


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Delaware -

~~THE~~ INVESTIGATIVE STRIKE FORCE

Submitted to the Executive Committee
of the
Delaware Agency to Reduce Crime

by
Allen Alexander
Program Analyst

July 1975

27416

Evaluation; Loan ①

ABSTRACT

The Investigative Strike Force was formerly a component of the Crime Specific Improvement and Strike Force project. In July 1974, the Strike Force became a project in its own right. The project's purpose as stated in its 1974-1975 application was to bring about a reduction in the distribution of narcotics and dangerous drugs by launching a coordinated attack on the distributors themselves. To accomplish this task, the application called for a Strike Force to be composed of all drug enforcement personnel within the State. At the present time, participants in the project include all those police agencies expected to join with the exception of New Castle County. The absence of New Castle County and the City of Newark from the project made it impossible for the Strike Force to realize its goal of involving all drug enforcement personnel within Delaware in the project. Nevertheless, it does seem that good progress has been made toward this goal.

Since coordination was clearly not an end in itself, this particular goal must be regarded as secondary to the implied goal of reducing the distribution of narcotics and dangerous drugs. One shortcoming of the application was a regrettable lack of detail about what was to be accomplished by the Strike Force. The section on "Purpose and Objectives" in the application did imply some few criteria of performance, e.g., the number of arrests or the proportion of successful prosecutions, but it offered no estimate of the expected level of performance. Confronted with these ambiguous statements about the expected level of performance, it was concluded that a typical "management by objectives" evaluation could not be conducted unless one was willing to impose criteria. This was done, reluctantly, but it is suggested that the objectives for the coming year be revised to avoid a similar situation arising in the future.

The conclusion reached on the basis of the measures used was that the project was generally operating at a satisfactory level. More specifically, it was found that:

1. The number of arrests made per officer per month had improved over time, from a low of 1.5 per month in the first quarter to a high of 2.0 per month in the last quarter.
2. The crimes of delivery, conspiracy to deliver, and possession with intent to deliver accounted for a large proportion of all arrests (39.3%) while the crime of possession accounted for a relatively small proportion (14.3%).

3. Of all those arrested, 62% were convicted, but of those arrested and charged with delivery, conspiracy to deliver, or possession with intent to deliver, 34% were convicted of lesser crimes, e.g., possession, and 32% were neither convicted nor tendered a plea.

These and other statistics contained in this report suggest, but do not prove, that the project was reaching the distributors of drugs as intended but that the success rate at the prosecution level may be less than satisfactory. However, with respect to the prosecution success rate, it is suggested that judgment be withheld until information on the disposition of more recent cases becomes available, as the prosecutor feels there has been an improvement since January, 1975.

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FIGURE I

Table of Organization, Strike Force

Applicant Agency

Delaware State Police

Project Director

Capt. H. Maichle
D.S.P.

Administrative Commander

Capt. J. Heller
Wilm. Bur. of Pol.

Operations Commander

Lt. J. Szymanski
D.S.P.

Deputy Attorney General

R. Otlowski

Northern Division

Delaware State Police
Officer

Southern Division*

Delaware State Police
Officer

Undercover Unit

D.S.P. 3 men
W.B.P. 3 men

Undercover Unit

D.S.P. 1 man
Dover 1 man
Milford 1 man
Rehoboth 1 man

Arrest Unit

D.S.P. 1 man
W.B.P. 3 men

Arrest Unit

D.S.P. 1 man

Special Investigations Unit

D.S.P. 2 men
W.B.P. 1 man

*Seaford about to send replacement

Evidence Unit

W.B.P. 1 man

I. Introduction

The Investigative Strike Force, formerly a component of the Crime Specific Improvement and Strike Force project, was first funded as a separate and distinct project in July, 1974. This report examines the performance of the Strike Force primarily since July 1974, interjecting some information on the historical development of the project and data on performance prior to that date only where necessary. In the application, a three faceted argument is advanced to justify the funding of a strike force. In synoptic form, the argument is as follows: (a) the illicit distribution of narcotics and dangerous drugs continues to be a serious problem within the State; (b) the distribution of these proscribed drugs is carried on by numerous individuals, the majority of whom are users themselves; (c) the distributors' source of supply may be within or without State boundaries; and (d) the distributors do not operate from fixed sites, hence distribution does not take place predominantly in any one or several geographical areas.

II. Project Goals

A. Based on these assumptions about the patterns of drug distribution, the applicant proposed to effect a decline in the distribution of narcotics and dangerous drugs by establishing a strike force composed of police officers from the several police agencies operating within Delaware.

1. The objectives of the project are:

- o To join together all skilled drug enforcement manpower and related resources within the State to operate as one unit with a singular purpose.
- o To develop a command structure which will effectively direct and supervise the activities of a combined enforcement unit.
- o To develop and further the cooperation of all units supporting this state-wide effort to reduce the distribution of narcotics and dangerous drugs.

B. It is obvious from the foregoing that the issues of organizational structure and management were of tantamount importance to the applicant. While this is understandable, it is nonetheless regrettable that the mission of the project, which I presume is to reduce the distribution of drugs, receives only cursory attention in this particular section of the application. I shall return to this point later. For the moment, let me point out several weaknesses

in the existing objectives, weaknesses which made the evaluation more difficult. Looking first at the last objective, the reader will note that the only economical means of determining whether the project succeeded in developing and furthering cooperation is to determine whether the units of government did or did not participate, in which case this objective effectively reduces to the first. Turning to the second objective, the problem of measurement becomes an even more critical problem for there are no implicit or explicit criteria for assessing effectiveness. As a consequence, we are left with a single useable objective, namely the proportion of all manpower assigned drug enforcement duties who were assigned to the Strike Force. Using this criteria, it appears that the project has been generally successful. The only police agencies operating their own individual drug units at present are New Castle County and Newark.

III. Withdrawal of New Castle County and City of Newark Police

A. Still New Castle County's and Newark's refusals to participate in the Strike Force during this and the coming year deserves attention in view of the Strike Force's stated objectives. After interviews with the principals in both police agencies, I attempted to summarize their criticisms. These criticisms may or may not be well founded and are presented merely to inform the board of the stated reasons for the two police agencies' refusal to participate.

B. New Castle County

New Castle County police withdrew from the Investigative Strike Force in January, 1975. Their reasons for withdrawals are summarized in a letter to Captain Maichle, the project director from Col. Larontonda, Chief of New Castle County police dated January 10, 1975, from which the following quotation has been excised.

It was determined that our Department had very little input into the Unit's operational policies and procedures and lacked someone in a supervisory position, which resulted in a breakdown in communications and the flow of information between the Unit and our Department. The result of this breakdown was that the staff of our Department was unable to analyze the status of the drug problem within our jurisdiction. In addition, the Unit was occasionally branching out into other diversified areas of investigation.

Some elaboration on this passage is warranted as the issue of communication is of fundamental importance if a cooperative venture such as the Strike Force is to succeed. The problem from the County police's perspective was one of having to account to both the government and citizenry of New Castle County concerning drug enforcement without being in direct control or even intimately familiar with either the day-to-day operations of the Strike Force or of the daily assignments of the county officers. Since New Castle County police felt they could not assign a senior officer to the project, none of their officers were in a supervisory position. Whether this alone explains the breakdown in communications is impossible to say. It does, however, seem that effective communications need not necessarily hinge on the presence or absence of a representative in a supervisory position.

The Strike Force did provide the participating police agencies with weekly and monthly reports in an effort to improve communications and Lt. Syzmanski states that the participants were offered weekly briefings. Obviously, New Castle County police found these efforts wanting. (The reader will find sample copies of the weekly and monthly reports in the appendix.) Specifically, the County had these concerns about the reports.

1. Information on drug investigations and arrests was minimal and did not permit effective monitoring of Strike Force activities.
2. Lack of information on the exact location of Strike Force operations made it impossible to determine where in the County police's jurisdiction the Strike Force was operating. This in turn meant it was still impossible for the County police to account for drug enforcement activities in their jurisdiction or to insure that they received credit for operations occurring in their jurisdiction.
3. Lack of information on the activities and performance of County police assigned to Strike Force made it all but impossible to monitor the performance of their officers and so reduced County control of their own officers.

C. City of Newark

Newark withdrew for some of the same reasons as New Castle County, although the primary reason was manpower. Both Chief Brierly and Lt. Fitzgerald (the former liaison officer) felt they could not justify assigning two or three officers exclusively to drug enforcement duty when

there were other more pressing tasks. While drug distribution and use was still regarded as a serious problem, both felt it had been overshadowed by the alarming rise in burglaries and robberies. To assign officers to the Strike Force effectively reduced Newark's manpower and restricted their ability to perform routine tasks or combat crimes to which they had given higher priority.

A secondary, but by no means unimportant, criticism leveled at the Strike Force concerned the matter of control. The Newark police and to a lesser degree, their New Castle County counterparts, felt as if they had surrendered control of their officers to the Strike Force. In the opinion of Chief Brierly and Lt. Fitzgerald, the officers assigned to the Strike Force were confused about who they were responsible to and gave the operations commander precedence over their ultimate commanders, their superiors in the Newark Police Department. This was obvious in their dress, attitude and demeanor. All too frequently, departmental regulations were violated because the Strike Force officers were not familiar with and so did not enforce Newark's departmental regulations. More aggravating still, Newark officers assigned to the Strike Force were resentful of their superiors' insistence that they abide by departmental regulations at all times. Because officers assigned to the Strike Force tended to develop a "negative attitude" toward their superiors in the Newark Police Department, Chief Brierly spoke of the need to "recycle" them; that is, to recall them from Strike Force duty and reassign.

IV. Assessment of Performance

A. Since the majority of governmental units have elected to participate in the Investigative Strike Force, it would appear that the project was reasonably successful in attaining its first goal. However, it seems to me that this objective speaks to a secondary issue, for organizing and managing the Strike Force are conceptionally subordinate to the mission of the project, i.e., to reduce the distribution of drugs. Since the mission of the Strike Force is only alluded to in the objectives, we must turn to the section of the application entitled "purpose" to gain some understanding of what the project was expected to accomplish. The purpose is, "to form a skilled, more effective drug enforcement organization which will operate statewide to identify, arrest, and successfully prosecute those persons engaged in the illegal distribution and use of narcotics and dangerous drugs". (Emphasis added) Once again, the concern with structure and management becomes obvious, but more im-

portantly, the mission of the project is presented in somewhat greater detail and so suggests several measures which can usefully be employed in evaluating the full prosecutions. What is regrettably not known are the estimates of the number of investigations, arrests, and successful prosecutions which the strike force expected to produce during the course of the year. As a result, there is no agreed upon standard to be employed in evaluating the program thereby making a traditional management by objective type of evaluation all but impossible. This is not to say the project is not amenable to evaluation; indeed there are ways of extracting much valuable information from the project which would allow its performance to be assessed. What is not possible, however, is to say whether or not the objectives have been attained since the objectives are ambiguous in certain key respects.

B. One measure of performance suggested in the application was the number of arrests. By this standard, the Strike Force performance has improved over time as the number of arrests has generally increased (see Table I). On the average, there were approximately 1.7 arrests per officer per month assigned to the Strike Force for the period July 1974 to May 1975. During the first three months of operation, the average had increased to 2.0. For the brief period in the Spring of 1974, when the project's organizational structure was in a state of flux, performance was less satisfactory than at present. At that period, the average number of arrests per officer per month was 0.8. Having noted an improvement in performance does not necessarily mean that performance was satisfactory. In order to determine whether or not performance was satisfactory requires a standard against which performance could be assessed, e.g., one or more specific objectives. But it is this very information which is missing from the application. Consequently, one inexpensive means of improving the project would be the development of an evaluation plan for the 1975-76 operational year. For the present, my own assessment of this data is favorable. The number of arrests per officer per month seems at a reasonable level and the number is increasing over time.

C. Given that the project's aim was to reduce the distribution of narcotics and dangerous drugs, one would expect to find most of those arrested charged with delivery, conspiracy to deliver, or possession with intent to deliver. Hence, a second performance measure would be the proportion of all arrests or charges related to delivery. Table II compares the frequency of these three charges

to the total number of charges made against arrestees. It is apparent that these charges make up a large proportion of all charges. Similarly, Table III indicates a majority of those arrested were charged with one or more of these crimes. Taken together this would seem suggest the Strike Force had indeed focused its efforts on distributors as intended. A similar conclusion may be drawn from Tables IV and V which provide data on the number of these arrests for possession and the number of possession charges lodged. In both instances, the numbers are small, indicating the Strike Force was not concentrating on those who merely possessed or used narcotics or dangerous drugs but those who were delivering them. I should point out here that the Strike Force members contend in many instances individuals were intentionally arrested for or charged with possession in an effort to obtain information on suppliers. By arresting and charging an individual with possession, they often were able to induce them to cooperate thereby facilitating the Strike Force's efforts to reach the primary targets. This means that some portion of the arrests for mere possession contributed to the overall purpose of the project and must be regarded as strategic.

Aside from strategic reasons, some arrests for possession were unavoidable. For example in the course of arresting distributors, their companions were sometimes found to have drugs in their possession and were arrested.

- D. A third measure of performance implied in the application concerns the matter of prosecution. As the application refers to but does not define "successful prosecution", two alternatives are available. First, success can be construed to mean merely securing a conviction of those arrested. Second, success can be more narrowly construed to mean convictions for distribution, i.e., for delivery, conspiracy to deliver, and possession with intent to deliver. Table VI breaks down the data by disposition for the 113 cases for which information was available. An examination of this table clearly demonstrates that the "success" rate, however defined, was not impressive, although this may be due to the limited data on dispositions. Looking at the total number of convictions first, it seems only 62% were convicted in spite of the fact that the Strike Force was attempting to generate sufficient evidence to insure successful prosecution. The picture is more doleful still, for 12 of those convicted were convicted of possession or other petty violations and so usually received probation, fine or both. Turning to those charged with delivery, conspiracy to deliver, and possession with intent to deliver, only 34% were convicted of delivery or similar crimes and only 68% were convicted

of any crime whatsoever. Whether this record is an improvement over the "success rate" in prosecuting similar crimes prior to the Strike Force is unknown. The members of the Strike Force are, however, dissatisfied with the prosecution record and feel their successes are being canceled by the low number of successful prosecution. While the Strike Force members see little improvement in the prosecution success rate, the prosecutor is convinced there has been both an improvement in the rate of convictions and in the seriousness of the charges for which convictions were obtained. The apparent disagreement in the assessments of the police and prosecutor may be due to time lag. The information on dispositions gathered by the Strike Force and used in this report covers only cases where the arrests were made in 1974. By contrast, the prosecutor is aware of the status of more recent cases and their progress through the judicial system.

Further Assessment of Performance

- A. In this section, several additional measures will be employed in order to further assess performance. In contrast to the previous measures, these have been constructed by the evaluator and imposed on the project in hopes of gaining more insight into the performance of the Strike Force. In each case, the imposed measures have been inferred (perhaps unjustly) from the application itself or derived from interviews with past and present participants in the project.

The particular drugs used, possessed, or delivered by those arrested would seem to have some impact as a measure of performance, if the following assumptions are made.

1. Marijuana use constitutes less of a problem for society than does the use of physiologically addicting drugs e.g., heroin or other opium derivatives for marijuana users engage in less secondary crime to support their drug use. (The foregoing is based on interviews of police currently and previously associated with the Strike Force.)
2. Marijuana users seldom use other drugs, in particular those producing physiological addiction. (This assumption is consistent with the data presented in Table VII)
3. It follows from the preceding two assumptions that if the Strike Force were expected to have an impact on secondary crime (an expectation held by many of those

interviewed, its impact would be dissipated to the degree it concentrated on drug violations involving marijuana.

Reference to Table VII indicates that a sizeable minority of arrests were for crimes involving only marijuana. Presuming the foregoing argument is accepted, the conclusion is inevitable; the performance of the Strike Force could be improved by directing its effort more exclusively at distributors or distributor-users of the physiologically addictive drugs. To do so would appear to be more cost-effective unless there are reasons not brought out in the interviews for continuing the present policy.

- B. Looking at Table VIII will reveal little change in the proportion of arrests for marijuana violations over time. There are of course monthly fluctuations, but in general, the trend has been fairly constant. Heroin related violations have by contrast, declined over time while arrests for violations involving miscellaneous drugs have increased. If many of the arrests were for crimes related exclusively to the possession, use, or delivery of marijuana, a question which immediately arises is whether the Strike Force was concentrating on distributors of marijuana or merely its "street users".
- C. A partial answer to this question may be inferred from the data presented in Table I. To reiterate, there were few arrests for simple possession; the bulk were for delivery, conspiracy to deliver, or possession with the intent to deliver. That evidence, in conjunction with the findings that a significantly large minority of arrests were for crimes involving only the drug marijuana, suggests the Strike Force was probably reaching the distributor of marijuana rather than merely the "street users". This reference is generally confirmed by Table IX where marijuana charges are broken down by month.
- D. But if we conclude the Strike Force was focusing its attention on distributors of marijuana, this does not vitiate the foregoing criticism. Would it not be more cost effective to concentrate on the distributors of the more dangerous drugs? Would this not, in the long run, have a greater impact on crime? There are perhaps good reasons for continuing the present patterns of enforcement, although none were offered during the course of this evaluation. Rather than insist on a modification of the project, it then seems best to propose two alternatives. Either the Strike Force could direct its efforts more exclusively at the distributors of the more dangerous drugs and narcotics or demonstrate why the con-

tinued pattern of enforcement should be continued.

- E. I would re-emphasize that the enforcement of laws against the use and distribution of marijuana are not being objected to, merely the apparent emphasis on this drug. If the possession or delivery of marijuana is proscribed by law, someone must be responsible for enforcement. However, it may not necessarily be the best use of the Strike Force to perform this duty. At present time, it is costing approximately \$70-80 per arrests, not counting the salaries of the police officers which are paid by their respective departments. Since few of those arrested for marijuana are convicted and sentenced to anything other than probation, it would seem wise to consider whether this phase of drug enforcement does not constitute a drain on the Strike Force's limited resources.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

- A. Generally, the Investigative Strike Force appeared to be a smoothly operating and effective program. Certainly no cause for concern was identified through the interviews and analysis of the project's records; although some thorny problems of a non-critical nature were detected. In summary, these problems are:
- (1) An inability to gain the cooperation of all drug enforcement units operating in the State, specifically those in New Castle County and Newark.
 - (2) A less than satisfactory success rate for prosecuting those arrested. (This observation is based on limited and dated information)
 - (3) An unsatisfactory, vague statement of the project's goals and purpose, and a total lack of objectives.
 - (4) A surfeit of arrests for marijuana violations which produce few convictions but which divert Strike Force resources from more important tasks of decreasing distribution of more dangerous drugs and narcotics.
- B. Each of these problems requires attention during the coming year. In particular the issue of cooperation and coordination will not easily be resolved for already New Castle County and Newark have refused to participate in the coming year despite the hopes of the applicant ex-

pressed in their most recent application. No specific recommendations can be offered here for the issue is complex and not easily resolved.

- C. As for the apparently unsatisfactory rate of convictions, a wait-and-see approach is recommended. The prosecutor believes he is now getting better cases and therefore having greater success in the courts, as it would seem best to wait until information on the disposition of some individuals arrested in 1975 becomes available.
- D. The problem of an inadequate statement of the project's goals, objectives and purpose seems easily resolved and an addendum should be attached to the current application as soon as possible. A review of the application for continuing the Strike Force indicates some improvement but greater clarity and specificity is required.
- E. The final problem identified suggests the need to either concentrate Strike Force efforts on the distributors of physiologically addictive drugs or develop a rationale for continuing to direct the Strike Force efforts at distributors in general.

APPENDIX A

TABLE I

Number of Arrests Made and Charges
From July, 1974 to May, 1975

Month	Number of Arrests	Number of Charges Against Those Arrested
July	12	19
August	52	126
September	69	123
October	45	127
November	30	82
December	44	93
January	50	115
February	50	92
March	50	112
April	65	121
May	68	115
Total	523	1,125

TABLE II

Number and Percent of Charges For Delivery
From August, 1974 to May, 1975

Month	Charges for Delivery, Conspiracy to Deliver & Possession with In- tent to Deliver		Total Charges
	Number	Percent All Charges	
August	55	43.7	126
September	42	34.1	123
October	69	54.3	127
November	19	23.1	82
December	21	22.6	93
January	37	32.2	115
February	32	34.8	92
March	25	22.3	112
April	16	13.2	121
May	76	66.1	115
Total	392	35.4	1,106

TABLE III

Number and Percent of Arrests For Delivery and Related Offenses
From August, 1974 to May, 1975

Month	Delivery		Conspiracy to Deliver		Possession with Intent to Deliver		All Other Charges		Total
	#	% of Total	#	% of Total	#	% of Total	#	% of Total	
August	24	46.2	0	0	5	9.6	23	44.2	52
September	23	33.3	0	0	1	1.4	45	65.3	69
October	19	42.2	0	0	9	20.0	17	37.8	45
November	6	20.0	1	3.3	3	10.0	20	66.7	30
December	9	20.5	1	2.3	6	13.6	28	63.6	44
January	11	22.0	0	0	7	14.0	32	64.0	50
February	5	10.0	0	0	4	8.0	41	82.0	50
March	13	26.0	0	0	1	2.0	36	72.0	50
April	7	10.8	0	0	5	7.7	53	81.5	65
May	39	57.3	4	5.9	3	4.4	22	32.4	68
Total	156	29.8	6	1.1	44	8.4	317	60.7	523

Table IV

Number and Percent of Arrests for Possession
by Type of Drug From August, 1974 to May, 1975*

Month	Marijuana		Herion		Methamphetamine		Misc. Drugs		All Other Arrests		Total Arrests
	#	% of Arrests	#	% of Arrests	#	% of Arrests	#	% of Arrests	#	% of Arrests	
August	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	52	100	52
September	3	4.3	0	0	2	2.9	1	1.4	63	91.4	69
October	0	0	1	2.2	0	0	0	0	44	97.8	45
November	1	3.3	3	10.0	0	0	5	16.7	21	70.0	30
December	8	18.2	1	2.3	1	2.3	1	2.3	33	74.9	44
January	3	6.0	1	2.0	3	6.0	0	0	43	86.0	50
February	10	20.0	4	8.0	1	2.0	0	0	35	70.0	50
March	9	18.0	3	6.0	0	0	0	0	38	76.0	50
April	5	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	60	92.3	65
May	7	10.3	1	1.5	0	0	1	1.5	59	86.7	68
Total	46	8.8	14	2.7	7	1.3	8	1.5	448	85.7	523

*Classification based on most harmful or dangerous drug found at arrest.

TABLE V

Number and Percent of Charges for Possession
From August, 1974 to May, 1975

Month	Charges for Possession		Total Charges
	Number	Percent of All Charges	
August	20	15.9	126
September	19	15.4	123
October	31	24.4	127
November	27	32.9	82
December	30	32.2	93
January	24	20.9	115
February	23	25.0	92
March	23	20.5	112
April	12	9.9	121
May	18	15.7	115
Total	227	20.5	1,106

TABLE VI

Most Serious Charge by Disposition for 109 Individuals
for Which Disposition Known

Disposition	Delivery	Conspiracy to Delivery	Conspiracy to Possess	Possession With Intent to Deliver.	Sale	Manufacture	Attempted Delivery	Possession	Other
Subtotal of Plead to or Convicted of:	53	1	0	2	0	4	0	8	0
(%)	67.9	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
1. Delivery	26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Conspiracy to deliver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Possession with intent to deliver	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Possession	25	1	0	2	0	4	0	7	0
5. Reckless Endanger- ing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Subtotal of No Plead to Not Convicted	23	0	2	1	1	4	1	8	1
(%)	30.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
1. Nolle	15	0	2	0	1	2	0	5	1
2. Suspended	7	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0
3. Dismissed	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Total	76	1	2	3	1	8	1	16	1

*Percentages based on a total less than 50, as in the case here, are unstable and misleading, and so have been omitted.

TABLE VII

Breakdown of Arrests by Month
and Type of Drug From August,
1974 to May, 1975*

Month	Marijuana Only		Heroin Only		Both Marijuana and Heroin Only		Other Durgs or Combinations of Drugs		Total Arrests
	No.	% of All Arrests	#	% of All Arrests	#	% of All Arrests	#	% of All Arrests	
August	29	55.7	8	15.4	0	0	15	28.9	52
September	12	17.4	12	17.4	3	4.3	42	60.9	69
October	16	35.5	9	20.0	2	4.4	18	40.1	45
November	11	36.7	4	13.3	1	3.3	14	46.7	30
December	14	31.8	6	13.6	2	4.5	22	50.1	44
January	13	26.0	5	10.0	2	4.0	30	60.0	50
February	17	34.0	6	12.0	1	2.0	26	52.0	50
March	19	38.0	3	6.0	0	0	28	56.0	50
April	12	18.5	0	0	1	1.5	52	80.0	65
May	20	29.2	12	17.6	4	5.9	32	47.0	68
Total	163	31.2	65	12.4	16	3.0	279	53.4	523

*Classification based on most harmful or dangerous drug found at arrest.

TABLE VIII

Breakdown of Charges by Month and Type Drug Involved
From August, 1974 to May, 1975*

	Charges						Total Charges
	Violations Involving Only Marijuana		Violations Involving Only Herion		Violations Involving All Other Drugs and Combination of Drugs		
	No.	Percent All Charges	No.	Percent All Charges	No.	Percent All Charges	
August	59	6.8	8	.3	59	46.9	126
September	25	20.3	26	21.1	72	58.6	123
October	32	25.2	27	21.3	68	53.5	127
November	11	13.4	6	7.3	65	79.3	82
December	21	22.6	10	10.7	62	66.7	93
January	29	25.2	13	11.3	73	63.5	115
February	26	28.2	6	6.5	60	65.3	92
March	27	24.1	4	3.6	81	72.3	112
April	18	14.9	0	0	103	85.1	121
May	3	2.6	24	20.9	88	76.5	115
Total	251	22.7	124	11.2	731	66.1	1,106

*Classification based on most harmful or dangerous drug found at arrest.

TABLE IX

Breakdown of Marijuana Arrests for
Delivery by Month From August, 1974
to May, 1975

Month	Delivery		Conspiracy to Delivery		Possession With Intent to Deliver		Total Arrests For Marijuana Violations
	No.	% Total	No.	% Total	No.	% Total	
August	14	*	1	*	0	*	15
September	5	*	0	*	0	*	3
October	12	*	0	*	1	*	13
November	2	*	1	*	3	*	6
December	3	*	0	*	1	*	4
January	5	*	0	*	0	*	5
February	4	*	0	*	4	*	8
March	8	*	0	*	1	*	9
April	5	*	0	*	3	*	8
May	13	*	0	*	0	*	13
Total	71	82.6	2	2.3	13	15.1	86

*Percentages based on a total less than 50, as in the case here, are unstable and misleading and so have been omitted.

REPORT
INVESTIGATIVE STRIKE FORCE

Activities from 5 June 1975 to 12 June 1975

DRUG PURCHASES: (North) - 3
(South) - 4
TOTAL PURCHASES: 7

TYPE OF DRUGS PURCHASED:
1 Marijuana buy
2 Methamphetamine buys
2 Heroin buys
1 Hashish buy
1 PCP buy

AREAS OF DRUGS PURCHASED:
2 buys in New Castle County/State jurisdiction
1 buy in City of Wilmington
4 buys in Kent County/State jurisdiction

ARRESTS MADE AS A RESULT OF DRUG PURCHASES AND WARRANT EXECUTIONS:

6/5/75		Possession of marijuana	Troop 6
6/5/75		Delivery of marijuana	Troop 9
		Poss w/i del. amphetamines	Troop 9
6/7/75		Possession of marijuana	Rehoboth
		CCDW	Rehoboth
6/10/75	NAMES OF THOSE ARRESTED WERE SUPPRESSED	Possession of marijuana	Wilmington
6/10/75		Possession of marijuana	Wilmington
6/10/75		Delivery of heroin	Wilmington
6/10/75		Manufacturing marijuana	Troop 3
6/11/75		Manufacturing marijuana	Troop 3
6/11/75		Manufacturing marijuana	Troop 3
6/11/75		Delivery of cocaine	Wilmington

TOTAL PERSONS ARRESTED 10 TOTAL CHARGES 12

DRUGS CONFISCATED:
Marijuana 6 lbs.
Marijuana Plants 37
Amphetamine pills 321

VALUE OF DRUGS CONFISCATED: \$1135.00
MONIES CONFISCATED: \$1205.00

OTHER PROPERTY RECOVERED:
1 - .22 cal. hand gun
1 - 1971 Volkswagen van

Assisted Rehoboth PD ref drug investigation

J. James G. Szymanski
Lt. James G. Szymanski

APPENDIX B

INVESTIGATIVE STRIKE FORCE

December, 1974

DRUG PURCHASES: (North) - 20
 (South) - 15
 TOTAL PURCHASES: 35

TYPE OF DRUGS PURCHASED:

- 20 Marijuana buys
- 5 Heroin buys
- 3 Methamphetamine buys
- 2 Amphetamine buys
- 3 Cocaine buys
- 2 P.C.P. buys

AREAS OF DRUGS PURCHASED:

- 9 buys in New Castle County/State jurisdiction
- 9 buys in City of Wilmington
- 3 buys in Kent/Sussex County/State jurisdiction
- 8 buys in City of Dover
- 2 buys in City of Seaford
- 1 buy in City of Milford
- 1 buy in City of Lewes
- 1 buy in Pennsylvania with D.E.A.
- 1 buy in Salisbury, Maryland

TOTAL PERSONS ARRESTED 44

TOTAL CHARGES 93

DRUGS CONFISCATED AS A RESULT OF RAIDS AND ARRESTS:

Marijuana	9 lbs. 2 1/4 oz.
Hashish	1 gram
Methamphetamine	5 1/2 spoons
Heroin	168 - 1/4 T's
Cocaine	1/2 oz. pure & 15 - 1/4 T's
Amphetamine tablets	500 white crosses
D.M.T.	1 gram
P.C.P.	2 spoons
Hypodermic needle & Syringe	7

VALUE OF DRUGS CONFISCATED \$9,251.00

MONIES CONFISCATED \$1,238.00

OTHER PROPERTY RECOVERED:

- 1 - large folding knife
- 1 - .38 cal. revolver
- 1 - .22 cal. rifle
- 1 - .25 cal. revolver and 4 rounds
- 1 - 1973 Volkswagon
- 1 - radio
- 1 - set of binoculars

Lt. James Szymanski
 Lt. James Szymanski

EXHIBIT C

Budget Summary from Project Application

Budget Categories	Totals	DARC Federal Funds Requested	DARC Cash Match Funds Requested	Subgrantee Cash Match
(a) Personnel (Employees Benefits)	\$9,915	\$5,574	\$4,161	-
(b) Professional Services (Consultants & Contractors)	-	-	-	-
(c) Travel	750	750	-	-
(d) Supplies	984	984	-	-
(e) Operating Expenses	29,961	29,961	-	-
(f) Equipment	-	-	-	-
(g) Other	-	-	-	-
TOTALS	\$41,610	\$37,449	\$4,161	-

END