


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Evaluation

Report on Investigative Effectiveness —  
A Comparison of Three Investigative Models

PREPARED BY *Cincinnati Police Dept*  
COM-SEC EVALUATION SECTION  
AND  
THE URBAN INSTITUTE

7-10-74

# CITY OF CINCINNATI

DATE 7/10/74

INTERDEPARTMENT CORRESPONDENCE SHEET

TO Lt. Robert L. Pope, Acting Commander, Program Management Bureau

FROM Lt. Robert J. Heinlein, COMSEC Evaluation Section Commander

COPIES TO Mr. Al Schwartz, Dr. Sumner Clarren, Urban Institute

SUBJECT REPORT ON INVESTIGATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

Attached is the investigative effectiveness report which has been prepared in collaboration with the Urban Institute. Mr. Lind has indicated that he would like a copy sent to him at home so that he can review it before it goes to the Chief. Since the Chief has not yet seen it, distribution has been restricted to only the parties listed above.

*RJH*  
RJH:ft

## INVESTIGATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN CINCINNATI

The Cincinnati Police Division conducted an experiment between March, 1973 - January, 1974 to determine whether organizational structure had a measurable impact on investigative effectiveness. During that period the Police Division operated three "models":

Team Policing - District 1 was organized around six geographical sectors. Officers with investigative skills were assigned to each sector "team". Under District 1's COMSEC plan, all officers were to be encouraged to perform investigative functions. District 1 had responsibility for all crimes except Homicide.

Decentralized District - Officers with investigative skills were assigned to District 5 and operated as a specialized unit within the district. The investigative function was organized by the nature of the crime - investigators were assigned to deal with either crimes against property or crimes against persons. District investigators had responsibility for all crimes except Homicide.

Centralized Investigation (C.I.S.) - The other four districts were supported by Cincinnati's Centralized Investigative Section. That section consisted of specialized sub-units (Drugs, Vice, Burglary, Homicide, Youth Aid, Robbery and Documents). The centralized unit was the "standard mode" of investigation - the other two models were seen as "experiments".

The findings presented in this report were derived from two sources. The Division's COMSEC evaluation team collected and organized data from Division records to determine shifts in statistics which might reflect changes in investigative effectiveness. This data was taken from District keybooks for the entire year of 1973.

The statistical findings were supplemented by interviews conducted by Urban Institute personnel in March and April of 1974. At that time, portions of C.I.S. had been decentralized due to the January reorganization. Those officers interviewed in March showed markedly different attitudes from officers still assigned to C.I.S. Central. Consequently, this evaluation reports the attitudes of four groups of officers. In all, 47 officers were personally interviewed. They were chosen as being especially knowledgeable about the investigative function in their respective units of assignment.

TABLE 1  
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS FOR EACH MODEL

District 1	District 5	C. I. S.	
		Centralized	District
N = 13	N = 8	N = 12	N = 14

Major Findings

The District 1 Team Policing model showed the best overall level of effectiveness during the experimental period. This is best seen in the clearance by arrest rate and in the overall clearance rate, both of which were highest for District 1. To a large extent, this success can be attributed to the District 1 patrol force.

When only investigative functions are considered, however, it was the District 5 model which exhibited the best results. The major statistical finding was that the clearance rate for cases requiring investigative follow-up was highest in this model. This ranking was supported both by other statistical measurements and by the opinions of the officers interviewed. In situations where the respondents could not choose their own model, the great majority preferred the District 5 model.

The third major finding was that the ideal investigative model, as pictured by the investigators interviewed, would involve a district assignment for most investigators. Other components of the model would be a team policing set-up for patrol functions and a central coordinating agency for handling specialized cases and for disseminating information.

A Critique of the Experiment

The three models are not completely comparable either in geography, population served, or responsibility. To some extent, this can be adjusted for by comparing each model with its own baseline period two months prior to the start of the experiment.

More crucial were some unique factors in District 1. First, District 1 had responsibility for a broader range of crimes than District 5, making workload comparisons impossible. Second, and most important, the District 1 model was never fully realized. Training for patrolmen in investigative skills was not available until June of 1973. Even then, the stress upon "quality performance" discouraged young patrolmen from following through with too many investigations on their own, so that investigations remained the responsibility of a skilled few on most teams. The District 1 model was actually a further decentralization of skilled investigators to the team level. The "generalist" officer model was never tested. At present, it appears that the existing structure consists of "generalist teams" composed of officers with specific skills.

Changes in Crime

Many factors influence reported crime. Reported crime represents part of the workload of the police - a portion of which requires investigative follow-up. Dr. Clifford Marshall of the Urban Institute compared the first 6 months of the experiment with a compar-

able period in 1973 to determine what changes were larger than one would expect by chance<sup>1</sup>. These are reported in Table 2 (see following page).

From Table 2 it is clear that no experimental district shows changes which out-strip other comparable areas. Similar positive changes appear in District 7 (which received C.I.S. support) and District 1.

Overall Effectiveness

In Cincinnati, the preliminary investigation has traditionally been performed by a patrol officer. Moreover, patrol officers may make on-site apprehensions. Consequently, the effectiveness of any district in solving crimes is the result of the combined efforts of both the investigators and patrol officers. The district clearance by arrest rate is one measure of overall effectiveness<sup>2</sup> (see Table 3).

TABLE 3  
CLEARANCE BY ARREST RATE<sup>2</sup>

	District 1*	District 5	Other Districts
Baseline Period (Jan - Feb)	18.7%	13.5%	16.6%
Experimental Period (Mar - Dec)	24.4%	15.5%	16.2%

District 1's team policing model shows the highest clearance by arrest rate, and the highest net gain during the experimental period. Likewise, District 1's total clearance rate is higher than that of the other areas. This higher level of effectiveness is apparent even after arrests made by store security guards are systematically excluded from consideration as in Table 3 above.

As might be expected, most investigators felt their model was most effective. The exception was C.I.S. personnel now assigned in the districts (see Table 4).

<sup>1</sup> Working Draft, "an elementary statistical analysis of pre and post COMSEC offense data", June 21, 1974.

<sup>2</sup> Clearance by arrest rate =  $\frac{\# \text{ Clearances by Arrest}}{\# \text{ Part I Crimes Reported}}$

\* Arrests by store security guards are not included.

TABLE 2

REPORTED CRIME BY TYPE AND DISTRICT

Test Statistic Z

Region

Crime Type	Region							
	Dist 1	Outside Dist 1	Entire City	Dist 3	Dist 4	Dist 5	Dist 6	Dist 7
Rape		↓	↓					
Robbery		↓ H	↓ H		↓ H	↓ H	↓	↓
Aggravated Assault								
Burglary	↓ H	↑		↑ H	↑ H	↑		↓
Larceny (over \$50)	↑	↑ H	↑ H	↑ H	↑		↑ H	
Larceny (under \$50)		↓ H	↓ H			↓	↓ H	
Auto Theft		↓ H	↓ H			↓	↓	↓ H
Total Index <sup>1</sup>	↓				↑		↓	↓ H
Minor (other) Assault	↑ H	↑ H	↑ H	↑ H	↑ H			↑ H
Total Part I <sup>2</sup>				↑ H	↑ H			↓
Total Part II	↓			↑ H	↓			
Grand Total <sup>2</sup>				↑ H				

1. Does not include Homicide

2. Does not include Homicide or Negligent Manslaughter.

LEGEND:

- Blank space indicates no significant change.
- ↓ Indicates a decrease when the first 6 months are compared with a comparable period 1 year earlier (p<.05, two-tailed test).
- ↓ H Indicates a highly significant decrease (p<.01).
- ↑ Indicates an increase (p<.05).
- ↑ H Indicates a highly significant increase (p<.01).

TABLE 4

OFFICER'S REPORTED EFFECTIVENESS

	District 1	District 5	C. I. S. Centralized	C. I. S. in District
% who saw own model as most effective	62%	100%	92%	21%

Investigators also felt they were given little information about other units so that comparisons were difficult to make.

To some extent the clearance rates for districts (again excluding clearances due to arrests by security guards) may be inflated. Clearance rates are reported in Table 5.

TABLE 5

CLEARANCE FOR TOTAL PART I CRIMES

	District 1	District 5	Districts with C.I.S.
District Clearance Rate - baseline (Jan - Feb)	30.5%	34.7%	41.2%
District Clearance Rate (Mar - Dec)	48.7%	40.2%	31.3%

Fifty-one percent of the investigators interviewed felt that the models were not accurately portrayed by the statistics. Another 13% were not sure. Table 6 gives those reasons given by officers for their opinions (see following page).

Effectiveness of Investigative Follow-up

To a large extent, District 1's high clearance by arrest rate is due to apprehensions and arrests made on the same day as the crime was reported. In this study, any apprehension made on the same date as the crime was reported was called a "Patrol Arrest". If the arrest was made later, it was termed an arrest which required investigative follow-up (see Table 7).

TABLE 6

Why does the Division look better or worse on paper than is actually the case?

REASON	# of Responses
District 1 has more people, making a higher arrest rate easier.	4
District 1 gets credit for arrests by security guards.	4
The Division data is distorted by misuse of multiple-closures (exceptional clearances).	4
C.I.S. takes credit away from districts.	2
C.I.S. has more difficult cases.	2
All crimes are not reported to the police.	2
District 1 can control what the figures show.	1
District 5 gets credit for arrests made at U.C.	1
District 5 is blamed for crime at U.C.	1
District 1 crime is more difficult.	1
District 1 does not properly report youth problems.	1
	<u>23</u>

TABLE 7

CLEARANCE BY PATROL ARREST RATE FOR PART I CRIMES\*

	District 1	District 5	Districts with C.I.S.
Jan - Feb	9.5%	5.8%	9.0%
March - Dec	20.6%	8.0%	11.3%

\*Definition -  $\frac{\# \text{ of Cases Closed by Patrol Arrest}}{\# \text{ of Part I Crimes}}$

Keeping in mind that the activities of a model's patrol force affects its investigators, we can sharpen our focus to consider strictly investigative functions. We have chosen three indices of investigative effectiveness to illustrate differences among the three models. The first is the clearance by arrest rate due to investigative follow-up. Examination of these figures (see Table 8) shows that, while all three models exhibited a decline since the baseline period, District 5 out-performed its rivals in both periods.

TABLE 8

% OF CASES CLEARED BY ARREST DUE TO INVESTIGATIVE FOLLOW-UP\* (PART I CRIMES)

	District 1	District 5	Districts with C.I.S.
Jan - Feb	5.2%	7.7%	7.6%
March - Dec	3.8%	7.5%	4.9%

\*Definition -  $\frac{\# \text{ of Cases Closed by Investigative Arrest}}{\# \text{ of Part I Crimes}}$

Another important measure of investigative effectiveness is proportion of investigative workload cleared by investigative arrest. Rather than the above-mentioned arrest rate which has as its base all Part I offenses, this measure considers only investigative workload. Investigative workload consists of all Part I crimes

with the exception of those closed by patrol arrest. In a sense, the offenses represent these offenses which require follow-up investigation. A glance at Table 9 shows that while the COMSEC and C.I.S. models showed some deterioration, District 5 held steady at 8.2%.

TABLE 9  
CLEARANCE BY INVESTIGATIVE ARREST  
AS A PROPORTION OF INVESTIGATIVE WORKLOAD\*

	District 1	District 5	Districts with C.I.S.
Jan - Feb	6.4%	8.2%	8.3%
March - Dec	5.5%	8.2%	5.7%

\*Definition -  $\frac{\# \text{ of Cases Closed by Investigative Arrest}}{\# \text{ Part I Crimes} - \# \text{ Clearance by Patrol Arrest Crimes}}$

The final measure of investigative effectiveness is the ratio of clearances to arrests for investigative follow-ups. Ideally, every closure made by an investigator would be by arrest. The closer to 1.0 that this ratio is, the better is the approximation to this ideal. By this standard, both District 5 and the centralized model have done rather well (Table 10).

TABLE 10  
CLEARANCES PER ARREST FOR INVESTIGATIVE FOLLOW-UP\*

	District 1	District 5	Districts with C.I.S.
Jan - Feb	4.0	3.7	4.2
March - Dec	7.4	4.3	4.0

\*Definition -  $\frac{\text{Closures by Investigative Arrest and Exceptional Clearances}}{\text{Closures by Investigative Arrest}}$

This statistical focus on investigative effectiveness was supported by the interview findings. As noted above, when asked to pick the "best" model, most respondents chose their own model. If we look further however, we can make some more tentative conclusions (Table 11).

TABLE 11

Q: "Which investigative model do you feel was doing the best job considering the overall investigative effectiveness?"

Model Doing "Best Job"	Model To Which Respondent Was Assigned							
	District 1		District 5		CIS "Central"		Districts with CIS	
	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%
District 1	8	61.5	-	-	-	-	1	7.1
District 5	2	15.4	8	100.0	1	8.3	9	57.1
C.I.S.	-	-	-	-	11	91.6	3	21.4
Other (don't know, etc.)	3	23.1	-	-	-	-	1	7.1
TOTAL	13		8		12		14	

The first striking point is the near-unanimity of opinion among District 5 and C.I.S. "Central" respondents. Both groups felt very strongly that their own model was "best". If the breakdown of C.I.S. respondents is any indication, previously centralized investigators quickly adopt a new viewpoint when exposed to a situation involving more decentralization. In fact, of the above four groups, only the decentralized C.I.S. respondents chose a model other than their own.

The other significant finding is that among those who did not choose their own model, District 5 was the most frequently mentioned. Of 17 interviewees who chose a model other than their own (or didn't know which was best) 71% (12) chose the District 5 model. The reasons given for the various choices are listed below (Table 12).

TABLE 12

Q: "What contributed to the superiority of the model that the respondent said was doing the best job."

Most Important Factor	Model Chosen As Doing Best Job					(N)	%
	District 1	District 5	C.I.S.	Other	Total		
Training	4	3	2	1	10	21.3	
Experienced Officers	2	5	5	1	13	27.7	
Organizational Structure	3	7	6	-	16	34.0	
Supervisors	-	5	1	2	8	17.0	

Part II Crimes

The primary focus of this report has been on Part I crime. There are two reasons for this. First, Part I offenses are generally considered to be "more serious" than are Part II offenses. Secondly, a Part II offense is only entered into the keybook when an arrest is made. Therefore, it is impossible to determine what level of investigation was necessary for closure. Table 13 shows the number of arrests in two Part II categories for the 12-month periods prior to and immediately after the implementation of COMSEC in March, 1973.

TABLE 13

PART II ARRESTS

	District 1		District 5		Others	
	Pre*	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
Drug Arrests	251	376	125	157	599	624
Total Vice Arrests**	1047	913	310	388	1319	1405

\* Pre COMSEC period was 3/72 - 2/73; Post COMSEC period was 3/73 - 2/74

\*\*Total Vice Arrests include those for prostitution and commercialized vice, narcotic drug laws, gambling, and liquor law violations.

Table 14 yields some insight into the relative effectiveness of handling specialized types of investigations. Respondents were asked to rank, on a 5-point scale, how their model did on these specialized cases.

TABLE 14

Q: "How did your model do compared to other models with vice cases, drug cases, fraud and document cases, and youth aid cases?"

Model	Type of Case			
	Vice	Drug	Frauds	Youth Aid
District 1	4.3	4.2	3.2	3.1
District 5	2.9	2.6	3.0	3.5
C.I.S.	3.5	4.0	4.3	3.3

Scale

(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)
Much Better Job	Better Job	Similar Job	Worse Job	Much Worse Job

The Ideal Investigative Model

The final questions of the interview dealt with the preferred investigative model. The respondents were asked to list the components of the "ideal" investigative model. The results are listed below in Table 15.

TABLE 15

Component	# of Responses
1. Train patrolmen as investigators	3
2. Eliminate most specialized units.	1
3. Give patrolmen responsibility for follow-up.	3
4. Team policing.	15
5. District assignment for investigators	29
a. With separate investigative supervision.	2
b. Responsible to District Commander.	2
6. Drug cases as an exception.	1
7. Homicides as an exception.	8
8. Collators for coordination.	1
9. C.I.S. as it was (good image).	6
10. Mini-Tac Units for coordination.	2
11. Different organizational structure for different areas.	2
12. Document Squad centralized.	1
13. COMSEC as it is.	2

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MODELS

Officers critiqued their own models describing the strengths and weaknesses of each model. Table 14.1 contains the advantages mentioned by officers, grouped by the investigator's assignment. Table 14.2 lists weaknesses mentioned by investigators in describing their own models. The ideal investigative model follows naturally from these observations of current practice.

TABLE 14.1  
ADVANTAGES OF  
INVESTIGATIVE MODELS

	Dist. One	Dist. Five	C.I.S. District	C.I.S. Central
<b>Patrolman - Investigator Interactions</b>				
1. Cooperation, rapport	3	5	1	1
2. Continuing Exchange of information	2	2	0	0
3. Credit to patrolman for case closures	1	2	0	0
<hr/>				
<b>Patrolman - Performance of Investigative functions</b>				
1. Partial performance of all functions	1	0	0	0
2. Complete performance of some functions	1	0	0	0
3. Complete performance of all functions	2	0	0	0
4. Unspecified performance of functions	2	0	0	0
<hr/>				
<b>Familiarity with area of operations</b>				
1. Geographic familiarity with area	0	0	0	0
2. Familiarity with area residents	2	1	0	0
3. Familiarity with specific criminals	2	0	0	3
4. Familiarity with informants	0	0	1	3
5. Familiarity with crime types, trends, etc.	0	0	1	2
6. Community generated information, community meetings	4	0	0	0
7. Police-Community relations	1	0	0	0

TABLE 14.1  
ADVANTAGES OF  
INVESTIGATIVE MODELS

	Dist. One	Dist. Five	C.I.S. District	C.I.S. Central
<b>Familiarity with type of operation (Specialization and Expertise)</b>				
1. Training - investigative techniques	2	1	0	1
2. Training - specific crime types requiring investigation	0	0	0	1
3. Experience - investigative techniques (thorough case work)	2	0	2	4
4. Experience - specific crime types	0	0	1	5
<hr/>				
<b>Centralization (for handling multi-district crimes)</b>				
1. Exchange and dissemination of information	0	0	2	4
2. Direction and performance of investigations	0	0	0	4
3. Coordination with outside agencies	0	0	0	5
<hr/>				
<b>Characteristics of the Unit</b>				
1. Flexibility of operations (excluding early closures)	1	0	0	3
2. Early closures	1	2	0	0
3. Effectiveness of command, supervisor	0	1	0	1
4. Internal communications	1	1	0	2
5. Equipment and time	0	0	0	3
6. Faster response (time lag overcome)	2	0	0	0
7. Responsibility for performance of investigations	5	3	0	2
8. Inter-Sector cooperation and assistance	2	0	0	0
9. Team-work (pride in job)	2	0	0	2
10. Relieves patrolman of all investigative duties	0	1	0	0

TABLE 14.2

WEAKNESSES OF INVESTIGATIVE MODELS

	District 1	District 5	C.I.S. District	C.I.S. Central
1. Communications Problems: Between sectors To and from C.I.S. Internal (general)	3 1 1	0 2 0	0 7 0	0 6 0
2. Specialization Problems: Lack of Too much	3 0	2 0	0 2	0 0
3. Supervisory Problems: Internal Lines of control (C.I.S. and District)	2 0	0 0	1 3	0 1
4. Not Enough Familiarity With Neighborhood or Area	0	0	2	2
5. Need for More Training	3	0	0	0
6. Job Environment: Need for early closures Other problems	0 1	0 0	2 1	0 2
7. Workload or Equipment Problems: Workload too heavy Lack of manpower Lack of equipment	1 0 1	1 2 2	0 0 0	2 0 1

SUMMARY

1. District 1 - Team Policing - showed the best overall effectiveness during the experimental period.

- District 1 clearance by arrest rate was higher than other districts.

- District 1 overall clearance rate was higher than other districts.

These results do not include arrests made by Department Store Security Guards which would make the District 1 rates even higher.

2. District 5 showed the best results for clearance by arrest for cases requiring investigative follow-up.

Much of District 1's high clearance by arrest rate is due to apprehensions made the same day as the arrest is reported.

3. Investigators tended to prefer a District 5 model in situations where they could not choose their own model.

4. The "ideal investigative model" would have:

- District assignment for most investigators.

- Team policing for patrol functions with partial investigations.

- A central coordinating agency to provide:

1. Analysis.
2. Coordination with outside agencies.
3. Consolidation and dissemination of information.
4. Special, scarce skills.

## Appendix A

### DATA SOURCES

The great bulk of hard data used in this study was obtained from District keybooks rather than from regular Division sources. By using this keybook data a more accurate impression of investigative effectiveness could be obtained. The primary reason for this improved accuracy can be illustrated by considering the derivation of clearance rates. If we had used, for instance, the monthly offense and arrest reports produced by R.C.C., we would have had a problem of association. That is, while the offenses listed had occurred during the month in question, the arrests may have been for offenses which occurred during a prior month. In the keybooks, by contrast, the type of clearance is listed immediately to the right of the report of the offense. So, by using keybook data, we can obtain an accurate association of offenses and clearances.

### APPENDICES

## Appendix B

When, during the interviews, investigators were asked to list components of an ideal investigative system, many (often conflicting) answers were received. One especially thoughtful and coherent answer is the following:

Q: Considering cost and overall levels of service, what would be the best way to organize the delivery of investigative services in Cincinnati; using the best ideas from any of the three models?

District assigned units [should be] doing on-the-street investigations; [their] closeness to patrolmen and district area allows them to be better aware of what is going on. Mini-tactical units also function as liaison between districts and centralized units. [They] can link up with R.E.N.U., Vice Control, Burglary Squad, etc., when needed. [We would] still need a central unit for continuity of effort, centralized information, [and the] expertise required for some crime types.


Sector assignment, task oriented patrol functions like COMSEC are [an] excellent way to obtain very close, accurate information about problems and conditions in neighborhoods. This would link up well with a district level investigative unit. [The] environment provided by COMSEC is an improvement in the life of a patrolman. [He has] more opportunity to do investigations, select and pursue [his own] specialization. [This] can be done without censorship, since creativity and individual initiative are encouraged.

## Appendix C


The following graphs are included to illustrate trend in various rates over the course of an entire year (1973). In this sense, they supplement that data presented in the body of the text.




# Index Offenses Reported to the Police (12 months before vs. 12 months after implementation of Com-Sec)



1973 District #1 Clearance Arrest Rate Due to District Personnel



1973 District #5 Clearance Arrest Rate Due to District Personnel




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
Exhibit 3

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1973 Districts 3, 4, 6 & 7 Clearance Arrest Rate Due to District Personnel



1973 District #1 Clearance by Patrol Arrest Rate



# 1973 District #5 Clearance by Patrol Arrest Rate






Exhibit 6

1973 Districts 3, 4, 6 & 7 Clearance by Patrol Arrest Rate



1973 District #1 Clearance by Investigative  
Arrest as Proportion of Investigative Workload



1973 District #5 Clearance by Investigative  
Arrest as Proportion of Investigative Workload





Exhibit 9


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10 Squares to the Inch

1973 Districts #3, 4, 6 & 7 Clearance by Investigative  
Arrest as Proportion of Investigative Workload



1973 District #1 Proportion of Investigative Workload Cleared







Exhibit 12



1973 Districts #3, 4, 6 & 7 Proportion of Investigative Workload Cleared



## Appendix D

### EARLY CLOSURES


As originally conceived, the two experimental models (Districts 1 and 5) were to have available an early closure option. The experimental use of this option was to lead to information as to its effect upon the investigative process. As the accompanying graphs illustrate, the option, in practice, has been employed in all three models, although somewhat more frequently in District 5.

EARLY CLOSURES

## Monthly Average Part I Offenses

	<u>Early Closures</u>	<u>Early Closure Rate</u>
District I:		
Jan-Feb	111.5	.200
Sept-Dec.	125.5	.226
District 5:		
Jan-Feb.	27.5	.058
Sept-Dec.	288.7	.543
Districts 3,4,6,7		
Jan-Feb.	231.5	.164
Sept-Oct.	274.5	.158

1973 Dist. #1 Early Closure Rate



1973 Dist. #5 Early Closure Rate





Exhibit 16

1973 Districts 3, 4, 6 & 7 Early Closure Rate



**END**