


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
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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Crime-Specific Burglary Prevention Handbook

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA

OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING

Crime-Specific Burglary Prevention Handbook

By System Development Corporation

NOTE: Staff of the California Council on Criminal Justice (CCCJ) directed the preparation of this publication. As of January 1, 1974, under Section 13820 of the California Penal Code, this CCCJ staff became the Office of Criminal Justice Planning, reporting, through its Executive Director, to the Governor of California.

Participating with staff in this Crime-Specific program were the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Oakland Police Department, Orange County Sheriff's Department, San Diego Police Department, San Francisco Police Department and the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics.

PREFACE

This book is a report on the efforts of hundreds of California peace officers in six large jurisdictions, who joined forces to mount an effective attack on burglary. The Crime Specific Burglary Program was a beginning. The statistics contained herein show about what we expected. The battle against burglary cannot be won overnight, but it is possible through concerted efforts by law enforcement and the public to win some real victories. We hope that you can use some of the techniques and data in this book to win those victories in your community.

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Crime-Specific projects are only a few among the many projects funded by the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning. Such projects seek to prevent crime and to improve the system of criminal justice as it operates within the police, court and correctional agencies of state and local governments. Descriptions of current projects appear monthly in the OCJP Bulletin. You may obtain a free subscription to the Bulletin by writing:

OCJP Bulletin
 Office of Criminal Justice Planning
 7171 Bowling Drive
 Sacramento, CA 95823

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This handbook is published by the California Council on Criminal Justice as a source of information and guidance for law enforcement personnel who are interested in establishing comprehensive burglary abatement programs in their jurisdictions.

The contents are based on the experiences of the six law enforcement agencies who collectively established the original Crime-Specific Burglary program. The analysis and findings that are included are based on data collected by the six agencies during the twelve months that various burglary abatement approaches and techniques were field tested.

This chapter briefly discusses the background and objectives of the original Crime-Specific program and the analysis approach used in evaluating its results.

Chapter II, "Planning a Local Crime-Specific Burglary Program," presents an overview of the planning, organization, staffing and training that are necessary pre-requisites for establishing a similar program.

Chapters III through VII each present recommendations and findings related to one of the five major categories of burglary abatement approaches employed by the Crime-Specific agencies. Each chapter includes the hypothesis which underlies the approach, its specific objectives, procedures and techniques, and a summary and relevant findings.

A short bibliography identifies related research reports and other sources of information on burglary abatement. The various appendices contain background information, sample materials, and additional findings from analysis activities.

B. BACKGROUND OF THE CRIME-SPECIFIC BURGLARY PROGRAM

1. CCCJ Origin and Objectives

When the 1970 amendments to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 were passed, the California Council on Criminal Justice (CCCJ)--the state agency responsible for criminal justice planning and coordinating throughout

California--began a research program to create a mechanism for effectively achieving the maximum "impact" intended by the Congress.

The immediate mission of Council staff was focused on strengthening CCCJ's role as a "catalyst in the reduction of crime." Under the direction of the California Attorney General, who is chairman of CCCJ, the staff formulated a concept for selectively applying its technical and financial resources to the reduction of specific crimes. This approach became known as the "Crime-Specific" concept for criminal justice programs.

Under this concept, a program that qualifies for the Crime-Specific designation must have the following characteristics:

- (a) It will focus upon a crime deemed serious by the California populace.
- (b) It will have a high probability of visible, significant success.
- (c) It will be acceptable to the local implementing agencies.
- (d) It will involve more than one element of the system.
- (e) Ultimately, it will be transferable, as modified and proven, to similar jurisdictions anywhere.

After considerable study and discussion, the Council decided, in May of 1971, to allocate \$1.5 million for the first program to attack a specific crime in such a manner as to produce significant impact.

In July, 1971, after considering several possible crimes to attack, CCCJ decided to invite the heads of six of the largest law enforcement agencies in California to meet and help make the choice.

On September 16, the Attorney General met with the chiefs and sheriffs of the following agencies:

- Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
- Los Angeles Police Department
- Oakland Police Department
- Orange County Sheriff's Department

- San Diego Police Department
- San Francisco Police Department

After reviewing the crime problems, the sheriffs and chiefs and the Attorney General were unanimous in their selection of burglary as the initial crime to attack.

2. Why Burglary Was Chosen

In considering possible crimes as the target for the states' first Crime-Specific program, a review of the reports by the FBI and California's Bureau of Criminal Statistics (BCS) revealed the magnitude of the burglary problem.

a. The National Scene

According to information provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Uniform Crime Report), 2,368,400 or 40 percent of the 5,995,200 seven major offenses reported in the United States in 1971 were burglaries which resulted in a loss of \$739 million to property owners. Table I-1 shows the number and percentage of burglaries in relation to the other major offenses reported in the United States.

TABLE I-1. FELONY CRIMES REPORTED IN THE UNITED STATES, 1971

Offense	Number	Rate per 1000 Population	Percent of Total
Murder	17,630	0.09	0.3
Robbery	385,910	1.9	6.4
Assault	364,600	1.8	6.1
Rape	41,890	0.2	0.7
Burglary	2,368,400	11.5	39.5
Theft (over \$50)	1,875,200	9.1	31.3
Auto Theft	941,600	4.6	15.7

Thirty-six percent of these burglaries were reported in cities of more than 250,000 population. Burglary comprised 40 percent of index offenses and 46 percent of property crimes.

Nationwide, since 1966, reported burglaries have increased 70 percent with an increase of 0.6 percent in the rate per 1,000 population. Western states have the highest rates (17/1,000) followed by states in the Northeast (12/1,000). Major cities, nationally, have much higher rates than suburban or rural areas. Daytime residential burglaries increased 14 percent in 1971 and accounted for over one-half of the residential offenses. Since 1966, there has been a substantial increase of 108 percent in daytime burglaries.

Arrests for burglary for the period 1966-1971 increased 42 percent. Eighty-three percent of all burglary arrests in 1971 were of persons less than 25 years old. Of adults prosecuted in 1971, 51 percent were found guilty as charged, 18 percent were convicted of a lesser charge, and 31 percent were freed through acquittal or dismissal. Nationally, clearance rates of 19 percent were reported both in 1970 and 1971.

b. The California Scene

According to information provided by the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics, 391,157 or 55 percent of the 714,688 seven major offenses reported in California in 1971 were burglaries which caused a loss of \$45 million.

Table I-2 shows the number and percentage of burglaries in relation to the other major crimes reported in California.

TABLE I-2. FELONY CRIMES REPORTED IN CALIFORNIA, 1971

Offense	Number	Rate per 1000	Percent of Total
Homicide	1,636	0.08	0.2
Robbery	47,477	2.3	6.6
Assault	48,098	2.4	6.7
Rape	7,281	0.4	1.0
Burglary	391,157	19.3	54.7
Theft (over \$200)	75,128	3.7	10.5
Auto Theft	143,911	7.1	20.1

Thirty-three percent of the burglaries were reported in cities of more than 250,000 population. Burglary comprised 55 percent of index offenses and 64 percent of property crimes.

More than 72,000 burglary arrests were made: 36,522 adults and 35,842 juveniles. Of adults arrested and processed for burglary by California Superior Courts in 1971, 4.8 percent were dismissed, 4.0 percent were acquitted, 75.0 percent pled guilty, and 16.2 percent were convicted by trial. Of those convicted, 8.3 percent were sentenced to prison, 65.3 percent received probation, 14.7 percent were sent to jail, and 11.7 percent received other kinds of sentencing.

From 1968 to 1971, California's burglary rate increased 24 percent. By 1971 it was the highest in the nation. In the same period, the clearance percentage for burglary cases dropped from 19 percent to 17 percent.

When he announced the beginning of the Crime-Specific Program, the California Attorney General said:

"Burglary is a peculiarly appropriate subject for this intensive attack, because burglary is the serious crime which keeps California very much in the running for the unhappy distinction of being America's crime capital. Law enforcement in California has done a good job, and is striving to do a better job, of making our streets relatively safe. Citizens here are much less in danger of being the victims of crimes of violence than people in other parts of the country, and the rate of crimes of violence has not risen nearly so fast here as in other areas. But the criminal who has caused California to have a dramatically increasing rate of crime is the burglar. We can reasonably hope that very few of our citizens will be the victims of rape, robbery, or murder, but the one crime that is very apt to strike any of us is burglary."

3. Crime-Specific Program Organization and Objectives

Planning began in earnest for the Crime-Specific Burglary Program with the formation of what became known as the Working Group, which was composed of representatives from each of the departments, the Attorney General's Office,

and the CCCJ. The Working Group, chaired by the Assistant Attorney General, held its first meeting in October of 1971. Until implementation of the program the following April, the Working Group met monthly to plan the details of the overall program and the six individual projects.

The Working Group saw the program both as a vehicle for implementing an intensive and coordinated attack on burglary, and as a mechanism for field testing and evaluating a variety of burglary abatement approaches. Very early in the planning stage, the following program objective was established:

"...to significantly reduce the occurrence or lower the rate of increase of the crime of burglary within a geographic area within the one-year time frame of the project, through the selective utilization of community and law enforcement resources, and to provide an evaluative description of the various techniques for statewide application."

Accomplishment of the objective was to be by means of six individual projects to be implemented in target areas, with a separate overall independent evaluation of program effectiveness. The working group agreed that the same basic burglary abatement approaches should be incorporated in all jurisdictions, but that each jurisdiction should tailor its approach to a particular target community, the departmental capabilities and policies, and the local peculiarities of the burglary problem.

The total allocation of \$1.5 million was divided among the six agencies according to the requirements of the individual projects. An amount of \$200,000 was reserved for data collection by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics, evaluation by an independent contractor, and for common project elements, such as publicity materials. The evaluation was designed to measure overall goal achievement and the relative success of the various techniques being tried. It was also intended to result in this handbook.

4. Burglary Abatement Techniques

The Crime-Specific agencies each produced a formal Grant Request to CCCJ. Included in their requests were the specific burglary abatement techniques that were employed.

The initial task of the evaluation contractor was to catalog the information on the abatement techniques that were collectively planned by the six agencies.

Discussions with the Crime-Specific Working Group, and an analysis of the individual grant requests led to the conclusion that the planned abatement techniques could be classified into five major types of efforts. These were:

- (a) Increasing public education, awareness, and involvement.
- (b) Improving security of physical facilities.
- (c) Improving patrol techniques.
- (d) Improving investigation and suspect handling.
- (e) Reducing the market for stolen property.

The catalog of abatement techniques that was prepared was organized into the above categories of efforts and is included in Appendix A. These same categories (with shortened titles) became the structure for program reporting, evaluation, and for organizing the contents of this handbook.

C. ANALYSIS APPROACH

The Crime-Specific Program was not designed as an experiment with rigid experimental controls, but rather as a series of field tests for trying burglary abatement procedures and techniques in various types of communities.

The primary objectives of the evaluation effort were to record the techniques and procedures used by the agencies, and to examine all available performance data in order to identify indications of the effectiveness of the various burglary abatement efforts. The performance of individual agencies was not to be evaluated.

Each agency was free to select a target area within its jurisdiction that was not necessarily representative of the total community. Each target area was defined as a specific set of census tracts so that the evaluation could examine community characteristics that might be associated with: (1) the success or failure of the various abatement techniques, (2) burglary rates and profiles, and (3) characteristics of arrested offenders and their case dispositions.

1. Data Sources

For all census tracts in the target areas the evaluation contractor prepared a data base of community characteristics derived from 1970 U.S. Bureau of the Census data. The specific data items collected are identified in Appendix B.

The burglary abatement techniques and procedures used by the agencies, and their experiences in trying them were reviewed through regular site visits to each agency by the evaluation staff. In addition, each agency prepared quarterly narrative reports of their activities and experiences.

To support the evaluation of effectiveness, each agency submitted a copy of the agency's standard burglary report to the BCS, plus a special Crime-Specific supplemental report on each burglary in its target area. The census tract where each burglary occurred was identified. A report of each arrest made in connection with the program was also submitted to BCS. The reports were checked, and abstracts were key punched into a standard format and delivered to the evaluation contractor for processing and analysis. The items of information provided by BCS to the evaluation contractor are identified in Appendix B.

Because the Crime-Specific program was not viewed as an experiment, the agencies were not required to provide comparable base-line data on burglaries and arrests in their target areas prior to the start of the program. Similarly, there was no requirement to provide the same data from non-participating (control) areas.

2. Analysis Procedures

The analysis reported in this handbook is based on comparisons of data from the burglaries, case clearances, and associated arrests from four statistically defined communities.

The four communities are designated as Low Risk, Low-Medium Risk, High-Medium Risk, and High Risk. They were created by aggregating individual census tracts from the six Crime-Specific target areas into four groups, based on a calculation of the number of burglaries per 1,000 population that each tract experienced during the twelve month program.

A total of 106 census tracts were included in Crime-Specific target areas. Their annual burglary rates per 1,000 population ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 55, with 15 the median rate, and 17 the mean (average) rate.

Those tracts with burglary rates at or below the median rate were divided into two groups. Those with a rate of 7 or less were designated as Low Risk. Those with rates of 8 to 15 were designated Low-Medium Risk.

Tracts with burglary rates above the median value were also divided into two groups. Those with rates of 16 to 24 were designated as Medium-High Risk. Those with a rate above 25 were designated as High Risk.

The summary of these assignments is shown in Table I-3. In terms of agency representation, aggregating the census tracts into four risk communities resulted in the following distribution:

- The Low Risk community contains tracts from four of the six participating agencies.
- The Low-Medium Risk community contains tracts from all six of the participating agencies.
- The High-Medium Risk community contains tracts from all six of the participating agencies.
- The High Risk community contains tracts from four of the six participating agencies.

TABLE I-3. STATISTICAL COMMUNITIES

Burglary Rate Per 1000 Population	Community Type	Number of Tracts
7 or less	Low Risk	22
8 to 15	Low-Medium Risk	34 (includes 6 tracts with the median rate)
16 to 24	High-Medium Risk	28
25 or more	High Risk	22

TABLE I-4. RISK COMMUNITY COMPOSITION

AGENCY TARGET AREAS

LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT (LAPD)
(10 Tracts)

OAKLAND POLICE
DEPARTMENT
(23 Tracts)

ORANGE COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPT.
(21 Tracts)

SAN DIEGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT
(25 Tracts)

SAN FRANCISCO
POLICE DEPT.
(19 Tracts)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPT.
(9 Tracts)

RISK COMMUNITIES

LOW RISK COMMUNITY
3 LAPD
2 Oakland
7 Orange Co.
10 San Diego
22 Tracts

LOW-MEDIUM RISK COMMUNITY
4 LAPD
3 Oakland
6 Orange Co.
11 San Diego
6 San Francisco
4 LASD
34 Tracts

HIGH-MEDIUM RISK COMMUNITY
2 LAPD
3 Oakland
6 Orange Co.
4 San Diego
8 San Francisco
5 LASD
28 Tracts

HIGH RISK COMMUNITY
1 LAPD
14 Oakland
3 Orange Co.
5 San Francisco
23 Tracts

Table I-4 shows the number of census tracts in each agency's target area, and identifies the agencies represented in each of the risk communities. Seventy-seven percent of the tracts in the Low Risk community come from the target areas in Orange County and San Diego. Eighty-six percent of the tracts in the High Risk community come from the Oakland and San Francisco target areas.

Once the tracts were assigned to risk communities, the census-tract-level data that were available to describe the communities, their 12-month burglary history, their offender profiles, and the results of abatement efforts were also aggregated to the four risk communities. This approach was used in order to provide the basis for comparing the burglary situation in other communities with that of the four risk communities, so that the most nearly applicable experience can be studied for local application. As an aid in making community comparisons, Table I-5 presents summary profiles of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the four risk communities. Chapters III through VII of this handbook, which deal with burglary abatement techniques, discuss findings in terms of these four types of risk communities.

TABLE I-5. CHARACTERISTICS OF RISK COMMUNITIES

Community Type	Total Population		Burglary Rate Per 1,000 Population		Age				Non-White		Schooling			
					18 or Less		Under 25		8 Years or Less		12 Years or Less			
					#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	107,098	22.6	551	5.1	31,740	29.6	44,231	41.3	6,761	6.3	4,575	7.3	30,613	48.5
Low-Medium Risk	153,614	32.4	1813	11.8	40,695	26.5	63,122	41.1	25,283	16.5	14,854	13.5	60,693	67.3
High-Medium Risk	135,431	28.6	2656	19.6	39,559	29.2	58,474	43.2	34,759	25.7	17,447	22.7	54,144	70.3
High Risk	78,094	16.5	2743	35.1	27,967	35.8	37,767	48.4	52,891	67.7	11,145	32.1	32,099	92.5
All Communities	474,237	100.0	7763	16.5	139,961	29.5	203,594	42.9	119,694	25.2	48,201	18.1	177,549	67.1

Community Type	Household Income				Unemployment			
	Under \$5,000		Under \$10,000		Males		Females	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	5,058	14.2	13,415	37.6	989	3.9	691	5.1
Low-Medium Risk	5,211	26.2	32,907	55.6	2,359	5.7	1,723	6.2
High-Medium Risk	15,856	31.9	31,480	63.4	2,435	6.7	1,423	6.1
High Risk	9,415	35.5	18,628	70.2	1,612	8.8	1,446	11.8
All Communities	35,540	20.9	96,430	56.7	7,395	6.1	5,283	6.8

Community Type	Housing Units											
	Single Family		Apartment		Owner Occupied		Overcrowded		Female Head		Median Rent Value	Median Home Value
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	\$	\$
Low Risk	25,435	66.4	12,859	33.6	23,788	62.1	817	2.1	2,556	8.9	168	37,634
Low-Medium Risk	37,466	61.3	23,588	38.6	28,795	47.2	4,447	7.3	5,430	13.5	139	24,848
High-Medium Risk	26,525	49.9	26,632	50.1	18,771	35.3	6,155	11.6	5,040	14.6	141	24,851
High Risk	13,956	49.2	14,399	50.8	9,275	32.7	7,700	27.1	3,927	21.2	106	20,718
All Communities	103,382	57.2	77,478	42.8	80,629	44.6	19,119	10.6	16,593	13.9	-	-

CHAPTER II. PLANNING A LOCAL CRIME-SPECIFIC BURGLARY PROGRAM

A. INFORMATION NEEDS

Before developing and implementing a burglary abatement program, law enforcement agencies should develop detailed knowledge about the local burglary situation. Although much of the needed information is available within the agency (i.e., burglary reports and arrest records), it is often not in a form that lends itself to easy or rapid analysis. Planning a program is a difficult and time consuming task, but unless the agency produces a well thought out and thorough plan, the program in all likelihood will not produce the desired results. The prerequisites for planning and operating an effective burglary abatement program are to:

- Know the local community.
- Know the local burglary problem.
- Know the local offenders.
- Know the local resources and constraints.

Detailed knowledge from each of these areas should be applied in the initial planning process, and knowledge of changes that occur during the operation of the abatement program should be used to constantly adjust the operation to meet the current situation. The kind of information needed, possible sources and planning application are presented in the remaining sections of this chapter.

1. Know the Community

Knowledge of the community should include a clear understanding of the physical, social, economic, and demographic environment. Burglary is a crime against property. Its targets are the homes, businesses, and other physical facilities that make up the community. To protect these targets, it is essential to learn what they are in terms of types, numbers, locations, security conditions, occupancy patterns, and visibility to patrol. It is also essential to know something of the people who live and work in the community, so that the burglary abatement program can be tailored to meet their needs and expectations and can maximize the level of community support. Fortunately, much of the

community information that is required is readily available from local city or county planning departments, Chambers of Commerce, civic organizations, and from U.S. Census Bureau reports. Data should be gathered at the census tract level to permit small area analysis.

Some of the more significant data elements relating to the socioeconomic and demographic conditions in a community are presented in Table II-1. This table also suggests applications of the data for planning burglary abatement programs.

2. Know the Burglary Problem

Detailed knowledge of the local burglary picture is essential for planning and operating a burglary abatement program. Whether pin-maps or computers are used, it is important to identify the total magnitude and the special patterns

TABLE II-1. SIGNIFICANT DATA ELEMENTS

Data	Use
Total population of the target area	Calculating burglary rates per 1,000 population
Total population by sex and age	Identifying areas with large groups of potential offenders
Non-English speaking persons by native language	Preparing public education materials
Median education levels	Selecting and preparing public education materials
Median household incomes	Recommending security improvements
Housing units by types	Calculating residential burglary rate per 1,000 targets by type
Median value of homes	Recommending security improvements
Median rental cost	Recommending security improvements
Commercial facilities by type	Calculating commercial burglary rates per 1,000 targets

of burglary that are occurring in the community. Of special interest are patterns that indicate areas with exceptionally high numbers of burglaries, or those with consistent patterns in terms of time of day, method of entry, or type of property taken. A comprehensive burglary reporting system is necessary to gather the data, and a statistical processing capability is needed to summarize it for planning purposes.

A list of data elements taken from burglary reports has been developed and is presented below. In most communities this information is already being collected and should be used in planning burglary abatement efforts.

- Date of occurrence. Record the day, month, and year of the burglary when known. Record the beginning date when the exact date is unknown.
- Day of week. Record the exact day (Monday, Tuesday, etc.) when known. Record week day, or weekend, when exact day is unknown. Record "unknown" only when absolutely necessary.
- Time of occurrence. Record the exact time when known. Record morning, afternoon, or night, when a range of time is given. Record "unknown" only when absolutely necessary.
- Location of occurrence. Record beat, reporting district, census tract, and exact location.
- Category of premise. Record residence, business, or other category.
- Specific type of premise. Record the type of the premise, such as single family, theater, apartment, etc.
- Occupancy status. Record whether or not anyone was on the premise.
- Point of entry. Record where entry was made into the facility, such as door or window.
- Instrument used to gain entry. Record the kind of instrument used, such as screwdriver, etc.
- How entry was made. Record what was done to get inside the facility, such as used passkey, smashed window, etc.

- Type of property taken. Record the type of items taken, such as money, sound equipment, etc.
- Dollar amount taken. Record the total reported dollar loss for all items taken.
- Street lights. For nighttime burglaries, record the existence or nonexistence of street lights.
- Point of entry lighting. For nighttime burglaries, record the existence or nonexistence of entry lights.
- Visibility at point of entry. Record whether or not the point of entry is visible to patrolling police units.
- Alarm systems. Record the existence or nonexistence of an alarm system.
- Status of alarm. Record whether the alarm operated or not, and whether it was defeated.
- How incident was detected. Record how the burglary was detected, such as by neighbor, police, alarm, victim, etc.
- When detected. Record as: in progress; same day; next day; etc.
- Property identification. Record whether or not the items taken had identifying numbers or markings.

Much of the above information was collected by the Crime-Specific agencies, and was analyzed to describe the burglary situation in the four risk communities. This analysis is contained in Appendix C.

3. Know the Burglars and Receivers

Information about local individuals and groups that are known or suspected burglary offenders or receivers of stolen property should be collected and analyzed. This effort should pool the information available from various sources such as crime files, arrest reports, field interrogation reports, informer reports, and other intelligence sources.

Suspect files should include the following types of information on individuals:

- Names and nicknames
- Residence address
- Business, work, or school address
- Sex
- Age
- Race
- Physical description
- Prior arrest date, charge, and disposition
- Current status - parole, probation, bail, etc.
- Names of associates and gangs
- Vehicles used - license and description
- Summary of prior MO information

A subset of the above types of information was summarized for persons arrested during the Crime-Specific program. The analysis is included in Appendix C.

4. Know the Resources and Constraints

A burglary abatement campaign requires a commitment of men, resources and time. Special skills, materials, and equipment are needed, and are always limited by financial and operational constraints. The policies and priorities of the department will determine the amount and quality of manpower and other resources that can be assembled for the burglary program, since the needed resources normally must be drawn from existing Patrol, Investigation, Intelligence, Crime Analysis, and Community Relations staffs.

The six Crime-Specific teams varied in composition, but averaged 10 sworn officers plus a clerk. Other part-time support was provided by the agencies, community groups, and reserve forces.

B. STAFFING AND TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS

A burglar abatement project of the scope and type employed by the Crime-Specific agencies requires strong leadership to successfully compete for the manpower, equipment, services, and public support that such a program requires. The project head must be able to operate effectively within his department, and with other public and private agencies, as well as with the general public.

The project staff requires individuals with high motivation and with specialized skills in patrol, security, investigation, intelligence, public relations, and analysis.

Traditionally there has not been much glamour attached to the burglary detail. The work is often considered dull and unproductive, when compared to other areas of police work. The Crime-Specific program helped to overcome any motivational problems by offering special recognition, additional overtime pay, and broader responsibilities to the project staffs.

For the most part, training requirements for project staffs are limited to refresher courses on standard police techniques, combined with new instructions on security and on the special procedures for operating during the Crime-Specific program itself.

Each of the Crime-Specific agencies conducted a training program for members of the Burglary Abatement team. The purposes for the training program were to:

- (1) Familiarize team members with the objectives and procedures of the program.
- (2) To unify and standardize team operations.
- (3) Prepare team members to perform residential and commercial security inspections.
- (4) Provide patrol and investigative personnel with current procedures and techniques.

The training programs consist of academic sessions, tours and visits, and on-the-job training activities. Training time ranged from a few days to two weeks for the teams. Listed below are the major areas that were covered:

- Program goals and objectives.
- Project organization and administration.
- Overall plan and schedule for accomplishing objectives.
- Special reporting requirement.
- Target area demographic and burglary problem descriptions.
- Presentations by alarm and lock companies.
- Procedures for performing security inspections of residential areas.
- Procedures for performing security inspections for business/commercial areas.
- Fire regulations concerning lock and other security measures.
- Building department codes, and other city or county agencies responsibilities pertaining to security measures.
- Tours of the target area.
- Crime scene investigative activities.
- Interview and interrogation procedures.
- Arrest and search procedures.
- Suspect investigation and handling.
- Collection and use of physical evidence and latent prints.
- Undercover surveillance and investigation techniques.
- Systems available to support investigations and analysis.
- Known suspects.
- Use of criminal records.
- Community relations aspect of the program.

- Interactions with the District Attorney, Courts, Parole and Probation.

A similar training program should be considered by each agency planning a major burglary abatement effort.

CHAPTER III. PUBLIC EDUCATION/AWARENESS/INVOLVEMENT

A. HYPOTHESIS

If the citizens of a particular jurisdiction are informed about the nature and extent of the burglary problems in their community, if they are made aware of a concerted law enforcement effort to reduce burglary, and if they can be convinced to lend their support and assistance to that effort, then the crime of burglary can be reduced in that community.

B. OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of the public affairs portion of a Crime-Specific/Burglary Abatement Program, is to convey information regarding burglary and the activities and accomplishments of an anti-burglary program to the client community of each participating agency, toward the end of securing the public's support in reducing burglaries.

The specific objectives of public affairs efforts should be to:

- *Increase public awareness and knowledge of the local burglary problem.*
- *Elicit citizen interest, concern, involvement, and commitment to support the Burglary Abatement Program.*
- *Provide the public with needed information about how they can help themselves and make the program successful.*
- *Use the activities and accomplishments of the program to enhance the public image of law enforcement.*

Success in achieving the objectives will make people aware of the burglary problem and receptive to guidance and instructions on burglary prevention. Specific objectives for public involvement activities are:

- *To motivate the public to make maximum use of existing residential and commercial security capabilities--basically, a "lock-up and light-up" campaign.*
- *To encourage the public to improve security devices and practices, thereby "hardening" the targets of burglary.*

- To mobilize the public to work together and with law enforcement agencies within the community, to improve burglary reporting, and to assist in the detection and apprehension of burglars.

C. PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

Based on the Crime-Specific experience, an effective public affairs and public involvement effort requires a great deal of planning and coordination, but is readily supported by the public and the media (newspapers, radio and television). The basic difficulty is not generating initial support, but rather in increasing and maintaining it through a planned series of public interest events and information releases.

In order to accomplish the necessary planning and coordination, law enforcement agencies should establish a departmental working group composed of representatives from department management, public relations, patrol, investigation, and statistical services. The working group should be charged with the responsibility of planning and maintaining an active public relations campaign throughout the life of the burglary abatement program.

1. Planning the Public Relations Campaign

The initial task of the working group should be to assemble or prepare as much information as possible in each of the following categories:

- The extent and nature of the local burglary problem.
- Comparisons of the local burglary problem with that in other areas, the state, and the nation.
- The specific objectives, planned activities, procedures, and schedules of the department's planned burglary abatement program.
- Names, addresses, phone numbers, and general procedures of all media representatives (i.e., newspapers, radio and television) providing coverage in the local area.
- Usable copies and sample formats of burglary prevention materials produced in other programs (the state and regional criminal justice planning agencies should be of assistance in identifying these items).

Using the assembled information for guidance, the working groups can plan and prepare a campaign that includes the following components:

- (a) A special press conference to announce and describe the burglary abatement program should be held. The announcement should be made by the department chief, or jointly by the Mayor and the chief. Press release materials should be distributed.
- (b) A series of follow-up news releases should be made to all media representatives. The releases should include: background information on burglary; abatement approaches and techniques; reports of individual burglaries, investigations and arrests; instructional materials on improving security; statistical findings; and progress reports on the abatement program. Photos and TV film clips should be included.
- (c) A series of public presentations, and TV and radio interviews should be given on the abatement program. A speakers bureau of departmental personnel should be formed to make the presentations.
- (d) The working group should prepare and disseminate other publicity materials, such as pamphlets, bumper and window stickers, displays, posters, placards, and billboards. It is desirable to use a standard logo or symbol on these materials to identify them to the public as part of the abatement program. Food markets can print the logo on their shopping bags as an additional source of local publicity.
- (e) Special events, such as a "Burglary Prevention Week," and Home Security booths at the Fair or Home Show should be planned and tied in to other community events where possible.

2. Conducting the Public Relations Campaign

As a guide for planning and conducting a public relations campaign, this section provides an overview of the campaign used in the Crime-Specific program.

An early decision of the working groups was that certain aspects of the publicity program should be carried out at the State level by the CCCJ, and others at the individual agencies. The media were to be cultivated and used to the greatest degree possible.

a. Initial Press Conference

A joint press conference was planned to announce the beginning of the program and achieve maximum press coverage. Consequently, no individual departmental releases were initiated prior to the kick-off press conference, which was held March 10, 1972, in the Governor's Press Conference Room of the State Capitol in Sacramento. Participants were the California Attorney General, and the sheriffs and chiefs of the six involved agencies.

All members of the Capitol Press Corps were invited, which provided coverage by national wire services, as well as major media coverage for the six areas.

Press kits were sent to approximately 800 media outlets in California, including radio and television stations, daily and weekly newspapers, and wire services. They were also sent to selected national crime-oriented publications.

The press conference resulted in extensive coverage throughout the state that night and the following days. It also set the stage for locally oriented stories and features, as each department began its particular project.

b. Follow-up Publicity

One of the most successful local kick-offs of the program, in terms of publicity generated, was that of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. On the day that program began, every major television station in Los Angeles was on the scene to cover the arrival, in the target community of Bellflower, of hundreds of uniformed sheriff's deputies; the deputies were arriving to begin residential security checks, an event which had been extensively explained and promoted prior to this occasion. The local city council came out to greet them. The high school drill team served sandwiches and refreshments. Citizens of Bellflower were in the streets and at their front doors to thank the deputies for coming to help.

The resultant publicity and community support set the tone for the entire program in Bellflower. It was distinctly one of police-community cooperation.

In addition to very satisfactory newspaper coverage at both State and local levels, individual agencies worked in developing public affairs presentations, news feature shows, public service announcements, question and answer programs,

and talk shows. This publicity was achieved at no cost to the departments other than their time.

At the State level, articles were written for national publications with broad criminal justice circulation. Through cultivation of the media, stories on the program were carried on the front page of the Christian Science Monitor, in the New York Times, and as a Sunday feature by a national wire service.

Thirty-second and sixty-second public service announcements were prepared for radio. Several public affairs programs were planned for television, usually involving the nearest participating agency.

c. Public Presentations

Presentations, seminars, and speeches about the program were made to local groups and, at the State level, to organizations such as the California Peace Officers' Association, and the National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators. Attorney General Evelle J. Younger gave several major speeches on Crime-Specific, which resulted in additional favorable publicity for the program.

d. Publicity Materials

The pamphlet, "Residential Burglary and What To Do About It," (see Appendix D) was developed by the Working Group and was published in both English and Spanish. More than 100,000 copies, personalized to each department, were printed for distribution in the target areas. Unanticipated demand quickly depleted this initial supply, and the booklet was reprinted by individual agencies several times. The booklet eventually reached approximately 80 percent of all target area households. In addition, copies were sent by the CCCJ to California legislators, congressmen, and every sheriff and police chief in the State, with an invitation to use and reprint it for their own constituents and communities. Several major newspapers used it, in part or in whole, in order to reach as many people at as little cost as possible. A number of other states and jurisdictions were also allowed to use the booklet.

Promotional items, all utilizing the Crime-Specific logo, consisted of buttons, posters, bumper strips, and decals. Samples are displayed in Appendix D.

Again, these were purchased centrally, in quantity, and personalized for use in each department.

In a search for visual aids to use in the program, two new films on burglary prevention were located and purchased. All six agencies received prints of both films for use in their community awareness activities. The Attorney General's office and the CCCJ retained copies for use in State crime prevention programs, and to be loaned at no charge to other State law enforcement agencies and community organizations. Both films were cleared for public service television and received extensive exposure through this medium.

"Rip Off" stars Henry Fonda, and deals with commercial burglary. "Invitations to Burglary," which provides tips to help prevent residential burglary, stars Raymond Burr. Copies of both films were personalized with title credits for each of the six agencies.

The Working Group designed a logo for the Crime-Specific program (see Figure III-1). The official logo of the Crime-Specific program features number "459", the section of the California Penal Code designating burglary as a crime. It also has a circle and bar, which is an international symbol signifying prohibition of a particular act. The new logo was introduced, in the form of a promotional button, at the joint press conference. It was used thereafter in every aspect of the program at all levels.

e. Special Events

As the Crime-Specific/Burglary Abatement program got underway, more and more requests were received by the CCCJ for information on burglary prevention. Many of these requests were from law enforcement agencies in the State who had heard about Crime-Specific, did not have such a program, and sincerely wanted help; not necessarily in the form of money, but information.

As a result, the CCCJ sponsored a series of eight 3-hour burglary seminars throughout California, specifically designed to provide local law enforcement personnel with information about security and burglary prevention as aids to crime prevention and improved community relations. More than 500 law enforcement personnel representing 175 California law enforcement agencies attended the seminars. By working with private enterprise and local chiefs and sherrifs,



Figure III-1. Burglary Logo

the CCCJ was able to present the seminars at a minimum cost to itself and at no cost to the participants. The seminars were enthusiastically received and, after their completion, requests for additional seminars arrived with regularity.

In conjunction with one of the seminars and with the cooperation of a local criminal justice planning region, a three-day burglary conference was held. It brought together 52 of the working level personnel in the six Crime-Specific projects. The conference was in three parts: (1) a two-day meeting of the working members; (2) a seminar (described above) for law enforcement; and (3) a public conference during which burglary program findings, problems, and solutions were presented by the Crime-Specific spokesmen.

The 52 conferees met to hear preliminary reports on evaluation findings, and to exchange ideas, information, and problems with colleagues in other agencies.

Observers at the session suggested that, in itself, this interagency communication and sharing of both successes and problems was a valuable achievement of the program.

Commenting on these events, Attorney General Evelle J. Younger said: "These seminars and the burglary conference are yet more efforts on the part of CCCJ to stretch our limited financial resources through sharing of information obtained from the Council-initiated and funded Crime-Specific program. We hope, so to speak, to be able to continue spending each of our anti-burglary dollars several times over by spreading knowledge acquired in earlier efforts."

As demonstrated by the activities described above, community interest and cooperation were brought about by a number of factors. The enthusiasm of the Working Group was a catalyst in promoting departmental pride in the program. Once the program had started, the favorable publicity, the responsiveness of the community, and the very fact that the program was having success heightened the interest at the departmental level. An obvious commitment to the program by each chief and sheriff carried considerable weight with the departmental staffs.

3. Encouraging Public Action

A public relations campaign as described above is of little value in burglary abatement unless it leads to direct public action.

As mentioned in the objectives, the specific public actions desired in a burglary abatement program are: (1) to make maximum use of existing security features by locking-up and lighting-up residences and businesses; (2) to improve security features and practices, thus hardening the targets of burglary; and (3) to improve reporting of burglaries, and the detection and apprehension of burglars.

a. Promoting a Lock-up and Light-up Campaign

The message to lock-up and light-up should be conveyed through a variety of public information materials, in community meetings, and in person by patrols making increased routine security checks in the target areas.

Open doors and windows, where no one is home or working, can be tagged with lock-up reminders* or followed up later by mailing a security reminder notice to the address. All six Crime-Specific agencies reported that garage doors are frequently left open when no one is home. The practice often exposes bicycles and tools to potential burglars as well as advertising the absence of the residents.

In the Crime-Specific Program, the San Diego Police Department tagged valuable items that were left unprotected with an adhesive sticker. An example of the wording on such a sticker would be:

THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN STOLEN
FOR BURGLARY PREVENTION
INFORMATION CALL:

(Phone Number)

Light-up suggestions can be included with bills mailed by utility companies, by reminders left on the doors of unlighted facilities, or mailed by the department to the address.

b. Improved Security

Techniques for encouraging the public to improve security features and practices are described in Chapter IV, Security. Those efforts addressed at improving the identification of property are included in Chapter VII, Decreasing the Receiver Market.

c. Promotion, Improved Citizen Reporting

The recognition, identification, and reporting of burglaries and burglary suspects by citizens can be improved. The primary techniques recommended are to encourage neighbors to watch each other's property and to provide suspect and vehicle descriptions to law enforcement. A two-way communications link can be established with existing citizens' organizations, or through those community organizations formed specifically to assist the program.

The Los Angeles Police Department organized citizens into Block Groups and issued community crime bulletins through the Groups. The Oakland Police

* A sample form is included in Appendix D.

Department took the same approach using its previously established Home Alert Groups. All departments enlisted assistance from merchant and homeowner associations, civic clubs, and schools. Citizens who were especially helpful were given official recognition by the department, usually in the form of a letter from the chief.

D. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

1. Summary

A public relations campaign is an essential part of a burglary abatement program. Initial publicity and public support can be achieved with minimal effort; however, careful planning is required to sustain public interest and to achieve direct public action.

The Crime-Specific agencies found it advantageous to pool their resources and efforts for a joint public relations campaign that attracted statewide and national publicity, while providing quality publicity materials for local use by the individual agencies.

Direct measures of public involvement in burglary abatement as a result of the public relations activity include indications of:

- Improved use of existing security features.
- Installation and use of improved security features.*
- Improved citizen reporting of burglaries.

2. Findings

Reported data elements containing items of information that could be directly affected by a vigorous public education/awareness program were reviewed, in order to look at the effect the public information effort had on the burglary problem.

Specifically, reports which indicated that no force was used to gain entrance, and someone other than the victim reported the burglary to the police were received.

* Improved security efforts are described in Chapter IV.

a. No-Force Entries*

The percentage of no-force entries were looked at on a monthly basis on the assumption that, as the citizens became more aware of the burglary problem, the percentage of no-force entries would decline, because more citizens would take the simple precautions of locking doors and windows.

Table III-1 shows the percentage of residential burglaries with no-force entries, and the total number of burglaries by program quarters. The data shows that while total numbers of residential burglaries were declining each quarter, the percentage of no-force entries for all communities rose from 31.1 percent in the first program quarter (April, May and June) to 34.3 percent in the second quarter. The percentages of no-force entries then declined in both the third and fourth quarters. Although there was no baseline data for comparison, data suggests that seasonal differences may have had more influence on whether or not residents locked their doors and windows, than did the lock-up campaign efforts of the Crime-Specific agencies. Another possibility is suggested by the fact that the heaviest public education efforts took place in the first quarter of the program. Therefore, the effects of the lock-up campaign may have been of short duration. Table III-1 also shows that no-force entries are less

TABLE III-1. PERCENTAGES OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES WITH NO-FORCE ENTRIES

Community Type	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	37.7	45.3	28.9	32.9
Low-Medium Risk	40.1	40.5	37.1	32.5
High-Medium Risk	33.4	36.2	30.3	30.0
High Risk	22.4	26.0	19.3	19.7
All Communities	31.1	34.3	28.2	27.3
Total Residential Burglaries	1416.0	1402.0	1366.0	1323.0

* The term "no-force" is defined as door or window left unlocked, or removed screen to open window, etc.

frequent on a percentage basis in higher-risk communities, than in the lower-risk communities. These differences can probably be attributed to a greater citizen awareness of the need to lock up in those areas which experience the highest burglary rates.

Table III-2 shows the percentages of no-force entries for the commercial and industrial targets of burglary, and the total number of burglaries by program quarters.

As was the case with residential burglaries, the highest percentage of no-force entries occurred in the second quarter (July, August and September), when more doors and windows are likely to be opened for cooling and ventilation. The quarterly percentages fail to indicate any downward trend in no-force entries that might be attributed to the lock-up campaign efforts.

b. Reporting of Burglaries

Increased public involvement in the efforts to reduce burglaries was expected to directly result in increases in the percentage of burglaries reported by neighbors and passing citizens (non-victims).

Table III-3 shows that the quarterly percentages of residential burglaries reported by non-victims actually declined after the first quarter. The table also shows that a higher percentage of burglaries are reported by non-victims in the high-risk community than in the low-risk areas.

Table III-3, like III-1 and III-2 may indicate that the public response to law enforcement campaigns is of short duration, and that a continuous series of public education efforts is needed to maintain public action in support of burglary abatement.

TABLE III-2. PERCENTAGES OF COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES WITH NO-FORCE ENTRIES

Community Type	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	29.3	15.6	28.6	5.3
Low-Medium Risk	15.8	23.6	20.7	20.9
High-Medium Risk	11.7	21.9	15.0	17.3
High Risk	5.9	16.7	21.3	14.4
All Communities	11.0	19.8	18.8	16.9
Total Commercial/Industrial Burglaries	501.0	495.0	401.0	479.0

TABLE III-3. PERCENTAGES OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES REPORTED BY NON-VICTIMS

Community Type	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	11.9	6.2	6.0	4.4
Low-Medium Risk	11.3	10.4	5.2	8.3
High-Medium Risk	10.8	9.4	7.4	7.3
High Risk	13.3	12.6	10.7	10.3
All Communities	12.0	10.6	8.0	8.8

CHAPTER IV. SECURITY

A. HYPOTHESIS

Law enforcement agencies can reduce local burglaries by determining the security weaknesses of the targets of burglary, and encouraging property owners and users to make the necessary security improvements.

B. OBJECTIVES

The security efforts of a local law enforcement agency should be designed to achieve the following specific objectives:

- *Increase the agency's knowledge of the security weaknesses of the community.*
- *Inform the public of the security weaknesses which contribute to their burglary losses.*
- *Advise the public on the specific security improvements that should be made and how to make them.*
- *Achieve a reduction in the number of successful burglaries committed where little or no force is required to enter the building.*
- *Increase the percentage of burglaries that are detected while in progress.*
- *Aid in the overall reduction of burglary rates in the community.*

C. PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

Based on the experience gained in the Crime-Specific program, the following techniques are recommended for achieving the objectives identified above:

- Analyze the security information from local burglary reports and prior studies.
- Conduct security inspection programs.
- Establish security displays and centers.
- Promote improved street and facility lighting.

- Promote building security ordinances.
- Promote reduced insurance rates for properly secured facilities.

Each of the recommended techniques is described below.

1. Analyze Security Information

The foundation for all security activities must be a comprehensive understanding of building security in general, and of the local burglary experience in terms of existing building security.

A number of burglary security studies have been completed by various agencies throughout the country. Several of these are cited in the Bibliography. Other studies and reports can be identified and obtained through State and Regional Criminal Justice Planning agencies, and through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service.* In addition, the Crime-Specific findings presented in Section D of this chapter should aid in understanding the relationship between burglary rates and building security features.

By analyzing prior local burglary reports, a law enforcement agency should be able to determine the major security weaknesses that contribute most to burglaries in various areas of the agency's jurisdiction and in various types of structures. The analysis should identify the data items that each agency wants to include in its local burglary profile studies, and the types of security check lists to be used in security inspections. The results of the analysis may indicate the need for collecting additional information through more comprehensive burglary reporting requirements and/or through building inspection programs.

2. Conduct Security Inspections

A security inspection program should be planned for two major reasons. First, as a means of gathering more detailed knowledge of local security weaknesses, and second, as a convenient method for advising the public of the specific security improvements required and how to make them.

* U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D.C. 20530; Telephone: (202) 963-5244.

The scope of an inspection program can be adjusted to meet local needs and available resources. At a minimum, brief security inspections can be included as a part of the on-site investigation of reported burglaries. Recommendations for security improvements should be provided to the burglary victim. The Crime-Specific agencies found that burglary victims and their neighbors were generally very receptive to post-burglary inspections.

The scope of the inspection programs can be limited to the areas with the highest burglary rates or expanded to include inspection of every home, business, and other facility in the area. The costs in inspection man-hours and administration are extensive, however, and the scheduling of inspections proved to be difficult for most of the Crime-Specific agencies.

Regardless of the size of inspection program selected, the following activities will be required:

- Establish inspection standards and guidelines.
- Select and train inspectors.
- Obtain community support for inspection.
- Schedule inspections.
- Conduct and report inspections.
- Evaluate results.

a. Establish Inspection Standards and Guidelines

Inspection standards are needed to define the security features and practices that are desirable for each type of building or facility, and guidelines are needed to define the procedures that security inspectors are expected to follow. Inspection standards should be based on applicable security, safety, and building ordinances in the community. Standards for individual security items should be based on their contribution as one link in the total security of the facility. The proper mix and use of security features provide the desired

psychological and physical deterrence to burglars by accomplishing the following objectives:

- Deter entry attempts.
- Detect entry attempts (and entries).
- Defeat entry attempts.
- Delay burglary completion.

Security standards and guidelines should be developed to encourage the individual owners and users of facilities in the target areas to make practical, cost-effective improvements in the security of existing and planned facilities.

There are several major limitations on the amount and type of security desirable for a given structure. Initial cost is probably the most commonly recognized limitation, but the degree to which the security features restrict normal facility utilization is also a major consideration. Restriction of emergency and fire escape routes must be avoided. The reliability, installation requirements, operating and maintenance difficulties, and even the aesthetic quality of the security devices themselves should also be considered. Support can be secured from building departments, fire departments, building contractors, insurance underwriters and investigators, and from the manufacturers of security devices in establishing these standards and guidelines. Sample inspection check lists and reporting forms are included in Appendix D.

b. Select and Train Inspectors

A variety of resources can be used to man an inspection force capable of conducting the inspections desired. For example, the following approaches were used in the Crime-Specific program:

- One of the target areas used approximately 800 law enforcement reserve personnel to perform almost 15,000 inspections in three days at the same time the inspections were being solicited on a door-to-door basis.
- Another target area hired and trained ten local residents as part-time Security Aides to conduct residential security inspections.

- Other programs used members of their burglary abatement team which was composed of sworn personnel from Patrol, Investigation, and Community Relations.
- One agency paid patrol officers to conduct residential inspections during their off hours.

Whatever staffing technique is used, a training program must be developed to prepare the inspectors for their tasks. A training course, averaging about 20 hours, should include the following topics:

- Instruction on program objectives and the local burglary problem.
- Interacting with the public:
 - (1) Scheduling inspections and call-backs.
 - (2) Conducting inspections.
 - (3) Making security recommendations and referrals.
 - (4) Handling questions and complaints.
- Exterior security measures:
 - (1) Improving visibility, including removal of obstructions and improving lighting.
 - (2) Exterior locks, alarms, and other devices.
- Interior security measures:
 - (1) Property identification.
 - (2) Special protection for valuables.
 - (3) Interior door and window inspection.
- On-the-job training under the guidance of department security personnel.

c. Obtain Community Support

A variety of methods can be used by law enforcement agencies to obtain community support for an inspection program. The most important method is a strong public information program, such as that discussed in Chapter III.

Strong support also is needed from city councilmen, the mayor and/or city manager, and other city and county departments to make the program a success. It is important to have community leaders participate by having their own residences and business establishments inspected. This action should then be brought to the attention of the citizens in the community through local news media.

To solicit inspections from the general public the following techniques can be used:

- Conduct door to door visits to explain the program and sign up residents for later inspections.
- Leave letters announcing inspection at each home, with return mail request forms for those desiring inspection.
- Contact citizens by telephone by using the address ordered telephone directory.
- Give speeches to home owner associations, business associations, churches and school groups, and other civic and community groups followed by inspection sign-ups.
- Encourage block group captains to contact their neighbors for sign-ups.
- Encourage home alert groups to contact their neighbors for sign-ups.
- Install security booths in shopping centers, home shows, and county fairs where visitors can request inspections.
- Use mobile trailer security centers where visitors can request inspection.
- Establish store front community centers where visitors can request inspection.
- Contact burglary victims to schedule inspections of each facility experiencing a burglary.

d. Schedule Inspection

The scheduling of inspections depends upon the manpower available to complete them, and the approach used in soliciting inspections. All of the Crime-Specific agencies relied heavily on community-wide publicity to generate public interest and support. The requests for inspections that resulted were scattered throughout the community, and if scheduled on a "first come-first served" basis, were wasteful in terms of travel time. When possible, inspections should be scheduled on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis so that the available inspection personnel can minimize travel time. Of the various forms of solicitation, direct door-to-door contacts produced both the highest rate of requested inspections, and the minimum number of scheduling problems.

One agency mobilized its reserve personnel on one weekend and trained them for implementing the inspection program. On the following weekend, all the reserves were again mobilized and swept the community, conducting inspections at the time of solicitation. The best time in the week to solicit and conduct door-to-door home inspections is on weekends, preferably on Sunday. During the week many of the residents are not at home, and the wives who are at home, frequently want to wait until their husbands are there before committing to an inspection. On Sunday, more people are at home and engaged in leisure activities around the house. Even on Sundays, refusals and requests for later callbacks must be anticipated. One of the most common reasons for refusing or delaying Sunday inspections was that the inspections would interfere with watching the football games.

Letters offering a free security inspection can be left at each residence in the target area. Explorer Scouts, Boy Scouts, or other similar organizations can be used to deliver the letters; however, one of the target areas reported they received less than two percent response to this approach.

Mass mailings and public announcements can also be used to request that citizens telephone the law enforcement agency to schedule an inspection. Here again, one community reported little success with this approach (approximately 15 percent responded). Techniques that rely primarily on public responses to announcements of the inspection service are less effective than schedulings done by door-to-door solicitation in the neighborhood.

e. Conduct and Report Inspections

All techniques used by law enforcement agencies to conduct security inspections require face-to-face contact with local residents. This gives the agency the opportunity to strengthen existing community relations (in many instances, the security inspection was the first and only direct contact many citizens had had with police). The average time required to conduct an inspection is approximately 30 to 35 minutes for each residential inspection and 40 to 45 minutes for each commercial inspection, excluding travel time.

The typical residential door-to-door inspection should include the following activities:

- Positive identification of the inspector(s).
- Discussion of the Crime-Specific program and its objectives, and presentation of the pamphlet "Residential Burglary and What to Do About It."
- Discussion of the community burglary problem, emphasizing the rates of no-force and minor-force entries, and the difficulty of identifying stolen property.
- Room-by-room inspection of the interior in the company of the owner/resident, emphasizing the security of exterior doors and windows and showing improvements as suggested in the pamphlet. Recording of all findings and recommendations on the report form.
- Exterior inspection of the premises, emphasizing patrol visibility, lighting, and garage security. Recording of all findings and recommendations.
- Explain special protection for valuables and property identification procedures.
- Give the owner/resident a copy of the inspection report, and explain the supply sources and installation procedures for recommended improvements.

- Emphasize the importance of using existing and improved security features at all times and the necessity for neighbors to watch out for each other. Explain how and when to report to the police.

An approach that can be used for conducting apartment building inspections is as follows:

- Brief the apartment manager and schedule the inspection.
- Inspect only one typical apartment, perhaps the manager's.
- Complete the security report which includes name of the owner, address, and number of units in the apartment complex.
- Duplicate the report.
- Distribute reports and cover letter to the owner, manager and tenants.

For business inspections, some agencies used plain-clothes officers to conduct inspections, because businessmen were more receptive to this procedure. Business operations were less likely to be disrupted by customers and employees asking questions of the supervisors, or police officers in plain-clothes.

f. Evaluate Results

An important step in the security program is to measure the effectiveness of the program. The elements of information that should be collected at the census tract level to assist in this effort are:

- Number of inspections conducted.
- Number of residents complying totally with the recommendations.
- Number of residents complying partially with the recommendations.
- Number of residents not complying with any of the recommendations.
- Number of burglaries committed against targets with all recommendations completed, and by how entry was made.
- Number of burglaries committed against targets; with some recommendations completed, and by how entry was made.

- Number of burglaries committed against non-inspected facilities, and how entry was made.

Each of the burglary abatement projects attempted to evaluate the rate of compliance with the security recommendations they made as a result of the inspection program. These individual evaluation efforts were generally based on a small sample follow-up of re-inspections,* or by phone or mail questionnaire follow-up. Estimate of compliance ranged from 4 percent to 65 percent compliance with all specific recommendations, to as high as 20 percent to 70 percent for compliance with at least one specific recommendation. The best compliance with recommendations was by residents who had experienced a burglary, or had a neighbor recently burglarized. Apartment renters and apartment owners tended to have the lowest compliance rates with recommendations made during security inspections.

Those who had complied usually had taken one or more of the following actions:

- (1) Installed double cylinder dead bolt locks.
- (2) Installed locking pins or devices on windows.
- (3) Pruned shrubbery.
- (4) Identified valuables.
- (5) Installed exterior lighting.
- (6) Installed pin door hinges.
- (7) Installed door viewers.
- (8) Replaced faulty windows.
- (9) Replaced outside doors.

* One of the agencies conducted an on-site follow-up inspection of 10 percent of the facilities receiving an initial inspection. The sample results are:

- followed no recommendation	58 percent
- followed less than one-half of recommendations	25 percent
- followed more than one-half of recommendations	13 percent
- followed all recommendations	4 percent

Some of the more common reasons reported by residents as to why they did not comply with the security recommendations are:

- Content with existing security.
- Too costly to install recommendations.
- Not concerned, insurance will pay for losses.
- Apartment dwellers expected owner to comply with recommendations.
- "Haven't gotten around to it yet."

Another evaluation technique that can be used to help determine if residents are following the security recommendations is to survey local locksmiths and hardware stores. One agency conducted a survey of locksmiths and hardware stores in the target area and found that store owners indicated their sales of security equipment had increased 20 percent to 45 percent. Many of the store owners stated the customers mentioned the security inspection as the reason for their purchase.

3. Security Displays and Centers

Displays consisting of security hardware and associated literature are desirable. The purpose of collecting and displaying security hardware and devices is twofold. First, the displays themselves generate public interest and curiosity and attract individuals who can be instructed about burglary prevention. Second, the displays enable the project teams to describe and demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of the various devices and discuss their costs and methods of installation.

The security displays consist of doors, windows, locks, alarms, lighting fixtures, timers, and a variety of other hardware devices, most of which can be contributed or borrowed from local manufacturers and dealers. Approved sales literature can be displayed and disseminated by the security centers. All security hardware dealers and installers in the area should be alerted about the security program to ensure that sufficient stock levels are on hand to meet the expected increased local demand.

At a minimum, the displays, combined with the handout literature and the guidance of trained security personnel, should provide sufficient information for

individuals wishing to select improved security devices and have them professionally installed. For the relatively unskilled "do-it-yourself" homeowners, a contact for guidance on installation techniques is desirable. Some security hardware dealers provide this service, and rent the necessary tools. The various types of security displays used in the Crime-Specific program are discussed below.

a. Store-front Security Centers

Two of the Crime-Specific agencies opened security centers in small store fronts. Such centers can provide information to the citizens on how to make their homes and community more secure from burglary. Steps in establishing and operating a security center are:

- Rent or lease appropriate facility located in an area with heavy pedestrian traffic.
- Display security hardware and other material.
- Provide space for community group meetings.
- Publicize the opening.
- Man the center during hours when people are most likely to request information. One agency, after an audit of visitors by time of day, changed their hours to 1600-2000 hours daily instead of the normal 0900-1800 hours.

In both cases the community center attendance decreased to a point (from 60 to 100 per day to 5 to 10 per day) where it was not cost-effective to keep the center in operation. Some of the reasons for the decline were:

- Publicity from newspapers and television decreased.
- More and more of the residents were contacted in their own home which eliminated their need to visit the center.
- Other facilities for group meetings and security requirements were more adequate.
- Pedestrian traffic was too limited.

b. Mobile Security Center

Probably the most successful security display approach is to use a mobile home especially designed and equipped as a mobile security center, which is periodically moved into selected areas throughout the community.

The mobile security center should be located in major shopping centers which have a large hardware or department store willing to stock the recommended security items. The mobile center can be easily moved from shopping center to shopping center, in order to cover the entire target area and take advantage of the available parking spaces and the high concentration of visitors.

One Crime-Specific agency successfully experimented with a "proxy" inspection program in its mobile security center. The agency used special local mailing lists obtained from the local gas company, and an extensive and concentrated promotion effect to invite local neighborhood residents in for security counseling.

Procedures that can be used to perform proxy security inspections from a mobile security center are as follows:

- Greet resident at reception desk (preferably by a uniformed officer).
- Request resident to describe their residence or business in terms of existing security features.
- Complete a security recommendations checklist.
- Provide homeowner with a completed copy of recommendations, and a copy of the booklet "Residential Burglary and What to Do About It."
- Direct homeowner to next officer who demonstrates recommended doors, door locks, hinges, and other door security hardware.
- Direct homeowner to third officer who: (1) demonstrates methods and devices for securing windows, locks, garages, gates, sliding glass doors; (2) provides cost estimates for modifications; and (3) demonstrates techniques for identifying personal property.
- Direct homeowner to table near exit which contains additional program literature.

This approach to security inspections takes one quarter of the time (7 to 10 minutes) as compared to 30 to 40 minutes used in going door to door, and the residents gain a better understanding of the security recommendations by actually seeing and operating the recommended hardware. The brief 'proxy' inspection program performed in the mobile center, rather than in the individual's home, also permits a more equal distribution of inspections throughout the week.

The security center should be sufficiently manned to provide three to four trained security personnel during the peak business hours of the shopping center. During slack hours, the personnel manning the security center can engage in preparing for security briefings, and other related administrative functions.

c. Other Security Displays

In addition to the large security center displays, small portable displays can be used effectively in security presentations to various groups. Board-type displays can be assembled and put on view in public buildings such as libraries, city halls, and police stations. The display can also be put to good use at home shows, county fairs, appliance shows, shopping malls, and community courses. The display boards should include a supply of the pamphlet "Residential Burglary and What to Do About It," as well as phone numbers to contact, or mail-in postcards to request further information or security inspections.

4. Promote Improved Street Lighting

Police agencies can help deter nighttime burglaries and increase the visibility of their patrol units by promoting improved street and alley lighting.

Frequently the costs of improved lighting is born directly by the affected property owners through special tax assessments. In this situation, a police department can assist in promoting a lighting program by providing the property owners with information on the local rates of crimes in poorly lighted areas as compared with crime rates in better lighted areas of the community. Lighting for public areas can be promoted directly with the City Administration.

All agencies in the Crime-Specific program indicated they had actively promoted improved street lighting programs, and one of the agencies developed a program

through the City Department of Water and Power, whereby citizens and businesses can have 'snap on' lights placed on existing power poles for only \$4.00 per month.

5. Promote Building Security Ordinances

Appendix D provides copies of sample ordinances. Each of the burglary abatement projects spent considerable time in discussing the issues involved with building inspection departments, fire departments, and other representatives of the local community. Because of the poor compliance rates of the inspection program, all the projects agreed on the need for new building regulations requiring improved security. Although estimates of the average costs for upgrading security of existing residences varied considerably, they were in the range of five to ten times the estimated cost of installing the same features at the time of initial construction.

6. Promote Insurance Reductions

Homeowners' and renters' insurance policies are normally sold as "packages" that include coverage for a variety of risks in addition to theft and burglary. Separate "floater" policies are also written to insure specifically identified valuables. The Crime-Specific burglary abatement staff collectively and individually approached the insurance community, in an attempt to secure commitments from insurance underwriters to reduce premium costs and/or loss deductibles for property owners who improved the physical security of their premises. Although there were numerous expressions of interest, no specific new rate reductions were made or offered. However, commercial and industrial insurers currently offer their customers rates that are in part determined by security considerations, most commonly the existence of alarm systems.

In general, the insurance community responded to the suggestions for premium rate or deductible reductions with the following arguments:

- (a) The insurance premium rate structure was actuarially determined on an area basis, and rates would go down if losses declined in the area.

- (b) The cost for insurers to check on security features and prepare security ratings would probably exceed any savings, due to reduced losses at secure facilities.
- (c) Current actuarial practices do not normally separate losses, due to burglary from those due to theft or mysterious disappearance. Separate rate calculations based on these distinctions would have to be prepared before the actual changes in loss experience could be measured.
- (d) Community-wide security ordinances are perhaps the best way to achieve lower burglary losses and the resulting decreases in premium rates from insurance companies.

Although the insurance industry is in a position to require security measures as prerequisite for burglary coverage, promotional efforts in this area have not yet been successful. Apparently there is insufficient evidence to convince insurance companies that such a program would be economically sound for them. Local law enforcement agencies should continue to encourage insurance companies to offer rate reductions, and should assist in collecting data to demonstrate that such a program can be made cost-effective.

D. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

1. Security Summary

The results of the security portion of the total burglary abatement program indicate the need for substantial improvement in the security features of both residential and commercial buildings in the areas of: (1) point of entry visibility; (2) security hardware; (3) street and entry lighting; and (4) alarms in commercial establishments. Each of the participating agencies used a variety of approaches for encouraging the public to increase the physical and psychological barriers between potential burglars and their perceived needs. The highlights of the security effort are as follows:

- 29,657 residential and 11,772 commercial security inspections were performed and contributed to a better knowledge of security weaknesses for both the community and the law enforcement agencies.

- Security displays and fixed and mobile security centers were successfully used to attract interest and to demonstrate recommended security devices.
 - Fixed security centers were successful during the initial months of the program, but their usefulness declined after the heavy promotion/advertising program abated.
 - Promotion of insurance reductions was tried without success as an incentive for owners to improve the security of existing facilities.
 - Promotion of building security ordinances was seen as the most effective and least expensive means for gradually upgrading residential and commercial security in new and existing facilities.
- #### 2. Security Weakness Findings

The analysis of the 7,763 burglary reports that were written during the Crime-Specific Program shows that the major security weaknesses of all types of structures are: (1) doors and windows, (2) poor point of entry visibility, (3) poor point of entry lighting, and (4) inadequate alarm systems.

Table IV-1 shows the percentages of total burglaries reported by each of the various points of entry for Residential, Commercial and Industrial, and Other Types of Facilities.

The extent of physical security weaknesses in all types of facilities is such that little or no force is required for burglars to make most entries.

Table IV-2 presents the percentages of all burglaries reported during the Crime-Specific Program by the amount of force required to enter.

The effect of visibility of entry points to patrol on the choice of entry points by burglars was examined and is presented in Table IV-3. Of particular interest to security planners are those cases where visibility of the entry points could be easily increased to provide more deterrence to potential burglars.

TABLE IV-1. PERCENTAGES OF BURGLARIES BY POINT OF ENTRY

Point of Entry	Residential	Commercial/Industrial	Other Facilities*
Door	59.6	57.7	50.9
Window	36.6	30.0	40.9
Not Specified/Unknown	3.1	2.7	4.2
Roof (existing opening)	0.2	4.2	1.6
Roof (makes opening)	0.0	0.4	0.0
Wall (existing opening)	0.1	0.6	0.0
Wall (makes opening)	0.1	3.0	0.0
Floor	0.1	0.1	0.0
Other	0.2	1.3	2.4
Total Burglaries	5,506	1,876	381

* Other facilities include schools, churches, and public facilities.

TABLE IV-2. PERCENTAGES OF BURGLARIES BY FORCE REQUIRED TO ENTER

Force Required*	Residential	Commercial/Industrial	Other Facilities
Major Force	24.2	38.9	33.6
Minor Force	36.9	34.9	36.5
No Force	30.3	16.6	20.7
Unknown/Not Reported	3.8	2.9	4.7
Aborted Attempt	4.8	6.7	4.5
Total Burglaries	5,506	1,876	381

* The Force Required descriptors used in reporting were:

Major force: Breaks, forces, smashes at points of entry. Saws, bores, burns, cuts glass, cuts lock, etc., at point of entry. Uses explosives to gain entry, tunnels in premises.

Minor force: Used pass key, pick, or slip lock with celluloid, etc. Pries or jimmys door, window, screen; cuts screen, or removes louvers.

No force: Door or window left unlocked, or removed screen to open window, etc.

Aborted: No entry, attempts only.

TABLE IV-3. PERCENTAGES OF BURGLARIES BY VISIBILITY OF ENTRY POINT TO NORMAL PATROL ACTIVITY

Visibility of Entry Point*	Residential	Commercial/Industrial	Other Facilities
Visible	24.9	45.1	19.1
Obscured	5.7	4.2	4.2
Not Visible	66.7	46.8	72.4
Other/Not Reported	2.7	3.9	4.2
Total Burglaries	5,506	1,876	381

* Visibility Descriptors used were:

Visible: Visible to normal patrol activity.

Obscured: Normally visible, but obscured by shrubbery or other easily removable obstructions.

Not Visible: Not visible to normal patrol.

Although it is undoubtedly correct to assume that apartments are less visible to patrol surveillance than are single family homes, the rate of burglaries is actually lower for apartments than for homes. The Crime-Specific findings show that apartment burglaries constitute 36.6 percent of all residential burglaries, although apartments constitute 42.8 percent of all dwelling units in the target areas. In terms of the rate of burglaries per one thousand dwelling units, the figures are 25.2 per 1,000 apartment units, and 34.3 per 1,000 single family homes. A likely explanation is simply that burglars are more concerned with the possibility of being observed by neighbors in adjoining apartments, than they are of being observed by a passing patrol unit.

An analysis of the lighting present during the nighttime burglaries reported during the Crime-Specific Program is shown in Table IV-4.

Although comparative data on lighting conditions for all targets that were not burglarized was not available for comparison of the deterrent effects of lighting, the above percentages indicate that the ideal combination of both street and entry point lighting was present in only 27.8 percent of all burglaries.

TABLE IV-4. PERCENTAGES OF BURGLARIES BY NIGHTTIME LIGHTING CONDITIONS

Lighting Condition	Residential		Commercial/ Industrial		Other	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No Lighting	507	29.5	190	18.1	39	27.0
Street Lights Only*	691	40.2	420	40.1	56	38.8
Entry Lights Only	116	6.7	66	6.3	14	9.7
Street* and Entry Lights	404	23.5	370	35.3	35	24.3
Total Burglaries	1,718		1,046		144	

* Street lights were reported if present within 100 feet.

Burglar alarm systems are designed primarily to detect entries and entry attempts. The presence of visible alarm systems may also provide a deterrent effect. Table IV-5 shows the analysis of reported burglaries that occurred where alarms were present.

The deterrent value of alarm systems was not examined; however, alarms failed to function in more than 50 percent of the cases where they were present (268 failures out of 528 systems). Only 18.9 percent of the reported alarm failures were attributed to alarm defeating actions by the burglar.

TABLE IV-5. PERCENTAGES OF BURGLARIES BY ALARM STATUS

Alarm Status	Residential	Commercial/ Industrial	Other
Percentage with Alarms	1.0	21.9	16.5
Percentage where Alarms Functioned	0.4	10.7	9.7
Total Burglaries	5,506	1,876	381

3. Program Findings

The Crime-Specific efforts to improve the security of residences, businesses, and other facilities that are the targets of burglary, were evaluated on the basis of the data available from the 7,763 burglaries reported during the 12 months of the program. Comparative baseline data for previous years, or from matched control areas, was not available for analysis.

The Crime-Specific security efforts were planned to increase the amount of force required for a burglar to enter his chosen target. Table IV-6 shows that the number of total burglaries declined each quarter, and quarterly percentages of residential burglaries requiring major force to enter did increase overall, while the percentages of burglaries requiring only minor or no-force decreased. Aborts (unsuccessful entry attempts) which were expected to increase as a result of improved security, failed to do so. However, reporting of unsuccessful entry attempts is generally considered less reliable than is reporting of successful entries.

When the same data, as presented in Table IV-6, was analyzed in terms of community types (Table IV-7), it indicated that all communities showed an overall percentage increase in major force entries and a percentage decrease in no-force entries. However, the percentages of minor force entries indicate the two higher risk communities out-performed the two lower risk communities in decreasing the percentages of minor force entries. The high risk communities, which have the lowest levels of income and education, also consistently maintained a lower percentage of no force entries, probably reflecting a greater awareness of security needs in these communities.

TABLE IV-6. PERCENTAGES OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY FORCE REQUIRED TO ENTER

Force Required to Enter	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Major Force	21.0	19.3	27.7	28.8
Minor Force	38.9	37.9	34.6	36.1
No-Force	31.1	34.3	28.2	27.3
Aborts (unsuccessful entry attempts)	5.7	4.0	4.6	4.6
Total Burglaries	1416	1402	1366	1323

TABLE IV-7. PERCENTAGES OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY FORCE REQUIRED TO ENTER BY COMMUNITY TYPE

Force and Community	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
<u>Major Force</u>				
Low Risk	10.4	13.4	21.7	26.4
Low-Medium Risk	14.1	17.6	15.1	18.4
High-Medium Risk	17.9	14.8	25.1	27.9
High Risk	30.2	26.1	38.5	38.3
All Communities	21.0	19.3	27.7	28.8
<u>Minor Force</u>				
Low Risk	34.8	38.1	31.3	37.3
Low-Medium Risk	40.1	33.8	39.7	42.3
High-Medium Risk	39.1	38.1	35.2	32.9
High Risk	39.3	40.7	29.6	34.7
All Communities	38.9	37.9	34.6	36.1
<u>No-Force</u>				
Low Risk	37.7	45.3	28.9	32.9
Low-Medium Risk	40.1	40.5	37.1	32.5
High-Medium Risk	33.4	36.2	30.3	30.0
High Risk	22.4	26.0	19.3	19.7
All Communities	31.1	34.3	28.2	27.3

Commercial/Industrial burglaries, in terms of the force required to enter, are shown in Table IV-8. These burglaries seem to be largely unaffected by the Crime-Specific security efforts. Percentages fluctuated throughout the program. There was an increase (11.0 percent to 16.9 percent) in total no-force entries, and a decline (39.9 to 37.9) in total major force entries, both the opposite of what was expected. One explanation is that less emphasis was placed on commercial and industrial security by the Crime-Specific agencies than on residential security.

The Crime-Specific efforts to improve lighting conditions failed to show any decrease in the number of nighttime burglaries or in their percentage of all

TABLE IV-8. PERCENTAGES OF COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES BY FORCE TO ENTER BY COMMUNITY TYPE

Force and Community	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
<u>Major Force</u>				
Low Risk	36.6	40.6	21.4	52.6
Low-Medium Risk	42.1	32.6	28.7	33.1
High-Medium Risk	36.0	35.0	41.9	36.2
High Risk	43.4	41.1	42.6	42.4
All Communities	39.9	37.3	38.6	37.9
<u>Minor Force</u>				
Low Risk	29.3	31.3	50.0	42.1
Low-Medium Risk	32.9	37.1	43.7	37.1
High-Medium Risk	33.0	31.1	35.3	31.1
High Risk	40.0	33.9	26.5	36.0
All Communities	35.5	33.3	34.7	34.5
<u>No-Force</u>				
Low Risk	29.3	15.6	28.6	5.3
Low-Medium Risk	15.8	23.6	20.7	20.9
High-Medium Risk	11.7	21.9	15.0	17.3
High Risk	5.9	16.7	21.3	14.4
All Communities	11.0	19.8	18.8	16.9

burglaries by quarter. Nighttime burglaries stayed at approximately 700 per quarter, or 37 percent of all burglaries reported.

A separate analysis was made of nighttime burglaries for each of the risk communities where the points of entry were unlighted (Table IV-9). Only the High Risk Community shows a steady decline in the rate of nighttime burglaries with unlighted entry points, which may indicate that the High Risk area was most responsive to the light up campaigns.

TABLE IV-9. NIGHTTIME RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES WITH UNLIGHTED ENTRY POINTS BY COMMUNITY TYPE

Community Type	Quarterly Rate per 1000 Residential Units			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.7
Low-Medium Risk	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.4
High-Medium Risk	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.0
High Risk	4.5	4.4	4.3	3.1
All Communities	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7

The results of the efforts made by each of the participating agencies to improve visibility of residences to normal patrol activity is presented in Table IV-10. It shows that overall there was a slight decrease (1 percent) in the percentage of burglaries committed against targets with obscured visibility to patrol units. When looked at by type of community, the High-Medium and High Risk communities show the greatest percentage of decrease. These communities have the greatest percentage of low income families and also the lowest average home values, yet seem to have made the most improvements in residential visibility.

Table IV-11 shows that the percentage of reported commercial and industrial burglaries against targets with obscured visibility to patrol units fluctuated throughout the 12 months of the program.

It was anticipated that the percentage of commercial and industrial burglaries detected by alarms would increase during the security improvement program. Table IV-12 shows that this did not occur. When looking at each risk community, the low risk communities are the only ones showing an increase in detections. This is probably because the businesses in the wealthier low risk communities can more readily afford the costs of new or improved alarm systems.

As a measure of the improvements in security attributable to the residential inspection program, a comparison was made of the percentages of burglaries of inspected and non-inspected facilities requiring major force to enter. Table IV-13 shows these comparisons by community type. Notice that the percentages of major force entries are much higher in the high risk communities,

TABLE IV-10. PERCENTAGES OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES ENTERED AT POINTS WITH OBSCURED VISIBILITY*

Community	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	5.2	6.2	8.4	5.5
Low-Medium Risk	5.8	7.2	3.8	7.1
High-Medium Risk	5.9	6.6	5.6	4.4
High Risk	6.9	4.5	4.9	4.5
All Communities	6.2	6.0	5.1	5.2

* Normally visible, but concealed by shrubbery or other removable obstruction.

TABLE IV-11. PERCENTAGES OF COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES ENTERED AT POINTS WITH OBSCURED VISIBILITY

Community	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	0.0	6.3	7.1	0.0
Low-Medium Risk	9.2	3.4	1.1	2.4
High-Medium Risk	3.9	4.7	3.8	8.6
High Risk	4.4	5.2	3.7	3.6
All Communities	4.6	4.8	3.0	4.2

TABLE IV-12. PERCENTAGES OF COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES DETECTED BY ALARMS

Community	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	2.4	9.4	14.3	10.5
Low-Medium Risk	5.3	10.1	8.0	4.8
High-Medium Risk	8.1	12.0	5.4	7.7
High Risk	20.1	14.1	11.8	12.2
All Communities	12.1	12.3	10.9	8.4

TABLE IV-13. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES WITH MAJOR FORCE ENTRIES BY COMMUNITY TYPE AND INSPECTION STATUS

Community Type	Inspected		Non-Inspected		Totals	
	Number	Percent Major Force	Number	Percent Major Force	Number	Percent Major Force
Low Risk	44	25.0	362	16.0	406	17.0
Low-Medium Risk	151	13.9	1193	16.7	1344	16.4
High-Medium Risk	225	20.0	1575	21.7	1800	21.6
High Risk	46	34.7	1910	33.3	1956	33.4
All Communities	466	19.9	5040	24.5	5506	24.2

whether or not the residences had been inspected. This tends to confirm the earlier implications that residents in high burglary areas both need and use more security than those in areas experiencing fewer burglaries.

Table IV-13 also shows that inspected residences experienced a higher percentage of major force entries, than did non-inspected residences only in the Low Risk community. This may indicate that more of the inspection recommendations were implemented in the Low Risk community than in the poorer High Risk area.

The overall rate of residential burglaries per 1000 residential units was 1.6 for residences given a security inspection, as compared to 2.8 for those that were not inspected. The rates could not be computed by risk community because inspections were not reported by census tract. A total of 29,657 residences were inspected constituting 16.4 percent of all residential units in the target areas.

CHAPTER V. IMPROVED PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE

A. HYPOTHESIS

Improved preventive patrol tactics and the increased surveillance of burglary suspects by patrol will decrease the burglary rate through deterrence and will increase the arrest rate for burglary offenders.

B. OBJECTIVES

The objective of burglary patrol is to deploy trained law enforcement officers in such a manner that:

- Patrol presence and activities in the field will provide the maximum psychological deterrence to potential burglaries.
- Patrolling patterns and procedures will increase the likelihood of detecting burglaries in progress, and apprehending burglars on or near the scene of their crime.

C. PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

The heart of the police effort against crime is patrol; moving by vehicle or on foot in an assigned area, answering calls for service, stopping to check buildings, to survey possible incidents, to question suspicious persons, or simply to converse with residents who may provide intelligence as to occurrences in a neighborhood.

The following patrol techniques were among those tried in the Burglary Abatement Program:

- Target Area Saturation
- Dynamic Patrol Scheduling
- Tandem or Team Patrol
- Bicycle Patrol
- Helicopter Patrol
- "Bird-Dog" Surveillance of Suspects
- Undercover Activity

- Receiver Stake-Outs
- Truancy Checks
- Increased Field Interrogations

In all cases, the techniques were chosen to accommodate the total set of patrol functions, not just those associated with burglary abatement. Total calls-for-service, traffic management, the taking of crime reports, public relations, and other functions left few man-hours available solely for burglary abatement operations.

The Burglary Abatement patrol planners have three basic options and their various combinations to use whenever patrol time is available for burglary abatement operations:

- (1) Patrol acting as a guard force to protect the residences, businesses, and other facilities that are targets of burglary.
- (2) Patrol acting as a surveillance force to monitor the actions of known or suspected burglars and receivers.
- (3) Patrol acting as an interdiction force to prevent the successful completion of burglaries reported in progress.

1. Patrol as a Guard Force

For preventive patrol to serve as a community "guard force," the patrol planner must develop routing and scheduling techniques that permit maximum target coverage at those times when the threat of burglary is greatest.

a. Target Area Saturation

Total target area saturation usually is not possible with the limited levels of patrol manning available; however, each agency should consider shifting and concentrating its available normal patrol forces, and supplementing them with added project staffs in order to achieve temporary patrol saturation in specific portions of the target areas. This form of area saturation enables the agency to optimize the use of the available patrol manpower, and to concentrate on the local hot-spots where local burglary rates are the highest.

b. Dynamic Scheduling

Dynamic scheduling is done on the basis of local analyses of day-to-day burglary experiences in the target areas. Thus, each agency can maintain current pin-maps, other forms of displays, and computer based systems to show the numbers, types, and times of burglaries by location within this area. Distinct patterns are frequently discernible and useful in scheduling patrol deployment. For example, one of the target areas was able to identify a nighttime commercial burglary pattern clearly associated with freeway access points. Another identified daytime residential burglary patterns associated with the afternoon hours immediately after school and along the major walking routes to and from the junior and senior high schools. All agencies detected local neighborhood patterns that tended to center on the residence location of known or suspected offenders, particularly juveniles engaged in residential burglary.

Dynamic patrol scheduling imposes an additional personnel management burden on the agency, by altering normal shift schedules and patrol area assignments. For the most part, the necessary adjustments can be limited to those personnel specifically assigned to the burglary abatement staffs, and those other patrol personnel paid on an overtime basis for additional shifts in the selected areas. Under the team-policing approach, all members of the regularly assigned team should agree in advance to shifting schedules and assignments within the team's total area of responsibility.

One of the target areas' burglary abatement staffs felt that the special augmentation approach worked so well, that they have recommended that the department set up a permanent burglary suppression team within patrol that can be shifted and reassigned as needed.

Crime-Specific burglary data confirmed that the vast majority of burglaries are committed when there is no one at the target premises, i.e., residential burglaries are committed largely in the daylight hours, while business and commercial burglaries are committed largely in the hours of darkness. Patrol scheduling to better accommodate this situation is needed to improve target coverage.

The data also show that single family homes are the preferred targets of residential burglars, regardless of community types in terms of economic level or

the mix between apartments and houses. Therefore, the relative amounts of available daytime patrol time devoted to single family areas should exceed that for apartment areas with the same number of residential units.

Similarly, office and businesses in small complexes, and particularly those bordering residential areas, show higher burglary rates than did those in major business areas.

c. Patrol Visibility

Patrol force visibility is a psychological deterrence factor to consider in planning a guard-force type of preventive patrol. Two possible techniques are: (1) to promote high visibility through the expanded display of marked patrol vehicles and uniformed officers; and (2) to publicize and use unmarked vehicles and plain-clothes patrol, creating the impression that patrol is continuous although essentially invisible. The intent of both approaches is to increase the potential burglar's fear of detection and apprehension. Most of the burglary abatement projects tried both methods.

Unmarked vehicles of several types can be employed in patrol operations. These include standard unmarked police vehicles, rental cars and camper-vans, motor scooters and bicycles. The rental vehicles, which can be exchanged on a monthly basis, provide the most secure undercover patrol vehicles, but as is the case with bicycles and motor scooters, communications are limited by the necessity to rely on hand-held transceivers. The two-wheeled vehicles provided better target visibility, and the bicycles also improved the ability to hear unusual noises made by offenders in attempting to gain entry. However, both are fairly easy to identify, because of the need to carry a hand radio or to frequently check in with a radio-equipped car.

d. Patrol with Multiple Units

Various patrol approaches are used to increase actual and apparent patrol visibility. Tandem patrol, which utilizes two marked one-man vehicles, one of which follows the other at intervals of one-half to several blocks, can be used. Also, two one-man vehicles patrolling in a parallel fashion, with one on the street and the other in the alley, should be considered. To support the parallel approach, and as an aid for responding to calls for service, the

local Boy Scout troop or youth organizations can be used to paint street numbers on the alley entrances. Both the tandem and parallel approaches are useful in providing better coverage for burglary-in-progress and alarm response calls, but the additional deterrent value of these approaches did not appear to justify the added cost and coordination difficulties.

e. Randomized Patterns for Patrol

A randomized patrol pattern within each assigned patrol area is preferable to a fixed or habitual pattern, since a burglar cannot plan his jobs based on observation of patrol activities.

For example, one of the target areas was experiencing a commercial burglary problem in an industrial complex where the suspect's M.O. was smashing windows and taking business machines. Stake-outs, saturation, and other patrol techniques were used but none resulted in an apprehension. The law enforcement agency was working with a law enforcement agency in an adjacent community on a new plan of attack when a passing patrol unit spotted a burglary in progress and apprehended the burglar. The suspect admitted committing the burglaries in the industrial complex which had plagued the organization for over a year. The investigation and follow-up discussion with the subject revealed the following story.

"The burglar drove a new Chrysler Imperial Le Baron equipped with heavy duty suspension and an eight band police radio. He explained that patrol cars do not pay as much attention to luxury cars parked at, or driving through, a business district as they might a pickup truck or older model car. Also, the Chrysler had a top speed that few patrol cars could match. The suspect kept the radio set on the frequency used by the police agency patrolling the area he was going to work. The suspect frequently followed patrol cars noting any particular patrol patterns, speeds, and coffee and lunch stops. After categorizing these patterns, the suspect would drive at normal speed from the business he planned to hit to the patrol car's coffee stop. He would note the time required to travel this distance, then he would drive back to the business at a high rate of speed and note the time required to make the return trip. He also knew approximately

how much time was required for an alarm company to receive an alarm, check it, call the police, and for the police to dispatch the area patrol car. By combining all of this information the suspect had a close estimate of the time he could spend at a particular burglary scene. At a later date the suspect would follow the patrol car to its coffee stop then drive immediately to his planned burglary and make the hit. Since his average time per hit was less than two minutes, the suspect stated he was almost always completely out of the industrial complex before the patrol car was dispatched, and the suspect was usually several miles away by the time the patrol car arrived at the scene.

We found it interesting that the suspect, who knew every detail of the patrol pattern, was not aware of our five week long undercover stake-out, but simply had not hit during that time as he felt he had taken so much that he would wait for the companies to replace the stolen machines with new ones before he hit them again.

Another interesting point was that the suspect did not hit at random, then try to sell the stolen property. Almost without exception the suspect had orders for certain machines and often was told where the machines could be found. The orders were placed by a business machine company who then leased the stolen machines to another business.

The receiving company did not record serial numbers on the lease agreements forcing law enforcement to check machines of nearly every rental customer."

In order to avoid situations like those described above, patrol must be random and unpredictable to potential burglars. Patrol shift (or watch) changes should be staggered and provide for some overlap coverage. Coffee and meal breaks should also be varied as to time and place. Habitual patrol patterns are easy to form and easy to detect. Single man patrol units may be more prone to habitual patterns than are two-man units, due to the extra boredom of preventative patrol when alone.

Some police departments have used mathematical devices to help randomize patrol patterns. These include elaborate computer generated routings, random number tables, and even dice! These approaches all seek to accomplish the same objective as does the more normally used manual approach. The objective is to achieve an unpredictable patrol pattern which results in the patrol unit spending time in various areas of its assigned beat in proportion to the area's crime experience.

2. Patrol as a Suspect Surveillance Force

Preventive patrol often involves aggressive action on the part of the police in stopping and talking with persons using the streets, sidewalks and alleys in high-crime areas. The purpose is not only to field interview those individuals who are suspected of having committed crimes, but more broadly to collect potential criminal intelligence and to create an atmosphere of police presence and concern that will reassure honest citizens and discourage dishonest ones.

The principal advantage to patrol as a suspect surveillance force is that there are far less burglary suspects than there are burglary targets. Therefore, the manpower requirements for suspect surveillance are less than for target surveillance. However, the approach presents other difficulties. Suspects are highly mobile, and the set of "suspects" is variable, while targets change little and are fixed.

a. Suspect Information

To keep current on known and suspected burglars, patrol forces must be provided with information on the suspects, who they are, and where they are likely to be found.

Suspect information must be developed by a careful analysis of burglary reports, prior arrests, and other offender data. The information must be compiled into a format readily usable by patrol units and maintained in a timely manner. An effective technique is to provide each patrol unit with a set of photos, descriptions, and MO's of persons with recent entries of a burglary on their rap sheets. Thus, the patrol unit has constantly available the information necessary to make a positive identification and/or conduct

an effective field interview. It was found that suspect files were more usable by patrol if they were limited to 10 to 15 of the most active suspects in the area scheduled for surveillance.

b. Group Surveillance Techniques

Suspect surveillance can be done on a general basis; for example, watching teenagers on their way to and from school, since most communities show patterns of residential burglaries along major school routes for the hours preceding, during, and after school sessions. On the burglary abatement program, 50 percent of the offenders arrested were under age 18. Therefore, it is recommended that law enforcement agencies increase their liaison with students and school officials to curb truancy rates, and thus decrease the opportunity of daytime residential burglaries.

The Crime-Specific agencies found that plain-clothes officers were most effective in dealing with youthful suspects and informers. By stopping at juvenile hangouts and spending time with them, the patrol officers increased the juvenile's interest and respect for law enforcement. By being readily available, the officers were able to become acquainted with the youngsters and obtain information about burglary patterns and other activity in the neighborhood. In this situation the officer must be willing to allow the juveniles to set the tempo and the areas of discussion, but will find that most juveniles are willing and reliable informers as long as their identity is protected.

c. "Bird-Dogging" Suspected Burglars

The extreme level of suspect surveillance is constant tracking or "bird-dogging" specific known offenders. When done undercover, bird-dogging is primarily to apprehend the suspect in the act of committing a burglary or receiving stolen property. When done openly, bird-dogging is intended to discourage the suspect from attempting burglary. For all but the most habitual of burglars, bird-dogging on a 24-hour basis is too expensive to maintain; however, an increased level of observations and field interrogations is generally possible, and was reported to be effective in the Crime-Specific Program.

d. Receiver Surveillance

The emphasis of burglary-preventive patrol can also be placed on surveillance of known and suspected receivers of stolen property. In theory, at least, there are fewer receivers (fences) than there are burglars or burglary targets.

Traditionally, law enforcement has devoted special manpower details to the surveillance of pawn shops, and has relied primarily upon burglary investigators to disclose other types of receivers. The experience of the burglary abatement projects indicates that there is a broad-based receiver market, and that pawn shops play a relatively minor role in the disposal of stolen property. For these reasons, burglary abatement efforts addressed at the receiver market were viewed as a team effort and are discussed separately in Chapter VII. Those efforts include contribution by patrol forces, as well as investigators and intelligence.

3. Patrol as an Interdiction Force

For a patrol to function effectively as an interdiction force, it is necessary that: (1) burglaries be detected and reported to the patrol while the burglary is still in progress, and (2) the patrol response time be less than that required to complete the burglary.

As a practical matter, no more than 19 percent of the 7,763 burglaries reported in the burglary abatement program could have been reported while in progress. This figure includes detections made by properly functioning alarm systems (3 percent), by patrol observation (2 percent), by passing citizens (5 percent), and by victims who were on the premise at the time of the burglary or returned while it was in progress (9 percent).

The Security section of the burglary abatement program includes emphasis on alarm systems to detect burglaries, and hardware improvements to delay the successful completion of burglaries. The Public Education section program includes attempts to improve reporting by victims and non-victims.

Patrol itself must attempt to improve its own effectiveness primarily by shifting patrol emphasis to those areas experiencing the heaviest burglary rates, thus increasing the likelihood of detecting burglaries in progress and reducing their response time to calls for service in the high burglary areas.

D. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

1. Summary

The preventive patrol techniques for a Burglary Abatement program should be designed to help deter burglaries in general, but more specifically, they should be planned to decrease the percentage of burglaries occurring where entry is made at a point observable to patrol. Changes in patrol techniques should also be expected to increase the detections of burglaries by patrol personnel, and to increase the percentages of on-the-scene apprehensions.

Patrol planners need to deploy the available manpower in proportion to the changing patterns and times of the burglary experience in the area. The information needed for planning must come from a continuous analysis of the communities burglary experience, while the necessary flexibility in scheduling can be achieved through: (1) creation and use of unassigned tactical patrol teams, (2) use of overtime, (3) a change to team policing, or (4) overlap scheduling of patrol shifts or watches.

Preventative patrol tactics should emphasize improved suspect surveillance rather than building surveillance. This approach requires that patrol units be supplied with current descriptions of the groups and individuals who are most likely to commit burglaries, their known habits, and techniques.

Preventative patrol routes should be random in order to make pre-planning as difficult as possible for potential burglars. For the same reason, a mix of marked and unmarked cars, bicycles, motor scooters and foot patrols should be employed by patrol at irregular intervals.

2. Findings

In order to determine the effectiveness of preventative patrol techniques tried in the Crime-Specific Program, the following elements of information were selected for analysis from the 7,763 burglary reports received:

- Entry points visible to patrol units.
- Burglary detections by patrol units.
- Offender apprehensions by patrol units.

Table V-1 presents the percentages of residential burglaries where the entry point was visible to patrol. The figures indicate that preventative patrol activities may have influenced the choice of entry points by burglars in all but the High Risk area, although the percentages for all communities combined remained unchanged.

Table V-2 presents the same information for Commercial and Industrial Burglaries. As might be expected, Commercial and Industrial facilities generally have better patrol visibility, so the percentages shown tend to be higher than those in Table V-1 for residential burglaries. The quarterly percentages indicate that patrol activities probably had a direct effect in the Low Risk Community, and may have been partially effective in all communities.

Burglaries Detected by Patrol are presented in Table V-3. The total number of detections was small (159 cases out of 7,763 reports), and the percentages fail to indicate any improvement during the project.

Table V-4 shows the percentages of burglaries cleared by on-the-scene arrests by patrol units. There were only 131 on-the-scene arrests in the 7,763 burglaries reported. The percentages fail to indicate an increase in burglary arrests made on-the-scene by patrol units.

TABLE V-1. PERCENTAGES OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES WHERE ENTRY POINT IS VISIBLE TO PATROL

Community	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	19.3	21.6	22.9	16.5
Low-Medium Risk	21.4	20.8	20.6	19.3
High-Medium Risk	23.3	27.6	20.2	21.7
High Risk	28.0	30.5	27.9	32.6
All Communities	24.3	26.8	23.0	24.3

TABLE V-2. PERCENTAGES OF COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES WHERE ENTRY POINT IS VISIBLE TO PATROL

Community	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	48.8	43.8	21.4	26.3
Low-Medium Risk	43.4	43.8	55.1	41.9
High-Medium Risk	45.3	46.4	42.5	41.8
High Risk	44.9	50.5	52.2	41.0
All Communities	45.1	47.4	47.7	41.0

TABLE V-3. PERCENTAGES OF ALL BURGLARIES DETECTED BY PATROL

Community	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	2.1	2.1	0.0	1.0
Low-Medium Risk	1.6	1.7	6.4	3.7
High-Medium Risk	1.6	1.0	1.9	1.0
High Risk	2.2	1.9	1.1	2.3
All Communities	1.9	1.5	2.6	2.0

TABLE V-4. PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL BURGLARIES CLEARED BY ON-THE-SCENE PATROL ARREST

Community	Quarterly Percentages			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Low Risk	1.0	0.6	0.8	1.4
Low-Medium Risk	1.6	1.7	2.3	0.4
High-Medium Risk	1.4	2.6	1.2	0.4
High Risk	1.9	1.5	1.1	1.8
All Communities	1.7	1.9	1.4	1.5

CHAPTER VI. INVESTIGATION

A. HYPOTHESIS

Improved investigation techniques and procedures will decrease burglaries by removing more offenders from the community, and by deterring potential burglars through increasing their risk of being arrested.

B. OBJECTIVES

Changes in the investigation efforts of a local law enforcement agency should be designed to achieve the following specific objectives:

- Improve the clearance and arrest rates for burglaries.
- Increase the complaint filing rate of "booked" burglary suspects.
- Increase the conviction rate for burglaries.

The first two objectives are largely attainable by law enforcement agencies themselves. The third goal, which pertains to increased conviction rates, is dependent to some degree on the judicial system. However, law enforcement agencies are able to increase convictions by performing more thorough burglary investigations, thus building stronger cases against arrested offenders.

C. PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

Most law enforcement agencies can improve their burglary investigation efforts by one or more of the following approaches:

- Increasing the effective manpower available for investigations.
- Improving the quality (completeness and accuracy) of burglary information.
- Improving the processing of burglary information.

1. Increasing Investigation Manpower

Short of assigning additional sworn personnel to the burglary section of the detective bureau, there are other approaches that should be considered.

a. Use of Patrol Officers

Patrol officers can be assigned some of the investigative functions normally assigned to detectives and crime lab technicians, particularly those associated with the initial on-site investigation.

The nature of the teaming arrangement can vary from: (1) a full scale team policing approach, (2) a special burglary enforcement unit, or (3) simply adding investigation duties to the long list of functions performed by patrol officers.

All three teaming approaches were tried in the Crime-Specific Program, and all were reported to be effective ways for making additional manpower available for burglary investigations. In all three, patrol officers were expected to conduct the initial on-site investigation consisting of interviewing the victim and any witnesses; identifying and protecting physical evidence; identifying the items stolen; determining the time, place and method of entry; type of tools used; and collecting descriptions of any suspects. In some agencies, the patrol officers were expected to take latent fingerprints and collect other physical evidence, although crime lab specialists were on call if the patrol officer felt they were needed.

One agency estimated that the additional investigative functions required beat patrol officers to spend an average of 20 to 30 minutes per burglary call, as compared with the 10 to 15 minutes formerly used in taking a report.

Patrol officers who are expected to perform burglary investigative functions require additional training. The Los Angeles Police Department spent approximately three days in investigation training for their patrolmen who were part of a team policing effort. Other agencies, which assigned investigative duties to regular patrol officers, devoted an average of six hours to training in interviewing, recognizing and protecting physical evidence, latent fingerprints, and crime scene reporting.

b. Other Approaches for Increasing Investigation Manpower

Another approach to increase the effective size of the investigative staffs is to use non-sworn "investigative aides" to handle much of the routine file searches and paper work, thus permitting the sworn investigators more time

for direct investigations. An investigator who has access to a competent aide or assistant can be expected to handle a larger caseload, or to do a more thorough job with his current caseload.

The net effect of additional staffing is to increase the investigation time available for each reported burglary. The desired result is a more thorough investigation leading to improvements in clearance arrests and complaint-filing rates.

Another way to achieve the same effect is to reduce the number of cases that require the attention of investigators. By carefully screening out those cases which have little chance for solution, investigators can concentrate their efforts on the remaining cases. For example, burglary reports that are "cold" and those without suspect descriptions, physical evidence, or specific identification of items taken may not deserve additional investigation beyond that done in compiling the initial report. Screening criteria should be based on a careful analysis of the elements of information that are associated with previous successful investigations, compared with that information contained in a comprehensive initial burglary report.

2. Improving the Quality of Burglary Information

a. The Burglary Report

Burglary investigation begins with the preparation of the initial report. The person taking that initial report, by what he asks and observes, and by what he records, can greatly influence the chances of clearing a burglary case. Crime scene training is obviously important, but the single form of guidance that is always present during the initial investigations is the burglary report form.

Burglary reports vary significantly among law enforcement agencies. Many are simple forms with a few general headings and blank space for the reporting officer to make whatever notes or comments he feels appropriate. Such forms may work well enough in small highly trained departments where there is close interaction between detectives and patrol personnel. However, most departments can benefit from a more structured burglary report format. Departments that do crime pattern and modus operandi analysis find that structured reporting is essential.

The layout of the report form is important to make it as easy as possible to complete and process, but the emphasis should be on a form that identifies all the items of information that may contribute to the investigation.

The following set of burglary report descriptors are suggested as minimal:

- (1) Unique Report Number
- (2) Report date
- (3) Reporting Officer
 - Name and badge number
- (4) Location
 - Street address, and beat or reporting district
- (5) Time of Occurrence
 - Daylight, nighttime, or unknown
 - Exact time, or begin and end times of a range estimate
- (6) Date and time of first report to police
- (7) How detected
 - Alarm, victim, witness, patrol, or other
- (8) Type of facility
 - Single family house, apartment, other residential, commercial, industrial, or other
- (9) Occupancy status at time of entry
 - Occupied, unoccupied, or unknown
- (10) Point of Entry and Location
 - Door, window, wall, roof, floor (location: front, rear, side)
- (11) Method of Entry
 - Open/unlocked, body force, breaks glass, pries, cuts, smashes, attack lock, concealment, unknown, and other

- (12) Property taken
 - Article type, identification, description, and estimated value of each item. Total value of loss.
- (13) Physical evidence
 - Fingerprints, footprints, tool marks, tire marks, other.
- (14) Suspect information
 - Names, descriptions, and sources of information.
- (15) Suspect vehicle information
 - Licenses, description, and source of information.
- (16) Victim information
 - Name, address, phone number, and hours for contact.
- (17) Witness information
 - Names, addresses, phone numbers (if any).
- (18) Other modus operandi information
 - Alarm disabled, drapes or shades drawn, repeat of prior burglary.

Additional items that might be considered include:

- (19) Type of tools used.
- (20) Visibility of entry point from street.
- (21) Lighting of entry point for nighttime burglaries.
- (22) Victim insured or not.

b. Suspect Descriptions

In burglary investigation, suspect descriptions are not generally available from the victim since the majority of burglaries occur when there is no one on the premises. For this reason, increased efforts should be made to locate other potential witnesses, principally neighbors for residential burglaries and persons considered likely to have been in the area for commercial

burglaries. Delivery men know their territory and frequently notice visitors and different vehicles.

Individual physical descriptions provided by witnesses, Field Investigation Reports, prior bookings, wanted persons lists, and other sources all attempt to make possible the recognition of an individual as a possible suspect. In addition, the physical descriptions of suspects from various cases can be compared to help link one case to others (this same situation holds true for vehicle descriptions).

The value of witness reports and other types of suspect descriptions depends on: (1) the accuracy of the description; and (2) the investigator's ability to record, retrieve and compare descriptors. The descriptions of suspects by witnesses are known to be of questionable accuracy, while those prepared by Field Interrogation, or by police personnel during bookings are assumed to be more reliable.

Based on discussions with investigative personnel, it appears that the following list may represent the appropriate order of the reliability and availability for reported suspect descriptions (more study should be done to determine the actual order of reliability):

- (1) Sex
- (2) Race (white/black/Mexican-American/Oriental/other)
- (3) Build (rather than specific height and weight ranges)
- (4) Dress (color and type of clothing)
- (5) Unusual features or marks (facial hair, scars, tattoos)
- (6) Color of hair and style
- (7) Color of eyes
- (8) Height
- (9) Weight
- (10) Age

Although "build" is considered more reliable than "height" and "weight," few report forms provide space or instructions for recording "build," while all

ask for estimates of height and weight. It may be possible to improve the accuracy and use of suspect descriptions if efforts were made to standardize build descriptions, and to use them in preference to height and weight estimates. Such a program might take the form of developing a set of typical build profile cards that could be shown to witnesses for their selection of the most appropriate one. The build classification could then be compared in separate description reports. This type of comparison should be easier and might be more reliable than comparing specific heights and weight, since error allowances are required but are difficult to determine.

c. Vehicle Descriptions

Vehicle descriptions are generally reported as available and reliable in the following order:

- (1) Color
- (2) Basic type (i.e., truck, motorcycle, sedan, convertible)
- (3) Make (i.e., Plymouth, Ford, Datsun)
- (4) Age (within 2-3 years of model year)
- (5) Condition and marks (unusual features)
- (6) Model (i.e., Fury, Vega)
- (7) Year (exact model year)
- (8) State of license
- (9) Partial license
- (10) Complete license

Because most burglars find vehicles a necessity, the collection and use of suspect vehicle descriptions should receive special attention. License checks should be run routinely on vehicles matching descriptions on the suspect vehicle list. In addition, vehicles parked in residential alleys during daylight hours, and in commercial areas during non-business hours should be checked. A surprisingly high percentage of such checks made by one of the Crime-Specific agencies, identified individuals with prior police contact as suspects, in Field Interrogation files, and/or with previous police records.

Such checks are particularly helpful in associating individuals who are sharing the use of vehicles, and therefore may be teamed in criminal activity.

d. Physical Evidence

The collection of latent fingerprints and other physical evidence can be improved through emphasis and training. This was done in the Crime-Specific Program; however, the actual use of latent prints from burglaries remained generally unchanged, i.e., the prints are classified and filed, and matches are attempted on burglary suspects. Print files quickly become too large to attempt all possible matches, and therefore become largely inactive. The time and specialized skill required to classify and match prints are the primary limiting factors in their use for the large numbers of burglary cases. More work is needed on automated systems for classifying, retrieving and matching fingerprints.

e. Stolen Property/Pawn Files

Stolen property and pawn files should be routinely maintained and compared by agencies with pawn shops in their jurisdiction. The use of these files was not significantly changed during the Crime-Specific Program, but some additional effort was made to identify frequent pawners, and those who pawned more than one item of the same type.

A computer-based system which includes information from pawn transactions should contain the following elements:

- (1) Pawn ticket-number.
- (2) Code number assigned to the store.
- (3) Indicate whether the transaction is a pawn or buy.
- (4) Date of the transaction.
- (5) Description of the person making the transaction. This information should include:
 - Sex
 - Descent
 - Color hair

- Color eyes
- Build
- Height
- Weight
- Date of birth
- First, last and middle name

(6) Description of the property. This information should parallel that in the burglary report and includes:

- Article
- Brand
- Serial number
- Model number
- Markings or inscription
- Color

Pawn files can be searched for property matching the description of that reported stolen in a burglary report, and the burglary file can be searched for property matching that pawned by a suspect.

f. Undercover Information Sources

Undercover investigation efforts include the use of paid and non-paid informers, suspect surveillance, and "buys" and "sales" of stolen property. Police intelligence units may support special investigation efforts, such as those to identify known narcotics pushers as receivers for stolen property.

Undercover investigation efforts applied to building and maintaining improved suspect files on burglars and receivers probably pay the highest dividends in improving the burglary clearance and arrest rate.

3. Improving Information Processing

Most law enforcement agencies have a wealth of information concerning known and suspected offenders, individual burglaries, and fencing operations.

Unfortunately, much of this information is of little value to the average investigator, mainly because of the difficulties of locating individual items of information and linking them together to form meaningful conclusions. These difficulties arise from several common sources including:

- The separation of departmental functions and files into separate operational units.
- The lack of consistent formats and item definitions among various reports and files.
- The lack of clerical and/or computer system support for the investigator.
- Caseloads that prohibit the expenditure of time required for thorough investigations.

The Crime-Specific agencies found that a closer interaction between patrol and investigation helped reduce these problems, particularly those associated with consistency in reporting and filing. For example, patrol and investigation personnel joined forces to "package" suspect information to make it more readily usable for both. The result was a current suspect kit containing information from a variety of sources including arrest reports, crime reports, field interviews, witness and informant reports, undercover activities, and juvenile reports.

A typical suspect kit should contain three sections:

- Suspect name(s), description, address, previous record, known associates, MO description.
- Vehicle(s) description and license, and names of suspects known to have used the vehicle.
- Photographs of suspects and associates--frequently Xerox reproductions with several suspects per page. The photos can be from previous bookings, or those that are taken during undercover operations.

Ideally, several copies of the list should be maintained. One agency produced them for each patrol unit. Others maintained only one or two copies which were shared by various users.

One method for manually organizing suspect information is by sorting the suspects into types of modus operandi as shown in the chart of Typical MO Burglary Profile (see Table VI-1). With a computer base matching system, a complete search can be made of suspect files for descriptors that match those from the particular burglary being investigated.

Case clearance rates can be influenced by department policy and investigator practices with regard to "cop-outs"--an arrested suspect's confession to other burglaries in exchange for guaranteed immunity from future prosecution on those cases. Depending on department policy, investigators should be able to increase and partially verify cop-outs through comparing the MO descriptors in burglary reports with the MO of the suspect. One Crime-Specific agency used the polygraph (lie-detector) to encourage and verify cop-outs where the MOs were comparable.

The investigation task is not finished when a suspect has been arrested. The thoroughness of his preparation of case and suspect background reports, directly influence the action of the deputy district attorney in accepting, amending, or rejecting the police complaint. It is important that the investigator and the deputy district attorney share the same guidelines for what constitutes an acceptable case, and the best way to achieve such an understanding is through direct discussion leading to a working agreement.

D. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

1. Summary

Burglary investigation techniques and procedures should be changed to improve the clearance and arrest rates, and increase the complaint filing and conviction rates for burglaries. In order to accomplish those objectives, investigators need to: (1) increase the effective manpower available to perform more detailed investigations by spending more time per case, (2) improve the quality and completeness of burglary and suspect information, and (3) provide rapid and easy access to all relevant information which can help the investigator. Additionally, detective or investigator bureaus should consider developing a formal approach for determining the amount of time to allocate for each investigation based on the initial crime report. This

TABLE VI-1. TYPICAL MO BURGLARY PROFILE

MO Descriptors	"Hot Prowl" or "Cat Burglar"	Youthful Opportunist	Smash and Grab	Most Common Residential	Most Common Commercial	Most Common Other Businesses
Type Premises	Single family homes/small apartment buildings	Homes and apartments, including garages	Small commercial/retail stores	Single family homes	Small retail stores	Offices
Location	Less dense residential areas	On routes to/from school	Mixed residential and commercial areas	All residential areas	Frequently near freeway access	Individual office structure and small complexes
Occupancy Status	Occupied	Unoccupied	Unoccupied	Unoccupied	Unoccupied	Unoccupied
Point/Method of Entry	Unlocked window	Unlocked doors	Display window smash	Door or window (no force or minor force)	Door or window (forced entry)	Door or window (forced entry)
Tools Used	None	None	Thrown brick or rock	Lock defeating or pry	Impact cutting and forcing tools	Impact cutting and forcing tools
Items Taken	Cash, jewelry, small items	Small sound equipment, sporting goods, cash	Anything on display	TV, sound equipment, sporting goods	Cash, merchandise, business machine	Business machines
Time	Any night - 12:PM to 5:AM	Weekday - 12:Noon to 5:PM	Weekday - 9:AM to 6:PM	Weekday - 9:AM to 6:PM	Weekend night - 10:PM to 7:AM	Weekend night - 10:PM to 7:AM
Property Damage	Removed window screen	May vandalize	Window	Minor or none	Point of entry, may attack safe	Point of entry

approach requires that the agency determine which elements of information about a burglary are needed to warrant further investigation of the incident.

When clearance, arrest, and complaint filing rates rose during the Crime-Specific Program, the agencies attributed most of the improvement to additional manpower support for their burglary investigation efforts. The following investigative techniques and procedures were tried with the following reported results:

- Use of patrol personnel to support investigation improved patrol morale and provided more manpower for investigation activities.
- Investigative techniques changed little, but improved reporting, and more investigation time per case improved results.
- Closer work with District Attorneys, Courts, Parole, and Probation probably contributed to improved complaint filing rates on those persons who were arrested.

2. Findings

In order to determine the effectiveness of the investigation techniques tried in the burglary abatement program, the following elements of information were selected for analysis from the 7,763 burglary reports and 1,078 offender reports received:

- Case clearance status
- Police disposition of arrested offenders*

Table VI-2 presents the percentages of cases cleared. The percentages are cumulative, based on the total cases and total clearances from the start of the program to the end of each month shown. Of all reported burglaries, 16.5 percent were reported as cleared by arrest, exception, or death of the offender. This clearance percentage is equal to the 1971 and 1972 statewide figure of 16.5 percent as reported by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics. The burglary clearance percentages for each of the risk communities show that the lower-risk communities exceed statewide figures. The Low-Risk Community has a clearance percentage of 26.9, and the Low-Medium Risk Community has a clearance percentage of 24.2 percent. Comparison of the percentages of

* Data on court dispositions was not available for analysis.

clearances by community show that clearances decrease as the number of cases (amount of risk) increases. The all community clearance percentages also show that the Crime-Specific Program effects may have peaked out during the fourth month when clearances reached 20.3 percent.

Of the 7,763 reported burglaries, 1,197 (15.5 percent) were cleared by the arrests of 1,078 offenders. An additional 86 cases were reported as cleared exceptionally, by the death of the offender or by other types of clearance. Thus, 93.2 percent of all cleared cases were cleared by arrest. Table VI-3 presents the monthly cumulative percentages of cases cleared by arrest, and shows that the maximum percentage of 19.1 percent for all communities was reached in the fourth month of the Crime-Specific Program. The reason for the decline from that point is not known.

Table VI-4 shows how adult arrests were handled by police agencies. Of the adult arrests, 64.5 percent resulted in filing felony complaints as compared to the 1971 statewide average of 61 percent, which was calculated by Bureau of Criminal Statistics based on summary data received from law enforcement agencies. The highest percentage of felony complaints are filed in the High-Medium Risk community which also has the highest percentage of adult offenders (60 percent).

Table VI-5 shows police dispositions of juvenile arrests. Juveniles in the High Risk community were the least likely to be released and the most likely to be referred to Juvenile Court or Probation.

TABLE VI-2. MONTHLY PERCENTAGES OF CLEARANCES

Community	Cumulative Monthly Percentages (Running Average)											
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th
Low Risk	37.7	33.6	31.0	31.5	32.7	31.3	30.8	29.6	29.2	27.5	27.6	26.9
Low-Medium Risk	18.0	23.7	23.4	24.0	25.8	25.9	25.8	25.8	25.8	25.8	25.1	24.2
High-Medium Risk	15.5	20.6	22.3	21.9	20.3	21.1	20.0	18.5	17.7	17.0	16.0	15.2
High Risk	12.6	14.1	14.1	14.4	14.1	13.4	12.7	12.2	11.3	11.0	10.9	10.7
All Communities	16.6	19.8	20.0	20.3	20.1	19.8	19.4	18.7	18.0	17.6	17.1	16.5
Burglary cases totaled: 7,763												
Cleared cases totaled: 1,283												

TABLE VI-3. MONTHLY PERCENTAGES OF CLEARANCES BY ARREST

Community	Cumulative Monthly Percentages (Running Average)											
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th
Low Risk	37.7	33.6	31.0	30.7	32.0	30.3	29.4	28.3	27.8	26.0	25.9	25.2
Low-Medium Risk	17.3	23.3	23.2	23.7	25.1	25.0	24.7	24.7	24.7	24.5	23.8	22.9
High-Medium Risk	15.0	19.2	21.0	20.6	19.3	19.5	19.1	17.6	16.9	16.1	15.1	14.5
High Risk	10.1	11.1	11.4	11.9	11.7	11.1	10.6	10.3	9.7	9.6	9.5	9.4
All Communities	15.2	18.8	19.0	19.1	18.9	18.7	18.3	17.6	17.0	16.6	16.1	15.5
Cases cleared by arrest totaled: 1,197												
Individuals arrested totaled: 1,078												

TABLE VI-4. DISPOSITION OF ADULT ARRESTS*

Community Type and Number of Adult Arrests		Percentages of Disposition by Type			
Type	Arrests	Released	Misdemeanor Complaint	Felony Complaint	Other and Unknown
Low Risk	23	8.6	17.3	73.9	0
Low-Medium Risk	176	8.5	17.6	67.0	6.8
High-Medium Risk	196	19.8	6.6	67.8	6.1
High Risk	149	16.1	14.0	55.7	14.0
All Communities	544	14.7	12.7	64.5	8.1
*Adult arrests were 50.5 percent of all arrests.					

TABLE VI-5. DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE ARRESTS*

Community Type and Number of Juvenile Arrests		Percentages of Disposition by Type			
Type	Arrests	Released	Handled by Police Agency	Petition to Juvenile Court or Referred To Probation	Other and Unknown
Low Risk	71	28.1	25.3	39.4	7.0
Low-Medium Risk	157	26.7	22.2	47.7	3.1
High-Medium Risk	130	29.2	14.6	51.5	4.6
High Risk	176	10.7	23.8	60.7	4.5
All Communities	534	22.3	21.4	52.0	4.3
*Juvenile arrests were 49.5 percent of all arrests.					

CHAPTER VII. DECREASING THE RECEIVER MARKET

A. HYPOTHESIS

Increased detections and apprehensions of the dealers in stolen property and improved property identification will make it more difficult for burglars to convert stolen merchandise into cash and will result in a reduction of burglaries.

B. OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of the burglary abatement efforts addressed at the receiver market are to:

- *Increase arrests of persons engaged in the receipt and sale of stolen property.*
- *Decrease the saleability and improve the recovery potential for stolen property through better identification of items.*
- *Discourage the public from buying stolen property.*

C. PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

The following are abatement techniques that can be utilized in a program directed toward the receiver market.

- Analyze the receiver's market.
- Sponsor property ID program.
- Increase pawn shop surveillance.
- Check used appliance dealers.
- Check rental dealers.
- Check garage sales, swap meets and flea markets.
- Publicize stolen property lists.
- Conduct intelligence operations.

1. Analyzing the Stolen Property Market

The first step in developing abatement strategies directed at the receiver market is to analyze the receiver market to determine where the stolen property is going. Partial answers can be obtained: (1) by reviewing previous property recovery data, (2) from undercover "sales" and "buys," and (3) from tracking known suspected burglars and receivers.

a. Market Areas

Geographic market areas for stolen property are likely to be the same or nearly identical to those geographic areas where the property was stolen. Stolen business machines are resold to businesses; stolen construction equipment and supplies are resold to construction companies; television sets and sound equipment from homes and apartments are resold for use in other homes and apartments.

There are no signs of any significant "Robin Hood" effect in which property is redistributed from the wealthy to the poor. Nor are there any signs that the poor, who suffer higher burglary rates, do so to the benefit of wealthier buyers of stolen property. It appears that the number of buyers in a community is essentially in balance with its number of burglaries, i.e., supply and demand are localized for most types of stolen property.

Easily identifiable high-value items, such as expensive jewelry, art, and some uncommon business machines are exceptions in the sense that the local market, while theoretically available, is too narrow to warrant the risk of local redistribution. Similarly, open communities, where people know each other and each other's property, are not likely to be good markets for neighborhood redistribution. The same is true for active business associations, homeowner groups, and community alert groups. Whether a "market" is a single census tract or a city of 300,000, it appears that the things stolen there are the same things most likely to be bought there as stolen property, unless the public attitude can be shaped to discourage such purchases. The types of abatement techniques tried in the Crime-Specific Program, and described below, are more easily implemented where some community organization already exists; it is simply easier to make use of existing communication links than to create new ones.

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

Based on written reports and discussions with the agencies participating in the Crime-Specific Program, it appears that the majority of stolen property stays in the local community and ends up in the hands of unknowing or uncaring citizens. However, there are a number of distinct paths to this local redistribution cycle (see Figure VII-1).

b. Distribution Channels

Probably the most common path makes use of existing distribution outlets for new and "used" merchandise; i.e., television and appliance dealers, business machine dealers, the all-purpose outlets such as "second-hand" stores, and equipment rental agencies.

Pawn shops seem to have a decreasing percentage of the business, probably because of the restrictions placed on them over the years, and the continuing surveillance of their activities by law enforcement agencies.

The second most important path is apparently the direct sale to the consumers; reputable citizens who snap up bargains for cash, such as an extra television for the den or children's bedroom, or an electric typewriter for the office. Customer contact is frequently made in public meeting places, such as local bars, barber shops, as well as in the customer's place of business. In some areas, local swap meets and garage sales bring the seller and the buyer together. Advertising in the local newspapers is also undoubtedly used. The following ad was seen under the "Garage Sale" heading of a local California paper: *"If you have the garage, we have the merchandise..."*

Another redistribution path is the use of rental agency outlets for business machines, televisions, bicycles, and other commonly rented items. Tools and equipment may also fall into these channels, although it appears that the more direct route of resale to other contractors is preferred for construction tools, equipment and supplies.

c. Receivers

Persons who receive stolen property directly from burglars can be categorized as follows:

- Professional Receivers
- Burglar/Receivers
- Casual Receivers




Figure VII-1. Redistribution of Stolen Property

(1) Professional Receivers. The professional receiver is one who steadily buys and sells stolen goods, either through a legitimate business front or as a sole enterprise. The major problems for law enforcement with the professional receiver is to determine: (1) how the receiver is dealing with burglars, and (2) how the receiver is disposing of stolen property. This information can be obtained by staking out the suspected "fence" locations until his operation is known. This, of course, is a time-consuming process. In order to present a solid case in court on an arrested professional receiver, it is often necessary to gather evidence under the authority of a search warrant. A warrant requires a detailed description of the stolen property expected to be found. This can be accomplished by tracking a known burglar with a piece of identified stolen property to the receiver and then securing a search warrant. For a conviction, it is usually necessary to identify stolen property on the premise from several different burglaries.

In a recent case, a suspected receiver was a TV rental and repair service. A known burglar was observed entering the store carrying a television set. The officer on stake-out noticed where the set was placed in the store. After establishing that the set was one taken in a burglary the day before, a search warrant was obtained. The subsequent search produced several more stolen sets. Using the rental records, the television sets that had been rented out were checked in the customer's homes and businesses. Because of known serial numbers, more stolen sets were recovered. This type of operation is very difficult to discover, since the receiver buys only property which is of the type the store handles in its normal business.

(2) Burglar/Receiver. The active burglary suspect can also receive stolen property from other burglars. In a recent case, the arrested party was an active burglar and also a receiver for other burglars. Property taken in different burglaries were recovered; some were committed by the suspect and others by different burglars. The case was made by keeping the suspect's house under surveillance until enough information was gathered to obtain a search warrant. Other burglars were seen entering with property that could be identified as stolen. In many cases, it is difficult to make a burglary case against a skilled burglar because of the care taken by the burglar to

avoid witnesses, leaving prints, or physical evidence. In these cases, it may be easier to build a case on possession or receiving stolen property.

(3) Casual Receiver. The most common type of receiver is the casual or reputable receiver. He is a businessman who buys office machinery for his business, or the barber shop customer or tavern patron who buys property from people coming in off the street offering merchandise at a tremendous savings. The reputable citizen who buys this type of property is aiding the burglar as surely as if he was driving the get-away car. If law enforcement could stop citizens from buying property off the streets, the burglary rate would decrease.

One of the Crime-Specific agencies made a survey of the business establishments in the target area. With the cooperation of the businessmen, they made a check of all office machines and stereo equipment found on the premises. Through this method, they recovered a total of eight electric typewriters, one calculator, and one color television set which had been reported stolen in burglaries and grand thefts in the same area. These businessmen were not arrested, but were severely admonished and were told to expect additional checks.

Juvenile burglars (18 years old or younger) constituted 50 percent of all burglars apprehended in the 12 months of the Crime-Specific Program and undoubtedly account for a larger percentage of all burglaries committed. Based on discussions with agency personnel, it appears that many juveniles frequently steal for their own use, or to trade or sell to other juveniles.

The truly professional "big-time" receiver who can handle a high volume of merchandise probably makes use of the same local distribution methods mentioned above, as well as wholesale distribution activities. Special customer groups may include large furnished apartment projects, hotels, motels and rental agencies for TVs and appliances, and new or expanding commercial enterprises for office equipment. No such big-time wholesale receivers were uncovered in the Crime-Specific Program; however, the heavy losses of business machines indicate the possibility of such an operation.

In summary, the Crime-Specific experience seems to indicate that:

- The ultimate receiver of stolen property is typically a local citizen or businessman.

- Existing legitimate distribution outlets are frequently used for stolen property, as are swap meets and garage sales.
- Direct sales between the burglar and the user are common, and are frequently transacted at public meeting places.
- Rental agencies may represent a significant amount of the market for stolen televisions and business machines.
- Large-scale wholesale distribution systems for stolen property may exist, but have not yet been uncovered.

2. Reducing the Market for Stolen Property

If, as indicated, the ultimate receiver of stolen property is the local citizen or businessman, then it follows that a local educational campaign directed at reducing the market for stolen property should be beneficial. Very little of the Crime-Specific effort was directed to this specific abatement objective, primarily because each of the six agencies recognized that "there is a certain amount of larceny in everyone." It is obviously difficult to persuade the general public to pass up a bargain price for something that they want or need.

a. Public Education

The most effective public education technique seems to combine both a "plea" and a "warning." In this case, the plea is to help stop burglary in the community at large, and to reduce the likelihood of burglary to each individual's home or business, by depriving the burglar of his market. The warning consists of diligently publicizing and enforcing the laws related to receiving and possessing stolen property.

Slogans like the following can be used in public service announcements, TV spots, pamphlets, newspaper articles, and advertisements:

"The citizen who buys stolen property is aiding the burglar as surely as if he were driving the get-away car."

"If a burglar delivers you a TV today, will he pick it up again tomorrow?"

"Your bargain TV may have a hidden price tag of a stay in jail. Be sure what you're buying isn't stolen before you buy."

As part of the public education effort, the public should be cautioned against buying used merchandise from strangers, unless the seller can provide an original bill of sale to a name that matches that on his driver's license. In the case of inscribed property, the potential buyer should require the seller to show that his driver's license carries the same number as that inscribed on the item in question.

b. Property Identification Program

The identification of stolen property is the key to abatement efforts directed at reducing the receiver market and improving property recovery rates. The abatement theory is that property identification can discourage a burglar from taking property that may: (1) link the burglar to the crime, or (2) be difficult to sell.

"Operation Identification" encompasses a variety of approaches for encouraging the individual identification of valuable property. These approaches include:

- (1) Recording serial numbers.
- (2) Inscribing driver's license numbers.
- (3) Photographing jewelry, art objects, and other items that cannot be readily inscribed.
- (4) Tattooing furs.
- (5) Maintaining current property inventory lists, including credit cards.

Law enforcement agencies can lend inscribing tools directly to the public, or make them available through fire stations, libraries, civic clubs, community organizations or business associations. Inventory forms and identification instructions should also be provided. Generally, when the inscribing tool is returned, window decals should be provided that warn potential burglars that the property has been marked for easy identification.

The following suggestions for implementing an Operation Identification program are abstracted from "Selected Crime Preventive Programs in California."*

One possible implementing procedure is to establish target areas within the jurisdiction. Residents of these areas should be notified of the visits at least one week in advance. This notification should include the date and time of the visit, a detailed explanation of Operation I.D., and a request that all property be laid out for inscribing. As the property is being inscribed, the inscriber should strongly recommend that the merchant or resident list on a provided form all items inscribed. Permanently affixed serial numbers should also be recorded. It is not recommended that these records be kept by the law enforcement agency. Rather, they should be retained and updated by the property owner. This list should be stored in a secure place such as a safe deposit box. Should there be a burglary, the list would then be given to the reporting officers. If no one is home at the time of the visit, a card should be left explaining that the visit was made. It should also include a telephone number that can be called to schedule another visit.

Until such time as a set of national identifying numbers may become available, the recommended identifier is the California driver's license number. This should be preceded by the letters CA for state designation. It is not recommended that local identifying numbers be used. Should the property be found in another jurisdiction, there would be no way to trace ownership. Drivers' license numbers can, of course, easily be traced through the California Law Enforcement Teletype System (CLETS). In addition to inscribing the number in an easily seen location, the number should also be inscribed in one or more hidden areas on the item.

Items having a permanently affixed serial number should also be engraved. No item should be marked in a manner that would impair its appearance or reduce its value. Extreme care must be taken not

* California Council on Criminal Justice, March 1973.

to damage any property. Items that should be marked are those that a thief would be most likely to steal: e.g., television sets, radios, stereos, cameras, binoculars, appliances, power tools, tool boxes, typewriters, tape decks, office machinery, watches, and some types of jewelry. In the event that the householder wishes to do the engraving himself, he should be so permitted.

Another method of implementation is to have burglary reporting officers ask burglary victims if they wish to sponsor neighborhood meetings. If so, a Crime Prevention officer can give a presentation on Operation Identification, residential security checks, and Neighborhood Alert. These neighbors may wish to pass a department-provided inscriber among themselves.

In any event, extra pens should be available from the law enforcement agency for any resident who may not be in the target area or who may have purchased items since the initial inscribing session. The law enforcement agency should coordinate the use of the inscribers. This may be accomplished by establishing a 72-hour loan period.

As legal ownership of an item of property is transferred, a single diagonal line should be drawn through the driver's license number. It should run from the upper right corner to the lower left corner. The old number should not be obliterated. The new owner's license number should then be placed next to the old number.

Residences and commercial establishments of citizens participating in Operation Identification should have small notices informing passers-by that items located within have been inscribed for ready identification by law enforcement agencies. These notices should be posted near potential points of entry for burglars.

The forms recommended for Operation Identification are: (1) Letter to citizen describing Operation Identification; (2) Warning sticker; and (3) Pamphlet Personal Property Record.

c. Checking Serial Numbers

Reputable businesses can be asked to permit checking the serial numbers of their office equipment against stolen property lists. Several machines were recovered in this way by participating agencies. The businessmen involved were admonished but not arrested. The hope is that they themselves will avoid such future purchases and will pass the word to their business associates. To discourage legitimate distributors and rental agencies from handling stolen property, they should be required to maintain a record of their purchases and sales (or leases) of used merchandise, including the property description, identification and/or serial numbers, and the names, addresses of both their suppliers and their customers. Their records and inventories could be spot-checked for wanted items. Lists of wanted property can be circulated to them to alert them of hot items so that they can report attempted sales.

Cooperative repair services can be of significant assistance in locating and returning stolen business machines, TVs and appliances. They can be encouraged to check serial numbers or other identification marks against specific wanted property lists, or simply to maintain a log of all identified property that they service. The log should include the name and address of their customer. Such a log can then be reviewed periodically by law enforcement officials.

Many business machine companies routinely keep excellent records of machines they have sold and/or serviced. When a suspicious piece of equipment is recovered, they may be able to provide the original buyer's name and address.

One of the Crime-Specific agencies compiled a "Business Machine Identification Guide" to enable field officers and investigators to locate serial and identification numbers on some of the most commonly stolen business machines and, where possible, to provide an approximate street value of these machines. A sample of the guide may be found in Appendix D.

d. Undercover Operations

Undercover operations that can be directed at the receiver market include:

- (1) Stake-outs of suspected receivers.
- (2) Stake-outs of "stash" points.
- (3) Undercover sales and buys.
- (4) Tracking of known burglars.

Receiver stake-outs have generally proven less effective than might be expected, apparently because receiving stolen property is often only an infrequent and casual event for an otherwise legitimate business. Consequently, stakeouts tend to become long and expensive.

In a few cases, stake-outs of suspected storage or "stash" areas served as the point of contact with the burglar, who is then either picked up or tracked through the remainder of his redistribution path. Vacant buildings in or near high-burglary-rate areas are favored stash locations.

Undercover sales, particularly with a cooperating burglar, are effective in identifying receivers. Some insurance companies permitted the use of recovered property for this purpose when the insurance claim had already been paid. After the receiver is identified, he can then be watched until a case can be made against him. Actual undercover buys were not extensively tried because of insufficient funds for this purpose, and the high risk of not being able to specifically identify the purchase as stolen property.

Another undercover possibility is to review classified ads, selecting those that are suspicious, then pose as a buyer to check the identification of the property being sold.

e. Following Known Burglars

Tracking known burglars was reported as the most successful Crime-Specific approach for identifying receivers. Patience is required, particularly when the merchandise is temporarily stored at some stash point prior to the actual sales effort. The "costs" for this type of effort are high, and therefore are normally justified for only the seasoned, highly active, burglars.

f. Garage Sale and Swap Meet Checks

The problem of policing swap meets and garage sales indicates a clear need for tighter regulations by law or ordinance. Many cities now require permits for garage sales, but few restrict the sales to items from a single household or to one or two days of operation. In fact, some sales have become regular weekend events, with merchandise supplied from a variety of sources. Swap meets in some communities are the local answer to European Flea Markets. The promoter is frequently a property owner who collects a space fee from the sellers and sometimes an entry fee from the buyers. Beyond these interests, the promoter is unconcerned with the type of business transacted at the meet. Sales records are uncommon, since most transactions are for cash, and there is no permanent business location to be checked.

Besides promoting stricter controls through legislation or local ordinances, law enforcement must be content to make their presence known through occasional spot-checks for wanted items. The Crime-Specific Program's spot-check efforts did recover some merchandise, but none of the agencies felt that spot-checking was the final answer.

D. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

1. Summary

There is a ready market for stolen property in all types of communities. Traditionally, law enforcement agencies have concentrated their efforts to reduce the market on pawn shops and professional fences. However, it now appears that these two groups may play a relatively minor role in the total distribution of stolen merchandise. Used appliance and business machine dealers, rental agencies, garage sales, swap meets, and direct sales to the public appear to be the major outlets for the property stolen in burglaries.

A thorough analysis of the distribution of stolen property is needed, and can only be accomplished if property identification is improved sufficiently to permit better tracking. More undercover activities are also needed to establish the connections between burglars, receivers, and the buying public.

Public education campaigns to discourage citizens from supporting the market for stolen property should help decrease the market, but have not yet been adequately tested.

2. Program Findings

The Crime-Specific efforts to analyze and reduce the receiver market were a minor portion of the total program.

The analysis of direct results was limited to that supported by data elements available in the 7,763 burglary reports and the 1,078 offender reports. The specific data elements used were:

- Property Identification - Whether or not the owner of stolen property could positively identify it by serial number, unique inscriptions or markings.
- Types of Property Stolen - The type of property constituting the major amount of loss in each burglary.
- Arrests for Receiving or Possession of Stolen Property - The charges reported in each agency arrest report.
- Clearance Status - The clearance status and type of clearance of each burglary report.

Table VII-1 shows the results of efforts to improve property identification by owners. The data shows percentage improvements in the ability of burglary victims to positively identify their property losses. Improvements were largest in the High Risk community and lowest in the Low Risk community, which seems to indicate that exposure to burglary problems is a major factor influencing the public reaction to abatement efforts.

Despite the improvements, property identification remained a major weakness as shown by the 8.6 percent total for all communities at the end of the fourth quarter. For the entire year, only 399 of the 7,763 burglary reports (5.1 percent) indicated that the victim could positively identify the property lost. Stated differently, only one burglary victim in twenty was able to specifically identify his property losses.

Further analysis of the identifiable property losses by type of property stolen showed that:

- 1.9 percent of furs and jewelry losses were identifiable.
- 3.0 percent of the soft saleable items were identifiable.

- 8.8 percent of the hard saleable items were identifiable.
- 16.0 percent of firearm losses were identifiable.

Table VII-2 shows the relationship between the percentages of all burglary cases cleared and the percentages of those cases with identified property that were cleared. The percentages are cumulative based on the total cases and total clearances from the start of the program to the end of the quarter shown. This approach acknowledges that investigation efforts are not limited to the quarter in which the burglary occurred.

Of the 7,763 total burglaries reported, 1,283 (16.5 percent) were cleared, while of the 399 burglaries reported with identified property, 45 (11.3 percent) were cleared.

Two considerations may help explain these unexpected results. First, the small number of clearances for cases reported with identified property may not reflect the actual value of property identification to the investigative process, i.e., a good physical description of property may be as useful as a serial number, engraving, or other unique marking. The second possibility is that investigators failed to make use of the property identification information, because of difficulties in processing it or a preference for concentrating on other types of information.

One Crime-Specific investigator commented that "serial numbers are no good because half the time the owner has written down a model or patent number by mistake."

Table VII-3 shows that the 36 arrests for receiving or possession of stolen property accounted for only 3.3 percent of the 1,078 arrests made during the Crime-Specific Program. Although it was expected that more burglars than receivers would be arrested, these small numbers were surprisingly low, and may indicate both the difficulty and lack of emphasis placed in decreasing the receiver market.

Another factor to consider is that the procedure used by BCS in the Crime-Specific program restricted offender reports to those directly associated with a burglary report. Thus burglars and receivers who were arrested, but were not linked to a specific burglary report from the target area, were excluded.

TABLE VII-1. PERCENTAGES OF BURGLARIES WITH IDENTIFIABLE PROPERTY LOSSES*

Community Type	Quarterly Percentages			
	1	2	3	4
Low Risk	1.1	1.4	0.9	4.3
Low-Medium Risk	0.3	2.6	8.7	7.5
High-Medium Risk	0.3	4.2	8.4	7.1
High Risk	0.1	2.7	11.8	12.0
All Communities	0.3	2.9	9.2	8.6

* Identifiable property losses include stolen items reported with unique serial numbers, engravings, or special owner markings.

TABLE VII-2. CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGES OF CASES CLEARED

Type of Case	Cumulative Percentages by Quarter			
	1	2	3	4
All Cases	20.0	19.8	18.0	16.5
Identified Property Cases	33.3	27.0	11.5	11.3

TABLE VII-3. ARRESTS FOR RECEIVING OR POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY

Community Type	Total Arrests Number	Arrests for Receiving or Possession	
		Number	Percent
Low Risk	94	0	0
Low-Medium Risk	333	16	4.8
High-Medium Risk	326	5	1.5
High Risk	325	15	4.6
All Communities	1078	36	3.3

APPENDIX A
CATALOG OF ABATEMENT TECHNIQUES

- SECTION I
PUBLIC EDUCATION/AWARENESS
- SECTION II
IMPROVED SECURITY
- SECTION III
IMPROVED PATROL
- SECTION IV
IMPROVED INVESTIGATION
- SECTION V
DECREASING THE RECEIVER MARKET

APPENDIX A

SECTION I - PUBLIC EDUCATION/AWARENESS

PROJECT ACTIVITY	Los Angeles Police Dept.	Los Angeles County Sheriff	Oakland Police Dept.	Orange County Sheriff	San Diego Police Dept.	San Francisco Police Dept.	COMMENTS
INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION ACTIVITIES							
1. Pamphlets and Literature	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects distributed thousands of items, many printed in Spanish.
2. News Releases to the Press	x	x	x	x	x	x	Press publicity was extensive in all projects.
3. TV and Radio Coverage	x	x	x	x	x	x	While Oakland and San Francisco received project coverage, there was no specific plan or emphasis on utilizing this in their projects.
4. Public Speeches and Talks	x	x	x	x	x	x	This activity received considerable attention by all projects. Project members presented the program to almost all commercial, residential and other community groups.
5. Public Information Centers	x	x		x	x		Los Angeles Police and Sheriff's Depts. each established store front centers. San Diego and Orange Depts. used temporary security centers in shopping centers.
6. Signs, Posters, Decals, Buttons	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects displayed and distributed these materials.
7. Special Public Events	x		x	x			Activities included: • Team-up Fair • Burglary Prevention Week/Month • Home Show • County Fair • Appliance Show
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES							
1. Block or Neighborhood Citizen Groups	x		x				Organized to support law enforcement.
2. Home Owner Associations	x			x	x		Existing home owner associations were briefed and urged to actively participate in the home security portion of the program.
3. Merchant Association	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects briefed and urged business associations to actively support the business security portion of the program.
4. Insurance Underwriters	x	x	x	x	x	x	Each project had discussions or correspondence with insurance groups concerning rate reductions for residential and business facilities which implement recommended security changes.
5. Civic Clubs	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects provided speakers to civic clubs.
6. School Programs	x			x	x		These projects gave presentations on security to existing school organizations such as PTA, Advisory Council and Student Groups.
7. Church Programs						x	Letters were mailed to churches offering speakers but met with very little success.
8. Citizen Recognition and Reward Programs	x						Citizens who made substantial contribution in terms of support or by supplying information leading to an arrest were presented letters of appreciation.

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SECTION II - IMPROVED SECURITY

PROJECT ACTIVITY	Los Angeles Police Dept.	Los Angeles County Sheriff	Oakland Police Dept.	Orange County Sheriff	San Diego Police Dept.	San Francisco Police Dept.	COMMENTS
INSPECTION PROGRAMS							
1. Residential Inspections	x	x	x	x	x		Many approaches were used such as: • Door-to-door solicitation by Police Reserves or Scouts • Telephone solicitation • Letter solicitation • Presentations to community associations and organizations • Mobile security centers • Store front centers • Block groups • Home Alert groups • Manned booths in shopping centers, fairs, shows, and public buildings.
2. Commercial Inspections							
3. Post Burglary Security Inspections	x	x	x	x	x		The Oakland project placed heavy emphasis on this approach by having trained civilian security inspectors perform security inspections on all burglarized facilities. Other projects had officers provide security recommendations at the time the burglary report was taken.
4. Follow-up inspections	x	x	x	x	x		Perform security inspection.
PROVIDE SECURITY SERVICES							
1. Evaluate and recommend specific hardware, devices and services	x	x	x	x	x	x	No testing. Recommendations based on available information.
2. Display security hardware and devices	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects displayed security items by using large display boards for static display centers and personnel kits for door-to-door inspections.
3. Provide installation support and/or tools		x					Limited to special need cases.
4. Promote insurance reductions for secured facilities	x	x		x	x		Contacts were made with insurance organizations for this purpose.
5. Promote security ordinances/legislation	x	x	x	x	x		All projects participated in the development and promotion of community security ordinances.
6. Promote improved street lighting	x	x	x	x	x	x	Projects had discussions with local electric and power companies and city officials concerning activities to improve street lighting in the target areas.

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SECTION III - IMPROVED PATROL

PROJECT ACTIVITY	Los Angeles Police Dept.	Los Angeles County Sheriff	Oakland Police Dept.	Orange County Sheriff	San Diego Police Dept.	San Francisco Police Dept.	COMMENTS
MODIFIED PREVENTATIVE PATROL ACTIVITY							
1. Target area Saturation	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects used this technique to suppress burglaries in areas experiencing an increase in burglaries.
2. Dynamic Scheduling	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects augmented or adjusted patrol schedules based on day-to-day project experiences.
3. Tandem or Team Patrol	x		x	x			In this approach a minimum of two cars are used to perform area surveillance.
4. Bicycle Patrol	x	x			x		Some projects provided bicycles to patrolmen to use in certain sections in the target area.
5. Helicopter Patrol						x	This project uses helicopter patrol to support surveillance activities in areas not readily accessible to units in patrol cars.
6. Foot Patrol	x	x		x	x		This technique was used in conjunction with stakeout activities.
SPECIAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES							
1. Routine "Bird-Dog" Surveillance	x	x		x	x	x	Projects developed "most wanted" lists of known burglary suspects and made an effort to remain aware of their crime related activities.
2. Special Undercover Activity	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects utilized this technique against known or suspected burglaries.
3. Target Stakeouts	x	x	x	x	x	x	Target stakeouts were used when information was obtained either manually or by computer that identified a burglary pattern. The pattern had to be well identified including sufficient M.O. information to call for a stakeout.
4. Receiver Stakeouts	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects included stakeouts of people and places suspected of receiving or selling stolen property.
5. Truancy Patrol	x	x		x	x		Projects attempted to provide additional surveillance around school grounds. This activity was based on experience which indicated that burglaries occur more frequently around schools.
6. Increased Field Interrogations	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects emphasized importance of field interrogations of persons involved in suspicious activities in the target areas.

APPENDIX A

SECTION IV - IMPROVED INVESTIGATION

PROJECT ACTIVITY	Los Angeles Police Dept.	Los Angeles County Sheriff	Oakland Police Dept.	Orange County Sheriff	San Diego Police Dept.	San Francisco Police Dept.	COMMENTS
STAFFING CHANGES							
1. Use of Patrol Personnel for Investigative Support	x			x	x	x	Patrol personnel conducted on-the-scene investigation.
2. Use of Investigative Aids			x				Non-sworn aids were used to handle much of the routine paper work, thus permitting investigators more time for direct investigation activities.
3. Team Approaches	x	x	x	x			Investigation teams composed of two or more investigators were used.
4. Special Staff Training	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects devoted an average of 6 hours to specialized and refresher training for their investigative staffs.
TECHNIQUE CHANGES							
1. Use of Computer Based M.O. Profiles	x			x			Computer-based system containing Part I and II crime report data was used to retrieve information on crime reports containing similar M.O. information.
2. Use of Computer Based Suspect Files	x			x			Computer-based systems containing descriptions and modus operandi of arrested persons was used to retrieve persons matching the description and M.O. on the burglary report.
3. Use of Computer Based Pawn and Property Files	x				x		Computer-based systems containing information from pawn slips (person and property descriptions) and from burglary property reports (description of the property) were used to assist investigators working burglary cases.
4. Undercover Operations	x	x	x	x	x	x	This activity included: • Stakeouts of suspected receivers • Stakeouts of "stash" points • Undercover sales and buys • Surveillance of known burglars
SUSPECT HANDLING CHANGES							
1. Closer work with D.A. and Courts	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects made efforts to work more closely with district attorneys to improve the filing rate on burglary arrests and the chances for convictions on the cases.
2. Case-Linking through M.O. Comparison	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects (using computer or manual) made efforts to link arrested suspects with previously reported burglaries having the same suspect or vehicle descriptions and M.O. traits.
3. Increased Emphasis on Latent Print Checks	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects placed additional emphasis on capturing suspect prints at the scene of the burglary.
4. Increased Use of "Lis Detector"		x					Used to encourage arrested suspects to admit to other burglaries.
5. Closer Work with Deputy District Attorneys	x	x	x	x	x	x	To develop working agreement on acceptable support for case filings.

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SECTION V - DECREASING THE RECEIVER MARKET

PROJECT ACTIVITY	Los Angeles Police Dept.	Los Angeles County Sheriff	Oakland Police Dept.	Orange County Sheriff	San Diego Police Dept.	San Francisco Police Dept.	COMMENTS
DECREASING THE RECEIVER MARKET							
1. Sponsor Property "Ip" Program	x	x	x	x	x	x	All projects encouraged residents to mark their property by working with existing community organizations. Inscribing tools were made available to the public.
2. Increased Pawn Shop Surveillance		x	x	x	x	x	All projects concentrated on decreasing the receiver market for stolen property by frequent checks on locations where stolen property may appear.
3. Used Appliance Dealer Checks	x	x	x	x	x	x	
4. Appliance Rental Dealer Checks				x	x	x	
5. Garage and Swap Meet Checks				x	x		
6. Published Stolen Property Lists	x						This was done through Block Group Captains.
7. Published Business Machine ID Guide					x		This document published for field officers and investigators is used to locate serial and other identification numbers on the most commonly stolen business machines.

APPENDIX B

DATA DEFINITIONS AND FORMATS USED IN THE EVALUATION

This appendix provides the data definitions and formats used to describe the communities, burglaries and the burglary offenders.

- SECTION I. CENSUS DATA ELEMENT CODES - Contains descriptions of the data elements used to describe the communities in terms of Bureau of Census information.
- SECTION II. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS BURGLARY DATA ELEMENT CODES - Contains the descriptions of the data elements provided by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics that describe each burglary report.
- SECTION III. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS OFFENDER DATA ELEMENT CODES. - Defines the data used to describe arrested offenders.

Appendix B

Section I - Census Data Element Codes
Crime-Specific Burglary Program

Data Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description	Data Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description
1-2	St 70	Two digit 1970 state code	178-180	F4 I1	Household of 4, income less than \$2,000
3-5	County	Three digit 1970 county code	181-183	F4 I2	Household of 4, income \$2,000-2,999
6-7	S area	Two digit code representing each of the participating law enforcement agencies	184-186	F4 I3	Household of 4, income \$3,000-4,999
			187-189	F4 I4	Household of 4, income \$5,000-6,999
13-17	Tract	Census tract number	190-192	F4 I5	Household of 4, income \$7,000-9,999
14-18	Risk Category	Alpha designator for each of the four risk communities L = low risk LM = low-medium risk HM = high-medium risk H = high risk	193-195	F4 I6	Household of 4, income \$10,000-14,999
			196-198	F4 I7	Household of 4, income \$15,000-24,999
			199-201	F4 I8	Household of 4, income \$25,000 or more
			202-204	F5 I1	Household of 5, income less than \$2,000
19-21	TPOP	Total population in census tract	205-207	F5 I2	Household of 5, income \$2,000-2,999
22-24	TMPOP	Total male population	208-210	F5 I3	Household of 5, income \$3,000-4,999
25-27	TFPOP	Total female population	211-213	F5 I4	Household of 5, income \$5,000-6,999
28-30	MU18	Number of males under 18 years of age	214-216	F5 I5	Household of 5, income \$7,000-9,999
31-33	MU 18-19	Number of males 18-19 years of age	217-219	F5 I6	Household of 5, income \$10,000-14,999
34-36	M 20-24	Number of males 20-24 years of age	220-222	F5 I7	Household of 5, income \$15,000-24,999
37-39	M 25-29	Number of males 25-29 years of age	223-225	F5 I8	Household of 5, income \$25,000 or more
40-42	M 30-34	Number of males 30-34 years of age	226-228	F6 I1	Household of 6, income less than \$2,000
43-45	M 35-39	Number of males 35-39 years of age	229-231	F6 I2	Household of 6, income \$2,000-2,999
46-48	M 40-44	Number of males 40-44 years of age	232-234	F6 I3	Household of 6, income \$3,000-4,999
49-51	M 45-49	Number of males 45-49 years of age	235-237	F6 I4	Household of 6, income \$5,000-6,999
52-54	M 50+	Number of males 50 or older	238-240	F6 I5	Household of 6, income \$7,000-9,999
55-57	FU 18	Number of females under 18 years of age	241-243	F6 I6	Household of 6, income \$10,000-14,999
58-60	F 18-19	Number of females 18-19 years of age	244-246	F6 I7	Household of 6, income \$15,000-24,999
61-63	F 20-24	Number of females 20-24 years of age	247-249	F6 I8	Household of 6, income \$25,000 or more
64-66	F 25-29	Number of females 25-29 years of age	250-252	TFAM	Total number of families
67-69	F 30-34	Number of females 30-34 years of age	253-255	TFFR	Total number of families with female head
70-72	F 35-39	Number of females 35-39 years of age	256-258	ME0YR	Male with no education
73-75	F 40-44	Number of females 40-44 years of age	259-261	ME1-8	Male 1-8 years school
76-78	F 45-49	Number of females 45-49 years of age	262-264	ME9-12	Male 9-12 years school
79-81	F 50+	Number of females 50 or older	265-267	ME13-16	Male 13-16 years school
82-84	White	Total white population	268-270	ME17+	Male 17 or more years of school
85-87	Negro	Total negro population	271-273	FE0YR	Female with no education
88-90	Indian	Total Indian population	274-276	FE1-8	Female 1-8 years school
91-93	Japan	Total Japanese population	277-279	FE9-12	Female 9-12 years school
94-96	China	Total Chinese population	280-282	FE13-16	Female 13-16 years school
97-99	Other I	Total other oriental population	283-285	FE17+	Female 17 or more years of school
100-102	Other	Total other population	286-288	PROF	Total employed professional 16 and over
103-105	SP Amer	Total Spanish-American population	289-291	MANAGE	Total employed managers 16 and over
106-108	F1 I1	Household of 1, income less than \$2,000	292-294	AOTHER	Total employed others 16 and over
109-111	F1 I2	Household of 1, income \$2,000-2,999	295-297	MEM	Total employed male
112-114	F1 I3	Household of 1, income \$3,000-4,999	298-300	MUM	Total unemployed male
115-117	F1 I4	Household of 1, income \$5,000-6,999	301-303	FEM	Total employed female
118-120	F1 I5	Household of 1, income \$7,000-9,999	304-306	FUM	Total unemployed female
121-123	F1 I6	Household of 1, income \$10,000-14,999	307-309	PCMOCEB+	Percent owner-occupied units moved into 1968-1970
124-126	F1 I7	Household of 1, income \$15,000-24,999	310-312	PROCB+	Percent renter-occupied units moved into 1968-1970
127-129	F1 I8	Household of 1, income \$25,000 or more	313-315	MEDVAL	Median value
130-132	F2 I1	Household of 2, income less than \$2,000	316-318	MEDRENT	Median cash rent
133-135	F2 I2	Household of 2, income \$2,000-2,999	319-321	OW60-70	Owner-occupied built 60-70
136-138	F2 I3	Household of 2, income \$3,000-4,999	322-324	OW40-60	Owner-occupied built 40-59
139-141	F2 I4	Household of 2, income \$5,000-6,999	325-327	OW39-	Owner-occupied built before 1940
142-144	F2 I5	Household of 2, income \$7,000-9,999	328-330	R60-70	Renter-unit built 60-70
145-147	F2 I6	Household of 2, income \$10,000-14,999	331-333	R40-60	Renter-unit built 40-59
148-150	F2 I7	Household of 2, income \$15,000-24,999	334-336	R39-	Renter-unit built before 1940
151-153	F2 I8	Household of 2, income \$25,000 or more	337-339	UNIT1	Structures with only 1 unit
154-156	F3 I1	Household of 3, income less than \$2,000	340-342	UNIT2-9	Structures with 2-9 units
157-159	F3 I2	Household of 3, income \$2,000-2,999	343-345	UNIT10+	Structures with 10 or more units
160-162	F3 I3	Household of 3, income \$3,000-4,999	346-348	MOBTR	Mobil homes or trailers
163-165	F3 I4	Household of 3, income \$5,000-6,999	349-351	OVERCR	Population in units with 1.51 or more persons per room
166-168	F3 I5	Household of 3, income \$7,000-9,999			
169-171	F3 I6	Household of 3, income \$10,000-14,999	352-378	PADDING	Padding
172-174	F3 I7	Household of 3, income \$15,000-24,999			
175-177	F3 I8	Household of 3, income \$25,000 or more			

Appendix B

Section II - Bureau of Criminal Statistics

BURGLARY DATA ELEMENT CODES
Crime Specific-Burglary Program

Card Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description	Card Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description
1-5	Agency number	Standard BCS agency codes			
6-11	Crime report number	6-digit number assigned by participating agency			
12-17	Date reported	6-digit date when report was taken			
18-23	Date occurred	6-digit date indicated on the report as the date occurred. If the burglary occurred between two dates, the first date is used.			
24	Day occurred	0 - unspecified or undetermined, used when day cannot be determined because of a span of more than a week 1 - Sunday 2 - Monday 3 - Tuesday 4 - Wednesday 5 - Thursday 6 - Friday 7 - Saturday 8 - Exact day unknown - sometime approximately between Monday and Friday. Used when exact day is unknown but falls between Monday and Friday. 9 - Exact day unknown - sometime approximately between Friday and Monday. Use the weekend code when the span falls between Friday and Monday.			
25	Time occurred	0 - Unspecified or undetermined 1 - Morning (approximately 7 AM to 12 noon) 2 - Afternoon (approximately 12 noon to 5 PM) 3 - Evening (approximately 5 PM to midnight) 4 - Early morning (approximately midnight to 7 AM) 5 - Sometime during nighttime (approximately 5 PM to 7 AM) 6 - Sometime during daytime (approximately 7 AM to 5 PM) 7 - Morning and early morning (approximately midnight to noon) 8 - Nighttime to morning (approximately 5 PM to noon) 9 - Sometime within 24 hour period			
26	Premises	00 - Unspecified 01 - Single family home. This includes all residences other than apartments or duplexes. It includes garages when attached to the residence. 02 - Apartments/duplexes. This includes all multiple rental units, flats, high rise apartments, apartment complexes and any living quarters above or behind commercial establishments. 03 - Commercial lodging - This includes occupied hotel/motel rooms, rest homes and any other short time rental commercial room or rooms. 04 - All other residences. This includes mobile homes, trailers, storage rooms and buildings, apartment laundry rooms, detached garages and other residential associated buildings. 05 - Retail business/services. This includes laundries, dry cleaners, restaurants, bars, drive-ins, repair shops, barber-beauty shops, and auto repair shops. Any business that primarily repairs or performs a service as its major operation. 06 - Retail business/commodities. This includes supermarkets, department stores, hardware stores, jewelry stores and pawn shops. Any business that primarily sells items as its major operation. 07 - Auto dealers/sales lots. This includes new auto sales rooms, used car lot buildings and all buildings associated with car sales. If it is a building associated with the service of cars use code 05. 08 - Private offices. This includes all offices such as real estate, insurance, law offices or an office in an office building. 09 - Unoccupied motel/hotel rooms. This includes commercial lodging that has not been rented and is under control of the owner.	28	Point of entry or attempt	10 - Medical offices. This includes doctor's offices, clinics, hospitals, pet hospitals, dentists, chiropractors, and all medical type facilities. 11 - Entertainment/recreational facilities. This includes theatres, bowling alleys, lodge halls, private swimming pools, pool halls and card rooms. Any premises where the primary purpose is recreation or entertainment. 12 - Warehouse. This includes all buildings used for storage except those at a residence. 13 - Industrial. This includes construction companies, manufacturing sites, building construction sites, building and houses under construction and industrial concerns such as oil refineries or railroad yard. 14 - Financial institution. This includes banks and savings and loan buildings. 15 - Government facilities. This includes all federal, state, county, city and special district buildings, office and facilities. A city owned swimming pool as well as a state or city park building would fall in this category. 16 - Schools. This includes all public and private schools and associated buildings. 17 - Churches. This includes all churches and associated buildings. 18 - All other
			29	Means of entry	1 - Not specified or unknown 2 - Door 3 - Window 4 - Roof or attic-existing opening (duct skylight) 5 - Wall existing opening (vent, chute, duct) 6 - Floor or basement 7 - Concealment or hiding. This is used when the burglar enters a store, for instance, during regular hours through a regular entrance, then hides until the store closes and then commits the burglary. 8 - Roof - makes opening. 9 - Wall - makes opening. X - All other
			30	Tool used	0 - No entry, attempt only. Entry is attempted but not gained. 1 - Not specified or unknown 2 - No force. Door or window is left unlocked, screen is removed to open unlocked window. 3 - Used pass key. A lock defeating device is used such as a pick, slip lock with celluloid, playing card, shim or pass key. 4 - Pries or jimmies door. This is used when a minimum amount of force is used to gain entry, such as removing louvers, prying a lock, prying a window, or jimmying a door. 5 - Breaks, force, smashes at point of entry. This is used instead of 4 because more force is used such as breaking a window, forcing or smashing a window or door. The breaking or forcing can be with hands or feet or an impact tool. 6 - Saws, boxes, burns. This is entered whenever a tool is used to cut, burn or bore to gain entrance. 7 - Explosives. This is entered whenever an explosive or explosive tool is used. 8 - Tunnels. This is entered when a tunnel is dug to gain entrance. X - All other. This is entered when the method used does not seem to fit any other category.
					1 - Not specified or unknown 2 - Hands, feet, bodily force 3 - Lock defeating tool (key, celluloid, shim) 4 - Reaching tool (fishpole, coat hanger) 5 - Prying tool (screwdriver, prybar)

Section II (continued)

Card Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description	Card Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description
		6 - Impact tool (hammer, rock) 7 - Cutting or forcing tool (drill, saw, pipe wrench, knife) 8 - Burning tool (torch, burning bar) 9 - Explosive tool X - All other The factor to consider is how the tool was used rather than its intended purpose. For example, a drill could be thrown through a window, in which case an impact tool would be coded.			4 - Cleared by arrest of offender in another jurisdiction 5 - Cleared by death of offender 6 - Case proved unfounded 7 - Classification changed from burglary to other crime 8 - All other
31	Extent of loss	0 - No loss 1 - Up to \$9 2 - \$10 to \$49 3 - \$50 to \$99 4 - \$100 to \$199 5 - \$200 to \$499 6 - \$500 to \$999 7 - \$1,000 to \$4,999 8 - \$5,000 to \$9,999 9 - \$10,000 + X - Loss not reported. This is entered when there is a loss but the owner does not know the value, or when the value cannot be determined.	36-40	Census tract area	6-digit census tract number
		Y - No loss - offender apprehended at scene.	41	Street lights	Outside artificial lights during hours of darkness; street lights within 100 feet of premise. 1 - Yes 2 - No 3 - Unknown or not specified 4 - All other
32	Property damage	0 - Not specified or unable to determine. 1 - No damage done (used key, walked in). 2 - Minor damage (jimmies, prisms) 3 - Moderate damage (cut, broke, bore, saw) 4 - Major damage (display window smash, malicious property damage inside, wrecks and tears up premise) 5 - Attacked safe 6 - Extreme damage (explosion, burning)	42	Entry lighted	Point of entry lighted 1 - Yes 2 - No 3 - Unknown or not specified 4 - All other
		1 - Money 2 - Negotiable items (checks, credit cards, securities). 3 - Jewelry/furs 4 - Soft saleable items (clothing, furniture, bedding) 5 - Hard saleable items (T.V.'s, stereos, appliances, radios). 6 - Drugs 7 - Firearms 8 - Explosives 9 - Items from inside safe X - All other In burglaries where more than one item is taken (which is the majority), the most numerous item or the most expensive is entered.	43	Visibility	Visibility of point of entry 1 - Not visible to normal patrol activity 2 - Normally visible but concealed by shrubbery or other removable obstruction. 3 - Open, visible to normal patrol activity 4 - Other
33	Type property taken	0 - Unknown, not specified, nothing taken 1 - Money 2 - Negotiable items (checks, credit cards, securities). 3 - Jewelry/furs 4 - Soft saleable items (clothing, furniture, bedding) 5 - Hard saleable items (T.V.'s, stereos, appliances, radios). 6 - Drugs 7 - Firearms 8 - Explosives 9 - Items from inside safe X - All other In burglaries where more than one item is taken (which is the majority), the most numerous item or the most expensive is entered.	44	Alarmed	1 - Premise not alarmed 2 - Premise contains silent alarm 3 - Premise contains audible alarm 4 - Other
		1 - Money 2 - Negotiable items (checks, credit cards, securities). 3 - Jewelry/furs 4 - Soft saleable items (clothing, furniture, bedding) 5 - Hard saleable items (T.V.'s, stereos, appliances, radios). 6 - Drugs 7 - Firearms 8 - Explosives 9 - Items from inside safe X - All other In burglaries where more than one item is taken (which is the majority), the most numerous item or the most expensive is entered.	45	Alarm status	1 - Not alarmed 2 - Alarmed - alarm operated 3 - Alarmed - alarm did not operate 4 - Alarmed - alarm defeated by suspect 5 - Other
34	How detected	0 - Not specified or unknown 1 - Discovered by or on return of victim. This value will be entered for most residential burglaries. 2 - Someone other than victim (neighbor, friend, relative) - residential only. 3 - Discovered next working day (commercial only). This is entered for most of the commercial burglaries. 4 - Passing citizen or phone complaint by citizen. 5 - Victim returns while burglary in progress. 6 - Victim on premises at time of burglary. 7 - Passing patrolman or security guard. 8 - Burglary alarm X - All other	46	Inspected	1 - Yes premise inspected prior to burglary 2 - Yes premise not inspected prior to burglary 3 - Other
		0 - Not specified 1 - Not cleared, open case. This code is entered in most of the cases. 2 - Cleared exceptionally 3 - Cleared by arrest	47	BCS Number	5-digit code number: 1st digit - agency 2nd, 3rd, 4th digit - page number 5th digit - item number on page
35	Clearance	0 - Not specified 1 - Not cleared, open case. This code is entered in most of the cases. 2 - Cleared exceptionally 3 - Cleared by arrest	78	Dog present	1 - Yes - dog present on premise 2 - No - dog not present on premise 3 - Not specified
		0 - Not specified 1 - Not cleared, open case. This code is entered in most of the cases. 2 - Cleared exceptionally 3 - Cleared by arrest	79	Dog effect	1 - Yes - dog was effective 2 - No - dog not effective 3 - Not specified
		0 - Not specified 1 - Not cleared, open case. This code is entered in most of the cases. 2 - Cleared exceptionally 3 - Cleared by arrest	80	ID	1 - Yes - property was identified with serial numbers etched on property 2 - No - property not identified 3 - Not specified

Appendix B

Section III - Bureau of Criminal Statistics
Offender Data Element Codes

Crime Specific-Burglary Program

Note: Data elements shown in parenthesis were not available for analysis.

Card Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description	Card Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description
1	Agency	One-digit number assigned to each participating agency	39	Police disposition	0 - Undetermined 1 - Released (adults only) 2 - Juvenile released, or counseled and released 3 - Released to other jurisdiction 4 - Misdemeanor complaint 5 - Felony complaint 6 - Juvenile - petition requested or filed or referred to probation department or probation officer 7 - Handled by police agency juvenile bureau 8 - Released orig. charge, hold on other charges or warrants 9 - Other
2-7	Crime report number	Six-digit number assigned by each participating agency	40-45	Disposition date	Six-digit number representing the date on which the law enforcement agency disposed of the case. MM/DD/YY 000000 Date undetermined
8-22	Name	This item was not provided	46	(Lower court filing)	1 - Felony 2 - Misdemeanor
23-24	Age	Two-digit number representing the exact age of the offender	47	(Lower court disposition)	1 - Acquitted 2 - Dismissed 3 - Certified juvenile court 4 - Convicted misdemeanor 5 - Convicted misdemeanor 17b(5) P.C. 6 - Held to answer 7 - Certified to superior court 8 - 1968 P.C. 9 - Other
25	Age group	0 - Unknown 1 - Under 18 2 - 18-19 3 - 20-24 4 - 25-29 5 - 30-34 6 - 35-39 7 - 40-44 8 - 45-49 9 - 50 and over	48-50	(Convicted charges)	Three-digit number representing the lower court conviction charges. Standard BCS codes are used.
26	Race/sex	1 - Male-white 2 - Male-Mexican-American 3 - Male-Negro 4 - Male-American Indian 5 - Male-other 6 - Female-white 7 - Female-Mexican-American 8 - Female-Negro 9 - Female-American Indian 0 - Female-other X - Unspecified	51-55	(Disposition date)	Six-digit number (MM/DD/YY) representing the date of the lower court disposition.
27-32	Arrest date	Six-digit number representing the date the offender was arrested MM/DD/YY	57	(Superior Court)	0 - Dismissed - or off calendar 1 - Dismissed 2 - Submitted on transcript - acquitted 3 - Submitted on transcript - convicted 4 - Acquitted by jury or insane at commission 5 - Acquitted by court or insane at commission 6 - Convicted - original plea of guilty 7 - Convicted - not guilty plea changed to guilty 8 - Convicted - jury 9 - Convicted - court X - Consolidated or combined
33	Type arrest	0 - Unknown, not stated 1 - On premises 2 - Fleeing scene or in vicinity after occurrence 3 - Citizen arrest or hold 4 - APS or known want 5 - Arrested on other charge 6 - Warrant 7 - Institutional hold 8 - Reasonable cause 9 - Other	58	(Conviction level)	1 - Felony as charged - felony sentence 2 - Felony as charged - misdemeanor sentence 3 - Felony as charged - 17 P.C. 4 - Lesser felony - felony sentence 5 - Lesser felony - misdemeanor sentence 6 - Lesser felony - 17 P.C. 7 - Lesser misdemeanor
34-36	Arrest charge	Three-digit number representing the charges at arrest. Standard BCS codes are used.	59-61	(Convicted offense)	Three-digit number representing the conviction offense. The standard BCS codes are used.
37	Number of partners	1 - Lone offender 2 - Two offenders 3 - Three offenders 4 - Four offenders 5 - Five offenders 6 - Six offenders 7 - Seven offenders 8 - Eight offenders 9 - Nine or more offenders 0 - Unknown	62-67	(Conviction date)	Six-digit number (MM/DD/YY) representing the date of the Superior Court disposition
38	(Distance)	One-digit number representing the distance the offense occurred in relation to offender residence. (This element of information was not provided.) 0 - Undetermined 1 - Within one mile 2 - One to three miles 3 - Three to five miles 4 - Five to ten miles 5 - More than ten miles	68	(Sentence)	0 - Death 1 - Prison 2 - CVA 3 - Probation (supervised) 4 - Probation and jail (supervised) 5 - Summary or court probation (non-supervised) or probation and jail (non-supervised) 6 - Jail - note - 1 day suspended - count as jail only 7 - Probation and jail, same length of time 8 - Fine 9 - Indeterminate commitment as sexual psychopath X - CMC (3051 W & 1)

Section III (continued)

Card Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description	Card Position (Column)	Data Element Name	Description
69	(Probation length)	0 - Under 1 year 1 - 1 - under 2 2 - 2 - under 3 3 - 3 - under 4 4 - 4 - under 5 5 - 5 - under 6 6 - 6 - under 10 7 - 10 and over			
70	(Type judgement)	1 - Prison sentence imposed and suspended 2 - Jail sentence imposed and suspended 3 - No imposition of sentence - felony is convicted offense 4 - No imposition of sentence - misdemeanor is convicted offense 5 - No imposition of sentence - misdemeanor is declared at sentencing (17 P.C.) 6 - Probation denied - prison suspended 7 - Probation denied - jail suspended	74	Current status	0 - Not under any commitment 1 - On parole - Department of Corrections 2 - On parole - California Youth Authority 4 - California probation 5 - California juvenile probation 6 - Other jurisdiction probation 7 - Other jurisdiction parole 8 - CRC parole 9 - Serving term in prison (not to be used when OTC w/c within a few months) X - Serving term in other institution
71	(Jail term)	0 - 1-29 - under 1 month 1 - 30 - 1 month 2 - 31-60 - 2 months 3 - 61-90 - 3 months 4 - 91-120 - 4 months 5 - 121-150 - 5 months 6 - 151-210 - 6 and 7 months 7 - 211-270 - 8 and 9 months 8 - 271-330 - 10 and 11 months 9 - 331-365 and over - 12 months and over	75	Drug used	One-digit number representing prior drug involvement of the offender. 0 - Unknown, not stated 1 - Marijuana 2 - Dangerous drugs 3 - Opiates 4 - Other drugs 5 - Marijuana and dangerous drugs 6 - Marijuana and opiates 7 - Marijuana, opiates and dangerous drugs 8 - Dangerous drugs and opiates
72	(Fine)	0 - Not given 1 - Under \$50 2 - \$50 - under \$100 3 - \$100 - under \$250 4 - \$250 - under \$500 5 - \$500 - under \$1,000 6 - \$1,000 - under \$5,000 7 - \$5,000 and over	76	Burglary record	One-digit code representing the prior burglary record and related offenses prior to date of current arrest. I. No prior record X - No prior arrests II. Minor prior record 0 - 1 or 2 arrests only - no disposition given 1 - 3 to 7 arrests - no dispositions or 1 or 2 convictions of less than 90 days jail or probation of less than 2 years 2 - 8 or more arrests - no dispositions or 3, 4 or 5 convictions of less than 90 days or probation of less than 2 years 3 - 6 or more convictions of less than 90 days or probation of less than 2 years III. Major prior record 4 - 1 or 2 convictions of 90 days jail or more or probation of 2 years or more 5 - 3 or more convictions of 90 days jail or more probation of 2 years or more IV. Prior prison record 6 - 1 prison commitment, and no more than 1 major 7 - 1 prison commitment, with 2 or more majors 8 - 2 prison commitments 9 - 3 or more prison commitments
73	Prior record	One-digit code representing record prior to date of current arrest. I. No prior record X - No prior arrests II. Minor prior record 0 - 1 or 2 arrests only - no disposition given 1 - 3 to 7 arrests - no dispositions or 1 or 2 convictions of less than 90 days jail or probation of less than 2 years 2 - 8 or more arrests - no dispositions or 3, 4 or 5 convictions of less than 90 days or probation of less than 2 years 3 - 6 or more convictions of less than 90 days or probation of less than 2 years III. Major prior record 4 - 1 or 2 convictions of 90 days jail or more or probation of 2 years or more 5 - 3 or more convictions of 90 days jail or more probation of 2 years or more IV. Prior prison record 6 - 1 prison commitment, and no more than 1 major 7 - 1 prison commitment, with 2 or more majors 8 - 2 prison commitments 9 - 3 or more prison commitments	77-79	(Interval)	Time interval of arrest to final disposition in months and tenths of months.

APPENDIX C

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

This appendix contains profiles of community characteristics, burglaries, and burglary offenders. The profiles are presented as simple tables of comparative percentages and totals.

- SECTION I - SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS - Presents highlights of the data found in the remainder of the appendix.
- SECTION II - THE BURGLARY PROFILE - Presents a comparison of the reported details about the burglaries experienced by each of the four risk communities during the twelve-month Crime-Specific Program.
- SECTION III - THE BURGLAR OFFENDER PROFILE - Presents a comparison of the characteristics of offenders who were arrested, and of their arrest dispositions by each of the four risk communities.

NOTE:

Because of rounding, total percentage shown in tables do not always equal 100 percent.

APPENDIX C

SECTION I - SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

Burglary Rates

- Community burglary rates increase as the following factors increase:
 - (1) Percentage of males under age 25.
 - (2) Percentage of non-white population.
 - (3) Percentage of families with female heads.
 - (4) Percentage of persons over 25 with less than 8 years of formal education.
 - (5) Percentage of households with less than \$5,000 annual income.
 - (6) Percentage of overcrowded households.
- Community burglary rates decrease as the following socio-economic factors increase:
 - (1) Percentage of owner-occupied dwellings.
 - (2) Median value of monthly rent.
 - (3) Median value of private homes.
- The Low Risk community averaged 5.1 burglaries per 1,000 population for the year and was characterized by the highest average levels of education and income and by the lowest levels of minorities and youth.
- The Low-Medium Risk community averaged 11.7 burglaries per 1,000 population and was characterized by the second highest average levels of minorities and youth.
- The High-Medium Risk community averaged 19.6 burglaries per 1,000 population and was characterized by the third highest levels of education and income and by the third lowest average levels of minorities and youth.
- The High Risk community averaged 35.1 burglaries per 1,000 population and was characterized by the lowest average levels of education and income and by the highest levels of minorities and youth.

- Residential burglaries account for more than 70 percent of all burglaries.
- Single family homes are the preferred targets of burglars with a rate of 31.1 burglaries per 1000 homes as compared with the apartment rate of 25.4 burglaries per 1000 apartment units.

Burglary Times

- Burglary is a 7 day a week problem, although Fridays show the highest percentage of Residential burglaries, while Sundays show the highest percentage of Commercial/Industrial burglaries.
- Residential burglaries occur more frequently during daylight hours, while Commercial/Industrial burglaries occur more frequently during the hours of darkness.

Burglary Entries

- 94 percent of all burglaries involve entry through either a door (58.8 percent) or a window (35.2 percent).
- 62 percent of the chosen entry points are not visible to normal patrol activity.
- The entry points of nighttime burglaries are unlighted in 63.8 percent of the cases.
- 63 percent of the burglaries require either no force or only minor force to gain entry.
- Bodily force or simple hand tools are all that is used to gain entry in more than 90 percent of all burglaries.

Property Taken

- Residential burglaries showed a higher average dollar loss than did Commercial/Industrial burglaries. Residential losses averaged \$399.43 while Commercial/Industrial losses averaged \$369.75.

- Hard saleable items like TVs, business machines, and sports equipment were the principal losses in 47.3 percent of all burglaries. Cash was the principal loss in 13.2 percent of the cases.
- Owners could positively identify their losses in only 5.1 percent of the cases.

Burglary Detections

- Law enforcement personnel detected 5 percent of all burglaries; non-victims detected 11 percent; and victims detected the remainder.
- Alarm systems functioned in 3 percent of the burglaries while alarms were present in 7 percent of the places burglarized.

Case Clearances and Offender Profiles

- 17 percent of all Residential burglaries were cleared while 15 percent of the Commercial/Industrial, and Other Facility Burglary cases were cleared.
- 50 percent of the arrested burglary offenders were less than 18 years old, and 62 percent of all offenders were less than 20.
- 92 percent of the offenders were males.
- More than 70 percent of the offenders operated with one or more associates.
- 43 percent of the offenders had prior records and 70 percent of those with records had prior burglary records.
- 56 percent of the offenders with prior records had drug records of various types.
- At the time of their arrest, 7.8 percent were on parole and 14.7 percent were on probation.

APPENDIX C

Section II - THE BURGLARY PROFILE

Burglary Rates

Table C-1 shows the distribution of all reported burglaries for each of the four risk communities. The reported burglary rate per 1,000 population for all communities is 16.4 as compared to the statewide rate in 1971 and 1972 of 19.4 per 1,000 population.

Table C-2 shows the distribution of residential burglaries for each of the risk communities. The rate per 1,000 single family residences shows a steady increase from the Low Risk community to the High Risk community. The same pattern exists for apartments and duplex facilities.

Type of Premise

Table C-3 shows the distribution of all reported burglaries for each premise category. Throughout California, from 1969 to 1972, residential burglaries have increased from 60 percent to 66 percent, whereas during this program almost 71 percent of the burglaries were against residential targets.

TABLE C-1. PERCENTAGE OF BURGLARIES FOR EACH RISK COMMUNITY

Community Type	Number of Reports	Percentage	Population	
			Target Area	Rate per 1,000
Low Risk	551	7.1	107,098	5.1
Low-Medium Risk	1,813	23.3	153,614	11.7
High-Medium Risk	2,656	34.2	135,431	19.6
High Risk	2,743	35.4	78,094	35.1
All Communities	7,763	100.0	474,237	16.4

TABLE C-2. BURGLARIES BY SINGLE FAMILY AND APARTMENT FACILITIES

Community Type	Residential Burglaries	Residential Targets			
		Single Family		Apartments	
		Number of Houses	Rate per 1,000	Number of Units	Rate per 1,000
Low Risk	406	25,434	13.6	12,859	3.8
Low-Medium Risk	1,344	37,466	19.8	23,588	21.7
High-Medium Risk	1,800	26,525	31.0	26,632	30.5
High Risk	1,956	13,956	92.5	14,399	40.2
All Communities	5,506	103,381	31.1	77,496	25.4

TABLE C-3. PERCENTAGE OF ALL BURGLARIES BY TYPE OF PREMISE

Community Type	Total Burglaries	Residential		Commercial/Industrial		Other Facilities	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
		Low Risk	551	406	73.7	106	19.2
Low-Medium Risk	1831	1344	73.4	376	20.5	93	5.1
High-Medium Risk	2656	1800	67.8	725	27.3	131	4.9
High Risk	2743	1956	71.3	669	24.4	118	4.3
All Communities	7763	5506	70.9	1876	24.2	381	4.9

Description of the Burglary Profile

This section contains tables of data which describe the burglary environment as reported by the six participating agencies. Data is presented for each of the four risk communities and for each category of premise.* Each of the 20 data

* Residential; commercial/industrial; other types of facilities

elements used by each participating agency to describe each burglary is analyzed and the results are presented in the following manner:

- Burglary rates.
- Where burglaries occur (premises).
- When burglaries occur (time, day).
- How burglaries are committed (point of entry, street lights, entry lights, method of entry, and tool(s) used).
- What items are stolen at what cost (type of property, dollar value, security inspection, property identification).
- How burglaries are detected (how, when, and method of detection).
- What cases are cleared (clearance status and type).

Table C-4 presents the volume and percentage of all reported burglaries by specific types of premises. The highest percentages of commercial burglaries occur in retail sales and service facilities and industrial, manufacturing, and construction facilities. The highest percentage of other facilities burglaries occur in schools.

Occurrence Time

Tables C-5 through C-8 show the volume and percentage of all reported burglaries for each category of premise by time of occurrence. Thirty-one percent of all reported burglaries occur during daytime hours, while 39 percent occur during nighttime hours. Thirty percent indicate "unknown" as the time of occurrence. Forty percent of the residential burglaries occur during daylight hours, whereas 32 percent occur during nighttime hours. Eight percent of the commercial/industrial burglaries occur during daylight hours, while 57 percent occur during nighttime hours. Thirty-five percent have "unknown" as the time of occurrence compared to 27 percent for residential burglaries. Sixteen percent of the other types of facilities burglaries occur during daylight hours, while 39 percent occur during nighttime hours. Forty-seven percent have "unknown" as the time of occurrence.

TABLE C-4. PERCENTAGES OF ALL BURGLARIES BY SPECIFIC FACILITY

Community Type	Commercial/Industrial																			
	Retail				Offices				Facilities								Unoccupied Motel/Hotel			
	Service		Sells		Medical		Private		Storage		Recreation		Construction		Financial		Auto		#	%
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Low Risk	20	3.6	18	3.3	2	0.4	13	2.4	10	1.8	12	2.2	31	5.6	3	0.5	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	120	6.6	108	6.0	29	1.6	39	2.2	20	1.1	19	1.0	31	1.7	1	0.1	8	0.4	-	-
High-Medium Risk	246	9.3	179	6.7	40	1.5	61	2.3	43	1.6	27	1.0	105	4.0	4	0.2	20	0.8	-	-
High Risk	208	7.6	202	7.4	14	0.5	54	2.0	56	2.0	19	0.7	86	3.1	3	0.1	10	0.4	17	0.6
All Communities	594	7.7	507	6.5	85	1.1	167	2.2	129	1.7	77	1.0	253	3.3	11	0.1	38	0.5	18	0.2

Community Type	Other Facilities													
	Residential						Other Facilities							
	Single Family		Apartments		Other		Gov't		School		Church		Other	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	341	61.9	50	9.1	15	2.7	-	-	24	4.4	8	1.5	4	0.7
Low-Medium Risk	732	40.4	522	28.5	90	4.9	6	0.3	59	3.3	20	1.1	8	0.4
High-Medium Risk	837	31.5	824	31.0	139	5.2	4	0.2	81	3.0	28	1.1	18	0.7
High Risk	1297	47.3	563	20.5	97	3.5	10	0.4	72	2.6	9	0.3	26	0.9
All Communities	3207	41.3	1959	25.2	341	4.4	20	0.3	236	3.0	65	0.8	56	0.7

TABLE C-5. ALL BURGLARIES BY TIME OF OCCURRENCE

Community Type	Time of Occurrence										Unknown Time			
	Daytime Reporting Periods					Nighttime Reporting Periods								
	0701-1200		1201-1700		0701*-1700	0001-0700		1701-2400		1701*-0701	No.	%		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%				
Low Risk	34	6.2	66	12.0	54	9.8	26	4.7	83	15.1	64	11.6	224	40.7
Low-Medium Risk	79	4.4	227	12.5	228	12.5	130	7.2	293	16.2	234	12.9	622	34.3
High-Medium Risk	137	5.2	342	12.9	320	12.0	214	8.1	420	15.8	395	14.9	838	31.6
High Risk	205	7.5	421	15.3	319	11.6	265	9.7	511	18.6	360	13.1	662	24.1
All Communities	455	5.9	1056	13.6	921	11.9	635	8.2	1307	16.8	1053	13.6	2336	30.1

TABLE C-6. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY TIME OF OCCURRENCE

Community Type	Time of Occurrence										Unknown Time			
	Daytime Reporting Period					Nighttime Reporting Period								
	0701-1200		1201-1700		0701*-1700	0001-0700		1701-2400		1701*-0701	No.	%		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%				
Low Risk	32	7.9	60	14.8	52	12.8	17	4.2	71	17.5	27	6.7	147	36.2
Low-Medium Risk	73	5.4	199	14.8	224	16.7	68	5.1	239	17.7	103	7.7	439	32.7
High-Medium Risk	114	6.3	305	16.9	308	17.1	101	5.6	336	18.7	128	7.1	508	28.2
High Risk	178	9.1	369	18.9	309	15.8	138	7.1	388	19.8	157	8.0	417	21.3
All Communities	397	7.2	933	17.0	893	16.2	324	5.9	1033	18.8	415	7.5	1511	27.4

* Broad scope reporting period because more accurate time of occurrence unknown.

TABLE C-7. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES BY TIME OF OCCURRENCE

Community Type	Time of Occurrence										Unknown Time			
	Daytime Reporting Periods					Nighttime Reporting Periods								
	0701-1200		1201-1700		0701*-1700	0001-0700		1701-2400		1701*-0701	No.	%		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%				
Low Risk	-	-	3	2.8	1	0.9	9	8.5	7	6.6	31	29.2	55	51.9
Low-Medium Risk	4	1.1	21	5.6	2	0.5	60	16.0	45	12.0	112	28.8	132	35.1
High-Medium Risk	18	2.5	27	3.7	7	1.0	110	15.2	66	9.1	239	33.0	258	35.6
High Risk	23	3.4	39	5.8	7	1.0	116	17.3	104	15.5	174	26.0	206	30.1
All Communities	45	2.4	90	4.8	17	0.9	295	15.7	222	11.8	556	29.6	651	34.7

TABLE C-8. OTHER FACILITIES BURGLARIES BY TIME OF OCCURRENCE

Community Type	Time of Occurrence										Unknown Time			
	Daytime Reporting Periods					Nighttime Reporting Periods								
	0701-1200		1201-1700		0701*-1700	0001-0700		1701-2400		1701*-0701	No.	%		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%				
Low Risk	2	5.1	3	7.7	1	2.6	-	-	5	12.8	6	15.4	22	56.4
Low-Medium Risk	2	2.2	7	7.5	2	2.2	2	2.2	10	10.8	19	20.4	51	54.8
High-Medium Risk	5	3.8	10	7.6	5	3.8	3	2.3	18	13.7	28	21.4	62	47.3
High Risk	4	3.4	13	11.0	3	2.5	11	9.3	19	16.1	29	24.6	39	33.1
All Communities	13	3.4	33	8.7	11	2.9	16	4.2	52	13.7	82	21.5	174	45.6

* Broad scope reporting period because more accurate time of occurrence unknown.

Streetlights and Nighttime Burglaries

Tables C-9 through C-12 present the volume and percentage of all reported nighttime burglaries for each category of premise. In 68 percent of all reported burglaries, streetlights existed within 100 feet of the burglarized premise and in 34 percent of all burglaries, the point of entry was lighted. Residential areas have the lowest percentages of streetlights and entry point lighting compared to commercial/industrial or other type of facilities areas.

Day of Occurrence

Tables C-13 through C-16 show the volume and percentage of all reported burglaries by day of occurrence. The highest percentages of all burglaries reported occur on Friday and Monday. On Saturday and Sunday (weekend) the average percentage of burglaries for each day is 17 percent, while the average percentage of burglaries for each weekday is 13 percent.

The highest percentage of residential burglaries also occur on Friday and Monday. Both weekends and weekdays experience approximately the same percentage of burglaries per day (13 percent).

The highest percentages of commercial/industrial burglaries occur on Sunday (6.6 percent), Saturday (6.3 percent), and Monday (6.3 percent). Weekend burglaries average 20 percent per day, while weekday burglaries average 11 percent per day.

The highest percentages of other types of facilities burglaries occur on Saturday (7.1 percent) and Sunday (5.8 percent). Weekend burglaries average 21 percent per day, while weekday burglaries average 10 percent per day.

Points of Entry

Tables C-17 through C-20 present the points of entry used by burglars in the 7,763 reported burglaries.

Table C-17 is a summary of all burglaries, while Tables C-18 through C-20 present Residential, Commercial/Industrial, and Other Facility burglaries, respectively.

Either a door or a window is the entry point in 94 percent of the burglaries.

TABLE C-9. ALL NIGHTTIME BURGLARIES BY LIGHTING

Nighttime Burglaries		Street Lights						Entry Point Lights					
		Yes		No		Not Reported		Yes		No		Not Reported	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	173	95	54.9	78	45.1	-	-	55	31.8	115	66.5	3	0.7
Low-Medium Risk	657	404	61.5	248	37.7	5	0.8	227	34.6	418	63.6	12	0.8
High-Medium Risk	1029	733	71.2	287	27.9	9	0.9	337	32.8	662	64.3	30	2.9
High Risk	1136	805	70.9	325	28.6	6	0.5	388	34.2	714	62.9	34	3.0
All Communities	3095	2037	68.0	938	31.3	20	0.7	1007	33.6	1909	63.8	79	2.6

TABLE C-10. RESIDENTIAL NIGHTTIME BURGLARIES BY LIGHTING

Nighttime Burglaries		Street Lights						Entry Point Lights					
		Yes		No		Not Reported		Yes		No		Not Reported	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	115	60	52.2	55	43.5	-	-	26	22.6	86	78.8	3	2.6
Low-Medium Risk	409	243	59.4	163	39.9	3	0.7	120	29.3	282	68.9	7	1.7
High-Medium Risk	565	362	64.1	194	34.3	9	1.6	178	31.5	369	65.3	18	3.2
High Risk	683	464	67.9	215	31.5	4	0.6	197	28.8	464	67.9	22	3.2
All Communities	1772	1129	63.7	627	35.4	16	0.9	521	29.4	1201	67.8	50	2.8

TABLE C-11. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL NIGHTTIME BURGLARIES BY LIGHTING

Nighttime Burglaries		Street Lights						Entry Point Lights					
		Yes		No		Not Reported		Yes		No		Not Reported	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	47	30	63.8	17	36.2	-	-	25	53.2	22	46.8	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	217	143	65.9	72	33.2	2	0.9	97	44.7	116	53.5	4	1.8
High-Medium Risk	415	332	80.0	83	20.0	-	-	148	35.7	257	61.9	10	2.4
High Risk	394	307	77.9	86	21.8	1	0.3	167	42.4	217	55.1	10	2.5
All Communities	1073	812	75.7	258	24.0	3	0.3	437	40.7	612	57.0	24	2.2

TABLE C-12. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES NIGHTTIME BURGLARIES BY LIGHTING

Nighttime Burglaries		Street Lights						Entry Point Lights					
		Yes		No		Not Reported		Yes		No		Not Reported	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	11	5	45.5	6	54.5	-	-	4	36.4	7	63.6	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	31	18	58.1	13	41.9	-	-	10	32.3	20	64.5	1	3.2
High-Medium Risk	49	39	79.6	10	11.4	-	-	11	22.4	36	73.5	2	4.1
High Risk	59	34	57.6	24	40.7	1	1.7	24	40.7	33	55.9	2	3.4
All Communities	150	96	64.0	53	35.3	1	0.7	49	32.7	96	64.0	5	3.3

TABLE C-13. ALL BURGLARIES BY DAY OF OCCURRENCE

Community Type	Day of Occurrence																			
	Monday		Tuesday		Wednesday		Thursday		Friday		Saturday		Sunday		Weekday*		Weekend**		Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	30	5.4	37	6.7	42	7.6	48	8.7	55	10.0	35	6.4	44	8.0	84	15.2	114	20.7	62	11.3
Low-Medium Risk	170	9.4	167	9.2	174	9.6	131	7.2	184	10.1	129	7.1	135	7.4	275	15.2	296	16.3	152	8.4
High-Medium Risk	236	8.9	249	9.4	235	8.8	237	8.9	257	9.7	195	7.3	176	6.6	446	16.8	438	16.5	187	7.0
High Risk	324	11.8	233	8.5	263	9.6	303	11.0	286	10.4	242	8.8	262	9.6	368	13.4	347	12.7	115	4.2
All Communities	760	9.8	686	8.8	714	9.2	719	9.3	782	10.1	601	7.7	617	8.1	1173	15.1	1195	15.4	516	6.7

TABLE C-14. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY DAY OF OCCURRENCE

Community Type	Day of Occurrence																			
	Monday		Tuesday		Wednesday		Thursday		Friday		Saturday		Sunday		Weekday*		Weekend**		Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	27	6.7	29	7.1	39	9.6	43	5.7	49	12.1	29	7.1	36	8.9	40	9.9	61	15.0	53	13.1
Low-Medium Risk	140	10.4	142	10.6	154	11.5	113	8.4	155	11.5	106	7.9	111	8.3	136	10.1	161	12.0	126	9.4
High-Medium Risk	194	10.8	206	11.4	206	11.4	198	11.0	207	11.5	154	8.6	127	7.1	187	10.4	194	10.8	127	7.1
High Risk	263	13.4	180	9.2	218	11.1	260	13.3	248	12.7	166	8.5	197	10.1	161	8.2	175	8.9	88	4.5
All Communities	624	11.3	557	10.1	617	11.2	614	11.2	659	12.0	455	8.3	471	8.6	524	9.5	591	10.7	394	7.2

* Weekday - sometime between Monday and Friday
 ** Weekend - sometime between Friday and Monday

TABLE C-15. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES BY DAY OF OCCURRENCE

Community Type	Day of Occurrence																			
	Monday		Tuesday		Wednesday		Thursday		Friday		Saturday		Sunday		Weekday*		Weekend**		Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	2	1.9	5	5.7	2	1.9	4	3.8	5	5.7	3	2.8	5	5.7	34	32.1	42	39.6	4	3.8
Low-Medium Risk	25	6.6	23	8.8	16	4.3	16	4.3	25	9.3	18	4.8	22	5.9	111	29.5	103	27.4	17	4.5
High-Medium Risk	38	5.2	36	5.0	23	3.2	34	4.7	46	6.3	36	5.0	39	5.4	221	30.5	203	28.0	49	6.8
High Risk	54	8.1	44	6.6	38	5.7	35	5.2	35	5.2	62	9.3	58	8.7	182	27.2	142	21.2	19	2.8
All Communities	119	6.3	108	5.8	79	4.2	89	4.7	111	5.9	119	6.3	124	6.6	548	29.2	490	26.1	89	4.7

TABLE C-16. OTHER FACILITIES BURGLARIES BY DAY OF OCCURRENCE

Community Type	Day of Occurrence																			
	Monday		Tuesday		Wednesday		Thursday		Friday		Saturday		Sunday		Weekday*		Weekend**		Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	1	2.6	3	7.7	1	2.6	1	2.6	1	2.6	3	7.7	3	7.7	10	25.6	11	28.2	5	12.8
Low-Medium Risk	5	5.4	2	2.2	4	4.3	2	2.2	4	4.3	5	5.4	2	2.2	28	30.1	32	34.4	9	9.7
High-Medium Risk	4	3.1	7	5.3	6	4.6	5	3.8	4	3.1	5	3.8	10	7.6	38	29.0	41	31.3	11	8.4
High Risk	7	5.9	9	7.6	7	5.9	8	6.8	3	2.5	14	11.9	7	5.9	25	21.2	30	25.4	8	6.8
All Communities	17	4.5	21	5.5	18	4.7	16	4.2	12	3.1	27	7.1	22	5.8	101	26.5	114	29.9	33	8.7

* Weekday - sometime between Monday and Friday
 ** Weekend - sometime between Friday and Monday

TABLE C-17. ALL BURGLARIES BY POINTS OF ENTRY

Community Type	Entry Points																	
	Door		Window		Roof		Wall		Floor		Concealment		Roof - Makes Opening		Wall - Makes Opening		Other and Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	310	56.3	214	38.8	3	0.5	-	-	-	-	1	0.2	1	0.2	2	0.4	20	3.6
Low-Medium Risk	1056	58.2	661	36.5	24	1.3	3	0.2	-	-	6	0.3	3	0.2	9	0.5	51	2.8
High-Medium Risk	1661	62.5	804	30.3	45	1.7	8	0.3	-	-	4	0.2	2	0.1	15	0.6	117	4.4
High Risk	1534	55.9	1054	38.4	25	0.9	7	0.3	3	0.1	5	0.2	1	0.1	36	1.3	78	2.8
All Communities	4561	58.8	2733	35.2	97	1.3	18	0.2	3	0.0	16	0.2	7	0.1	62	0.8	266	3.4

TABLE C-18. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY POINT OF ENTRY

Community Type	Entry Points																	
	Door		Window		Roof		Wall		Floor		Concealment		Roof - Makes Opening		Wall - Makes Opening		Other and Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	236	58.1	154	37.9	1	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2	14	3.4
Low-Medium Risk	789	58.7	512	38.1	5	0.4	1	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.1	36	2.7
High-Medium Risk	1166	64.8	550	30.6	7	0.4	2	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75	4.2
High Risk	1093	55.9	799	40.8	-	-	3	0.2	2	0.1	-	-	-	-	3	0.2	56	2.9
All Communities	3284	59.6	2015	36.6	13	0.2	6	0.1	2	0.0	-	-	-	-	5	0.1	161	3.3

TABLE C-19. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES BY POINT OF ENTRY

Community Type	Entry Points																	
	Door		Window		Roof		Wall		Floor		Concealment		Roof - Makes Opening		Wall - Makes Opening		Other and Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	61	57.5	37	34.9	1	0.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.9	1	0.9	5	4.7
Low-Medium Risk	224	59.6	108	28.7	16	4.3	2	0.5	-	-	6	1.6	3	0.1	8	2.1	9	2.4
High-Medium Risk	420	57.9	208	28.7	37	5.1	6	0.8	-	-	2	0.3	2	0.3	15	2.1	35	4.8
High Risk	378	56.5	209	31.2	24	3.6	4	0.6	1	0.2	4	0.6	1	0.2	33	4.9	15	2.2
All Communities	1083	57.7	562	30.0	78	4.2	12	0.6	1	0.1	12	0.6	7	0.5	57	3.0	64	3.4

TABLE C-20. OTHER TYPES OF FACILITIES BURGLARIES AND POINT OF ENTRY

Community Type	Entry Points																	
	Door		Window		Roof		Wall		Floor		Concealment		Roof - Makes Opening		Wall - Makes Opening		Other and Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	13	33.3	23	59.0	1	2.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.6
Low-Medium Risk	43	46.2	41	44.1	3	3.2	-	-	-	-	1	2.6	-	-	-	-	6	6.5
High-Medium Risk	75	57.3	46	35.1	1	0.8	-	-	-	-	2	1.5	-	-	-	-	7	5.3
High Risk	63	53.4	46	39.0	1	0.8	-	-	-	-	1	0.8	-	-	-	-	7	5.9
All Communities	194	50.9	156	40.9	6	1.6	-	-	-	-	4	1.1	-	-	-	-	21	5.5

Entry Point Visibility

Tables C-21 through C-24 show the visibility of the entry points. Table C-21 is a summary for all burglaries. Tables C-22 through C-24 present the visibility information by type of facility. In 62 percent of all reported cases, the point of entry into the facility was not visible to normal patrol activity. Commercial industrial areas have the highest percentage of entry points visible to patrol (45 percent). Other types of facilities areas have the highest percentages of entry points not visible to patrol (72 percent).

TABLE C-21. ALL BURGLARIES AND ENTRY POINT VISIBILITY

Community Type	Visibility							
	Open		Obstructed and Correctable		Not Visible		Other or Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	129	23.4	29	5.3	371	67.3	22	4.0
Low-Medium Risk	468	25.8	97	5.4	1198	66.1	50	2.8
High-Medium Risk	774	29.1	143	5.4	1654	62.3	85	3.2
High Risk	920	33.5	141	5.1	1602	58.4	80	2.9
All Communities	2291	29.5	410	5.3	4825	62.2	237	3.0

TABLE C-22. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES AND ENTRY POINT VISIBILITY

Community Type	Visibility							
	Open		Obstructed and Correctable		Not Visible		Other or Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	81	20.0	25	6.2	286	70.4	14	3.4
Low-Medium Risk	277	20.6	80	6.0	957	71.2	30	2.2
High-Medium Risk	428	23.8	102	5.7	1218	67.7	52	2.9
High Risk	585	29.9	107	5.5	1210	61.9	54	2.8
All Communities	1371	24.9	314	5.7	3671	66.7	150	2.7

TABLE C-23. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES AND ENTRY POINT VISIBILITY

Community Type	Visibility							
	Open		Obstructed and Correctable		Not Visible		Other or Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	42	39.6	3	2.8	54	50.9	7	6.6
Low-Medium Risk	172	45.7	14	3.7	170	45.2	20	5.3
High-Medium Risk	319	44.0	34	4.7	347	47.9	25	3.4
High Risk	314	46.9	29	4.3	307	45.9	19	2.8
All Communities	847	45.1	80	4.3	878	46.8	71	3.8

TABLE C-24. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES BURGLARIES AND POINT OF VISIBILITY

Community Type	Visibility							
	Open		Obstructed and Correctable		Not Visible		Other or Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	6	8.7	1	2.6	31	79.5	1	2.6
Low-Medium Risk	19	20.4	3	3.2	71	76.3	-	-
High-Medium Risk	27	20.6	7	5.3	89	67.9	8	6.1
High Risk	21	17.8	5	4.2	85	72.0	7	5.9
All Communities	73	19.2	16	4.2	276	72.4	16	4.2

Entry Methods

Tables C-25 through C-28 present the methods of entry used in all reported burglaries. The methods are expressed in terms of the force used to successfully gain entry. The descriptors used and their definitions are:

- (1) NO FORCE Door or window left unlocked; screen removed to open unlocked window.
- (2) MINOR FORCE Pass key, pick or slip lock, pries or jimmies door, removes louvers, etc.

- (3) MAJOR FORCE Breaks, forces, smashes doors or windows; saws, bores, burns, explodes, or tunnels point of entry.
- (4) ATTEMPT ONLY Unsuccessful efforts to enter.
- (5) OTHER AND UNKNOWN All other types of entry and those with no entry type specified.

Table C-25 is a summary of entry methods for all reported burglaries. Table C-26 presents Residential Burglaries, Table C-27 presents Commercial/Industrial Burglaries, and Table C-28 presents Burglaries of Other Types of Facilities. Collectively, these tables indicate that physical security of all types of facilities in all communities is low. Almost 27 percent of all burglaries are committed with no force. An additional 36 percent require only minor force.

On a percentage basis, the higher risk communities show fewer no-force entries and more major force entries than do the lower risk communities. Fewer no-force entries suggests that persons in high risk areas make better use of their existing locks, but their higher rate of major entries may indicate that physical security has less deterrent value in these communities. The percentages of minor force entries are about equal in all risk communities.

TABLE C-25. ALL BURGLARIES BY METHOD OF ENTRY

Community Type	Entry Methods									
	No Force		Minor Force		Major Force		Unsuccessful Attempt Only		Other & Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	181	32.8	194	35.2	123	22.3	20	3.6	33	6.0
Low-Medium Risk	595	32.8	695	38.3	389	21.5	79	4.4	55	3.0
High-Medium Risk	742	27.9	935	35.2	703	26.5	154	5.8	122	4.6
High Risk	543	19.8	1003	36.6	972	35.4	136	5.0	89	3.2
All Communities	2061	26.6	2827	36.4	2187	28.2	389	5.0	299	3.9

TABLE C-26. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY METHOD OF ENTRY

Community Type	Entry Methods									
	No Force		Minor Force		Major Force		Unsuccessful Attempt Only		Other & Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	149	36.7	144	35.5	69	17.0	13	3.2	31	7.6
Low-Medium Risk	503	37.4	523	38.9	220	16.4	56	4.2	42	3.1
High-Medium Risk	584	32.4	652	36.2	388	21.6	90	5.0	86	4.8
High Risk	434	22.2	715	36.6	653	33.4	87	4.4	67	3.4
All Communities	1670	30.3	2034	37.0	1330	24.2	246	4.5	226	4.1

TABLE C-27. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES BY METHOD OF ENTRY

Community Type	Entry Methods									
	No Force		Minor Force		Major Force		Unsuccessful Attempt Only		Other & Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	22	20.8	37	34.9	41	38.7	4	3.8	2	1.9
Low-Medium Risk	77	20.5	142	37.8	127	33.8	22	5.9	8	2.1
High-Medium Risk	120	16.6	242	33.4	276	38.1	57	7.9	30	4.1
High Risk	93	13.9	233	34.8	285	42.6	43	6.4	15	2.2
All Communities	312	16.6	654	34.9	729	38.9	126	6.7	55	2.9

TABLE C-28. OTHER FACILITIES BURGLARIES BY METHOD OF ENTRY

Community Type	Entry Methods									
	No Force		Minor Force		Major Force		Unsuccessful Attempt Only		Other & Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	10	25.6	13	33.3	13	33.3	3	7.7	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	15	16.1	30	32.3	42	45.2	1	1.1	5	5.4
High-Medium Risk	38	29.0	41	31.3	39	29.8	7	5.3	6	4.6
High Risk	16	13.6	55	46.6	34	28.8	6	5.1	7	5.9
All Communities	79	20.7	139	36.5	128	33.6	17	4.5	18	4.7

Tools Used to Gain Entry

Tables C-29 through C-32 show the types of tools used to gain entry. Table C-29 is the summary data, while Tables C-30, C-31 and C-32 present information on tools used by the type of facility burglarized. In 35 percent of the cases, the burglar used hands, feet or other bodily force to enter the facility. In 27 percent of the cases (next highest percentage), the burglar used a prying tool such as a screwdriver or prybar to enter the facility.

In 51 percent of the residential burglaries, hands, feet, other bodily force, or pry tools were used to gain entry.

In 54 percent of the commercial/industrial burglaries, prying or impact tools (hammer, rock, sledgehammer) were used to enter the facility. Also in 8 percent of the cases, cutting or forcing tools (drill, saw, jack, pipe wrench, knife) were used to gain entry.

In 58 percent of other type facilities burglaries, prying or impact tools were used to enter the facility.

Type of Property Taken

Tables C-33 through C-36 show the types of property taken. Table C-33 presents summary data, while Tables C-34 through C-36 present the type of property taken by type of premise. In all cases, the data is based on the type of property which constituted the greatest amount of dollar loss to the victim. In 47 percent of all reported burglaries hard saleable items (television, stereos, appliances, etc.) were taken. These same items were taken in over 50 percent of the residential burglaries. In commercial/industrial burglaries, 38 percent involved hard saleable items.

TABLE C-29. ALL BURGLARIES BY TOOL USED TO ENTER FACILITY

Community Type	Tools Used																	
	Hands/Feet/ Bodily Force		Lock Defeating Tool		Reaching Tool		Prying Tool		Impact Tool		Cutting/ Forcing Tool		Burning Tool		Explosive Tool		Other/ Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	219	39.7	41	7.4	-	-	149	27.0	75	13.6	51	9.3	-	-	-	-	16	2.9
Low-Medium Risk	700	38.6	183	10.1	2	0.1	510	28.1	245	13.5	104	5.7	-	-	-	-	69	3.8
High-Medium Risk	956	36.0	326	12.3	3	0.1	648	24.4	368	13.9	193	7.3	2	0.1	-	-	160	6.0
High Risk	799	29.1	254	9.3	1	0.1	784	28.6	591	21.5	153	5.6	1	0.1	-	-	160	5.8
All Communities	2674	34.4	804	10.4	6	0.1	2091	26.9	1279	16.5	501	6.5	3	-	-	-	405	5.2

TABLE C-30. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY TOOL USED TO ENTER FACILITY

Community Type	Tools Used																	
	Hands/Feet/ Bodily Force		Lock Defeating Tool		Reaching Tool		Prying Tool		Impact Tool		Cutting/ Forcing Tool		Burning Tool		Explosive Tool		Other/ Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	176	43.3	32	7.9	-	-	108	26.6	42	10.3	35	8.6	-	-	-	-	13	3.2
Low-Medium Risk	570	42.4	148	11.0	1	0.1	370	27.5	122	9.1	83	6.2	-	-	-	-	50	3.7
High-Medium Risk	718	39.9	246	13.7	-	-	423	23.5	172	9.6	130	7.2	2	0.1	-	-	109	6.1
High Risk	639	32.7	206	10.5	-	-	528	27.0	374	19.1	83	4.2	-	-	-	-	126	6.4
All Communities	2103	38.2	632	11.5	-	-	1429	26.0	710	12.9	331	6.0	-	-	-	-	298	5.4

TABLE C-31. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES BY TOOL USED TO ENTER FACILITY

Community Type	Tools Used																	
	Hands/Feet/ Bodily Force		Lock Defeating Tool		Reaching Tool		Prying Tool		Impact Tool		Cutting/ Forcing Tool		Burning Tool		Explosive Tool		Other/ Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	15	38.5	1	2.6	-	-	9	23.1	11	28.2	3	7.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	18	19.4	10	10.8	-	-	20	21.5	38	40.9	1	1.1	-	-	-	-	6	6.5
High-Medium Risk	41	31.3	12	9.2	1	0.8	34	26.0	32	24.4	5	3.8	-	-	-	-	6	4.6
High Risk	20	16.9	9	7.6	-	-	48	40.7	28	23.7	5	4.2	-	-	-	-	8	6.8
All Communities	94	24.7	32	8.4	1	0.3	111	29.1	109	28.6	14	3.7	-	-	-	-	20	5.3

TABLE C-32. OTHER TYPE OF FACILITIES BURGLARIES BY TOOL USED TO ENTER FACILITY

Community Type	Tools Used																	
	Hands/Feet/ Bodily Force		Lock Defeating Tool		Reaching Tool		Prying Tool		Impact Tool		Cutting/ Forcing Tool		Burning Tool		Explosive Tool		Other/ Unknown	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	28	26.4	8	7.5	-	-	32	30.2	22	20.8	13	12.3	-	-	-	-	3	2.8
Low-Medium Risk	112	29.8	25	6.6	1	0.3	120	31.9	85	22.6	20	5.3	-	-	-	-	13	3.5
High-Medium Risk	197	27.2	68	9.4	2	0.3	191	25.0	164	22.6	58	8.0	-	-	-	-	45	6.2
High Risk	140	20.9	39	5.8	1	0.1	208	31.1	189	28.2	65	9.7	1	0.1	-	-	26	3.9
All Communities	477	25.5	140	7.5	4	0.3	551	29.4	460	24.5	156	8.4	1	0.1	-	-	87	4.6

TABLE C-33. ALL BURGLARIES BY TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN

Community Type	Type of Property																			
	Money		Negotiable Items		Jewelry/Furs		Soft Saleable Items		Hard Saleable Items		Drugs		Firearms		Items From Safe		Other		Unknown or Not Specific	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	88	16.0	3	0.5	35	6.4	22	4.0	225	40.8	2	0.4	21	3.8	1	0.2	23	4.2	131	23.8
Low-Medium Risk	285	15.7	9	0.5	132	7.3	91	5.0	785	43.3	12	0.7	60	3.3	5	0.3	74	4.1	360	19.9
High-Medium Risk	397	14.8	14	0.5	211	7.9	109	4.1	1219	45.9	13	0.5	58	2.2	12	0.5	106	4.0	507	19.1
High Risk	253	9.2	12	0.4	109	4.0	171	6.2	1446	52.7	1	0.1	66	2.4	6	0.2	95	3.5	583	21.3
All Communities	1023	13.2	28	0.5	487	6.3	403	5.1	3675	47.3	28	0.4	206	2.7	24	0.3	298	3.9	1581	20.3

TABLE C-34. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN

Community Type	Type of Property																			
	Money		Negotiable Items		Jewelry/Furs		Soft Saleable Items		Hard Saleable Items		Drugs		Firearms		Items From Safe		Other		Unknown or Not Specific	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	67	16.5	2	0.5	34	8.4	16	3.9	164	40.4	2	0.5	19	4.7	1	0.2	10	2.5	91	22.4
Low-Medium Risk	193	14.4	6	0.5	126	9.4	62	4.6	638	47.5	1	0.1	57	4.2	1	0.1	23	1.7	237	17.6
High-Medium Risk	230	12.8	9	0.5	200	11.1	83	4.6	896	49.8	2	0.1	52	2.9	1	0.1	32	1.8	295	16.4
High Risk	170	8.7	9	0.5	105	5.4	139	7.1	1113	56.9	-	-	59	3.0	2	0.1	24	1.2	335	16.6
All Communities	660	12.0	26	0.5	465	8.5	300	5.4	2811	51.1	5	0.1	187	3.4	5	0.1	89	1.6	951	17.0

TABLE C-35. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES BY TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN

Community Type	Type of Property																			
	Money		Negotiable Items		Jewelry/Furs		Soft Saleable Items		Hard Saleable Items		Drugs		Firearms		Items From Safe		Other		Unknown or Not Specific	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	14	13.2	1	0.9	1	0.9	5	4.7	52	49.1	-	-	1	0.9	-	-	10	9.4	22	20.8
Low-Medium Risk	80	21.3	3	0.8	6	1.6	27	7.2	113	30.1	11	2.9	3	0.8	4	1.1	40	10.6	89	23.7
High-Medium Risk	149	20.6	5	0.7	9	1.2	35	4.8	262	36.1	11	1.5	4	0.6	11	1.5	67	9.2	172	23.7
High Risk	77	11.5	3	0.4	4	0.6	29	4.3	285	42.6	1	0.1	7	1.0	4	0.6	52	7.8	207	30.9
All Communities	320	17.1	12	0.6	20	1.1	96	5.1	712	38.0	23	1.3	15	0.8	19	1.0	169	9.0	490	26.1

TABLE C-36. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES BURGLARIES BY TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN

Community Type	Type of Property																			
	Money		Negotiable Items		Jewelry/Furs		Soft Saleable Items		Hard Saleable Items		Drugs		Firearms		Items From Safe		Other		Unknown or Not Specific	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	7	17.9	-	-	-	-	1	2.6	9	23.1	-	-	1	2.6	-	-	3	7.7	18	46.2
Low-Medium Risk	12	12.9	-	-	-	-	2	2.2	34	36.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	11.8	34	36.6
High-Medium Risk	18	13.7	-	-	2	1.5	1	0.8	61	46.6	-	-	2	1.5	-	-	7	4.3	40	30.5
High Risk	6	5.1	-	-	-	-	3	2.5	48	40.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	16.1	41	34.7
All Communities	143	11.3	-	-	2	0.5	7	1.8	152	39.9	-	-	4	1.1	-	-	40	10.5	133	34.9

Dollar Value Lost

Tables C-37 through C-40 present the reported dollar losses of burglaries. Table C-37 presents summary data, while Tables C-38 through C-40 show dollar losses by type of facility burglarized. In 19 percent of the cases, the dollar loss was between \$200 and \$499.

In 23 percent of the residential burglaries, the reported dollar loss was between \$200 and \$499. In 18 percent of the cases the value of the loss was not reported.

For commercial/industrial burglaries, the highest percentage occurred in the "not reported" category (24 percent), the second highest in the "no loss" category (16 percent), and the third highest percentage occurred in the "between \$200 and \$499" category.

In burglaries of other types of facilities, "not reported" and "no loss" contain the two highest percentages, the third highest percentage is for the "between \$10 and \$49" category.

Total Dollar Loss

Tables C-41 through C-44 present all reported burglaries by category of premise, the total dollar loss, and the average dollar loss per risk community. The percentage of loss in relation to the percentage of burglaries is also shown.

Security Inspection

Tables C-45 through C-48 present the volume and percentage of all reported burglaries by security inspection status. Eleven percent of all reported burglaries were against facilities that had a security inspection.

Identification of Property

Tables C-49 through C-52 present the volume and percentage of all reported burglaries by property identification. Five percent of the burglaries involved property that could be identified through serial numbers, drivers license numbers, initials, or other markings which had been placed on the property.

TABLE C-37. ALL BURGLARIES BY DOLLAR VALUE LOST

Community Type	Dollar Values																							
	0-9		10-49		50-99		100-199		200-499		500-999		1,000-4,999		5,000-9,999		Over 10,000		No Loss		Not Reported			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	No Loss	Apprehended				
Low Risk	29	5.3	70	12.7	32	5.8	56	10.2	81	14.7	52	9.4	48	8.7	-	-	1	0.2	102	18.5	6	1.1	74	13.4
Low-Medium Risk	70	3.9	172	9.5	151	8.3	199	11.0	361	19.9	63	3.5	129	7.1	5	0.3	2	0.1	247	13.6	42	2.3	272	15.0
High-Medium Risk	76	2.9	236	8.9	256	9.6	330	12.4	486	18.3	256	9.6	199	7.5	9	0.3	7	0.3	351	13.2	37	13.9	413	15.5
High Risk	38	1.4	181	6.6	172	2.2	307	6.3	571	20.8	316	11.5	179	6.5	6	0.2	-	-	299	10.9	40	1.7	628	22.9
All Communities	213	2.7	659	8.5	611	7.9	892	11.5	1499	19.3	787	10.1	585	7.2	20	0.3	10	0.1	999	12.9	131	1.7	1387	17.9

TABLE C-38. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY DOLLAR VALUE LOST

Community Type	Dollar Values																							
	0-9		10-49		50-99		100-199		200-499		500-999		1,000-4,999		5,000-9,999		Over 10,000		No Loss		Not Reported			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	No Loss	Apprehended				
Low Risk	20	4.9	44	10.8	28	6.9	48	11.8	64	15.8	38	9.4	34	8.4	-	-	1	0.2	79	19.5	2	0.5	48	11.8
Low-Medium Risk	44	1.3	113	8.4	121	9.0	165	12.3	306	22.8	130	9.7	102	7.6	5	0.4	2	0.1	163	12.1	13	1.0	180	13.4
High-Medium Risk	44	2.4	150	8.3	194	10.8	237	13.2	387	21.5	193	10.7	136	7.6	5	0.3	2	0.1	220	12.2	14	0.8	218	12.1
High Risk	26	1.3	140	7.2	132	6.7	235	12.0	479	24.5	255	13.0	130	6.6	3	0.2	-	-	188	9.6	15	0.8	353	18.0
All Communities	134	2.4	447	8.1	475	8.6	685	12.4	1236	22.5	616	11.2	402	7.3	13	0.3	5	0.1	650	11.8	44	0.8	799	14.5

TABLE C-39. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES BY DOLLAR VALUE LOST

Community Type	Dollar Values																							
	0-9		10-49		50-99		100-199		200-499		500-999		1,000-4,999		5,000-9,999		Over 10,000		No Loss		Not Reported			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	No Loss	Apprehended				
Low Risk	5	4.7	17	16.0	4	3.8	5	4.7	15	14.2	13	12.3	14	13.2	-	-	-	-	15	14.2	4	3.8	14	13.2
Low-Medium Risk	17	4.5	44	11.7	23	6.1	31	8.2	50	13.3	30	8.0	24	6.4	-	-	-	-	65	17.3	25	6.6	67	17.8
High-Medium Risk	18	2.5	73	12.8	54	7.4	82	11.3	85	11.7	59	8.1	55	7.6	4	0.6	5	0.6	111	15.3	20	2.8	159	21.9
High Risk	10	1.5	38	5.7	34	5.1	63	9.4	85	12.7	55	8.2	42	6.3	2	0.3	-	-	100	14.9	26	3.9	214	32.0
All Communities	50	2.7	172	9.2	115	6.1	181	9.7	235	12.5	157	8.4	135	7.2	6	0.3	5	0.3	291	15.5	75	4.0	454	24.2

TABLE C-40. OTHER TYPES OF FACILITIES BURGLARIES BY DOLLAR VALUE LOST

Community Type	Dollar Values																							
	0-9		10-49		50-99		100-199		200-499		500-999		1,000-4,999		5,000-9,999		Over 10,000		No Loss		Not Reported			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	No Loss	Apprehended				
Low Risk	4	10.3	9	23.1	-	-	3	7.7	2	5.1	1	2.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	20.5	-	-	12	30.8
Low-Medium Risk	9	9.7	15	16.1	7	7.5	3	3.2	5	5.4	3	3.2	3	3.2	-	-	-	-	19	20.4	4	4.3	25	26.9
High-Medium Risk	14	10.7	13	9.9	8	6.1	11	8.4	14	10.7	4	3.1	8	6.1	-	-	-	-	20	15.3	3	2.3	36	27.5
High Risk	2	1.7	3	2.5	6	5.1	9	7.6	7	5.9	6	5.1	7	5.9	1	0.8	-	-	11	9.3	5	4.2	61	51.7
All Communities	29	7.6	40	10.5	21	5.5	26	6.8	28	7.3	14	3.7	18	4.7	1	0.2	-	-	58	15.2	12	3.2	134	35.2

TABLE C-41. ALL BURGLARIES BY TOTAL DOLLAR LOSS

Community Type	Total Dollar Loss*			
	\$ Loss	Avg. \$ Loss	Percentage of Loss	Percentage of Burglaries
Low Risk	\$ 210,375	\$381.80	7.1	7.1
Low-Medium Risk	605,285	383.49	23.4	23.3
High-Medium Risk	1,072,660	403.86	36.1	34.2
High Risk	993,940	362.35	33.4	35.4
All Communities	\$2,199,275	\$382.87	100.0	100.0

TABLE C-42. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES BY TOTAL DOLLAR LOSS

Community Type	Total Dollar Loss*			
	\$ Loss	Avg. \$ Loss	Percentage of Loss	Percentage of Burglaries
Low Risk	\$ 156,620	\$385.76	7.1	7.3
Low-Medium Risk	554,535	412.60	25.2	24.4
High-Medium Risk	732,220	406.78	33.3	32.7
High Risk	755,900	386.45	34.4	35.5
All Communities	\$2,199,275	\$399.43	74.0	70.9

TABLE C-43. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES BY TOTAL

Community Type	Total Dollar Loss*			
	\$ Loss	Avg. \$ Loss	Percentage of Loss	Percentage of Burglaries
Low Risk	\$ 51,565	\$486.46	7.4	5.7
Low-Medium Risk	127,780	339.84	18.4	20.0
High-Medium Risk	310,130	427.72	44.7	38.7
High Risk	204,190	305.21	29.4	35.7
All Communities	\$ 693,665	\$369.75	23.4	24.2

TABLE C-44. OTHER TYPES OF FACILITIES BURGLARIES BY TOTAL

Community Type	Total Dollar Loss*			
	\$ Loss	Avg. \$ Loss	Percentage of Loss	Percentage of Burglaries
Low Risk	\$ 2,190	\$ 56.15	2.8	10.2
Low-Medium Risk	12,970	139.46	16.4	24.4
High-Medium Risk	30,310	231.37	38.0	34.4
High Risk	33,850	286.86	42.7	31.0
All Communities	\$ 79,320	\$208.18	2.6	4.9

TABLE C-45. ALL BURGLARIES AND SECURITY INSPECTION STATUS

Community Type	Security Inspection Status					
	Inspected		Not Inspected		Not Specified	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	57	10.3	491	89.1	3	0.6
Low-Medium Risk	214	11.8	1573	86.8	26	1.4
High-Medium Risk	332	12.5	2270	85.5	54	2.0
High Risk	261	9.5	2467	89.9	15	0.6
All Communities	864	11.1	6801	87.6	98	1.3

TABLE C-46. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES

Community Type	Security Inspection Status					
	Inspected		Not Inspected		Not Specified	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	46	11.3	357	87.9	3	0.8
Low-Medium Risk	155	11.5	1178	87.6	11	0.8
High-Medium Risk	233	12.9	1541	85.6	26	1.4
High Risk	48	2.5	1902	97.2	6	0.3
All Communities	482	8.8	4978	90.4	46	0.8

* Loss amounts are based on the midpoint value of the loss reporting categories shown in Table C-37.

TABLE C-47. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL

Community Type	Security Inspection Status					
	Inspected		Not Inspected		Not Specified	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	10	9.4	96	90.6	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	51	13.6	312	83.0	13	3.5
High-Medium Risk	81	11.2	621	86.0	23	3.2
High Risk	186	27.8	475	71.0	8	1.2
All Communities	328	17.5	1504	80.2	44	2.3

TABLE C-48. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES

Community Type	Security Inspection Status					
	Inspected		Not Inspected		Not Specified	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	1	2.6	38	97.4	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	8	8.6	83	89.2	2	2.2
High-Medium Risk	18	13.7	108	82.4	5	3.8
High Risk	27	22.9	90	76.3	1	0.8
All Communities	54	14.2	319	83.7	8	2.1

TABLE C-49. ALL BURGLARIES AND PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION

Community Type	Property Identification Status					
	Identified		Not Identified		Not Specified	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	11	2.0	326	59.2	214	38.8
Low-Medium Risk	88	4.9	1116	61.6	609	33.6
High-Medium Risk	133	5.0	1481	55.8	1042	39.2
High Risk	167	6.1	1243	45.3	1333	48.6
All Communities	399	5.1	4166	53.7	3196	41.2

TABLE C-50. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES AND PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION

Community Type	Property Identification Status					
	Identified		Not Identified		Not Specified	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	6	1.5	255	62.8	145	35.7
Low-Medium Risk	70	5.2	824	61.3	450	33.5
High-Medium Risk	91	5.1	1006	55.9	703	39.0
High Risk	120	6.1	928	47.4	908	46.4
All Communities	287	5.2	3013	54.7	2206	40.1

TABLE C-51. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES AND PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION

Community Type	Property Identification Status					
	Identified		Not Identified		Not Specified	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	5	4.7	45	42.5	56	52.8
Low-Medium Risk	12	3.2	247	65.7	117	31.1
High-Medium Risk	32	4.4	403	55.6	290	40.0
High Risk	43	6.4	269	40.2	357	53.4
All Communities	92	4.9	964	51.4	820	43.7

TABLE C-52. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES BURGLARIES AND PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION

Community Type	Property Identification Status					
	Identified		Not Identified		Not Specified	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	-	-	26	66.7	13	33.3
Low-Medium Risk	6	6.5	45	48.4	42	45.1
High-Medium Risk	10	7.6	72	55.0	49	37.4
High Risk	4					

Burglary Detections

Tables C-53 through C-56 show how burglaries were detected. In 88.9 percent of the Residential cases, the victim detected the burglary. Citizens other than the victim detected 9.9 percent of the cases while law enforcement personnel detected 1.2 percent of the cases.

Non-victim detections were highest for burglaries of Other Types of Facilities at 18.4 percent, while Law Enforcement detections were 16.0 percent for both Commercial/Industrial and Other Facility burglaries.

TABLE C-53. ALL BURGLARIES AND HOW DETECTED*

Community	By Victim								By Other Than Victim				By Law Enforce.				Unknown	
	On Return		Progress*		On Premises		Next Work- ing Day		Neighbor Family, etc.		Phone or Pass. Cit.		Patrol or Sec. Guard		Other		#	%
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Low Risk	340	61.7	7	1.3	41	7.4	101	18.3	26	4.7	15	2.7	7	1.3	14	2.5	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	1094	60.3	22	1.2	131	7.2	294	16.2	110	6.1	50	3.2	64	3.5	35	1.9	5	0.3
High-Medium Risk	1477	55.6	37	1.4	198	7.5	546	20.6	132	5.0	147	5.5	34	1.3	79	3.0	6	0.2
High Risk	1539	56.1	53	1.9	206	7.5	410	14.9	202	7.4	144	5.2	54	2.0	126	4.6	9	0.3
All Communities	4450	57.3	119	1.5	576	7.4	1351	17.4	470	6.0	364	4.7	159	2.0	254	3.2	20	0.3

TABLE C-54. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES

Community	By Victim								By Other Than Victim				By Law Enforce.				Unknown	
	On Return		Progress*		On Premises		Next Work- ing Day		Neighbor Family, etc.		Phone or Pass. Cit.		Patrol or Sec. Guard		Other		#	%
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Low Risk	327	89.5	5	1.2	36	8.9	-	-	26	6.4	5	1.2	3	0.7	4	9.9	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	1060	78.9	21	1.6	108	8.0	4	0.3	110	8.2	9	0.7	27	2.0	3	0.2	2	0.1
High-Medium Risk	1414	78.6	34	1.9	169	9.4	11	0.6	131	7.3	25	1.4	8	0.4	6	0.3	2	0.1
High Risk	1475	75.4	44	2.2	179	9.2	8	0.4	202	10.3	38	1.9	2	0.1	8	0.4	-	-
All Communities	4236	77.7	104	1.9	492	8.9	23	0.4	469	8.5	77	1.4	40	0.8	21	0.4	4	0.1

*Victim returns while burglary is in progress.

TABLE C-55. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES

Community	By Victim								By Other Than Victim				By Law Enforce.				Unknown	
	On Return		Progress*		On Premises		Next Work- ing Day		Neighbor Family, etc.		Phone or Pass. Cit.		Patrol or Sec. Guard		Other		#	%
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Low Risk	9	8.5	1	0.9	2	1.9	77	72.6	-	-	5	4.7	4	3.8	8	7.5	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	26	6.9	1	0.3	23	6.1	227	60.4	-	-	39	10.4	32	8.5	26	6.9	2	0.5
High-Medium Risk	50	6.9	2	0.3	29	4.0	469	64.7	-	-	90	12.4	19	2.6	62	8.6	4	0.6
High Risk	61	9.1	7	1.0	26	3.9	346	51.7	-	-	84	12.6	39	5.8	101	15.1	5	0.7
All Communities	146	2.7	11	0.6	80	4.2	1119	59.6	-	-	218	11.6	94	5.0	197	10.5	11	0.7

TABLE C-56. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES

Community	By Victim								By Other Than Victim				By Law Enforce.				Unknown	
	On Return		Progress*		On Premises		Next Work- ing Day		Neighbor Family, etc.		Phone or Pass. Cit.		Patrol or Sec. Guard		Other		#	%
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Low Risk	4	10.3	1	2.6	3	7.7	24	61.5	-	-	5	12.8	-	-	7	5.1	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	8	8.6	-	-	-	-	63	67.7	-	-	10	10.8	5	5.3	6	6.5	1	1.1
High-Medium Risk	13	9.9	1	0.8	-	-	66	50.4	1	0.8	22	24.4	7	5.3	11	8.4	0	-
High Risk	3	2.5	2	1.7	1	0.8	56	47.5	-	-	22	18.6	13	11.0	17	14.4	4	3.4
All Communities	28	7.3	4	1.1	4	1.1	209	54.9	1	0.3	69	18.1	25	6.5	36	9.5	5	1.3

*Victim returns while burglary is in progress.

Installed Alarm Systems

Tables C-57 through C-60 shows the volume and percentage of all reported burglaries by installed alarm systems. Seven percent of all burglarized facilities had installed alarm systems.

TABLE C-57. ALL BURGLARIES AND ALARM SYSTEMS

Community	Alarm Systems							
	Type Alarm Systems						Not Alarmed	
	Audible		Silent		Other*		#	%
	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Low Risk	10	1.8	15	2.7	1	0.2	525	95.3
Low-Medium Risk	39	2.2	57	3.1	10	0.6	1707	94.2
High-Medium Risk	77	2.9	77	2.9	12	0.5	2490	93.8
High Risk	67	2.4	166	6.1	10	0.4	2500	91.1
All Communities	193	2.5	315	4.0	33	0.4	7222	93.1

TABLE C-58. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES AND ALARM

Community	Alarm Systems							
	Type Alarm Systems						Not Alarmed	
	Audible		Silent		Other*		#	%
	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Low Risk	7	1.7	3	0.7	-	-	396	97.5
Low-Medium Risk	6	0.4	4	0.3	3	0.3	1331	99.0
High-Medium Risk	12	0.7	1	0.1	3	0.1	1784	99.1
High Risk	15	0.8	4	0.2	-	-	1937	99.0
All Communities	40	0.7	12	0.3	6	0.1	5448	98.9

* Other - Included in this category are other types of alarm systems.

TABLE C-59. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES AND ALARM

Community	Alarm Systems							
	Type Alarm Systems						Not Alarmed	
	Audible		Silent		Other*			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	3	2.8	10	9.4	1	1.0	92	86.8
Low-Medium Risk	33	8.8	41	10.9	7	1.9	295	78.5
High-Medium Risk	64	8.8	62	8.6	8	1.1	591	81.5
High Risk	49	7.3	134	20.0	7	1.0	479	71.6
All Communities	149	7.9	247	13.2	23	1.2	1457	77.7

TABLE C-60. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES BURGLARIES AND ALARMS

Community	Alarm Systems							
	Type Alarm Systems						Not Alarmed	
	Audible		Silent		Other*			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	-	-	2	5.1	-	-	37	94.9
Low-Medium Risk	-	-	12	12.9	-	-	81	87.1
High-Medium Risk /	1	0.8	14	10.7	1	0.8	115	87.8
High Risk	3	2.5	28	23.7	3	2.5	84	71.2
All Communities	4	1.1	56	14.7	4	1.1	317	83.2

Operating Alarm Systems

Tables C-61 through C-64 show the status of the installed alarms for all burglary reports. The burglary alarm systems operated in approximately 50 percent of the 529 cases where burglary alarm systems were installed.

* Other - Included in this category are other types of alarm systems.

TABLE C-61. ALL BURGLARIES AND ALARM STATUS

Community	Total Alarms	Alarm Status							
		Operated		Defeated by Suspect		Did Not Operate		Unknown	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	26	14	53.8	6	23.1	4	15.4	2	7.7
Low-Medium Risk	103	37	35.9	34	33.0	12	11.7	20	19.4
High-Medium Risk	163	81	49.7	28	17.2	31	19.0	23	14.1
High Risk	237	128	39.1	35	14.8	52	21.9	22	9.3
All Communities	529	260	49.1	103	19.5	99	18.7	67	12.7

TABLE C-62. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES AND ALARM STATUS

Community	Total Alarms	Alarm Status							
		Operated		Defeated by Suspect		Did Not Operate		Unknown	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	10	4	40.0	3	30.0	2	20.0	1	10.0
Low-Medium Risk	11	5	45.5	3	27.3	-	-	3	27.3
High-Medium Risk	16	6	37.5	5	31.3	3	18.8	2	12.5
High Risk	17	8	47.1	3	17.6	5	29.4	1	5.9
All Communities	54	23	42.6	14	25.9	10	18.5	7	13.0

TABLE C-63. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES AND ALARM STATUS

Community	Total Alarms	Alarm Status							
		Operated		Defeated by Suspect		Did Not Operate		Unknown	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	14	8	57.1	3	21.4	2	14.3	1	7.1
Low-Medium Risk	80	25	31.3	27	33.8	12	15.0	16	20.0
High-Medium Risk	131	64	48.9	23	17.6	24	18.3	20	15.3
High Risk	187	103	55.1	26	13.9	39	20.9	19	10.2
All Communities	412	200	48.5	79	19.2	77	18.7	56	13.6

TABLE C-64. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES, BURGLARIES AND ALARM STATUS

Community	Total Alarms	Alarm Status							
		Operated		Defeated by Suspect		Did Not Operate		Unknown	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	2	2	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	12	7	58.3	4	33.3	-	-	1	8.3
High-Medium Risk	16	11	68.8	-	-	4	25.0	1	6.3
High Risk	33	17	51.5	6	18.2	8	18.2	2	6.1
All Communities	63	37	58.7	10	15.9	12	19.0	4	6.4

Dog on Burglarized Premise

Tables C-65 through C-68 presents volume and percentage of all burglary reports where a dog was on the premise. A dog was on the premise in 8 percent of a reported 5044 cases and was reported to be effective in detecting the burglary in less than one percent of the cases.

TABLE C-65. ALL BURGLARIES AND PRESENCE OF DOG

Community	Total Rpts.	Dog Present		Effectiveness of Dog					
				Yes		No		Unknown	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	367	39	10.6	2	5.1	24	61.5	13	33.3
Low-Medium Risk	1306	100	7.7	1	1.0	27	27.0	72	72.0
High-Medium Risk	1813	115	6.3	3	2.6	9	7.8	103	89.6
High Risk	1555	154	9.9	1	0.6	-	-	153	99.4
All Communities	5044	408	8.1	7	1.7	60	14.8	341	83.6

TABLE C-66. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES AND PRESENCE OF DOG

Community	Total Rpts.	Dog Present		Effectiveness of Dog					
				Yes		No		Unknown	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	284	38	13.4	2	5.3	24	63.2	12	31.6
Low-Medium Risk	973	96	9.9	1	1.0	27	28.1	68	70.8
High-Medium Risk	1233	106	8.6	2	1.9	9	8.5	95	89.6
High Risk	1157	137	11.8	1	0.7	0	-	136	99.3
All Communities	3647	377	10.3	6	1.6	60	15.9	311	82.5

TABLE C-67. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL BURGLARIES AND PRESENCE OF DOG

Community	Total Rpts.	Dog Present		Effectiveness of Dog					
				Yes		No		Unknown	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	53	1	1.9	-	-	-	-	1	100
Low-Medium Risk	274	4	1.5	-	-	-	-	4	100
High-Medium Risk	484	8	1.7	1	12.5	-	-	7	87.5
High Risk	343	17	5.0	-	-	-	-	17	100.0
All Communities	1155	30	2.6	1	3.3	-	-	29	96.7

TABLE C-68. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES BURGLARIES AND PRESENCE OF DOG

Community	Total Rpts.	Dog Present		Effectiveness of Dog					
				Yes		No		Unknown	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
High-Medium Risk	96	1	1.0	-	-	-	-	1	100
High Risk	55	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All Communities	242	1	0.4	0	0	0	0	1	100

Case Status

Tables C-69 through C-72 present the clearance status for all reported burglaries. The 1282 cleared cases account for 16.5 percent of all 7763 reported burglaries.

TABLE C-69. ALL BURGLARIES AND CLEARANCE STATUS

Community Type	Cleared								Not Cleared															
	By Arrest				Death				Case Open				Unfounded				Class Change				Other & Not Specified			
	Local Arrest		In Other Areas		Death		Exceptionally		Case Open		Unfounded		Class Change		Other & Not Specified									
Low Risk	120	21.8	19	3.4	1	-	9	7.5	389	70.6	14	2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-						
Low-Medium Risk	414	22.8	2	0.1	1	0.1	21	1.6	1345	74.2	26	1.4	4	0.2	-	-	-	-						
High-Medium Risk	384	14.5	1	0.1	-	-	19	0.7	2198	82.8	47	1.8	6	0.2	1	0.1	-	-						
High Risk	254	9.3	3	0.1	-	-	35	1.3	2419	86.2	25	0.9	4	0.1	3	0.1	-	-						
All Communities	1172	15.1	25	0.3	1	0	84	1.1	6351	81.8	112	1.4	14	0.6	4	0.1	-	-						

TABLE C-70. RESIDENTIAL

Community Type	Cleared								Not Cleared															
	By Arrest				Death				Case Open				Unfounded				Class Change				Other & Not Specified			
	Local Arrest		In Other Areas		Death		Exceptionally		Case Open		Unfounded		Class Change		Other & Not Specified									
Low Risk	104	25.6	4	1.2	-	-	4	1.0	283	69.7	11	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-						
Low-Medium Risk	308	22.9	2	0.1	1	0.1	19	1.4	1000	74.4	12	0.9	2	0.1	-	-	-	-						
High-Medium Risk	287	15.9	-	-	-	-	15	0.8	1459	81.1	38	2.1	1	0.1	-	-	-	-						
High Risk	166	8.5	1	0.1	-	-	34	1.7	1732	88.5	19	1.0	3	0.2	1	0.1	-	-						
All Communities	865	15.7	7	0.1	1	0	72	1.0	4374	81.3	90	1.5	6	0.1	1	0	-	-						

TABLE C-71. COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL

Community Type	Cleared								Not Cleared															
	By Arrest				Death				Case Open				Unfounded				Class Change				Other & Not Specified			
	Local Arrest		In Other Areas		Death		Exceptionally		Case Open		Unfounded		Class Change		Other & Not Specified									
Low Risk	13	12.3	15	14.2	-	-	2	1.9	73	68.9	3	2.8	-	-	-	-	-	-						
Low-Medium Risk	88	23.4	-	-	-	-	1	0.3	273	72.6	12	3.2	2	0.5	-	-	-	-						
High-Medium Risk	82	11.3	1	0.1	-	-	4	0.6	624	86.1	8	1.1	5	0.7	1	0.1	-	-						
High Risk	71	10.6	2	0.3	-	-	-	-	587	87.7	6	9.0	1	0.1	2	0.3	-	-						
All Communities	254	13.5	18	1.0	-	-	7	0.4	1557	83.0	29	1.5	8	0.5	3	0.2	-	-						

TABLE C-72. OTHER TYPE FACILITIES

Community Type	Cleared								Not Cleared															
	By Arrest				Death				Case Open				Unfounded				Class Change				Other & Not Specified			
	Local Arrest		In Other Areas		Death		Exceptionally		Case Open		Unfounded		Class Change		Other & Not Specified									
Low Risk	3	7.7	-	-	-	-	3	7.7	33	84.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
Low-Medium Risk	18	19.4	-	-	-	-	1	1.1	72	77.4	2	2.2	-	-	-	-	-	-						
High-Medium Risk	15	11.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	87.8	1	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	-						
High Risk	17	14.4	-	-	-	-	1	0.8	100	84.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
All Communities	53	13.9	-	-	-	-	5	1.4	320	84.0	3	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	-						

APPENDIX C

Section III - THE BURGLAR OFFENDER PROFILE

This section contains tables of data which describe the 1,078 arrested burglary offenders as reported by the six participating agencies. The data is presented for each of the risk communities and includes the 12 data elements used to describe arrested offenders.

Offender Age

Tables C-73 through C-76 present statistics relating to the age of the burglary offenders. Table C-73 shows that the total mean or average age in all communities is 19, the median age is 18, and the modal age is 16.

TABLE C-73. OFFENDER AGE SUMMARY

Community Type	Mean Age Levels			Median Ages	Modal Ages
	Male	Female	Total		
Low Risk	16	15	16	16	17
Low-Medium Risk	19	18	19	18	13
High-Medium Risk	20	22	20	19	16
High Risk	18	22	19	17	16
All Communities	18	19	19	18	16

Table C-74 shows the volume and percentage of all offenders by age group. Approximately 50 percent of the offender population are less than 18 years old, while 41 percent of the total population in each of the four risk communities are less than 18. Sixty-two percent of the offenders are less than 20, while 58 percent of the total population in each of the four risk communities are less than 20. Seventy-five percent of the burglars in the Low Risk community are less than 18.

Tables C-75 and C-76 show that 8 percent of the offenders are female and they tend to be older than the male offenders. Forty percent of the female offenders are under 18 compared to 50 percent of the males.

TABLE C-74. TOTAL OFFENDERS BY AGE GROUPS

Community Type	Total Offenders	Age Groups																			
		To 18		18-19		20-24		25-29		30-34		35-39		40-44		45-49		50+			
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Low Risk	94	71	75.5	8	8.5	12	12.8	2	2.1	1	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	333	157	47.1	44	13.2	73	21.9	28	8.4	10	3.0	9	2.7	5	1.5	5	1.5	2	0.6		
High-Medium Risk	326	132	40.5	48	14.7	74	22.7	42	12.9	12	4.0	8	2.5	6	1.8	3	.9	1	0.3		
High Risk	325	173	53.7	35	10.9	56	17.4	32	9.9	9	2.8	8	2.5	4	1.2	2	.6	4	1.2		
All Communities	1078	532	49.5	135	12.6	215	20.0	104	9.7	32	3.0	25	2.3	15	1.5	10	1.0	7	0.7		

TABLE C-75. MALE OFFENDER AGE GROUP SUMMARY

Community Type	Total Male Offenders	Age Groups																			
		To 18		18-19		20-24		25-29		30-34		35-39		40-44		45-49		50+			
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Low Risk	88	66	75.0	7	8.0	12	13.6	2	2.3	1	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	294	141	48.0	34	11.6	63	21.4	27	9.2	10	3.4	8	2.7	5	1.7	4	1.4	2	0.7		
High-Medium Risk	303	123	40.6	45	14.9	69	22.8	36	11.9	12	4.0	7	2.3	6	2.0	2	0.7	1	0.3		
High Risk	308	166	53.9	31	10.1	53	17.2	30	9.7	8	2.6	7	2.3	4	1.3	2	0.6	3	1.0		
All Communities	993	496	50.1	117	11.8	197	19.9	95	9.6	31	3.1	22	2.2	15	1.5	8	0.8	6	0.7		

TABLE C-76. FEMALE OFFENDER AGE GROUP SUMMARY

Community Type	Total Female Offenders	Age Groups																	
		To 18		18-19		20-24		25-29		30-34		35-39		40-44		45-49		50+	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	6	5	83.3	1	16.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	39	16	41.0	10	25.6	10	25.6	1	2.6	-	-	1	2.6	-	-	1	2.6	-	-
High-Medium Risk	23	7	30.4	3	13.0	5	21.7	6	26.1	-	-	1	4.3	-	-	1	4.3	-	-
High Risk	17	6	35.3	4	23.5	3	17.6	2	11.8	-	-	1	5.9	-	-	-	-	1	5.9
All Communities	85	34	40.0	18	21.2	18	21.2	9	10.6	-	-	3	3.5	-	-	2	2.4	1	1.2

Offender Race Summary

Table C-77 shows the volume and number of all arrested offenders by ethnic background. Although 25 percent of the population in the risk communities are non-white, the arrests of non-whites accounted for 36 percent of all reported arrests.

TABLE C-77. OFFENDER RACE SUMMARY

Community Type	Total Offenders	Race									
		White		Black		Mex-Amer		Indian		Other	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	94	81	86.2	8	8.5	5	5.3	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	333	257	77.2	48	14.4	25	7.5	3	0.9	-	-
High-Medium Risk	326	263	80.7	41	12.6	17	5.2	1	2.1	2	0.6
High Risk	325	85	26.2	224	68.9	15	4.6	1	0.3	2	0.6
All Communities	1078	686	63.6	321	29.8	62	5.8	5	0.5	4	0.4

Offender and Associates

Table C-78 shows the number and percentage of all offenders who participated in burglary offenses with one or more partners. Seventy-one percent of the arrested persons had one or more crime partners.

Offender and Arrest Charges

Table C-79 shows the volume and percentages of all offenders by the arrest charge. The 22 specific charges that were reported are grouped into seven categories. Only 3.3 percent of the offenders were arrested for receiving or having in their possession stolen property.

Case Disposition of Arresting Agency

Table C-80 shows the number and volume of all arrested offenders by case disposition. In this program the arresting agencies reported that 65 percent of the adult arrests resulted in the filing of a felony complaint. Statewide, based on 1971 summary data provided by all law enforcement agencies, 60 percent of the adult arrests resulted in the filing of a felony complaint.

TABLE C-78. OFFENDER AND ASSOCIATES SUMMARY (In Percent)

Community Type	Total Offenders	Number of Associates																	
		None		One		Two		Three		Four		Five		Six		Seven		Eight	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low-Risk	94	25	26.5	26	27.7	26	27.7	12	12.8	5	5.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	333	94	28.3	135	40.5	52	15.6	22	6.6	18	5.4	12	6.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
High-Medium Risk	326	109	33.4	118	36.2	74	22.7	9	2.8	6	1.8	10	3.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
High Risk	325	91	28.0	108	32.2	47	14.5	52	16.0	17	5.2	-	-	-	-	7	2.2	3	3.9
All Communities	1073	319	29.6	387	36.0	199	18.5	95	8.8	46	4.3	22	2.0	-	-	7	0.6	3	0.3

TABLE C-79. OFFENDER ARREST CHARGE SUMMARY (In Percent)

Community Type	Total Offenders	Arrest Charge Category													
		Burglary		Stolen Property		Theft		Forgery		Drugs		Assault		Other	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	94	85	90.4	-	-	4	4.3	-	-	1	1.0	-	-	4	4.3
Low-Medium Risk	333	308	92.5	16	4.8	6	1.8	-	-	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3
High-Medium Risk	326	305	93.6	5	1.5	4	1.2	3	0.9	1	0.3	-	-	8	2.5
High Risk	335	303	93.2	15	4.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1.8	1	0.3
All Communities	1078	1001	92.9	36	3.3	14	1.3	3	0.3	3	0.3	7	0.7	14	1.3

Approximately 48 percent of the arrested juveniles are either released or referred to the Probation Department or to the local law enforcement juvenile bureau.

Type of Arrest

Table C-81 presents the number and percentage of all offenders by the type of arrest. Approximately 39 percent of the offenders were arrested at or near the scene of the burglary.

Prior Drug Involvement

Tables C-82 and C-83 show the volume and percentage of all arrested offenders by prior drug involvement. The drug involvement data was provided by BCS from their existing records on the offender. In approximately 76 percent of the cases, prior drug usage was reported as "unknown" or "not stated."

Table C-83 shows the percentage of drugs used by type and for only those 264 cases where prior drug usage was recorded: approximately 20 percent of the cases indicated that only marijuana was used.

Table C-84 presents the burglary arrest rates per 1,000 population in each of the communities, and shows that juveniles are much more likely to be arrested for burglaries than are adults.

Table C-85 relates total case clearances by type of clearance and type of premises. Residential burglaries had a higher clearance rate than did burglaries of Commercial/Industrial and Other Types of premises.

Type of Arrest and Disposition

Table C-86 shows the number and percentage of all offenders by type of arrest and disposition of the case. Approximately 11 percent of the offenders arrested on the premises of the burglary received misdemeanor or felony charges.

TABLE C-80. ARRESTING AGENCY CASE DISPOSITION SUMMARY (In Percent)

Community Type	Total Arrests	Case Disposition															
		Complaint Filed				Referred				Released						Other	
		Felony		Misdemeanor		Probation Dept.		Law Enfor. Juv. Bur.		Adult		Juvenile		Other Juris.			
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	94	17	18.1	4	4.3	28	29.8	18	19.1	2	2.1	20	21.3	1	1.1	4	4.3
Low-Medium Risk	333	118	35.4	31	9.3	75	22.5	35	10.5	15	4.5	42	12.6	2	0.6	15	4.5
High-Medium Risk	326	133	40.8	13	4.0	67	20.6	19	5.8	39	12.0	38	11.7	8	2.5	9	2.7
High Risk	335	83	25.5	21	6.5	107	32.9	42	13.1	24	7.4	19	5.8	1	0.3	28	8.6
All Communities	1078	351	32.6	69	6.4	277	25.7	114	10.6	80	7.4	119	11.0	12	1.1	56	5.2

TABLE C-81. TYPE OF ARREST (In Percent)

Community Type	Total Arrests	Type of Arrest																	
		On Premise		Flee Scene/ In Vicinity		Citizen Arrest/ Hold		Reasonable Cause		APR/ Want		Warrant		Other Charge		Hold		Other + Unknown	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
		Low Risk	94	7	7.4	16	17.0	2	2.1	63	67.0	2	2.1	-	-	4	4.3	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	333	79	23.7	29	8.7	7	2.1	189	56.8	9	2.7	7	2.1	9	2.7	3	0.9	1	0.3
High-Medium Risk	326	66	20.2	47	14.4	15	4.6	177	54.3	7	2.1	5	1.5	4	1.2	4	1.2	1	0.3
High Risk	325	65	20.0	75	23.1	5	1.5	151	46.5	9	2.8	9	2.8	9	2.8	-	-	1	0.3
All Communities	1078	217	20.1	167	15.5	29	2.7	580	53.8	27	2.5	21	1.9	26	2.4	7	0.8	3	0.3

TABLE C-82. PRIOR DRUG INVOLVEMENT SUMMARY

Community Type	Total Arrests	Recorded Drug Involvement															
		Unknown/ Not Stated		Marijuana		Dangerous Drugs		Opiates		Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs		Marijuana and Opiates		Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs and Opiates		Dangerous Drugs and Opiates	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
		Low Risk	94	77	81.9	5	5.3	2	2.1	-	-	6	6.4	2	2.1	2	2.1
Low-Medium Risk	333	245	73.6	17	5.1	15	4.5	8	2.4	16	4.8	10	3.0	11	3.3	11	3.3
High-Medium Risk	326	224	68.7	19	5.8	13	4.0	11	3.4	16	4.9	18	5.5	12	3.7	13	4.0
High Risk	325	268	82.5	11	3.4	12	3.7	8	2.5	5	1.5	8	2.5	6	1.8	7	2.2
All Communities	1078	814	75.5	52	4.8	42	3.8	27	2.5	43	4.0	38	3.5	31	2.8	31	2.8

TABLE C-83. DRUGS USED BY PRIOR DRUG OFFENDERS

Community Type	Total Drug Offenders	Drugs Used															
		Marijuana		Dangerous Drugs		Opiates		Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs		Marijuana and Opiates		Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs and Opiates		Dangerous Drugs and Opiates			
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
		Low Risk	17	5	29.4	2	11.8	-	-	6	35.3	2	11.8	2	11.8	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	88	17	19.3	15	17.0	8	9.1	16	18.2	10	11.4	11	12.5	11	12.5		
High-Medium Risk	102	19	18.6	13	12.7	11	10.8	16	15.7	18	17.6	12	11.8	13	12.7		
High Risk	57	11	19.3	12	21.1	8	14.0	5	8.8	8	15.0	6	10.5	7	12.3		
All Communities	264	52	19.7	42	15.9	27	10.2	43	16.3	38	14.4	31	11.7	31	11.7		

TABLE C-84. BURGLARY ARREST RATES

Community Type	Arrests		
	Per 1,000 Adults	Per 1,000 Juveniles*	Per 1,000 Total Population
Low Risk	0.3	2.2	0.9
Low-Medium Risk	1.6	3.8	2.2
High-Medium Risk	2.0	3.3	2.4
High Risk	3.0	6.3	4.2
All Communities	1.6	3.8	2.3

*Less than 18 years of age.

TABLE C-85. PERCENTAGE OF CASES CLEARED BY TYPE OF CLEARANCE AND PREMISES

Type of Premises	Total Cases	Percentage of Cases Cleared by Type of Clearance		
		Arrest	Other Clearances	Total
Residential	5506	15.8	1.3	17.2
Commercial/ Industrial	1876	14.5	0.5	15.0
Other Premises	381	13.9	1.3	15.2
Totals	7763	15.5	1.5	16.5

TABLE C-86. TYPE OF ARREST AND DESPOSITION SUMMARY

Community Type	Total Arrests	Case Disposition	Type of Arrest																	
			On Premise		Flee Scene/In Vicinity		Citizen Arrest/Hold		Reasonable Cause		APB/Want		Warrant		Other Charge		Hold		Other and Unknown	
			#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	94	Complaint Filed	4	4.3	2	2.1	1	1.1	10	10.6	-	-	-	-	4	4.3	-	-	-	-
		Referred	1	1.1	10	10.6	-	-	34	66.1	1	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Released	2	2.1	4	4.3	1	1.1	15	16.0	1	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	333	Complaint Filed	41	12.3	13	3.9	4	1.2	73	21.9	3	0.1	7	2.1	5	1.5	3	0.1	-	-
		Referred	26	7.8	10	3.0	3	0.1	65	19.5	5	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.3
		Released	7	2.1	6	1.8	-	-	44	13.2	1	0.3	-	-	1	0.3	-	-	-	-
High-Medium Risk	326	Complaint Filed	42	12.9	21	6.4	2	0.6	75	23.0	1	0.3	4	1.2	1	0.3	-	-	-	-
		Referred	13	4.0	14	4.3	5	1.5	48	14.7	4	1.2	-	-	2	0.6	-	-	-	-
		Released	9	2.8	11	3.4	7	2.1	50	15.3	2	0.6	1	0.3	1	0.3	3	0.9	1	0.3
High Risk	325	Complaint Filed	28	8.6	27	8.3	2	0.6	37	11.4	1	0.3	6	1.8	2	0.6	-	-	1	0.3
		Referred	22	6.8	29	8.9	2	0.6	84	25.8	7	2.2	2	0.6	2	0.6	1	0.3	-	-
		Released	10	3.1	5	1.5	1	0.3	25	7.7	1	0.3	1	0.1	1	0.3	-	-	-	-
All Communities	1078	Complaint Filed	115	10.7	63	5.8	9	0.8	195	18.1	5	0.5	17	1.6	12	1.1	3	0.3	1	0.1
		Referred	62	5.8	63	5.8	10	0.9	246	22.8	17	1.6	2	0.2	4	0.4	1	0.1	1	0.1
		Released	28	2.6	26	2.4	9	0.8	134	12.4	5	0.5	2	0.2	3	0.3	3	0.3	1	0.1

Offender Prior Record*

Tables C-87 and C-88 show the number and percentage of all offenders having prior criminal records (including prior burglary offenses). Approximately 57 percent of all offenders had no previous arrests (no previous record). Table C-87, which pertains only to offenders with prior records, shows that 44 percent of the offenders with a previous record had a major previous record (1, 2, or 3 convictions of 90 days jail or more, or probation of 2 years or more).

Offender Prior Record and Drug Usage

Table C-89 shows the volume and percentage of all offenders that had a prior record and their involvement with drugs. Forty-four percent of the 468 offenders who had prior records had no reported prior involvement with drugs. Of those offenders with prior major arrest records, less than 30 percent had no recorded drug usage record. Of the offenders who had a prison record, 32.1 percent had no recorded drug record.

TABLE C-87. OFFENDER PRIOR RECORD SUMMARY (In Percent)

Community Type	Total Arrests	Prior Record Categories							
		None		Minor		Major		Prison	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	94	70	74.5	9	8.5	14	14.9	2	2.1
Low-Medium Risk	333	180	54.1	68	20.4	64	19.2	21	6.3
High-Medium Risk	326	156	47.9	58	20.9	72	22.1	30	9.2
High Risk	325	204	62.8	41	12.6	55	16.9	25	7.7
All Communities	1078	610	56.6	185	17.2	205	19.0	78	7.2

Prior Burglary Record

Table C-90 shows the number and percentage of offenders who had previous arrest records for burglary offenses. Seventy percent of the offenders with previous

* See Appendix D for definitions of minor, major and prison records.

records had prior burglary records. Thirty-four percent of the 327 prior burglary offenders had minor prior burglary records.

TABLE C-88. OFFENDERS WITH PRIOR RECORDS SUMMARY

Community Type	Total With Prior Arrests	Prior Record Categories					
		Minor		Major		Prison	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	24	8	33.3	14	58.3	2	8.3
Low-Medium Risk	153	68	44.4	64	41.8	21	13.7
High-Medium Risk	170	68	22.4	72	42.4	30	17.4
High Risk	121	41	33.9	55	45.5	25	20.7
All Communities	468	185	39.5	205	43.8	78	16.7

TABLE C-89. OFFENDER PRIOR RECORD AND DRUG RECORD

Community Type	Total Offenders With Prior Records		Marijuana		Dangerous Drugs		Opiates		Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs		Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs and Opiates		Dangerous Drugs and Opiates		None Reported	
	Type	#	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	Minor	8	1	12.5	-	-	-	-	1	12.5	-	-	-	-	6	75.0
	Major	14	4	28.6	2	14.3	-	-	5	35.7	1	-	1	-	1	7.1
	Prison	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	50.0	1	50.0	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	Minor	68	13	19.1	7	10.3	1	1.5	8	11.8	2	2.9	-	-	37	54.4
	Major	64	4	6.3	7	10.9	4	6.3	7	10.9	3	4.7	10	15.6	7	10.9
	Prison	21	-	-	1	4.8	3	14.3	1	4.8	5	23.8	1	4.8	4	19.0
High-Medium Risk	Minor	68	10	14.7	5	7.4	-	-	3	4.4	-	-	1	1.5	46	67.6
	Major	72	7	9.7	8	11.1	9	12.5	12	16.7	8	11.1	9	12.5	6	8.3
	Prison	30	2	6.7	-	-	2	6.7	1	3.3	7	23.3	3	10.0	6	20.0
High Risk	Minor	41	5	12.2	4	9.8	-	-	1	2.4	2	4.9	-	-	29	70.7
	Major	55	5	9.1	7	12.7	5	9.1	2	3.6	3	5.4	4	7.3	25	45.5
	Prison	25	1	4.0	1	4.0	3	12.0	2	8.0	3	12.0	2	8.0	4	16.0
All Communities	Minor	185	29	15.7	16	8.6	1	0.5	13	7.0	7	3.8	-	-	118	63.8
	Major	205	20	9.8	24	11.7	18	8.8	26	12.7	15	7.3	27	13.2	17	8.3
	Prison	78	3	3.8	2	2.6	7	0.9	4	9.0	16	20.5	7	9.0	13	16.7
TOTALS		468	52	11.1	42	9.0	26	5.4	43	9.2	38	8.1	35	7.5	31	6.6

TABLE C-90. PRIOR BURGLARY RECORD AND TOTAL PRIOR RECORD

Community Type	Total Offenders With Prior Record (Includes All Offenses)		Prior Burglary Record							
			Minor		Major		Prison		None	
	Type	#	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	Minor	8	4	50.0	-	-	-	-	4	50.0
	Major	14	6	42.9	5	35.7	-	-	3	21.4
	Prison	2	-	-	-	-	1	50.0	1	50.0
Low-Medium Risk	Minor	68	24	35.3	-	-	-	-	44	64.7
	Major	64	20	31.3	24	37.5	-	-	20	31.3
	Prison	21	1	4.8	4	19.0	16	76.2	-	-
High-Medium Risk	Minor	68	40	58.8	-	-	-	-	28	41.1
	Major	72	26	36.1	28	38.9	-	-	18	25.0
	Prison	30	6	20.0	12	40.0	10	33.3	2	6.7
High Risk	Minor	41	20	48.8	-	-	-	-	21	51.2
	Major	55	12	21.8	35	63.6	-	-	8	14.5
	Prison	25	2	8.0	7	28.0	14	56.0	2	8.0
All Communities	Minor	185	88	47.6	-	-	-	-	97	52.4
	Major	205	64	31.2	102	49.8	-	-	49	23.9
	Prison	78	9	11.5	23	29.5	41	52.6	5	6.4
TOTALS		468	161	34.4	125	26.7	41	8.8	141	30.1

Offender Current Status

Tables C-91 and C-92 show the number and percentage of all offenders and their existing status at the time of the arrest. Seventy-eight percent of the offenders were under no commitment at the time of arrest. Approximately 15 percent of all offenders were on probation at the time of the arrest. Table C-91, which only pertains to the 243 offenders who were either on parole, probation, or prison commitment, shows that 65 percent of the offenders were on probation and 35 percent were on parole at the time of arrest.

TABLE C-91. OFFENDER CURRENT STATUS SUMMARY

Community Type	Total Offenders	Existing Status																	
		No Commitment		Parole						Probation						Prison			
				Dept. Corrections		CYA		CRC		Other Jurisdiction		Calif.		Calif. Juvenile				Other Jurisdiction	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	94	81	86.2	-	-	1	1.1	2	2.1	-	-	10	10.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	333	258	77.5	8	2.4	10	3.0	9	2.7	-	-	47	14.1	-	-	1	0.3	-	-
High-Medium Risk	326	241	73.9	8	2.5	7	2.1	14	4.3	1	0.3	54	16.6	-	-	-	-	1	0.3
High Risk	325	255	78.5	9	2.8	8	2.5	6	1.8	1	0.3	46	14.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
All Communities	1078	835	77.5	25	2.3	26	2.4	31	2.9	2	0.2	157	14.6	-	-	1	0.1	1	0.1

TABLE C-92. OFFENDERS WITH A COMMITMENT

Community Type	Total Offenders with Commitments	Commitment Status					
		Parole		Probation		Prison	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Low Risk	13	3	23.1	10	76.9	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	75	27	36.0	48	64.0	-	-
High-Medium Risk	85	30	35.3	54	63.5	1	1.2
High Risk	70	24	34.3	46	65.7	-	-
All Communities	243	85	35.0	157	64.6	1	0.4

Offender Current Status and Prior Record

Table C-93 shows the number and percentage of offenders who had parole, probation, or prison commitments at the time of arrest and their prior record history. Forty-eight percent of the offenders who had a previous record were under no commitment at the time of arrest.

TABLE C-93. OFFENDER CURRENT STATUS AND PRIOR RECORD

Community Type	Total Offenders With Prior Records	Commitment Status								
		No Commitment		Parole		Probation		Prison		
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Low Risk	Minor	8	8	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Major	14	2	14.3	2	14.3	10	72.4	-	-
	Prison	2	1	50.0	1	50.0	-	-	-	-
Low-Medium Risk	Minor	68	65	95.6	-	-	3	4.4	-	-
	Major	64	8	12.5	16	25.0	40	62.5	-	-
	Prison	21	5	23.8	11	52.4	5	23.8	-	-
High-Medium Risk	Minor	68	62	91.2	2	2.9	4	5.9	-	-
	Major	72	14	19.4	15	20.8	43	59.7	-	-
	Prison	30	9	30.0	13	43.3	7	23.3	1	3.3
High Risk	Minor	41	37	90.2	-	-	4	9.8	-	-
	Major	55	9	16.4	10	18.2	36	65.5	-	-
	Prison	25	5	20.0	14	56.0	6	24.0	-	-
All Communities	Minor	185	172	93.0	2	1.1	11	5.9	-	-
	Major	205	33	16.1	43	21.0	129	62.9	-	-
	Prison	78	20	25.6	39	50.0	18	23.1	-	-
TOTALS	All	468	225	48.1	85	18.2	157	33.5	1	0.2

Prior Records by Age Group

Table C-94 shows the prior records of arrested offenders by age group. The "All Community" figures show that persons under the age of 18 accounted for 81.1 percent of all offenders who had no prior record, while those between ages 20 and 24 comprised 49.3 percent of offenders with major records.

The "All Ages" column show that 83.2 percent of the offenders arrested in the Low Risk Community had no prior records, while only 47.9 percent of the offenders from the High-Medium Risk Community had no prior records.

TABLE C-94. PRIOR RECORDS OF OFFENDERS BY AGE GROUP

Community Type	Prior Record	Age Group																		All Ages		
		<18		18-19		20-24		25-29		30-34		35-39		40-44		45-49		50+				
		Type	#	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Low Risk	None	70	64	91.4	5	7.1	1	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70	83.2
	Minor	8	6	75.0	2	25.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	8.5
	Major	14	1	7.1	1	7.1	12	85.7	1	7.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	14.9
	Prison	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	50.0	1	50.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2.1
Low-Medium Risk	None	180	143	79.4	17	9.4	12	6.7	4	2.2	1	0.6	2	1.1	1	0.6	1	0.6	1	0.6	180	54.1
	Minor	68	11	16.2	22	37.3	24	35.3	6	8.8	2	2.9	-	-	1	1.5	-	-	-	-	68	20.4
	Major	64	3	4.7	5	7.8	33	51.6	12	18.8	5	7.8	2	3.1	1	1.6	3	4.7	-	-	64	19.2
	Prison	21	-	-	-	-	4	19.0	6	28.6	2	9.5	5	23.8	2	9.5	1	4.8	1	4.8	21	6.3
High-Medium Risk	None	156	125	80.1	18	11.5	9	7.2	3	1.9	-	-	1	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	156	47.9
	Minor	68	7	10.3	21	30.9	24	35.3	11	16.2	-	-	-	-	1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	68	20.9
	Major	72	-	-	9	12.5	34	48.6	9	12.5	6	8.3	1	1.4	1	1.4	1	1.4	-	-	72	22.1
	Prison	30	-	-	-	-	6	20.0	8	26.7	6	20.0	5	16.7	4	13.3	1	3.3	-	-	30	9.2
High Risk	None	204	163	79.9	19	9.3	14	6.9	2	1.0	2	1.0	-	-	1	0.5	-	-	-	-	204	62.8
	Minor	41	6	14.6	8	19.5	13	31.7	8	19.5	-	-	2	4.9	-	-	-	-	2	4.9	41	12.6
	Major	55	3	5.5	2	3.6	22	40.0	14	25.5	3	5.5	2	3.6	2	3.6	1	1.8	1	1.8	55	16.9
	Prison	25	-	-	1	4.0	5	20.0	8	32.0	4	16.0	4	16.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	25	7.7
All Communities	None	610	495	81.1	59	9.7	36	7.3	9	1.5	3	0.5	3	0.5	2	0.3	1	0.2	1	0.2	610	56.6
	Minor	185	30	16.2	53	28.6	61	33.0	25	13.5	2	1.1	2	1.1	2	1.1	1	0.5	3	1.6	185	17.2
	Major	205	7	3.4	17	8.3	101	49.3	36	17.6	14	6.8	5	2.4	4	2.0	4	2.0	1	0.5	205	19.0
	Prison	78	-	-	1	1.3	15	19.2	25	32.1	13	16.7	14	19.9	7	9.0	3	3.8	2	2.6	78	7.2

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE FORMS, MATERIALS AND ORDINANCES

This appendix provides a small sample of the materials and forms used in the Crime-Specific Program, and contains appropriate sample ordinances.

- SECTION I. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT - Both the English and Spanish language versions of the pamphlet are included.
- SECTION II. SAMPLE FORMS - Contains samples of the forms for use in reporting burglaries, property identification, insecure premises, and speaker requests.
- SECTION III. SECURITY ORDINANCES - Contains Model Burglary Security Ordinances for Oakland and Los Angeles County.
- SECTION IV. BUSINESS MACHINE IDENTIFICATION GUIDE - Contains the guide prepared by the San Diego Police Department.

APPENDIX D

SECTION I - RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

1. English language pamphlet
2. Spanish language pamphlet

(Pages D-2 through D-34 to be supplied by the State of California)

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT



 CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE

INTRODUCTION

All of us fear personal violence, but the odds of being murdered or attacked on the street are actually very low. There is, however, one very serious crime to which every American is vulnerable—burglary.

There were more than two million burglaries reported in America in 1970, causing a loss of nearly \$700 million. Here in California, more than half of all major crimes committed are burglaries. Your chances of being burglarized are increasing every year, whether your income is high or low, whether you are white or black, young or old, apartment-dweller or homeowner.

Don't think insurance alone can protect you. Of course you need insurance, but no policy protects you from the fear that comes from knowing your home has been invaded, from the loss of keepsakes, and from the inconvenience of having to make repairs after you've been burglarized. Even the protection insurance *does* afford becomes more expensive each year because of the rising number of burglaries.

The Attorney General of California, the police departments of Anaheim, Berkeley, Compton, Fresno, Pasadena, Richmond, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Ana, and Stockton, and the sheriffs' departments of San Joaquin and San Mateo counties, are putting all their know-how together in an anti-burglary program designed and funded by the California Council on Criminal Justice. Your community has been selected as one of the target areas for the program which is known as the Crime-Specific Burglary Prevention and Control Program.

As a resident of a target neighborhood, you are an integral part of this burglary prevention and control program. You will see the emblem on the cover of this booklet—an international traffic sign directing the prevention of "459", California's Penal Code Section on burglary—on signs, buttons, and literature. It is to remind you and your community to prevent burglary, because it's a job your law enforcement officers can't do alone. Why not start today, by reading this booklet and following its suggestions?

Anaheim Police Department	Pasadena Police Department	San Joaquin County Sheriff's Department
Berkeley Police Department	Richmond Police Department	San Mateo County Sheriff's Department
Compton Police Department	Riverside Police Department	Santa Ana Police Department
Fresno Police Department	San Bernardino Police Department	Stockton Police Department

EVELLE J. YOUNGER
Attorney General, State of California
and
Chairman, California Council on Criminal Justice

The California Council on Criminal Justice is pleased to present this booklet on "RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT". We hope you will read it carefully and take action to burglar-proof **your** home or apartment.

This useful booklet is a by-product of the Council-initiated Crime-Specific Burglary Prevention and Control Program. With the cooperation and participation of the Attorney General and major California law enforcement agencies, we have developed a program to do something positive about the crime of burglary. In target communities in California, we are mounting an intensive attack on burglary. We believe the results will be significant and we hope the anti-burglary techniques developed will be used throughout the state.


The Crime-Specific program is another example of the commitment of the California Council on Criminal Justice toward making Californians safe from crime.

ROBERT H. LAWSON
Executive Director
California Council on Criminal Justice


MINIMUM SECURITY MEANS THE PREVENTION OF ENTRY BY A BURGLAR THROUGH ANY DOOR OR WINDOW EXCEPT BY MEANS OF DESTRUCTIVE FORCE. Most burglars will not break a window to enter. The majority of the devices in this booklet cost very little and the home security procedures suggested cost nothing; all of them will help reduce burglary.

Begin your home security check with the front door and work clockwise around the entire inside of the house. Include all doors and windows, finishing with the back yard, fence and shrubs, gates, and garage.

Shrubbery should never block the view of your front door. This allows an intruder the opportunity of privacy to gain entrance.




A wide angle viewer in the door lets you know your visitor.



CANE BOLTS — ½" in diameter by 12" high installed at top and bottom of the inactive door offer minimum security.

Many homes with pairs of doors, use half-barrel slidebolts on the inactive door. These are weak and inadequate.




ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEANS THE PREVENTION OF EXIT BY AN INTRUDER THROUGH ANY DOOR EXCEPT BY MEANS OF DESTRUCTIVE FORCE. This reduces the possibility of theft of large household possessions after the intruder has gained entrance through a window and is expecting an easy exit through a door.

WARNING: One window in every bedroom on the ground and second floor must be left available as a fire exit, particularly for children and guests in your home. At night, the bedroom window may often be the quickest and safest means of getting out. Because of the danger of fire, decorative iron grilles are not recommended on bedroom windows, unless they can be opened from the inside.


Following are illustrations of key locks which can be used as *additional security* when the home is unoccupied.



AUXILIARY DEADLOCK — 1" deadbolt and double cylinders with hardened cylinder guards. If the double cylinder deadbolt is locked when the house is occupied, a key should be left in the inside keyhole, as a means of fast exit in case of fire. Always remove the key when leaving home.



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AUXILIARY DEADLOCK — 1" deadbolt, single cylinder with hardened cylinder guard, and thumb turn.


If glass is within 40" of the locking hardware, *additional security* provisions should be followed. See page 5.

A DEAD-LATCH is an inexpensive and attractive addition to your existing knob-lock set which keeps the burglar from simply slipping your door open with a credit card. This method of entry is common in many areas but very easy to prevent.




Lock all doors and windows before you leave. The majority of burglaries are committed by persons on narcotics, so even if you are not concerned about your valuables — why support their habit?

THE RIM LOCK is a 1" dead bolt lock which is installed on the inside surface of the door. It is less expensive than other types of locks, but equally effective for security.



RIM LOCK
D-2

FLUSH BOLTS — Installed at the top and bottom of the inactive door of a pair of doors, flush bolts offer additional security, since the intruder cannot get at these devices to tamper with them if the doors are locked.



FLUSH BOLT




Put identification (your driver's license number is best) on all valuables. This reduces chances of theft when spotted by the burglar; it increases chances of recovery if you are a victim. Your police, sheriff, fire department, or service club may have engraving tools to loan — they are as easy to write with as a pencil and will write on anything. The tools can even be purchased for under ten dollars.



Call your local sheriff or police whenever a stranger seems to be hanging around. They can politely have a look. Get a license number if you can do it easily, but don't subject yourself to danger, or even embarrassment, by approaching a strange person or car.

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THE "JIMMY-PROOF" RIM LOCK is another lock which is installed on the inside surface of the door. But this lock has vertical dead bolts, which is an additional security approved locking device.




"JIMMY PROOF" RIM LOCK
D-2

HINGE PROTECTION

To protect your door from being lifted from its hinges by pulling the hinge pin, follow these simple steps:

1. Remove two screws, opposite each other, from both leafs of your hinge.
2. Insert screw or concrete nail into jamb leaf—protruding 1/2".
3. Drill out the opposing screw hole in door. Do this in the top and bottom hinge of the door. When closed, the pins may be removed, but the door will remain firmly in place.




PINNED HINGE

6

7


WINDOWS: Primary interest in securing windows is to eliminate entry by prying open. Most burglars avoid breaking glass, due to the fear of attracting attention.

WITH SLIDING WINDOWS the primary objective is to keep the window from sliding or being lifted up and out of the track.




SLIDING WINDOW


DOUBLE HUNG WINDOW latches may be jimmied open. If the window is not used, screw it shut (except bedrooms). For windows in use, drill a downward sloping hole into the top of the bottom window through and into the bottom of the top window and insert a pin or nail.



SCREW




PIN




DOUBLE HUNG


There are many manufactured products available for securing windows; here are some of the suggestions.



PINNED WINDOW



ANTI-SLIDE BLOCK



SLIDE BOLT



Did something seem odd about that salesman? Was that really a repairman with a wrong address? Your local police can easily find out if you just call them.


171



It is not recommended to lock a window in a ventilating position. This is an invitation to a prying action which can result in entry.


Key locking devices offer no real security and they can be a fire exit hazard.

CASEMENT WINDOWS are the simplest to secure. Make sure the latch works properly and that the "operator" has no excess play. If so, replace the worn hardware.




CASEMENT WINDOW


8



GRILLE



GRATE



LOUVRE WINDOW


LOUVRE windows are bad security risks. Remove and replace with solid glass or other type of ventilating window. Or protect with a grate or grille (except bedrooms).

Another good security measure is the use of ornamental iron gates and fencing for ground level entrances and yard protection.

WARNING: One window in every bedroom on the ground and second floor must be left available as a fire exit, particularly for children and guests in your home. At night, the bedroom window may often be the quickest and safest means of getting out.


9

SLIDING DOOR: The purpose of securing a sliding door is to keep it from sliding or being pried up and out of the track.




SLIDING DOOR


A simple way to secure an inside sliding door is to drill a downward sloping hole through the top channel into the top portion of the sliding door frame. Insert a pin as illustrated. This may be used as a *minimum security* method when the home is unoccupied.



PINNED SLIDING PANEL



SLIDE BOLT



SLIDE BOLT WITH PADLOCK

Another way to secure a sliding door is to install a slide bolt for *minimum security*. To offer *additional security* when your home is unoccupied, a padlock keyed to your front door may be added.

Of the many devices available for sliding doors, these offer the least expensive and most effective means of security.


Sticks and bars may be used, but any burglar can easily remove these. They offer no protection from the intruder making an easy exit with your household goods.

10

GARAGES: The single lock on the garage door is inadequate to keep intruders from prying up the opposite side and crawling in.

One of three methods may be used to secure the door:

1. Add another bolt and padlock to the opposite side.
2. Install a pair of cane bolts to the inside. (Note — these are operable only from the inside.)
3. Add a top center hasp, as illustrated. Any person of average height can operate this locking device.



SLIDING HASP H-2



CANE BOLT C-2

HASPS: These must be of hardened steel and installed with carriage bolts through the door or gate. Use large washers on the inside. After the nuts are secured, deface the threads of the bolt ends with a hammer to keep the nuts from being removed.



HINGING HASP H-1

In every case use a *minimum standard* exterior padlock as described on page 12.




Don't hide a key outside. Most hiding places are obvious to the burglar.

11

PADLOCKS: There are many padlocks on the market from which to choose. Do not be guilty of economizing on a padlock that will not give you the protection you need. The most common assault on a padlock is with a large bolt cutter or pry bar. The following description, which you can take to the locksmith or hardware store, is the *minimum standard* for an exterior padlock:


1. Hardened steel, 9/32" shackle. (Naturally, heavier shackles offer additional security.)
2. Double locking mechanism—heel and toe.
3. Five-pin tumbler.
4. A key retaining feature, whenever possible. This prevents your removing the key until you have locked the padlock.

Never leave your padlock unlocked. This is an invitation to have the padlock removed so that a key can be made, and the lock returned to its position. Later the burglar returns when no one is home and enters at his leisure, using his key.



PADLOCK P-1

LIGHTING: Good exterior lighting is important, particularly when the yard area is obscured by high non-removable shrubbery. The best possible location for outside lights is under the eaves. This makes ground-level assault more difficult. You can buy an inexpensive timer or a photo-electric cell which will automatically turn the lights on at dusk and turn them off at dawn.



EXTERIOR LIGHTING


BURN A LIGHT AT NIGHT. The best source of interior lighting is a living room light, whether you are home or not. Again, use a timer or photo-electric cell to automatically turn the light on at dusk. The illumination coming from this source is sufficient to silhouette an intruder through many windows in your home. It is also confusing to the burglar as to whether you are away, at home, or asleep on the sofa.



INTERIOR LIGHTING


MINIMUM STANDARD FOR APPROVED CHAIN:

Must be of at least 5/16" hardened steel alloy. The link must be of continuous welded construction. Lighter chain or chain with open links simply will not withstand bolt cutting attacks. Don't give your bicycle away. Using anything less will invite its theft.



MOTORCYCLES: These expensive bikes require additional security measures. They must be secured with a mated 3/8" hardened steel alloy chain and padlock of equal strength. Sheathed cable has not proven a satisfactory deterrent to theft.

SECONDARY BARRIER: If the value of small personal items warrants protection, a secondary barrier is an additional safeguard. On a hinging closet door, install a 1" deadbolt lock. Store your jewels, furs, camera, guns, silverware, and other valuables behind this barrier. Be sure to pin the hinges. See page 5, "Hinge Protection".



SECONDARY BARRIER

Keep the burglar away from this vital target by use of an alarm.

ALARMS: There are many types of alarms on the market. Secure the services of a reputable alarm company. They will advise you of the best system to protect your home. Space detection methods are excellent. Physical contact methods are fair, but tend to send false alarms.

DON'T DEPEND ONLY UPON AN ALARM TO PROTECT YOU... BE SURE TO USE THE PROPER LOCKING DEVICES.

Any alarm system should include:

1. A battery failsafe back-up.
2. Fire sensing capability.
3. Read-out ability to check working of system.
4. Horn sounding device installed in attic through vent.

When shopping for an alarm, take this list with you.




ALARMS

BE SURE TO LOCK BEFORE YOU LEAVE AND LET A NEIGHBOR HAVE A KEY.

BICYCLES: You don't leave your car unlocked, so treat your bicycle the same way. Use an approved chain and padlock whenever you are not on the seat! Lock it to the garage — with a 3/8" x 6" eye screw fastened into a stud. The eye screw should be at least 3 feet above the floor, because this makes using a pry bar much more difficult.

Whenever you lock your bike in a public place, chain it to a secure rack or stanchion through the frame and a wheel. Keep the chain as high above the ground as the bike will allow. This reduces the leverage for a pry bar or bolt cutter attack.



EYE SCREW

12

13

USE THIS TO LIST YOUR PERSONAL PROPERTY

If you can identify recovered stolen property, it will aid police in returning the items to you. On those items that have no serial number, you may engrave your Drivers License or Social Security number with a simple etching tool. Personal items such as jewelry may be photographed with proper identification listed on the back of the photo.

PROPERTY MARKED WITH DRIVERS LICENSE NO.

Item	Make

CREDIT CARDS

Company	Serial #

AUTOMOBILE, MOTORCYCLE, SCOOTER

Make	Color	Lic. No.	Serial No.

DISHWASHER, STOVE, MIXER, TOASTER, REFRIGERATOR, ETC.

Item	Make	Serial No.

BICYCLE

Make	Color	Lic. No.	Frame No.

CAMERA, BINOCULARS, SPORTING GOODS, SEWING MACHINE, WATCHES

Item	Make	Serial No.

GUNS

Make	Caliber	Serial No.

POWER TOOLS & SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

Item	Make	Serial No.

TELEVISION, RADIO, STEREO, TAPE RECORDER, ETC.

Item	Make	Serial No.

WHEN LEAVING YOUR HOME PRACTICE THE FOLLOWING ADVICE—
IT WILL PAY DIVIDENDS

GOING TO THE MARKET OR OUT TO DINNER-----?

A residence which presents a lived-in appearance is a deterrent to burglars. Never leave notes which can inform a burglar that your house is unoccupied. Make certain all windows and doors are secured before departure. An empty garage advertises your absence, so close the doors. When going out at night, leave one or more interior lights on and perhaps have a radio playing. Timers may be purchased that will turn lights on and off during your absence. Do not leave door keys under flower pots or doormats, inside an unlocked mailbox, over the doorway, or in other obvious places.

WHEN PLANNING VACATIONS OR PROLONGED ABSENCES-----

Discontinue milk, newspaper, and other deliveries by phone or in person ahead of time. Do not leave notes. Arrange for lawn care and have someone remove advertising circulars and other debris regularly. On the other hand, several toys left scattered about will create an impression of occupancy. Notify the post office to forward your mail or have a trustworthy person pick it up daily. Apartment house tenants could also heed this hint as stuffed mail receptacles are a give-away when no one is home. Inform neighbors of your absence so they can be extra alert for suspicious persons. Leave a key with them so your place may be periodically inspected. Ask them to vary the positions of your shades and blinds. Have the telephone temporarily disconnected. Burglars may try calling to find out whether anyone is in. When you leave, do not publicize your plans. Some burglars specialize in reading newspaper accounts of other people's vacation activities. Contact your local police or sheriff station and inform them how long you will be gone, who has a key to your house, and where you can be reached. Special attention will be given to the premises while you are away. If you find a door or window has been forced or broken while you were absent.....DO NOT ENTER. The criminal may still be inside. Use a neighbor's phone immediately to summon police or sheriff. Do not touch anything or clean up if a crime has occurred. Preserve the scene until the police or sheriff can inspect for evidence.

REMEMBER TO:

- LOCK BEFORE YOU LEAVE
- TRUST A NEIGHBOR WITH A KEY
- BE A CONCERNED NEIGHBOR, YOURSELF



CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE



ROBOS RESIDENCIALES
Y LO QUE SE PUEDE HACER PARA PREVENIRLOS

INTRODUCCIÓN

Todos tenemos la violencia personal, pero la probabilidad de ser asesinado o atacado en la calle es muy raro. Sin embargo, hay un crimen muy serio al cual cada ciudadano está accesible—el robo de residencia en escala.

Hubieron más de dos millones de robos en escala reportados en Los Estados Unidos en 1970 que causaron una pérdida de casi siete millones de dólares. Más de la mitad de los crímenes mayores cometidos aquí en California son robos de residencia en escala. El riesgo de que usted sea la víctima de un robo en escala aumenta cada año, ya sea que usted sea pobre o rico, sea blanco o negro, joven o anciano, o viva en casa propia o en un apartamento.

No crea que al tener una póliza de seguro usted estará protegido. Es cierto que necesita una póliza de seguro, pero no hay póliza que le proteja del miedo que usted siente al saber que su hogar ha sido invadido, de la pérdida de sus prendas o recuerdos, o de la inconveniencia de tener que hacer reparaciones después del robo. Hasta la protección que el seguro le ofrece, llega a ser más costosa cada año por el aumento de robos de residencia en escala.

El Procurador General de California, los departamentos de policía de las ciudades de Anaheim, Berkeley, Compton, Fresno, Pasadena, Richmond, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Ana, y Stockton y los departamentos de alguaciles de los condados de San Joaquin y San Mateo han unido su habilidad en un programa de anti-robos en escala diseñado y suministrado por el Concilio de Justicia Criminal de California. Su comunidad ha sido seleccionada como una de las áreas para el programa conocido como "Crime-Specific Burglary Prevention and Control Program," o sea el programa para prevenir y controlar el crimen de robos en escala.

Como residente de esta comunidad usted es parte íntegra del programa para prevenir y controlar robos en escala. Verá usted una emblema en la cara de este folleto—es un señal de tránsito dirigiendo la prevención del "459," el número de la sección del Código Penal de California que se refiere a robos de hogar en escala—también estará en carteles, botones de anuncio y otra materia escrita. Esto es para recordarle a usted y a su comunidad, que el prevenir robos en escala, es una tarea que los agentes de policía no pueden hacer solos. ¿Porqué no empieza hoy mismo leyendo y siguiendo las sugerencias de este folleto?

El Concilio de California para la Justicia Criminal tiene el placer de presentar este folleto sobre "Robos residenciales y que hacer en contra de ellos." Esperamos que lo lea con interés y que tome acción para prevenir robos en escala a su hogar o apartamento.

Este folleto es el resultado del "programa para controlar y prevenir el crimen específico de robos en escala" iniciado por el Concilio. Hemos desarrollado un programa para hacer algo positivo en contra del crimen de robos en escala con la cooperación y participación del Procurador General y las seis agencias de aplicadores de leyes más grandes en el estado de California. Estamos contra-atacando intensivamente el crimen de robos en escala en 6 comunidades de California. Creemos que los resultados serán significantes y esperamos que los métodos desarrollados para combatir el robo en escala serán usados por todo el estado de California. El programa crimen—específico es otro ejemplo del compromiso contraído por el Concilio de California para asegurar que los californianos esten protegidos en el crimen.

ROBERT H. LAWSON
Director Ejecutivo
Concilio de California
para la Justicia Criminal

Anaheim
Police Department

Pasadena
Police Department

San Joaquin County
Sheriff's Department

Berkeley
Police Department

Richmond
Police Department

San Mateo County
Sheriff's Department

Compton
Police Department

Riverside
Police Department

Santa Ana
Police Department

Fresno
Police Department

San Bernardino
Police Department

Stockton
Police Department

EVELLE J. YOUNGER
Attorney General, State of California
and
Chairman, California Council on Criminal Justice


SEGURIDAD MÍNIMA SIGNIFICA EL PREVENIR LA ENTRADA DE UN LADRÓN POR CUALQUIER PUERTA O VENTANA A MENOS DE QUE USE FUERZA DESTRUCTIVA PARA ENTRAR.
La mayoría de los ladrones no quiebran una ventana para entrar. La mayoría de los instrumentos diseñados en este folleto cuestan poco y las sugerencias para la seguridad de su hogar no cuestan nada y todos le ayudan a reducir los robos en escala.

Revise la seguridad de su hogar. Empiece por la puerta de la calle y siga por dentro de la casa entera, incluyendo todas las puertas y ventanas terminando con su patio de atrás, el cerco y los arbustos, portón y cochera.


Los arbustos no deben tapar la vista de su puerta de enfrente. Esto le da oportunidad de aislarse al intruso para ganar la entrada al hogar.



Una mirilla de ángulo ancho en su puerta le permite saber quien le visita cuando tocan en la puerta.



UN PASADOR DE BASTON de media pulgada de diámetro por 12 pulgadas de altura instalado en la parte de arriba y en la parte de abajo de las puertas sin llave le ofrece seguridad mínima. Muchas residencias con puertas dobles usan pasador corredizo de medio cilindro el cual es muy débil y no es adecuado.



SEGURIDAD ADICIONAL ES EL PREVENIR QUE EL INTRUSO SALGA POR CUALQUIER PUERTA A MENOS DE QUE USE FUERZA DESTRUCTIVA. Esto reduce la posibilidad del robo de artículos grandes después de que el ladrón haya entrado por una ventana y espera salir fácilmente.

ADVERTENCIA: Una ventana en cada recámara y en el primer y segundo piso deben ser disponibles como salida de emergencia en caso de un incendio, especialmente para niños y huéspedes en su casa. De noche la ventana de la recámara tal vez sea la más rápida y segura salida. Por el peligro de incendio, no se recomienda rejilla decorativa en las ventanas de las recámaras a menos de que se abran de adentro.


A continuación hay ilustraciones de pasadores de llave que se pueden usar como seguridad adicional cuando la residencia esté desocupada.




DETECCIÓN AUXILIAR — es un pestillo de una pulgada con un cerradero de guardia templado y asidero digital.

Si hay vidrio a menos de 40 pulgadas del herraje de cierre, debe seguir las provisiones adicionales de seguridad que continúan.

UNA ALDABILLA ABSOLUTA es una adición barata y no da mal aspecto al tirado y a la llave existente, también sirve para que el ladrón no vaya a zafar el pasador simplemente con una tarjetilla de crédito. Esta manera de entrar es muy común en muchas áreas, pero también es muy fácil el prevenir la entrada.




DETECCIÓN AUXILIAR — Un pestillo de una pulgada y de doble cilindro con guardias templados. Si el pestillo de doble cilindro está en uso cuando hay alguien en casa, se debe dejar la llave en él para asegurar la salida en caso de emergencia de un incendio.





Siempre quite la llave cuando vaya a salir del hogar. Cierre con llave todas las puertas y asegure las ventanas cuando salga. La mayoría de robos en escala son cometidos por personas bajo la influencia de narcóticos así que no les ayude a mantener el vicio aunque su propiedad no le preocupe.

El pasador de orilla es un pestillo seguro de una pulgada que se instala por dentro de la puerta. No es tan caro como otros tipos de cerrojos, pero es igual de efectivo para la seguridad.



PASADORES AL NIVEL son instalados en la parte de arriba y abajo de la puerta que no está fija de puertas dobles y prestan seguridad adicional ya que el intruso no puede alcanzar a forzar estas cerraduras si está la puerta cerrada.




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Marque con el número de identificación (el número de su licencia de manejar) todos sus artículos de valor. Esto disminuye el riesgo de robo cuando el ladrón ve la identificación y aumenta la oportunidad de que usted recupere su propiedad. Quizás la policía, el departamento del alguacil, departamento de bomberos u otras organizaciones cívicas tengan instrumentos para grabar que presten y es tan fácil como el escribir con un lápiz sobre cualquier cosa. Este instrumento se puede comprar por menos de diez dólares.

El pasador de orilla es otra cerradura que es instalada por dentro de la puerta. Pero esta cerradura tiene pestillos seguros y verticales que dan seguridad adicional aprobada.




Llame al alguacil o a la policía cuando vea una persona extraña en los alrededores de su casa. Ellos pueden investigarle, sin ofenderle. Si puede, tome el número de la licencia del carro, sin exponerse a peligro o compromiso al acercarse a una persona o automóvil desconocido.

PROTECCIÓN DE BISAGRAS

Para impedir que saquen la puerta de las bisagras, sacando el rodillo de la bisagra, haga lo siguiente:

1. Saque dos tornillos opuestos, uno al otro, de las dos hojas de la bisagra.
2. Penetre en el agujero un clavo o tornillo mas largo dejándose una media pulgada fuera del marco de la puerta.
3. Taladre el agujero del tornillo en la puerta. Hágase esto en ambas bisagras. Cuando cierre la puerta, el rodillo de la bisagra puede ser sacada pero la puerta permanece firme.





VENTANAS: El interés principal en asegurar las ventanas es el de eliminar que las forcen. La mayoría de los ladrones evitan quebrar vidrio porque temen atraer atención.




VENTANAS CORREDIZAS — El propósito aquí es de no permitir que la ventana sea levantada o sacada del carril.



VENTANAS DOBLE COLGADAS — las aldabas de estas se pueden forzar. Si no las usa, atorníllelas cerradas pero no en las recámaras. Si usa la ventana, taladre un agujero inclinado hacia abajo en la parte superior de la ventana de abajo pasando por la parte inferior de la ventana de arriba y luego encaje un clavo o pasador.




Hay muchos productos obtenibles para asegurar ventanas, he aquí algunas sugerencias:





¿Le pareció algo extraño la manera de ese vendedor? ¿Era reparador de utensilios que traía la dirección incorrecta? Su departamento de policía puede indagar fácilmente si usted les llama.

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
VENTANAS ESTILO PERSIANAS no son seguras. Quítelas y cambíelas por otras con un vidrio de una sola pieza o de otro tipo de ventana para ventilación adecuada o protéjalas con rejas o rejillas.



No es recomendado que una ventana se asegure media abierta. Esto es una invitación para que alguien la abra y esto resulta en entrada a fuerza. Instrumentos que cierran con llave no ofrecen seguridad y pueden ser un obstáculo impidiendo la salida en caso de incendio.





PUERTA VENTANAS son las más fáciles de asegurar. Asegure que la aldaba trabaje bien y que el mango de la puerta no esté suelto. Si está suelto, repóngalo.



Otra manera de asegurar es el uso de portales y cerco de hierro para proteger entradas al primer piso y a los patios.

AVISO: Deje disponible una ventana en cada recámara en el primer y segundo piso para salir en caso de incendio, particularmente para niños y huéspedes en su casa. De noche esta será la mas fácil y segura salida.

PUERTA CORREDIZA: El objeto de asegurar una puerta corrediza es el de prevenir que se resbale o sea levantada y sacada del carril.




Una manera fácil de asegurar la puerta interior es de taladrar un agujero inclinado hacia abajo por la parte superior de la puerta hacia la parte superior del marco de la puerta. Encaje un clavo como en la ilustración. Esto se usa como seguridad mínima cuando el hogar está desocupado.

COCHERAS: Un candado en la puerta de la cochera no es adecuado para prevenir que intrusos forcen el lado opuesto y se metan a gatas.

Uno de estos tres métodos se puede usar para asegurar la puerta:


1. Póngase otro pasador con candado en el lado opuesto.
2. Instálese un par de pasadores de bastón por dentro (Nótese que estos se pueden mover solamente por adentro)
3. Agréguese una aldaba deslizadora como en la ilustración. Cualquier persona de estatura normal puede usar este método de asegurar la puerta.




PASADOR DE BASTÓN C-B

ALDABA DE CANDADO RESBALADORA H-2

08T



TRANCA RESBALADORA



TRANCA CORREDIZA CON CANDADO

ALDABAS DE CANDADO: Deben ser de hierro endurecido e instaladas con tornillos de coche que pasen por la puerta o el portal. Uséanse arandelas por dentro, luego que estén apretadas las tuercas, desfigure la rosca del tornillo con un martillo para que no se puedan sacar las tuercas.



ALDABA DE CANDADO CON BISAGRA H-1

En todo caso úsese un candado modelo de seguridad mínima como es descrito en la página 12.

Otra manera de asegurar una puerta corrediza es el de instalar una tranca corrediza que sirva de mínima seguridad. Para más seguridad, cuando su residencia esté sola, agregue un candado que se abra con la misma llave que la puerta de enfrente. De los muchos aparatos disponibles para puertas corredizas, estos son los más baratos y más efectivos para la seguridad. Puede usar palos o barras pero cualquier ladrón puede quitarlos fácilmente; no ofrecen protección ya que el intruso encuentra fácil salida de su casa con el botín.

10




Nunca esconda una llave afuera de la casa, la mayoría de los lugares donde la esconde son obvios al ladrón.

11


CANDADOS: Hay muchos candados de venta de donde escoger. No trate de economizar al comprar un candado que no le da la protección que necesita. La manera más común de violar un candado es tratando de usar un cortador de pasador grande o una barra para forzar el candado. La descripción que sigue se puede llevar a una ferretería o taller de llaves y es el modelo de seguridad mínima de un candado para uso de afuera.

1. Hierro endurecido, traba de 9/32 de pulgada. (Naturalmente trabas más gruesas prestan más seguridad)
2. Mecanismo al enganche doble - tobillo y pie.
3. Fiador de cinco piezas.
4. Cuando sea posible, con carácter de detención de llave. Esto le previene el sacar la llave antes de cerrar el candado.

Nunca deje el candado abierto. Esto invita a que se lleven el candado y hagan una llave y lo regresen donde estaba. Después el ladrón regresa cuando no hay nadie en casa y usa la llave para entrar.



ILUMINACIÓN: Es importante que tenga buena iluminación en el exterior, especialmente si tiene arbustos altos en el patio que no puede sacar. El mejor lugar para luces exteriores es debajo del alero, esto hace el asalto al nivel de la tierra más difícil. Usted puede comprar un cronómetro barato o una pila foto-eléctrica, la cual, automáticamente prende las luces al anochecer y las apaga al amanecer.



ILUMINACION EXTERIOR

MANTENGA LA LUZ DE NOCHE: La mejor fuente de luz interior es una luz en la sala, ya esté en casa o no. Esta luz es suficiente para ver la silueta de un intruso por las ventanas de su casa. También sirve para confundir al ladrón de que si hay o no hay nadie en casa o dormido en el sillón.




LUZ INTERIOR


MODELO MÍNIMO DE CADENA APROBADA:

5/16 de pulgada de acero de aleación endurecido. El enganche debe ser de construcción soldada continua. Cadena más liviana o con enganche abierto se puede cortar con cortador de pasador. No regale su bicicleta. El usar algo menos, es invitar a que le roben su bicicleta.

MOTOCICLETAS: Necesitan seguridad adicional, ya que son más caras. Deben ser aseguradas con una cadena de 3/8 de pulgada y de acero de aleación endurecido enganche unido y un candado de igual fuerza.




BARRERA SECUNDARIA: Si el valor de sus cosas personales merecen protección, una barrera secundaria sirve de seguridad adicional. En una puerta del ropero con bisagras, instale una aldaba absoluta, de una pulgada. Almacene sus joyas, pieles, cámaras, armas y otras cosas de valor detrás de esta barrera y asegure las bisagras. (Página 5, protección de bisagras.) El uso de una alarma en este lugar esencial, previene la entrada de un ladrón.



BARRERA SECUNDARIA

BICICLETAS: Si no deja su carro abierto, trate su bicicleta de la misma manera. Use una cadena y candado aprobado cuando no esté en el asiento. Encadénela en su garage con un tornillo de argolla de 3/8 por 6 pulgadas, puesto en un poste. El tornillo de argolla debe estar cuando menos a 3 pies del nivel del piso, así es más difícil usar una barra para forzar el candado. Cuando encadene su bicicleta en un lugar público hágalo en una percha asido del armazón y la rueda de la bicicleta. Mantenga la cadena lo más alto que permita la bicicleta. Esto disminuye el riesgo de que se pueda usar una barra como palanca o que se corte la cadena con cortador de pasador.



TORNILLO DE OJO



ALARMAS: Se venden muchas clases de alarmas. Obtenga los servicios de una compañía de alarmas, ellos le aconsejarán cual es el mejor sistema para proteger su residencia. El sistema de rayos de energía es excelente. Algunos otros sistemas no son tan buenos porque emiten alarmas falsas.

NO DEPENDA SOLAMENTE EN QUE LE PROTEJA UNA ALARMA, ESTE SEGURO DE USAR LOS APARATOS APROPIADOS PARA CERRAR.

Cualquier sistema de alarma debe incluir:

1. Una pila que continúe en servicio cuando falle la electricidad.
2. Que sea capaz de percibir un incendio.
3. Que tenga modo de revisarse para probar que el sistema sigue funcionando.
4. Un aparato que suene y que sea instalado en el ático por una ventanilla de ventilación.

Llévese esta lista cuando vaya a comprar un alarma.

ESTÉ SEGURO DE QUE CERRÓ CON LLAVE ANTES DE SALIR Y DEJE UNA LLAVE CON SU VECINO.

12

13

USE ESTA LISTA PARA SU PROPIEDAD PERSONAL

Si puede identificar artículos robados que han sido recuperados por la policía, se le facilitará la devolución. Los artículos que no tengan número en serie pueden ser grabados con el número de su seguro social o el número de su licencia de manejar con un instrumento de grabar. Artículos personales, como joyas, pueden ser fotografiadas marcando la propia identificación por detrás de la foto.

OBJETOS MARCADOS CON LICENCIA DE MANEJAR NO.

Artículo	Hecho Por

TARJETA DE CRÉDITO

Compañía	Número en Serie

AUTOMÓVIL, MOTOCICLETA, PATÍN MOTORIZADO

Hecho Por	Color	Lic. No.	Número en Serie

BICICLETA

Hecho Por	Color	Lic. No.	Armazon No.

ARMAS

Hecho Por	Calibre	Número en Serie

TELEVISIÓN, RADIO, GRABADORA, ETC.

Artículo	Hecho Por	Número en Serie

LAVADOR DE TRASTES, ESTUFA, BATEADOR ELÉCTRICO, TOSTADOR, REFRIGERADOR, ETC.

Artículo	Hecho Por	Número en Serie

CÁMARA, GEMELOS, EQUIPO DEPORTIVO, MÁQUINA DE COSER, RELOJES

Artículo	Hecho Por	Número en Serie

HERRAMIENTA DE MOTOR & APARATOS ESPECIALES

Artículo	Hecho Por	Número en Serie

AL SALIR DE SU CASA SIGA ESTOS CONSEJOS, LE SERVIRÁN DE MUCHO.

¿Va a ir al mercado o a cenar fuera de casa?

Una residencia que parece tener gente dentro disuade la entrada de un ladrón.

No deje notas que le informan al ladrón que no está en casa.

Asegúrese que todas las ventanas y puertas están con llave antes de salir. Cierre las puertas de la cochera ya que una cochera vacía avisa su ausencia.

Cuando salga de noche deje por lo menos una luz encendida o el radio tocando. Puede comprar cronómetros que encienden y apagan las luces de la casa durante su ausencia.

No deje llaves debajo de macetas, tapetes, adentro del buzón, arriba de la puerta o en otros lugares obvios al ladrón.

CUANDO PIENSE SALIR DE VACACIONES O AUSENTARSE DEL HOGAR POR LARGO TIEMPO:

Antes de salir, suspenda las entregas de la leche y el periódico. No deje notas.

Arregle que alguien le corte el césped, recoja anuncios y otra basura regularmente. Si deja algunos juguetes tirados darán la impresión que hay gente en casa.

Avisé al correo para que le envíen su correspondencia o deje que alguien de confianza se lo levante diariamente. Personas que viven en apartamentos deben hacer caso a esto, pues buzones llenos indican que no hay nadie en casa.

Informe a sus vecinos de su ausencia para que estén alertas a personas sospechosas. Déjeles una llave para que revisen su hogar de vez en cuando. Dígales que cambien la posición de las cortinas y persianas.

Descontinúe el servicio telefónico temporalmente. Ladrones llaman para tratar de averiguar si hay alguien en casa.

No publique sus planes cuando salga, algunos ladrones leen periódicos para estar al tanto de las actividades sociales.

Informe a la policía o departamento de alguacil el tiempo que va a estar fuera del hogar, quien tiene la llave a su hogar y adonde se le pueden hallar. Le darán atención especial a su hogar, mientras no esté en casa.

Si encuentra una puerta o ventana forzada cuando regrese, no entre. El criminal aún puede estar adentro. Use el teléfono de un vecino inmediatamente, para llamar a la policía o alguacil.

Si ha ocurrido un crimen, no limpie ni toque nada. Mantenga intacto la escena, hasta que la policía o el alguacil pueda revisarlo para ver si hay alguna evidencia.

ACUERDESE:

CIERRE CON LLAVE ANTES DE SALIR

TENGA CONFIANZA EN UN VECINO DEJÁNDOLE UNA LLAVE.

SEA USTED UN VECINO QUE SE PREOCUPA.

APPENDIX D

SECTION II - SAMPLE FORMS

1. Burglary Report
2. Residential Security Inspection Checklist
3. Commercial Security Inspection Checklist
4. Property Identification Letter
5. Property Identification Decal
6. Property Identification Form
7. Speaker Request/Assignment Form

BURGLARY REPORT

Resid. Com'l. Safe Attempt (220)

DR

PREMISES: 14 Business, 13 Residence, 10 Store, 15 Miscellaneous, 16 Located, 16 No. Stories, 16 Neighborhood

CODE: V-Victim R-Person Reporting S-Person Who Secured Premises D-Person Who Discovered Crime W-Witness Day Phone-X

VEH: LIC. NO., STATE, MAKE/MODEL, MFG., YEAR, TYPE, TOP COLORS - BOTTOM, I.D. CHARACTERISTICS

SUSPECT: SEX, DESCENT, HAIR, EYES, HEIGHT, WEIGHT, AGE, CLOTHING, NAME & ADDRESS IF KNOWN

PERSONAL ODDITIES: 300 Amputee, 301 Deformed, 302 Tattoo, 303 Facial Scars, 304 Facial Scars, 305 Facial Oddity, 307 Teeth, 308 Body Scars, 309 Speech, 311 Eyes, 312 Hair Type, 313, 314 Facial Hair, 315 Ears, 316 Nose, 317 Face, 318 Complexion, 319 Other

ENTRY: 51 Instrument Used, 50 Entered From, 51 Method of Entry, 51 Outside Lighting, 50 Window, 50 Glass, 51 Door

BURGLARY REPORT

CHECKED

BURGLARY REPORT

DR

TRADEMARKS: 22 Pretended to be, 23 Suspect's Actions, 24 Suspect Wore, 26 Alarm, 24 Telephone, 25 Evidence, 25 Force, 24 Safe Jobs, 22 Victim Was, 22 Veh. Involved, 22 Shots Fired

(1) IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL SUSPECTS ON A SECOND FACE SHEET. IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL WITNESSES. (2) RECONSTRUCT THE CRIME. (3) DESCRIBE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE-STATE LOCATION FOUND AND BY WHOM. GIVE DISPOSITION. (4) SUMMARIZE OTHER DETAILS RELATING TO CRIME. (5) INDICATE TIME AND LOCATION WHERE VICTIM AND WITNESSES CAN BE LOCATED BY DAY INVESTIGATORS IF NO AVAILABLE PHONE. (6) LIST STOLEN ITEMS - EXCEPT IF CASH IS THE ONLY ITEM TAKEN - ON A PROPERTY SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, FORM 03.05.0.

SUPERVISOR APPROVING, SERIAL NO., INTERVIEWING OFFICERS, SERIAL NO., DIVISION, DETAIL, PERSON REPORTING (SIGNATURE), DATE & TIME REPRODUCED, DIVISION, CLERK, CLEARED BY MULTIPLE FOLLOWUP OR NO., CLEARED BY ARREST Yes No

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY INSPECTION
CHECKLIST

Name: _____
 Address: _____ City: _____ Phone: _____
 Building Type: Single Family _____ Apartment _____ Condiom _____
 Attached Garage _____ Detached Garage _____ Outbuildings _____
 Vehicles _____ Other _____
 Inspected By: _____ Date and Time: _____
 Grid: _____ Time Spent: _____ Followup Inspections: _____
 Census Tract: _____ Beat Identification: _____
 Insurance Company: _____ Policy #: _____

Building Perimeter	Unsat.	Fair	Recd.	Recommendations	
Shrubbery					
Lighting					
Gates					
Garage Doors					
Out Buildings					
Vehicles					
Vents					
Building Interior					
Doors	Hinges	Type	Locks	Frames	Recommendations
Main Entrance					
Side					
Back					
Garage Door					
Sliding Door					
Louver Door					
Other					
Other					
Windows	Locks	Frames	Security	Location	Recommendations
Double Hung					
Sliding					
Louver					
Other					
Other					
Alarms	Yes	No			

COMMERCIAL SECURITY INSPECTION
CHECKLIST

Business Name: _____
 Address: _____ City: _____ Phone: _____
 Person Contacted: _____ Title: _____
 Emergency Name: _____ Phone: _____
 Type of Business: _____
 Insurance Company: _____ Policy #: _____
 Type of Insurance: _____
 Grid: _____ Census Tract Area: _____ Time Spent: _____
 Inspected By: _____ Date & Time: _____
 Follow-up Inspection: _____

Building Perimeter	Unsat.	Fair	Recd.	Recommendations		
Shrubbery						
Lighting						
Roof						
Skylights						
Vents						
Fencing						
Building Interior	Hinges	Type	Locks	Frames	Recommendations	
Doors						
Main Entrance						
Side						
Rear						
Loading						
Other						
Windows:	Loc.	Security	Locks	Frames	Recommendations	
Sliding						
Double Hung						
Louver						
Other						
Locks	Type	Loc.	Security	Unsat.	Sat.	Recommendations
Doors						
Windows						
Exterior Openings						
Safes	Type	Loc.	Unsat.	Sat.	Recommendations	
Floor						
Wall						
Upright						
Vault						
Fire Box						
Money Chest						
Alarms	Yes	No	Recommendations			
Contact - Doors & Windows						
Beam						
Sonic						
Guard Service						

PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION

1. Sample letter (AGENCY LETTERHEAD)

Dear Citizen:

The Department is attempting to reduce crime in the City/County through the implementation of a crime prevention program called "Operation Identification". The purpose of this program is to discourage thefts and burglaries by recording the serial numbers or engraving your driver's license number on portable items such as tools, radios, appliances, television sets, cameras, and so forth.

A special decal, prominently displayed on front and back windows, should discourage burglary by serving notice that the items in the house have been marked and recorded. If marked items are subsequently stolen, the chance of recovery by a police agency would be materially increased, and the property could then be returned to the owner.

A member of our department will be in your neighborhood on between and . If you wish to participate in this program, please have those articles you wish engraved readily available.


Our primary purpose is to prevent crime. However, crime prevention is everybody's business, and we need your support.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

(Agency Head)
(Title)

2. Warning decal



Personal Property record

Name:

Automobiles, Motorcycles, Scooters, Bicycles, etc.

Table with columns: MAKE, COLOR, LIC. NO., SERIAL NO.

Guns

Table with columns: MAKE, CALIBER, SERIAL NO.

Small electrical appliances (radios, stereos, tape recorders, etc.)

Table with columns: DESCRIPTION, SERIAL NO.

Major electrical appliances, (TV, mixer, refrigerator, washer, etc.)

Table with columns: DESCRIPTION, SERIAL NO.

Cameras, Binoculars, Sporting Goods, Watches, etc.

Table with columns: DESCRIPTION, SERIAL NO.

Power tools & Miscellaneous equipment

Table with columns: DESCRIPTION, SERIAL NO.

Credit Cards

Table with columns: COMPANY, SERIAL NO.

IMPORTANT Engrave Driver's License Number on all un-numbered valuable items.

Table with columns: COMPANY, SERIAL NO.

3. Recording Form

INSECURE PREMISES REPORT - POLICE DEPT.

Name of business			
Address-House or Block Number			
While patrolling your district the reporting officer found the following conditions to exist at your place of business. Your cooperation with our Burglary Prevention Program in correcting this situation will be greatly appreciated.			
Describe insecure conditions			
Date	Time Reported	Beat	Census
Reporting Officer		Serial Number	
INSTRUCTIONS: 1st copy (white) forward to crime analysis section. 2nd copy (yellow) leave at insecure premise.			
Follow-up Remarks:			
Corrective Action:		Person Contacted	
<input type="checkbox"/> Taken	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Taken <input type="checkbox"/> To be Taken	Date	Time
Follow-Up Officer		Serial Number	

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

BURGLARY PREVENTION
PUBLIC SPEAKING ASSIGNMENT

REQUEST FOR: Speaker _____ on subject of _____
Film _____ on subject of _____
Other _____

LOCATION: _____

DATE: _____ TIME: _____

REQUEST BY: _____ of _____
(Name) (Organization)

(Address) (Telephone)

OFFICER ASSIGNED: _____ DATE ASSIGNED: _____

VERIFICATION WITH REQUESTING PARTY _____
(Date)

TOTAL PERSONS ADDRESSED: _____ TIME SPENT: Duty Time _____ Overtime _____

When completed return to Public Relations Coordinator

APPENDIX D

SECTION III - SECURITY ORDINANCES

1. Oakland City Ordinance
2. Los Angeles County Ordinance

POLICE-FIRE AND INSURANCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE

MODEL BURGLARY SECURITY CODE

MINIMUM STANDARDS

I. Purpose

The purpose of this Code is to provide minimum standards to safeguard property and public welfare by regulating and controlling the design, construction, quality of materials, use and occupancy, location and maintenance of all buildings and structures within a city and certain equipment specifically regulated herein.

II. Development of Model Code

The following City Ordinances were used as guides in developing the model code: General Ordinance No. 25, 1969, as amended, City of Indianapolis, Indiana -- Section 605-3 -- F211 Housing Inspection and Code Enforcement, Trenton, New Jersey -- Section 23-405 of the Arlington Heights Village, Illinois, Code -- Section 614.46 Chapter 3 of the Arlington County, Virginia, Building Code -- Section H-323.4 of the Prince George's County, Maryland Housing Code -- City of Oakland, California Building Code -- Burglary Prevention Ordinance, Oakland, California.

III. Scope

The provisions of the Code shall apply to new construction and to buildings or structures to which additions, alterations or repairs are made except as specifically provided in this Code. When additions, alterations or repairs within any 12-month period exceed 50 per cent of the replacement value of the existing building or structure, such building or structure shall be made to conform to the requirements for new buildings or structures.

IV. Applications to Existing Buildings

(It is the Committee's recommendation that the Code apply only to new construction, additions, alterations or repairs. However, some cities may wish to include present structures. If so, the following paragraph may be substituted for III. above.)

All existing and future buildings in the city shall, when unattended, be so secured as to prevent unauthorized entry, in accordance with specifications for physical security of accessible openings as provided in this Code.

V. Alternate Materials and Methods of Construction

The provisions of this Code are not intended to prevent the use of any material or method of construction not specifically prescribed by this Code, provided any such alternate has been approved, nor is it the intention of this Code to exclude any sound method of structural design or analysis not

specifically provided for in this Code. Structural design limitations given in this Code are to be used as a guide only, and exceptions thereto may be made if substantiated by calculations or other suitable evidence prepared by a qualified person.

The enforcing authority may approve any such alternate provided he finds the proposed design is satisfactory and the material, method or work offered is, for the purpose intended, at least equivalent of that prescribed in this Code in quality, strength, effectiveness, burglary resistance, durability and safety.

VI. Tests

Whenever there is insufficient evidence of compliance with the provisions of this Code or evidence that any material or any construction does not conform to the requirements of this Code, or in order to substantiate claims for alternate materials or methods of construction, the enforcing authority may require tests as proof of compliance to be made at the expense of the owner or his agent by an approved agency.

VII. Enforcement

The Multiple Dwelling and Private Dwelling Ordinances shall be included in the Building Code and enforced by the Building Official. The Commercial Ordinance shall be administered and enforced by the Chief of Police.

VIII. Responsibility for Security

The owner or his designated agent shall be responsible for compliance with the specifications set forth in this Code.

IX. Violations and Penalties

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to erect, construct, enlarge, alter, repair, move, improve, remove, convert or demolish, equip, use, occupy or maintain any building or structure in the city, or cause the same to be done, contrary to or in violation of any of the provisions of this Code.

Any person, firm, or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Code shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punishable by a fine of not more than \$500, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

X. Appeals

In order to prevent or lessen unnecessary hardship or practical difficulties in exceptional cases where it is difficult or impossible to comply with the strict letter of this Code, and in order to determine the suitability of alternate materials and types of construction and to provide for reasonable interpretations of the provisions of this Code, there shall be created a Board of

Examiners and Appeals (if none exist). The Board shall exercise its powers on these matters in such a way that the public welfare is secured, and substantial justice done most nearly in accord with the intent and purpose of this Code.

MODEL COMMERCIAL BURGLARY SECURITY ORDINANCE

MINIMUM STANDARDS

1. All Exterior Doors Shall Be Secured as Follows:

- A. A single door shall be secured with either a double cylinder deadbolt or a single cylinder deadbolt without a turnpiece with a minimum throw of one inch. A hook or expanding bolt may have a throw of 3/4 inch. Any deadbolt must contain hardened material to repel attempts at cutting through the bolt.
- B. On pairs of doors, the active leaf shall be secured with the type lock required for single doors in (A) above. The inactive leaf shall be equipped with flush bolts protected by hardened material with a minimum throw of 5/8 inch at head and foot. Multiple point locks, cylinder activated from the active leaf and satisfying (I, A and B) above may be used in lieu of flush bolts.
- C. Any single or pair of doors requiring locking at the bottom or top rail shall have locks with a minimum 5/8 inch throw bolt at both the top and bottom rails.
- D. Cylinders shall be so designed or protected so they cannot be gripped by pliers or other wrenching devices.
- E. Exterior sliding commercial entrances shall be secured as in (A, B & D) above with special attention given to safety regulations.
- F. Rolling overhead doors, solid overhead swinging, sliding or accordion garage-type doors shall be secured with a cylinder lock or padlock on the inside, when not otherwise controlled or locked by electric power operation. If a padlock is used, it shall be of hardened steel shackle, with minimum five pin tumbler operation with non-removable key when in an unlocked position.
- G. Metal accordion grate or grill-type doors shall be equipped with metal guide track at top and bottom, and a cylinder lock and/or padlock with hardened steel shackle and minimum five pin tumbler operation with non-removable key when in an unlocked position. The bottom track shall be so designed that the door cannot be lifted from the track when the

door is in a locked position.

- H. Outside hinges on all exterior doors shall be provided with non-removable pins when using pin-type hinges.
 - I. Doors with glass panels and doors that have glass panels adjacent to the door frame shall be secured as follows:
 - 1. Rated burglary-resistant glass or glass-like material, or
 - 2. The glass shall be covered with iron bars of at least one half-inch round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material, spaced not more than five inches apart, secured on the inside of the glazing, or
 - 3. Iron or steel grills of at least 1/8" material of 2" mesh secured on the inside of the glazing.
 - J. Inswinging doors shall have rabbitted jambs.
 - K. Wood doors, not of solid core construction, or with panels therein less than 1 3/8" thick, shall be covered on the inside with at least 16 gauge sheet steel or its equivalent attached with screws on minimum six inch centers.
 - L. Jambs for all doors shall be so constructed or protected so as to prevent violation of the function of the strike.
 - M. All exterior doors, excluding front doors, shall have a minimum of 60 watt bulb over the outside of the door. Such bulb shall be protected with a vapour cover or cover of equal breaking resistant material.
- II. Glass Windows:
- A. Accessible rear and side windows not viewable from the street shall consist of rated burglary resistant glass or glass-like material. Fire Department approval shall be obtained on type of glazing used.
 - B. If the accessible side or rear window is of the openable type it shall be secured on the inside with a locking device capable of withstanding a force of 300 pounds applied in any direction.
 - C. Louvered windows shall not be used within eight feet of ground level, adjacent structures or fire escapes.
 - D. Outside hinges on all accessible side and rear glass windows shall be provided with non-removable pins. If the hinge screws are accessible the screws shall be of the non-removable type.

III. Accessible Transoms:

All exterior transoms exceeding 8" x 12" on the side and rear of any building or premises used for business purposes shall be protected by one of the following:

1. Rated burglary-resistant glass or glass-like material, or
2. Outside iron bars of at least 1/2" round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material, spaced no more than 5" apart, or
3. Outside iron or steel grills of at least 1/8" material but not more than 2" mesh
4. The window barrier shall be secured with rounded head flush bolts on the outside.

IV. Roof Openings:

A. All glass skylights on the roof of any building or premises used for business purposes shall be provided with:

1. Rated burglary-resistant glass or glass-like material meeting Code requirements, or
2. Iron bars of at least 1/2" round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material under the skylight and securely fastened, or
3. A steel grill of at least 1/8" material of 2" mesh under the skylight and securely fastened.

B. All hatchway openings on the roof of any building or premises used for business purposes shall be secured as follows:

1. If the hatchway is of wooden material, it shall be covered on the inside with at least 16 gauge sheet steel or its equivalent attached with screws.
2. The hatchway shall be secured from the inside with a slide bar or slide bolts. The use of crossbar or padlock must be approved by the Fire Marshal.
3. Outside hinges on all hatchway openings shall be provided with non-removable pins when using pin-type hinges.

C. All air duct or air vent openings exceeding 8" x 12" on the roof or exterior walls of any building or premise used for business purposes shall be secured by covering the same with either of the following:

1. Iron bars of at least 1/2" round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material spaced no more than 5" apart and securely fastened or
2. A steel grill of at least 1/8" material of 2" mesh and securely fastened.
3. If the barrier is on the outside, it shall be secured with rounded head flush bolts on the outside.

V. Special Security Measures:

A. Safes:

Commercial establishments having \$1,000 or more in cash on the premises after closing hours shall lock such money in a Class "E" safe after closing hours.

B. Office Buildings (Multiple occupancy):

All entrance doors to individual office suites shall have a deadbolt lock with a minimum one inch throw bolt which can be opened from the inside.

VI. Intrusion Detection Devices:

A. If it is determined by the enforcing authority of this ordinance that the security measures and locking devices described in this ordinance do not adequately secure the building, he may require the installation and maintenance of an intrusion detection device (Burglar Alarm System).

B. Establishments having specific type inventories shall be protected by the following type alarm service:

1. Silent Alarm--Central Station--Supervised Service
 - a. Jewelry Store -- Mfg., wholesale, and retail
 - b. Guns and ammo shops
 - c. Wholesale liquor
 - d. Wholesale tobacco
 - e. Wholesale drugs
 - f. Fur stores

2. Silent Alarm

- a. Liquor stores
- b. Pawn shops
- c. Electronic equipment
- d. Wig stores
- e. Clothing (new)
- f. Coins and stamps
- g. Industrial tool supply houses
- h. Camera stores
- i. Precious metal storage facility

3. Local Alarm (Bell outside premise)

- a. Antique dealers
- b. Art galleries
- c. Service stations

VII. Exceptions:

No portion of this Code shall supersede any local, state or Federal

laws, regulations, or codes dealing with the life-safety factor.

Enforcement of this ordinance should be developed with the cooperation of the local fire authority to avoid possible conflict with fire laws.

MODEL PRIVATE DWELLING SECURITY ORDINANCE

MINIMUM STANDARDS

I. Exterior Doors:

- A. Exterior doors and doors leading from garage areas into private family dwellings shall be of solid core no less than 1 3/4 inches thickness.
- B. Exterior doors and doors leading from garage areas into private family dwellings shall have self-locking (dead latch) devices with a minimum throw of one-half inch.
- C. Vision panels in exterior doors or within reach of the inside activating device must be of burglary-resistant material or equivalent as approved by the Building Official.
- D. Exterior doors swinging out shall have non-removable hinge pins.
- E. In-swinging exterior doors shall have rabbited jambs.
- F. Jambs for all doors shall be so constructed or protected so as to prevent violation of the function of the strike.

II. Sliding Patio-Type Doors Opening Onto Patios or Balconies Which Are Less Than One Story Above Grade or are Otherwise Accessible From the Outside:

- A. All single sliding patio doors shall have the movable section of the door sliding on the inside of the fixed portion of the door.
- B. Dead locks shall be provided on all single sliding patio doors. The lock shall be operable from the outside by a key utilizing a bored lock cylinder or pin tumbler construction. Mounting screws for the lock case shall be inaccessible from the outside. Lock bolts shall be of hardened steel or have hardened steel inserts and shall be capable of withstanding a force of 800 pounds applied in any direction. The lock bolt shall engage the strike sufficiently to prevent its being disengaged by any possible movement of the door within the space or clearances provided for installation and operation. The strike area shall be reinforced to maintain effectiveness of bolt strength.

- C. Double sliding patio doors must be locked at the meeting rail and meet the locking requirements of "B" above.

III. Window Protection

- A. Windows shall be so constructed that when the window is locked it cannot be lifted from the frame.
- B. Window locking devices shall be capable of withstanding force of 300 pounds applied in any direction.
- C. Louvered windows shall not be used within eight feet of ground level.

IV. It Shall be Unlawful to Furnish Overhead Garage Doors with Bottom Vents.

V. Exceptions:

No portion of this Code shall supersede any local, state or Federal laws, regulations, or codes dealing with the life-safety factor.

Enforcement of this ordinance should be developed with the cooperation of the local fire laws.

MODEL MULTIPLE DWELLING SECURITY ORDINANCE

MINIMUM STANDARDS

I. Exterior Doors:

- A. Exterior doors and doors leading from garage areas into multiple dwelling buildings and doors leading into stairwells below the sixth floor level shall have self-locking (Dead latch) devices, allowing egress to the exterior of the building or into the garage area, or stairwell, but requiring a key be used to gain access to the interior of the building from the outside or garage area or into the hallways from the stairwell.
- B. Exterior doors and doors leading from the garage areas into multiple dwelling buildings and doors leading into stairwells shall be equipped with self-closing devices, if not already required by other regulations, ordinance, or code.

II. Garage Doors:

Whenever parking facilities are provided, either under or within the confines of the perimeter walls of any multiple dwelling, such facility shall be fully enclosed and provided with a locking device.

III. All Swinging Doors to Individual Motel, Hotel, and Multi-Family Dwellings:

- A. All wood doors shall be of solid core with a minimum thickness of 1 3/4 inches.
- B. Swinging entrance doors to individual units shall have deadbolts with one-inch minimum throw and hardened steel inserts in addition to deadlatches with half-inch minimum throw. The locks shall be so constructed that both deadbolt and deadlatch can be retracted by a single action of the inside door knob. Alternate devices to equally resist illegal entry may be substituted subject to prior approval of the Police Department.
- C. An interviewer or peephole shall be provided in each individual unit entrance door.
- D. Door closers will be provided on each individual entrance door.
- E. Doors swinging out shall have non-removable hinge pins.
- F. In-swinging exterior doors shall have rabbited jambs.
- G. Jambs for all doors shall be so constructed or protected so as to prevent violation of the function of the strike.

IV. Sliding Patio-Type Doors Opening Onto Patios or Balconies Which Are Less Than One Story Above Grade or Are Otherwise Accessible From the Outside:

- A. All single sliding patio doors shall have the moveable section of the door slide on the inside of the fixed portion of the door.
- B. Dead locks shall be provided on all single sliding patio doors. The lock shall be operable from the outside by a key utilizing a bored lock cylinder of pin tumbler construction. Mounting screws for the lock case shall be inaccessible from the outside. Lock bolts shall be of hardened material or have hardened steel inserts and shall be capable of withstanding a force of 800 pounds applied in any direction. The lock bolts shall engage the strike sufficiently to prevent its being disengaged by any possible movement of the door within the space or clearances provided for installation and operation. The strike area shall be reinforced to maintain effectiveness of bolt strength.
- C. Double sliding patio doors must be locked at the meeting rail and meet the locking requirements of "B" above.

V. Window Protection:

- A. Windows shall be so constructed that when the window is locked it cannot be lifted from the frame.
- B. Window locking devices shall be capable of withstanding a force of 300 pounds applied in any direction.
- C. Louvered windows shall not be used within eight feet of ground level, adjacent structures or fire escapes.

VI. Exceptions:

No portion of this Code shall supersede any local, state or Federal laws, regulations, or codes dealing with the life-safety factors.

Enforcement of this ordinance should be developed with the cooperation of the local fire authority to avoid possible conflict with fire laws.

LOS ANGELES
ORDINANCE NO. 10,163

An ordinance adding Chapter 67 to Ordinance No. 2225, the Building Code, relating to security provisions.

The Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles do ordain as follows:

Section 1. Chapter 67 (beginning with Section 6701) is added to Ordinance No. 2225 entitled "Building Code" adopted March 20, 1933 to read:

CHAPTER 67
SECURITY PROVISIONS

SECTION 6701 - PURPOSE

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth minimum standards of construction for resistance to unlawful entry.

SECTION 6702 - SCOPE

The provisions of this chapter shall apply to enclosed Group F, G, H, I, and J Occupancies regulated by this Code. EXCEPTION: The requirements shall not apply to enclosed Group J Occupancies having no opening to an attached building or which are completely detached.

SECTION 6703 - LIMITATIONS

No provision of this Chapter shall require or be construed to require devices on exit doors contrary to the requirements specified in Chapter 33.

SECTION 6704 - ALTERNATE SECURITY PROVISIONS

The provisions of this Chapter are not intended to prevent the use of any device or method of construction not specifically prescribed by this Code when such alternate provides equivalent security based upon a recommendation of the County Sheriff.

SECTION 6705 - DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this Chapter, certain terms are defined as follows:

1. CYLINDER GUARD is a hardened ring surrounding the exposed portion of the lock cylinder or other

device which is so fastened as to protect the cylinder from wrenching, prying, cutting or pulling by attack tools.

2. DEADLOCKING LATCH is a latch in which the latch bolt is positively held in the projected position by a guard bolt, plunger, or auxiliary mechanism.
3. DEADBOLT is a bolt which has no automatic spring action and which is operated by a key cylinder, thumbturn, or lever, and is positively held fast when in the projected position.
4. LATCH is a device for automatically retaining the door in a closed position upon its closing.

SECTION 6706 - TESTS

Sliding glass doors. Panels shall be closed and locked. Tests shall be performed in the following order:

- a. Test A. With the panels in the normal position, a concentrated load of 300 pounds shall be applied separately to each vertical pull stile incorporating a locking device at a point on the stile within six inches of the locking device in the direction parallel to the plane of glass that would tend to open the door.
- b. Test B. Repeat Test A while simultaneously adding a concentrated load of 150 pounds to the same area of the same stile in a direction perpendicular to the plane of glass toward the interior side of the door.
- c. Test C. Repeat Test B with the 150 pound force in the reversed direction towards the exterior side of the door.
- d. Test D, E, and F. Repeat A, B, and C with the movable panel lifted upwards to its full limit within the confines of the door frame.

SECTION 6707 - TESTS

Sliding Glass Windows. Sash shall be closed and locked. Tests shall be performed in the following order:

- a. Test A. With the sliding sash in the normal position a concentrated load of 150 pounds shall be applied separately to each sash member incorporating a

locking device at a point on the sash member within six (6) inches of the locking device in the direction parallel to the plane of glass that would tend to open the window.

- b. Test B. Repeat Test A while simultaneously adding a concentrated load of 75 pounds to the same area of the same sash member in the direction perpendicular to the plane of glass toward the interior side of the window.
- c. Test C. Repeat Test B with the 75 pounds force in the reversed direction towards the exterior side of the window.
- d. Test D, E, and F. Repeat Tests A, B, and C with the movable sash lifted upwards to its full limit within the confines of the window frame.

SECTION 6708 - DOORS - General

A door forming a part of the enclosure of a dwelling unit or of an area occupied by one tenant of a building shall be constructed, installed, and secured as set forth in Sections 6709, 6710, 6711, and 6712, when such door is directly reachable or capable of being reached from a street, highway, yard, court, passageway, corridor, balcony, patio, breezeway, private garage, portion of the building which is available for use by the public or other tenants or similar area. A door enclosing a private garage with an interior opening leading directly to a dwelling unit shall also comply with said Sections 6709, 6710, 6711, and 6712.

SECTION 6709 - DOORS - Swinging Doors

- a. Swinging wooden doors, openable from the inside without the use of a key and which are either of hollow core construction or less than 1 3/8 inches in thickness, shall be covered on the inside face with 16 gage sheet metal attached with screws at six (6) inch maximum centers around the perimeter or equivalent. Lights in doors shall be as set forth in Sections 6714 and 6715.
- b. A single swinging door, the active leaf of a pair of doors, and the bottom leaf of Dutch doors shall be equipped with a deadbolt and a deadlocking latch. The deadbolt and latch may be activated by one lock or by individual locks. Deadbolts shall contain hardened inserts or equivalent, so as to repel cutting tool attack. The lock or locks shall

be key operated from the exterior side of the door and engaged or disengaged from the interior side of the door by a device not requiring a key or special knowledge or effort. EXCEPTION:

1. The latch may be omitted from doors in Group F and G occupancies.
 2. Locks may be key or otherwise operated from the inside when not prohibited by Chapter 33 or other laws and regulations.
 3. A swinging door of width greater than five (5) feet may be secured as set forth in Section 6711. A straight deadbolt shall have a minimum throw of one inch and the embedment shall be not less than 5/8 inch into the holding device receiving the projected bolt, a hook shape or expending lug deadbolt shall have a minimum throw of 3/4 inch. All deadbolts of locks which automatically activate two or more deadbolts shall embed at least 1/2 inch but need not exceed 3/4 inch into the holding devices receiving the projected bolts.
- c. The inactive leaf of a pair of doors and the upper leaf of Dutch doors shall be equipped with a deadbolt or deadbolts as set forth in Subsection (b). EXCEPTION:
1. The bolt or bolts need not be key operated, but shall not be otherwise activated from the exterior side of the door.
 2. The bolt or bolts may be engaged or disengaged automatically with the deadbolt or by another device on the active leaf or lower leaf.
 3. Manually operated hardened bolts at the top and bottom of the leaf and which embed a minimum of 1/2 inch into the device receiving the projected bolt may be used when not prohibited by Chapter 33 or other laws and regulations.
- d. Door stops on wooden jambs for in-swinging doors shall be of one piece construction with the jamb or joined by a rabbet.
- e. Nonremovable pins shall be used in pin-type hinges which are accessible from the outside when the door is closed.

- f. Cylinder guards shall be installed on all mortise or rim-type cylinder locks installed in hollow metal doors whenever the cylinder projects beyond the face of the door or is otherwise accessible to gripping tools.

SECTION 6710 - DOORS - Sliding Glass Doors.

Sliding glass doors shall be equipped with locking devices and shall be so installed that, when subjected to tests specified in Section 6706, remain intact and engaged. Movable panels shall not be rendered easily openable or removable from the frame during or after the tests. Cylinder guards shall be installed on all mortise or rim-type cylinder locks installed in hollow metal doors whenever the cylinder projects beyond the face of the door or is otherwise accessible to gripping tools.

SECTION 6711 - DOORS - Overhead and Sliding Doors.

Metal or wooden overhead and sliding doors shall be secured with a cylinder lock, padlock with a hardened steel shackle, metal slide bar, bolt or equivalent when not otherwise locked by electric power operation.

Cylinder guards shall be installed on all mortise or rim-type cylinder locks installed in hollow metal doors whenever the cylinder projects beyond the face of the door or is otherwise accessible to gripping tools.

SECTION 6712 - DOORS - Metal Accordion grate or grille-type doors.

Metal accordion grate or grille-type doors shall be equipped with metal guides at top and bottom and a cylinder lock or padlock and hardened steel shackle shall be provided. Cylinder guards shall be installed on all mortise or rim-type cylinder locks installed in hollow metal doors whenever the cylinder projects beyond the face of the door or is otherwise accessible to gripping tools.

SECTION 6713 - LIGHTS - In General.

A window, skylight, or other light forming a part of the enclosure of a dwelling unit or of an area occupied by one tenant of a building shall be constructed, installed and secured as set forth in Section 6714, and 6715, when the bottom of such window, skylight or light is not more than a street, highway, yard, court, passageway, corridor, balcony, patio, breezeway, private garage, portion of the building which is available for use by the public or other tenants or similar area.

A window enclosing a private garage with an interior opening leading directly to a dwelling unit shall also comply with said Sections 6714 and 6715.

SECTION 6714 - LIGHTS - Material.

Lights within forty (40) inches of a required locking device on a door when in the closed and locked position and openable from the inside without the use of a key, and lights with a least dimension greater than six (6) inches but less than forty-eight (48) inches in F and G Occupancies, shall be fully tempered glass approved burglary-resistant material or guarded by metal bars, screens or grilles in an approved manner.

SECTION 6715 - LIGHTS - Locking Devices.

- a. Sliding glass windows shall be provided with locking devices that, when subjected to the tests specified in Section 6707, remain intact and engaged. Movable panels shall not be rendered easily openable or removable from the frame during or after the tests.
- b. Other openable windows shall be provided with substantial locking devices which render the building as secure as the devices required by this section. In Group F and G Occupancies, such devices shall be a glide bar, bolt, cross bar, and/or padlock with hardened steel shackle.
- c. Special louvered windows, except those above the first story in Group H and I Occupancies which cannot be reached without a ladder, shall be of material or guarded as specified in Section 6714 and individual panes shall be securely fastened by mechanical fasteners requiring a tool for removal and not accessible from the outside when the window is in the closed position.

SECTION 6716 - OTHER OPENINGS - In General.

Openings, other than doors or lights, which form a part of the enclosure, or portion thereof, housing a single occupant and the bottom of which is not more than sixteen (16) feet above the grade of a street, highway, yard, court, passageway, corridor, balcony, patio, breezeway, or similar area, or from a private garage, or from a portion of the building which is occupied, used or available for use by the public or other tenants, or an opening enclosing a private garage attached to a dwelling unit which openings therein shall be constructed, installed and secured as set forth in Section 6717.

SECTION 6717 - HATCHWAYS, SCUTTLES AND SIMILAR OPENINGS

- a. Wooden hatchways less than 1-3/4 inch thick solid wood shall be covered on the inside with 16 gage sheet metal attached with screws at six (6) inch maximum centers around perimeter.
- b. The hatchway shall be secured from the inside with a slide bar, slide bolts, and/or padlock with a hardened steel shackle.
- c. Outside pin-type hinges shall be provided with non-removable pins.
- d. Other openings exceeding ninety-six (96) square inches with a least dimension exceeding eight (8) inches shall be secured by metal bars, screens, or grilles in an approved manner.

Section 2. This ordinance shall be published in the Journal of Commerce and Independent Review, a newspaper printed and published in the County of Los Angeles.

(Seal)

WARREN M. DORN
Chairman.

Attest:

JAMES S. MIZE
Executive Officer-Clerk of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles

I hereby certify that at its meeting of December 8, 1970, the foregoing ordinance was adopted by the Board of Supervisors of said County of Los Angeles by the following vote, to wit:

Ayes: Supervisors Kenneth Hahn, Ernest E. Debs, Burton W. Chace and Warren M. Dorn.

Noes: None.

(Seal)

JAMES S. MIZE
Executive Officer-Clerk of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles.

Effective date January 8, 1971.

(95918) Dec. 18

APPENDIX D

SECTION IV - BUSINESS MACHINE IDENTIFICATION GUIDE

COMPILED BY

SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

BUSINESS MACHINE IDENTIFICATION GUIDE

The following is intended as a guide to assist field officers and investigators in locating the serial and identification numbers on some of the more popular business machines subject to theft, and where possible to provide an approximate market value of these machines. The list is, of course, incomplete containing only the most popular and the most valuable machines. The information offered is to be used as a guide, not an absolute.

Where the serial number of a machine is part of, or on the same line as a model number, carriage length, etc., an officer making a computer check of possibly stolen equipment should check the number both ways, with and without the model number or other number, as it may have been reported to the police either way. Example: Underwood typewriters list the carriage length immediately to the left of the serial number; appearing as 11-8746523. The 11 is the carriage length, eleven inches. When checked for stolen, the number should be run with and without the "11".

Where noted in the guide, certain information aside from the serial number will be printed on the serial number plate. If this information is missing, the officer may in most instances presume that the original plate has been removed and a facsimile attached. Also where noted, the officer should check to see that no more than the allowable number of digits are present in the serial number. Many times a thief will simply stamp an extra digit or two before or after the serial number to avoid discovery by computer check.

ELECTRIC TYPEWRITERS

I.B.M. ELECTRIC TYPEWRITERS

- Model A 20 to 25 years old. Gray case, dark blue keys. Serial number 0 to 499,999. 11" or 12" carriage. Very few still in use, most have been reworked, parts exchanged with other I.B.M.'s. Run carriage all the way to the right. Serial number is on the frame, under the carriage on the left side, either on an attached tag or stamped directly into the frame. Value \$50 to \$75.
- Model B 15 to 20 years old. Usually gray case and gray keys. Serial numbers 500,000 to 999,999. 11" or 12" carriage. Run carriage to right, locate serial number on frame under carriage on left side. Model B Executive same but possibly 13" carriage, more deluxe model. Model B value \$100, B Executive \$110.
- Model C Recent Models. Different case colors and keys. Serial numbers 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 on standard and 2,000,000 to 4,000,000 on Executive model. Run carriage all the way to right, locate serial number on the frame under the carriage on the left. Model C Standard value \$175, Model C Executive value \$195.
- Model D Current model. Different color cases and keys. Serial numbers contain seven digits. Plug machine in to run carriage to right. Serial number is under carriage rails on left side. Must look UNDER carriage to see serial plate, which faces to left rather than straight up. Model D Standard value \$600, Model D Executive value \$800.
- Note: All the above machines are "type-bar" machines with standard keys. The below machines utilize a "type-ball".

Model 721 "Selectric" Current. The "Selectric" series uses a type-ball instead of standard keys, and is easily identified by this feature. Serial numbers 4,000,000 up. Machine MUST be plugged in to move carriage to right, then lift top of machine to expose serial number stamped on left hand side of inner case. Value \$225.

Model 721 D.I. and 725 D.I. "Selectric". These machines differ from the standard Selectric in that there is a lever for adjusting the depth of typing impression located immediately to the right of the "key-ball", the chrome ball carrying the type. Serial number located same as standard "Selectric". Model 721 D.I. Value \$250, Model 725 D.I. value \$300.

REMINGTON ELECTRIC TYPEWRITERS

There are several different models, series, case types and colors, as many machines marketed under the Remington name are foreign-made. Used Remington typewriters are generally worth from \$50 to \$120, with higher prices only for very recent, extremely good machines. They do not hold value like the I.B.M.'s. Serial numbers may be of varying lengths but the tags or plates should in most cases only be long enough to hold the original number of digits. Serial numbers are located under the carriage on the right side. It may be necessary to plug the machine in to run the carriage to the left. The serial number on all Remington electric typewriters will be preceded by the letter "E". In the past, stolen Remington Electrics have eluded officer-initiated computer check by change of the letter "E" to "8", "B" or other letter or number of similar configuration. If the machine does not bear this "E", it should be considered suspect.

ROYAL ELECTRIC TYPEWRITERS

Several different sizes and models, many foreign-made for Royal. Value, depending on age, may run from \$20 to \$100. Very low prices that look suspect may be perfectly valid, as the used value of a Royal is very low. Serial number should be found on a metal tag or stamped into the frame under the carriage rails on the right side. Again, it may be necessary with some machines to plug them in to run the carriage to the left. All serial numbers on Royal electrics should be prefaced with REP-13 or REP-12, REP-11, etc. The "REP" should always be present. The next two numbers are the carriage length in inches. It is recommended that computer checks of the serial should be run both with and without the first letters and carriage length.

SMITH CORONA ELECTRIC TYPEWRITERS

Again, there are several different models, sizes and varied serial number series. Prices may run from \$20 to \$80 used. Serial numbers are stamped into the frame of the machine on either left or right side. Most newer Smith-Corona machines use carbon tape rather than the standard inked fabric tape. The tape spools, two of them, are located on both sides of the keyboard. To locate serial numbers, lift the top cover and look immediately under the lower edge of the tape spools.

ADLER ELECTRIC TYPEWRITERS

Same information as for the Smith-Corona, but the serial number is stamped into the frame on the right side of the keys. To locate, lift the top cover.

UNDERWOOD ELECTRIC TYPEWRITERS

Most common are the full-size "Scriptor" and "Forum" models, and the compact "Praxis" and "Editor II" models. The serial number is located on the flat portion of the frame under and between the rails on the right side. To locate, plug the machine in and run the carriage to the left by pressing the "tab". The serial number will be preceded by an "E" and the carriage length; 11, 12, or 15 inches, etc., and will appear as "E 11-1234567". The serial number should be seven digits, no more. The standard manual Underwoods will have the serial number in the same place, and the carriage length preceding the serial number, but without the letter "E". The Underwoods do not as yet have a "street price", but the above models sell for \$500.

CALCULATORS

REMINGTON CALCULATORS

There are basically two series of Remington calculators, the large-case (American made) and small-case (German made). All Remington calculators have an oblong hole cut into the bottom pan, through which the serial number is visible. It will be either hand-etched, which looks suspicious and is easily defaced, or stamped. The first few numbers are followed by a letter. This is the model designation. Example: 99N1234567 "99N" is the model number. It is very important to run computer checks of the number

both ways. Some Remington calculators will have the serial number affixed to a metallic tape instead of stamped or engraved. This may be peeled up with a knife blade or key to check for another serial number beneath. If the tape is the only serial number, it is valid, though of course the tape may have been replaced. Value used from \$50 to \$100.

OLIVETTI CALCULATORS

Older models are very large and heavy, black/gray or black/silver; newer models are the size of a standard typewriter and pink in color. The serial number is hand-etched or stamped into the frame, visible through an oblong hole in the bottom pan. The serial number is preceded by a model which should read "D-24, D-25", etc. Example: D-24 807586. Value: \$135 to \$220.

VICTOR CALCULATORS

Many different sizes, colors, etc. Serial number is stamped on the bottom pan, keyboard end. There are two rows of numbers, the top row being a six-digit (no more) model number. The bottom row is the serial number, which may be of varying length. Value \$170 to \$195.

ADLER ELECTRIC/ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS

Most common are the 1200 series, 1201, 1204, etc. The make and model are clearly marked on the top of the case. The set is usually black/gray plastic, with a twelve-column capability window on the top. The serial number is on a small metal plate attached to the bottom pan with two phillips-head screws. This plate can be removed easily and a fake attached, but the original plate will contain information besides the serial number indicating type of machine, model, A German maintenance code on the top line using

some symbols, and on the bottom line, "Made in Japan". The machine is made in Germany and assembled in Japan. Depending on capability (square root, memory, etc.) prices run new from \$169.50 to \$300.

UNICOM CALCULATORS

Several thousand Unicom calculators have been sold in southern California over the last two years. These calculators are among the most expensive, and most will be found in professional buildings rather than retail stores. All Unicom machines are marked somewhere on the exterior, but also have the serial number stamped into the interior frame, accessible only by removing the outer case. Model 500P is an electric printing (paper-tape fed) calculator having an off-white case with blue or gray front key panel. Unicom 500P is impressed into the plastic front, and the serial number plate is attached to the rear of the machine with two plastic pop-rivets. This plate should also contain information on model #, operating voltage, and the company logo. On this particular model, the serial number may be of any length, combined with letters as well as digits. Price new \$675, used \$350 up. Model 801 and 802 are electronic, battery-powered, window-readout portable calculators with 8 column capability. The 801 is 1-1/2" x 6-3/4" x 4", weight 30 oz. Though the carrying case is marked with logo and model, the machine itself is not. Serial number is all digits, not more than seven. Price new \$159. Model 802 is slightly smaller, weighs 20 oz. "Unicom 802" is 1-1/2" x 6-1/4" x 3-1/4", weight 20 Oz. Same serial information as 801. Price new \$159.50. The remainder of the Unicom calculators are larger,

either printing type or window-readout models of varying value. All have the model number and company logo impressed into the face of the machine, and the serial number plate with additional information attached to the rear of the machine with plastic pop-rivets.

"ROTARY" TYPE CALCULATORS

These are the older, manual, mechanically-cranked calculators characterized by their multiple banks of numbers running up and down the keyboard (5 rows of 1's, 5 rows of 2's, etc.). Most of these are Smith-Corona, Marchant, Friden, or Remington. They have very little value since the electric and electronic calculators were developed. All are large-case machines and very heavy, some models weighing 60 pounds. Most originally sold for \$300 to \$500, now range from \$10 to \$50, even for recent models. The serial numbers on almost all known models are on a metal tag on the bottom pan of the machine, and usually preceded by a model number of varying length.

PAYMASTER CHECKWRITERS

One basic model, usually blue-gray or gray. The serial number is found on a metal tag riveted to the back of the machine, which also carries the model number and original selling price of the machine, ranging from \$139 to \$179. Used value is from a low of \$20 to a high of \$50.

N.C.R. AND R. C. ALLEN CASH REGISTERS

The serial number is located on a small metal tag riveted just above the front edge of the cash drawer. If this has been removed, run the cash drawer all the way out and locate the

release catch at top rear center of the cash drawer. Pull to the rear or lift up and remove the drawer. The serial number should be reproduced on a small metal plate riveted to the bottom of the cash drawer.

REMINGTON CASH REGISTERS

Many different sizes and models. Some have the serial number on a metal plate riveted to the front or rear of the machine. Others have the serial number WRITTEN IN GREASE PENCIL on the bottom of the cash drawer. Tilt the machine on the side to expose the number.

ANSAFONE TELEPHONE ANSWERING DEVICES

There are several models now being used in offices, most of them approximately 11" x 14" x 5", all-metal cased, with a two-tone gray finish. "Ansafone" and "Dictaphone" tags are epoxied to the face of the machine, and the serial number is found on a metal tag riveted to the bottom pan. The tag should bear the Dictaphone company logo, operating voltage, a three-digit model number, and the six-digit or lower serial number. Prices new are from \$375 to \$795, with a used price for the least expensive model around \$225. Any Ansafone device selling for less than \$125 should be considered suspect.

APPENDIX E BIBLIOGRAPHY

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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