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AMBUSH ATTACKS

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A RISK REDUCTION MANUAL FOR POLICE



**LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION**

U. S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE



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Foreword

The well-trained and experienced police officer generally acquires attitudes and skills that permit him to cope with most physical assaults without exposure to harm. There is, however, an extremely dangerous type of assault that most officers find very difficult or impossible to prevent or defend against: the unprovoked ambush attack. Previously an almost unknown occurrence in everyday law enforcement operations, ambush attacks now have become a fact of modern police operations.

Confronted by this critical threat, the law enforcement community has urgently sought needed information on how to deal with the ambush attack. In response to this and similar requirements, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice initiated a major long-range research program, the Police Assaults Study, incorporating the problem oriented analysis of ambush attacks as an important research objective. The International Association of Chiefs of Police was given the responsibility for national casualty data collection and analysis with an emphasis on immediate *risk reduction* in contemporary ambush attack situations, primarily through improved police tactical procedures, equipment, and training. This task was accomplished by staff assigned to the IACP Police Weapons Center who traveled throughout the United States gathering information and discussing specific incidents with *police personnel* at all levels.

The following findings and recommendations for reducing the risks associated with ambush attack are a product of this effort. This document, however, should be considered a beginning rather than a final product. I would urge all users of this manual to provide us with their suggestions and comments regarding the problem of ambush risk reduction, a matter of vital concern to the law enforcement community.

Quinn Tamm
Executive Director
International Association
of Chiefs of Police

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AMBUSH ATTACKS

SECTION ONE

AN OVERVIEW OF AMBUSH ATTACKS

INTRODUCTION

Thousands of police officers are assaulted under a variety of circumstances every year in the United States. Identifying exactly which of these assaults are actually ambush attacks is the first basic step in any program for ambush attack risk reduction. A working definition fitted to the realities and practice of modern police service is required for this task. Unfortunately, standard definitions of ambush are often unsatisfactory because of their tendency to evoke outdated and misleading images, probably as a result of the military origin of the term and its tendency to become generalized in common usage over time. For the purpose of this manual, an ambush attack event is defined according to three key distinguishing characteristics:

- *Suddenness* – An ambush attack event is initiated and concluded within a very brief space of time. An event rarely lasts longer than a few seconds, or if follow-up attacks occur, from one to two minutes.
- *Surprise* – The assailant surprises or attempts to surprise his victim. Surprise may be achieved either by stealth and concealment or by posing as an ordinary citizen with a direct approach in full view of the victim officer. Experience demonstrates that these two methods are equally effective in preventing forewarning to targeted law enforcement personnel.
- *Lack of Provocation* – When measured by the standards of the reasonable man, the ambush attack can never be said to have been provoked by the immediate behavior of the target officer. That is, the officer is not initially engaged in any police activity that could reasonably be expected to provoke attack. In most events, the assailant apparently has had no previous contact with the victim officer, and perceives his target simply as a symbol of governmental authority. In those few ambushes in which a desire for personal revenge appears to be a contributing force, the victim officer has done nothing immediately prior to the attack to excite deadly malice. In either instance, the victim officer is in large part an external object against which the assailant concentrates direct aggressive emotions generated and sustained within an immature, antisocial, or seriously disordered personality structure.

Judged by the criteria of this definition, during the 12 month period from September 1972 to August 1973 seven police officers were murdered in the United States under circumstances that can best be described as ambush attacks. An additional 21 officers were reported wounded in ambush attacks during the same period, while 28 officers escaped injury under similar circumstances. Altogether, 56 law enforcement personnel were victims of armed assailants in 33 separate ambush attack events.

The IACP Police Casualty Analysis Unit conducted detailed field investigations of all but one of these events.¹ The purpose of this activity was to collect and evaluate data to determine if police techniques, procedures, and equipment could be modified or improved to reduce the incidence of ambush assaults on police and to minimize the injuries resulting from such assaults. The 32 ambush attack events studied are summarized in this section to provide an overview of the circumstances surrounding this series of incidents by focusing upon the attack, the victim officers, and the assailants.

AMBUSH ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS

Officer Casualties

Fifty-five law enforcement personnel were targeted by assailants in the 32 ambush attacks studied. Of these, seven were killed, 20 were non-fatal casualties, and 28 escaped injury. Gunfire produced six out of seven fatalities. One fatal attack was carried out with a knife that was used to cut the victim's throat and to inflict multiple stab wounds in the torso. Torso wounds caused most fatalities (4); arm and leg wounds produced the most non-fatal casualties (14)—the distribution of major wounds sustained by victim officers is tabulated in Figure 1.

Wound Location	Fatal	Non-Fatal
Head		3
Torso	4	3
Arms		5
Legs		9
Multiple	3	
TOTAL	7	20

Figure 1
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR WOUNDS
AMONG POLICE CASUALTIES

¹One event involving the injury of one officer was not studied: See Appendix A, Methodology.

Location

Though ambush attacks were executed against law enforcement personnel in various situations, most officers (80 percent) were targeted when in or near their vehicles. Usually these vehicles were marked patrol cars that provided attackers with a ready means of target acquisition and identification. A breakdown of the locations at which victim officers were attacked appears in Figure 2.

Location	Number	Percent
In Vehicle	31	56.4
Proximate Vicinity of Vehicle	11	20.0
Exiting Vehicle	2	3.6
Inside Police Station	3	5.5
Entering Police Station	1	1.8
In Police Jail Driveway	2	3.6
At University Entrance	2	3.6
Inside Residence	1	1.8
Exiting Restaurant	1	1.8
In Parking Lot	1	1.8
TOTAL	55	99.9*

*Rounding off individual figures causes total to be different from 100.0.

Figure 2
LOCATION OF VICTIM PERSONNEL AT
TIME OF ATTACK

Day and Time

The largest number (eight) of the 32 ambush attack events occurred on Sunday; the smallest number of events (one) took place on Tuesday. With the exception of Tuesday and Friday, the distribution of occurrence was remarkably even.

Weekday	Number of Events
Sunday	8
Monday	6
Tuesday	1
Wednesday	5
Thursday	5
Friday	2
Saturday	5
<hr/>	
TOTAL	32

As indicated in Figure 3, all of the 32 ambush attack events were executed in the evening and early morning hours, periods of limited visibility.

Ambush Sites

Twenty-six of the 32 ambush attacks occurred in built-up urban areas; six occurred in rural areas.

Urban Areas. A small number of the events that occurred in urban areas took place in commercial locations; however, the majority of urban ambushes were conducted in residential neighborhoods. Densely populated residential areas provided protection from police detection prior to the initiation of the ambush, good fields of observations and fire, numerous covered and concealed escape routes, and many opportunities for temporary refuge in the immediate vicinity of the ambush site. In some residential areas, the assailants were undoubtedly able to exploit prevailing neighborhood hostility toward law enforcement agencies and personnel.

Rural Areas. Two ambush attack events happened on isolated roadways in sparsely populated rural areas. One ambush took place on a state parkway adjacent to an exclusive neighborhood. Another occurred at a rural residence. The other two events were located near police stations in small rural communities.

Racial Tensions

Figure 4 shows the predominant racial composition of the population in areas surrounding or adjacent to the 32 ambush attack event sites.

The influence of racial divisiveness contributed to several ambush events. In these cases, race hostility was directly identified as a motivating force in the psychology of the assailant, or indirectly evidenced in the generally indifferent or hostile attitudes toward law enforcement agencies and personnel that were apparent in the community. It should be noted, however, that law enforcement personnel were apparently indiscriminantly targeted regardless of their race.

Nature of Attack

Several of the 32 ambush attack events were the result of premeditated plans conceived and




Figure 3
 TIME OF AMBUSH ATTACK OCCURRENCE

Race	Events	
	Number	Percent
White	9	28.1
White-Black	5	15.6
Black	12	37.5
Black-Hispanic	4	12.5
Hispanic	2	6.3
TOTAL	32	100.0

Figure 4
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF AMBUSH ATTACK AREAS

implemented to inflict casualties among law enforcement personnel. These events were marked by prior preparation and deliberate execution and were intended to kill police officers—in at least three events, police officers personally known to the assailant—at carefully selected times and places. A few attacks were clearly on-the-spot reactions to either the threat of police apprehension or intrusion or the sight of an officer known to the assailant. It was not possible to determine the exact instance or degree of prior planning and preparation in all of the ambush attack events studied. It is probable, however, that most of these ambush events were hastily conceived and implemented random assaults upon law enforcement personnel acquired as targets of opportunity by persons whose direct, calculated intent was to kill or injure officers regardless of their identity, race, or duty status.

All of the ambush events studied fell into one of three general categories:

- *Sniping Attacks.* Attacks by firearms at medium to long ranges from concealed positions.
- *Direct Assaults.* Attacks by firearms or other weapons at close range without effort at concealment.
- *Coordinated Attacks.* Attacks by firearms at close range by two or more assailants from preselected positions.

Sniping Attacks. On the basis of available evidence, 14 (43.8 percent) of the 32 events examined in this study can be best described as sniping attacks. Sniping ambushes are characterized as brief lying-in-wait attacks at medium to long ranges carried out by assailants firing from concealed locations. The average number of rounds fired by snipers in these 14 events was 2.36 rounds per event. A total of six rounds was fired in only two events. Frequently, the sniper fired only one

round before breaking off the attack; this happened in six of the 14 sniping attack events examined in this study.

Approximate ranges are known or can be estimated for ten of the 14 events. The average range was 93 yards. The shortest range was approximately 13 yards; the longest range was almost 185 yards. Three sniping attacks for which figures are available occurred at ranges of 150 yards. Four other sniping ambushes were initiated at ranges varying from slightly over 65 yards to 100 yards. Two other sniping ambushes were carried out at ranges of from 50 yards to just under 65 yards. In one of these sniping ambushes, the assailant chose to open fire at close contact. In this case, the assailant was very well concealed and protected by his location within the darkened interior of an industrial plant. He opened fire, shooting through a glass pane, at a range of approximately 13 yards, killing one of two officers standing in full view outside the building. Though the assailant continued to fire at the surviving officer, he was so well hidden that even the muzzle flashes of his weapon were not detected.

Sniping ambushes were executed against 25 (45.5 percent) of the 55 victim officers. Four (57.1 percent) of the seven victim officers who were killed died in sniping attack events. Four (20 percent) of the 20 victim officers suffering non-fatal injuries were wounded in sniping attacks. Seventeen (60.7 percent) of the 28 officers who escaped injury were targeted by snipers.

Altogether, assailants conducting sniping ambushes killed 1 or injured eight (32 percent) of the officers targeted; 68 percent of the victim officers escaped injury.

Only four (16 percent) of the 25 officers who were victims of sniping ambushes saw their assailant during the attack and one of these officers was alerted by his senses *prior* to the attack.

Direct Assaults. Fourteen (43.8 percent) of the 32 ambush attack events in this sample can be most accurately classified, on the basis of the information available, as direct assaults. A direct assault ambush attack is executed at close range by an assailant who makes little or no effort at concealment, using the camouflage of an ordinary citizen conducting his normal daily affairs to approach and surprise his unsuspecting victim. Several of these ambushes were conducted by simply walking up to the victim officer. In one event, the assailant strolled from off the street into a police station and began shooting at the desk officer. In other direct assault ambushes, the assailants were occupants of private automobiles. As the car was driven past the victim officer, the assailants began shooting. In one attack, the assailant exploded a fire bomb in the street and then attempted to run down the investigating officers with an automobile.

Firearms were used by assailants in 12 of the 14 direct assault events. The average number of rounds fired was three rounds per event. Direct assaults by assailants on foot tended to be the most violently executed; seven (58.3 percent) of the 12 events conducted with firearms and initiated by assailants operating on foot accounted for 28 (77.8 percent) of the 36 rounds expended by assailants in direct assault ambush attack events. The greatest number of shots fired by an assailant in any direct assault ambush event was nine rounds. In this case, the assailant was on foot and shooting from his front porch at two approaching marked police vehicles.

Two direct assault ambush attacks did not involve firearms. In one event, previously noted, the

assailant employed an automobile. In the other, an assailant armed with a knife stopped a plainclothes special agent, cut his throat, and inflicted multiple stab wounds.

Known or estimated range figures are available for 11 of the 12 direct assault ambush attack events conducted by firearms. The average range for these events was seven yards, or only 7.8 percent of the average range of 93 yards for sniping ambush attacks. The shortest range was under one yard; the longest; 17 yards. Seven firearms attacks occurred at ranges of from 5 to 12 yards; an additional two occurred at a range of three yards or less.

Direct assault ambushes were carried out against 21 (38.2 percent) of the 55 victim officers. Three (42.9 percent) of the seven fatalities were killed in direct assault ambush attacks. Nine (45 percent) of the 20 injured officers were wounded by direct assault ambushes. And nine (32.1 percent) of the 28 officers ambushed who escaped injury were victims of direct assaults.

In sum, ambush assailants who carried out direct assaults against their victims killed three (14.3 percent) of their 21 victims, injured nine (42.9 percent), and were unsuccessful in attacks against nine (42.9 percent) of other victim officers.

As could be expected, 20 (95.2 percent) of the 21 officers who were victims of direct assault ambushes saw their assailants before or during the attack. None of those officers appear to have been suspicious of an impending deadly assault. The one officer who never saw his assailant was lured to a parking lot, where he was shot in the back a number of times.

Coordinated Attacks. Four (12.5 percent) of the 32 ambush attack events studied were coordinated ambush attack events. A coordinated ambush attack is executed at close-range by two or more assailants laying down crossfires from preselected firing positions. Coordinated ambush attacks are the most violent of all forms of ambush. This is illustrated by brief summaries of the four coordinated attacks. In one event a two-man patrol unit was attacked by assailants armed with 9mm automatic weapons. Sixteen rounds struck the target vehicle, wounding both officers before the unit could clear the fire zone. In the second event, another two-man unit was attacked by assailants armed with automatic weapons and at least one shotgun. In this case, the target vehicle was temporarily immobilized in the fire zone and hit by 41 rounds. Here again both occupants of the police vehicle were injured.

In the third coordinated ambush attack, two teenage assailants lured two unarmed off-duty officers into an alley where they fired two shotguns five times at their victims. Both officers were struck and wounded. In the fourth coordinated ambush attack a two-man unit was struck by three bullets as it proceeded into an intersection. The victim police officers lowered themselves in the front seat and as the driver attempted to clear the fire zone, he lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a tree. The assailants, armed with a rifle and handgun, continued to fire. Uninjured, the officers left their vehicle: one officer charged towards one suspect while his partner pursued the other. Numerous shots were fired by the officers at the escaping suspects without apparent effect. This was the only coordinated ambush attack in which the victim officers were not injured. Although several rounds were fired by the assailants, the exact number is undetermined.

Known or estimated range figures for these ambush attacks indicate that the average range of engagement was 8.5 yards, slightly in excess of the range for direct assault attacks and again greatly

below the average range of sniping attacks. Two attacks were initiated at ranges of approximately five yards, one at a range of slightly over seven yards, and one at a range of 17 yards.

Eight (14.5 percent) of the 55 victim officers were subjected to ambush attacks. No fatalities were inflicted by assailants in these events; however, six (30 percent) were wounded and two (7.1 percent) escaped injury out of the 20 and 28 officers respectively, who were victims of all types of ambush attacks.

In conclusion, assailants conducting coordinated ambush attacks killed none, injured 75 percent, and failed to injure 25 percent of their victims. All of the victim officers saw their assailants; two officers were alerted by their senses to the threat of an impending attack.

Entrapment

For the purpose of this study, entrapment ambushes are defined as those events in which the assailant or assailants employed some ruse to lure the victim officers into a preselected fire zone.

On-Duty Officers. Twenty-seven (55.1 percent) of 49 on-duty victim officers were attacked while they were simply performing the routine duties of their assignment. But 15 (30.6 percent) of the on-duty victim officers were on dispatch at the time they were attacked, and seven (14.3 percent) were conducting on-view police activities when ambushed. Although two on-duty victim officers, who were routinely performing their duties, happened by chance to drive through a fire zone minutes after their assailants had attempted to lure other officers into it, such entrapment techniques were most frequently encountered by on-duty personnel while on a call or handling an on-view incident.

Six of the 15 victim officers on dispatch were responding to burglar alarms. In one event, the alarm was set off by an assailant who minutes before had killed a police cadet and injured a police lieutenant at a different location. Two officers responded and one was immediately shot and killed. It is impossible to determine if this alarm was set off accidentally while the assailant was seeking temporary shelter or if the alarm was set off for the explicit purpose of drawing police officers to the scene. In another event, four officers responded to an alarm at a grocery store and upon investigation discovered that no entry had been made. Minutes later these officers were fired upon while in the immediate area.

Four officers were on dispatch to serve warrants when ambushed. There was no evidence of entrapment in these events. Three officers were dispatched as a result of fraudulent telephone calls that clearly indicated the use of entrapment techniques. In one event, a deputy sheriff on duty at a county jail received a call from a man reporting a drunk on a highway. He drove to the location but could not find anyone. As he was returning to his car, he was shot and injured by an assailant in a passing automobile.

In the other event, an anonymous telephone call was received reporting a fictitious accident, luring two officers to an ambush site. The time was in the early morning hours, and, according to the information given by the caller, the accident had occurred in a dead-end street located in a neighborhood noted for its anti-police sentiment. A two-man unit was dispatched to that location where the officers were ambushed. No injuries were sustained in this event.

One officer was ambushed when he was dispatched to examine an area that had been the scene of a previous sniping incident. Another officer was ambushed when he was dispatched to take a "miscellaneous report." In reality, however, a communications failure had occurred and the "miscellaneous report" concerned a sniping ambush, as this officer soon learned when he arrived at the scene. Both officers escaped injury in these events.

Two of the seven on-duty officers ambushed while performing on-view police activities were conducting traffic stops. Another officer was observing the occupants of a vehicle that had turned into a deserted parking lot. Two other officers had just been assaulted by a group of youths throwing bottles and were leaving the area when fired upon. There was no hard evidence of entrapment in any of these events.

Two other officers ambushed while performing on-view police activities may have been the victims of entrapment. In this event, a fire bomb was exploded in the street as the officers approached in a two-man unit. When the officers halted their vehicle to investigate, an assailant attempted to run them down.

Off-Duty Officers. Four of the six off-duty officers ambushed were victims of entrapment techniques. Though off-duty, three of these four officers were performing police functions when shot. One officer was employed as a security guard in the parking lot of a bar and restaurant. As he walked to confer with the manager, someone told him that he had left the lights of his personal vehicle on. When he returned to his vehicle, he was shot and killed from behind at close range.

Two other off-duty officers were lured to an ambush site by two teenagers. The officers had previously interrupted their meal at a restaurant to issue a traffic citation to one of these youths. After receiving the ticket the teenagers armed themselves, returned to the restaurant, broke into the officers' car, and stole the ticket book. The two youths then drove by at a high rate of speed as the officers exited the restaurant and discovered the theft. The officers then took up pursuit. The teenagers turned into an alley, abandoned their vehicle, and shot the approaching officers with shotguns, injuring both.

Another officer, an undercover agent, was driving to work when his automobile was struck lightly in the rear by another vehicle. Apparently, the agent pulled over and stopped, and the operator of the other vehicle approached the agent's car from the rear, reached through the open left front window, and stabbed his victim several times with a large knife. The assailant in this event had previously identified the agent's residence and on several occasions may have observed the agent as he traveled to and from his place of employment.

Self-Defense and Counterattack

In 11 (34.4 percent) of the 32 ambush incidents studied, victim police officers were able to use their weapons in self-defense or counterattack. Thirty-seven shots were fired by 13 officers, with seven (18.5 percent) known hits scored by two (15.4 percent) officers. One of the two officers scoring hits was wounded prior to the time that he fired his weapon. One officer scored six hits firing point blank at an assailant who continued his ambush attack even though he had just been shot numerous times by other officers. The other officer, who was rated as an expert in firearms proficiency, hit his assailant in the buttocks with one of two rounds fired.

Fatalities. All of the seven law enforcement personnel killed were immediately rendered unable to defend themselves.

Injuries. Only five of the 20 officers suffering non-fatal injuries returned fire, with the following results:

- In two events, the victims were passengers in police vehicles that came under automatic weapons fire. In one event, the police vehicle was driven several hundred feet before the injured officer was able to fire two shots. In the second event, the police car was blocked by other vehicles from clearing the fire zone. One shot was fired at the fleeing assailants.
- In two other ambush attack events, the officer, wounded by a shot fired from a passing vehicle, fired at the vehicle without apparent effect.
- In the fifth event, an officer was shot in the chest without warning. Although severely wounded, this officer later managed to fire six shots, participating in the slaying of his assailant.

Non-Injuries. In six events, eight officers who were ambushed, but not injured, returned fire. In one event, two officers fired at an assailant who had wounded a fellow officer. The assailant escaped but was later killed by other officers. In three other events, the officer, alone and on foot, returned the fire of his assailant without apparent effect. In a fifth event, two officers in a police vehicle were fired upon by two assailants from opposite sides of a street. The vehicle struck a tree, and the officers abandoned the automobile to pursue the suspects on foot, firing several shots without apparent effect. In the sixth event, an off-duty officer was fired upon while driving his personal automobile. The officer left his vehicle and fired two shots at his assailant, hitting him once. He pursued the suspect to his home and, with the assistance of another officer, made an arrest without resorting to further gunfire. Figure 5 contains selected data regarding the use of firearms by victim officers.

Cover and Evasive Action

In many ambush attack events, law enforcement personnel did not use available cover and failed to take effective evasive action when assaulted. These officers needlessly exposed themselves to death or serious injury in a variety of ways. In perhaps the most tragic instance of this kind, an officer was shot and mortally wounded as he exited a police vehicle. His partner abandoned the protection of the police vehicle and rushed to render aid. He was also shot and killed. Unknown to both officers, their assailant was shooting from a carefully selected firing position located to the rear of the police vehicle. The officers' actions placed them squarely in the ambusher's line of fire.

In the ambush cases studied, police vehicles provided protection to their occupants in several instances. In six events, the operator of the vehicle cleared the fire zone in a timely manner. In each of these events, prompt and effective evasive action was made possible through immediate vehicle mobility. The vehicle occupants also reduced their vulnerability by quickly lowering themselves into their automobile's interior.

Event	Number of Officers Firing	Wounded Officer Firing	Number of Shots Fired	Fired at Assailant	Fired at Vehicle	Fired in General Direction of Assailant	Number of Known Hits
One	1	No	5	X			
	1	No	1	X			
Two	1	No	3			X	
Three	1	Yes	2		X		
Four	1	Yes	1	X			
Five	1	No	5		X		
Six	1	No	5	X			
	1	No	2	X			
Seven	1	Yes	1		X		
Eight	1	Yes	1		X		
Nine	1	No	3	X			
Ten	1	No	2	X			1
Eleven	1	Yes	6	X			6

**Figure 5
VICTIM PERSONNEL USE OF FIREARMS**

VICTIM LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL

Geographic Distribution

The 55 victim officers were employed by law enforcement agencies located in 15 states and the District of Columbia. Distribution by state is reflected in Figure 6. As indicated in Figure 7, over half (54.5 percent) of the victims were from the Mid and South Atlantic regions.

State	Fatal	Injury	Non-Injury	Total
New York		9	5	14
California		2	6	8
Pennsylvania	2	1	3	6
Louisiana	2	1	1	4
Maryland		1	3	4
Georgia		1	3	4
Kansas			3	3
Indiana			2	2
Tennessee			2	2
Minnesota		2		2
Massachusetts	1			1
Illinois	1			1
Texas	1			1
West Virginia		1		1
Mississippi		1		1
District of Columbia		1		1
TOTAL	7	20	28	55

Figure 6
AMBUSH VICTIM DISTRIBUTION BY STATE

Agency Category

Members of municipal police departments were most often the victims (87.3 percent) of ambush attack. However, the agency jurisdiction of the other victim officers suggests that no member of any law enforcement agency is entirely immune from ambush attack.

Geographic Region	Ambush Victims				Percent of National Total
	Fatal	Injury	Non-Injury	Total	
New England Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont	1			1	1.8
Middle Atlantic New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania	2	10	8	20	36.4
East North Central Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin	1		2	3	5.5
West North Central Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota		2	3	5	9.1
South Atlantic Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Washington, D.C., North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia		4	6	10	18.2
East South Central Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee		1	2	3	5.5
West South Central Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas	3	1	1	5	9.1
Mountain Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming					
Pacific Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington		2	6	8	14.5
TOTAL	7	20	28	55	100.1*

*Rounding off individual figures causes total to be different from 100.0.

Figure 7
REPORTED AMBUSH VICTIMS BY REGION

Law Enforcement Jurisdiction	Population	Ambush Victims			
		Fatal	Injury	Non-Injury	Total
New York City, N.Y.	8,000,000		8	5	13
Los Angeles, Ca.	2,812,000		1		1
Philadelphia, Pa.	2,000,000			3	3
Houston, Tx.	1,233,000	1			1
Baltimore, Md.	906,000		1	3	4
Washington, D.C.	780,000		1		1
Memphis, Tn.	665,000			2	2
New Orleans, La.	600,000	2	1	1	4
St. Paul, Minn.	310,000		2		2
Wichita, Ks.	275,000			3	3
Riverside, Ca.	146,000			6	6
Evansville, In.	141,000			2	2
Fall River, Ma.	98,000	1			1
Compton, Ca.	79,000		1		1
Attala County, Ms.	30,000		1		1
Upper Dublin, Pa.	21,000		1		1
Kennett Square, Pa.	5,000	2			2
Montgomery, W.V.	2,500		1		1
Lavonia, Ga.	2,000		1	3	4
Illinois Bureau of Investigation	N/A	1			1
Long Island State Parkway Police	N/A		1		1
TOTAL		7	20	28	55

Figure 8
VICTIM PERSONNEL LAW ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION POPULATIONS

Agency Jurisdiction	Victim Personnel
Municipal	87.3%
County	9.1%
State	<u>3.6%</u>
	100.0%

Jurisdiction Populations

As Figure 8 shows, the populations of law enforcement jurisdictions in which officers were attacked from ambush ranged from the most heavily populated urban centers in the United States to small country towns having less than 3,000 inhabitants.

Rank or Position

The 55 ambush victims reflected varying law enforcement job classifications and levels of authority as indicated in Figure 9.

Victim Rank or Status	Killed	Injured	Non-Casualties	Total
Police Officers	5	14	24	43
Police Cadet	1			1
State Investigator	1			1
Sheriff's Deputies		2	1	3
Lieutenants		2		2
Sergeants		2		2
Reserve Deputies			2	2
Police Chief			1	1
TOTAL	7	20	28	55

Figure 9
VICTIM RANK OR STATUS

Duty Status and Dress

The great majority of ambushed law enforcement personnel were on duty (89.1 percent) and in uniform (83.6 percent) at the time of the attack.

Duty Status	Dress	
	Uniform	Plainclothes
On-Duty	46	3
Off-Duty	1	5
TOTAL	47	8

On-Duty/In Uniform. Among the 46 officers on-duty and in uniform, six were killed and 17 were wounded; the remainder (50 percent) escaped injury.

Off-Duty/In Uniform. One officer, who was off-duty but in uniform, was shot and killed in the parking lot of the restaurant where he was employed.

Off-Duty/Plainclothes. One of the five off-duty plainclothes officers was riding in a patrol car driven by a uniformed officer when he was struck by a bullet. A second off-duty officer in plainclothes was driving his own vehicle when fired upon; he was not injured. Two off-duty officers in plainclothes were wounded by shotgun fire when they drove a private car into a dead end street while chasing two youths that they had recently cited for a traffic violation. A fifth off-duty officer in plainclothes, an undercover agent, was ambushed and killed by a man he had previously arrested.

On-Duty/Plainclothes. One on-duty officer dressed in plainclothes was in an unmarked vehicle providing backup protection for two uniformed officers conducting a traffic investigation when shot and wounded by an unknown assailant. The two other on-duty officers wearing plainclothes had completed their tour as an anti-ambush backup unit and were returning to their station house in an unmarked vehicle when they were fired upon by a man who recognized them as policemen. They were not injured.

Duty Assignments

Forty-nine on-duty law enforcement personnel were attacked while performing a wide variety of activities. The largest number of victim officers reflected routine motor patrol assignments, but attacks were also conducted against officers detailed to duty on fixed posts or on foot patrol, as summarized in Figure 10.

Age

The average age of law enforcement personnel killed was 28 years, 11 months, and 16 days. The youngest fatality was a 19 year-old police cadet, less than 3 weeks short of his 20th birthday; the oldest, a 38 year-old suburban police officer. The average age of personnel suffering non-fatal injuries was 32 years, 8 months, and 16 days. The youngest, a 22 year-old municipal police officer; the oldest, a 50 year-old sergeant of a large urban police force. The average age of personnel escaping injury was 29 years, 1 month, and 23 days. The youngest was a 21 year-old reserve deputy sheriff; the oldest a 55 year-old chief of a small rural department.

involved in a large variety of other violent criminal activities: the planning and execution of numerous bank holdups as well as ambush attacks against police officers.

Prior to its neutralization in 1973, the notoriety that this group received created fear and apprehension among law enforcement personnel and citizens alike. Reports by investigating agencies and available evidence on the extensive activities of the Black Liberation Army (BLA) in one major urban area revealed many facts dispelling some of the rumors and mystique associated with this group:

- There were not more than 25 to 30 hard core members in the Black Liberation Army.
- Associates or sympathizers numbered approximately 75 persons.
- The criminal acts attributable to this group were largely committed by ten to 15 members of the hard core group.
- Although a fringe element of associates or sympathizers could have been involved, this same hard core nucleus formed a "flying squad" that traveled to other cities to commit crimes, including ambush attacks of police officers.
- The Black Liberation Army mainly consisted of former and present members of the Black Panther Party. These persons were members of a faction driven underground as a result of their criminal acts. In addition to ambush attacks, these individuals carried out bank robberies, holdups, assaults, larcenies, and murders.
- Although their garbled ideology demonstrated Marxist influence, there were no known members of the American Communist Party in the Black Liberation Army.
- Evidence indicated that the BLA group obtained weapons by purchase in various parts of the country, by robbing gun stores and armories, and by attacking armed law enforcement personnel. It is also believed that some arms were acquired from returning Vietnam veterans.

Weapons Employed

Assailants used a wide variety of weapons in the 32 ambush attack events under examination ranging from a knife to a 12 gauge shotgun. The most common weapons employed were .22 caliber handguns (6) and .22 caliber rifles (4). Weapon caliber was confirmed by actual recovery of the weapon, by analysis of the spent shell cases found at the scene of the ambush, and by analysis of bullets removed from the victims. The following list categorizes the type and number of weapons used:

BB or Pellet gun	1
.22 caliber handguns	6
.22 caliber rifles	4
.223 caliber semi-automatic rifle	1
.25 caliber ACP	2
.32 caliber handgun	2
.38 Special caliber handgun	3

9mm automatic SMG	3
.44 Magnum carbine	1
.308 FN rifle	1
.410 shotgun	1
20 gauge shotgun	2
12 gauge shotgun	1
Knife	1
Automobile	1

In addition, other estimated calibers or types of weapons employed by assailants were reported by victims and witnesses to consist of:

Unknown weapon/caliber	2
Rifle, heavy caliber unknown	2
Large caliber handgun	1
Small caliber handgun/rifle	4

Number Assigned Suspect	Number of Officers Killed	Number of Officers Injured	Number of Officers Non-Casualties	How Apprehended	Age	Race	Height	Build	Known Previous History of Emotional Disturbance
One	2	1	1	Killed	23	Black	5' 7"	Slender	Unsuitability discharge from military service because of character and behavior disorder.
Two	2	0	0	Arrested	28	White	5' 7"	Medium	None
Three	1	0	0	Arrested	25	White	5' 5"	Medium	None
Four	1	0	0	Arrested	25	White	6' 0"	Medium	Unconfirmed reports of alteration in behavior patterns attributed to narcotics.
Five	1	0	0	Arrested	25	Black	5' 9½"	Slender	Dishonorable discharge from military service. Psychiatric diagnosis chronic, severe passive aggressive personality with manifested hostility.
Six	0	1	3	Shot and Killed	55	Black	5' 11"	Medium	Committed seven times to hospitals possibly for mental illness.
Seven	0	1	0	Shot and Arrested	22	White	6' 2"	Slender	None
Eight	0	2	0	Arrested	17	White	5' 8"	Medium	None
Nine				Arrested	15	White	5' 7½"	Medium	None
Ten	0	3	0	Killed	25	White	5' 6"	Slender	None
Eleven	0	0	2	Arrested	38	Black	5' 10"	Medium	None
Twelve	0	0	2	Arrested	33	Black	5' 9"	Medium	None
Thirteen	0	0	1	Shot and Arrested	18	Black	6' 0"	Medium	None
Fourteen	0	0	2	Arrested	17	Black	5' 5"	Small	None
Fifteen				Arrested	19	Black	5' 7"	Small	None

Figure 11
CHARACTERISTICS OF AMBUSH SUSPECTS APPREHENDED OR KILLED

Prior Criminal Activity	Weapon Used	Circumstances of Ambush Attack	Motive for Ambush Attack
No Arrest Record	.44 Cal. Magnum Carbine	Unprovoked attack of two officers at police jail - lying in wait for two officers responding to burglar alarm.	Racial hatreds developed while in military service. "My death lies in the bloody death of racist pigs, and political power comes from the barrel of a gun."
Arrest Record including Burglary, Larceny, Receiving Stolen Goods, and Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles.	.308 Cal. Rifle	Fired from carefully selected position in rear of police station.	Had declared to magistrate that he would kill one of the victim officers because of alleged harassment.
Arrest Record including Drunk and Disorderly Conduct, Assault and Battery, Robbery, Auto Theft, and Narcotics. Awaiting Trial on Drug Charges.	.38 Cal. Revolver	Approached officer in one-man patrol car, drew weapon and emptied cylinder.	Motive Unknown.
Arrest Record including Destruction of Property, Possession of Liquor, Disorderly Conduct, and Sale of Marijuana. Awaiting Trial on Drug Charges.	Knife	Halted officer in unmarked police vehicle and attacked without warning.	Had threatened to bomb officer's house in retaliation for previous arrest on narcotics offense.
Arrest Record including Shoplifting, Theft, Burglary, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle, and Aggravated Assault; also suspected of Murder.	.38 Cal. Revolver 22 Cal. Revolver	Fired from close range at officer standing in parking lot.	Motive Unknown.
No Arrest Record	.22 Cal. Revolver	Fired upon officers approaching residence in vehicles to serve warrant.	Motive Unknown. Possibly in state of extreme mental agitation.
No Arrest Record	.410 Ga. Shotgun	Sneaked up stairs, obtained gun, fired without warning down hallway.	Victim officer was participating in arrest of suspect's friend.
Arrest Record including Destruction of Property, Disorderly Conduct, Assault, Possession of Marijuana, Auto Theft, and Larceny.	.20 Ga. Shotgun	Lured officers to alley and opened fire.	Officers had previously issued a traffic citation to one of the suspects.
Arrest Record including Destruction of Property, Tampering with an Automobile, and Larceny.	.20 Ga. Shotgun		
No Arrest Record	.22 Cal. Revolver .38 Special Cal. Revolver	Entered police station and began shooting.	Motive Unknown.
Arrest Record including Larceny, Gambling, Possession and Sale of Heroin, Possession of Firearms, and Resisting Arrest.	.32 Cal. Revolver	Fired at two plainclothes officers in passing unmarked vehicle.	Motive Unknown.
Arrest Record including Burglary, Larceny, Criminal Trespassing, Assault, and Resisting Arrest.	Molotov Cocktail and Automobile	Exploded firebomb, attempted to run down officers with automobile.	Motive Unknown.
Arrest Record including Burglary, Assault, Vandalism, Disorderly Conduct, and Possession of a Firearm.	.32 Cal. Revolver	Fired at off-duty officer stopped at traffic light in private vehicle.	Victim officer had previously arrested fellow gang member for armed robbery.
Arrest Record including Vandalism, Trespassing, Disorderly Conduct, Burglary, Larceny, Robbery, and Aggravated Assault and Battery. On Probation.	.22 Cal. Rifle	Fired from high rise apartment building at officers in street below.	Claimed to have fired without any reason.
Arrest Record including Vandalism, Disorderly Conduct, Larceny Of Auto, Arson, Burglary, and Assault and Battery. On Probation.			

SECTION TWO

AMBUSH COUNTERMEASURES

INTRODUCTION

Most ambush attacks against police personnel are conceived and executed by individuals, generally acting alone without ties to criminal organizations or other groups. In some instances, a police officer known to the assailant is selectively identified, but the majority of attacks appear to be random occurrences—indiscriminant assaults triggered simply by the sight of a police uniform or vehicle. Although ideology and deviant social attitudes are sometimes decisive, motives for ambush attacks are frequently difficult to identify and often are known only to the assailants.

Times, places, configurations, and methods of ambush attacks frequently do not evidence any readily suggested common denominators; almost anyone, even females and juveniles, can successfully ambush a police officer. An ambush attack, whether elaborately or hastily planned and executed, can be carried out without difficult, time consuming, or complex preparation: no special skills are required. The means and opportunity to carry out a deadly assault against a police officer are generally readily at hand. A suitable weapon is easily procured and concealed on or about the person. Targets are easily recognized and potential victims can usually be approached in a straightforward manner; or, where necessary, hidden or inconspicuous firing positions can be located and occupied without real fear of interference, and movement to and from the ambush site by foot or automobile can be accomplished without attracting suspicion.

Even a well-planned and coordinated attack need involve only two armed gunman standing casually on a busy street. Predictable recurring patterns of behavior and physical circumstances that could be identified and isolated as reliable indicators of an assailant personality or ambush attack probability are largely nonexistent. Thus, effective prevention or defense against ambush attacks is extremely difficult.

The problem of ambush countermeasures is further complicated by the nature of police work. Officers must provide service to all sectors of the community. They deal, for the most part, with people and to be effective, the law enforcement officer is required to remain in close, continuous contact with the public and move aggressively from place to place wherever police presence and assistance are needed.

Although the police officer must be prepared, he cannot adopt an overly defensive posture of extreme caution and still perform his mission. Nor, for that matter, are police officers inclined to do so. Most officers realize that only a very small percentage of the population pose a threat for executing an ambush attack, and officers generally are determined that concern about ambush attack will not be permitted to obstruct the complete and satisfactory performance of the police mission.

For these reasons, such simplistic solutions to the problem as providing a bullet proof environment to the police officer—assuming for the moment that it is technologically or procedurally possible—are quickly exposed as no solutions at all. Similarly, the design and

implementation of highly specialized and constricting tactics, the procurement of an inventory of threat-unique equipment, and the intensive training of law enforcement personnel in the use of such tactics and equipment is no final solution. Such a narrow approach ignores the critical realities of police funding, staffing, deployment and, most important of all, the real requirements of operational conditions in the everyday policing of the modern community.

To be practical and productive, tactics, equipment, and training for ambush countermeasures must complement the requirements of the total law enforcement mission and the effective procedures for accomplishing that mission. Fortunately, defense against ambush can realistically be approached through the application of conventional law enforcement capabilities and resources in tactics, equipment, and training that are, for the most part, now at hand or readily available. In most instances, the application and refinement of standing operational procedures and tactics, the proper employment of items of police equipment now in inventory, and, especially, the orientation of current training programs to include the problem of ambush attack should produce a substantial measure of risk reduction.

Sound tactics and procedures backed by adequate equipment and good training can reduce risks from the threat of ambush attack. A straightforward common sense approach to the problem will produce a number of new and improved policies, procedures, and tactics that will increase the protection of law enforcement personnel and assist them in defending against the ambush attack.

The following discussion is based upon interviews with experienced and knowledgeable police officers, many of whom were involved in ambush attacks; a search, review, and analysis of recent ambush attacks; and a survey and evaluation of practical law enforcement technology. It considers the opportunities for risk reduction in such critical areas as leadership, community relations, individual alertness, minimization of exposure, off-duty employment policies, the K-9 dog, intelligence, defense against entrapment, evasive action and self-defense, communications, patrol vehicle manning, back-up vehicles, and wounded officer rescue. Its purpose is to present a general framework for problem solving from which law enforcement agencies can develop and refine specific procedures and tactics to fit their particular needs.

LEADERSHIP AND POLICY FORMULATION

No other expression of human violence has such immediate and drastic effect upon the morale of law enforcement personnel as the ambush attack. The law enforcement officer expects and accepts the threat of bodily injury as an ever present hazard of the normal, daily duties of his vocation. He knows that from time to time he may have to use lawful force to protect his community from criminal activities and that others may seek to employ violence against him to thwart his efforts. The prospect of incurring harm in the line of duty is regarded by most officers as an inherent part of the police role.

Such is not the case with an ambush attack. The police officer does not expect, nor can he readily accept, the threat of being purposely killed or severely injured by unknown assailants executing an attack by total surprise. Nor can he readily cope with the threat of being singled out and attacked at any moment for no other reason than the wearing of a police uniform. The suddenness, the deliberate malice, and the calculated unpredictability of the ambush attack sharply distinguishes its psychological effect from the kind of incoherent and disorderly, but immediately event-related, violence which most experienced law enforcement officers have come to expect.

Invariably, the threat of ambush attack, if permitted to freely influence the imagination, will produce fear, tension, and suspicion. The officer may come to imagine that he is a member of an occupying army in a hostile land, and his behavior is apt to reflect this attitude.

This kind of adverse reaction was very evident among the personnel of two large urban departments visited by the IACP Casualty Analysis staff. Several ambush attacks had occurred in these jurisdictions and many officers were convinced that they were the targets of highly organized and tightly disciplined conspiracies of national scope. Obviously, this common belief, which in large part remained unchecked for considerable periods of time, created a volatile operational situation. Even a single, ineffectual ambush attack can evoke widespread apprehension. In one of the 32 events examined in this study, an assailant fired at and slightly wounded an officer driving a one-man unit. Many of this agency's patrolmen immediately armed themselves with their own unauthorized rifles and shotguns. There can be little doubt that the dramatic emotional climates produced in these departments by ambush attacks were contrary to the requirements of effective police operations and posed severe problems to both the law enforcement agencies and the communities they served.

Though policies, procedures, and tactics for ambush defense will vary in part as the situation warrants, an objective informed assessment of the realities of the problem must serve as the common denominator of all management responses wherever they are developed and implemented. Police leaders cannot allow themselves to become captives of the problem of ambush attack. They must observe, evaluate, and take realistic steps to deal with problems at hand and this is not often an easy task. Law enforcement managers and supervisory personnel must recognize the anxieties of their subordinates on the one hand, while on the other hand, must avoid needless posturing. The forceful presentation and supervision of practical, well thought-out measures and means for ambush attack defense is a prime goal of productive leadership.

The Management Response

The crippling psychological environment often created by the threat of ambush attack can be met and countered by positive leadership. Inaction will be perceived as a lack of concern and this can strike a heavy blow to the morale of an entire agency or department. In the policeman's eyes, his superiors should react to threats to the safety of personnel and lead all endeavors toward risk reduction. Though they do not seek paternalism, police officers generally expect and respond to positive, confident leadership from their superiors, and leaders must respond to this expectation. Their actions can help maintain perspective, preserve morale, and limit the risk of ambush attack.

Police officers expect that unprovoked attacks against members of their agency will be considered exceptional events and pursued appropriately. Because of the social and organizational implications of ambush attacks, most police executives will elect to respond to such events with a balanced but vigorous effort to identify and apprehend assailants. Where arrests are made, the effective police leader will take or initiate those steps necessary to see that police ambush assailants are promptly and fairly prosecuted. Every law enforcement agency should closely monitor the disposition of ambush assailants in the criminal justice system to insure that these individuals are being appropriately processed and to detect *patterns* of disposition that may require or suggest further action by the police executive. This is an especially important task, for if suspects who have been apprehended escape punishment through lack of vigorous prosecution or inadequate penal sanctions, police morale is likely to be damaged.

Where departments are faced with a rash of non-injury ambush incidents, it may be necessary for the police leadership to develop and execute a positive program to convince the public and the remainder of the criminal justice community of the seriousness of such events.

While the foregoing *reactive* measures are an important part of the responsibility of the law enforcement leader, even more vital are those steps that evidence interest and concern before the fact. Law enforcement managers and supervisory personnel can most effectively demonstrate their concern through the development and implementation of effective policies, procedures, and tactics for ambush defense. Sound expertise must be applied immediately to this pressing task, for there are likely to be many others anxious to seize the initiative and attempt to establish their own, often hasty and ill-advised, recommendations regarding what must be done to defend against ambush attacks. Indeed it is often true that after the dramatic execution of a serious ambush attack, there is a rush to be heard by the media, organized private groups, professional associations, elected public officials and others. If the urgency of the situation is not defused by the business-like dissemination of persuasive and authoritative policies, procedures, and tactical instructions by responsible law enforcement officials, a needless and unwarranted atmosphere of crises may result. Not only will this contribute to the decay of police morale, but it is also likely to increase friction and tension within the community.

The Role of the Community

Good community relations, one of the major responsibilities of the police executive, are especially important in the context of ambush countermeasures. Isolated instances of excessive force, callousness, discourtesy, petty corruption, or similar acts of poor judgment distort rapport with the community. Recurring conduct of this kind can, if allowed to continue, sever the community from its police force. When the police and their community do not work together, the safety of all police officers is needlessly jeopardized.

If the public becomes hostile, wary, or indifferent to the police presence, the objective of the potential assailant is facilitated. In a few instances, ambush attacks against law enforcement personnel have undoubtedly received active encouragement or at least tacit approval by people in the community. When this occurs, the assailant may continue to commit attacks, or stimulate others to imitate his example. If the community does not actively support the assailant, it may nevertheless tolerate his activities and fail to assist law enforcement personnel. This robs the police officer of friendly eyes and ears and allows the assailant to operate without real fear of hindrance or interference from neighbors, bystanders, and witnesses.

Good community relations, a very important and useful facet of the everyday law enforcement mission, can aid in deterring potential ambush assailants. A cooperative community with confidence in, and respect for, its law enforcement personnel is a decidedly adverse setting for many kinds of ambush attacks. The opportunities for detection and apprehension of the assailant are increased, as are the chances of his attack being spoiled. If the community is sympathetic to the police and the assailant is a local resident, many of the tactical advantages of operating in home territory become disadvantages. For example, in a community hostile to the police, the assailant may carry on his preparations with relative impunity because he is known to other residents, but in a community that is sympathetic to the police, the many residents who know the assailant, and can therefore readily identify him, represent a continuing danger. Faced with an environment that is hostile to him, rather than to the police, the would-be assailant, if capable of rational calculation, may be

dissuaded from his purpose altogether or forced to relocate to an unfamiliar area where his lack of knowledge of the neighborhood and local conditions may reduce the opportunities for a successful ambush attack.

Though it is sometimes difficult to establish a direct and obvious correlation between good community relations and the frequency of ambush attacks, law enforcement managers and supervisory personnel must continue to impress upon all officers the importance of good rapport with the community. Hollow exhortations are not adequate. The many tangible benefits that accrue from good cooperation between the community and its police force must be pointed out to every officer. Not the least of these dividends is increased individual safety from ambush attacks.

FIELD OPERATIONS

Most ambush attacks are carried out against patrol and investigative personnel in the field. While target hardening of police vehicles and facilities may be indicated in some jurisdictions, the greatest potential for risk reduction lies in improved preventive and reactive field procedures and tactics.

Avoiding the Ambush

Individual Alertness. The best defense against ambush attack is often the alert use of the senses prior to the attack. A watchful officer has a good chance of detecting possible ambush attack situations and is thereby able to seize the initiative and take appropriate action to avoid, deter, or neutralize his attacker. A complacent officer has a good chance of becoming a casualty.

The officer should know and observe his territory. The application of normal powers of perception and reasoning, reinforced by accumulated professional experience and knowledge of individuals, events, and things can produce an "early warning" that signifies a need to be wary. A few of the officers who were victims of the ambush attacks analyzed in this study vaguely sensed something amiss prior to the attack, but almost all failed to respond quickly to the danger signals they perceived.

In only one event did the officers become actively suspicious and take appropriate action. Officers can be alerted by a variety of stimuli. In one attempted ambush, the officer's knowledge of his patrol area and the usual activities of its inhabitants combined with a quick sensory reading of his immediate surroundings enabled him to spoil the attack of an assailant lying in wait:

A foot patrolman turned a corner and entered a block that was normally, at that hour, filled with people escaping the summer heat of their homes. The officer instantly became aware of the absence of noise and a quick glance revealed the street was deserted. The officer, who usually patrolled about a foot from the curb to better observe the interiors of doorways, entered the recess of one of the doorways he had just inspected and radioed his dispatcher, relaying his suspicions and requesting a patrol car inspection of the block. His request was filled and the inspection was made with negative results.

The officer was called back to headquarters and a two-man patrol was instituted in the area for the balance of the evening. Several days later the officer learned from an informant that a young man he had previously arrested had boasted that he was planning to kill the officer that evening as the officer patrolled that particular block. This was confirmed by the suspect

himself when he was later arrested. He admitted he had observed the officer enter the block and was puzzled when the officer left his view. When he observed the patrol car slowly cruise the street and pick up the officer, he abandoned his assault plan.

In an ambush attack that occurred outside of the time frame under consideration in this study, the behavior and appearance of an individual provided the tip-off to an impending attack that enabled an officer to take prompt evasive action:

An officer reported that he had observed a suspicious looking individual lounging near a tree. After passing the man, his suspicions aroused, the officer glanced at his side view mirror just as the man raised a rifle. In a reflex action, the officer stepped on his accelerator as his rear window shattered. The rapid departure generated by his glance into the rear view mirror may have denied his assailant a second or third shot.

Officers must discipline themselves to be alert at all times and in any circumstances. A keen awareness of the environment is one of the most important steps the individual officer can take to reduce his risk of ambush attack: the use of the senses is the first and most critical link in the protective chain. This fact must be constantly stressed to the inexperienced officer.

In addition to being constantly alert to his environment, the field officer can also recognize and attempt to minimize his vulnerability or exposure. The times and places at which officers are likely to be found on a regular basis greatly simplify the assailant's target acquisition and increase the possibility of ambush attack. Police stations and places where coffee breaks are taken provide excellent opportunities for target engagement. An officer standing under a street light while issuing a citation to a traffic violator or walking a regular night foot patrol, in which the officer is frequently silhouetted against lighted display windows, are other instances of increased exposure.

The marked patrol car has a similar vulnerability in signalling the presence and location of police officers. Officers assigned to patrol cars are almost always in or near their automobile. Moreover, the increased mobility of the car brings it and its occupants under observation by large numbers of people. If regular routes are followed, the danger increases even more.

The practice of making regular stops in patrol vehicles is extremely dangerous, and this is especially true if well illuminated parking spots are chosen. For example, in one of the ambush attack events examined in this study, the victim officers were following a "high visibility" departmental policy that made them particularly vulnerable to an assailant. This ambush occurred in a high crime area where all uniformed personnel had been instructed by their supervisors to maintain an obvious presence. Officers assigned to patrol vehicles had been advised to park in conspicuous locations at night when writing reports. In accordance with this policy, two officers parked at a lighted intersection while a third officer, who was on foot patrol, entered the vehicle to write a report. This parking location, next to a high-rise apartment building, had been used by police units many times before. Obviously, any potential ambush assailant could have expected that this location would be used again, and good street lighting made this a particularly inviting spot at which to execute a lying-in-wait sniping ambush. These officers were attacked by an assailant firing a small caliber weapon at a range of approximately 200 feet. One officer was injured in this event.

These kinds of exposure are the inevitable outcome of normal police operations, and it is unrealistic to imagine that they can all be eliminated. Obviously, police stations cannot be done

away with; there are good reasons for stopping a traffic violator under a street light or for encouraging a high visibility show of presence in high crime areas; police officers must patrol commercial districts; and the marked patrol car is an integral part of modern police operations. The informed exercise of caution can, however, reduce the risks inherent in such situations. Officers must be aware that they are vulnerable to ambush attack and that vulnerability increases in situations of high visibility whenever and wherever officers congregate, regularly appear, or remain for any length of time. Although none of the ambush events during the period covered by this report involved explosives, an earlier publication by the IACP pointed out the importance of target patterning in such attacks.²

When investigating service calls, officers must avoid the complacency that frequently develops in routine situations. Many potential fire zones or possible assailant locations can be identified by the officer if he pauses briefly to make a survey of the scene. As indicated in Figures 12 and 13, the alert officer can also quickly determine what cover and concealment is available, the best protected approach to and from the scene, and the existence of possible escape routes and positions of refuge that can be used to achieve safety if fired upon. Having done this, the officer can evaluate his situation and then plan and carry out a course of action calculated to reduce his vulnerability to ambush attack without hindering the performance of his duties. Again, the key is the exercise of informed caution.

Defense Against Entrapment. Ambushes initiated through the use of entrapment techniques are frequently the most dangerous of all ambush attacks. These techniques, however, are simple and easily detected by experienced personnel, and usually succeed only when officers have failed to be alert and use common sense caution. There are several things a potential victim officer can do to avoid being lured into a fire zone:

Expect the Unexpected. When responding to any call or on-view occurrence, law enforcement personnel must be psychologically prepared for an unprovoked attack. Proper mental preparation can be a life-saver. Even the most ordinary and innocuous occurrence must be approached with caution. Some degree of the officer's powers of observation and concentration must be always "reserved" to detect and defend against a surprise attack.

Suspect the Unusual. Entrapment techniques are often clumsy and not well thought-out. Anonymous complaints or calls reporting incidents at odd hours or out-of-the-way places that require the dispatch of law enforcement personnel to the scene should instantly sound a danger signal. Often such calls can be defeated through good complaint and communications procedures. Officers or complaint clerks who take service calls should always ask for a call-back number. If the caller refuses to give a call-back number, this fact should be reported to the officer(s) assigned the call. If the caller gives a call-back number, this number should be verified and the officers should be promptly informed. If the caller gives a call-back number but explains that he cannot remain at the phone, this should also be reported to the officers who are assigned the call.

²IACP-NBDC Technical Bulletin 3-70, *Entrapment Bombing Techniques and Tactics*, C. R. Newhouser. See Appendix B.




Figure 12
 POSSIBLE EMERGENCY LOCATIONS FOR CONCEALMENT OR
 COVER IN RESIDENTIAL AREA

When a fraudulent call is detected, personnel must be alert for similar calls reporting fictitious events in the same area. If a pattern is detected, this should be immediately communicated to field personnel. Procedures should be developed and implemented to insure that information regarding fraudulent calls is not lost when watches are changed.

When individuals act suspiciously or actually carry out criminal activities in an overt manner in full view of a police officer, the officer should be forewarned. Abusive language or harassing activities directed at an officer by an individual who then turns and flees with little or no attempt to escape the officer's line of sight are also an immediate cause for alarm. Officers must also recognize that females or juveniles may be used to entrap officers. Any incident calling for a law enforcement response that is suspicious on its face or rings false to everyday police experience should be viewed as a possible entrapment technique.

Stop, Look, and Listen. The officer should look and listen before he acts. Even the most carefully planned ambush attack can often be detected by an alert officer before he enters the




Figure 13
 POSSIBLE EMERGENCY LOCATIONS FOR CONCEALMENT OR
 COVER IN COMMERCIAL AREA

fire zone, provided that he gives himself the opportunity to do so. This is very difficult to do for some officers who are victims of an entrapment. The attention of officers en route to a call is too often focused exclusively in anticipation of what has been reported to them by their dispatcher. These officers expect to find a burglary, a prowler, or an accident. Preoccupied as they are, they seldom consider the possibility of an ambush attack. Officers who encounter an on-view incident are equally likely to ignore the possibility of ambush: these officers focus their attention upon what is actually occurring before their eyes. In either instance, because the officer *thinks* he knows what is happening, his first impulse is not to stop, look, and listen, but to act. This can be a fatal mistake.

There are danger signals peculiar to most incidents that can be perceived and acted upon to thwart entrapment. For example, when dispatched to investigate a reported burglary at a residence, the officer should note if the lights of the residence are on or off before he approaches too closely. If the lights are off and it is late at night, it is possible that the call was

fraudulent and that the officer may walk into an ambush. If the officer is dispatched to a reported street robbery or called to intervene in a disturbance, the officer should look to see if people are gathered around. Since incidents such as these often attract curious on-lookers, their absence may indicate that the report was an attempt to lure the officer into prepared fire zone. Most matters commonly requiring police action often exhibit patterns or characteristics as to scene and activity. Law enforcement personnel must know these patterns and react with extreme caution if their senses tell them something is missing or out of place. But even if everything fits, officers must still remain cautious, for an assailant may have exploited the chance discovery of a real incident, such as a drunk lying in the street, in order to summon police officers to the scene with the least risk of giving forewarning. It is also possible that the event may have been carefully staged.

When in Doubt, Call for Assistance. If for any reason an officer becomes suspicious or alarmed, he should request help before proceeding. This is a cardinal rule in reducing risks from all types of assaults, and is especially valuable in reducing risks from the threat of ambush attack. The assailant who uses an entrapment technique generally attempts to operate within a structured scheme directed toward engaging one or two officers at a carefully plotted time and place. It is usually not his intention to engage in a prolonged fire fight. Nothing can be more disconcerting to his plans than to encounter several alert officers acting in accordance with good risk reduction procedures. In these circumstances, most assailants, except those who are seeking self-destruction, will abort their attempt and think only of escape.

Manning of Patrol Vehicles. The constant debate as to whether to employ one or two-man patrol vehicles increases where the incidence or threat of ambush attacks is greatest. The "cost-effectiveness" of one-man units is generally superior since they provide for better manpower distribution and thus more protection for the public. Maximum police service for the number of available personnel is an important objective for police departments, but one which few administrators feel is sufficiently realized.

Officer safety is another factor to be considered in the manning of patrol vehicles. Uniform Crime Report statistics, reproduced in Figure 14, show that a higher percentage of officers are injured when assigned to two-man vehicles. Although this would appear to support a one-man vehicle operation, it must be assumed that there are more two-men units assigned to areas where more violence is expected, thus making the incidence of exposure greater for the two-man unit. This is especially true in large urban jurisdictions where the most violent crimes are committed. Had these responses to calls in high-crime areas been made in one-man vehicles, the casualty rate would no doubt be much higher.

Despite the Uniform Crime Report statistics, many police officers feel the best possible protection both for the public and for themselves would be accomplished by the use of two-man units. They reason that the driver of a police car must devote at least one-half of his active visual surveillance time to the movement of the car; thus, an officer in a one-man car cannot observe his environment to any great extent. In a two-man car, the driver may devote almost full time attention to traffic conditions, while the second man has the opportunity for full time surveillance of the environment.

Viewed solely from the standpoint of defense against ambush attacks, the use of two-man cars may actually be superior. While the second officer may not deter an ambush attack or other deadly

Type of Activity	Total	Type of Assignment														
		Two-man vehicle(s)		One-man vehicle(s)		Detective of Special Assignment		Other								
		Unassisted	Assisted	Unassisted	Assisted	Unassisted	Assisted	Unassisted	Assisted							
TOTAL	33,642	14,803	5,558	5,643	452	1,806	2,173	3,207	100.0	44.0	16.5	16.8	1.3	5.4	6.5	9.5
Percent of individual activity ¹ ..																
Responding to "disturbance" calls (family quarrels, man with gun)	8,951	4,475	1,516	2,070	40	185	171	494	100.0	50.0	16.9	23.1	.4	2.1	1.9	5.5
Percent of individual activity ..																
Burglaries in progress or pursuing burglary suspects	644	356	77	92	3	38	39	39	100.0	55.3	12.0	14.3	.5	5.9	6.1	6.1
Percent of individual activity ..																
Robberies in progress or pursuing robbery suspects	686	320	71	64	11	108	79	33	100.0	46.6	10.3	9.3	1.6	15.7	11.5	4.8
Percent of individual activity ..																
Attempting other arrests	8,476	3,616	1,344	1,417	156	625	564	754	100.0	42.7	15.9	16.7	1.8	7.4	6.7	8.9
Percent of individual activity ..																
Civil disorder (riot, mass disturbance)	883	153	48	95	21	117	37	412	100.0	17.3	5.4	10.8	2.4	13.3	4.2	46.7
Percent of individual activity ..																
Handling, transporting, custody of prisoners	3,797	1,603	457	538	46	153	356	644	100.0	42.2	12.0	14.2	1.2	4.0	9.4	17.0
Percent of individual activity ..																
Investigating suspicious persons or circumstances	2,397	1,004	450	315	57	278	146	147	100.0	41.9	18.8	13.1	2.4	11.6	6.1	6.1
Percent of individual activity ..																
Ambush (premeditated and without warning or provocation)	325	133	60	20	14	29	35	34	100.0	40.9	18.5	6.2	4.3	8.9	10.8	10.5
Percent of individual activity ..																
Mentally deranged	578	296	75	115	3	14	26	49	100.0	51.2	13.0	19.9	.5	2.4	4.5	8.5
Percent of individual activity ..																
Traffic pursuits and stops	3,523	1,662	880	599	31	74	125	152	100.0	47.2	25.0	17.0	.9	2.1	3.5	4.3
Percent of individual activity ..																
All other	3,382	1,185	580	318	70	185	595	449	100.0	35.0	17.1	9.4	2.1	5.5	17.6	13.3
Percent of individual activity ..																

¹ Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

FBI/UCR Data

Figure 14
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSAULTED, 1972
 Type of Assignment by Police Activity
 [4,317 agencies; 1972 estimated population 114,049,000]

assault, he could provide defensive fire, call for help, assist the other officer to safety, and possibly render first aid while protecting a wounded officer from further attack. A second officer may also force the attacker to distribute his fire and attention between two targets at once, possibly decreasing the assailant's first round hit probability or the severity of a continuing attack. Perhaps his presence could cause the assailant to abandon a follow-up attempt altogether. And if the suspect is to be apprehended, the presence of a second officer is obviously desirable in most situations.

The data gathered from events involving on-duty victim officers during the period of this study show that casualty rates, on the whole, were lower among victim officers assigned to two-men vehicles. The percentage of officers killed or injured in one-man vehicles (63.3 percent) was twice as high as the percentage of those assigned to two-man units (31.0 percent).

	ONE-MAN CARS		TWO-MAN CARS	
	Number of Victim Officers	Percentage of Total Number	Number of Victim Officers	Percentage of Total Number
Fatal	1	9.1	3	10.3
Injury	6	54.5	6	20.7
Non-Injury	4	36.4	20	69.0
TOTAL	11	100.0	29	100.0

Because of the limited size of the sample and the influence of variables not assessed or weighed in the figures, these comparative casualty rates cannot be viewed as conclusive. Nevertheless, they do lend credence to the assertion that if the most effective possible defense against ambush attacks is the primary consideration, the use of two-man cars may be preferable where and when the threat of ambush attack is high. Simply put, two officers defending themselves together are potentially more effective than one officer defending himself alone.

The same data, however, also suggests that the use of two-man cars does little or nothing to deter ambush assailants. Indeed, in some situations, the presence of two officers—by providing a better opportunity for target acquisition or a higher “kill”—may actually increase the likelihood of an attack. Of 49 on-duty victim officers, only ten (20.4 percent) were alone when attacked; the remaining 39 (79.6 percent) were actually in the company of other officers at the time of the ambush.

It would appear, therefore, that the exclusive use of either one or two-man units would not remedy the problem of ambush attacks. There are a number of compromise allocations or “mixes” of units that may provide the most practical and effective distribution of manpower:

- One-man patrol units during certain hours, two-man units at other times.
- One-man patrol units in certain areas, two-man units in other areas.
- Two-man units with each officer alternating foot patrol but available to answer calls as a two-man unit.

Further increases in officer protection can be achieved through the introduction of risk reducing practices such as:

- One-man units responding to certain service requests and awaiting assistance before taking action, when practical.
- Officers assigned to one-man units carrying shotguns when answering certain calls.
- The use of specially trained units equipped to respond to sniper attacks, barricaded suspects, and other violent encounters.
- Officers assigned to one-man units equipped with portable radios to avoid being entrapped without the capability to communicate and summon assistance.
- Flexible variations in deployment strategy to permit basic follow-up and/or supervisor follow-up on potentially high risk calls.

To a large extent, however, the one-man vs. two-man car debate obscures the most important criterion for reducing risks in an ambush attack: the defensive actions taken by the individual victim officer whether he is alone or with other officers. It is what the officer who is attacked does and not simply how many officers are at the scene that is the best determinant of survival in an ambush. Certainly two or more officers working together effectively as a well-coordinated tactical team may greatly reduce the risks normally encountered in an ambush attack. On the other hand, the greater the number of officers, the greater the opportunities for confusion and possible injury. By the same token, an officer who is alone in the field and who fails to follow practices for risk reduction is likely to become a casualty, while an officer who is alone in a similar situation, but who follows practices for risk reduction, is not.

Use of Back-Up Cars. It is as difficult to truly evaluate the usefulness of back-up units in ambush defense as it is to arrive at a conclusive resolution of the one-man vs. two-man car controversy. Three ambush attack events in this study occurred while a back-up unit was present; one of these units was specifically assigned to a counterambush role. In one event, two officers were issuing a traffic citation to a motorist. These officers were supported by a back-up unit that had responded to their location in accordance with normal procedure. The back-up unit was parked to the immediate rear of the first police unit. A single shot was fired as a private automobile was driven past the halted officers. One officer was injured by this shot and, believing that the occupants of the passing automobile were responsible, the injured officer called out, "I've been shot! Get that car!" The back-up unit took up pursuit and apprehended the suspects who were later released because of lack of evidence to support a case against them.

In another event, a pair of two-man units responded to a silent burglar alarm at a grocery store. Officers found that no entry had been made, and this fact, viewed in the light of subsequent events, indicates that the alarm may have been a ploy to draw the officers to the area. After clearing the call, the officers in one two-man unit heard what resembled a rifle shot and upon instructions from their dispatcher began a check of vehicles in the vicinity. They encountered a small vehicle that had previously driven past the grocery store several times while the occupants observed police investigating the alarm. The suspect vehicle was stopped and two officers exited their vehicle while the other two-man unit parked to serve as back-up. After a negative check of the occupants of the

suspect vehicle, both two-man units began to drive away though the suspect vehicle had not yet left the area. Moments later, the police vehicles were fired upon from an undetermined location to the rear. One occupant of the suspect vehicle yelled at one two-man unit to stop, and when the police vehicle did so, the driver began yelling insults in an apparent effort to keep the officers in the fire zone. Realizing this to be a ploy, both units left the area.

In the third event, an officer wearing plain clothes and assigned to an unmarked two-man back-up unit was shot and injured while standing to the rear of uniformed officers conducting an accident investigation. One of the uniformed officers moved his vehicle between the injured officer and the point from which he thought the shot had been fired. He then assisted the injured officer into the car and took him to the hospital. No suspect was identified in this event.

As no attempts were made to conceal the back-up units, it can be assumed that the assailants in all three events attacked with full knowledge of the presence of the supporting unit. This does not indicate that back-up units never deter ambush attacks—for obvious reasons of logic, it is impossible to calculate the incidence of negative events—but it does show that determined assailants are not always dissuaded from initiating an attack simply by the presence of two vehicles rather than one in the fire zone.

This would seem to be especially true when the assailant has chosen to conduct a sniping ambush, as in the last two events discussed. It is more probable, however, that ambush assailants attempting to execute a coordinated attack or direct assault upon one police vehicle may abort their attack when confronted by a second police vehicle supporting the first. However, the first event discussed above appears to have been a close-in direct assault from a moving automobile, and the assailants were not deterred in that event.

At least one of these events demonstrates a common error in vehicle positioning that frequently hampers the effectiveness of back-up units in defending against ambush attack. In this event, the back-up unit was parked close to the unit it was supporting. In those situations in which the supported officers may be immediately threatened by the suspects they are presently dealing with, a relatively close positioning of the back-up unit may be necessary if assistance is to be promptly rendered. But in those situations in which the risk of ambush attack is high, the back-up unit should be positioned at least several car lengths away from the supported unit in order to obtain good fields of observation and deterrence. Essentially, the question of which threat to defend against will often be determined by specific mission assignment or the officer's evaluation of the situation. Whatever the circumstances, officers assigned to a back-up unit must cooperate to maintain an all-round visual search of the entire area. And they must always keep in mind that the sight of two police vehicles with officers clustered in full view may present a target that invites ambush attack.

It is possible that the greatest usefulness of the back-up unit is not deterrence but providing increased capabilities in mobility, communications, observation, and cover and concealment during and after the occurrence of an attack. As illustrated in the first event, the presence of a back-up unit was decisive in pursuing and apprehending the suspected assailants. And although in the third event it was the back-up unit rather than the supported unit that was attacked (quickly reversing mission roles), the presence of an extra unit provided a mobile screen behind which the injured officer could be sheltered while his rescue was taking place. Again, however, a qualification must be added. If the assailant were well armed, skilled in the use of his weapon, and had chosen to continue his attack, it is unlikely that the cover and concealment provided by the automobile driven between the injured

officer and the suspected point of fire would have fully protected the rescuing officer who was operating the vehicle. In these circumstances the best course of action would have been for the injured man, who suffered only a minor wound, to have gained nearby cover on his own.

Use of Police Dogs. Police dogs dissuade some types of crime and can reduce the risk of ambush attack in many situations of potential hazard to police officers. Dogs can be assigned to officers on foot patrol in specified danger areas in which the threat of attack is thought to be great, or they can be assigned to vehicle patrol units sent to handle prowler calls, burglaries, and incidents in parking lots where the animal's superior sight and scenting abilities would most frequently be a decisive asset.

Unfortunately, police dogs gained an unsavory reputation through infrequent but highly publicized and inflammatory instances of misuse in crowd control during civil rights demonstrations in the 1960's. As a result, many agency heads have experienced difficulty in getting approval for their use from concerned legislative bodies and public officials. This negative outlook may be changed by the presentation of a department policy that outlines the type of training each dog and his trainer would receive and the conditions in which the dogs might be used. It may also be necessary to reassure community leaders by conducting a low key, objective public information program explaining the need for a K-9 Corps and the policies developed to prevent or eliminate misuse.

Off-Duty Employment. Some law enforcement agencies permit off-duty police officers to obtain outside employment as private security guards. Such an off-duty employment policy poses many difficult problems in defending against ambush attack. Since these officers are regularly found at the same location on a routine basis, are generally working individually and without means of radio communication, are frequently lulled into complacency by the humdrum nature of their work, and, in many instances, are restricted to a passive deterrent role by the policies of their second employers, they become an easy target for the assailant.

The potential assailant need only identify the guard as a member of a law enforcement agency to plan his attack with high prospects of success:

- The assailant may know the officer personally.
- The officer may have been pointed out to the assailant.
- The assailant may have heard from others that an off-duty police officer was to be found working at a certain location.
- The potential victim may be working in his police uniform as a result of departmental policy authorizing or overlooking such a practice.

The off-duty officer working in a high visibility parapolice role usually experiences some conflicts of responsibility. Are his actions governed by the police agency or by the business owner who contracted for his services? If he is bound by departmental rules and regulations, has some method been devised to adequately supervise him? If not, does the employer expect to direct the officer's police-oriented activities? Does the officer have back-up protection? What kind of authority does he have? Who must accept final responsibility for the officer's action or failure to take action?

An in-depth policy providing answers to these questions must be devised from the standpoint of officer safety before an off-duty officer employed as a private security guard can be considered even partially protected. At best, the department should control and supervise off-duty employment even to the point of billing the user for the officer's time and the administrative costs involved. Requests from merchants or others for off-duty officers should be subjected to controlled review, including site inspection, plan of action, operational coordination, and executive approval. All such activity should be considered in the same vein as all other department operations and deployment practices and handled accordingly.

Stake-Out. The stake-out is a law enforcement activity that offers a unique invitation to ambush attack. If the stake-out is conducted for any appreciable length of time, the police presence at the location frequently becomes common knowledge among local residents and their acquaintances. Or as happens in too many instances, the stake-out is not really well concealed and can be detected by the ambush assailant. But perhaps the greatest danger inherent in the stake-out is that the officers involved focus their attention and fields of view exclusively upon one small area of their environment: a convenience store with a history of holdups, a residential gambling operation, or a narcotics drop.

Because of the requirements of their mission, these officers often become completely oblivious to activity and persons to their flanks or rear, and thus they can be easily approached with little fear of detection. Further, if the officers have been in place and observing for any length of time, they are often not psychologically prepared to react to a sudden attack from an unexpected quarter. This gives the ambush assailant an unsurpassed opportunity to carry out a close range surprise attack with high prospects of success.

When conducting stake-outs, law enforcement personnel should take every precaution to conceal themselves from *all* eyes. Moreover, they must select locations that either make it impossible to be approached from the flanks and rear or locations that give the officers good all-round fields of observation. The possibility of a back-up stake-out team to cover the primary team should not be overlooked. As always, the officer's senses and alertness are his first lines of defense. He must frequently observe all around his location and be prepared to react to the possibility that he may be attacked at any moment from directions other than to his front. Lastly, an officer must never be placed on stake-out alone. These precautions will greatly reduce ambush risks and contribute to making the stake-out more effective.

Response to the Ambush

The first moments of the ambush attack are the most hazardous. With rare exceptions, ambush attacks are triggered only when the victim officer is a clearly defined target in the assailant's chosen fire zone. If the first shot, fire bomb, or knife thrust is ineffective, an aggressive assailant can follow-up quickly and continue his attack. Thus it is essential that officers react quickly and effectively even when a totally unexpected first attack is unsuccessful.

Immediate Action. While alert personnel will employ those tactics and procedures designed to avoid the ambush trap, the ambush attack will, by definition, almost always come as a completely unanticipated event. The normal human reaction in times of unusual and extreme danger is one of shock, surprise, and stunned inaction. The average person is likely to freeze, and police officers are as apt to react in this manner as anyone else. Experience strongly indicates, however, that the first

rule for ambush survival is to *do something immediately*. This rule applies to almost every ambush attack, regardless of the situation, and even extends to action taken instinctively, without conscious thought.

But what if the officer takes immediate action without thinking, isn't he likely to do the wrong thing and thereby increase his risk of becoming a casualty? The answer is that in every ambush situation initiated by an assailant having any skill and determination, there is only one instant response that is a fatal mistake: to do nothing. If the victim officer is prepared to do something, to adopt a course of action other than no action, he at least has given himself an opportunity to survive. It is true that the victim officer may throw this opportunity away through ignorance of what to do or by poor judgment in doing it. But if he fails to act, he substantially increases the risk of injury.

Evasive Action and Self-Defense. Most successful ambush attacks are completed within a few seconds. To avoid injury, the surprised officer must immediately make himself as difficult and elusive a target as possible. Every second of exposure increases the risk of becoming a casualty. He must be prepared to defend himself should the attack continue and call for assistance at the first opportunity.

There are several different but interrelated considerations that must be stipulated and evaluated before any sensible, rule-of-thumb recommendations can be offered regarding evasive action and self-defense in ambush attack events. Among these, the kinds of weapons employed and the ranges at which the attack is begun are very important. Briefly, these may be categorized as follows:

- *Short Range/Non-Firearm Attacks.* At arm's length by cutting, stabbing, or impact weapons wielded by hand;
- *Short Range/Firearm, Missile, or Bomb Attack.* At short distances from a few feet to the width of a room by firearms, from the upper floors or roofs of buildings by deadly missiles, or from across the street by explosive or incendiary devices.
- *Medium-Long Range/Firearms.* At more distant ranges extending to several hundred feet by firearms.

The patrol mode of the officer at the time of the attack—on foot or in a vehicle—and the closeness and availability of concealment and cover or obstacles and escape routes are also important. Finally, the number of assailants participating in an ambush attack is a significant consideration. When combined and translated into the tangible realities of law enforcement operations, these considerations evoke several types of ambush attack events. Each of these events must be countered in different ways:

- *Short Range/Non-Firearm Attacks.* If the victim officer is on foot and is ambushed by an assailant armed with a knife, club, or other hand-held weapon, he should attempt to avoid the first thrust or blow without being drawn into a bare hands grappling match with his assailant. The victim officer must secure at least the minimum of defensive space required to provide the two or three seconds needed to bring his weapon into play. Obstacles such as parked cars in the street or furniture in a building should be used whenever available to block or delay the attacker. If an escape route leading to temporary refuge is open, the officer should take it if he can do so

without increasing the danger to himself. The important thing is to gain time and space in which to prepare for defensive action and, if possible, to summon assistance. Toe-to-toe heroics are often fatal.

If the victim officer is seated in a vehicle, his best course of action—as in every kind of ambush—is to drive away from his assailant. If this is not possible, the victim officer should either twist away from the open window or door or throw himself to the opposite side of the car. The most important thing is to instantly get the critically vulnerable head, neck and upper torso areas out of the assailant's reach. The victim officer may still suffer serious injuries to the lower torso or limbs, but wounds in these parts of the body are usually less likely to be fatal or to render the officer incapable of employing self-defense and seeking help.

The possibility of being attacked at close range by multiple assailants armed with hand-held weapons is probably remote. The evidence seems to indicate that if two or more persons join forces to ambush a police officer, they will almost always attempt to carry out their combined attack with firearms. But if they should not, the officer must avoid being caught in the middle at close quarters by assailants wielding hand-held weapons on either side or to his front and rear. Again, survival is often a matter of space and time. In some circumstances, the officer attacked while on foot can neutralize his attackers' advantage in numbers by a quick flanking or turning movement. Obstacles and escape routes should be exploited at the first opportunity. As in all such attacks by more than one assailant, the victim officer must determine which attacker presents the most immediate threat and evade and defend against that assailant first. An officer seated in a vehicle who is attacked by ambush from both sides should attempt to exploit his vehicle's mobility to leave the area and then call for assistance. When this is impossible, the officer should seek to escape or neutralize the most immediate threat, usually the assailant on the near side of the automobile. In all cases, the officer should communicate for assistance as soon as possible.

- *Short Range/Firearm, Missile, or Bomb Attacks.* The officer attacked at close range by a firearm or by deadly missiles, such as steel balls and garbage cans dropped or hurled from the upper floors or roofs of buildings, must make himself as small a target as possible and evade the assailant's direct line of fire or impact area. In many short distance ambush attacks that involve firearms, the victim officer who is on foot and exposed on the street, sidewalk, grounds of adjacent commercial buildings or private residences, or in a parking lot must instantly throw himself to the ground or to one side, thereby forcing his assailant to either realign his weapon or acquire a new sight picture. If concealment or cover is available within a few feet, the officer can seek this additional protection. But concealment and cover may not be available, and time is of the essence. If the attack is initiated at very close range, the assailant's second round hit probability is so high that frequently the officer will be unable to move even a few feet before being struck by a bullet. In such instances, after executing the first simple evasive maneuver, the victim officer's only course of action may be to return effective fire immediately. In this situation an aggressive counterattack may afford the best chance for survival. In any event, in countering a close range ambush attack carried out with firearms, the victim officer should be prepared to defend himself with his own weapon immediately.

The interior equipment or furnishings of commercial buildings can greatly increase the survival opportunities of a victim officer who is surprised by a close range attack with firearms. When fired upon, the officer can often completely escape the assailant's direct line of fire by darting

into or out of a hall, room, or doorway. If this course of action is impossible because the officer is fixed in place by the assailant's fire, he can often gain concealment and some degree of cover by dropping behind a piece of machinery, packing crate, desk, cabinet, products display or shelving, or whatever other furnishings are available. Here again, the victim officer must be prepared to return fire. And if he has a communications capability, he should use it as soon as he can to call for assistance.

When the officer is attacked with firearms at close range while in a vehicle, the automobile body will provide some measure of concealment and cover. If the assailant is to the immediate front or rear and is exposed on the street or sidewalk or is sheltering behind hasty cover such as garbage cans and boxes, the officer may have an opportunity to use his vehicle as an offensive weapon while clearing the fire zone. In most events, however, the officer should accelerate directly away from the fire zone, crouching as low in the operator's seat as he can while retaining a degree of driver visibility. (Figure 15 shows an example of this defensive action). Whenever he can do so without endangering other motorists or innocent bystanders, the vehicle operator should swerve his car from side to side rather than drive in a straight line. He should also attempt to turn a corner and escape the assailant's line-of-sight as soon as possible.

If the vehicle is at a halt and blocked by traffic, the officer should throw himself to the floor and attempt to exit the automobile on the side opposite the attacker's line of fire. Once clear of the vehicle, the officer should crouch behind the engine compartment area and prepare to defend himself should the attack continue. (See Figure 16).

When using an automobile for cover and concealment, officers should realize that bullet penetration of the vehicle is possible, especially from high velocity weapons. Placing the engine compartment area between the officer and the assailant provides considerable bulk and maximizes the capability of a vehicle to defeat or deflect the assailant's fire.

Officers should also be aware that the cover provided by a vehicle may be insufficient if an assailant is firing from a height of three stories or more. At these elevations, the line of sight afforded an assailant will expose the officer. If more effective concealment and cover is nearby and can be reached without affording the assailant an unobstructed shot, the officer should seek it. Before leaving the area of the vehicle with its communications capability, the officer should try to summon assistance with his radio. This is not necessary, of course, for officers equipped with a portable radio on their person. But in many cases, in the absence of a portable radio, the officer must remain near his vehicle and its radio to direct other officers arriving at the scene. Where this is necessary, the officer should crouch behind the engine compartment area.

The officer may also increase his survival chances in ambush attacks, especially those in which the assailant is in an elevated position, by exiting the vehicle and quickly getting well away from it. Since the attacker expects the officer to remain near the vehicle to radio for help, leaving the vehicle may save both the officer's life and the lives of those other officers who respond to the reported gunfire. If the escaping officer would enter a place of business or request entry into a private home, he could use a telephone to summon assistance and provide tactical information.

When two or more assailants open fire at close range upon a victim officer on foot or in a vehicle, he must employ all possible defensive measures to avoid the effects of their combined fire. The already high probability of quickly hitting the victim officer is increased considerably,




Figure 15
OFFICER REDUCING EXPOSURE WHEN IN A VEHICLE




Figure 16
OFFICER USING VEHICLE FOR COVER

and this high hit probability is increased still further if the victim officer is engaged by fire from different directions, since protection against the fire of one assailant may not be protection against the fire of the other. In this situation, a victim officer in a vehicle has an initial advantage over a victim officer on foot: the concealment and cover afforded by the automobile does provide some degree of protection. If he remains in the car, he may escape injury in the initial attack and can then accelerate from the fire zone when the situation warrants.

The officer on foot, however, is not without recourse in responding to a coordinated attack triggered at close range. Instant evasive action remains a must. Moreover, a sudden aggressive counterattack directed against the assailant posing the greatest danger may be the officer's best initial defense. In the face of such unexpected determined action, one or more assailants may break, causing the coordinated attack to become disorganized and giving the officer an opportunity to either secure adequate concealment and cover or to move to safety and call for assistance.

Close range ambush attacks conducted with thrown or dropped objects or with incendiary devices can be most effectively countered by immediately clearing the impact area. Officers on foot caught in an impact zone should seek some kind of concealment or cover as quickly as possible. Often the best protection will be found in a nearby building or doorway. If the officer is in an automobile, the wisest course of action is to remain within the vehicle and drive clear of the impact zone. Not only does the automobile provide excellent protection from low velocity missiles, but it also resists ignition by most common types of inflammable liquids and fire bombs. For these reasons, the officer should not abandon even an immobilized vehicle. His best course of action is to remain in the vehicle, radio for assistance, and then prepare to defend himself as the situation dictates. As determined by the officer and the situation, he may then leave the vehicle to seek other cover outside of the impact zone. As always, the officer needs to deal with the most dangerous threat first.

An attack at close range by an explosive device such as a dynamite bomb or improvised hand grenade is best countered by immediately dropping to a prone position on the ground, street, sidewalk, or in the gutter. By doing this, the officer may escape the full force of the pressure wave and a large part of any fragmentation. If the officer can shelter behind an object, vehicle, or structure without any loss of time, so much the better. But he should not panic and increase his exposure to the blast by remaining on his feet and attempting to gain distant cover. If other devices are hurled at him or if he is brought under fire while lying prone, the victim officer should crawl or roll away. After first protecting himself from the effects of the blast, the officer should prepare to defend himself and summon assistance.

If an explosive device is thrown at his vehicle, the officer should accelerate away from the bomb. If the car is stopped, the officer should immediately crouch as low as he can in the seat of the vehicle. If the bomb fails to explode and the automobile can be quickly driven away, the officer should remain in the vehicle. But if it is impossible to move the car or is extremely difficult and time consuming to do so, the officer can exit the automobile and crawl or roll away from the area toward the nearest concealment and cover, using the automobile as a shield as he moves. If an attack by an explosive device is followed up by further attacks with firearms, the victim officer should not abandon his vehicle for other protection except as a last resort.

- *Medium-Long Range/Firearms.* Long range attacks by firearms executed by single or

multiple assailants against officers on foot can be countered by using many of the basic techniques discussed in defense against short range attacks by firearms: evade, seek concealment and cover, prepare to defend, call for assistance, and counter the most dangerous threat first. There is, however, one significant difference. When attacked at long range, the victim officer may have difficulty in determining where the fire is coming from; this will be a particularly difficult task if more than one assailant is involved. He must make this determination as soon as possible after initial evasive action.

If the officer is unable to locate the general direction or directions from which the fire is coming, he nevertheless should evade, take some kind of concealment and cover, prepare to defend himself, and observe the possible threat sectors. He should, of course, call for assistance and help plan counter action. The victim officer must remain calm and not move again until he has at least accurately determined the general location of his assailant or assailants. Otherwise he may abandon perfectly adequate concealment or cover and blunder into the assailant's line of fire.

If the officer is operating a vehicle he must, as always, attempt to drive away from the fire zone. If the vehicle is immobilized, he should remain in the vehicle until he has determined the direction from which the assailant is firing. After calling for assistance, he may then exit the vehicle, gain protection behind the engine compartment area or, if necessary, seek nearby concealment and cover, then prepare to defend himself against further attack. If the officer is caught in a crossfire by two or more assailants, he should remain in the vehicle until at least one side of the vehicle is free of fire.

As indicated in Figure 17, the officer can increase his chances of survival during the first few moments of any ambush attack event by the use of simple defensive techniques. The kinds of techniques used and how they are used must depend upon the circumstances of the attack. The exercise of good judgment is essential; the victim officer must arrive at an accurate estimate of his situation and react accordingly. The critical requirements are to buy time and then to use that time to reduce risk. The attacker's greatest advantage is surprise, and with each passing second the force of this advantage diminishes. Further, each second of officer survival is an additional period during which the assailant can make a mistake and provide the victim officer an opportunity to turn the tables to his own advantage. If the officer knows what to do, how to do it, and does not panic, he can greatly reduce his risk of becoming a casualty. Survival in an ambush attack need not be a sometime product of happy coincidence—it can be learned. A brief summary of survival steps is contained in Figure 18.

General Considerations


Communications. Communications can save officers' lives in ambush attack events. Most police vehicles are equipped with radios and many foot patrol officers carry portable transceivers. This equipment should be used to reduce potential risks by notifying dispatchers of suspicious circumstances that indicate the possibility of an ambush attack and by requesting assistance prior to being engaged. If actually attacked, the officer, after insuring his own safety, should call for help. His request for assistance should include the following elements of information:

- His location

NATURE OF THE ATTACK

SHORT RANGE		MEDIUM/LONG RANGE
O N F O O T	<p>Handheld Clubs, Knives, etc.</p> <p>Avoid hand-to-hand combat Secure defensive space Use obstacles or escape routes Prepare to defend Request assistance Counter most dangerous attacker first</p>	<p>Explosive Devices</p> <p>Drop to ground shelter behind object or in structure If attack continues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Crawl or roll away ● Seek cover and concealment ● Prepare to defend ● Request assistance ● Counter most dangerous attacker first </p>
A C T I O N	<p>Deadly Missiles And Incendiary Devices</p> <p>Clear impact area Seek cover and concealment Prepare to defend Request assistance Counter most dangerous attacker first</p>	<p>Firearms</p> <p>Drop to ground or evade to one side Determine direction of fire Seek cover and concealment Prepare to defend Request assistance Counter most dangerous attacker first</p>
I N V E H I C L E	<p>Handheld Clubs, Knives, etc.</p> <p>Drive away Be alert to opportunity to use vehicle as weapon If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Protect vulnerable body areas ● Prepare to defend ● Request assistance ● Counter most dangerous attacker first </p>	<p>Explosive Devices</p> <p>Drive away Be alert for opportunity to use vehicle as weapon If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Crouch in seat or lay across floor ● If device does not explode, exit vehicle using automobile as shield ● Crawl or roll away ● Seek cover and concealment <p>If attack continues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Do not abandon vehicle except as last resort ● Prepare to defend ● Request assistance ● Counter most dangerous attacker first </p> </p>
A C T I O N	<p>Deadly Missiles And Incendiary Devices</p> <p>Drive away Be alert to opportunity to use vehicle as weapon If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Remain temporarily within the vehicle ● Prepare to defend ● Request assistance ● Exit vehicle and clear impact area ● Counter most dangerous attacker first </p>	<p>Firearms</p> <p>Drive away Assume low profile Do not drive in straight line Escape attacker's line-of-sight Be alert for opportunity to use vehicle as weapon If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Exit vehicle ● Use engine area for cover or concealment ● Seek nearby cover and concealment ● Prepare to defend ● Request assistance ● Counter most dangerous attacker first </p>
I N V E H I C L E	<p>Handheld Clubs, Knives, etc.</p> <p>Drive away Be alert to opportunity to use vehicle as weapon If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Protect vulnerable body areas ● Prepare to defend ● Request assistance ● Counter most dangerous attacker first </p>	<p>Firearms</p> <p>Drive away If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Remain in vehicle ● Determine direction of fire ● Exit vehicle ● Use engine area for cover or seek nearby cover and concealment ● Prepare to defend ● Request assistance ● Counter most dangerous attacker first </p>

Figure 17
AMBUSH RESPONSE ACTION SUMMARY



AMBUSH ATTACKS ARE EXECUTED TO KILL

Police Officers Survive Because
They:

ACTED IMMEDIATELY ON THE BASIS OF ACCURATE
SITUATION ASSESSMENT

COVERED AND CONCEALED THEMSELVES QUICKLY

TRANSMITTED QUICKLY A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

EVADED THEIR ASSAILANTS BY MANEUVER,
ESPECIALLY WHEN DRIVING

DEFENDED THEMSELVES EFFECTIVELY BY
RETURNING FIRE



Figure 18
AMBUSH SURVIVAL POSTER

- His condition
- The number and location of his assailants, if known
- The kind of weapons being employed against him, if known
- The possible escape routes available to his assailant(s)
- The safest routes for access to the scene
- The suggested positions for the deployment of police at the attack scene

The officer must keep his dispatcher informed of any new developments that may occur whenever he can do so without placing his own safety in jeopardy. If his communications capability permits, he should talk directly to the incoming units. Since he is on or near the attack scene, the officer radioing information will often be much more effective in reducing risks than the expenditure of ammunition. He becomes, in effect, the eyes and ears of officers coming to his aid. Their help is critical to his survival, but it is a two-way street. The victim officer has a duty to see to it that assisting officers do not rush unprepared into an on-going ambush attack and become casualties through lack of information as to what is actually occurring. Therefore, the victim officer must be alert to all requests for additional information and should not hesitate to transmit unsolicited data that will reduce risks to other personnel.

To insure that a victim officer gets help when he needs it, guidelines should be prepared in the form of policies and procedures that will assist dispatchers in the proper deployment of vehicles during emergencies. The safety of personnel performing foot or vehicle patrol is enhanced when a dispatch system is developed and implemented that automatically provides back-up protection. So that the system operates at the highest possible level of efficiency, communications should be monitored and, when necessary, personnel should be retrained and tested in the principles of good radio usage. Also, dispatcher performance should be continually evaluated and upgraded.

A survey of selected ambush attack events reveals the importance of prompt and effective communications:

- In one ambush attack event, an officer was able to reach his radio after being wounded in the thigh by a shot from a passing automobile. The first units were on the scene in two minutes. The injured officer, however, had failed to provide his dispatcher with a description of his assailants' vehicle, and though police vehicles probably passed the suspects as they were driving from the ambush site, effective action to apprehend them was impossible.
- In another ambush attack, an injured officer ignored his department's radio code and gave a verbal report that was misunderstood. This caused his dispatcher to issue a radio report stating that an officer from another agency had been shot. As a result, he had to spend time in retransmission in order to apprise his headquarters of the correct situation.
- An extremely dangerous communications breakdown that could have directly caused an officer fatality occurred in one ambush attack event in the Mid West. Two reserve deputies working traffic control and gate admission at the entrance to a state university were ambushed

by a sniper. Taking cover, the deputies used a portable radio to report the incident to their supervisor who was located on the campus grounds. The supervisor instructed the on-campus sheriff's dispatcher to contact the local police department and advise them to send an officer to take a report from a reserve sheriff's deputy who "had a citizen there who wishes to make the report of someone shooting at him." The police department dispatcher notified a one-man unit to take a "miscellaneous report" at the university. No information was given regarding the fact that officers were currently under fire or in danger. The officer who responded casually drove up to the ambush site and parked directly in the fire zone. As the deputies were telling this officer what had actually happened, the sniper fired another shot which fortunately missed all three. If this assailant had been more skilled or more heavily armed, it is quite clear that the police officer who answered the "miscellaneous report" call could have easily been killed or injured as he arrived on the scene.

If the victim officer is without radio communication, he must attempt to establish alternate channels of communication. If, as is most probable, he is unable to reach a call box or telephone, he can call to people nearby or to a passing motorist and request that they telephone for help or go for aid. The use of civilians, however, involves a danger that they too may be targeted by the assailant. For this reason, civilians should be employed only when there is little possibility that they may be injured.

The absolute necessity for officers at the ambush site to communicate among themselves cannot be overlooked. Timely interpersonal contact is essential to risk reduction when two or more officers are defending against ambush attack. The effective use of speech, arm and hand signals, or portable radios prevents confusion, keeps the officers well-informed, permits coordinated tactical counteraction, and contributes to maintaining good morale in even the most dangerous and intense situations.

If the assailant's key advantage is surprise, the victim officer's key advantage is communications. An officer who establishes and maintains communication with his fellow officers as soon as possible after the initiation of an ambush attack is no longer isolated or dependent only upon his own resources. He becomes, once again, part of an equipped and trained force that can neutralize even the most determined assailant. Common sense and good communications when used together are formidable counterambush weapons.

Wounded Personnel. The wounding of an officer greatly increases the psychological stress and objective risks in an ambush attack. This is true for the officer who is injured and for officers who attempt to come to his aid. The most critical consideration to be kept in mind is that the assailant may continue his attack. Given this real possibility, there are three tactical rules that can be applied to events in which an officer is wounded:

- If the wounded officer is capable of physical movement, he should continue to execute defensive action to the best of his ability, call for help, and give himself first aid.
- If the wounded officer is incapable of physical movement, he should remain still, possibly escaping observation and a follow-up attack.
- Officers who respond should first secure the area before attempting to aid the injured officer.

Though the latter rule seems harsh, a heroic attempt to rescue may only end in further casualties as officers plunge heedlessly into the fire zone of the assailant. Prompt aggressive tactical action against the assailant is the best way to effect the timely rescue of an injured officer. In prolonged confrontations, however, it may be necessary to employ armored vehicles for the recovery of injured personnel prior to the neutralization of the area. But if this equipment is not available, field expedience can be used. Protective vests, ballistic shields, or bomb blankets may be arranged inside or outside of a police vehicle driven into a fire zone to accomplish an emergency retrieval. Rescue officers can also advance on foot under the cover of a bomb blanket to effect removal of a wounded officer, except in those cases involving rifle fire, which is not usually stopped by bomb blankets. Smoke grenades are very effective if used to obscure or obstruct the assailants' view of the target area for the brief period of time required to approach and retrieve an injured officer. If the event occurs at night, the area power can be turned off, street lights can be shot out, and other sources of illumination masked or eliminated. In any event, rescue attempts should be carefully planned and executed maneuvers rather than spontaneous efforts carried out under the emotional stress of the moment.

INTELLIGENCE

The development, implementation, and servicing of an effective intelligence function is an essential requirement of the police mission. An indispensable tool in accomplishing traditional law enforcement objectives, the intelligence cycle is a valuable in-house resource that, if effectively used, can play an important role in police casualty risk reduction.

Surprise is the key advantage enjoyed by the ambush assailant; it is the vital element of his method of attack. Without this advantage the assailant may call off his attack; or if he acts, he can be countered and neutralized by appropriate police tactical techniques.

The establishment of additional intelligence collection requirements directed specifically toward the threat of ambush attack is the first step in applying the standard intelligence cycle to risk reduction. Threat indicators must be determined whenever possible and then translated into concrete specifications for primary data—essential elements of information signifying the existence of circumstances and probabilities for an ambush attack.

Law enforcement agencies normally gather large amounts of information pursuant to routine police operations. Data regarding arrests, wanted persons, suspect persons, outstanding warrants, the release of convicted felons, stolen vehicles, firearms, field incidents, and criminal activities are important to officer safety in many encounters that occur in daily law enforcement activity between the officer and the public. For example, an officer responding to a disturbance call would certainly exercise more caution if he knew that an occupant of the house had a history of resisting arrest for simple assault when intoxicated. And an officer making a routine traffic stop would be far more cautious if he were aware that the owner or driver of the vehicle had an arrest record for firearms offenses, battery, armed robbery, or similar crimes.

In some instances, the formulation of special threat indicators and special intelligence collection requirements will be necessary to supplement normal data acquisition categories. The presence in the community of former mental patients previously afflicted with violent psychoses, the local establishment of an element of a national extremist political organization, or reports of arms caches

and contraband sales of military weapons are the most dramatic examples of extraordinary danger signals that might be detected by the intelligence cycle. There are other possible threat indicators of this kind, and each police agency must fix its own special intelligence collection requirements based upon a flexible, in-depth assessment of its distinctive situation and the unique conditions prevailing in its community.

Of course, intelligence is of little value if not acted upon. In one instance, two officers were ambushed by an assailant who had publicly threatened to kill one of the victim officers. Moreover, the officers knew the assailant, knew he was involved in criminal activity, and knew he had possession of weapons, yet did nothing to implement the positive intelligence that they had accumulated.

Priorities must be assigned to identified threat indicators for the intelligence cycle to best accommodate the ambush attack problem and to continue functioning with maximum utility and economy of effort. Any assignment of priorities must be guided by the realistic evaluation and integration of numerous possible descriptions of personality and circumstance that can signal the intent, capability, and method of operation of potential assailants. The key questions are: "Will it happen?, Who will do it?, and How will it be attempted?" Common sense is a necessary and fundamental tool by which to accomplish the task of delineating and ranking threat criticality. The following is a simplified and noninclusive example of one possible listing of precedence for intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination:

- Data regarding unprovoked attacks upon police officers, use of entrapment techniques, appearance of propaganda advocating police killings, and similar tangible acts by unknown persons that indicate the presence of ambush assailants.
- Data regarding individuals who have themselves threatened police officers, injured police officers, or otherwise overtly evidenced a violent animosity directed specifically toward law enforcement personnel.
- Data regarding felons or misdemeanants who have repeatedly engaged in general criminal activity involving the use of force or the threat of force.
- Data regarding citizens whose past or present behavior indicates a disordered and aggressive antisocial personality lacking self-control in normal life situations.

Sources of information must be cultivated to support intelligence collection requirements in priority. The base from which to begin is to employ a comprehensive intelligence collection plan that lists all sources that may be feasibly developed and exploited, allocates responsibilities and resources to the collection function, and outlines procedures by which collection may be achieved. Since it is a supplement or subcomponent modification to current collection planning, the ambush attack collection plan must be skillfully integrated into the overall plan and reflect all possible ways and means of gathering information on potential or existent ambush attack threats.

Sources of information may exist locally or on state and national levels. These sources can be independent of the law enforcement agency, closely allied with it, or within the department itself. Offense and incident reports, field interrogation reports, and similar materials prepared by law enforcement personnel are an excellent place to begin the collection process. The records and

activities of other agencies within the criminal justice mechanism, such as probation and parole departments, prosecutors' offices, courts, and penal facilities, are also lucrative sources of information. Public welfare, health, and social service agencies are especially valuable sources for information on human problems likely to flare into violence against the police.

The "common knowledge" of the community, if skillfully assessed and collected by police officers moving about the populace, is a highly cost-effective source for the continuous input of useful information. Additionally, the use of clandestine informants may be absolutely necessary in countering conspiracies to ambush police officers.

The National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a national computer information system developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, provides real-time access to information of critical importance in risk reduction. Information regarding federal fugitives, persons wanted on local felony or misdemeanor charges, vehicles used in the commission of felonies, and stolen vehicles can be obtained very quickly. Similar systems are also in operation or being planned at many state and local levels.

The continual painstaking application of good management skills and techniques is required to implement the collection plan—it will not run itself. Practical experience has demonstrated that tactical intelligence collection is particularly difficult to manage. This has been true in law enforcement agencies, in the military, and even within the specialized intelligence community. The difficulties inherent in efficient collection are increased considerably when an on-going collection effort attempts to gather information on a problem whose frequency and circumstances are out-of-the ordinary. In some instances, the introduction of additional requirements of this nature is viewed as an unwanted irritant to the smooth functioning of a collection system considered fully comprehensive and adequate. More frequently, newly introduced requirements are inadvertently submerged or drained of emphasis and specificity by more compelling considerations of system orthodoxy and uniformity. This problem is best dealt with by continual monitoring and direction by responsible managers and supervisory personnel.

Once collected, information must first be processed into a finished intelligence product in accordance with the overall scheme for threat evaluation and then disseminated in a timely, comprehensive fashion. Effective dissemination is of great importance in ambush attack defense, for ambush attack threatens every law enforcement officer regardless of his professional standing and duty assignment. This distinguishes ambush attacks from many other crimes that can be subjects of special concern to particular groupings of personnel within the law enforcement agency. Everyone must know about potential ambush attacks. This cannot be overstressed; imperfections in dissemination are a recurring difficulty in the performance of any intelligence cycle.

Equipping the intelligence cycle to provide information on ambush attack threat indicators does not necessarily require a heavy investment of additional assets. Given its low cost and the potential payoff that will in many instances be realized, the intelligence cycle must not be overlooked by law enforcement managers and decision makers. As depicted in Figure 19, with a little extra effort, intelligence can be oriented to risk reduction from ambush attack.

TRAINING

To reduce risks in ambush attack events, law enforcement agencies should train their personnel in




Figure 19
THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION IN RISK REDUCTION

tactics, procedures, and equipment useful in ambush defense. Tactics and procedures designed to reduce risk from ambush attacks are largely ineffective when poorly executed by untrained personnel; indeed, the risk of death or injury may increase. Equipment in the hands of untrained personnel that have no understanding of its capabilities and limitations is simply extra clutter and

perhaps a danger to other officers and innocent bystanders. Training is a necessary part in the development of any skill, including ambush attack survival.

Training to accomplish the primary police mission is a fundamental and ongoing objective of most police agencies today. The curricula to meet this objective, however, rarely addresses the specific area of reducing the risk to officers from ambush attack. Although a proliferation of counterattack tactics have emerged involving the use of highly specialized well-armed teams, little has been done to develop and employ appropriate risk reduction techniques suitable to cope with the everyday threat of ambush attack.

The character, quality, and extent of police training in the United States varies widely. Despite the continued thrust of mandated training legislation, the almost universal acceptance that police training is a necessary prerequisite for acceptable performance, and the increasing availability of this resource, police officers in some agencies still fail to receive adequate preparation for their job. Moreover, this initial deficiency is not corrected by any later efforts. As noted in Figure 20, eight of the 55 officers who came under ambush attack had never received training of any type; another three had received a week or less of basic instruction.

Police training can be basically categorized as follows: recruit training, in-service training, and specialized training. Each category provides opportunity to highlight risk reduction techniques suitable against the threat of ambush attack.

Recruit Training

The primary purpose and value of recruit training is the development of a base of knowledge to serve as the central foundation for the continuing development of professional expertise throughout an officer's career. Periodically, layers of learning can be added to this foundation to increase the officer's capability to perform his job. The effectiveness of this instruction helps the officer assimilate the lessons he learns from everyday on-the-job experience. Basic training, therefore, is the appropriate point at which to begin risk reduction efforts.

Figure 20 lists the extent of recruit training received by all of the 55 officers who were the victims of the ambush attack events that form the basis for this study. Except for the observation noted previously that eight of these officers had no recruit training and three had received a week or less, no apparent significant relationship can be noted between the extent of recruit training received and the risk of becoming a casualty. This is sharply highlighted in Figure 21 where the total of fatal and injured victims are compared with non-casualty victims.

In all of the recruit programs examined in each of the victim officers' agencies, no specific risk reduction courses existed in the recruit curricula. Although the philosophy of caution becomes a recurring theme throughout much of each agency's recruit training program, there were no courses that specifically pertained to ambush attack. Courses that were noted as "Defensive Tactics" were largely devoted to training in the art of self-defense in hand-to-hand encounters and in the use of the baton.

Obviously, if recruit training is to provide a satisfactory preparatory base, then elements of a risk reduction program for ambush attack must be incorporated into this stage of training. Specific courses must be developed that directly address the threat of ambush attack and the risk reduction measures to be taken. Moreover, the entire recruit training program of each agency should be reviewed and ambush risk reduction doctrine included wherever appropriate.

It must be emphasized to the recruit that at times he will find himself in situations of real physical danger. Once a motivation for self-protection has been established, training in tactics, procedures, and equipment for ambush defense can begin. The instruction must stress the close interrelationship that exists between ambush defense and officer survival in many other possible situations of immediate hazard. If the recruit is led to believe that an ambush attack is a highly unique once-in-a-lifetime occurrence, it is unlikely that he will retain this instruction. But, if he is taught that an ambush attack, though infrequently encountered, has distinctive characteristics and is the most dangerous of several basic threat situations that may be experienced by police officers during the normal course of their duties, the recruit will grasp and retain this instruction with far greater alacrity. It becomes useful, lifesaving information of everyday value.

The standard basic training programs that exist in victim officer agencies include instructions on departmental policies and procedures, patrol and investigative techniques, equipment, firearms, and self-defense. All of these subjects are highly relevant and useful in preparing the recruit to defend himself against ambush attack. But many specific topics within these broad categories deserve special emphasis and attention from the standpoint of ambush risk reduction. Due to the large variety of law enforcement agencies performing the police mission in many diverse circumstances, the formulation of a single set of detailed lesson plans for training in ambush defense is inappropriate; each agency must develop its own training materials in accordance with its actual needs. Bearing this in mind, the following selected topics are listed for consideration and further development by police administrators and training coordinators:

- Where and when ambush attacks frequently happen
- Who is more likely to be ambushed
- Tactics commonly employed to execute ambush attacks
- Weapons used in ambush attacks
- The kinds of personalities most likely to ambush police officers
- The motivations for ambush attacks
- The role of extremist groups in ambush attacks
- How good community relations reduce risks
- The importance of being alert; the need for instant reaction
- How to minimize exposure and plan for use of available cover and concealment

- The use of an intelligence system for risk reduction
- Specific ways and means of self-protection
- The role of communications before, during, and after an ambush attack
- What to do when another officer is wounded; when you are wounded
- The use and capabilities of police firearms in an ambush attack
- The value and use of protective equipment

This brief listing is not inclusive; additional topics can and should be developed and integrated with the basic training curriculum as desired. The important thing to remember is that comprehensive recruit training can help prevent casualties. On-the-job training in an ambush attack event is a very costly way to make up for omissions in recruit training. The officer who has not been initially trained in ambush defense may well learn his lesson too late.

In-Service Training

For many years, formal police training was limited solely to the basic training received upon appointment due to lack of available funds, limited interest and expertise in developing suitable instruction, and the belief that the police job could be learned through experience. Additionally, many small agencies found it difficult to provide training while the officer was on duty and still maintain adequate patrol coverage. Although many law enforcement agencies still do not provide in-service training, more and more are attempting to provide various training measures to supplement and update the initial level of recruit instruction.

In-service training is basically a means of expanding or refreshing an officer's knowledge about his craft or of maintaining his proficiency and skill in certain areas that require manual performance. It includes roll call training, periodic firearms practice, seminars, and other formal training sessions conducted for individuals, selected groups, or for the entire force.

Thirteen of the 28 agencies visited by PWC study teams did not provide any type of in-service training. Except for some firearms training, the majority of the 55 officers who were victims of ambush attack events reviewed in this study had not received any training within the 12 month period preceding their attack.

In-service training is the most current method by which officers can be exposed to information that can help them avoid becoming casualties. Therefore, the failure to provide satisfactory instruction ignores an irretrievable opportunity to reduce risks in an ambush attack. With a little extra effort, in-service training can be employed as a significant risk reduction activity.

Agencies desiring in-service training can begin with two-to-four hour training sessions held before or after tours of duty. Instruction can be accomplished through lecture, discussion, or a combination of lecture and discussion. Each of these methods has certain advantages and disadvantages, but all can be effective provided that the intent is purposeful, the training time structured, and the responsible instructor is not content with simply "going through the

motions”—an all too frequent approach where small blocks of instructions are concerned. The agency can either develop more lengthy comprehensive programs itself or can often participate in training programs developed by other agencies. In any event, in-service training must also include an annual or semi-annual review and reinforcement of instruction previously presented.

The training topics suggested for teaching ambush defense in basic training are all worthy of extended treatment in in-service training. The timeliness of information is particularly vital in this kind of training, and the materials presented should be supplemented with concrete illustrations of actual events whenever possible. Instructors should avoid an “academic” presentation of ways and means of risk reduction and always seek to stress the *practical application* of those points highlighted during the session. All such instruction must be presented within the context of the everyday realities of police operations. If the instructor cannot do this, the lesson plan should be revised or the instructor replaced as appropriate.

Officers who receive in-service training in ambush defense commonly express a feeling of greater confidence in their ability to survive an ambush. These officers believe they know what to do and how to do it, and this feeling of confidence extends into many other areas of the police mission as well. In-service training is one of the best means to achieve the critical goal of officer survival.

Roll Call Training. This type of in-service training is commonly described as a short five to 15 minute formal training period, usually conducted as an adjunct to the regular briefing and/or inspection prior to the beginning of a tour of duty. The frequency varies among agencies from once each week to once every other month. Roll call training sessions are enhanced when a training bulletin directed toward a particular topic is distributed to each officer. This provides an opportunity for the instructor to amplify and highlight the main points, for officers to question and discuss areas that they do not understand, and for the agency and its members to amass a documented body of doctrine useful to all.

Only one of the victim officers interviewed reported that he regularly received formal roll call training. Seven other victim officers reported receiving a comparable type of irregularly scheduled training. In other cases, it must be noted that although a victim may have indicated that he received some roll call training from time to time, these situations were identified largely as the sort of informal advice and counsel offered by a supervisor at a briefing conducted at the beginning of a tour of duty. None of these formal and informal roll call situations provided instruction in any of the topics dealing with defense against ambush attack.

Firearms Training. Although officers receive firearms instruction during recruit training, they must maintain an acceptable level of firearms proficiency throughout their careers. Moreover, specific instruction regarding the appropriate use of his weapons during an ambush attack must be provided to the officer.

Seven of the 55 victim personnel involved in the 32 ambush attack events had not received any basic instruction in the use of their service weapons. The basic firearms training received by the remainder of the victim personnel included, as a minimum, only the fundamentals of firearms safety and usage. Beyond this, the quality and extent of firearms instruction varied considerably among law enforcement agencies, ranging from instruction limited to firing ten shots at a conventional bull’s-eye with a service revolver to comprehensive courses requiring each officer to meet set standards while discharging over 100 rounds under many different firing conditions with both

service and off-duty weapons. A few agencies were implementing modified practical pistol courses, combat firing, dimlight firing, and many other instructional configurations designed to improve proficiency and instill confidence.

Nine of the victim officers were employed in agencies that did not require periodic firearms in-service training or periodic qualification. While the remaining agencies did require some form of re-qualification on a monthly, semi-annual or annual basis, the lack of uniform standards makes it impossible to analyze the effectiveness of such training.

Although the shotgun is a basic item of police equipment and is carried in many police vehicles, its advantage in deterrence of ambush attacks cannot be easily determined. However, once the attack is initiated and the officer is in a position to successfully defend himself, the shotgun is clearly an advantage. Therefore, proper training in the use of the police shotgun should be a basic adjunct of regular police handgun instruction. Aside from a few instances of basic orientation and familiarization, none of the victim officers had received formal shotgun training. Also, none received periodic proficiency training or qualification despite the fact that their weapons were carried in police vehicles or available within their agencies.

All officers who are armed should receive a minimum of 30 hours of basic handgun instruction and should be capable of completing a practical combat type course with a minimum proficiency of 75 percent accuracy. This proficiency level should be maintained by means of firearms re-training sessions conducted at least every three months. Additionally, all officers should receive a minimum of four hours of instruction in the use of the shotgun. Basic shotgun proficiency should be demonstrated at each firearms re-training session by properly loading and unloading the weapon and by firing a minimum of three rounds at a realistic target—preferably the same type used for handgun practice.

Counter Ambush Training. Tactics to counter an ambush attack provide a subject area that is easily compatible with all modes of in-service training.

Four of the victim officers interviewed in this study had received instruction in counter ambush tactics. Most of them were convinced that when ambushed they had chosen a course of action in accordance with their instruction and that the tactics learned had helped them survive the attack.

A major thrust of this manual is the identification of those tactics deemed most successful in reducing risks inherent in ambush attacks. Training in such tactics must not be confused with counterattack tactics, SWAT operations, or those measures undertaken to neutralize an armed barricaded subject or the position of a known sniper. In all of these latter cases, the counteraction activity commences after the attack, not before.

Training Resources

A number of resources can be developed and utilized by police agencies, individually or in combination, to assist in the training effort. These include:

- The creation of a risk reduction specialist in each agency to collect and analyze information regarding ambush attack.

- The review and analysis of the FBI reports on law enforcement officers killed as reported through the National Law Enforcement teletype system and the annual summary.
- The use of appropriate films available from commercial sources. These can be secured and used on a regional basis to minimize expense.
- The use of the IACP Police Weapons Center on an inquiry-response basis for assistance in planning training programs.
- The employment of the "Alert Bulletins" issued under this program as an interim measure in the overall risk reduction effort.

Physical Conditioning

A sound program of physical conditioning is a must for reducing risks from the threat of ambush attack. An officer who is physically fit is far more likely to have the quick reactions and coordination required to survive the first seconds of an ambush attack than is an officer who is in poor physical condition. Further, the victim officer who is physically fit and in good health has the stamina and strength required to continue evasive and defensive actions should he become injured. The physical capability to remain in action, even though wounded, is one of the victim officer's most important protective resources. Finally, the injured officer who is physically fit has a much better chance of responding to emergency medical treatment than does the officer who is in poor physical condition.

Unfortunately, many departments do not stress physical fitness. Many law enforcement officers feel physical conditioning is something to cope with in recruit training but not thereafter. Police agencies can emphasize the importance of training for physical fitness through motivation, adequate facilities (if the agency does not have a large physical plant, arrangements can often be made to use facilities elsewhere), and appropriate physical training materials. A program of periodic physical fitness testing is an excellent reinforcement tool. Concurrently, individual officers must make an effort to avail themselves of the opportunities offered and recognize that even a few minutes daily spent in performing simple exercises can provide great dividends over a period of time.

The Role of the Supervisor in Training

Supervision in any organization is synonymous with training; police agencies are no exception. Sergeants and other first line police supervisors can play a significant role in reducing the risks inherent in ambush attacks. By virtue of his assignment, the first line supervisor has an excellent opportunity to identify training needs, to provide the training needed (possibly even on an individual basis), to observe officer performance, and to take corrective action. Unfortunately, the dynamics of police operations also involve the first line supervisor in a myriad of other tasks and responsibilities as well. This is evidenced by the fact that in none of the ambush attack events that form the basis for this study was there clear evidence that the first line supervisor functioned as a trainer. Of all the victim officers who were interviewed, only one reported that his supervisor provided his training. In this case, the officer was one who never received any formal recruit training and was actually learning his craft from his supervisor on a day-by-day basis as he went about his duties.

The constraints of available time and funds which frequently are offered as reasons for the lack of training are only valid when formal recruit or specialized training is considered. There is no justification for not using first line supervisors to conduct roll call training or to coach their men on an individual basis. Opportunities exist while providing backup on certain calls, during coffee and lunch breaks, or at meetings in the patrol area deliberately arranged for that purpose.

The first line supervisor is a vital part of the risk reduction effort of any department. Only the first line supervisor can insure that his men are properly trained and are carrying out risk reduction practices on a day-to-day basis. The routine of daily operations can quickly dull the sharp edge of alertness of even the best training program if it is not continuously honed by good supervision.

EQUIPMENT

Good police equipment, if properly used, can reduce risks in ambush attacks. Sound investments in weapons, protective equipment, and communications can prevent injury and save lives. Items of equipment that are valuable to the survival of an officer caught by surprise in an ambush attack event are also of equal value to the safety of the officer in other kinds of hazardous events, and of value to the overall police mission. Therefore, the procurement of such equipment does not require the allocation of scarce funds to highly specialized areas of hardware, but rather an upgrading of the general inventory of such equipment to increase law enforcement capabilities in all areas of mission performance.

Firearms

Most officers consider the sidearm to be their most important item of equipment and rely upon it to provide the protection that they may require. So armed, police officers do not hesitate to interrupt the most violent crime or to pursue and apprehend an armed suspect. This feeling of confidence and security usually permits police officers to perform their duties without frequent recourse to the sidearm since they feel secure in the knowledge that an adequate means of self-defense is available if needed. Unfortunately, the threat of ambush attack frequently destroys the credibility of the sidearm as a satisfactory weapon. The resulting loss in psychological assurance can be quickly translated into concrete operational problems, and this is especially likely to occur in the climate of hasty sensationalism generated by the occurrence or threat of ambush attack. IACP Casualty Analysis staff determined that a careful sifting of fact and opinion is necessary before any valid judgments regarding the performance of the sidearm in ambush defense can be made.

It is true that in many ambush attack events the sidearm will have little or no influence upon the probability of the victim officer becoming a casualty. But this is because of the characteristics of the ambush attack, not because the sidearm as a weapon may be intrinsically inadequate. Most of the ambush attacks studied caught an unsuspecting victim officer by surprise and were over in seconds. In such attacks, the opportunity to draw and employ the sidearm defensively in an exchange of fire with the attacker was frequently limited or altogether nonexistent. Moreover, in many ambush events, and this is especially true of ambush attacks triggered at short range, the probabilities are that the victim officer who has been surprised will be immediately killed or injured.

Even if the officer does manage to draw his weapon, it will often happen that the assailant has already broken off the attack and fled, or if the attack has been initiated at long range, the officer may be unable to locate the assailant who will generally have opened fire from a concealed position.

Therefore, at least during the first moments of any ambush attack event, the sidearm will seldom guarantee the survival of a victim officer. But it is equally true that no other kind of weapon would be of any greater utility in these circumstances. It is not the weapon, but the lack of opportunity to use the weapon, that is decisive.

But what of those ambush attack events in which the victim officer does have an opportunity to employ his weapon? Many argue that in such cases the facts demonstrate that victim officers armed with sidearms have often been outgunned. Although many reports of the kinds and numbers of weapons used by assailants remain unconfirmed, and in some instances are possibly exaggerated, ballistic evidence from recovered bullets and weapons show that ambush attacks have been carried out by assailants armed with high-powered rifles, shotguns, autoloading pistols, and less frequently with automatic weapons. Certainly, these weapons, if employed to maximize their advantages, do provide the assailant with a superior ability to deliver fire to the target.

It must be recognized, however, that any valid assessment of firepower must include a comparative evaluation of the weapon's characteristics including lethality, accuracy, rate of fire, reliability, ease in handling (or time needed for aiming) and the conditions of engagement, such as elapsed time, range, and the existence of obstructions or "clutter" along the sightline. If both sides of the firepower equation are taken into account, a weapon that provides a decisive advantage in firepower in one ambush attack may put its user at a disadvantage in a different event. For example, a high-powered bolt action rifle equipped with a scope, if used by an assailant to initiate a long range attack, will clearly be superior to the officer's sidearm because of the rifle's great accuracy and range. But if the same weapon were used in the close quarters of the interior of a residence or commercial building, the sidearm with its greater ease in handling would give the officer an edge. This oversimplified illustration is not intended to imply that officers are not outgunned in many ambush attacks in which relative firepower can affect the outcome. However, simply because an assailant is armed with a particular kind of firearm does not necessarily mean that there is a real disparity in firepower between the assailant and the victim; or, if there is, this disparity is not always so great as to put the officer at a disadvantage. "Firepower" is an often misused term of considerable emotive impact. Perhaps it is significant that officers who are less skilled in the use of their weapon are usually among the first to denigrate the worth of the sidearm as an effective means of defense. Moreover, there is some indication that officers who are less skilled with their sidearm may be more injury prone.

Granted that officers are outgunned in some ambush attack events and that these officers do have an opportunity to defend themselves, what practical corrective action should be taken to put the officer in the best possible position to exploit this critical opportunity? First it should be reiterated that the officer's chief requirement is for a means of self-defense. Given the many tactical advantages the assailant enjoys—it is after all the assailant who has chosen the time, location, and method of attack—the wisest course of action for the officer is to evade, gain some means of protection, and then call for assistance. His first concern must be for his own immediate safety and his tactical posture must be defensive.

In most ambush attack events, the sidearm is perfectly adequate for the mission of close-in self-defense, because if the officer has secured a temporary place of shelter, the assailant, if he is to continue his attack, must advance to the victim officer. Should the assailant choose to do this, he has thrown away his position of initial tactical superiority. In these circumstances, the officer's handgun can most often be used effectively. Therefore, to purposely increase an officer's armament so that

he can aggressively seek out and counterattack his assailant is contrary to the best tactical procedure of ambush defense and could well result in more, not fewer, police casualties.

In some instances, it is desirable that officers be equipped with weapons in addition to the sidearm. Some officers favor automatic or self-loading small arms; that is, rifles, carbines, submachineguns, and machine pistols. The emotionalism that sometimes accompanies such suggestions often endows them with more force than their merit deserves. Most law enforcement decision makers have resisted full scale procurement and issue of weapons of this type on clearly sound grounds:

- Even the most sympathetic community is likely to react adversely to the sight of officers carrying such weapons.
- The increased risk of injury to the public by police use of such weapons cannot be condoned.
- The infrequency of need does not justify the purchase of such weapons or the expense of providing the extensive training required for such weapons to be used safely and effectively.
- The development of specially trained and equipped teams available for rapid response is a more effective and practical approach.

If additional standard armament is required, it would seem that the shotgun, a weapon already in the armories of many departments, would be the best choice. However, though several of the police vehicles involved in ambush attack events reviewed in this study did contain shotguns, the victim officers were without exception unable to employ these weapons. In large part this was due to the suddenness of the attack and the fact that shotguns were most often carried in locked mounts located in the interior of the automobile or in the trunk.

In some agencies, shotguns were carried only in sergeants' vehicles. There are good reasons involving public safety and theft prevention for such restrictive precautions, and these reasons must be accorded substantial weight when assessing the desirability of providing officers with instant access to shotguns. If shotguns are available, perhaps the best possible solution is to provide these weapons in patrol vehicles equipped with specially selected quick release lock mounts located in the automobile interior. A mounting position on the floor with the weapon horizontal and easily available from either side of the front seat, is the safest and most desirable. All in all, this method of issue and storage provides both good accessibility and weapon security.

Though shotguns would sometimes be of great value, the handgun will nevertheless be the officer's most practical means of self-defense in an ambush attack event. This being so, what is the best way to increase the utility of this weapon? Again, the realities of daily activity must be considered. Most police departments equip their officers with .38 Special double-action revolvers; some departments have adopted Magnum double-action revolvers; and a small number of departments use semiautomatic pistols of 9mm or .45 ACP caliber. The choice as to which caliber and design provides the superior police sidearm is largely subjective and reflects a controversy that has existed for many years; it cannot be addressed within the limited scope of this brief study. There are, however, a few observations regarding the design and caliber of the police sidearm that are worthy of discussion from the standpoint of ambush defense.

“Knockdown” Power. It is important that an officer be equipped with a weapon and ammunition so that a single well-placed round will render an assailant unable to continue his attack. Moreover, it must be understood that there can be no substitute for accuracy. Many police officers exhibit a great deal of interest and anxiety over the relative “stopping or shocking” ability of various cartridges, and this cannot be ignored. Unfortunately, many officers falsely assume that the larger the caliber, the more effective the handgun must be in disabling an assailant. This assumption is only partially true at best; caliber is but one of several basic considerations that determine the lethality of any given cartridge. For present purposes, it is sufficient to point out that any of the standard calibers currently used by police departments are within the “manstopper” category.

The issue of knockdown power is best understood as effecting a more efficient transference of kinetic energy from the impacting bullet to the tissue of the target. It is most desirable that the bullet give up all of its energy and come to rest within the target. This can be accomplished by adopting any of several bullet configurations specially designed for maximum energy transference now on the market. On the basis of studies and tests, many departments have chosen this course of action and have discarded the caliber .38 Special round nose lead bullet in favor of improved cartridges with jacketed hollowpoint, jacketed softpoint, wadcutter, semi-wadcutter, and semi-wadcutter hollowpoint bullet configurations.

Cartridge Capacity. Many officers feel that a revolver’s six-shot capacity limits the effectiveness of this weapon and fear the possibility of being caught with an unloaded weapon. Some officers even carry second handguns to avoid being trapped with an empty revolver. Because of this concern, some officers have expressed a belief that some autoloading pistols are better weapons than the revolver because of greater cartridge capacity and quicker reload capability.

Whatever might be the merits of an increased cartridge capacity for the sidearm in other events associated with police operations, it is highly unlikely that the capability to fire more than six rounds before reloading would be critical to officer survival in most ambush attacks. As previously indicated, the victim officer in many ambush attacks will have no opportunity to fire at all; but if he does, the engagement conditions associated with the critical demands of close-in defense are such that cartridge capacity will seldom be a decisive factor. Only 13 of the 55 victim officers assaulted in the 32 ambush events in this study returned fire. These officers fired 37 rounds in 11 events for an average of approximately 2.8 rounds per police weapon discharged. This compares favorably with previous studies in New York and Los Angeles regarding all types of police combat situations. Unfortunately, only two of the 13 victim officers who fired their weapons obtained hits. This suggests that accuracy rather than cartridge capacity is the most difficult problem for law enforcement personnel defending against armed attack.

Armor

The procurement and issue of various configurations of armor to be used as a standard item of equipment on a daily or as needed basis would greatly reduce the risk of officer death or injury in most ambush attack events. However, armor is not a single answer to ambush attack and there are many practical difficulties that work against its use on a large scale. But armor can provide effective protection to the officer during the first critical moment of an attack when most officers are rendered casualties. This would reduce the advantages of the assailant’s “first strike” capability and secure an opportunity for officer survival.

The modern development of armor to protect the individual has been underway for over 50 years; continuing advances in technology and design have now brought the question of police armor procurement into the realm of practical consideration. There are several types of armor that can be reviewed in the operational context of ambush defense.

Torso Protection. Twenty-seven of the 55 police officers who were victims of ambush attack in events surveyed in this study were wounded. Seven of these victim officers suffered fatal injuries. An analysis of the distribution of injuries as shown in Figure 22 indicates that many of these casualties could have been avoided if the victim officers had been equipped with suitable ballistic protection to the torso. Four of the seven officers killed died solely from torso wounds; at least one of the three officers who died because of multiple injuries to different parts of the body sustained his most critical injuries in the torso; three of the 20 officers injured were wounded in the torso. Torso armor that would have prevented the casualties in all of these instances is currently available, but none of the 55 victim officers were wearing such armor.

The majority of all law enforcement personnel, including victims of past ambush attack events who discussed their experience with IACP Casualty Analysis teams, do not believe they would willingly don torso armor for continuous wear. The primary adversions to body armor focus on comfort, appearance, and convenience:

- Comments regarding comfort usually begin with an expression of dislike for the standard police uniform. Many officers are satisfied with their current uniforms only in the summer when ties and long sleeves can be dispensed with. Other seasonal garb is described as uncomfortable and restrictive. Most of these officers are unwilling to add to their discomfort by wearing an armor vest or other protective garment.
- Appearance is of concern to many officers. These officers do not wish to wear torso armor because they feel they might appear as an armored knight or a paramilitary invader. These officers seek to avoid ridicule, suspicion, and hostility by not wearing torso armor.
- “Another nuisance to put up with” is the general viewpoint of officers concerned with the convenience of their equipment. These officers point out that they are already burdened with a large number of items including a sidearm, nightstick, portable radio, chemical agent, extra ammunition, handcuffs, holsters, and other assorted items. In addition, the officer will usually have a flashlight, a notebook, report forms and perhaps a clipboard of some type. Many officers also carry selected articles that they personally feel are important, such as ammonia inhalants and basic first aid items. Finally, an officer may be issued a shotgun or an inhalator or other equipment unique to his assignment such as a wrench for turning off hydrants or a rope for capturing animals. Therefore, many officers resist carrying and managing another piece of equipment, especially a major item such as torso armor.

These adverse opinions are straightforward expressions of practical concern generated by the demands and conditions of everyday police experience. On the other hand, many of these objections are founded upon generalizations that do not always hold true for every type of torso armor.

Armor vests and other protective garments are manufactured in many different shapes, sizes, weights, and materials, some examples of which are illustrated in Figures 23-27. This variety




Figure 22
 DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR WOUNDS AMONG VICTIM PERSONNEL

provides ample opportunity for the exercise of sound trade-off options. For the most part, the higher the degree of protection required, the more cumbersome, heavier, and more costly the torso armor. Armor that will defeat caliber .30-06 armor-piercing rounds looks and wears as if it were capable of doing so. Designed to defeat a very high threat level, this kind of torso armor is burdensome and generally must be worn in full view over the officer's clothing. But torso armor that is designed to counter lower threat levels is generally much less hindering and some designs can be worn concealed under the service blouse or shirt.

Torso armor is manufactured from a variety of materials including nylon, glass-reinforced plastics, polycarbonate resins, ceramics, metals, or combinations of these materials. Some armor vests are of single piece design, while others utilize a carrying garment or harness made of cloth or vinyl into which the armor material is inserted. There are manufacturers that are currently designing ballistic resistant protective garments that look like ordinary clothing. Rapidly developing technology may soon produce the ideal item of torso armor: an armor vest or protective garment that offers excellent ballistic protection and is comfortable, good looking, and convenient. But even now there are many good designs available that can keep officers from becoming casualties in ambush attack events.

Neck Protection. Three of the victim officers in the current study suffered wounds in their necks. One officer died when his throat was cut in a multiple stabbing attack; another was killed when he sustained multiple hits in his face; and the third officer was shot in the neck, but recovered.

One of the officers who was killed was an undercover agent who could not have performed his job while wearing armor that would have defeated an attack of that type. This situation does not hold true for most police officers; the neck area can be secured from injury from knife and small arms attack through the use of ballistic nylon collars or extension pieces fitted to existing vests.

Head Protection. The FBI Uniform Crime Reports Summary for 1972 indicates that 48 of a total of 112 police fatalities were caused by head wounds—accounting for almost 43 percent of all fatalities. Four of the victim officers in the events reviewed in this study suffered head and facial injuries. Two of these officers were multiple injury fatalities. The high number of fatal injuries in which head wounds were decisive or a contributing cause indicated a critical need for some means by which to protect this highly vulnerable part of the body.

Bullet resistant helmets have been developed and are on the market. Serious consideration should be given to the procurement and issue of such items of protective equipment. It is true that many of the objections against torso armor are equally applicable to ballistic helmets. Further, many police officers are quite fatalistic about head wounds, and either doubt the ability of any helmet to stop a bullet or else fear that if the bullet does not penetrate the helmet, the impact will generate severe shock waves that will either injure the brain or break the neck. In part, this negative attitude is the result of training received regarding nonbullet resistant helmets in which instructors have commonly stressed that such general duty helmets are not ballistic resistant and therefore are of no value against a well-armed assailant.

A lack of publicized information and extensive independent testing of ballistic helmets is undoubtedly another contributing cause. But whatever the source of this negativism, the seriousness



Figure 23

Ballistic vest, light weight, designed for concealed wear under clothing. Material: DuPont "Kevlar." Weight: 2 pounds, 15 ounces. Rated against: .38 Special, and 357 Magnum.




Figure 24

Ballistic vest, light weight, can be worn under clothing. Material: ballistic nylon. Weight: under 5 pounds. Rated against: .38 Special, .45 AR (lead nose bullet) and .22 handgun.




Figure 25

Ballistic vest, medium weight, can be worn concealed. Material: ballistic nylon, steel, ethofoam, and vinyl coated nylon. Weight: 6-3/4 pounds. Rated against: 357 Magnum, .45 ACP, 9mm, .22 LR, and .38 Special (front and back sections), .38 Special (side sections).




Figure 26

Ballistic jacket, medium weight. Material: ballistic nylon. Weight: 10 pounds. Rated against: .38 Special, .45 AR (lead nose bullet) and .22 handgun.




Figure 27

Armored vest, heavy weight. Material: ceramic armor "KT" silican carbide in polyester and combed cotton vest. Weight: 30.2 pounds (regular), 42.9 pounds (large) and 54.9 pounds (modified). Rated against: .30-06 armor piercing.

of head injuries is so severe that law enforcement agencies should not overlook the selected use of bullet-resistant helmets in reducing risks in general service as well as in ambush attacks.

Vehicle Armor. In most departments, the standard method of patrol is by radio equipped patrol vehicles. Providing quick response and excellent mobility, the patrol vehicle is an indispensable item of equipment. Unfortunately, the patrol vehicle also provides assailants with a ready means of acquiring targets. Forty-four of the 55 victim officers in the 32 ambush events examined in this study were in, near, or exiting vehicles at the time of the ambush attack. Almost all of these vehicles were marked patrol cars.

The most obvious and effective solution is to install materials that can defeat bullet penetration on police vehicles. This method does not pose great difficulties for those portions of the automobile that are not required to be transparent—the automobile body itself. Metallic, lightweight armor materials are available that can be fabricated to the required configurations. These metals, which include aluminum alloy, homogeneous steel, titanium alloy, and dual hardness steel, are very suitable for vehicle application. Combinations of metal and nonmetallic materials bonded together also offer substantial bullet resistance. Among such materials are ballistic nylon, glass reinforced plastic, and polycarbonate plastic. Nonmetallic materials can also be used independently.

More difficulty is encountered when attempting to combine bullet resistance and transparency in order to armor the windshield and other window areas. Materials possessing both characteristics are available such as bullet resistant glass, polycarbonate plastic, and acrylic plastic. In each instance, the thicker the material the greater the ballistic resistant capability. Such factors as occupant

comfort, durability, and scratch resistance must also be considered, and mounting problems are difficult to overcome.

The purchase and application of vehicle armor poses problems for police administrators. Many would prefer complete protection for every vehicle, but they are cognizant that the frequency of ambush attack cannot alone justify such an expenditure. Some are contemplating obtaining several bullet resistant equipped vehicles and assigning them to selected areas where the potential for ambush attack is great. Automobiles so equipped would also be available to respond to certain incidents involving firearms. Several manufacturers of ballistic resistant panels for vehicles have designed their products in a fashion that permits interchangeable installation, allowing the armor to be transferred from one automobile to another.

Whatever the method of deployment or installation, an officer attacked when in a protected vehicle will enjoy an enormous advantage in survival potential. In view of the number of ambush attacks conducted against personnel assigned to police vehicles, the procurement and selected use of vehicle armor can be a substantial step forward in implementing a satisfactory means of ambush defense.

Communications

Modern communications equipment reduces risks in ambush attacks by helping to eliminate officer isolation. Years ago, foot patrolmen in many police departments in this country were on their own after roll call. Except for infrequent contacts with his patrol sergeant, each officer was isolated and without any capability to quickly summon assistance. Telegraphic call boxes were the first means developed that permitted officers to communicate simple messages to headquarters. The ability of police headquarters to respond satisfactorily to events of great urgency awaited the perfection of the telephone. The telephone not only provided communications with patrol officers but with the public as well. This increased communications capability provided a great improvement in protection for the community and for the police officer who now could much more readily summon assistance when he detected a threat to his safety. But though a marked improvement over telegraphic communication, the telephone was not portable.

The development of the police radio began in the late 1920's and by 1950, the police radio in conjunction with the automobile, had revolutionized police patrol practices. Officers who were assigned to patrol vehicles could now increase their odds of avoiding injury by requesting assistance and in many cases receiving immediate support. The availability and high mobility of radio equipped patrol vehicles also benefitted the officer on foot patrol.

Police radio usage has been broadened in some areas to include interdepartmental communication. This is another great aid in reducing officer isolation. Vehicle communications capabilities have also been improved by the development of electronic equipment such as the mobile digital terminal. (Figure 28). This model has a double-sized red emergency key which transmits a call for assistance until the message has been received. Such electronic equipment also provides for rapid and accurate dispatching of mobile units.

Hand-held radios with modern improvements in transmission capability afford police officers with instant communication when they are on foot. As the state of electronic technology has advanced, these "walkie-talkies" have become smaller, more reliable, and more readily available. In




Figure 28
MOBILE DIGITAL TERMINAL

terms of risk reduction in ambush attack, this equipment provides an officer with the ability to communicate from concealment or cover without any need to expose himself to further assault. In events involving snipers or barricaded criminals, portable radio equipment cannot only be used to request immediate assistance but can also be used to insure the safest possible deployment of units which respond to assist.

Progress in modern communications continues. Some police agencies now are utilizing closed circuit television with cameras located in selected high risk areas. These systems also help reduce the number of attacks against the public and police officers.

Technical success in the manufacture of communications equipment has led to advancements in the police services. The ability to communicate before, during, and after an ambush attack protects the officer and assists in suspect apprehension. The development of an adequate communications inventory is a task of priority concern to all law enforcement personnel.

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

This study was limited to ambush attack events that occurred between September 1, 1972 and August 30, 1973. Events for field visits were selected by PWC Casualty Analysis staff in several ways. The Federal Bureau of Investigation made available teletype messages and bulletins announcing all police fatalities. A newsclipping service continuously screened approximately 8,750 daily and weekly news publications and supplied news accounts of incidents involving police assaults. A brochure describing the project was prepared and distributed to all known police agencies in the U.S. requesting them to forward reports or information on assaults against police officers.

All reports received were carefully reviewed by the PWC staff who sought to identify specific ambush attacks against law enforcement officers. Occasionally, the agency concerned would be contacted for additional information. If the event appeared qualified for examination, a letter was sent to the agency head describing the program and requesting to visit the agency to secure information about the event, to interview the principals involved, and also to examine relevant policies, procedures, and training programs.

A total of 39 reported ambush attack events were selected for examination, of which 33 were subsequently determined to fall within the study definition of ambushes. Thirty-five on-site visits to 28 law enforcement agencies were performed during the field study effort. The agencies visited ranged in size from two officers to more than 30,000.

Regions	Number of Agencies Visited	Number of Events
Mid Atlantic	5	13
Pacific	7	7
South	6	6
West South Central	2	3
West North Central	4	2
North Central	2	2
East South Central	1	1
North East	1	1
TOTAL	28	35

Figure 1
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ON-SITE VISITS

A positive reply from an agency led to arrangements for the visit and a field study of the reported ambush attack event.¹

Each field study was conducted by a member of the IACP Police Weapons Center staff. Normally, each event required a two to three day visit to gather information. In each instance, the staff member sought to obtain documents and information by the following means:

- Review of the offense and follow-up reports concerning the event
- Review of the personnel records of the victim officer
- Review of the training record of the victim officer
- Review of the firearms proficiency record of the victim officer
- Interview with the victim officer, if possible
- Interview with other police participants
- Interview with investigative personnel
- Interview with supervisory personnel
- Visual examination of the event site
- Securing photographs and/or sketches of the scene
- Review of the arrest record of the suspect(s)
- Review of the description of weapon(s) used by the suspect(s) and the officer(s)

The results of this information gathering process often led to further interviews with firearm instructors, training personnel, criminal justice planners, prosecutors, parole officers, and others who might contribute to the research effort.

Upon completion of each field visit, the staff prepared several primary and interim documents. Additionally, reports were prepared and sent to the University of Oklahoma Research Institute to provide data for a detailed quantitative study of the variables in the assault process:

¹One department declined to participate in the study, thus eliminating from the study one event in which one officer was wounded. The following summary of this event is drawn from media reports:

While on patrol, the victim officer was flagged down by a 25- or 30-year-old black man screaming, "My baby's hurt real bad, you've got to help." As the officer started to radio for help, another assailant jumped him from behind, and a third assailant put a saw-off shotgun to the officer's stomach and pulled the trigger. The gun misfired. One of the other assailants grabbed the officer's service revolver and shot him in the leg. As the three assailants fled to their car, the officer fired his second gun, a .44 Magnum, and hit one of the assailants.

- *Physical Contact Summary* – a University of Oklahoma form requesting basic information that was to be assimilated with data submitted by other agencies and computer analyzed to determine causes and countermeasures for assaults on police officers. (Appendix D).
- *Incident Summary* – a factual summary report of the incident, a roster of persons contacted, and a list of materials collected for later analysis.

Other documents prepared and retained at IACP Headquarters for in-depth examination and analysis included:

- *Casualty Analysis Report* – a specific analysis of each event describing and evaluating the development, initiation, and execution of the ambush attack with major emphasis upon the identification of significant risk reduction factors.
- *Wound Chart* – a visual description and location of the wound(s) suffered by the victim officer.
- *Weapons Report* – a description of the weapon(s) and ammunition used by each participant in the event and the manner in which the weapons were employed.

These materials provided the basis for analysis and comparative review of all field data. A large number of interactive variables regarding the scenario and structure of identified ambush attack events, the behavior of event participants and victims, and outstanding environmental considerations were isolated, extracted, and then applied to direct further examination. The variables were clustered within three major subject categories. Primary data was processed within these categories in Figure 2.

The findings derived from this phase of the research effort were tabulated and arranged to generate initial recommendations for risk reduction in ambush attacks through new or improved tactics and procedures, equipment, and training. In turn, these recommendations were studied and tested against known operational and resource constraints of law enforcement. Recommendations that could not be realized within the constraints were modified or discarded. Final recommendations and discussions presented in this report are designed to provide a comprehensive effort toward risk reduction in ambush attacks.

Ambush Attack Events	Victim Personnel	Assailant/Suspects
Prior planning and preparation	Geographic distribution	How apprehended
Possible indications of attack	Agency classification	Age
	Professional standing	Race
Entrapment	Duty assignment	Physical characteristics
Role of extremist groups	Duty status and dress	Prior arrest record
Triggering mechanism	Age	Previous history of emotional disturbance
Tactics of execution	Length of service	Weapon used
Range	Training	
Number of rounds fired	Initial reaction of victim officer(s)	Circumstance of attack
Direction of fire	Evasive action taken	Motive, if known
Impact distribution in target area	Ability to locate assailant(s)	Casualties
	Accuracy of defensive fire	Wound distribution
Time of event	Criticality of wound	Criticality of wound
Physical characteristics, construction, and population density of area of occurrence	Casualties	Number of assailants
	Wound distribution	Weapon(s)/type(s)
Community attitudes toward police	Criticality of wound	Availability and use of escape routes
	Location and activities of victim	
Response by other law enforcement personnel	Number of victims	
	Weapon(s)/type(s)	
	Availability and use of escape routes	
	Availability and effectiveness of communications equipment	
	Rescue of wounded officer	

Figure 2
DATA CATEGORIES

APPENDIX B

ENTRAPMENT BOMBING TECHNIQUES AND TACTICS*

C. R. Newhouser

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this technical bulletin is to alert public safety administrators to the emerging threat of entrapment bombings. In the past, ambush attempts have generally been limited to the physical assault or shooting of public safety personnel. The recent trend toward the use of incendiary and explosive devices in ambush attempts presents special problems because:

- Clearly the purpose of the bomb is to kill, not merely to harass.
- The victim usually receives no warning and has no reaction time in which to take protective measures.
- Public safety personnel are often unaware of the potential danger and untrained in routine defensive tactics.
- Successful entrapment breeds fear, inspires terror, and the resulting publicity frequently leads to additional entrapment attempts.

To operate under a continuous threat of ambush is demoralizing for any agency and can lead to both reduced efficiency and appropriate response to routine situations. Thus, overreaction to the fear of entrapment can damage a department's effectiveness even when no attacks materialize.

*Originally published as Technical Bulletin 3-70 of The National Bomb Data Center during the period when NBDC was operated by the IACP.

SPECIAL NOTE: This technical bulletin has been released as unclassified to allow the information to be disseminated to all levels of public safety agency personnel. The information in this bulletin should not be disseminated outside the public safety community. The appearance of this information in a newspaper, or magazine or its transmission in any manner to militant/dissident groups may result in additional danger to public safety personnel.

FOR USE BY
AUTHORIZED PUBLIC SAFETY
PERSONNEL ONLY

TECHNICAL DATA

FOR USE BY
AUTHORIZED PUBLIC SAFETY
PERSONNEL ONLY

It is strongly recommended that each public safety administrator review this document in relation to the risk of local bombing entrapment and only then decide what portions of this bulletin are appropriate for internal dissemination.

This bulletin will briefly describe the following nine bomb entrapment tactics that have been employed by militant groups in the United States or are described in their literature:

The "Dud" Pipe Bomb	page B-3
False Citizen Report	page B-4
Habit Pattern	page B-5
Aerial Bombing	page B-7
Elevator Firebomb	page B-8
Second Story Fire	page B-9
Package Entrapment	page B-10
Stolen/Abandoned Automobile ...	page B-10
Delayed Action	page B-11

Since, by definition, an ambush can occur at any time or place, it is clearly impossible to describe every possibility. However, the examples provided herein and a basic understanding of ambush vulnerability should enable public safety personnel to reduce the risk of injury or death from explosive and incendiary device entrapments.

Given the bomb construction technology, a planned entrapment bombing requires only the ability to place the bomb on the target. This is accomplished by predicting the behavior of public safety personnel in one of two ways:

- By anticipating routine movements or duties
- By creating situations that call for a predictable response

While each of the tactics that follow differ in the details of execution, the success of each depends upon the ability of the bomber to predict the behavior of public safety personnel. Target personnel are vulnerable, then, to the extent that their conduct is predictable. This dependence upon predictability suggests the simplest and most effective preventive program. In areas of risk, personnel should:

- Avoid predictable behavior whenever possible.
- Be aware of typical entrapment bombing tactics.

- Be trained in defensive measures.

When a bomb or suspicious object is located, public safety personnel should:

- Not touch or disturb the device in any manner.
- Evacuate the area for at least 300 feet in all directions.
- Call for technical assistance from bomb squads or military EOD units.
- When absolutely necessary to move a device, employ only remote methods and tested transport equipment.

TECHNICAL INFORMATION

“Dud” Pipe Bomb Tactic

In recent months a number of public safety bulletins from across the country have described the construction of what externally appears to be a “Dud” pipe bomb having a section of burned safety fuse protruding from one end. Internally, this pipe bomb actually contains an anti-disturbance mercury tilt switch fuze which will cause detonation of the “Dud” pipe bomb when it is picked up or moved. The burned safety fuse serves no purpose other than to lure the unsuspecting into believing that the bomb is inactive and can be safely moved.

The concealed internal fuze consists of a small clock or watch rigged with electrical contact points (the hour or minute hand and a screw passing through the plastic crystal). The clock normally serves as an arming timer, completing the electrical circuit between the battery, the mercury tilt switch, and the electric blasting cap after the bomber leaves the area. The bomb is normally placed in a position which insures that the mercury switch contacts remain open. When the firing circuit becomes armed by the clock or watch, the bomb will not explode until it is moved sufficiently to cause the mercury to complete the firing circuit. Should this bomb be accidentally or deliberately placed in a position which causes the mercury switch to assume a closed position, the bomb will detonate when the arming timer contacts close. Thus, this fuzing system allows the bomb to be used as an entrapment device or as a simple time bomb.

Complete instructions for assembling a bomb of this basic type (but with no arming timer) were published in September, 1965, by the Department of the Army in a then unclassified Field Manual, FM 5-31, *Boobytraps*. Instructions and drawings may be found on pages 107 and 108 paragraph 61. a. (2), of FM 5-31, which was classified earlier this year to “Confidential”. Copies of this manual are no longer available through the Government Printing Office.

This device has also been illustrated and described in detail in at least one major city Sunday newspaper.

Because of availability of FM 5-31 to any citizen between 1965 and July, 1970, and because of recent newspaper reports about this type of entrapment bomb, it is reasonable to assume that it will be encountered in the future.

To prevent serious injury or death as a result of this tactic, all levels of public safety personnel must understand the employment of the “Dud” bomb tactic and should:

- Leave undisturbed any bomb encountered. Do not touch or move *any bomb*, even if you are sure it is a “Dud.”
- If a suspected bomb is found, clear the immediate area to a minimum distance of 300 feet in each direction.
- Request bomb squad assistance.
- If due to unusual circumstances the “Dud” bomb *must* be moved prior to the arrival of the bomb squad, that movement should be accomplished through *remote means only*. A long line can be used, with the operator under adequate protective cover. (500 feet of 1/8 inch diameter nylon line is excellent for this purpose).

False Citizen Report Tactic

The false citizen report tactic involves a telephone call to the public safety agency reporting some suspicious act or requesting assistance at a specific location. The seven police officers responding to “a woman screaming and calling for help” in Omaha found instead an empty two story house. During the search for the “woman,” a patrolman found a suitcase on the floor. When he moved the suitcase it exploded, killing the officer and injuring several others. All of the officers were following routine investigative procedures. It was a natural act under the circumstances to investigate the suitcase since it might have provided information about the woman’s identity. The entrapment tactic worked with deadly efficiency.

The false citizen report in Des Moines, Iowa, which led to the discovery of a tool box bomb; was the same type of tactic. There is little that can be done to protect against this type of entrapment tactic other than to be aware that the tactic is in use. If public safety personnel responding to a call can find no immediate subject or disturbance, they should be especially alert to the danger of entrapment. Response to calls for service in troublesome parts of town, areas of unrest, or uninhabited areas should be answered with the possibility of entrapment in mind. An object out of place in its surroundings, such as a new briefcase on the sidewalk in a ghetto area, or a normally crowded street that is empty, and stays empty after the arrival of patrol cars, should suggest the possibility of entrapment.

When entrapment is suspected, any entry into buildings should be cautious. Before entering a doorway, the door should be carefully checked for wires or strings attached to the door, door frame, lock, or doorknob. The door should be opened slowly and if any pressure is felt while opening the door, all movement should stop at once. Whenever possible, *avoid the obvious means of entry*. Enter through a window or go up a fire escape rather than use the front or back door. If an object is found, it should always be moved remotely using a long lightweight rope or cord. To prevent vulnerability to this entrapment tactic, all levels of public safety personnel must understand the “false citizen’s report” entrapment tactic and should:

- Keep the possibility of entrapment in mind. Be alert.

- When responding to a possible entrapment situation, avoid the obvious means of entry into a building.
- Avoid hand movement of any item found in a suspected entrapment area. All movement of suspected items should be accomplished using a remote line with the operator under cover.
- Be provided with up to the minute intelligence information relating to possible entrapment.

“Habit Pattern” Bombing Tactic

This tactic is quite simple when viewed from the bomber’s standpoint. Its purpose is to catch public safety personnel where they gather in groups for any reason and to injure or kill as many as possible with one bomb. Most public safety personnel develop habits that make them vulnerable to group bombing. In wartime combat, two of the basic rules of survival are “don’t bunch up” and “don’t do the same thing twice.” The same protective survival rules apply in those areas where urban warfare has become a reality.

Public safety personnel who always eat at the same diner or have a cup of coffee at the same restaurant when changing shifts are following a habit pattern. Personnel who regularly gather by the back door of the station house to engage in conversation before going to work are following a habit pattern and are violating the basic survival rules. The normal work day provides enough predictable action patterns without voluntarily creating additional entrapment situations. For example, each day requires at least one assembly or muster of each shift and even when these groups break up, personnel generally follow a routine action pattern. Thus the traditional roll-call alone raises interesting vulnerability questions:

- Are parking areas secured before and during shift changes or could a bomb be placed there and timed for the shift change?
- Could a suitcase full of dynamite be placed inside an unguarded garage while muster is being conducted?
- Could a time bomb be left in the men’s restroom next to the locker room?
- How secure is the assembly area between shifts? Are there trash cans next to the muster area and would a man leaving a cardboard box there be challenged?

The police in Emeryville, California, were the apparent target of the “Habit Pattern” tactic when four bombs were planted at their favorite drive-in restaurant, and several cities have reported that police vehicles were bombed while in their parking lots. To prevent vulnerability to this entrapment tactic, all levels of public safety personnel must understand the “Habit Pattern” entrapment bombing tactic and should:

- Avoid development of fixed daily personal or group habits.
- Provide 24-hour security for assembly points.
- Be particularly alert to entrapment situations when changing shifts.




Figure 1
12 GAUGE SHOTGUN AERIAL BOMBS

- Analyze the personal and group patterns now being followed and try to vary them whenever possible.
- Secure parking areas and garages.
- Make a visual check of locker rooms, public restrooms and surrounding areas when changing shifts.
- Report immediately any object that is suspicious, different, or out of place. Report it, but *don't touch it*.

Aerial Bombing Tactic

This tactic is one which is primarily employed after dark in downtown or high rise areas where buildings are close to the street. The bombers place themselves inside or on top of a building somewhere along the patrolman's beat or the area cruised by the patrol car. In the case of the patrolman, the bomber's intention is to cause the patrolman to stop walking (an open doorway) or to lure him into an alleyway (shining a flashlight on a box), consequently making him a vulnerable target for a fire bomb. With the patrol car, the tactic is similar. The bomber waits until the car stops (a trash can blocking the lane of traffic or a stop sign), releases the bomb, and then fades away.

Small explosive bombs (Figure 1) which detonate upon impact with a hard surface can be equally as effective as fire bombs in this tactic. For instance, an ordinary 12 gauge shotgun shell with a band of nails or wire taped or wrapped around the outside makes a deadly small bomb. When the shotgun shell hits the sidewalk it fires and blows apart, spreading nails and shot in all directions. There is nothing to give away the position of the thrower and a handful can be thrown at one time, creating multiple detonations and increasing the chances of success. Construction information and drawings of this type of bomb were published in August of this year and available to militant groups.

To provide protection against the aerial bombing tactic, all levels of public safety personnel must fully understand the tactic and should:

- Avoid establishing a predictable pattern of patrol whether on foot or in a car. For example, a patrolman could vary his pattern by changing sides of the street frequently.
- In higher risk areas, the skyline of buildings along patrol routes should be scanned. A man on a roof may often be spotted against the city's night sky glow.
- If a patrol car is struck by a fire bomb or if one lands in front of the car, the vehicle should be driven forward for at least half a block. Tests have indicated that automobiles can be driven through burning gasoline with little risk to occupants.
- A gasoline fire bomb striking a car should burn out in less than one and a half minutes with the intense flame diminishing in one minute. Stopping or attempting to leave the vehicle may lead to further attacks with fire bombs or small arms and should be avoided. The mobility and protection offered by the patrol car should not be abandoned unless absolutely necessary.

Elevator Fire Bomb Tactic

An entrapment tactic in use in some major metropolitan areas is one in which public safety personnel are trapped in elevators while fire bombs are dropped down the elevator shaft onto the roof of the cab.

This tactic is usually encountered in low income, high rise, public housing developments. Public safety officers responding to a citizen report (usually false) take the elevator and start up to the reported floor. At some point in their travel, the elevator cab is stopped from the outside either by turning off the power or by opening one of the floor doors. Fire bombs are then dropped down the elevator shaft to impact and ignite on the top of the elevator cab.

While this tactic is certainly unpleasant, it is not normally hazardous to those inside the cab. The roof of the elevator cab is usually made of one piece of metal having only the emergency escape hatch for an opening, and this hatch is usually sufficiently tight fitting so that it is unlikely that burning gasoline will enter the cab. Additionally, most small elevators have a slightly rounded or sloped roof and this tends to deflect the burning gasoline. The intense flame of the fire bomb will normally burn out within about one minute and most of the heat, smoke and flame will go *up* the elevator shaft.

What looks to the bomber like a roaring blaze is in fact not really effective against those inside the elevator cab. Passengers in the cab will usually hear the flames, but become aware of only a slight increase in temperature near the ceiling of the elevator car.

Victims temporarily trapped in the cab should stay near the floor, keep calm, and remember that there is always a flood of cool air rushing up the shaft from below due to the draft created by the fire. Perhaps the most disconcerting element of the tactic is that frequently personnel remain trapped inside the elevator cab for extended periods of time because the bombers fail to turn the power back on or leave the floor elevator doors ajar, which automatically immobilizes the cab.

To reduce the risk of entrapment in an elevator, all levels of public safety personnel must understand the elevator fire bombing entrapment tactic and should:

- Always keep one or more officers free of the elevator system so that assistance can be provided quickly in case of entrapment.
- Consider the use of two elevators to confuse the bombers.
- Consider sending an empty elevator up and taking a second elevator.
- Consider using the stairs for the first few floors and then taking the elevator. This may confuse the bombers, who are expecting the elevator to be entered at the ground level.
- Remember if you are fire bombed, it *seems* more dangerous than it actually is. Stay near the floor, keep calm, and wait for assistance.

Second Story Fire Tactic

This tactic usually involves the setting of a small low intensity fire in the second story of an abandoned building. When public safety personnel respond and proceed to the second floor to take action against the fire, an explosively initiated fire bomb is functioned on the first floor, filling that floor with burning gasoline and trapping those on the floor above.

The entrapment fire bomb on the first floor generally consists of a large frangible container, such as a 20 gallon plastic trash can, having a tight fitting lid and containing gasoline.

If the bomber desires to function the fire bomb electrically, he attaches wires to a flashbulb and inserts the flashbulb into a quart sized plastic container filled with smokeless powder, black powder, or a mixture of both. This container is sealed and partially submerged in the gasoline. The electrical wires are passed thru a hole punched in the plastic lid of the trash can and the lid is tightly sealed to the can to prevent the escape of gasoline fumes.

If the bomber desires to function the fire bomb nonelectrically, a length of safety fuse is inserted into the powder filled plastic quart container and passed thru the sealed lids of both containers.

If the fire bomb is rigged electrically, the wires can be attached to a clockwork/battery fuze or to a switch/battery fuze. The bomber can thus estimate the amount of response time required to allow the public safety personnel to arrive inside the building and use the clockwork fuze to function the bomb, or he can remain in the area and trigger the bomb himself when officers enter the building. It is unlikely, however, that he will remain in the area and risk the increased danger of capture. When the fire bomb has been rigged nonelectrically, the bomber will probably ignite the safety fuse when he hears the approaching sirens, having previously measured and cut sufficient safety fuse to allow entrapment of public safety personnel inside the building. Once the powder in the plastic container is ignited by the heat of the flashbulb or by the flame from the safety fuse, the plastic container explodes ripping apart the plastic trash can, spreading and igniting the gasoline.

Tactically speaking, the entrapment fire bomb must be located in such a position that the gasoline will be spread throughout the entire first floor. Placement of the fire bomb in a corner or concealed in a closet reduces its effectiveness. A quick look around downstairs can often lead to rapid detection of this entrapment bombing tactic.

To reduce vulnerability to this form of entrapment, all levels of public safety personnel must understand the second story fire entrapment tactic and should:

- Be alert to entrapment on the second run to the same abandoned building area. The first (false) run may have been used to time the response time.
- When responding to a call of this type, make a quick visual check of the lower floor or floors.
- If a large frangible (glass, plastic, wood) container is encountered standing away from the walls in good tactical position, immediately alert all public safety personnel to the danger of entrapment and get out of the building.

- If ignition must be prevented and a *high level of personal injury risk* is acceptable, rapidly remove the lid of the large container and take the lid, fuse or wire, and the quart plastic bottle from the building. In so doing, try to use the lid as a face shield to protect you against the heat and flame should the powder ignite and/or explode while the components are being carried.

The "Package" Tactic

This tactic is one where the bomber enters the target area carrying a fully armed and functioning time bomb concealed in a briefcase, box, shopping bag or similar container and asks someone on duty to watch the package for a few minutes. The bomber then departs and the bomb subsequently detonates. While this tactic is quite old, it still meets with success. The bomb employed is almost always a time bomb of some type, usually a clockwork device. Receptionists, entryway guards, desk sergeants and personnel dealing with the public are the prime targets of this kind of attack.

To reduce vulnerability to entrapment bombing tactics of this kind, all levels of public safety personnel must understand the employment of the "package" tactic and should:

- Insist that persons desiring to leave packages for safekeeping open the package and display the contents.
- Immediately notify the bomb squad and, when practical, evacuate the area whenever a package is found abandoned in a public area.
- Never attempt to open or inspect suspicious containers. They may be rigged to detonate upon opening or movement.
- If the bomb squad is not immediately available and *if the package was observed being carried into the building*, two additional immediate actions may also be performed if it is *absolutely necessary* to remove the package from the building and a high risk of injury is acceptable:
 1. Carry the package to a secure open area outside the building, such as a parking lot.
 2. Clear the area around the suspected package for a minimum distance of 300 feet and await the arrival of the bomb squad.
- Encourage the installation of a silent bomb alert system which will bring quick response to a public area in the event an employee observes a suspicious activity or object.

Stolen/Abandoned Automobile Tactic

This tactic has not been used recently by militant/dissident groups. It has, however, been discussed by these groups, and it could well become a popular tactic because it is highly target oriented, can be accomplished anywhere in the city or surrounding area, provides minimal risk for the bomber, and is guaranteed to draw the attention of public safety personnel.

The tactic involves simply stealing a late model automobile, wiring it as a bomb, and abandoning it. Sooner or later, the automobile will be discovered and the bomb is rigged to explode as public safety personnel open the door or perform some other normal act of investigation or removal.

The bomb could be rigged to any part of the automobile; the more common locations for the placement of the bomb would be:

- Under the hood and fuzed to detonate when the hood is opened or when the engine is started.
- Under the dashboard and fuzed to detonate when a door is opened or when the engine is started.
- Under the seat and fuzed to detonate when a door is opened or when someone sits on the seat.
- In the back seat or on the floor and fuzed to detonate when the bomb or the automobile is moved.
- In the trunk and fuzed to detonate when the trunk is opened, the bomb or automobile is moved, or when the automobile is started.
- Under the automobile and fuzed to detonate in any of the above ways.

To reduce vulnerability to entrapment by these tactics, all public safety personnel must understand the employment of the stolen/abandoned automobile tactic and should:

- Conduct a careful visual inspection of all encountered stolen/abandoned automobiles. Look for strings or wires attached to the hood, the inside of the doors and the trunk.
- Visually inspect the underside of the automobile before attempting to enter or move it.
- Whenever possible, enter the automobile thru the right rear door rather than thru the driver's door. Be particularly suspicious of a stolen/abandoned automobile which has only *one* door unlocked.
- Whenever possible, open the hood, the doors, and the trunk remotely using a long line with the operator under cover. (500 feet of 1/8 inch Nylon cord is excellent for this purpose.)
- Look under the seats *before* sitting on them.
- Look under the dashboard *before* opening the glove compartment.
- Visually inspect any packages or containers found inside the automobile without moving them in any manner. If you are in doubt as to what they may contain, make initial movement *remotely* using a long line with the operator under cover.
- Do not flip switches, turn knobs, release the hand brake, blow the horn, step on the brakes or perform other operations until you are sure that no bomb is located in or under the automobile.

Delayed Action Tactic

The delayed action tactic involves the employment of two or more bombs placed in the same general area set to detonate one after the other. Detonation of the first bomb draws public safety personnel to the scene and, after their arrival, the other bomb or bombs detonate. This tactic was recently employed in Minnesota by a 15-year-old bomber having militant associations, and the technique was also used several years ago during Ku Klux Klan bombings in the south.

Public safety personnel responding to a bomb detonation should always conduct a search of the area for additional bombs. Continued searching may well uncover more bombs placed in the immediate area or elsewhere in the target building. Particular attention should be paid to other parts of the detonation site, rooms next to the point of detonation, entryways, natural gathering places, automobile parking areas, halls and stairways granting access to the area, and other possible places of concealment where a bomb detonation would injure or kill personnel processing the scene of an earlier explosion.

To prevent vulnerability to this entrapment tactic, all levels of public safety personnel must understand the "delayed action" tactic and should:

- Conduct a thorough search of the bomb scene surrounding area as rapidly as possible upon arrival.
- Remember to completely search the entire area even when a second bomb is found. Look for a third and fourth bomb.
- Check those areas that lead to the bomb scene as well as vehicle parking areas.

Public safety personnel who become aware of specific bombing entrapment tactics or techniques not covered by this bulletin are encouraged to submit such information to the National Bomb Data Center so that supplemental bulletins can be issued.

APPENDIX C

A CASUALTY RISK REDUCTION PROGRAM

Any law enforcement agency seriously interested in reducing the risk of injury or death to its personnel should consider the implementation of an internal casualty risk reduction program.

Although an effective risk reduction program must receive the support and cooperation of all members of the department, especially those in supervisory and command positions, a risk reduction officer or team should be designated to formulate and guide the implementation of improved tactics, training, and equipment intended to reduce casualties. The risk reduction function should have staff authority and responsibility for finding and implementing solutions to the problem of attacks on police officers.

In the case of ambush attacks, for example, the risk reduction officer or team might be held responsible for:

- Familiarity with all pertinent materials on defense against ambush attack.
- Field study and analysis of ambush attack events.
- The development of effective counterambush policies, procedures and tactics.
- Evaluation of current department practices from the standpoint of defending against ambush attack.
- The recommendation of corrective actions to increase officer safety.
- The preparation and distribution of risk reduction materials.
- The provision of advice and assistance in defending against ambush attack to all members of the department.

Naturally, the level of effort to be assigned to risk reduction in a department is a management decision which will be based upon such considerations as available resources, casualty experience, and the perceived seriousness of the problem.

In a small agency the chief or sheriff may elect to devote some of his time to executing a risk reduction program. In larger, low-risk agencies the risk reduction function may be a part-time assignment. Where the risk of police assaults is considered high, a full-time officer may be required. In very large or very high-risk agencies, a risk reduction team may be appointed on a permanent or task-force basis.

Selection Criteria for Risk Reduction Assignments

The selection criteria for risk reduction duty assignment must be rigorous. Any attempt to economize in qualifications will produce poor results and in the end prove to be the most expensive

possible course of action. The officer who is chosen must be well trained and have solid expertise built upon proven field experience. It is especially important that this officer have the ability to approach risk reduction in a straightforward and practical manner. He must be capable of knowing and appreciating the realities of everyday field operations. If he cannot do this, his findings and recommendations will be unrealistic and have little or no credence with field personnel.

The officer must also have the capability to collect and evaluate data regarding assaults on police personnel. This is where the problem solving process begins. Higher education may be helpful, but it is not a mandatory requirement. Logic and common sense are the most critical skills.

The risk reduction officer should have some experience and aptitude as an instructor in formal law enforcement training programs. A great deal of his work will require knowledge of training materials and techniques. Since training matters often can become very time consuming, this officer must have the background and attitudes required to provide the capability to produce or contribute to training manuals, schedules, and classes in the most efficient manner possible.

Finally, the officer chosen must have the desire and ability to cooperate with other officers. Extensive communications and liaison may be necessary with other personnel and offices in his law enforcement agency.

The Role of the Risk Reduction Function

The risk reduction officer or team is responsible for the development and execution of a positive risk reduction program and provides advice, assistance, and recommendations regarding ambush defense to law enforcement decision makers, supervisors, and field personnel. His overall responsibilities and duties can be divided into four basic steps toward risk reduction.

Investigation. The investigation of police assault events to determine the Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How is the first step in the risk reduction program. Incident reports, field interviews, tactical bulletins, and liaison and communication with other agencies are just a very few of the basic sources of readily available information that can be exploited by the risk reduction officer to obtain knowledge of assault situations. The search should be as thorough as possible, for a comprehensive data collection effort can turn up a great deal of information that can be profitably used both now and later to reduce risks without “re-inventing the wheel”—a very wasteful and common difficulty in any problem-solving activity. When collecting and analyzing data, the risk reduction officer must give special attention to drawing forth “lessons learned.”

It is especially important that the risk reduction officer conduct his own field investigations of assaults since formal reports frequently do not include the kind of information that is useful in assessing the nature and validity of the tactics and equipment employed. Routine incident or criminal investigation reports almost never contain the type of data needed to support the risk reduction program.

Evaluation. Successes and failures in defending against previous attacks or the various recommendations to reduce risks that have been isolated and identified in the investigation phase must carefully be reviewed and analyzed. As local conditions and the field environment vary according to participants, locations, and times, it is not always possible to say that because an attempt to reduce risks worked or failed before, it will do so again. But a continuing critique of

current and past practices to reduce risks from attack can often suggest new and improved concepts and recommendations.

Building upon what experience and thinking is available, realistic tactical scenarios and operational exercises and models can be developed as tools by which to formulate and test possible means of risk reduction. An input of field experience from knowledgeable personnel within the department is necessary to determine the suitability of recommendations developed by the risk reduction program.

The policies, procedures, and tactics of the department must be surveyed and assessed from the standpoint of effective attack defense. Do contemporary practices increase the risk attack? If so, how and why? Are overriding operational constraints or mission considerations involved? The risk reduction officer should prepare a threat estimate in light of the deficiencies discovered and determine how the countermeasure policies, procedures, and tactics he has developed can be best fitted into the organization and activities of his department or agency. The objective is maximum risk reduction with a minimum of friction in implementation. Coordination with appropriate levels of authority, offices, and personnel within the department must be effected, and plans, training materials, tactical bulletins or manuals and the like prepared for review, approval, and dissemination.

Implementation. The risk reduction officer must insure a complete dissemination of approved measures for defense against attack. The importance of the risk reduction program must be brought home to all personnel in positions of leadership, and their positive cooperation solicited to get a viable, substantive effort underway. Policies, procedures, and tactics must be continuously monitored and subjected to a comprehensive periodic assessment to make certain those measures for risk reduction that have been promulgated have, in fact, been implemented. The risk reduction officer must make himself readily available to answer questions and receive and review suggestions concerning defense against ambush attack. The implementation phase must be recognized as a continuous effort.

Support for the Risk Reduction Program

Internal. Law enforcement executives and other agency decision makers must exert every effort to make the risk reduction program a truly effective means for increased officer safety, including the provision of full staff assistance to the risk reduction function. Management must also prepare to support a long term effort; a brief display of concern and enthusiasm will not be sufficient. The threat of attack is an everyday risk and it must be combatted on a daily basis. Further, there are no complete lasting solutions to the problem of assaults on police. New and improved countermeasures must be developed and put into practice in accordance with new threats and changes in the tactical environment. The interest and commitment of law enforcement leaders is essential to making any program work.

External. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the International Association of Chiefs of Police have long been concerned about the problem of assaults on law enforcement officers. Both agencies will respond to specific requests for assistance in the development and execution of risk reduction programs at the local, county, and state levels of law enforcement. Such requests may be addressed:

- Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20535
- International Association of Chiefs of Police
Police Casualty Analysis Unit
Research Division
11 Firstfield Road
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760

APPENDIX D

CASUALTY DATA COLLECTION FORM

The "Physical Contact Summary" report form illustrated here is a prototype developed in conjunction with this study as an experimental means of gathering assault data for use in risk reduction programs. Although by no means complete, it may serve as a useful tool for agencies to record and analyze attacks made against police officers. Risk reduction programs should provide for the routine collection and analysis of assault data and the establishment of staff responsibility for this purpose.

PHYSICAL CONTACT SUMMARY

Do not use this space

1. Study File No.

2. Population Code

3. NCIC No. (O.R.I.)

PART I

4. Name of Reporting Agency: _____

1. City Police Dept. 2. Sheriff's Office 3. Highway Patrol or State Police 4. Univ. Police
 5. Other _____ (specify)

PART II ABOUT THE OFFICER ASSAULTED

1. Sex: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Male 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Female	2. Years of Police Service: _____ 5. Height: _____ feet _____ inches	3. Rank: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Patrolman, Deputy, Trooper 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Detective 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Sgt. or Field Supervisor 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Above Sgt. 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ (specify)	4. Race: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> White 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Mexican-American 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Negro 4. <input type="checkbox"/> American Indian 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ (specify)
7. Date of Birth: / / mo day year		6. Build: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Slender 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Medium 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Heavy	
8. Assignment: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Auto Patrol 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Foot Patrol 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Traffic 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Juvenile 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Vice 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Detective 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Jail 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ (specify)	9. Duty Status: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> On Duty 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Off Duty	10. Dress At Time of Assault: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Uniform 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Plain Clothes	11. Was Officer In: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> One-Man Unit 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Two-Man Unit 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Assignment, describe _____
12. Others Present at Time of Assault: 1. Number of other officers _____ 2. Number of other suspects _____ 3. Number of civilian witnesses _____			
13. Involvement of Witnesses: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> None Present 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Present, Not Involved 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Agitated Suspect 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Assisted Suspect 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Assisted Officer	14. Other Officer(s) Assaulted? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No	15. Was Officer Ambushed? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No	
	16. Was the Incident a Sniping Incident? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No	17. Was the Incident a Bombing Incident? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No	

PART III ABOUT THE SUSPECT

1. Suspect: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Known 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown	2. If Known and Arrested, Name: _____ last _____ first _____ middle	3. Date of Birth: _____ / _____ / _____ mo day year	4. Sex: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Male 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Female	5. Race: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> White 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Mexican-American 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Negro 4. <input type="checkbox"/> American Indian 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ (specify)
6. Height: _____ feet _____ inches	7. Employed? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No	8. If Yes, Give Usual Occupation: _____		
9. Build: 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Slender 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Medium 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Heavy	10. Police Ident. No. (if known) 1. Local _____ 2. State _____ 3. FBI _____	11. Did the Officer Know the Identity of the Suspect Prior to the Assault? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No		
13. Did Suspect Appear to be Under the Influence of Drugs? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		12. Did Suspect Appear to be Under the Influence of Alcohol? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		
14. Did Suspect Appear Mentally Deranged? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		15. Had Suspect Been Drinking? 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		
16. If Subject was Arrested, Specify Charge(s): _____				

PART V INJURIES

<p>1. Police Officer:</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> None</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Bruise</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Cut or Puncture</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Fractured or Broken Bones</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Gunshot Wounds</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Killed</p> <p>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Other (describe)</p>	<p>2. Suspect:</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> None</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Bruise</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Cut or Puncture</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Fractured or Broken Bones</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Gunshot Wounds</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Killed</p> <p>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Other (describe)</p>	<p>3. If Officer Injured, Where Injured?</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Head</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (body)</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Hands or Feet</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Arms or Legs</p> <hr/> <p>4. If Suspect Injured, Where Injured?</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Head</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (body)</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Hands or Feet</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Arms or Legs</p>
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PART VI TRAINING COURSES

Please indicate below those Training Courses that you have completed, indicating whether that training was completed during the past 6 months, 12 months, or longer:

COURSE TITLE	LAST 6 MONTHS	LAST 12 MONTHS	LONGER
1. Basic Recruit Training	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Firearms Training	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Arrest Procedures	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Prisoner Handling	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Riot Control	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Police Community Relations	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
7. Defensive Tactics	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
8. Defensive Driving	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
9. Pursuit Driving	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
10. Never had any Police Training	1. <input type="checkbox"/>		

PART VII WHAT WAS UNUSUAL ?

In the following spaces, please write in any information you have about unusual weapons, unusual assault techniques, notable circumstances (unusual events, particular people present, situational factors, etc.) , or anything you believe is important that is not covered elsewhere or that needs further explanation. You may wish to attach a copy of the Police Incident Report.

Thank you for completing this summary. This information will be used to help you and your fellow officers. The information you have given in this summary will be assimilated with information submitted by other officers and computer analyzed to determine causes and countermeasures for assaults on police officers. No individual officer will be identified in this study.

APPENDIX E

MODEL ROLL CALL LESSON PLAN

THE USE OF INDIVIDUAL ALERTNESS TO REDUCE RISK IN AMBUSH ATTACKS

Total Time: 15 Minutes

Instructional Time: 15 Minutes

Site: Roll Call

Description: Provides field personnel with instructions on the use of the senses, the application of field experience and knowledge, and the minimization of exposure to reduce the risk of ambush attack.

Performance Objective: Development of the ability of each trainee to prevent, avoid, or counter ambush attacks through the exercise of caution and an awareness of the threat of ambush attack.

Equipment: Optional

Instructor References: 1. *Law Enforcement Officers Killed*, Annual Summary (Federal Bureau of Investigation). 2. *Ambush Attacks: A Risk Reduction Manual for Police* (IACP).

Student Handout Materials: 1. Physical Contact Summary.

Outline of Major Points of Instruction:

- I. Introduction and Objectives
- II. Why Victim Officers are Killed or Injured in Ambush Attacks
 - A. "It Doesn't Happen Here"
 - B. "You Can't Do Anything About It Anyway"
- III. Alert Use of the Senses
 - A. Ambush Attacks Can Be Detected
 - B. The First Link in the Protective Chain
 - C. Be Watchful at all Times and Places
 - D. Complacency Kills

- IV. Apply Field Experience and Knowledge
 - A. Self-Protection is the Best Protection
 - B. Know Your Territory
 - C. Listen to Experience and Training
 - D. Act Upon Early Warning Signals
- V. Minimize Exposure
 - A. Exercise Informed Caution
 - B. Times and Places of Greatest Danger
 - 1. Where Officers Can Be Regularly Found
 - 2. Where Officers Can Be Easily Detected and Observed
 - C. High Risk Activities
 - 1. Marked Vehicle Patrol
 - 2. Investigating Service Calls
 - D. Survey the Scene
 - 1. Mark Potential Fire Zones
 - 2. Look for Possible Assailant Locations
 - 3. Check for Cover and Concealment
 - 4. Locate Emergency Escape Routes
 - E. Proceed According to a Plan of Action
 - 1. Estimate the Situation
 - 2. Implement Good Tactical Procedures
 - 3. Be Psychologically Prepared

APPENDIX F

MODEL LESSON PLAN

RISK REDUCTION IN AMBUSH ATTACKS

Total Time: 2 Hours

Instructional Time: 100 Minutes

Site: Classroom

Description: Provides personnel performing field operations with instructions on policies, procedures, and tactics in community relations, individual alertness, immediate action, evasive action and defensive use of weapons, communications, and wounded personnel rescue.

Performance Objective: Development of the ability of each trainee to prevent, avoid, or counter ambush attacks through the exercise of caution and an awareness of the threat of ambush attack.

Equipment: Blackboard, charts, or overhead projector.

Instructor References: 1. *Law Enforcement Officers Killed*, Annual Summary (Federal Bureau of Investigation). 2. *Ambush Attacks: A Risk Reduction Manual for Police* (IACP).

Student Handout Materials: 1. Physical Contact Summary. 2. *Ambush Attacks: A Risk Reduction Manual for Police*.

Outline of Major Points of Instruction:

- I. Introduction and Objectives
- II. The Threat
 - A. Ambush Attack Overview
 1. Execution of Ambush
 - a. Suddenness
 - b. Surprise
 - c. Lack of Provocation
 2. Day and Time of Occurrence
 3. Victim Location and Activity
 4. Factors Contributing to Ambush

- B. Types of Ambush
 - 1. Sniping Ambush
 - 2. Direct Assault Ambush
 - 3. Coordinated Attack Ambush
- C. Entrapment
- D. Assailant Profiles

III. Ambush Attack Countermeasures

- A. Avoiding Ambush Attack
 - 1. Community Relations
 - a. Encourage Friendly “Eyes and Ears”
 - b. Increase the Difficulty of Ambush
 - 2. Individual Alertness
 - a. Use Senses
 - b. Apply Field Experience and Knowledge
 - c. Minimize Exposure
 - 3. Defense Against Entrapment
 - a. Be Psychologically Prepared
 - b. Suspect Unusual Events or Behavior
 - c. Think Before Acting
 - d. Do Not Proceed Alone
- B. Responding to Ambush Attack
 - 1. Short Range Nonfirearms Attack
 - a. Handheld Clubs, Knives, Etc.
 - When on Foot

- Take Immediate Action
 - Avoid Hand-to-Hand Combat
 - Secure Defensive Space
 - Use Obstacles or Escape Routes
 - Prepare to Defend
 - Request Assistance
 - Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First
- When in Vehicle
 - Take Immediate Action
 - Drive Away
 - Be Alert to Opportunity to Use Vehicle As Weapon
 - If Vehicle is Immobilized,
 - Protect Vulnerable Body Areas
 - Prepare to Defend
 - Request Assistance
 - Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First

b. Deadly Missiles and Incendiary Devices

- When on Foot
 - Take Immediate Action
 - Clear Impact Area
 - Seek Cover and Concealment
 - Prepare to Defend
 - Request Assistance
 - Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First

- When in Vehicle
 - Take Immediate Action
 - Drive Away
 - Be Alert to Opportunity to Use Vehicle as Weapon
 - If Vehicle is Immobilized,
 - Remain Temporarily within the Vehicle
 - Prepare to Defend
 - Request Assistance
 - Exit Vehicle and Clear Impact Area
 - Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First

c. Explosive Devices

- When on Foot
 - Take Immediate Action
 - Drop to Ground
 - Shelter Behind Object or in Structure
 - If Attack Continues,
 - Crawl or Roll Away
 - Seek Cover and Concealment
 - Prepare to Defend
 - Request Assistance
 - Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First
- When in Vehicle
 - Take Immediate Action
 - Drive Away
 - Be Alert for Opportunity to Use Vehicle as Weapon

- If Vehicle is Immobilized,
 - Crouch in or Lay Across Seat
 - If Device Does Not Explode, Exit Vehicle Using Automobile as Shield
 - Crawl or Roll Away
 - Seek Cover and Concealment
- If Attack Continues,
 - Abandon Vehicle only as Last Resort
- Prepare to Defend
- Request Assistance
- Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First

d. Firearms

- When on Foot
 - Take Immediate Action
 - Drop to Ground Evade to One Side
 - Seek Cover/Immediate Counterattack
 - Request Assistance
 - Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First
- When in Vehicle
 - Attempt to Drive Away
 - Assume Low Profile
 - Do Not Drive in Straight Line
 - Escape Attackers Line-of-Sight
 - Be Alert for Opportunity to Use Vehicle as Weapon
 - If Vehicle is Immobilized,

Exit Vehicle

Use Engine Block for Cover or

Seek Nearby Cover and Concealment

Prepare to Defend

Request Assistance

Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First

2. Medium/Long Range Firearms Attack

a. When on Foot

- Take Immediate Action
- Drop to ground or Evade to One Side
- Determine Direction of Fire
- Seek Cover and Concealment
- Prepare to Defend
- Request Assistance
- Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First

b. When in Vehicle

- Take Immediate Action
- Drive Away
- Be Alert for Opportunity to Use Vehicle as Weapon
- If Vehicle is Immobilized,
 - Remain in Vehicle
 - Determine Direction of Fire
 - Exit Vehicle
 - Use Engine Block for Cover or Concealment

- Prepare to Defend
- Request Assistance
- Counter Most Dangerous Attacker First

C. Communications

1. Include Essential Data In Call for Help
2. Continue to Transmit Risk Reducing Data
3. If Without Radio, Use Alternate Means
4. Maintain Personal Contact

D. Wounded Personnel

1. Individual Action
 - a. Slightly Wounded
 - b. Severely Wounded
2. Wounded Officer Rescue
 - a. Secure Area First
 - b. Plan Rescue
 - c. Field Expendience
 - Protective Vests, Ballistic Shields, Bomb Blankets
 - Smoke
 - Neutralization of Illumination

