

TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY
Hostage Defense Measures

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

Senate SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PART 5

JULY 25, 1975

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

LOAN DOCUMENT

RETURN TO:

NCJRS



P. O. BOX 24036 S. W. POST OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024

RETURN TO: NCJRS DOCUMENT LOAN
BOX 6000

ROCKVILLE, MD. 20850

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1975

57-854

For sale by Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

MICROFICHE

Box 1-1
24234-24237

30345

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BIRCH BAYII, Indiana
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California
JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dakota

ROMAN L. IRUSKA, Nebraska
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
BIRCH BAYII, Indiana

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia

J. G. SOURWINE, *Chief Counsel*
ALFONSO L. TARABOCHIA, *Chief Investigator*
MARY E. DOOLEY, *Research Director*

RESOLUTION

Resolved, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, that the testimony of Brooks McClure, taken in executive session on July 25, 1975, be released from the injunction of secrecy, be printed and made public.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman.

Approved October 8, 1975.

LOAN DOCUMENT (M)

RETURN TO

NCJRS

P.O. BOX 24036 S.W. POST OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024

RECEIVED
OCT 10 1975
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

RECEIVED
OCT 10 1975
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY

Hostage Defense Measures

FRIDAY, JULY 25, 1975

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 154, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond presiding.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Alfonso Tarabochia, chief investigator; Robert J. Short, senior investigator; and Mary E. Dooley, research director.

[The witness was previously sworn by Senator Thurmond.]

Senator THURMOND. The problem of terrorist kidnappings is one that has become increasingly serious in view of the emergence of a number of ideological revolutionary and ethnic terrorist groups whose objective is almost always the seizure of hostages for armed propaganda purposes.

This problem is worldwide, and no nation in the free world seems to be immune. It also follows that no personality of the political, economic, or even cultural field can be considered safe, in view of the tactics employed by the terrorists. There is no reason that the United States will remain immune for long. A Canadian Provincial Cabinet Minister has fallen victim to terrorist kidnappers. This should be seriously considered by the Members of Congress, especially those who, for reasons of their office, travel abroad.

We have today with us Mr. Brooks McClure, a Foreign Service officer of the U.S. Information Agency assigned as special assistant in the Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs Directorate of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense. He is conversant with the subject of hostage defense measures by having made extensive studies of hostage debriefings and literature written on the matter by survivors of such ordeals. I am sure that my colleagues will find his testimony most valuable.

TESTIMONY OF BROOKS McCLURE, FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY; SPECIAL ASSISTANT, POLICY PLANS AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. McCLURE. I was born in 1919 in New York City, educated at the University of Maryland, and I am a graduate of the Naval War

College. I was a correspondent in New York for the Western Press, Ltd. of Australia from 1939 to 1942, then went into the Army and served in Europe during World War II. I returned and joined the staff of the Washington Star for 5 years as copy editor.

In 1951 I entered the State Department Foreign Service, and 2 years later, when the U.S. Information Agency was created, I transferred to the USIA. I have served during the last 25 years in Denmark, Austria, Egypt, Korea, and Germany, and I have had temporary-duty assignments to Vietnam, Thailand, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, and a number of European countries.

I contributed a chapter on Russian guerrilla warfare in World War II to an anthology, "Modern Guerrilla Warfare," and have written articles for such publications as the Infantry Journal, Armed Forces Journal, Army, Air Force magazine, and the Foreign Service Journal.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are a Foreign Service officer?

Mr. McCCLURE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of what grade?

Mr. McCCLURE. Class II.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your rank in the Army?

Mr. McCCLURE. I was a staff sergeant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, you know the subject that we are interested in this morning. The chairman has outlined the committee's interest. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. McCCLURE. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want to offer it, read it, or use it as notes, or what?

Mr. McCCLURE. Perhaps, since it's quite long, I could just review it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may the text of the statement be printed as a confidential appendix to the record?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

[The prepared statement of Brooks McClure, submitted as a confidential Appendix, is omitted from the public record.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Then, Mr. McClure, you could emphasize or summarize as you will. If we may, we will break in with questions.

Mr. McCCLURE. Let me say at the outset that any comments I make here are based on my analysis of hostage debriefings and other reports on terrorist operations in various countries. They do not represent official policy or doctrine of either the U.S. Information Agency or the Department of Defense.

This paper attempts to develop some practical defense measures for persons taken hostage by terrorists. There have been an increasing number of cases of political kidnappings on the international scene—that is, the seizure of persons of one nationality by terrorists of another. Americans have been victims in about 40 percent of the cases.

The question is: What can a person do to improve his chances of survival under the extreme mental and physical pressures of such an experience? There have been two outstanding examples of survival by rather mature men. One was Sir Geoffrey Jackson, British Ambassador to Uruguay, and the other Dr. Claude Fly, American agronomist, both of whom were taken by the Tupamaros, the Uruguayan revolutionaries, in 1970.

Ambassador Jackson was held for 244 days and Dr. Fly for 208. Living conditions in both cases were exceedingly poor, but both men

survived without any lasting effect. Dr. Fly suffered a heart attack at the end of his incarceration and was, in fact, released because of that seizure. The Ambassador was released in early 1971, after the escape of 106 Tupamaro prisoners from a Montevideo prison apparently had provided a face-saving opportunity to let him go. Both men wrote books about their experience.¹

The first advice to potential hostages is to be able to analyze the situation they are likely to find themselves in.

There are three basic types of hostage situations. One is skyjacking, in which a plane is seized and all the persons aboard are hostages of opportunity. Usually there are a number of prominent or politically exploitable people on the plane. In the United States, the hijackings have almost invariably been by fugitives or political dissidents trying to get to Cuba. The American airline skyjackings ended in 1973 when the Cuban Government agreed it would not offer sanctuary to hijackers and the screening of air travelers proved effective.

The second basic type of hostage situation is the siege or barricade incident. Hostages, including diplomats or other prominent persons, are seized in a public place, which is then surrounded by police. The terrorists attempt to negotiate the release of the imprisoned terrorists or obtain ransom and escape. These incidents usually last between 2 days and 2 weeks.

Finally, there is the kidnap-imprisonment form of seizure, in which a prominent person is spirited away to a hideaway and held, usually for weeks or months, against ransom or other concessions.

The terrorists themselves can be divided roughly into two main varieties. First is the nationalist-irredentist type who is trying to seize power or cause a national revolution. This type is not necessarily ideological, but many are in fact Marxists.

A second type is the vague ideological revolutionary type, usually Marxist, the sort of people found in the Weather Underground. They have a different set of objectives from the nationalists. The nationalists have a definite, near-term objective and will often compromise in a practical way in order to achieve it. The ideological terrorists, on the other hand, are really more anarchistic. They are trying to destroy the existing system and often do not have anything to offer in its place. In fact, the ideological groups usually avoid promoting any definite type of substitute government because this tends to fragment the organization through dissension.

As for the terrorist personality, hostages have generally encountered three types. One is the trained leader, who is often a schooled Marxist, very tough-minded, intelligent and well-trained. He is the administrator and the leader, the decisionmaker at the cell level and above.

Then there is what might be called the activist-operator, possibly an ex-criminal or a former soldier trained in the use of arms and explosives. He is hard, unsentimental, sometimes not very intelligent, and often even psychotic.

Finally, there is the idealist—usually the university dropout alienated from the family and isolated from society, very often from the upper middle class socioeconomic level. This type of person tends

¹ Sir Geoffrey Jackson, "Surviving the Long Night" (New York, 1973) The Vanguard Press, Inc.

Dr. Claude L. Fly, "No Hope But God" (New York, 1973) Hawthorne Books, Inc.

to be humanitarian by inclination; intelligent, but a follower rather than leader; often weak under emotional stress.

The hostage—particularly in a kidnap-imprisonment situation—is likely to encounter all three types of terrorist. The activist operator seizes him; he is interrogated by the trained leader, who has intelligence interrogation experience, and finally he encounters the idealist among his guards and the people who take care of him in captivity. The idealists normally are used for noncombat type of low-stress assignments in the organization and constitute the largest element in most ideological terrorist groups.

It should be stressed that these personality types are by no means always clear-cut. Some individuals have a mixed "profile"; others shift from one type to another—idealist to leader or activist-operator. But in general the categories offer a practical guide for a potential hostage.

What can a potential hostage do? First he has to recognize his vulnerability. A person prominent in any field—in the arts, in business or certainly in politics—must always realize he could be useful as a hostage and bear this in mind when he senses a dangerous situation.

The would-be hostage can reduce the possibility of his being seized and, failing that, can prepare himself to help survive the ordeal of captivity by following a few simple rules. One is that his personal affairs be in order, his will up to date. He should be able to walk out and feel that if he never returns his wife and family will be able to manage. If he does not do this, and is taken, probably the greatest strain he will experience in his whole imprisonment will be worry about the family and its welfare.

Another rule is to be alert to any threat. There are usually warnings of kidnappings, which are difficult operations requiring elaborate preparations. Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian guerrilla leader whose handbook, the "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," is perhaps the most important single text for terrorists today, points out that there must be extensive surveillance and planning, and even dry runs, if a kidnapping is to succeed. Thus there are usually warnings, and the perceptive victim can sense trouble in most cases. Most persons taken hostage realize, upon reflection, that they had warning of impending trouble, but they did not pay attention to it at the time. When one gets the feel of trouble, of being watched, it is important to consult the police. Certain things can then be done to reduce the risk of kidnapping—varying the route to work, changing the working hours, departures and arrivals, and using guards intermittently. One of the things a person must always be careful to avoid is carrying papers, classified or otherwise, which in any way could be used for propaganda purposes by a terrorist organization.

If the worst comes to worst, and the person is taken, certain factors are obviously beyond his control. Daniel Mitrione, a public-safety specialist assigned to work with the Uruguayan police, was seized by the Tupamaros in 1970 and "executed." He actually had no chance to avoid this fate, because it was to the political and psychological advantage of the organization.

Most hostages are used as negotiating pawns, however, and relatively few of them have been killed. There is therefore a distinct possibility of survival, and the longer one is kept a prisoner the more likely he is to be released in the end. That has been the trend in our experience up to now.

The first requirement is for the hostage to understand what happens to him when he is taken—his emotional reaction—and to realize that this is entirely natural. Everyone in this situation experiences it. The kidnaping victim usually goes through three phases of reaction. First, upon being seized, he is shocked, bewildered, confused, and terribly frightened, of course. Then, very shortly after that, as he is being driven away, he begins to collect his thoughts. He tries to focus on the people around him and what is happening. He tries to determine where he is being taken by the motion of the car, and so forth. Finally, when he arrives at the destination, the victim makes another adjustment. This is when he assesses his situation for the long term. He has calmed down a bit and he now thinks about such questions as: Who are his captors? What do they want? What are his chances of escape? And what can he do to survive the ordeal he is about to face?

The terrorists themselves use various tactics to try to disorient the victim. They will take his watch away. He is almost always held in a cellar or a place where he cannot see daylight. They attempt to make him lose track of time, since time is a very important element in a person's total orientation. Therefore, the hostage must reorient himself immediately. He should start a calendar. Ambassador Jackson sketched out a calendar for 18 months ahead, and this had the effect of notifying his captors that he was ready for a long stay. The hostage calendar should include Sundays, holidays, and all kinds of personal days of importance like birthdays and anniversaries. This enables him from day to day to follow the familiar routine at home in his mind. It is a vital connection with the world outside.

He can expect to get no news whatever. Hardly any hostage has been permitted to listen to a news broadcast. He never sees newspapers, so he is totally isolated. His guards are usually unfriendly. He normally has no contact with other prisoners for the first weeks or even months of his captivity. Therefore, he must build up his own protection against losing his will and his own identity.

One of the things every hostage faces, particularly when taken by an ideological group, is interrogation. The interrogator is experienced. He will always make a soft approach initially, and then apply increasing pressure, going from the trivial and casual type of conversation to matters of importance. What the interrogator is after is intelligence first—useful information about other possible hostages or targets—and then any kind of statement by the hostage which could be used for propaganda purposes.

There is a good deal of psychological pressure, some of it quite subtle, which the hostage has to be prepared for. But if he has a reasonably firm sense of his own ethical values, he does not have to be concerned about, for instance, being subverted by drugs. Normally, drugs have very little effect on a person who does not really want to cooperate.

There is, however, a natural psychological process which every hostage should be aware of, and which can lead him to become sympathetic to and even a supporter of his captors. The victim subconsciously reverts psychologically to his childhood relationship with his parents. The parents had absolute authority and also provided essential security to the helpless child. Now the child, as an adult, finds himself in the same position of total dependence.

The result is that, in order to survive, the hostage subconsciously might identify with his captors as he once did with his parents. There have been several cases of this sort, in which the hostage has so completely gone over to the side of the captor that even later, when the captor has been arrested, the hostage has interceded with the authorities on his behalf. If this process is properly understood, any hostage can avoid the consequences.

How can one live in captivity? In the first place, the physical conditions are extremely poor, probably as bad as the worst of prisons. The cells—and I have pictures here of some of them used by the Tupamaros in Uruguay—are never large. This is deliberate, to keep psychological pressure on the hostage.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, do you wish to put those pictures in one by one and describe them, or do they come with captions, and can they all be ordered into the record, subject to a decision of the Chair with regard to printing?

Mr. McCURE. They are captioned and organized by subject. I could say a few words about them after I finish this part of my testimony, if you wish, and then perhaps they could be entered in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do it as you think best. Offer them as you think it appropriate.

Mr. McCURE. The first problem of the hostage, then, is to combat claustrophobia. He is in a very confined space. He must, therefore, use imagination to find ways to exercise. Ambassador Jackson followed the 5 BX physical training program of the Canadian Air Force, and ingeniously adjusted it to his circumstances. In one cell, he had only 18 inches between his bunk and the wall, and he had 3½ feet at the foot of his bunks in which he "ran" 5 miles a day. Exercise is important not only for physical conditioning but in order to release tension and to cause natural fatigue that will induce sound sleep.

It would be a serious mistake for anyone not to exercise every day when imprisoned, both for physical and psychological reasons. Alexander Dolgun, for instance, in his current best-selling book, "The Dolgun Story," tells how, when he was in a Moscow prison for 18 months before being sent to a Soviet labor camp, he figured out the distance across Moscow, through the Soviet Union, and into Western Europe; then he walked that distance in the space he had, which was only two and a half strides. So mentally, and in a way physically, he walked all the way from the prison to freedom over a period of months.

Another popular diversion of hostages—in fact, of educated prisoners down through history—is writing. But for the hostage the writing may not all be voluntary. Often the captors require long biographies, which are analyzed to determine the prisoner's political attitudes and socialization and to provide background for further interrogation. But most prisoners write on their own, as well—all subject to scrutiny, of course.

Dr. Fly wrote a 600-page biography of himself and a 50-page "Christian Checklist," in which he analyzed the New Testament to determine what were the "do's and don'ts" for a good Christian.

Sir Geoffrey Jackson started to write a series of children's stories. When the first of these was confiscated by his captors, he committed it and 11 others to memory and published them as a book after his release.

The important thing is for a person to create his own world, keep mental contact with the outside and insulate himself against the hostile pressures around him. When he is able to do this successfully, and if he can keep his temper, he can have a profound effect on his captors.

In the case of both Dr. Fly and Sir Geoffrey Jackson, and other hostages as well, the terrorist organization found it necessary to remove guards who were falling under their influence. The terrorists consider the hostage an enemy. This is particularly true of the ideological type of revolutionary who has a strong emotional feeling about the cause. The hostage represents all that is worst in the system these people are trying to destroy. The terrorists also must often justify themselves morally for having taken an innocent person a prisoner; therefore they must consider him guilty of being, as they put it, "an enemy of the people."

If this reasoning is understood, and if the hostage has the patience to deal with his captors properly, he can gradually break down the antipathy. Both Dr. Fly and Sir Geoffrey succeeded in doing this admirably.

In conclusion on the question of hostage behavior, I would like to make a general observation. The hostage is usually taken as a negotiating pawn, to be released in exchange for concessions. He is accordingly a valuable property and—despite his often extreme discomfort—will not deliberately be harmed. This kind of prisoner need not worry unduly about "brainwashing" or political subversion if he has a firm sense of personal values and stands his ground. There are exceptions to this rule—depending on the political nature of the victim and the specific purposes of the group which seizes him—but the hostage himself will recognize these circumstances and can conduct himself accordingly.

Mr. SOURWINE. What would you say are the best qualities of character or personality for a hostage to have?

Mr. McCURE. Considering the rigors of this kind of imprisonment, it would at first seem that the most important quality of a hostage would be youth and physical strength. This, however, is not so; much more important are self-sufficiency, mental discipline and determination to survive.

The two long-term hostages I have mentioned—Sir Geoffrey Jackson and Dr. Claude L. Fly—had different personalities but remarkably similar survival profiles. Both were older men—Sir Geoffrey was 56 when taken and Dr. Fly 65—and both had minor physical ailments associated with their age. But what they may have lacked in athletic prowess and physical endurance was compensated for by their mental and spiritual maturity.

The two men had several qualities in common: Each had enjoyed a successful professional life and had had extensive experience in dealing with people. Each had strong family ties. Both knew how to control their tempers, understood the tactics of their jailers and knew how to cope with their own fears, anxieties and periods of depression. Both men likewise had firmly rooted values, which they accepted intellectually as well as emotionally—they could not be disoriented by any degree of "brainwashing." And they maintained their dignity through all the dehumanizing experiences of their long captivity.

Perhaps most important, however, was the spiritual strength of the two men. Both were deeply religious—Sir Geoffrey as a Catholic and Dr. Fly as a Protestant—and this gave them the strength to face the constant threat of death. It also enabled them to deal with their captors as fellow human beings in the Christian concept; they avoided the corrosive effects of hate for their enemy.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made a mention of a brainwashing. There are factors involved in the situation of a prisoner, and you have described them, which are also practiced in brainwashing, but I take it in your testimony, and please correct me if I am wrong, that you feel that the purpose or desired intent of the captors to bring about a personality change or a change in thinking, or even a change in social consciousness, is lacking in these hostage situations?

Mr. McCURE. I think it varies. For one thing, if the terrorist group is nationalist oriented, say, like the Eritrean Liberation Front, the ideological interest can be relatively unimportant. The captors may well try to encourage the hostage to make favorable statements about the organization—provide some propaganda support. And they may try to convince the victim of the merit of their cause. But political conversion would not be a primary goal.

Ideological terrorists, on the other hand, often tend to proselytize. They would like to convert someone if they could. But from a practical standpoint, I think they would still be more interested in frightening the hostage into giving them propaganda support than to make him a permanent convert.

We have the case, of course, of Patricia Hearst who at least apparently was induced to join the organization and to stay with it. This is a highly advantageous thing, if an organization can do it; but I don't think most terrorist organizations consider it an attainable objective as a rule.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do we know, for sure, enough about the Hearst case to be able to say what preconditioning Patty Hearst may have had, what predisposition to accept the ideological norms of the groups whose captive she was might already have been present at the time she became a candidate?

Mr. McCURE. No one seems to know for sure, but there are indications of some preconditioning for her apparent decision to stay with the group. She seems to have departed from the values and norms of her parents. She had contact with a number of people who apparently had dissident tendencies; in fact, this may have been why she was chosen as an SLA target in the first place. I, myself, would think—just from what I have read about the case—that she was psychologically prepared to make the change and simply adopted a new dogmatic philosophical norm. Such a change can occur to people who are religious and conservative in their youth. When they depart from this early influence, they often have to find a substitute for religion and for the ethical order and *raison d'être* this gives. They adopt what is really a new religion; in this case a type of Marxism.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do we know whether Patty Hearst was or is a Marxist?

Mr. McCURE. No, and I would doubt if she had given much thought to Marxism as a system. I think, rather, it may be a humanitarian instinct in her case, as it is in many others. Persons of this

type are concerned about the failure of the system, as they see it—the poverty and other problems found in modern society—and they would like to conceive of a utopia where these problems don't exist.

Mr. SOURWINE. That's a very naive approach to Marxism. There isn't anything in Marxism which really has the factors that you have described as what you thought Patty might have been looking for.

Mr. McCLURE. No, of course, the Marxist system in practice is completely authoritarian—there is no room for social dissent. One-third of the world's population today lives under Marxian socialism or, if you will, Communism. Although countries in this ideological system sometimes differ in style and bureaucratic rigidity, not one of them fulfills the human and civil-rights guarantees of our Constitution—or of the basic law of any other free democratic government.

This is why one might say in advice to the hostage, who will be exposed to a great deal of ideological discussion: He should avoid discussing Marxism because he's not going to make much progress that way with the ideologs. On the other hand he can make a few points which can be rather telling and which underscore his own set of values. He can say he believes in the freedom of speech: the right to challenge authority; the right to a trial by jury with defense counsel, and all of the other protections of the Bill of Rights. These are lacking in the system his captors generally advocate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that Patty Hearst was a victim of brainwashing?

Mr. McCLURE. It is hard to say. I don't know any more about it than anyone else who has read the circumstances of the case, but I would guess that she had a certain predisposition to conversion, reinforced by her isolation and exposure to her kidnapers. Therefore, it may have been a relatively easy transition to the extreme position she ultimately took.

One psychiatrist who has studied the Patricia Hearst case believes she found a substitute family in the SLA, fulfilling a deep but unconscious emotional need created when she drew away from her own family. If this is so, her conversion would neither be by brainwashing, in the usual coercive sense of that term, nor even entirely by the fear-motivated hostage-captor identification I mentioned earlier. It would be basically finding a new emotional family-type relationship.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, if I may change the subject a little bit, you mentioned Carlos Marighella and his manual for the urban guerrilla. I'm sure you're familiar with many other books of this general class. Alberto Bayo's book which preceded Marighella's. Ché Guevara's book, Mao Tse-tung's book; Rob Williams' columns, in that area which, I think at one point, were excerpted and printed as a book of instructions.

Have you made any attempt to relate these in your own mind, to sort out which came first, which followed the other, who stole from whom?

Mr. McCLURE. No, I haven't. I have read much of this literature, of course. But I have confined myself to the more-or-less practical concerns of hostage-taking, hostage-survival, and other aspects of terrorist motivation and operation. This has been my starting point in looking through the literature. Carlos Marighella was particularly

effective in his methodical approach to urban guerrilla tactics, which seem so adaptable to situations outside Brazil. He himself was a thoroughly experienced political activist—he has been a devoted Communist for 40 years before he broke with the party over revolutionary strategy—and was quite different from the purely ideological, middle-class terrorist who seems to dominate the Japanese Red Army, Baader-Meinhof and Weather Underground movements today.

But Marighella thought violence itself could create conditions for revolution by forcing the Brazilian Government to take repressive measures that would alienate the public. Events proved him wrong; the repressive measures came, but they had wide support from a terror-weary population. The guerrillas—after some remarkable tactical successes—were ultimately decimated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Alberto Bayo's book is, strangely enough, more tactical and less strategic than Marighella's. Have you ever made a comparison of the translations of Mao's book and Alberto Bayo's?

Mr. McCURE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I've heard it said, though I am not competent to judge, that the Mao book is really little more than a translation of Alberto Bayo's with the reshuffling to fit the mind of people into whose language it has been translated. Have you heard this?

Mr. McCURE. Yes. I think it's apparent that most of these revolutionary philosopher-propagandist-tacticians borrow from one another; they distill, eliminate, alter and add, to create new versions of a basic doctrine—often with different tactical wrinkles. There are a couple of new manuals in this country, for example, which borrow quite eclectically from foreign writings.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Maoist book is, of course, a lot of it political theory thrown in with Maoism, but that's not particularly strange, is it? Even in a book like the Proverbs, in the Bible, you have the underconstruction of distilled truth from experience plus religious interlardings overlaid with the doctrinaire additions that have come later.

Do you think that the spread of terrorist books, which are after all manuals, along the road to the disruption of our society, is in any sense a danger to this country, more particularly, or to the Western World?

Mr. McCURE. I don't think so, if one is thinking about converting large numbers of people. Ideological terrorists have a considerable capacity for causing damage—they can come close to destroying the quality of life in a democratic country—but actually the numbers involved generally are small in relation to the total population, and they don't seem to gain a wide following. But we are now talking about terrorism of the nonorthodox Communists—the Maoists and Trotskyist-type of operation which concerns us most when we refer to urban terrorism in democracies. The orthodox Communists themselves have made considerable gains, of course, in countries like France and particularly Italy. But this has been done in a context of political legitimacy which they try to maintain. They attempt to divorce themselves, at least openly, from guerrilla and terrorist activity. This doesn't mean that Communist countries are not supporting terrorists, but they don't usually acknowledge it if they do.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, the Communists do actively support terrorism all around the globe, don't they?

Mr. McCURE. Yes; they do support guerrilla-type terrorism in every respect, in training, financing where necessary, and in arming

guerrilla groups. You see it in Africa right now, especially in Angola, where a Moscow-oriented and supplied force, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, faces another, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, with reported Chinese backing. A recent study published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London gives a detailed accounting of Soviet aid to Rhodesian insurgents, including arms and training. Similar published reports indicate Russian assistance to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command. Likewise, direct support by the People's Republic of China has been reported to the Naxalite and Naga insurgents in India, and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in May openly declared its support of the "revolutionary war" by Communist guerrillas against the Burmese Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. What about urban terrorists?

Mr. McCURE. Many of the terrorists we've been talking about here are beyond the control of the orthodox Communists and, in fact, they even attack Moscow and sometimes Peking in their propaganda. This is true in Japan, for instance, and in Germany among other countries. An exception might be the United States. There is no terrorist organization I know of here which is fighting orthodox communism, although a number regard themselves as non-Soviet Marxist.

But there are indications that Communist countries sometimes provide support to urban terrorist groups without much regard to their doctrinal purity. For example, Klaus Rainer Röhl, editor of the influential far-left German magazine, *Konkret*, and husband of Ulrike Meinhof, the terrorist leader, has admitted that he was a secret member of the Communist Party from 1956 to 1964 while promoting an antiorthodox Marxist movement which spawned the Baader-Meinhof gang. Röhl admits receiving funds—about a million marks—for his magazine through East Berlin and Prague. This support had to have Moscow's approval.

Another Communist-country link with terrorism was suggested in 1973 when Palestine guerrillas seized hostages on a train near Vienna, and forced the Austrian Government to close its Schönau processing camp for Soviet Jewish emigres. They came fully armed across the border of Czechoslovakia, a country normally noted for its security precautions.

An intriguing example of urban terrorist support by a Communist country surfaced only last month when three Cuban diplomats were expelled from France after the killing of two French counterintelligence officers by the mysterious "master terrorist" Ilich Ramirez Sanchez in Paris. The French action linked Cuban support with a network involving the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Baader-Meinhof gang, and the Japanese Red Army.

Mr. SOURWINE. Returning to terrorist literature, you have answered the question from the standpoint of ideology, mainly, and I'm glad you did. But actually, in asking the question, I had in mind just simply the standpoint of increasingly widespread dissemination of a sort of do-it-yourself book for blowing things up, killing people, disrupting government, causing uprisings, and riots, and so forth. Do you feel that the widespread dissemination of instructions in this regard—everything from how to make a very simple Molotov cocktail, to how to put together a rather sophisticated time bomb, and covering

the whole sphere of possible damage, how to control crowds, the whole area of possible terrorist activity—is the widespread dissemination of information about how to do this bringing about any more dangerous situations in the country or in the Western world?

Mr. McCLURE. Yes, I think so. Such literature, it seems to me, encourages antisocial, violent people to become terrorists and improves the capability of anyone already involved in terrorism. The kind of manual you describe—giving details on bombmaking, weapons handling, and urban guerrilla tactics—is relatively easy to obtain in this country, even through the mails.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think this literature actually recruits terrorists, then?

Mr. McCLURE. I think potential terrorists exist around the periphery of any terrorist activity. And terrorist organizations are trying to expand, to take more of these people in. These are people with antisocial inclinations, intense frustration, psychological problems, sometimes psychoses.

They are normally kept under restraint by a fear of being caught or punished, or perhaps because general social pressure is so great against what they would otherwise be tempted to do that they dare not do it. One seldom notices these people until they are moved by some opportunity or encouragement to cross the line into organized violence.

Certainly, one of the factors that encourages persons with these tendencies to become violent is literature which tells them precisely how to do it, and get away with it. Another possible factor may be the general public apathy toward crime that Attorney General Edward Levi only recently mentioned.

If there is a toleration of antisocial acts, violence, destruction of property, this becomes a new norm within which people with antisocial tendencies can operate relatively safely. This may explain in part the extraordinary increase in crime and vandalism which has occurred in the last few years, to the point where vandalism in American schools alone cost half a billion dollars last year and graffiti damage is estimated to cost \$600 million a year.

A generation ago this was not so. The situation today arises, in part, I think, from the fact that most people do not regard destruction of property as a very serious crime.

Mr. SOURWINE. Unless it is their own property.

Mr. McCLURE. There are two kinds of property people do not generally get terribly excited about: one is corporate property and the other is public property. There seems to be a popular assumption that insurance covers the cost of damage, and nobody loses.

So when the guard goes down, the violence increases. Then violence escalates from there, from the destruction of property to something more serious: attacks on people. There is also, of course, the attempt of criminals or people with criminal tendencies to rationalize their acts. This is one of the reasons I believe that certain criminals join ideological terrorist groups. The Symbionese Liberation Army is a good example of this, where criminals and middle-class dissidents have combined. Frantz Fanon, the West Indian advocate of violent revolution, was among the first extreme-left theoreticians to promote the doctrine of uniting the criminal and other "hopeless dregs of humanity" with the middle-class terrorist.

Mr. SOURWINE. And not to diverge too far down the line you have just opened up, but that is basically the reason why the several, not a large number, but the several organizations that capitalize on prisoners have been so successful. That is, that the prisoner loves to hear that he is in there as a political prisoner who is being persecuted.

Mr. McCCLURE. Yes, and he also knows that with this kind of attention, his chances of being released may be improved. He attracts attention to what he considers to be his plight. And he gets the services of lawyers who are supported by these organizations. The fact that a middle-class revolutionary element exists, not only in our own country but in many others as well, has complicated the whole problem of antisocial activity, because money is now available. These people often have independent means and have ways of getting financial support. Much of this money is put into legal services; for instance, there are partisan lawyers who get involved with terrorist groups in almost every country—not just as counsel but sometimes even as participants in their activities. Germany has had a particularly difficult time with this recently. So the criminal, and particularly the convict, sees a source of strength and help in these ideological groups.

Mr. SOURWINE. To revert back to the original question, not to curb any of your testimony, but just by way of tying it up a little, is there to your knowledge any way that has been devised to meet this threat of how to deal with violence literature without compromising our basic principle of free speech and free press?

Mr. McCCLURE. I do not know what can be done about the manuals—the how-to books. Beyond them is a range of ideological and even revolutionary literature often produced by leading publishers. The limits here depend solely on the judgment and restraint of editors.

Violent dissidents, including urban terrorists, argue that they are being abused and persecuted by society—by the system. And yet if one looks at the book list of top American publishers for the past few years, it is clear that almost any dissident of any prominence at all has been able to get into print and have his views widely disseminated. The authors intend these books to recruit for their cause and even to promote violence and revolution.

How dangerous these books are is hard to judge, and suppressing them, in my view, would violate our freedom of press. We cannot be afraid of ideas, even when they are intended to generate violence. At the same time, however, the ferocity of some of these publications, and their explicit calls for violence, probably stimulate terrorist activity. We must recognize and accept this fact, as must the publishers who issue some of the more extreme works.

The point here, however, is that dissidents of all kinds receive generous publicity, through books as well as other media. And it is in fact in these other media—in the press, films, and TV—where the terrorist seeks and gets his most valuable propaganda assistance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you give us some examples of propaganda assistance by the media for terrorists?

Mr. McCCLURE. Aside from newsworthy events which terrorists create by their violent acts, there have been instances of press and TV reportage in which the media themselves were an essential part of the story. In Germany, for example, a reporter and photographer from the national newsweekly, *Der Spiegel*, actually accompanied a gang of Ulrike Meinhof's companions on an attack and sacking of a

house in Hamburg. This, of course, required advance collusion between the magazine and dangerous criminals. Articles smuggled out of prison by the Baader-Meinhof leaders also have been printed in full by large-circulation publications.

In Britain there have been many cases of cooperation between top British media and the IRA Provisionals, who have declared war on Great Britain. These have taken the form of exclusive interviews with Provisional leaders and the holding of clandestine IRA press conferences for British reporters. Both the Government-owned British Broadcasting Corp. and independent television have telecast prime-time interviews with IRA leaders. One such interview with Provisional Chief of Staff David O'Connell—in which he announced a plan to step up bombings in England—came a week before two bars in Birmingham were bombed, killing 21 persons. The possibility that O'Connell had signaled the attacks through his TV appearance was raised in Parliament.

It is difficult to draw the line in journalism between covering events deliberately caused by a violent group and analyzing the motives and methods of terrorists by seeking them out. But critics in both Germany and Britain argue that such a line can be drawn far short of the extent to which some of the media have gone in handling the terrorism story. Whatever the merits of this view, one thing is certain: The continuous, voluminous, comprehensive coverage of terrorism in countries constantly threatened by it has contributed to the impact and fear-generating capacity of very small groups of people. Such publicity is vital to any terrorist organization.

Mr. SOURWINE. How does this situation apply in the United States?

Mr. McCURE. Fugitives of various sorts, including terrorists, have found a number of safe ways to make highly effective propaganda through the news media, knowing they would be protected as a news source. For example, the station manager of KPFFK in Santa Monica, Calif., was jailed for refusing to give the authorities an original tape of an SLA communique. The four stations of the Pacifica Network have consistently broadcast messages from such organizations as the SLA, the Weather Underground, and the World Liberation Front, which has claimed responsibility for bombings on the west coast. Abbie Hoffman, a self-styled revolutionary and a fugitive from a drug-selling charge, appeared on educational television in New York City last May—for which he received more than \$3,000, as well as valuable publicity. Filmmakers have met secretly with members of the Weather Underground and have shot footage which presumably will publicize the organization's activities and cause.

Another type of highly effective proterrorist propaganda distributed in this country is the Costa-Gavras film "State of Siege." Although real names are not used, this French-directed film—shot in Chile when Salvador Allende Gossens was president—is intended to tell a highly colored story of the American public-safety adviser, Daniel Mitrione, who was murdered by the Tupamaros in Uruguay in 1970. The film purports to be a documentary and is almost universally accepted as authentic; but it is actually a grossly distorted, deliberately perverted account. The film romanticizes the Tupamaros and justifies their killing Mitrione—who was in fact only 1 of their 45 murder victims.

The terrorists have ways, therefore, of keeping in the limelight, even when they are not committing violence. By getting their tailor-made messages—with appropriate timing—into the mass media, they create the impression of being daring, clever, and invincible, while the police search for them in vain. This is a kind of power projection which can induce fear and even paralysis on the part of the public when a concerted terror campaign gets underway. What ordinary citizen would dare report his suspicions about outlaws who have such connections? The New York Times last April published a long article on its opposite-editorial page about the end of the Vietnam war by Bernardine Rae Dohrn. Miss Dohrn is on the top-10 wanted list of the FBI as a leader of the Weather Underground Organization. The Times must have been able to authenticate the article, or it would not have used Miss Dohrn's by-line. Any reader has to be impressed with the leverage this young woman can exercise. What will she be able to do next? Here we have the mystique of the modern urban guerrilla.

Mr. SOURWINE. A few years ago in one of our major cities—as you all know, this sort of situation has been repeated in substantial substance at various places—plans had been made by a militant organization to ambush some police. And newspapers or certain newspapermen were tipped off, were told about it in advance, were present at an excellent observation point when it took place and printed the story afterward and contended that they had the right under freedom of the press to be there, not to warn anybody and to refuse to discuss their sources or what they saw.

Of course, this is entirely wrong; nobody has a right to refuse his testimony in any criminal case. But this seems to be a growing feeling in the country.

Mr. McCLURE. Severe competition among the media puts a premium on the exclusive story, the "beat." This is particularly true of television, which strives to get action footage of dramatic events—and before the rival stations or networks do.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is not the fault of a free press, is it?

Mr. McCLURE. No; I myself think it is a matter of judgment and responsibility of people who are running the press. They have the privilege of printing or broadcasting what they want. The question is to what extent they should restrain themselves in any way out of a concept of public interest or security. This depends above all on the circumstances of the story.

For example, terrorists can make their own news, what is called "the propaganda of the deed." The fact that they create a dramatic event makes it news. And there is no reason why these incidents should not be covered in detail even though they are intended as propaganda by the people who plan them.

If, indeed, this were not done, there would be a very serious psychological effect on the public once it were to realize that news of violent events was being suppressed. Regardless of cause, these are legitimate news stories. But then there are other events made possible only through advance cooperation of the media with terrorists.

There was a case 2 years ago in Ireland, for instance, in which an American TV documentary group was able to photograph IRA gunmen loading a car with explosives and driving it to a city street

corner where it was abandoned and blown up—before the eyes of the audience. In other words, being virtually an accomplice in the act, the TV producer could get realistic coverage of a planned event. This is hardly coverage of a news event in the normal journalistic sense.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we take the pictures that the witness wants to offer, Mr. Tarabochia, do you have any questions?

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Yes, sir.

In regard to the film, "State of Siege," which you mentioned, could you give us some details on how the film misrepresents the Tupamaro movement?

Mr. McCURE. Well, there are many points in the film which pervert the facts for dramatic or propaganda effect. One, for instance, concerns the Tupamaro decision to "execute" Dan Mitrione. Costa-Gavras goes to great pains to create the impression that a poll was taken among cell leaders, who in turn had canvassed their unit members, on whether Mitrione should die for his "crimes." According to the film, the majority favored death, and consequently the American was blindfolded, bound, and shot in an automobile on August 10, 1970.

This is nonsense. Terrorist organizations simply do not operate this way; decisions are made at the top. Normally—and this seems to be the case with the Mitrione decision—the executive committee rules on such matters. We have, in fact, proof from the Tupamaros themselves that the decision was made at the top and that any supposed "guilt" by Mitrione was not a question at all.

The simple fact is that the Tupamaros had demanded publication of a manifesto and the release of some 150 terrorists being held by the Uruguayan Government as ransom for Mitrione. The deadline set by the organization passed with the government taking no action, and the Tupamaro leaders decided they should carry out their threat to kill the hostage.

An authoritative explanation of the incident appeared in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper, Granma, some months later—in the issue of October 8, 1970, to be exact. A Tupamaro spokesman known by the code name "Urbano" was quoted as saying that Mitrione had to be murdered for two reasons. First, the terrorists had to demonstrate they were capable of carrying out their threats. Second, the failure to follow through would jeopardize the use of the kidnapping-hostage weapon by political terrorists in other countries.

The Cuban paper quoted "Urbano" as saying: "The logic of the technique of kidnaping to get the release of prisoners has to be followed all the way if it is to remain effective." This is the simple truth—and it is a far cry from the pseudo-judicial "trial" which Costa-Gavras suggests in his purportedly documentary film.

One more comment of the Mitrione case: The Tupamaros released a tape recording of an interrogation of Daniel Mitrione, presumably to support their decision to "execute" him for what they called crimes against the people. But, notwithstanding the heavy pressure felt by the hostage—and the tension is evident in his quiet responses to the questioning—there is nothing in this record which could reflect on his behavior as a U.S. Government official.

This was undoubtedly the best propaganda justification the terrorists could make for their political murder. But it is so weak, one wonders why they bothered to try. The answer may be, however, that

long after the actual content of the tape was forgotten, it would be remembered that the Tupamaros produced "evidence" of Mitrione's guilt.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. You are very correct in your assessment of the Tupamaro contention, Mr. McClure. It was indeed a senseless murder perpetrated solely for the purpose of showing their determination to carry out a threat.

In this context I would like to introduce for the record, a copy of some excerpts from the Mitrione interrogation by the Tupamaros. These were published in the October 8, 1970, issue of the Liberation News Service a New Left publication very sympathetic to revolutionary groups such as the Tupamaros. These excerpts, as L.N.S. saw fit to publish them, confirm the fact that "revolutionary justice" is nothing more than a term to justify a totally unwarranted sacrifice of a human life.

Mr. SOURWINE. May it be accepted, Mr. Chairman?

Senator THURMOND. Without objection, so ordered.

[The material referred to follows:]

THE TUPAMAROS SPEAK TO DAN MITRIONE: EXCERPTS FROM AN INTERVIEW
LIBERATION NEWS SERVICE

(Editor's note: The following are excerpts from a tape recording of one section of the questioning of CIA agent Dan Mitrione by members of the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement.

Dan Mitrione, once an Indiana police chief, was executed on August 9 after the regime refused to free all the Uruguayan political prisoners in exchange for him. Mitrione had been kidnapped by a Tupamaros commando group on July 31. The same day, Aloisio Dias Gomide, the Brazilian Consul, was also kidnapped, Claude Fly—accused by several Argentine publications of being a CIA agent—was kidnapped on August 7. The two are still being held by the Tupamaros.

The entire transcript of the tape was printed in Granma, a Cuban daily newspaper.)

Tup. Now you have a job that's different from being a chief in the United States?

MITRIONE. Yes, an entirely different job. Now I work for the police.

Tup. What kind of work did you do in Brazil?

M. I was an adviser. I worked in the interior of Brazil with I was an adviser to the Military Police, in the matter of training. You know, in Brazil, like in Uruguay, policemen are only doing their duty. We search for the more peaceful way to do things so that their job will be better for them and for everybody. We try to have them do their job a little more in line with our views.

Turs. Were you in the jungle?

M. No, it wasn't that kind of a job. I also taught them about upkeep of equipment, better maintenance of equipment.

Turs. As you know, they lose their equipment quite often. We stole 700 pieces ourselves.

M. Yes, I know.

Turs. Do you know that some of them were in pretty bad condition?

M. In bad condition?

Turs. We had a hard time getting them back in shape. The revolvers were all right, but the rifles * * *

M. You had to work hard, eh?

Turs. Yes! We had to do the work instead of them, but everything is in top shape now. What about your work in Uruguay?

M. It's more or less the same thing. We have an office at headquarters, and we work with the Ministry of the Interior and the chief of Police, there at headquarters. We work in communications in the interior, for the various departments of the interior, principally in the main network: telecommunications. They also brought in prowl cars, but these are purchased by Uruguay, not us. We split the cost of the radios, fifty-fifty. That is, some of them. Others are paid for in full by Uruguay.

Turs. Do you think the Uruguayan policemen learn very quickly?

M. No; I really don't know. I think the young Uruguayans are very intelligent. I believe Uruguay is the best place in Latin America, because it has the best system of education and schools. The only bad thing is, there isn't much ambition to work harder here, to get better jobs—but after all, they're paid very little. Yes, they are underpaid. Yes, it would help if they were paid more.

Tups. Just as a subject for discussion, what do you think of us?

M. Of the Tupamaros?

Tups. Yes. You know quite a lot about us. You've been living here for quite some time now. How long?

M. A year.

Tups. That's enough time.

M. You work very well. You're well organized. You must have good leaders.

Tups. Well, I should tell you—and I hope you believe me—that we have no leaders. We have people who are more or less important, but nothing like chiefs. We discuss everything. We are of less importance—at least I am—but there are others who are important. We're all comrades.

M. It's quite evident to me that you have a good organization. I'd say that you have good discipline and have been very successful.

Tups. We are Uruguayans who don't put off until tomorrow what we can do today. That's for sure.

All right, when you worked with the military police in Brazil, what was your liaison with the DOPS [Department of Political and Social Order; Political Police]?

M. The DOPS? Oh, well, I think that—the DOPS—I didn't know too much in those days. They're the Political Police, aren't they? I believe that one of their problems is that they're policemen who were hired through political patronage, while the military police are people with military training. I had very little to do with the DOPS.

Tups. I believe the military police are trained in anti-guerrilla warfare. That's the main problem, right?

M. At that time we weren't doing that. The problem wasn't the guerrillas. We trained them to handle workers' strikes, labor problems, and maybe demonstrations in general—how to use humane methods, without hurting anybody, if possible, but also to fight when necessary.

Tups. They're changing their methods now, you know.

M. Yes, I read the interrogation manuals, all about special measures and all that. Very interesting.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Mr. McClure, in your study of this subject I am sure that you have delved deeply in the various forms of terrorism. Could you give us an outline of the historical background of the most active groups, worldwide, such as the Tupamaros, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and others of which you may have knowledge?

Mr. McCLURE. There are three general lines of development which account for the urban terrorism we know today. One of these was centered in Latin America, a second grew out of middle-class intellectual dissension in leading industrial countries, and a third originated with irredentist-ethnic movements, chiefly in the Middle East and Northern Ireland but not confined to those places.

Latin America has had a history of guerrilla warfare going back a century and a half and more. But the current phase of guerrilla activities largely dates from 1959, when Fidel Castro took over Cuba and soon rather openly promoted revolution in a number of countries in the area. Existing insurgent groups operated from rural bases, and this suited both the Maoist revolutionary doctrine of enveloping the cities from the countryside and the Castroite experience of seizing power from initial bases in the rugged Sierra Maestra. So the Cuban-backed guerrillas in Latin America were originally rural centered.

The historic turning point from rural to urban-centered operations in Latin America might well be 1967, when Che Guevara and his revolutionary companions were hunted down and destroyed in a

remote region of Bolivia. Actually, significant urban guerrilla operations had occurred in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil, but rural bases were still considered essential. It was the Tupamaros which broke new ground in the late 1960's and pointed the way to all-urban operations. Uruguay, the smallest country in South America and with few distinctive terrain features, offered little rural cover for terrorists. On the other hand, 82 percent of the population lives in cities—chiefly Montevideo. This created both an opportunity and necessity for all-urban operations, which have since become a model for city terrorism elsewhere.

The second line of terrorist development occurred in such countries as Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and the United States with the emergence of highly organized, university-spawned, middle-class revolutionaries. There is a remarkably similar pattern of growth in all these countries: The movements originated in campus protest activities, developing into mass political demonstrations which became increasingly violent. When the demonstrations reached their limit of effectiveness as a political-action weapon and were contained, the most extreme elements broke away to form revolutionary assault groups.

The third element of terror development is nationalist-ethnic, where the goal is primarily to take over territory as a sovereign entity. The IRA campaign in Ulster involves a question of sovereignty going back half a century, and even the terrorist assaults on England have the precedent of similar attacks made at the beginning of World War II. The Palestine Liberation Organization uses techniques which some observers compare with those developed by such extremist Zionist terror groups as Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang to drive the British out of Palestine in the 1940's.

Although the objectives of the various terrorist movements may vary in purpose and political ideology, there is today much cross-fertilization, cooperation and particularly tactical imitation among them.

Mr. SOURWINE. As you say, urban terrorism has arisen in just the past 7 or 8 years. What do you think has brought about this sudden threat, particularly in the liberal democracies?

Mr. McCLURE. It's very difficult to say why this problem has arisen at this time and with such intensity. Certainly the lack of effective countermeasures is a factor in the rapid growth of terrorism; success has bred imitation. But the basic cause remains puzzling.

One theory—which incidentally seeks to explain the rapid increase of general crime as well—is that terrorism is a rebellion against social injustice. According to this reasoning, the only cure for antisocial violence is to correct the failures of the system. But even a glance at the situation throws doubt on this theory.

Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany rose from the ashes of World War II to become the third and fourth most powerful industrial states by the late 1960's, when urban terrorism began to appear. Although these countries—like all others—had social problems, they were offering their citizens unprecedented personal freedom, prosperity and social mobility. Never had the population as a whole been so well off.

In the United States, the FBI index of crime tells a similar story. Between 1933, in the depths of the great depression, and 1970, at the height of national prosperity and social welfare, the Nation's population grew 34 percent while the incidence of crime went up 470%. And, although the depression continued almost up to our entry into World War II, the crime rate actually declined for a number of years. The 1933 crime level was in fact not equaled again until 1946. It then accelerated steadily through a period of growing prosperity and enormous social advancement.

Allowing for the impact of recent problems—continued pressure for minority gains, ecology, pollution, the nuclear issue, and Vietnam dissidence—the increase in antisocial violence can hardly be explained by worsening social conditions.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the FBI data I have referred to might be of general interest and therefore would like to offer the Index of Crime, 1933-73, for placement in the record.

Senator THURMOND. So ordered.

[The material referred to follows:]

INDEX OF CRIME, UNITED STATES, 1933-73

Year	Total crime index	Violent crime	Property crime	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Auto theft
1933	1,705,600	222,040	1,483,600	9,630	4,930	136,660	70,830	454,600	713,600	315,300
1934	1,591,400	190,970	1,400,400	7,760	5,380	108,780	69,060	401,400	716,200	282,800
1935	1,461,400	170,620	1,290,800	8,940	6,040	90,060	65,590	340,100	707,200	243,400
1936	1,374,300	156,500	1,217,800	9,110	6,960	74,070	66,370	334,200	672,300	210,300
1937	1,455,400	159,480	1,296,000	9,070	7,350	79,530	63,540	351,000	732,800	212,200
1938	1,472,300	155,920	1,316,400	8,580	6,300	78,850	62,200	355,500	774,600	185,400
1939	1,523,400	154,510	1,368,800	8,670	7,370	73,520	64,960	373,200	820,300	175,300
1940	1,553,700	152,060	1,401,600	8,700	7,280	71,050	65,030	379,700	847,300	174,600
1941	1,563,400	150,220	1,413,200	8,720	7,580	66,270	67,650	362,800	863,400	187,000
1942	1,455,200	152,580	1,302,600	8,730	8,250	62,720	72,890	319,200	818,500	164,900
1943	1,390,000	147,530	1,242,500	7,520	10,110	60,270	69,630	326,000	731,800	184,800
1944	1,412,000	153,410	1,258,600	7,650	10,720	58,350	76,790	328,700	730,500	199,600
1945	1,592,000	175,920	1,416,100	7,900	11,940	72,290	83,790	385,600	793,100	237,400
1946	1,717,000	200,300	1,516,700	9,730	12,300	83,630	94,630	429,200	861,300	226,100
1947	1,657,400	202,190	1,455,200	8,940	12,390	80,490	100,370	431,400	841,500	182,300
1948	1,664,400	200,090	1,464,300	8,780	11,280	76,120	103,910	436,000	860,900	167,400
1949	1,742,900	206,700	1,536,200	8,050	10,840	81,850	105,960	472,900	902,200	161,100
1950	1,765,300	201,700	1,563,600	8,080	11,170	73,660	108,800	475,600	919,300	168,700
1951	1,846,100	197,310	1,648,800	7,860	11,680	72,160	105,610	469,700	984,600	194,600
1952	2,000,000	218,110	1,781,900	8,310	11,240	80,490	118,080	511,000	1,058,400	212,500
1953	2,123,500	231,520	1,891,900	8,210	11,670	87,330	124,310	552,800	1,115,600	223,500
1954	2,230,500	237,800	1,992,700	7,910	11,100	93,200	125,590	599,200	1,180,300	213,200
1955	2,216,200	225,190	1,991,000	7,910	13,300	79,530	124,450	568,800	1,198,000	224,200
1956	2,495,400	230,280	2,265,100	8,050	14,380	78,440	129,420	606,900	1,398,100	260,200
1957	2,724,200	241,630	2,482,600	7,990	14,490	84,860	134,300	681,100	1,515,500	286,000
1958	2,974,600	257,950	2,716,600	8,150	16,370	95,660	137,770	767,000	1,657,300	292,300
1959	2,971,100	260,780	2,710,400	8,500	16,620	90,740	144,930	768,300	1,643,700	298,300
1960	3,352,800	286,220	3,066,600	9,050	17,050	107,410	152,720	903,400	1,836,800	326,400
1961	3,455,500	287,120	3,168,400	8,680	17,080	106,240	155,130	940,400	1,893,800	334,200
1962	3,717,400	299,150	3,418,200	8,480	17,410	110,410	162,850	984,800	2,068,700	364,800
1963	4,071,200	314,490	3,756,700	8,580	17,510	116,000	172,400	1,076,000	2,274,800	406,000
1964	4,522,300	361,350	4,161,000	9,300	21,250	129,860	200,940	1,201,600	2,489,300	470,200
1965	4,695,500	384,340	4,311,200	9,900	23,230	138,130	213,090	1,270,200	2,546,900	494,100
1966	5,175,200	426,830	4,748,300	10,970	25,620	157,350	232,890	1,396,500	2,793,700	558,100
1967	5,849,200	496,150	5,353,000	12,160	27,410	202,100	254,490	1,616,500	3,080,500	656,100
1968	6,658,900	590,640	6,068,200	13,720	31,410	261,780	283,720	1,841,100	3,447,800	779,300
1969	7,343,300	657,050	6,686,200	14,670	36,880	297,650	307,850	1,962,900	3,849,700	873,600
1970	8,024,100	733,530	7,290,500	15,890	37,690	348,460	331,480	2,183,800	4,183,500	923,200
1971	8,509,800	810,680	7,699,100	17,670	41,940	386,150	364,920	2,376,300	4,379,900	942,900
1972	8,173,400	828,820	7,344,600	18,550	46,480	374,790	389,000	2,352,800	4,109,600	882,200
1973	8,638,400	869,470	7,768,900	19,510	51,000	382,680	416,270	2,540,900	4,304,400	923,000

Note: Figures added before rounding.

Mr. McCLURE. There are many other factors which might help account for the crime-terror problem, including such psychological considerations as unrealized hopes, perceived "relative deprivation," a critical and largely negative approach to political affairs, and the "bad news" emphasis in the mass media of all free countries. All these together tend to share confidence in his social system. But in absolute terms, the decade of the 1960's probably accounted for the greatest gain for the greatest number of people in history—and chiefly in some of those very countries plagued by ideological terrorism.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does a comparison of revolutionary movements provide any clues to the motivations of terrorists?

Mr. McCLURE. The surprising thing about ideological terrorists in such widely separated countries as Japan, Germany, and the United States is their marked similarity in average age, sex, class, rhetoric, apparent philosophy, and psychological makeup. Local conditions differ among the three countries, and one might normally expect a pronounced cultural variation in behavior among these national groups. But such differences are not very noticeable.

The average terrorist age—based on the ages of prisoners and known fugitives—is in the midthirties for the Germans and Americans, and a little under 30 for the Japanese. Nearly all terrorists began their political activism when they were between 17 and 20, although the Japanese sometimes started earlier. With few exceptions, they are middle class, at least partly university educated, about one-fifth to one-third female, reasonably affluent, and with no history of material or cultural deprivation. They are Marxist—usually professedly Maoist or Trotskyist rather than orthodox Communist—speak the same new-left jargon, and have the same deeply emotional, sometimes suicidal, sense of commitment.

The prominence of women in the movements is also striking. Leaders such as Ulrike Meinhof, 41, of the Baader-Meinhof gang, Fusako Shigenobu, 30, of the Japanese Red Army, and Bernardine Rae Dohrn, 33, of the Weather Underground all appear to plan and conduct difficult operations and maintain organizational discipline.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything in the social background of these terrorists that would explain their violent inclinations?

Mr. McCLURE. This is a study for sociologists and psychologists, and there is probably insufficient comparative data available to draw firm conclusions. Any tentative judgment is likely to be challenged as subjective.

Certain general observations might be made, however. In the case of Japan and West Germany, the gap between the World War II and immediate postwar generations—involving abrupt cultural changes and perhaps different generational concepts of responsibility and conformity—may have stimulated disaffection by the activist young. Some critics regard the Vietnam war as having the same disaffecting influence on young activists in the United States, but this comparison could be debated.

In the case of Germany and the United States—with Japan omitted for lack of sufficient background information—certain radical activists and terrorists have rejected the values of their elders and adopted their own social philosophy. More frequently, however, they appear to have simply extended into violent action the socially critical attitudes of their parents. Ulrike Meinhof, for instance, is the daughter

of two art historians, long deceased, and the ward of a leftist intellectual who apparently prepared her psychologically for her role as a radical columnist and then revolutionary. Likewise, several of the parents of SLA members have shown sympathy with the cause of their terrorist offspring, though deploring the methods they chose to promote it.

The extension of parental social criticism into social disaffection is treated in a controversial new book, "Liberal Parents, Radical Children," by Midge Decter. The "liberal" in this case is more social than political. Miss Decter maintains that the infusion of crucial ethical attitudes into youth who have been spared the pain of making their own living or confronting other mundane problems of existence has led them to retreat from the real world into a commune or other counterculture. These are privileged, protected, pampered, and undisciplined youth who are forced to find their way without specific parental guidance or practical life experience.

This thesis has received both high praise and scathing criticism from reviewers and has attracted wide popular attention. The distance from a commune or drug pad to terrorism—which sometimes has its own severe brand of puritanical discipline—may be remote, but the move in both cases out of established society is similar.

The tragic suicide last April of Lady Lucy Russell, granddaughter of Bertrand Russell, perhaps illustrates how the preoccupation with a cause by parents can be magnified to intolerable lengths by their offspring. The 26-year-old woman burned herself to death in a churchyard as a general anti-war protest.

In May a young man from a prominent American family, a former Vietnam War protest leader, shot himself to death at the UN to draw attention to the danger of nuclear war. In 1969 another young man at the same place burned himself to death protesting the Nigerian civil war.

These are all unstable persons, moved to self-destruction by an overwhelming burden of idealism and frustration. A terrorist with an equal obsession, but directing his compulsive aggression outward, becomes homicidal instead of suicidal—and with no qualms of conscience.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you think makes the terrorists so fanatical that they will kill or accept death themselves to further their cause?

Mr. McCLURE. Few terrorists actually have total disregard for their own lives, and many daring acts of hostage-taking appear to be based on a fair calculation of getting away—as most have managed to do so far. A few failures might discourage even the Japanese Red Army, considered the most fanatical of the terrorist groups, although suicide attacks such as that on Lod Airport in Israel in 1972 might still be attempted. Other actions, such as bombing buildings at night, are relatively safe for the perpetrators if the target is easily accessible or poorly guarded.

Aside from dedication to the cause, terrorists can be spurred on by their public image, heavy media coverage and the possibility of high returns. Also, terrorism tends to escalate by its own momentum and because of the need for constant public attention. These factors, quite rational and within the limits of calculated risk, apply in perhaps 95 percent of terrorist operations.

When analyzing the terrorist problem, it is well to remember that this is not a new phenomenon. Technology, tactics, communications and modern social circumstances have given antisocial activists advantages which pose great difficulties for governments, but there have been periods in the recent past when terrorists caused equal if not greater disruption than today.

Third Republic France was a liberal democracy for its time, and yet it was plagued by anarchist violence in the 1890's which included the bombing of the Chamber of Deputies and the assassination of President Sadi Carnot. The activists involved were largely romantic intellectuals, as were the anarchists in Germany, Russia, and Italy before and after the turn of the century. Extreme-right terrorism brought both Mussolini and Hitler to power. There was a wave of anarchist violence—among other types—in the United States in the 1920's. The mysterious Wall Street explosion at lunchtime on September 16, 1920, which took 38 lives and injured hundreds, was probably anarchist in origin.

In many respects—including their privileged-class origin, education and psychological makeup—the ideological terrorist today resembles certain of the violent political activists of 50 or more years ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you think are the dominant trends in international terrorism today?

Mr. McCLURE. The Tupamaros are in many ways a model for all the succeeding urban guerrilla groups. They were enormously successful and set the standards for others. Now the most active groups—the ones we are hearing the most about—are the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, the Japanese Red Army and the Montoneros and the ERP, the Marxist guerrillas in Argentina.

There are less active or less noticeable groups of this kind in many countries. Japan has come into the news principally because of the Japanese Red Army, a group of extremists driven out of their own country and which operates abroad. This is a phenomenon all of its own. But Japan has 27 other varieties of violent extremists at home.

There is a significant interplay between the ideological anarchistic type of terrorist group and the national liberation type such as the PLO and PFLP in the Middle East. What we see now is an increasing coordination of activities and even combined operations, particularly between the Japanese Red Army and various other groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

The Baader-Meinhof gang actually seemed to fade away—at least the German authorities thought so—after the top leaders were seized 3 years ago. However, they have been able to maintain contact outside and have had enough of an organization outside the prison in order to actually accelerate their terrorism and even refine it.

The result is such incidents as the assassination of Justice Günter von Drenkmann in Berlin last November, the kidnaping of the Christian Democratic Union candidate for mayor in Berlin, Peter Lorenz, and the more recent seizure of the German Embassy in Stockholm. These events have raised the terrorist threshold in Germany considerably.

Just to show the recent acceleration of terrorism in Germany, in 1973 there were 70 terrorist incidents, and in 1974, 104.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is in West Germany?

Mr. McCCLURE. West Germany. This is an increase of 49 percent in a single year. For other categories of violence by terrorists, bomb attacks are up 90 percent and arson 35 percent.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the same comparable years?

Mr. McCCLURE. Yes; just that 1-year period, 1973 to 1974. The number of wounded rose from 63 in 1973 to 129 in 1974, an increase of 105 percent. Only in murders by terrorists, where there were six in 1973 and five in 1974, has there been a decline.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what the comparable statistics were for the United States of America?

Mr. McCCLURE. No; I don't. The only figures I have are for bombings. The FBI reported that 20 persons were killed and 122 injured in the United States by bombs during the year ending April 30, 1975. Four of these deaths and 16 injuries occurred during last April alone. The comparable statistics for the full year ending April 30, 1974, were 3 dead and 51 wounded.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the extent that they are comparable, Mr. Chairman, may the order be that the research director of the committee prepare a table from the crime reports of the FBI and other sources, showing statistics for the United States, and that they be inserted in the record at this point.

[The material referred to follows:]

BOMBING ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES (1973-74)

	1973	1974	Percent increase
Attacks.....	1,955	2,041	8.6
Resulting deaths.....	22	24	2.0
Resulting injuries.....	187	206	1.9

Source: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related Agencies Appropriations for 1976, pt. 2, Department of Justice, p. 243.

Mr. McCCLURE. This is a significant intensification of violence, but what is more important is that the terrorist methods used pose problems for which there are no ready solutions. We are familiar in this country with the difficulty of coping with terror bombings. But we do not have the same kind of bombing problem which confronts Britain, for example, or the refined techniques of extortionist hostage taking which the Baader-Meinhof gang has directed against the Federal Republic.

There are only four ways to counteract terrorism, and all four are needed if there are to be appreciable results. The first is to eliminate foreign sanctuaries for hostage-taking terrorists. This would probably end one of the major terrorist threats, but there is little prospect at the moment of eliminating all such safe havens. Another approach is to increase protection of possible terrorist targets. But it is impossible to guard everything in a complex modern society—the result would be a total garrison state—and the terrorists can still shift their attention to those people or places which are relatively undefended.

The remaining two areas for countermeasures require, in most countries, changes in law. One is the realm of detection and apprehension, usually involving substantial strengthening of such police activities as intelligence and surveillance. The second is in the judicial

function, improving the ability of courts to cope with terrorist cases and get reasonably quick and sure convictions for those defendants demonstrated to be guilty.

Mr. SOURWINE. What legal measures have other countries taken to curb terrorism?

Mr. McCLURE. If we consider democratic countries with legal safeguards similar to our own, the general rule has been to make as few changes in the law as possible to meet the terrorist threat, and to avoid using emergency powers. Some observers feel this has enabled terrorist organizations to grow and gain valuable experience within established laws which were never designed to meet their kind of violence. In countries such as Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, it took spectacular terrorist outrages to bring significant changes in law, and even these are carefully circumscribed.

Canada is something of an exception to this rule. From 1965 to 1970, the *Front de Liberation du Quebec* (FLQ) had committed a number of bank robberies and bombings, but it was considered by the police to be a manageable threat. Then, late in 1970, elements of the FLQ held a British trade commissioner hostage and kidnaped—and later murdered—Pierre Laporte, a Quebec Cabinet Minister.

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau quickly invoked the War Measures Act which gave him Federal powers to deal with the crisis and permitted the use of troops. This drastic move took political courage, but Canada is not a heavily policed nation and might well have had difficulty coping with further terrorist violence of this intensity on a Provincial basis.

As it developed, the action proved effective. While it cannot be said that the FLQ will never again make a determined effort to use terror, the organization was largely broken, and the level of political violence in Canada today is well within the power of local authorities to control.

Mr. SOURWINE. Britain has had a terrorism problem both in Northern Ireland and in England itself. What legal measures has she taken?

Mr. McCLURE. British law is noted for its protection of individual rights, and this has made the apprehension and conviction of terrorists difficult. Although the British Army has been taking casualties fighting the IRA in Northern Ireland for years, it was common up to last November for the IRA to solicit funds, to demonstrate, and to wear distinctive uniforms in London, Birmingham, and other large English cities. The IRA was not outlawed as an organization in the United Kingdom outside Ulster.

This situation has now changed as a result of the bombing of two bars in Birmingham last November 21, in which 21 persons were killed and more than 180 injured. Only a month earlier, a similar bombing of two bars in the town of Guildford had caused 5 deaths and 65 injuries, and there had been a series of other fatal bombings going back several years. The Birmingham attacks were the last straw.

Under a temporary emergency act passed by Parliament and since renewed, it is now illegal to support the IRA, display its insignia or solicit in its behalf. Irishmen can be expelled from Britain for aiding or harboring terrorists. Suspects can be held as long as 48 hours for interrogation and fingerprinting, and this detention can be extended

for up to 5 days on higher authority. In terms of British legal tradition, these are extreme measures.

In Ulster, changes in the law have been made slowly under heavy pressure of events. Courts at first were releasing accused terrorists on bail because Northern Ireland law did not permit holding anyone on grounds that he might commit another crime while awaiting trial. Strict rules of evidence and police procedure also permitted the release of many suspects on technicalities, and British soldiers had to carry cards explaining the five different grounds for arrest so they would not commit errors in detaining anyone. At the same time, the penalty for false arrest was high; any error in apprehending a would-be terrorist could result in both criminal and civil actions against the arresting soldier.

By mid-1971 the ability of terrorists to intimidate witnesses, and to a lesser extent jurors, threatened the whole judicial process. Convictions were increasingly difficult to get, and guaranteeing a fair trial in a communally divided society was a problem. This led to a law permitting internment of suspects without trial. Safeguards and checks are built into the procedures to avoid imprisoning innocent persons, but the system has been bitterly controversial. The number of internees has dropped from a high of over 900 in 1972 to 230 today, however, and the British Government has promised to end internment at the end of the year if the current uneasy cease-fire of the IRA provisionals continues. Courts in Northern Ireland, meantime, are functioning better, holding more trials of terrorists than formerly and getting more convictions.

Only last month, in an amendment to the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act, further changes were made to ease the task of the security forces. Now suspects can be stopped without specific charges to be asked for their identity and any knowledge of terrorist acts. It is also possible to search for and seize radio transmitters—which the IRA has used to detonate bombs and to ambush patrols. Recruitment for terrorist organizations is now illegal, as is training in the use of arms and explosives. Hoods and masks are banned in public, and the collection of information about judges and other specified officials—often targets of assassination—is forbidden.

These measures are expected to strengthen the hand of the authorities in a situation which is still tense and intermittently violent.

Mr. SOURWINE. What about the situation in Germany, where the Baader-Meinhof gang leaders are now being tried?

Mr. McCURE. As with Britain, the Federal Republic made significant legal changes to deal with terrorism only when rapid escalation of violence left no alternative. The kidnaping of Peter Lorenz in Berlin—leading to the release of five imprisoned terrorists—had followed only by a few months the murder of Justice von Drenkmann. Then came the seizure of the German Embassy in Stockholm with a demand for the release of 26 more terrorists. The limit had been reached.

Accordingly, the Bundestag last month passed an emergency bill to reduce the legal advantages enjoyed by violent extremists. The new law permits the remission or reduction of penalties for terrorists who turn state's evidence. Heretofore there has been little chance of getting evidence from an informer, as it is under British and American law, because there was no way for him to reduce his own sentence by cooperating with the prosecution.

The act also establishes a new crime, the creation of terrorist associations, and provides for detention of terrorist suspects who otherwise would have to be released pending trial.

Since the Baader-Meinhof leaders were apparently able to communicate with gang members outside—to the extent of even planning terrorist operations—the Government also found it necessary in recent months to control defense lawyers whom it charges have acted as couriers for the organization. No defendant may now have more than five lawyers—one terrorist had 18 and another 22 in recent trials—and there are even provisions for the monitoring of consultations between lawyer and defendant to prevent the conduct of terror operations from prison.

These measures have aroused considerable debate in Germany, as has the trial of the four terrorist leaders in Stuttgart. The defense contends that a fair trial is impossible under present circumstances—though many of these circumstances have been created by the defendants themselves. The Stuttgart trial is certain to be one of the most expensive in the history of jurisprudence: With the special bombproof building constructed for the purpose, the evidence of 500 witnesses and statements and depositions of 1,000 others covering 5 counts of murder, 54 counts of attempted murder and a variety of other charges, the total cost is likely to run about DM 14 million, or \$6 million. The defendants have been held for 3 years during preparation of the case, and the trial is expected to last 6 to 18 months.

The Federal Republic has encountered difficulties as well in trying to control the network of radicals which can supply intelligence and other support to terrorists. Screening of persons applying for government jobs has been tightened, for example, and this has aroused criticism in the press. The problem, however, remains. The Baader-Meinhof gang and related terrorist organizations—such as the June Second Movement in Berlin—have a demonstrated capability for assassination, kidnaping, and other violence. This obviously involves assistance from supporters, some of whom may be strategically placed. Can these supporters be found without screening and surveillance?

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of the rising terrorist threat, what do you think are the chances of a reaction or right backlash?

Mr. McCLURE. A fierce backlash to leftist terrorism has developed in a number of countries, particularly in Latin America, and some of these movements have assumed the character of a rightist counterterrorism. The most notable example today is Argentina, where the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA) is matching the violence of the leftist Montoneros and the Marxist People's Revolutionary Army (ERP).

Since terrorist organizations are clandestine, and it is difficult to identify their actual members, a counterterrorist movement often seeks to root out all possible visible support for the enemy. The result in Argentina is that anyone who might be conceived to be leftist is in danger. Many prominent persons—politicians, artists, professional people and other community leaders—have been put on the AAA execution list and have fled the country. Others suspected of leftist sympathies have been killed. The three terrorist movements have killed more than 500 persons in the past year.

Most countries are very sensitive to the right backlash danger, and the left extremists naturally encourage these fears. Marxists conceive of any opposition as bourgeois-fascist, and therefore rightist. But in the leading industrial democracies now troubled by Marxist-oriented terrorism, there is practically no evidence of right backlash.

In West Germany, for example, leftist terrorism has been an increasing concern for several years, and there has been a rising tide of public demand for effective countermeasures. But this has not been accompanied by a growth on the extreme right; indeed, right wing organizations have generally lost strength while the left wing has gained.

Last year, for example, total membership of leftist organizations was 126,200, according to official figures. This compares with 88,550 in 1971, for a 43-percent gain in 4 years. The Maoists alone, although small in number, have nevertheless multiplied 6½ times between 1971 and 1974.

In the same period all rightist organizations, including political parties, declined in strength by about 18 percent—from 31,000 to 25,600.

It is important to emphasize, of course, that when these figures are measured against the 63 million population of the Federal Republic of Germany, extremist groups of all kinds account for less than one-quarter of 1 percent of the total.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, can you tell us the source of those statistics?

Mr. McCURE. This is from a report by the Ministry for the Interior. It's called the *Verfassungsschutzbericht*, or a report on measures for the protection of the constitution.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the breakdown of the figures I have just cited may be of general interest and, if so, I would like to offer them for the record.

Senator THURMOND. They will be received in the record.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Type of organization	End of 1971		End of 1972		End of 1973		End of 1974	
	Number of organizations	Members	Number of organizations	Members	Number of organizations	Members	Number of organizations	Members
Membership in rightist organizations:								
Parties.....	4	18,000	3	14,700	3	12,200	2	11,600
Youth organizations.....	9	2,200	9	1,800	8	2,000	10	2,200
Groups of the "New Right".....	12	400	15	1,000	10	900	14	800
Other organizations.....	42	10,300	49	11,000	41	10,600	55	10,800
Publishers and book services.....	56	200	53	200	45	200	38	200
Total.....	123	31,900	129	28,700	107	25,900	119	25,400
Membership in leftist organizations:								
Orthodox Communist and pro-Communist.....	130	83,000	115	88,500	110	98,000	113	117,000
Maoist.....	35	2,000	90	6,300	61	12,000	65	13,000
Trotskyist.....	7	700	10	1,000	10	1,000	10	1,200
Anarchist.....	10	250	15	300	32	500	24	500
Other organizations of the "New Left".....	210	2,600	135	7,000	104	5,000	90	4,500
Total.....	392	88,550	365	103,100	317	116,500	302	126,200

Source: FRG Ministry of Interior: *Bericht Verfassungsschutz*, 1973 and 1974.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is an official government body in West Germany?

Mr. McCLURE. Yes. I believe the figures tell us something about the nature of the opposition to terrorism in Germany. There has been a strong reaction to political violence, and in fact this has led to a change in the laws. But obviously, the opposition has not come from the right, because the rightists have diminished in strength.

Mr. SOURWINE. With due deference to the official source of those figures, how does anybody know? Forgive me, but perhaps the largest organization of rightists in any country is what you might call the common man, or the grassroots citizen. How does anybody know how many of that group are right, and how many of that group are left?

Mr. McCLURE. This may be true. But I think that, in practical terms, political action comes from groups, and it is important to know how many people belong to organizations that act in concert. What has happened here is that the organizations on the extreme left have increased their strength, and one sees a parallel—it may be related or maybe not—but a parallel development in leftist violence. At the same time, there is no rightist counter-violence on an organized basis. This is almost completely absent.

And this pattern, incidentally, is repeated—although I don't have as detailed figures for those countries—in Japan and in Great Britain.

In Japan there are activist rightists who occasionally attract international attention by assaulting an official, and everyone recalls the dramatic suicide of Yukio Mishima, the novelist, after his miniscule rightist army failed to take over a military command. But the violent left element has not prompted a national rightist reaction in Japan.

In Britain the leftist activists who mainly demonstrate—they are not terrorists—are confronted by a much weaker rightist youth organization, the National Front. The Angry Brigade—somewhat like the Weather Underground—has faded from sight, at least for the time being. The principal terrorist threat is from the IRA and from international terrorists identified with the Palestine guerrilla movement.

The opposition to the terrorist threat has no demonstrable rightist complection. A right-wing British organization linked with the World Anti-Communist League avoids physical activism and is declining in strength. Two other organizations—one headed by retired Gen. Sir Walter Walker and the other by a wartime RAF hero, David Stirling—were formed to operate essential national services in the event of another general strike, such as that which tied up Britain in 1926. But despite some expressions of concern that these may prove to be right-wing militant groups, they have so far shown no inclination to act militantly or to move against the terrorists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the pattern is similar in the United States of America?

Mr. McCLURE. I think it is; yes. I don't know of any concerted rightist group activity of any significance aimed at leftists in this country today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it true that any form of repression of a violent or terrorist group is regarded by that group and its supporters as fascism, totalitarianism, extreme rightist activity? This even includes police activity. Efforts to enforce the law, to keep public order, simply

lead in the classification by the terrorists themselves of police as Fascist dogs.

Mr. McCLURE. Yes; of course. And there's a relationship between repression and the vitality of terrorist groups. Sometimes counter-measures, even relatively mild ones, attract a lot of sympathy to the so-called underdog. It's a paradox, because we really are talking here about people who are killing others and destroying property. And yet, psychologically, there's a tendency for many people in any society—people not at all inclined toward violence themselves, or who even support violence—to come to the defense of an activist group that they feel somehow is being abused. However, I think in the event—in actual practice—there has been an amazing restraint in democratic countries on the whole in applying countermeasures. For instance, the legal measures taken in Germany and in Britain, both under extreme provocation, have been very carefully tailored and trimmed to minimize the loss of civil rights to the population as a whole, and to prevent these stricter laws from burdening the ordinary lawabiding citizen.

This, in fact, is a principle which Herbert Marcuse called "repressive tolerance," whereby the "Establishment" goes along, at least to an extent, with radical actions and thus blunts them. Marcuse used this term to apply to student activists who are mollified and, in effect, psychologically disarmed by being denied the kind of brutal oppression that they're trying to achieve.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider Professor Marcuse an authority with respect to terrorist activities and leftist groups?

Mr. McCLURE. Certainly. I don't know about terrorist activity, as such, but certainly as a philosopher of the left, he has a sizable following.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, but you wouldn't call him a dispassionate, disinterested observer and expert, would you?

Mr. McCLURE. No. He is a polemicist, of course. He is advocating—

Mr. SOURWINE. Anything he tells us is liable to be intended to help the cause of the far left, isn't it?

Mr. McCLURE. Yes; but I think it's revealing that he would perceive such a thing as repressive tolerance, because he and others like him see repression as the key to developing revolution. In other words, the authorities resort to repression; the repression then is directed against the population as a whole; and the population, which had been largely apathetic, then comes to support, or perhaps joins, the terrorist group. This is the process the revolutionaries want to set in motion. They want martyrs, and they want repression. What they have gotten is less than what they want and I believe this has frustrated them.

Now, the whole trick really is getting the proper balance between effective countermeasures which can reduce and, hopefully, ultimately eliminate terrorism, without repression that affects the general population.

Mr. SOURWINE. It's always seemed to me that any philosophy that operated to reduce the most effective possible suppression of crime had something wrong with it. I make no criticism of what you said.

Let me ask this question. Perhaps it's a little involved. You have told us a great deal here about how a man in a hostage situation can defend himself against what's being done to him, in general. You

have told us a great deal, in particular areas, about how to stand the most they can do to us and get through it, but that kind of philosophy has to come to an end somewhere. Would you think, if a gang came into being which made a practice of waylaying citizens and poking their eyes out with dull sticks, it would be a proper way to counter it to have everybody learn braille and set a white cane behind the door and try to increase their ESP?

Mr. McCLURE. No, indeed. I think society has to find a means to preserve itself. Certainly, a democratic society has every justification for doing this, because there are many outlets for dissent. There are legal ways of expressing opposition. Therefore any extent, to my mind, to which measures are necessary to preserve the common order and the safety of the citizenry are justified. It's a matter, however, of what weapons to choose, and how effective they're going to be.

And I think there has been an increased sophistication, particularly in the democratic countries, in coping with terrorism, despite the fact that terrorism is still a serious and perhaps growing problem. Britain, with great reluctance, has just instituted new laws, in order to curb the terrorists operating in the United Kingdom. Germany has done the same. They may have to do even more. We may be obliged to do more.

However, in making these decisions as to what to do, great care has to be taken that in the first place, the measures are going to be effective, and in the second place, that they are not too costly for what they accomplish; that they do not cause excessive distress to the population as a whole.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you spoke of the Attorney General, I think you criticized—correct me if I'm wrong—public reaction toward crime, or public tolerance for crime, but isn't it true that in this country, we are taught that you do not take law enforcement into your own hands, that you leave that to the police and the courts? Are you saying, or do you think the Attorney General is saying that the people are at fault because the police and the courts are not curbing crime, because over 30 percent of people who commit homicides are paroled, or get probation, because present terms are shorter, release comes sooner, punishment is less, and so on? Do you think this is the fault of the people, or that the Attorney General does?

Mr. McCLURE. No. Judging from other circumstances in law enforcement here, I think what the Attorney General is talking about is people coming forward with information when they observe an illegal act, willingly appearing as witnesses in court—a type of a general response or opposition to crime, a rejection of it rather than merely accepting it as an inevitable necessity. In other words, I think he would like to see social pressure. He would like to see, first, I believe, individual citizens acting responsibly toward the law enforcement authorities in their attempt to control crime. Then, in the mass, he would like people to become more concerned about crime and determined that the country should do more about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, isn't it perfectly obvious that the police of this country generally—and I'm not talking about any particular police department—are being constantly rendered more ineffective and less able to do their job by a combination of public opinion, propaganda and official help which deprives them of security units, deprives them

of investigation units, makes it impossible to operate under cover, forbids them to keep necessary files, and so forth?

Mr. McCLURE. That may well be so, and as a matter of fact, one of the most serious problems in connection with terrorism is inadequate police intelligence capability.

Britain found, after the Birmingham bombings last year, that it was less able to cope with the IRA in one of its leading cities than in Northern Ireland, where the IRA has sizeable popular support. This was because of the difference in intelligence capability in the two places. In his last annual report, Sir Robert Mark, chief of Scotland Yard, made special mention of the need for good police intelligence.

In Germany, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his security message to the Bundestag last March emphasized that police sweeps, surveillance, infiltration of terrorist organizations and other intelligence-type activities by police are essential countermeasures.

The techniques of police intelligence—penetration of suspicious groups, dossier-keeping, cultivation of informers, undercover activities in general—disturb the average citizen. These are seen as underhanded methods, and there is frequently concern—sometimes justified by events—that they will be misused. The whole aura of "secret police" is disagreeable.

Yet the problem of terrorism is essentially one of counterintelligence—of frustrating and neutralizing plans and breaking up secret conspiracies by small groups of people seeking to destroy the state. The penalty of failure is death to innocent people, destruction of property and intimidation of the public in a continuous upward spiral. Furthermore, there is a long lead-time in police intelligence before it can work effectively. Waiting until the terrorists are fully organized and trained before taking counter-intelligence measures means sometimes years of suffering before there is any chance of bringing them under control.

Looking at the situation in the United States, there has been a tendency in recent years to clean up old police intelligence files and criminal files—to eliminate vast numbers of them. In New York early this year, the Puerto Rican Liberation Army (FALN) blew up the Fraunces Tavern, killing four people and wounding more than 50. The police were unable to get any kind of a lead on this group, because 2 years earlier they had destroyed the entire file on Puerto Rican suspects.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, one of the great police departments of the United States had to come to this committee recently to get information that had been purged from its own files, which was needed for criminal investigation and development of prosecution. This is being multiplied all over the country.

Mr. McCLURE. There was also the example, more recently, in Chicago, of bombings on the Loop by the FALN. It was then learned that the Chicago police had planned to penetrate the group 2 months earlier but took the men off the job at the last minute because they were afraid of possible public criticism.

Mr. SOURWINE. In police department after police department, across this country, you find a situation has been brought about in which it is impossible to operate an undercover man. This is due, in large part, to the sophisticated use of existing rules and regulations. Our policemen have to come through civil service. Any man who becomes

an applicant for police service, is known, and becomes potentially a suspect of the terrorists as a possible police undercover operator.

The terrorists in some areas expose the names of everybody who goes to work for the police, publicize their telephone listings, gives their description, prints pictures of them. It's impossible to operate. We've had testimony on this.

What can be devised? What can be done? If we have no police, have we got to go back to the old system of posses?

Mr. McCLURE. The story in Great Britain and Germany is that it took extreme acts of terrorism and loss of lives before they could make necessary legal changes in order to cope with this problem. But in both cases the strengthening of police intelligence was a basic requirement to meet the threat.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions in this area, which is perhaps a divergence. Forgive the interruption, Mr. Tarabochia, go ahead.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. I do not mind the interruption. It was most interesting to hear both the questions and the remarks.

Returning to the transnational terrorism that I had mentioned before and to your mention of the photographs you had regarding Tupamaros organization, would you be kind enough to supply us with the pertinent information?

Mr. McCLURE. Yes. We have here a set of diagrams that shows how the Tupamaros—known more formally as the National Liberation Movement or MLN (*Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional*)—were organized. I will not go into them in detail. I am indebted for all this material to Peter Ellena, a former public-safety specialist with the Agency for International Development. He has debriefed some of the hostages taken by the Tupamaros and is especially knowledgeable on this organization, as well as on security problems in Latin America generally. He prepared these diagrams.

Briefly, there was a national directorate heading the Tupamaros, consisting of "legals"—persons not even suspected by the police of being terrorists. Therefore, these people operated quite openly in the society. They in turn had the assistance of specialists in various fields. These were also people with normal daytime jobs—politicians, priests, and military intelligence specialists and people involved in foreign affairs.

I would like to offer these for the record, Mr. Chairman.


Senator THURMOND. They will be received in the record.

[The material referred to follows:]



ORGANIZATION OF TUPAMAROS I.—Diagram shows top-command structure. The National Direction—consisting of “legals,” or persons the authorities do not suspect of being Tupamaros—made basic decisions. These were then passed on to a two- or three-man Secretariat which coordinated implementation. Execution of the plans was directed by a clandestine Executive Committee which drew upon the advice and assistance of Tupamaro supporters in political life, the church, the military, intelligence and international relations.

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (TUPAMAROS)



COMITE EJECUTIVO (Executive Committee)

Organizes and plans strategy for Column Commands and appoints Column Commanders.


COMANDO DE COLUMNA (Column Command)

Each Column is divided into three sections (1) Military, which in turn is sub divided into Army, Navy, and Air Force branches; (2) Political, which is sub divided into the Students sub Command, the Labor sub Command; and (3) the Service Command, which is sub divided into stores, counterfeiting, propaganda, sanitary section, explosives and telecommunications.


8 NOV 71

ORGANIZATION OF TUPAMAROS II.—The Executive Committee used liaison officers to reach various Column Commands, each of which had military, political and service elements.

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (TUPAMAROS)




ORGANIZATION OF THE TUPAMAROS III.—One of the three operational elements of the Column Command was the Service Command. It had sub-units for repair and maintenance, counterfeiting, propaganda, medical services, explosives and telecommunications. Each element, in turn had operating cells with no lateral communication.



ORGANIZATION OF THE TUPAMAROS IV.—The Column Political Command was divided into three sections dealing with students, labor and wards. Each of these sections was divided into units serving specific targets, and these operated through compartmentalized cells of usually three to five members each.


NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (TUPAMAROS)




COLUMN MILITARY COMMAND

The column military commander appoints the sub-commanders, the sub-commander appoints the cell coordinator and he in turn appoints the cell leader and designates the various cells under his direction.

ORGANIZATION OF THE TUPAMAROS V.—The Column Military Command had Army, Navy and Air Force Sub-Commands, each operating through a “cell coordinator” to the individual tactical units.




Small business in the middle of Montevideo is a cover for a Tupamaro prison, situated in the basement.




Entrance to a Tupamaro "people's" prison, concealed under the floor of a bathroom in a Montevideo home




Sign reads: "People's prison cell No. 17, Carlos Frick Davie," indicating the last occupant before the basement facility was found by police.




Wire mesh forms a wall for a series of Tupamaro cells.



Cramped quarters of a Tupamaro cell discovered in the basement of a Montevideo house. Most such cells measured 6' \times 9'.



Underground concrete Tupamaro hideout on the outskirts of Montevideo.



Tupamaro paraphernalia includes two kinds of masks and handcuffs. The "butterfly" wire handcuffs below cut the wearer if he struggled. The others are made of plastic.





Diagram prepared by the designers of a rifle grenade-launcher, which was then hand-made by the Tupamaros.




Sacks of valuables taken in bank robberies, stacked in one corner of a "people's prison."




A cot in a Tupamaro cell in the basement of a home in Montevideo. Travel brochures and other reading matter—presumably used by the prisoners—were found scattered about the room.



TUPARAMO HOSPITAL I.—This small chemical-distribution company in the heart of Montevideo served as a front for an elaborately equipped underground Tuparamo hospital. The terrorists had an extensive staff of surgeons and specialists who normally worked in city hospitals.



TUPAMARO HOSPITAL II.—Equipment in the underground Tupamaro hospital permitted a complete range of surgery. The guerrillas had seized three complete Uruguayan Army field hospital units to equip this and other medical facilities.




TUPAMARO HOSPITAL III.—Stacks of drugs and other medical supplies, stolen from the Uruguayan Army, stand in one corner of the basement hospital.




TUPAMARO HOSPITAL IV.—Oxygen and various supplies used in the surgical facility.



TUPAMARO HOSPITAL V.—Some of the bandages and implements used in the operating room.



TUPAMARO HOSPITAL VI.—More supplies and equipment in the surgery.



TUPAMARO HOSPITAL VII.—Hospital bunks stand next to a pile of medical supplies.

Mr. McCLURE. In the operational conduct of affairs there was an executive committee which had liaison with individual column commands, as seen in the second diagram. A column command was a completely self-contained unit in the Tupamaro organization which might have had regional or countrywide responsibilities. In each case the column command had military, political, and service organizations. These in turn broke down into functions and activities that are necessary for running a sophisticated operation.

The cell was, of course, the ultimate activity unit. Cells are arranged in such a way that they have no lateral communication with one another, as a security precaution.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are your pictures numbered or charts numbered? If you think of it, refer to them by numbers sufficiently so that the record will show which ones you are talking about.

Mr. McCLURE. I shall. On diagram No. 3, we see an example of a column service command. The service command included stores and repair facilities, counterfeiting propaganda, medical services, explosives, and telecommunications. Each of the separate activities had its own cells and the cells were designed in such a way that if any one of them was destroyed, the rest of the organization was not affected. There was normally only one person in a cell who knew the next person in the command structure above him. This compartmentalized the organization.

Chart No. 4 shows how the political command worked. This element was divided into three major subdivisions; the subcommand that dealt with students ranging from high school up through university; the labor subcommand which was divided by industry, public employees and employees in general; and finally the ward subcommand with zonal responsibilities.

Chart No. 5 shows how the military command functioned. There was a subdivision for each of the main military elements—army, navy, and air force. And under each of these was the cell structure that operated in the field.

This very briefly is the picture of how the Tupamaros organized themselves. Many of the former Uruguayan terrorists are now believed to have crossed the River Plate to operate with one of the two left-wing Argentine organizations, the Montoneros and the ERP. From the nature of the operations of those organizations, the Tupamaro organizational and operational model appears still very much in use.

It would seem in retrospect, now that the Tupamaro organization as we see it here has virtually been destroyed, the optimum strength was about 500 operatives—not counting sympathizers who provided incidental or occasional support. They started terrorist activities in late 1966 with about 50 members and had perhaps 3,000 in September 1971, when the President of Uruguay invoked martial law and the army took over the function of antiterrorism from the police.

The Tupamaros at first thought they could cope with the army as they had with the police, which they had effectively infiltrated. They soon discovered differently. The army had relatively good defensive security and developed effective counterintelligence. By spring of 1972, 1,500 Tupamaros were in prison.

The Tupamaros suffered the fatal disease of the successful terrorist organization: It had become too large. Discipline, control, and security were increasingly difficult to maintain, and fringe elements which had joined the organization—lacking the same dedication and determination of the earlier elite—made penetration by the Government easier. Meantime, a followup security law was enacted by the Uruguayan Congress in April 1972 creating a state of internal war. This cut off many of the Tupamaro channels to friendly political and professional contacts in Uruguayan society. Isolated and exposed, the organization was no match for police-military antiterrorist operations.

In a second set of photographs I have here, we see examples of the physical conditions in which hostages of the Tupamaros had to live. Also, we have some pictures of the "fronts" or cover of normal businesses behind which the terrorists operated. An ordinary building in Montevideo that would not be noticed could be a cover for a Tupamaro prison or other facility. Particularly note the cells themselves; they are extremely small and generally very uncomfortable.

We have still another set of photographs showing a Tupamaro underground hospital. This was operated under the cover of a chemical distribution company. The first picture of this series shows a quite normal business from the outside. In the cellar, though, the Tupamaros were able to build a hospital which could handle any kind of surgical case. They had raided three army field hospitals to get the equipment and supplies for this installation and it was operated up until the final raids which crippled the organization.

Finally I have a picture here of Dan Mitrione after he was assassinated by the Tupamaros, bound and blindfolded.

[The photograph of Mr. Mitrione is in the files of the subcommittee.]

May I go off the record for just a minute?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. McCCLURE. Now, I think I might just say one more thing about the Tupamaros. The general assumption is that terrorism arises because of oppression or repression. The rise of the Tupamaros is only one example of how this is not necessarily so. It shows rather how a terrorist organization can come to exist when a very enlightened, liberal society falls onto hard times.

Before World War I, Uruguay had become a model democracy in what we would consider the current liberal mode. It had the 8-hour day, unemployment benefits, minimum wage, old age pensions; it abolished capital punishment; it nationalized certain utilities and insurance companies. Uruguay was known as the Switzerland of Latin America, and after World War II it was considered perhaps the strongest democracy in Latin America.

But then, in the sixties, a whole series of problems developed. Three hundred thousand people in the work force—25 percent of the total labor force—were working for the Government. Beef exports and prices dropped, almost eliminating a major source of income. Wool, another big export, suffered a similar fate. In 1967 the inflation grew 135 percent and the peso was devalued seven times. It was against this background of severe economic difficulty, and the inability of the country to maintain its social services on the scale it had enjoyed for five decades, that the Tupamaros developed. Their first communique was in 1965, protesting the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. At that time they had about 50 members. By August of 1970 they had about 3,000 members. Their first kidnaping was in August 1968. This launched them on a career which was to plague the country for years.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Would you care to elaborate on the Baader-Meinhof gang?

Mr. McCCLURE. The Baader-Meinhof gang is the most active terrorist organization in Germany, and the most visible. Actually it is only one of several such violent splinter groups which cause periodic incidents. The June Second Movement in Berlin, which surfaced early this year to kidnap Peter Lorenz, is one of these.

All the terror organizations seem to have a common origin in the student-protest movement of the early 1960's under the *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund*, or German Socialist Student Association. The hardcore activists broke off, many of them joining an organization known as the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition—*Ausserparlamentarische Opposition*—headed by the student radical, Rudi Dutschke.

The Baader-Meinhof gang—named for Andreas Baader, 33, and Ulrike Meinhof, 41—gained prominence beginning late in 1967 with a series of bombing and arson attacks on department stores and government installations, including an American military headquarters. In 1970, three of the now-arrested leaders—Baader, Meinhof, and Gudrun Ensslin, 35—and other members trained in guerrilla camps in Jordan and Syria.

About 3 years ago the heart of the organization, some 60 persons, were imprisoned and it appeared that it was broken. But starting in January 1974 it began reorganizing and took the name of the Red Army Faction—Reconstruction Organization—*RAF/Aufbauorganisation*. A new series of outrages occurred. Meantime, the imprisoned terrorists began a hunger strike which resulted in the death of one of them, Holger Meins. It was the death of Meins which was used as a pretext for the murder of Justice von Drenkmann in Berlin.

It is interesting to note that the origins of the Baader-Meinhof gang follow the same pattern as those of the Japanese Red Army and the American Weather Underground. In Japan, the ultraextremists got their start in the Zengakuren, the left-dominated student confederation, which conducted increasingly violent political demonstrations in the 1960's. The training ground for American terrorists seems to be chiefly the Students for a Democratic Society, out of which violent-radical movements were distilled.

Four persons are being tried in Stuttgart: Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe. They have apparently been able to operate in prison, however, by virtue of the help of their lawyers. Some of their lawyers have acted quite obviously as couriers, and perhaps as planners and executors of the cause. The result is that, although the leadership of the Baader-Meinhof gang has been imprisoned, the terrorists, themselves, have operated with increasing ferocity.

There has been a progression of incidents, which demonstrate the difficulty in trying to appease terrorists.

In March of this year, Peter Lorenz was seized in Berlin. He was the candidate for mayor of the Christian Democratic Union, while the government of Berlin was controlled by the SPD, or Social Democratic Party. This posed an extremely awkward situation, particularly because the election campaign was in progress. A decision was made to yield to the terrorists and permit five imprisoned terrorists to be released with a ransom and flown out of the country. This won the freedom of Peter Lorenz, but it was recognized at the time that this probably would set the pattern for future operations.

The next incident followed quickly, at the German Embassy in Stockholm. The demand this time was the release of 26 Baader-Meinhof prisoners, including the leaders now being tried. The Government felt it could not make this concession, and the result was that two of the Embassy staff were killed, but the perpetrators were all caught.

The eternal problem, of course, is how much can one yield to terrorists and still manage. The limit had been exceeded in this case.

We might be able to develop a kind of a profile of the ideological terrorist. These are intelligent, fairly well educated, affluent young people, very often attractive and conventional-looking people. They have a good deal of sympathy from the public at large, at least before they start causing serious trouble, and they gradually develop from a small base into a viable organization, improving their capabilities with each new experience. This is why toleration of terrorist acts in the early stages is very dangerous. Suddenly the terrorist organization can emerge almost full blown as a major threat to the security of the country.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. You mentioned the use of lawyers in Germany with regard to communications between the prisoners and other members of the gangs at large. Are you aware that in Heidelberg, just a few months ago, the police raided the offices of some attorneys that were involved with the Baader-Meinhof gang?

Mr. McCLURE. Yes; and they imprisoned one of them.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Were you also aware that these offices were shared by some American lawyers?

Mr. McCLURE. No; I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Well, there is evidence along those lines, so the international connections affecting the United States are always there.

Mr. McCLURE. I have been told that William Kunstler had applied to become a counsel for the Baader-Meinhof leaders—which seems improbable, since the whole code of German law is different from ours—but that this proposal was turned down. This is not official, but I think it comes from a fairly good source.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if Mr. Kunstler speaks German?

Mr. McCLURE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about his schooling or knowledge of German law?

Mr. McCLURE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how he contacted the leaders of the gang in Germany to make his bid to become their counsel for the group?

Mr. McCLURE. From the information I have, there is no indication of how he did it or whether he was invited by the Baader-Meinhof defendants. He may have done this simply on his own. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, what is the source of the information that he did it at all? This was not an official publication?

Mr. McCLURE. No; it has not been published. This was a conversation with a person I consider reliable.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. The Japanese Red Army, which you mentioned awhile ago, what is its structure and the degree of fractionalism prevalent within it?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. McCLURE. The Japanese Red Army—Nihon Sekigun—which today is operating internationally, appears to be made up of a number of fanatical individuals who have gravitated to it as defectors from other Japanese extreme-left terrorist groups. Beyond subscribing to "world revolution" through the violent overthrow of existing governments everywhere, the JRA's ideology is difficult to define. It appears in fact to be nihilistic-anarchist, with no plan to provide a substitute form of rule for present governments. It is Marxist in origin and tenor, though not in direct political orientation; and it generally rejects all organized Communist sects: Soviet, Chinese, Neo-Maoist and Trotskyite. It in turn has been rejected by most extreme-leftist organizations in Japan.

The probable birth of the Japanese Red Army may well be traced to February 1971 when Fusako Shigenobu, a former Meiji University student and daughter of a Tokyo insurance executive, flew to Beirut from Japan to make contact with Palestine guerrillas. Miss Shigenobu, who was then 26 years old, had been a member of the central committee of the Red Army Faction (RAF), but she was soon cut off from this organization when its leadership changed. She thereupon formed the Arab Committee of the RAF, which was independent of the RAF in Japan. It appears she was then joined by about 30 other extreme-left dissident activists from Japan—probably financed by the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine—and the JRA came into being. Miss Shigenobu is known to conduct the Mideast operations of the JRA and is probably still the organization's overall leader.

The Japanese Red Army launched its international terror campaign on May 30, 1972, when three of its members attacked Lod Airport in Israel with submachineguns and handgrenades, killing 26 persons and wounding more than 70. Two assailants were killed, including Fusaku Okudaira, believed to be the husband of Fusako Shigenobu. The third, Kozo Okamoto, was taken alive and has provided some insight into the nature of the Red Army organizations and the mentality of its members.

The JRA is one of the legacies of the protest movements of the early sixties conducted by the leftist-dominated Japanese Student Confederation (Zengakuren). The more extreme student activists formed militant revolutionary groups, one of which became known as the United Red Army—Rengo Sekigun—in 1969. This group soon fragmented under police pressure and through political dissention into half a dozen feuding organizations with “Red Army” in their name. At least 17 young people have died and hundreds have been injured in the bitter fighting among these splinter groups.

The extraordinary brutality of this continual struggle was widely publicized in February 1972 when police laid siege to a United Red Army mountain hideout in Karuizawa, about 80 miles from Tokyo. When resistance ended, the mangled and tortured bodies of 14 members of the group were discovered. These persons—accounting for nearly half the 31 then-known members of the organization—had been “executed” by their comrades for having “bourgeois tendencies” and “antirevolutionary failings.”

The current Japanese Red Army, operating as what Brian Crozier calls “ideological mercenaries” around the world, probably has drawn many of its members from the other “Red Army” groups in Japan. In general, it can be said that the JRA has provided the fanatical zeal in working for other terrorist organizations—chiefly the extremist PFLP—which have provided funds, organization and training—and designated targets—for the JRA missions.

The menace of the Japanese Red Army lies not merely in its fanaticism but in its training, financial backing and technical support. JRA terrorists have been able to travel with little difficulty on forged documents and have been provided safehouses in a number of countries. One JRA agent, 26-year-old Yutaka Furuya, was seized by the French police with \$10,000 in counterfeit U.S. \$100 bills, together with several sets of identity papers and elaborate plans for attacking Japanese diplomats and businessmen.

Planning is painstaking and thorough. Swedish police arrested two JRA operators in Stockholm last March after they had photographed everyone entering and leaving a building housing six foreign missions. More than 300 photographs, diagrams and background notes were later found. This obviously was preparation for an eventual attack. The Lebanese Embassy was reported to be a prime target.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. What is the extent of terrorist or revolutionary groups within Japan itself?

Mr. McCLURE. In Japan, the ultraradical left groups have roughly 40,000 total members. Of these, about 27,400 are activists. The mobilization strength of these activists is estimated to be around 60,000. These are revolutionary student groups only; most organizations in Japan are student centered. We're talking about 1.5 percent of the

entire student body as activists, as left-radical activists, and about 3.8 percent of potential mobilization strength for demonstrations or other harassment action of that sort.

At the moment, there are about 27 left-radical groups. This number changes constantly because these groups are born, multiply, combined, and disappear by turns; it's difficult to keep track of them. Most of these are very small, although they can be quite potent when they start bombing.

There are three main elements in the radical left. One is under the Japanese Communist Party influence. Another is under the influence of the Japanese Socialist Party. And the third are ultraradical leftists, opposed to the first two groups—Trotskyites, anarchists, or Maoists. In the midst of all this, a nonsectarian political group called the Black Helmets has developed and grown. It is violent, having gone the route from demonstrations to explosions by degree. It has gained from the "masses line" of some of the other parties—the "masses line" being that armed struggle should be abandoned in the interest of temporary political maneuvering for ultimate revolution. Some activists are not content to relinquish violence for political advantage.

In this picture, there has been no marked growth on the right in the last few years to correspond with the rise of leftist terrorism. Violence from the left has actually subsided somewhat, but there is still a possibility of violence related to new political developments. In the past, there have been major disturbances over such issues as the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, the Vietnamese war, Japan's relations with Korea, and Japan's security treaty with the United States.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Mr. McClure, with regard to open terrorism, as a political weapon, could you elaborate on the subject of its appeal, strength, weaknesses, and so forth?

Mr. McCLURE. Urban terrorism reflects weakness. Terrorism is a necessity for revolutionaries who do not have formal strength. They try to exploit certain advantages of surprise, special training, and good intelligence to generate attacks which will serve several purposes. The first, of course, is to advertise their presence and to recruit members. Another is to intimidate both the authorities and the people—to frighten them. A third is to generate repression which will result in the alienation of the public.

Now Soviet-oriented Communists oppose terrorism.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. That is for public consumption, of course.

Mr. McCLURE. Yes; they oppose it for the record. They themselves do not participate, and they counsel against it in public. There is evidence, as I have already mentioned, that the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba have all nevertheless recently supported terrorist operations in one form or another.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Not only that, but they have supported assassination as a weapon of terror; they call it "execution."

Mr. McCLURE. Yes; and in doctrine, they do. In practice they try to avoid direct involvement because they have too much to gain by political maneuvering. Communist parties want legitimization: it is vital to their political image. They have been successful in France, and especially successful in Italy in the recent weeks, as the elections show. They don't want to alienate the public; they want a mass support.

The orthodox Communists also are Leninists, in the sense that they are supremely disciplined. This political discipline is something

that many self-styled Maoists, anarchists, and Trotskyists often do not have. The People's Republic of China, incidentally, follows now the same overt line as the Soviet Union on terrorism abroad, although it does doctrinally support wars of national liberation, as does Moscow.

Terrorists really are centered in the area of the unorthodox extreme—chiefly Trotskyist, Maoist and what might be called Marxist-anarchist for lack of a better definition.

All ideological terrorist organizations have one common aim—to destroy the establishment. They seldom have a plan to rule, and they deliberately avoid saying too much about what they would propose to substitute for the existing system. They generally find it very difficult to compromise, and when they do they tend to fragment in disagreement. They are compulsively antisocial. They are really functional anarchists, in the sense that a lot of their motivation is psychological rather than political. They are finding a way to act out their frustrations and to meet challenges which they otherwise can't cope with.

Terrorism has its own momentum and tends to get out of control. It also serves as an institutional supporting mechanism; that is to say, that terrorism is used to recruit for the organization, advertise its cause, maintain its internal morale through external challenge, and prove its viability—the group must do something to show it's still around.

The negative effects of terrorism from the standpoint of the terrorist himself is first that terrorism can alienate the people. As the political targets are hardened, a tendency of terrorists is to turn to soft targets, which usually means killing innocent people. This is, in the long run, self-defeating.

Another problem for the terrorist is he may not provoke the kind of repression that serves his purpose. When he cannot do this, he finds himself locked into a vicious circle of futile violence. This has been noted, incidentally, in Britain, Germany, and Japan.

Terrorist leaders may, on the other hand, try to force a hard political line. This means ideological discipline, the sort of thing that has caused many "soldiers" in the organization to reject Soviet Communism; and it tends to create dissention in the organization.

Terrorists often unwittingly generate a hard line of resistance on the part of the society they are trying to subvert. This usually results in the demolition of the organization itself by bringing about public support for the harsh measures that the government finds necessary to use.

There is, of course, the problem of political compromise which causes splits. For instance, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which is a nationalist-oriented guerrilla organization, has had difficulty with the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) which rejects any compromise with Israel. So, as soon as the main part of the organization has found it expedient to make certain concessions or to reach an accommodation—which they at least have made a step towards doing—the extremists in the organization have broken off.

In Japan, this is constantly in evidence. As soon as the leftist groups show signs of compromise, they lose some of their members to

the more violent groups. The Trotskyites and neo-Marxists are always splitting in all parts of the world.

So, in conclusion, we can say that terrorists are often very unstable people. They might be effective; they might be dedicated and very clever, but they, as social beings, have certain shortcomings. They suffer from a general disaffection from the society. Many are chronic visionaries and compulsive activists. So, in the absence of action or planning, they tend to disintegrate. It is hard to maintain discipline very long in most of these ideological organizations. There is usually a lack of plan to rule. And if there were a plan, it would tend to divide their members, because there are so many different views of what should be done. It is easier to take the offensive instead. But this tendency to kill and destroy diminishes the positive appeal of the organization, so it is not likely to gain much favor among the population as a whole.

Terrorists cannot bring about revolution themselves—most of them accept this fact—but they can seriously disrupt a target society in their efforts to take it over. They can generate a great deal of fear, which can have a profound effect in any democracy. We have seen instances in which witnesses are afraid to testify and juries will not convict. This has been true—it is less so now—in Northern Ireland, for instance, because of the intimidating power of terrorists on both sides. And terrorists inevitably bring more restrictions on a society. The more successful they are, the more the society must adjust and apply restraining measures, which affect the freedom of movement of everybody to some extent. The quality of life is reduced.

The Weather Underground is something of an exception to the usual amorphous ideological movement because it seeks to unite the whole left. It does not take a highly parochial political or ideological view. It has a deliberate pace of violence. It shows a certain amount of discipline. It possibly has an orthodox Communist goal, and it may be influenced particularly by the Cubans, because some of the Weather Underground leaders—Bernardine Rae Dohrn among them—have been in Cuba with the Venceremos Brigade.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. The Weatherman leadership has had very close contact with the Cubans. In July of 1969 most of the leaders visited Cuba for the purpose of meeting with a delegation of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Bernardine Dohrn was with this group. Both the Cubans and the Vietnamese Communists saw in them enough commitment to consider them as the "vanguard", to use their term, in the United States. Bernardine Dohrn was not a member of the Venceremos Brigade, although she was instrumental, with other Weatherman leaders, in the formation of the Brigades.

With both the Weatherman groups and the members of the eight Venceremos Brigades, the Cubans, aware of the fractionalism which was rife among the American New Left, went to great lengths to stress unity of both thought and action. They emphasized this both in the field of manual labor and that of revolutionary activity. To what degree they succeeded in inculcating their ideological beliefs into the minds of the Americans, is debatable. One thing is certain though, the Weatherman groups who visited Cuba between July and September 1969 received enough inspiration to "bring the war home" as was demonstrated by the "days of rage" on October 9-11 when they terrorized Chicago and wrecked the Loop.

Mr. McCLURE. To look at a few of our other organizations, the FALN, the Puerto Rican National Liberation Army, has a nationalist objective. It also probably has a Cuban connection. Some of its manuals in Spanish appear to have been prepared in Cuba. It also demonstrates an endurance, of course, which shows a lot of organization and planning.

Other terrorist groups tend to follow the classic pattern that I previously described, however—the SLA, for instance, the Black Liberation Army, the Death Angels in San Francisco; there are many of them. These have no apparent political plan or concrete goal.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Before I conclude my questions, and going back to your initial statement about the defense measures of hostages, do you have any suggestions as to how a VIP or personality in the political/economic/educational fields should conduct himself when traveling abroad?

Mr. McCLURE. I think there are a few simple rules that would help a good deal in protecting him, protecting a prominent person traveling in a terror-prone area. One, I think, is to move, particularly at night, in groups of four or five persons. Normally, this poses a very difficult problem for would-be kidnapers. Grabbing one person or even two may be feasible, but if it is a group, they may well hesitate to try. Certainly, never go out alone. It is advisable, when someone goes to a restaurant, to have the restaurant call a taxi when he is leaving so he does not have to roam around looking for a cab. Again, it is advisable to always have somebody along; two or three people would even be better.

If one observes a disturbance on the street or anything unusual, it is advisable not to investigate it, but to leave. Sometimes this is a trap or a diversion. Terrorists sometimes will create a diversion in one place, a block away, to attract attention, and then seize the victim while nobody is watching.

Also beware when people stop on the street to engage in conversation. This may be an attempt to immobilize the victim temporarily and set him up for seizure.

If these rules are followed, kidnaping will certainly be more difficult.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Mr. McClure, in response to your statements regarding terrorism, it comes to mind that Morris West, the prominent British author of "The Shoes of the Fisherman" in his recent book, the "Salamander," gave an excellent definition of terror. He said that "as a weapon it is most irresistible; it infuses fear and doubt; it destroys confidence in democratic procedures; it immobilizes police agencies; it polarizes factions: the young against the old, the have-nots against the haves, the ignorant against the knowing, the idealist against the pragmatist. As a social infection, it is more deadly than the plague: it justifies the vilest of remedies, the suspension of human rights: preventive arrest, cruel and unusual punishment, subornation, torture, and legal murder. The most moral men, the sanest of governments, is not immune from the infection. Violence begets violence. Black-mailers are paid from the public treasury. Reprisals fall heavily on the innocent, as on the guilty."

Mr. McCLURE. I think that is an accurate description of the terrorist phenomenon. I think we are going to have it around for a while.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Tarabochia, are you quoting that as a statement of authority or only as a felicitous expression of what you consider to be the facts?

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Coming from a book written as fiction, it was prophetic. I consider it relevant as a definition of terror and as a constant reminder of what terrorism could do to a free society such as ours.

Mr. SOURWINE. Excuse the intrusion.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. I have no more questions.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, either.

Senator THURMOND. The committee will recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:52 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or organization in this index.)

	A	Page
Africa.....		271
Agency for International Development (AID).....		294
Angola.....		271
Angry Brigade, The.....		290
Argentina.....		284, 288
Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA).....		288
Armed Forces Journal.....		262
Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (Exsra-Parliamentary Opposition).....		309
Australia.....		262
Austria.....		262
Government.....		271

	B	Page
Baader, Andreas.....		309, 310
Baader-Meinhof gang.....	270, 271, 274, 278, 282, 284, 285, 288,	309-311
Bayo, Alberto.....		269, 270
Beirut.....		311
Berlin.....	284, 287, 288, 309,	310
East.....		271
Birmingham, London.....		286
Bombings.....		293
Black Helmets.....		313
Black Liberation Army.....		316
Bolivia.....		279
Bombing attacks in the United States, 1973-1974 (table).....		285
Brazil.....	270, 277-	279
Government.....		270
British Broadcasting Corp. (BBC).....		274
Burmese Government.....		271

	C	Page
Canada.....		286
Carnot, Sadi.....		284
Castro, Fidel.....		278
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).....		277
Christian Democratic Union.....	284,	310
Chicago.....	293,	315
Chile.....		274
China, People's Republic of (Red China).....	271, 313,	314
"Christian Checklist" (publication).....		266
Colombia.....		279
Communist.....	270, 282, 311,	315
Communist Party.....		271
China.....		271
Central Committee.....		271
Cuba.....		276
Japan.....		313
Communists.....	271,	313
Costa-Gavras.....	274,	276
Crozier, Brian.....		312

II

	Page
Cuba.....	263, 278, 313, 315
Communist Party.....	276
Government.....	263
Cuban diplomats.....	271
Czechoslovakia.....	271

D

Davie, Carlos Frick.....	299
Death Angels.....	316
Decter, Midge.....	283
Denmark.....	262
Department of Defense (DOD).....	262
Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs Directorate of International Security.....	261
Department of Political and Social Order (DOPS).....	278
Der Spiegel (magazine).....	273
Dohrn, Bernardine Rae.....	275, 282, 315
Dolgun, Alexander.....	266
"Dolgun Story, The" (book).....	266
Dutschke, Rudi.....	309

E

Egypt.....	262
Ellena, Peter.....	294
England.....	274, 279, 286
Ensslin, Gudrun.....	309, 310
Eritrean Liberation Front.....	268
Ethiopia.....	262
Europe, Western.....	266

F

Fanon, Franz.....	272
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).....	275, 280, 285
Fly, Dr. Claude L.....	262, 263-266-268, 277, 278
Foreign Service Journal.....	262
France.....	270, 271, 279, 313
Fraunces Tavern.....	293
Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ).....	286
Furuya, Yutaka.....	312

G

German Embassy, Stockholm.....	284, 287, 310
Germany.....	262, 271, 273, 282, 284, 287, 311, 314
West (Federal Republic of Germany).....	279, 282, 284-286, 288-294
Gomide, Aloisio Dias.....	277
Gossens, Salvador Allende.....	274
Granma (newspaper).....	276, 277
Great Britain.....	274, 279, 285-287, 290-292, 294
Army.....	286
Guevara, Che.....	269, 278
Guildford, England.....	286

H

Hamburg.....	274
Hawthorne Books, Inc.....	263
Hearst case.....	268
Hearst, Patricia (Patty).....	268, 269
Heidelberg.....	310
Hitler.....	284
Hoffman, Abbie.....	274

I

Index of Crime, United States, 1933-73 (table).....	281
India.....	271
Infantry Journal.....	262
International Institute for Strategic Studies.....	271

III

	Page
Ireland	275
Northern	278, 286, 287, 293, 315
Irgun Zvai Leumi	279
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	275, 279, 286, 287, 290, 293
Provisional Wing	274, 287
Israel	283, 314
Italy	270, 313

J

Jackson Sir Geoffrey	262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 268
Japan	271, 279, 282, 290, 310-314
Communist Party	313
Japanese Red Army (Nihon Sekigun) (<i>see also</i> United Red Army)	270, 271, 282-284, 310-312
Japanese Socialist Party	313
Japanese Student Confederation	312
Jordan	309
June Second Movement	288, 309

K

Karuizawa.....	312
Konkret (magazine).....	271
Korea.....	262, 313
KPFFK (radio station).....	274
Kunstler, William.....	311

I.

Laporte, Pierre	286
Latin America	278, 294, 309
Leninists	313
Levi, Attorney General Edward	272
"Liberal Parents, Radical Children" (book)	283
Liberation News Service (LNS)	277
Lod Airport	283, 312
London	271, 286
Lorenz, Peter	284, 287, 309, 310

Mc

McClure, Brooks, testimony of----- 261-317

M

Mao Tse-tung	269, 270
Maoism	270
Maoists	270, 282, 289, 311, 313, 314
Marighella, Carlos	264, 269, 270
Mark, Sir Robert	293
Maryland, University of	261
Marxism	268, 269
Marxists	263, 269, 282, 289, 311, 315
Guerrillas	284
Meiji University	311
Meinhof, Ulrike	271, 273, 282, 309, 310
Meins, Holger	309
Middle East	278, 284
"Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" (book)	264
Mishima, Yukio	290
Mitrione, Daniel	264, 274, 276, 277, 308
"Modern Guerrilla Warfare" (book)	262
Montevideo	263, 279, 297, 298, 300, 301
Montoneros	284, 288, 308
Moscow	266, 271, 314
Prison	266
Mussolini	284

IV

N

	Page
Naga insurgents.....	271
National Front.....	290
National Front for the Liberation of Angola.....	271
National Liberation Movement.....	277
Naval War College.....	261
Naxalite insurgents.....	271
New Left.....	315
New York City.....	261, 262, 274, 293
New York Times.....	275
Nigeria.....	262
Nigerian civil war.....	283
"No Hope But God" (book).....	263
Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act.....	287

O

O'Connell, David.....	274
Okamoto, Kozo.....	312
Okinawa.....	313
Okudaira, Fusaku.....	312

P

Pacifica Network.....	274
Palestine.....	279
Palestine guerrillas.....	271, 311
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).....	279, 284, 314
Paris.....	271
Peking.....	271
People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine.....	311, 312, 314
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP).....	284, 288, 308
Prague.....	271
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).....	271, 284
General Command.....	271
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.....	271
Puerto Rican National Liberation Army (FALN).....	293, 316

R

Raspe, Jan-Carl.....	310
Red Army Faction (RAF).....	309, 311
Arab Committee.....	311
Red Army Faction—Reconstruction Organization (RAF/Aufbauorganisation).....	309
River Plate.....	308
Röhl, Klaus Ramier.....	271
Russell, Bertrand.....	283
Russell, Lady Lucy.....	283

S

"Salamander" (book).....	316
San Francisco.....	316
Sanchez, Ilch Ramirez.....	271
Santa Monica, Calif.....	274
Schmidt, Chancellor Helmut.....	293
Schönau processing camp.....	271
Scotland Yard.....	293
Shigenobu, Fusako.....	282, 311, 312
"Shoes of the Fisherman, The" (book).....	316
Sierra Maestra.....	278
Social Democratic Party (SPD).....	310
Somalia.....	262
Sourwine, J. G.....	261-317
South America.....	279
Soviet Union.....	266, 313
Labor camp.....	266
Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (German Socialist Student Association).....	309
State Department Foreign Service.....	262

V

	Page
"State of Siege" (movie).....	274, 276
Stern Gang.....	279
Stirling, David.....	290
Stockholm.....	312
Students for a Democratic Society.....	310
Stuttgart, Germany.....	288, 310
"Surviving the Long Night" (book).....	263
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA).....	268, 269, 272, 274, 316
Syria.....	309

T

Tarabochia, Alfonso.....	261-317
Thailand.....	262
Thurmond, Senator Strom.....	261-317
Tokyo.....	311, 312
Trotskyist.....	270, 282, 314
Trotskyites.....	311, 313, 315
Trudeau, Prime Minister Pierre.....	286
Tupamaros (MLN) (Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional) (National Liberation Movement).....	262-264, 266, 274, 276-279, 284, 294-296, 302, 308, 309
Cell.....	299, 300, 303
Hideout.....	301
Hospitals.....	303-307
Prison.....	297, 298, 299, 302

U

Ulster.....	279, 286, 287
United States.....	263, 271, 274, 279, 280, 282, 285, 290, 293, 309, 311, 313, 315
Army.....	262
Information Agency (USIA).....	261, 262
United Nations (U.N.).....	283
United Red Army (Rengo Sekigun) (see also Japanese Red Army).....	312
Urbano (code name).....	276
Uruguay.....	262, 266, 274, 277, 308, 309
Army.....	305
Congress.....	308
Government.....	276
Ministry of the Interior.....	277
Police.....	264, 277

V

Vanguard Press, Inc.....	263
Venceremos Brigade.....	315
Venezuela.....	279
Verfassungsschutzbericht (report).....	289
Vienna.....	271
Viet Cong.....	315
Vietnam.....	262, 280, 309
War.....	275, 282, 283, 313
von Drenkmann, Justice Günter.....	284, 287, 309

W

Waller, Gen. Sir Walter.....	290
Wall Street explosion.....	284
War Measures Act.....	286
Washington Star (newspaper).....	262
Weather Underground.....	263, 270, 274, 275, 282, 290, 310, 315
West Morris.....	316
Western Press, Ltd.....	262
Williams, Rob.....	269
World Anti-Communist League.....	290
World Liberation Front.....	274
World War I.....	309
World War II.....	262, 279, 280, 282, 309

Z

Zengakuren.....	310
Zionist.....	279

END