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A Brief Look at Crime Rates

"The government is very keen on amassing statistics. They collect them, add them, refer them to the Nth power, take the cube root, and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the... village watchman who just puts down what he damn pleases."

Sir Josiah Stamp

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WHAT ARE CRIME STATISTICS

Crime statistics do not represent the actual incidence of crime. The figures reported by the FBI are reported to the FBI by local police. These in turn represent only those crimes reported to the police by citizens. The FBI calculates a crime rate by dividing the total number of crimes into the city's population as reported in the decennial census. The crimes used by the FBI are murder, robbery, rape, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and auto theft.

A crime becomes a statistic when a citizen calls the police department and a police officer responds and makes a report which gets entered into the statistics of the Department. A crime not reported by a citizen is considered never to have occurred. Yet all studies conducted since 1965 which deal with police records and victimization show that reported crime and actual crime have relatively little relationship -- that the method by which crime statistics are generated is flawed and results in serious under reporting.

For one thing, local police departments have a good deal of leeway in determining if a crime has officially occurred and which category to use in classifying it. For example, all larcenies over \$50 are supposed to be reported as serious crimes and incorporated in the crime index. To decrease the total number of reported larcenies, a department need only change its system of estimating

fight as an Aggravated Assault (a crime which influence's the city's "crime rate") or a simple assault (a crime which does not). Even when officers have the best intentions, they frequently encounter situations in which they know that a crime has been committed, but in which the victim does not want to report it. That crime does not become "a crime."

But by far the most serious problem with crime statistics is that many people simply do not report crimes which they see happen; and many people do not report crimes of which they are the victim. People who believe that crime control is strictly a matter for the police and courts fail to take the one action that they as citizens must take if the police are to have any hope of intervening successfully, that is, make a report. A survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center for the President's Crime Commission attempted to measure the magnitude of unreported crime. It found that only about one-half of the total number of victimizations uncovered by the survey had been reported to the police.

The victim's reluctance to get involved was one of the reasons most frequently cited by people who had not reported. Victimization studies show that the average taxi driver had been robbed about five times. Yet, most report only the first or second offense to the police. Realizing that the situation is hopeless and time con-

suming, they stop reporting. They cannot afford to spend hours off the street filling out police reports and looking through photographs; when the prospects of apprehension and recovery are so small. Thus robberies are not reported, and do not enter the "crime rate."

Some who witness crimes and fail to make a report believe that it is not their responsibility to do so. They were not victimized, so why should they take the initiative and report it to the police.

Fear of reprisal deters many from reporting. Elderly, single women, cripple living in housing projects are common victims of this fear. Neighborhood thieves prey on them, threatening to kill them if they go to the police. Because they are obliged to reside in the area and have no confidence in the justice system's operations, they feel that to report would bring not punishment for wrong-doers but reprisal for them; this fear of revenge is more real and visible than police protection.

Another kind of fear that affects willingness to report is fear of insurance cancellation. People decline to report a loss because they believe their insurance might be cancelled or their rates increased. Merchants whose stores are in high crime areas will prefer to lose a few dollars in a robbery than lose their insurance coverage by claiming the few dollars.

The reason most frequently cited for not calling the police is a resigned belief that efforts are useless. The victim simply accepts his loss as irrevocable. This is particularly true in cases of street robberies or "muggings" when there are no clues. A suspect approaches his victim from behind and yokes him to the ground. Then he removes the victim's wallet or pocketbook before he has the chance to catch a glimpse. A few yards away, the victim recovers most of his personal property and sees no reason to report the theft. The chances of identifying the suspect are minute and the chances of recovery virtually non-existent.

Finally, NORC found that many victims do not notify the police because they are uncertain whether a crime has been committed. For example, a father rapes his young daughter. The girl is young and naive, ignorant of the law and her rights. She doesn't report to the police because she is confused and doesn't understand that her father has done something criminal.

Even if citizens take the initiative in crime reporting, it is not necessarily reflected in crime figures. One study of police reporting practices suggests that police officers tend to disregard about one-quarter of the felonies brought to their attention. Among the factors which affect what police do is the character of the victim, his behavior toward the police, and how much he desires legal action. In this Department prior to implementation

of Commissioner's di Grazia's Maximum Response Plan, we were not responding to 200 calls on each shift. We did not have sufficient officers and cars to cover all calls for assistance. Some undetermined number of these calls were crimes, which because there was no response, were unrecorded. Now they are crimes in our statistics as well as in fact.

Criminologists and other students of crime have been complaining for years about the weaknesses of the UCR. The Crime Commission of 1967 recommended that the UCR be supplemented with periodic victimization surveys -- a far more reliable method of measuring the actual incidence of crime. Finally, this year victimization surveys are beginning.

The program conducted by the Census Bureau will be divided into two parts. The first part of the survey will be nationwide and will involve the questioning of 60,000 households and 13,000 businesses at six month intervals. Every six months, one-seventh of the panel will be dropped and a new selection will replace them. The first results will compare crime levels throughout the country for a given period of time, and based on this will show the crime rates for the nation and four regions. In addition, this report will produce data on the race, age and sex of victims of certain crimes and when and where these crimes are most likely to occur.

The second part of the program will be dedicated to providing consistent data on major cities. In each city residents in 10,000 households and 2,000 businesses will be asked about their crime experiences. The value of this effort will not be its recording of actual crime incidence although this will be a good deal more valid than the UCR's. Its real value will be in determining actual trends within each city over time. There is, however, one caution. The early surveys show, as all victimization surveys have, that actual crime incidence is a good deal higher than the total of crimes reported to the police.

REPORTED AND UNREPORTED CRIME

	Incidents reported by police and published by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports	Estimated crime incidents pro- jected from im- pact Cities Crime Survey
<u>By Offenses</u>		
Total all Offenses	409,208	913,900
Rape	3,090	6,600
Aggrevated assault	24,095	37,600
Robbery	34,274	78,100
Burglary	119,984	325,600
Larceny \$50+	60,714	140,700
Larceny \$50	101,085	259,500
Auto theft	85,966	65,700
<u>By City</u>		
Total all Cities	409,208	913,900
Atlanta	42,104	98,700
Baltimore	69,554	151,100
Cleveland	48,921	118,900
Dallas	64,876	166,500
Denver	47,704	139,800
Newark	35,423	493,300
Portland (Ore.)	35,736	93,700
St. Louis	64,890	95,800

The surveys have the potential therefore of being shocking to a public already concerned about crime. What is important is that people realized that when victimization studies show that there is more robbery, more larceny, and more rape than has been previously reported, they are not saying that these crimes are on the rampage.

Why Crime Rates Increase

Because our techniques of measuring the incidence of crime have been so crude, with fifty, even sixty-five percent margins of error, decreases or increases in crime rates cannot be interpreted. There is no way of knowing whether they reflect actual increases or changes of other kinds. There are a number of causes for increases in the statistical rates of crime:

1. Real Increase:

The most obvious cause is actual increases. Homicide is the best example since it is the most highly reported crime. No one can doubt that the number of homicides increased last year in Boston.

2. Changes in Reporting Systems:

One of the most common rate increases is caused by changes in police department reporting systems. Departments which have improved their field reporting systems, making it easier for patrolmen to report more accurately, have had statistical increases in crime. (This, incidentally, can be expected here with the radical reform in our field reporting system to be implemented this year.) Other changes which can affect the crime rates are improvements in the records and data processing systems, both of which have been occurring here throughout 1973, and will continue in 1974.

3. Changes in Citizen Complaint System:

Cities which have adopted a 911 reporting system, making it easier for citizens to report crimes, have experienced sizeable increases in citizen calls for service and a corresponding increases in reported crimes. Boston adopted a 911 system in November 1972, and since then, calls for service have doubled. Some of those are crimes which in the past would have been unreported.

4. Confidence in Police:

Another common experience shared by police departments taken over by "reform administrations" is that crime rates increase sharply immediately after the "reform administration" takes hold. Commissioner di Grazia has become a highly visible figure in the city; his determination to improve police services seems to have become widely understood. If so, a feeling in the city that the Department wants to respond to people's calls for service, wants people to report crimes would affect the rates of crime.

5. Changes in Citizen Reporting Habits:

It is understood by students of crime rates that citizen reporting habits change. Generally these changes occur gradually as a result of cultural changes. But, in principle, they could occur rapidly. There seems to be no other way of accounting for the sudden increase in rape statistics in virtually every large city. What appears to be happening is that women are less reluctant to report the

crime, police departments are becoming more skillful and sensitive in dealing with victims, rape crisis centers are encouraging reporting, and the crime is being rapidly redefined.

6. Improvement in Management of Calls:

Last spring when the Department was planning the Maximum Response Plan, we learned that we were "losing" as many as 600 calls a day. That is, up to 600 citizens who wanted police cars to respond to their emergency situations were not getting through to the Department to request cars or were not getting cars because there weren't enough cars and officers on the streets. The Department has made great progress in picking up those "lost calls." If six percent of them are crimes -- this is the percentage of total calls received by the Department which are actual Part I crimes -- it would account for an increase of 36 crimes a day, or a 16 percent increase.

Boston and Other Cities

The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting gives a nationwide view of crime based on statistics contributed by local police. It is quite common for cities to compare themselves to other cities of similar population. The underlying premise is that causes of crime are the same wherever crime occurs. But we must be cautious in comparing information of individual communities solely based on population similarity. Population is only one

of many factors which may affect a crime rate. Some of many other conditions are: reporting practices, density and size of the community population and the metropolitan area, economic status and mores, population stability including commuting and seasonal variations, climate, educational, recreational, and religious characteristics, strength of the police, policies of the prosecuting officials and courts, and correctional practices.

Basing of crime rates merely on population is weak. Cities are of very different sizes. Boston has 45 square miles; Memphis, with our approximate population size, has 245, New Orleans 365, and Honolulu 610. Those with larger areas have less of an urban core population and are freer from crimes that plague the inner core cities. Density is a factor, as are rates of automobile ownership, population ages, rates on in-migration, income levels, housing quality, unemployment rates and a hundred other variables which, in a valid intercity comparison, would be held constant.

The Uniform Crime rates are statistical abstractions because likelihood of victimization depends on personal circumstances. An offense may occur at a very low rate per 100,000 total population, but, a very restricted segment of the population may actually be severely threatened by that crime. And of course the likelihood of a rape is at least twice as high for women because men are not potential victims.

Police and Crime

The police responsibility for crime control is the most familiar and widely understood aspect of the police function. Traditionally, it has been seen as analogous to doctors' responsibility for illness. In the medical professions, the doctors' responsibility for illness is understood. They are expected to diagnose problems since diseases have been classified and their symptoms are known. They can make the decisions about whether to hospitalize, what drugs to use, whether a specialist is needed, whether an operation is required since treatment programs are known and proven.

In the police field, responsibility for crime is far more difficult to pin down. Police are not called upon to diagnose, treatment methods are not available to them; indeed, there is so little knowledge and so little experimentation and testing that police responses to crime are primitive and general.

Yet although police are expected to "do something about crime," doctors are never expected to "do something about illness." (Nor for that matter are firemen held accountable for fires, welfare workers for poverty, or school teachers for learning problems.) No one would dream of holding doctors responsible for being unable to cure cancer or a cold; it is well understood that cures have not been discovered. Police, on the other hand, are expected to accept responsibility for "crime," as general a concept as illness, even though far less is known about "illness."

In discussing police responsibility for crime, therefore, the first point which must be made is that "crime" is not a very useful concept. In the first place, crime means different things to people who use the word. An innercity merchant, for example, is concerned about daytime robbery and nighttime burglary, while to a suburban merchant, the prospects of robbery seem very small, but shoplifting, employee theft, and bad checks are very real problems. Assault and robbery are most on the mind of a ghetto resident, while apartment burglary and auto theft are the problems which concern Back Bay students.

There are thousands of criminal violations on the statute books, and the only thing they have in common is that some legislative body decided that the act should be criminal and that some police agency should have responsibility for enforcing the prohibitions. Yet no one is concerned equally about all crimes -- tax fraud, vagrancy, gambling, monopolistic practices, traffic violations. Crimes are committed by different kinds of people, under different sets of conditions; and are treated by the public and police with different senses of urgency.

There are striking variations even within the same crime. A wife who kills her husband and then calls the police is not fearful to the public which reads in the morning paper about the crime. The public is generally unconcerned about gang warfare, no matter how many gangsters

are killed, and how many go unpunished. But the public cares deeply about the schoolteacher raped and murdered in her apartment; that appears to be a more immediate threat.

Auto theft, particularly high in Boston, is another example of a crime which should be parsed, not considered as a single phenomenon. The teenager who steals a car for joyriding is committing a crime quite different from the gang who steal it for stripping parts; and that in turn is different from the organized crime theft of certain kinds of automobiles which are repainted and transported elsewhere for sale.

A great number of efforts have been made by police agencies, the FBI, and criminologists to classify crimes into victimless crime, predatory crime, white collar crime, crimes against property, Part I and Part II crimes, etc. But these efforts have largely failed to affect public perceptions, and help people make rational distinctions between crimes which concern them and those which don't, crimes which are preventable and those which aren't, crimes for which police can be held accountable, and those for which they cannot.

The failure to distinguish among crimes is a source of exaggerated fear on the part of the public, and a source of frustration for police departments earnestly attempting to cope with crimes. The public wants to hold their police departments accountable for suppressing

crime. Police are seen as capable of dealing successfully with all kinds of crime. They are under intense public scrutiny and political pressure fed by monthly release of statistics which report to show that crime has increased four, ten, twenty percent. And they are seen as falling behind, losing the "war against crime," leaving the public unprotected against the "criminal element."

These efforts to force on the police responsibilities for which their powers are limited have all sorts of consequences. For example, police attach an exaggerated sense of importance to a responsibility, "crime control," which in reality comprises only a fraction, perhaps fifteen percent, of what the public asks them to do. They are frustrated by their inability to devote more of their time to the crime control function; and attach far less importance to the non-criminal functions which demand most of their time.

Attempts to hold police responsible for things they cannot do result in cyclical efforts by police departments to "clamp down" on crime, use of saturation and aggressive patrol in high crime areas which often are those areas in which the police can least afford the abrasive consequences of aggressive patrol. They lead to internal efforts to force unattainable crime control responsibilities on personnel -- threatening officers with bad performance ratings if they do not make more arrests.

These efforts to force on the police responsibility for matters beyond their control are not limited to outside agencies. Indeed, during the past decade, it has been police administrators who have made the most exaggerated promises of crime control. In the face of rising public concern about crime translated into political pressure on the police, administrators have found it necessary to reduce that pressure by promising results they cannot achieve. Thus the mortality rate of chief administrators has risen, police departments have been disingenuous in their reporting, and the public frustrations has increased.

But these efforts have not been entirely motivated by politics. No police administrator reading the Monday morning reports of crimes committed over the weekend or facing the television cameras after a particularly vicious crime can be immune from the sense of need to do "something". But in the face of such emotion, it has been difficult for police to level with the public about the limitations on their ability to control crime. It has appeared easier to cling to the traditional beliefs that more resources would mean less crime, more patrols less criminal opportunity, more detectives fewer unsolved cases. It is that assumption -- that the problem is one of resources and that adequately "armed", the police can win the war against crime -- that we are contesting.

None of this is meant to imply that the police have no responsibility for crime; it is rather meant to be a plea for exploring in greater depth and more thoughtfulness the nature of that responsibility. It has been argued that the responsibility is far broader and more complex than we have before understood -- the traditional "investigation and apprehension" formula is far too simplistic. The police responsibilities in dealing with crime range from providing a sense of security which deals with people's fear of crime, to reducing opportunities for commission of crimes, to detecting through intelligence and investigations crimes before they occur, to investigating offenses after they occur, to responding to citizens who have been victimized in order to reassure them, to recovering property lost in crimes.

This list, although not complete, does illustrate one principle -- that the police have some responsibilities for some forms of criminal activity that they do not have for others. For example, while they can be held responsible for identifying and locating people who commit homicides, they cannot be held responsible for preventing homicides, most of which occur inside, behind closed doors, between people who are related or know each other.

We can illustrate this by examining each of the seven Part One crimes to see how much police can be expected to do:

Homicide

In 1972, there were about 18,520 reported murders in the United States. This represents about two percent of the total of violent crime and less than one-half percent of the total seven Index offenses. The number of murders increased five percent in 1972 over 1971. The victims of murder in 1972 were male in about four out of five cases. Forty-five percent of the victims were white, fifty-three percent were Black, and two percent were other races. The largest number of victims were between 20 and 29 years of age.

In 1972, as in previous years, handguns were used for most murders. Nationwide 66 percent of homicides were committed with firearms, 54 percent were committed with handguns. Cutting or stabbing accounted for 19 percent of the murders committed in the nation. The northeastern states reported the greatest number of deaths in this category, 29 percent.

The circumstances which result in murder range from family arguments to felonious acts. Criminal homicide is largely a social problem beyond the control of the police. In 1972, murder within the family made up about one-fourth of all murder offenses. Over one-half of these were spouse killing spouse, and the remainder were parents killing children and others in family killing. Felony murder, killings that result from the commission of another crime, constituted 22 percent of all homicides. Romantic triangles, lovers quarrels and other known relationships constituted about 46 percent of all homicides.

Police close a greater percentage of homicides than any other offense; in 1972, the police solved about 82 percent of all homicides committed.

Aggravated Assault

Aggravated assault is an unlawful attack by one person on another person for the purposes of inflicting severe bodily injury usually accompanied by a weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.

In 1972, there were about 388,650 reported cases of aggravated assault. This represents about seven percent of the Part I Index offenses, and about 47 percent of the Index crimes of violence.

Once again, the police have little effect on the crime. As with homicides most aggravated assaults occur within family units and among neighbors and acquaintances. The ability of police to intervene in a dispute which typically occurs indoors between relatives or friends is limited to those to which, as in family disputes, they are called by a disputant or neighbor.

Police "solved" 66 out of 100 cases that came to their attention. This high solution is in line with high solution rates in other crime against the person. Persons under 18 years of age were identified in 11 percent of these clearances. Arrests usually result from the response of patrol units. This type of patrol call is hazardous to the responding officers. Since 1963, 103 police officers have lost their lives responding to disturbance type calls.

Forcible Rape

Forcible rape, carnal knowledge of a female through the use of force or the threat of force, includes assaults to commit rape, but not statutory rape (without force).

In 1972, there were 46,430 reported forcible rapes. Forcible rape is less than one percent of the Crime Index rate. It represents about six percent of the crimes of violence. Large core cities with a population of over 250,000 counted for 44 percent of the nation's rapes. Forcible rape increased nine percent in this group of cities and 18 percent in the suburbs surrounding the core.

Forcible rapes are most frequently committed in locations not readily visible to patrol personnel, within residences, enclosed courtyards, cars, heavily wooded areas. Frequently, the victim and assailant are friends or family members who spend considerable amounts of time together.

Traditionally, rape has been one of the most under-reported offenses because of the fear and embarrassment associated with it. The stigma that it produces affects both the personal and public life of the victim, and police and defense attorneys have been relatively insensitive to this. In the past few years, police officials have realized the need to reach the victims of rape. To do so, many departments have established special rape crisis units staffed by policewomen trained in sympathetic approaches to the problem, and are participating in rape

crisis centers, which victims can go or call immediately after rape has been committed. This new sympathetic approach, combined with a growing independence of women, probably account for the huge increases in reported rape.

Robbery

Robbery is taking of property from a person by use or threat of force with or without a weapon. There were 374,560 reported robberies in 1972. This represents six percent of the total Crime Index rate but 45 percent of the violent index rate. Large core cities reported a seven percent decrease in robbery offenses in 1972, compared to 1971 volume. Robbery is primarily a large city crime. American cities with a population of over 250,000 accounted for two-thirds of all robberies in the United States in 1972.

Robbery may be more susceptible to police action than the other crimes just discussed. There is little reason to believe that preventive patrol-- police simply cruising in automobiles -- is effective in dealing with robberies. There is no reason whatever to believe that robberies which occur indoors can be affected by police presence. But new alarm systems, street anti-

crime units, special robbery squad specializing in quick response, careful crime analysis all may be effective in dealing with robbery.

Burglary

Burglary, the unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft, was reported 2,345,000 times in 1972. This was a decrease over the year 1971. The large core cities represented 35 percent of the total burglary figure. It is a crime of both planning and opportunity. It is committed by amateurs and professionals alike. Prevention and detection of the offense by police must take account of the crimes complexity. The major detection problem is the sheer volume of burglaries, and in 1972, departments closed only 19 percent of the cases reported.

Police action against burglary centers on public education. In recent years, police departments have taken steps to inform the public of ways to protect themselves from burglary. These steps range from programs such as "operation identification", marking property with the owner's social security number, and, "secure and lock" instructing business merchants in the safest and securest locks for their stores.

Larceny

Larceny, the unlawful taking or stealing of property or articles of value without the use of violence, force, or fraud, includes shoplifting, pocket-picking, purse snatching. In the Uniform Crime Reporting program it does not include embezzlement, forgery, fraud, and "con-games". Before 1974, only larceny over \$50 was included. In 1972, there were 1,837,800 reported larcenies over \$50, 31 percent of the total crime index.

The nature of larceny, a crime of opportunity, sneak thievery, petty unobserved thefts and very few clues, make it extremely difficult for police to prevent or solve this crime. The absence of witnesses and volume of the crime work in the offenders' favor. Only 20 percent of all larceny reported in 1972 were solved.

Auto Theft

Auto theft is defined as the unlawful taking or stealing of a motor vehicle, including attempts. In 1972, there were 881,000 reported auto thefts, a six percent decrease over 1971.

Police were able to clear 17 percent of the auto thefts reported. This comes about by very sophisticated patrol techniques. Officers, with the use of computers, are now able to spot and confirm auto thefts whereas they once had to rely exclusively on their own intuition. In addition, auto theft prevention campaigns, sponsored by insurance companies, are reminding citizens to lock cars and take other actions.

Auto theft is a crime committed by young boys. In 1972, about 54 percent of all auto theft arrests were of juveniles under the age of 18; and when persons under the age of 21 are added to the group, the figure increased to about 72 percent.

Traditionally, the police have used three major weapons against these seven crimes -- responding to citizen calls for service, maintaining a "police presence" through patrol, and investigating suspicious circumstances. The first of these, responding quickly to calls, has been a major reason for departments' maintenance of highly motorized forces of patrolmen, cruising the city. The ability of police to come quickly to the assistance of someone being attacked because there is always a car nearby which can respond within minutes, increases the potential of intervention and apprehension. There is no question about the importance of quick response to citizen emergency calls, although its contribution to crime solution is now being questioned nearly everywhere.

The second major weapon of the police has been "preventive patrol," the maintenance of a visible police presence which deters people from committing crimes because they have the impression that they may be seen and apprehended. If this was ever fully believed in the field, that patrol deters crime, it is quickly disappearing as a rational defense for patrol. Its place is being taken by the belief that the public is reassured by the visible presence of police officers in cars, available for calls.

A third major weapon, investigating suspicious circumstances, varies in importance from city to city. In some cities, police officers keep records of stores which have been victimized and drive by them repeatedly during their shifts. In others, where there is a high continuity of assignment, officers know their beats so well that any unusual circumstance is noticed by them. In still others, aggressive patrol has been widely used to "harrass" suspicious people and potential law-breakers. This latter technique raises difficult questions about people's rights to be left alone and the police department's stake in maintaining good relationship with the kinds of people who get harrassed in aggressive patrol.

What is emerging from a rejection of these traditional gross techniques of dealing with all crimes by a single action -- patrol -- are far more sophisticated strategies being adopted by police departments for dealing selectively with crimes. Ignoring crimes which are impervious to

police prevention, departments are taking on street robberies and assaults with imaginative use of disguised police officers. New York's Citywide Anti-Crime Unit is the best and most successful example. It is this example we are following in creation of Boston's Anti-Crime Unit.

The Anti-Crime Unit, now in final stages of planning with implementation scheduled for the spring, will concentrate on street crimes by putting into the areas where crimes are occurring (determined by continuously monitored and analyzed) teams of men disguised as street people, delivery men, taxi drivers, mailmen, -- to apprehend people who commit crimes. By blending into the public, being "invisible," police officers will witness crimes being committed, and take action. As in New York, over a period, the street robber will become gradually uncertain whether the derelict, the street cleaner, the old man are not in fact police officers in disguise.

A second large activity, already underway, concentrates on crime prevention and public education. Some months ago the Department established a Crime Prevention Unit to help educate the public about protection of property and person. Much of the crime against property is the result of carelessness of victims -- doors left open, keys left under doormats, cars left unlocked with keys in the ignition, garage doors left open, mail and newspapers

piled up, and other careless acts that leave people vulnerable.

The Department's Crime Prevention Unit attempts to show how to make homes and businesses less vulnerable to criminals. It conducts surveys of individual businesses to show owners exactly what can be done to reduce the chances of their becoming crime statistics. It offers information on how to avoid being caught in situations where people become victims of personal crime.

Conclusion

One final word is required, although it may be an obvious point. In showing that police ability to control crime is limited, we are most certainly not saying that they are unimportant. What we are saying is that the crime control conception of the police is a narrow, unrealistic, unachievable, and fundamentally wrong view of the police. It is well-known that police spend about 80 percent of their time performing services which are unrelated or marginally related to crime control. The traditional view is that if the police could be divested of these services, they would be able to concentrate full attention on their "true function," crime control.

What we are saying is that even if the police department could spend 100 percent of its time on "crime control," there are inherent, inescapable limitations

on its abilities to control crime. But just as important, those other things the police are called upon to perform are important, vital public services for which people have a right to call their police department. Some of them belong to the police by tradition; others belong to the police because they cannot be performed by other agencies; others belong to the police because the police department is the only 24-hour a day social service delivery agency. Regardless of the reason, they are police responsibilities, and should be regarded as such by public and police.

This Department is attempting to embrace the full range of police responsibilities. This theme runs through public statements of the Commissioner; it is a principle of the new recruit training program; it is a motivating force in the new performance evaluation project.

This attempt to provide the services for which the people of Boston call upon their Police Department seems to us the realistic and responsible thing to do.

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