summary of Findings**

Introduction

Six years have passed since Congress enacted the Model Cities Program. Since that time, approximately 150 cities have secured Model Cities planning and program implementation funds. In these six years, both the Federal Government and participating Model Cities have engaged in a unique, often frustrating, always difficult effort to define and initiate relevant strategies to improve the quality of urban life.

This report is one of a series of analyses¹ initiated and completed by Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn² at the request of HUD. It is directed at testing some of the initial findings generated from the firm's previously published analyses of the Model Cities Program in a number of representative cities. These findings suggested that:

- Cities responded to the Model Cities Program in a limited number of ways;
- Relationship between and among local chief executives and Model Cities resident groups, and level of turbulence were closely related to city response patterns; and
- Each response pattern generated specific types of outcomes or characteristics with respect to the Model Cities planning process and action year efforts.

METHODOLOGY³

Interviews with HUD staff and CDA Directors, combined with use of a questionnaire completed by Model City officials at both the Federal and local level, provided data concerning the nature of the planning process and first year of action in all Model Cities. Based on this information, generalizations were made concerning the response of each city to Model Cities. These generalizations were related, where possible, to findings generated by the 21-City Study.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter One provides a summary outline of the 21-City Study and a brief outline of the conclusions emanating from this study's analysis of the Model Cities response pattern of all 147 participating cities.

Chapter Two relates response patterns uncovered in MKGK's previous study of 21 cities to all Model Cities. It tests the degree to which these patterns of behavior "fit" and help explain the Model Cities activities of all cities.

Chapters Three and Four relate response patterns to select indices descriptive of the outcome of the Model Cities Program; that is, to Model City plans, program administration, and project initiation. These chapters present evidence that there is a distinct relationship between certain types of response patterns and city performance with respect to Model Cities.

Chapter Five analyzes the relationship between HUD's initial selection process (application review) and ultimate city performance in the Model Cities Program. It clearly suggests that the Federal Government would have done a "better job" of picking the winners if it had a more systemized way of analyzing city characteristics. More relevant, it indicates the need for more precise Federal acknowledgment of city differences in developing criteria associated with community development programs and in developing strategies with respect to building local capacity.

¹Other reports prepared by MKGK at the request of HUD include: (1) "The History and Analysis of the Planning Process in Three Cities," U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969; (2) "A Comparative Analysis of the Planning Process in Eleven Cities," U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970; (3) "The Model Cities Program: A Study of Six Cities" (to be published); (4) "Ten Model Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Second Round Planning Years" (to be published); and (5) "The Model Cities Program: A Comparative Analysis of City Response Patterns and Relation to Future Urban Policy" (to be published).

²The study was designed, implemented and authored by Drs. Neil Gilbert and Harry Specht, University of California, Berkeley, California. It should be viewed as a technical supplement to and extension of the more general HUD-published MKGK studies mentioned above.

³A detailed explanation of the methodology is presented in the Appendix.

APPROACH

The central thrust of the 21-city comparative analyses and case studies involved the definition and analysis of alternative planning and action year approaches taken in the Model Cities Program. Specifically, five response patterns or systems were identified. Each was related to the degree of resident and staff influence in local planning and action year decision-making. They were designated: staff-dominance, staff-influence, parity, resident-influence, and resident-dominance systems.

Selected variables in the pre-Model Cities environment of each of the 21 cities were examined by MKGK in an attempt to determine if any set of conditions was systematically associated with the development of different staff/resident response patterns. Among the major variables studied were: degree of turbulence in the Model Neighborhood prior to Model Cities, chief executive involvement, degree of cohesiveness among Model Neighborhood residents, political integration of residents, population size, racial indices, form of local government, CDA organizational structure, linkages with resident organizations, and staff hiring patterns. This study provides a quantitative analysis of many of these variables in relation to all cities participating in the Model Cities Program.¹ Using data collected from these cities, it also confirms or amends generalizations concerning linkages established in the 21-city analysis between Model City response patterns and planning and action year performance.

TWENTY-ONE CITIES: BY PLANNING SYSTEM

	1st Round*	2nd Round*
Staff Dominant	Atlanta	Allegheny County Houston Los Angeles County
Staff Influence	San Antonio Pittsburgh Gary Detroit	Youngstown Los Angeles City
Parity	Denver Richmond Cambridge Reading	Indianapolis
Resident Influence	Rochester	Cleveland Santa Fe New London Wilmington
Resident Dominant	Dayton	

*First and Second Round merely refers to the timing associated with HUD's awarding Model Cities planning grants to successful applicant cities. First Round Cities were chosen in the Fall of 1967 and Second Round Cities in the Fall of 1968.

FINDINGS

Type of System

- Nearly 6 out of every 10 cities were classified as staff-dominant systems. Conversely, less than two out of every 10 cities were resident-dominant.

¹ Readers who are interested in the research methodology may read in some detail about how these variables were measured and defined in the Appendix.

- There was no significant difference in the distribution of planning and action systems between first and second round Model Cities.

Factors Influencing Model City Response Patterns

- City patterns of behavior were examined in relation to three factors in the pre-planning environment: city size, ethnicity, and form of government. The findings are: (1) city size is the best indicator of the type of planning system that will develop; (2) there is a negligible relationship between ethnicity and type of planning system; and (3) cities with City-Manager governments are somewhat more likely to develop resident-influence systems than those with elected Mayors.
- City patterns of behavior were examined in relation to several aspects of the local planning environment. Among the findings are: (1) Patterns of behavior have a substantial-positive association with: CDA Director's accountability to resident groups; degree of conflict in the Model Neighborhood; and degree of political integration of Model Neighborhood residents; (2) There is a direct relationship between degree of resident influence and chief executive commitment *in cities which are characterized as non-turbulent* (i.e., that have low degrees of conflict). In cities where there is moderate or high conflict there is no association between executive commitment and patterns of behavior.

Factors Associated with the Development of Quality Planning Products

- Chief executive support and political integration are strongly associated with quality of the CDP.
- Parity-type systems achieve the best ratings with respect to the quality of the CDP and also achieve a higher proportion of categorical funds in their projected CDP budgets.
- Larger cities tend to have smaller proportions of their CDP budgets composed of categorical funds in the CDP budget.
- The number of agencies with a designated role in the CDP is only negligibly (and usually negatively) associated with size, patterns of behavior, level of conflict, political experience or integration of resident groups, and chief executive commitment.

Factors Associated with Program Implementation

- There is a negative association between population size and program implementation; that is, as size of city increases, ability to implement decreases; however, *middle-size cities do best of all*.
- There is a substantial-positive association between chief executive support and ability to successfully implement programs.
- There is only a negligible or modest relationship between patterns of behavior and program implementation; but clearly *parity-type systems do better than all others*.
- There appears to be little association between the quality of the planning product (CDP) and ability to successfully implement programs.

Factors Associated with HUD'S Ability to Pick the "Winners" or Define High Performers

- The Federal officials whose expert judgments were employed to rate the success potential of cities before they were selected to receive planning grants were, apparently, *selective* in regard to the bases on which they were judged cities.
- On most judgments regarding the potential of cities to meet HUD's Model City requirements, Federal predictions were either no better than random or proved to be the reverse of what actually occurred. Certainly, Federal predictions regarding local technical capacity and ability to develop a plan and implement a program were poor. Conversely, Federal ability to predict success with regard to citizen participation was quite good.

**Model City Response
Patterns and
Future Urban Policy**

- There appears to be a substantial enough difference among cities of different sizes regarding Model City processes, results and overall performance to merit consideration of different program requirements for different size cities.
- A larger proportion of middle-size cities seemed to be better able to meet HUD's Model Cities requirements than either large or small cities. Small cities are short on professional and technical expertise, as indicated by the lower proportion of CDA Directors in those cities with professional backgrounds in urban planning. These cities could benefit from programs offering intensive kinds of technical training and assistance. Since such a large proportion of the cities are forced, none too successfully, to use private consulting firms for these purposes, the Federal Government might consider how they could expedite the development of local staff capacity.
- The alleged benefits of very strong citizen participation (bordering on resident dominance) would merit some further consideration in light of the costs that accrue from these arrangements in terms of product and performance (e.g., lower quality CDPs, and underspending). Certainly, if strong citizen participation clearly results in decreased alienation, increased communication and increased responsiveness of institutions, the effort may well be worth the costs. This study merely suggests that the reality or unreality of these benefits should be clearly established. Participation, short of dominance, may be preferred strategy.
- Larger cities have greater problems in exercising the executive leadership and control required for program implementation. The performance requirements of coordination and integration of services as conceived in the Model Cities Program may impose an impossible burden upon large cities, particularly without changes in the Federal delivery system.
- The degree of commitment of the chief executive to the program appears to be crucial for developing quality products and for program implementation. Given the experience of the Model Cities Program, criteria governing Federal aid should lay greater stress upon identifying the degree of chief executive commitment, and should consider developing means to build, encourage and reward strong chief executive commitment.
- Cities in which there are high degrees of conflict in the Model Neighborhood do not provide a context in which systematic planning flourishes. The committed chief executive is less able to give direction to the program in such environments. However, a minimal degree of conflict combined with an experienced resident group appeared to provide the best environment for systematic planning. This suggests that programs like Model Cities may be better suited to some environments than others. The advent of community development and special revenue sharing suggests that cities in which there is excessive conflict and resident groups with only marginal political experience should be subjected to closer Federal surveillance and evaluation with respect to performance than other cities.
- The low degree of association between product or plan ratings (i.e., the quality of the CDP and numbers of agencies in the planning and in the CDP) and program implementation suggests that product requirements should be modified and reduced considerably. However, the high degree of association between program implementation and proportion of categorical funds in the CDP budget (which, in turn, was associated with chief executive commitment) would suggest that major stress in plans should be laid upon requiring communities to provide evidence

concerning agency coordination and strategic use of the array of public and private programs.

- Given the high degree of underspending of supplemental funds, it would seem wise to consider policies that:
 - build cities' capacities to develop planning and programming with the agencies that are the providers of categorical funds; and
 - provide incentives that reward cities that succeed in spending a high proportion of their budget (e.g., by explicitly tying second year program allocations to first year spending on locally defined targets.

Finally, based on the isolation of factors influencing city behavior uncovered in this and other MKGK studies, it appears clear that most of the prescriptive standards or criteria governing categorical program use have a negligible impact on cities. Relatively simple criteria governing roles of the chief executive and residents would be more appropriate in assuring a response to national and local objectives. A delivery system premised on an understanding of specific city environments rather than on generic national guidelines would generate far more success in helping resolve urban problems.

Chapter Two: The Planning Process

SOME CONCEPTUAL THOUGHTS

In the literature on social planning, the planning "process" is frequently discussed and analyzed according to two distinct perspectives: planning as a socio-political process and planning as a technical process. For example, planning as a socio-political process is discussed by Rein in *Social Policy*,¹ and Lindholm in "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'"² and planning from the technical viewpoint is analyzed by Kahn in *Theory and Practice of Social Planning*,³ among others. Perlman and Gurin,⁴ and Kramer and Specht⁵ suggest that these perspectives are different sides of the planning coin — both equally required for a planning process to be successful. These authors use the notions of "analytic" and "interactional" tasks to describe the technical and socio-political aspects of the planning process. Analytic tasks or techno-methodological considerations involve data collection (via surveys or from secondary sources), quantification of problems and analysis in light of these data, ranking priorities, specification of objectives, program design, and the like. The interactional tasks (or socio-political considerations) involve the development of an organizational network; this requires the structuring of a planning system within which communication and exchange of information among relevant actors takes place and decisions are made.

With regard to these two sides of the planning coin, the HUD guidelines for the Model Cities Program participants were quite clear and firm on techno-methodological approaches and rather vague and loose on the socio-political aspects of planning.

Planning Process: Technological Approaches

The HUD planning model stipulated that cities follow a pre-defined rational, orderly, step-by-step approach in developing their CDPs. Initially, this entailed a three-part planning framework:

Part I was to describe and analyze problems and their causes, to rank these problems in order of local priorities and to indicate objectives, strategies, and program approaches to HUD two-thirds of the way through the planning year. Based on these documents HUD was to provide appropriate feedback to the CDAs that would be useful for the completion of Parts II and III.

Part II was to be a statement of projected five-year objectives and cost estimates to achieve these objectives. This document was to be submitted at the end of the planning year with Part III.

Part III was to be a detailed statement of program plans for the First Action Year, the costs involved, and administrative arrangements for implementation. This document was to be a logical extension of the analysis, strategies and priorities outlined in Part I.

Toward the end of 1969 this framework was simplified by the elimination of the Part II document and changing Part I to a Mid-Term Planning Statement (limited to 75 pages) that was to be submitted mid-way in the planning year and then revised and merged with what was previously designated as the Part III document for the final submission — the CDP, or Comprehensive Development Plan.

The extent to which cities were able to satisfy the technical requirements of the planning process is discussed in detail in HUD-published MKGK studies. In general, it was found that the cities made considerable effort to follow the guidelines,

¹ Martin Rein, *Social Policy* (New York: Random House, 1970).

² Charles E. Lindholm, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" *Public Administration Review*, Spring, 1959.

³ Alfred J. Kahn, *Theory and Practice of Social Planning* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969).

⁴ Robert Perlman and Arnold Gurin, *Community Organization and Social Planning* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972).

⁵ Ralph M. Kramer and Harry Specht, *Readings in Community Organization Practice* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

but few were able to do more than approximate the process prescribed by HUD. In part, this is because the demands were strenuous, even for those cities that could command the required technical expertise. Causal analyses of problems had a tendency towards "infinite regress," and the problem analysis approach often proved to be a frustrating and unilluminating exercise to the participants in the planning process. Given the limited planning resources that were available, five-year projections plans could hardly demand the investment of time, effort, and commitment that planning for the following year's programs received; and in fact, the initial Part II submission was often the most superficial document prepared by the cities. Moreover, many cities simply did not have the staff expertise to do comprehensive planning according to HUD's approach.

Planning Process: Political Approaches

While the technical requirements of the planning process were spelled out in detail, the socio-political aspects of the process were left largely to local determination. The major prescription that HUD offered was that administrative and fiscal responsibility for the program ultimately be vested in the local chief executive. Beyond this, the guidelines left considerable latitude for the types of linkages and relationships among groups that might develop to imbue the decision-making around CDPs with an element of social choice as well as technical procedure. The first Program Guide states it as follows:

[The CDA] should be closely related to the governmental decision-making process in a way that permits the exercise of leadership by responsible elected officials in the establishment of policies . . . It should have sufficient powers, authority and structure to achieve the coordinated administration of all aspects of the program . . . It should provide a meaningful role in policy making to area residents and to the major agencies expected to contribute to the program.

While "a meaningful role in policy making to area residents" is an innocuous enough statement, the HUD administrative staff which was responsible for the Model Cities Program tended philosophically, at least initially, to favor substantive citizen participation and vigorously sought the realization of citizen influence in the decision-making process. (The Model Cities Administration was staffed largely from outside of HUD. A number of OEO personnel had transferred to the Model Cities Program anticipating that this program was where the Administration would concentrate its urban thrust.) Warren² and previous MKGK studies indicate that first-round planning grant awards were often accompanied by stipulations that the city spell out or strengthen its provisions for resident participation in Model Cities planning. Further evidence of this is found in data presented in Chapter Five concerning the application review. This data suggests that citizen influence in the planning year was among the variables most strongly associated by HUD with high capability ratings.

CITY RESPONSE PATTERNS: ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR

In examining the alternative planning approaches, this report collapses MKGK's five planning/action systems outlined earlier into three response patterns according to the degree of resident influence:³ (1) *weak citizen influence* (this would approximate a staff-dominance/staff-influence system); (2) *moderate citizen influence* (this approximates a parity system); (3) *strong citizen influence* (this approximates resident-influence/resident-dominance systems).

¹ *Improving the Quality of Urban Life* op cit., December, 1956, p. 11.

² Op. cit.

³ As used in the report, the terms system, response patterns, or patterns of influence carry similar meanings. They refer to a series or cluster of related Model City events and participants. The systems used by MKGK in their previous studies clearly denote the degree to which residents or staff were involved in the planning process. That is, in the

Overall, 56% (n=79) of the cities were characterized as weak citizen-influence systems, 26% as moderate (n=37), and 18% as strong (n=26). As indicated in Table 1, there was virtually no difference in the distribution of citizen influence in the planning year between first- and second-round funded cities ($\lambda .023$).¹ Fifty-six percent of first-round cities were classified as having weak citizen-influence systems compared to 55% of second-round cities.²

TABLE 1
ROUND FUNDED AND PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE

Citizen Influence	Round Funded	
	1st Round	2nd Round
Weak	56%	55%
Moderate	23%	29%
Strong	21%	16%
Total	100%	100%
($\lambda .023$)	(n=73)	(n=69)

CONDITIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH
RESPONSE PATTERNS

Identified Variables:
Previous MKGK Studies

Previously published MKGK studies examined a number of variables related to the pre-Model Cities environment in an effort to determine if there were identifiable environmental conditions that were more likely to produce one type of Model Cities response pattern or pattern of influence than another. Demographic factors such as city size and ethnicity, and socio-political factors such as the degree of turbulence (i.e., tension within the Model Neighborhood Area and among Model Neighborhood resident organizations and various other groups and City Hall), the form of local government, and the degree of political integration of residents (i.e., the extent to which residents had welcome access to City Hall and participated in local decision-making) were analyzed. Findings generally indicated that the strongest associations were found between alternate response patterns in the planning period and the chief executive's degree of commitment, degree of turbulence and degree of political integration in the pre-planning period.

It was not possible to obtain pre-planning period data on turbulence and political integration for all 147 cities. However, these variables were examined for the planning period and appropriate generalizations drawn. Five additional variables were selected for analysis. These were: (1) degree of chief executive support; (2) CDA Director's accountability to Model Neighborhood residents; (3) percent of CDA staff who were professionals; (4) citizen influence on hiring of resident organization staff; and (5) number of agencies that played an active role during the planning period.

staff-dominant cities, it was clear that the staff played the dominant role in defining the events associated with planning and the ultimate product. Conversely, in the resident-dominated cities, the resident group played the analogous role. In the parity cities, both the residents and the staff shared equally in decision-making power concerning the planning process; while in the staff and resident-influence cities, neither staff nor residents were in a dominant position for a sustained period of time. The determinants associated with each system were clearly identified by MKGK and included, as noted above, (1) the degree of turbulence in the environment; (2) the role of the chief executive; and (3) characteristics associated with the resident organization.

¹ Lambda .023 indicates that if we tried to predict either variable from the other, the available information would allow for predictions that are only 2% better than chance alone.

² Events reviewed in this study generally occurred prior to the Administration's effort to clearly place responsibility for the program in the Mayor's Office.

As indicated in Table 2, city response or behavior patterns during the planning period have a substantial-positive correlation with the degree of CDA Director accountability to resident organizations ($\gamma .589$), the degree of conflict in the Model Neighborhood ($\gamma .537$), and the degree of political integration of the leaders of Model Neighborhood citizen participation structures ($\gamma .404$). What this indicates is that the higher the rank for each of these three variables in each city the more likely citizen influence was strong in the planning process, and the lower the rank the more likely citizen influence was minimal. These findings strongly support analyses contained in MKGK studies.

TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIPS OF SEVEN FACTORS
WITH PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE

Factors	Correlation	Strength of Correlation
CDA Director Accountability	.589*	Substantial-Positive
MNA Conflict	.537	Substantial-Positive
Political Integration	.404	Substantial-Positive
Percent of Professional Staff	.297	Moderate-Positive
Resident Role in Staff Hiring	.283	Moderate-Positive
Number of Agencies with an Active Role in the Planning Period	-.154	Negligible-Negative
Chief Executive Support	.064	Negligible-Positive

*The numbers in the cells are a measure of association called "gamma" which we use throughout this report. Gamma tells us the degree to which a city's rank or rating on one scale is predictable from its rank or rating on another. The predictions can be made in two directions: towards perfect agreement among rankings ($\gamma +1.00$) and toward perfect disagreement ($\gamma -1.00$). Agreement indicates that a city ranking high on one scale also ranks high on the other. Disagreement indicates that a city ranking high on one scale ranks low on the other. For example, in the above table there is substantial agreement (or positive association) between a city's rank on MNA conflict and its Pattern of Influence. (Technically, the gamma here of .537 indicates that there is a 53.7% greater agreement than disagreement between a city's rank on both of these scales.) This means that the *higher* a city ranks on MNA conflict the more likely it is to have developed a strong-citizen-influence system. Or conversely, the *lower* a city ranks in terms of MNA conflict the more likely it is to have developed a weak-citizen-influence system.

The above table also indicates that there is negligible disagreement (i.e. a low gamma and a negative association) between the number of agencies with an active role in the planning period and type of citizen-influence system ($\gamma -.154$).

Finally, a low gamma (for example, the .064 correlation between chief executive support and patterns of influence) indicates that there is no discernible *linear* type of relationship between the ratings. Later on, we shall indicate that such relationships may be non-linear but nonetheless significant. For further details see James A. Davis, *Elementary Survey Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), and Leo Goodman and William Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49, 1954, pp. 732-762.

CDA Director Accountability: CDA Director accountability to resident groups was most noticed in planning systems where citizen influence was strong. Certainly, this should not be surprising. The high degree of association between CDA Director's accountability and Model City response patterns appears to relate to the orientation of CDA Directors (i.e., a Director inclined to be accountable to citizen groups is also likely to facilitate the creation of citizen organizations that wield influence) and the impact of strong resident involvement (i.e., citizen groups that are influential can exert pressure to hold CDA Directors accountable to them, even if the Directors are otherwise inclined).

Model Neighborhood Conflict: As indicated in Table 3, the substantial-positive association between citizen influence and Model Neighborhood conflict (an indicator of turbulence) means that in programs where citizen influence was weak (i.e., staff dominance-staff influence) there was a smaller likelihood of finding conflict in the Model Neighborhood during the planning year. And that as weak-citizen influence changes to strong-resident influence (resident influence-resident dominance) the likelihood of conflict increased. Assuming conflict during the planning period existed prior to the planning period, these results parallel the findings reported in the MKGK studies concerning the relationship of turbulence in the pre-planning environment and city response patterns.

**TABLE 3
MNA CONFLICT AND PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE**

	Degree of MNA Conflict		
	Low	Medium	High
Citizen Influence			
Weak	73%	57%	21%
Moderate	24%	27%	32%
Strong	3%	17%	47%
Total	100% (n=66)	101%* (n=30)	100% (n=34)

(gamma .537)

*Due to rounding.

Political Integration: A similar relationship is found between response patterns and political integration of Model Neighborhood leadership. That is, cities which were judged to have lower degrees of political integration were more likely than others to develop staff-dominant patterns of influence and cities in which there were moderate or strong degrees of political integration were more likely to develop parity and resident-dominant patterns of influence. While this describes the general order of the relationship, it is worth noting that as indicated in Table 4, a high degree of

**TABLE 4
POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE**

	Political Integration		
	Low	Medium	High
Citizen Influence			
Weak	73%	56%	21%
Moderate	12%	23%	62%
Strong	15%	21%	17%
Total	100% (n=59)	100% (n=43)	100% (n=29)

(gamma .404)

political integration is found most frequently in planning environments where citizen influence was moderate (i.e., parity-type systems). This finding was also reported in the MKGK case studies on the pre-planning period.

These relationships between conflict and political integration and city response patterns suggest that:

- Where citizen influence is weak, the CDA Director has a low degree of accountability to the Model Neighborhood resident organization. There is little conflict, and a low degree of political integration of resident leadership.
- Where citizen influence is moderate, the CDA Director is more accountable to Model Neighborhood residents. Conflict is weak to moderate, and political integration is moderate to strong.
- Where citizen influence is strong, the CDA Director is highly accountable to Model Neighborhood resident organizations. Conflict is most intense, and political integration is moderate.

Conflict and Political Integration: Combining the two factors, degree of Model Neighborhood conflict and degree of resident political integration, generates an increased ability to predict patterns of behavior or influence. The findings of the 147-city studies suggest that this would be so. Cities in which there were staff-dominant patterns of influence (Table 5.A.) were most likely to be characterized by low degrees of political integration. Sixty-two percent of cities characterized as having strong-citizen influence fell into the cells of low-moderate political integration/high conflict, and 15% fell into the neighboring cells. And finally, cities in which there were parity-type patterns of influence (Table 5.B.) were characterized by high degrees of political integration and low degrees of conflict. Twenty-seven percent of cities characterized as having moderate citizen influence fell into the cell indicating high political integration and low conflict with 33% falling into the neighboring cells.

**TABLE 5
PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE IN RELATION TO DEGREE OF MNA CONFLICT
AND DEGREE OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION**

Degree of Conflict	A. Cities With Weak Citizen Influence			B. Cities With Moderate Citizen Influence			C. Cities With Strong Citizen Influence		
	Degree of Political Integration			Degree of Political Integration			Degree of Political Integration		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Low	44%	15%	8%	9%	12%	27%	5%	5%	0%
Medium	9%	17%	0%	3%	9%	12%	10%	5%	5%
High	3%	3%	2%	9%	9%	12%	29%	33%	10%
Total	101%* (n=66)			102%* (n=34)			102%* (n=21)		

*due to rounding

As expected, given the 147-city analysis, there were only seven cities that evidenced high degrees of conflict and political integration. Clearly, political integration tends to reduce conflict. Where there was low conflict and low political integration the likelihood was for little citizen influence. Where there was high conflict and low political integration, strong citizen-influence systems were likely to emerge. Where there were lower and intermediate degrees of conflict and high political integration, parity systems were more likely to evolve. But high degrees of conflict and high degrees of political integration were unlikely to be found very frequently. In effect, conflict often occurred because of the absence of political integration. Model

Neighborhood leaders and organizations that achieved high degrees of political integration were likely to keep their constituents under control and to utilize the formal political system for mediating differences and dissatisfactions.

Professional Staff and Residents' Role in Hiring CDA Staff: The other variables examined in this analysis had moderate to negligible relationships with each city's Model Cities response pattern. Both the percent of professional staff employed by the CDA and the resident role in hiring procedures for community organization staff were associated with response patterns or patterns of influence to a moderate degree. That is, planning environments in which citizen influence was strong were more likely to have CDAs with a higher percent of professional staff (those with college degrees or more) than environments in which there was weak citizen influence. Similarly, where citizen influence was strong, residents were more likely to have played an active role in the hiring procedure for community organization staff (either through recommendations to the CDA or direct hiring of their own staff through a CDA sub-contract), than in planning environments where citizen influence tended to be weak.

Chief Executive Support: Findings concerning chief executive support and the number of agencies playing an active role in the planning period, are worth some discussion even though correlations are often negligible and weak. In the first instance, the degree of chief executive support (whether it was limited to "lip service," or "moderate" to the extent that the executive could be called upon to act on the program's behalf, or "active" in the sense that the executive frequently took the initiative to stimulate program development) did not have a simple one-to-one relationship to local response patterns. That is, executive support was as likely to be limited or active in a planning environment characterized by weak citizen influence as in one characterized by moderate or strong citizen influence. Other factors combined with chief executive role obviously were important in determining patterns of influence.

As indicated in the 21-city studies, the relationship between chief executive commitment and city response patterns was affected by the degree of conflict in the Model Neighborhood. For example:

- In cities which were characterized as having a *low degree of conflict* the correlation between executive leadership and varied response patterns of influence was substantive-positive (gamma .489).
- In cities which were characterized as having a *medium degree of conflict* the correlation between executive support and patterns of influence was negligible-positive (gamma .185).
- In cities which were characterized as having a *high degree of conflict* the correlation between executive support and patterns of influence was negligible-negative (gamma -.106).

That is, as degree of conflict increases the relationship between chief executive behavior and patterns of influence becomes negligible. Clearly, turbulence in the environment affected the executive's ability to exert his influence on the development of planning systems. Under conditions of minimum conflict most "active" executives were able to exert their will. In more turbulent environments the relationship between executive involvement and alternate Model City response patterns was more difficult to predict. No doubt, in very turbulent environments, most chief executives feared complete loss of control of the program to residents and many approached Model Cities in a gingerly fashion.

Many indicators, discussed in later sections of this report, illustrated the importance of the chief executive's commitment to the program. One example will suffice here. HUD officials responsible for the Model Cities Program were to select those programs which had the "greatest impact on local government" and those which had the "least impact on local government." They selected 57 of "the greatest" and 33 of "the least." There was a substantial-positive correlation (gamma .519) between chief executive commitment and HUD judgments relative to impact. That is, CDAs

having the "greatest" impact on local government were likely to be in cities with chief executives whose support was characterized by HUD staff as "active."

Agencies and Planning Year: The weak negative relationship between patterns of influence and the number of agencies that played an active role during the planning year (gamma -.154) indicates that in planning environments characterized by strong citizen influence there tended to be few agencies actively engaged in the planning process, while in environments where citizen influence was weak there tended to be more agencies actively engaged in the process. This finding essentially corroborates the findings of the MKGK case studies.

In order to determine the extent to which city size (availability of agencies) might have influenced this finding, relevant data was analyzed holding city size constant. Here it was found that weak negative relationships (G -.154) increased somewhat for small cities (G -.287) and substantially for large cities (G -.589), while for the medium-sized cities a weak positive relationship (G .157) emerged. Thus, though there is some variation according to city size, it is interesting to note that in the large cities, where the potential is greater to engage a large number of agencies (simply by virtue of availability), there is a substantial *inverse* relationship between response patterns and number of agencies actively involved in the planning period. This fact suggests that the CDAs with strong citizen involvement may have discouraged agency participation.

Additional Variables

This study was able to review the import and impact of several factors that were subject only to general analyses in the 21-city analyses; among them, population size, ethnicity and form of government. Among these three variables, it is clear that city size is the best indicator of the patterns of influence that emerged during the planning period. These findings are illustrated in Tables 6, 7 and 8.¹

Population Size: The positive relationship between population size and response patterns requires two qualifications. First, while size appears in a relative sense to be the "best" indicator of the three examined, in an absolute sense it is only a "fair" indicator. That is, there is a moderate-positive correlation (gamma .363) between patterns of influence and population size; i.e., the analyst would do 36.3% better than chance by predicting along the following lines: that the larger cities are more likely than others to develop programs in which citizen influence tends to be strong; smaller cities are more likely than others to develop programs in which citizen influence tends to be weak.

TABLE 6
CITY SIZE AND PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE

	Small 49,999 and under	City Size Medium 50,000 to 249,999	Large 250,000 and over
Citizen Influence			
Weak	70.3%	57.4%	41%
Moderate	24.3%	24.6%	29.5%
Strong	5.4%	18%	29.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%
	(n=37)	(n=61)	(n=44)
(gamma .363)			

¹ Readers should bear in mind that the majority of cities developed weak-citizen-influence systems (56%) and few developed strong-citizen-influence systems (18%). But the former type was most *likely* to develop in small cities, while the latter was more *likely* to develop in large cities.

Chapter Three: Product—The Comprehensive Demonstration Plan

Second, while population size is antecedent it would be faulty to infer any direct and easy causality between size and patterns of influence. More likely, the relationship obtained reflects some combination of intervening variables associated with city size¹ for which the study could not control; for example, residents' level of education, their previous experiences with urban renewal and anti-poverty programs, the capacity of professional staff and the like.

Ethnicity: Table 7 indicates that there is a low positive relationship (gamma .138) between ethnicity (i.e., percent of Black population in the Model Neighborhood) and Model City response patterns.

**TABLE 7
PERCENT BLACK POPULATION OF MNA AND PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE**

Citizen Influence	Percent Black Population in MNA		
	25% and under	26% to 60%	61% and over
Weak	72%	43%	61%
Moderate	17%	43%	22%
Strong	11%	14%	17%
Total	100%	100%	100%
	(n=36)	(n=28)	(n=41)

(gamma .138)

Form of Government: Table 8 suggests a slight relationship between the form of city government and the patterns of influence that developed in different cities. That is, cities with strong Mayors were somewhat more likely to develop staff-dominant patterns of influence than cities with professional Managers (i.e., 65% and 50% respectively). Conversely, City-Manager cities were somewhat more likely to develop parity-type patterns of influence than others (34.4% and 20.7% respectively). The fact that City-Manager cities were 40% more likely than others to develop parity-type systems would support the contention (cf. p.43) that the development of systems that exhibit a high degree of citizen influence required a high degree of professional skill.

**TABLE 8
FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE**

Citizen Influence	Form of Government	
	City Manager	Elected Mayor
Weak	50%	65%
Moderate	34.4%	20.7%
Strong	15.6%	14.3%
Total	100%	100%
	(n=32)	(n=63)

¹*Population Sizes of the 148 Model Cities:* It is of interest to note that the Model Cities program was not by any means limited to "big" cities exclusively. The population sizes of the 148 cities are as follows: 23 or 15.5% had populations of under 25,000
14 or 9.5% had populations of between 25,000 and 49,999
27 or 18.2% had populations of between 50,000 and 99,999
48 or 39.2% had populations of between 100,000 and 499,999
26 or 17.6% had populations of over 500,000

Eight of the cities in the last category had populations of one million or more, and eighteen were in the 500,000 to under one million range; 43.2% of the cities had populations of under 100,000, and 26 of the cities are in the "big" city category (over 500,000). The program thus represents most of the large cities in the country as well as a large proportion of medium-size and smaller cities. The development of one type of Federal program for such a wide spread of cities may not be the most effective approach to urban planning. This point is suggested by findings that differential program outcomes are related in part to city size.

PLANNING YEAR EXPERIENCE

The planning year culminated in the development of a Comprehensive Demonstration Plan (CDP). In addition to problem analyses, statements of priorities and other elements of the Part I document and later the Mid-Term Planning Statement, the plan was to contain specific project proposals for a comprehensive attack on the combined physical and social ills of Model Neighborhoods. These projects involved efforts focused around housing, relocation, social services, health, education, transportation, manpower training, and the like. Project descriptions in the plan were to include the following: designation of the sponsoring agency; plans for coordination with other projects; a structure for citizen participation; budget summaries; and some indication of funding sources other than Model Cities supplemental monies that would be committed to the program. In all, the CDP was a planning product, conceived in the womb of high expectations. Often, what actually emerged was another matter.

The discussion of CDPs analyzed in the MKGK earlier studies suggests that statements in the plans were generally fuzzy on problem analysis, program approaches, goals, and strategies. The project descriptions were often submitted in outline form, and sponsors were often absent. Overall, in terms of the substantive content of the plans, no consistent patterns emerged in the twenty-one cities studied. Two major findings concerning the CDPs were: (1) programs in which citizen influence was weak-to-moderate (staff dominance/parity systems) during the planning year came closer to meeting HUD's overall product requirements than did those in which citizen influence was strong (resident dominance); and (2) cities in which citizen influence was moderate (parity systems) during the planning year were more likely than others to program for categorical funds. Data resulting from this study of all Model City participants tends to substantiate these findings.

CRITERIA OF CDP "QUALITY"

Time and resources prevented this study from analyzing the substantive details of the plans submitted by each city. Instead, three rather broad criteria were used to make some relative assessments of CDP quality.

The first criterion of CDP quality was based on judgments of HUD officials in the central office who were asked to designate those CDPs they considered to be the "best" and "worst." Interviewees were not asked to rate every city but, rather, to select those cities which produced plans they considered "best" and those cities which produced plans that they considered "worst." In this manner ratings were obtained on 105 CDPs, with positive impressions outweighing negative impressions almost two to one.

The second criterion of CDP quality was the proportion of categorical funds (as a percent of the total CDP budget) that was included in the plan for the first program year (as reported in CDA questionnaire). The proportion of categorical funds anticipated in the budget is employed as an indicator of "quality" of the plan in the sense that it reflects one of HUD's major performance criteria — the mobilization and concentration of resources. One of the objectives of supplemental funding (as suggested by the label "supplemental") was to provide a form of seed money to attract and coordinate outside sources of funding, primarily categorical monies. To the extent that a CDP was able to portray use of a large proportion of outside resources, it could be inferred that at least initially the CDP comes closer to satisfying this performance criterion than one which did not do so. And in this sense of the term the former is judged of higher quality. This is not meant to infer, however, that a city with a high proportion of categorical funds in their plan was able to implement the "mobilization of resources" objective any more successfully than other cities when it came time to put programs into operation. Thus, although this criterion may be used as a measure of "quality of CDP" from the point of view of HUD's performance standards for the CDP, it is *not* a measure of ultimate "program effectiveness."¹

¹ In fact, however, this measure does appear to be a reliable predictor of successful program outcome. Table 14, Chapter Four, indicated that there is a moderate-positive relationship

The third criterion of quality of the CDP involved the number of agencies in the CDP that were designated as having a defined formal responsibility for carrying out the proposed projects contained therein (reported in CDA questionnaire). This indicator of "quality," again, reflects one of HUD's major performance criteria — coordination. The number of agencies with roles in the CDP is, in a sense, suggestive of the "degree of coordination effort" that the plan required. (Again, this is not to imply that coordination during the program year would be more successful; if anything, it would probably be more difficult because of the greater number of units involved.)¹

CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH "BEST" AND "WORST" CDPs

HUD Judgments

In terms of global judgments of "the best" and "the worst" CDPs, Table 9 indicates that *chief executive support and political integration have the strongest degrees of association with CDP quality ratings*. Conflict and basic patterns of influence of behavior patterns have weak degrees of association with CDP ratings. However, in the case of both conflict, and of patterns of influence it is important to note that the parity cities come off looking "best." A larger proportion of the parity cities were judged "best" than were the staff-dominant or resident-dominant cities (i.e., 59.5% to 45.6% and 23% respectively). Similarly, the proportion of "best" increases with medium conflict and drops with high conflict.

**TABLE 9
RELATIONSHIPS OF SEVEN FACTORS WITH QUALITY OF CDP'S AS JUDGED BY HUD OFFICIALS**

Factor	Correlation*	Strength of Correlation
City Size	.081	Negligible-Positive
Patterns of Influence	-.117	Negligible-Negative
Conflict	.143	Negligible-Positive
Political Integration	.498	Substantial-Positive
Percent Professional Staff in CDA	.036	Negligible-Positive
Number of Agencies With An Active Role in Planning Period	-.065	Negligible-Negative
Chief Executive Support	.702	Strong-Positive

*For explanation of this measure of association, see footnote on pg. 15.

The other variables have negligible relationships to CDP ratings. Specifically what this suggests is that environments characterized by a high degree of chief executive support and political integration were most likely to be judged by HUD to have the "best" CDPs. As noted in the previous chapter, political integration had a moderate degree of association with patterns of influence and was most prominent in parity-type systems.

It appears that chief executive support did have a significant effect on the CDP. The *effects* of the chief executive's behavior can be seen quite directly in such areas as quality of the CDP, proportion of CDP budget in categorical funds, and base obligation expenditures.

between percent of CDP budget categorical and 6 months base-obligation expenditures (gamma .210) and a substantial-positive relationship between the percent of CDP budget categorical and 12 months base-obligation expenditures (gamma .440).

¹ In fact, we find that this measure turns out to be a *negative* predictor of program outcome as measured by 12 months base-obligation expenditures (gamma -.262). (See Table 14, p. 29.)

City Response Patterns and "Best" and "Worst" CDPs

The low degree of negative association between CDP Quality and Patterns of Influence appears somewhat misleading when the actual distribution is examined in Table 10. The data in Table 10 suggest that there is more of an association between patterns of influence and CDP ratings than is reflected by the gamma, but the relationship is not linear.¹ In this case the proportion of CDPs rated "best" increases by almost 20% as patterns of influence move from weak to moderate citizen influence and then decreases sharply (by 45%) as they move from moderate to strong citizen influence. That is, *the percent of "best" CDPs peaks in the middle range of citizen influence and tapers off at either end.*

**TABLE 10
PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE AND CDP RATINGS**

	Citizen Influence		
	Weak	Moderate	Strong
"Best" CDPs	62%	81.5%	35%
"Worst" CDPs	38%	18.5%	65%
Total	100%	100%	100%
	(n=58)	(n=27)	(n=17)

(gamma -.117)

Percent Categorical Funding in CDP Budget

In terms of the percent of categorical funds in the budget, Table 11 indicates that the highest degree of association is to be found with chief executive support and city size, while the lowest degree of association is found with a number of agencies with an active role in the planning period and patterns of influence.

**TABLE 11
RELATIONSHIPS OF EIGHT FACTORS WITH PERCENT OF CATEGORICAL FUNDS IN THE CDP BUDGET**

Factor	Correlation	Strength of Correlation
City Size	-.405*	Substantial-Negative
Patterns of Influence	.126	Negligible-Positive
Percent of Professional Staff in the CDA	.215	Moderate-Positive
Number of Agencies with an Active Role in the Planning Period	.106	Negligible-Positive
MNA Conflict	-.235	Moderate-Negative
Political Integration	.186	Negligible-Positive
Chief Executive Support	.534	Substantial-Positive

*For explanation of this measure of association see footnote on pg. 15.

Percent Categorical Funding and Chief Executive Support: The relationship between chief executive support and percent of categorical funds in the

¹The reason for this is that gamma coefficients reflect the general tendency towards linear types of relationships among variables. A small gamma value may indicate that there is no association among the variables, or it might indicate that the *form* of the relationship tends to be curvilinear. William Hays, *Statistics for Psychologists* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 646-656.

CDP budget suggests that in cities where chief executive support was strongest the Model Cities Program was able to obtain a higher proportion of categorical funding than other cities. Clearly, chief executives were able to secure more agency involvement. It seems that several factors were associated together. For example, cities resembling parity systems, with strong executive commitment, low-to-medium degrees of conflict, high degrees of political integration, and generally medium-size population produce, more than other cities, CDPs that were judged to be of "high" quality, with high percentages of categorical funds budgeted.

Percent Categorical Funding and Population Size: There are a number of ways to interpret the substantial-negative correlation between city size and percent of categorical funds in the CDP budget. What the finding means is that larger cities tended to have a smaller percent of their budgets as categorical and smaller cities tended to have a larger percent of their budgets as categorical (i.e., an inverse relationship). Whether or not this is because smaller cities were really much better at getting categorical monies is not exactly clear. In one sense it might be argued that smaller cities had smaller budgets and therefore needed considerably less categorical money to produce a high percent of categorical funds than larger cities. On the other hand, larger cities, presumably, have more opportunities and greater availability of categorical sources and, therefore, for a proportionately equal effort should be able to come up with more funds than the smaller cities. Thus, the funding patterns can only tentatively be used to infer anything about the skill and motivation of the cities involved. However, skill and motivation notwithstanding, it does suggest quite clearly that in terms of the objective of mustering categorical funds there was a "bigger bang for the buck" in smaller cities.

Percent Categorical Funding and Professional Staff: The moderate-positive correlation of Percent of Categorical Funds in the CDP Budget with the Percent of Professional Staff in the CDA (gamma .215) indicates that in programs with a high percent of professionals there tended to be a somewhat greater percent of categorical funds in the CDP budget than in programs where the percent of professionals was lower.

Percent Categorical Funding and Patterns of Influence: There was a negligible-positive correlation between patterns of influence and percent of categorical funds in the CDP (gamma .126). However, as suggested in the previous section, this may reflect a relationship that is curvilinear rather than simply no relationship. When the distributions in Table 12 are examined, it appears that, as in the previous case, there is an increase as they move from weak- to moderate-citizen influence and then a

**TABLE 12
PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE AND PERCENT CATEGORICAL FUNDS**

Percent Categorical Funds in CDP Budget	Citizen Influence		
	Weak	Moderate	Strong
0-12%	33%	21%	60%
13-32%	42%	21%	7%
33%+	24%	57%	33%
Total	99%*	99%*	100%
	(n=66)	(n=28)	(n=15)

(gamma .126)

*Due to rounding.

Chapter Four: Performance—Implementation of the First Year Program

sharp decrease from moderate- to strong-citizen influence. That is, planning environments characterized by a moderate degree of citizen influence (parity-type systems) fell into the range of the highest percent of categorical funds in the budget proportionately almost twice as often as environments characterized by either weak or strong degrees of citizen influence.

Percent Categorical Funding and Agencies: The negligible degree of association (gamma .106) between the Number of Agencies with an active role in the planning period and the Percent of Categorical Funds in the CDP Budget is interesting because, on first thought, such a finding might not be anticipated. What this finding suggests is that agencies were evidently much more interested in obtaining supplemental funds from the CDA than in committing categorical funds to it. Therefore, whether a large or small number of agencies was involved in the planning activities, it still required special efforts by the CDA to get agencies to commit any of their money.

Number of Agencies in CDP

As indicated in Table 13, the Number of Agencies Active in the Planning Period had the highest degree of association with the Number of Agencies Designated for an Active Role in the CDP (i.e., designated as responsible for project implementation). This result is one, of course, that would be anticipated. There appears to be very little association, however, between the number of agencies designated for an active role in the CDP and the other variables that were examined. However, negligible relationships are sometimes meaningful. For example, the weak-negative relationship between chief executive support and the number of agencies designated for an active role in the CDP provides an interesting contrast to the substantial-positive relationship between executive support and the percent of categorical funds in the CDP budget. This finding lends tentative support to the earlier suggestion that regardless of whether a large or a small number of agencies were involved in the planning activities, special efforts were required by the CDA to get agencies to commit their money. These special efforts involved chief executive support which, it appears, cannot be measured quantitatively in terms of the numbers of agencies that were listed in the CDP, but rather can be inferred from the amount of financial backing these agencies were willing to commit. Indeed, the relationship between the number of agencies designated for an active role in the CDP and the percent of categorical funds in the budget was almost negligible (gamma .107).

TABLE 13
RELATIONSHIPS OF SEVEN FACTORS WITH THE
NUMBER OF AGENCIES WITH ACTIVE ROLE IN THE CDP

Factor	Correlation	Strength of Correlation
City Size	-.169*	Negligible-Negative
Patterns of Influence	-.116	Negligible-Negative
Percent Professional Staff in CDA	-.117	Negligible-Negative
Agencies with an Active Role in the Planning Period	.712	Strong-Positive
MNA Conflict	-.091	Negligible-Negative
Political Integration	.053	Negligible-Positive
Chief Executive Support	-.196	Negligible-Negative

*For explanation of this measure of association, see footnote on pg. 15.

MEANS AND ENDS

The planning process and its product are each means and ends. They are ends in the sense that a certain value may be placed on a "good" planning process regardless of what is produced. The "good" process viewed at end is one that is democratic and receives substantive input from all of the relevant parties. In this kind of process, decision-making combines technical expertise and social choice so that the technicians explicate alternative lines of action and their potential consequences and the community or its representatives decide which course to take based on the available knowledge and value preferences. It is, of course, more complex than this, but the general picture is that of the democratic process applied to decision-making concerning plans for the physical/social rejuvenation of the community. Similarly, the product (i.e., the plan) may be viewed as an end in itself in the sense that a certain value is placed on a "high quality" plan regardless of how it is produced or implemented. A "high quality" plan is one that is rational, comprehensive and, in the specific context of the Model Cities Program, proposes a course of action that involves mobilization and concentration of resources, coordination of efforts, citizen participation, evaluation, and so forth.

Both the process and produce were conceived as means in the Model Cities Program. That is, a "good" planning process was supposed to produce a high quality plan and at the same time to lay the political groundwork for successful implementation. A "high quality" plan was supposed to contain the technical guidelines for successful program implementation.

In the previous chapters the characteristics of the environments in which different kinds of planning processes evolved were examined and the extent to which these characteristics were associated with the production of high quality plans described. In this chapter the study comes to the crux of the matter — program implementation. The questions addressed here are: To what extent are certain characteristics of the planning environment associated with successful program implementation? To what extent are certain characteristics of the planning products, the CDPs, associated with successful program implementation?

To judge the success of program implementation is no easy matter with a program as varied and complex as Model Cities. The criterion of success selected for this analysis is simple and straightforward — the percent of Model City funds spent six and twelve months into the First Action Year. This definition of "success" does not tap any of the qualitative and subtle nuances of program operation which might be measured along dozens of dimensions. Several reasons compel such simplicity. First, it takes some skill to organize "paper" projects and get them running (i.e., to spend money); second, it is almost impossible, on a comparative basis, to measure the quality of a program with 10% of projects in operation against the quality of a program with 90% of its projects going; and third, when HUD officials were asked to designate first year programs they considered of the "highest quality" and the "lowest quality," there was a substantial positive correlation between their qualitative judgments and the percent of funds spent for six months (gamma .552) and for twelve months (gamma .459).

FACTORS INFLUENCING PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS

The findings in Table 14 indicate that there is a substantial correlation between program implementation and two factors: population size and chief executive support. While patterns of influence do not have a direct relationship to implementation, the cities with moderate degrees of citizen influence (i.e., parity-type systems) appear to be best at program implementation, supporting findings based on the 21-city studies.

Population Size

There is a substantial-negative correlation between city size and program implementation (gamma $-.471$ and $-.534$). That is, *the larger the city the more difficulty it had in spending money*. However, there is one qualification to this relationship regarding different size cities and spending: i.e., *middle size cities were the best spenders of all*. This is clearly illustrated in Table 15, which describes the spending

patterns of the 65 cities that had reached 12 months of expenditures. Forty-six percent of medium-size cities were in the high-spending category which is slightly more than small cities, and 42% of medium-size cities are in the medium-spending category which is also slightly more than small cities. The finding here suggests that size and spending ability do not have a direct linear relationship. While large cities have spending difficulty, "small" is not necessarily "best." Middle-size cities can probably do as well or better than small cities in this regard because they have greater technical capability available to them than small cities and fewer of the problems imposed by large size.

TABLE 14
RELATIONSHIPS OF SEVEN FACTORS WITH PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Environmental Factors	% of Supplemental Funds Spent in 6 months Correlation*	Strength of Correlation	% of Supplemental Funds Spent in 12 months Correlation	Strength of Correlation
Population Size	-.471	Substantial-Negative	-.534	Substantial-Negative
Patterns of Influence	-.200	Moderate-Negative	-.064	Negligible-Negative
Political Integration	.095	Negligible-Positive	.145	Negligible-Positive
Chief Executive Support	.096	Negligible-Positive	.455	Substantial-Positive
Quality of CDP Factors				
CDP Ratings	.046	Negligible-Positive	.031	Negligible-Positive
Percent Categorical Funds In the CDP Budget	.210	Moderate-Positive	.440	Substantial-Positive
Number of Agencies Designated in CDP	.041	Negligible-Positive	-.262	Moderate-Negative

*For explanation of this measure of association, see footnote on pg. 15.

Chief Executive Support

Of all the seven factors considered in relation to spending patterns, the support of the chief executive shows the greatest difference between measurements taken after six months of expenditures (gamma .096) and after twelve months of expenditures (gamma .455). The explanation of this impressive shift in the strength of this relationship has more to do with HUD's spending patterns than anything else. That is, in the first months that cities were implementing their first year programs, HUD officials observed that most of the cities had considerably high rates of underspending of the supplemental funds allocated to them. Federal officials, concerned about finding themselves with enormous surpluses of funds at the end of the fiscal year, began to pressure cities to implement programs more rapidly. And with this pressure it is interesting to note that after the next six months, expenditure patterns came to be substantially and positively associated with the strength of the chief executive's commitment. This is an impressive demonstration of the crucial nature of the chief executive's role in implementation of programs.

City Response Patterns

Generally, there appears to be a moderate- to negligible-negative correlation between patterns of influence and program implementation (gamma $-.200$ and $-.064$). That is, to the extent that there is a relationship, *the greater the degree of citizen influence, the lower the proportion of funds spent*. This is not an unexpected finding since citizen participation does increase both the complexity of, and the amount of time needed for, the implementation of programs. However, while the relationship between spending and patterns of influence is negative the relationship is,

TABLE 15
POPULATION SIZE AND SPENDING PATTERNS (AT 12 MONTHS)

	Population Size		
	Small 49,999 and under	Medium 50,000 to 249,999	Large 250,000 and over
Spending Patterns			
Low	19%	13%	64%
Medium	38%	42%	24%
High	44%	46%	12%
Total	101%*	101%*	101%
	(n=16)	(n=24)	(n=25)
(gamma -.534)			

*Due to rounding.

once again, curvilinear. That is, *parity-type cities tend to be the best spenders*. This relationship is illustrated in Table 16. Parity-type cities have the highest proportion (43%) of high spenders while resident-dominant types of cities have the highest proportion (44%) of low spenders. Here again, the relationship between patterns of influence and patterns of spending may be somewhat spurious. The important intervening variable is very likely the technical/professional skill involved. That is, a high degree of professional skill is required both to manage citizen influence and to implement programs.

TABLE 16
PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE AND SPENDING PATTERNS
(AT 12 MONTHS)

	Citizen Influence		
	Weak	Moderate	Strong
Spending Patterns			
Low	30%	29%	44%
Medium	38%	29%	33%
High	33%	43%	22%
Totals	101%*	101%*	99%*
	(n=40)	(n=14)	(n=9)
(gamma -.064)			

*Due to rounding.

Quality of CDP

Percent of Categorical Funding in CDP: There is only one quality-of-CDP factor, percent categorical funds in the CDP budget, that appears to have a substantial association with program implementation. All of the others are moderate or negligible. The substantial-positive association between percent categorical funds in the CDP budget and program implementation only appears after twelve months of program implementation (gamma .440). This is particularly interesting because it supports the finding reported earlier regarding the substantial-positive relationship between percent categorical funds in the CDP budget and chief executive support (gamma .534, Table 11, p.24). Clearly, the relationship between percent of categorical funds in the CDP budget and program implementation is probably a result of the chief executive's behavior. When the chief executive begins to take steps to make the program "move"

(i.e., to spend the money) then a large proportion of cities with the high percentage of categorical funds in the CDP budget emerge as high spenders because *strong chief executive commitment is associated with both factors — with high percentages of categorical funds in the CDP budget and with high levels of spending*. When the chief executive is actively involved with the program, the CDA's capacity to deal with agencies, particularly at the Federal level, is considerably enhanced.

Number of Agencies in CDP: While the degree of association between the number of agencies with designated roles in the CDP and level of spending is negligible at six months (gamma .041) and moderate-negative at twelve months (gamma -.262) it is interesting to speculate on the fact that the direction of the change in degree of association over time is negative. That is, the larger the number of agencies involved in program implementation, the more difficulty CDAs experience in spending money.¹ The plausibility of this relationship may be further examined when there is additional data describing the spending patterns of a larger number of the cities and covering periods longer than six and twelve months. (Present data tends to be somewhat selective in that it reflects the experiences of the cities who completed their planning more quickly than others and, thus, began their programs first.)

The tentative nature of the explanation of the relationship between number of agencies with a designated role in the CDP and program implementation should be underscored. There are several questions related to this finding which remain unexplained. For example, if this relationship holds, it should be expected that the worst spenders will be the cities with largest number of agencies with designated roles in the CDP. Large cities are the worst spenders (gamma -.471 and -.534) and the large cities have the *smallest* number of agencies with designated roles in the CDP (gamma -.169, Table 9, p.23). The various strengths of these correlations suggest that the most important of the relationships is between size and spending, and that the relationship of each of these two variables to number of agencies with designated roles in the CDP is of lesser importance. However, the more refined analysis that is required to explain the relationships of several variables with each other will have to be dealt with in a subsequent report.

¹ However, the number of agencies involved in *funding* of programs is, as we have noted, quite a different story. High percentages of categorical funds in the CDP budget is associated with *success* in program implementation, while number of agencies involved in program implementation is not.

**Chapter Five:
Predictions—Evaluation of
the Planning Grant Project**

HUD EFFORTS AT PREDICTION

This study has demonstrated that many of the planning system variables described in the MKGK studies (e.g., chief executive commitment, turbulence, political integration) as well as others (e.g., population size) can be useful in predicting the process and performance outcomes of programs of this kind. However, this study was done *after-the-fact*. A more courageous attempt to predict program outcomes occurred at the outset of the Model Cities Program. That is, in the Planning Grant Review Project the Federal staff of the Model Cities Program made a monumental effort to predict the outcomes of the program *before* any planning grants were made, *before* they had the benefit of knowledge about how the program would operate in reality. It is indeed worthwhile for those who are organizing programs of the magnitude of Model Cities to attempt to predict the possibilities for success and, therefore, worthwhile for us to evaluate their attempt.

Apart from assessing the ability of the Federal staff to predict outcomes, the following pages also compare the value of HUD's initial predictions with what appear to be the predictive value of the variables used in the 21-city studies.

Planning Grant Review Project

The first major task in launching the Model Cities Program was to select the cities which were to receive the planning grants. Applications for these grants were accepted from all cities interested enough to apply. By May 1, 1967, the deadline for submission of applications, 193 cities had applied. Six months later, on November 16, 1967, the first 63 cities to receive grants were announced and twelve more were named a few weeks later. In all, 75 cities were selected out of the original 193 applicants.

The procedure for choosing among applicant cities was called the Planning Grant Review Project. Applications were reviewed initially by each of the agencies expected to be engaged in funding demonstration projects — HUD, Justice, Commerce, HEW, OEO, Labor, and Transportation. Following this review, in which each agency made comments or rated the applications, there was a final review by a board of representatives of all these agencies. This review produced recommendations on each city in the form of capability ratings. Using these ratings, HUD made the final selection of cities to be funded, subject to White House approval.

In applying for first-round planning grants the cities followed a 51-page Program Guide prepared by HUD.¹ The Guide required that applications include an analysis of the social, economic and physical problems of the proposed Model Neighborhood Area (MNA); a statement of proposed program goals, and a general description of program approaches and administrative machinery that would be used to run the program. A revised Guide emphasized that problem analysis should receive greater attention in the submission than program proposals. Both editions of the Program Guide stressed comprehensiveness of planning and indicated that some mechanism for resident involvement be incorporated in the planning period. One hundred fifty-nine cities applied for the second round of funding. The application and selection processes (including a Planning Grant Review) were similar for the second-round applicants but considerably simplified by the knowledge acquired from experience with the first-round applicants. The second round review process took place largely at the regional level. Regional review teams, composed of officials from Federal agencies participating in the program, submitted reports on each application to the Washington Interagency Committee, which tended to rely more on the regional report than on the application itself.²

The Planning Grant Review Project was a costly and time-consuming operation. It required that high level officials of various Federal agencies read

¹ *Improving the Quality of Urban Life, op. cit.*

² For a more detailed discussion of this process see, Judson Lehman James, "Federalism and the Model Cities Experiment," Speech prepared for delivery at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 8-12, 1970. (Mimeographed)

numerous applications, comment on them in writing, discuss them in committee meetings, and finally that HUD make some decisions based upon the information, opinions, and data gathered through this process. Some agencies, such as HEW, developed relatively systematic rating scales upon which to judge applications, to the extent that they were able to give cities numerical scores. The objective of this project was to gather and sort the knowledge, experience, and expert judgment of different agencies in a concerted effort to "pick the winners" — those cities that appeared most likely to be able to carry out the planning process envisioned by HUD and to implement plans after they were produced.

Of course, the final selection of cities was not a purely technical matter based on expert judgments of capability. Political considerations also played a role in this process. At the very least, a wide geographical spread among the chosen cities was politically desirable. And there is reason to believe that in some minor cases more stringent political constraints were operating.

The Planning Grant Review Project (PGRP) was based on the assumption that, within certain political constraints, suggested above, expert opinion could pick the winners better than random choice, first come first served, or some other system of selection. At the very least, it should be better than random choice to compensate for the time and money spent on the project.

In this study, data has been collected and analyzed in an effort to examine the degree to which this assumption may prove a useful basis for future policies of selection among applicants for programs like Model Cities or for the development of criteria governing the administration of community development programs. Specifically, four ratings that were given to each city in the first Planning Grant Review Project were compared with ratings given to cities based on this study.

Before examining the results, a major caveat is in order. That is, interpretation of the findings is limited in a significant way because this comparative analysis deals only with those cities that were finally selected to participate; i.e., no evidence about how poorly or how well the rejected cities might have fared in terms of the predictive variables. More than half of the cities that applied for first-round funding were rejected, presumably in most cases because they received lower ratings in the PGRP than those cities that were selected. Thus, what this analysis focuses upon is the PGRP's ability to predict the relative potential among the seemingly best of the applicants (i.e., those that were not rejected). In this sense it may be that data reveals how well the PGRP could rank those cities within the "winners circle," assuming a degree of accuracy in the initial rejections. If this is the case, then even a moderate degree of success is quite impressive.

Relevance of Federal Actions

Table 17 contains a summary of the relationships between four ratings that each city received in the PGRP and a series of variables that rate and describe the planning process, product and performance for each city based on this study. The four PGRP ratings are: (1) an overall capability rating of the city's potential for planning and implementation according to HUD guidelines; (2) the numerical rating that HEW gave each city according to the formula they had developed for analyzing applications; (3) a rating of how well the city was expected to implement citizen participation in the planning process; and (4) a rating of the technical quality of the city's application for first-round funding.¹

The PGRP ratings are compared with the following sets of variables: the planning environment ratings of: (a) City Size, and (b) Patterns of Influence; the product ratings of: (c) CDP Quality, and (d) Percent of the CDP Budget Composed of Categorical Funds; and performance ratings of: (e) Expenditures at six months, and (f) Expenditures at twelve months.

In general the findings, as indicated in Table 17, suggest that the PGRP ratings were most closely associated in a positive direction with select elements of the

¹ Ratings are discussed in greater detail in section on methodology — Appendix A.

planning environment. That is, cities with high PGRP ratings tended to be larger and to have stronger citizen participation in the planning period than cities with low PGRP ratings. There is a substantial-positive correlation between a city's rank in terms of its potential for citizen participation and the degree of citizen participation that actually developed during the planning period (gamma .454).

TABLE 17
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PLANNING GRANT REVIEW PROJECT RATINGS AND RATINGS OF PROCESS, PRODUCT, PERFORMANCE VARIABLES*

	PGRP Ratings			
	1. Overall Capability	2. HEW Functional	3. Citizen Participation	4. Technical Quality
Planning Environment:				
a) Population Size	.521*	.320	.101	.313
b) Patterns of Influence	.377	.290	.454	.154
Product:				
c) CDP Rating	-.091	-.211	-.305	-.178
d) % CDP Budget Composed of Categorical Funds	-.453	-.332	-.121	-.222
Performance:				
e) Expenditures at 6 mos.	-.551	.125	-.242	-.250
f) Expenditures at 12 mos.	-.321	.173	.002	.036

*For explanation of this measure of association see footnote on pg. 15.

In light of the substantial-positive correlations between planning environment variables, it is interesting to note that the correlations between PGRP ratings and product and performance variables range all the way from negligible-positive and negative to substantial-negative. For example, it would appear from the correlations between PGRP ratings and Percent of CDP Budget Composed of Categorical Funds that *high PGRP ratings can be used to predict poor performance in the acquisition of categorical funds.*

Thus, the sharpest distinction that emerges in these findings is that PGRP ratings appear to be fairly good predictors of certain features of the planning environment, but are either weak or inversely related to product and performance factors. It may be that the PGRP raters were not all that clear about what they were attempting to predict.¹ Perhaps the Federal officials making the ratings were responding to HUD's concerns in a *selective* manner. While HUD had several objectives for the Model Cities Program (e.g., coordination, increasing technical planning capacity

¹The discussion and analysis of the PGRP ratings suggests that certain of the ratings are strongly associated with specific outcome variables, so that, for instance, the single best indicator for predicting Patterns of Influence is, in fact, the Citizen Participation rating. From a more theoretical viewpoint it is useful to consider the extent to which the individual ratings are associated with one another. The data in Table i indicate that the single rating most strongly associated with the other three ratings is the technical quality rating which, we will suggest later on, is probably related to city size and access to professional planning expertise. The high correlations among the ratings suggest that there was a reasonable amount of internal consistency to the PGRP rating effort, but that these ratings were not equivalent measures.

in the cities, increasing citizen participation) the raters appeared to be motivated by concern with social problems in the *big* cities and strong commitment to citizen participation. Also, it is possible that the high degree of association between PGRP ratings and city size reflect the relatively greater technical capacity of larger cities to produce more impressive applications than smaller cities.

Certainly, the predictive power of the PGRP-type of selection process might have been increased if greater clarity were introduced regarding the goals and objectives which raters were attempting to maximize. This is to suggest that if the knowledge and experience of the Federal raters had been tapped by somewhat more systematic and methodologically controlled processes, the uses of the PGRP would have been more effective. Unfortunately, the pressures of time usually demand the sacrifice of such methodological and systematic procedures.

Capacity and Population Size

Population size was strongly correlated with the initial HUD rating of overall capability (gamma .521). This fact, as suggested above, may reflect both HUD's early "biases" in favor of large cities and the "possibility" that larger cities may have more professional skill in the preparation of plans and applications (i.e., "grantsmanship") than other cities. City experiences reveal only a modest advantage in favor of larger cities, however, in terms of select indices measuring staff competence.

Professional Background of CDA Director and Population Size: The professional backgrounds of the directors of the CDAs indicates that there is only weak-positive association (gamma .170) between population size of city and the degree to which the CDA Directors had background experience as planners and urban

TABLE 18
SIZE OF CITY AND PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND OF CDA DIRECTOR

	Size of City		
	Small 49,999 and under	Medium 50,000 to 249,999	Large 250,000 and over
Position of CDA Director Prior To Appointment			
Planner/Urban Specialist	45%	47%	57%
Professional Functions Related To Planning	36%	41%	36%
Non-related Functions	19%	12%	7%
Total	100% (n = 31)	100% (n = 51)	100% (n = 28)
(gamma .170)			

Table i. Correlations of PGRP Ratings With One Another

	1 Capability	2 Technical Quality	3 Citizen Participation	4 HEW Functional
1. Capability	xx	xx	xx	xx
2. Technical Quality	.660	xx	xx	xx
3. Citizen Part.	.530	.672	xx	xx
4. HEW Functional	.440	.666	.397	xx

technologists. That is, CDAs in larger cities are more likely to have directors with professional backgrounds in planning.¹ In Table 18 the CDA Directors are categorized by city size and professional position prior to being CDA Director.² It can be seen in Table 18 that the proportion of CDA Directors who were planner/urban specialists or in professional positions related to planning increases directly with city size. Ninety-three percent of the CDAs in large cities had planners with backgrounds in planning or related areas compared to 88% in medium-size cities and 81% in small cities.

Use of Professional Consultants and Population Size: There appears to be little variation in the use of private consulting firms in relation to city size. The data show that approximately two-thirds of the cities did make some use of private consulting firms in preparing CDPs. The proportions of cities in different size categories which reported use of consulting firms in preparation of the CDP are shown in Table 19. There appears to be little difference between size categories. The proportions range from 59% to 68% with middle-size cities making the greatest use of consulting firms. However, this indicator of use of professional resources is not as conclusive as the preceding one which reports the CDA Director's previous positions. That is, the report of use of a private consulting firm gives us no indication of either the quantity or quality of the consultation, and present data cannot enlighten further on this. The finding merely indicates that there was quite extensive use of private consultants in *all* cities. The data does not suggest that there were significant differences among cities of different types regarding use of professional consultation.

TABLE 19.
SIZE OF CITY AND USE OF PRIVATE CONSULTING FIRMS

Size of City	Proportion of Cities Using Consulting Firms
Small (49,999 and under)	59% (n=32)
Medium (50,000 to 249,999)	68% (n=50)
Large (250,000 and over)	62% (n=29)

Proportions of Professionals on CDA Staffs and Population Size: Data indicates a weak negative relationship (gamma -0.195) between city size and the proportion of professionals on the staffs of the CDAs during the planning period. As shown in Table 20, smaller cities were somewhat more likely to have had higher proportions of professionals on their staffs than large cities. However, because size of staff also varies with size of city, CDAs in larger cities had a far greater *number* of professionals available even though the professionals may have constituted a smaller proportion of CDA staffs.

In sum, only tentative conclusions can be drawn concerning the relationship between city size and its professional capacity. On the quantitative measures (use of consulting firms and proportion of professionals) no inferences can be drawn about the difference in professional capacity between large and small cities. However, on the only qualitative measure (professional experience of CDA Directors), the larger cities apparently obtain more experienced planner- and urban technician-types as CDA Directors than smaller cities. And in this respect, the greater professional capacity of larger cities may be reflected in their applications and general ability at "grantsmanship."

¹This discussion is based on the professional background of only the first person to occupy the position of CDA Director. However, the relationships are similar for the second Directors. (Our data include 66 CDAs that had a second Director during the period studied.)

²The Director's prior position was rated as: (1) planner/urban specialist (e.g., Director of an urban renewal agency); (2) professional functions related to planning (e.g., social work); (3) non-related functions (e.g., businessman).

TABLE 20
SIZE OF CITY AND PROPORTIONS OF PROFESSIONALS
ON CDA STAFF IN PLANNING PERIOD

Proportions Of Professionals On CDA Staff**	Small	Size of City Medium	Large
	49,999 and under	50,000 to 249,999	250,000 and over
13%-48%	38%	33%	46%
50%-65%	31%	42%	39%
67%-89%	31%	24%	15%
Total	100%	99%*	100%
	(n=26)	(n=45)	(n=26)

(gamma -0.145)

*Due to rounding.

**Staff members with four years or more of college education were classified as "professional."

Appendices

APPENDIX A:
METHODOLOGY

Data for the study were collected from the following sources:

- (a) Interviews were conducted with HUD personnel in Washington, D.C. ("Desk men") who were responsible for managing and maintaining relationships with cities and regional staff (the interview schedule is included in Appendix B; each of these staff members was responsible for dealing with anywhere from 12 to 30 cities within a region and thus they were able to make comparisons among the cities with which they had contact;
- (b) Planning Grant Review Project data on the 148 cities was collected at HUD in Washington, D.C.;
- (c) Budget expenditures (for supplemental funds) were provided by the HUD accounting office;
- (d) Quarterly reports on cities' progress in planning and "briefing memos" which were written for each city at the end of the planning period by a regional HUD representative ("leadman") were collected in Washington, D.C.;
- (e) A questionnaire (included in Appendix C) was sent to the 148 CDA Directors and was completed by 112 directors;
- (f) Other sources of data included the Directory of International City Management Association and census data for population size.

Planning grant review data, quarterly reports and briefing memos were subjected to content analysis by three coders (each reading all of the data) and cities were rated by each coder on the various items. Ratings on items were accepted only if at least two of the three coders agreed; otherwise the rating was discarded and no score given that item for that city.

All data was first punched on IBM cards and then transferred to a tape in order to use the Berkeley Transposed File Statistical System (a computer program).

The majority of items used in the analysis are defined in the interview schedule and questionnaire in Appendix B and C. The following is a description of how a number of the individual variables were derived:

1. *Form of Local Government* (Table 8). This was obtained from the CDA questionnaire. The categories employed are: City Manager and elected Mayor.
2. *Percent of Black Population of MNA* (Table 7). This was obtained from the questionnaire survey.
3. *City Size* (Table 6). Obtained from the above survey and augmented by census data for those cities not responding.
4. *Resident Role in Staff Hiring* (Table 2). This was a survey question which asked CDAs to indicate which of the following arrangements were employed in hiring resident organization staff: (a) CDA hires and assigns staff to resident organization; (b) CDA hires and assigns staff based upon recommendations of resident organization; (c) CDA contracts with another organization to hire and assign staff for resident organization; (d) CDA contracts with residents to hire their own staff. The third category (contracts with another organization) was eliminated from the analysis because only three of the programs that responded to the questionnaire indicated use of this arrangement.
5. *Number of Agencies That Played an Active Role During the Planning Period* (Table 2). This was calculated from a survey question asking CDAs to list the number of staff at various educational levels. The designation "professional" is applied to those with a college degree or more.

Other variables like patterns of influence, chief executive support, Model Neighborhood conflict, Political Integration, and CDA Director Accountability involve qualitative judgments that were quantified along an ordinal scale. These judgments were obtained from two sources: (a) the briefing memos on each city's progress

written at the end of the planning period, and (b) the structured interviews with eleven HUD officials in Washington, most of whom were "deskmen." The interviewees were asked to make specific judgments on a number of variables concerning the cities under their jurisdictions. Thus, it is important to bear in mind that most of the qualitative judgments used in the analysis represent a "Federal perspective" on what was happening in the Model Cities Program. In many respects this probably allows for as clear a view of the Model Cities Program nationwide as could be hoped for. These people were close enough to a number of programs for a period of time to be able to make informed comparative judgments and, yet, removed enough from these programs (as compared, for example, to local CDA staff or citizen participants) to allow these judgments to be made with a reasonable degree of objectivity.

- (a) *Patterns of Influence* — HUD officials were asked to rate each of the programs under their jurisdiction along a five-point continuum from weakest to strongest citizen influence on decision-making as it appeared during the last quarter of the planning year. A second set of judgments concerning citizen influence was obtained through a content analysis of the briefing memos on each program, prepared by regional HUD staff. Here, each program was ranked along a three-point continuum (weak, moderate, strong-citizen influence) by three raters; for the cases in which at least two out of three raters were in agreement their judgments were combined into a single ranking for the city. The two sets of judgments (deskmen interviews and analysis of briefing memos) were correlated and demonstrated a high degree of association (gamma .667). The interview ratings were then collapsed into a three point continuum (1, 2 = weak, 3 = moderate, and 4, 5 = strong) and again run against the ratings of the content analysis of briefing memos. This time the degree of association between the two sets of judgments was very strong (gamma .769). We selected the collapsed interview ratings as our indicators of patterns of influence.
- (b) *Chief Executive Support* — A procedure similar to that described above was used to obtain a measure of chief executive support. When the interview judgments on this variable were correlated with the judgments from the content analysis a moderate degree of association emerged (gamma .470). The two sets of judgments were combined into an index which had a strong degree of association (gamma .939 and gamma .734) with each independent set of judgments.
- (c) *The Degree of MNA Conflict, Political Integration of Resident Leadership and CDA Director Accountability to Resident Groups*, were each based on the ratings obtained from the interview schedules.

**APPENDIX B:
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE**

[These are the rating sheets used by HUD personnel in response to questions about the cities under their jurisdiction. The cities of each interviewee were listed following each question.]

1. Patterns of Influence Characteristic of Cities During Planning Period

(a) *Staff Dominance:* MNA residents functioned primarily to "legitimize" the planning processes and products originated by the CDA staff. At this end of the continuum, residents play a residual role in decisions and generally rubber stamp the decisions of the CDA staff.

(b) *Parity:* MNA residents and CDA staff shared responsibility for key planning decisions. At this midpoint on the continuum, residents and staff could be characterized as "equal partners" in the planning enterprise.

(c) *Resident Dominance:* MNA residents exerted preponderant influence in the planning process. At this end of the continuum, residents could be characterized as directors of the planning process. Here we usually find strong and aggressive resident participants and a weak staff.

CITIES	Staff Dominance	Parity	Resident Dominance
--------	--------------------	--------	-----------------------

2. Agency Participation in the Planning Process

CITIES	Poor	Fair	Excellent
--------	------	------	-----------

3. Development of MNA Citizen Participation Structure

CITIES	Built on Existing MNA Organizations and Leadership	Combination of Both	Involved the Creation of New Organizations and Leadership
--------	--	------------------------	---

4. Degree of Conflict in Development of Citizen Participation Structure

1. *Low Degree of Conflict:* Virtually no contest for leadership and jurisdiction in the development of MNA citizen participation structure. If elections were held, they were generally humdrum, with the results predictable.

2. *Moderate Degree of Conflict:* There were genuine contests for leadership and jurisdiction. Individuals and groups competed with one another. If elections were held, they were fairly lively, with factions focusing more on issues than on attacking each other.

3. *High Degree of Conflict:* There was a *struggle* for leadership and jurisdiction between groups that were clearly at odds with one another. If elections were held, campaigns were heated and lively.

CITIES	Low	Moderate	High
--------	-----	----------	------

5. Political Integration of MNA Leaders

(a) *Low Degree of Political Integration:* MNA citizen participation leadership not fully accepted and used by city government.

(b) *Moderate Degree of Integration:* MNA citizen participation leadership accepted by city government on an informal ad hoc basis when seeking cooperation or support on specific projects.

(c) *High Degree of Integration:* MNA citizen participation leadership engaged in formal on-going communication and cooperation with city leadership.

CITIES	Low	Moderate	High
--------	-----	----------	------

6. Commitment and Support of Chief Executive

1. *Limited Support:* Executive's support was primarily "lip service," little action was taken on the program's behalf without much prodding, etc.

2. *Moderate Support:* Executive was positively associated with the program to the extent that he could be called upon to act on the program's behalf and frequently produced the desired result.

3. *Active Support:* Executive was clearly identified as the program's backer; he acted not only on request, but frequently took the initiative, e.g. in interventions with HUD and local agencies.

CITIES	Limited	Moderate	Active
--------	---------	----------	--------

7. CDA Director Accountability to MNA Residents

CITIES	Weak	Moderate	Strong
--------	------	----------	--------

8. CDA Director's Administrative Behavior

CITIES	Technical	Mixture of Both	Political
--------	-----------	-----------------	-----------

9. Comprehensive Development Plans

CITIES	Best CDP's	Worst CDP's	Noteworthy Features of Particular CDP's
--------	------------	-------------	--

10. Extent to which CDP met HUD Coordination Criteria

CITIES	Adequate	Excellent
--------	----------	-----------

11. Extent to which CDP met HUD Citizen Participation Criteria

CITIES	Adequate	Excellent
--------	----------	-----------

12. Quality of First Year Program Implementation

CITIES	Most Successful Cities During First Action Year	Most Impressive Features	Least Successful Cities During First Action Year	Least Impressive Features
--------	---	--------------------------------	--	---------------------------------

13. Speed and Efficiency in Implementing First Program Year

CITIES	Low	Moderate	High
--------	-----	----------	------

14. Citizen Participation in First Program Year

CITIES	Low	Moderate	High
--------	-----	----------	------

15. Degree of Interagency Coordination in First Program Year

CITIES	Low	Moderate	High
--------	-----	----------	------

16. Degree of Correspondence Between Number and Types of Programs in the CDP and those Implemented in First Program Year

CITIES	Low	Moderate	High
--------	-----	----------	------

17. Impact on Local Government's Problem-Solving Capacity

CITIES	Cities With Least Increase	Cities With Most Increase In Local Government Capacity	How is Increase Manifested
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**APPENDIX C:
QUESTIONNAIRE TO
CDA DIRECTORS**

National League of Cities
and U.S. Conference
of Mayors

Model Cities Questionnaire

To the CDA Director: We will appreciate it if the answers to the following questions can be completed as accurately as possible by you or a member of your staff. All information will be treated in confidence and is to be handled only by members of our research staff. Analysis of the data will not mention individual cities but only categories (e.g., small cities/large cities; first round/second round). The data obtained from the questionnaires will be combined with other national data to produce information about the experiences of the Model Cities Program which should be useful to the staff members of CDA's as well as to others who are engaged in urban planning programs. Thank you for your cooperation.

Completed questionnaires should be returned to: Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, 560 Pacific Avenue, San Francisco, California 94133, Attn: Sarah Johnson

- A. Name of City: _____
- B. The CDA Executive Director(s):
We want to know about the executive director of the CDA during the time covered by the planning period and the first program year. (Some CDA's had more than one executive director in that time period, in which case we want to know about all who served in that position.)

Executive Directors of CDA

	1st CDA Director	2nd CDA Director	3rd CDA Director
Dates of service as CDA Director	From: _____ To: _____	From: _____ To: _____	From: _____ To: _____
Position before he became CDA director:	_____		
	Name of Employer _____		
	Title of Job _____		
Major professional identity before taking position as CDA director (e.g. social worker, businessman, lawyer):	_____		
Position after he left job as CDA director:	_____		
	Name of Employer _____		
	Title of Job _____		

- C. City Chief Executive (Note: Where CDA is an agency of another jurisdiction, like a county, please indicate the appropriate official title. Where a city has both an elected mayor and a city manager, indicate the person to whom the CDA director reports.)
- Chief executive is (check one): City Manager _____ Elected Mayor _____
Council-Elected Mayor _____ Other (specify) _____
 - During the time covered by the planning period and first program year, did the same person occupy the position of chief executive? yes _____ no _____
 - If not, please give date(s) on which change(s) occurred: _____
- D. Composition of Model Neighborhood (Note: If recent changes have occurred, use figures for the planning period.)
- Population size of city _____
 - Population size of Model Neighborhood _____
 - Percentage of Model Neighborhood population that is Black _____
Caucasian _____ Oriental _____ Spanish-speaking _____ Native American _____ Other (specify) _____

E. CDA Staff

We are interested in the numbers of CDA staff members and their educational backgrounds. Would you indicate the numbers of staff members in each of these categories for the planning period, and then the numbers in each category in the first program year. (Note: Some positions may not have been filled for all or part of the periods. As a rule of thumb, count all staff members who were engaged for at least five months in the period.)

Numbers of CDA Staff in Administrative, Technical Planning, And Community Organization Jobs

	Planning Period	First Program Year
With Advanced Degree Beyond College		
With College Degree		
Some College		
High School Grad or Less		

F. Resident Organization Staff

During the planning period and first program year, which of the following arrangements best describes the relationship to the CDA of the staff members of the resident organization that have administrative, technical planning and community organization functions? (Note: If the arrangement was different in each period, indicate by using "PP" for the arrangement that best describes planning period and "FPY" for first program year.)

1. CDA hires and assigns all staff that works with resident organization _____
2. CDA hires and assigns all staff that works with resident organization based on recommendations of the resident organization _____
3. CDA contracts with another organization to hire and assign staff that works with the resident organization (give names of organization) _____
4. CDA contracts with resident organization to hire their own staff _____
5. Other (please describe) _____

G. CDA Director's Role

We want your opinion about the role of the CDA Director in the planning period and the first year of program. Use numbers 1 to 4 giving 1 to the role that best describes the central focus of the Director's action in each period and 4 to the role which least describes his actions. Numbers 2 and 3 should be placed accordingly. (Note: If there was more than one director in either or both periods, make the judgments for the director who served the most time in that period.)

Director's Role	Planning Period (Rate from 1 to 4)	First Year of Program (Rate from 1 to 4)
1. <i>Managerial</i> : Coordinated efforts of various actors and usually was able to achieve unity in definition and implementation of tasks and to produce HUD components on schedule.		
2. <i>Broker</i> : Usually served as intermediary, referee, and mediator among actors in defining tasks and product components.		
3. <i>Directive</i> : Administered and organized program with		

strong direction and high expectancy of positive and cooperative response to leadership from most other actors in assigning tasks and developing product components.

4. *Secretariat*: Service agent for Model Cities-related actors. Prime function was not substantive but rather provided resources to whomever took leadership and initiative.

H. CDA Staff Role

We want your opinion about the general role behavior of the CDA staff (not including the Director). Assign #1 to the role that best describes the central focus of staff behavior in each period and #4 to that which least describes them. Use #s 2 and 3 accordingly.

Staff Role	Planning Period (Rate from 1 to 4)	First Year Of Program (Rate from 1 to 4)
1. <i>Facilitators</i> : Functioned primarily as service personnel to provide other actors with resources needed to participate in process. Active role in planning process was minimal.		
2. <i>Brokers</i> : Major energies devoted to functioning primarily as intermediaries between resident groups and public agencies. Central focus was on achieving consensus among different actors.		
3. <i>Technicians</i> : High ability to respond to HUD's process and product requirements with technical skill. Roles were clearly legitimized in view of most other Model Cities actors.		
4. <i>Technicians/Advocates</i> : Mixed a high ability to respond to HUD requirements with high degree of responsiveness to resident interests and desire to share decision-making with residents.		

I. Community Agencies and Organizations

We want to know the number and kinds of local private and public community agencies and organizations which have worked with the CDA. In the following table, please list those agencies and organizations which played an active role in planning and implementing the Community Development Program. By "active" we mean that they had some actual responsibility for carrying out some task, as distinct from merely lending their names to lists of sponsors and committees. Using the list of agencies on the left, check any or all of the three columns which apply. (Note: When you add "others," try to use the generic names of organizations wherever possible rather than local names, e.g., Public Health Dept., Chamber of Commerce, "private industrial firm.")

into three parts for first-round cities and simplified to two for second-round cities. (See Parts I, II, III and first and second-round cities). These parts primarily describe the model neighborhood problems and causes, goals and objectives of the Model Cities Programs, and implementation strategies which include a list of upcoming Action Year projects. At the end of each Action Year a revised CDP is submitted to HUD for the following year.

Component	The functional areas of planning in the Model Cities Program such as housing, health, education, employment, transportation, crime and juvenile delinquency, social services and relocation. Citizen participation activities are often treated as a single component in a CDP.
CEP	<i>Concentrated Employment Program.</i> A Department of Labor manpower program which seeks to provide, through a single local sponsor (usually the Community Action Agency), a full range of employment and job training services in areas having the greatest concentration of disadvantaged persons. CEP's services included recruitment, orientation, counseling, training, referral to training, job placement and other supportive services to the unemployed or underemployed.
Citizen Participation	An integral part of any Model Cities Program is the role of the Model Neighborhood Citizens. HUD requires that a structure be developed in order that "the residents' views are incorporated into CDA's policies, and that the citizens are constructively involved in planning and implementing the Model Cities program."
CRP	<i>Community Renewal Program.</i> A HUD program providing cities with funds to identify needs, locate resources and draft a comprehensive plan for broad-scale urban renewal. A CRP is generally administered either by the local planning department or the housing or redevelopment authorities.
Demonstration Cities Act of 1966	Original legislation establishing the Model Cities Program, to be administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
DOL	<i>Department of Labor.</i> DOL is the Federal department responsible for administering national manpower programs, gathering labor statistics and directing the nation's manpower policies.
EDA	<i>Economic Development Administration.</i> A section of the Department of Commerce which assists in providing new industry and jobs in economically depressed areas by offering grants and loans to business and development companies, and monies for technical assistance, economic research and information activities.
Evaluation System	The methods by which the activities and information gathered by the Model Cities staff, residents and project personnel are analyzed to help determine the success or failure of a project. A complete Evaluation System, according to HUD guidelines includes the monitoring of projects and activities and interpreting information to provide a basis for alternative courses of action.
First-Round Cities	The first seventy-five Model Cities Programs funded by HUD prior to Spring of 1968.
Formula Grant	A particular type of Federal grant which is apportioned to States on the basis of a fixed percentage of State expenditure on certain programs. Individual projects funded by formula grants are often approved at the State rather than the Federal level.
HEW	<i>Department of Health, Education and Welfare.</i> HEW is the Federal department charged with the responsibility to administer national welfare, health and educational programs.

HUD	<i>Department of Housing and Urban Development.</i> HUD is the Federal department responsible for managing the Model Cities Programs.
HUD Planning Model	The Model Cities planning process as prescribed by HUD's CDA Letters in which guidelines, procedures and policies are provided for project and program planning.
Leadman	The first line HUD official concerned with the Model Cities Program. Presently titled a Community Development Specialist, the HUD area office staff member acts as a liaison between HUD and the local Model Cities Program.
Linkages	Functional or programmatic connections between one project and another (e.g. transportation as it relates to employment) or an organizational intermediary implying a tie-in with other agencies, governmental or non-governmental, (e.g. the CDA serving as a contracting agent between the Local School Board and the Department of Education).
MCA	<i>The Model Cities Administration.</i> Prior to the 1971 HUD reorganization, MCA was the division of HUD responsible for administering the Model Cities Program. The program is now part of the Office of Community Development.
Mid-Planning Statement (MPS)	A statement the second round CDAs are required to submit to HUD halfway through the planning period. The Mid-Planning Statement described the planning process, summarizes conditions in the MNA and outlines overall objectives and strategies. First round cities were required to submit the above information in the Part I Section of the CDP. The Mid-Term Planning Statement replaced the Part I requirement in December 1969.
MNA	See Model Neighborhood.
Model Cities Board (CDA Board)	The local policy-making group in the Model Cities Program. The board, often referred to as the CDA Board, is usually composed of residents plus elected and appointed officials, and is responsible for CDA activities in the Model Neighborhood Area.
Model Neighborhood	The specific geographical area designated for the Model Cities program. All CDA projects are designed to focus on problems in the target Model Neighborhood Area. Initially restricted to ten per cent of a city's or county's population, in February 1970 HUD allowed CDA's to expand their programs up to 50 per cent of the original area.
NDP	<i>Neighborhood Development Program.</i> Began as a new approach to Urban Renewal in 1968, NDP's are sponsored by the Renewal Assistance Administration of HUD and are designed to help communities carry out redevelopment, rehabilitation and public improvement activities in one or more urban renewal area. Like Model Cities, NDPs are planned and implemented on the basis of annual increments and emphasize citizen participation.
OEO	<i>Office of Economic Opportunity.</i> Created by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the OEO is a major Federal agency providing funds and services to areas of the country which have high rates of poverty.
Parts I, II, and III of the CDP	For the seventy-five first round Model Cities, HUD required that the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan be submitted in three separate parts: Part I was to define and analyze problems and specify long-range goals, objectives, program approaches, and the overall strategy to be used by the CDA in pursuing these goals. Part II was a five-year forecast derived from the statement of Part I which outlined specific projects with estimated costs. Part III specified how the city intended to achieve the objectives of the five-year

forecast during the first year. Detailed descriptions of individual projects, budgets, administrative structure and planning and evaluation systems was also provided in this section.

Requirements for seventy-five Second Round Cities were substantially simplified in December 1969. Part I took the form of a Mid-Term Planning Statement which included an explanation of how the plan was being developed, a summary of MN problems and their causes and a statement of overall objectives and strategies. Part II, the five-year forecast was dropped as a requirement.

Planning Year	The period between the awarding of a planning grant and a supplemental funds grant for the Model City's first Action Year. Activities of the Planning Year include analyses of the problems of the Model Neighborhood, development of strategy for treating problems and achieving goals, and a detailed action plan for the first year.
Reprogramming	A term devised by HUD to describe the redistribution of supplemental funds which are unspent toward the end of a Model City's Action Year. Reprogramming is usually necessitated because projects start late, are cancelled, or applications for matching Federal grants are delayed. Often referred to as "back-up" projects, activities proposed for reprogramming are subject to the same type of citizen and Federal review and approval process as an Action Year CDP.
RICC	<i>Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee.</i> The Federal committee which oversees, reviews, and makes recommendations about the design of Model Cities programs. The RICC also assists in helping CDA's solve administrative and program problems. Regional and area officials of all Federal agencies participating in a Model Cities Program (HEW, DOL, OEO, HUD, EDA) compose the membership of the RICC.
Second-Round Cities	The seventy-five Model Cities Programs approved by HUD between September and November 1968, slightly less than one year after the initial seventy-five programs were funded.
Supplemental Funds	Monies made available to Model Cities upon approval of planned (the CDP) target areas. Funds can be used to finance experimental projects, to fill gaps not met by other Federal, State or local resources, or to pay the non-Federal programs. Supplemental funds cannot be used to replace local funds that would normally have benefited Model Neighborhood residents.
Workable Program for Community Development	A comprehensive plan submitted every two years to HUD by a locality which ties together public and private efforts to eliminate slums and urban blight and provide housing. The plan has four major components: codes and code enforcement, planning and programming, housing and relocation, and citizen involvement.

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