

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CRIME AND HOUSING IN A METROPOLITAN AREA:

A STUDY OF THE PATTERNS OF RESIDENTIAL CRIME

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study analyzed the patterns of stranger-to-stranger crime committed on residential premises in urban and suburban areas. This was accomplished through examination of police and other criminal justice records, a search of relevant literature, a household survey that interviewed nearly 1,000 persons including victims and non-victims of residential crime, a field observation study of 39 separate areas of the Boston SMSA and interviews with 100 offenders.

The study determined that the concept of residential crime is diffuse and that there is a considerable variance in the frequency, distribution, and consequences of specific offenses. The most common of the serious residential offenses is burglary, followed at a considerable distance by robbery.

These crimes tend to be unequally distributed geographically and among different segments of the population. The incidence of each is disproportionately high in the central areas of SMSA, this being especially true for robbery.

The average loss in a residential burglary was on the order of $300 and except for multiple victims, the economic consequences did not appear serious to the individual. The fear engendered by residential crime was its most important consequence for many people.

The interviews with burglary offenders indicated that in general they did little planning, were not highly skilled, and did not make large profits from their crime. The interviewees were divided into categories based on age, race, and drug use. Those under 18 were apt to be unskilled, to hit targets close to home, to make lower profit from individual scores and to be motivated by "excitement" as well as by economic considerations. The middle and older age groups were typically more mobile and highly effective, though not highly skilled, burglars. The older group (25 and older) selected their targets with more care, preferring affluence to vulnerability.

Apart from differences in housing type selected, there was no great difference between white and black burglars. The principle difference between drug users and non-drug users was the frequency with which the former worked.

An analysis was undertaken of various environmental factors thought to influence the distribution of residential crime rates among areas. Those that appeared to be

most closely associated were affluence, vulnerability (including level of physical access, occupancy, visibility and social cohesion) and location. The last was a proxy for a variety of socio-economic factors which cluster in the inner city. Factors such as housing type, regular police patrol, street lighting and neighborhood traffic patterns did not seem to greatly influence the residential crime rate.

In general, crime rates were inversely proportional to distance from the center of the metropolitan area. However, in the inner areas vulnerability was considered a more important factor than affluence, whereas this relationship was reversed in the outer areas.

It was determined that the relative weight of factors varied among areas of the city and that the probability of residential burglary victimization follows an ascending hierarchy:

1. Areas with a highly cohesive population or a concentration of secure buildings, regardless of location.
2. Outlying non-affluent areas
3. Outlying affluent areas
4. Inner city areas that are not highly vulnerable
5. Inner city areas that are highly vulnerable.

Large housing project areas were virtually the only ones with a significant amount of residential robbery. In these areas the most likely explanation for the high rates of residential robbery and burglary was the presence of a large youth population.

Within areas of comparable crime rate, victimization tended to fall most heavily on the relatively affluent and those whose dwellings were unoccupied for a great portion of the time. In general, most dwellings had substandard access security for portals; but the rates of victimization were less for those whose doors, locks, and windows were at least of minimum standard. In general, awareness of and concern about being burglarized was found to parallel both the burglary experience of an area and of the individual. Most people's opinions of how to improve security were based on traditional notions of police patrol, even though this type of protection was found to be ineffective because of the low visibility of residential crimes.

The general conclusion of the study was that, in order to reduce the rate of residential crime it is necessary to undertake programs directed at offender motivation and crime opportunity. Regarding motivation, the criminal justice system does not appear to deter criminal behavior,

either through fear of punishment or by rehabilitating adjudicated offenders. However, the offender population for specific crimes such as burglary appears to be relatively small and known, so that programs directed toward them might produce major dividends in crime reduction. The most effective type programs appear to be those pertaining to drug treatment and employment opportunities.

Strategies to minimize crime opportunity must take account of a variety of interactive factors related to specific offenders, crimes, areas, and victims. A program designed to reduce crime in one type area may have no effect in another and in some instances may displace offenders functionally or geographically and shift crime risk to other victims. The most effective strategy would appear to be to raise the level of dwelling access security, even though the exact method must vary, depending on the area. In some cases an increase in the number of security guards, in others higher standards for doors and locks, and in still others the installation of central station alarms would be appropriate.

In many respects, the character and control of residential crime differs from street crime. Residential crime is less dangerous, but because it is dispersed and non-visible, it is less amenable to control by police methods. Its control largely depends on citizen actions, both as individuals and in groups. If citizens were fully informed of the nature of residential crime, they would be better able to assist in its control.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT STUDY

This study of "crime in and around residences" grows out of the concern felt by various agencies of the federal government over the incidence of stranger-to-stranger crime committed in and around dwellings. Both the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (DHUD) are vitally interested in reducing the level of this type of crime and as a result have undertaken a four phase study of which the present project is Phase I.

B. OBJECTIVES OF THE PHASE I STUDY

Phase I was required to determine the nature and pattern of common crimes committed against residential properties in urban and suburban areas. The tactics, conditions, and circumstances related to the crime were to be investigated in order to assist DHUD and LEAA in establishing guidelines for residential security.

The study was expected to focus on the relationship between such pertinent factors as neighborhood environment, characteristics of persons and residences victimized, details of specific crimes, and criminal

behavior. The study was to encompass both high and low crime rate areas in order to assess the characteristics of each as they relate to residential crime. It was also to include non-victims as well as victims, to determine whether they have different characteristics or use different protective measures.

C. RESEARCH DESIGN

1. General

To accomplish the objective of the project, the study has sought to identify, describe, and where possible to explain in a systematic and quantitative manner, the rates and patterns of residential crimes, and their correlation to key variables. Rates are here defined as the number of offenses per unit (generally measured in crimes per 1000 households per year), patterns are the chronological and spatial distribution of rates and distinctive characteristics of residential crime in terms of method and target of attack. Correlative factors are conditions and circumstances which appear to be related to, and are possible explanations of the rates and patterns of residential crime.

2. Methodology

The setting for this study was Metropolitan Boston. It is not, however, meant to be a definitive account of residential crime in the entire Boston area. Rather, the study has examined representative areas of the Boston

SMSA. In effect this is a microcosmic look at the residential crime problem. As the report will make clear, accumulations of gross data across large geographic units often obscures as much as it reveals. Policies based on such data may be inappropriate when applied in specific situations. Of late criminal justice research has begin to move away from the general study of "crime" and "criminals" to the study of specific types of criminal behavior such as robbery or burglary. This study carries the trend a step further by adopting an area specific approach wherein an analysis is undertaken of the crime experience of various types of urban environments.

In order to gather information and test hypotheses, the study employed five basic tools: (1) a search of the literature, both popular and professional; (2) an analysis of police records pertaining to residential crime; (3) a survey of households which included both a detailed interview with victims and non-victims of residential crime, and an audit and site survey of the security aspects of dwelling units ; (4) a field observation study of the characteristics of selected geographic areas to determine the comparative security features of each; and (5) a study of residential offender behavior, including detailed interviews with and an analysis of the criminal history of 100 adjudicated burglars.

Tasks 2, 3, and 4 were closely related and form the core of the project. In essence they comprise an analysis of the residential crime experience in thirty-nine geographic areas of the Boston SMSA.[1] These areas were chosen based upon stratifications of housing type, race, income and crime rate.

Thirty-six of the locales are in the city of Boston proper, where each comprises one of the city's 824 police reporting areas, commonly called RA's. (See Map IA.) The RA's are the smallest subdivision for which crime records are kept. The next largest unit of crime analysis is the neighborhood, of which there are 81 in Boston. The neighborhoods generally comprise coherent social, economic, and geographic communities. The next level unit is the police district; the twelve districts[2] roughly correspond to the historic divisions of Boston as they were incorporated into the city proper and are the present administrative subdivisions of the city police department (see Map IB).

A district, therefore, is a group of neighborhoods and a neighborhood is a group of RA's. Within the city the terms area, neighborhood, and district will refer to the units described above.

Suburban police do not use the reporting area concept. The suburban areas are actually census tracts for which crime data was especially collected for this

MAP 1A



SELECTED POLICE REPORTING AREAS

CITY OF BOSTON

surveyed areas

non surveyed areas

MAP 1B



NEIGHBORHOODS WITHIN
BOSTON POLICE DISTRICTS

Broken lines--Police Districts
Solid lines --Neighborhoods

project (see Map 1C). Table 1.1 identifies all the studied areas by neighborhood and police district.

The first step in the analysis (Task 2) was to gather police data on all residential robberies and burglaries[3] reported in each area between 1/1/69 and 9/30/71[4]. Next, from the original 39 areas, 18 (see Maps 1A and 1C) were selected, from within the stratified categories, for further analysis. This took the form of a household survey (Task 3) of victims and non-victims and a site survey of the environment (Task 4). In addition, the offender interviews (Task 5) were structured to gather data on areas of the type analyzed in Tasks 2 to 4. Efforts were made throughout to interface each task with previous research identified through the literature search (Task 1).

The report that follows is organized to present the findings of each task individually and as an integrated whole. Chapter II delineates the nature of the residential crime problem. Chapter III presents previous research findings on the subject and is supported by Appendix A, which contains the bibliography. Chapter IV discusses offender behavior, with reference to additional material from the offender interviews in Appendix B. Chapter V examines the influence of environmental factors, with detailed information from the site survey and various



SUBURBAN REPORTING AREAS

MAP 1C

quantitative analysis contained in Appendix C. Chapter VI is concerned with the characteristics of victim and non-victim persons; Chapter VII, victimized and non-victimized structures. The basic data for these two chapters are the results of the household survey contained in Appendix D. Chapter VIII presents overall conclusions and the policy implications of the findings.

TABLE 1.1A

LOCATION OF REPORTING AREAS BY

POLICE DISTRICT AND NEIGHBORHOOD - CITY OF BOSTON

POLICE DISTRICT	REPORTING AREA	NEIGHBORHOOD
1	62	West End
	70*	Beacon Hill
	83*	North End
3	421	Mattapan
	447*	Mt. Bowdoin
	467	Mattapan
	470	Mattapan
4	135	Beacon Commonwealth
	622*	Kenmore Sq.-B.U.
	143	Prudential-Copley Sq.
	145*	Prudential-Copley Sq.
	166*	South Bay-City Hosp. Castle Sq.-South End
5	530	Hyde Park - Readville
	720	West Roxbury
6	196*	Broadway
	214	Broadway
	232	Telegraph Hill-Beach Front

*Household Survey Area

POLICE DISTRICT	REPORTING AREA	NEIGHBORHOOD
7	824	Maverick-Central Sq.
9	265*	Sav Mor
	296	Sav Mor
	297	Washington Park
	306	Grove Hall West
	307*	Grove Hall West
	308	Washington Park
	315*	Grove Hall West
	319	Grove Hall West
10	291*	Jackson Square
	589	Mission Hill Housing Proj.
	600	Mission Hill Housing Proj.
	602	Mission Hill Proper
11	256*	Columbia Point
13	505 *	Forest Hill
	653	Moss Hill Sect.
14	775 *	Chestnut Hill-Aberdeen
	779	Brighton Center
15	57*	City Square

TABLE 1.1B

LOCATION OF REPORTING AREAS BY

SUBURBAN TOWN AND NEIGHBORHOOD

CITY	REPORTING AREA	NEIGHBORHOOD
NEWTON	736	CHESTNUT HILL
	745	NEWTONVILLE - AUBURNDALE
NORWOOD	134	CENTRAL NORWOOD-WILLET POND

INTRODUCTION

FOOTNOTES

1. Three areas (196, 470, and 745) are actually two RA's combined into one.

2. Two districts were recently combined, but for crime analysis purposes the city continues to use the 12-district framework.

3. Data on murder, rape, arson, and vandalism was collected by a different method (see pp. 23-24).

4. City police data for the last three months of 1971 was not available at the time of the records search. Since it was necessary to obtain victim data for the household survey, there was no opportunity to wait for it to be compiled. Suburban police data was not available for 1969, but was for all of 1970 and 1971.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF RESIDENTIAL CRIME

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CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF RESIDENTIAL CRIME

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will attempt to define the nature of residential crime, the problems in researching it, its distribution and its consequences. The objective of this section is to present the dimensions of the problem. Discussion of the explanatory variables is left for later chapters.

B. THE DEFINITION OF RESIDENTIAL CRIME

Residential crime is a somewhat amorphous term. The working definition for this study is "stranger-to-stranger crime committed in and around dwellings in urban and suburban areas." The term "around dwellings" was defined as areas attached to housing units which form logical extensions of dwelling space, such as hallways, yards, or the grounds of housing projects. The criteria for inclusion is whether the property in question is under the control of owners, occupants, or managers. Areas under the control of local government, such as streets and alleys, are excluded.

The establishment of a category of crime based on a precise definition of place of occurrence presents fundamental problems to the investigator. In general, the criminal law, crime statistics, and criminological research

are not organized around the concept of residential crime. For example, in defining the crime of rape, the law requires no specification of locale; the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) do not contain a category of residential rape; and studies of the criminal histories of rapists do not single out those who might choose to attack exclusively or primarily strangers on residential premises[1]. The same is true for many other categories of offense - murder[2], assault[3], larceny[4], and vandalism[5], for example - in that the location of the crime is problematic, insofar as its occurrence on a residential premise is more likely to be by chance than by design.

Two crimes, robbery and burglary, are exceptions to the above generalization. The UCR contain a category of residential robbery. However, much of the so-called residential robbery does not involve direct attack on a dwelling, but more typically the victim (often a non-resident) is attacked in an adjacent area, such as a hallway. In some respects, these crimes tend to resemble street robbery, and the fact that they occur on residential premises is often a matter of chance. Other residential robberies may begin as burglaries, but because of an unexpected encounter between offender and victim, they become robberies, although, as this study will suggest, "home invasion" robberies are comparatively rare.

The prototype of residential crime is the offense of burglary. In its original common law definition, burglary involved the breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another at night with the intent to commit a felony therein.[6] In this respect, it encompasses all the elements that the public tends to associate with residential crime - forceable entry into a dwelling at a time when the occupants could be expected to be home, for the purpose of committing a serious offense. At present in the United States, however, under UCR definition and often by state statute, the offense of burglary can be committed against non-dwelling structures, can occur at any time of the day, and does not require a forceable entry. Indeed, nearly half of the burglaries reported annually do not take place in dwellings[7], and the overwhelming number of residential burglaries are committed at a time when the occupants are away. In many instances, the dollar value of the loss is of an amount which, if sustained in an ordinary theft, would not constitute a felony crime.

The fact that the concept of residential crime is not clearly defined in law, administration, or research, has presented difficulties in integrating the present study with other work in the field. For example, criminological literature discusses person or property offenders, not the cross-cutting category of residential offenders. Court records deal with burglars, but not residential burglars <u>per se</u>. In sum, it must be borne in mind that while there are residential crimes, there is no clearly delineated category of criminal behavior which can be labeled residential crime.

C. THE MEASUREMENT OF RESIDENTIAL CRIME

In attempting to describe the extent of residential crime, account must be taken of methods of computing crime statistics. There are two means by which a crime rate may be calculated: (1) studies of crime or offense rates, largely derived from the number of crimes reported to the police in a particular jurisdiction, (2) studies of criminal or offender rates, largely derived from records of persons who are apprehended for criminal or delinquent behavior in a particular jurisdiction.

These two methods will yield different results when applied to the same geographic unit. For example, a large number of crimes might be reported in Neighborhood X, but very few residents of the neighborhood might be charged by the police. Thus, Neighborhood X might have a high offense rate, but a low offender rate.

Another consideration is that the basis for most criminological analysis is official statistics pertaining to crimes reported to or arrests made by the police. However, there is a significant amount of crime which, for various reasons, is never reflected in official statistics. Indeed, the President's Crime Commission estimated that the actual rate of the common residential crime of burglary was about three times greater than the official rate.[8]

An annual survey of a random sample of Boston households calculated victimization rates for residential burglary.

Table 2.1 compares their findings to the official police figures.

TABLE 2.1

COMPARISON OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATES--1970

	Per 1000 Households
Official Rate[1]	32
Survey Rate[2]	120

[1]See report of the Police Commissioner, City of Boston, 1970, Table IV.

[2]MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, Citizen Attitude Survey, 1970.

This finding parallels the Presidential Commission report noted earlier and was generally duplicated in nine other cities which underwent similar surveys as part of a national study.[9]

While the problem of unreported crime is known to researchers, the prevailing view has been

> It is not necessary to know about every act that occurs. Official information would still be adequate for most crimes to show the relative variation in crime rate in different city areas, providing that the offenses and the offenders in these areas have roughly the same chance of coming to official notice and action. There is increasing evidence. . .that this assumption is probably true, especially for the more serious offenses which are not confined in the family context."[10]

Victimization data gathered by the household survey phase of the present project was used as a check on the accuracy of police crime reporting figures. As expected from previous surveys, all RA's reported more offenses than police figures. However, in two officially low crime RA's the survey uncovered a sufficient amount of unreported burglary to raise doubts whether the relative variation in actual crime parallels the variation in reported figures.

In RA 196, the recorded rate for the first nine months of 1971 was 3/1000. Yet, from a total of 43 non-victimized households interviewed, six burglaries were sustained in the equivalent time period. In RA 447 the official rate for the first nine months of 1971 was 10/1000, but of 68 non-victim households surveyed, ten sustained burglaries during that period. RA 196 is a city housing project. A more extensive survey reported for a 12-month period in 1970-71 a residential burglary rate of 552/1000 households as compared with the official rate of 12/1000.[11] In later sections of the present study, analysis of similar RA's will frequently find 196 and 447 standing out from their group. It is likely, therefore, that these are not low burglary rate areas. If, however, the present research had relied solely on the official rate, a number of possible false hypotheses could have been generated to explain this unusual situation. This suggests than in undertaking criminological research based on

official statistics, it is useful to conduct validation studies.

D. THE DISTRIBUTION OF RESIDENTIAL CRIME

1. By Category

Of the serious residential crimes, burglary is the most common and robbery a distant second. Table 2.2 provides a comparison of offense rates for the two most common type crimes. Table 2.3 provides similar data for offender rates for all burglars and robbers.

TABLE 2.2

RESIDENTIAL ROBBERY AND BURGLARY OFFENSES

1970

	U. S. A.[1]		BOSTON[2]	
OFFENSE	ESTIMATED GROSS NO.	RATE PER 100,000	GROSS NO.	RATE PER 100,000
Residential Burglary	1,247,000	614	6,985	1,089
Residential Robbery	41,800	21	325	51

[1]FBI UCR 1970, Tables 1 and 19.

[2]Report of the Police Commissioner, City of Boston, 1970, Table IV.

TABLE 2.3

ROBBERY AND BURGLARY OFFENDERS - 1970

	U. S. A.[1]		B O S T O N[2]	
TYPE OF OFFENDER	ESTIMATED GROSS NO. ARRESTED	RATE PER 100,000	GROSS NO. ARRESTED	RATE PER 100,000
Burglars	285,000	188	971	151
Robbers	88,000	58	631	98

[1]FBI UCR 1970, Table 23.

[2]Report of the Police Commissioner, City of Boston, 1970, Table VIII.

Male youths, particularly from the non-white segments of the population, are heavily represented as offenders in the leading residential crime categories.[12] See Tables 2.4 and 2.5.

TABLE 2.4

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS ARRESTED FOR BURGLARY - 1970

	Nationally[1]	U.S. Cities[2]	U.S. Suburbs[3]	Boston[4]
% Male	95	95	95	97
Median Age	17	17	17	18
% Non-white	34	39	18	45

SOURCE: FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1970

1. Tables 28, 30, 32.
2. Cities are defined as municipalities with over 2500 population, Tables 34, 36, 38.
3. Tables 40, 42, 43.
4. SOURCE: Annual Report Police Commissioner for the City of Boston 1970, Table VIII.

TABLE 2.5

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS ARRESTED FOR ROBBERY - 1970

	Nationally[1]	U.S. Cities[2]	U.S. Suburbs[3]	Boston[4]
% Male	94%	94%	95%	93%
Median age	20	19	20	20
% Non-white	65%	68%	40%	65%

SOURCE: FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1970

1. Tables 28, 30, 32.
2. Tables 34, 36, 38.
3. Tables 40, 42, 43.
4. SOURCE: Annual Report Police Commissioner for the City of Boston 1970, Table VIII.

The crimes of robbery and burglary are reported under sub-categories of residential attack, others are not. For purposes of the present study, special analysis was made of several other offenses to determine what proportion of them would be of a residential nature (i.e., stranger to stranger on residential premises). The results follow:

Rape. 92 rapes (12% of the city total) were reported to the police in the 36 Boston areas studied. Only six met the definition of a residential crime. Given that other studies (See Note 1) have shown that most rapes occur between previously acquainted persons, this finding is probably typical.

Murder. 28 murders (9% of the city total)were reported in the 36 studied areas of which three were possibly residential. However, given the small sample size and the gravity of the offense, a further analysis was made of all 321 murders which occured in Boston in the years 1969-1971, inclusive. This disclosed that seven were clearly perpetrated by strangers on residential premises, five were in connection with a robbery, and two with an apparent burglary. In an additional twelve cases (comprising 13 victims) the victim was apparently killed on residential premises, but the perpetrator and motives are unclear. It is not likely that all of the killers were strangers since, in some instances, the victim was thought to have been in a quarrel just prior to his death. In

others the victim was apparently a prostitute or drug pusher so that the crime may have arisen out of "professional" disputes. In some of the cases which occured inside the dwelling, there was evidence of an unlawful entry, but this does not guarantee that the perpetrator was a stranger. In any event the number of incidents was so few that it is clear that the probability of becoming a residential murder victim is in the order of one in 100,000 annually for the average Bostonian.

Arson. Arson is a potentially serious but a comparatively rare crime. Only 3 respondents in the household survey reported sustaining an arson against residential premises. This would comprise an annual rate of approximately 1/1000 households.

Vandalism. Most acts of vandalism are usually minor in nature. However, it is a relatively common crime. In 1969 a survey of a random sample of Boston households (n=500) reported an annual vandalism rate of 62/1000. The household survey conducted for this study reported a rate of 80/1000 households.

2. By Time

It is apparent from Table 2.6 that the number of reported crimes has greatly increased both locally and nationally. In 1966 the President's Crime Commission estimated that about half of all robberies and two thirds of all burglaries went unrecorded. As Table 2.6 indicates,

between 1966 and 1970 reported residential burglary increased 150% and robbery nearly 300% in Boston. Despite this increase, victimization studies, including those conducted for this project, continue to find much unreported crime. Therefore increases appear to be real and not just due to improved reporting.

In contrast, while arrests nationally have followed a similar pattern of steady increase, locally they dipped at mid-decade and then rose back to former levels. (See Table 2.7.)

TABLE 2.6

OFFENSE RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION
SELECTED RESIDENTIAL CRIMES

CATEGORY		1962	1966	1970
Residential Burglary	U.S.A.	207+	343++	614
	Boston	248	434++	1089
Residential Robbery	U.S.A.	4	6	21
	Boston	5+	13++	51

+Estimate based on population of 675,000
++Estimate based on population of 650,000
SOURCE: FBI UCR 1962, 1966, 1970
Annual Reports Boston Police Department, 1962, 1966, 1970.

TABLE 2.7

OFFENDER RATES PER 100,000
SELECTED RESIDENTIAL CRIMES

CATEGORY		1962	1966	1970
Burglars	U.S.A.	132	145	188
	Boston	154+	128++	151
Robbers	U.S.A.	32	34	58
	Boston	75+	64++	98

+Estimate based on population of 675,000
++Estimate based on population of 650,000
SOURCE: FBI UCR 1962, 1966, 1970
Annual Reports Boston Police Department, 1962, 1966, 1970.

The present study determined that residential burglaries were more likely to occur during the week and in the daytime. Residential robbery, on the other hand, was more common at night and on the weekend. There were no discernable patterns by month or season. Specific details are discussed in Chapter IV.

3. By Area

Among the regions of the United States, robbery rates are currently highest in the Northeast and lowest in the South, while burglary rates are highest in the West, with the other regions showing no significant variations from one another.[13]

Within any given region, it has been found that crime rates are higher in central cities than in suburbs. For the crime of robbery, approximately 10% of which is

residential in nature,[14] according to the Uniform Crime Reports, cities over 250,000 in population had a robbery rate about ten times that of suburbs in 1970. Burglary, of which nearly 60% is residential, occurs about twice as frequently in cities of over a quarter of a million as in suburbs.[15] Chapter V will discuss in detail the spatial distribution of residential crime within the metropolitan area.

4. By Population Characteristics

In terms of offense rates, the burden of crime is not evenly distributed across the population. A NORC study[16] indicated that victimization falls most heavily on low-income and non-white groups. When specific categories of crime are considered, it is found that among whites, burglary victimization rates decline as income rises, while among blacks, the reverse is true. Robbery victimization tends to decline as income rises among both races. See Table 2.8.

TABLE 2.8

DISTRIBUTION OF CRIME
BY RACE AND INCOME
(rates per 100,000 population)

	White				Non-White		
Crime	$0-$2,999	$3,000-$5,999	$6,000-$9,999	Above $10,000	$0-$2,999	$3,000-$5,999	Above $6,000
Burglary	1,310	958	764	763	1,336	1,261	2,056
Robbery	116	91	42	34	278	240	121

Source: Phillip H. Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1967), Table 14.

The NORC study also provided data regarding the extent of multiple victimization which further indicates that crime is unevenly distributed. Nearly one third of the victimized households sustained more than one crime. See Table 2.9.

TABLE 2.9

THE EXTENT OF MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION

All Households with--

No victimizations	72
One victimization	19
Two victimizations	6
Three victimizations	2
Four or more victimizations	1
Total	100%
N	(3,296)

Source: Phillip H. Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1967), Table 21.

E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF RESIDENTIAL CRIME

1. Direct

Economic Consequences

In Boston in 1970 the average loss from a residential burglary was $338 and the gross loss approximately $2,361,000. The average loss from residential robbery was $133 and the gross loss approximately $43,000.[17] Nationally the average residential burglary loss was approximately $330 and the residential robbery loss $268. The gross losses respectively were approximately 400 million and 12 million.[18] If the number of unreported residential burglaries were taken into account, it is likely that the total loss would be in the vicinity of one billion dollars. Only about 10 - 15% of property taken in reported burglaries is recovered.

Physical Injury

Burglary by definition is not a crime of force or threat against the victim. If these elements are present, the offense is properly classified as robbery. The President's Crime Commission estimated that 1 in 40 burglaries results in a sufficient confrontation to reclassify it as a robbery. This appears, however, to be incorrect. Data for the present study suggests that 1 in

100 is probably a more accurate estimate.[19] In addition it was noted earlier that only two or three murders per year in Boston could be attributed to the work of a burglar. Thus, in general, burglary does not appear to be physically dangerous to the victim.

An analysis of residential robberies undertaken for this study indicated that the victim was attacked in about half of the cases. In 80% of those instances, he was knocked down or beaten while in the remainder he was struck with an object or stabbed. (See Chapter IV, p.143) If the study figures for robbery are projected to the entire city it would mean about 150-200 persons are assaulted annually in a city of 640,000 or less than one in 3,000. The murder analysis would suggest four to five such incidents annually lead to a criminal homicide. Robbery, however, is much more geographically concentrated than burglary so that the averages would vary considerably by neighborhood.

2. Indirect

Economic Consequences

The need for residential burglary insurance is one part of indirect economic costs to the citizen. About 35% of the household survey's respondents said they had such insurance, another (27%) said the only reason they did not have insurance was that it was too expensive.[20]

Other costs include variously priced hardware items from special locks to alarm systems. Fifty percent of the respondents had purchased special locks of one sort or another. Only 3% owned any kind of alarm system. In any case, the security hardware costs of those interviewed do not appear excessive.

Social Costs

The social costs of residential crime are myriad. One of the foremost among them is the level of fear which living with crime generates in people.

In general, the NORC study concluded that most people do not express fear of crime. However, fear, like other aspects of the crime problem, is not spread evenly across the population; urban dwellers in general, and in particular women, non-whites and low income persons expressed the most fear of crime.[21] The following tables indicate some findings of the NORC study of crime victimization as regards the respondents fears for the security of his home.

TABLE 2.10

CONCERN ABOUT BURGLARY

Response	White Male	White Female	Non-White Male	Non-White Female
Very concerned	11%	14%	22%	25%
Somewhat concerned	36	38	29	37
Not worried	53	48	49	38
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(4,668)	(7,515)	(646)	(1,037)

Source: Phillip H. Ennis, Victimization of Crime in the United States (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1967), Table 46.

Personal experience with crime victimization apparently tends to heighten the individual's concern about burglary and robbery.

TABLE 2.11

CONCERN OF VICTIMS AND NONVICTIMS ABOUT BURGLARY AND ROBBERY
(in percentages)

Worry about burglary or robbery	Victim	Nonvictim
Males:		
Worried	69	59
Not worried	31	41
	100	100
Number of males	(1,456)	(3,930)
Females:		
Worried	84	77
Not worried	16	23
	100	100
Number of females	(2,399)	(6,189)

Source: Task Force Report: Crime and its Impact--An Assessment (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 86.

Chapter VI contains an extensive discussion of fear among respondents to the household survey conducted for the present study. In general it parallels the NORC findings. Perhaps the most discouraging finding of the NORC and other surveys was that few people thought they could do anything to control crime.[22]

SUMMARY - CHAPTER II

The concept of residential crime is diffuse. The most common residential offenses are burglary, and to a much lesser extent, robbery.

Crime statistics, whether pertaining to offeses or offenders, must be treated cautiously. There is much unreported crime, and variations in the rates of unreported crimes do not necessarily parallel the rates of reported crimes. It seems clear, however, that overall the actual rate of residential crime has risen significantly in recent years.

Residential crime, particularly robbery, tends to cluster in the central metropolitan areas. Robbery and burglary victimization is unevenly distributed among the population, with the highest incidence falling on specific groups such as the non-white population. There also appears to be a significant amount of multiple victimization. Fear of burglary victimization among the population tends to parallel actual victimization.

The economic consequences of residential burglary are large in sum, but they are relatively small for most individual victims and usually not dangerous physically. Residential robbery, while uncommon and not great in total dollar loss, imposes high social costs on society in terms of victim fear.

The central finding of this chapter is the variance of specific residential crimes in terms of their frequency, distribution and consequences.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Indeed, most rapes do not occur between strangers. For example, a District of Columbia study reported that 2/3 of a sample of rape victims were attacked by persons with whom they were at least casually acquainted. See, Report of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 53.

2. Murder is also predominately a crime between acquaintances. A Philadelphia study indicated that only 12% of all homicides examined over a four-year period occurred between strangers. See Marvin E. Wolfgang, Patterns of Criminal Homicide (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958).

3. The District of Columbia study referred to in Note 1 found that only 19% of a sample of aggravated assault victims were unacquainted with their assailants. Op. cit. Crime in the District of Columbia, p. 76.

4. A 1970 FBI analysis of larceny found that nearly two-thirds were from autos or stores or involved stolen bikes. See FBI, UCR 1970, Table 19. A victimization study indicated that only 11% of all larcenies took place in the home. See Phillip H. Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1967), Table 20.

5. The largest part of the national dollar loss to vandalism is incurred by public buildings and facilities. See Stephen Cutler and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Crimes Against Public and Quasi-Public Organizations in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C." (A special survey for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1966), cited in Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact--An Assessment (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 46.

6. See Blacks' Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1968) p. 247.

7. In 1970, the UCR listed 58% of all reported burglaries as residential, however, some of these occured in unattached garages or other non-dwelling property. Op. cit. FBI, UCR, 1970, p. 21.

8. See op. cit., Crime and Its Impact, p. 17, Table 4.

9. See Floyd Fowler, "City Taxes and Services: Citizens Speak out," Nations Cities, Vol. 9 (Nov. 1971), pp. 37-52.

10. Op. Cit., Crime and its Impact, p. 54.

11. See Deborah Blumin, Victims: A Study of Crime in a Boston Housing Project, (Boston: Mayor's Office of Justice Administration, forthcoming). This study interviewed 283 households of approximately 950 in the project. The results separated burglaries from attempts. The rate for the former was 187/1000 households and for the latter, 355/1000.

12. It could be argued, however, the the arrested or adjudicated population is unrepresentative in that it grossly over-represents disadvantaged groups. Data collected for this project suggests that this is incorrect, and that the arrested population does in fact coincide to the actual population. (See Chapter VIII)

13. The regional figures tend to fluctuate by year and exhibit differences between UCR and victimization studies. See op. cit. Crime and Its Impact, p. 28-29. For current figures see op. cit. UCR, 1970.

14. The figure of 10% is based on national averages and while this parallels cities such as Boston, it may grossly underrepresent the experience of other cities. A Rand study of New York crime indicated that nearly 30% of all robberies were residential, see Peter W. Greenwood, An Analysis of the Apprehension Activities of the New York City Police Department (New York: Rand Institute, 1970), Table 7.

15. Op. cit., UCR, 1970, pp. 15, 21.

16. Op. cit., Ennis, Criminal Victimization, pp. 43-48.

17. See Annual Report of the Police Commissioner for the City Boston, 1970, Table IV.

18. Op. Cit., UCR, 1970, Table 19.

19. The commission apparently assumed all residential robberies begin as burglaries. Op. cit., Crime and Its Impact, p. 15 and FBI, Uniform Crime Reports 1965, Table 14, p. 105. An analysis of 152 residential robberies in Boston during 1969-1971 determined that only one third took place in the dwelling unit. The rest were in hallways, elevators, etc., where the offenders presence was not necessarily unlawful. Of those in the dwelling unit, it is not always possible to determine the offender's state of mind when he committed the crime, In several instances a ruse was used to gain entrance, indicating that the offender knew the premises were occupied and he was going to engage in a robbery. Even if it were assumed that all cases within the dwelling where the offender's intentions were unclear were actually burglaries that turned into robberies, this would constitute only 25% of all residential robberies in the sample. Projecting these figures citywide, it would mean that no more than one burglary in 90 turns into a robbery. Clearly 1/100 is much closer to reality than one in 40.

20. See Appendix D, Table 26.

21. Op. cit., Ennis, Criminal Victimization, and op. cit., Crime and Its Impact, p. 86.

22. Op. cit., Crime and Its Impact, p. 91.

CHAPTER III

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON RESIDENTIAL CRIME

CHAPTER III

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON RESIDENTIAL CRIME

A. OVERVIEW

Previous research related to this study may be subsumed under three headings.

1. A considerable body of scholarly material dealing with the classic questions of criminology. In general, this literature has sought to describe the nature and extent of criminal behavior and identify apparent correlative factors, test hypotheses, and build systematic theories of a predictive and explanatory nature. While work of this type has not been focused on residential crime, and is therefore not directly congruent with the concerns of this project, it does provide theoretical underpinnings for a general approach to the problem.

2. A small number of professionally prepared studies, mostly of recent vintage, which address themselves to questions of direct concern to the present project. Among them are studies that seek to determine ways in which residences might

be made more secure against criminal attack, describe citizen behavior as it relates to residential security, or examine the effect of various deterrent measures on offender behavior. Work in this category tends to be much less theoretical and more applied than the scholarly criminological literature.

3. A growing number of popular books and articles by journalists, ex-criminals, or security personnel, which offer suggestions on how to safeguard residential premises from criminal attack. In general, these studies lack an empirical base and do not contain systematic analysis. Instead, they are largely compendia of common-sense suggestions.

The review which follows attempts to integrate the above material in a form which is most relevant to the present project. The central question therefore is what information exists about how residences may be made more secure from criminal attack. However, an answer to this question requires consideration of a number of collateral factors. Therefore, the material will be reviewed to determine what research findings exist regarding (1) the behavior of residential offenders; (2) correlative factors and theories that seek to explain the distribution of residential crime and its causation; and (3) means of controlling residential crime.

B. OFFENDER BEHAVIOR

Criminal offender typologies are usually constructed according to categories of target or motivation (property, person, sex offender, etc.) or legal definitions (robber, burglar, rapist) rather than in terms of location of offense (residence, street, commercial establishment). Therefore, their applicability to residential crime varies. Gibbons and Garrity[1] offer a typology for property offenders (including robbers as well as burglars and thieves) which assumes that the real world of criminal behavior is comprised of social roles or stable behavior patterns and that these role patterns are differentiated along two major dimensions: self-definition and attitudes, and offense behavior. They argue that variations in these two dimensions are highly interrelated--offenders who exhibit certain kinds of attitudes and self definitions in common also commit offenses of some specific kind. They differentiate a so-called professional or "heavy" from the nonprofessional property offender. The professional is characterized by a high degree of technical skill and large profit in the operations he undertakes; non-professional crime is characterized by lack of planning, lack of skills and meager profit. According to Gibbons and Garrity, both the non-professional and the professional have "right guy" attitudes, i.e., they are loyal to the criminal group.

Clinard and Quinney[2] analyzed what they termed "conventional criminals" who commit property offenses to obtain part or all of their income. For such individuals their criminal career is a way of life, they have a self concept as a criminal and associate with other offenders. Like the criminals described by Gibbons and Garrity, they also tend to specialize and to maintain loyalty to the criminal group. Clinard and Quinney define a professional criminal in terms of high skill and while they conceded that some robbers or burglars could fit into this definition they emphasize the element of non-violence associated with professionalism and indicate that confidence men represent the archetype of professional criminals.

A group of researchers working on a pilot study for the President's Crime Commission[3] interviewed 50 professional criminals in four United States cities: Atlanta, Chicago, New York, and San Francisco. Their definition of professional crime was "crime committed for personal or economic gain by individuals whose major source of income is from criminal pursuits and spend the majority of their working time in illegal enterprises." Their definition excluded organized and white collar crime and concentrated mainly on predatory offenses (such as robbery or burglary) where the victim does not consent. This definition contrasts with previous views of a professional criminal as one who is highly skilled,

and instead emphasizes working regularly at crime as the essential characteristics of professionalism. The Commission researchers did, however, differentiate between high status, and medium or low status professional criminals. Many of the characteristics which other criminologists have ascribed to professionals tended to cluster in the definition of high status professional criminals. That is, the high status criminals engaged in a great deal of planning, expected loyalty from their associates, and tended to be specialized. The low or middle status professional, on the other hand, engaged in little or no planning, did not specialize and did not expect loyalty from other professional criminals.

A study of older (average age 35 years) property offenders, mostly black (86%) who were incarcerated in a Washington, D. C. reformatory for men, indicated that the subjects, although they had extensive records, did not view themselves as criminals. Instead they tended to have middle class values regarding crime, i.e., they subscribed to the belief in crime as a deviant form of behavior and supported rehabilitation goals. Despite extensive involvement in criminal activity they were thought not to be highly skilled or professional. In fact, most were individuals who seemed to be caught up in a particular cycle and way of life which they did not personally care for.[4]

Adjectives such as low or middle status professional, conventional, or nonprofessional, all tend to describe property offenders with limited skills, who do little planning and obtain relatively modest profits from their work. On this the literature seems to agree. However, there is disagreement as to whether the low status semi-professional offender, the type most frequently involved in residential crime, tends to specialize, is loyal to other criminals and defines himself as a criminal.

At the operating level of residential criminal behavior the research questions have dealt with mobility and organization. A study of offender mobility in Seattle in 1965 indicated that property offenders were more likely to operate outside of their own neighborhoods than person offenders. Over 70% of the apprehended burglars were working in census tracts other than the ones in which they resided.[5] A 1930 Indianapolis study of apprehended burglars showed that they worked a mean distance of 1.76 miles from their place of residence.[6]

A study of crime patterns in St. Louis found that residential burglars were more likely than other property offenders to work in their own neighborhoods because of the greater ease with which they could obtain information about targets.[7]

Most burglaries do not involve cash losses. Therefore, means must be found to turn stolen items into dollars. Generally, this is accomplished through a receiver of stolen goods, commonly known as a "fence". Robert Barnes, a professional burglar, advises his fellows not to steal what they cannot sell. In Barnes' opinion, a concentration of law enforcement resources on fences would cut down on property theft.[8] A Presidential Commission study indicated that some persons acted as fences to supplement legitimate businesses while others' main enterprise was dealing in stolen goods. It was also reported that some narcotic dealers took stolen goods instead of cash as payment for drugs.[9] In addition to the fences there are other members of the offenders' interactional network,[10] such as tipsters, lawyers, and bondsmen.

C. CORRELATIVE FACTORS AND EXPLANATORY THEORIES

Past research has linked many factors with the incidence of crime, and several theories seek to explain the distribution of crime and the behavior of offenders.

Among the earliest, significant efforts to investigate the geographical distribution of crime were those undertaken by members of the so-called "Ecological School", particularly Thrasher, Shaw, and McKay[11], which developed at the University of Chicago between the two World Wars. Their research tended to concentrate on juvenile deliquency, particularly as regards the spatial distribution of offender rates. Their main research findings were (1) rates of delinquency and crime varied widely in different neighborhoods

in the city, (2) the high crime and deliquency rates decreased with increasing distance from the city center, (3) high deliquency rate areas tended to maintain their high rates over time although the population composition of the area changed radically, (4) the deliquency rates of particular nationality and ethnic groups followed the general tendency of the entire population, to be high in the central areas of the city and low as those groups moved towards the outskirts.

The Chicago School explained their findings in terms of social disorganization. They maintained that the areas of concentration of crime and deliquency were "zones in transition," adjacent to the thriving center of the city but characterized by mixed land usage, high industrial concentration, physical deterioration, rented dwellings, transient populations -- often foreign and nonwhite -- with few ties to the social institutions of the area. It was argued that the rapid turnover of population in such areas is associated with crime and disorder because the movement and change are disruptive to institutional patterns of behavior.

In general, the gradients of spatial distribution of offender rates discovered in Chicago have been found in other cities.[12] Other studies have found high correlations between crime rates and other social problems such as infant mortality,

mental disorder, and high proportions of overcrowded and sub-standard dwelling units.[13] However, since a number of factors have been cited as correlates of crime, the relationship among them and their order of importance have been much debated in the criminological literature.

Several researchers have questioned the Ecological School's assumption that the position of an area *per se* accounts for the crime rate. Taft, for example, has contended that areas with high crime rates attract, rather than produce, offenders.[14] He examined the criminal records of Danville, Illinois, men who had been committed to prison for felonies and concluded that while in fact social and economic conditions of areas directly influenced the concentration of crime, over 40% of those committed to prison from the Danville delinquency areas had had criminal records before coming to Danville. Thus, both pull and push factors seem to operate in high delinquency areas.

In an ecological analysis of Baltimore, Lander determined that delinquency rates were fundamentally related, not specifically to the socio-economic conditions of the area, but rather to the degree of social instability and normlessness.[15] He argued that the delinquency rate in a stable community would be low in spite of poverty, bad housing and proximity to the city center.

In Baltimore, Lander[16] also found that the high concentration of blacks in an area was associated with a relatively low delinquency rate. Where blacks constituted less than half of the population of an area, however, the delinquency rate was relatively high. The same pattern was found in Washington, D.C., where, in addition, the high positive association between the racial heterogeneity of an area and the crime rate was maintained when socio-economic level was controlled for.[17] Willie and Gershenovitz contend that racially heterogeneous areas are characterized by a low degree of social integration, which accounts for the high offender rate in these areas.[18]

Wilkes has concluded:

> the racial composition of an area does have an impact upon the area's crime rate, but this relationship is not a simple one. That is, we cannot unequivocally assert that certain nationality or racial groups have high rates of crime regardless of their geographical location, nor can we state that the geographical location exclusively determines the crime rates of such groups. It is necessary to consider the area's ongoing social processes and the social and cultural structure of the residential area in order to understand the relationship between geographical location, racial composition, and area crime rate. In other words, the social integration of the area appears to be of crucial importance in predicting the area's rate of crime and delinquency.[19]

Durkheim, an early French sociologist, suggested that differential crime rates are produced by differential degrees of social cohesion and corresponding social control.[20] Following Durkheim's lead, sociologist Robert K. Merton devised an analytical scheme for predicting the likelihood of criminal and/or deviant behavior on the basis of differential access to the legitimate means to achieving success goals.[21]

Also basing his work on the notion that lower class persons are frustrated in their efforts to achieve success, Cohen[22] devised a theory to account for the rise of delinquent subcultures in urban disadvantaged neighborhoods. He argued that lower class boys, unable to succeed in the societally prescribed manner, "stand the values on their head" and develop counternormative behaviors which are the antithesis of what is valued in conventional middle class society.

More recently, Cloward and Ohlin[23] have developed a theory of delinquency causation, also based on the seminal contributions of Durkheim and Merton, which takes account not only of the distribution of access to legitimate channels but also of the differential availability of illegitimate alternatives. Cloward and Ohlin posit the

existence of three distinct types of delinquent subculture--conflict, retreatist and criminal--based on differential access to legitimate and illegitimate opportunities. By implication from their analysis, crimes of property, such as burglary, would most likely occur in contexts where avenues to legitimate success are closed to up-coming youth, but where there is an established criminal network such as fences through which success strivings may be channeled.

In a similar analysis, Spergel[24] compared three different neighborhoods and their characteristic patterns of delinquency. Racketville represents the subculture of young delinquents in neighborhoods where rackets are the chief means of achieving success goals. Slumtown represents the conflict subculture of delinquent youth in the most deteriorated slums. Haulberg's theft subculture grows out of a social contradiction in which there are partially limited conventional and criminal opportunities by which to achieve success goals.

In contrast to theories which relate crime to social disorganization or paucity of social and economic resources, some writers have suggested that crime is to some extent an unintended consequence of social developments that are almost universally regarded as improvements in the society. Increases

in crime, it is argued, may stem from increased prosperity and leisure in that there are more and more goods to steal and more and more time in which to do it.[25]

Other researchers have noted that many persons, even in high crime areas, do not become criminals, and instead of seeking explanations in environmental factors they have examined psychological considerations which stress early family life. A well-known investigation of this type was the Cambridge-Somerville study of 650 boys begun in 1938 as an effort to determine if certain forms of treatment would deter delinquency. In 1955, the McCords[26] examined the relationship between the data collected earlier and the subsequent life histories of the 263 boys remaining in the study group. They did not find a strong direct relationship between residence in slum neighborhoods and criminality. Instead they concluded that the mother's personality was the key factor in determining whether the individual became delinquent. The McCords also looked at particular types of offenses and reported that a high percentage of those boys who had been convicted at least once for property crime had been raised by neglecting parents and had been subjected to erratic discipline. They also found no significant relationship between property crime and the socio-economic

characteristics of the neighborhood and concluded, therefore, that property crime is not simply the result of poverty.

The Gluecks[27] reported a relationship between the frequency of property offenses and the aging process. A study showed that 76% of the sample of juvenile delinquents committed crimes against property, 5 years later 74%, 10 years later 51%, and 15 years later 42%. The decline in commission of property offenses among the members of this sample was offset, however, by an increase in involvement in sex offenses and drunkenness. Other studies have noted a similar effect of maturation or so called "burning out," which refers to the termination of the criminal career at the onset of middle age or sooner.[28]

Currently, much interest in the elements of crime causation centers around the relationship between drug use and crime, especially for common crimes such as robbery and burglary. Many persons, when arrested for these offenses, admit to a drug habit, particularly heroin addition.[29] Estimates that addicts account for 50% of all property crime have become a common yardstick in discussions of the problem.[30] It is generally conceded,

however, that criminal behavior does not result from drug use *per se*. Instead it is thought that the need for drugs, and therefore the need for funds to purchase drugs, or the illegality of drug use which compels addicts to be involved in criminal subcultures, are the chief factors conducive to criminal behavior.

The relevant question for this study is the extent to which drugs contribute to the problem of residential crime. Clearly a number of residential offenders are also drug users, but the fact that drug use is correlated with criminal behavior does not confirm a causal relationship. The volume of addict crime is perhaps overstated and the majority of addicts probably do not engage in residential type crime as a means of obtaining money.[31] Moreover, based on a study of addict offenders which showed that most had been delinquent prior to addiction, Kolb[32] suggests that the direction of causality is reversed, namely that addicts do not become criminal but rather that criminals become addicted to drugs. Support for this argument is also found in studies by Morgan[33] which indicate that a majority of the adult subjects had criminal records prior to identification as drug users.

According to O'Donnell,[34] drug use has spread outside the previously narrow circles in which it was prevalent and has been taken up by younger and more

heterogeneous sectors of the population, including those who would normally engage in criminal behavior. He has found that areas of high opiate use are also areas of high crime and delinquency and argues that both drug use and criminal behavior are manifestations of basic underlying sociological factors.

Similarly, Finestone,[35] in a review of the findings of several studies on the relationship between narcotics and criminal behavior in large urban areas such as New York City and Chicago, concludes that both criminality and drug use stem from the same sociological conditions, that both are a relatively normal part of the subculture of the disadvantaged areas of cities, but that once addicted, young criminals may perpetuate their illegal activities in order to sustain their narcotic habits. Finestone also draws attention to the evidence, originally generated by Faris and Dunham[36] in the 1920's and 1930's, but also substantiated more recently,[37] that the areas of cities such as Chicago and New York City which are characterized by high rates of narcotic addiction and criminality are also noted for other forms of social pathology such as residential instability, physical disease and infant mortality. Such disadvantaged areas, it is argued,

constitute breeding grounds for both drug use and crime, particularly property crime, which, in that context, are "normal" responses to "abnormal" sociological conditions.

If, in fact, criminals become addicts rather than the reverse, then a "solution" to the drug problem might not produce a reduction in residential crime. A Presidential Task Force has commented:[38]

> Since there is much crime in cities where drug use is not thought to be a major problem, to commit resources against abuse solely in the expectation of producing a dramatic reduction in crime may be to invite disappointment.

Perhaps a more useful approach is to ascertain whether an addictive habit increases the frequency of criminal activity. In other words, an individual who engages in criminal behavior might do so regardless of whether he is addicted, but the volume of his criminal activity may well be affected by the fact of his addiction. The relationship between the two is still by no means clear, however.

Larner and Tefferteller[39] cite several accounts of addicts who were able to support their habits by legitimate employment until such point as their tolerance for the narcotic increased, i.e, more and more of the drug was required to sustain the same physical and psychological state of well being, at which point it became necessary to supplement and ultimately replace regular jobs with illegal activities.

On the other hand, Kolb[40] indicates that heroin suppresses rather than excites crime; thus, a burglar who is an addict might be less active than he would be were he not addicted. Similarly, data compiled by the Narcotic Bureau of the Chicago Police Department for 1951[41] indicated that addiction tends to reduce the capacity for careful planning of property crime and the propensity to violent crime.

However, Chein and Rosenfeld[42] found that high drug use areas in New York City were ones with increasing property crime while low drug use areas showed increases in disturbance type crimes. Finestone[43] has also suggested that with increased drug use property crime rose and violent crime declined, although the finding as to violent crime is disputed by O'Donnell.[44] O'Donnell, in a study of 266 addicts, found that drug use increased the frequency with which individuals engaged in common residential crimes, such as robbery and burglary.

In summary, the weight of research thus far tends to support the hypothesis that regular drug use may increase the frequency of individual criminal behavior, but that residential type crime by drug users is largely of the relatively unsophisticated property crime type, such as "smash and grab" burglary.

The above discussion is by no means exhaustive of the literature on the causes of crime but rather is presented

in order to suggest the major themes and concerns which have dominated the field of criminology, and which, therefore, have guided the present research. At present there is little precise knowledge about the relative contributions of social, cultural and economic variables to the production of crime. Since no single variable is strongly correlated with crime, it is concluded that some complex configuration of variables produces an environment which is conducive to the occurrence of criminal behavior. However, the studies cited are not fully successful in explaining which factors are paramount in creating crime and which are merely covariant, nor is it clear why criminogenic factors are differentially located. Moreover, in all too many instances the studies fail to differentiate between offender and offense rates.

D. CONTROL OF RESIDENTIAL CRIME

1. Police and security patrols

Standard texts in police administration project a model of crime control approximating the following:[45] crime is assumed to arise out of a union of desire and opportunity. To counter crime, police employ a strategy of detection, deterrence, and apprehension (DDA). In essence, this involves the application of specific techniques designed to suppress

criminal behavior. The primary techniques are:

Omnipresence: An attempt to project to the maximum extent a belief on the part of potential offenders in the likelihood of police presence at any given point in time and space.

Aggressive patrol: Police seek to interdict crime by locating and challenging suspicious persons.

Rapid response: the capability of quickly responding to emergency calls in order that criminals may be apprehended in the act.

Follow-up investigation: optimum investigative techniques to maximize the possibility that the offenders who are successful in fleeing from crime scenes will be apprehended at a later date.

The crime control model of policing and the DDA strategy it employs have been the subject of recent research which questions their effectiveness. A Washington D.C. study undertook to determine how convicted felons perceived and responded to the police DDA strategy.[46] Three-fourths of the interviewed sample had been convicted of robbery, burglary, or larceny, i.e., common residential type crimes. In general, the group did not actively perceive the size and nature of police operations, and at the time of the crime took few precautions against the possibility of police interference. The conclusion of the study was that either offenders were not highly rational and were not

fearful of the consequences, or else, while committing the crime, they were able to block out the fear. A study of robbery offenders in Boston concluded that one-third did not fear capture, one-third blocked out the fear, and one-third thought that chances of capture were minimal.[47]

The Washington study[48] found that burglars were the least susceptible to police deterrence. It was hypothesized that the reason for this was that they worked in low visibility situations. Robbers were the most susceptible although they tended to mention fear of informers rather than patrolling police. In this respect, a Presidential Commission study calculated that the average patrolman is likely to encounter a robbery in progress once every fourteen years.[49]

A Rand Corporation analysis of the apprehension activities of the New York City Police Department provides some interesting findings in regard to the effectiveness of the DDA strategy in controlling various types of crime.[50] The Rand researchers constructed an arrest index, defined as the fraction of crimes that result in at least one arrest, and a detective arrest index for the fraction of cases assigned to the detectives for investigation that eventually result in a detective arrest. The arrest indices are an estimate of the probability that at least one offender will be arrested for any particular crime. See Table 3.1.

TABLE 3.1

ARREST INDEX AND DETECTIVE ARREST INDEX FOR PART I OFFENSES

Crime	Cases	Arrest Index	Detective Arrest Index
Homicide	338	.7130	.6632
Rape	906	.4834	.3914
Robbery	15,847	.1327	.0558
Assault	13,392	.4599	.3075
Burglary	67,028	.0434	.0135
Grand Larceny	40,822	.0420	.0216
Grand Larceny, MV[a]	20,792	.0810	.0221

[a]Motor Vehicle

Source: Peter W. Greenwood, An Analysis of the Apprehension Activities of the New York City Police Department (New York: Rand Institute, 1970), p. 6.

It would appear that the probability of arrest differs vastly between what the study called crimes of passion (homicide, rape, assault), and crimes of profit (robbery, burglary, larceny). The latter, of course, are the ones which constitute the heart of residential crime. In these categories police managed to effect arrests in only about 5% of the cases. However, it should be borne in mind that since many crimes are not reported, for crimes of profit, the true arrest figures may be closer to 2%.

Of those arrested only a minority are convicted and an even lesser number incarcerated. For example, in 1970, about one third of the adults who were arrested for burglary were convicted of the substantive offense. The comparable figure was approximately one fourth for robbery.[51] A Presidential Commission calculated that less than 10% of all persons arrested for Index crimes actually are sentenced to prison.[52]

The Rand study also provided findings regarding the means by which police were able to effect arrests and the likelihood of apprehension in various circumstances. The vast majority of arrests for property crimes were made near the scene of the crime or as a result of evidence that was readily apparent at the time the crime was reported. For unsolved crimes of profit, the probability of arrest through detective investigation is extremely low, .06 for robbery, .01 for burglary, and .02 for larceny. In contrast to

crimes of passion, the probability of arrest for crimes of profit does not appear to increase if more effort is devoted to the case.

As an additional test, a comparison was made between detective arrest indices for high value loss against low value loss cases. It was found that detectives are no more successful in solving cases to which they assign high priority than they are for those of less significance. This finding agreed with other results of the Rand analysis, indicating that the solution of any particular property crime is largely a chance event, relatively insensitive to the amount of investigation conducted. They also found no difference in investigative success between residential and commercial types of burglary.

Another Rand study analyzed the effects of police "saturation" (substantial increases in manpower to heighten omnipresence) in a Manhattan precinct.[53] It was found that saturation tended to be followed by a reduction in crimes of a type visible to patrolling police but had no effect on non-visible crime. Residential crimes tend to be largely of the latter type. The study also noted an apparent displacement of visible type crimes to areas immediately

adjacent to the experimental precinct. However, there was no evidence of a functional displacement within the experimental area; that is, robbers did not appear to switch to burglary.

Field observation studies in Washington, Chicago, and Boston, performed under the direction of Albert Reiss, tend to support the Rand findings. According to Reiss, the amount of time police spend on patrol is largely unproductive in that officers observe few crimes in progress. Also, the bulk of police mobilizations are in response to citizen calls, most of which do not concern serious crime.[54]

James Q. Wilson, in an analysis of police operations, similarly determined that most calls for police service do not involve serious crime such as robbery or burglary, but instead concern what Wilson has called order maintenance, i.e., settling disputes or rendering miscellaneous services.[55] This is confirmed in research by Webster[56] and Livermore.[57]

The conclusions which emerge from the recent studies suggest that there are many obstacles to the successful application of the classic DDA strategy for the control of residential (and other) type crime. First, most common offenders are not rationally calculating individuals likely to weigh carefully cost/benefit factors; secondly, the likelihood of any individual residential type crime

resulting in an arrest is in the order of one in fifty or a hundred. The explanation for this latter finding seems to lie in a variety of factors such as the low visibility of residential crime, the ratio of police resources to possible crime targets and the competing demands which other police tasks place on resources.

However, a factor which balances the apparently bleak showing of the police in their efforts to control residential crime is that offenders commit multiple offenses over a period of time and are therefore likely to be caught eventually. Thus, while the police and the larger criminal justice system may be largely ineffective in interdicting criminal <u>acts</u> they may be very effective in interdicting criminal <u>careers</u>. A study of robbery offenders, for example, concluded that virtually all career robbers were caught.[58]

Although there are limited data on the way in which the workings of the criminal justice system affects criminal careers, the Washington study[59] previously cited concluded that imprisonment was not sufficiently punitive to constitute an effective deterrent nor was it sufficiently rehabilitative to serve as an effective means of crime prevention.

Recently there have been attempts to evolve new police strategies to deter crime beyond the traditional patrol and investigative methods. This has led to the establishment of crime prevention bureaus within municipal

police departments. In essence, crime prevention units seek to harden crime targets by conducting premise surveys, providing public education programs, and assisting in the design of building security codes.[60] Typical of these programs is one in Stockton, California, where the police department and local business associations have set up working committees to involve citizens in burglary prevention programs. This approach provides free home security checks by law enforcement officials and focuses on the adequacy of building codes, security standards on new structures, and the need for legislative controls on locksmithing and key duplicating. It has been reported that, as a consequence of this program, the burglary trend for the period examined was down.

A similar program is "Operation Identification," originally undertaken by the Monterey Park, California Police Department, which involved etching the owner's drivers license number on items of value.[61] Both of these plans have been implemented elsewhere in the United States.

In addition to the regular police there are a number of private and volunteer protective forces which provide security for a community. A recent study indicated that most privately owned security organizations service the non-residential market.[62]

There are also a variety of citizen groups organized for the surveillance and protection of their own communities. James Q. Wilson has described citizen auxillaries as perhaps "the single most effective addition to police practice", and has urged the President of the United States to use his office and prestige to enlist citizen interest and action in such programs.[63] In contrast, Bruce Smith has said

> Experience has shown that it is not alone the super defenders of hearth and home who clamor for an opportunity to serve. Truculent, disorderly, intolerant, and downright vicious elements also flock to police standards...for motives of their own, and with objectives foreign to the maintenance of civil peace.[64]

A recent analysis of citizen defense organizations[65] indicates that while all of those groups considered arose out of a common belief in the failure of the police, they could be dichotomized in terms of whether they saw themselves in a supplementary versus an adversarial capacity vis-a-vis the police. Often self-defense groups were organized around ethnic considerations and held particular ideological beliefs concerning the maintenance of law and order.

The types of patrol of concern in this context are those specifically organized to protect residential areas (especially housing projects) as opposed to those which engage in more general patrol of public ways, or attempt to counter alledged police misconduct. The New York City Housing Authority, for example, has a regular police force of 1200 men and in addition reportedly employs more than 8500 unpaid volunteers in tenant safety patrols in 93 housing projects. These patrols are primarily deployed to survey poorly lighted areas of the projects, and in some instances ride elevators as escorts for unaccompanied women.[66]

Citizen patrols generally are not institutionally established in the same way as regular police and consequently they face severe problems in obtaining resources, and maintaining organizational integrity. In addition, they frequently encounter suspicion or hostility from regular police and the community they seek to serve. They generally lack the legal authority necessary to perform police type operations such as arrest, search, and seizure, and thus are confined to an observer role. The nature of such patrol work is frequently boring and thus the attrition rate among members is high.

After three and one half years, the founder of a housing authority patrol reported that he had not seen anything "really suspicious" and saw the work as "mostly tedious duty".[67] Several informants reported that they thought the main consequence of their patrols was symbolic and participatory rather than the actual reduction of the crime level. However, visible guards patrolling on foot in limited areas such as an old people's home, or a playground, appeared in some instances to have reduced vandalism and physical assaults.[68]

There is little hard data on the effectiveness of such patrols, although there are some glowing but unsubstantiated reports of success. For example, it is claimed that crime was cut 40% in one New York City precinct by the activities of the auxillary police.[69] Nevertheless, although a one week experimental youth patrol in New York City in 1968 was described as very successful,[70] four years later the concept remains unimplemented on a larger scale.

In sum, based on studies available , the effect of citizen patrols on the incidence of common crime appears problematic. Possibly the most effective anti-crime activity is the use of police supplementary organizations for observation of specific premises, e.g., unarmed guards at building entrances in housing project areas. Attempts of citizen patrols to duplicate regular police by engaging in general

patrol and investigative activities seem to be no more effective than regular police and in many cases less so. Moreover, there is also a danger arising from untrained and non-official persons carrying out professional duties. Nevertheless, the literature does present the possibility that citizen patrols, even though less technically efficient than regular police, may possess trade off benefits in terms of citizen morale.

2. Physical Security

Studies of crime patterns in terms of physical security fall into two major categories, depending on whether they attribute target vulnerability to the physical composition of cities and neighborhoods or, to the individual dwelling--its structural characteristics, security systems, and opportunity factors. Bridging these two foci are housing projects, because they must be considered both as a major component of the neighborhood structure and as individual housing units.

It is commonly assumed that light constitutes a major deterrent to crime. Several articles report major reductions in the rates of crime after the installation of an improved lighting system.[71] Generally such studies are not rigouously documented; more importantly for the concerns

of the present project, the type of crimes usually mentioned are non-residential, such as playground vandalism, street robbery, or commercial burglary.

A Detroit study which inspected the site of residential burglaries rated street lighting "inadequate from a crime reduction standpoint" in 50% of the blocks surveyed and 88.2% of the alleys. Only 11.1% of the burglarized structures had "adequate" side or rear lighting although entry from these directions accounted for 77% of all burglaries in the city. The study hypothesized that there was a correlation between lighting and residential crime. It was not stated whether lighting in the surveyed premises was significantly poorer than in non-victimized locations, although apartment buildings tended to have both better lighting and fewer night time burglaries.[72]

Jane Jacobs, in an early study relating crime patterns to city planning, argued that in specializing activity areas into residential, commercial, industrial, financial, educational, and recreational, casual surveillance of streets and public areas has been reduced and the city made more unsafe.[73] The alternative she suggested was to concentrate diverse land use so as to generate more street activity and more voluntary surveillance. Her models for this type of neighborhood development were New York's Greenwich Village, and Boston's North End (a portion of which formed part of the

study area for the present project). Aside from the creation of specialized activity areas, Jacobs attributed high crime incidence to underuse of border areas along the edge of transportation networks, university and educational facilities, and housing projects, and to underuse of grounds, hallways, and elevators within housing projects. Much of Jacobs' analysis is more germane to street crime than to residential crime. However, in considering building security, she proposed specific measures such as doormen and elevator operators for housing projects.

In a similar study, Angel[74] accepted the Jacobs theory of crime prevention through street activity and casual surveillance, but found her concept of mixed land use impractical in most cities because there are not enough evening establishments to sprinkle effectively over all city streets. Asserting that few crimes will occur under conditions of either very few people, both potential victims and criminals, or very many people on the streets, Angel proposes to "design out" areas where there are enough people to create high probability of crime but not enough to deter it.

Although the thrust of the Angel study also relates mainly to street crime, he makes two suggestions that pertain to

residential crime. First, noting higher crime rates for dwellings behind commercial strips, he proposes to replace commercial strip developments with clusters of stores in order to eliminate accessible high crime residential fringe areas behind strips. Secondly, he recommends that housing projects be planned with dwelling entrances facing inward in order to encourage project ground use and avoidance of isolated border areas.

A pilot study was undertaken of crime experience in the city of Detroit in order to examine the premise that the physical design of urban neighborhood may be utilized as an approach to crime reduction.[75] The findings concerning residential property are relevant in the present context.

Site surveys were conducted on 298 structures in which burglaries had been committed in 1969-1970. Seventy-three of the selected sites were residential premises (52 single-family homes, 21 apartments), while four were multi-unit housing projects.

Of the 73 residential structures, 63.5% were located at or near corner lots. From this finding a hypothesis was generated that corner houses appear to be more susceptible to burglaries because, there being no adjoining home, fear of detection is minimized.[76]

It was found that 65.6% of the sites had side or rear access to the alley. Although it was not stated what percentage were actually entered from the side or rear, the study noted that of 21,000 burglaries of private dwellings which occurred in the city in a 10 month period, the side or rear accounted for nearly 77% of entries.

The majority of the 52 single-family dwellings were found to have garages in the rear adjoining an alley, which obstructed vision from the dwelling directly across the alley.

The study did not provide statements of relationship between variables, possibly because the sample was too small from which to draw meaningful inferences. A number of observations, however, were offered without reference to quantitative data: (1) homes with front or rear porches appeared to be more susceptible to burglary; such dwellings are easy prey for the potential burglar, since locks usually found in porch doors are inadequate and can be pried open with a large screwdriver. Once inside the porch enclosure, the criminal is concealed from public view and can work methodically to open the main door; (2) large chimneys located on the side of homes offer another form of concealment for the burglar, since the side door was often found

to be located near the chimney; (3) houses having double alleys, one in the rear and another on the side, tend to be victimized more, since the side alley usually faces the back of strip commercial development which offers both concealment and nearby parking; (4) dwellings facing a large park or an undeveloped open space are often more susceptible to burglaries since there are no nearby structures facing the front entrances to provide a surveillance effect.

Four public housing projects were surveyed which included both high rise apartments and garden apartments or row house type dwellings. Although no quantitative data were provided, certain generalizations were drawn from the study: (1) burglaries in the public housing projects generally occur during evening hours when occupants are away shopping or visiting; (2) burglaries in the one public housing project which houses primarily senior citizens generally occur on weekends when residents leave their apartments unoccupied for one or more days to visit relatives; (3) ground floor apartments located at the end of a row of buildings are the most frequent object of breaking and entering; (4) generally, row house apartments are more frequently victimized by breaking and entering than high rise apartment buildings. This arises from the fact that although individual dwelling

units are continguous in row housing, there is limited visibility of adjoining apartments because all windows and doors are located along the same linear axis. In addition, the high rise apartment buildings have more elaborate security measures at the entrance points. (5) Mugging and purse snatching in housing projects tend to occur along paved walkways leading to shopping and parking areas. A large proportion occur during the daytime, and frequently involve elderly persons. (6) Crime-staging areas in large public housing projects are the parking lots, enclosed areas such as courtyards which are not visible from the street or sidewalk, building lobbies, stairwells, and laundry rooms.

The Detroit study found that one of the most significant factors in crime incidence on project grounds was the use of the super block, where interior grounds are not traversed by streets. Police patrol cars cannot drive through to survey these areas; hence pedestrians are often victimized by muggings or purse snatchings.

A study of the security of housing projects by Newman compared a number of them and tried to determine why some were relatively more secure than similar ones in other areas. In general, he found much higher crime rate in high rise buildings. Based on

his analysis he developed a concept of "defensible space" in which the residents themselves assume responsibility for safe, well maintained living environments rather than relying on hardware or external institutions such as the police. Newman proposed to further "territorial concern" by changes in physical design. He pointed out that corridors, stairways, and grounds related to specific dwelling units (through landscaping, partitioning, and positioning) are more likely to be maintained and watched by residents than large anonymous spaces. Surveillance capability, he felt, was increased through modification of windows and other openings and by increasing activity through corridors and grounds. Security was also fostered by altering the governance of housing projects in order to provide monetary incentives for self-maintenance and self-policing. This same suggestion is made by Duhl in reference to a specific New York City Housing Project.[78]

Other measures mentioned by Newman for making space defensible include alterations of building design to make it more difficult for criminals to evade detection by eliminating blind corners, enclosed corridors and windowless stairways, and by using electronic devices to monitor entrances, halls, stairs, and grounds. Newman also points out that security

arrangements which conflict with residential convenience will not be used by residents, and describes how tenants sometimes deliberately jam locks and leave fire doors open.

Newman suggests that using single load corridors i.e., structures with one row of apartments opening on to a single outside corridor, improves surveillance from both apartments and grounds and also eliminates underused hallways. However, Jacobs [79] cites an example of a single loaded hi-rise that was successful in creating activity and surveillance along corridors, but whose stairways and elevators became high crime areas. The light and activity along corridors could be viewed by the residents of the surrounding neighborhood and attracted delinquents to the building who were able to penetrate the entrances without difficulty and victimized residents in the underused areas.

In some respects, the proposals to improve security design contradict one another. Luedtke, Angel, and Newman agree that undertrafficked interior project grounds are hazardous. However, whereas Angel urges that pedestrians should be encouraged to traverse grounds, Newman indicates that overly accessible grounds draw in criminal elements from outside the project and so he recommends that pedestrians be routed around the border streets. Solutions therefore seem to depend on who the offenders are, where they come from, what attracts them to or deters them from committing offenses.

Although the Jacobs and Newman studies deal with physical design features, they can be seen as following in the wave of earlier writers who posited social disorganization as a key variable in determining the crime rate of an area. Like the latter the former agree that it is people who deter crime. In contrast with the past Jacobs and Newman seek to structure social organization thru physical design and land use planning.

The more practical studies of "how to" secure residential premises tend to concentrate on individual dwellings rather than surrounding areas. These studies, however, have tended to shift emphasis over the years. Holcomb,[80] writing in 1953, concentrated on simple security procedures (leaving lights on, avoiding glass doors, buying window locks) and included only a brief description of door locks or alarm systems. In contrast, Moolman in 1970 listed extensive consumer information regarding special locks, alarm systems, unbreakable glass, and steel door frames.[81] Moreover, whereas earlier advice was largely addressed to suburban householders, the more recent emphasis has been on central city apartments.

Among the favorite items in the more recent security guides are electronic alarm locks, police locks, and magic

eye locks. Robert Barnes, a professional burglar, suggests that an apartment can be made secure for $98,[82] which includes security for the front door, sliding patio doors, and windows. For the front door, he recommends a dead bolt locking device, battery powered burglar alarm, and locking key chain. For the patio door, he prescribes a cross bar locking device, including a safety bar screwed on to the door, a chain and catch, and a lock with a key, as well as a battery powered alarm. For the window, he advises key locks for each window, and a battery powered alarm system for each one. As an option he suggests an added metal window gate.

Standards for burglary prevention devised for the city of Alexandria, Virginia, emphasized the goal of slowing down the burglar until the police have time to arrive rather than attempting to prevent entry altogether.[83] The authors of these guidelines suggest that a combination of security devices, such as alarms and window gates is more reliable than a single secure device, because even if a burglar cannot defeat this one special device he may find various other means of entry which will permit him to do the job and leave within a time period which is not sufficient for police action to be effective. Of course, such guidelines are dependent for their significance upon the presence of an efficient system for instantaneous notification of the police and rapid police response.

SUMMARY - CHAPTER III

This chapter has examined an extensive literature related in whole or in part to the problem of residential crime, and has suggested a number of generalizations which pertain to various aspects of the problem.

Offender Behavior

The research has generally agreed that the majority of property offenders, i.e., those who commit residential burglary or robbery are unskilled, do little planning, possess limited mobility, and do not make large profits from their criminal endeavors. The literature differs on the extent to which offenders specialize or see themselves as members of a distinct criminal subculture.

Correlative Factors and Explanatory Theories

The literature has argued that neighborhoods with high offender and offense rates tend to be geographically concentrated in the center of the metropolitan area. However, a number of covariant factors are present in these areas, and it is difficult to sort out their relative weights. Attempts to explain the motivation for and distribution of residential type crimes have chiefly concentrated on socio-economic factors such as racial and income characteristics, family background, age, and addiction to drugs.

Crime Control

While the traditional view has been that police are a major deterrent to residential type crime, recent studies have suggested that standard police patrol and investigative operations are ineffective against single acts of robbery or burglary. On the other hand, since property offenders commit multiple crimes, they tend to be caught relatively often. Thus, the police do interdict criminal careers although the larger criminal justice system does not seem to deter offenders through either current rehabilitation methods or fear of punishment. While normal police operations appear ineffective, it has been posited that local or fixed security may be an effective deterrent in specific circumstances.

The literature also suggests that the probability of victimization of an individual dwelling is related to the vulnerability of its design, access security and the degree to which the social organization and physical layout of the surrounding neighborhood fosters the detection of offenders.

CHAPTER III

Footnotes

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CHAPTER IV

OFFENDERS AND OFFENSES

CHAPTER IV

OFFENDERS AND OFFENSES

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes some of the behavioral patterns which relate to the principal residential crimes, burglary and robbery. It draws on police reports, interviews with adjudicated burglars, and survey research data.

B. SCOPE

Police reports on 1,988 residential burglaries and 152 residential robberies were collected from 39 geographic areas of metropolitan Boston. They comprised the total of such crimes reported in these areas over a three year period. Personal interviews were conducted with 100 adjudicated burglars. The interviewees were selected from court probationers and the jail population. All were volunteers.

Arguably the validity of the interview data is limited by the small size of the sample, possible biases from non-random selection, and possible lack of veracity by the interviewees. However, it was concluded that in terms of the resources of the project and its desired output, that is, detailed information on how and why residential offenders attack dwellings, the selected sample was appropriate. A complete account of the offender interview process is contained in Appendix B, Section II.

C. BURGLARS AND BURGLARY

1. Burglary and the Criminal Justice System[1]

Over half of all burglaries are residential in nature. According to uniform crime-reporting rules, a person commits a residential burglary when he makes or attempts to make an unlawful entry into a dwelling or an erection or appertunance thereto, to commit a felony or theft, even though no force is used.[2] In Massachusetts, however, there are a specific number of criminal charges which may be leveled depending upon such variables as time of day, degree of force used, type of structure attacked, whether or not the victim is present, the motive of the offender, etc.[3]

In Massachusetts a person charged with a burglary type offense is afforded a hearing at the district court level. In general the district court cannot dispose of breaking and entering cases where the penalty is more than ten years imprisonment. As a practical matter most cases are handled at district court level, including felony cases over which the court technically does not have any jurisdiction. In these cases the police prosecuter will reduce the charge to one which the court can hear. This is especially likely when the defendant has agreed to plead guilty in return for lesser sentence.

Defendants found guilty at district court level may be fined, given a suspended sentence, placed on probation, or sentenced - juveniles to the youth service division and adults to the house of correction. The latter is a medium security penal institution operated by county government.

Alternatively, the district court judge or the district attorney may elect to send a case to the grand jury for indictment and subsequent trial in the superior court. This is likely to occur if they feel the defendant's crime or past history merits a state prison sentence.

Individuals who are held to the grand jury, and indicted and tried in the superior court, may receive any of the penalties they would be liable to in district court or they may be sentenced to a term in the state prison if convicted. Table 4.1 presents the disposition of burglary prosecutions in a typical year.

TABLE 4.1

DISPOSITION OF BURGLARY PROSECUTIONS BOSTON SMSA[1] - 1970

No. persons tried for burglary[2]	2286
% tried in district court	78%
% tried in superior court	22%
Total % convicted	61%
Sentenced to imprisonment as % of total cases tried[3]	22%
% of Total Sentenced to imprisonment who were received at state prison[4]	17%
% of Total Sentenced to imprisonment who were received at house of correction[5]	83%

[1]Source: Statistical Reports of the Commissioner of Corrections, Comm. of Mass. 1966, 1968, 1970.

[2]Does not include pending cases.

[3]Does not include cases pending sentence.

[4]Based on figures for entire state.

It is evident that the district court rather than the superior court disposes of burglary cases; only a small percentage of those convicted are imprisoned; and most imprisoned are confined in the house of correction rather than the state prison. In 1970 the median house of correction sentence for burglary was six months.

2. Characteristics of the Interview Sample

The interviewees for this study were classified by three categories and seven sub-categories.

Age

Under 18 years
18 - 25 years
Over 25 years

Race

White
Non-white

Drugs

Drug user
Non-drug user

These categories were formulated based on an analysis of criminal justice statistics, the literature, and pre-testing of actual subjects. Originally the proposed typology was based on skill levels, such as skilled, semi-skilled, professional, and non-professional. However, it soon became

apparent that most offenders in the sample were not highly skilled and to classify them as "professional" would involve subjective ratings beyond the data base.

An analysis of offender data in the criminal justice system suggests that youth and/or non-white status may be factors in offender behavior. Likewise, a popular explanation of the incidence of burglary relates to drug users' need for funds. Thus, the categories were devised to determine the influence of these factors.

The three characteristics used to describe interviewees tended to overlap to some extent. For example, most drug users were in the 18 - 25 year group; most skilled offenders were over 25.

Table 4.2 describes demographic characteristics of persons arrested for burglary in Boston in comparison with the general population.

TABLE 4.2

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS ARRESTED FOR BURGLARY, BOSTON, 1970 COMPARED TO CITY POPULATION

	Arrested[1] Burglars	City Population[2]
% Male	97%	46%
Median Age	18	28.7
% Non-white	45%	16%

1 Annual Reports Police Commissioner for the City of Boston 1970, Table VIII.

2 U. S. Census, 1970.

The interview population was in many respects similar to the arrested population. All were male, 46% non-white, and the median age was 24.

Table 4.3 relates the age and race of interviewees with their drug use* (see also Appendix B, Tables 1-3.

TABLE 4.3

AGE	White		Non White		
	Drug User	Non Drug User	Drug User	Non Drug User	Total
Under 18	1 (5%)	11 (52%)	4 (19%)	5 (24%)	21 (100%)
18-25	19 (37%)	5 (10%)	16 (31%)	11 (22%)	51 (100%)
Over 25	6 (24%)	10 (40%)	2 (8%)	7 (28%)	25 (100%)
Total No.	26	26	22	23	97

As a group they were not well educated and had limited work skills - 70% had never earned more than $200/week in a legitimate occupation. Nearly 60% were in jail at the time they were interviewed. A large percentage admitted to being involved previously in other illegal activities, principally auto theft and drug law violations and to having also broken into non residential buildings, particularly stores and offices. (See Appendix B, Tables 4-10).

* A major drug user was defined as someone spending over $50 a week buying drugs or admitting to using hard drugs or amphetamines. Amphetamines were included because several interviewees, who did not use heroin, were addicted to amphetamines and indicated they stole to support their habits. Those spending over $50 a week on drugs were also included in order not to omit anyone who did not want to admit to taking heroin, but who was prepared to admit to buying substantial amounts of unspecified drugs. While most of those who admitted to being major drug users were likely to be addicts, all those who said they were not are less likely to be accurate. Therefore, the drug user category may really be larger and the non-drug user category smaller than appears.

A check of the interviewee's official criminal histories generally verified their own accounts, although a few, perhaps understandably, did not mention certain serious assaults they had been charged with. On the other hand, some individuals admitted to crimes which, though consistent with their histories, did not appear in official records.

3. Choice of Target

a. Preferred Dwellings

Interviewees were shown slides of different types of housing and asked to select the type similar to that in which they most frequently operated. The types were

A public housing project with elevator buildings;

A group of attached (row) houses;

A group of small multi-family houses (known locally 3 or 4 deckers).

A group of large multi-unit older brick apartment buildings;

A group of luxury high-rise apartment buildings;

A group of detached, single-family houses.

Table 4.4 shows the results (see Appendix B, Table 10).

TABLE 4.4

SELECTION OF LIKELY TARGETS

Housing Projects	19%	Brick Apartments	8%
Row Houses	6%	Luxury High-Rise Apartments	4%
Multi-family Houses	28%	Single Family Houses	35%

N = 97

Single family and multi-family houses were selected most frequently. The principle reasons for selecting single-family houses were apparent affluence,vulnerability to attack and isolation from neighboring residences. Multi-family houses were selected because of vulnerability to attack (see Appendix B, Table 11).

The older age group was more apt to work in single family houses than other age groups, valuing the affluence and isolation of residences. Likewise, only members of the older age group showed serious interest in luxury apartments. The younger groups found such apartments "too much of a hassle," requiring skill, experience and extensive planning before they could be attacked.

More members of the younger group worked in multi-family houses and housing projects. Their chief concern was that the residence be easy to enter, and they were considerably less interested than other age groups that it appear affluent.

More whites worked in single-family houses and were marginally more concerned that a residence appear affluent. More non-whites worked in housing projects, and were somewhat more concerned that there should be few police or security patrols around and that they be inconspciuous than were whites (see Appendix B, Table 12).

Interviewees were also asked to select the housing type in which they were least likely to work. The table below gives their answers (see Appendix B, Table 13).

TABLE 4.5

SELECTION OF LEAST LIKELY TARGETS

Projects	40%	Old Brick Apartment	3%
Row Houses	6%	Single Family House	21%
Multifamily House	5%	Luxury Apartment	25%

N = 97

Housing projects, the luxury apartments and the single-family houses were most often indicated as unlikely targets. In general, the reasons interviewees gave related to fear of detection (see Appendix B, Table 14)

The older age group was least apt to work in housing projects because they did not think they would be profitable. In avoiding luxury apartments and the single-family houses, the main reservation of the younger groups was that there would be police or security patrols around. Only 10% of the younger interviewees indicated that they rejected a target because it might not be profitable.

Non-whites avoided single-family houses; whites avoided projects. There was little difference, however, between the selections of drug and non-drug users, although non-drug users were somewhat more concerned about the possiblity of police or security patrols (see Appendix B, Table 15).

Although single-family houses were selected by offenders more frequently than housing projects, police and victimization data indicate that single-family houses have lower burglary rates than housing projects (see Table 4.6)

TABLE 4.6

COMPARATIVE RESIDENTIAL BURGALRY VICTIMIZATION BETWEEN SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSES AND HOUSING PROJECTS

	Rate Per 1000
Single-Family Houses	94
Housing Projects	103

The apparent discrepancy between targets selected by interviewees and real-world victimization patterns parallels biases in the offender sample. Older white interviewees, who were overrepresented in the sample, generally preferred single-family houses, while younger offenders tended to operate in housing projects. On the other hand, the aversion of almost all interviewees to luxury high-rise apartments is borne out by police data (see Chapter V)

The preference of younger offenders for projects along with the higher victimization of projects suggests that the real world burglar population tends to be as young, as arrest figures would seem to indicate.

b. Effect of Race in Decision Process

Most whites and non-whites would still work in a neighborhood if the race of residents were different from their own, although whites were more apt to be adverse. Non-whites who avoided white neighborhoods were mainly young and/or less experienced (see Appendix B, Table 16).

An analysis of police arrest data for specific locales indicates that age and race make a difference in type of area chosen for attack. In a housing project area there were no burglars over 25. In contrast, 30% of the offenders arrested in an apartment area were 25 or older. In a predominantly black area 84% of the offenders were non-white while in a white suburban area only 7% were. In a white inner city transient area offenders were evenly divided between the races (see Appendix B, Table 16).

4. Planning and Method of Operation

a. Extent of Planning (see Appendix B, Tables 17 and 18)

The majority of the interviewees undertook some planning before they hit a target. The older group was more likely to engage in extensive planning. There was no significant difference by race, but drug users tended to do less planning than non-drug users.

The extent of planning by housing type was also checked. Except that considerably more planning was anticipated before hitting the luxury apartment, there was little difference between the housing types, suggesting that personal characteristics of offenders are more important than the housing type attacked.

b. Type of Planning (see Appendix B, Tables 19 and 20)

Most interviewees, especially in the older group, wanted to know whether the dwelling was occupied, and found out by observing the premises. Some telephoned the residence and a few looked for signs such as uncollected mail or newspapers.

The police data (N=1910) tends to confirm the offenders' reluctance to confront the householder. In 92% of the cases studied the premises were not occupied when the

burglary occurred. Of 82 cases where the premises were occupied and the occupants state could be determined, in 51% they were sleeping and in 14%, though awake, they were unaware that a burglary was taking place. For example, they may have been in the backyard or basement while the burglar was in the living room. In the other 35% they became aware of the burglary but a sufficient confrontation did not take place to cause the crime to be classified as a robbery.

Approximately a third of the interviewees wanted to know what valuables were available. The primary means of finding this out were "window peeping" and through tips. A third of the sample also wanted to know whether there was a burglar alarm system in use. The older group was more likely to take cognizance of police or security patrols, even though they were less deterred by them (see Appendix B, Table 15).

c. Time of Operation (see Appendix B, Tables 21 to 23)

Overall, interviewees preferred to work in the morning because people were likely to be out, and few worked after midnight. In terms of age groups, considerably more of the middle age group worked in the morning and more of the younger and older groups worked in the afternoon and early evening.

Younger offenders' preferences were in part dictated by the necessity of attending school.

According to racial groups, more non-whites than whites operated in the mornings while more whites operated in the early evening. Several non-whites indicated that people in white neighborhoods were more likely to be suspicious if they saw non-whites there after dark than during the day.

There were no significant time differences between drug users and non-drug users.

Police reports tend to confirm the interviewees' assertions, since most reported burglaries occur during the daytime. Hoveyer, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact time when burglaries occur so that many morning burglaries may not be discovered until later. This could explain why police rocords indicate most burglaries occur in the afternoon (see Appendix B, Table 23). The police data also indicates that weekdays were the most favored days, while no pattern could be discerned by month or season.

The time of day a hit would normally be made by interviewees was also checked by housing type. Some interesting differences emerged. The old brick apartment, the multi-family house, and the projects were more likely to be hit in the daytime, reflecting a general feeling

that this was when the residents were out (at work, taking the children to school, or shopping). For the single-family house, the evening was marginally preferred. There is some confirmation of this in the police data examined. 72% of burglaries in all areas together took place in the daytime, while only 54% of burglaries in the single-family areas took place in the daytime (see Appendix C, Table 17). Likewise, there was a relatively high incidence of nighttime burglary in the suburbs where two of the single-family areas were located. A city RA of single-family homes and a suburban apartment area showed patterns which fit the city-suburb dichotomy--day in the city, night in the suburbs. It is likely that the interviewees, in preferring night attacks on single-family homes, viewed this housing type as synonymous with suburbia. This is a reasonable assumption in the Boston area, where only 15% of the central city housing stock is single-family. In contrast some housing project areas has a high percentage of night attacks.

d. Means of Transport (see Appendix B, Table 24)

Most interviewees got to their target in stolen cars, on foot, or in their own cars. Not surprisingly, considerably more of the younger age group went on foot. More of the middle age group went in stolen cars, and

more of the older group went in their own cars. More whites used a stolen car and more non-whites went on foot. There was no major difference between drug users and non-drug users.

e. Time Traveled (see Appendix B, Tables 25 and 26)

About half of the interviewees would not travel more than one hour from their homes to make a hit. A quarter would consider traveling one to three hours, and a few would travel over 24 hours.

Again, about half of the respondents said they would not work in their own neighborhood if they were going to hit an apartment or a house.

The younger age group and non-whites generally were less likely to travel far. For younger offenders this meant operating primarily in their own neighborhoods. Within the categories of race and drug use there was considerable division over working near home.

The interviewees' responses tended on the whole to coincide with their criminal histories, since nearly half showed a consistent pattern of arrests in the suburban town, or city neighborhood where they resided.

As regards mobility, this suggests that once beyond the teen years, offenders split into two groups--one preferring

to operate close to home and the other to travel further afield.

f. Use of Accomplice (see Appendix B, Table 27)

Almost half the interviewees always used at least one accomplice, over a third sometimes used them, and a fifth never used them. The major task of the accomplice was to be the lookout man. Other tasks were to help carry the goods out, to do the job with the interviewee and to drive the get-away car.

Considerably more of the younger age group always used accomplices - breaking and entering was often a group activity for them - while considerably less of the older age group always did. The younger group were more inclined to have accomplices to help them carry the goods out (particularly important since many of them travelled on foot).

Drug users were considerably more likely than non-drug users to use accomplices consistently (usually the accomplice was also an addict).

g. Tools and/or Weapons (Appendix B, Table 28)

Almost three quarters of interviewees carried a screwdriver, and two-fifths carried a crowbar, tire iron, or jimmy. Other tools included celluloid cards, glass cutters,

hammers, and dent pullers. Only six people admitted to carrying guns, five to carrying knives, and three to carrying mace.

h. Place of Entry (see Appendix B, Tables 29 to 31)

The place of entry - window and/or door - was tabulated by housing type: in most the door was used more often than the window. Not surprisingly, in the old brick apartment building it was used three quarters of the time and in the projects over two thirds of the time. In all housing types except the luxury apartment building, the first floor was the level interviewees preferred to hit because it gave them the option of trying the window should the door prove too difficult.

Police data confirmed that in general the door was violated about twice as frequently as the window. Curiously, though, the police data for housing projects contradicts the offenders' statements. Only four of 18 surveyed RA's had more than 50% entrance via the window and two of these were project areas. (See Appendix C, Table 17)

i. Method of Entry (see Appendix B, Tables 32 to 35)

Interviewees were asked which method they used to enter a door or a window. A full description of the various

methods of entry listed is given in Appendix B, Table 32. By far the most common method employed against a door was to pry it. Other methods included attacking the lock directly, loiding the door, or using direct impact. Very few people picked the lock or used a passkey.

The most common method used to enter windows was to break the glass. This was followed, in order, by loiding or prying the catch, cutting the glass, or finding the window open.

There were few differences in methods used by categories of interviewees. The older age group was less likely to use methods involving extreme force (attacking the lock, direct impact) than the other two age groups, and more likely to use methods not involving a high degree of force (loiding the door, picking the lock, or cutting the window glass). There did not appear to be major differences in attack methods by race or drug use.

Interviewees were rated as skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled according to the entry method they principally used. The skill ratings assigned to the various methods are shown in a footnote to Appendix B, Table 33. Over four-fifths of the interviewees were semi-skilled, only 6% were skilled and 11% were unskilled.

Not surprisingly, more of the younger group fell into the unskilled category and none were skilled, but nevertheless, three quarters of the group were semi-skilled. A few more of the older age group were skilled.

Police data confirms that the vast majority of attacks on doors are carried out by even more simple methods than the interview sample described. This suggests that real world burglars are younger and less skilled (see Appendix B, Table 34).

j. Time Taken to Enter (see Appendix B, Table 35)

Interviewees estimated that it took them five minutes to enter a door and three minutes for a window. Ten minutes was the maximum time they would spend in an attempt to enter a door and five minutes for a window (where they were usually more exposed).

As might be expected the younger age group gave somewhat higher estimates and the middle groups somewhat lower estimates, particularly to enter doors.

k. Goods Sought (see Appendix B, Table 36)

Hi-fi's, TVs, radios were sought by over three quarters of the interviewees, cash was sought by 70%, and jewelry and silver by two thirds. Only a few interviewees (less than 10%) were interested in other items such as photo equipment, credit cards, clothing, or furniture.

Almost all the younger age group looked for hi-fi's, TV's, and radios which they might use themselves or were easy to sell. Only half looked for jewelry or silver because they found these items more difficult to sell. On the other hand, four-fifths of the older age group - usually with well established fences - sought jewelry and silver and only half bothered with TV's radios, and hi-fi's.

Once again police data supported the offenders assertions. In the cases analyzed the most common item of loss (62% of the cases) was electronic equipment such as hi-fi's, TV's and radios. Cash was taken in 25% of the instances, jewelry in 18%, clothing in 10%, and photo equipment in 8%.

l. Average Score (see Appendix B, Tables 37 and 38)

Almost half the interviewees made average scores between $100 and $300. Just under a third made more than that and about a fifth made less.

As expected, there were considerable differences between age groups. The younger age group had lower average scores (one third made less than $50) and the older age group had higher average scores (over half made over $300 a hit).

44% of the whites made average scores over $300, compared to 15% of the blacks. More drug users than non-drug

users made average scores of over $300.

The amount of the average score by housing type was also tabulated. Those interviewees hitting the projects and multi-family houses generally expected average scores below $300. Those hitting the luxury apartments usually expected an average score of over $1,000.

A comparison between actual police reports and offender estimates is provided in Table 4.7.

TABLE 4.7

COMPARISON OF ACTUAL VS. ESTIMATED LOSS

Value of Loss	Police Reports (N = 1673)	Offenders Estimates
under $100	21%	23%
$100 - $300	38	47
$301 - $1000	34	25
over $1000	7	6

In general the offenders' estimates are slightly below the police reports but the reports more nearly reflect actual value of the stolen item while the estimates are what the offender expects to receive. Usually this is 60-80% below the actual value of the item. It should be noted that average age of the offender sample is older than arrested burglars. The estimates made by the two younger age groups are much more consistent with real world losses than the estimates of the sample as a whole. Once again this suggests that arrested burglars and actual burglars share the same characteristics.

m. Time Spent Inside Residence (Appendix B, Table 39)

Over 90% of interviewees usually spent less than 30 minutes, and almost half of these spent less than 15 minutes in the residence.

None of the younger age group spent over 30 minutes there. Few of the older age group spent less than 15 minutes and almost a fourth spent between 30 minutes and 2 hours. There were no significant differences between whites and non-whites nor between drug users and non-drug users.

n. Emergency Situations (Appendix B, Tables 40 to 41)

Interviewees were asked what they would call an emergency situation and what they would do. Most would leave immediately

if they thought they had set off a ringing or silent alarm, although some would quickly finish the job and then leave. Almost all interviewees would leave if someone returned and nearly three quarters if someone were awake inside the residence when they entered. However, only a quarter would leave immediately if someone was asleep inside - about the same number that would leave if a dog started barking.

There was little difference between the reactions of the sub groups. More of the older age group would leave if someone was inside (asleep or awake), several mentioned more severe penalties this would involve if they were caught.

Based on the police records analysis, burglary is most often discovered by the return of a household member sometime after the crime has occurred. In only 7% of the cases was discovery triggered by sighting the offender. In less than 1% was it discovered by the police. Only one crime was reported as discovered by the activation of an alarm.

TABLE 4.8

CRIME DISCOVERY FACTORS ACCORDING TO POLICE RECORDS

	Discovered By (N=1947)
Household Member	94.1%
Neighbor	4.6%
Police	+
Other++	+
	Attention Drawn By (N=1793)
Alarm Ringing	+
Sight of Offender	7.7%
Condition of Premises (Offender not present)	92.0%

+ Less than 1%

++ Caretaker, relative, passerby

5. Actions after Completing a Hit

a. Actions Immediately Afterwards (see Appendix B, Table 42)

Most interviewees disposed of the goods immediately. Others took them home, to a friend's house, or elsewhere.

There were considerable differences between the sub-groups. Over two-thirds of the middle and older age groups disposed of goods immediately, but only 10% of the younger age group - instead, almost all of this age group took them home or to a friend's house.

Most whites disposed of the goods immediately. As might be expected, considerably more drug users disposed of the goods immediately, to get cash for narcotics.

b. Where Goods Disposed of (see Appendix B, Table 43)

Two-fifths of the interviewees usually disposed of the goods in a bar, while somewhat fewer took the goods to somebody's house or apartment. The other places mentioned most often were stores, warehouses, and gas stations.

Again, there was considerable difference between the age groups. A majority of the younger group disposed of the goods in a house or apartment, while over half the older group and nearly half the middle age group disposed of them in a bar. Very few of the older group used a house or apartment. There was little difference between the other two sub groups.

6. Motivation and Frequency of Operation

Those offenders interviewed for this study primarily expressed need for money for drugs or the more conventional luxuries of life (see Appendix B, Tables 44 and 45).

a. Money Needed to Live per Week (see Table 46)

Of the interviewees who answered the question, a third estimated they needed $50-100 a week, almost half needed between $100 and $500, and the remainder needed over $500. Not surprisingly almost none of the younger age group needed over $100 a week, whereas almost all the older age group needed more than this. Drug users needed considerably more than non-drug users.

b. Number of Hits per Week

The operating frequency of individuals is shown in Appendix B, Table 47. The major factor here was drug use. Almost half the drug users made over five hits a week while a sizable majority of the non-drug users made less than three hits a week.

The number of hits each interviewee made a week was also tabulated with his average score and the amount of money he needed a week (see Appendix B, Table 48).

Those making fewer hits tended to make higher average scores. As might be expected the more money an interviewee

needed each week the greater the number of hits he was likely to make.

Interviewees were asked if they would continue to break and enter if they had enough money to cover their needs. Almost three fourths said no, some were undecided and a few said yes (see Appendix B, Table 49).

A considerably lower percentage of the younger age group and higher percentage of the middle age group said they would definitely stop. There was no significant difference between drug users and non-drug users. "Enough money to support your needs" to the former meant, "enough money to support your habit."

Of the drug users asked whether they had broken into a residence before taking drugs, seventy-one percent said no, twenty-nine percent said yes. In general this answer approximated their criminal history, i.e., for two-thirds drug arrests preceeded burglary charges; however, more than two-thirds had some criminal arrests before their first drug arrest. Thus, their involvement in burglary (and drugs) may have been a continuation of their criminal career rather than a result of drug use. It seems clear, however, that drug use accelerates the pace of burglary activity.

Just under half of the interviewees mentioned other motives besides profit for breaking into residences. The younger age group and non-drug users were more apt to mention additional motives. The excitement or "challenge" of breaking and entering was the motive given most frequently, particularly by the younger age group (see Appendix B, Table 50)

7. Offender Profiles

A brief profile of the typical offender in each category drawn from the comparisons made in the previous pages may help to highlight the differences among them in skill levels, planning, mode of operation, preferred neighborhood, and attitudes.

a. Age

There are many individual exceptions within each age group but there are enough differences among groups to make comparisons worthwhile.

(1) The Juvenile Offender

The typical juvenile offender in this study had been arrested a couple of times and placed on probation. He was unskilled and because of his youth, more than his record, found it difficult to get a job. He was more inclined than the older offender to work with friends or in gangs. In general he traveled on foot to make a hit, which meant that he was likely to work in or around his own neighborhood.

Sometimes a hit was done on the spur of the moment. "I'm just walking down the street and a couple of friends say, hey do you want to break into a house with us, I say

OK if it's a good hit." He was not usually desperate for money, and probably not very experienced. Since he was not always very skilled, it was more important that a place should be easy to get into than that it should be affluent. He frequently used unskilled methods like breaking the glass in the window to enter. He took longer than the others to get in; he was more deterred by evidence of a burglar alarm, and the possibility of police or security patrols and by neighborhoods with which he was unfamilar and where he would feel conspicuous. His average score was low. His disposal of the goods was haphazard rather than carefully planned. He was less likely than the older ones to assess the possible gain against the risk, both in the actual burglary itself - where planning, if any, concentrated on how to do it rather than whether it was worthwhile to do - and in his behavior afterwards. He ran the risk of taking the goods home and keeping them there while he tried to arrange to sell them. To him it seemed more a game than a way of life. As for the money, he spent most of it on clothes, goods, a small part on drugs, and gave some to his family.

(2) The 18-25 Year Old Offender

The picture of a typical offender in this age group may be colored by the large number of heavy drug users in it, but still distinct differences can be discerned from the younger group. Even if not interviewed in a jail, he has probably had several previous convictions. In many instances he made a calculated decision to concentrate on breaking and entering because it was easy, not too risky, and had relatively light penalties if he was caught. "I gave up mugging because it might end in murder." (18 year old) "I like breaking and entering because you don't have to contend with people." (22 year old)

He was more mobile and had moved outside his own neighborhood for at least half his hits. Single-family suburban homes he found easy and profitable. Multi-family homes he found good for a quick score. By his early 20's he was a very experienced, effective, but usually not a highly skilled burglar. His methods of entry usually involved little skill; rather he forced the door or window using screwdrivers or crowbars. He would probably do little planning. "You have to know whether prople are home or not, but you find that out when you're there" or "I just pick at random unless I know something ahead of time."

Usually he would not enter an occupied house, although more of this group were prepared to chance it than the other groups. In general, he made more hits (over 50% did five or more hits a week, although most of these were drug users), and his average score was higher than the juveniles. He took a wider variety of goods because he had more highly developed channels for disposing of them. No one in this group indicated that getting rid of their score was a problem. Moreover, he usually disposed of goods immediately, to one of several reliable fences with whom he'd worked for some time. He would meet the fence in a bar, or even at his house. In several cases the fences were referred to as "so-called respectable citizens." He spent the money, if not on drugs, on goods, clothes, "having a good time," "leading the good life," traveling, and on his family.

(3) The Older Offender - Age 25 and Upwards

The typical offender in this age group was a very old hand. Unless he had recently become a drug addict he had been breaking and entering for many years, and he had been in and out of jail several times on many different charges. (Everyone interviewed in this age group was in jail.) Like many in the middle age group he chose breaking and entering

as preferable to and more profitable than other types of crime. "I purse-snatched when I was 15. I grew out of that onto something bigger." And in many cases he also changed from less profitable to more profitable neighborhoods. "I changed as I learned more...from low class neighborhoods to high rise apartments...it's another step."

That the neighborhood should be affluent was the first consideration and therefore he spent much of his time working in single family suburban houses. He was more inclined to plan carefully, to get to know the neighborhood thoroughly before attempting a hit there. He might work there a couple of days, he might talk to the neighbors, he might dress up.."It's very important not to look out of place." He might put on a repairman's uniform. "I'd cruise there today, see how the people are. You can look at a person and know just what they'd have in their house." He took care and advised, "Don't shoot blind, that's for beginners." And he was cautious, "When the gains don't outbalance the other, you don't take the chance." Sometimes he did the planning and others did the job. When he did it himself, his entry methods were usually effective and sometimes skillful. He felt there were few places he could not get into. "Any lock made by man can be broken by man." And

anyway, "You can always try the window." However, because of his reluctance to be caught, he was more wary of entering an occupied house than the younger ones, and more wary of large dogs. He was less afraid of burglar alarms because he felt he was able to handle them. He was scornful of those working in housing projects, "only junkies would go there... nothing worth taking." He stayed longer in a residence than the others and would be more thorough once he was there. He would look for a variety of things in unlikely places (like the freezer or the refrigerator), and occasionally find them. His average score was higher and he disposed of the goods immediately through several trusted fences.

On the whole, (unless he were a drug addict) he made fewer, more profitable hits, thus reducing the chances of being caught. "I do three to four hits a month, but they've got to be good ones." He might have a job, "I just do it once a month to supplement my income...I've been doing it for 15 years." But usually he had had considerable difficulty getting or holding jobs, and had often given up trying. "I don't like to work. I haven't had to work for five years." Moreover, "You can make a week's pay in one night." Money went on goods, clothes, alcohol, and family, or building up his own business. As one interviewee put it, "I steal to live."

b. Racial

In many respects the pictures from the interviewee sample of the white and black burglar were very similar. They were both likely to be semi-skilled and use the same simple but effective methods to enter residences. They both used accomplices to the same extent, and frequently had accomplices of the opposite race. They primarily looked for cash, color TV's, stereos, and radios. They would spend approximately the same length of time inside a residence, they disposed of the goods in the same type of places. There was approximately the same likelihood in each group that some of the money obtained would be spent on drugs. There was almost no difference in the number of hits they both made a week.

However, some interesting differences and viewpoints did emerge between the groups which may be seen from the following profiles.

(1) Whites

The white burglar was more likely to be married than the black burglar. He was more likely to have had a semi-skilled job and to have earned a little more money

a week than the black burglar. He was more inclined to prefer single family houses, principally because they were usually in affluent neighborhoods and easy to get into. He generally picked a certain type of house and hit it whether the owner was black or white. "No difference, if the houses were the same, they'd have the same amount of money." However, he was less likely to plan deliberately to go to a black neighborhood for fear of violence. "If you get caught in a black or Puerto Rican neighborhood you might get killed."

The white burglar was less likely to go into housing projects because there were too many people around and there was "nothing worth taking there". Several said they would not hit a poor neighborhood regardless or race because "they're poor just like me" or "I have more than they do."

He preferred working in the early evening, and then the afternoon. In order to reach his target he would be more likely to use a stolen car, to travel further, and to be more cautious in hitting the same neighborhood again.

The white burglar gave a higher estimate of the amount of money he needed a week than the black burglar.

However, since his average score was likely to be a little higher, the number of hits made a week by each group were almost identical. While approximately the same number in each group were drug users, the white burglar was marginally more likely to be a heroin user.

(2) Blacks

As was mentioned earlier,the black burglar had many things in common with his white counterpart. He generally preferred to hit residences owned by white people largely because he assumed they were more affluent. "If it was a black guy, I'd know there was not too much money. If it was a white guy, I'd know there was." However, some hits he made would probably be in black neighborhoods. "I don't like to hit my own people...but sometimes you can't help it." The neighborhoods he worked in most often had single or multi-family houses or were housing projects. However, here there was considerable diversity within the group since blacks also selected single-family houses along with the projects and luxury apartments as the neighborhoods in which they were least likely to work. The black who did work in single-family houses was probably more experienced; he would do more planning and preparation before making a hit; he might even

dress up to play the part of a salesman, gardener, or odd-job man.

One man remarked, "It's important to dress right, like the people of the neighborhood." Another pointed out, "Another reason for going out to the suburbs is because anybody living in the suburbs - you know they got more than you." However, many blacks did not hit suburban houses because they felt conspicuous and out of place there. "I wouldn't go to the suburbs because there are no black people there - you're too conspicuous." As another man put it, the suburbs are "too quiet, too scary. They're sweet targets, I know, but I'm from the city so I like the city." The juveniles in the group tended to feel that affluent white neighborhoods were better secured. They therefore worked in medium and lower income white neighborhoods because they felt they were more affluent than black neighborhoods.

They disliked the luxury apartment buildings for the same reasons. "Cops over there all the time. (Slide picture) Looks like a white neighborhood. You'd have a police escort every corner you turned." In general blacks were more likely to be deterred by police patrols.

Unlike the white burglar he was more likely to get to his target on foot, though he often used his own or a stolen car.

Unlike the white burglar he would probably travel less than one hour to make a hit. His average score was marginally lower than the white burglar; he was much less likely to be looking for jewelry or silver, and he was more inclined to take the goods home or to a friend's home than to dispose of them immediately.

The adult black gave a lower estimate of the amount of money he needed a week - between $100 and $250, rather than $250 or more that the white burglar required. If he was a drug user, he was more inclined to use amphetamines than the white burglar.

c. Drug Use

(1) The Drug User

The typical drug user in the interviewee sample was under 25; usually he was addicted to heroin, sometimes to amphetamines. Often he had been an addict for several years. In many respects his method of operation was very similar to the non-drug user -- the time of day he worked, his means of transport, his attitude toward carrying weapons, the goods he wanted (except for more cash), the length of time he stayed in the residence, and where he disposed of the goods. However, he differed from the non-drug user in two important respects. First, he needed more money and second, as a consequence, he made more hits. His habit could cost him $1,500 a week, it rarely cost him less than $150. Since his job, if he still had one, normally earned him between $100 and $200 a week, he had to supplement his income in other ways. In general, he had decided to concentrate on breaking and entering because it was the easiest way to get the amount of money he needed, and did not involve violence. However, his scores were only a little higher than the non-drug user, and therefore he made many more hits per week. In fact, on average the drug user made five to six hits each week, while the non-drug user only made one or two. A drug user,

aged 27, described the way he worked, "I wouldn't stop till I made my quarter (250 dollars) or more, and my partner would have to make that, too. Most claimed they did not break and enter before taking heroin. A man on amphetamines was also likely to make more hits than the non-drug user. "On amphetamines you're full of pep, does something to your nervous system. You can't stop for days. We'd just keep going on and on...on one of those benders I might do 150 or 200 burglaries; before that I had only done about ten a year."

Although the drug user, in principle, preferred single family suburban houses where the scores were higher, he was more likely than the non-drug user to work around or in his own neighborhood, particularly as his habit increased. "When I started doing it, it was always there (single family suburban houses); then I said to heck with going all the way out there. I wanted the junk, right; I'd look for the quickest way to make money where I wouldn't have to drive all the way there and have to drive back and go and see the dope man. I'd want it right there, right now. Even though there might be better hits...you still don't want to spend the time. You want to do what

you got to do as quick as you can do it."

Because of the speed and urgency with which he needed his money, his view of deterrents was somewhat different from the non-drug user. Although he preferred no one to be home, he was more inclined to be reckless and risk confrontations.

As one drug user said, "When I'm strung out on drugs, I don't care who's at home. I need money." However, the drug user was more likely to be deterred by burglar alarms, by strong locks, by steel doors or frames, by anything, in fact, that might delay him. "If the door was a hassle, I'd go elsewhere." He gave up more easily because in the extra time taken, he could make a couple more hits somewhere else.

However, once inside the residence, his need for money again affected his reactions. If he triggered an alarm, if someone was asleep inside, or if someone returned, he was more likely than the non-drug user to quickly finish the job, rather than to leave immediately.

As might be expected from the frequency with which he operated, he would do little or no planning, he usually did not "case" the residence. He would usually work with several fences and he almost always disposed of goods immediately. He had a great deal of previous experience and was more likely to be in jail than the non-drug user.

(2) The Non-Drug User

The non-drug user was a more nebulous figure, difficult to characterize. The group of non-drug users included a cross-section of the large variety of people who commit residential crimes but do not use hard drugs or amphetamines. Within the group there were the very young, the old, the unskilled, and the highly skilled. Techniques, methods of operation, and motivation varied substantially within this group - more, probably, than they did between drug users and non-drug users. Where there are clear divergencies of opinion within the group, such as between juveniles and adults; they have been noted.

The user/non-user groups did differ in two major ways: the non-user needed less money and made fewer hits.

The non-drug user generally did not operate at the tempo or under the tremendous pressure of the drug user. He had more time to plan and although the bulk of non-drug users still only did a little planning, he did more than the drug users.

The non-drug user's attitude to deterrents was also generally somewhat different. He was concerned with avoiding violence or personal confrontations. He was more inclined than the drug user to be deterred by a full time occupant

in the residence, by police or security patrols, even by dogs or by neighbors checking on the residence. He was also more inclined to be deterred by good lighting although less inclined to be deterred by the hardware - burglar alarms, strong locks, steel doors and frames, etc. - perhaps because he was in less a hurry and allowed himself more time to get around them He was less likely both to work in his immediate neighborhood and to hit the residences of friends or acquaintances; some interviewees were shocked at the suggestion.

There was remarkable similarity in the group's attitude toward drug users. Frequently, a non-drug user would remark of a very poor, run-down neighborhood, "only a junkie would go there", or, "that was a junkie's paradise", but personally he would not go near it. Several mentioned specifically that they would not do a job with a drug addict. "I wouldn't work with a junkie - they're not good thieves, anyway, they're too noisy."

D. ROBBERS AND ROBBERY

Residential offenders constitute a much smaller percentage of the robber population than do residential burglars of the burglar population. It is therefore difficult to generalize about residential robbers on the basis of findings about robbers in general. Although an analysis of residential robberies was undertaken for this study through an examination of police data, interviews with victims, and site visits, no actual offenders were interviewed. What follows is a brief discussion of data on residential robbery following the format for burglary analysis wherever appropriate. In addition, this section will refer to a study of robbery in Boston conducted by the Harvard Law School.[4]

1. Robbers and the Criminal Justice System

Under uniform crime-reporting rules a person commits a robbery when he obtains or attempts to obtain property or a thing of value from the presence of the victim by use of force or by putting the victim in fear.[5] If this occurs on residential premises it is classified as a residential robbery. Massachusetts statutes provide a similar definition for the crime of robbery.[6]

A person arrested for robbery will follow a somewhat similar path through the criminal justice system as a burglar. District courts do not have jurisdiction to try robbery cases. They do, however, conduct the preliminary hearings to determine probable cause and at this stage

many robbery offenders are dismissed. The court can also hear robbery cases where the original charge is reduced. Robbery charges not dismissed or reduced are heard in superior court. The Harvard Study described a sample of robbery cases processed through the criminal justice system. Based on the table it would appear that in contrast to burglars, robbery offenders are more likely to be tried in superior court and imprisoned in maximum security institutions. (see Table 4.9)

TABLE 4.9

DISPOSITION OF ROBBERY PROSECUTIONS

CITY OF BOSTON--1968

% tried in district court	59%
% tried in superior court	41%
Total % convicted	55%
Sentenced to imprisonment as % of total cases tried	48%
% of total sentenced to imprisonment, sentenced to house of correction	49%
% of total sentenced to imprisonment, sentenced to state prison	51%

Source: John Conklin, Robbery and the Criminal Justice System, Table 23.

2. Personal Characteristics

Table 4.10 presents demographic characteristics of persons arrested for robbery compared to the general population.

TABLE 4.10

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS ARRESTED FOR ROBBERY, BOSTON, 1970 COMPARED TO CITY POPULATION

	Arrested Robbers[1]	City Population[2]
% Male	93%	46%
Median Age	20	28.7
% Non-white	65%	16%

[1]Annual Report Police Commissioner for the City of Boston, 1970, Table VIII.

[2]U.S. Census, 1970.

Arrested robbers as a group, therefore, are male; and compared to burglars, slightly older and more likely to be non-white. Table 4.11 presents characteristics of described offenders in the residential robberies analyzed for this study. The large percentage of black offenders may be a result of the fact that in the study's sample 80% of the crimes took place in five areas where the population is 55% black compared to 16% in the city as a whole.

TABLE 4.11

DESCRIPTIONS OF OFFENDERS

RESIDENTIAL ROBBERY

SEX (N=264)

Male - 97%

Female -3%

RACE (N=257)

White - 5%

Black - 93%

Other - 2%

AGE (N=204)

Under 17 - 12%

17 - 20 - 52%

21 - 25 - 27%

Over 25 - 9%

3. Choice of Target

Residential robbers not only attack a type of housing, but a particular type of person. Like burglars they must calculate possibility of gain, risk of detection and ease of access; but also face the added factor of victim resistance.

a. Housing Type

Very little data exists on residential robbery offenders and their choice of housing type. An analysis of residential robberies in the study RA's disclosed that only one third took place in a dwelling unit, whereas the remainder were in areas such as hallways or elevators. Of those in the dwelling unit only 8% were in single family homes and the remainder divided between apartment buildings and public housing units.

Of those robberies which occurred outside the dwelling unit but on residential premises, 65% were on the grounds of housing projects, 34% in apartment buildings, and 1% on the property of single family houses. This seems a reasonable finding since residential robbery in Boston is concentrated in the inner-city areas where there are few single family houses, and mostly multi-unit dwellings. (See Chapter V, page 189)

b. Persons

Table 4.11 identifies the characteristics of residential robbery victims.

TABLE 4.12

RESIDENTIAL ROBBERY VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS

AGE (N=147)	
Under 21	5%
21 - 30	22%
31 - 40	13%
41 - 50	14%
51 - 65	18%
Over 65	28%
	100%
SEX (N=152)	
Male	74%
Female	26%
RACE (N=127)+	
White	83%
Black	11%
Other	6%

The findings regarding age are predictable since older persons are more vulnerable to physical attack than the younger. If the number of larceny purse-snatchings were included with robbery figures the percentage of female victims would likely rise considerably. Over three-quarters of the victims were white.

A close analysis of residential robberies in the three survey RA's (N-64) disclosed that in a fourth of the cases the victim was a non-resident (see Appendix C, Maps for RA's 145, 166, and 256).

4. Planning and Method of Operation

a. Extent of Planning

The Harvard study indicated that older "professional" type robbers tended to plan the most. The others did little planning. Tipsters, for example, were less relied upon by robbers than burglars. As with burglars, professionals would be more likely to case the area and look for affluent targets, whereas other offenders were more concerned with victim vulnerability.[7]

Robbers, in general, need to be wary of the police to a greater extent than burglars since the bulk of robberies take place on the public ways or in stores. It is interesting, however, that residential robbery, though it is less visible than other types, annually constitutes slightly less than 10% of all Boston robberies compared to 66% for street robberies.

b. Time of Operation

Residential robberies tended to run counter to preferred burglary time patterns, i.e., to cluster in the afternoon and on week-ends. This is natural, since robbery requires that people be home, whereas burglary requires that they not be. No pattern was discerned by month or by season. (see Table 4.13)

TABLE 4.13

TIME PATTERNS FOR RESIDENTIAL ROBBERY

MONTH (N=152)

January	11.8%	May	11.8%	September	5.9%
February	5.9%	June	12.5%	October	8.7%
March	7.2%	July	6.5%	November	9.2%
April	7.2%	August	10.5%	December	3.2%
					99.4%

DAY (N=151)

Monday	11.2%	Thursday	12.5%	Sunday	11.9%
Tuesday	19.2%	Friday	14.5%		99.6%
Wednesday	10.5%	Saturday	19.8%		

TIME (N=152)

0:01 A.M. - 6:00 A.M.	12.5%
6:01 A.M. -12:00 P.M.	15.7%
12:01 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.	42.1%
6:01 P.M. -12:00 A.M.	29.8%
	100.1%

c. Accomplices

In 76% of the cases examined for this study there there were two or more perpetrators. An accomplice in robbery often serves different purposes than one in burglary. Primarily, he can aid in applying physical force (or the threat of it) to the victim.

d. Location and Technique of Entry

Only one-third of the cases involved an entry into the dwelling unit. In about 10% of those cases entry was via the window. In the remainder, it was via the door. However, in contrast to burglary, robbers were more likely (60%) to gain entry by a ruse or threat; i.e., pose as a deliveryman or accost the occupant as he is entering or leaving his home. In 8% of the cases, entry was gained through an unlocked door and in 14% via bodily force against the door.

In two-thirds of the cases which did not occur in the dwelling unit, 80% took place in hallways, 12% in elevators, and the remainder in miscellaneous areas such as driveways or walk-ways.

e. Weapons and Nature of Attack

Table 4.14 provides details of the nature of the attack.

TABLE 4.14

NATURE OF THE ATTACK

Offender used threat as follows (N=133)

Gun	20%
Knife	30%
Blunt Object	3%
Physical Force	47%

Victim Resisted (N=130)

Yes	5%
No	95%

Victim Injured (N=99)

Yes	50%
No	50%

If Injured, How (N=50)

Shot	0%
Stabbed	12%
Struck by Object	8%
Beaten	80%

As indicated by the table, the offenders were armed in about half the cases and in about half the victim was injured

even though most of the time he did not resist. The Harvard study provided similar findings for all types of robbery in regard to use of weapons (50%), and injury or assault upon the victim (50%)[8]. This would suggest that residential robbery, while dangerous to the victim, is no more dangerous than other forms of robbery.

f. Goods Sought

Most robbery loss involves cash, although the reporting areas analysis disclosed jewelry was taken in 17% of the cases and clothing in about 9%. The average loss per residential robbery in Boston in 1970 was $133.

g. Emergency

A robbery is dangerous by definition since it involves physical confrontation. The most common type emergencies are unexpected arrival of police or a third party, or resistance by the victim. According to the Harvard study, most robbers felt carrying a gun would neutralize civilian interference. In instances where the victim resisted and was shot it was felt by the robbers that the victims' behavior was illegitimate. Police interfering was best met by flight, although use of a gun was not ruled out completely.[9] Of 67 offenders interviewed by

the Harvard study, two had actually been committing burglaries when they were confronted by the occupant and used force on him, converting the crime to robbery.[10]

h. Motivation and Level of Effort

The reason chiefly mentioned for committing robbery as determined by the Harvard study was the need for funds to purchase drugs followed closely by the need for money for a better life. As in burglary, adults and whites were more likely to realize larger gains from a robbery than were other categories of offenders. The Harvard study reported that 32% of the adults and 8% of the juveniles made $100 or more on a robbery, as did 43% of whites and 20% of blacks.[11]

SUMMARY - CHAPTER IV

In general, the characteristics of burglars tended to coincide with those suggested by the literature search. Most notably they were not highly skilled. Differences among burglars emerged when they were divided into categories based on age, race and drug use. Those under 18 were more likely to be unskilled, to hit targets close to home, to have some difficulty disposing of the goods, to make lower scores and to break and enter for "excitement". The middle and older age groups were likely to be more mobile and to be highly effective and experienced - though not highly skilled - burglars. The older group generally selected their targets with more care, preferring affluence to accessibility or vulnerability.

Apart from some differences in the housing types selected and avoided and the time of day worked, there was much similarity between the methods of black and white burglars.

The principal difference by drug use was the amount of money needed and therefore the frequency of operation (the average score being approximately the same for both groups).

Although residential robbery was a small percentage of all robberies, it did not vary from other types of robbery in any important respect. Residential robbery victims in this study tended to be elderly, predominatly male, and white.

The central finding of this chapter is that important differences exist between various types of burglars. This suggests that deterrent and correctional measures which might apply to one group would be inappropriate for another.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. The discussion which follows is based in part on Edwin Powers, The Basic Structure of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Massachusetts, 5th Ed. (Boston: Mass. Correctional Association, 1969).

2. FBI, Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook, p. 27.

3. For example, a person may be charged with:

   Burglary - Breaking and entering the dwelling house of another in the night time with intent to commit a felony therein.

   Entering without breaking in the night time or breaking and entering in the day time, a building, ship, or vessel with intent to commit a felony, the owner or other person lawfully present therein being put in fear.

   Entering without breaking in the night time a dwelling house or breaking and entering in the day time a building, ship, or vessel with intent to commit a felony, no person lawfully therein being put in fear.

   Breaking and entering in the night time or day time a building, ship, vessel, or vehicle with intent to commit a misdemeanor.

   In some instances an individual may not be charged with the substantive offense because the police can not link him to an actual burglary. He may instead be charged with possession of burglary tools or receiving stolen property.

4. John E. Conklin, Robbery and the Criminal Justice System (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1972). This work bears some similarity to the present study. For example, the robbery project interviewed convicted offenders (67 men in the state prison) and victims (90 persons), and covered a similar locale (city of Boston) and time period (1966-1968). Although it is centered on the crime of robbery and its relationship to the Criminal Justice System, rather than how to make potential victims more secure, and does not dwell to any great extent on residential robbery per se; nevertheless, some of the study data does touch on the concerns of this project.

5. Op. cit., FBI, Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook, p. 20.

6. Robbery: The taking with intent to steal of personal property in possession of another from his person or in his presence by violence or putting him to fear.

   In some instances of purse-snatching it is difficult to decide whether the offense should be classified as a robbery or larceny. Uniform crime-reporting rules provide that if more force is used than is actually necessary to snatch from the grasp of the victim, the offense is a robbery.

7. Op. cit., Conklin, p. 63-71.

8. Ibid, p. 112-14.

9. Ibid, p. 108-12.

10. Ibid, p. 65.

11. Ibid, p. 82

CHAPTER V

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

A. INTRODUCTION

In this section an attempt is made to relate the socio-economic and vulnerability characteristics of various reporting areas to their crime experience. The analysis centers on factors related to the total environment rather than those related to individual persons, dwellings, or offenders. Areas have been grouped according to a number of variables, such as age, race, and income of residents and an average residential burglary rate calculated. An effort has then been made to explain the group rate and why individual RA's "deviate" from it. Standard statistical tests are used to calculate the significance of the groupings. To complement this approach, regression analysis has been used to study the influence of these factors on the average annual burglary rate. The main purpose of the analysis which follows is to determine why the rates of residential crime are differentially distributed among geographic areas.

B. METHOD

The regression analysis focuses on a variety of socio-economic influences to explain the wide variations in reporting area burglary rates. Since particular importance is

frequently placed on income, racial composition, burglary rate of the surrounding areas, and age distribution as key socio-economic factors influencing crime rates, these are included in the analysis. The special emphasis of this study on physical aspects of the target also suggests that interneighborhood variation in the types of dwelling may also be influential in determining the rate of residential crime.

The particular measures of these independent variables are as follows: affluence is measured as neighborhood median income in thousands of dollars; racial composition is the percentage of non-whites in the RA; the neighborhood burglary rate is the average of the rates in all contiguous RA's; the average number of people under eighteen years per occupied dwelling unit is a measure of the concentration of young people in the area; percentage of dwelling units in large buildings (10 or more units) is the measure of the influences of structure type on residential burglary rate. (Data for the regression analysis and additional census information is contained in Appendix C, Table 1, and the average annual burglary rates in Appendix C, Table 2).

For the regression analysis, four different samples of the 39 RA's were used. In addition to the full 39 RA sample, three subsamples were defined. The first subsample contains seven areas with less than one person under eighteen years per

four dwelling units. These areas had few families with children and instead contained a high percentage of college students, singles, and young couples as well as elderly. The second subsample includes four outlying neighborhoods. The last subsample is the 28 remaining RA's. The purpose of classifying the data in this manner was to focus on the different reasons for residential burglaries in different kinds of areas and to improve the explanatory power of the equation by controlling for obvious influences on the burglary rates. Unfortunately, however, the small number of observations in two of the subsamples precludes meaningful statistical interpretations of the results. Thus, the following discussion centers on the complete sample and the main subsample. Pertinent results from the other samples are reported only if especially suggestive. The RA's contained in the various samples are given in Appendix C, Table 3.

Investigation of the influences of these social and physical variables must take account of their tendency to covary in the real world. Thus, statistical association between the crime rate and the racial composition of the neighborhood may only reflect negative correlation between income and percent non-white, with income being the causal variable in the determination of residential crime rates.

This extensive collinearity between the independent or explanatory variables can be seen clearly from the correlation matrix of Table 5.1. This is based on selected reporting areas in the city of Boston.

TABLE 5.1

CORRELATION MATRIX REGRESSION VARIABLES

	Income	Race	Youth	Structure	Neighborhood Rate
Income	1.0	-.36	-.11	-.27	-.24
Race	-.36	1.0	.56	-.06	.50
Youth	-.11	.56	1.0	.09	-.08
Structure	-.27	-.06	.09	1.0	.35
Neighborhood rate	-.24	.50	-.08	.35	1.0

Thus, the income variable is seen to be negatively correlated with all three additional variables; high positive correlation also exists between race and the age composition of the neighborhood. Because of this multi-collinearity, the effects have been analyzed in a multi-variate framework. These results are discussed separately in Part H. The single variate analyses are discussed in the appropriate sections of Part C below.

It should also be noted that the reported crime rates for certain RA's were considered suspect. As indicated in Chapter II, the household survey data suggests that RA's 196 and 447 are not low residential burglary areas. The same may be also true of RA 600, a housing project not surveyed. Although it reports a low residential burglary rate, it had a relatively high residential robbery rate. This RA frequently stands out from the trends of comparable RA's in various analyses undertaken for this chapter. Therefore, it is possible that the official figures do not accurately reflect the level of residential burglary.

C. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY ANALYSIS BY SOCIAL INDICATORS

1. Geographic Location

Location is based on an RA's position relative to the metropolitan core. Officially this is measured from the State House, the historic center of the city, which is adjacent to Park Station, the hub of Boston's subway network. In a broader sense the "core" section describes the central business district and the area around it, including most of the low-income black ghetto area. This core is contained within Police Districts 1, 4, 9, and 10. (See Appendix C, Map 2.)

Criminological research has repeatedly found that the core area of the city, the section where social problems are concentrated, contains the greatest number of offenders and the highest rates of crime. It has also been found that crime rates decrease with distance from the core (See Chapter III, pp. 44-45)

The Boston black ghetto is not entirely located within the "core." As Appendix C, Map 3 depicts, it has expanded into surrounding areas. Therefore, an RA may be core in the sense of its central location or in terms of its social characteristics. In this section core RA's will be designated according to geographic location. Appendix C, Maps 4 and 5 and Table 4 depict the general trend of residential crime to decrease with distance from the center. These results are summarized in Table 5.2.

TABLE 5.2

AVERAGE ANNUAL BURGLARY RATE BY LOCATION OF REPORTING AREA

Location - Group Rates[1]	Average Annual Rate/1000 DU's
Core	39
Adjacent to Core	22
Outlying	12

[1] Difference in group rates not significant at .05 level.

See also Appendix C, Table 4.

While not statistically significant, the results are suggestive. The clearest pattern emerges in the core RA's. Among those that tend to deviate from the pattern of medium to high rates, three areas (62, 143, and 602) are luxury high-rise apartment areas with special security devices and private guards. RA 600 (a housing project) reports a low burglary rate, but as noted, the area was not surveyed, and it is possible that the reported rate is incorrect. RA 83's low rate was confirmed by the household survey. This RA is part of the North End neighborhood, which has a generally low crime rate. Possible reasons for this will be discussed in Section H of this Chapter.

Among adjacent RA's there is much more fluctuation in crime rate, ranging from low to high, indicating that factors other than location might have more influence on the residential burglary rate. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that none of the outlying areas had high rates.

It is likely that the distinction between core and adjacent areas is not useful for analytic purposes, since many adjacent RA's display socio-economic characteristics similar to core RA's. In contrast, there is a marked difference between inner (core and adjacent) RA's and outlying ones. The latter, for example, contain no black, low-income, or housing project areas.

2. Neighborhood Burglary Rate

A comparison was made between the residential burglary rate of an RA and the overall burglary (both residential and non-residential) rate of the larger neighborhood. The offender data in Chapter IV suggests that burglars do not confine themselves solely to residential attacks or to an area as small as a few blocks. A large group do, however, tend to operate in the same general neighborhood. Therefore, burglaries against residents in an RA may be in part a function of the general burglary level in the surrounding neighborhood. (See Table 5.3.)

TABLE 5.3

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE COMPARED TO SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOODS[1]

Neighborhood Rate	Average Annual Rate/1000 DU's
Low	8
Medium	28
High	55

[1]Difference in group rates significant at .05 level.

See also, Appendix C, Table 5.

The clearest patterns emerged in the low and high neighborhoods. Only one of 12 RA's in low burglary rate neighborhoods had other than a low rate itself. In the high burglary rate neighborhoods, RA's 143 and 166 were well below their environs. RA 143, as noted, is a luxury high-rise area with private security. RA 166 is primarily a housing project area. Here too, though, there is a level of security and maintenance beyond the normal pattern for housing projects. (See Appendix C, p. 16.)

The regression analysis confirms the correlation between residential burglary rates and the rates in the adjacent neighborhoods. As seen in Appendix C, Table 6 in both the complete sample and in the main subsample, the environmental burglary rate is significantly positively associated with high rates within the RA.

3. Race

Many studies have found correlations between race and crime, particularly noting high crime rates in black areas.

The individual RA's were grouped into three categories: (1) white--less than 20% (in actuality less than 10%) black population; (2) mixed--20 to 63% black population; (3) black--over 63% (in practice over 78%) black population. Table 5.4 indicates the rate for each type area.

TABLE 5.4

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE BY RACE

Type - RA	Average Annual Rate/1000 DU's
white	19
mixed	40
black	59

[1]Group rates significantly different at .05 level.

See also Appendix C, Table 7.

There was considerable deviation in rates within the white and mixed categories. In the black areas the only deviation from the generally high rates is RA 447, where the figures are suspect.

The regression analysis demonstrates a significant positive correlation between non-white composition of the population and residential burglary rates, as can be seen from Appendix C, Table 8. Furthermore, in the main sample the percentage of non-white population explained about 25% more of the variation in burglary rates than the next "best" variable, environmental burglary rate (R^2 = .56 vs. .48). However, the explanatory power of race is suspect because of its strong collinearity with low income, a large number of young people, and generally high burglary rates, as seen in Table 5.1. The multivariate analysis presented in Section H attempts to disentangle some of these effects.

4. Income

Income has often been cited as a factor in producing high crime rates. Low income areas may breed offenders as well as apathy or alienation which provides criminal opportunity. High income areas offer the chance for profitable scores, since there will likely be more valuable articles available to steal. The presence of such items will manifest

in the apparent value of the dwelling, observation by the burglar, or tips from his acquaintances.

RA's have been grouped according to family and unrelated persons' median income as listed by the 1970 U.S. Census. The ratings are

Lower Group--less than $5,000

Middle Group--$5,000 to $8,000

Higher Group--over $8,000

Table 5.5 presents the findings.

TABLE 5.5

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE BY INCOME*

Type - RA	Average Annual Rate/1000 DU's
Lower	47
Middle	27
Higher	13

*This definition of income provides for a relative ranking of an area rather than an absolute one as used in Chapter VI, p. 201. Thus, an RA may have a "higher" income level relative to other areas without actually being a "high" income area.

[1]Group rates significantly different at .05 level.

See also Appendix C, Table 9.

No clear pattern emerges, since a number of areas deviate from low to high residential burglary rates at all income levels. Among the low income areas, ignoring 196 and 600 where figures are suspect, two have medium rates and eight have high rates.

The regression results for median income are given in Appendix C, Table 10. Both the complete sample and the main sample show a significant decreasing burglary rate with increased income. The low youth sample shows a similar but much stronger tendency. These trends probably reflect both lower victimization with income, and collinear factors such as the neighborhood rate, proportion of the dwelling units in large structures, etc. as seen in Table 5.1. Similar patterns hold in the low youth areas, but are probably distorted because of the student neighborhoods that comprise part of this sample, which while low income, are not "poor." Such areas offer attractive targets because of their relative affluence and casual life styles.

The relationship between income and burglarization rates is reversed in the suburban areas where there is a significant positive correlation between income and burglary incidence. Here it is likely that income measures attractiveness as a target rather than causal social factors associated with the burglars themselves.

When race and income were considered together, it was found that in black areas burglary rates increase with income level, while among white areas it decreases. (See Tables 5.6A and 5.6B). However, there is some indication that among white RA's at the highest levels of income, victimization rises though not to the same rates as in the low income.

TABLE 5.6A

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATES BY INCOME IN BLACK RA'S

Type RA's[1]		Avg. Annual Rate/1000 D.U.s[3]
Lower Income	(265, 296, 297, 589)	54
Middle Income[2]	(306, 307, 308, 315, 319, 447)	62

[1]There were no higher income black areas.

[2]If RA 447 is eliminated, the rate is 69.

[3]Differences between group rates not significant at .05 level.

TABLE 5.6B

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATES BY INCOME IN WHITE RA'S

Type RA's		Avg. Annual Rate/1000 D.U.s [2]
Low Income[1]	(622, 135, 196)	53
Medium Income	(57, 62, 70, 83, 214, 602, 775, 779, 824)	10
High Income	(134, 143, 232, 421, 505, 530, 653, 720, 736, 745)	12

[1] If RA 196 is eliminated, the rate is 74.
[2] Differences in group rates significant at 95%.

5. Housing Type

Housing type has been suggested as correlated with crime, in that large buildings provide an impersonal atmosphere in which crime opportunities exist, while detached structures, such as single-family homes, offer more portals to attack. RA's were classified according to their predominate housing* type.

*In most areas predominate type was determined according to which had the largest percentage of units in the total housing stock. The exceptions were 505, where there were slightly more small multi-unit dwellings than single-family, and 70, 145, 307, and 622, where SMU's prevailed over large multi-units. In those instances the rating was made based on site observers judgments of which type best characterized the RA and on the type of housing sustaining burglaries.

1. Single-family structures
2. Small multi-family structures, 2-9 units (usually walk-up)
3. Large multi-family structures, 10 or more units (often elevator buildings)
4. Public housing projects (While not a type of housing in the physical sense, it was felt that the public housing areas were sufficiently unique to require a separate analysis.)

The crime rate of each is expressed by Table 5.7.

TABLE 5.7

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY BY RA'S PREDOMINANT HOUSING TYPE

	AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE/1000 D.U.'s [1]
Single Family	14
Small Multi-unit	30
Large Multi-unit	37
Public Housing	34

[1] Differences between group rates not significant at the .05 level.

See also Appendix C, Table 11.

The fact that areas where single-family housing predominate has a markedly lower rate than the others may be less a result of structure than other covariant factors such as location in outlying areas.

If 196 and 600, where figures are suspect, are removed from the housing project group, its rate increases to 43/1000.

If the luxury high-rise areas are removed from the large multi-unit sample, the average rate rises to 57/1000 units. This suggests the possibility that large structures may be positively correlated with burglary. Only RA 421 deviated from this pattern, and its crime rate was not tested by household survey. However, in Chapter VII an analysis of victimization failed to support a relationship between burglary rates and housing type.

Because of the generality of the housing variable used, the regression analysis shows no real correlation between housing types and burglary rates (see Appendix C, Table 12). The housing variable used in this analysis is the proportion of the dwelling units in buildings of more than 10 units, and thus not as detailed as the one discussed above. The scatter plot (Appendix C, Figure 1) for these variables shows that there are both high crime areas with few large structures, and low crime areas with many such

buildings. Clearly the diversity between high-rise, high rent areas, and high-rise, low income, and public housing in terms of security, life style, and social factors mitigate the usefulness of regression analysis of the housing factor above.

6. Youth Population

The offender interview data supports the common belief that younger offenders work close to their homes, so that neighborhoods with a high proportion of youths will likely experience more crime. The RA's were divided into four groups according to the percentage of the population under 18 years of age:

1. Under 20%
2. 20 to 29%
3. 30 to 39%
4. Over 40%

Table 5.8 presents the results.

TABLE 5.8

AVERAGE ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY BY UNDER 18 POPULATION

Under 18 Population[1]	Average Annual Rate/1000 DU's
Less than 20%	37
Less than 30%	18
Less than 40%	19
Over 40%	41

[1]Difference between groups not significant at .05 level. See also Appendix C, Table 13.

The clearest pattern is found at the over 40% level. If RA's 196 and 447, where the figures are suspect, were eliminated from the over 40% group, the rate increases to 51 and all remaining areas have at least a medium rate. The remainder are likewise housing project areas. Housing project areas tend to be located in or near the core area and have a large black, low-income population, and many factors interact in such areas. Nevertheless, projects tend to be victimized primarily by young persons who live in the vicinity. (See Chapter IV, PP. 96 and 104 and Appendix B Tables 10, 25, 26) This was confirmed by an analysis made of all arrests for burglary in RA 256 (a large housing project) during the years 1970 and 1971. It disclosed that out of a total of 78 persons arrested, 30% were under 17, 70% were

17-24, and none were older. Eithty-one percent of all persons arrested lived in the project.

In the main regression sample residential burglary increases with the number of young people 18 years old or less (see Appendix C, Table 14). This trend does not exist in the complete sample, however. The scatter plot shown in Appendix C, Figure 2 depicts two separate groups of observations. The low youth sample, those RA's with less than 25% under 18, shows no correspondence to the number of youth in the area. Clearly these areas are being burglarized for different reasons than the main sample. In the larger sample, burglary incidence increases with the number of young people. This is consistent with the analysis presented above, and probably reflects the more common trend in areas of high youth population.

D. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY BY VULNERABILITY FACTORS

There are several factors that can make an area more or less vulnerable to victimization. These include level of access or physical vulnerability of structures and their component units, average number of hours during which a dwelling unit is unoccupied, the social cohesion of the area, the visibility of entrances, and the deployment of protective forces. All of these factors have been examined in the 18 areas that underwent household and site surveys.

1. Access or Physical Vulnerability

The highest levels of access security were found in the areas of luxury high-rise buildings. Typical of these was (non-survey) RA 62. The Charles River Park Apartments, completed in 1962, are near downtown Boston. They consist of four high-rise apartment complexes and a few ranch style single-family town houses. Most residents have middle to high incomes. There are security guards on duty day and night at entrances to the complex, and entrances to the apartment buildings can be seen either directly by guards or via closed-circuit TV cameras, which operate 24 hours a day. All similar areas (RA's 143 and 602) also displayed low rates of burglary and had no robberies.

In analyzing the victimization of luxury high-rise areas, two factors should be considered. Properly speaking, luxury high rise is a type of structure, not a characteristic of an area, although in this study enough of these buildings clustered to form distinct areas. Further, luxury high-rise by definition denotes the residence of a particular class of people (middle or higher income, usually with no or few children). Therefore, the very low victimization rates would probably not hold in an area containing few rather than a concentration of such structures. It is also likely that it would be more difficult to impose and maintain the same level of security with a different population group, e.g., low-income families with many children.

The household survey undertook an analysis to determine the security of dwelling portals (doors and windows). Portals met Federal standards (see Chapter VII, Note 1) if the door were made of metal, metal panel, solid wood, or hollow wood with a dead bolt or dead latch three-fourths inch or longer (or an auxilliary vertical bolt lock) and no exposed hinges. In general most portals did not meet the standard. Therefore, it is not feasible to rate RA's according to physical vulnerability, although this was an important consideration with some burglars. Impressionistic accounts of physical vulnerability for each surveyed RA are found in Appendix C. Chapter VII contains an extensive discussion of tne subject in relation to victimization within an RA.

2. Occupancy or Behavioral Vulnerability

The overwhelming number of burglaries are directed against unoccupied premises. The household survey ranked RA's according to the rates at which dwellings were occupied. The groupings were as follows:

High Occupancy: RA's where 60% or more of the dwellings were unoccupied in the daytime no more than five hours a week.

Low Occupancy: RA's where 60% of the dwellings were unoccupied in the daytime more than 35 hours a week.

Medium Occupancy: RA's where dwellings did not fall into either of the above categories.

The results are contained in Table 5.9.

TABLE 5.9

AVERAGE ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE BY DWELLING OCCUPANCY

Type of RA	Average Annual Rate/1000 DU's
Low occupancy	94
Medium occupancy	27
High occupancy	28

Difference between groups not significant at the .05 level. See also Appendix C, Table 15.

As the table suggests, the three areas where dwellings are unoccupied a great portion of the day are frequently victimized. In others there is wide variation. In Chapter VII the relationship between low occupancy and victimization is confirmed.

3. Social Cohesion

The criminological literature has often argued that socially stable areas display lower crime rates. Studies of crime in housing projects have suggested that residents'

attitudes and relationships toward one another are significant in fostering a concern for the area, which in turn leads citizens to observe and report criminal behavior. (See Chapter III, p. 75)

The household survey phase of the present project has derived an index of social cohesion based upon the answers to three questions:

In some neighborhoods people do things together and help each other--in other neighborhoods people mostly go their own ways. In general, what kind of neighborhood would you say this is mostly--one where people help each other or one where people go their own ways?

☐ HELP EACH OTHER

☐ GO THEIR OWN WAYS

How many families around here do you feel you know well enough to ask a favor of if you needed something--would you say most of them, some of them or almost none of them?

☐ MOST

☐ SOME

☐ ALMOST NONE

And how long have you been living at this address?

The areas were rated low, medium, or high in degree of social cohesion, based on the following scale. One point (each) was given if a person knew almost none of his neighbors, had lived at his present address less than two years, or said that people in the neighborhood went their own way. Two points (each) were given if a person knew most of his neighbors, said people in the neighborhood helped each other, or had lived at his present address five years or more. Those who received an average score that was less than 1.6 were defined as "low," between 1.6 and 2.5 were defined as "medium" and those with 2.6 or more were defined as "high." Any RA where 40% or more fell into the low category was defined as "low"; RA's where 40% fell into the "high" category were defined as "high" cohesion.

As Table 5.10 indicates, the burglary rate was inversely related to social cohesion.

TABLE 5.10

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY BY DEGREE OF SOCIAL COHESION

Degree of Social Cohesion	Average Annual Rate/1000 DU's
Low	90
Medium	28
High	16

Differences between groups not significant at the .05 level. See also Appendix C, Table 16.

The example of a socially cohesive area was RA 83. Its population is predominately Italian-American, and of all RA's surveyed it ranked highest in social cohesion and lowest in the utilization of external protective forces as measured by calls for police service. The North End neighborhood is in effect an urban village. Other highly cohesive areas (RA's 57 and 505) displayed low rates as did the non-surveyed but similar white ethnic areas (214, 232, 824).

4. Visibility

Among visibility factors analyzed were street lighting, patterns of pedestrian and vehicle traffic, and visibility of portals. Visibility and social cohesion combined comprise the level of crime detection in an area. People, particularly residents, must not only be able to see possible offenders but must be concerned enough to act on their observations.

a. Lighting

Most burglaries take place in the daytime and even at night many attacks originate from within hallways rather than the streets. Lighting was rated as standard or non-standard. Standard lighting is 20,000 lumen standard fixtures spaced approximately 150 feet apart on alternate sides

of the street. Commercial street lighting is 20,000 lumen fixtures spaced directly opposite each other, 150 feet apart.

In general, the municipal lighting provided was similar in RA's but the contour of buildings and trees, combined with dwelling lights, altered lighting effects from block to block and RA to RA. The study did not reveal any significant impact of lighting. The most poorly lit area (RA 70) had few night burglaries and no residential robberies.

b. Traffic Patterns

Traffic conditions are defined as follows:

1. Light traffic--generally very few or no passing vehicles over a period of 10-15 minutes.
2. Moderate traffic--generally a steady flow of passing vehicles every few minutes.
3. Heavy traffic--generally a continuous flow of passing vehicles.

Pedestrian traffic was classified in the same terms as vehicular traffic--light, moderate, and heavy. In addition, residents in yards and in streets were noted to estimate outdoor users in the neighborhood.

No clear pattern emerged from the analysis of traffic patterns. Both RA' 83 and 622 had many people on the street

late at night, yet one had low and the other high victimization. RA 505 had few people on the street and a low victimization rate. It is likely that the social cohesion of an area is more important than the number of persons on the street in determining whether criminals will be deterred. RA's 505 and 83 both rated high in social cohesion, while 622 was low.

c. Visibility of Portals

Although there was variation among RA's, more RA's (such as 70, 265, 291, and 736) with portals somewhat obscured from view by shrubs, trees, vacant lots, dark alleyways or small streets had medium or high burglary rates and more RA's where entrances could be easily seen (such as RA's 505, 57, and 134) had low burglary rates. Only RA 83, where many entrances were difficult to see because of side alleys or small back streets, had a low burglary rate. It was also noteworthy that in RA 256 robberies were concentrated in buildings set back from the main road.

5. Protective Forces

The police are commonly thought of as the first line of defense against crime. Police departments in the Boston area generally have a large amount of personnel per capita compared to other regions of the country. See Table 5.11.

TABLE 5.11

COMPARATIVE RATIO OF POLICE TO POPULATION--1970

City	Sworn Personnel/ 1000 Population	National Average[1] for Cities of a Similar Size
Boston	4.36	2.8
Newton	2.28	1.5
Norwood	1.5	1.5

[1]FBI UCR 1970, Table 51.

In general, however, the police do not appear to be particularly successful in detecting burglaries in progress. Of approximately 2,000 burglaries analyzed, less than 1% were discovered by patrolling police. In an additional 6% the crime was discovered while still in progress by citizens who summoned police. In 93% of the cases the crime was not discovered until sometime after being committed.

Police were able to effect arrests in approximately 5% of the cases surveyed. About half the arrests were at the scene and the rest later on through detective follow up investigation. These findings are quite similar to a study of police apprehension activities undertaken in New York City. See Table 5.12

TABLE 5.12

COMPARATIVE ARREST INDEX FOR BURGLARY

City	Cases	Arrest Index	Detective Arrest Index
Boston (39 RA's)	1,860	.04	.02
New York[+]	67,028	.04	.01

[+] Peter W. Greenwood, An Analysis of the Apprehension Activities of the New York City Police Department (New York: Rand Institute, 1970), p. 6.

A study of robbery in Boston analyzed means by which residential robbery is discovered and arrests effected. Of a total of 69 residential robberies that occurred in the first six months of 1968, none were observed by patrolling police. Of the 46% cleared by arrest, only 15% of that number resulted from an arrest at the scene, while the remainder were through some type of follow up investigation. The number of on-scene arrests for residential robbery was lower than for any other category of robbery. (See Table 5.13)

TABLE 5.13

CLEARANCE BY TYPE OF ROBBERY--1968*

Means of clearance	TYPE OF ROBBERY: Street robbery	Purse-snatch	Residential robbery	Cab robbery	Small commercial robbery	Large commercial robbery
Arrest as scene	52.4%	43.7%	15.6%	32.5%	16.1%	18.8%
Victim identification	16.1%	0.0%	50.0%	5.0%	22.6%	31.3%
Identification of suspect in another case	7.3%	0.0%	15.6%	55.0%	25.8%	25.0%
Multiple confession	21.8%	56.2%	15.6%	5.0%	12.9%	6.3%
Police investigation	2.4%	0.0%	3.1%	2.5%	22.6%	18.8%
Total number	124	16	32	40	31	16

*Source: John F. Conklin, Robbery and the Criminal Justice System. Table 19.

There was confirmation of this in the present study, since only 23% of the residential robbery arrests took place at the scene. However, the number of cases (13) was too small to draw conclusions.

The above findings seem to confirm the previous research, which suggests that the low visibility of residential crime makes it difficult to control via police methods.

Measuring the amount and effect of police protection in relation to specific crimes in the particular reporting areas studied by this project is difficult. Police deployment is normally based on overall workload, of which residential crime is only a small part. In addition, police patrol beats in Boston generally encompass several RA's. Therefore, any calculation of police cars vs. the number of burglaries or robberies would be meaningless, since there is no way to determine how much time officers spend on anti-residential crime patrol in one RA as compared to officers in another RA.

One possible indicator of relative police protection in an area is to measure consumer evaluations. In this respect, the household survey asked questions regarding citizens' opinions of police protection. With but one exception, all white RA's gave favorable ratings to the police and all

mixed or black areas gave unfavorable. RA 196, a white housing project area, also gave unfavorable ratings. Whether the ratings reflect objective reality or simply racial and class attitudes is difficult to ascertain. Site survey observers did not note any obvious differences in the level of police operations between black and white RA's, although no performance tests were run to measure such factors as speed of response. None of the surveyed RA's employed private patrols to any extent. However, the study did analyze the use of security patrols designed to protect a specific locale, in this instance a public housing project. Each of the three surveyed housing projects received special protection as follows:

166 - 3 private guards and one city policeman per shift (2 shifts 8 AM to midnight).

196 - 1 city policeman per shift (2 shifts 8 AM to midnight) plus extra details on the weekend, primarily to combat rowdyism.

256 - 3 city policemen per shift (2 shifts 8 AM to midnight).

The crime rate for each area is shown in Table 5.14

TABLE 5.14

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AND ROBBERY

RA	Residential Burglary Rate/1000 D.U.	Residential Robbery Rate/1000 Persons
166[1]	18	4
196[2]	6	0
256	50	4

[1]In this RA the rate was adjusted to reflect only offenses in the project. The other two RA's consist solely of public housing.

[2]It should be remembered that a survey found a high rate of burglary in this RA; see Chapter II, p.19.

It is interesting also to note that the residents of the three projects perceived the relative presence of foot patrols with reasonable accuracy.

Q. How often do you see police patrolling on foot?

	166	196	256
At least once a day	16%	10%	17%
At least once a week	18	7	32
Less than once a week	66	81	52

Perceptions of police patrol did not reflect in assessments of protection.

Q. How would you rate the job police do of protecting this neighborhood?

	166	196	256
Very good or good enough	43%	33%	17%
Not so good or not good at all	47	61	72
N.A.	0	6	11

RA 166 is unusual in that its residential burglary rate is below that of its neighborhood and relatively low for a mixed population, core area, housing project with a large youth and low-income population. It is difficult not to infer that in some respects its special protective services perceived by the population has positive effect on the burglary rate. RA 196, in contrast, is less protected in fact and perception, and it is likely that the actual burglary rate in part reflects this. RA 256 has protection similar to 166, and its residents are at least as aware of if as in 166, but somehow do not feel protected.

One possible explanation for the difference between these two areas is the size of 166 compared to 256. The former covers a smaller land area than the latter. Therefore, protective forces may be spread too thinly in 256. It is noteworthy, however, that citizen attitudes toward police were extremely negative in 256 and the level of portal security was higher in 166.

Local security via the use of police or guards is probably more accurately seen as an access vulnerability factor, since it is not normally a facet of routine police operations.

E. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY BY PATTERNS OF ATTACK

Attack patterns were analyzed in three dimensions: day versus night, front versus rear or side, and door versus window (see Appendix C, Table 17), in order to determine if certain type RA's had distinctive patterns. Only RA's with 10 or more offenses were included in the analysis.

1. Day Versus Night

The only pattern which clearly emerges is that outlying areas, particularly the suburbs, have a high percentage of nighttime burglaries. Some housing projects also have a large number of night attacks. The pattern of night attack in the outlying areas possible relates to the low density of these neighborhoods, a fact which makes intruders highly visible during the day. The household survey found little connection between occupancy and night attacks. In two of the three suburban RA's where night attacks were common, the dwelling occupancy rates were high. The exception was RA 736. In the housing projects, it has been

demonstrated that most offenders are young and live in the vicinity. It is likely that night attacks coincide with the normal time periods when youngsters gather. As in the suburbs, night attacks in the projects were not correlated with occupancy, since the areas where night burglary was high (196, 256) also had high occupancy at night.

2. Front Versus Side or Rear

The pattern that emerges relates to housing type. Rear or side attacks are predominant in a single-family housing area, and quite common in small multi-unit areas. Large multi-unit areas are more likely to be attacked through the front. This is the expected pattern, since single or small multi-unit housing usually has more portals available for attack, whereas dwelling units in large apartment buildings often do not have side or rear portals.

3. Door Versus Window

Here, too, the pattern is more related to housing type than to the environmental characteristics of an area. Housing projects tended to be attacked via the window to a much greater extent than in other housing types. As Chapter VII will indicate, housing projects generally

have above average physical security, and it is likely that young offenders who operate in such areas, finding doors too difficult for their skills, instead rely on their agility to attack windows. This may also be due to the design of the building, such as in RA 256, where it is easy to step from the passage window sills to an apartment window sill at all levels.

F. RESIDENTIAL ROBBERY ANALYSIS BY SOCIAL INDICATORS

Only five reporting areas had enough residential robberies from which to draw inferences (see Appendix C, Table 18). Four were in the core; one was adjacent. By racial characteristics, one RA was black and four were mixed. All were low income, and four had a large under 18 population. Sixty-four percent of the residential robbery offenders described in these areas were under 21. Four of the five RA's were housing project areas.

The above data suggest that the typical RA where residential robbery is a problem is primarily one composed of low-income non-white persons, who live in housing projects that contain large youth populations.

G. RESIDENTIAL ROBBERY BY PATTERN OF ATTACK

Once again, only five RA's (166, 145, 256, 589, and 600) had robbery rates high enough for comparisons of robbery patterns to be made. (See Appendix C, Table 19.) Housing projects were the predominate housing types in four of these RA's and large multi-family apartments in one RA (145). In RA 145 half of the robberies occurred within the dwelling unit itself, compared to a quarter or less in the housing project RA's. More assailants in RA 145 (37%) carried guns and seemed older in the assessment of the victims than in the other RA's. A majority were described as over 21, whereas in all the housing project RA's the largest group of offenders were described as between 17 and 20. In all RA's except 145 half or more of the robberies occurred during the day.

These findings suggest that the character of residential robbery differs between housing projects and other inner city neighborhoods. In the former, the offenders are local youngsters, while in the later they are older men from outside the area.

H. CONCLUSIONS

1. Multivariate Regression Analysis

A number of factors have been examined in this chapter in order to explain the differential distribution of residential crime rates. In section B and throughout the presentation of the univariate regression results the problem of collinearity among the variables has been emphasized. This suggests that the relationship between the environmental variables and residential burglary rates should be examined in a multivariate framework in addition to the partial analysis presented in the preceeding sections. Accordingly, a series of multiple regression analyses have been performed as a means of disentangling the separate effects of income, age, race, neighborhood burglary rates, and housing type. The results of the analysis are summarized below. Full details are found in Appendix C, Section II.

This multivariable equation helps disentangle the effects of the socio-economic variables considered. First, when racial factors are held constant, burglary rates increase with affluence. As noted previously, without controlling for race, burglary rates increase with income in relatively affluent outlying areas, and decrease with income in all other areas. Second, in most cases crime rates increase with the number of people under 18 years old in the

reporting area. Only in the RA's with few young people is crime invariant with this factor; income, racial composition, housing types, and neighborhood burglary rates do not influence this effect. Third, the racial composition of the RA is the most important and most stable predictor of burglary rates. However, as is pointed out elsewhere in this report, racial composition is often covarient with other determinants of crime. Finally, with all these factors held constant, there is a spillover effect of crime: RA's surrounded by high burglary rate areas tend to have higher crime than otherwise. This effect, however, may simply be a measurement of socio-economic continuity rather than crime patterns.

2. Patterns of Victimization

The foregoing analysis confirms the relationship between race, income, geographic location, and neighborhood burglary rate. This is not surprising, since previous research has also identified the inner city areas as those where crime and other social problems are concentrated. If location can be seen as a proxy for other factors, then the most important considerations that govern the differential distribution of residential burglary rates are location, affluence, and vulnerability (access, occupancy, visibility and social cohesion).

This leaves unresolved the relative weight of these factors. It has been a major hypothesis of this project that the configuration of forces at work in one RA may differ substantially from those in another.

In RA's where social cohesion was high or there was a concentration of access-secure buildings, the burglary rate was low regardless of location or (in the case of luxury high-rises) affluence. In these RA's low vulnerability was the key factor.

Among other areas there appeared to be a fundamental difference in crime rate based on geographic location, with rates generally inversely proportional to distance from the core. However, the precise interplay of forces within the inner (core and adjacent) or outer zone differed among particular type RA's.

RA 256, a large public housing project with a predominately non-white population, had a high incidence of residential burglary and robbery despite better than average police partol and portal security. As indicated earlier, most offenses are committed by youths who reside in the project. Therefore, the high crime rate is probably explained by population characteristics which produce offenders.

RA 622, composed of young, unmarried, white persons, had a low level of social cohesion. It also had a low dwelling occupancy rate during the day and the predominate housing type is multi-unit apartments, so that burglars can work in low visibility situations. Here the burglary rate is best explained by the combination of vulnerability factors which provides crime opportunities.

RA 315 is located in the midst of high-crime, core neighborhoods. It is chiefly composed of black families and has a relatively low transiency rate and a high percentage of homeowners. Most of the housing is small multi-unit. One section of the RA is relatively affluent. The social cohesion of the area was rated as medium, and the percentage of youngsters under 18 is about average. This RA does not produce an inordinate amount of either crime opportunities or offenders. In many respects it resembles a typical outlying area. Its high burglary rate is likely a result of being a relatively affluent area located amid less affluent environs.

While the presence of a large low-income youth population explains the burglary rate in housing projects, it has not been established whether affluence or vulnerability is a more important factor in the distribution of residential crime among inner city reporting areas. Burglars who work

in these areas are more likely to be younger and non-white than suburban burglars. When interviewed, these groups tended to give first preference to vulnerable targets followed by affluent ones. The fact that higher burglary rates are found in areas like 622, where vulnerability is more apparent than in those such as 315 or 70, where some affluence was noted, suggests that within core and adjacent areas vulnerability is a more important factor than affluence in determining victimization probability.

In outlying areas (none of which had highly cohesive populations or a concentration of well secured buildings) it would appear as though the relative effect of affluence and vulnerability are the reverse of the city. An analysis of suburban burglary arrests disclosed that there were considerably fewer juvenile offenders than in the city. Among older offenders interviewed by this project there was a greater preference for affluent targets over vulnerable ones. Suburban RA's 736 and 745 were both more affluent than 134, while vulnerability was similar in each. Yet the first two had medium rates, while the latter had low. It could be argued that 134 was geographically remote, but the Newtonville section of 745 was equally so (see Appendix C, p. 63) and still had a medium rate.

The foregoing suggests that the probability of residential burglary victimization follows an ascending hierarchy.

1. RA's with a highly cohesive population or a concentration of secure buildings regardless of location.
2. Outlying, non-affluent RA's
3. Outlying affluent RA's
4. Inner RA's that are not highly vulnerable
5. Inner RA's that are highly vulnerable.

SUMMARY - CHAPTER V

This chapter has examined a number of environmental factors thought to influence the distribution of residential crime rates among areas. The factors which appeared to be most influential were affluence, vulnerability, (access, occupancy, visibility, and social cohesion) and location. The last was a proxy for a variety of socio-economic factors which cluster in the inner city. Factors such as housing type, normal police patrol, street lighting and neighborhood traffic patterns did not appear to greatly influence the residential crime rate.

It was determined that the relative weight of factors differed among RA's. Socially cohesive areas or those with a concentration of buildings that maintained a high level of access security had the lowest probability of victimization regardless of location or other factors. Among other areas distance from the geographic center of the metropolitan area was fundamental. In general, crime rates were inversely proportional to distance from the center. However, in the inner areas vulnerability appeared to be more important than affluence, whereas this relationship was reversed in the outer areas.

Large housing projects were virtually the only RA's with a significant amount of residential robbery. In these areas the most likely explanation for the high

residential crime rate was the presence of a large youth population.

The central finding of this chapter is that to a large extent the residential crime rate of an area is predictable based upon factors of location, affluence, and vulnerability.

CHAPTER VI

VICTIMS AND NON-VICTIMS

CHAPTER VI

VICTIMS AND NON-VICTIMS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with differences between the people who were and were not burglarized in the high, medium, and low crime RA's during the time frame of the study. The socio-economic characteristics of these groups of people, certain of their behavioral traits, and their awareness and attitudes toward crime and its prevention will be discussed. The central question to be answered in this and the following chapter is: Within areas of similar crime rate, why is a particular household victimized?

Grouping areas by crime rate insures that generalizations will be drawn from data on persons with relatively equal chances of being victimized thus minimizing biases which might arise if a single sample were used. For example, blacks are usually found to be victimized more frequently than whites, but whites are more likely to live in the outlying areas where crime rates are low for reasons which relate to factors other than race. Nevertheless, as Chapter V pointed out, the factors which influence one high crime area may not influence another.

The Sample

The sample RA's selected for the household survey were initially stratified according to residential crime rate, income level, racial composition and predominant housing type in order to approximate a "typical large metropolitan area."

The household survey sample is composed of:

1. a random sample of the dwelling units in each of the 18 RA's which excluded all units that the police records showed had reported a burglary over the appropriate period of time, and
2. a random sample of the dwelling units in the 18 RA's at which (according to police reports) a burglary had taken place..

Victims, for the purposes of this chapter, are, unless otherwise specified, defined as respondents in the 18 RA's whose dwelling units sustained burglaries or attempted burglaries during the time frame of the study. Non-victims, then, are respondents who have not had a burglary or attempted burglary in their dwelling during the same time frame.

One hundred and twenty-five persons who lived at the reported burglary address at the time of the burglary were interviewed. An additional 52 respondents were interviewed whose dwellings had been burglarized, according to police

reports, after January 1, 1970, but before they had moved in. By definition these respondents were non-victims. (Data on victimized structures is discussed in the next chapter.) During the survey another 95 respondents who had been burglarized at their present address during the 1970-1972 period were interviewed. Some of these persons had failed to report the crime; for others, the report was too recent to be available.

Thus 220 persons in the 18 RA's who had experienced a burglary or a burglary attempt were interviewed. These 220 respondents had sustained 298 burglaries or attempted burglaries over the time period of the study. Appendix D, Table 1, shows the extent of multiple-victimization. The 682 "non-victims" had experienced 269 other residential and/or non residential crimes. Burglary has been singled out for special analysis because it involves the largest number of serious residential crimes and a direct attack against the dwelling unit.

The findings from the sample population are presented in a form which indicates the victim rate (number of persons victimized per thousand households), the number of burglaries per thousand (burglary incidence), and the percent of multiple victimization occurring to dwellings in the 18 RA's. It should not be inferred that the real world population will

contain the same population proportions as the sample.

Tests of statistical significance using chi square computations have been conducted on data in this chapter. Findings termed statistically "significant" are so at the .05 level. Additional data is presented in Appendix D.

B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTIMS

Various social indicators have been shown to relate to both the crime rate of an area and individuals who are victimized. The preceding chapter has discussed some of these in terms of the crime rate of the RA. The socio-economic characteristics of the individual victims presented here should be viewed within the context of those findings.

1. Victims Income Characteristics

The low, middle, and high-income definitions used here approximate those used in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' standard for Boston for a family of four; that is, low-income families earned less than $8,000, middle income families earned between $8,000-$15,000, and high income families earned more than $15,000 a year. 53% of the sample population had a low total family income in 1971, 26% were middle-income, and 21% were high-income.

TABLE 6.1

VICTIMIZATION BY INCOME*

	V. rate	(n)	Burglary incidence	% Multiply-victimized
Less than $8,000	100	(424)	140	40%
$8,000 - $14,999	130	(209)	140	8%
$15,000 or more	190	(169)	230	21%
		(802)		

* Differences in group rates significant at the .05 level.

As Table 6.1 shows, victimization is significantly related to affluence. That is, the higher an individual's income, the more likely he will be victimized. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that within a neighborhood, a person'e economic affluence is mirrored in his dwelling. The prospective burglar, interested in making a profitable hit, will choose the target with the most visible signs of affluence. This assumption, i.e., where the resident's income is high his dwelling will visibly reflect this affluence, is corroborated in the site survey data.

TABLE 6.2

VICTIMIZATION BY INCOME IN LOW, MIDDLE, AND HIGH CRIME RA'S*

	V. rate	(n)	Burglary incidence	% Multiply-victimized
HC RA'S				
Less than $8,000	100	(167)	150	50%
$8,000 - $14,999	180	(60)	210	17%
$15,000 or more	250	(40)	370	48%
MC RA'S				
Less than $8,000	100	(117)	150	50%
$8,000 - $14,999	220	(71)	220	--
$15,000 or more	260	(78)	300	15%
LC RA'S				
Less than $8,000	120	(139)	120	--
$8,000 - $14,999	60	(89)	60	--
$15,000 or more	110	(41)	120	9%
		(802)		

* Differences in High and Middle Crime groups significant at the 95% level.

As Table 6.2 shows, the pattern of victimization increasing with income exists in both high and middle crime RA's. However, the low income people who were victimized in these RA's had a higher percentage of multiple-victimization than either the high or middle income victims. It may be that burglars who are not as interested in the affluence of a target will return to the same dwelling unit once it has proven vulnerable.

Although affluence is significantly associated with victimization regardless of the general income level in middle and high crime areas, this relationship did not obtain in the low crime areas.

2. Victims' Racial Characteristics

One quarter of those interviewed in the study were black and three-quarters, white. Although blacks were victimized at slightly higher rates than whites, there was no significant difference in victimization between the two groups. Blacks, however, tended to be multiply-victimized somewhat more often than whites (see Appendix D, Table 2).

TABLE 6.3

VICTIMIZATION BY RACE IN LOW, MIDDLE, AND HIGH CRIME RA'S*

	V. rate	(n)	Burglary incidence	% Multiply-victimized
HC RA'S				
Black	90	(161)	140	55%
White	140	(132)	210	50%
MC RA'S				
Black	210	(83)	280	33%
White	170	(187)	180	6%
LC RA'S				
Black	140	(50)	220	57%
White	70	(285)	90	29%
		(898)		

* Differences in High Crime areas, only, significant at .05 level.

In the high crime areas surveyed the total population was 55% black and 45% white. The victimization rate for whites in these areas was found to be significantly higher than for blacks (Table 6.3). The multiple victimization for whites and blacks in these areas were each about 50%. In the middle crime areas where the total percentage of blacks was smaller than in high crime areas, blacks were

victimized slightly more frequently than their number in the general population and were somewhat more likely to be multiply-victimized than whites. Blacks were also more likely to be victimized and multiply-victimized in low crime RA's, but the number of blacks in low crime areas (N = 50) makes these figures less reliable.

3. Race and Income Characteristics

When race and income were tabulated together (Table 6.4), victimization rises as income rises for both blacks and whites. The most frequently victimized group was the high-income black group (N = 36) who were also most frequently multiply-victimized. The order is, in terms of decreasing victimization, high-income blacks, middle income blacks, high income whites, middle income whites and low income blacks (same rate, although the incidence figures are higher for the black group), and low income whites. This finding is quite different from that of the NORC Study[1] which found on a national random sample that victimization rose with affluence for blacks but decreased with affluence for whites.

TABLE 6.4

VICTIMIZATION BY RACE AND INCOME*

	V. rate	(n)	Burglary incidence	% Multiply-victimized
BLACK				
Less than $8,000	110	(167)	160	45%
$8,000 - $14,999	220	(67)	230	5%
$15,000 or more	270	(36)	500	85%
WHITE				
Less than $8,000	90	(256)	130	44%
$8,000 - $14,999	110	(153)	120	9%
$15,000 or more	190	(123)	200	5%
		(802)		

* Differences in group rates significant at .05 level.

This pattern of victimization increasing with affluence in the order mentioned above was found in both high and middle crime rate RA's, but not as consistently in the low crime RA's (see Appendix D, Table 3). The sample of blacks earning $15,000 or more in middle and low crime RA's, however, was too small (N = 8) to be reliable.

4. Education and Occupation

Victims tended to have more education than non-victims: 55% of the victims had at least some college education

although only 39% of all persons interviewed had some college education. Persons who did not continue their education past high school were victimized less often than their numbers in the general population. These tendencies, however, were not significant (see Appendix D, Table 4).

There were almost no differences in the rates of victimization between occupational groups (see Appendix D, Table 5). Professionals were victimized just slightly more frequently than other groups, and semi-skilled and skilled workers just slightly (not significantly) less frequently than other occupational groups.

Thus, no clear association between victimization and occupation or education emerges. The tendencies for the college-educated and the professionals to be victimized slightly more frequently than others may simply reflect a correlation between these qualities and higher incomes.

5. Age and Marital Status

Victims were significantly more likely to have a head of household who was thirty years old or less (see Appendix D, Table 6). Victims of burglary were least likely to be found in the sixty-five or more age group.

These findings are fairly consistent with police data on surveyed area burglary victims. The police records

indicate that 44% of the victims had a head of household between the ages of 21 and 30. Only 5% of the victims on whom the police have data had a head of household who was over 65 years of age (see Appendix D, Table 7).

Moreover, single persons, particularly young single persons, were significantly more likely to be victimized than those of other ages (see Appendix D, Table 8).

Young heads of household were heavily concentrated in the high burglary rate RA's and were victimized disproportionately within the high crime areas (see Appendix D, Table 9). This young, single group, particularly in RA's 622 and 775, was highly transient and left their homes unoccupied a good deal of the time, whereas the elderly, the group that was victimized least frequently, were less transient and often at home (see section on Occupancy Behavior in this chapter).

C. BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTIMS AND NON-VICTIMS

The household survey obtained information on peoples' occupancy patterns, social interaction with neighbors, and various household security practices to better understand the effect of these behavioral variables on victimization experience.

1. Occupancy Behavior

The amount of time when no one is at home was positively associated with the likelihood of being burglarized.

TABLE 6.5

VICTIMIZATION BY OCCUPANCY PATTERN*

	V. rate	(n)	Burglary incidence	% Multiply-victimized
Out 0-5 hours per week	80	(372)	100	25%
Out 5-35 hours per week	140	(262)	160	14%
Out more than 35 hours per week	160	(230) (864)	220	38%

* Differences in group rates significant at .05 level.

As Table 6.5 indicates, people whose homes were unoccupied more than thirty-five daytime hours per week were twice as likely to be victimized at least once by burglar as those whose homes were almost always occupied during the day.[2] In terms of burglary incidence, this relationship is even greater. This basic pattern holds in both high and middle crime RA's although those who leave their houses unoccupied 5-35 hours per week have almost the same victimization rate as those who are out more often in the high

crime RA's (see Appendix D, Table 11). The pattern of multiple-victimization has a similar relationship to hours unoccupied.

In the low crime RA's however, people out between 5-35 hours per week have the highest victimization rate. An analysis of each low crime RA indicates that this relationship is strong in only one. RA 134 is a middle-income suburban area located a good distance from the core city. It has a fairly large youth population. Arrests in the town in which the RA is located are too few for inference, but it may be that local youths, who can closely watch a resident leave his home, are breaking into the houses in this area.

2. Social Isolation

It has been shown in the previous chapter that the degree of social cohesion in an RA appears to be related to the RA's crime rate. An index of the degree of "social isolation" was composed in order to measure the amount of neighborhood interaction of victims and non-victims. The index was based on the same three questions as the index of "social cohesion" in Chapter 5 but applied here to individuals (see Appendix D, Table 12). Overall, no significant relationship appears although the "isolated" were

victimized and multiply-victimized at slightly higher rates than their numbers in the sample population.

However, a relationship between victimization and social isolation did seem to exist in the low burglary rate RA's (see Appendix D, Table 13); victimization and particularly multiple-victimization rose the more a person was isolated in his neighborhood. As the low crime RA's exhibited most cohesion, it may be that an individual's isolation from his neighbors is more apparent to a prospective burglar, particularly if the latter is a resident of the area. Data also indicated, however, that in low crime RA's (only) isolation was related to being out frequently. Thus, this may be an effect of occupancy more than of isolation per se.

3. Security Behavior

People were asked "what measures do you usually take when you leave home to work, shop, etc?" and asked to respond to a list of measures. It was thought that people whose security behavior was less than minimum (those who did not lock doors or windows when leaving) would be victimized by burglars more frequently than others. However, 95% of the respondents said they did usually lock their doors when they left home. This distribution did not allow for meaningful analysis between victims and non-victims.

Fewer people, about half the sampled population, were in the habit of locking their windows when they went out. The percentage who did not lock their windows was fairly constant, regardless of the crime rate of the RA (see Appendix D, Table 14).

TABLE 6.6

VICTIMIZATION BY SECURITY BEHAVIOR*

	V. rate	(n)	Burglary incidence	% Multiply-victimized
Locks windows when leaving	90	(401)	110	22%
Does not lock windows when leaving	40	(393) (794)	50	25%

* Differences in Group rates significant at .05 level.

Victims, however, locked their windows significantly more often than did non-victims (Table 6.6). This is surprising in light of the fact that an F.B.I. analysis[3] indicated that 32% of burglary entries were made through unlocked doors or windows and police data on areas surveyed in this project indicates that 10% of burglaries were through unlocked doors and 27% through unlocked windows.

It may be that victims were loath to admit that although

they had incurred a burglary recently, they did not take such fundamental steps to prevent another occurrence. To control for behavior changes, all victims who said they had changed their security practices in the last year and all those burglarized before January 1971 were deleted. Nevertheless, the data may still reflect, to some degree, security behavior changes due to victimization. It may be, though, that such behavior does not have much effect on one's likelihood of being burglarized. Data from the offender interviews (see Appendix B, Table 32) suggest this may indeed be the case.

D. AWARENESS OF CRIME

To elicit the general degree of awareness about the burglary problem the household survey asked respondents two questions relating to worry about one's home being burglarized in the daytime or at night. Further, the relationship of victimization experience and this concern for one's home was investigated. It was hypothesized that victims' level of concern about burglary would be higher and that this increased concern would translate into behavioral changes designed to increase security in the home.

1. Concern About Burglary

Generally, about half the respondents expressed "high concern" and half expressed "low concern"[4] about their home being broken into. However, three-quarters of the respondents in high residential crime RA's, half of those living in medium crime RA's, and just over one-quarter of those living in low crime RA's expressed high concern (Appendix D, Table 15). This suggests that people are fairly knowledgeable about burglary conditions in their neighborhood.

The experience of being burglarized was significantly associated with a higher level of concern (Table 6.7).

TABLE 6.7

VICTIMIZATION BY CONCERN ABOUT BEING VICTIMIZED*

	V. rate	(n)
High concern	350	(436)
Low concern	120	(427)
		(863)

* Differences in group rates significant at .05 level.

73% of the victims expressed considerable worry compared to 41% of the non-victims. This relationship held most strongly in the low crime RA's, where people do not expect

to be victimized (see Appendix D, Table 15).

As was found in the NORC[5] study worry is significantly higher among the blacks than among whites (Appendix D, Table 16). 69% of the blacks and 40% of the whites said they were either "very" or "somewhat" worried. In the extreme fear categories, even greater differences appear: 45% of the blacks were "very worried" while only 21% of the whites felt this way. 31% of the white respondents and 17% of the blacks said they were "not at all worried," the lowest level of concern. Blacks were victimized somewhat more often by burglars and were more likely to live in high crime RA's than were whites. However, in high crime RA's 80% of the blacks expressed a high degree of concern as opposed to 62% of the whites (see Appendix D, Table 16). It should be remembered that in high crime RA's, whites were victimized more often than blacks, although affluent blacks had the highest victimization rate when income was controlled for.

People who lived in public housing were more concerned about being burglarized than those who lived in private housing, either small or large multi-unit dwellings or single-family dwellings (Appendix D, Table 17). One out of three respondents in private housing expressed a high degree of concern whereas two out of three of those living in public

housing expressed such concern. There were no differences in the amount of concern between the 3 private housing categories mentioned above. It should be noted that the burglary victimization rate was lower for those living in public housing although multiple-victimization was greater than in private housing.

Women, significantly more often than men, expressed concern (see Appendix D, Table 18). No statistically significant differences were found when worry was related to income or distance from the core city (Appendix D, Tables 19 and 20). Low income people expressed most concern, followed by high income people, then middle income people. In terms of geographic location, 52% of the core city residents, 71% of the residents in adjacent areas, and 30% in outlying areas expressed a high degree of concern. However, when the two housing projects adjacent to the core are not considered in the "adjacent" category, only 20% of the residents in adjacent RA's expressed such worry. It appears that while residents in adjacent RA's generally were not highly concerned, residents of housing projects in adjacent RA's were extremely concerned.

Although the experience of victimization and the residential burglary rate of the RA are associated with concern, these factors appear to be only partial explanations of the

uneven distribution of concern within the population studied. Of the four RA's with the highest fear levels (256, 196, 736, and 291) two are medium crime areas, one a high crime area, and one that may be high (196). Victims in these four RA's were not significantly more afraid than non-victims. These facts would suggest that in areas where the population was extremely concerned about their homes being broken into, their concern is not fully explained by either the experience of victimization or the burglary rate of the area. Two of the four areas are housing projects (256, 196). Of the remaining two RA's with extremely high levels of concern, one (736) is a suburban area with a median income above $28,000 and the other (291) is an area where the racial composition of the population is changing rapidly and the burglary rate has increased more than 500% between 1969 and 1971.

2. Security Behavior Changes

Although the NORC Study[7] stated that recent victimization experience did not "seem to increase behavior designed to protect the home", the household survey data (Table 6.8) indicates that changes in security practices in the last year were made by 46% of the victims and 19% of the non-victims--a significant difference. The majority of the victims who changed their security behavior said they had

done so as a result of being burglarized. It would seem, then, that one consequence of being burglarized is the taking of stronger security practices.

TABLE 6.8

VICTIMIZATION BY SECURITY PRACTICE CHANGE*

	V. rate	(n)	Burglary incidence	% Multiply-victimized
Has changed	260	(230)	310	19%
Has not changed	70	(672)	100	43%
		(902)		

* Differences in group rates significant at 95% level.

In high crime RA's, 46% of the victims and 28% of the non-victims had changed their security behavior, 53% of the victims and 15% of non-victims in medium crime RA's, and 54% of the victims and 19% of the non-victims in low crime RA's (Table 6.9). Thus, a larger percentage of victims in low-crime RA's and a larger percentage of non-victims in high crime areas changed their security practices in the last year. This suggests that both victimization and the general burglary rate of an area have an effect on security practice changes.

TABLE 6.9

VICTIMIZATION BY SECURITY PRACTICE CHANGE
IN LOW, MIDDLE AND HIGH CRIME RA'S*

	V. rate	(n)	Burglary incidence	% Multiply-victimized
HC RA'S				
Changed	170	(90)	260	52%
No change	90	(200)	120	33%
MC RA'S				
Changed	430	(89)	470	12%
No Change	110	(229)	130	18%
LC RA'S				
Changed	220	(56)	230	5%
No change	40	(248)	70	75%
		(902)		

* Differences in group rates significant at .05 level.

E. CITIZEN'S ATTITUDES TOWARD CRIME PREVENTION

Several questions were asked on the household survey to elicit the citizens' views on crime prevention and their involvement in preventive activities in their neighborhoods.

Ten percent of the respondents said there was no need to reduce crime in their neighborhood. As Table 6.10 shows, almost one-third of the respondents had no clear idea about

how to go about reducing crime. Furthermore, of those who had a specific idea (51%), no more than 11% mentioned the same solution.

TABLE 6.10

"WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE DONE IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD TO REDUCE CRIME?"*

	Victims	Non-victims	Total
More police patrol	10%	11%	11%
More foot patrol	9%	9%	9%
Better street lighting	11%	6%	8%
Deal with drug problem	15%	5%	6%
Police Protection unspecified	7%	5%	6%
More policy (numbers)	8%	5%	5%
Policy-community relations	13%	10%	10%
Recreation or discipline for teenagers	4%	4%	4%
Other physical security	11%	4%	5%
Deal with social problems (jobs, etc.)	5%	2%	3%
Don't Know	20%	31%	29%
No crime in neighborhood	1%	12%	10%

* Figures based on multiple responses.

It has been found previously that few people "believe that they as individuals could do anything about the crime in their own neighborhood."[8] This attitude seems consistent with the responses about decreasing crime in the neighborhood on the household survey. More than anything else, people saw the police as the main crime prevention agents. 41% of the responses were suggestions referring to the police--more patrols, more foot patrols, more policemen, better police-community relations, etc. Another 13% thought the way to reduce crime was to improve the physical security of the neighborhood--particularly street lighting. Only 6% of the respondents suggested that dealing with the drug problem was a way to lessen crime. Victims tended to have more ideas concerning crime reduction in the neighborhood than did non-victims with 20% of the victims saying they "didn't know" how to reduce crime, compared to 31% of the non-victims.

The level of neighborhood involvement in crime preventive activities was found to be relatively low. Only 1 out of 5 persons interviewed had ever met with neighbors or other groups to talk about crime in the neighborhood (Appendix D, Table 21) and only 7% decided to do anything about it (Appendix D, Table 22). Most of these (few) people became active in a neighborhood group with a multi-problem orientation rather than in a specifically crime oriented group

(see Appendix D, Table 23). 12% of the victims were involved in such groups as opposed to 6% non-victims.

People were also asked if they had heard of private citizens neighborhood patrol groups (see Appendix D, Table 24). 57% were familiar with this idea, and 65% of the sample thought it was a "good idea" in general. More victims (77%) thought it was a good idea than non-victims (63%) (Appendix D, Table 25). Non-victims were somewhat less familiar with the idea and somewhat less sure ("don't know") about the effect of such groups. Generally, however, people seemed to be favorably disposed toward neighborhood patrol gorups.

The responses to these questions suggest that people viewed the neighborhood crime problem as being out of the control of themselves and their neighbors. Despite the fact that the majority were familiar with and positive about neighborhood patrol groups, no one suggested them as a way to reduce crime in the neighborhood (although the questions about such groups had already been asked) and only very few had even gotten together with their neighbors in any kind of group where crime was an issue. The orientation of the respondents seemed to be toward traditional police patrols rather than neighborhood patrols.

The differences between the victims and non-victims suggest that the issue was more pressing to victims who

had therefore given it more thought and were slightly more likely to actively involve themselves in crime preventive activities.

Another method of protecting oneself against loss due to burglary would be to buy an appropriate insurance policy (Appendix D, Table 26). 41% of the non-victims and 35% of the victims had done this. The most common reasons given for not obtaining such a policy (see Appendix D, Table 26) were that it was too expensive (15%), they had nothing worth insuring (14%), and they had never thought about it (11%). Victims and non-victims gave similar responses to this question.

SUMMARY - CHAPTER VI

Based upon the findings of this chapter it would appear that the probability of burglary victimization within areas of comparable crime rate is unevenly distributed. There was also a considerable amount of multiple victimization. The highest incidence fell on the relatively affluent--whether in low, middle, or high income RA's. It was also found that burglary victims left their dwellings unoccupied more often than people who had not been burglarized. Overall, the factor of race did not seem to affect burglary experience within an RA.

Awareness of and concern about being burglarized was found to parallel both the burglary experience of the area and of the individual. Victims were not only more concerned about being burglarized, but also somewhat more concerned with crime in general in their neighborhood. Most persons whether victims or non-victims tended to seek solutions to residential crime which involved emphasis on regular police patrols rather than on things they or their neighbors could do.

CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

1. Phillip H. Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1967), Table 14.
2. Another measure of occupancy, based on the usual number of hours per day, showed a similar relationship to victimization (see Appendix D, Table 10).
3. Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook, Feb. 1965, pp. 39-40.
4. Fear categories were based on the responses to: "In the daytime" and "at night," "how worried are you about your home being broken into or entered illegally when no one is at home?"
5. Op. Cit., Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States, p. 75.
6. Ibid., p. 75.
7. Ibid., p. 86.
8. Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact, An Assessment, p. 91.

CHAPTER VII

STRUCTURAL VICTIMIZATION

CHAPTER VII

STRUCTURAL VICTIMIZATION

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the possible relationship between a dwelling unit's physical characteristics--such as the type, number and security of portals--and its probability of being burglarized. The data analyzed in this chapter is primarily derived from the household survey described in Chapter 6. In this context, however, the "victim" is a dwelling unit wherein a respondent was burglarized during the time frame of the study.

In choosing a target a burglar likely considers four points: occupancy, affluence, access, and detection. The influence of the first two were discussed in the previous chapters. The factors which relate to the physical attributes are access and detection: Can the burglar successfully enter and leave with a minimal probability of being detected and apprehended.

Dwelling units have two general access characteristics: the number and type of potential entry portals (doors and windows) and the quality of portal security (locks, door construction). The most universal physical aspect of detection is the visibility of the portals to persons in neighboring dwelling units and/or on the street. There is also a social factor dealt with in earlier chapters: someone must not only recognize the irregular behavior, but act to

interrupt it. This is dictated to a large extent by the occupancy and the degree of social organization in the area. Other detection factors dealt with briefly are burglar alarms and dogs.

Analysis of detection (visibility) and access factors is complicated by their interactive nature. Visibility factors may lessen the number of potential portals available to the burglar. For example, unconventional entry through a vulnerable front window in full view of street and neighboring houses is generally less preferable to the burglar than attacking a more physically secure but less visible back door. Portal visibility can also alter the absolute level of portal security by affecting the duration and/or method of attack, since the more visible the portal the more quickly it must be violated. Similarly, very low portal security will virtually nullify the deterent effect of visibility. The two factors are also influenced by the skill level of the attacking burglar.

In addition to the previous material this chapter examines the distribution of "standard" door security, by geographic location, type of structure, income of household, etc., and indicates the nature of the deficiencies causing most doors to be rated "non-standard". Note is also taken of less common detection factors including location of structure on the block, presence of burglar alarm and dogs. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relative

influence of several common deterrents on offender behavior.

B. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY SAMPLE

The sample was drawn from dwellings within the 18 surveyed RAs described in Chapter 6 (see Table 7.1). It should be noted that the sample does not contain any luxury high rise buildings. The burglary incidence rate is the number of burglaries per 1,000 dwelling units over the time period of the study. The rates are based on the "weighted" figures. The (n)s appearing on the tables are the unweighted numbers.

Tests of statistical significance using chi square computations have been conducted on the data. The significance or non-significance at the .05 level is noted on each table.

TABLE 7.1

TYPE OF STRUCTURE

	Single Family		Small Multi-unit (2-9 units)		Large Multi-unit (10+)		Public		Private	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
All RAs	25	(168)	40	(432)	35	(234)	24	(148)	76	(686)
High Crime	9	(31)	40	(153)	51	(78)	44	(52)	56	(210)
Middle Crime	26	(67)	40	(121)	34	(93)	22	(52)	78	(229)
Low Crime	32	(70)	40	(158)	28	(63)	15	(44)	85	(247)

C. ACCESS FACTORS

1. Number and Types of Portals

The number and type of portal entry opportunities tend to effect target attractiveness, as evidenced by burglary rate. As Table 7.2 suggests, by holding the number of doors to the dwelling unit constant, the presence of accessible windows tends to increase the burglary probability.

TABLE 7.2

BURGLARY RATE BY NUMBER OF DOORS WITH AND WITHOUT ACCESSIBLE WINDOWS LEADING DIRECTLY TO THE DWELLING UNIT

	1 Door		1 Door Window		2 Doors		2 Doors Windows		3 Doors		3 Doors Windows	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
All RAs	74	(50)	166	(153)	179	(104)	176	(126)	116	(115)	194	(153)
High Crime	66	(11)	169	(38)	80	(36)	400	(45)	95	(59)	409	(47)
Middle Crime	169	(24)	303	(54)	57	(44)	211	(37)	49	(26)	279	(34)
Low Crime	10	(15)	66	(61)	365	(24)	45	(44)	258	(30)	77	(72)

Significance not obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between number of portals and crime rate.

As Table 7.3. shows, attacks on single-family units do not totally explain the accessible window preference. The high burglary rate of multi-unit structures with accessible windows suggests first-floor apartments have a higher probability of burglary than other units in multi-unit structures.

TABLE 7.3

BURGLARY INCIDENCE RATES BY NUMBER OF DOORS LEADING DIRECTLY TO DWELLING UNITS IN MULTI-FAMILY STRUCTURES WITH AND WITHOUT ACCESSIBLE WINDOWS

	1 Door		1 Door Windows		2 Doors		2 doors Windows		3 Doors		3 Doors Windows	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
ALL RAs												
Small multi-unit	57	(29)	216	(73)	247	(52)	195	(80)	143	(64)	259	(87)
Large multi-unit	0	(10)	167	(20)	157	(48)	104	(29)	103	(49)	177	(55)
HIGH CRIME												
Small multi-unit	139	(8)	304	(16)	163	(26)	406	(33)	210	(30)	338	(25)
Large multi-unit	0	(2)	54	(8)	28	(10)	449	(8)	50	(27)	679	(18)
MIDDLE CRIME												
Small multi-unit	75	(12)	383	(28)	144	(15)	292	(18)	66	(14)	290	(18)
Large multi-unit	0	(6)	0	(8)	6	(26)	41	(12)	34	(12)	358	(14)
LOW CRIME												
Small multi-unit	20	(9)	16	(29)	368	(11)	56	(29)	106	(20)	132	(24)
Large multi-unit	0	(2)	783	(4)	541	(12)	0	(9)	406	(10)	65	(23)

Significance not obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between number of portals and crime rate.

Table 7.3 also suggests the tendency for units with accessible windows to have higher burglary rates is more pronounced in the small than in large multi-unit structures. This is not surprising since many small multi-unit structures have the security disadvantages of both detached single-unit dwellings (multiple access points) and large multi-unit structures (interior, thus non-visible, doors to the dwelling unit). This perhaps explains why dwelling units in small multi-unit structures have the highest burglary rate of any other type structure:

	Rate
Small multi-unit structures:	185
Large multi-unit structures:	142
Single-unit strucutres:	132

The accessible window finding does not appear to hold in low crime areas, (See Table 7.3), suggesting that this characteristic of portal choice is more salient to the less skilled burglars. The offender data in Chapter IV indicated that less experienced burglars, who concentrate in the high crime RA's, are more likely than other burglars to use window entrances. However, this data does not indicate windows are attacked more frequently than doors, but rather that preference is shown for dwelling units with a window option.

It is possible that the number of doors leading to the dwelling units without accessible windows will influence the burglary rate. However, Table 7.3 does not strongly indicate this relationship. The burglary rate of these dwelling units is more likely influenced by the number of doors leading to the common hallways of the structure. Table 7.4, in fact, indicates a direct relationship between the number of doors to the building and the burglary rate for small multi-unit structures.

TABLE 7.4

BURGLARY INCIDENCE RATE OF UNITS WITHOUT ACCESSIBLE WINDOWS IN MULTI-FAMILY STRUCTURES BY NUMBER OF DOORS LEADING INTO THE STRUCTURE

	1 Door		2 Doors		3 Doors	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
ALL RAs						
Small multi-unit	63	(42)	153	(89)	474	(23)
Large multi-unit	128	(76)	86	(34)	0	(6)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between (1) number of doors and crime rate (2) number of doors and housing type.

It could be argued that the presence of locked common entrances affects the burglary rate in Table 7.4. Surprisingly, however, the burglary rate for units in buildings which are essentially open to the public and those that are not, do not appear to be strikingly different. (See Table 7.5). Since the tenants of multi-unit structures usually have little control over the security of the common entrances, this finding is particularly interesting.

TABLE 7.5

BURGLARY INCIDENCE RATE OF UNITS IN MULTI-UNIT STRUCTURES BY THE TIME COMMON ENTRANCES ARE LOCKED

	Locked Day & Night		Locked Night		Never Locked	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
ALL RAs						
Small multi-unit	232	(193)	67	(66)	240	(153)
Large multi-unit	157	(74)	282	(9)	152	(153)

Significance not obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between time doors locked and crime rate.

2. Physical Security of Portals

Although the factors of number and types of portals appear to affect the burglary rate, their presence is not amenable to change. The question, then, is: if the unit's portals are secured, will the unit's burglary probability be reduced?

Conventional wisdom dictates "target hardening" to lessen an individual units chance of victimization. Furthermore, the offender interview data indicated that physical vulnerability was a major consideration in target selection (Appendix B , Table 11). Although strong locks had a low deterrent ranking (Appendix B , Table 57) among the burglars interviewed, the most common recommendation that they might give friends and family for burglary protection was to place strong locks on the doors. (Appendix B, Table 58) This seeming conflict suggests three things: first, that those interviewees who worked in housing types where there were accessible first floor windows felt that strong door locks or door frames were no problem, since they could enter by the window; second, that there was some bravado in the replies, such as, "there's no lock I haven't been able to get through"; and third, that the interviewees might have been judging by their experience of existing locks and doors in particular housing types.

The offender interviews also indicated that portal security had a differential effect on the various types of burglars. A high level of physical security seemed more effective against the young, inexperienced burglar and the impatient drug-user. The older, skilled offender, who usually works the more affluent neighborhoods, is not particularly deterred by the quality of portal security

(alarms were more of a threat). Thus, in high crime inner RA's, where the young and the drug-users work frequently, the data should evidence the affect of good security. In the outlying middle and low crime areas, the difference between the burglary rate is expected to be less closely related to the quality of portal security--the more skilled burglar not being as deterred by physical security.

The study attempted to determine the effects of physical security by measuring the door security of dwelling units. Doors were rated as "standard" and "non-standard." The rating of "standard" for a door is somewhat more stringent than Federal Crime Insurance requirements, but less than the proposed Federal Security Code.[1] The construction standard a door must meet in this study is: (1) be of metal, metal panels, solid wood, or hollow wood of three-quarter inch thickness; (2) have no unprotected glass in or near the door handle; (3) have no exposed hinges. The standard door's locking system includes a three-quarter inch dead latch or dead bolt, or a vertical bolt. Only the doors leading directly to the dwelling unit were evaluated. The dwelling units are divided into three categories: (1) no standard doors; (2) some standard doors; (3) all standard doors. Since the

evaluation seeks to determine the effectiveness of standard doors, burglaries through windows and attempted burglaries must be removed from the sample. Although this has been done, a certain number of doors were entered without the burglar defeating the door (use of a key or door unlocked).

The quality of standard doors in the sample is low: 8% of the units have all standard doors; 4% have at least one standard door. But nevertheless, a pattern emerges: burglary incidence is inversely related to standard door security. This relationship appears to hold in each crime area (Table 7.6). It should be noted that having some standard doors did not deter offenders since this group had the highest rates of all.

TABLE 7.6

BURGLARY RATE THROUGH DOOR BY DOOR VULNERABILITY IN HIGH, MIDDLE, AND LOW CRIME RAs

	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	Rate	(N)	RATE	(N)	RATE	(N)
All RAs	79	(773)	136	(57)	28	(57)
High Crime	101	(251)	174	(22)	17	(27)
Middle Crime	98	(247)	103	(28)	44	(25)
Low Crime	54	(275)	273	(7)	24	(5)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between (1) door vulnerability and crime rate (2) door vulnerability and crime areas.

As Table 7.7 indicates, the association between burglary rates and security is particularly strong in the inner (core and adjacent) high crime areas again suggesting that good security is more effective against the less skilled, less mobile group of burglars. However, the sample is too small to confirm that security is less effective against the older, more skilled burglars in the outer areas.

TABLE 7.7

BURGLARY RATE THROUGH DOOR BY DOOR VULNERABILITY AND GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION: INNER (CORE AND ADJACENT) VS. OUTER

	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
All RAs						
Inner	96	(607)	138	(52)	29	(51)
Outer	45	(166)	97	(5)	0	(6)
High Crime						
Inner	101	(251)	174	(22)	17	(27)
Outer	--	--	--	--	--	--
Middle Crime						
Inner	111	(168)	101	(25)	48	(19)
Outer	56	(79)	159	(3)	0	(6)
Low Crime						
Inner	71	(188)	333	(5)	24	(5)
Outer	42	(87)	0	(2)	--	--

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between (1) door vulnerability and crime rate (2) location and door vulnerability.

Although physical security generally appears to affect the burglary rate, the previous chapter suggested that occupancy was highly correlated with victimization. The offenders who were interviewed were primarily deterred by occupants in the dwelling under consideration for attack (see Appendix B, Table 51). A test of the independence of door security from the influence of occupancy can be seen in Table 7.8. Security of the doors appears to be effective in two of the three occupancy categories.

TABLE 7.8

BURGLARY RATE THROUGH DOOR BY DOOR VULNERABILITY AND NUMBER OF HOURS UNOCCUPIED PER WEEK

Occupancy	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Stantard Doors	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
All RAs						
Less than 5	46	(326)	144	(22)	54	(19)
5 - 35	85	(223)	22	(18)	5	(18)
More than 35	103	(196)	402	(16)	0	(13)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between (1) door vulnerabiltiy and crime rate (2) occupancy and crime rate.

Chapter VI also indicated that affluence was a key variable in victimization. The independence of door security from income is apparent from Table 7.9.

TABLE 7.9

BURGLARY RATE THROUGH DOOR BY DOOR VULNERABILITY AND INCOME OF HOUSEHOLD

Income	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
All RAs						
Less than $8,000	68	(373)	209	(21)	47	(35)
$8,000 - $15,000	63	(192)	160	(19)	0	(11)
More than $15,000	145	(133)	23	(12)	0	(6)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between (1) door vulnerability and crime rate (2) door vulnerability and income

It was hoped that data would yield a number of cases in which the burglar had the choice among both standard and non-standard doors. Unfortunately, only five cases (in units with only two doors leading directly to the dwelling unit) gave the burglar an opportunity to choose between a standard and non-standard door. Nevertheless, in four of the five cases the burglar entered the non-standard door.

Even though the sample of units protected by standard doors is only 8%, it is useful to see how these protected units are distributed by geographic location, type of structure, private/public, income of household, and tenure.

The category with one of the greatest variations was geographic location. Only 1% of the dwelling units in the outer areas are protected, compared with 6% of the dwelling units of the inner (core and adjacent) areas. But since the outer areas also have a lower burglary rate, and door security is less effective against the experienced burglar who tends to operate in these outer, more affluent areas, this absence of door security is less significant than it might appear.

Dwelling units in large multi-unit structures have the highest percentage of protected units, 15%. Since most units in large multi-unit structures are less likely

to have accessible windows, the overall security of these units is enhanced. Units in small multi-unit structures have 6% protected, while single-family-attached have 4%, and single-family-detached have, in our survey, no units with all standard doors.

The relative protection of units in large multi-unit structures probably reflects the influence of public housing. Public housing has two and a half times the proportion of protected units as private housing (18% of public housing units have all standard doors, compared with 5% in private housing).

Households earning less than $8,000 appear to be better protected than higher income households. Nine percent of the under $8,000 income category have units with all standard doors, while 6% of the households in the category between $8,000 and $15,000 and 6% in the category of over $15,000 have units with all standard doors.

However, when public housing tenants are removed from the low income category, the percentage of all standard units falls to 2%.

Control over one's level of security depends to some extent on whether one owns or rents. While owners have complete control over their level of security, limited only by income and willingness to expend income on se-

curity, they usually live in single-family units, which have the highest number of portals to secure. Renters have limited control. The tenant can usually provide, at his own expense, auxiliary locks but can not easily alter the door construction. Provision of auxiliary locks can be expensive for frequent movers. Furthermore, the locking system may be irrelevant if the door is wood panel and can be easily battered through. The study indicates that 7% of the renter-occupied units compared with 1% of the owner-occupied units have all standard doors. (See Appendix D, Tables 32-37).

Major factors in the construction and/or the locking system of the doors evaluated in this study caused 88% of the units to have non-standard doors. Construction factors that caused a door to fail include one or more of the following: (1) 39% of the doors in the study are wood panel; (2) 8% have outside removable hinges; (3) 26% have glass near the handle. Only 18% of the doors had dead bolts, 12% had dead latches, and 13% had a vertical bolt auxiliary lock, which satisfies the locking system requirement. Only 7% of the units had any kind of special window protection--special locks, bars, burglar-proof glass.

D. DETECTION FACTORS

This section on detection factors will first discuss the characteristic common to most structures--the visibility of the portals. Next to actual occupancy of the dwelling unit, the offender interviews suggested that burglars were most deterred by neighbors and other persons in the vicinity.

Presumably, a burglar concerned about detection will enter a dwelling unit through the least conspicuous portal. The door is obviously the most natural way of entering a dwelling unit, but it is also the easiest to secure. Thus, the burglar has a trade-off between the detection possibilities of the window and the access limitation possibilities of the door. The household survey contained 172 cases in which there was an option to enter window or door. In 61% of these cases the door was attacked. (See Table 7.10)[2]

TABLE 7.10
PORTAL ATTACKED BY CHOICE OF DOOR OR WINDOW AND STRUCTURE TYPE

Structure Type	Door % (N)	Window % (N)	Total % (N)
Single Family	67% (36)	33% (18)	100% (54)
Small Multi-unit	58% (48)	42% (35)	100% (83)
Large Multi-unit	60% (21)	40% (67)	100% (35)
TOTALS	61% (105)	39% (14)	100% (172)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between choice of portal and structure type.

A window entry, presumably, would be less noticeable if it were made on the side or the rear. As Table 7.11 indicates, of 79 window attacks, three-quarters were made against the side or rear.

TABLE 7.11
WINDOW ATTACKED BY LOCATION AND STRUCTURE TYPE

Structure Type	Side of Attack: Front % (N)	Side % (N)	Rear % (N)	Total % (N)
Single Family	23% (5)	32% (7)	46% (10)	100% (22)
Small Multi-unit	15% (6)	39% (15)	46% (18)	100% (39)
Large Multi-unit	50% (9)	22% (4)	23% (5)	100% (18)
TOTAL	25% (20)	33% (26)	42% (33)	100% (79)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between location of window and type of structure.

Although door entry is more conventional, the burglar concerned about detection will likely enter the least visible door. An examination of 39 burglaries against single-family units found that only 46% of the doors attacked were on the front of the unit.

Table 7.12 measures the visibility of attacked windows and doors (doors leading to common hallways excluded). The table indicates that the doors attacked were generally less visible than the attacked windows. This may suggest that the speed with which a window can be violated reduces the deterrent effect of its visibility.

TABLE 7.12

VISIBILITY OF ATTACKED PORTALS

	Door* %	(N)	Window %	(N)
Not visible from street or neighbors' windows	33%	(22)	10%	(6)
Visible from street, not visible from neighbors' windows	8%	(5)	5%	(3)
Visible from neighbors' windows at distance greater than 50 feet, not visible from street	12%	(8)	17%	(10)
Visible from neighbors' windows at distance less than 50 feet, not visible from street	19%	(13)	35%	(21)
Visible from street and neighbors' windows at distance less than 249 feet	28%	(19)	33%	(20)
TOTAL	100%	(67)	100%	(60)

*Doors not leading to dwelling unit from a multi-unit common hallway.

As in the previous section, an attempt was made to locate dwelling units which gave the burglar the opportunity to choose between a visible and a non-visible door. The sample yielded 21 cases where the security can be held constant and the visibility factor varied. In 57% of the cases the non-visible, non-standard door was attacked rather than the visible, non-standard door. (See Appendix D, Table 38).

The detection factors other than visibility include location on the corner of the block, burglar alarms, and dogs.

Previous research has indicated that corner structures have a higher probability of burglary. Not having an adjacent structure presumably reduces the detection possibilities as well as opening a side (especially in large multi-family structures which are often attached) to entry-exit opportunities. A third of the offenders interviewed said they were deterred by structures being close on the side. The household survey data confirms the higher burglary of corner structures. (See Table 7.13).

TABLE 7.13

BURGLARY BY LOCATION ON BLOCK AND STRUCTURE TYPE

Structure Type	Corner Rate	Corner (N)	Non-Corner Rate	Non-Corner (N)
Single Family	253	(30)	109	(141)
Small multi-unit	194	(62)	185)	(373)
Large multi-unit	273	(28)	122	(206)
TOTAL	242	(120)	144	(720)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between location on block and crime rate.

The detection factor which appeared most salient to the burglars interviewed in the offender survey was the burglar alarm. The household survey indicated that only 1% of the households had a burglar alarm.

A detection factor which also influences access to some degree is the presence of a dog. About one fourth of the offenders were deterred, and an additional two-fifths thought presence of a dog might deter them. The household survey shows that 15% of the respondents owned dogs.

E. EFFECTIVE COMBINATIONS OF DETERRENTS

This section discusses the relative influence of common deterrents on offenders interviewed in the study. (See Appendix B, Tables 51-53) The deterrent variables selected included three for which there were a reasonable number of offender responses and which were principally within the influence of the resident--burglar alarms, dogs, and strong door locks (hardware). In addition, police patrols were included because the most common demand of citizens was for more patrols. This category does not include fixed post or local security. It was taken instead as heightened regular patrols. The object was to see what variable or combination of variables definitely deterred each offender interviewed.[3] For example, of those offenders who were definitely deterred by burglar

alarms, how many were also deterred by police or security patrols and strong locks, and how many were also deterred by dogs but nothing else? In other words, how many offenders in total were definitely deterred by each variable and what was the marginal deterrent effect of adding one more variable to the other variables?

Table 7.14 compares those interviewees who would definitely be deterred to those who might be or would definitely not be deterred by every possible combination of the four variable.

TABLE 7.14

Interviewee Deterrance

A = Would definitely be deterred by burglar alarm.

$\bar{A}$ = Might or would not be deterred by burglar alarm.

KEY: A = Burglar Alarms; B = Dogs; C = Security Patrols; D = Strong Locks.

$ABCD = 1$	$\bar{A}\bar{B}\bar{C}\bar{D} = 28$	$A\bar{B}CD = 0$	$\bar{A}BC\bar{D} = 0$
$ABC\bar{D} = 1$	$\bar{A}\bar{B}C\bar{D} = 1$	$\bar{A}\bar{B}CD = 0$	$A\bar{B}C\bar{D} = 2$
$AB\bar{C}\bar{D} = 5$	$\bar{A}B\bar{C}\bar{D} = 1$	$\bar{A}BCD = 1$	$\bar{A}B\bar{C}D = 8$
$A\bar{B}\bar{C}\bar{D} = 13$	$\bar{A}\bar{B}CD = 0$	$\bar{A}B\bar{C}D = 0$	$\bar{A}\bar{B}C\bar{D} = 5$

In total, sixty-six people responded. Twenty-eight people (42%) were not definitely deterred by the presence of all four variables. The remaining 38 people (57%) were deterred by at least one and often by several of the four deterrents.

Table 7.15 shows the number and percentage of people who would be deterred initially by each of the four variables alone and then what combination after that would give the best protection.

TABLE 7.15

Deterrance Combinations



From this, a burglar alarm stands out as the best deterrent, followed by a dog. A burglar alarm and a dog together provide protection against 47% of the responding interviewees while the addition of police/security patrols and strong locks only adds 7% and 1% respectively. The additional effect of each variable over the other three variables (i.e., the number of additional interviewees

who would be deterred by each variable alone) is shown in Table 7.16.

TABLE 7.16

Additional Deterrance Combinations



SUMMARY - CHAPTER VII

In this chapter household survey data was used to examine the relationship between a dwelling unit's characteristics and its burglary probability. The analysis included access and detection factors which encourage or deter particular types of burglars.

Under access factors, the data indicated that units with accessible windows have a higher burglary probability than units without. These latter were in multi-unit structures whose rate was influenced by the number of doors leading into the building, regardless of the building's locking practices. Although only 8% of the units in the survey had all standard doors, the efficacy of this protection was evidenced by a lower burglary rate. The units with protected doors were more prevalent in inner RAs, large multi-unit structures, public housing, renter occupied units and lower income households than in their counterparts. Deficiencies in both the construction and locking systems of the doors caused them to fail, but insufficient locks alone accounted for most failures.

The detection factors included visibility of portals, alarms, dogs and location on the block. The survey data and offender interviews indicated that while visibility was a consideration, most burglars were definitely deterred by alarms a quarter of the interviewees by a dog. The survey confirmed previous findings that corner structures were particularly attractive to burglars.

Footnotes - Chapter VII

1. Federal Crime Insurance Program of National Housing Act as amended by P.L. 91-609. Federal Security Code with Minimum Building Security Guidelines and Cost Estimates for The Security Features (Initial Draft) of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, May 14, 1971.

2. It should be noted the visibility tables include an unknown number of attacks on portals which took place at night.

3. Offenders were asked whether each deterrent on its own would deter them. These combinations were constructed from their separate responses.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. OVERVIEW

Previous chapters of this study have attempted to describe the nature and extent of residential crime and specific findings about offenders, geographic areas, and victimized persons and dwellings. This chapter will present the general conclusions of the study and their policy implications for the reduction of the rate of residential crime. Basically there are two ways by which residential crime may be reduced. One is to reduce the number of offenders who engage in such behavior and/or their frequency of operation, and the second is to reduce the number of opportunities to commit offenses.

B. REDUCING THE NUMBER OF OFFENDERS

1. Factors Related to the Increase in Residential Crime Rates

As noted in Chapter II, the rates of residential crime have risen significantly in recent years. Many factors could be cited to explain this phenomenon. For example, an increase in youth, black, or low-income populations, which have high offender rates, could result in increased criminal activity.

Between 1960 and 1970 the percentage of the population, 14 to 24 inclusive, rose in Boston from 18 to 23 percent, while between 1962 (the first year of the decade for which adequate figures are available) and 1970, the under 25 arrested population rose from 69% to 77% of all robbery arrests, and 70% to 76% of burglary arrests.

The black population in the city has remained at approximately 16% since about 1965. Between 1965 and 1970 the percentage of non-whites arrested for burglary rose from 35% to 46%, and for robbery from 56% to 65%.

Recent explanations of crime rates have emphasized the frustrations of blacks that cause them to engage in criminal behavior. The extent to which this has increased offender rates among blacks is only conjectural. Black burglars interviewed in the present study did not express motives very different from, nor did they work more frequently than, their white counterparts. If they preferred to attack dwellings owned by whites, it was principally because they felt whites were more affluent. A high percentage of robbery assailants in this study were described as black and a high percentage of victims were white. However, there was insufficient data on both victims and assailants to ascribe this phenomenon to to particular causes. The Harvard study of robbery in

Boston was unable to confirm any hypothesis regarding the disproportionate number of black offenders involved in robbery. It did conclude, however, that "the changing status of the black man in American society is probably responsible for some of the recent increase in robbery rates."[1]

Real income rose steadily in Boston throughout the 1960's for both whites and non-whites.[2] However, it has been suggested that relative deprivation may account for increased criminal behavior. There is some support for this in the present study, in that, while most offenders interviewed came from lower income backgrounds, their expressed motives for crime were not related to basic survival needs such as food and shelter. Unless they were major drug users, they sought money for such things as clothes or vacations. Therefore, while not absolutely deprived, individuals who engage in criminal behavior may feel relatively so.

Increases in youth and non-white populations, feelings of frustration, and relative deprivation probably account for some of the increased crime rate. However, it is most unlikely that the above factors account for the 340% increase in residential burglary and the 920% increase

in residential robbery rates that occurred in Boston between 1962 and 1970.

Between 1965 and 1970 narcotic arrests rose ten-fold (from 210 to 2,106) in Boston. The increased arrests have paralleled residential crime increases to such an extent that a relationship between them could logically by inferred. Support for this hypothesis is contained in the interview section of this study, which found that burglars who are major drug users work much more frequently than non-drug users due to their need for funds to purchase drugs.

The present study has also examined the argument that the rise in crime has been due to constraints on police or greater court leniency. Certainly police work load has risen. For example, calls for police service rose 71% in Boston between 1964 and 1970, while manpower rose only 8%.[3] Between 1966 and 1970 the percentage of arrested burglars who were convicted declined, fewer of the guilty were imprisoned, and of those imprisoned, a higher percentage received short terms in houses of correction rather than state prison sentences.[4]

As noted throughout this report, the extent to which the criminal justice system deters crime is unclear. The fact that fewer accused persons are incarcerated and for shorter terms than in the past may or may not mean that

there are more burglars in circulation. For example, offenders who receive probation or a shorter sentence may be more likely to forego criminal behavior than those who are given prison terms. However, there is no way to determine this. All that can be asserted is that it would appear that in 1970 the average burglar had less chance of being caught, convicted, and incarcerated than he did in 1966.

2. The Size of the Offender Population

In attempting to draw conclusions about offenders and offenses, the present study went beyond police reports to actual offenders and victims. However, while procedures were employed to locate unrecorded crime victims, no similar procedures were utilized to find unapprehended offenders.[5] Therefore, the character and extent of the real offender population is uncertain. Indeed, many studies argue that the apprehended offender group is not representative.[6]

In general there are two models to describe the offender population for a crime such as burglary. Each model assumes that the actual number of burglaries in a community is approximately three times the reported figure. This would mean in 1970 in the city of Boston there were 30,000 burglaries or in the SMSA, 100,000.

Model A could be described as the economic model. It assumes that the apprehended burglar population is coincident with the actual burglar population and thus displays many of the characteristics of offenders interviewed for this study. This would mean that the average burglar is motivated by economic gain (including the need for funds to purchase drugs) and works frequently, usually with accomplices, to maximize profits.

In 1970 approximately 1,000 people were charged with burglary in Boston. If this figure coincides with the actual size of the local burglar population, and if there were 30,000 burglaries in the city, then according to this model, 500 two-man teams would average 60 burglaries (30,000 ÷ 500) or a return of $3,000 apiece (60 x $100 ÷ 2) since the average gain from a residential burglary is only about $100.[7] Obviously, these figures would vary considerably between juveniles, who averaged one hit a week, and drug users, who averaged five. Juveniles also made lower average scores, and older offenders made higher ones.

Model B, which could be called the psychological model, posits that there are a large number of offenders, most of whom remain uncaught. If this is true, they can not work frequently, and economic gain can not be their primary motive. For example, if there were 5,000 burglars in

Boston in 1970, their average gain even if they worked alone would have been only $600 per year (30,000 divided by 5,000 = 6 x $100 = $600). This would suggest that their prime motive was not economic but psychological.

Obviously the two models can not coexist in their entirety. That is, there can not be a large population of burglars, most of whom are undetected, who engage in criminal behavior for economic gain; otherwise, there would be many more burglaries. The present study would suggest that while model B might explain the behavior of some juvenile offenders, model A is much more explanatory of most burglars.

If the offender population for burglary is relatively small (in Boston on the order of 1,000 out of 70,000 males between 14 and 24, and much smaller for other population groups) and known to the criminal justice system through repeated arrests, there are fundamental implications for deterrence and correctional efforts. While it is not within the scope of the present study to evaluate specific programs, there are two obvious possibilities for altering criminal behavior which develop from this finding:

1. The offender population could be dealt with more severely by the criminal justice system, and convicted burglars would be sent to jail on the rationale that the society will sustain one, three, or five fewer burglaries for every week that the offender is away.
2. Specific programs to alter motivation could be instituted.

In attempting to choose between these approaches, which are obviously not mutually exclusive, it should be pointed out that neither punishment nor rehabilitation has seemed to deter most offenders to date. While the present project was not equipped to undertake a social-psychological analysis of the interviewed offenders, the general impression of the staff was that the typical burglar was not a hardened criminal, but an individual who met certain needs by criminal behavior and who might be equally content to meet them in non-criminal ways, if such alternatives were readily available.

It is appropriate to point out that were drug users "cured" or their habit met in a way that did not require them to steal, there would probably be a major effect on the residential burglary rate. This would be true even if the drug users continued to burglarize,

since the frequency of such activity would drop. If the interviewee sample is representative of Boston burglars, and the drug using group of offenders reduced their activity to the level of their non-drug using counterparts, it would mean a 20% drop in the annual burglary rate. If they stopped entirely, it would mean a 50% reduction.

As regards the non-drug using group of burglars, it is possible that specific programs directed toward this relatively known population might cause many of them to forego theft behavior. One possible approach would be training for employment in occupations whose requirements and rewards coincide to some extent with theft behavior. Construction work, for example, is well paid, demands manual skills, and presents some degree of physical challenge.

C. REDUCING OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESIDENTIAL CRIME

The primary serious residential crime is burglary and to a lesser extent, robbery. Other crimes either are not usually serious (vandalism) or very uncommon (arson). Major differences exist between the principal offenses. Residential burglary is a common phenomenon across the metropolitan area and involves a direct attack

against a dwelling unit when its occupants are away. Residential robbery is a much rarer crime, largely confined to a few inner city neighborhoods and is usually perpetrated outside the individual dwelling units. By definition it requires a personal confrontation. This finding suggests that strategies to counter residential crime must take account of the specific aspects of each in terms of geographic location, place and method of attack, victim and offender.

1. Reducing Vulnerability

This study has indicated the incidence of residential crime among and within geographic areas is distributed in predictable patterns based on factors of location (as proxy for socio-economic conditions), affluence, and vulnerability (including access, occupancy, visibility, and social cohesion) with the relative influence of each varying among RA's. There is also a significant amount of multiple victimization. Since location and affluence are not flexible, opportunity reduction must concentrate on vulnerability factors.

One means of reducing burglary opportunity would be to strengthen the degree of social cohesion within particular neighborhoods so that citizens would assume increased reponsibility for one anothers' security.

However, this is likely to be very difficult, since ethnic communities such as RA 83 are less common in American cities than they were in the past. Recently there have been proposals to strengthen territorial concern by changing the structure of living environments. Whether this can be accomplished is problematic. Housing project areas, for example, tend to rank low in levels of social cohesion, and, unlike areas such as RA 83, are beset with problems of race, low income, broken families, unusually large youth populations, etc. Fostering territorial concern in a housing project like RA 256 or among the transient youth population in RA 622 would be a formidable undertaking. This study can only assert that while to create socially cohesive neighborhoods would probably reduce residential (and other type) crime, its achievement might be difficult.

A similar situation is presented by attempts to control residential crime through increased access security by the use of guards and surveillance devices. Because of the low visibility of residential crime, regular police patrol is not particularly effective against it. It was determined, however, that local patrol forces, i.e., personnel assigned to fixed locations, appeared effective in high-rise luxury areas and to some extent

in a housing project such as RA 166. There are two obstacles, however, to achieving a high level of security. One is the size of an area. A large multi-unit structure in a concentrated land area can be secured by guards, alarms, etc. But a number of smaller type structures, spread over a wider geographic area, can not achieve the same level of security except at prohibitive costs. Secondly, there are limits imposed by the type of population occupying the structure. Middle class citizens or residents of senior citizen public housing can be expected to cooperate with security control to a greater extent than low-income youngsters in a housing project. There is a possibility, however, that improved security in such areas as housing projects might come about through altered physical design, installation of tenant patrols, and special emphasis on the involvement of youthful residents in community affairs.

The site survey of this project also identified certain RA's where fallen trees, rubbish, or weeds obstructed visibility in the area, particularly of rear or side portals of dwelling units. Municipal government might contribute toward burglary prevention by removing obstructions to visibility in areas where they are common and serve no useful purpose.

It is also possible that if more police efforts were directed toward receivers of stolen property, it might curtail the market for stolen property. At present, communities are instituting new systems for marking items so that, if stolen, they can be traced to their owners. The burglars frequently mentioned that they utilized licensed business premises as outlets for stolen goods. Concentrated police surveillance of these places with a view toward administrative procedures to revoke licenses might make fencing more difficult.

Individual householders generally can not change their occupancy pattern. Although it is often recommended that occupancy be simulated, the burglars interviewed were generally not fooled by this. Individuals might rely on neighbors to watch their dwelling while they are away, but this is often not feasible in areas where transiency is high and occupancy time low.

In regard to access security, citizens can remember to lock their doors and windows, and in some cases, they can purchase or have purchased for them more effective portal security. This is easier in some structure types than in others. In large multi-unit buildings, the only practical means of entry for a burglar may be via the

front door. In others (single-family homes) there may be three to four doors and twenty windows.

The cost-benefit tradeoff may dictate the individual's response. In high crime, large multi-unit areas, where probability of burglary is high and the installation of secure door and lock mechanisms is relatively inexpensive, it may be cost effective. In non-affluent outlying areas the probability of loss may be so low that obtaining a high level of security for all portals would be less cost-effective than securing insurance. In highly affluent dwelling areas, such as RA 736, where targets may attract more skilled burglars, a high level of security would likely require a central station alarm system. Given possible losses, this might be well worth the cost.

The policy implication of these findings is that crime reduction programs must give priority to high rate areas and high risk persons. The most useful strategies appear to be efforts to decrease access vulnerability; however, particular strategies must be area-specific to fit the local conditions.

2. Educating Citizens

The most important consequence of residential crime appears to be the fear that it engenders among some segments of the population. To some extent fear tends to be rational, in that its distribution follows the distribution of residential burglary; i.e., it is higher in high crime areas and among victims. In other respects, it is not rational. Burglary, while common, results in a modest loss and no physical danger. Robbery, though physically dangerous to the victim, is uncommon. The exceptions to this are those persons who are repeatedly burglarized and those who live in areas where residential robbery is common. In some instances the highest fear was not found in the highest crime areas.

During the course of this study considerable confusion among the public about the nature of robbery and burglary was noted, and the terms were frequently used interchangeably. Public perceptions of residential crime are often shaped by descriptions such as the following, taken from a popular book on crime prevention.

> It was that hour just before dawn...Suddenly the phone rang in the police station and a frantic whispered voice of a woman pleaded with the desk sergeant to send help. Someone had broken into her apartment.
>
> Radio transmitters crackled, guns were drawn from leather holsters, and as the burglar climbed out from the frightened woman's open window, three police officers were waiting for him...

> Weeks later the woman identified the thief in court. Twice before convicted he was sent to prison for ten years.
>
> Later when she thanked the policeman who had made the arrest, ...if the burglar had shown any sorrow for his crime. In spite of being robbed (sic), she felt sorry for the man and wondered what kind of life he had lived to make him a criminal. "I don't know about his background," the officer said, "but he sure didn't show any remorse...they don't feel sorry for their actions. He's only sorry we caught him. If there is one thing I've learned, it's that criminals consider themselves part of a different world than ours. They see society as being made up of two kinds of people ...themselves and the people they victimize."
>
> "You mean the criminal mind works differently?"
>
> "Exactly!"[8]

As this study has demonstrated, very few burglaries take place against occupied premises, and the pre-dawn hours are the least common in which a residential burglar would work. As the study also determined, the great bulk of offenders did not appear to be hardened criminals. It is likely that fear of residential crime and crime in general would be less if people were more aware of the true nature of crimes such as burglary, that the probability of victimization through residential robbery is remote, and that a stranger-to-stranger murder or rape on residential premises is extremely rare.

This is not to suggest that all fears are unjustified, but that accurate information on the nature and extent of various crimes would permit people to make more rational calculations about their own victimization probabilities. This consideration is important, since the control of residential crime presents very different problems from the control of street crime. It is dispersed and non-visible and is therefore less susceptible to control by police methods. Its control is largely dependent on citizen actions, both of individuals and groups. People must provide adequate portal security and work with their neighbors to safeguard their territory. The policy implication of this finding is that more public information about the actual nature and extent of residential crime would make people less fearful and better able to assist in crime control.

D. CRIME DISPLACEMENT FACTORS

Crime reduction programs must be aware of the problems of displacement. There are two types of displacement which can occur: functional and geographic. For example, robbers can switch to burglary and burglars can move from the inner city to the outer. Functional transfers may possess some benefit, in that given a choice, most persons would prefer to be burglarized rather than

robbed, since the former rarely involves confrontation and injury. Geographic transfer of crime risks, on the other hand, is not a satisfactory policy alternative.

There is insufficient information available to forecast in precise detail the effects of various strategies on crime displacement. The interviewed burglars were asked what they would do if their present targets hardened. In general, they indicated that they would continue as burglars, choosing targets that were less hard or upgrading their skill levels. The older offenders and drug users were more likely than others to change to other crime categories.[9]

The types of burglars who work certain geographic areas are generally known (see Appendix B, Table 16b). Some understanding of possible displacement effects can be obtained by briefly analyzing the residential burglary situation in some of the typical RA's cited previously.

In RA 256 (typical of large housing project areas such as 196 and 166) the offenders were all under 25 and generally resided in the project itself. RA 315 (typical of small multi-unit neighborhoods in core or adjacent areas such as 265, 291, and 447) is part of the Boston ghetto area, where a large percentage of the

burglars are juveniles and most offenders were black. RA 622 (typical of the white, highly transient apartment areas like RA 70 and 775) in general had an older group of burglars, with about equal numbers of blacks and whites. Suburban RA's (736, 745) also had a burglar population that was generally older, but 93% were white.

In areas like 256, if more positive opportunities (vocational training, community participation, etc.) were available to youth, it is likely that criminal behavior would be reduced with little displacement. If alternative strategies were utilized, such as increasing police patrols or hardening portal access, offenders in the former case might operate in adjacent areas, or in the latter, commit more robberies.

If a single RA or a similar group of RA's were subjected to target hardening and other ones left untouched, that is, if standard doors were installed in <u>all</u> areas like 622, or burglar alarms in <u>all</u> areas like 736, or a combination of these items in areas like 315, the offenders would be likely to shift to other locales. However, there are limits to the options of various groups. While the young black offenders who work in the ghetto area could shift to adjacent areas like 622, it is not likely that they would move to the outlying sections like 736 because many

of them do not use automobiles, find that they are too conspicuous in these areas or lack of information about targets. On the other hand, the white offenders who operate in RA 622 could move to the suburbs and the suburban offenders could move to areas like RA 622, but neither could move to the black ghetto, where they would be conspicuous.

The policy implication of this assessment constitutes the ultimate finding of the present project. Strategies design to counter residential crime can only be effective if they take account of the specific characteristics of offenses, offenders, and locales. A strategy that may be effective against juvenile burglars who work in inner city housing projects may be ineffective against older burglars in low-density suburban areas. A strategy to secure one area may simply cause offenders to relocate so that the net effect is a transfer of risk from one segment of the population to another. Worse, a strategy to combat burglary may heighten robbery. This study has identified patterns in the distribution of residential crime. Attention to their implications should assist in the design and implementation of appropriate counter-strategies.

SUMMARY - CHAPTER VIII

This chapter has posited that crime can be reduced in two ways: by reducing the number of offenders or reducing the number of opportunities. Socio-economic factors such as race and income do not appear to fully explain the increase in the rates of residential crime. Increased drug use would seem to be more closely related. There has also been a trend in recent years for there to be less probability that the average burglar would be arrested and incarcerated.

It would appear that the number of persons who engage in a specific offense such as burglary constitutes a relatively small percentage of the population, motivated primarily by economic considerations or a drug habit. The most likely programs designed to reduce offender motivation would be directed toward drug treatment and employment.

The reduction of crime opportunities would probably best be achieved through lessening vulnerability by raising the access security level of dwellings and promoting citizen concern.

In the ultimate sense, control of residential crime is much more dependent upon citizens than street crime. In contrast to the latter, residential crime is more

dispersed and less visible, so that it is difficult to deter by routine police methods. If citizens are properly informed of the nature of residential crime, they could take steps, both as individuals and as groups, to better secure their own dwellings.

The ultimate conclusion of the study is that careful attention to the patterns of distribution of residential crime will assist in the design and implementation of appropriate counter-strategies.

CHAPTER VIII

FOOTNOTES

1. John Conklin, Robbery and the Criminal Justice System, (Phil: J. B. Lippencott, 1972) p. 36.

2. See Table below.

MEAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME, CITY OF BOSTON
(Dollars at 1970 Prices)

Year of Period	City of Boston	City of Boston Nonwhite
1960	$ 8,115	$6,051
1965	9,343	7,594
1970	11,507	9,248

Source: A. Ganz and T. Freeman, Population and Income of the City of Boston (BRA Research Department, 1972) p. 36.

3. Representative Indicators of Boston Police Work Load, 1962 - 1970.

Year	Total Calls for Service	Part I Offenses*	Sworn Police Manpower
1962	NA	20,515	2,595
1963	NA	20,612	2,557
1964	199,172	22,517	2,572
1965	220,847	26,132	2,495
1966	229,741	25,806	2,513
1967	236,475	28,215	2,494
1968	286,784	36,452	2,617
1969	332,458	39,942	2,607
1970	340,742	43,335	2,805

Source: Annual Report, Boston Police Department 1970, Figure 1.
*Part I Offenses include Criminal Homicide, Forcible Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Burglary, Larceny, and Auto Theft.

4. See Table below.

NUMBER OF REPORTED BURGLARIES
AND COURT DISPOSITIONS OF BURGLARY ARRESTS
SELECTED YEARS BOSTON SMSA[1]

	1966	1968	1970
No. of reported burglaries[2]	19,204	25,332	33,934
No. persons tried for burglary[3]	1,819	2,218	2,286
Total % convicted	74%	64%	61%
Sentences to imprisonment as % of total cases tried[4]	30%	24%	21%
% of Total Sentenced to imprisonment, who were received at state prison[5]	30%	20%	17%

[1]Source: Statistical Reports of the Commissioner of Corrections, Comm of Mass. 1966, 1968, 1970.

[2]Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 1966, 1968, 1970.

[3]Does not include pending cases.

[4]Does not include cases pending sentence.

[5]Based on figures for entire state.

5. The reason for this is obvious, it is much less difficult to ask individuals about undetected crimes they experienced rather than those they committed. Methods of securing this type information e.g., anonymous questionnaires etc. do exist but would have been beyond project resources.

6. See James F. Short, Jr, and F. Ivan Nye, "Extent of Unrecorded Delinquency, Tentative Conclusions," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 49, Nov-Dec. 1958, pp. 296-302.

7. The average loss for residential burglary in Boston in 1970 was $335, but since most of this was not in cash, it had to be converted through fences at 60-80% discounts. Thus, most burglars only received from a fourth to a third of the value.

8. Jack DeCelle, The Safety Strategy, (Joseph Rank Pub. 1971) pp. 15-16.

9. See table on the following page.

Q. What would interviewees do should present targets harden, in total, and by age, race and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
WHAT WOULD INTERVIEWEES DO IF PRESENT TARGETS HARDEN	Stop B & E	15%	20%	9%	25%	12%	18%	7%	24%
	Shift to other homes	20	20	22	15	19	21	21	18
	Shift to non-residential buildings	13	20	11	10	14	11	12	13
	Shift to other illegal activities (1)	28	7	31	35	29	26	41	13
	Get a job (2)	8	7	9	5	7	8	2	13
	Learn new B&E skills	23	20	27	15	21	24	29	15
	Other (3)	19	20	4	15	17	3	7	13
	Total No. answering	80	15	45	20	42	38	42	38
	Multiple Responses								

Examples

[1]See Table 9 Appendix B for other illegal activities interviewees admitted to have already engaged in.

[2]Either instead of breaking and entering or as well as breaking and entering.

[3]Continue the same as before - cannot harden targets sufficiently; go back to school.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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APPENDIX B

OFFENDER INTERVIEW DATA

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APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

SECTION 1

OFFENDERS AND OFFENSES

Table 1A Age and Race of Interviewees.

		A G E			
		Under 18	18-25	Over 25	Total #
RACE	White	12 (57%)	24 (47%)	16 (64%)	52
	Non-White	9 (43%)	27 (53%)	9 (36%)	45
	Total #	21 (100%)	51 (100%)	25 (100%)	97 (100%)

Table 1B Median Age of Interviewees in Each Age Group

	A G E		
	Under 18	18-25	Over 25
Median age	15	20	32
No. of Interviewees	21	51	25

Table 2A Age of Drug Users and Non Drug Users

		D R U G U S E	
		Drug User	Non Drug User
AGE	Under 18	5 (10%)	16 (33%)
	18 - 25	35 (73%)	16 (33%)
	Over 25	8 (17%)	17 (34%)
	Total #	48 (100%)	49 (100%)

Table 2B Drug Use According to Age

		A G E		
		Under 18	18-25	Over 25
DRUG USE	Drug User	5 (24%)	35 (69%)	8 (32%)
	Non Drug User	16 (76%)	16 (31%)	17 (68%)
	Total #	21 (100%)	51 (100%)	25 (100%)

Table 3A Race of drug users and non-drug users.

		R A C E	
		White	Non-White
USE OF DRUGS	Drug User	26 (50%)	22(49%)
	Non Drug User	26 (50%)	23(51%)
	Total #	52 (100%)	45(100%)

Table 3B Drug Use of Whites and Non-Whites

		U S E O F D R U G S	
		Drug User	Non-Drug User
RACE	White	26 (54%)	26 (53%)
	Non-White	22 (46%)	23 (47%)
	Total #	48 (100%)	49 (100%)

Table 4 Education levels of interviewees, in total and by age, race and drug use.

		A G E				R A C E		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
EDUCATION LEVEL	Under 8th	9%	29%	4%	4%	13%	4%	2%	16%
	8-9th	12	33	8	4	13	11	13	12
	10-11th	42	33	53	28	34	51	46	39
	12th	21	0	22	36	25	16	27	14
	Over 12th	15	5	14	28	13	18	13	18
	Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49
	Median Ed.	11th	10th	11th	11th	10th	11th	11th	10th

Table 5 Marital status of interviewees; and number of dependents, in total and by age, race and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
MARITAL STATUS	Married	19%	0%	18%	36%	19%	18%	17%	20%
	Single	74	100	78	48	69	80	73	76
	Divorced	7	0	4	16	11	2	10	4
	Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS	No dependents	62%	95%	61%	36%	73%	49%	67%	57%
	One or more dependents	38	5	39	64	27	51	33	43
	Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

Table 6 Type of occupations interviewees had held, in total and by age, race and drug use?+

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL	Unskilled	53%	71%	49%	40%	59%	44%	52%	53%
	Semi-skilled	61	14	74	72	65	56	67	55
	Armed services	8	0	12	8	14	2	10	6
	Skilled, managerial, or professional	8	0	6	20	8	9	8	8
	Never been employed	7	24	4	0	6	9	6	8
	Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

+Does not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.

Table 7 What was the most interviewees had ever earned in a week?

		AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
Less than $50	10%	36%	4%	0%	5%	15%	5%	16%
$50 - 100	24	47	28	0	34	15	26	23
$100 - 200	43	12	47	57	39	46	49	36
Over $200	23	0	21	43	22	24	21	25
Total #	87	17	47	23	41	46	43	44

Table 8 Status of offenders at the time of interview, in total and by age, race and drug use?

		AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
INTERVIEWEE STATUS In jail	59%	10%	65%	100%	69%	47%	69%	49%
On probation	41	90	35	0	31	53	31	51
Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

Table 9A What other illegal activities did interviewees say they had engaged in, in total, and by age, race and drug use?+

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
OTHER ADMITTED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES	Purseasnatching	10%	21%	8%	4%	9%	11%	11%	9%
	Robbery	21	5	33	8	26	16	26	16
	Autotheft	50	47	54	42	55	43	45	55
	Assault	29	21	25	25	26	23	23	25
	Possessing narcotics	56	47	71	33	57	52	100	18
	Selling narcotics	14	5	15	21	15	14	23	13
	Other[1]	25	16	29	25	23	27	38	11
	None	17	21	8	29	15	18	6	27
	Total #	91	19	48	24	47	44	47	44

+Does not add up to 100% due to multiple responses

Examples

[1]Stealing checks; forgery; pickpocketing; con man; shoplifting; pimping; arson; smuggling; stealing from tills; receiving stolen goods.

Table 9B What other non-residential buildings, if any had interviewees worked on.

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
NON-RESIDENTIAL	Stores	63%	70%	64%	52%	65%	60%	66%	59%
	Offices	32	11	33	52	39	24	35	29
	Restaurants	9	5	7	17	6	12	7	10
	Factories	6	5	4	11	11	0	5	8
	Others	27	35	28	11	27	24	28	24
	Total #	76	17	42	17	43	33	39	37
	Does not add up to 100% because of multiple responses.								

Table 10 What housing types did interviewees most frequently operate in, in total, by age, race and drug use?

		AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
Single Family House	35%	14%	35%	52%	41%	29%	44%	27%
Multi Family House	28	33	33	12	26	29	21	35
Housing Project	19	33	18	8	12	28	12	24
Old Brick Apartment Building	8	5	10	8	9	6	13	4
Row House	6	14	2	8	6	6	6	6
Luxury Apartment	4	0	2	12	6	2	4	4
Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

Table 11 What were the principal reasons for operating in particular housing types?*

	HOUSING TYPES					
	Housing Projects	Row Houses	Multi-family Houses	Old brick Apts.	Luxury Apt.	Single family House
Ease of access (1)	46%	58%	45%	56%	17%	39%
Appears affluent	33	33	35	37	58	48
Feels inconspicuous (2)	21	17	23	30	25	14
Isolated neighborhood	0	17	12	15	25	31
Few police/security patrols	21	8	22	19	17	15
Neighbors don't know each other (3)	25	25	12	7	17	7
Total No. Responses	24	12	60	27	12	59

*Each interviewee who indicated that he often operated in more than one housing type was asked to describe his reasons for selection of the two housing types where he most often worked. This chart, therefore, includes two sets of answers from most interviewees.

Table 12 What were the main reasons interviewees gave for their choices, in total and by age, race and drug use?+

		AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
Ease of access[1]	44%	52%	42%	40%	46%	42%	44%	45%
Appears affluent	41	24	40	56	46	36	46	37
Feels inconspicuous[2]	21	29	13	28	23	18	17	24
Isolated neighborhood	19	0	21	32	27	9	21	16
Few police/security patrols/guards	19	29	13	20	15	22	17	20
Neighbors don't know each other[3]	12	24	6	16	15	9	13	12
Total	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

+Will not add up to 100% - see footnote, Table 11.

Examples

[1]Building "dead easy." "Can walk right in." "No problem."

[2]Fits into neighborhood - same race or age as residents.

[3]Either a transient, fast shifting neighborhood (students, working girls), or single family, possibly elderly neighborhood where houses isolated from each other.

Table 13 What housing types were interviewees least likely to operate in, overall and by age, race and drug use?

		A G E			R A C E		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
Housing projects	40%	23%	38%	53%	46%	30%	42%	34%
Luxury apartments	25	28	28	16	22	29	21	29
Single family houses	21	28	22	12	10	34	22	18
Row houses	6	9	6	4	10	2	6	6
Multi-family houses	5	9	4	4	2	4	4	6
Old brick apartments	3	0	2	8	10	0	2	4
Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

Table 14 What were the principal reasons for not operating in particular housing types?+

		H O U S I N G T Y P E S				
	Projects	Row Houses	Multi-family Houses	Old brick Apts.	Luxury Apts.	Single family House
REASONS FOR NOT OPERATING IN PARTICULAR NEIGHBORHOODS: Not profitable	58%	66%	40%	100%	9%	0%
Feels conspicuous	11		0	0	26	47
Police/security patrols	11	17	0	0	78	37
Too many people around	44	33	60	0	44	16
Neighbors' surveillance	17	50	60	0	13	26
Total No. Responses	36	6	5	1	23	19

Will not add up to 100%. See footnote, Table 11.

Table 15 What were the main reasons interviewees gave for their choices by age, race, and drug use?

		A G E			R A C E		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
Too many people around (1)	35%	33%	41%	28%	38%	31%	35%	35%
Not profitable	31	10	35	48	36	24	29	33
Police/security patrols	31	57	29	16	27	36	23	39
Neighbors surveillance (2)	21	33	14	24	17	24	17	24
Feels conspicuous (3)	20	24	22	12	11	29	19	20
Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

+Will not add up to 100%. See footnote, Table 11.

Examples

[1]People walking by in the street or in the apartment building; children playing outside.

[2]Neighbors likely to be watching from inside (the next door house or apartment):"Too many nosy neighbors....", Always watching out for strangers, "Couldn't get to the front door before the neighbor would call the cops."

[3]Out of place in the neighborhood - race or age different from residents.

Table 16a Would white and non white interviewees still hit a neighborhood if the race of residents was different from their own?

		RACE	
		White	Non White
ACTION	Would not hit neighborhood	30%	8%
	Might hit neighborhood	11	20
	Would still hit neighborhood	59	72
	Total #	46	39

Table 16b Characteristics of Arrested Burglars Selected Areas 1970-71

Type of Area	Age			Race	
	Under 17	17-24	25 over	W	NW
Large public housing project (N=78)	30%	70%	0	NA	NA
Inner city apt. area, predominantly white transient (N=162)	14%	56%	30%	50%	50%
Predominantly black inner city (N-518)	34%	50%	16%	16%	84%
Predominantly white suburban (N=125)	23%	59%	18%	93%	7%

Table 17 How much planning did interviewees do, in total, and by age, race and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
EXTENT OF PLANNING	None	26%	29%	33%	8%	29%	22%	33%	18%
	Some	60	42	61	60	59	60	58	61
	A lot	14	19	6	32	11	18	8	20
	Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

Table 18 How much planning was done by housing type?

		HOUSING TYPE					
		Projects	Row Houses	Multi family Houses	Old Brick Apt.	Luxury Apt.	Single family Houses
EXTENT OF PLANNING	None	21%	25%	32%	26%	8%	24%
	Some	63	50	58	67	58	60
	A lot	17	25	10	7	33	16
	Total #	24	12	59	27	12	55

Table 19 What type of information would interviewees want?+

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
TYPE OF INFORMATION	Occupancy of Residents	70%	76%	63%	80%	65%	76%	58%	82%
	Valuables avalailable	34	43	27	36	29	40	27	41
	Burglar Alarm	36	34	36	36	29	47	35	39
	Police or security patrols	14	0	10	36	17	11	13	16
	Location of entrances	15	19	12	24	17	13	13	18
	Escape routes	20	19	16	28	17	22	15	24
	Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49
	+Will not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.								

Table 20 How did those interviewees who wanted to know the occupancy pattern of residents and what valuables were available obtain their information, in total, and by age, race and drug use? +

HOW INFORMATION SOUGHT				AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
			Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
RESIDENTS OCCUPANCY PATTERNS		Watches residence[1]	68%	56%	62%	85%	76%	58%	75%	63%
		Asks neighbors	6	0	3	15	8	3	4	8
		Signs of absence[2]	6	0	6	10	3	9	7	5
		Telephones	18	12	21	15	17	18	21	15
		Other[3]	24	31	31	25	23	26	29	20
		Total #	68	16	32	20	34	34	28	40
VALUABLES AVAILABLE		Window peeping	42%	55%	28%	40%	53%	33%	46%	40%
		Previous entrance[4]	9	11	7	10	7	11	8	10
		Tips from friends/fence	33	33	50	10	20	44	38	30
		Other[5]	39	22	50	40	53	28	67	45
		Total #	33	9	14	10	15	18	13	20

+Will not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.

Examples

[1]Length of time interviewees would watch residence varied from half an hour to periodically over several weeks.

[2]Newspapers outside front door, uncollected mail, old milk bottles.

[3]Asks friends; gets tip; checks newspapers; rings front door bell.

[4]May have broken in, or entered previously as a tradesman, salesman, or friend.

[5]TV aerial, air conditioner outside; sees family ve in.

Table 21 What time of day or night did interviewees usually work, in total, and by age, race and drug use.+

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
TIME INTERVIEWEE WORKED	6 am - 12 pm	41%	30%	54%	30%	29%	57%	47%	40%
	12 pm - 6 pm	34	40	38	48	31	39	34	35
	6 pm - 12 am	33	40	30	39	45	20	31	35
	12 am - 6 am	9	10	14	0	8	11	11	8
	No preferred time	5	10	4	9	8	2	6	4
	Total #	94	20	51	23	51	44	47	48

+Will not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.

Table 22 What time was the hit probably made, by housing type?*

		HOUSING TYPE					
		Projects	Row Houses	Multi-family Houses	Old brick Apt.	Luxury Apt.	Single family House
TIME HIT PROBABLY MADE	Morning 6am-12pm	43%	25%	48%	58%	17%	33%
	Afternoon 12-6pm	30	33	35	42	42	32
	Evening 6pm-12am	17	50	28	31	42	37
	Night 12-6am	17	17	10	4	0	7
	No preferred time	13	0	3	0	8	7
	Total #	23	12	60	26	12	57

*This chart includes two answers from most interviewees (see footnote, Table11.).

Table 23 TIME OF ATTACK, BASED ON POLICE RECORDS

Month (N=1140)+

Jan.	8.9%	May 7.3%	Sept. 6.4%	Total 92.2%
Feb.	7.3%	June 7.9%	Oct. 8.8%	
Mar.	8.8%	July 9.2%	Nov. 10.2%	
Apr.	7.9%	Aug. 6.4%	Dec. 10.1%	

Day (N=1666)

Day				
Mon.	16%	Fri.	16.1%	Total 99.5%
Tues.	15.9%	Sat.	10.6%	
Wed.	15.8%	Sun.	8.1%	
Thurs.	17%			

Time (N=1632)

Day	72.4%
Night	27.5%
	99.9%

By Hours (N=918)

0:01a.m. - 6:00a.m.	10.9%
6:01a.m. - 12:00a.m.	16.2%
12:01p.m. - 6:00p.m.	47.7%
6:01p.m. - 12:00p.m.	25.1%

Total 99.9%

+City data for 1969-1970 only because last 3 months of 1971 not available.

Table 24 What means of transport did interviewees usually use to reach crime scene, in total and by age, race and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
MEANS OF TRANSPORT		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
	Stolen car or truck	35%	10%	45%	35%	43%	27%	38%	32%
	Own car or truck	21	5	27	52	21	22	21	21
	On foot	24	65	18	4	18	31	23	26
	Friend's car	10	15	10	9	8	10	6	11
	Other[1]	10	5	14	9	10	11	11	11
	Total #	94	20	51	23	49	44	47	47

Examples

[1]Taxi, public transport, rented car.

Table 25 The farthest and longest interviewees would travel to make a hit?

			A G E			R A C E		Drug Use	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
TIME TRAVELED	0 - 1 hour	53%	71%	53%	40%	50%	58%	47%	59%
	1 - 3 hours	26	18	33	20	25	27	26	26
	3 - 6 hours	1	6	0	0	3	0	0	3
	6 - 12 hours	1	0	0	5	0	3	3	0
	12 - 24 hours	4	0	3	10	5	3	6	3
	Over 24 hours	14	6	11	25	18	9	18	10
	Total #	73	17	36	20	40	33	34	39

Table 26 Interviewees who would not work in their own neighborhood.

		A G E			RACE		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
Would not work in own neighborhood to hit apartment.	52%	19%	47%	100%	53%	50%	39%	66%
Total # responses	62	16	34	12	32	30	33	29
Would not work in own neighborhood to hit house.	46%	40%	45%	53%	40%	54%	43%	48%
Total # responses	83	15	47	21	48	35	35	48

Table 27 Did interviewees use accomplices, and, if so, what for, in total, and by age, race and drug use.+

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
USES ACCOMPLICE?	Always	45%	62%	45%	29%	48%	41%	54%	38%
	Sometimes	36	24	39	42	36	36	31	40
	Never	19	14	16	29	15	23	15	23
	Total #	96	21	51	24	52	44	48	48
WHAT ACCOMPLICE DOES	Drives	17%	11%	17%	22%	25%	8%	24%	11%
	Carries goods out	30	44	32	11	35	24	26	34
	Acts as look out	55	56	59	50	50	59	42	68
	Acts as partner[1]	23	28	27	11	25	22	29	18
	Does job for interviewee	5	11	0	11	5	5	3	8
	Other	5	11	2	6	3	8	3	8
	Total #	77	18	41	18	40	37	38	38

+Will not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.

Example

[1]Shares job and proceeds with interviewee.

Table 28 What tools and/or weapons did interviewees usually carry, in total and by age, race and drug use.+

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
TOOLS	Wrench, vice grips	3%	0%	2%	8%	2%	4%	4%	2%
	Hammer	6	10	6	4	0	13	2	10
	Screwdriver	72	86	76	52	57	89	71	73
	Crowbar, tire iron, jimmy	39	53	33	36	46	31	35	43
	Picks, key gun	5	5	6	4	6	4	4	6
	Glass cutter	7	0	14	0	8	7	13	2
	Loid card	8	5	12	4	10	7	13	4
	Other[1]	29	24	24	44	33	22	35	20
	None	2	0	2	4	4	0	2	2
	Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49
WEAPONS	Guns	8%	5%	10%	8%	13%	3%	8%	8%
	Knife	7	5	7	8	8	5	11	3
	Mace	5	11	5	0	5	5	5	5
	Other[2]	4	5	5	0	3	5	3	5
	None	75	74	74	85	73	78	70	78
	Total #	76	19	42	13	40	36	37	40

+Will not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.

Examples

[1]Key, knife, dent puller.

[2]Machete bottle

Table 29 What was the usual portal of entry, by housing type?*

	HOUSING TYPE					
	Projects	Row Houses	Multi-family Houses	Old brick Apt.	Luxury Apt.	Single family House
Window	32%	41%	42%	25%	50%	47%
Door	68	59	58	75	50	53
Total No. Responses	28	17	74	28	20	70

*This chart includes two sets of answers from most interviewees (see footnote Table 11)

Table 30 What floor did interviewees prefer to enter, by housing type?*

	HOUSING TYPE					
	Projects	Row Houses	Multi-family Houses	Old Brick Apt.	Luxury Apt.	Single family House
1st floor	56%	67%	65%	56%	20%	67%
2nd floor	21	0	18	13	30	17
Top floor	15	17	4	6	20	22
Midway or Highrise	3	17	2	6	10	0
Does not matter	6	0	12	19	20	28
Total No. Responses	34	6	51	16	10	18

*This chart includes two sets of answers from some interviewees (see footnote, Table 11).

Table 31 Location and portal of entry - based on police records

Point of Entry (N=1345)

Front	61.1%
Side	6.0%
Rear	32.2%
Total	99.2%

Opening Used (N=1584)

Door	67.7%
Window	32.0%
Other	Less than 1%
Total	99.7%

Table 32 Which of the methods listed below did interviewees normally use to enter a door or window?

METHOD OF ENTRY			Total	AGE: Under 18	AGE: 18-25	AGE: Over 25	RACE: W	RACE: Non W	DRUG USE: DU	DRUG USE: Non DU
DOOR		Prying door[1]	42%	35%	45%	42%	45%	39%	42%	42%
		Attacking lock[2]	17	26	18	4	7	26	16	18
		Direct Impact[3]	11	12	14	5	17	6	14	9
		Loiding door[4]	16	8	16	25	19	14	20	13
		Picking lock[5]	6	2	4	13	5	8	3	8
		Passkey[6]	4	11	1	4	2	5	2	5
		Look for door open	4	6	2	7	5	2	3	5
		Total # *	90	20	46	24	49	41	46	44
WINDOW		Breaking glass[7]	37%	41%	37%	35%	42%	32%	37%	38%
		Prying catch[8]	16	12	17	15	12	19	17	14
		Loiding catch[9]	21	23	22	17	19	24	15	26
		Cutting glass[10]	13	10	10	22	11	14	17	9
		Look for window open	13	14	14	11	15	11	14	13
		Total # **	93	20	49	24	51	42	48	45

*Interviewees were asked to describe what methods they would use for a typical ten entries through a door and ten entries through a window.

**Seven people said they only went through windows and four said they went only through doors. So they were not asked this section of the question.

Examples

[1] Using force to pry or jimmy the door and jamb apart, or to force the lock striker out of the door or wall. Usual tools; screwdriver, crowbar or pinchbar.

[2] Breaking or taking the lock apart, thus opening the door. Usual tools; pinchbar, crowbar, screwdriver, pliers or dent puller.

[3] Using direct physical force or ramming or attacking the door with heavy objects, thus breaking the door or taking it off its hinges. Usual tools; body (shoulder, knee, foot), crowbar, axe.

[4] Slipping thin, flexible material between door and jamb to move the bolt. Usual tools; credit card; plastic strip, screwdriver, knife.

[5] Usual tools; lock picking set, wire, file.

[6] Usual tools; skeleton key or homemade key.

[7] Smashing glass and then turning catch and opening window. Usual tools; screwdriver, rock, elbow, brick, tape.

[8] Breaking the wood between the two frames and forcing open the catch. Usual tools; screwdriver, crowbar.

[9] Placing an object between the two frames to slip open the catch. Usual tools; screwdriver, plastic strip, butterknife.

[10] Cutting glass and then turning catch and opening window. Usual tools; glasscutter, tape.

Table 33 What was the skill level of interviewees*, in total, and by age, race, and drug use?

SKILL LEVEL			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
	Unskilled	11%	24%	8%	8%	17%	4%	6%	16%
	Semi-skilled	82	76	86	80	77	89	90	76
	Skilled	6	0	6	12	6	7	4	8
	Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

*Skill level was determined by the entry method interviewees predominantly used:

Skilled - (door) lockpicking

Semi-skilled - (door) prying
attacking lock
loiding
passkey

(window) prying
loiding
cutting glass

Unskilled - (door) direct impact
door open

(window) smashing glass
window open

Table 34 TECHNIQUES OF PORTAL ENTRY, RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY

Door (N=219)+	
Pry Door	19.2%
Attack Lock	15.0%
Direct Impact	39.3%
Loid Door	5.5%
Pick Lock	5.0%
Pass Key	5.9%
Open Door	10.0%
	99.9%

Window (N=383)++	
Break Glass	38%
Cut Glass	1%
Pry Catch	33%
Use Open or Unlocked Window	28%
	100%

+ Police reports in the Boston area were largely of the short narrative type and therefore not particularly helpful in pinpointing the specific method of attack used against the door. For example, it was common simply to record "door forced." Therefore, it was necessary to use victimization data for analysis purposes.

++ Based on Boston Police Records

Table 35 What was the average and the maximum number of minutes that interviewees estimated they would take to enter through a door and through a window, in total, and by age, race, and drug use?

			A G E			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
TIME TAKEN	Door								
	Average Minutes	5	8	4	5	4	6	5	5
	Maximum Minutes	10	12	8	10	9	11	10	9
	Window								
	Average Minutes	3	3	2	3	4	3	3	4
	Maximum Minutes	5	6	5	5	6	5	5	6

Table 36 What goods were interviewees primarily looking for, once they were inside, in total, and by age, race and drug use?+

			A G E			R A C E		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
GOODS SOUGHT	Cash	70%	60%	73%	76%	73%	67%	77%	63%
	Jewlery, silver	66	54	65	80	79	51	73	59
	Electric appliances	6	10	4	8	6	7	2	10
	Photo equipment	9	5	8	16	13	4	8	10
	HiFi, TV, radios	78	95	84	52	77	80	75	82
	Clothing, furs	7	0	8	12	8	7	8	6
	Furniture, paintings	7	14	4	8	10	4	6	8
	Credit cards, checks (social security, etc.)	6	5	4	12	8	4	8	4
	Total #	97	21	52	25	52	45	48	49

+Figures do not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.

Table 37 What was the average score per hit for interviewees, in total, and by age, race and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
AVERAGE SCORE PER HIT	0-$50	9%	35%	2%	0	13%	4%	0	18%
	$50-100	14	16	16	4	7	23	10	16
	$100-300	47	32	51	44	37	58	48	47
	$300-500	14	0	19	17	20	8	25	4
	$500-1,000	11	4	7	22	17	3	13	9
	Over $1,000	6	0	5	13	7	4	5	7
Total #		86	20	43	23	46	40	40	45

Table 38 What was the average score by housing type?

	HOUSING TYPE					
	Projects	Row Houses	Multifamily Houses	Old brick Apts.	Luxury Apts.	Single family Houses
Less than $100	22%	27%	26%	12%	9%	11%
$100 - 300	57	27	51	42	46	43
$300 - 1000	17	27	24	31	18	28
Over $1000	4	18	0	15	27	19
Total #	23	11	55	26	11	54

Table 42 What did interviewees do immediately after making a hit, in total, and by age, race, and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
AFTER MAKING A HIT	Goes home	19%	48%	12%	9%	16%	23%	19%	20%
	Goes to friend's house	15	38	10	4	12	19	4	26
	Goes to public place[1]	4	0	2	13	4	5	4	4
	Disposes of goods	55	10	67	70	64	42	70	39
	Other[2]	6	5	8	4	4	12	2	11
	Total #	93	21	49	23	50	43	47	46

Examples

[1] Bar.

[2] Hides goods (near target, in dump yard); leaves town.

Table 39 How long did interviewees usually spend inside the residence, in total, and by age, race, and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
EXPOSURE TIME	Under 15 min.	40%	50%	41%	29%	35%	44%	39%	41%
	15-30 min.	51	50	54	50	54	51	55	50
	30 min. - 1 hour	6	0	2	17	6	5	5	7
	1-2 hours	3	0	2	4	4	0	2	2
	Over 2 hours	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total #	90	20	46	24	48	41	44	46

Table 40 What do interviewees do if a burglar alarm sounds, or if they think they have triggered a silent alarm, in total, and by age, race, and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
IF ALARM SOUNDS	Leaves immediately	78%	85%	77%	75%	79%	77%	67%	89%
	Quickly finishes job	21	15	23	21	21	20	31	11
	Ignores alarm	1	0	0	4	0	2	2	0
	Total #	91	20	47	24	47	44	45	46
IF SILENT ALARM IS TRIGGERED	Leaves immediately	73%	72%	75%	68%	77%	68%	67%	78%
	Quickly finishes job	26	28	25	27	20	33	30	22
	Ignores alarm	1	0	0	5	2	0	2	0
	Total #	84	18	44	22	44	40	43	41

Table 41 What else might have made interviewees leave immediately, in total, and by age, race, and drug use? +

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
WHAT ELSE MADE INTERVIEWEES LEAVE	Dog barking	20%	33%	16%	16%	19%	20%	19%	20%
	Someone awake inside	71	71	65	84	74	67	73	69
	Someone asleep inside	24	14	24	32	27	20	19	29
	Someone returning	88	95	88	80	88	89	83	92
	Other	11	5	10	20	13	4	8	14
	Total #	97	21	51	25	52	45	48	49

+Will not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.

Examples

[1]Neighbors return; hears car stop (police); unexpected noise.

Table 43 Where do interviewees dispose of the goods, in total, and by age, race, and drug use? +

		AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
Warehouse	11%	14%	9%	14%	11%	12%	7%	16%
House/apt.	34	52	39	9	35	37	33	36
Bar	40	10	48	55	39	41	40	40
Store	17	5	23	18	22	12	29	7
Gas Station	10	15	11	5	13	7	12	9
Other[1]	25	33	27	14	24	27	24	27
Total #	87	21	44	22	46	21	42	45

+Will not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.

Examples

[1]Poolroom, racetrack, pawnshop, restaurant, barbershop.

Table 44. What do interviewees use the money for, in total, and by age, race, and drug use?+

WHAT MONEY IS USED FOR		Total	AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
			Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
	Drugs	51%	35%	67%	32%	50%	52%	98%*	13%**
	Alcohol	19	15	6	48	25	11	8	29
	Buys goods, clothes	55	70	47	60	48	61	42	69
	Banks money	14	5	18	16	13	14	13	15
	Other[1]	46	40	37	68	42	50	35	54
	Total #	96	20	51	25	52	44	48	48

+Will not add up to 100% due to multiple responses.

Examples

[1]Gives to family, children; takes vacation; leads the good life - "goes to fancy restaurants"; "to live."

*One drug user claimed he did not buy heroin, but was given it at parties (see footnote to Table 54).

**These interviewees would buy only marijuana or hallucinogens.

Table 45 How much money did interviewees spend on drugs a week, in total, and by age, race, and drug use?

MONEY SPENT ON DRUGS PER WEEK		Total	AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
			Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
	None	37%	50%	18%	61%	43%	38%	2%*	78%
	$ 1- 25	11	28	7	4	9	14	5	19
	$ 25- 50	5	11	5	0	5	5	7	3
	$ 50-100	9	11	10	8	7	11	16	0
	$100-200	7	0	7	13	5	5	14	0
	Over $200**	30	0	53	13	9	27	56	0
	Total #	80	18	40	22	43	37	43	37

*This interviewee claimed to use heroin only when he was given it at parties.

**Of these at least 18 people (23%) spent $500 - $1,500 a week on drugs.

Table 46 How much money did interviewees need to live a week, in total, and by age, race, and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
MONEY NEEDED PER WEEK	$ 50-100	34%	89%	24%	5 %	32%	37%	20%	50%
	$100-250	18	6	16	35	10	29	15	22
	$250-500	21	6	16	45	27	14	20	22
	$500-1000	16	0	32	0	17	14	30	0
	Over $1000	11	0	13	15	15	3	15	6
	Total #	76	18	38	20	41	35	40	36

Table 47 How many hits per week did interviewees make, in total and by age, race and drug use? *

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
NUMBER OF HITS PER WEEK	0-1	17%	25%	5%	33%	16%	17%	5%	28%
	1-2	26	40	21	24	29	23	17	35
	2-5	27	30	25	29	27	28	33	21
	5-10	15	5	25	5	13	17	21	9
	Over 10	15	0	25	10	16	15	24	7
Total #		85	20	44	21	45	40	42	43

* These categories were used because interviewees frequently made such replies as "I do one hit every two weeks," "I make one or two hits a week," or "I do four or five hits a week."

Table 48 What was the relation of the average score and the money needed per week to the number of hits per week?

		NUMBER OF HITS PER WEEK				
		0 - 1	1 - 2	2 - 5	Over 5	(Of these: Over 10)
AVERAGE SCORE	0-$50	9%	19%	5%	5%	(0%)
	$50-100	9	19	10	23	(25)
	$100-300	55	24	67	50	(50)
	$300-500	18	19	10	14	(8)
	$500-1000	18	5	10	10	(17)
	Over $1000	9	14	0	9	(0)
	Total # Responses	11	21	21	22	(12)
MONEY NEEDED PER WEEK	$50-100	46%	55%	40%	6%	(0%)
	$100-250	27	20	10	17	(13)
	$250-500	18	20	30	17	(0)
	$500-1000	0	5	20	28	(38)
	Over $1000	9	0	0	33	(50)
	Total # Responses	11	20	20	18	(8)

Table 49 Would interviewees continue to break and enter if they had enough money for their needs, in total and by age, race and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
WOULD THEY STILL B & E WITH ENOUGH MONEY	Yes	10%	19%	4%	13%	6%	14%	11%	8%
	No	73	52	83	71	80	64	78	69
	Maybe	17	29	13	17	14	21	11	13
Total #		93	21	48	24	51	42	45	48

Table 50 What motives did interviewees have, besides profit, for breaking into residences in total, and by age, race and drug use?

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
MOTIVES BESIDES PROFIT	Excitement[1]	30%	50%	21%	13%	27%	33%	28%	33%
	Encouraged by group	5	6	5	0	5	5	4	4
	Other[2]	65	44	73	87	69	62	68	63
Total #		43(44%)	16(76%)	19(37%)	8(32%)	22 (42%)	21(47%)	18 (38%)	24(49%)

Examples

[1] Challenge; "spirit of it."

[2] Revenge; it's so easy, "it's a hobby"; "to help my pal."

Table 51 What effect do the following detection and access deterrents have on interviewees' decision to hit a residence, in total, and by age, race and drug use?

		AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
DETERRENTS - DETECTION								
Full time occupant								
Would prevent offense	67%	68%	63%	74%	75%	57%	60%	73%
Might prevent offense	21	16	23	22	15	29	24	18
No effect	12	16	15	4	10	14	16	9
Total No. Answering	90	19	48	23	48	42	45	45
Neighbors checking								
Would prevent offense	23%	25%	14%	35%	24%	21%	25%	21%
Might prevent offense	39	44	35	41	36	31	32	44
No effect	39	31	52	24	30	48	43	35
Total No. Answering	62	16	29	17	33	29	28	34
Police/Security Patrols								
Would prevent offense	14%	26%	7%	18%	4%	25%	10%	18%
Might prevent offense	37	42	38	32	48	25	39	36
No effect	49	32	56	50	48	50	51	47
Total No. Answering	86	19	45	22	46	40	41	45
Evidence of alarm								
Would prevent offense	36%	47%	38%	25%	37%	35%	41%	31%
Might prevent offense	37	24	33	54	40	35	36	38
No effect	27	29	29	21	23	30	23	31
Total No. Answering	86	17	45	24	43	43	44	42

Table 51 (continued)

			AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
		Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
RESIDENT DETECTION (continued)	Good Lighting								
	Would prevent offense	9%	7%	9%	11%	13%	4%	3%	16%
	Might prevent offense	24	29	12	42	36	7	17	32
	No effect	67	64	79	47	51	89	80	52
	Total No. Answering	66	14	33	19	39	27	35	31
RESIDENT DETERRENCE	Strong Locks								
	Would prevent offense	5%	7%	4%	5%	5%	5%	7%	2%
	Might prevent offense	33	33	29	40	24	42	31	34
	No effect*	63	61	67	55	71	54	62	63
	Total No. Answering	83	18	45	20	42	41	42	41
	Steel Doors and Frames								
	Would prevent offense	5%	25%	16%	16%	18%	18%	23%	12%
	Might prevent offense	45	38	32	53	39	39	39	39
	No effect	50	38	51	32	44	42	39	49
	Total No. Answering	62	16	37	19	39	33	39	33
Detection & Access	Dog								
	Would prevent offense	22%	24%	24%	14%	24%	19%	19%	24%
	Might prevent offense	39	33	31	64	38	41	45	33
	No effect	39	43	45	23	38	41	36	42
	Total No. Answering	92	21	49	22	50	42	47	45

*Two different answers here:

1. "I haven't found a lock I can't get through yet",

or 2. "Just go through the window".

Table 52 What was the view of different detection and access deterrents by neighborhood?

		HOUSING TYPES					
		Projects	Row Houses	Multi family Houses	Old brick Apt.	Luxury Apt.	Single family Houses
RESIDENT DETECTION	Full time occupant						
	Would prevent offense	57%	90%	69%	64%	63%	67%
	Might prevent offense	33	0	18	28	18	19
	No effect	9	0	12	8	18	13
	Total No. Responses	21	11	55	25	11	52
RESIDENT DETERRENCE	Neighbors Checking						
	Would prevent offense	20%	22%	21%	23%	42%	21%
	Might prevent offense	27	44	40	35	0	48
	No effect	53	33	38	41	57	30
	Total No. Responses	15	9	42	17	7	33
	Police/security patrols						
	Would prevent offense	10%	30%	15%	13%	0%	13%
	Might prevent offense	45	30	41	30	41	35
	No effect	45	40	43	56	58	50
	Total No. Responses	20	10	51	23	12	51
Detection & Access	Evidence of Alarm						
	Would prevent offense	40%	36%	44%	30%	18%	34%
	Might prevent offense	40	36	30	39	45	40
	No effect	20	27	25	30	36	26
	Total No. Responses	20	11	52	23	11	50

Table 52 (cont'd.)

		HOUSING TYPE					
		Projects	Row Houses	Multi-family Houses	Old brick Apt.	Luxury Apt.	Single family Houses
SURVEILLANCE & DETECTION	Good Lighting						
	Would prevent offense	0%	20%	5%	5%	11%	15%
	Might prevent offense	12	40	23	17	33	26
	No effect	88	40	71	76	55	57
	Total No. Responses	17	10	38	17	9	38
	Strong Locks						
	Would prevent offense	5%	9%	2%	8%	10%	4%
	Might prevent offense	40	54	33	26	10	31
	No effect	55	36	64	65	80	66
	Total No. Responses	20	11	54	23	10	45
	Steel Doors and Frames						
	Would prevent offense	6%	66%	20%	20%	11%	14%
	Might prevent offense	50	16	35	40	33	39
	No effect	44	16	43	40	55	46
	Total No. Responses	18	6	48	20	9	41
DETECTION & ACCESS	Dog						
	Would prevent offense	9%	27%	24%	23%	27%	22%
	Might prevent offense	41	45	38	34	45	37
	No effect	50	27	36	42	27	39
	Total No. Responses	22	11	57	26	11	53

*Most interviewees made two responses to each question (see footnote Table 14).

Table 53 What precautions would the interviewees advise?

		AGE			RACE		DRUG USE	
	Total	Under 18	18-25	Over 25	W	Non W	DU	Non DU
Burglar alarms	20%	14%	17%	30%	26%	12%	18%	21%
Strong locks[1]	45	62	42	35	40	50	41	48
Strong doors & frames	7	14	6	0	6	7	2	8
Dog	20	24	21	13	18	21	18	21
Window locks or bars	18	29	17	13	16	21	18	19
Full time occupant	20	29	19	13	10	31	20	19
Lights on	14	5	17	17	24	2	14	15
Radip playing	7	0	8	9	10	2	9	4
Other[2]	34	24	33	52	40	31	41	31
Total # answering	92	21	48	23	50	42	44	48

Examples

[1]Six people specifically recommended the New York type Fox police lock.

[2]Notify and know neighbors (4) - electrify windows (3) - have screens on windows (3) - don't have expensive things (3) - have plexiglass windows (2) - have an insurance policy (3) - have a gun (2) - leave the door open (2).

APPENDIX B

SECTION 2

OFFENDER INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY

A. SAMPLE SELECTION

A prime objective of the study has been to determine specific details of criminal behavior in relation to residential crime. Personal interviews were conducted with actual offenders, because a study confined to an analysis of official records alone would not provide sufficient information. An official record, for example, might indicate that subject X attacked house Y via method Z. Another record might describe the personal and criminal history of the subject offender. However, official records could not be expected to tell why the offender chose house Y, used method Z, or many other details of the offense such as how he determines whether a dwelling is occupied, what he does if an alarm sounds, etc.

The sample population was limited to subjects involved in the crime of burglary since it was the key residential offense. Project resources permitted the scheduling of 100 interviews. It is likely that if persons convicted of other crimes had been included the findings would have been too diverse.

The interviewees were sought among probationers at an inner city and an outlying district court, and among prisoners at two houses of correction which serve the city of

Boston and a large portion of its suburban area respectively. District courts, probation departments, and houses of correction supervise the vast majority of persons convicted of various burglary related offenses (see Chapter IV, Table 4.1). There was no attempt to interview non-adjudicated persons suspected of being burglars since (1) authorities generally are not permitted to furnish such information and (2) it would not be in the suspect's interests to speak frankly about any burglaries that he committed but was not convicted for.

The interviewees were all volunteers. This was made necessary because the subjects were to be asked to discuss sensitive matters like their own criminal operations. Indeed, each interview was taped, and probed in detail the subject's method of operation so that a random selection would probably have produced many refusals to be interviewed. Secondly, the various correctional authorities involved stipulated that interviews were to be entirely voluntary without any appearance of implicit coercion. Finally, a purely random sample would have turned up an interviewee population with a large percentage of teen-agers. It was considered desirable that the median age be somewhat above the norm since older offenders would probably be more skilled and have more to contribute

to the interview. It was therefore decided that interviewees be selected on a volunteer basis with controls applied for age.

Arguably the validity of the data is limited by the small size of the sample, possible biases from non-random selection, and possible lack of veracity of the interviewees. However, it was concluded that in light of the project resources and desired output, that is, detailed information on how and why residential offenders attack dwellings, the selected sample was appropriate.

To control for individual veracity each interviewee was given a skill test and his criminal history checked against his own statements. In the opinion of the interviewers most interviewees seemed candid and their answers generally fit well with data collected in seperate components of the study such as the police records analysis and the household victimization study. Nevertheless, despite the above controls and the staff assessment of the results, the offender interview section should be seen as primarily exploratory in nature. Even though its findings are presented in quantitative as well as narrative form, due to the sample size and its method of selection, it cannot be inferred in a scientific sense that these findings apply to the general burglar

population. They should be seen as qualified and tentative. However, it is hoped that this study will be useful not only for its data but as a guide to similar studies of a more ambitious nature. To aid such efforts, the sections below on interviewing methods have been developed more extensively than would be necessary for this project alone.

B. INTERVIEW TECHNIQUES

One hundred burglars were interviewed. Preparations for these interviews included:

1. collection of slides of different housing types - actual housing photographed was in other northeastern cities which had housing stock similar to the Boston area. Local housing was not used because, as anticipated, the interviewees were most curious about the exact location of the residences shown

2. design of interview questionnaire, score sheet, and skill test

3. selection and training of interviewers

4. pretest of interviews

5. adjustments of interview methods, questionnaire, score sheet, and skill test

The interviews sought specific information. Interviewees were asked at the beginning of the interview to identify those housing types in the slides that they were

most and least likely to operate in. They were then asked further questions about their reasons for particular selections. They were asked sequentially about each phase of a burglary: target selection, planning, method of operation, actions after completion of burglary, use of money, frequency of operation, motives, and effects of deterrents and target hardening. A skill test was given as a separate part of the interview in which interviewees demonstrated their methods of attack on actual doors, locks, and windows which were specially constructed for this project.

In the first set of pre-tests non-offenders with knowledge of residential burglary were interviewed (including a police detective, a criminologist, and a security specialist). These pre-tests were designed to test interview format, the appropriateness of questions and to estimate the length of the interview. More pre-tests then were given to inmates at a local house of correction and several interview techniques were tried. These pre-tests enabled the following assessments and adjustments to be made before the final interviews began:

1. The slides worked well both in interesting interviewees initially and in eliciting specific and useful information.

2. More information was obtained in less structured interviews, that is, when interviewers asked several broad questions with follow-up questions rather than adhering strictly to a question and answer format.
3. The interviews would be taped. Interviewers obtained more information when they could concentrate on the conversation and not write down all the responses. Moreover, contrary to expectations, none of the interviewees objected to a tape recorder being used, providing confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed.
4. Each interviewer would score his own interview as soon as possible afterwards. Experiments with a second person scoring the replies during the interview were unsatisfactory both because key comments were missed and because the unstructured format made it difficult to keep track on the score sheet.
5. Although slides were effective in helping to pinpoint the interviewees' usual area of operation, they were not helpful in pinpointing

access and detection variables important to the interviewee. These slides were therefore eliminated and the information obtained through direct questions.

6. Locks and doors used in the skill test were destroyed so frequently (five during the pre-tests) that interviewees would be asked to demonstrate their skills only up to the point where significant force was used.

7. The interviewees were so cooperative that more probing questions were added for the regular interviews referring, for example, to previous illegal activities, disposal of the goods and to use of drugs.

8. The skill tests showed very few of the interviewees were highly skilled, and that a large majority were semi-skilled. Therefore, contrary to expectations, the analysis would have to be based on criteria other than skill level.

9. Because of the detailed and extensive information obtained from the interviews, computer run offs would have to be made for a satisfactory analysis to be done.

C. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF INTERVIEWERS

All interviewers had some background in fields related to the subject matter of the interview. One, for example, was a doctoral candidate in sociology, specializing in crime and delinquency; another was a third year law student. One interviewer had worked with delinquents and minority action groups. Interviewers were both male and female, and were ethnically mixed. In general there were no major differences in the reaction of various subjects to different interviewers. (Note: This is in contrast to the household survey phase of the project.)

Interviewers were given interview and scoring instructions. The pre-test interviewers watched at least the first interview given by each person to see that the interviews were satisfactory. Since interviewers scored their own interviews as soon as possible after they were undertaken, when the 100th interview was completed, all the interviews except the last few had been scored. Hand tallies were made periodically to indicate the initial direction of the findings.

The average interview lasted about 1½-2 hours and consisted of the slide test and the skill test. The latter took an average of 20 minutes. Interviewers worked in two-person teams. In general they found it unproductive to do more than

four interviews per day. The average interviewer completed about 13 interviews during the course of the project.

After 100 interviews were completed and scored, the score sheets were handchecked for errors. At this point three interviews were discarded for technical reasons - eg., indistinct recording so that an insufficient number of responses could be heard. After the corrections were made the information was keypunched and the computer analysis began.

APPENDIX C
ENVIRONMENTAL DATA

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APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

SECTION 1

SITE SURVEYS

INTRODUCTION

This appendix supports the analysis in Chapter V of the text. It consists of two major sections. The first contains detailed information on 18 reporting areas that underwent household survey. The pertinent items noted were:

1. Location in terms of distance from the core of the metropolitan area.
2. Population characteristics in terms of race, income, age, and social cohesion.
3. Housing type broken into categories according to the predominant types in the RA. These are respectively single-family, small multi-unit, large multi-unit, public housing.
4. Characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood in terms of population and the burglary rate, both residential and non-residential.
5. Security in terms of portal vulnerability, traffic patterns, street lighting, and obstructions to the visibility of possible attack points.
6. Crime patterns in terms of time, location and portal of attack.

The police data on residential burglary and where appropriate, robbery for each RA has been plotted on maps which contain detailed information on construction of the buildings, physical layout of streets, alleys, and yards.

The maps provide a reference for points alluded to in the site description and a graphic representation of the distribution of the commonest type of residential crime (see sample provided by Map C1).



MAP C1

KEY

Types of burglaries:
- △ day-time, forced
- □ day-time, no force
- ▲ night-time, forced
- ■ night-time, no force
- 4△ (ex) number of occurences


indicates residences where crimes occurred.


indicates non-residential property.

Types of residences:

D- dwelling, Sanborn map notation for a private residential building occupied by not more than two families.

F- flat, Sanborn map notation for a residential building occupied by not more than one family per floor.

A- apartments, Sanborn map notation for a residential building occupied by several families, with at least two per floor.

R- rooming, Sanborn map notation for a residential building containing more than ten rooms used for lodging purposes.

G- Notation for garages.

The second section contains the full quantitative material referred to in various parts of the chapter. This includes details of the regression analysis.

CORE REPORTING AREAS

R A 70

A. LOCATION

R A 70 is located in central Boston on Beacon Hill, a historic neighborhood of the city. It is adjacent to the Boston Common and is within walking distance of downtown commercial and nightlife sections. The nearby subway stations make the area accessible to most of the metropolitan area.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

The residents of R A 70 are mainly a transient population of white, middle and upper income, white collar workers. There are few families with children in the area and over half the dwelling units are occupied by only one person.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

Housing stock in R A 70 consists of mainly attached multi-family structures, a large proportion having 10 or more units. It is an expensive area in terms of both rents and property values. Residences generally appear to be in sound condition, and the single-family homes on Mt. Veron and Chestnut Streets are in excellent condition.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

Many long time residents of Beacon Hill complain that the hill has been invaded by "hippies" and that there is an influx of drugs. In contrast to the affluent residents on Mt. Vernon, there are a number of shabby rooming houses for transients on Pinckney Street and other parts of the hill.

The neighborhood has a medium burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

An unusual feature in the area's physical layout is the number of narrow alleys that run behind apartments.

Rear access from narrow alleys and access to upper level windows from the roofs of garages and garden apartments are factors that increase the vulnerability of residences. Other factors are old doors, some with panels or glass in them, glass windows around doors, and old locks.

Some new, solid-core doors have been installed along with window grates, and special locks. There are also many burglar alarm signs.

Street lighting in R A 70 consists mainly of gas and incandescent lights. According to city officials, residents have opted for this type lighting to preserve the historic atmosphere of Beacon Hill. However, R A 70 does not meet the general lighting standards of other areas of the city.

The main traffic arteries for both pedestrians and vehicular traffic are Charles Street and Beacon Street which have moderate to heavy traffic throughout the day and night. Interior streets are lightly travelled except at the beginning and end of the work day when numerous office workers pass through the area.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

In R A 70 the burglaries tend to cluster in the interior streets of the area. Several corner dwellings were hit, and several adjacent dwellings (for example, three on Louisburg Square and five apartment buildings on Mount Vernon Street). Apart from the group of large apartment buildings on Mount Vernon Street, the principal targets were affluent single-family dwellings.

A majority of entries were made through the front door of the building (even when there was rear access from narrow alleys) during the day. Ground floor apartments were hit most often. Force was usually used. More breaks occurred on Thursdays and Fridays than on other days and were distributed fairly evenly throughout the year. There were at least six burglaries in nearby apartments on Mount Vernon Street within five weeks of each other, in which similar operating techniques were used. This suggests that the same burglar or burglars returned several times.

In R A 70 the burglary rate has increased considerably in three years and in 1971 the R A had a high burglary rate. A likely explanation for the burglary rate in this R A is the large number of drug users who frequent the area.



RA 70

R A 83

A. LOCATION

R A 83 is located in the North End, a neighborhood of central Boston whose perimeters are defined by water on three sides and an expressway on the fourth. It is accessible by foot to all parts of central Boston, including cheap nightlife areas and the warehouse district. There is a nearby bus and subway stop.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

R A 83 is inhabited mainly by Italian-American families. There are no blacks and, although students and young professionals have been moving into the North End recently, most persons are long-time residents of the area. Typically residents are low and middle income blue-collar workers who occupy rented units. This area was one of three with a high degree of social cohesion.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

The predominate housing type in R A 83 is small, attached multi-family structures of 5-10 units, with some large multi-family structures. Although most buildings were built at the turn of the century, they appear to be in sound condition.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The surrounding North End neighborhood was one of the areas examined in a well-known study of the relation between crime and land use patterns, Jane Jacobs' The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Its population and housing are similar to RA 83. The burglary rate in the North End is low.

E. SECURITY

R A is a densely populated area with numerous dark, narrow alleys and courtyards, and structures which are completely surrounded by other buildings.

Dwellings in R A 83 are vulnerable to breaking and entering. They have old doors, some with a key-in-knob lock, and a few were standing open at the time of site observations. Doorways are dark, particularly at night. There are few ground-level windows, but many upper floors are accessible by fire escapes. No special security devices were noted except in a few commercial establishments which had alarm tape or window grates. However, observers were under surveillance by residents looking out of upper story windows. Street lighting is standard in the area, except on Hanover Street, which is lit as a commercial street.

Hanover Street receives a constant flow of slow-moving traffic, while Commercial receives faster moving, but with fewer cars. Other streets are not usually travelled by cars because they are winding and narrow.

There are people outside on the streets constantly in good weather until late at night, especially on Hanover Street.



RA 83

F. CRIME PATTERNS

R A 83 has too low an incidence of residential burglary to discern a crime pattern. However, of the nine residential burglaries noted on the map, four occurred in one building and two in another. Neither building was dissimilar from others in the area, except that one backed onto several commercial buildings. No breaks were made on Sundays, the day for public gatherings in the North End, or during the summer months.

R A 83 is curiously atypical. It is in the core city, the interior streets are poorly lit with many alleys and small side streets behind, the condition of the doors and windows are extremely poor and there are almost no special security devices. The area includes almost everything that would suggest a high burglary rate. However, it is a very stable neighborhood (66% of the residents have lived there over 5 years), it is an extremely tightly knit ethnic community, with much community activity. It was one of the highest R As in percent of the dwellings that are occupied during the day, and the neighbors are extremely watchful - as our observers discovered.

R A 145

A. LOCATION

R A 145 is situated in the neighborhood of the Prudential Center in the South End district of Boston. It is accessible by subway and is adjacent to many commercial establishments in the Prudential Center and along Massachusetts Avenue.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

R A 145 has a transient, racially mixed population comprised of low and medium income working people. Although some young professionals are buying townhouses in the area, the predominant occupancy pattern is rented units. Almost half the units have one-person households.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

Housing stock in R A 145 is predominantly attached multi-family structures, a large proportion having 10 or more units.

The condition of most dwellings is generally sound, although there are some deteriorating structures. Presently, a large number of units are undergoing rehabilitation.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The Prudential-Copley Square neighborhood surrounding R A 145 contains a mixture of cultural and academic centers, office buildings, expensive stores, upper income high rise apartments, deteriorated residential sections, and hotels,

bars, and nightclubs. Its commercial and tourist facilities attract residents both of other parts of Boston and outside the city.

Respondents interviewed in the household survey complained that teen gangs and prostitutes operate in the area, although some have been evicted in the process of rehabilitation. The neighborhood has a high burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

Generally, residential structures in the area appear vulnerable to breaking and entering because of old, loose-fitting doors, some with glass panes; loose-fitting, screenless windows; and rear access from narrow alleys.

The vulnerability of doors with glass panes is evidenced by the fact that some panes have been broken and are now replaced with plywood. Residents on Durham Streets have replaced old doors with solid wood ones and have added wrought iron grates over windows and glass panes near doors.

The presence of a few trained dogs was reported to interviewers, but alarms were not evident to observers.

Non-resident pedestrian traffic is generally routed on the perimeters of the area, mainly along Massachusetts Avenue. In cool weather, there were few people on any street in the area, but on a summer afternoon many residents were seen sitting on their steps and in chairs along the sidewalk. especially on St. Botolph.

Vehicular traffic is usually heavy on the perimeters of the R A, particularly on Massachusetts Avenue. St. Botolph, the only through street within the area, receives moderate traffic. The other streets are dead-end streets that only residents and their visitors have reason to drive over.

Nighttime traffic follows the same general pattern as daytime traffic.

Lighting in R A 145 is standard on all streets, but St. Botolph appears particularly well lit because no trees obstruct light.

F. CRIME PATTERNS - BURGLARY

In RA 145, more burglaries occurred on St. Botolph, and on the side streets towards Massachusetts Avenue than on the other streets. The single-family dwellings, particularly on Cumberland and Durham Streets, were hit considerably less often than the apartment buildings and flats. There were so many burglaries in this area that the fact that several adjacent apartments were hit is not very significant. A majority of apartments were hit more than once (one was hit 14 times, another 8 times) between 1969 and 1971.

Approximately three quarters of the entries were through the front door. Force was usually employed. Most burglaries occurred during the day; on a weekday while residents were out working. Fewer burglaries occurred in the summer months when some residents tend to sit outside.

Most residences were physically vulnerable but some of the single family dwellings, particularly on Durham and Cumberland Streets, had both a higher level of security and a lower burglary rate. The burglary rate has not risen for three years in this area perhaps because several old buildings were pulled down and other buildings renovated and better secured, thus reducing the number of obvious targets.

G. CRIME PATTERNS - ROBBERY

In R A 145, a majority of the robberies occurred in the large multi-family apartment buildings on St. Botolph, the main street of the R A. The remainder occurred in small and large multi-family apartments in the dead end streets running off St. Botolph. No robberies occurred in single family dwellings in the area.

Less than half the robberies occurred within the dwelling units themselves -- the majority occurred in the more public parts of the buildings; principally in the hallways. Just over half the robberies occurred at night. Eighty-nine percent of the robbery victims were residents. Eighty-four percent of the assailants were described by the victims as Black and in over two-thirds of the cases, at least two assailants were described.

Over a third of the assailants used guns to threaten their victims.

Robbery offenders in R A 145 were more likely to be older and armed than in the other four (housing project/RA's) studied.



RA 145



RA 145.

R A 166

A. LOCATION

R A 166 is located in the South End district in the neighborhood of South Bay and Castle Square. It is near central Boston and is accessible by subway and bus.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

About half the population in R A 166 is black, with Spanish-speaking residents comprising a significant proportion of the rest. Low income families with children, many with a female head, predominate in the area. This was one of the highest RA's in percentage of population under 18. The area has a medium transiency rate, even though it is primarily a housing project area.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

The South End housing project, a 500-unit complex with combined high rise towers and middle rise apartment buildings, is the predominant housing stock in 166. The arrangement of buildings in the project is a complicated one that permits passage from one block of units to another through stairwells and underground hallways. Streets cut through the interior of the project, but there are a number of interior courtyards that cannot be surveyed from the street.

In comparison to the Columbia Point project and to sections of the Broadway project, the Cathedral project appears better maintained and cleaner inside.

Other housing in the area includes attached apartment buildings of five or more units. Most appear to be deteriorating although there has been recent renovation of many structures on Shawmut Avenue. One unusual feature of housing in the area is the number of residences located above commercial establishments. This type is found on Washington Street.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The neighborhood surrounding R A 166 has a racially mixed population and varied land use patterns which include manufacturing and warehouse properties, parks, a hospital, and medical facilities, and residential neighborhoods which range from dilapidated to upper income areas.

Washington Street is a commercial center with a number of small shops. It is also the side of a number of taverns and bars which cater to the alcoholics seen on the streets in the area. The neighborhood has a medium buglary rate.

E. SECURITY

Almost all residences outside the project appear to be vulnerable to breaking and entering because of doors and windows in poor condition, and old locks. Some doors have panes of glass in or near them and pry marks are evident on a few. A factor in the vulnerability of residences outside the project is rear access from narrow alleys. No special security devices are evident.

The insides of buildings in the project are dimly lit with low intensity incandescent lights. In the towers the stairwells are laid out in such a way that surveillance is

impossible because fire doors and turns block the view of different sections. In the middle rise buildings hallways are well maintained and children play in them. Elevators in the tower were out of order at the time of site visits. Doors in the project are of metal construction with drop bolt locks.

Auxillary exterior lights have been installed in the project, and many people were observed sitting outdoors in good weather. Other streets in 166 are not well lit, particularly Shawmut Avenue, which is dark and deserted.

Pedestrians and vehicular traffic are concentrated on Washington Street, a main traffic artery between central Boston and outlying areas, and East Brookline, a main cross street. Traffic is moderate to light on all other streets in the area.

F. CRIME PATTERNS - BURGLARY

The part of RA 166 that is outside the housing project has a higher burglary rate than within the project itself. Within the project there seems a slight preference to select corner and end buildings.

The pattern of entry was predominantly through the front of the building - usually through the door. Almost two thirds of the entries occurred during the day, slightly more often on weekends. Burglaries seemed distributed fairly evenly through the year. In almost a quarter of the entries, the residence was occupied - the highest figure for any RA.

This RA is somewhat unusual. It has a medium burglary rate despite processing the characteristics associated with a high burglary RA; low income, racially mixed, in the core city, a high percentage of residencs under 18, many cheap bars nearby, and a high rate of burglary in the surrounding neighborhood. However, the burglary rate has fallen for three years.

Several factors may contribute to this: First, the project has a medium transiency rate and a generally more stable population than the area outside the project. Second, some security precautions have been taken: the doors are metal and many have had additional locks put on. Third, the project has a higher level of police protection than usual; three security guards and one policeman on duty each shift. Finally, recent renovations in the area generally may have removed some easy targets and decreased its attraction to normal elements from crime here.

G. CRIME PATTERNS - ROBBERY

More robberies (89%) occurred within the project in RA 166 than in the multi-family apartments outside it. 52% of all the robberies occurred in one particular building of the housing project - always outside the dwelling unit and usually in the elevator or in the hall.

In fact, all except three of the robberies within the project occurred in the buildings in the central complex.

Unlike most robberies within the project the two robberies occurring outside the project took place within the dwelling unit itself. Almost 80% of the robberies occurred during the day. One third of the victims within the project were non residents. Eighty-four percent of the assailants were described by the victims as Black. In two thirds of the cases at least two assailants were described. Most offenders were not armed.

SHAWMUT

CANTON PL

W BROOKLINE

W. CANTON

CANTON CT

W. DEDHAM

PELHAM

UNION PARK ST

WASHINGTON

E. CANTON

BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY APARTMENTS

MALDEN (MONSIGNOR REYNOLDS WAY)

UNION PARK ST

WALTHAM

E. BROOKLINE

HARRISON AVE

RA 166

SHAWMUT

W. BROOKLINE

1513

W. CANTON

W. DEDHAM

PELHAM

WASHINGTON

E. CANTON

MALDEN (MONSIGNOR REYNOLDS WAY)

UNION PARK

WALTHAM

E. BROOKLINE

HARRISON AVE

RESIDENTIAL ROBBERIES

indicates 10 story building

□ day-time robbery within dwelling unit

■ night-time robbery within dwelling unit

△ day-time robbery outside of dwelling unit

▲ night-time robbery outside of dwelling unit

△ resident of dwelling unit

Ⓐ non-resident

R A 265

A. LOCATION

R A 265 is located in Roxbury's Sav Mor neighborhood adjacent to Blue Hill Avenue. It was once a busy commercial strip whose businesses have been closed since the 1967 riots in Roxbury. R A 265 is accessible by bus, but it is about a half mile from a subway stop.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

R A 265 is inhabited by black low and middle income families with children. Although the majority of residents live in rented units, the area has a relatively low transient rate.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

The predominant housing type in R A 265 is small multi-family structures of 2-4 units, both free-standing and attached. There are also a few single-family houses and several large apartment buildings in the area. Almost all structures are old but their condition varies from sound to deteriorating. Generally single-family houses appear to be in better condition than other structures, although several apartment buildings have undergone recent renovation.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The Sav Mor neighborhood is similar in population and housing characteristics to RA 265 with the exception of the commercial establishments, bars and restaurants that line part of Warren Street and much of Blue Hill Avenue, the border streets of the area. The surrounding neighborhood has a high burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

RA 265 is a medium density area with commercial and manufacturing structures concentrated in the first block of Waverly Street off Warren. It is unusual in the number of dead end streets it has off both Blue Hill Avenue and Copeland. Much of the area appears deteriorated with abandoned buildings and overgrown yards.

Residences in 265 are vulnerable because of glass panes in many doors; old, loose-fitting windows; and the poor visibility of many doors from other houses because the houses are set at angles that do not permit surveilance.

Street lighting in the area is standard. However, most houses are dark because yards and porches are not lighted.

Blue Hill Avenue and Warren Street are major traffic arteries. Traffic is generally light to moderate on other streets.

While the few persons observed on the street and in yards appeared to be residents of the RA, an elementary

school in the area brings in student-related traffic during school sessions. A nighttime observation found few people in yards or on the street.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

Multi-family buildings are hit considerably more often than single-family dwellings in this area. For example, on Waverly Street, three adjacent multi-family houses were hit five times between them, while nine single-family dwellings next door to them were untouched. Also several houses and multi-family dwellings at the end of the dead end streets were hit.

In contrast to most areas, almost two thirds of the entries (which were usually forced) were made through the side or rear of the building, and approximately half through windows. Possibly this may be tied to the poor visibility of access points and to the large number of abandoned buildings and overgrown yards, making it easy to approach the side or rear of houses or apartments undetected.

Most breaks occurred on weekdays and fairly regularly through the year.

R. A 265 is a racially mixed area in the core city, surrounded by a neighborhood with a high burglary rate. However, the burglary rate has not risen in three years.

Simple security devices, (window grills, a buzzer system, mesh reinforced glass doors) have reduced the burglary rate in at least one apartment building; this building reported 10 burglaries in 1969 and 1970 and none in 1971, suggesting that the burglars themselves are probably young and relatively unskilled.



RA 265

R A 291

A. LOCATION

R A 291 is located in Boston's Roxbury district in the Jackson Square neighborhood. The area is bordered by Columbus Avenue, a main route to central Boston, but it is about a half mile away from the nearest subway station.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

R A 291 is a racially mixed neighborhood with about 60% black residents. Typically inhabitants are low income families with children. The area has a medium transiency rate, although most persons occupy rental units.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

The predominant housing type in R A 291 are small multi-family structures of 2-4 units, both free-standing and attached. Single-unit structures comprise about 10% of the total units, and large apartment buildings account for less than 1% of the total.

Most houses in the area were built around 1900 and many now appear to be in deteriorating condition. However, some single-family and renovated apartment buildings appear sound, while a few are dilapidated. About 25% of the units are vacant, the highest proportion of any area surveyed.

R A 291

A. LOCATION

R A 291 is located in Boston's Roxbury district in the Jackson Square neighborhood. The area is bordered by Columbus Avenue, a main route to central Boston, but it is about a half mile away from the nearest subway station.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

R A 291 is a racially mixed neighborhood with about 60% black residents. Typically inhabitants are low income families with children. The area has a medium transiency rate, although most persons occupy rental units.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

The predominant housing type in R A 291 are small multi-family structures of 2-4 units, both free-standing and attached. Single-unit structures comprise about 10% of the total units, and large apartment buildings account for less than 1% of the total.

Most houses in the area were built around 1900 and many now appear to be in deteriorating condition. However, some single-family and renovated apartment buildings appear sound, while a few are dilapidated. About 25% of the units are vacant, the highest proportion of any area surveyed.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The Jackson Square neighborhood is similar in composition to R A 291. It has a medium burglary rate.

Directly across Columbus Avenue lies an extensive housing project which reports high rates of robbery and assault.

E. SECURITY

R A. 291 is a medium density area in a hilly section of Roxbury. Because of the hills there are a number of short streets that are either dead-ends or connect to other streets at odd angles. Also because of the hills and rocks, a number of lots are vacant.

The area is primarily residential although there are a number of old industrial buildings along Columbus Avenue and a few small commercial establishments. The area appears to be in deteriorated condition with overgrown lots and vacant houses.

Most residences in the area are vulnerable to burglaries because of age and poor maintenance of doors and windows. Many doors are loose fitting and some have glass panes. Windows are generally without screens or storm windows.

However, a number of residents of the area have taken precautions with second locks on doors, watch dogs and grills over windows. One alarm system was in evidence.

Another factor in the vulnerability of houses in the area is the poor surveillance from one house to another due to overgrown shrubbery, vacant lots and streets at odd angles. Almost half of the burglaries in the area occurred in houses that can not be viewed from other houses on one or more sides.

Street lighting is standard, but many yards are dark.

Columbus Avenue is a main traffic artery between central Boston and the suburbs. However, elsewhere in the area there is little traffic because of several dead end streets and the poor condition of the roads. The layout of the streets is complicated, and an outsider would have difficulty in finding his way without a map.

Few residents or pedestrians were observed outdoors even in good weather.

A nighttime survey found little traffic in the area.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

In RA 291 more burglaries occurred between Lindwood and Cedar Streets (in the southeast section of the area) than in the other parts of the area. The different residential dwelling types seemed to be selected as targets equally. Unlike most RA's a majority of entries were made through the rear or side of the building - perhaps because of the number of vacant lots and overgrown

yards making such an approach easy. Probably for the same reason almost half the entries were through the window. Force was nearly always used. Three quarters occurred in the day and over half in the early summer months (May through July). No particular day was favored.

Although the residential burglary rate is still medium, there has been a seven fold increase since 1969. Given the combination of factors present, the increase is not unexpected. RA 291 is in the core city, is a low income, racially mixed area, surrounded by a high rise neighborhood. The area has undergone recent population changes and is now somewhat transient socially, and deteriorating physically. It was one of the highest RA's in terms of citizen concern over burglary.



RA 291

R A 307

A. LOCATION

R A 307 is located in Roxbury's Grove Hall West, a residential neighborhood designated for urban renewal in the 1960's. It is bound by several major streets and is the location of a subway and bus station, thus being easily accessible by public transportation.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

R.A 307 is mainly inhabited by black and a few Spanish-speaking families with children, although about one third of the units are occupied by one-person households. Most residents are low income workers although there are a few middle and upper income blacks in the area. The area has a medium transiency rate despite a high proportion of renters. It was one of five areas with a low level of social cohesion.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

The predominate housing type in R.A. 307 is large multi-unit structures of 10 or more units. Other types include detached 2-4 unit structures and 15 new townhouses built during urban renewal. Also built during urban renewal is a 70-unit middle-rise 221d3 project. This project has been cited by several housing authorities as one of the most successful in terms of low turnover rate of tenants and

good maintenance. There is also a public housing high rise tower for the economy.

Although some of the large multi-unit structures appear to be deteriorating, most other structures in the area appear sound. On Columbus Avenue, federally subsidized garden apartments are being constructed. These apartments have been extensively vandalized during the construction process.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The Grove Hall West neighborhood is very similar to R A 307. Adjacent to this neighborhood is Franklin Park, a large recreational park which is the site of assaults and robberies. Residents of the area complain of teenagers and drugs.

The neighborhood has a high burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

The vandalism of structures in the area underlines an apparent security problem. The doors of several large multi-family structures had panes of glass knocked out, allowing free passage into the buildings. Glass in doors has been replaced with plywood in other structures.

One visit during warm weather found doors to some multi-family structures braced open, apparently to allow children playing outside to enter.

Windows, like many doors, are old and loose fitting. Typically they have no screens, grates or wires mesh protection. The screens or mesh are apt to be rusted even on windows that have them.

Security devices noted by observers included grates installed over sliding glass doors on the new single family townhouses, grills over windows in the 221d3 project, and some special locks installed on doors. One alarm was seen.

Street lighting in the area is standard, but few dwellings had outside lights on at the time of observation.

Three major streets--Washington, Walnut, and Columbus---bound R A 307, and all receive moderate to heavy traffic throughout the day. The interior streets are lightly travelled by residents and their visitors. Observers found children playing in the street and teenagers standing around apartment doorways, but little other pedestrian traffic and few people in yards. A nighttime observation found the streets almost deserted.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

The burglaries tend to cluster off the interior streets of the area, which have little traffic. The large multi-family apartments were hit considerably more often than other housing types (every apartment building except one between Waldren and Wardman Road was hit, most several times). However, there were certain notable exceptions to the general burglary pattern: the two 221 D 3 projects and the large tower for the elderly on Columbus Avenue.

Over half the entries were made through the rear or side of the building (many apartments have back doors), mainly through the door. Force was almost always used. Most entries were made during the day, predominantly during the week with July and August the preferred months.

The burglary rate in RA 307 has remained fairly constant for three years. There is little within the area to attract criminal elements from elsewhere. It is a generally transient neighborhood with certain stable areas (the projects and the tower for the elderly) within it, where non-residents would be conspicuous. And it is also in the projects and the tower for the elderly that access security is higher than elsewhere, and the burglary rate lower. This RA demonstrates that even in an area with a high burglary rate there can be isolated pockets that are untouched. No burglaries have been reported in these complexes during the time frame of the study.



RA 307

R A 315

A. LOCATION

R A 315 in the Grove Hall West neighborhood of Roxbury, a neighborhood that underwent urban renewal in the 1960's. It is adjacent to main thoroughfares and is accessible by bus. However, it is about half a mile from the nearest subway.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

R A 315 is inhabited by black low income workers and some professionals. Families with children predominate. The area has a relatively low transiency rate and a significant percentage of homeowners.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

Small structures of 2-4 units comprise almost all housing in the area, with the exception of a few single-family homes, one large apartment building, and several rest homes for the elderly. Most structures appear sound and a few single-family houses are in excellent condition.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The Grove Hall West neighborhood has characteristics similar to R A 315, although throughout the neighborhood there are a higher proportion of large multi-family structures.

The neighborhood is bordered by Warren Street where a number of bars and commercial establishments are located, and is adjacent to Franklin Park, site of numerous assaults and robberies. The neighborhood burglary rate is high.

E. SECURITY

Most residences are detached small multi-family structures. There are many ground level access points per unit, thus making them vulnerable to breaking and entering. Doors with glass panes are common and few appear to have special locks. A number of houses have aluminum frame storm windows that provide a measure of reinforcement when closed. A few dog warnings and an alarm system were noted. Street lighting is standard.

All streets in the area receive light to moderate traffic except Humboldt, which has moderate to heavy traffic, and Warren, which has heavy traffic. Likewise, there are few people on the streets or in yards, and nighttime observation found the streets almost deserted.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

In RA 315 the single family dwellings, particularly on Howland Street, were hit more often than other types of dwellings. On Howland Street burglaries clustered together. On Wabeno and Waunbeck Streets the corner flats were hit.

Over two thirds of the entries were made through the front of the building, usually through the door. Force was commonly used. Almost two thirds of the burglaries took

place during the day and over half in June, July and August. No particular days of the week were favored. The burglary rate doubled between 1969 and 1971.

Although RA 315 has a low median income, some professionals (middle and high income) live there, particularly around Howland Street. Their houses seem the preferred targets. In fact, almost a third of the victims in RA 315 compared to a small percentage of non-victims, had annual incomes between $10,000 and $15,000. The general security level was medium. However, 47% of the victims compared to 8% of non-victims have changed their security practices in the last year, presumably to try to combat the rapidly increasing burglary rate. To an extent then, the high burglary rate in this area can be explained in terms of contrasts in wealth, where a small pocket of affluence is surrounded by an extremely poor neighborhood.



RA 315

R. A. 622

A. LOCATION

R A 622 is in the Kenmore Square-Boston University neighborhood of Boston's Back Bay district. The area is about a mile from central Boston but it serves as a commercial nucleus to the neighborhoods around it. The Kenmore Square subway and bus terminal lie within the area, and main traffic arteries criss-cross it. It is accessible by foot from the Back Bay and Fenway neighborhoods of Boston.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

The residents in R A 622 are typically white, young, and transient. Many residents are students, and within the area are several dormitories and fraternity houses.[1] About half the units in the area are occupied by one-person households. Most dwelling units are rented. This is one of five areas which ranked low in social cohesion.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

The predominant housing type in R A 622 is attached multi-family structures, a large proportion having 10 or more units. There are also two modern Boston University dormitories located in the area. Generally structures appear sound despite the fact that most of them were built

[1] Dormitories and fraternity houses were excluded from the household survey sample.

almost 100 years ago. Many apartment buildings have offices on the ground floor.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The Kenmore Square-Boston University neighborhood includes part of Boston University and a residential section of Back Bay similar to R A 622. It has a medium burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

Residences in the area appear vulnerable to burglary because of old doors and windows, because they are accessible from the rear by back streets and alleys, and because the upper floors of many buildings can be reached by fire escapes at the rear of buildings.

Many doors have glass panes in or near them which are not protected by bars or mesh in most cases. Special locks have been installed on some front doors. Windows are generally old and loose fitting. Most have no screens or grills.

Buzzer systems have been installed in many apartments. Other security devices noted by observers were alarms in several buildings where doctors offices are located.

Street lighting in the area is standard for residential areas except on Commonwealth Avenue, which is lit as a commercial street. The nightclubs and open commercial establishments further illuminate Commonwealth Avenue.

At night, groups of young people can be seen sitting or standing in front of establishments on Commonwealth.

Commonwealth Avenue receives a constant flow of heavy pedestrian and vehicular traffic at all times of day and night. Other streets in the area are narrow and vehicular traffic is moderate and more slow moving. Pedestrian traffic on these streets varies, increasing when students are going to and from nearby Boston University.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

Burglaries occurred in every part of this area, particularly, in the middle section of Bay State Road. There was just one small group of residences on Bay State Road, near Sherborn Road, that were not hit. However, on the rest of Bay State Road there were no obvious differences between those buildings that were hit (many several times) and those that were not. All were multi-unit buildings. First floor units were more likely to be hit than the rest.

A large majority of entries were through the front of the building - usually through the door. Force was used only two thirds of the time. Most burglaries occurred during the day, predominantly on week days and were distributed fairly evenly throughout the year.

Despite the heavy vehicle and pedestrian traffic, it is a highly transient and unstable neighborhood so strangers are unnoticed. Moreover, many apartments are over offices

making detection even less likely. This was also one of the lowest RA's in terms of time dwellings being occupied. Although, some security improvements have been made, predominant security level of the area is low.


STORROW DRIVE
BACK ST
dorm.
dorm.
BAY STATE RD
dormitory
SHERBORN
HOTEL
DEERFIELD ST
RALEIGH
BEACON ST
CHARLESGATE
COMMONWEALTH AVE
COMMONWEALTH AVE
MTA
KENMORE SQUARE
MTA STATION
N

RA 622

ADJACENT REPORTING AREAS

A. LOCATION

RA 57 is located in the City Square neighborhood of Charlestown, a district of Boston separated from the central city by water on three sides and railroads on the fourth. The area is accessible from Boston by subway and from most parts of Charlestown by foot.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

Blue Collar Irish American workers are the dominant group in RA 57. There are no Black residents. Low and middle income families with children predominate in the RA. The area has a low transiency rate and the proportion of owner-occupied units is significantly higher than generally found in the City of Boston. It was one of three areas with a high degree of social cohesion.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

Housing stock in RA 57 consists mainly of small, attached multi-family structures, of 2-4 units along with single-family townhouses. Although old, most structures appear to be in sound condition.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The City Square neighborhood is similar to RA 57. Immediately to the north of the area are extensive housing projects. The surrounding neighborhood has a low burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

Houses in the area are vulnerable through front doors, which generally are old, loose fitting, and have glass panes. Some houses have only the original locks on old doors, and a few have only key-in-knob locks.

Windows are without screens for the most part, although mesh wire screens have been added to street level windows, apparently to protect glass from children playing in the street.

One vulnerable point in many of the houses is a cellar door that can be pried or shoved open easily. At least half the houses have rear access through narrow alleys.

There was some evidence that residents do take notice of strangers on the street, in that a few persons were noted watching the observers from windows.

City street lights are standard except on Winthrop Street, which is poorly lit. Hallways inside houses reflected light on front steps, but few additional outside lights were on. Thus, front doorways were dark. The streets around Monument Square are particularly well lit because of the flood lights beamed on the monument.

Pedestrian traffic is also light except for the occasional busloads of tourists visiting Bunker Hill.

A nighttime survey found a number of small teenage groups standing around in the area and in the surrounding neighborhood. At night vehicular traffic is light.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

R A 57 has too low an incidence of burglary for a pattern to be determined, however the burglaries do cluster around Monument Square. Most buildings were forcibly entered through the front, usually through the door. A majority of the breaks occurred at night and on weekdays, spread fairly evenly over the year.

Charlestown is remote from the rest of Boston, although it is connected by subway. However, there is little to attract other groups from Boston - the area is not affluent, there is little night life and ethnically it is a fairly tightly knit community. However, there are several teenage gangs in the neighborhood that tend to gather around Monument Square at night. There is considerable vandalism and the same groups could be responsible for some of the burglaries.



RA 57

R A 196[1]

A. LOCATION

R A 196 is in South Boston, a district separated from the rest of Boston by railroad tracks and expressways on one side and water on three others. The area can be reached by bus but not by subway; it is distant for pedestrians from other parts of Boston.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

The residents of the area are typically white, low income families with some Spanish-speaking residents, and about 5% black residents. A large percent of the units are occupied by female heads of family, and the area has the largest percentage of children under 18 of any area surveyed. Almost all residents rent units in the housing project located in the area.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

RA 196 is comprised of a large middle-rise project. The buildings are laid out in large superblocks with two L-Shaped series of connected structures forming a partially enclosed courtyard. Most superblocks have four such structures which form two courtyards which do not permit surveillance from the street.

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[1] The housing project that makes up RA's 196 and 198 together will here be referred to as RA 196.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The surrounding Broadway neighborhood contains a number of businesses and a large number of bars and taverns. Most of the neighborhood is residential. The neighborhood has a low burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

Maintenance and security within project buildings varies. Most units have locks installed with metal plates on metal doors. Some doors have peep-holes and some ground floor windows have wire mesh, but others are without even screens.

The upkeep of the hallways also varies. While some buildings are in good condition and have well lit halls, in others vandals have marred walls with paint and have broken lights and windows. Broken windows have been boarded up, resulting in dark halls and stairways. Pry marks are evident on some doors.

A nighttime observation found the interior grounds poorly lit, with few auxillary flood lights supplementing the incandescent lights in doorways and the standard street lights at the edge of the project. Residents report teenage gangs in the area.

Surveillance is not possible by police patrol cars in the interior courtyards of the project. A police station is situated one half block from the project and an officer is stationed in the project from 8:00 AM to Midnight.

Vehicular traffic travels along the perimeters of the project, Broadway, the main route, has a steady flow of moderate to heavy traffic. Within the project, cross streets are narrow and form confusing patterns by transversing parking lots and running into dead ends. They receive light vehicular traffic and light pedestrian traffic was observed at the time of the survey, although numerous children were seen playing in the courtyard.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

RA 196 has too low a reported burglary rate for there to be any discernable pattern. What breaks there were, were distributed fairly evenly through the front of the building, in 85% of the cases through the window suggesting that the doubly reinforced metal doors were successful in warding off intruders. Just over half the burglaries occurred during the day and there were too few cases for preferred days or months to be determined.

The burglary rate found by this and an independent survey was considerably higher than the reported rate.



R A 256

A. LOCATION

R A 256, Columbia Point, is a large peninsula that extends into Dorchester Bay. The fourth side of this peninsula is bordered by two expressways and railroad tracks which separate it from the Dorchester district of Boston.

The R A is thus distant from most parts of Boston. The Columbia Point project itself is further isolated from the city because it is located a half mile out on the peninsula and is distant from any subway stop. Buses are the main public transportation.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

R A 256 has a highly transient, mixed population, with 60% black residents and the rest white and Spanish-speaking. Typically, inhabitants are low income families with children, many with a female head. It was one of the highest RA's in the number of persons under 18.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

Housing in 256 is comprised of the large Columbia Point housing project, a 1400 unit project built in the 1950's.

The project includes a mixture of three story buildings and seven story elevator buildings. Most structures are built in three sections, so that each ground level entrance is the access point to a large number of units, but not to

the entire building.

Buildings are constructed in large superblocks. A road does not circumvent each building, but rather several buildings form an interior courtyard which cannot be surveyed from police patrol cars.

Most buildings are deteriorating. There is evidence of extensive vandalism, elevators are out of order, and interior lights are broken.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The Columbia Point peninsula comprises an entire neighborhood. Surrounding the project are large open spaces on the peninsula. The area includes a shopping center, several schools, some industrial properties, and a bank.

The open spaces around the project contrast sharply to the project area which has a great concentration of structures in a small area. Residents report teenage gangs operate in the area.

E. SECURITY

A number of security devices have been installed in the Columbia Point project, including metal doors, frames, and special locks on apartment doors. Columbia Point is the only area surveyed in the city of Boston where more entries are made through windows than doors. These entries through windows are possible, even on the upper floors, because the offender can step across the inner corners from the ledge of the hallway window to the ledge of an apartment window. Grills and mesh wire have been put on some windows, but these precautions are mainly taken on the ground level.

Hallways in the project are dark due to burnt out and vandalized lights. Special plastic covers have been installed over some, not all lights.

There is very light vehicular traffic in 256 aside from that on the expressways which form the west boundary. Likewise, there is little pedestrian traffic, and few people were seen around the project grounds. A nighttime observation found a small number of people in the doorways of the project.

Street lights in 256 are standard and a number of auxillary lights have been attached to the exteriors of buildings. However, because structures are built on superblocks and because their design includes many interior corners, there are numerous small areas of the project which are dark and which cannot come under police patrol car surveillance.

Columbia Point has a security force with three officers on the project grounds from 8:00 AM to Midnight.

F. CRIME PATTERNS – BURGLARY

In RA 256, there are both three story and seven story buildings. Marginally, the seven story buildings were hit more frequently. The taller buildings suffered more multiple victimization; some buildings were hit six, eight, nine or eleven times. No three-story building was hit more than four times.

Most entries occurred through the front of the building and in over half the cases through the window. Just over half the burglaries took place during the day.

Columbia Point is extremely isolated from the rest of Boston, and it is reasonable to assume that the residents are largely responsible for the crime pattern there. Eighty one percent of the arrested burglars in 1970 and 1971 were residents. It has a very high rate of crimes, particularly robbery and assault.

G. CRIME PATTERNS - ROBBERY

Most robberies (87%) were committed in the seven story apartment buildings. In some of these buildings as many as three or four robberies occurred. Only 14% of the robberies occurred in the three story buildings, and these buildings were set well back from the main road, Mt. Vernon Street. No robberies occured in the three story apartments lining Mt. Vernon Street.

Less than a quarter of the robberies occurred within the dwelling units, the remainder took place in the more public areas of the building: the halls, and elevators. Half the robberies occurred at night and half during the day.

Over three quarters of the robbery victims were residents. Ninety one percent of the assailants were described by the victims as Black and over four fifths of the robbery victims described at least two assailants. Forty percent of the assailants threatened physical force and almost a quarter had knives.



RA 256

Residential burglaries at Columbia Point. Street number and name with burglaries listed.

MONTICELLO

25 □1
26 △1
30 △2
40 △2 ▲1 ■1
50 □1
60 △1 ■1
80 ▲1 ■1
84 △1 ▲2
95 △1 ▲1
99 △1 ▲2 ■1
100 □1 ▲1
103 △1 □1 ▲2
110 □2 ▲3 ■1
111 △2
114 △1 □1 ■1
115 △1 □2 ▲1
119 △1 ■1
156 □1
161 △2 ▲1
164 △3 □1 ▲1 ■3
165 △1 □1 ▲5
166 △1
169 ■2
170 ■4
174 △2
176 ▲1 ■2
180 ■1
181 ■1
184 □1
189 □1 ▲2 ■1

BRANDON

2 △1 □1 ▲1
6 △1 □1 ▲1
10 △1 □3 ▲7
11 △1 ■2
14 ▲4 ■2
15 □1 ▲1
18 △2 ■
19 △1 □1 ▲1

BELVOIR

5 △3 ▲1
9 △3 ■3

BLAIR

6 △1 □1 ▲3
10 △1

MONTPELIER

10 △1
11 □1 ■1
14 ■1
15 △3 ▲1
19 △1 □1 ▲2 ■1
20 △1
23 □1
25 △1 ■1
26 △4 ▲1 ■4
29 △1 □1 ■1
30 ▲1
34 □1

MT. VERNON

260 ■1
264 △1
350 △1 ▲1
380 □1

indicates 7 story building

indicates 3 story building



RA 256



R A 447

A. LOCATION

R A 447 is located in Mt. Bowdoin, a large predominantly residential neighborhood of Dorchester. The R.A. is not close to major commercial, industrial, or nightlife activities. Although a bus passes a few blocks away on Washington Street, the R.A. is not accessible from central Boston by subway.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

RA 447 is primarily composed of Black low and middle income families with children, with few elderly residents. In general, inhabitants are renters and tend to be highly transient.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

The predominant housing type in 447 is detached 2-4 unit dwellings. Housing in the area is old, but its condition varies, with sound structures next to deteriorating or delapidated structures. The area has an above average vacancy rate. Several "for sale" signs were noted.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The Mt. Bowdoin neighborhood is similar in composition to R A 447. Commercial establishments line Washington Street and Blue Hill Avenue, which border the neighborhood.

The neighborhood has been changing racially in the last decade from a completely white area to a black area. Its burglary rate is medium.

E. SECURITY

There are signs of deterioration in that some yards are overgrown or filled with discarded auto parts and furniture. Others are planted with shrubbery that obscures entrances.

Dwellings in R A 447 are detached, small, multi-family structures with a high proportion of ground-level access points per unit. Doors are old, and many have glass panes in them. A few were standing open at the time of one site observation. Windows are likewise old and screenless.

Security devices were not evident to site observers, but a few alarms, special locks, metal grates, and trained dogs were reported to interviewers.

Street lighting is standard, but many houses and yards appear dark because outside lights are not on and bushes often obscure light from ground-level doors and windows.

The area has light vehicular and pedestrian traffic. A daytime observation found a few school children playing in the streets, and at night some young men were seen standing around. However, in contradiction to the findings of site observers, residents perceived the traffic flow as heavy.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

The reported burglary rate here is very low, but the victimization study indicates that it may be considerably higher than reported. What entries there were occurred mainly through the front of the building--two-thirds through windows--and during the day. No days of the week or months of the year were preferred. Over three years the reported burglary rate remained fairly constant. It is possible that the high transiency rate is an explanation of the discrepancy between the reported and survey crime rates.



RA 447

R A 505

A. LOCATION

R A 505 is located in the Forest Hills neighborhood of the Jamaica Plain District. It is several miles from central Boston and is neither adjacent to main thoroughfares or near a subway station. The area is further isolated in that the cemeteries and large park on the north and east form a barrier to other residential and commercial areas.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

Residents of R A 505 are white, middle income, white collar workers, or skilled laborers. The area has a low transient rate and most residents own their homes. It was one of three areas with a high degree of social cohesion.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

About half the units in R A 505 are single-family houses and the rest detached 2-4 multi-unit structures. There are some new houses in the area and all residences are in sound or excellent condition.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTIS

The Forest Hills neighborhood is similar in composition to R A 505. Its burglary rate is low.

E. SECURITY

Residences in the area are vulnerable to breaking and entering in that, being detached single-family and small multi-family structures, there are many ground level access points per unit.

Doors and windows are in good condition. However, many residences have glass panes in or near the doors, and most are without special locks on doors or windows.

No unusual security devices were noted by observers. Street lighting in the area is standard, and some outdoor lights are turned on by residents at night.

R A 505 receives very light pedestrian and vehicular traffic, except for residents and school children going to and from their homes. A nighttime observation found virtually no one on the streets.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

R A 505 has too low a burglary rate for any pattern to be discerned. What few breaks there were, were made on weekdays. Most breaks occurred during the day and usually the entry took place through the side or rear door which was entered forcibly. No breaks took place in the summer months. On no occasion was anyone inside when the break occurred.

Several factors may help explain the low crime rate. RA 505 is relatively isolated from--although

close to--the core city, and there is a low rate of burglary in the surrounding neighborhood. There is little in in to attract criminal elements from other areas; it is not conspicuously affluent (mainly middle income) and it is not particularly accessible by public transport. Moreover, it is a cohesive and stable neighborhood with a high percentage of home owners where houses are close together and neighbors know each other. Strangers are conspicuous and probably regarded with curiosity. The fact that doors and windows are only moderately secure seems immaterial in this RA.

RA 505

RA 775

A. LOCATION

RA 775 is located in the Chestnut Hill-Aberdeen neighborhood of Allston-Brighton. The area is four or five miles from central Boston but is accessible because it is adjacent to Commonwealth Avenue, a main thoroughfare, and to the subway line that runs along Commonwealth.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

RA 775 is the site of two large apartment buildings for the elderly. Slightly over half the residents in the area were over 62 years old in 1970.*

Residents of the area are typically retired or middle-income working people. There are few Blacks and relatively few children in the area. Most dwellings are rented.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

The predominant housing types in RA 775 are detached small multi-family structures. There is also a new garden apartment complex and a large high rise apartment building, both built to house the elderly. Thus, the predominate housing type has changed from small to large multi unit. Most residences in RA 775 appear to be generally sound, and the new elderly housing is in excellent condition.

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* The 234-unit high rise project for the elderly was incomplete at the time of the 1970 Census. The increase in units may be assumed to have produced a concommitant increase in population and percent of elderly residents in the area.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The Chestnut Hill-Aberdeen neighborhood is similar in composition to RA 775. There are a couple of small social club buildings in the RA, and an ice cream stand attracts crowds of teenagers at night.

The neighborhood has a medium burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

Structures form a ring around a large open space that has no cross streets, causing few residences to have close surveillance from the rear. While the open space has been designated as a playground, it has an overgrown and neglected look.

Houses are vulnerable because of glass panes in doors and loose-fitting windows. Rotten window frames were noted in old apartment buildings along Chiswick.

Security devices were not evident in the area although some residents report special locks installed on front doors. Street lighting is standard, although, some yards appear dark because outside lights are not on.

While the short stretch of Commonwealth Avenue that forms a border of 775 is a major thoroughfare, other streets in the area are lightly travelled.

At the time of the site observations, there were a few persons in yards or walking along the street, but otherwise pedestrian traffic is very light. A nighttime

observation found traffic very light. This RA was one of the lowest in terms of time when dwellings were unoccupied.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

The burglaries in R A 775 cluster off Chiswick Road in the west of the area. Here several apartment buildings have been hit more than once. None of the single-family dwellings in the east of the area were hit. Entries were usually made through the front of the building, usually through the door. Force was always used. Three quarters of the breaks occurred during the day, mainly on week days. Half the breaks took place between June and September.


LEDGEMERE RD.
WALLINGFORD RD.
Housing For The Elderly
CHESTNUT HILL
Housing For The Elderly
WALLINGFORD RD.
COMMONWEALTH AVE.
CHISWICK
N

RA 775

OUTLYING REPORTING AREAS

R A 134

A. LOCATION

RA 134 is located in Norwood, a suburb about a half hour's car ride from central Boston, Although Norwood is accessible to Boston and the suburbs via an expressway, 134 is several miles away from this route. It is not connected to Boston by rapid transit systems.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

R A 134's population is characterized by white, middle-income families. Many persons are professional and white collar workers, although a significant number are unskilled workers. About half the units in the area are owner-occupied.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

Almost half the units in 134 are single-family units. Many of these are modern ranch and spilt-level style houses although there are some older Victorian houses in the area. The area also contains several new garden apartment complexes, one being quite large with several hundred units.

Housing is generally new and in sound or excellent condition.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

R A 134 is similar to other sections of Norwood and the burglary rate in the town is low.

E. SECURITY

Residences are vulnerable to breaking and entering because, as detached single-family and small multi-unit structures, there are many ground-level access points per unit.

Doors and windows are in good condition. However, there are a number of all-glass doors, and many have glass panes in or near them.

Some residences have special locks, usually on the front door only. Other security devices were not evident to observers. Lighting in the area is standard.

Except for the town center around Washington and Nahatan Streets, traffic is very light. One of the most notable aspects of the area is the emptiness of residential streets. There was little pedestrian traffic and few persons were seen in yards. There is also light traffic at night.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

R A 134 has a relatively low burglary rate. More burglaries occurred in the modern developments in the side roads off Walpole Street, in the southwest corner

of the area. Here several buildings were hit two or three times. Again, most breaks occurred during the day and usually the side or rear door was entered forcible. Most breaks took place on week days and were distributed fairly evenly through the year.

R A 134 is some distance from the core city and there is also a low rate of burglary in the surrounding neighborhood. However, a possible explanation for the divergency of the burglary rate within the area itself is that strangers may be less conspicuous in the modern developments, as many residents will be newcomers to the neighborhood. Also, the modern developments look more affluent than some of the older houses in the area.



A. Location

R A 736 is in the Chestnut Hill neighborhood of Newton, a large suburb immediately west of Boston. The area is bordered by Boston on the east and Brookline on the south. Several major thoroughfares and a subway line that runs to the perimeter of the area make R A 736 accessible to central Boston despite the distance of more than five miles.

B. Population Characteristics

The residents of R A 736 are characteristically white, upper or middle-income professionals. A relatively low proportion of persons under 18 years old coupled with a low proportion of one-person households is evidence of the predominance of couples without resident children. There is a high proportion of homeowners and a concommitant low transiency rate.

C. Housing Characteristics

Housing stock in R A 736 is predominantly detached single-family structures. The area has the highest percentage of this type of any area surveyed, and most structures are in sound or excellent condition. Property is expensive with residences valued at $50,000 or more.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The surrounding neighborhood, though not quite as affluent as, is similar to R A 736. It has a medium burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

Residences in the area are vulnerable to breaking and entering because, being predominantly detached single-family houses, there are many ground-level access points per unit. Furthermore, because of large yards, fences, hedges, shrubbery, and the distance from and angle to the street of neighboring houses, many access points have poor visibility to either passersby or neighbors.

Doors and windows are in good condition, but many doors have glass panes in or near them. Security devices in the area include a few alarm systems and special locks, usually on front doors only, but occassionally on other doors as well as windows.

Lighting in the area is generally standard. However, because of the size of yards, trees, and distance from the street, many houses are not well-lit at night.

Vehicular traffic on most streets in 736 is light to moderate. However, Commonwealth Avenue, Beacon Street, and Chestnut Hill are major arteries into Boston and receive heavy traffic, as do Hammond Pond and Hammond Street, the major cross streets in the area.

Pedestrian traffic is light.

F. CRIME PATTERNS.

There were two principal differences between R A 736 and most other R A 's. First, half the breaks occurred at night and second, the burglars entered through windows more frequently than doors. Most entries were made forcibly through the rear or side of the building. Most breaks took place on Fridays and Saturdays and during the summer months when people were probably assumed to be away.

Although R A 736 is a suburb five miles outside Boston, it is easily accessible from the core city by car or public transport. It is an obviously wealthy area with some, but not much, interchange between neighbors. Moreover, the distance between the houses and the number of access points not visible from the road make it easy for a stranger to go unnoticed.



R A 745

R A 745 consists of two non-contiguous areas of Newton, a large suburb adjacent to Boston. They each correspond to a census block area and are similar in socio-economic characteristics and housing stock, which in both is made up of large multi-family structures. The two areas were surveyed together to determine crime patterns in suburban apartment areas.

A. LOCATION

One area, Auburndale, is near the western boundary of Newton, approximately ten miles from central Boston. It is accessible to Boston by a subway line that terminates across the street from the area.

The other area, Newtonville, is located on the northern boundary of Newton, and is about two miles nearer central Boston. However, it is not accessible by subway and is somewhat difficult to locate without prior knowledge of the streets in the surrounding neighborhood.

B. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

The population in both the Newtonville and Auburndale areas is white, middle income white-collar workers. There are low proportions of children and elderly in the areas, and few one-person households. Almost all persons are renters.

This area scored low in social cohesion, but since most housing units are new it is not surprising that people have not established stable relationships.

C. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

Housing stock in the Newtonville and Auburndale areas is almost entirely made up of large multi-family units. These are new 2-3 story garden apartments which appear to be in sound condition.

D. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

The above apartment areas are surrounded by suburban residential neighborhoods of single-family houses and large open spaces. The apartments stand out in the neighborhood because they are high density concentrations in low density neighborhoods. The neighborhood has a medium burglary rate.

E. SECURITY

Auburndale and Newtonville are similar in that each is almost entirely made up of garden apartments surrounded by well-tended yards.

However, in Auburndale the structures are built facing a street that circles the interior of the complex and parking lots at the rear of buildings, forming a second street. Thus, both front and rear of buildings can be viewed from the street. The area has few shrubs and no trees.

In Newtonville most structures are built in a superblock with interior paths leading to centrally located parking lots. Many large shrubs line walks.

In the Auburndale area a number of security devices are in evidence: a buzzer system at entrances; glass doors reinforced with mesh at entrances and at entry to halls; and windows that cannot be pried open. Visibility of entrances is good.

Street lighting in Auburndale is standard. There are auxillary exterior lights attached to buildings.

In the Newtonville area exterior doors are wood panelled with no locks. Observers were able to enter buildings unchallenged. The apartments surveyed have key-in-knob locks. Visibility of many entrances is not possible from cars because of the superblock construction and the obstruction of shrubs.

Street lighting in Newtonville is standard. Exterior lights have been installed beside doors.

Vehicular traffic is very light during day and night in both areas and they are empty of pedestrians, even in good weather.

RA 745 was one of the lowest areas in terms of amount of time when dwellings were occupied.

F. CRIME PATTERNS

All entries in the Auburndale area and 60% of the entries in the Newtonville area were made through the door. Force was usually applied. In Newtonville almost two thirds of the burglaries occurred during the day, but in Auburndale

over half occurred at night. In both areas at least half the burglaries took place at the weekend when, in all cases, the residence was unoccupied.

Auburndale and Newtonville are both in Newton. Both areas have large multi family apartments occupied by white middle income residents. However, even though Newtonville is considerably less accessible from the core city than Auburndale, the burglary rate there was higher. There are two possible explanations. First the entrances to all the Auburndale apartments were highly visible from other apartment buildings and from the road - there is a very open layout - whereas the entrances to the Newtonville apartments can only be seen from one apartment building directly opposite. Second, the security level in the Auburndale apartments is higher than in Newtonville.





Table 1B

1970 CENSUS STATISTICS: NON-SURVEY AREAS

Reporting Area	62	135	143	214	232	296	297	306	308	319	421	467	470-	530	589	600	602	653	720	779	824
Population	2050	2278	1174	1668	857	917	1040	1186	795	2380	1401	681	827	196	1248	2588	1416	482	531	990	1860
% Black	1%	2%	1%	2%	--	86%	96%	78%	93%	96%	8%	63%	20%	—	95%	39%	8%	.7%	—	--	--
% Under 18	6%	7%	3%	31%	22%	34%	49%	36%	36%	42%	20%	39%	25%	36%	59%	36%	5%	37%	25%	25%	34%
% 62 and Over	13%	4%	30%	15%	28%	13%	7%	20%	13%	4%	15%	5%	15%	11%	5%	21%	13%	17%	21%	20%	12%
Total Units	1386	1385	800	640	301	342	301	313	279	815	549	206	268	59	410	1038	846	126	192	305	643
% in Single Unit Structures	—	.2%	.4%	24%	5%	11%	58%	6%	30%	3%	19%	16%	62%	53%	.4%	1%	7%	98%	26%	7%	8%
% in Structures of 10 or More Units	100%	57%	91%	--	23%	5%	13%	33%	--	44%	40%	6%	7%	--	87%	27%	75%	--	11%	--	.1%
% Owner Occupied	—	7%	--	38%	18%	26%	14%	25%	17%	12%	30%	51%	69%	42%	1%	.7%	6%	95%	48%	42%	31%
% Renter Occupied	100%	92%	100%	61%	81%	73%	85%	73%	82%	87%	69%	48%	30%	58%	98%	99%	93%	4%	52%	57%	67%
% Vacant	11%	7%	10%	15%	4%	11%	5%	11%	5%	3%	2%	4%	1%	—	17%	14%	13%	--	2%	2%	4%
Value Range of Owner Occupied Structures	—	46,900 57,100	--	6,900 12,300	--	5,300 13,800	9,600 15,800	12,200	18,400	14,800	17,100 26,300	20,500	19,000 23,000	16,800 21,700	--	--	19,000 21,800	28,000 39,000	21,000 24,300	21,500 23,300	9,600 13,200
Rent Range	$268	$158-271	$280	$46-87	$81-162	$87-102	$76-126	$76-108	$91-105	$89-126	$101-173	$118-139	$106-163	$76-88	$73	$67-183	$104-208	--	$107-141	$92 127	$64-75
% Units Occupied by One-person Households	52%	53%	51%	25%	32%	30%	15%	21%	17%	23%	20%	10%	9%	19%	13%	40%	57%	17%	22%	15%	19%
% Units Occupied by Female Head of Household	4%	3%	4%	17%	15%	17%	34%	28%	23%	31%	6%	14%	9%	5%	63%	29%	5%	11%	19%	16%	14%
Family and Unrelated Person Median Income	$6,628	$4,279	$9,421	$7,366	$8,365	$4,909	$4,962	$5,917	$5,441	$5,707	$8,903	$7,509	$8,903	$9,393	$1,139	$3,112	$6,170	$9,020	$11,161	$6,915	$7,889

-- Denotes none of this category present.

Table 1A

1970 CENSUS STATISICS SURVEYED AREAS

Reporting Area	57	70	83	145	166	196	256	265	291	307	315	447	505	622	775	736	745	134
Population	1355	2377	1349	1443	2091	3160	4708	1402	905	1029	801	791	409	3140	209	4104	251	9943
% Black	-----	.4%	-----	38%	50%	5%	60%	86%	60%	82%	85%	83%	----	.5%	7%	2%	-----	-----
% Under 18	30%	9%	23%	14%	41%	51%	61%	34%	24%	38%	27%	45%	30%	3%	11%	15%	9%	32%
% 62 and Over	14%	18%	17%	19%	14%	10%	9%	13%	23%	5%	24%	5%	19%	.7%	51%	1[illegible]%	7%	14%
Total Units	459	1451	576	771	740	937	1418	483	425	376	220	250	131	510	115	647	132	3281
% in Single Unit Structures	29%	11%	.6%	3%	6%	3%	-----	11%	9%	3%	13%	7%	47%	6%	6%	78%	7%	46%
% in Structures of 10 or more Units	8%	38%	22%	40%	63%	72%	96%	16%	.4%	39%	.9%	----	-----	42%	9%	2%	91%	22%
% Owner Occupied	42%	17%	12%	7%	3%	6%	-----	21%	19%	6%	37%	30%	66%	8%	13%	80%	5%	52%
% Renter Occupied	58%	83%	88%	93%	97%	94%	100%	79%	81%	94%	63%	70%	34%	92%	87%	20%	95%	48%
% Vacant	6%	7%	8%	10%	8%	4%	18%	8%	24%	6%	8%	11%	1%	10%	3%	1%	3%	4%
Value Range of Owner Occupied Structures	$12,200 $20,200	$52,300 $60,000	----	$22,500	-----	$6,300 $6,900	------	$11,700 $14,800	$5,400 $11,400	------	$14,400 $15,400	$13,800	$21,400 $23,800	$37,700	------	$51,800	$29,200	$28,800
Rent Range	$73 $116	$167 $252	$43 $76	$88 $128	$74 $96	$53 $85	$69 $75	$91 $107	$64 $90	$99 $106	$98 $115	$83 $102	$109 $113	$132 $181	$88	$198	$222	$154
% Units Occupied by One-person Households	21%	52%	32%	55%	31%	33%	23%	25%	35%	21%	16%	16%	10%	53%	54%	12%	29%	18%
% Units Occupied by Female Head of Household	12%	2%	8%	6%	29%	32%	42%	19%	19%	33%	21%	23%	13%	2%	7%	7%	4%	7%
Family and Unrelated Person Median Income	$7,100	$7,111	$5,964	$2,650	$3,362	$3,550	$3,459	$4,909	$3,938	$5,779	$6,471	$6,694	$10,000	$1,127	$5,386	$30,482	$11,161	$12,542

----Denotes none of this category present.

Table 2A

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE PER 1000 HOUSEHOLDS[1]

SURVEY AREAS

	1969		1970		1971[2]		Average Yearly Rate
	Incidence/Units	Rate	Incidence/Units	Rate	Incidence/Units	Rate	
57	6/459	13	4/459	9	5.3/459	11	11
70	9/1351	7	27/1351	20	69.3/1351	50	26
83	2/576	3	4/576	7	9.3/576	16	9
134[3]	--	--	14/3281	4	25/3281	8	6
145	85/771	110	61/771	79	77.3/771	100	97
166	16/740	21	15/740	20	10.6/740	14	18
196	6/835	7	8/835	9	2.6/835	3	6
256	46/1418	32	51/1418	36	116/1418	82	50
265	25/483	52	15/483	31	25.3/483	52	45
291	2/425	5	8/425	19	16/425	38	20
307	23/376	61	29/376	77	28/376	74	71
315	12/220	56	13/220	59	25.3/220	111	75
447	2/250	8	2/250	8	2.6/250	10	9
505	-/131	--	4/131	31	1.3/131	10	14
622	36/510	71	56/510	110	84/510	164	116
736[3]	--	--	23/647	35	24/647	37	36
745[3]	--	--	6/132	45	5/132	37	41
775	8/115	70	2/115	17	12/115	104	64

1. Number of units based on 1970 Census Statistics.

2. Boston Police data not available for Period October through December 1971. Figures given here are estimated number of incidents and rates extrapolated from October through December.

3. Suburban police data for 1969 was unavailable.

Table 2B

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE PER 1000 HOUSEHOLDS[1]

NON-SURVEY AREAS

	1969		1970		1971[2]		Average Yearly Rate
	Incidence/Units	Rate	Incidence/Units	Rate	Incidence/Units	Rate	
135	102/1385	74	100/1385	72	146.3/1385	106	83
143	6/800	8	6/800	8	13.3/800	17	10
214	0/640	0	4/640	6	5.3/640	8	4
232	2/301	7	1/301	3	4/301	13	7
296	11/342	32	19/342	56	27.6/342	66	5
297	11/301	37	11/301	37	25.3/301	84	52
306	15/313	48	10/313	32	10.6/313	34	38
308	13/279	47	22/279	79	38.6/279	138	88
319	50/815	61	76/815	93	54.6/815	67	73
421	2/549	4	4/549	7	4/549	7	6
467	10/206	49	9/206	44	10.6/206	51	47
470	13/268	49	6/268	22	12/268	45	37
589	2/410	5	5/410	12	73.3/410	179	65
600	5/1038	5	3/1038	3	16/1038	15	7
602	3/846	4	2/846	2	1.3/846	2	2
653	15/126	119	6/126	48	2.6/126	21	62
779	4/305	13	4/305	13	5.3/305	17	14
824	2/643	3	4/643	6	1.3/643	2	3
62	0/1386	0	0/1386	0	0/1386	0	0
530	0/59	0	0/59	0	0/59	0	0
720	2/192	10	1/192	5	27/192	14 13	10

1. Number of units based on 1970 Census Statistics.

2. Boston Police data not available for Period October through December 1971. Figures given here are estimated number of incidents and rates extrapolated from October through December.

Table 3

RA's IN EACH SUB-SAMPLE

Main Sample		Low Youth	Suburban
57	308	62	134
83	315	70	720
166	319	135	736
196	421	143	745
214	447	602	
232	467	622	
256	470	775	
265	505		
291	530		
296	589		
297	600		
306	653		
307	779		
	825		

Table 4

AVERAGE ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE
BY LOCATION OF REPORTING AREA

Core RA's[1]		RA's Adjacent to Core[2]		Outlying RA's[3]	
RA	Rate/1000 Units	RA	Rate/1000 Units	RA	Rate/1000 Units
62	0	57	11	134	6
70	26	196	6	530	0
83	9	214	4	720	10
135	83	232	7	736	36
143	10	256	50	745	41
145	97	421	6		
166	18	447	9		
265	45	467	47		
291	20	470	37		
296	56	505	9		
297	52	653	62		
306	38	775	64		
307	71	779	14		
308	88	824	3		
315	75				
319	73				
589	65				
600	7				
602	2				
622	116				

GROUP RATES[4]	
Core	39
Adjacent to Core	22
Outlying	12

[1]Core RA's are those within Districts 1, 4, 9 and 10.
[2]Adjacent RA's are those within police districts that adjoin the core districts. As noted (see pp.), Boston Police District boundaries conform to historic towns so that an adjacent RA could be seen as one in a "town" that adjoins the core city.
[3]Outlying is all other RA's.
[4]Difference in group rates are not significant at the .05 level.

Table 5

AVERAGE ANNUAL BURGLARY RATE:
RA COMPARED TO SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOOD

	RA #	RA Residential Rate/1000 DUs	Total[1] Neighborhood Rate/1000 Persons[2]	Neighborhood Residential Rate/ 1000 Persons
RA's In Low Rate Neighborhoods	57	11	7.2	2.6
	83	9	9.2	2.8
	134	6	2.7	
	196	6	9.9	3.5
	214	4	9.9	3.5
	232	7	3.7	2.0
	505	14	8.3	4.9
	530	0	3.8	2.6
	600	7	11.2	9.2
	602	2	11.2	9.2
	653	62	8.8	7.5
	720	10	6.5	2.3
	779	14	9.0	6.1
	824	3	6.7	2.5
RA's In Medium Rate Neighborhoods	62	0	21.1	16.6
	70	26	21.1	16.6
	256	50	24.5	15.5
	291	20	17.8	13.7
	421	6	14.3	11.0
	447	9	16.9	13.0
	467	48	14.3	11.0
	470	38	14.3	11.0
	589	65	8.6	7.2
	622	116	19.9	15.5
	736	36	11.8	7.1
	745	41	11.8	7.1
	775	64	13.6	8.9
RA's In High Rate Neighborhoods	135	83	59.1	49.6
	143	10	28.9	15.0
	145	98	39.9	15.0
	166	18	33.1	14.0
	265	45	32.8	26.6
	296	56	32.9	26.6
	297	52	34.2	28.0
	306	38	31.5	26.7
	307	71	31.5	26.7
	308	88	34.2	28.0
	315	75	31.5	26.7
	319	73	31.5	26.7

Neighborhood Rate[3]	Average RA Rate
Low	8
Medium	28
High	55

[1]Total neighborhood rate includes residential and non-residential burglaries.

[2]Burglary rates are calculated by 1000 persons rather than dwellings, since the number of non-residential structures at risk is unknown.

[3]Difference in group rates significant at .05 level.

Table 6

REGRESSION RESULTS: NEIGHBORHOOD BURGLARY RATE

Sample[1]	Constant	Coefficient	R^2	F
Complete (N=39)	*[2]	.0003 (3.96)[3]	.28	15.7
Main (N=28)	*	.0004 (4.89)	.47	23.9
Low Youth	*	*	*	*

1. Samples explained in text.
2. Indicates not significantly different from zero at .05 level.
3. Number in parentheses are t values.

Table 7

AVERAGE ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE
BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF REPORTING AREAS

White RA's	Rate/1000 Units	Mixed RA's	Rate/1000 Units	Black RA's	Rate/1000 Units
57	11	145	97	265	45
62	0	166	18	296	56
70	26	256	50	297	52
83	9	291	20	306	38
134	6	467	47	307	71
135	83	470	37	308	88
143	10	600	7	315	75
196	6			319	73
214	4			447	9
232	7			589	65
421	6				
505	9				
530	0				
602	2				
622	116				
653	62				
720	10				
736	36				
745	41				
775	64				
779	14				
824	3				

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE[1]	
White	19
Mixed	40
Black	59

[1]Group rates significant at .05 level.

Table 8

REGRESSION RESULTS: PERCENTATE NON-WHITE

Sample[1]	Constant	Coefficient	R^2	F
Complete (N=39)	.03 (3.90)[2]	.0004 (2.82)	.16	7.97
Main (N=28)	*[3]	.0006	.54	32.3
Low Youth (N=7)	*	*	*	*

1. Samples explained in text.
2. Numbers in parentheses are t values.
3. Indicates not significantly different from zero at .05 level.

Table 9

AVERAGE ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE

BY INCOME LEVEL

LOWER		MIDDLE		HIGHER	
RA#	RATE/1000 DUs	RA #	RATE/1000 DUs	RA #	RATE/1000 DUs
135	83	57	11	134	6
145	97	62	0	143	10
166	18	70	26	232	7
196	6	83	9	421	6
256	50	214	4	470	37
265	45	306	38	505	9
291	20	307	71	530	0
296	56	308	88	653	62
297	52	315	75	720	10
589	65	319	73	736	36
600	7	367	47	745	41
622	116	447	9		
		602	2		
		775	84		
		779	14		
		824	3		

INCOME	RATE
Lower	47
Middle	27
Higher	13

[1]This definition of income provides for a relative ranking of an area rather than an absolute one as used in Chapter VI, pp. . Thus, an RA may have a higher income level relative to other areas without actually being a "high" income area.

[2]Group rates significantly different at .05 level.

Table 10

REGRESSION RESULTS: MEDIAN INCOME

Sample[1]	Constant	Coefficient	R^2	F
Complete	.05	-.0002	.05	3.16
(N=39)	(5.41)[2]	(-1.77)		
Main	.06	-.0004	.06	2.92
(N=28)	(3.75)	(-1.71)		
Low Youth	.141	-.002	.62	10.7
(N=7)	(5.27)	(-3.27)		
Suburban	-	.0001	.19	13.8
(N=4)		(3.03)		

[1]Samples described in text previously.

[2]Numbers in parentheses are t values.

Table 11

AVERAGE ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE

BY PREDOMINANT HOUSING TYPE IN RA

Single Family	Rate/ 1000 D.U.s	Small Multi-Unit	Rate/ 1000 D.U.s	Large Multi-Unit	Rate/ 1000 D.U.s	Public Public Housing	Rate/ 1000 D.U.s
134	6	57	11	62	0	166	18
470	37	83	9	70	26	196	6
505	9	214	4	135	83	256	50
530	0	232	7	143	10	297	52
653	62	265	45	145	97	306	38
736	36	291	20	307	71	589	65
		296	56	421	6	600	7
		308	88	602	2		
		315	75	622	116		
		319	73	745	41		
		447	9	775	64		
		467	47				
		720	10				
		779	14				
		824	3				

	RATE/1000 D.U.s[1]
Single Family	14
Small Multi-unit	30
Large Multi-unit	37
Public Housing	34

[1] Difference between group rates not significant at the .05 level.

Table 12

REGRESSION RESULTS: HOUSING

Sample[1]	Constant	Coefficient	R^2	F
Complete (N=39)	.04 (4.69)[2]	*[3]	*	*
Main (N=28)	.03 (4.21)	*	.01	1.04
Low Youth (N=7)	.110 (2.55)	*	.08	1.48

[1] Samples explained in text.

[2] Numbers in parentheses are t values.

[3] * indicates not significantly different from zero at .05 level.

Table 13

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY

BY PERCENT POPULATION UNDER 18

%	RA	Avg. Annual Rate/1000 D.U.s
LESS THAN 20%	62	0
	70	26
	135	83
	143	10
	145	97
	602	2
	622	116
	736	36
	745	41
	775	64
LESS THAN 30%	83	9
	232	7
	291	20
	315	75
	421	6
	470	37
	720	10
	779	14
LESS THAN 40%	57	
	134	6
	214	4
	265	45
	296	56
	306	38
	467	47
	505	9
	530	0
	600	7
	653	62
	824	3
	307	71
	308	88
MORE THAN 40%	166	18
	196	6
	256	50
	297	52
	319	73
	447	9
	589	67

Average Annual Rate/1000 Units[1]	
Less than 20%	37
Less than 30%	18
Less than 40%	19
Over 40%	41

[1]Difference between groups not significant at .05 level.

Figure 1

SCATTER PLOT OF HOUSING VARIABLE VERSES BURGLARY RATE



Table 14

REGRESSION RESULTS AGE

Sample[1]	Constant	Coefficient	R^2	F
Complete (N=39)	.04 (3.42)[2]	*	*	*
Main (N=8)	*[3]	.03 (2.20)	*	4.83

[1] Samples explained in text.

[2] Numbers in parentheses are t values

[3] * indicates not significantly different from zero at .05 level.



Fig. 2. SCATTER PLOT OF YOUTH vs. BURGLARY RATE

Table 15

AVERAGE ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE

BY DWELLING OCCUPANCY RATES

	RA	RATE/1000 D.U.s
LOW OCCUPANCY	622 745 775	116 41 64
MIDDLE OCCUPANCY	57 70 134 145 265 291 307 505 736	11 26 6 97 45 20 71 9 36
HIGH OCCUPANCY	83 166 196 256 315 447	9 18 6 50 75 9

Occupancy	Rates[1]
Low	94
Medium	27
High	28

[1]Differences between groups is not significant at the .05 level.

Table 16

AVERAGE ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE

BY DEGREE OF SOCIAL COHESION[1]

	RA	RATE/ 1000 D.U.s
LOW COHESION	307 622 745	71 116 41
MEDIUM COHESION	70 134 145 166 196 256 265 291 315 447 736 775	26 6 97 18 6 50 45 20 75 9 36 64
HIGH COHESION	57 83 505	11 9 9

Cohesion	Rate[2]
Low	90
Medium	28
High	16

[1]Includes only RA's in the household survey.

[2]Differences between groups is not significant at the .05 level.

Table 17

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY BY PATTERNS OF ATTACK

RA Number	Day	Night	Front	Rear/Side	Door	Window	Number
57	43	57	83	17	70	30	11
62+							0
70	80	20	72	28	76	24	69
83+							9
134	56	44	48	52	79	21	39
135	79	21	77	23	80	20	343
143	79	21	58	42	100	--	21
145	81	19	74	26	84	16	104
166	65	35	73	27	79	21	37
196	57	43	100	--	15	85	12
214+							8
232+							6
256	56	44	82	18	40	60	172
265	68	32	35	65	51	49	48
291	75	25	37	63	51	43	18
296	76	24	49	51	66	33	48
297	63	37	41	59	47	53	21
306	79	21	52	48	53	47	34
307	74	26	47	53	66	33	76
308	80	20	54	46	66	34	66
316	69	31	80	20	73	27	16
319	80	20	38	62	59	41	167
421	60	40	--	100	44	56	10
447+							2
467	68	32	38	62	67	33	30
470	57	43	23	77	72	28	28
505+							5
530+							0
589	78	22	95	5	81	19	62
600	44	56	42	58	31	69	22
602+							6
622	82	18	81	19	76	24	126
653	71	29	40	60	70	30	23
720+							5
736	50	50	20	80	45	55	47
745	50	50	64	36	82	18	11
775	75	25	67	33	85	15	16
779	80	20	57	43	100	--	12
824+							7

+ Insufficient number of incidents from which to develop pattern

Table 18

RESIDENTIAL ROBBERY RATE PER 1000 PERSONS[1]

JANUARY 1969 - DECEMBER 1971

Reporting Area	No. of Incidents	Average Rate/ 1000 Persons
135	5	+
143	2	+
145	19	4
166	20	4
256	47	4
265	1	+
296	6	2
297	1	+
306	2	+
307	2	+
315	1	+
319	6	+
467	1	+
589	22	6
600	15	2
622	2	+

[1]Omitted areas had no robberies
+Less than 1/1000

TABLE 19

ROBBERY PATTERNS
IN SURVEY RA'S

	166	145	256	589	600
Place Where Robbery Occurred					
Within dwelling unit	16%	42%	22%	23%	27%
Outside dwelling unit	84%	58%	78%	77%	73%
Time					
Daytime	79%	48%	50%	77%	60%
Nightime	21%	52%	50%	23%	40%
Type of Threat					
Gun	10%	37%	15%	23%	7%
Knife	--	16%	22%	55%	33%
Physical force	79%	37%	41%	17%	60%
Other (razor, blunt object)	--	10%	4%	5%	--
Unknown	10%	--	17%	--	--
Offender described as:					
White	--	16%	2%	--	--
Black	84%	84%	91%	100%	100%
Other	5%	--	4%	--	--
Unknown	10%	--	2%	--	--
Age					
16 or less	5%	11%	13%	18%	--
17-20	35%	21%	57%	32%	40%
21-25	10%	47%	17%	14%	20%
Over 25	20%	5%	2%	--	13%
Unknown	30%	15%	11%	36%	27%

MAP C2



THE METROPOLITAN CORE

CITY OF BOSTON

MAP C3



BLACKS AS A % OF TOTAL POPULATION*
1970

31-50%

51-90%

*Boston Sunday Globe
January 7, 1973
p.57

MAP C4



RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES
PER 1000 RESIDENTS
BY NEIGHBORHOOD-1971

Less than 10/1000

10-19/1000

20-30/1000

Over 30/1000

MAP C5



RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATE
PER 1000 DWELLING UNITS
SELECTED RA'S 1969-1971

HIGH

MEDIUM

LOW

Multivariate Regression Analysis

Variable Definitions are as follows:

Y=Reported burglary rate per occupied dwelling unit

X_1 =Median income of the reporting area

X_2 =Mean number of household members below 18 years of age

X_3 =% of non-white residents in reporting area

X_4 =% of occupied dwelling units in buildings with over 10 units

X_5 =Neighborhood burglary rate

$$Y=\alpha_0+\sum_{\kappa=1}^{5}\alpha_\kappa X_\kappa + u_\kappa$$

Table 20 presents the results of five separate regressions taking one variable at a time,and the one equation taking five variables at a time. While all coefficients have the "expected" sign, only in the cases of income, race and neighborhood burglary rate do they achieve any level of significance. Further, the use and interpretation of explanation variable X_5, total burglary rate in the surrounding neighborhood, is rather complicated since it is itself in part a function of the dependent variable Y. At the limit where neighborhood and RA become coterminus, it would "explain" the data perfectly. Furthermore, to the

Table 20

REGRESSION RESULTS ON COMPLETE SAMPLE

α_0	α_1	α_2	α_3	α_4	α_5	R^{-2}	f
53.2	-0.21					.07	3.16
(5.41	(-1.78						
36.6		2.13				.00	0.05
(3.42)		(0.21)					
26.3			.38			.16	7.97
(3.90)			(2.82)				
36.5				0.07		.00	.16
(4.68)				(0.40)			
5.84					.324	.28	15.6
(0.61)					(3.96)		
19.4	-0.12	-1.10	0.10	-0.16	.297		
(1.09)	(-1.00)	(-.09)	(0.43)	(-.87)	(2.31)	.26	3.65

[1]Numbers in parentheses are t values all coefficient values x 10^{-3} complete sample (N=39)

extent that the socio-economic structure of the RA's tend to be spatially continuous, there will be a high degree of collinearity between X_5 and the remaining variables, and thus the reliability of the coefficient estimates is worsened. In addition to these significance and interpretation problems, the "fit" of the equations is quite poor.

To improve the performance of the regression equations the areas of either particularly high income or low youth populations were eliminated. As explained in Chapter 5, burglary seems to be caused by different factors in these areas, and hence the linear approximation implicit in the regression model might break down. RA's containing fewer than one person 18 years or younger per four dwelling units and the outlying areas were removed from the sample for the next stage of the analysis.

The results of the initial analysis on this reduced sample are presented in Table 21. Again, in the single variable regressions all of the coefficients have the "expected" sign. In addition all variables are significant, including the measure of youth and housing type that were not significant with the complete sample. In all cases the "fit" is improved, with the variation explained by the equation increasing by nearly 75%.

Table 21

MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS MAJOR SUBSAMPLE

α_o	α_1	α_2	α_3	α_4	α_5	R^2	f
61.6 (3.75)	-.428 (-1.71)					.10	2.92
4.68 (0.32)		25.8 (2.20)				.16	4.83
10.8 (1.88)			.554 (5.68)			.56	32.3
30.5 (4.21				.206 (1.02)		.04	1.04
-1.53 (-0.18)					.389 (4.89)	.49	23.9
-42.7 (-1.47)	.463 (.163)	9.78 (0.77)	.442 (1.76)	.135 (.609)	.162 (0.91)	.63	7.07

*Note: Numbers in parentheses are t values all coefficient values x 10^{-3} main subsample (N=28)

$$Y=\alpha_o+\sum_{K=1}^{5}\alpha_K X_K$$

No other regression equation provides such consistently high values for the coefficient test statistic.

This multivariable equation helps disentangle the effects of the socio-economic variables considered. First, when racial factors are held constant burglary rates increase with affluence. As noted previously, without controlling for race, burglary rates increase with income in relatively affluent suburban areas, and decrease with income in all other areas. Second, in most cases, crime rates increase with the number of people under 18 in the reporting area. Only in the RA's with few young people is crime invariant with this factor; income, racial composition, housing types, and neighborhood burglary rates do not influence this effect. Third, the racial composition of the RA is the most important and most stable prediction of burglary rates. However, as is pointed out elsewhere in this report, racial composition is often covariant with other determinents of crime such as physical and behavioral vulnerability. Finally, all these factors held constant there is a spill-over effect of crime: RA's surrounded by high burglary rate areas tend to have worse crime than otherwise. This effect, however, may simply be a measurement of socio-economic continuity rather than a statement of the causes of crime patterns.

The next step involves reducing the number of variables included in the regression equation to improve the reliability of the estimated coefficients. Clearly the racial variable is the best single explainant, but the neighborhood burglary rate performs nearly as well. However, the race variable is the only independent variable to enter the five variable equation significantly. In fact, all others have t values less than unity, and hence reduce the reliability of the estimated equation. Because of the good univariate performance of these two variables, two series of bivariate analyses were performed to combine the other socio-economic variables first with race and second with the neighborhood burglary rate.

In the results presented in Table 22, the race variable was retained in each equation. It is impossible not to notice the stability of the ethnic coefficient and its fairly high level of significance in each case. None of the other variables show significance in these regressions, but it is interesting to note that income now appears with a positive coefficient, indicating that with racial variables held constant, increased income is associated with higher burglary rates.

Results based on regression equations using the "neighborhood" burglary rate as an independent variable are

Table 22[1]

MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS: RACE

α_o	α_1	α_2	α_3	α_4	α_5	R^{-2}	f
-4.80 (-0.29)	0.21 (3.97)		0.62 (5.21)			.58	16.6
0.45 (.03)		6.29 (0.66)	0.53 (4.79)			.57	16.0
9.99 (1.60)			0.55 (5.39)	.05 (.33)		.56	16.3

[1]Numbers in parentheses are t values
all coefficient values x 10^{-3} main subsample (N=28)

$$Y=\alpha_o+\sum_{K=1}^{S}\alpha_K X_K$$

presented in Table 23. These regressions take the three socio-economic variables and combine them each in turn with X_5. Reasonable fit is obtained in these results, but in no case do they provide improvements over the results using pairs of socio-economic variables including race as shown in Table 22. It is also interesting to note that the functional dependence of Y on X_5 described above does not appear to dominate, as would be the case if the coefficient X_5 was close to unity. As in Table 22, race appears to provide the most explanatory power of the socio-economic variables.

Finally, the race variable and the neighborhood burglary rate were considered together with the other socio-economic variables included. By dropping the housing variable from the five variable equation presented in Table 23, the equation below with four independent variables was obtained (numbers in parentheses are t values, all coefficient values X 10^{-3}).

α_o	α_1	α_2	α_3	α_5	R^{-2}	f
-38.6 (-1.39)	.37 (1.56)	14.0 (1.35)	.38 (1.67)	.17 (1.08)	.56	9.00

Table 23[1]

MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS: NEIGHBORHOOD BURGLARY RATE

α_o	α_1	α_2	α_3	α_5	R^{-2}	f
-16.5 (0.76)	.18 (0.75)			.43 (4.36)	.46	12.0
-13.8 (-1.14)		13.2 (1.40)		.35 (4,31)	.49	13.4
7.3 (0.8)			.46 (2.09)	.08 (0.50)	.54	15.8

[1]Numbers in parentheses are t values
coefficient values x 10^{-3} main subsample (N=28)

$$Y=\alpha_o+\sum_{\kappa=1}^{5}\alpha_\kappa X_\kappa$$

APPENDIX D
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA

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APPENDIX D

Table 1

EXTENT OF MULTIPLE - VICTIMIZATION IN LOW, MIDDLE AND HIGH CRIME RATE RA'S*

% of Victims Who Were Victimized More than Once	
HC RA's	43%
MC RA's	24
LC RA's	32
TOTAL	28

Table 2

VICTIMIZATION BY RACE

	V. rate**	(n)	% Multiply Victimized
Black	130	(294)	46%
White	110	(679)	22
		(898)	

*"Crime Rate", in these tables, refers only to the residential burglary rate.

**The victimization rate per thousand is based on weighted frequencies. The number of cases (n) refer to the actual number of interviews.

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 3

VICTIMIZATION BY RACE AND INCOME IN LOW, MIDDLE AND HIGH CRIME RA'S

HC RA's	V. rate	(n)	Burglary Incidence
Black			
Less than $8,000	80	(87)	120
$8,000-$14,999	180	(30)	180
$15,000 +	230	(20)	370
White			
Less than $8,000	120	(80)	180
$8,000-$14,999	180	(30)	250
$15,000 +	260	(20)	370
MC RA's			
Black			
Less than $8,000	200	(51)	270
$8,000-$14,999	270	(23)	280
$15,000 +	350	(8)	710
White			
Less than $8,000	60	(66)	70
$8,000-$14,999	210	(48)	210
$15,000 +	240	(70)	270
LC RA's			
Black			
Less than $8,000	70	(29)	110
$8,000-$14,999	290	(14)	360
$15,000 +	130	(8)	400
White			
Less than $8,000	80	(110)	130
$8,000-$14,999	50	(75)	50
$15,000 +	110	(33)	110

*Figures for Blacks in low crime RA's are based on RA's 196 and 447. If these two RA's are really middle or high crime areas as survey figures suggest, there are no blacks in the low crime RA's.

Statistically significant at the .05 level in high and middle crime RA's only.

Table 4

VICTIMIZATION BY EDUCATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

	V. Rate	(n)
Less than grade 12	210	(284)
High school graduate	270	(253)
Any college	310	(265)
Higher degree	430	(95)
		(897)

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 5

VICTIMIZATION BY OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

	V. Rate	(n)
Professional	430	(179)
Manager	340	(87)
Clerical	350	(112)
Sales	250	(40)
Skilled worker	300	(83)
Semi-skilled worker	190	(115)
Service worker	320	(102)
Unskilled	190	(142)

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 6

VICTIMIZATION RATE BY AGE OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

	V. Rate	(n)
30 years of less	230	(319)
31 - 64 years	150	(406)
65 or more years	90	(138)
		(863)

Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 7

AGE OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD OF THOSE PERSONS IN THE STUDIED RA'S REPORTING A BURGLARY TO THE POLICE (N = 1526)

Age	Percentage reporting a burglary
Under 21 years	10%
21 - 30 years	44
31 - 40 years	16
41 - 50 years	13
51 - 65 years	12
65+ years	5

Table 8

% WITH HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 30 YEARS OF AGE OR YOUNGER AND VICTIMIZATION IN LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH CRIME RATE RA'S

	V. Rate	(n)	% of sample less than 30 yrs. old
HC RA's	390	(129)	44%
MC RA's	270	(85)	35
LC RA's	200	(73)	22
		(287)	

Table 9

VICTIMIZATION BY AGE AND MARITAL STATUS OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

	V. Rate	(n)
Head to 40 yrs, not married	440	(147)
Head 40-64 yrs, not married	390	(69)
Head to 40 yrs, married (with or without children)	290	(311)
Head 40-64 yrs, married (with or without children)	270	(198)
Head 65 yrs. +	160	(138)
		(863)

Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 10

VICTIMIZATION BY NUMBER OF HOURS DWELLING UNOCCUPIED ON USUAL DAY

	V. Rate	(n)
None to two hours a day	120	(314)
2 - 7 hours a day	170	(331)
8 or more hours a day	280	(238)
		(883)

Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 11

VICTIMIZATION BY OCCUPANCY IN LOW, MIDDLE, AND HIGH CRIME RA'S

	V. Rate	(n)	Incidence
HC RA's			
Out 0-5 hrs/wk	70	(108)	100
Out 5-35 hrs/wk	150	(80)	200
Out 35 or more	160	(91)	220
MC RA's			
Out 0-5 hrs/wk	130	(112)	160
Out 5-35 hrs/wk	170	(93)	180
Out 35 or more	220	(87)	270
LC RA's			
Out 0-5 hrs/wk	60	(152)	70
Out 5-35 hrs/wk	110	(89)	110
Out 35 or more	80	(52)	160
		(864)	

Statistically significant at the .05 level in high and middle crime RA's only.

Table 12

VICTIMIZATION BY SOCIAL ISOLATION

	V. Rate	(n)	Incidence
Isolated	140	(289)	200
Somewhat isolated	100	(403)	130
Not isolated	120	(210)	130
		(902)	

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 13

VICTIMIZATION BY SOCIAL ISOLATION
IN LOW, MIDDLE, AND HIGH CRIME RA'S

	V. Rate	(n)	Incidence	% Multiply-victimized
HC RA's				
Isolated	130	(122)	190	46%
Somewhat isolated	70	(115)	120	71
Not isolated	210	(56)	230	10
MC RA's				
Isolated	200	(95)	230	15%
Somewhat isolated	150	(149)	180	20
Not isolated	220	(62)	250	14
LC RA's				
Isolated	100	(72)	170	70%
Somewhat isolated	80	(139)	100	25
Not isolated	30	(92)	40	33
		(902)		

Statistically significant at the .05 level in low crime RA's only.

Table 14

VICTIMIZATION BY SECURITY BEHAVIOR IN
LOW, MIDDLE AND HIGH CRIME RA'S

	V. Rate	(n)	Incidence	% Multiply-victimized
HC RA's				
Locks windows	80	(113)	100	25%
Does not lock windows	50	(130)	50	--
MC RA's				
Locks windows	140	(138)	140	--
Does not lock windows	50	(126)	50	--
LC RA's				
Locks windows	60	(150)	70	17%
Does not lock windows	40	(137)	60	50%
		(794)		

Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 15

VICTIMIZATION BY CONCERN ABOUT BEING BURGLARIZED IN
LOW, MIDDLE AND HIGH CRIME RA'S

HC RA's	V. Rate	(n)
High	330	(205)
Low	180	(80)
MC RA's		
High	370	(148)
Low	190	(143)
LC RA's		
High	360	(83)
Low	80	(204)
		(863)

Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 16

DEGREE OF CONCERN ABOUT BEING BURGLARIZED BY RACE IN LOW, MIDDLE AND HIGH CRIME RA'S

	% High Concern	(n)
HC RA's		
Black	80%	(159)
White	62	(132)
MC RA's		
Black	48%	(82)
White	51	(167)
LC RA's		
Black*	58%	(50)
White	27	(273)
		(863)

*Figures for blacks here are based on RA's 196 and 447. If these two RA's are really middle or high crime areas, as survey figures suggest, there are no blacks in the low crime RA's.

Table 17

DEGREE OF CONCERN ABOUT BEING BURGLARIZED BY RESPONDENT'S HOUSING TYPE AND VICTIMIZATION

	% High Concern	V. Rate[1]	(n)	% Multiply-victimized
Public housing	61%	70	(244)	57%
Large multi-unit	36	100	(225)	10
Small multi-unit	35	140	(162)	21
Single family	33	110	(234)	18
			(863)	

1 Victim rate stated for housing type overall.

Table 18

DEGREE OF CONCERN ABOUT BEING BURGLARIZED BY SEX OF RESPONDENT

	% High Concern	(n)
Male	31%	(302)
Female	57	(561)

Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 19

DEGREE OF CONCERN ABOUT BEING BURGLARIZED BY INCOME

	% High Concern	(n)
Less than $8,000	48%	(424)
$8,000-$14,999	38	(209)
$15,000 or more	43	(169)
		(802)

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 20

DEGREE OF CONCERN ABOUT BEING BURGLARIZED BY DISTANCE OF DWELLING UNIT FROM THE CORE CITY

	% High Concern	(n)
Core city	52%	(343)
Adjacent	71	(252)
Outlying	30	(268)
		(863)

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 21

NEIGHBORHOOD CONCERN ABOUT CRIME

	Victims	Non-victims	% Sample	(n)
Yes	25%	17%	19%	(169)
No	75	83	81	(719)
			100%	(888)

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 22

NEIGHBORHOOD DECISION TO TAKE ACTION ON CRIME

	victims	Non-victims	% of Sample	(n)
Yes	12%	6%	7%	(62)
No	12	11	11	(98)
Have not met with neighbors	76	83	82	(728)
			100%	(888)

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 23

NEIGHBORHOOD ACTION AGAINST CRIME

	Victims	Non-victims	% of Sample	(n)
Multi-problem group	9%	4%	5%	(44)
Crime oriented	1	1	1	(9)
Other	2	1	1	(9)
Inappropriate	88	94	93	(826)
			100%	(888)

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 24

RESPONDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF CITIZEN PATROL GROUPS

	victims	Non-victims	% of sample	(n)
Yes	62%	55%	57%	(514)
No	38	45	43	(388)
			100%	(902)

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 25

RESPONDENT'S OPINION OF CITIZEN PATROL GROUPS

	Victims	Non-victims	% of sample	(n)
"A good idea"	77%	63%	65%	(586)
"A bad idea"	14	15	15	(136)
Don't know	9	22	20	(180)
			100%	(902)

Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 26

BURGLARY INSURANCE

		Victims	Non-victims	% of sample	(n)
Owns policy	Yes	35%	39%	38%	(342)
	No	65	61	62	(557)
				100%	(899)
If not, why?	Too expensive	17%	15%	15%	(134)
	Can't - high risk neighborhood	12	10	10	(90)
	Can't - too many claims already	2	--	--	(4)
	Don't think will be burglarized	2	2	2	(18)
	Never thought about it	10	11	11	(98)
	Nothing worth insuring	14	14	14	(126)
	Other	5	1	2	(18)
	NA	3	7	6	(53)
	Has insurance	35	39	38	(342)
				100%	(883)

Table 27

BURGLARY INCIDENCE RATE OF UNITS WITHOUT ACCESSIBLE WINDOWS IN MULTI-FAMILY STRUCTURES BY NUMBER OF DOORS LEADING INTO THE STRUCTURE

	1 Door		2 Doors		3 Doors	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
ALL RAs						
Small multi-unit	63	(42)	153	(89)	474	(23)
Large multi-unit	128	(76)	86	(34)	0	(6)
HIGH CRIME						
Small multi-unit	159	(17)	161	(43)	209	(11)
Large multi-unit	27	(21)	60	(16)	0	(1)
MIDDLE CRIME						
Small multi-unit	17	(16)	225	(25)	116	(4)
Large multi-unit	41	(35)	39	(16)	0	(4)
LOW CRIME						
Small multi-unit	0	(9)	62	(21)	795	(8)
Large multi-unit	483	(20)	500	(2)	0	(1)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between (1) number of doors and crime rate (2) number of doors and housing type.

Table 28

BURGLARY INCIDENCE RATE OF UNITS IN MULTI-UNIT STRUCTURES BY THE TIME COMMON ENTRANCES ARE LOCKED

	Locked Day & Night		Locked Night		Never Locked	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
ALL RAs						
Small multi-unit	232	(193)	67	(66)	240	(153)
Large multi-unit	157	(74)	282	(9)	152	(153)
HIGH CRIME						
Small multi-unit	282	(74)	74	(19)	280	(64)
Large multi-unit	249	(31)	800	(4)	111	(49)
MIDDLE CRIME						
Small multi-unit	311	(64)	446	(4)	158	(49)
Large multi-unit	104	(41)	0	(2)	100	(50)
LOW CRIME						
Small multi-unit	36	(55)	22	(43)	284	(40)
Large multi-unit	0	(2)	0	(3)	207	(54)

Significance not obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between time doors locked and crime rate.

TAble 29

BURGLARY RATE THROUGH DOOR BY DOOR VULNERABILITY AND NUMBER OF HOURS UNOCCUPIED PER WEEK

Occupancy	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Stantard Doors	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
All RAs						
Less than 5	46	(326)	144	(22)	54	(19)
5 - 35	85	(223)	22	(18)	5	(18)
More than 35	103	(196)	402	(16)	0	(13)
High Crime						
Less than 5	39	(93)	326	(8)	22	(11)
5 - 35	88	(70)	0	(7)	0	(4)
More than 35	138	(79)	279	(7)	0	(6)
Middle Crime						
Less than 5	78	(93)	58	(10)	148	(7)
5 - 35	71	(73)	31	(10)	0	(10)
More than 35	118	(71)	600	(8)	0	(7)
Low Crime						
Less than 5	36	(140)	125	(4)	0	(1)
5 - 35	92	(80)	0	(1)	32	(4)
More than 35	51	(40)	0	(1)	--	--

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between (1) door vulnerability and crime rate (2) occupancy and crime rate.

Table 30

BURGLARY RATE THROUGH DOOR BY DOOR VULNERABILITY AND INCOME OF HOUSEHOLD

Income	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)	Rate	(N)
All RAs						
Less than $8,000	68	(373)	209	(21)	47	(15)
$8,000 - $15,000	63	(192)	160	(19)	0	(11)
More than $15,000	145	(133)	23	(12)	0	(6)
High Crime						
Less than $8,000	84	(142)	183	(12)	18	(20)
$8,000 - $15,000	94	(55)	462	(3)	0	(3)
More than $15,000	344	(31)	0	(4)	0	(1)
Middle Crime						
Less than $8,000	76	(100)	280	(7)	132	(13)
$8,000 - $15,000	116	(53)	96	(14)	0	(5)
More than $15,000	135	(65)	30	(6)	0	(5)
Low Crime						
Less than $8,000	48	(131)	0	(2)	91	(2)
$8,000 - $15,000	25	(84)	250	(2)	0	(3)
More than $15,000	116	(37)	0	(2)	--	(0)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between (1) door vulnerability and crime rate (2) door vulnerability and income.

Table 31

SECURITY OF ENTERED DOOR BY SECURITY OF NON-ENTERED DOOR
IN UNITS WITH ONLY TWO DOORS LEADING DIRECTLY TO THE UNIT

Security of Door Not Entered	Security of Door Entered	
	Standard	Non-Standard
Standard	1	4
Non-Standard	1	64

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between door entered and door not entered.

Table 32

DISTRIBUTION OF DOOR VULNERABILITY
BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
ALL RAs						
Inner	82%	(607)	12%	(52)	6%	(51)
Outer	99%	(166)	.4%	(5)	1%	(6)
HIGH CRIME						
Inner	80%	(251)	5%	(22)	15%	(27)
Outer	--	--	--	--	--	--
MIDDLE CRIME						
Inner	70%	(168)	22%	(12)	8%	(19)
Outer	92%	(79)	3%	(3)	5%	(6)
LOW CRIME						
Inner	96%	(188)	1%	(5)	3%	(5)
Outer	99%	(87)	.2%	(2)	--	--

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between location and door vulnerability.

Table 33

DISTRIBUTION OF DOOR VULNERABILITY
BY STRUCTURE

	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
ALL RAs						
Single-family detached	99%	(110)	1%	(4)	0%	(0)
Single-family attached	88%	(42)	8%	(6)	4%	(3)
Small multi-unit	89%	(376)	5%	(24)	6%	(21)
Large multi-unit	82	(192)	3%	(13)	15%	(27)
HIGH CRIME						
Single-family detached	100%	(21)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)
Single-family attached	90%	(8)	3%	(1)	7%	(1)
Small multi-unit	83%	(129)	7%	(11)	10%	(12)
Large multi-unit	67%	(59)	5%	(8)	28%	(10)
MIDDLE CRIME						
Single-family detached	97%	(41)	3%	(2)	0%	(0)
Single-family attached	69%	(16)	20%	(5)	11%	(2)
Small multi-unit	84%	(104)	9%	(8)	7%	(5)
Large multi-unit	76%	(72)	6%	(5)	18%	(277)
LOW CRIME						
Single-family detached	99%	(48)	1%	(2)		(0)
Single-family attached	100%	(18)	0%	(0)		(0)
Small multi-unit	95%	(143)	2%	(5)	3%	(4)
Large multi-unit	99%	(61)	0%	(0)	.1%	(1)
TOTAL	87%	(720)	4%	(47)	9%	(818)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between door vulnerability and housing type.

Table 34

DISTRIBUTION OF DOOR VULNERABILITY BY

PUBLIC/PRIVATE CONTROL

	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Public Housing	80%	(126)	2%	(2)	18%	(17)
Private Housing	90%	(594)	5%	(44)	5%	(34)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between door vulnerability and housing type.

Table 35

DISTRIBUTION OF DOOR VULNERABILITY BY INCOME

	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
ALL RAs						
Less than $8,000	88%	(373)	3%	(21)	9%	(35)
$8,000 - $15,000	89%	(192)	5%	(19)	6%	(11)
More than $15,000	86%	(133)	9%	(12)	5%	(6)
HIGH CRIME						
Less than $8,000	80%	(142)	4%	(12)	16%	(20)
$8,000 - $15,000	93%	(55)	4%	(3)	3%	(3)
More than $15,000	75%	(31)	18%	(4)	7%	(1)
MIDDLE CRIME						
Less than $8,000	84%	(100)	5%	(7)	11%	(13)
$8,000 - $15,000	77%	(53)	12%	(14)	11%	(5)
More than $15,000	78%	(65)	14%	(6)	8%	(5)
LOW CRIME						
Less than $8,000	99%	(131)	.5%	(2)	.5%	(2)
$8,000 - $15,000	96%	(84)	1%	(2)	3%	(3)
More than $15,000	99%	(37)	1%	(2)	0	(0)

Significance obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between door vulnerability and income.

Table 36

DISTRIBUTION OF DOOR VULNERABILITY BY TENURE

	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
ALL RAs						
Owner occupied units	95%	(128)	4%	(5)	1%	(2)
Renter occupied units	86%	(644)	7%	(52)	7%	(55)
HIGH CRIME						
Owner occupied units	100%	(30)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)
Renter occupied units	82%	(220)	8%	(22)	10%	(27)
MIDDLE CRIME						
Owner occupied units	89%	(50)	7%	(4)	4%	(2)
Renter occupied units	81%	(197)	10%	(24)	9%	(23)
LOW CRIME						
Owner occupied units	98%	(48)	2%	(1)	0%	(0)
Renter occupied units	95%	(227)	3%	(6)	2%	(5)

Significance not obtained at the .05 level for test of independence between door vulnerability and tenure.

Table 37

DISTRIBUTION OF DOOR VULNERABILITY BY NUMBER OF HOURS DWELLING UNIT IS LEFT VACANT PER WEEK

	No Standard Doors		Some Standard Doors		All Standard Doors	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
ALL RAs						
Less than 5 hours	88%	(326)	3%	(22)	9%	(19)
5 - 30 hours	84%	(223)	8%	(18)	8%	(18)
More than 30 hours	92%	(196)	3%	(16)	5%	(13)
HIGH CRIME						
Less than 5 hours	77%	(93)	3%	(8)	20%	(11)
5 - 30 hours	86%	(70)	9%	(7)	5%	(4)
More than 30 hours	89%	(79)	6%	(7)	5%	(6)
MIDDLE CRIME						
Less than 5 hours	82%	(93)	8%	(10)	10%	(7)
5 - 30 hours	69%	(73)	15%	(10)	16%	(10)
More than 30 hours	88%	(71)	4%	(8)	8%	(7)
LOW CRIME						
Less than 5 hours	98%	(140)	1%	(4)	1%	(1)
5 - 30 hours	97%	(80)	.2%	(1)	3%	(4)
More than 30 hours	99%	(46)	1%	(1)	--	--

Table 38

VISIBILITY[1] AND VULNERABILITY OF ATTACKED DOOR VS. NON-ATTACKED DOOR[2]

Other Door	Door Attacked: Not Visible/ Standard	Visible/ Standard	Not Visible/ Non-Standard	Visible/ Non-Standard
Not Visible/ Standard	1	0	2	1
Visible/Standard	0	0	1	0
Not Visible/ Non-Standard	1	0	34	9
Visible/ Non-Standard	0	0	12	8
TOTAL	2	0	49	18

Significance not obtainéd at the .05 level for test of independence between characteristics of attacked doors and non-attacked doors.

[1]Visible from street or neighbors' windows

[2]Includes only units with two doors leading directly to the dwelling unit.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

A. Sampling Procedures.

The sample was drawn from the addresses listed in the 1970 Boston City Directory and from town police listings for the suburban reporting areas. To correct for possible inaccuracies in these listings interviewers listed the number of dwelling units at the specified address. When this listing differed form that of the City Directory, additional addresses were selected (at the sampling rate) to account for in the Directory listing.

B. Interviewing Procedures.

An introductory letter explaining the study was sent to each dwelling unit. Any adult (over age 17) was interviewed. Interviewers returned to a dwelling unit a minimum of six times before the household was considered either a refusal or non-respondent, In the case of a refusal an interviewer of a different age, race or sex was given the assignment.

The interviewers were experienced staff members of the Survey Research Program. Pilot interviews, a week's training on the questionnaire and appendices, and careful evaluation of the interviews as they came in, served to insure complete and consitent data collection.

C. Coding Procedures.

The coding at Survey Research was continuously checked for internal inconsistencies amoung the coding staff. Cross-coder reliability was found to be 98%.

D. Reliability of the Data.

The response rate, overall, was 75%, ranging from 64% to 91% in the various RA's. The approximate sampling error for a sample of this size is, at maximum, ±5% at the .05 level.

END