


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

# HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM


## NATIONAL LEVEL EVALUATION

## FINAL REPORT

## VOLUME I



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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**HIGH IMPACT  
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM**

**VOL. I**

**National Level Evaluation**

**By**

**Eleanor Chelimsky**

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**JANUARY 1976**

**National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration  
U. S. Department of Justice**

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
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
## FOREWORD

This evaluation report details the lessons learned from the High Impact Anti-Crime program, a major Federal initiative to reduce urban street crime. The record of Impact was mixed. The program achieved successes in some areas and fell short of the mark in others. Some of the obstacles that Impact faced are inherent in any new, large-scale social program; others stemmed from the program's framework -- a coalition of Federal, regional, state and local agencies and officials. The evaluation of the Impact experience adds to our knowledge of what can be done to reduce crime and will be useful in designing future programs at both the national and local level.



Gerald M. Caplan  
Director  
National Institute of Law  
Enforcement and Criminal Justice

## CITIES PARTICIPATING IN THE HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM



## PREFACE

Under the sponsorship of the LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, MITRE conducted a several-year examination of the High-Impact Anti-Crime Program, which began in eight U.S. cities in January of 1972 and will end in September of 1976. This program was a broad-aim, free-form social action effort, designed to reduce crime and to improve criminal justice capabilities through the demonstration of an iterative process of comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation (the COPIE-cycle). Other objectives of the program included the improvement of agency coordination and of community involvement in the criminal justice planning process, as well as the development of new knowledge about crime, about anti-crime effectiveness, and about the process of innovation within the criminal justice system. The program introduced the concept of a Crime Analysis Team (composed of functional experts and researchers) which would work in each city to produce a master plan, supervise and perform the COPIE-cycle, and act as liaison in the effort to coordinate criminal justice agencies.

The MITRE evaluation identifies what tended to promote good planning, implementation and evaluation, and what did not; what moved agencies toward coordination and what did not; what stimulated innovation and institutionalization and what did not; and what new knowledge was gained from the program and what failed to be gained (and why). In particular, the evaluation establishes what happened in the development of each city's program, speaks to the feasibility and usefulness of the two program innovations (the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team) and examines anti-crime efforts at the project level. (The evaluation does not, however, address program-wide outcomes; this is to be done by means of a set of victimization surveys being performed in 1972, 1975 and 1978.)

A series of MITRE reports furnishes much of the information for this final assessment. A set of eight histories narrates in detail program development and agency/community interactions in each of the Impact cities. The COPIE-cycle is examined in four reports which separately address crime-oriented planning, implementation, evaluation planning and evaluation reporting across the eight cities. Another volume explores the processes of innovation and institutionalization in the program. Various other reports study two anti-crime strategies commonly employed in the Impact program: intensive supervision to reduce recidivism among probationers and parolees, and increases in overt police patrol to reduce crime levels. Finally, a set of papers analyzes specific questions such as the transferability of Impact projects, the implementation difficulties of drug program and data system efforts, the caseload and trial delay problems of Impact city felony courts, and the post-treatment reintegration of juveniles into the school system.

The present document, Volume I of the final report, summarizes the findings and recommendations of the MITRE evaluation. Volume II synthesizes the analyses and findings of all the other MITRE reports, generates its own information, and attempts to draw the conclusions of the overall evaluation effort for a general audience.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Many people have participated in the studies which provide the basis for MITRE's final report and for this executive summary of that report. It is their work which has made this work possible and it is hoped that the present volume will lead the reader back to those underlying documents in search of the data and analysis which gave rise to the conclusions and recommendations.

Among the colleagues and fellow researchers who have contributed their time and effort to this evaluative endeavor, the author would especially like to mention Lawrence L. Holmes (who first directed the evaluation), Warren S. L. Moy (who authored the court report); Gerrie W. Kupersmith, Michael B. Fischel and Adarsh P. Trehan (who worked on the evaluation planning and reporting documents); Pamela A. Miller; Joseph H. Sasfy (who authored the intensive supervision reports); Frank C. Jordan, Jr. and Richard T. Loomis (who wrote the eight city histories); Diana Read; Judith S. Dahmann (who was responsible for the police patrol analysis); Mitchell W. Silberbush; Lawrence A. Greenfeld and Connie Weis O'Mara (who worked on planning and implementation); Linda S. Russell; Ellen J. Albright (who wrote the paper on innovation and institutionalization); and Lawrence G. Siegel (who authored the report on transferability and developed crime profiles for the eight cities).

The MITRE effort benefited greatly from the intelligent criticism and insight of Dr. Richard T. Barnes (of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice) who served as program manager for the evaluation. His collaboration was crucial to the overall effort. The author also wishes to thank Dr. Richard L. Linster who worked on the Impact evaluation task force, and who originated the idea of the program histories.



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## **Section I**

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### **Program Environment**

## INTRODUCTION: CRIME CONTROL POLICY GOALS OF THE EARLY SEVENTIES

In the early seventies, a striking contrast existed between political prognoses of an "imminent end to the crime problem," and a gloomy research atmosphere which had resulted from the unsuccessful social programs of the sixties and from a new awareness (based on experience) of the real difficulties involved in solving urban problems through federal initiatives. A basic assumption of crime control policy had been that the modernization of the criminal justice system (i.e., police equipment, new weapon systems, etc.) would lead to reductions in crime. Now, however, that assumption had been challenged by the failure of such modernization to achieve and demonstrate improved crime control, and the assumption was therefore being critically re-examined.

This re-examination led to the unhappy realization that even a highly efficient criminal justice system might not be able to affect problems which originated in changing personal or social attitudes and relationships, in perceived environmental stresses and deprivations, and which appeared somehow to determine the supply of new offenders. In a democratic society, government does not have many options. It cannot, for example, tell parents how to raise their children, nor impose cultural or class values, nor restrict individual mobility, nor constrain divorce, even if any or all of these factors are shown to be related to rising rates of crime and delinquency. The fact is that governmental crime control options are narrowly restricted to a very few strategies and techniques, most of which can target only people who have already come in contact with the criminal justice system. Government can affect the pool of new offenders only through the general deterrence it can provide via an optimally functioning criminal justice system.

That criminal justice system, however, was hardly functioning optimally. Rising crime rates, increased arrests, the failure to plan and evaluate the adequacy of existing programs and procedures had led to a spreading stultification, based on heavy caseloads in the prosecution, probation and parole areas, large backlogs in the courts, and overcrowded prisons and jails. Modernization of the system, while important, was evidently not enough. Needed were thorough-going improvements to effectiveness (as well as to efficiency) through increased knowledge and expertise, through better organization, agency coordination and management, and through more supportive, cooperative relationships between the public and the criminal justice system.

But even though it was clear that crime control policy did not have many options, clear also that those options it did have were mostly restricted to the criminal justice system, and clear once again that that system needed major improvements, it still remained only an

assumption that even thorough-going improvement in system capability could reduce crime, given the multiplicity of other factors influencing crime rates which remained beyond even an optimal deterrent capability in the criminal justice system.

Nonetheless, a new crime control policy was evolving in the early seventies, based on the increased weakness of that deterrent capability, and on the recognition that there existed:

- important gaps in specific knowledge about crime, offenders and victims which rendered policy initiatives highly uncertain;
- an underdevelopment of the criminal justice research function (and of the tools for that research) which might have been able to provide new knowledge;
- serious fragmentation and resistance to coordination among criminal justice agencies;
- a need to develop effective mechanisms for overcoming agency resistance to coordination;
- significant obstacles to community support for law enforcement, especially in center-city high-crime neighborhoods; and
- major potential benefits to be derived from more effective community and citizen involvement in criminal justice system planning, both in terms of crime control, and in terms of combating agency resistance (see Chapter I, pages 3-16, Volume II of this report).

The new crime control policy thus embodied three central goals:

- to improve knowledge about crime, and about strategies and tactics for dealing with it;
- to increase coordination and system awareness across agencies of the criminal justice system; and
- to develop mechanisms by which to involve community members more closely in criminal justice planning and in crime control.

The assumption behind these goals was that the expanded leverage developed through such improvements in system capability would eventually reduce crime through a more knowledgeable and effective treatment of offenders, through the stronger deterrent capabilities of an efficient system, and through increased assistance and support from the community.

## SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE IMPACT PROGRAM

The High-Impact Anti-Crime Program was inaugurated by the LEAA in January of 1972 after about 3 months of program planning. Eight American cities with serious crime problems (Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland and St. Louis) had been chosen as the focus for the program whose announced goals were:

- to reduce the incidence of five specific crimes (i.e., stranger-to-stranger person crime--murder, rape, assault and robbery--along with the property crime of burglary) by 5 percent in two years and by 20 percent in five years; and
- to improve criminal justice capabilities via the demonstration of a comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process (the COPIE-cycle).

Under the program, \$160 million (or approximately \$20 million per city) in LEAA discretionary funds were to be made available over a two-year period to the participating locales to assist them in developing, implementing, and evaluating programs which specifically addressed the program's target crimes. The program would be administered within the structure established for LEAA block grant programs with the federal regional offices (ROs), the state planning agencies (SPAs), and the local governments all playing a role in the Impact effort. Within each Impact city, groups were either identified or created to administer the program at the local level. These groups, called Crime Analysis Teams, worked directly with the local criminal justice agencies which, for the most part, operated the numerous projects comprising the Impact program activities. The SPAs--established under LEAA authorizing legislation to generate state comprehensive plans and handle block grant funding--would participate in the financial and administrative monitoring of Impact program progress, and, "in certain cases," in the evaluation of city efforts. The LEAA Regional Offices (ROs) would retain final approval authority for Impact plans, action projects, and evaluation components. At LEAA in Washington, the National Impact Program Coordinator, the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, a Policy Decision Group (made up of three high-ranking LEAA officials) and the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service would monitor the development and progress of the program.

The Impact program, conceived as a governmental response to rising urban crime rates, reflected LEAA's mandate from Congress to help state and local governments control crime and improve the quality and capabilities of their criminal justice systems. The funds provided to the cities were intended to allow them an opportunity to attack their crime problems in their own ways and according to their own priorities, but

using a balanced, comprehensive and coordinated strategy rather than the fragmented, ad hoc approach which appeared to have characterized much of urban crime-fighting in the past. The program sought to address crime itself, rather than modernization or hardware needs, and elaborated an ambitious problem-solving framework to ensure that Impact projects would indeed be crime-oriented. Although Impact was thus intended to demonstrate the utility of such a problem-solving framework, it was, first and foremost; to be an action program and the program focused, therefore, on short-term, crime-oriented achievement.

The Impact program had six specific objectives. These were:

- (1) To reduce Impact crime (i.e., those crime types making up that segment of overall crime deemed to be both serious and accessible to control by government through criminal justice resources);
- (2) To demonstrate the crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process, or COPIE-cycle (this focus of the program targeted the integration of the criminal justice function with planning and evaluative research; its goal was an improved system capability for comprehensive and iterative planning, implementation and evaluation at the local level);
- (3) To acquire, through the use of the COPIE-cycle, new knowledge about:
  - anti-crime effectiveness;
  - specific crimes, in terms of victims, offenders, and crime-settings;
  - the process of innovation within the criminal justice system; and,
  - the application of evaluation to anti-crime projects and programs;
- (4) To improve coordination across intergovernmental and criminal justice agencies, and to increase community involvement and participation via:
  - incentives toward functional balance (90-10 match for corrections projects under special funding arrangements);
  - the institution of the Crime Analysis Team;

- (5) To institutionalize effective program innovations within the eight Impact cities;
- (6) To encourage improved system capabilities beyond the confines of the Impact program via dissemination of the knowledge acquired through program implementation, including:
  - the documentation of lessons learned;
  - the identification of useful program innovations; and,
  - the designation of effective projects for transfer.

The program was thus an expression of the policy goals enunciated earlier, in that the COPIE-cycle was an instrument for increasing knowledge, developing research capabilities and improving program and agency effectiveness, and in that the Crime Analysis Team (or CAT) was an instrument for monitoring and managing the COPIE-cycle, ensuring agency coordination, and developing community involvement in each of the eight cities. The chief tool for the production of new knowledge was to be evaluation, a major focus of the program, intended to take place at three levels:

- at the project or city level (within the COPIE-cycle process);
- at the national level (examining program processes and results across the eight city programs); and
- at a global level (using LEAA/Bureau of the Census victimization surveys as a tool in the determination of overall program effects).

Such evaluation, as part of the COPIE-cycle and outside it, was expected to produce information about criminal justice needs and priorities, about project and program effectiveness, and about the potential of the targeted system capability, once achieved, to reduce crime.

Crime control policy was not alone, however, in generating the Impact program. Like all programs, Impact had to conciliate both political and rational goals. Among the political requirements imposed upon the program from its inception were:



- a highly emphasized action focus;
- quantified objectives for the program (the 5 percent and 20 percent reduction figures) which were neither based upon any empirical evidence that they could be attained, nor even operationally defined (see Chapter IV, page 57, Volume II of this report);
- a city selection process based upon unclearly specified criteria (see page 21, Volume II);
- use of the New Federalist philosophy which had become a political requisite for LEAA programs (see pages 22-23, Volume II); and
- a three-way partnership among federal, state and city authorities without any very clear specification and differentiation of the roles and functions of each (see pages 26-32, Volume II of this report).

While conciliation of political necessities with the requirements of policy is a fact of life among social action programs, the conciliation usually occurs at the expense of policy. This was especially likely to happen in Impact, because--in addition to the hardness and fastness of political/action goals as compared to research objectives--the inadequate time allocated to national program and evaluation planning left both soft spots and gaps in the procedures laid out for achieving policy goals. At least three areas, which had been recognized as crucial by program planners, failed to receive adequate definition in terms of organizational mechanisms. These were:

- technical assistance to the cities and criminal justice agencies at all levels to aid them in planning, implementing, evaluating, monitoring and managing their anti-crime projects;
- lateral coordination among those federal agencies (such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Department of Labor) which target similar anti-crime objectives to those of LEAA; and
- high-crime area community surveys (see pages 32-35, Volume II of this report).

Such gaps could be expected to reduce, at least to some degree, both the power of the program thrust and its potential ability to achieve program objectives, and hence, policy goals.

## CONFLICTS AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE IMPACT PROGRAM

The nature of the tradeoffs which must inevitably be made in generating governmental programs means that all of them contain implicit and explicit conflicts or constraints. An emphasis in one area necessarily deprives emphasis in another area (see Chapter III, pages 39-41, Volume II of this report). Impact's quantified objectives for example, might implicitly deprive qualitative objectives which could turn out to be better (although perhaps harder to measure) indicators of overall program accomplishment. Quantified data might produce findings showing that crime rates had improved, while failing to point up a real unwanted deterioration in the crime control situation or the social organization of a declining neighborhood. Similarly, the fact that a program occurs in the public arena distorts the importance of private sector inputs. In criminal justice, for example, a crucial requirement for the success of any rehabilitation program is the participation of the business community and the possibility of sustained, meaningful employment for ex-offenders. (Governmental placement bureaus may find jobs for people just out of prison, but it is the business community which must help to keep them employed, and rehabilitation can only be judged over the long term, not according to the number of placements made.) In the same way, private bar associations need to coordinate their efforts with governmental efforts to improve court processing and reduce backlogs. Yet public programs tend to include the private sector--if at all--only as an afterthought. In Impact, these implicit conflicts resulted in the failure (already mentioned) to institute community surveys as a part of the program, as well as the failure to enlist the cooperation of private bar associations and business groups.

To these implicit conflicts, however, some very explicit conflicts were joined. Major problems appeared likely to arise, in Impact, from friction between:

- action and research objectives;
- crime-reduction effectiveness and system efficiency;
- New Federalism and the program goals of knowledge acquisition, rapid action, and agency coordination.

### Action Versus Research

National planners noted early on that there might be conflict between the short-term action focus of Impact and the planning and evaluative research aspects of the COPIE-cycle focus. Technical assistance had been only vaguely discussed in this context. Although political action requirements had brought forth the 6-month time-frame within which Crime Analysis Teams had to be recruited and installed,

program planning (including data collection, analysis, problem prioritizing and project development) and evaluation planning functions had to be performed, and projects had to be operationalized, it was not clear that this could be done. This was, however, a crucial problem for both action and knowledge/research objectives, because if rapid implementation could not be achieved, concentration of anti-crime emphasis within a city would give way to long-drawn out, straggling project implementation and weakened program impact; on the other hand, if the COPIE-cycle had to be sacrificed to rapid implementation, this would mean the inability of evaluation to speak to program effects, the uncertainty of whether projects had addressed priorities rationally derived, and the failure to achieve the major program research objective of knowledge about anti-crime projects and their effects.

Another immediately obvious conflict in this area had to do with the program requirement to achieve short-term anti-crime impacts while dealing with problems requiring long-term measurement for the acquisition of any real knowledge. This difficulty would evidently trouble corrections and drug project planners (among others) in the cities, given that freedom from drug use and changes in recidivism patterns/social adjustment, etc., need to be followed up over a rather lengthy time-span. Yet the program sought simultaneously to achieve both functional balance (and especially an important emphasis on corrections and recidivism-focused projects) and a 2-year crime-reduction payoff for all projects. Funds were correspondingly allocated only for a 2-year period of program operations and evaluation, despite the fact that knowledge about drug program effects and recidivism were major Impact priorities.

#### Crime-Reduction Effectiveness Versus System Efficiency

Another conflict arose from the fact that the program objective of rapid crime reduction, in specified amounts by a given date, meant that all Impact projects had to be directly justified in terms of crime-reduction effectiveness. Yet needed projects targeting improvements in system capability and efficiency (such as the reduction of court delays, or better jail conditions, or greater police productivity, for example), or improvements in community relations with police and courts, usually could not be so justified. However, effectiveness in crime reduction--insofar as it is achievable by any governmental program--clearly depends in large measure on system efficiency. Furthermore, Impact specifically addressed objectives of functional balance (among police, courts and corrections), of agency coordination, and of community involvement as well as crime reduction. The effectiveness objective thus contained within it elements of serious conflict with efficiency and with other important objectives of the program.

The problem signified, then, that many projects which might be good things to do in themselves, regardless of their effects on crime rates, could be rejected, depending on the interpretations of program priorities by reviewers. And insofar as the conflict, because of its importance, was highly likely to occur, this increased the possibility that interpretations, via the discretionary authority of regional offices, might differ notably, and give rise to city perceptions of unequal treatment by the LEAA.

#### New Federalism Versus Program Goals of Knowledge Acquisition, Rapid Action, and Agency Coordination

The New Federalist approach signified, in Impact, that cities (having determined their own priorities based on their analysis, and chosen their own projects) would also have collected the data they saw fit to collect. Whether or not the data were the best available, whether each Impact crime was fully analyzed to the extent possible in each city, whether evaluation planning, project monitoring, and evaluation reporting were adequately performed, would thus depend upon the quality of state planning agency (SPA) and/or regional office (RO) review.

New Federalism meant, however, that no mandatory evaluation standards had been established for states, that no requirements existed for comparable and uniform data across the states, and that no routine federal monitoring of the adequacy of state planning and assistance functions had been instituted.

Thus, New Federalism had not only precluded prescriptions to the cities about evaluation designs (Impact cities were being allowed to conduct their own evaluations and no particular design specifications, no control groups had been mandated), but even the leverage to insure that some data were being collected, and that some SPAs were checking on that data collection, was also missing. Yet it seemed an obvious necessity--to ensure that funds would not be wasted or misused, or that Impact goals would not be neglected--for SPAs and ROs to:

- review carefully the quality of the data analysis performed;
- see that the projects chosen addressed the crime problems delineated and substantiated by the analysis;
- ensure the possibility of a rapid anti-crime payoff;
- examine the adequacy and feasibility of the evaluation design;
- investigate the cost/effectiveness of the organization and methods chosen, etc.

SPAs, however, could resist these efforts in the name of New Federalism. On the other hand, if they chose to exercise these functions in an autocratic or interfering way, they could seriously slow implementation. The independence granted the SPAs and the cities via the New Federalism, then, was likely to come into conflict either with the program objective of knowledge acquisition, or with rapid implementation and anti-crime payoff, depending upon the attitudes, strength, and expertise of the particular SPA, the authority (and willingness to use that authority) on the part of the RO, and the LEAA Policy Decision Group's ability to exercise its prerogative of review (see pages 26-32, Volume II of this report). New Federalism, however, also enabled the ROs (and SPAs) to fight such an LEAA review.

Further, with everyone free to be "equal partners," it might not always be clear who was in charge, and given the tendencies of bureaucratic agencies to resist coordination (see Chapter I, Volume II), it seemed likely, under New Federalism, that progress might be difficult in this area. Given the innovativeness of the Impact COPIE-cycle and CAT approach (innovations take time and encounter resistances), and given also the difficulties of obtaining coordination across involved agencies in any anti-crime program, it also appeared that it might be arduous to attain a reasonable program-wide performance of the COPIE-cycle, using the non-coercive techniques of New Federalist guidelines as a program framework.

All of these conflicts clearly had the potential not only to affect program form and substance, but also to change significantly some of the initial expectations of what program achievements were likely to be.

#### SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE NATIONAL-LEVEL EVALUATION

As already discussed (see page 5 above) the Impact evaluation had been conceived during the program planning process at three levels. It had become a "given" that all local data collection and evaluation would be done by the cities, and a "given," also, that those evaluations would constitute the major data inputs to the national-level evaluation. The idea of the "macroscopic" or global evaluation, establishing crime-reduction achievements and outcomes of the Impact program (which was originally intended to be performed by the Statistics Division of LEAA in concert with the Bureau of the Census), however, was gradually dropped, leaving only the victimization surveys. While these could indeed measure victimization-rate changes, there was, of course, no possibility--without an evaluation design--of attributing these to the program. But since the national-level evaluation--scheduled to be completed before the second victimization survey--did not provide for an assessment of Impact crime-reduction outcomes, it seemed that the failure to perform the macroscopic (or global) evaluation would necessarily leave a serious gap in the evaluation of program achievements.

Evaluation planning at the national-level took place during November and December of 1971. Given the short time-frame, however, it proved impossible to establish an evaluation plan for the national-level evaluation (outcome objectives, for example, were never operationally defined). This is not to say that evaluation planning did not occur; on the contrary, efforts were indeed made, but they remained embryonic because of time constraints and because of the press of other efforts.

In July of 1972, six months after the program had begun, The MITRE Corporation contracted to perform the national-level evaluation. The development of a strategy for this effort was guided by several factors:

- program effectiveness would not be determined by the national-level evaluation but through victimization surveys to be performed in 1972, 1975 and 1978;
- the national-level evaluation would be dependent upon the Impact cities for all of its raw data (it was, however, still uncertain, in July of 1972, what the cities might produce in the way of data);
- while the program called for rigorous city-level evaluation, New Federalism had established that cities would evaluate their own projects, that no rigorous evaluation designs would be imposed and that no requirements for area-specific or base-line data collection would be levied; thus the information likely to be produced by a national-level evaluation which was entirely dependent upon city-level efforts in a New Federalist context, appeared somewhat constrained;
- it would be impossible, in this program context, to change the local data collection process in any significant way; this would severely limit both the research field and the selection of strategies open to the national-level evaluation;
- cost constraints dictated that:
  - no control or comparison groups using non-Impact cities be envisaged for the national-level evaluation;
  - no area-specific data collection within Impact cities could be undertaken; and
  - no presence was to be established by MITRE in the eight cities (such a cost was felt by the National Institute to be duplicative);

- the national-level evaluation would therefore not only depend entirely upon data and information furnished by the cities (by mail or over the telephone, for the most part, with an occasional exception made for specific, task-oriented visits), it would also be largely without the ability to validate that information.

All of these considerations necessarily signified the renunciation of any experimental or quasi-experimental design for the national-level evaluation, and the decision was taken to concentrate on process rather than outcome. The evaluation strategy would flow from the three general questions:

- (1) What happened--in terms of planning and implementation processes--when LEAA provided eight large cities with a significant sum of money and guidance on crime-oriented planning and evaluation?
- (2) What were the key factors which promoted or inhibited the success of the program in terms of the program's overall goals?
- (3) What meaningful conclusions can be drawn from the record of the Impact program and the overall evaluation effort?

With these questions as their focus, nine discrete assessment tasks were defined:

- Task 1, an analysis of crime-oriented planning and implementation in the eight cities;
- Task 2, an assessment of project institutionalization in the eight cities;
- Task 3, a study of the TASC (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime) programs which were attempted by Impact cities;
- Task 4, an examination of projects undertaken by the cities which were based upon the assumptions that:
  - intensive supervision of parolees/probationers is an effective means of reducing recidivism among these groups; or that
  - an increase in the patrol activity of police in a given area will result in a decrease in crime rates in that area;

- Task 5, an examination of project innovation in the Impact program;
- Task 6, the identification of transferable Impact projects;
- Task 7, an assessment of city-level evaluation planning and reporting;
- Task 8, the documentation of the Impact program history in each of the eight cities; and
- Task 9, the present document and final report, which integrates some of the broader program issues, receiving inputs from the eight other tasks and developing its own information as well.

The objectives of the national-level evaluation were thus:

- (1) to develop new knowledge about the capacities of eight U.S. cities in the years 1972-1975 to plan, implement and evaluate a comprehensive anti-crime program;
- (2) to assess the LEAA problems of monitoring and managing the Impact program across a four-level vertical organizational structure (involving the Crime Analysis Team, state planning agency, regional office and LEAA headquarters), using a New Federalist program philosophy; and
- (3) to formulate a set of recommendations, based on the Impact experience, for use in the elaboration of future urban/state/federal anti-crime programs.

#### THE IMPACT CITIES IN 1970, PRIOR TO PROGRAM INITIATION

To provide points of comparison for the eight Impact cities in terms of their relative positions at the start of the program, an analysis of background information is presented in Volume II of this report (see Chapter V). Cities were examined from various perspectives including:

- a general overview (with selected data on city history, geography, position within the state, economic situation and political system);
- crime-correlated indicators, attempting to measure:
  - demographic distribution;
  - family situation;



- educational/economic conditions;
- social cohesion; and,
- non-white disadvantage;
- crime correlates and reported crime rates;
- revenues, expenditures and resource capabilities; and
- reported crime rates and criminal justice system response.

It emerged from the analysis that there was a de facto division of the cities into two groups of four, the young and the old, the "advantaged" and the "disadvantaged." Without trying to establish any rigid set of rankings, it seemed that Portland, Denver, Dallas, and Atlanta were different from the other cities (i.e., Baltimore, Cleveland, Newark and St. Louis) because of the diversity of their economies, the education and skills of their inhabitants, their space and their affluence. Among these "advantaged" cities, Portland appeared as distinct from the other three because of its relatively minor crime problems, in comparison with the other Impact cities, combined with its favored demographic, economic and social environment. Atlanta, on the other hand, appeared as a sort of swing city, closer in many ways to more disadvantaged cities, with its racial tensions and majority black population, yet rejoining the more privileged cities by virtue of its economic diversity, its well-educated population, its lower violent and person crime rates (see Table XV, Volume II, page 99).

Among the older cities, Newark stood out as having begun the program with the greatest handicaps. St. Louis and Baltimore were in somewhat better positions, but their problems were similar in kind to those of Newark: exodus of people and jobs, aging white populations, poverty and unemployment.

Cleveland also appeared as disadvantaged (in relation to Dallas, Denver, or Portland), yet showed up on many scales in a better situation than Newark, St. Louis or Baltimore (less overcrowding, higher family income, more juveniles living with both parents, more owner-occupied housing, less burglary, less violent crime). On the other hand, the problems of middle class exodus (an outflow of 125,000 people between 1960 and 1970) and an underdiversified economy, the racial tensions between "ethnics" and blacks, all of these characteristics combined to keep Cleveland squarely in the camp of the older, more disadvantaged cities.

Crime problems for all of the cities except Portland were acute. Dallas, despite its prosperity, had reported rates for aggravated assault higher than those of St. Louis and rates for violent crime (murder, rape, aggravated assault) nearly twice those of Cleveland. Denver was troubled with the highest reported rate of forcible rape for any Impact city, higher than St. Louis, higher than Newark.

Given that high crime rates were seen both in "boom" and in "exodus" cities, however, the hypothesis was advanced that it might not be the boom or exodus in itself which is significant in terms of rising crime, but rather a perception of relative deprivation (among disadvantaged persons or groups vis-a-vis other persons or groups) which may influence the marginal propensity to commit crimes; such a perception would be exacerbated in either rapidly expanding or rapidly deteriorating economies.

Examination of city resources, expenditures and resource capabilities again confirmed the split between the two groups of cities; however, only Dallas, Denver and Portland presented evidence of obvious resource capability. It seemed possible, given the differences between the two groups of cities, that "disadvantaged" cities might have more difficulty in mounting the complex set of activities required under Impact than might "advantaged" cities, and a greater need, therefore, of technical assistance.

In summary, crime was not the only problem, perhaps, for the eight cities, but it was a major one. The Impact program thus began its operations at a moment when--despite differing assumptions about "root causes" and system capabilities--it had not been shown empirically that any of these variables directly affected rates of crime, delinquency or recidivism. It was therefore appropriate and necessary to try a new approach like the one posited by Impact's COPIE-cycle: that is, a careful examination of crime-specific problems followed by an application of federal funds to anti-crime efforts directly addressing those problems. Such an approach targeted a serious improvement in the quality of anti-crime thinking, services and effectiveness, and hence, in the overall capability of the criminal justice system.

## SUMMARY OF NATIONAL-LEVEL EVALUATION FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Impact program, then, was launched in eight cities in January of 1972. MITRE findings about the efforts, achievements, and problems of the program follow, based on the national-level evaluation analysis (performed between July of 1972 and December of 1975). Conclusions are stated in terms of that analysis (synthesized in Volume II of this report) and in terms of its baseline constructs (summarized in Section I above):

- the three crime control policy goals;
- the six program objectives; and
- the expectations developed at Impact start-up arising from inherent program conflicts and constraints.

Where the terseness of the summary format leads to obscurity and a need for more information, references are made to sections of the larger document (Volume II of the Final Report).

## **Section II**

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### **Program Findings and Conclusions**

1. Program Objective: To Demonstrate the Comprehensive Crime-Oriented Planning, Implementation and Evaluation Process (the COPIE-cycle).

(a) Findings and Conclusions on the COPIE-cycle as a Whole

- (1) The Impact experience showed that the COPIE-cycle is a feasible and useful tool for improving criminal justice capability.
- (2) All of the cities installed Crime Analysis Teams, performed crime-oriented planning, produced master and evaluation plans, implemented anti-crime projects and programs, and evaluated more than half of them.
- (3) Four of the cities (Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland) performed sound crime-oriented planning; another city (Dallas) made only a middling effort at first, but soon recognized gaps and omissions and moved both to correct them and to improve planning capabilities generally. It seems likely that Cleveland and St. Louis could have done as well as any of the best planners among the cities had they not opted for rapid implementation. Baltimore alone appears to have had a real feasibility problem in planning, posed by the autonomy of the police function in that city, and the consequent inability of the CAT to access police data.
- (4) Five of the cities (St. Louis, Dallas, Cleveland, Newark and Denver) were able to translate funds into operational projects rapidly and well. Atlanta, Baltimore and Portland, however, were troubled by delays which could, in many cases, have been reduced or eliminated had problems been signalled in time and projects adequately monitored and reviewed on an on-going basis. Implementation insufficiencies, in Impact, appeared in most cases to be more a function of the failure to coordinate and of management gaps than of inherent difficulties in the implementation process itself.
- (5) Evaluation, which had been a big question-mark for Impact program planners, turned out to be both a realistic expectation and generally feasible within the context of an action-oriented anti-crime program. The state of knowledge dissemination in the evaluative art was perhaps the biggest influence on the quality of the evaluation executed. This is evidenced by differences in performance according to project focus (showing more evaluation expertise and experience in some areas than in others), by inadequacies (many of them remediable) in the evaluation documents reviewed, and by the steady progress made in almost all the cities over the life of the program.

- (6) The crime-oriented planning process, adequately performed, brought a clearer focus on problems and needs, a better basis for justifying funding behavior, a sharp decrease in "off-the-shelf" projects when priority problems were well substantiated by data and analysis (e.g., in Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland). Even in those cities where the effort to implement the cycle was less than whole-hearted, there is today considerably more data collection and analysis being done by criminal justice planners, by police, courts and corrections people than before Impact (in Baltimore, Dallas and St. Louis, for example).
- (7) The crime-oriented planning process also brought new breadth in thinking about criminal justice problems. Many agency planners, for example, had to deal with projections, strategies and tactics on a scale they had never experienced before. Further, the COPIE-cycle brought exposure to what other people around the country were doing in planning and evaluation--not only in criminal justice but in other social program areas as well--and this exposure made them aware of other options and choices which could be applied locally. (This was especially true in Portland, in Denver, in Dallas and in Atlanta.) An important benefit of the COPIE-cycle, therefore, was a by-product of the wider dissemination of ideas which accompanied the program.
- (8) Evaluation planning acted in a similar way. It forced some new thinking about what a project was supposed to accomplish, an improved understanding of how activities needed to fit together to achieve targeted objectives. (This was evidenced by component revisions and grant application changes--especially in Atlanta, Denver and Portland). Evaluation planning also helped cities to identify gaps in data and in system information because they were obliged to specify data sources. In this way they came to realize that they needed to follow up on their offenders to know what was happening to them (in terms of rehabilitation, rearrest and/or reconviction) in order to have a basis for comparison with project outcomes. Denver and Atlanta both conducted recidivism studies, to be used as baselines for assessing project effects. Portland's victimization study fulfilled a need for data recognized early on in the program.
- (9) Management use of evaluation findings as a tool for decision-making (with respect to project refunding, modification, or phase-out) appears to have taken hold at least to some degree in most Impact cities. Between the beginning of the program and the present writing, this use increased progressively and

markedly, at top management levels. Evaluation findings now serve routinely in Denver, Atlanta, Dallas and St. Louis as inputs to project refunding decisions. Baltimore's progress reports also are fed back into the SPA refunding process.

- (10) Improvement has also been seen in the way that evaluation findings are being iteratively provided to project implementers for their action. Most evaluation reports reviewed to date have specified operational recommendations, and projects with multiple reports featuring such recommendations have often been reorganized or changed, to conform to those recommendations (e.g., Denver, St. Louis, Dallas, Atlanta).
- (11) Problems experienced by cities where the COPIE-cycle was not well performed reinforce confidence in the relationships observed. An initial crime-oriented planning failure to collect data, and to substantiate crime problems and priorities rationally, deprived cities of the increased criminal justice capabilities and benefits found to accompany an adequate COPIE-cycle performance. On the contrary, as implementation proceeded, it became clear that the first planning gaps led, in varying degrees, to priority uncertainties, to lack of baseline data for evaluation, inadequate evaluation, failure to affect and modify projects in a timely way via evaluation feedback, and above all, inability to assess and identify anti-crime project achievements.
- (12) Given the benefits accruing to those cities which effectively executed the COPIE-cycle, and the failure to accrue those benefits among those cities which did not, it is reasonably clear that the effort was feasible, useful in many ways, and generally replicable, with some remediation, in U.S. cities.

(b) Findings and Conclusions on Crime-Oriented Planning

(1) Four of the eight cities (Atlanta, Denver, Newark, and Portland) performed crime-oriented planning soundly; the other four cities evidenced lesser conformity with the crime-oriented planning model.

- The major factors encouraging successful crime-oriented planning were: (1) the capabilities, interests and size of the Crime Analysis Team, (2) the cooperation of city criminal justice agencies, and (3) the lack of any irresistible municipal pressures to operationalize projects rapidly.
- The key factor inhibiting successful performance in Cleveland and St. Louis was precisely this city pressure to implement; in Dallas and Baltimore, the chief problem was the small size of the Crime Analysis Team (however, Baltimore was hampered as well by problems of agency cooperation).
- The quality of data collection and analysis was not adequately monitored in four of the eight cities; crime-oriented planning in these cities could have been significantly improved by such monitoring.
- Dallas recognized various weaknesses in its planning process and took steps to remedy them during the course of the program.

(2) Contrary to program expectations:

- The program conflict between action and research did not result in the expected sacrifice of crime-oriented planning quality except in Cleveland and St. Louis; rather it resulted in program slippage.
- City "disadvantage" relative to other Impact cities (see page 14 above) was not a factor in planning performance; Newark achieved a rigorous execution of crime-oriented planning.
- The failure to develop continuing technical assistance was not an overwhelming problem for crime-oriented planning because of the adequate dissemination of materials in this instance. Abundant documentation and briefings were made available to the cities by LEAA for use in their planning effort.



- (3) Not enough time was provided for crime-oriented planning, and milestones were not established for the data-collection, analysis, and problem-prioritization steps of the planning model, making timely guidance and monitoring by SPAs and ROs more difficult.
- It was clear, by July 1972, that program planners had been over-optimistic about the activities which could be performed within cities in the space of six months. Eventually, there would be a general program slippage of about a year across the eight cities.
  - An average of 8 months' time was required to prepare city master plans (range: 3 months in St. Louis to 13 months in Newark).
- (4) Crime problems, as prioritized across the cities, showed a general program-wide focus on juvenile crime, on adult recidivism and on drug use.
- (5) An effective mechanism (the Neighborhoods Task Force) for the channeling of community input into the planning process was developed in Denver (see Chapter VII, Volume II).
- (6) Although high-level promises of lateral coordination across federal agencies had been obtained by the Attorney General (20 December 1971), efforts at cooperation with the Impact program (by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Small Business Administration, the National Institute of Mental Health, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and other federal agencies) all broke down within the first six months of the program; no mechanisms had been developed for joint planning at the working level across federal agencies.
- (7) New Federalism both helped and hindered crime-oriented planning; it allowed those cities which planned seriously to discover and address their own local priorities; it also, however, allowed cities which planned inadequately to proceed, almost unchallenged, to the implementation stage without sufficient analysis of crime problems or solid linkage of anti-crime interventions (projects) to those problems.
- (8) In the four cities where crime-oriented planning was well done, it brought:
- new knowledge about urban crime problems by pinpointing particular crime characteristics for selective attention;

- more awareness of current planning techniques;
- certainty that substantiated city crime problems were being addressed;
- more rational application of federal resources to local problems;
- better evaluation planning and reporting.

(9) Where crime-oriented planning was inadequately performed, there was:

- no certitude that identified priorities corresponded to city crime problems;
- no very strong pressure to address the priorities selected;
- weaker rationale-building for projects;
- failure to lay the foundation for evaluation planning and reporting.

(c) Findings and Conclusions on Implementation

- (1) 233 anti-crime projects were funded across the 8 cities at about \$140 million in federal funds.
- (2) Growing awareness in many Impact cities of rehabilitation failures, combined with program funding incentives and the New Federalist strengthening of city priorities, together had a greater effect on the shape of the program than did its nationally-set crime-reduction objectives. This meant that, in terms of expectations for the mix of projects included in the program:
  - Contrary to expectations, program-wide funding was shared about equally between police and corrections projects (33 percent and 31 percent, respectively, see Table I below). Thus, Impact was not a police program. (This is even clearer when projects are broken out by focus, also in Table I. Offender or recidivism-focused projects received the lion's share of the funding (42 percent) while direct crime-reduction projects received only 31 percent.)
  - Also contrary to expectations, juvenile projects were well funded, reflecting the identified eight-city priority in the area of juvenile problems.
  - Community involvement strategies also received much more attention than expected. This may have reflected a national trend (concurrent with the program) toward concern for crime victims and toward increased community input into the criminal justice planning process. Although Impact had targeted community participation as a program objective, it is likely that without external pressure, this objective might have been sacrificed to the program's action focus.
  - As expected, research projects were de-emphasized, as were target hardening and simple modernization projects. ("Gimmicks and gadgets" were not a hallmark of Impact.)
- (3) It is difficult to say whether the program target of functional balance was achieved since it is not clear what that balance should be, given that it depends on specific city problems, needs and priorities. However, it is clear that police and corrections functions were roughly balanced in the program and that funding was very different from the usual expenditure breakouts (about 80 percent for police, and about 20 percent for courts and corrections).

TABLE I  
DISTRIBUTION OF AWARDED FUNDS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA AND BY PROJECT FOCUS

PROJECT FUNCTIONAL AREA AND PROJECT FOCUS	PROGRAM-WIDE	ATLANTA	BALTIMORE	CLEVELAND	DALLAS	DENVER	NEWARK	PORTLAND	ST. LOUIS
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
<b>FUNCTIONAL AREA (1)</b>									
POLICE	33	45	23	38	45	21	41	23	33
COURTS	8	1	15	7	21	2	6	3	8
CORRECTIONS (JUVENILE AND ADULT)	1	27	27	22	19	29	28	61	33
DRUG USE PREVENTION	5	0	19	7	0	6	3	0	2
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	8	4	8	18	7	9	5	0	11
TARGET HARDENING	10	22	2	6	4	19	16	4	5
RESEARCH/INFORMATION SYSTEMS	2	1	4	2	0	3	1	2	6
OTHER	3	0.3	2	0.2	4	11	0	7	2
	<0.1	0	0.2	0	0	0	0.2	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(\$140.0M)	(\$16.9M)	(\$16.7M)	(\$18.5M)	(\$17.0M)	(\$18.1M)	(\$17.8M)	(\$16.1M)	(\$18.9M)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
<b>PROJECT FOCUS (2)</b>									
CRIME REDUCTION	31	66	24	26	31	27	54	8	27
RECIDIVISM REDUCTION	42	30	51	45	25	52	38	63	37
SYSTEMS CAPABILITY	27	4	25	29	44	21	8	29	36
<b>TOTAL</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(\$140.0M)	(\$16.9M)	(\$16.7M)	(\$18.5M)	(\$17.0M)	(\$18.1M)	(\$17.8M)	(\$16.1M)	(\$18.9M)

(1) FUNCTIONAL AREA CATEGORIES ARE DEFINED IN CHAPTER VI ( PAGES 160 THROUGH 162), VOLUME II OF THE FINAL REPORT. THE POLICE CATEGORY, FOR EXAMPLE, INCLUDES ALL PROJECT FUNDS AWARDED TO POLICE AGENCIES (TARGETING EITHER CRIME-REDUCTION OR SYSTEM CAPABILITY).

(2) PROJECT FOCUS CATEGORIES ARE DEFINED IN CHAPTER VI (PAGE 163), VOLUME II OF THE FINAL REPORT. THIS BREAKOUT, BY OBJECTIVE, CLASSIFIES PROJECTS ACCORDING TO THE KIND OF IMPROVEMENT TARGETED BY THE PROJECT, WHATEVER ITS FUNCTIONAL AREA.

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM TABLES XXV, XXVI, XXVII, AND XXVIII, VOLUME II OF THE FINAL REPORT (PAGES 161, 164, 165, AND 169).

- (4) Functional balance was very different in each of the cities, showing once again the ability of the New Federalist approach to bring out local priorities (see Table I). Atlanta and Newark emphasized a crime-reduction focus using a police strategy, Dallas a system-capability focus with a police strategy, Portland a strongly pronounced orientation toward recidivism reduction. The four other cities also focused generally on recidivism reduction, although much less overwhelmingly than Portland. Only Baltimore devoted substantial funds to drug use.
- (5) Both the Portland and Dallas programs were major surprises, compared against expectations of heavily-focused crime-reduction strategies. Portland's program, however, unquestionably represented city priorities which had been substantiated, and for which a large consensus (city/county/state/region) had been mobilized (see Chapter VII, Volume II); on the other hand, Dallas' system focus did not appear to reflect either the city's own identified crime problems (concentrating on corrections inadequacies, recidivism and drug use, see Figure 14, Chapter VI) or the short-term crime-reduction objective of the Impact program (see Chapter VII).
- (6) In terms of the expected effectiveness/efficiency trade-offs:
- Table I also shows that the program conflict between effectiveness and efficiency did not result, as expected, in a de-emphasis of system capability projects (i.e., projects which could not be directly linked with crime-reduction objectives but were important city priorities nonetheless). This is evidenced by the fact that 27 percent of the program funds went toward productivity-increasing efforts (such as Dallas' Legal Aides for Police or Baltimore's High Impact Courts).
  - The program effectiveness/efficiency conflict did result, as expected, in an apparent underemphasis of court projects. These emerged with only 8 percent of Impact funding, perhaps because court problems were a lower priority compared to more urgent city problems, perhaps because of the difficulty of rationalizing court improvements in terms of crime rates, or perhaps because of the program failure to provide funding incentives for court (as for corrections) projects.
- (7) The major implementation problems noted by Impact project directors were staffing delays and lengthy administrative procedures (often caused by inadequate interagency

communications and coordination). Newark and St. Louis were troubled, as well, by funding delays (see Table XXXIV, Chapter VIII, Volume II).

- (8) St. Louis, Dallas and Cleveland were the most rapid Impact implementers; Portland, Baltimore and Atlanta were the slowest.
- The major factors encouraging rapid implementation in St. Louis were the political push to operationalize and the typically small size and funding of St. Louis projects. In Dallas and Cleveland, the major stimulating factor was interagency coordination: Dallas projects benefited from an arrangement by which the state advanced the city's cash match automatically; in Cleveland, there was harmony between the RO and the CAT, the SPA played no role in the program (see Chapter VII), and also, as in St. Louis, there was strong political impetus toward rapid implementation.
  - The chief factor inhibiting rapid implementation generally was the failure of agency coordination; the 9-step approval process in Portland (see Chapter VII) and Crime Analysis Team liaison difficulties in Atlanta and Baltimore explained a large part of the delays in these cities. However, some other factors played a role as well.
- (9) Contrary to expectations, crime-oriented planning excellence was not a major factor in slowing implementation speed. Denver and Newark were good planners and better than average implementers, while Baltimore, which did not excel at crime-oriented planning, was also very slow to operationalize. Among the cities having produced a fine planning effort, those which had serious implementation difficulties (Atlanta and Portland) also had major problems of agency coordination. It is these, far more than the planning effort, which generated the lag in implementation.
- (10) The longest, slowest implementation occurred among drug programs and information system projects, among equipment-dependent projects, and among projects sponsored by governmental agencies (as opposed to non-governmental sponsors like the Red Cross, the Salvation Army and other private groups). These delays speak to problems of consensus in drug programs (see Chapters VIII and IX, Volume II), of long-term procurement in information systems and equipment-dependent projects, and of constraints affecting employment, operations and coordination among governmental agencies.

- (11) Examining implementation priorities in terms of city problem priorities (identified during the crime-oriented planning process), it appears that program-wide priorities in the areas of juvenile problems and adult recidivism were clearly reflected in implemented projects. Efforts addressing drug use (another planning priority), however, were de-emphasized. (This appears to have been more a result of the state-of-the-art in drug programs within the criminal justice system than of any faltering in the implementation of designated priorities.) The New Federalist approach seems here to have been generally successful in eliciting articulation and follow-through of strongly-held local convictions about local crime problems.
- (12) On the other hand, however, and as expected, the New Federalist approach, by strengthening already strong agencies, appears to have been a depressant of agency coordination and, as such, an inhibitor of focused and concentrated program implementation. Although strong LEAA Policy Board direction countered the tendency toward agency independence, this corrective was eliminated in June of 1973 by turnover in top management personnel at LEAA, and the consequent disappearance of the Policy Board.
- (13) In sum, the major implementation problem encountered across the eight cities (beyond the important one of staffing) was not, as expected, the difficulty of imposing rationality upon recalcitrant users, but rather the difficulty of coordination among highly rational, entrenched agencies.

(d) Findings and Conclusions on Evaluation Planning

- (1) The program's action/research conflict did not cripple the development of evaluation plans; these were prepared and reviewed for 140 projects (i.e., about 60 percent of the 233).
- (2) Only 8 evaluation components of the 149 analyzed could qualify as excellent plans (i.e., answering the questions of what the evaluations intended to do, how they would do it, and specifying mechanisms for linking observed changes logically to project activities). It is clear that, as expected, technical assistance could have vastly improved evaluation planning performance since many problems with the reviewed components were remediable (see Chapter VIII, Volume II).
- (3) The distribution among component quality levels was more or less as expected. In an action program, the primary emphasis is the provision of services. Evaluations must be planned and conducted within constraints imposed by the project. These constraints may hinder the development of carefully planned, rigorous evaluation designs.
- (4) Crime-reduction-focused components were generally superior to recidivism- or system-focused components, probably because of the need to construct baseline data for the latter, while crime-reduction projects can usually make use of available police data (see page 265, Chapter VIII, Volume II).
- (5) Differences in component quality across the eight cities were more the result of differences in project focus than in city-specific capability; however, some cities did better than others, given their mix of project foci.
- (6) Denver and Portland produced the best project evaluation plans; their quality was notably superior to what might have been expected, given the kinds of projects which they had chosen to implement.
- (7) The chief factors encouraging good evaluation planning appear to have been the attitudes toward empirical research prevalent among Crime Analysis Team or agency managements, and the early availability of evaluative expertise.
- (8) The key factor limiting evaluation plan performance was the lack of technical assistance (which could have compensated in some measure for at least some gaps in expertise both among evaluators and among administrative reviewers), and



the failure to tie evaluation funding to evaluation planning milestones and products (which permitted some cities to postpone evaluation planning until after implementation, rendering the exercise less than optimally useful).

- (9) Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland generally did very good jobs of evaluation planning (see Chapter VII, Volume II, for details of city performance), Newark again joining the ranks of the "advantaged" cities, as for crime-oriented planning.
- (10) New Federalism was, as expected, something of an obstacle to the achievement of program-wide evaluation planning. The failure to require baseline data collection and to stipulate certain evaluation design features signifies that some useful information necessarily went uncollected and unanalyzed.
- (11) Dissemination of evaluation planning information to the cities, to the SPAs and to the ROs was much less successfully performed than for crime-oriented planning.
- (12) Despite unavailable technical assistance, evaluation planning was shown to be feasible on a large scale within the context of an action program.
- (13) Benefits accrued when evaluation planning was well done included better evaluation design and reporting, useful modification of projects through evaluative precision and feedback, and a much greater likelihood of being able to demonstrate project effectiveness.

(e) Findings and Conclusions on Evaluation Reporting

- (1) Evaluation reports were received and reviewed for 141 Impact projects (i.e., 61 percent). Documentation for 119 of these projects was sufficiently complete to allow technical review. This was considerably more of a response than had been expected at the start of the program.
- (2) Only 17 of the 119 project evaluations reviewed, however, employed what was considered to be a rigorous evaluation approach to assess project outcomes. Some 55 additional project evaluations did make use of some type of evaluation approach (relying on before/after designs or combining these with some comparison base), this despite the failure of the program to mandate specific evaluation approaches and the failure to provide technical assistance in evaluation.
- (3) Project focus was not the strong discriminator for evaluation approach quality that it was for evaluation planning quality; variations in city quality far overrode project focus considerations in importance. Portland, Denver and Atlanta were noteworthy for their use of rigorous evaluation approaches; about half of the St. Louis and Dallas documentation utilized no true evaluation approach; projects reviewed from Baltimore and Cleveland consistently relied upon evaluation approaches that were not rigorous; all projects reviewed from Newark were documented in the absence of an evaluation approach. On the other hand, as expected, crime-reduction project evaluations were generally the best executed. These projects were more likely to be evaluated using some evaluation approach than were recidivism-reduction or system-focused projects--again, this is believed to reflect the problem of baseline data construction.
- (4) The chief factors contributing to excellence in evaluation appeared to be the same as for evaluation planning: management commitment and available expertise. The "advantaged" cities generally had a better chance to attract expert evaluators than did "disadvantaged" cities. Thus some very good evaluation work in Newark received a severe setback when the Team evaluator resigned, and although technical assistance would have been meaningful in all cities it was especially needed among Impact's "disadvantaged" cities. On the other hand, Dallas' merely average showing (despite its status as an "advantaged" city), reflects a lack of management commitment, and this lack was also a problem in Cleveland and Baltimore.

- (5) Major inhibitors of evaluation quality were the inadequacy of existing evaluative research tools, the lack of dissemination of the knowledge which does exist, and the failure of Crime Analysis Teams to hire or replace expert staff and to develop evaluation capability.
- (6) Despite gaps in assistance, evaluation reporting took place in Impact on a very large scale. Although problems existed (many of them remediable), the fact is that outcome-oriented project-level evaluation was shown to be feasible within an action program like Impact. Rigorous evaluation was demonstrated in a variety of cities and institutional settings. Multiple evaluation reports for the same project improved, over time. It is reasonable to believe that evaluation performance can be vastly upgraded, given more time, training, and aid.
- (7) The fear, at the beginning of the program, that it was unrealistic to have city evaluators evaluate city programs turned out to be unfounded. Evaluators across the program tended to be objective and professional about evaluation limitations (see page 265, Chapter VIII, Volume II). Their allegiances appeared to be oriented more toward the world of research and evaluation than toward any parochial agency interests.

2. Program Objective: To Improve Coordination Across Intergovernmental and Criminal Justice Agencies and to Increase Community Involvement Via the Crime Analysis Team

(a) Findings and Conclusions on Agency Coordination

- (1) Four cities (Cleveland, Dallas, Denver and Newark) unambiguously improved the coordination of their criminal justice agencies under Impact through Crime Analysis Team activities.
  - The Cleveland Crime Analysis Team tied youth service delivery together throughout the city by developing a system of Youth Neighborhood Coordinators; the Team also developed a community-based probation program involving the coordination and relocation of Municipal Court Probation, Common Pleas Court Probation and the Adult Parole Authority. County and state corrections officials were thus housed for the first time in the same building and could establish a close working relationship.
  - Dallas undertook a major effort of coordination across city and county agencies of the criminal justice system. The county sheriff's department and the city police department began the integration of data bases and information systems as part of a region-wide (city and county) effort to control crime. Dallas funded and implemented projects which generally aimed at improved coordination between the police and other components of the system as, for example, in Legal Aides for the Police, or in the Dallas Police Department's Youth Services program. Finally, the successful resolution of the city/county battles which took place at the beginning of the program constitutes a major achievement of the Crime Analysis Team. The issue was handled through the formation of an Executive Committee (within the Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council) in which there was city-county-suburban representation and an understanding that spending for any project would be subject to review and approval by the local governing body (County Commissioners, City Council) responsible for any projects funded through the Council.
  - In Denver, the Crime Analysis Team used data base development as a mode of entry into relationships with other agencies, and as a way of linking various agencies of the criminal justice system. The Team established a network of four Youth Service Bureaus to coordinate city-wide the referral of juveniles diverted from the criminal

justice system. The Task Force mechanism inaugurated in Denver appears to have worked well as a forum for bringing together disparate elements of the criminal justice system (including police, court and corrections people as well as prosecutors, public defenders and probation/parole officers).

- In Newark, there were severe problems of agency conflict at the beginning of the program (see Chapter VII, Volume II). These appear to have been considerably ameliorated through the Policy Board mechanism for bringing the department heads of every criminal justice agency in the city together regularly. City/county court relationships were also improved through the project "Special Case Processing for Impact Offenders" which targeted modifications to the entire adjudication process, reaching from Newark Municipal Court arraignment through Essex County Court sentencing. Other projects, such as the Rape Analysis and Investigative Unit, targeted improved prosecutor/police working relationships.
- (2) Major agency coordination problems existed in Atlanta, Baltimore, Portland and St. Louis.
- Impact did not improve agency coordination in Portland; the city and Multnomah County continue to have a highly tumultuous relationship, with the county ending its participation in the joint criminal justice planning agency rather abruptly in July of 1974. City/SPA relationships had not been improved when the evaluation function went to the SPA rather than the Crime Analysis Team (or Impact Staff) in Portland. Further the complexities of the state/county/city partnership were grafted, in Portland, upon a 9-step municipal approval process, which worsened rather than improved the prospects for agency coordination by making it even more cumbersome, complicated and time-consuming than it had been before (see Chapter VII, Volume II).
  - In St. Louis, as well, problems between the MLEAC Region 5, the SPA and the City Crime Commission became explosive and resulted in the transfer of the Crime Analysis Team to the Crime Commission and the resignation of the Team evaluators. Even though factionalism is not new in St. Louis (it is, in fact, deeply anchored in city traditions, see the general overview, Chapter V, Volume II), and even though it is not clear that any short-term action program could have impacted those traditions in any meaningful way, still, the same can be said of Newark, yet progress was made there under Impact. It seems that, as in Portland, it may have been a mistake--at least from

the viewpoints of agency coordination and of long-term system capability--to have moved the locus of program power outside the city.

- In Baltimore, the dominance of the SPA and the autonomy of the police department did not leave much room for the Crime Analysis Team liaison function (see Chapter VII, Volume II). In sum, the inability to access police data or achieve coordination with the police department, the delegation of power by the regional office to the SPA, a skeletal Crime Analysis Team and a change in Team leadership at a crucial point of program start-up, had all worked together to make improvements in agency coordination there very difficult.
  - In Atlanta, interagency relationships were troubled by SPA/city conflicts (see Chapter VII) and city/county conflicts, by the power and autonomy of the police chief, by the location of the Crime Analysis Team outside the city organization within the Atlanta Regional Commission, by turbulence between the Atlanta Regional Commission and the State Crime Commission, and by the successive resignation of two Team directors. Finally, a change in city leadership was accompanied by a reorganization at the end of 1974, creating a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council and transferring the Crime Analysis Team to the mayor's office as staff support to the Council. The Team now appears much better able, as a city agency, to stimulate coordination among other city agencies, and has begun clearinghouse and dissemination functions in support of that role.
- (3) It seems that the ability of the Crime Analysis Team to improve interagency coordination was largely a function of existing city/state relationships. In effect, most cities maintain a precarious balance of power with state agencies. When the Impact program failed to sustain city bargaining power (by giving an important CAT function to the state, for example, as in Portland and Baltimore, or by removing the Team from the city organizational structure, as in Atlanta and St. Louis), the CAT itself was weakened: it lost much of its ability to barter with other agencies, to deal with them on an equal footing, to maintain leverage in the criminal justice and intergovernmental systems and in the community.
- (4) Thus, the greatest inhibitor of CAT potential as an agent for coordination was the failure to invest the Team with the functions and prerogatives it needed to ensure an effective liaison role.

- (5) In those cities where interagency coordination improved, the Crime Analysis Teams had been able to keep all of their functions, were ensconced as city agencies, and benefited from the solid support of the mayor (Cleveland, Dallas, Denver and Newark).

(b) Findings and Conclusions on Community Involvement

- (1) All of the Impact cities appear to have made some progress with involving the community in the criminal justice process; most have also increased citizen input into the planning process, largely through the activities of the Crime Analysis Team.
- In Atlanta and Baltimore, citizens' advisory groups were created to help determine the selection of criminal justice anti-crime programs.
  - The Cleveland CAT was resolutely community-oriented (see Chapter VII, Volume II). The Team devoted considerable staff time to sessions with community groups, took a "root cause," crime-correlated approach to criminal justice planning, and implemented large numbers of community-oriented corrections and diversion projects.
  - In Dallas, however, a community-involvement focus has been slow in coming. Suggestions to broaden the Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council to include community representatives, for example, were fought on the grounds that it would turn the body into a "police review board." While Dallas has now implemented a larger community-focused crime prevention program, no mechanism has yet been introduced to bring a citizen orientation into the criminal justice planning process (see Chapter VII).
  - Denver developed a viable model (the only one in Impact) for community input into the planning process. Over the three years of Impact, members of Denver's Neighborhoods Task Force (composed entirely of private citizens) examined every project proposed; they also formed subcommittees outside the formal structure, and went out into the community to solicit citizen reactions. It is clear that this Task Force had a voice in decision-making and an impact upon proposed programs. Nearly one-fifth of Denver's Impact funds (\$3.5 million) focused upon community involvement projects.
  - Newark's first master plan focused its greatest emphasis on community involvement; this was, in fact, one of the main points of dissension with the LEAA regional office (See Chapter VII, Volume II); in the end, about 16 percent of Newark's funds went to community involvement projects.



- Portland's Impact Staff was successful in securing community involvement, in achieving a very high recruitment rate for its community projects, and an increase in the rates of crime-reporting by victims. While no usable community-input model was developed, as in Denver, Portland nonetheless emerged from the Impact program with better planning tools which include the community, and with a program (Neighborhood Block Crime Prevention) that brings Portland closer to having a community-wide criminal justice planning process.
  - Efforts of the St. Louis community to become involved in the Impact program met with little success at the beginning of the program. Early in the planning process, groups such as the Women's Crusade Against Crime, the Federation of Neighborhood Organizations, and the Metropolitan Citizens Crime Committee went on record with a number of projects and proposals. In addition a number of private citizens displayed a lively interest in the program and made early and frequent overtures to the city to become involved. Region 5, however, found it difficult to maintain contact with community groups, and citizens complained that they could never get through to the right officials or receive timely and acceptable answers. The July 1974 move of the St. Louis CAT to the City Crime Commission opened the program there for the first time to regular community input through the Commission's citizens' committees. Public hearings were held during the final Impact funding cycle with extensive community participation (see Chapter VII, Volume II).
- (2) The major factors inhibiting citizen involvement in Impact appear to have been a strong law enforcement focus within the criminal justice system, such as the one prevalent in Texas (see Volume II, Chapter VII, pages 209-210), and the existence of extremely powerful, independent agencies, well equipped to resist public pressure. Since these agencies were supported (or at least not countered) in their resistance by the New Federalist approach, it was sometimes difficult for Crime Analysis Teams to make progress in this area.
  - (3) Overall, considerable improvements were made nonetheless in community involvement, program-wide, largely due to Crime Analysis Team efforts, and a model was developed, tested and found to be effective in Denver. It should be remembered, however, that the extent of the effort toward community involvement in Impact also reflects a nation-wide movement toward better criminal justice system relations with the public, and a deeper consciousness of the problems of victimization; in that sense, Impact achievements are not attributable to Crime Analysis Team efforts alone, but reflect a combination of forces acting together.

3. Program Objective: To Reduce Impact Crime

As discussed earlier, the national-level evaluation did not address the question of program-wide effectiveness. Various MITRE tasks did, however, involve the examination of project-level evaluations, and through those evaluations, of project-level success. Findings of those tasks are presented below. It should be remembered, however, that only those projects which were able to demonstrate their success through evaluation have been included here. Given that evaluation itself was an innovation in some cities, and given also that the program is still on-going in most cities, it is clear that there may be project success which has not yet been--or could not be--documented.

(a) Findings and Conclusions on Project-Level Success, and on Various Anti-Crime Strategies Employed in the Eight Cities

- (1) 33 Impact projects, representing about \$30.5 million in federal funds, were shown through city evaluation documentation to have been effective; 2 more projects, presenting either inadequate documentation or none at all, were shown to have been successful via MITRE secondary analysis, bringing the total to 35 Impact projects and \$35.3 million in federal funds (see Chapter IX, Volume II).
- (2) 28 of the 35 projects (80 percent) originated in five cities: Denver, Dallas, St. Louis, Atlanta and Portland.
  - "Advantaged" cities (i.e., Atlanta, Dallas, Denver and Portland) were thus heavily represented in the sample since 23 of the 35 projects (or 67 percent), representing \$25.4 million of the \$35.3 million total (or 72 percent), originated in these cities. Spending for effective projects implemented in Dallas and Denver accounted for about 50 percent of the federal funds awarded in each of those cities.
  - It seems reasonable to believe that the inadequate evaluation performances of Cleveland and Newark caused them to be under-represented in the sample in terms of project effectiveness. (In effect, the two projects whose success was revealed through secondary analysis, based on raw data, originated in Cleveland and Newark.)
  - It also seems reasonable to expect that additional effective projects will continue to be identified in Atlanta and Portland (and perhaps also in Baltimore, if evaluation there continues to improve), given the late implementation in these cities.

- (3) Effective projects tended to be more innovative and had more likelihood of institutionalization than did projects generally, across the program.
- (4) More federal funds could be shown to have been effectively expended for projects with a crime-reduction focus than for recidivism- or system-focused projects (again a question of evaluation).
- (5) Findings from MITRE's intensive supervision analysis established that all of the four projects studied appeared to have reduced recidivism, the average reduction being about 50 percent.
  - In addition to significant reductions in recidivism for each of the projects, reductions were found at every level of pre-service number of offenses and baseline frequency. Also, the analysis of interactions between various client-descriptive variables and baseline frequency indicated that reductions in recidivism occurred for all levels of age group, ethnicity, educational lag, and living situation. Intensive supervision seemed to be beneficial for clients with different criminal backgrounds and different demographic characteristics, although some groups appeared to benefit more than others (see Chapter IX, Volume II).
  - Within the limits of the analysis performed, intensive supervision emerged reinforced as an effective strategy for reducing recidivism among probationers.
- (6) Findings from the police patrol analysis were that--in terms of expected performance--two of the three projects studied were successful in reducing crime levels by virtue of overt police patrol activity.
  - Again, within the limits of the analysis performed, increases in overt police patrol appeared to be effective in achieving short-term crime decreases which were attributable to the projects in 2 of the 3 cases studied; in these 2 cases, reductions for most crimes either had not occurred in untreated portions of the city (Cleveland, Concentrated Crime Patrol) or they were more pronounced in target areas (Denver, Special Crime Attack Team); in the third case, however, (St. Louis, Pilot Foot Patrol), crime-level reductions appeared to take place in both treated and untreated portions of the city so that project effectiveness was not clear (see Chapter IX, Volume II).

- Displacement was a rare phenomenon in the three case studies examined.
  - One crime, rape, consistently showed no evidence for declines across the three cities: in none of the cases was target area rape lower than expected. To what degree this may be due to increased rape reporting, however, is not known. The other three violent crimes (murder, aggravated assault and robbery) decreased generally in target areas.
- (7) Overt police patrol should not be dismissed as an important and useful short-term anti-crime strategy.
- (8) Many more successful projects were implemented and evaluated in the police, community involvement, juvenile and court areas, than in the drug or data system areas. The less successful project areas were troubled by problems of consensus or of leadtime which did not allow them to be well implemented or evaluated in the Impact context.
- The drug program, TASC<sup>1</sup>, had difficulty, in Impact, in achieving implementation. Problems identified involved philosophical disagreement (between treatment and law enforcement agencies), referral and agency coordination (courts, police, drug agencies), evaluation planning (no focus on client outcomes, no design mechanisms included which could allow for attribution of client achievements to the program), data collection (concern over client privacy and information confidentiality), high dropout rates and internal management difficulties (direction and personnel turnover).
  - One drug project (other than TASC) did, however, have some success: Baltimore's Intensive Supervision of Narcotic Offenders project featured an evaluation design including control groups and demonstrated effectiveness in meeting its objectives (see Chapter IX, Volume II).
  - It is clear that the difficulties encountered by TASC programs, under Impact, are of such magnitude that further research appears to be warranted to determine whether the problems are intrinsic to the projects or have to do rather with the fact that they were implemented in

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<sup>1</sup>Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime.

the Impact context. The Impact experience has not thus far furnished evidence reviewed by MITRE which can attest to the usefulness or relevance of these programs for crime control.

- Problems experienced by data system projects, on the other hand, were mainly a problem of the appropriateness of funding these projects (which require extensive developmental periods) in the context of a short-term rapid action program.

(9) In sum, those functional areas which benefited from:

- a developed research capability (e.g. police projects);
- private organizational and management capability (community involvement projects);
- more easily achieved objectives (some systems-improvement projects); and
- strongly emphasized city priorities (e.g., juvenile programs)

attained quite impressive relative levels of achievement. In these areas, the evaluation planning and reporting tools initiated via the Impact COPIE-cycle allowed 27 projects to be substantiated as effective.

(10) On the other hand, those functional areas which required:

- technical assistance unavailable under Impact (recidivism-focused projects, for example);
- more time than could be forthcoming in a 2-year action-oriented program (data system projects, for example);
- hurdling institutional impediments and long-established difficulties inherent in project objectives (adult corrections and especially offender employment projects); or
- sophisticated and finely-tuned agency coordination (drug programs, for example) were disadvantaged under Impact.

(11) The COPIE-cycle required some learning investment on the part of its users, but that investment paid off in the capability to substantiate effectiveness for 25 percent of program funding (see Table XXXIX, Chapter IX, Volume II).

- (12) Anti-crime achievement will remain essentially undocumented in those cities where evaluation capability was not well developed.
- (13) Evaluation planning, which was a major influence on the quality of both evaluation approaches and evaluation reporting, emerged as a crucial element of the COPIE-cycle in terms of the demonstration of project effectiveness.
- (14) Given expanded dissemination of evaluation information, given technical assistance in evaluation where it is needed, and given streamlining and sharpening of administrative procedures and implementation monitoring, it seems clear that the ability to evaluate and thereby substantiate project effectiveness could be significantly improved in future urban anti-crime programs utilizing the COPIE-cycle.
- (15) In terms of program expectations:
  - A criminal justice system planning and evaluation capability was able to be developed under Impact constraints, and did indeed result in knowledge payoffs, among which the ability to identify successful anti-crime projects.
  - While the four "advantaged" cities were, in fact, overrepresented in the sample of effective projects, St. Louis also generated 5 of these projects, despite a "disadvantaged" status in terms of age, exodus situation and other factors (see Chapter V, Volume II).

(b) Findings and Conclusions on Crime Changes in the Impact Cities

Despite the process character of this evaluation, Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data were examined in an effort to observe crime changes concurrent with the program in the eight Impact cities. It must be remembered, however, that city-wide changes in crime levels cannot be attributed to the Impact program because of:

- the lack of a rigorous evaluation design (and the consequent inability to link city-wide crime rates to Impact);
- the problems of measurement using UCR data;
- the number of projects other than crime-reduction-focused projects (offender or recidivism-focused projects and system-focused projects) which could not be linked with city-wide crime changes; and
- the stragglng implementation experienced in many of the cities.

Thus, the best present estimates of Impact anti-crime effectiveness had to come from project outcomes (see Chapter IX, Volume II).

But even if it could not be stated that an improved capability in some city resulted in a decrease in crime rates, it was extremely important to examine whether such an improved capability (once established) was accompanied by increases or decreases in those rates, given that it is an effect on crime which was being sought. Hence, since it could not be shown that crime rates or levels constituted the dependent variable of the program, MITRE examined them as a program correlate, made some efforts to improve their measurement, and suggested needed future development of those efforts. It is true that UCR data are highly fallible as measures of crime. Perhaps their major vulnerability is that there exists little evidence to support the inference that a change in UCR rates reflects an actual change in crime rates, or that they are related at all in some rational and consistent way; it is for this reason that victimization surveys, rather than UCR data, were chosen to be the tool for measuring Impact outcomes. However, only one data point (1972) is presently available from the victimization surveys, whereas UCR data are continuously generated and readily accessible; it is for these reasons that they were employed as the basis for this examination. Two analyses were performed. The first looked at UCR crime rates in the years 1968-1974 for the five crimes in the eight cities. The second generated expected levels for burglary using the Sister Cities Regression Model (see Chapter X, pages 385 through 391) and compared these expected levels with actual UCR data for burglary in 1973 and 1974.

- (1) Findings for the five crimes in each of the cities showed that, over the 1968-1974 period, there were:
- long-term, generally severe crime-rate increases in Atlanta and Portland;
  - declining or generally stabilizing trends in Dallas and Denver for person crimes (except rape in Dallas); burglary was up, however, especially in Dallas;
  - Dallas was the only city which did not show a rise in murder rates;
  - Baltimore was the only city to show steadily decreasing rates for rape;
  - Portland doubled its burglary rate finishing with the highest rate of any Impact city;
  - Cleveland maintained its relatively low burglary rate;
  - robbery rates increased in every Impact city;
  - Impact violent crime rates had considerably worsened overall: whereas in 1970, four cities had rates under 450 per 100,000, by 1974, all rates were above that figure;
  - Dallas, Denver and Newark showed real improvements in their rankings relative to other cities.
- (2) The burglary analysis (which generated expected monthly levels for burglary in the eight cities by means of Sister City Regression Models, and then compared these expected levels against actual UCR monthly data) showed that in 1973 and 1974, burglary was significantly lower than anticipated in five of the eight cities: Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver and Newark.
- (3) A juxtaposition of cities' performances in Impact with their crime-change experiences found that:
- the crime changes in Atlanta, Portland, and Baltimore are not likely to have been meaningfully affected by the Impact program because of the slow pace of implementation in these cities;



- in Cleveland, increases may have been moderated, and in Newark, decreases may have been influenced by Impact; evidence for this was derived from MITRE's secondary analysis of Cleveland's Concentrated Crime Patrol and from the burglary-level analysis in each city;
  - St. Louis' actual burglary levels were not significantly lower than expected levels, and MITRE did not find other evidence pointing to a moderation of city trends via the Impact program there; it is, however, possible that this may have been the case for crimes other than burglary;
  - in Dallas and Denver, it seems likely that Impact was a factor in achieving decreases and in moderating the rates of increase in those cities (based on evaluation reports, on a high proportion of demonstrated effectiveness, and on the burglary analysis).
- (4) Although the Dallas/Denver improvements cannot be directly attributed to Impact, it is important to note that in these cities, where system capability was notably improved and where Impact projects had a high proportion (50 percent) of demonstrated effectiveness, present indicators--fallible though they may be--show meaningful improvements in crime rates and levels which were not the result of long-term trends and which were not seen in the Impact "sister" cities. If attribution had, in fact, been possible, important evidence would have been provided to support the assumption that improved system capability can reduce or control crime: the basic underlying assumption of the Impact program.

4. Program Objective: To Acquire Knowledge

Overall knowledge contributions of the Impact program cannot yet be assessed. There are, however, three areas of knowledge gains and failures which should presently be documented insofar as that is possible because of their implications for policy (i.e., progress toward the policy goal of knowledge acquisition) and for the elaboration of new anti-crime programs. These areas are:

- knowledge increases achieved through the program innovations of the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team;
- knowledge acquired (and knowledge which failed to be acquired), about anti-crime effectiveness;
- knowledge gained about the process of innovation through project strategies implemented during the program.

(a) Findings and Conclusions on COPIE-cycle and Crime Analysis Team Knowledge Payoffs

- (1) Eight U.S. cities now possess, in varying degrees, the system capability to rationally plan, implement and evaluate their anti-crime programs.
- (2) This capability became an increasingly iterative process by the end of the program (i.e., evaluation findings were being used as a basis for new planning and project modification).
- (3) All of the agencies involved in the program benefited, in varying degrees, from the dissemination of knowledge which occurred because of the program and because of the research emphasis introduced by the Crime Analysis Team.
- (4) New knowledge about the incidence of specific crimes, about offenders, victims and crime-settings, was obtained in all of the cities, and especially in those cities where crime-oriented planning was well executed.
- (5) At the national level, knowledge was acquired about city priorities; about the feasibility of planning, implementation and evaluation using a New Federalist approach; about incentives which worked (favorable funding matches, for example) and incentives which did not work (jawboning and exhortations without a quid pro quo and without leverage to ensure compliance, for example); about anti-crime effectiveness at the project level (through COPIE-cycle evaluation); about the importance of city/state relationships for the effective

functioning of the COPIE-cycle and of the Crime Analysis Team; and about the need for technical assistance in the effort to gain performance of program innovations.

- (6) Research projects having been constrained by the action objectives of the program, and by the failure to provide technical assistance, it is not anticipated that there will be much basic research knowledge to emerge from the Impact program. (It should be noted, however, that while new knowledge from basic research is a policy goal, it was not an objective of the Impact program.)
- (7) A model for regular community input into the criminal justice planning process was implemented and shown to be effective in Denver.
- (8) New knowledge about community attitudes was constrained by the failure to institute regular community surveys.
- (9) In general, it was learned that the program innovations of the COPIE-cycle and the CAT were feasible, and that they were relevant for improved system capability; although the capability improvements in Dallas and Denver were associated with improvements in crime rates, the question of whether improved system capability can reduce or control crime will need to await a rigorous test.

(b) Findings and Conclusions About Knowledge Acquired and Not Acquired) on Anti-Crime Effectiveness

- (1) It is impossible to address the question of whether the 5 percent crime reduction was attained or not over the 1972-1974 period. There are three basic problems which cannot be surmounted in this evaluation.
- The problem of attribution: If a program can be said to have "attained" or "achieved" an effect, it must first be shown that program activities were the cause of such an effect. The Impact program had no evaluation design which could have permitted the reasonable attribution of crime level changes to the program. (Even if there had been such a design, however, methodological difficulties--see page 43, for example--would have constrained definitive attribution. Inferences would nonetheless have been more reasonable, but these would again have been constrained by problems of measurement.) On the other hand, area-specific data collection could have permitted attribution of crime-reduction-focused project effects to the project, and would then have permitted linkage of those effects to overall city-wide "effects" (based on the fact that target areas are nearly always the high-crime areas of the city.)
  - The problem of tying project effects to city-wide crime changes: All anti-crime efforts do not make an immediate or short-term impact on crime levels which is both identifiable and attributable to that effort. In Impact, for example, 42 percent of the anti-crime projects were focused on recidivism reduction (see Table XXVI, Chapter VI, Volume II). Yet although projects focusing on recidivism reduction for a small group of offenders may well be able to produce evidence at the project level demonstrating that they are successfully reducing recidivism, it remains impossible to pinpoint the contribution of that reduction to city-wide crime changes, nor, conversely, to attribute any specific part of those changes to the recidivism-focused project. Thus, although recidivism reduction achievements will certainly show up eventually in city-wide crime-rate changes, it is not presently possible to attribute those achievements to projects. Further, slippages in the program brought a straggling, diffused implementation, rather than the focused, concentrated thrust (expected by program planners) to which city-wide crime changes might reasonably have been attributed.

- The problem of measuring city crime changes: Even if city crime changes could be attributed to program interventions, they would still need to be measured reliably, and this cannot presently be done with UCR data (see page 44 above). Victimization surveys also have problems (such as differential victim reporting, or uncertain relationships with actual crime levels so that the establishment of trends must presume--as with the use of UCR data--an unlikely constant relationship between reported and unreported crime) but they are not subject to criminal justice system discretion and they are a considerable improvement in many other ways over what was hitherto available. However, as already discussed, only one data point is currently accessible to researchers, so that these surveys did not constitute a feasible tool for the national-level evaluation of the Impact program.

- (2) Thus, the New Federalist approach taken by Impact, combined with problems of national evaluation planning, severely constrained anti-crime knowledge payoffs from the program. The ability of cities to choose freely among direct and indirect crime-reduction strategies, the gaps in implementation management, the failure to impose area-specific data collection as a requirement, meant, among other things, that the results available at the project level could not allow for assessment of program-wide effects on city-wide crime changes.
- (3) New knowledge about anti-crime effectiveness for individual projects was gained, however, dependent upon evaluation capabilities developed through the COPIE-cycle.
- (4) Thirty-five projects, representing about \$35 million in federal funds, were shown to have been effective via city-level evaluation or via MITRE analysis.
- (5) Given the new understanding, acquired through the Impact experience of the factors liable to stimulate or discourage COPIE-cycle and CAT activities, it seems likely that future programs should be able to benefit from greatly increased system capabilities, if the necessary remedial efforts were made.

(c) Findings and Conclusions About Innovative Strategies Implemented at the Project-Level

In the Impact program, innovation was sought only incidentally, as a desired incremental payoff to other Impact benefits; there was no innovation mystique, per se. In fact, however, given the Impact approval and funding process, the "lengthy administrative procedures" against which project directors railed (see Table XXXIV, Chapter VIII), the general problems of interagency coordination, the pressures toward action and against research, given--above all--the lack of a quid pro quo or incentive for agencies to want to fund innovative ideas, it seemed unlikely, at the beginning of the program that much project-level innovation would emerge (see Chapter III, Volume II).

- (1) In all, 26 projects were found to be innovative<sup>1</sup> among the 233 funded under Impact (see the Appendix to Chapter VIII for a listing and brief précis of these 26 innovative projects).
- (2) Most of the projects selected (22 of 26) involved the community in some manner; 20 of the 26 made contributions to coordination between or among criminal justice and other intergovernmental agencies; only 2 of the innovative projects selected made a basic research contribution. (These were the Rape Prevention Project in Denver, whose first phase involved basic research on rape victims and offenders, and the Target Hardening Through Opportunity Reduction (THOR) project in Atlanta, which designed a study of the problems of false alarms and other issues relating to building security.)
- (3) The greatest number of innovative projects originated in Denver (10 of 26), with the closest contenders being Portland (with 4) and Dallas (with 3). The cities, in fact, appeared to divide according to lines of age and advantage (see Chapter V, Volume II), with the younger, higher-income/higher-education level cities originating 19 (or 73 percent) of the 26 innovative projects.

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<sup>1</sup>A project listed as innovative in this document conforms to one or more of the following definitions:

- Type A: Uses a new approach, new procedures, or new technology in solving a problem.
- Type B: Uses old procedures, technology or approaches in a new way or in a new context.
- Type C: Uses an existing agency to assume a set of new responsibilities.
- Type D: Uses a new agency to assume a set of responsibilities not carried out by an existing agency.

- (4) The chief factor inhibiting innovation in Impact appeared to be the problem of interagency coordination which prevented the CAT from functioning optimally. Different techniques were used by host agencies in these cities to out-manuever what they perceived to be the endless revisions of the grant application review process. Projects proposed thus tended variously to be "tried-and-true," non-controversial, and/or short-term, small, inexpensive. An agency in Atlanta actually cut a project budget in half with the explicit goal of facilitating its passage through "the system." Clearly this was not a climate in which the CAT could successfully push for innovation.
- (5) Innovative projects, however, occurred in every city; the major stimulators appeared to be unanimity of philosophy (Portland's "broader vision," for example, Dallas' system improvement orientation, or Denver's empirical, integrated approach) added to Crime Analysis Team energy and creative expertise.
- (6) In sum, innovative projects occurred in Impact despite New Federalism, agency independence, and the lack of any incentives to produce such projects; again, innovative projects were more likely also to be effective projects than could have been expected from their small representation in the overall project sample (i.e., only 26 of 233 projects--or 11 percent--were selected as innovative, but 8 of the 33 projects shown to be effective via the technical review process--or 24 percent--had also been selected as innovative); still further (as will be noted below) innovative projects were much more likely to be institutionalized than other projects.
- (7) Despite the fact, therefore, that progress can quite conceivably be made in criminal justice system capability without innovation (given the disparity between current knowledge and current practice) and despite the fact that innovation can sometimes impede efficiency because of agency resistance to it, there appears to be something intrinsically important which is embodied in the innovative idea, technique or approach. Innovative projects in Impact tended to undergo more careful development (because of the obstacles they had to clear in order to pass successfully through the approval process), tended to receive more media and public attention (because of their novelty), tended to be perceived as more effective (perhaps because of the enthusiasm of their staffs). Further, some innovations, in Impact appeared to have resistance-reducing (rather than resistance-increasing) effects. In

Denver, for example, to oppose innovation was really to oppose progress, and it seems clear that innovation was a rallying-cry used as effectively by the Team to link agencies (the Youth Service Bureaus, for example) as was the data base planning and bartering technique referred to earlier (see page 32 above). It is notable as well in this context, that 75 percent of innovative projects targeted some effort at agency coordination.



5. Program Objectives: To Institutionalize Effective Program Innovations and to Disseminate the Knowledge Acquired Through the Impact Experience

For both of these objectives, it is clearly too soon to say much. The Impact experience is not yet over, so that it has not been possible to disseminate a great deal of information about it. MITRE has taken the opportunity, however, to examine (from a current perspective) what is likely to remain of Impact within the eight cities after the program is over.

Findings and Conclusions About the Institutionalization of Projects and of the Crime Analysis Team

- (1) MITRE surveys of project and CAT directors as well as of SPA and RO personnel have established a current projection that about 43 percent (101 out of 233) of the projects funded under Impact will be continued.
- (2) This projection may be over-optimistic given the large number of exogenous factors which affect the continuation of projects, given that it is still very early to make predictions and given the tendency of federally-funded projects and programs to vanish without a trace when the funds have disappeared.
- (3) Of the 101 projects expected to be institutionalized, 67 percent are in the police, courts, and corrections areas. These areas contain 63 percent of the projects implemented as part of the Impact program. The breakout by particular functional areas, however, does not simply reflect emphases within the program. On the contrary, Impact implemented only 25 court projects, yet 17 are expected to continue; this is the highest proportion (68 percent) of projects to be institutionalized of any functional area. In the police area, 37 projects have been implemented and 19 (51 percent) are expected to continue. However, in the juvenile and adult corrections area where 84 projects were implemented, only 31 (37 percent) are expected to continue.
- (4) Thus, a higher percentage of projects is likely to be institutionalized in the police and courts areas than in the corrections areas. This may partially reflect the extent to which corrections projects involve costs for additional manpower, and partially, also, the lesser leverage of corrections in resource allocation decisions, and the weakness of the corrections constituency presently mobilizable to affect those decisions.

- (5) Some cities (e.g., Atlanta, Dallas, Denver, and St. Louis) expected high percentages of projects to be continued. In Denver, the number of projects expected to continue (22) is attributable to the overall success of the Denver program. In contrast, the large number expected to continue in St. Louis (also 22) is at least partially due to the fact that many of the projects in St. Louis were expansions of existing activities. Continuation, therefore, may actually indicate a return to the previous state, especially where equipment comprised a large share of the Impact funds. In Dallas, many of the projects were directed toward systems improvement and are therefore perhaps seen as more essential to continue than projects implemented outside the system. Most of the projects expected to continue in Atlanta also involve systems improvement.
- (6) Relatively inexpensive projects, and system-focused or target hardening projects which involved large onetime costs, are thus likely to be continued. For projects requiring substantial additional funds, institutionalization, generally speaking, is much less probable.
- (7) Innovative projects were more likely to be institutionalized (65 percent) than were Impact projects in general (43 percent).
- (8) Major factors influencing institutionalization were the success of the project, the degree to which it became an accepted part of the everyday way of "doing things," the support of key people (including agency personnel and political and community leaders), the attitude of the community, and available funds. For projects involving new agencies, the most important factor, in addition to funding, was credibility. A diversion project, for example, had to establish credibility with criminal justice agencies in order to receive referrals. Credibility also needed to be established with the community, and again with clients, if their participation was voluntary.
- (9) Factors inhibiting institutionalization in Impact were city finances and the disparity among city, county and state interests. Impact, as a city program, received strong support from the mayor's office. But a great deal of rivalry between city and county governments occurred in some places relative to Impact funding, and the mayor now holds the main vested interest in city project continuation from a political point of view. (Although county and state criminal justice agencies have similar vested interests, this is from an effectiveness,

rather than a political, viewpoint.) When decisions are to be made by county and state governments concerning continuation of project funding, therefore, there is less pressure on them to continue even highly rated and well-accepted projects than there exists for city governments. But city governments are, of course, notoriously "poor," and thus a key factor in municipal institutionalization becomes the availability of funds, just as the existence of political pressure becomes key for state and county agencies, for whom funding may be less of a problem. Impact involved a large infusion of funds into urban criminal justice budgets over a rather short time-period; therefore, many of the projects implemented were relatively expensive. Since Impact was a "city program" in a city/county/state criminal justice environment, it is now, as the program phases down, the responsibility of all these three levels of government to continue the funding of projects implemented. Yet it is not clear to many state legislatures or to state and county agencies that they should help to institutionalize projects which they had little or no voice in selecting. This is a crucial factor inhibiting institutionalization of Impact projects.

- (10) Overall, institutionalization appears more likely for systems improvement, efficiency-oriented projects which did not target Impact crime-reduction goals than it does for those projects which did; further, given the problem of available funds in urban areas, there is a serious institutionalization argument for heavier state/county involvement in, and acceptance of, high-crime area programs.
- (11) All of the Crime Analysis Teams have been institutionalized in one form or another except that of St. Louis. In Atlanta, Baltimore, Denver, Newark and Portland, the Team will be intimately connected to the mayor's office. In Dallas, the Team will return to its former status, planning and monitoring other LEAA programs. In Cleveland, the Team will be part of an umbrella agency to consolidate treatment services. Almost all of the seven Teams will continue with their Impact functions of planning, agency coordination, and evaluation of anti-crime programs.

6. Overall Program Conclusions

- (1) The program innovations of the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team were shown to be feasible and allowed major improvements in system capability.
- (2) Anti-crime effectiveness was demonstrated at the project level, via evaluation findings, for 35 Impact projects representing the expenditure of about \$35 million in federal funds. (Other project level success cannot be ruled out however, since there may be achievements which have not yet been--or could not be--documented.)
- (3) An examination of crime changes in the eight cities showed that in Dallas and Denver--which had the highest proportions of federal funds spent effectively--the increases in system capability were correlated with improvements in crime rates which were not the result of long-term trends, and which were not seen in non-Impact "sister" cities.
- (4) Eight U.S. cities now possess, in varying degrees, the system capability to rationally plan, implement and evaluate their anti-crime programs.
- (5) New Federalism worked well in eliciting local priorities and in resolving the effectiveness/efficiency conflict in some areas (i.e., community involvement, juvenile and system capability projects were not de-emphasized because of the strength of local priorities). On the other hand, New Federalism acted as a depressant to agency coordination, an inhibitor of implementation concentration and speed, an obstacle to data collection, evaluation planning and reporting and a constraint to knowledge payoffs and to innovation.
- (6) The question of "advantage" or "disadvantage" among Impact cities did not appear to be a crucial discriminator, except for innovation and evaluation. Crime-oriented planning was performed as well by Newark as by Portland, St. Louis was a faster implementer than Denver, and agency coordination depended more on the organizational locus and power of the CAT vis-a-vis the city/state relationship, than it did on any resource capabilities of the cities.
- (7) In general, contrary to early expectations (and contrary to the typical revenue-sharing experience), Impact cities used federal monies as they were intended to be used: for worthwhile anti-crime efforts which could not otherwise have been funded.

- (8) A disappointment of the program was the inability to implement effective drug programs (with the single exception of Baltimore's Intensive Supervision of Narcotics Offenders).
- (9) High points of the program were:
- the quality of the Denver Crime Analysis Team, which should serve as a model for future applications of this concept;
  - the excellence of Portland's evaluations;
  - the improvements in juvenile recidivism observed among many Impact projects.
- (10) Evaluation planning emerged as a "fulcrum" element, crucial for the success of anti-crime interventions both at the project and at the national levels.
- (11) Innovation appeared to bring benefits related intrinsically to the quality of freshness and newness. Innovative projects in Impact tended to undergo more careful development, received more media and public attention, were more likely to be effective and more likely to be institutionalized than other projects. Further, the difficulties of opposing innovation (and progress) made it a useful technique in some cases for reducing institutional barriers.

## Section III

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### Program Recommendations

## PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

It goes without saying that lessons need to be learned both from achievements and from problems experienced. The findings and conclusions about Impact achievements and problems (summarized in Section II above) are therefore transformed here, in concordance with the objectives of the national-level evaluation, into a set of recommendations of two kinds:

- recommendations relative to the still on-going Impact program;
- recommendations relative to future programs in terms of:
  - the COPIE-cycle;
  - the Crime Analysis Team;
  - national-level planning, evaluation and administration;
  - policy formation at the national level; and
  - priority areas for criminal justice research.

It is hoped that these recommendations will help in the process of assimilating the experience of this complex program, and help also to assure that new knowledge gained from program achievements and program problems can be applied to future urban anti-crime efforts.

A. Recommendations Relative to the On-Going Program

1. Capturing the Knowledge

- (a) Impact is still on-going in 6 of the 8 cities (Atlanta, Denver, Portland, Dallas, Baltimore, and Newark). The first three of these cities produced the best evaluation reports of the program, and both Dallas and Baltimore made great progress in this area. The LEAA should endeavor to capture the information relating to the success of these final projects and to the quality of their evaluations.
- (b) The verdict on project and Crime Analysis Team institutionalization is still out, and follow-up is therefore necessary within the next year, and again in September of 1977 (one year after final program phase-out).
- (c) Victimization survey analysis will need to be performed and no Crime Analysis Teams will be available for that effort; yet it is highly important to capture this information and to contrast it with the UCR data examined in this report, to see whether the inferences derived here are reinforced or not. LEAA should ensure that this analysis is performed.
- (d) A new crime-level analysis (such as the one performed for burglary in this evaluation) should be executed a year from now so as to determine whether the correlation between improved system capability and city crime changes reported here for Dallas and Denver is also observed over the longer term for the slower implementers (Atlanta, Baltimore, and Portland), and to see, as well whether the Denver and Dallas results obtain over a longer time period.
- (e) For those recidivism-focused projects which were well evaluated, it would be important to follow up and to analyze data on recidivism reduction, so as to reinforce or modify current findings.
- (f) The importance of these final Impact efforts lies in their power to alter the current estimate of the program's overall balance of achievement and hence to have a different impact on crime control policy goals.

2. Disseminating the Knowledge

- (a) The dissemination task has not yet really begun. Although the MITRE instrument for reviewing evaluation plans has been widely disseminated, serious efforts will need to be made to ensure



diffusion of the lessons learned in evaluation reporting, in implementation, in the iterative aspects of the crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process.

- (b) Wide diffusion should be made of the best evaluation plans and reports originated in the Impact cities over the course of the program. Some of these efforts were very good (especially in Portland, Denver and Atlanta) and are worthy of widespread dissemination.
- (c) Documents should be made accessible to researchers which display in convenient form the baseline information generated by the program. This information should be accessible both in synthesis and in the form of primary documentation.

B. Recommendations for Future Urban Anti-Crime Programs

1. Program Goals

- (a) Programs should not posit quantified city-wide crime reductions unless planners have evolved evaluation strategies allowing the development of plausible expectations about the effects of different kinds of anti-crime projects upon city-wide crime rates. These goals, when they have not been rationally determined, tend to raise public expectations and are more than likely to be unattainable, since there is no basis for their postulation.
- (b) Projects, on the other hand, should feature quantified objectives, based on experience, where possible, and in any case, to be updated by the collection of project evaluation data which thus serve as a baseline both for evaluating achievement and for re-assessing project objectives. Further, this reinforces the iterative quality needed in planning, implementation and evaluation.

2. The COPIE-Cycle

- (a) The COPIE-cycle, having proved effective for the development of system capability, should be adopted as a tool for rational planning and evaluation, with some modifications.
- (b) Given that many program problems developed because the cities could make a choice between good crime-oriented planning and rapid implementation (sacrificing either one or the other), this choice should be ruled out in future programs. Adequate time should be allowed for Crime Analysis Team start-up and master plan development (perhaps the 16 months required by Denver would be a good amount of time to schedule).

- (c) Implementation should not proceed before completion of the crime-oriented planning and evaluation planning phases.
- (d) The quality of crime data collected and of the analysis performed in cities should be monitored, and the monitoring itself randomly checked by LEAA.
- (e) The data problem in the courts area was a serious impediment to evaluative research at all levels in the Impact program. Data remain difficult to access and it was virtually impossible to compile usable information about court activities for the national-level evaluation. At the project level, complications arose from the myriad ways in which workload data and performance statistics are kept, not only by different courts but also by different agencies within the same court system. It is not always clear what the basic work unit is: indictments, defendants, or cases. Source data provided to the national-level evaluation by Impact court agencies were generally incomplete. Frequently missing were important data such as dismissal rates at different stages of the adjudication process, the reasons for dismissal, the average number of continuances per case, the average recycle time for a new hearing or trial date, the percentage of defendants who pleaded guilty to the original, most serious felony charge, etc. There were virtually no data on public defenders. LEAA should develop new guidelines for court data submission in the context of a future Impact-type program.
- (f) New as well as classical techniques for analyzing data, and for developing evaluation baselines should be routinely disseminated and on-going technical assistance furnished to host agencies where needed.
- (g) Materials to be disseminated to the cities should be ready before the start of the program (in Impact, only crime-oriented planning materials were adequately disseminated). System capability questionnaires (like the one prepared for Impact) are not especially useful, because by the time they are completed by the involved agencies, it is too late for them to be used in the planning process.
- (h) LEAA should take steps to ensure that project implementation is more carefully monitored and to investigate, on a random basis, the quality of the monitoring function. MITRE has recommended to the LEAA--based on severe implementation problems encountered--the development of a project implementation status

reporting system<sup>1</sup> for the regular and uniform monitoring and assessment of grant project implementation performance. The system suggested evolved from the recognition of four major needs:

- (1) to provide current and consistent implementation status information on each project;
- (2) to identify problem-ridden projects on a rapid and regular basis;
- (3) to insure swift intervention in the life of a project so identified; and,
- (4) to make certain that the intervention has indeed occurred and has expedited the implementation of the project.

One problem of implementation management is that it has been considered the step-child of planning and evaluation, and efforts to improve it have suffered thereby. Both resources and priority attention have been lacking. Implementation is, however, the critical link which lends meaning to the other two activities, and without which they cannot exist.

- (i) There is a need to examine, very closely, in each city, the reasons for chronic delays between grant submission and the beginning of service delivery. The status reporting system described above should be a good mechanism for isolating problems when they exist and correcting the particular factors in each city which are responsible. It is important to realize that the average delays of 8.3 months in Atlanta, 9.2 months in Baltimore and 15.9 months in Portland experienced in Impact (see Figure 17, Chapter VIII) between submission and service signified not only a failure to use resources optimally, but also a frittering away of anti-crime impact and concentration.
- (j) A city's program should not be too heavily oriented toward projects whose scope and funding are too small to allow them to make an impact. Implementation concentration will be weakened and program effects diminished if such "nickel-and-diming" is adopted as a program strategy. (Such a strategy was often indicative, in Impact, of the red-tape and communication difficulties typically caused by interagency problems.)

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<sup>1</sup>Greenfeld, L. A., Monitoring Project Implementation, Problems and Recommendations to the LEAA, September 1975, The MITRE Corporation, MTR-7056.

- (k) On the other hand, excessively large-sized projects are also a problem because they are hard to administer, they risk failure with big sums of money, and they may have great difficulty in achieving institutionalization at the end of the program.
- (l) Unless a project has been crime-orientedly planned, LEAA should not permit the re-funding with LEAA funds of projects already funded under other auspices because this seriously inhibits the COPIE-cycle. In effect, the arduous process of crime-oriented planning appears almost academic if the projects to be funded have already been selected.
- (m) LEAA should not mandate that all projects in a free-form program like Impact be evaluated. Some evaluations are likely to have much more important payoffs than others; some are not worth doing within a short time-frame; some are simply infeasible in a given context.
- (n) Evaluation planners should divide projects on some reasonable basis (such as crime problem priority or feasibility or public concern) into two groups, those which should receive only monitoring, and those for which a full-fledged evaluation permitting attribution to the project is worthwhile. A better basis for dividing between monitoring and full-fledged evaluation is the method suggested by Rossi<sup>2</sup> in which a "soft" Reconnaissance Phase of correlational analysis is implemented for all projects to identify programs likely to have sufficiently sizable effects to warrant further examination; this phase is then followed by an Experimental Phase designed to evaluate rigorously those projects which have shown real promise. Such a method is likely to bring major benefits in evaluative payoffs.
- (o) Evaluation planners in each city should group similar projects (such as those focusing on juvenile recidivism, for example) and plan their evaluations jointly, so that one set of baseline data can serve for all projects. Such a grouping (organized in Denver during Impact) would maximize the creation of new data sources and foster the development of a serious research function and focus.
- (p) The time-frame allowed for evaluation was typically too short, in Impact, except perhaps for area-specific crime-reduction projects. A future urban anti-crime program should provide for

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<sup>2</sup>Rossi, P. H., "Boobytraps and Pitfalls in the Evaluation of Social Action Programs" (in Evaluating Action Programs, ed. C. H. Weiss, Allyn and Bacon, 1972, pages 224-235).

more evaluation follow-up to allow for the development of more meaningful information in the area of recidivism reduction (especially since implementation delays further restricted time left for evaluation in Impact).

- (q) It is not enough to allocate no-match funds to evaluation in a general way. LEAA will need, in a future program similar to Impact, to consider the question of evaluation management so as to achieve a maximum production of needed plans and reports. There needs to be, simultaneously, enough flexibility to cut off problematic evaluation, but also enough rigor to stimulate the flow of documents. In any case, a final period, after the end of implementation, should be specifically earmarked for the analysis of collected data and for the writing of final reports.
- (r) Many of the problems besetting Impact evaluations could have been remedied through (1) better project implementation, (2) a resolute setting of evaluation milestones and products by LEAA Central, supported by the regional offices, (3) technical assistance, (4) better dissemination of evaluation materials and (5) mechanisms for communication, among the eight cities, of problems encountered and problem-solving techniques and strategies generated.
- (s) Technical assistance in evaluation should stress the importance of defining and specifying project activity objectives very clearly. Many Impact projects wrote of the "provision of counseling and rehabilitation services" or talked about achieving "an adequate reintegration into the community." Although this sort of terminology occurred most often in Cleveland, it was sufficiently widespread to account for the number of projects graded low for lack of operational definition of objectives. A major problem in the evaluation of anti-crime programs is the lack of a detailed knowledge of treatment, of the stimulus which is expected to produce the effect. This is often forgotten in the attention given to the dependent variable. Yet it is crucial, for an understanding of a project's effects to know precisely what happened, what a probation counsellor (for example) did, how much time he spent with his clients, how many clients he reached, what attitudes he had, what help he gave, what precise services he provided, etc.

### 3. The Crime Analysis Team

- (a) The Crime Analysis Team proved to be an effective mechanism in the cities where it was able to exercise its major functions, where it was organizationally located in the mayor's office (or with a city agency) and where it was not cut off from operating

by other agencies. To insure greater effectiveness of the Crime Analysis Team, LEAA should stress the importance of an organizational locus in the mayor's office and should require cooperation with the Team by agencies receiving LEAA funds.

- (b) The question of the evaluation responsibility is a delicate one, but it seems that some sacrifice of excellence is not an exorbitant price to pay for a developed in-house city evaluation capability and for a better chance at achieving long-term agency coordination. Evaluation should remain a function of the Crime Analysis Team.
- (c) Team transience was a problem in Impact, both in terms of staffing and in terms of the accumulation of enough power for the Team to be effective. Perhaps the Team should be funded on a more permanent basis, as it was in Dallas, to ensure power with other agencies and the retention of expert staff. Power and loyalty tend to be tied to the more permanent institutions, and the transience of Team activities was a handicap to CAT effectiveness in Impact.
- (d) Crime Analysis Teams should be required to hire at least one professional evaluator at program start-up, so as to ensure (1) the coordination of crime-oriented planning (and especially project selection) with evaluation planning, (2) timely evaluation planning and reporting, (3) the collection of baseline data, and (4) the feedback of early evaluation findings into on-going planning for new projects.
- (e) Crime Analysis Teams should include some members of local criminal justice agencies; this would ensure better agency coordination and also a greater likelihood of the propagation of planning and evaluation techniques.
- (f) The Denver Crime Analysis Team furnishes a model for future programs. All in all, Denver's was the most effective Team performance from the viewpoints of planning and evaluation, successful implementation, agency coordination, community involvement, innovation and institutionalization. A study of the Team's strategies and efforts, successes and failures should provide an important basis for future endeavors in this area (see MITRE's history of the Impact program in Denver, MTR-6838).

#### 4. National-Level Planning, Evaluation and Administration

- (a) Although program planning did take place at the national level in Impact, there was not enough time to follow through thoroughly, nor to perform the crucial task of evaluation planning.

Future programs should make this area an important priority. In brief, expert professional attention needs to be directed toward establishing an overall evaluation plan, answering the questions of what is to be done and how it is to be done, and specifying mechanisms for logically linking observed changes in measures to program activities. This report has addressed, in many different contexts, the difficulties of such an endeavor. Nevertheless, it needs to be done, for future national programs, and it needs to be done concurrently with other program planning so that data collection for this effort can proceed normally and can be scheduled in a coordinated fashion with other data collection activities. Despite the problems of attribution in a national program, such programs should be structured so that the greatest possible confidence can be attained in the linkage of outcomes to program activities.

- (b) A national implementation monitoring system needs to be installed (perhaps the one designed by MITRE and discussed earlier--see page 61 above--might furnish the basis for such a system) to provide national planners and evaluators with an instrument for:
- examining initial implementation results and making adjustments in planning and evaluation objectives;
  - linking program activities to program effects; and
  - establishing an iterative and dynamic planning, implementation and evaluation process at the national level rather than the current static one of discrete, successive phases.
- (c) Implicit in such an iterative COPIE-cycle at the national level is the need for national evaluators to be able to channel information directly to a national group, such as the original LEAA Policy Board, with power to effect needed implementation changes. The demise of the LEAA Policy Board was a serious loss to Impact in June of 1973. Future programs should ensure the continued existence of such a body throughout the life of the program, with full powers to require the phase-out or modification of obviously unsuccessful projects.
- (d) National evaluation planning should provide for the availability of technical assistance in evaluation not only to project evaluators, but also to various managers and to operational people needing to deal with the various phases of evaluation and with the interpretation of evaluative findings.

- (e) Planners should build into a future program real mechanisms for lateral coordination across federal agencies. These mechanisms need to be developed at the working, planning and evaluation levels; otherwise they will remain only well-meaning utterances of top-level interest which will bog down almost immediately (as in Impact) before any real coordination can take place. Yet a great many federal agencies have programs that relate and combine with LEAA interests: HEW handles most juvenile prevention programs, HUD develops tenant security programs and is directly concerned with matters of environmental design; the Department of Labor operates pre-trial intervention projects and ex-offender rehabilitation projects; NIMH/NIDA is intimately concerned with drug programs which it operates jointly with the LEAA (although very little substantive coordination appears to take place between the two agencies). This seems to be an important area, promising increased and more effective impact for all of the programs involved. Before embarking on the implementation of a new Impact-type program, the Attorney General, the Office of Management and Budget and the LEAA should convene a symposium involving all of the agencies with kindred work programs to identify and develop mechanisms for the joint planning, coordination and evaluation of their related efforts.
- (f) There are real dangers for the marshalling of new knowledge about crime and about anti-crime effectiveness if Congress allows new agencies to proliferate, given the existing problems of coordination among all agencies, and among federal agencies in particular. Steps should be taken immediately to ensure coordination between any newly created agencies (such as the National Center for the Prevention and Control of Rape, located within HEW) and LEAA. The current effort to control the drug problem clearly demonstrates the present inability of large bureaucracies to coordinate; it would be highly unfortunate if these failures should begin to spread to other criminal justice areas as well.
- (g) Program evaluation for future programs should strive to avoid at least some of the knowledge pitfalls encountered in Impact. A basic difficulty here is the action/research conflict: action programs are funded and operated to provide services, not to test hypotheses. Research must operate in a fashion which does not interfere with the delivery of services. Program operators cannot be overburdened with data collection tasks. Services have to be offered where needs are greatest, and changes in service delivery must be made when operational needs change, despite effects on the research endeavor in progress. Likewise, the research is tied to the delivery of services; delays in project implementation make for delays in the research.



Further, New Federalism's effectiveness in eliciting local priorities carried with it, in Impact, the disadvantage of generating a bewildering multiplicity of highly different projects (based on the individual criteria used for selection of problem areas, as well as on the general socio-geographic make-up of each city) which made comparative evaluation very difficult. To develop research knowledge then, in the context of a future social action program, requires some islands, at least, within that program, of specific replicated efforts to be performed in a rigorously experimental fashion.

- (h) New Federalism should be somewhat modified in future programs. LEAA should continue its recent felicitous changes in policy which have included a stronger leadership role, an upsurge of nationally-sponsored demonstration programs, a more powerful research and evaluation focus, and a tendency to begin attaching at least a few strings to its grants. As discussed above in other recommendations, planning and evaluation need to be tied at least nominally to milestones and products, implementation needs to be monitored and agencies need to be coordinated. Progress in criminal justice capability comes at that price. However, New Federalism should not, in any sense, be abandoned; it secured real expression of local priorities in the Impact program. It cannot, however, be allowed to impede both program objectives and the long-term goals of crime control. While it is necessary to continue to pursue better and more comfortable relations with the states, LEAA should not permit its leadership role to be passed to state planning agencies and local regional planning boards.
- (i) Turnover of high-level program personnel was a serious problem in Impact. Although turnover itself cannot be helped, program administrative structures should be so strengthened that the locus of power remains firmly at the federal level over the duration of any future federal/state/city program.
- (j) Not much has been learned about how citizens feel with respect to criminal justice programs. In Impact, no regular surveys were planned, and in consequence only ad hoc information is now available about community reactions to Impact efforts. Even though a major reason (perhaps the major reason) for the promulgation of national programs is the reduction of citizen fears of crime and victimization, almost nothing is known about how and whether those fears were affected by the program. Since community attitudes are highly important for the effectiveness of criminal justice programs, it is recommended that a future national program include systematic before/after surveys of target area communities for all projects involving community/criminal justice system interaction.

## 5. Policy Formation at the National-Level

- (a) In demonstrating the COPIE-cycle, LEAA asked the Impact cities to go to the sources of their crime problems, substantiate them, prioritize them, address them, and evaluate them. The kinds of benefits which accrued to those cities that did so make it seem that LEAA might fruitfully initiate a similar process at the national level. LEAA should establish, at least for its discretionary fund program, an iterative process of national planning, research, implementation and evaluation which allows a coherent delineation of what needs to be done and formulates reasonable criteria for assessing achievements.
- (b) Such a process should include:
- an on-going planning, evaluation and priority-setting function which generates policy goals and receives inputs from all LEAA programs;
  - a structured research function (addressing determined policy goal priorities) which includes:
    - basic theoretical research on priority crime problems;
    - system research (i.e., applied efforts to improve criminal justice capabilities); and
    - carefully designed experiments to establish a more solid basis for policy;
  - a demonstration function (such as the one which presently exists) to test new ideas which have successfully passed the research and development stage;
  - a crisis-management function which features large-scale urban action programs in the public interest utilizing currently acquired anti-crime knowledge to improve system capability, to reduce crime and public insecurity, and to provide insights into the value and relevance of program and policy goals in the real world; and finally,
  - a cost/benefit and policy analysis function.
- (c) The planning and evaluation capability is needed at the national level to ensure that programs undertaken are in the service of policy goals and that the likely results of such programs will bring knowledge about the progress made in reaching those goals and about the relevance of the goals themselves. Research,

demonstration and crisis-management program results should feed back into the planning process where evaluation findings should be related to policy via analysis, and where the various options possible in the pursuit of the same goal should be subjected to cost/benefit study. The policy and cost/benefit analysis functions would thus be the final steps in the on-going revision and updating of policy goals and priorities. In this way, research findings like those of the Pilot City program, or Impact, and knowledge assessments like those of the National Evaluation Program, would have a more prolonged and meaningful impact on the formation of policy and on the delineation of new assumptions, new goals and new actions to achieve those goals.

6. Priority Areas for Criminal Justice Research Emerging from the Impact Program Experience

(a) The Rehabilitation of Offenders

It is commonly argued today that rehabilitation efforts have failed and that incarceration or incapacitation of all serious offenders is the only feasible solution to the problem of rising crime rates. What has, in fact, been stated is that no rehabilitation programs have been able to produce incontrovertible evidence that they were effective for all offenders.<sup>3</sup> The problem, therefore, is as much one of evaluation failure as of rehabilitation failure, and there is, in fact, considerable evidence that some methods are effective for some offenders.<sup>4</sup> MITRE's intensive supervision findings showed that--within the framework of analysis possible in a program like Impact--recidivism was indeed being reduced by some projects.

The problem, however, is that incarceration is not really a feasible alternative to rehabilitative diversion, probation and community correction programs; it would cost much more than the public is willing to pay. The present situation is one of high and rising prison overcrowding, of cutbacks in public spending, of rejection of bond issues by voters, of refusal by state legislatures to vote appropriations for prison facilities, and of the blocking of prison construction by law suits and community resistance. There is no lobby and no constituency for prison-building. But if the present rate of incarceration were

<sup>3</sup>Martinson, R. "What Works? - Questions and Answers About Prison Reform," The Public Interest, Number 35, Spring 1974, pages 22-54.

<sup>4</sup>Palmer, T. "Martinson Revisited," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Volume 12, Number 2, July 1975, pages 133-152.

increased by only 10 percent, this would double the number of prisoners committed each year, at an incremental cost of many billions of dollars in new facilities, maintenance, and food service costs for prisoners. Incarceration would thus be a feasible alternative only if the public were willing to pay for it and it does not presently appear that this is indeed the case. In truth, the only penal reforms likely to find immediate favor are those which do not cost money.

In view of this situation, it seems highly important to improve the effectiveness of those rehabilitative interventions which do work for some offenders in given settings. The first step in such an effort is clearly to perform precisely the kind of rigorous experiment which has not been hitherto available in corrections research and which has led to the new gloom about the possibilities of rehabilitation.

There are numerous assumptions, related to the efficacy of specific treatment modalities (for example, transactional analysis or reality therapy) and general treatment approaches (for example, intensive supervision or community-based supervision) which underlie and determine the nature of correctional projects. If these assumptions are to move toward empirical certitude and thus gain in replicability and generalizability, it will be necessary to specifically address the assumptions in a formal research context rather than in the context of programs reflecting the political and administrative pressures which have molded them. This means, first of all, that the program must be large enough to produce some statistically meaningful results, and also that the shape of the program, its implementation, operations, and evaluation must reflect the kinds of research controls and constraints that are the necessary conditions of sound empirical results. For a correctional program, this means cooperation and commitment to the goals of the evaluative research by the courts (to insure that client selection and assignment conform to the research design), by project management (to insure that the treatment is efficiently implemented in its specified form), and by project personnel (to insure that reliable and detailed data related to the nature and extent of treatment can be gathered on a client-by-client basis).

The LEAA should undertake to fund such research on a priority basis. There are two major reasons why this should be done:

- (1) It is the lack of such research which led to the recent finding that the evaluative results of most rehabilitative interventions are indicative neither of success nor of failure but are simply uninterpretable; and

(2) The alternative to such research (and to a program developing and increasing the effectiveness of current rehabilitative interventions) is not incarceration (which the public is unwilling to subsidize) but a worsening of prison conditions such that incarceration will constitute cruel and unusual punishment (as it has already been ruled in the prisons of Alabama); the wholesale freeing of offenders will then appear preferable to imprisoning them in such places, and it is this which is liable to be the real alternative to rehabilitation.

(b) Research on Quantitative Methods for Estimating Crime Levels

One of the more significant methodological issues in the area of criminal justice research and evaluation involves the development of quantitative methods for demonstrating the impact of anti-crime programs on crime levels. The issue derives from the simple fact that crime occurs in an uncontrollable universe and, thus, it is critical to have a reliable estimate or expectation of what crime would have been (in this uncontrollable universe) if any particular program or treatment had not taken place. Recently, a number of regression and stochastic models have been developed which are designed to give projections of crime levels. As the criminal justice area continues to employ and find uses for a variety of quantitative techniques developed in other disciplines, it is likely that the development and use of models for crime rate estimation will proliferate. A central methodological task related to these developments will be the determination of the necessary assumptions and parameters of these models and, most important, the determination of their relative predictive utility. Without reliable estimates of expected crime levels, it is difficult to see how treatment effects on crime rates can be demonstrated. This was a major problem in Impact, and it will again be a major problem for future Impact-type urban programs, yet little is known at this point in time about the relative utility of various models and their specific limitations. If the use of these models is to proceed in a manner which can provide the greatest payoff for evaluative purposes in anti-crime programs, LEAA should undertake a serious critique and test of these models.

APPENDIX TO  
VOLUME I  
(EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)  
OF THE FINAL REPORT

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