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THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY: Its Nature and Extent

James S. Kakalik
and Sorel Wildhorn

Prepared for the
Department of Justice

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FOREWORD

The principal investigators in this study were Sorrel Wildhorn (study director) and James S. Kakalik. Members of the Los Angeles law firm of Munger, Tolles, Hills, and Rickershauser conducted the analysis of the legal issues and contributed significantly to the suggested policy and statutory guidelines.

Inquiries concerning this report should be directed to Sorrel Wildhorn at The Rand Corporation.

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PREFACE

This report is one of a series of five describing a 16-month study performed by The Rand Corporation under Grant NI-70-057 from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice.

The broad purposes of the study are essentially twofold. First, we seek to describe the nature and extent of the private police industry* in the United States, its problems, its present regulation, and how the law impinges on it. And second, we have attempted to evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks to society of current private security and, as specifically requested by the NILECJ, to develop preliminary policy and statutory guidelines for improving its future operations and regulation. The results of the study are intended for use by the private police industry and by the governmental agencies that regulate it, as well as by the general public.

The five reports comprising the study are:

R-869-DOJ *Private Police in the United States: Findings and Recommendations*

This comprehensive summary report draws on information contained in R-870-DOJ, R-871-DOJ, and R-872-DOJ to develop the overall findings and recommendations of the study.

R-870-DOJ *The Private Police Industry: Its Nature and Extent*

This descriptive report covers the nature, size, growth, and operation of the industry and its personnel. It also describes the results of a survey of private security employees.

R-871-DOJ *Current Regulation of Private Police: Regulatory Agency Experience and Views*

Licensing and regulation of the industry in every state and several cities is described. This report also includes extensive data on regulatory agency experience, complaints, disciplinary actions taken, and the views of 42 agencies on needed changes in regulation.

* Throughout this study we have used the term *private police* to include all privately employed guards, investigators, patrolmen, alarm and armored-car personnel, and any other personnel performing similar functions.

R-872-DOJ *The Law and Private Police*

This report discusses the law as it relates to the private police industry. It includes a general discussion of the sources of legal limitations upon private police activities and personnel and sources of legal powers, and an examination of specific legal problems raised by those activities and by the relationships between the users and providers of private security services. The legal doctrines governing particular security activities are evaluated and recommendations for improvement are offered.

R-873-DOJ *Special-Purpose Public Police*

Descriptive information is presented on certain types of public forces not having general law-enforcement responsibilities. These include reserve police, special-purpose federal forces, special local law-enforcement agencies, and campus police. These data provide a useful context for analyzing the role of private police.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A variety of people and organizations were very cooperative. Executives in various private and governmental organizations granted extensive interviews, provided information, and/or made it possible to obtain responses to our security employee survey. We are particularly indebted to Ray A. Sapp, Vice President for Operations, and Richard Bugbee, Public Relations, American District Telegraph Company; G. Ralph Kiel, Vice President for Public Relations, Wackenhut Corporation; Frederic E. Crist, President, and Paul J. Fitzpatrick, Vice President for Operations, William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.; W. C. Linn, Vice President for Operations, John J. Horan, Vice President and General Counsel, and George O'Neill, Director of Personnel, Pinkerton's, Inc.; Thomas W. Wathen, President, California Plant Protection; Joseph J. Kelly, General Manager, Southern California District, Wells Fargo Security Guard Services (Baker Industries); Edward Klosterman, President, Shield Security; Don Pillsbury, Insurance Rating Bureau; Harold Schloss, Vice President, Royal Globe Insurance Company; William T. Trainer, Research Department, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc.; Harry Haacke, Assistant Vice President, Marsh and McLennon, Inc.; William Wright, Executive Director, American Society for Industrial Security; Ron Smith, International Association of Chiefs of Police; James McGahey, President, United Plant Guard Workers of America; Vincent Gillen, President, Vincent Gillen & Associates; Jimmie James, President, National Detective Agencies, Inc.; William M. Weiss, Executive Vice President, Predicasts, Inc.; Morgan H. Cooper, Vice President, Oak Electro-Netics, Inc.; George Saunders and Robert Hedden, Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.; Neil Rosenthal and Joseph J. Rooney, Division of Manpower and Occupational Outlook, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Stanley Green, Population Census, U.S. Census Bureau; D. Wicoff, Census of Business, U.S. Census Bureau; Ken Andersen and Dave McNeilis, Census of Governments, U.S. Census Bureau; and Thomas Derdock, Chief, Physical Protection Branch, U.S. General Services Administration.

Executives of several other organizations were extremely cooperative, but requested that they and their organizations remain anonymous.

These organizations included several industrial firms with in-house security organizations, a large hotel, a large bank, a large retail chain, a private patrol organization, and a contract investigative agency.

Sidney Epstein, Richard Laymon, and Lou Mayo, of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice offered their cooperation and counsel.

Lieutenant John A. Kellar of the California Highway Patrol, while on educational leave at the University of California at Irvine, played a major role in the planning, execution, and analysis of the Rand survey of private security employees.

Several Rand colleagues and consultants offered valuable counsel during the conduct of the study; these included K. A. Archibald, H. Averch, R. Danzig, P. W. Greenwood, B. W. Haydon, H. J. Kiesling, L. Green, M. Hammer, and R. S. Post. Rand colleagues F. C. Iklé, M. M. Lavin, and A. B. Moore reviewed and made valuable comments concerning earlier drafts of the final reports.

Others who provided valuable and cogent comments concerning earlier drafts of the final reports were Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Yale University Law School; Professor James Fisk, Department of Political Science, UCLA (formerly Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Police Department); Gordon Bishop, Chief, Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services, California Department of Consumer Affairs; Colonel John R. Plants, Director, Licensing Unit, Michigan State Police; W. C. Linn, Vice President, Administration, Pinkerton's, Inc.; Frederic E. Crist, President, William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.; G. Ralph Kiel, Vice President, Public Relations, Wackenhut Corporation; Richard M. Bugbee and Ray A. Sapp, General Manager, Operations, American District Telegraph Company; and A. W. Innamorati, Assistant Commissioner for Buildings Management, U.S. General Services Administration.

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I. A GUIDE TO THIS REPORT

This report discusses certain aspects of the nature and extent of private security and private policing. Where feasible and appropriate, comparisons are made with the public police. A summary of this material appears in Rand report, R-869-DOJ, *Private Police in the United States: Findings and Recommendations*.

Chapter II outlines a taxonomy of public and private security services, illustrating the great diversity in types of security organizations and their powers and responsibilities. Chapter III discusses the forces spurring growth in private security, the trends in reported crime rate and public police budgets, business losses to crime and business crime-protection measures, and the relationships between crime insurance and the private security industry.

Chapters IV and V primarily address the questions of the size and extent of private security forces. Chapter IV examines gross trends in security employment and expenditures over more than a decade, tracing the comparative growth of public and private security. Chapter V focuses mainly on purchased private security services and equipment from the dual viewpoint of products and markets. The contract security industry, which sells protective services to the public as well as the private sector, is examined more closely. Since contract security is the fastest-growing sector of the private security industry, we discuss at some length the pros and cons of employing in-house forces versus contracting for private police services.

Chapter VI considers various aspects of the private/public police issue: some general considerations, the current partitioning and overlapping of roles and functions, and their relationships and interactions. Finally, we discuss the costs and effectiveness of private security.

Chapter VII examines various personnel matters: the kinds of people employed in private security in terms of age, background, experience and education, what they earn, how transient security workers are, and so on.

Chapter VIII deals in some depth with training, or more accurately, the virtual nonexistence of meaningful training programs for private security personnel.

Chapter IX summarizes the results of a survey of about 300 private security workers--guards, investigators, patrolmen, and men who work for central station alarm firms. Their responses to a questionnaire provided valuable information concerning the employee's personal and work history, his current job, training, knowledge of his legal powers, judgment in hypothetical work situations, supervision, relations with public police, and potential for improper action and abuse of authority.

II. THE SECURITY SERVICES FIELD: A TAXONOMY

Public and private security forces are highly diverse and may be categorized in several ways. In this report we have categorized such forces in two ways: by who employs them (a public agency or a private business, institution, or individual), and by the degree to which they possess peace-officer powers.

Public police employed by local agencies of government, such as cities and counties, have full peace-officer status, and are responsible for enforcing *all* state and local laws in their jurisdiction.

There are a variety of law-enforcement personnel employed by federal, state, and local agencies who possess varying degrees of peace-officer powers. Generally they are responsible for enforcing a specific set of laws or are limited to very specific jurisdictions, or both. Some security forces employed by local, state, or federal agencies have few or no police powers. At one extreme are guards who are employed by various governmental agencies; of these, some have no police powers at all, some have very limited police powers. At the other extreme are some local transit police and public housing police, e.g., the New York City Transit Police and Public Housing Authority Police, and campus police at some state universities; these personnel have full police powers but work primarily in subways, in public housing projects, and on campuses. Between these extremes are various public police forces who work for public agencies such as airports, harbors, parks, sanitation departments, and building departments, or who work for state or suprastate agencies such as the Port Authority in New York; often these police have more limited peace-officer powers. In this study we have categorized and described such police organizations as "special" public police. This category includes all police with at least *some* peace-officer powers who work for public agencies, but who are not regular city police or regular county sheriffs, as well as *reserve* police of some municipal and county sheriff police departments.

Within the private sector there are a variety of security forces. They are either in-house, i.e., employed by a single business, institution, or individual, or they work for a contract security agency.

Contract security agencies provide one or more of the following personnel services: guards, roving patrolmen (on foot or in cars), armored-car escort, central station alarm, and various investigative functions. Guard, patrol, and investigative services are also provided in-house. Such in-house and contract security personnel are utilized by banks, retail establishments, insurance companies and other financial institutions, hospitals, industrial firms, and educational institutions; at recreational events such as dances, fairs, and sporting events; in apartment houses; and so on. Most private security personnel have no peace-officer powers. A small fraction, however, are deputized or commissioned by the local police or state agencies and given limited police powers, generally in a limited geographic area (usually on and/or around the employer's or client's property). Table 1 displays a taxonomy of private and public security forces and organizations.

Almost all of the security force categories addressed in this study have at least one function in common: the prevention or investigation of criminal acts. However, certain types of private investigators and investigative organizations who only conduct credit, insurance, or pre-employment background investigations are exceptions to this general rule.

We have excluded a variety of organizations from consideration: regular military security forces, the National Guard, ideological or political groups such as the Minutemen, Black Panthers, Weathermen, ad hoc citizen's groups formed to prevent or combat crime, and organizations and personnel whose sole functions are to provide security from fire^{*} and other noncriminal sources of injury.

* However, in presenting trends in sales of security services and products (see Chapter V of this report) we do include estimates for various categories of fire-prevention and extinguishing equipment.

Table 1

A TAXONOMY OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONS

THE PUBLIC SECTOR

LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Local Government

Regular local police (municipalities, counties, townships,
special districts)
Reserve local police
Special local law-enforcement agencies
Park police (municipal, county)
Transit police
Public-housing police
Building-department police
Sanitation-department police
Airport police

State Government

State police and/or state highway patrol
Special state law-enforcement agencies
State park police or forest rangers
Narcotics agents and other investigators in state bureaus
Fish and game wardens
Police in state universities or colleges
Etc.

Federal Government

Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immigration and Naturalization Service
United States marshals
Border patrol
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Treasury Department
Secret Service
White House police
Customs Bureau (ports investigators, customs agents)
Internal Revenue Service
Alcohol, tobacco, and firearms special investigators
Intelligence special agents
Internal security inspectors
Department of the Interior
United States Park rangers
United States Park police
Bureau of Indian Affairs investigators
Sport fisheries and wildlife game management agents
Post Office Department
Postal inspectors
Department of State
Security agents
Zoo police, Smithsonian
Etc.

GUARDS AND WATCHMEN

Local Government

State Government

Federal Government

General Services Administration guards
Etc.

THE PRIVATE SECTOR

PURCHASED OR CONTRACT PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES^a

Guards and watchmen employed by detective agencies and protective-
service establishments
Detectives, investigators, and undercover agents employed by
detective agencies and protective-service establishments
Patrolmen employed in private patrol establishments
Guards employed in armored-car-service establishments
Guard respondents employed in central station alarm services
establishments

IN-HOUSE OR PROPRIETARY PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES

Guards and watchmen employed by industries, businesses, institu-
tions, and individuals
Detectives, investigators, and undercover agents employed by in-
dustries, businesses, institutions, and individuals

^a Each class of private security service can be subcategorized by
type of client or user, e.g., by broad industry, business, and institu-
tional categories.

III. THE CONTEXT OF GROWTH

FORCES SPURRING GROWTH IN PRIVATE SECURITY

An impression of the current situation, gleaned solely from the popular press and financial publications,* would be the following: Business losses to ordinary crime (burglary, robbery, shoplifting, employee theft, vandalism, bad checks) exceeded \$3 billion in the year 1967-68. Depending on the source of the estimate, individuals and corporations spent between \$2 and \$3 billion on security and crime prevention in 1969. The private security industry has been growing at a recession-resistant average rate of 10 to 15 percent annually over the last few years. Depending on the source used, there are anywhere from 1 to 2 private security workers for every regular public policeman in this country. In 1969 over 510,000 persons were employed in public police protection at all governmental levels. Depending on the source, estimates of the total number of private officers (guards, investigators, etc.) vary between 350,000 and 800,000.

How accurate is this impression? How are resources allocated among classes of security services? Detailed estimates are provided in this and the next chapter. In summary, we find the following: business losses to ordinary crime in the 1967-68 fiscal year were \$3 billion; private security services cost \$2.5 billion in 1969 plus \$800 million more for security equipment; the compound annual growth rate of private security expenditures was approximately 11 percent** during the 1963-1968 period; and in 1969 the number of public employees with police powers was approximately 395,000, while there were about 120,000

* See, for example: "Selling Security," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 August 1970; "To Catch a Thief," *Newsweek*, 27 July 1970; "Creeping Capitalism," *Forbes*, 1 September 1970; *Investment Opportunities in the Security, Protection, and Investigative Services Industry*, Burnham and Company, September 1970; *Crime Protection--A Growth Industry*, Bear, Stearns, and Company, 1968; *Crime Against Small Business*, A Report of the Small Business Administration, Select Committee on Small Business, U.S. Senate, Senate Document No. 91-14, 3 April 1969.

** Including inflation which has averaged 3.4 percent per year for the 1963-1968 period.

public and 290,000 private security employees without police powers.* Thus, for every 10 security employees in 1969 with police powers, there were about 3 public and 7 private security employees without police powers. A comparison of figures quoted in the news media with our best estimates shows that there is little disagreement, although some estimates of private security employment vary by a factor of two. Our estimates, which are documented in the next two chapters, are based on available "hard" data and tend to be lower than those data cited in the mass media. The relevant data provided by the 1970 Census of Population, which are scheduled for release in early 1972, will shed further light on the overall security employment situation.

What are the forces spurring the growth in private security? Most observers would include some of the following:

- The high level of and rate of increase in reported crime of all types and in all regions.
- Increasing public awareness and fear of crime.
- The federal government's need for security in its space and defense activities during the past decade and, more recently, for security against violent demonstrations, bombings, and hijackings.
- The basic trend toward specialization of all services.
- Rising claims to fire and casualty insurance companies for losses.
- Withdrawal of some insurers from the market.
- Insurers raising rates and/or requiring use of certain private security systems.
- Insurers offering premium discounts when certain private security measures are used.
- The nation's growth and advancing state of the art in electronics and other scientific areas, which has sparked new and distinct manufacturing branches of several protection companies, providing greatly improved security devices, especially for intrusion detection.

* Except for some small unknown percentage that are granted some peace-officer powers through deputization or commissioning by local jurisdictions or states.

- The general increase in corporate and private income; this means there is more property to protect and, at the same time, more income to pay for protection.
- A feeling in some quarters that the regular police are overburdened and have not been able alone to stem the tide of rising crime, therefore, that private security measures are needed to supplement regular police protection in some situations.

To the extent that data are available and inferences can be drawn, we shall comment on which of these forces, indeed, seem to be operating.

TRENDS IN REPORTED CRIME RATE AND PUBLIC POLICE BUDGETS

It is generally assumed that rising expenditures for regular public police can be legitimately considered a "cost" of rising crime rates. Between 1952 and 1969, for example, crime (as measured by the FBI's Index crimes plus larcenies under \$50) rose 208 percent,^{*} public police payroll expenditures rose 332 percent, and public police employment rose 102 percent. Thus, reported crime outpaced police employment but lagged behind expenditures. In per capita terms, a similar picture emerges. Population in the United States increased from 155.8 million to 203.2 million over the period. Thus, increases in per capita crime, police payroll expenditures, and police employment were 136 percent, 230 percent, and 55 percent, respectively. If one considers public police employment, rather than expenditures, as a measure of societal resources devoted to law enforcement, police employment has not kept pace with crime in either absolute or per capita terms. Although expenditures have risen faster than crime in both absolute and per capita terms, a recent study (discussed below) attempted to show that police expenditures over several recent decades can be "explained" by factors other than crime. That study attempted to document the assertion that local police departments have not made gains in terms of societal resources devoted to them (as measured by expenditures). Perhaps this is one reason why individuals and corporations have turned increasingly toward investment

^{*}It is generally accepted that crime-reporting practices have improved over the years, so that some (unknown) portion of the 208 percent increase in crime should be attributed to improved crime-reporting practices rather than to real increases in crime.

in private security. This assumes, of course, that expenditure increments for public and/or private police have significant desirable effects in reducing crime and increasing "valid" arrests.*

Table 2 displays the annual percentage growth rate of reported felony offenses per capita (by type of felony) over a 17-year period.

Table 2
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE IN PER CAPITA
FELONY OFFENSES FOR THE UNITED STATES

Offense	Average Annual Growth Rate	
	1952-1967 ^a	1966-1969 ^b
Murder	2.0	8.7
Forcible rape	6.8	11.9
Robbery	5.0	22.4
Aggravated assault	4.3	8.5
Burglary	6.1	11.0
Larceny	5.3 (total)	17.7 (over \$50)
Auto theft	6.1	15.0

^aSource: Votey, Harold L., Jr., and Llad Phillips, *Economic Crimes: Their Generation, Deterrence, and Control*, University of California, Santa Barbara, California (a final report under Grant No. NI 041, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice). These figures were computed from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports for the years 1952-1967.

^bSource: *Crime in the United States*, Uniform Crime Reports for the years 1967, 1968, 1969, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The table illustrates that reported felony offenses per capita have grown substantially since 1952 and that most of the growth occurred in the middle to late 1960s. However, the growth rate of reported crime slowed in the 1968-1969 period.**

How have police budgets grown, and what appears to account for that growth? A recent study attempts to demonstrate that changes in police

*These quantitative relationships are largely unknown at this time and are an important area of needed research.

**The change in the relationship between true and reported crime rates over the 1952-1969 time period is not known.

expenditures between 1902 and 1960 have *not* provided real increases in resources available to improve the quality of police effort in the area of criminal-law enforcement.* Rather, the expenditure change may be "explained" by the joint effect of components other than changes in crime rates. These components are increases in population, inflation, urbanization, and motor-vehicle registrations. The argument used in that study is that if expenditures simply increased proportionately with increases in these four factors, the entire police budget rise could be "explained" without referring to the increased reported crime. Nevertheless, police capacity to fight crime has been enhanced by the development of physical resources, e.g., police cars and communications equipment.

In 1902, \$50 million was expended nationally for local police, whereas in 1960, \$1.612 billion was expended. The Bordua-Haurek study shows that *all* of the increase can be explained by the four components mentioned. The relative contribution of each component is shown in Table 3.

Table 3

COMPONENTS OF INCREASE IN LOCAL POLICE
EXPENDITURES: 1902-1960

Reason for Increase	Percentage of Total Increase
Inflation	46
Population growth	29
Motor vehicles	17
Urbanization	8
Components jointly	100

Inflation was said to account for nearly half of the expenditure increase. In controlling for inflation, the authors of that study considered changes between 1902 and 1960 in working hours and annual working days, as well as salary increases; they estimated that 90 percent of

* David J. Bordua and Edward W. Haurek, "The Police Budget's Lot," *American Behavioral Scientist*, May-August 1970, pp. 667-680.

the police expenditures were attributable to salaries and wages and that this proportion appears to be relatively constant through time.

Population growth alone was said to account for a 29 percent increase in expenditures, and traffic control, as measured by the increase in number of registered motor vehicles, was said to account for 17 percent. Inflation and traffic control were clearly independent of crime rates in the standardization techniques used in that study. Population growth would not in itself result in an increase in *per capita* crime rates. Thus, these three components alone account for more than 90 percent of the budget increase without reference to crime rates.

Urbanization, as measured by the proportion of the population living in urban areas, accounted for only 8 percent of the budget increase and was the least important of the four components. The control for urbanization did not include the effects on police budgets due to rising national crime rates which might result from a larger proportion of the population living in urban areas; such urban areas are in turn assumed to have higher crime rates. But the control for urbanization did *not* eliminate the possible effects that any assumed increases in size-of-place-specific crime rates have upon police expenditures. In any event, the authors of that study state with only some certitude that this 8 percent of explained expenditure increase is due to the traditionally higher per capita police budgets in urban areas, whether or not higher urban expenditure reflects a higher urban crime rate.

Whether greater urbanization does or does not bring about higher crime rates, the authors of the Bordua-Haurek study claim that the hypothesis of the study is confirmed because inflation, population growth, and motor-vehicle-registration increases together explain over 90 percent of the increase in local police expenditures. The authors forego the temptation to speculate that local policing in 1960 was "under-financed" by 1902 standards or was less effective than in 1902. They merely suggest that increases in crime rates have been unduly emphasized as a major component of increasing police costs. They draw an additional implication from the analysis. Faced with real budgetary limitations, it is not surprising that police have turned to organizational

modernization--technological innovation and managerial sophistication-- as a cost-reducing device.

For our purposes, however, the foregoing analysis does lend some credence to two of the reasons mentioned initially that might account for the increase in investment in *private* security. These are the rise in reported crime rate and the feeling that the increasingly burdened regular public police cannot alone prevent that rise.

BUSINESS LOSSES TO CRIME

The possibility and the actuality of business losses due to crime are leading factors accounting for U.S. business investment in private security measures. A recent study examined crime against businesses, particularly against small businesses.* A Small Business Administration (SBA) sample of 1 out of every 1,400 such businesses resulted in selection of over 5,000 organizations; interviews were conducted with over 2,500 of these. The results of that survey are summarized in Table 4.

Total losses for all businesses in the United States, as computed from the SBA sample, are over \$3 billion for the year 1967-68. Burglary accounted for 31 percent of the total; the second, third, and fourth largest sources of loss were vandalism, shoplifting, and employee theft, respectively. Loss due to shoplifting was estimated at \$504 million; this compares with speculative estimates widely quoted in the press of shoplifting losses of \$2 billion to \$2.5 billion a year. Loss due to employee theft was estimated at \$381 million; this compares with speculative estimates of \$1 to \$2 billion in 1964.**

In comparing losses by size of business, the ratio of losses to receipts was taken as an index--a value of 100 corresponding to the ratio of total losses to total receipts for all firms. For example, for robbery, the index number was 333 for the smallest businesses, compared with unity for the largest. For all ordinary crime, the rate of losses to receipts for firms with receipts under \$100,000 was 36

* *Crime Against Small Business*, Small Business Administration, op. cit.

** See, for example, *Financial Executive*, January 1965.

Table 4

LOSSES BY TYPE OF CRIME AND BY SIZE AND LOCATION OF BUSINESS: 1967-1968

Type of Crime	Losses		Indexed Ratios of Losses to Receipts (by size of business)					Percent of Businesses Victimized (by location)				
	\$ Millions	Per- cent	Under \$100,000	\$100,000 to \$1,000,000	\$1,000,000 to \$5,000,000	Over \$5,000,000	Total	Ghetto	Nonghetto Central City	Suburbs	Rural	Total
Burglary	958	31	357	206	129	7	100	28	18	16	9	14
Robbery	77	3	333	167	133	1	100	9	3	2	1	2
Vandalism	813	27	283	167	167	17	100	37	18	17	9	15
Shoplifting	504	17	225	250	50	8	100	24	14	15	15	15
Employee theft	381	12	350	300	250	20	100	11	10	9	4	8
Bad checks	316	10	50	200	50	25	100	30	33	31	36	37
Total	3,049	100	323	205	127	9	100

times as great as those of firms with receipts over \$5 million (i.e., the ratio of the index numbers 323 and 9). In general then, for every crime except bad checks, the *relative* losses drop as size of business increases. In absolute terms, however, small businesses with receipts under \$1 million bore 68 percent (or over \$2 billion) of the losses.

Ghetto businesses have the highest crime rate by a substantial margin. Businesses in the nonghetto central cities are victimized at about the same rates as those in the suburbs. Rural businesses have the lowest crime rates. Fourteen percent of all businesses reported one or more burglaries in the preceding year. Counting all burglaries, the rate is 27 per 100 businesses, more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the rate based on official police statistics as reported to the FBI.

Location also affects dollar losses from crime. While ghetto businesses sustain disproportionate losses from crime relative to businesses in other locations, absolute dollar losses are greatest for businesses in other locations.

The SBA study also compared retail with all types of businesses. The numbers of robberies and burglaries per 100 businesses compared fairly closely except in the ghetto. Here, there were 97 burglaries per 100 establishments in retail trade, compared with 69 for all businesses. The corresponding figures for robbery were 19 and 23, respectively—that is, a lower rate in the retail trade. In the ghetto, each retail business was burglarized once in the year 1967-68, on the average. Overall, 54 percent of all businesses said they experienced shoplifting, but 75 to 82 percent of retail business reportedly experienced shoplifting, depending on location. Employee theft was reported by 8 percent of all and 12 percent of retail businesses. Theft of money and merchandise from retail businesses was twice as prevalent as that of supplies and equipment. Among retail businesses, shoplifting is about as important a source of dollar losses as are burglary and vandalism.

The losses from crime by all U.S. businesses for 1967-68 represent 0.23 percent of receipts--\$3 billion losses from an estimated \$1.3 trillion in receipts.* A disproportionate share of the \$3 billion

* *Crime Against Small Business*, Small Business Administration, op. cit., p. 25.

losses to crime is sustained by small businesses, however, relative to their annual receipts. Businesses grossing under \$100,000 annually had the largest share of receipts given to crime losses, about 0.75 percent.

SBA STUDY FINDINGS ON BUSINESS CRIME PROTECTION MEASURES

The SBA study surveyed businesses also to determine measures employed for protection against specific types of crime. Although the SBA study findings are highly relevant to our study, they fall short of fulfilling our needs. For example, they indicate only what proportion of all business establishments or of retail businesses only employ certain protective measures against crime. From these data it is *not* possible to estimate either the total dollar resources or the number of private security personnel (guards, investigators, etc.) involved in private security. In Chapter IV, using other sources of data, we estimate dollar and personnel resources devoted to private security and make comparisons, where feasible, with growth in resources devoted to regular police.

The major protection measures studied in the SBA field survey include local and central station alarms, reinforcing devices to deter entry to premises, security guards, subscription to protective services, firearms, and antishoplifting devices such as mirrors, cameras, and locked display cases. Many U.S. businesses operate without any special protective measures. One-third of all retail establishments reported that they used no particular form of protection. Table 5 displays the percentages of establishments that reported having various protective devices to prevent crimes; these percentages are listed by type of business organization and for all establishments and for retail establishments only. Table 6 displays similar data, but by location, rather than type, of business. The following are the SBA study's summary and conclusions regarding protective measures against crime:^{*}

One-fourth of all business and 31 percent of retail establishments reported having reinforcing devices such as ironwork or special locks. Some 18 percent of all businesses,

^{*}*Crime Against Small Business*, op. cit., p. 56.

Table 5

PERCENT OF ESTABLISHMENTS REPORTING VARIOUS PROTECTIVE DEVICES TO PREVENT
CRIMES AGAINST THEIR BUSINESS, BY TYPE OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
FOR ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND FOR RETAIL ONLY

Type of Business Organization	Percent of Business Using Devices													
	Type of Protective Device													
	Local Burglar Alarm		Central Burglar Alarm		Reinforcing Devices		Firearms		Shop-lifting Protective Devices		Security Guards		Subscription to Protective Services	
	Type of Business													
	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail
Corporations	18	22	13	15	35	39	10	16	3	8	16	16	16	26
Partnerships with employees	8	9	6	4	23	37	23	31	5	10	9	9	12	13
Partnerships without employees	9	16	3	1	20	28	11	8	8	15	5	8	5	8
Sole proprietorships with employees	8	12	3	4	24	33	20	28	5	10	7	7	7	8
Sole proprietorships without employees	4	7	2	5	15	22	22	31	3	7	3	2	3	3
Average	9	12	5	5	24	31	18	26	4	9	8	7	8	11

Table 6

PERCENT OF ESTABLISHMENTS REPORTING VARIOUS PROTECTIVE DEVICES TO PREVENT
CRIMES AGAINST THEIR BUSINESS, BY LOCATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
FOR ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND FOR RETAIL ONLY

Type of Business Organization	Percent of Business Using Devices													
	Type of Protective Device													
	Local Burglar Alarm		Central Burglar Alarm		Rein- forcing Devices		Firearms		Shop- lifting Protective Devices		Security Guards		Subscrip- tion to Protective Services	
	Type of Business													
	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail	All	Retail
Ghetto	23	26	19	21	48	55	26	41	6	12	10	7	19	24
Nonghetto Central City	13	18	8	9	32	43	13	25	3	7	13	11	15	20
Suburban	11	17	6	8	23	33	16	18	4	10	7	6	10	12
City population														
10,000 to 50,000	6	9	3	4	18	28	15	20	4	11	7	11	7	9
2,500 to 10,000	5	10	2	4	19	31	20	23	4	11	4	6	5	12
Under 2,500 and rural	4	5	1	1	14	19	30	32	4	7	3	2	1	..
Location not reported	10	19	3	3	24	26	18	19	8	13	9	13	7	10
Average	9	12	5	5	23	31	18	26	4	9	8	7	8	11

and 26 percent of retail businesses reported having firearms. Only one in seven of all and one in six of retail businesses had a burglar alarm.

Among burglar alarms, there were proportionately more local (9 percent) than central alarms (5 percent) among all businesses, and in retail trade 12 and 5 percent respectively. An important factor favoring local alarms is their substantially lower cost. In addition, however, central alarms are available generally only in larger cities. Eight percent of all businesses had some form of guard service and 8 percent subscribed to some form of protective service. Somewhat more of the retail businesses (11 percent) subscribe to a protective service than employ security guards (7 percent). Only 4 percent of all and 9 percent of retail businesses have antishoplifting devices.

Generally, retail businesses were more likely to obtain each form of protection than were all businesses, but the differences are small. A majority of all retail establishments are not protected by any major form of protective device or service. Corporations were the most likely to have both forms of alarms. This is particularly striking for central alarms, where 15 percent of all corporate retail establishments subscribed to a central alarm system as compared with 5 percent or less of partnerships or sole proprietorships. Reinforcing devices, a less costly and one-time outlay, were also reported more often by corporations. They are least likely, however, to report the possession of firearms. Antishoplifting devices are by their nature largely restricted to retail outlets.

The employment of security guards or a protective service depends on the scale and type of the enterprise. About one in four retail corporations subscribe to a protective service as compared with roughly one in twenty of retail sole proprietorships. The relatively high susceptibility of sole proprietors in retail trade to crime losses is not reflected in their use of protective services or guards because they are usually very small, often no-employee businesses.

A disproportionate number of businesses in high- as compared with low-crime rate areas have protective devices. The highest proportion of all businesses, and of retail outlets, with protection is found in ghettos. Particularly striking is the fact that twice as many retail businesses in ghetto areas as in the United States as a whole have local burglar alarms (26 versus 12 percent). For central alarms, it is four times as many (21 versus 5 percent). More than one-half of all ghetto retail establishments have reinforcing devices, compared with 31 percent of all retail establishments. The proportion with some form of protection against burglary decreases as one moves from ghetto to suburban locations.

The possession of firearms on a business premise bears a somewhat different relationship to location. The highest percentage of retail businesses with firearms (41 percent) occurs in ghettos but the next highest proportion is found in rural places (32 percent).

The purchase and maintenance of antisholifting devices does not bear a close relationship to the community location of a business.

Hiring security guards and subscription to a protective service depends upon the location of a business. Subscription to protective services included 24 percent of all ghetto retailers, 20 percent of those in other areas of the central city and 12 percent of those in the suburbs. No small town or rural business subscribed to a protective service.

The three most important variables determining whether or not any business has a form of protection against crime are experience with crime, the availability, and the cost of protection.

CRIME INSURANCE AND THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY

While crime insurance and private security equipment and personnel are two distinctly different means of protection against crime, they are not unrelated. Insurers may offer very substantial rate discounts, may require high deductibles before insuring, or may even refuse to insure, based on whether or not specified security systems are used. Thus, the insurance industry has a significant impact on the level of quality and use of private security services.

Recognizing that security measures taken to prevent crime sometimes fail, reasonably priced insurance is a complementary means of alleviating the effect of crime losses. However, as indicated in the recent SBA report,^{*} there is a critical shortage of crime insurance in the United States. This shortage is particularly acute in high crime areas where coverage is needed the most. The President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas surveyed 1,500 ghetto businessmen in six major cities and found that nearly 50 percent of them had no theft or burglary insurance. Interviews of those without insurance revealed that 30 percent wanted it but felt the rates were too high, while 25 percent said the insurance was unavailable at any price.^{**}

To compensate for the lack of affordably priced crime insurance, the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development began operating a crime insurance program in 11 states on August 1, 1971. The new

* *Crime Against Small Business*, op. cit., p. 257.

** Ibid.

federal insurance is available only in states that lack crime insurance at affordable^{*} rates, where the state government has taken no action to provide insurance. The federal rates are set, based on FBI crime statistics, and are uniform throughout a standard metropolitan statistical area. Thus, insurance rates in high-crime areas of a city are the same as rates in lower-crime areas of the suburbs. Maximum coverage is \$15,000 for commercial, and \$5,000 for residential policies.

The high and rising cost of crime insurance is due primarily to rapidly rising crime rates. Those rising crime rates generated an estimated total crime loss for U.S. business of \$3 billion in 1969, with burglary alone generating an estimated \$1 billion in losses.^{**} Table 7 presents illustrative changes in burglary insurance premiums between 1960 and 1967.^{***}

Insurance-company expenses, excluding payments for losses to insureds, account for slightly more than half of the total burglary and theft insurance premiums.[†] Selling commissions to agents and brokers are approximately 25 percent of crime insurance premiums. That commission rate was described as excessive in the SBA report.^{††}

The insurance industry has lost money on crime insurance in recent years, according to Don Pillsbury, Head of the Underwriting Division of the Insurance Rating Board (IRB). The IRB is an organization that serves the insurance industry by collecting loss and premium data from insurance companies and then recommending insurance rates and rate differentials among different types of coverages and geographic areas. To counter the unprofitability of crime insurance, several mechanisms are employed: (1) insurance is refused to high-potential-loss applicants; (2) policies may be cancelled as a result of poor loss experience; (3) insurance is given only for crime losses above a certain deductible amount; (4) applicants may be required to install specific security systems in order

* Affordable rates are, by definition, as low as or lower than the federal insurance premium rates.

** *Crime Against Small Business*, op. cit., p. 260.

*** *Supra*, p. 265.

† *Ibid.*

†† *Supra*, p. 266.

Table 7

BURGLARY INSURANCE PREMIUMS^a

Location of Business	Type of Business											
	Drugstore		Furniture Store		Grocery Store		Jewelry Store		Liquor Store		Pawnbroker	
	Size of Policy											
	\$7,500		\$15,000		\$15,000		\$15,000		\$7,500		\$30,000	
	1960	1967	1960	1967	1960	1967	1960	1967	1960	1967	1960	1967
Illinois												
Cook County, including												
Chicago	491	467	602	518	145	136	889	836	413	389	1,234	1,161
Remainder of Illinois	216	268	262	327	63	78	386	481	180	224	536	668
Michigan												
Detroit City Metropolitan												
District	216	388	262	472	63	113	386	695	180	324	536	965
Remainder of Michigan	162	258	197	315	47	76	290	464	135	216	404	643
District of Columbia	237	603	287	734	69	164	425	1,080	197	502	590	1,499
Pennsylvania												
Allegheny County	259	557	316	679	76	163	464	998	216	465	644	1,386
Philadelphia County	356	516	434	629	104	151	637	923	296	430	886	1,218
Remainder of Pennsylvania	108	193	131	235	31	56	194	380	90	161	269	480
Ohio												
Cuyahoga County	388	543	434	679	113	195	638	973	324	452	965	1,351
Remainder of Ohio	178	284	216	346	52	87	319	510	149	237	444	699

NOTE: The data do not reflect the decreased purchasing power of the dollar (11 percent between 1960 and 1967) nor do they reflect rate credits discounts for protective devices.

^aApproximate annual bureau (standard or regular) premiums for mercantile open-stock burglary insurance for typical retail establishments, 1960 and 1967.

to obtain insurance, or to obtain insurance at a reasonable price; (5) insurance rates are raised.*

The insurance-premium discounts recommended by the IRB for firms having private security systems range from very small percentages to 70 percent in practice. Examples of discounts recommended for various watchman and alarm security systems for "Mercantile Open Stock" Burglary Insurance are cited below.

MERCANTILE OPEN STOCK**

DISCOUNTS

9. WATCHMAN DISCOUNT

No discount shall be allowed for more than three watchmen at any one premises.

30% - For each private watchman employed exclusively by the insured, who will be on duty within the premises of the insured at all times when said premises are not regularly open for business, and who will make at least hourly rounds and signal at least hourly in the insured's premises to a central station located outside the insured's plant or to a police station provided there is at least one regular policeman on duty therein at all times.

15% - For each such watchman who does not signal to an outside station, but who registers at least hourly on a watchman's clock in the insured's premises.

10% - For each such watchman who does not signal to an outside station or register on a watchman's clock.

One-half the regular discount shall be allowed for any such watchman who is not on duty during the daytime of Saturdays or one other weekday when the premises are not open for business.

10. PREMISES ALARM SYSTEM DISCOUNT

The companies referred to on page 336** install burglar alarm systems protecting the premises. The

* For example, with the increase in campus unrest, the insurance rates for universities have been skyrocketing in recent years. See "Campus Unrest Spurs Insurance Hike," *College and University Business*, September 1970.

** *Burglary Insurance Manual*, National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 125 Maiden Lane, New York, New York, 10038, pp. 333-336.

alarm systems are designated numbers 1, 2 or 3 in accordance with the following definitions of the extent of protection.

Installation No. 1. Alarm system protecting completely all windows, doors, transoms, skylights and other openings leading from the premises, and all ceilings, floors, and hall, party, partition and building walls enclosing the premises, except building walls which are exposed to street or public highway, and except that part of any building wall which is at least two stories above the roof of an adjoining building.

Installation No. 2. Alarm system protecting with traps all inaccessible windows; with screens (or foils and traps) all accessible windows (except stationary show windows), doors, transoms, skylights and other openings leading from the premises, and also

(a) protecting all ceilings and floors not constructed of concrete, and all hall, party and partition walls enclosing the premises, or

(b) providing a network of invisible beams to subdivide the floor space of each floor or separate section of the protected area into three approximately equal areas, and more where necessary to provide at least one subdivision per 1,000 sq. ft. of floor space, or an alarm system protecting with supervisory contacts only all movable openings leading from the premises, and providing a system of invisible radiation to all sections of the enclosed area, so as to detect movement of a person walking not more than four consecutive steps at a rate of one step per second - such four step movement shall constitute a "trial" and a sufficient number of detection units shall be installed so that, upon test, an alarm will be initiated in at least three out of every four such consecutive "trials" made moving progressively throughout the protected area.

Installation No. 3. Alarm system (a) protecting with screens (or foils and traps) all accessible windows (except stationary show windows), and all doors, transoms, skylights and other openings leading from the premises, or (b) protecting with contacts only all movable accessible openings leading from the premises and providing one or more invisible rays or channels of radiation with the minimum overall length of the rays or radiation equivalent to the longest dimensions of the area or areas so as to detect movement through the channel when a person walks across

each channel at any point at the rate of one step per second, or (c) protecting with contacts all doors leading from the protected area or areas and providing a system of invisible radiation to all sections of the enclosed area so as to detect four-step movement as defined in the last paragraph of Installation No. 2 above.

If the premises are protected with an approved burglar alarm system installed by one of the companies listed on the state territorial pages and the insured holds an unexpired Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. certificate, the following discounts shall be allowed. The classification on the certificate governs the discount applicable.

Installation		Class A		Class B	
		Grade and Below Grade Floors	Above Grade Floor	Grade and Below Grade Floors	Above Grade Floor
Central Station with Keys	1	60%	70%	50%	60%
	2	50	60	40	50
	3	40	45	30	40
Central Station without Keys	1	50	55	45	50
	2	40	45	35	40
	3	30	35	25	30
Local	2	30	35	25	30
	3	20	25	15	20

Note:

(1) The reference to "keys" means that the central station alarm company located outside of the insured's premises has or has not keys to the insured's premises.

(2) The local system requires that a loud sounding gong or siren be located on the outside of the building containing the insured's premises.

The above discounts appear to imply that two guards provide twice the loss protection that one guard provides; guards employed exclusively by the insured (in-house guards) provide sufficient loss protection to justify a discount, whereas contract guards do not justify

a discount;* and a type-1 alarm system reduces insured burglary losses 70 percent on above-grade floors of Class A premises. Alarm systems certified by Underwriter's Laboratories are usually specified by the insurance company because they meet certain established minimum quality standards, and because some loss-experience data for those certified alarm systems are available.

Since the relative size of discounts ideally should be related to the relative effectiveness of the various security systems in preventing burglary losses, we tried to locate insurance-company loss data that quantitatively justified the various discounts. We did not succeed in locating such data and were told by insurance-industry sources that they did not exist. In our search, our contacts included the Insurance Rating Board, the National Insurance Actuarial and Statistical Association, the Surety Association of America, March and McLennon (an insurance brokerage), and the Royal Globe Insurance Company. We found that the available statistics on crime losses are (1) not collected in a timely fashion and (2) so aggregated that they are of little value in setting relative discounts for security systems. The insurance industry could not provide data on average losses at "type i" premises with a "type j" security system. However, statistics are available on total losses by major type of insurance such as "mercantile open stock." To compound the data problem, crime insurance is frequently part of a "package" policy with other types of insurance and only total losses are available.

The SBA report** similarly finds that:

While there is a widespread practice for insurance companies to give premium discounts as incentives for businesses to install anti-crime measures, the discounts seem to have no adequate statistical relationship to experience in deterring crimes. The reason is simply that the industry does not keep insurance statistics of crimes against business to permit such premium structure.

* We queried Don Pillsbury on this point and he could provide no rationale for this particular difference in guard discounts.

** *Crime Against Small Business*, op. cit., p. 15.

IV. GROSS TRENDS IN RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC POLICE

EMPLOYMENT

This chapter discusses estimates of employment trends in private and public police protection, beginning with regular public police. Table 8 displays federal, state, and local governmental employment for police protection between 1952 and 1969. When available, figures are shown for all, full-time, part-time, and full-time-equivalent employees. The basic data sources are the 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967 Census of Governments and the annual intercensal surveys published in Public Employment (Bureau of the Census), in which a complete census of federal and state governments is taken and a sample of local governments is surveyed by mail questionnaire.*

Figure 1 displays graphically the trends in governmental employment for police protection for all employees (part time and full time). The total police employment of local, state, and federal governments increased 100 percent between 1952 and 1969, to over 500,000 persons. During that period similar growth was experienced by local and state governments. Between 1964 and 1969 the police employment of local governments increased about 5 percent per year, compared to less than 4 percent per year between 1952 and 1964. State employment of police has increased about 160 percent since 1952, with growth of about 6 percent per year experienced between 1964 and 1969. Federal law-enforcement employment increased more slowly--only 60 percent since 1952, with an average growth of 3 percent per year between 1964 and 1969. However, the federal data include employment only in the following agencies: FBI, Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Including data on the Bureau of Customs,

* Also consulted were publications such as the *Book of States*, the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, a special Bureau of the Census report, *Criminal Justice Expenditure and Employment for Selected Large Governmental Units*, 1967-1968 (State and Local Government Special Study No. 55), and *Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System*, 1968-1969, issued December 1970, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, Series SC-EE No. 1, LEAA, U.S. Department of Justice.

Table 8

TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYMENT FOR POLICE PROTECTION^a
(Thousands)

Type of Employer	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
<u>All governments</u>																		
All employees	254	263		295		316			363		380	390	401	420	437	458	489	514
Full-time equivalent						290					340					405		
<u>Federal government</u> ^b																		
All employees	16	15		22		22			22		22	22	23	23	24	25	26	27
<u>State government</u>																		
All employees	21	22		24		28			32		36	37	38	41	44	48	52	54
<u>Local government</u>																		
All employees	217	227		249		267			309		322	332	340	357	369	385	412	432
Full time						235					272					323		
Part time						32					51					61		
Full-time equivalent						241					283					334		377
<u>State and local governments</u>																		
All employees	238	248		273		294					358	368				433	463	487
Full time						262					307					370		
Part time						32					51					62		
Full-time equivalent		230	239	251	264	269	287	295	304	310	318					381		431

^aAll employees. Subtotals and totals may not add due to rounding errors.

^bIncludes only four agencies: FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Secret Service, and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. In Table 1 of R-869-DCJ, for 1969 we show an employment figure of 36,000 for federal "All employees," making the figure for All governments 523,000. These figures include the Bureau of Customs as well as those four agencies noted above.




Fig. 1—Government employment trends for regular police protection

for example, could bring the total federal employees in 1968 to 35,000.* Other federal agencies employ law-enforcement personnel but are not included in the totals shown on the table. These include agencies in the Treasury Department (Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; White House Police; Internal Revenue Intelligence Agents; and Internal Security Inspectors), the Department of the Interior (U.S. Park Rangers; U.S. Park Police; Investigators in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, etc.), the Post Office (Postal Inspectors), the Department of State, and so on. In these agencies alone there are over 8,000 personnel with police powers. Also, federal government guards employed by the General Services Administration and by other federal agencies have been excluded from the totals; these guards generally do not have public police powers.

In Census of Government publications, the Census Bureau defines police protection as the functions of enforcing the law, preserving order, maintaining traffic safety, and apprehending those who violate the laws. Their employment figures include all personnel in regular police service, including administrative and clerical, traffic-control and traffic-safety activities, including related traffic engineering activities (but not highway planning and engineering), vehicular inspection, and the maintenance of buildings used exclusively for police purposes. Park police, marine law-enforcement officials, game wardens, and similar officials and activities are *not* included, unless they are an integral part of the regular police. At the county level, both county police agencies and the office of the sheriff, where such an office exists, are included in the law-enforcement category, except where the sheriff has no substantial responsibility for law enforcement. There are ten "special status" cities in which sheriffs operate but have duties that are judicial in nature. These cities are not included in the figures shown. Employment related to short-term custody and detention is assumed to be part of the police protection function.

* *Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System*, op. cit.

Generally speaking, between 72 percent and 75 percent of local or state police employment are sworn law-enforcement personnel (i.e., personnel with police powers). For federal agencies these percentages are more variable because many agencies have primary functions not at all related to law enforcement. For example, a large proportion of total Internal Revenue Service employment is concerned with processing tax returns.

We note that local police employment accounts for about 85 percent of the total, whereas state and federal figures are about 10 and 5 percent, respectively. These figures are relatively stable over time. The 1969 breakdown within the local level is displayed in Table 9.

Table 9

POLICE-PROTECTION EMPLOYMENT BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
(October 1969)

Local Government	Total Number of Employees	Percent of Employees
Counties	77,931	18
Municipalities	326,061	75
Townships	<u>28,476</u>	<u>7</u>
Total	432,468	100

Source: *Public Employment in 1969*,
Bureau of the Census (GE 69 No. 1).

We turn next to private security employment. Here the basic data sources are the Bureau of the Census publications such as the Censuses of Population and Business and the Bureau of Labor Statistics Publications. Data from, or based on, the Census of Population include employment in certain occupational categories within the broader classification of protective-service workers. Protective-service workers encompass six categories: firemen and fire protection (category 850); guards, watchmen, doorkeepers (category 851); crossing watchmen and bridge tenders (category 860); policemen and detectives (category 853);

marshals and constables (category 852); and sheriffs and bailiffs (category 854).^{*} We are concerned with crime-related protective services in this report and hence shall not present data on the fire-protection services. Category 851 (guards, watchmen, doorkeepers) actually includes an astonishing variety of occupational titles, some of which may be only marginally relevant to crime-related security work. Appendix A contains the complete Bureau of the Census listing of occupational titles for categories 851, 852, 853, 854, and 860, which we have organized into private, public, and special non-crime-related subcategories. Within category 853 are regular local city and county police as well as public police employed by state and federal agencies. The latter have full police powers, but their authority may be limited by geography and/or by the laws which they are empowered to enforce. Note that categories 852 and 854 are all public, whereas category 860 includes both public and private subcategories.

Since these occupational titles clearly omit administrative and clerical tasks, employment data based on these categories for, say, public police, will necessarily be *fewer* than those cited in Census of Government publications (see Table 8), since the latter *do* include personnel engaged in such tasks.

To display the employment time trends based on data from Census of Population and Bureau of Labor Statistics publications, we have aggregated and partitioned the data as follows:

Public police--includes part of category 853 and all of categories 852 and 854

Private police--includes part of category 853

Guards--includes all of categories 860 and 851; where data are available, we separate category 851 into guard employment in the public and private sectors

^{*} The fact that the category numbers are not in sequence does not mean, for example, that all categories between 851 and 860 are for protective-service workers. Categories 855-859 are not defined or assigned.

Table 10 displays these gross national employment trends from 1950 to 1967, with estimates for 1975, for all industries. For the years 1950 and 1960, data from Census of Population publications were used.* For 1960, 1967, and 1975, data from Bureau of Labor Statistics publications were employed; 1970 Census of Population data will be included in the final report if available prior to October 1971. Thus, for 1960, two sources of data exist and both results are displayed in Table 10. The BLS data uses as a main source the Census Bureau's Occupation by Industry report based on the 1960 Census.** The BLS Occupation by Industry Matrix (shown subsequently) differs from the census report in two major ways: (1) the BLS data make use of occupational data from a number of sources they consider preferable to decennial census data; and (2) the BLS matrix was made consistent with other sources of data. For example, monthly household employment survey data from the Current Population Survey were used between decennial census years.

* U.S. Census of Population 1960, Occupational Characteristics, PC(2)-7A Subject Reports, U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce.

** See "Tomorrow's Manpower Needs," Vol. IV, The National Industrial Occupational Matrix, Bulletin 1606, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, February 1969; and an unpublished report, "1960, 1967, 1975 Industry-Occupational Employment Matrix: 16 Years of Age and Older," Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 1970. In projecting the growth of occupations, the BLS used a variety of techniques. Two steps generally were followed: (1) projecting total manpower requirements in each detailed industry, and (2) projecting the trends in the use of each occupation in each detailed industry. In the first step GNP growth was estimated and adjustments were made in employment at the detailed or major industry division levels, so that the system was in balance in terms of expected productivity changes, civilian employment, and real GNP. Three approaches were used in developing such projections: (1) regression analysis, (2) input-output analysis, and (3) studies of individual industries to examine factors expected to influence their future growth. In the second step, occupational patterns for each industry were developed on the basis of occupational trends between 1950 and 1966 and projected to 1975. Variations in estimates obtained in the two steps are then reconciled to arrive at a final estimate.

Table 10

TRENDS IN SELECTED PROTECTIVE-SERVICES EMPLOYMENT^a

Category	1950	1960	1967	1975 (projected)
Public police and other public law-enforcement personnel (all governments)	199,000 ^b	260,000 ^c -266,000 ^b	363,000 ^c	489,000 ^d
Private police and detectives	21,000 ^b	20,000 ^b - 27,000 ^c	33,000 ^c	29,000 ^d
Guards, watchmen; doorkeepers, and bridge tenders				
Private	...	245,000 ^c	256,000 ^c	263,000 ^d
Public	...	85,000 ^c	109,000 ^c	152,000 ^d
Total	261,000 ^b	282,000 ^b -330,000 ^c	365,000 ^c	415,000 ^d
Total guards and private police	282,000 ^b	302,000 ^b -357,000 ^c	398,000 ^c	444,000 ^d

^aAll figures rounded to nearest thousand.

^bFrom Census of Population publications.

^cFrom Bureau of Labor Statistics publications.

^dFrom Bureau of Labor Statistics projections.

Table 10 shows that in 1950 there were 1.42 private policemen and public and private guards for each public policeman. In 1967 the ratio was about 1.1 to 1. By 1975, BLS projections indicate that there will be *fewer* combined private security workers and public guards than there will be public police; i.e., there will be 1.10 public policemen for each private policeman and public and private guard. Put another way, the *growth* in employment of security personnel without peace-officer powers has been *slower* than the growth in employment of personnel with peace-officer powers. Between 1950 and 1960 public police employment increased 33 percent, but private police and total public and private guard employment increased more slowly--by either 7 percent or 27 percent, depending on data sources used. Using BLS data, we see that between 1960 and 1967 public police employment increased sharply by 40 percent, whereas private police and all guard employment increased by only 11 percent. Projecting from 1965 to 1975, comparable growth figures are 34 percent and 11 percent, respectively.

If government guards are included with public police, the trend is even more pronounced because government guard employment has grown faster than private guard and private detective employment. In 1960 the ratio of public sector police and guards to private sector police and guards ranged between 1.27 to 1 and 1.62 to 1, depending on whether Census or BLS data are used. In 1967 this ratio had increased to 1.63 to 1, and by 1975 it is estimated at 2.19 to 1. Thus, public sector security employment is growing much more rapidly than private sector security employment.

Another way of comparing trends is to contrast increases in the numbers of public and private police and detectives with those for public and private guards. The ratio of public and private police and detectives to public and private guards did not change materially between 1960 and 1967 (between 1.01 to 1 and 1.15 to 1 in 1960, depending on data sources used, and 1.08 to 1 in 1967), but it is expected to rise to 1.24 to 1 in 1975.

Figure 2 displays these trends graphically. Also included are the comparable Census of Government data from Fig. 1 of regular police protection employment for all levels of government. Note that these




Fig.2—Trends of private and public police employment

figures are much higher than the comparable figures drawn from Census of Population and BLS sources. The basic reason is that Census of Government data include *all* police protection personnel, including nonsworn maintenance, administrative, and clerical personnel, whereas the population census and BLS figures are restricted to *occupational* categories which involve regular law enforcement. For example, note that in 1960 the employment totals differ by about 100,000, and that in 1967 the totals differ by about 74,000.

The number of guards employed by government, as a percentage of all guards, increased from about 26 percent to 30 percent between 1960 and 1967, and is projected to reach 37 percent in 1975. Private police and detectives are a small fraction of total private security workers, since the category for guard, watchman, doorkeeper, and bridge tender accounts for about 92 percent of the total. Between 1967 and 1975, BLS projections show an actual decline in private police and detective employment and a rise in guard employment, but the bulk of this rise is in the government guard rather than in the private sector guard.*

Table 11 presents a comparison between the gross employment levels and trends based on official U.S. government publications from the Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics and estimates drawn from other sources, such as the private security industry itself, the popular press, and financial community publications. By and large, sources *other* than official U.S. government publications *overstate* total private security employment, compared to Census and BLS figures. Reasonable agreement between estimates from official U.S. government publications and private sources exists in some cases; for example, between government and Predicasts, Inc. Estimates from other nongovernment sources generally are about *double* those of the Census and BLS. Several factors help explain the difference. Census and BLS occupational employment figures are for *primary* occupation only. This means that part-time private policemen, detectives, and guards whose primary employment is in

* However, as is shown in Chapter V, there has been a shift from in-house to contract services providing private guards and detectives, as the total market grows. Projections indicate that this trend will continue.

Table 11

COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF TOTAL GUARD AND PRIVATE POLICE SECURITY EMPLOYMENT

Source	1950	1960	1966	1967	1969	1970	1975
<u>Official U.S. Government Publications</u>							
(Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics)	282,000 (261,000) ^a	302,000-357,000 (282,000 ^a -330,000) ^a	388,000 (356,000) ^a	398,000 (365,000) ^a	409,000 378,000 ^a	415,000 384,000 ^a	444,000 415,000 ^a
<u>Press, Industry, Financial</u>							
<i>Forbes</i> , Sept. 1, 1970					800,000		
<i>Business Week</i> , Oct. 15, 1960	450,000	750,000					
<i>Security World</i> , Feb. 1968		392,000	754,000			838,000	983,000
Predicasts, Inc. <i>Security Systems</i> , Special Study 56, March 5, 1970		280,000 ^a	328,000 ^a	335,000 ^a	358,000 ^a	364,000 ^a	396,000 ^a

^aGuards, watchmen, doorkeepers, etc., only.

another occupational category would not show up in Census or BLS estimates.* We know from interviews with large and small private firms who sell security services that part-time security workers range from 20 to 50 percent of the total employees in the contract security industry. Also, though precise data are not available, only a relatively small proportion (probably less than 15 percent) of the private security work force is old enough to have retired from former civilian occupations with a pension, although a small proportion of the total work force retired from military careers at a younger age. Thus, a majority of part-timers are probably moonlighting from a different primary occupation.

Another factor which helps explain the difference in source estimates is that BLS and Census of Population employment figures do not include administrative, clerical, and maintenance personnel employed in private security work. Including these categories might add less than 10 percent to the Census and BLS figures. Therefore, the combination of these two factors--part-time workers and clerical, administrative, and maintenance workers--perhaps would explain between one-half and all of the difference between the higher private and lower official government employment estimates.

PRIVATE SECURITY EMPLOYMENT BY BROAD INDUSTRY CATEGORY

As indicated above, the BLS publications provide estimates of private security employment trends by broad industry category. These trends are displayed in Table 12 for each of two occupational categories (private guards, watchmen, doorkeepers; and private policemen) as well as for the sum of the two categories. Notice that manufacturing accounted for about one-third of all private security employment in 1960, but employment has been declining in this industry in both absolute and relative terms, and in 1975 it is estimated that manufacturing will account for less than one-quarter of the total employment. Agriculture, mining, and construction together accounted for about only 3 percent of the total in 1960, and projections to 1975 show employment declines

*This observation also holds for expenditures on private security. See the discussion below.

Table 12

SECURITY EMPLOYMENT TRENDS FOR ALL GUARDS AND PRIVATE POLICE AND DETECTIVES BY BROAD INDUSTRIAL CATEGORY^a

Industry Category	1960			1967			1975 (projected)		
	Guards, Watchmen, Doorkeepers	Police and De- tectives	Total ^b	Guards, Watchmen, Doorkeepers	Police and De- tectives	Total ^b	Guards, Watchmen, Doorkeepers	Police and De- tectives	Total ^b
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries	2,100	...	2,100	1,300	...	1,300	1,700	...	1,700
Mining	4,000	100	4,100	3,000	100	3,100	2,400	100	2,500
Construction	6,700	500	7,200	5,400	200	5,600	5,000	...	5,000
Manufacturing	110,200	3,900	114,100	99,900	4,500	104,400	89,700	4,200	93,900
Transportation, communication, and public utilities									
Total	26,000	6,600	32,600	21,200	6,800	28,000	15,400	9,600	25,000
Transportation (rail only)	8,000	4,100	12,100	4,100	3,200	7,300	2,400	4,400	6,800
Transportation (air only)	600	200	800	600	300	900	400	400	800
Wholesale and retail trade									
Total	15,500	1,400	16,900	14,900	1,800	6,700	15,900	2,100	18,000
Retail (gen. mdsg. only)	3,100	1,000	4,100	3,800	1,300	5,100	5,100	12,600	17,700
Finance, insurance, real estate									
Total	18,300	1,000	19,300	19,500	1,300	20,800	19,500	1,300	20,800
Finance (banks and credit agencies only)	12,400	400	12,800	13,600	400	14,000	15,400	300	15,800
Services									
Total	61,800	13,300	75,100	90,900	18,100	109,000	114,000	12,100	126,100
Misc. business serv. only	31,400	8,400	39,800	52,100	9,900	62,000	81,100	2,800	83,900
Educational serv. only	8,900	2,000	10,900	11,300	4,100	15,400	7,100	5,400	12,500
Total private sector	244,600	26,900	271,500	256,100	32,900	289,000	263,400	29,500	292,900
Public administration ^c	85,400	(all public)	85,400	109,400	(all public)	109,400	151,600	(all public)	151,600
Totals	330,000	26,900	356,900	365,500	32,900	398,400	415,000	29,500	444,500

^aFigures rounded to the nearest hundred; totals may not add due to rounding.

^bTotal private police and detectives plus guards, watchmen, and doorkeepers.

^cExcludes personnel with public police powers.

in both absolute and relative terms. Employment in transportation, communications, and public utilities also is declining in absolute and relative terms, from 9 percent in 1960 to 6 percent in 1975. Railroad police and guard employment declined from 12,100 in 1960 to 7,300 in 1967, and projection to 1975 shows a further small decline. Wholesale and retail trade employed about 5 percent of the total private guards and policemen in 1960, and this level is relatively stable over time. However, two counteracting trends are at work. The projection for the general-merchandising subcategory (department and discount stores) shows more than a threefold increase between 1967 and 1975, whereas the projection for wholesale and other retail subcategories shows a decline. Employment in finance, insurance, and real estate is relatively stable over time, but employment in the subcategory comprising banks and credit agencies shows a modest upward trend.

It is only in the service industries that we see large absolute and relative gains in security employment--from 75,000 in 1960 to 109,000 in 1967, and the projection to 1975 shows a further rise to 126,000. Most of the gains in the private sector are in the miscellaneous business services subcategory (the finest level of disaggregation available). Between 1960 and 1967, employment in that subcategory, which includes contract detective and protective agencies, grew 55 percent. Projection to 1975 shows a further gain of 35 percent. In the next chapter we examine further the trends in employment and expenditures in contract protective agencies.

The other category in which absolute and relative employment gains appear is in guards, watchmen, and doorkeepers employed by governments. From 1960 to 1967, employment rose almost 30 percent. The projection for 1975 shows 152,000, an increase of almost 40 percent over 1967. It is estimated that in 1975, government guards will account for over one-third of the total of all guards and private policemen.

In essence, then, the BLS data and projections suggest that total employment in the occupation of private policeman and guard (both public and private) has risen and will rise steadily; upward trends in employment of *public* guards are even steeper than those of private guards and policemen; employment of private *contract* guards and police (which

represent only a portion of total security employment in the subcategory of miscellaneous business services) shows a sharp upward trend; and proprietary, or *in-house*, private guard and police employment in the private sector has been declining and will continue to decline, in the aggregate. The latter observation seems to be contrary to impressions one receives in reading the popular press, viz., that *both* contract and in-house guard and police employment trends are upward. If the BLS trends are correct, then it must be concluded that, in the private sector of the economy at least, private guard and police employment is leveling off, but *contract* security employment has been increasing at the expense of declining employment of in-house guards and police.

Figure 3 shows the trends exhibited by the BLS data. Estimates from three other data sources are also shown for comparative purposes. Two Census Bureau publications, the Census of Business^{*} and County Business Patterns (CBP),^{**} publish employment and payroll figures (among other things) by industry classification. For our purposes, the only relevant data are for "detective agencies and protective services," as defined by Standard Industrial Classification 7393 (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1967 Classified) Index of Occupations and Industries. They include establishments primarily engaged in providing personnel for detective, investigative, patrolling, guard, personal-protection, and armored-car services. Data on establishments primarily engaged in installing and servicing protective devices and systems, such as central alarm and local alarm companies, are not available, since they are included in the totals for SIC category 7399, "business services, not elsewhere classified." SIC categories 7393 and 7399 are but a small subset of business services included in the broader SIC category 73, "miscellaneous business services."

We have displayed Census of Business data for detective agencies and protective services (contract security employment) for the census

^{*} 1967 *Census of Business, Selected Services*, BC 67-SA1, Vol. 7, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. See similar volumes for 1948, 1954, 1958, and 1963 census years.

^{**} *County Business Patterns, U.S. Summary*, CBP-68-1 (for 1968), CBP-69-1 (for 1969), Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Source:

- Bureau of Labor statistics for 1960, 1967, 1975
- - - { Census of Business for 1958, 1963, 1967
- { County Business Patterns for 1968, 1969
- — — Predicasts, Inc. for 1958, 1963, 1968, 1973, 1978




Fig.3—A comparison of private security employment trends from several data sources

* Includes part-time employees and some employees whose occupation is not that of guard or policeman.

** Mostly contract guards and police, but others are also included.

years 1958, 1963, and 1967. Prior to 1958, employment figures were available only for detective agencies and not for protective-service establishments. The annual County Business Patterns statistics are displayed for only 1968 and 1969; they are a by-product derived from employment and payroll information reported on Treasury Form 941, Schedule A, supplemented by a special survey of multiunit companies. Both the Census of Business and County Business Patterns employment data show *total* employment in each SIC category. Thus, they include part-time security workers as well as employees doing nonsecurity tasks such as administrative, clerical, maintenance, etc. Hence, these totals should be higher than those from BLS sources, because the latter include only those employees whose primary occupation is private guard or policeman. However, the BLS figures shown are not directly comparable, because they include, in addition to contract security workers in SIC category 7393, in-house guards and private police employed in *other* SIC categories under the broader category of "miscellaneous business services." It is not possible to extract employment figures in SIC category 7393 from BLS figures, since the BLS does not have fine enough raw data available. It is interesting to observe, however, that employment figures for contract security workers from Census of Business and County Business Patterns sources show a steeper rise in the middle and late 1960s than do the BLS figures.

A third source of employment estimates is the Predicasts, Inc., report mentioned earlier.* That report, in turn, used the Census Bureau, BLS, pre-1967 Censuses of Business, annual reports, prospectuses, trade literature, interview data, and Predicasts' data bank as sources, but it is not possible to ascertain exactly how the resulting estimates were obtained.** Nevertheless, Predicasts estimates of total guard employment, as well as their breakout by contract and in-house categories, are also displayed in Fig. 3. Their estimate of contract guard employment between 1958 and 1967 is fairly consistent with Census of Business and CBP figures, but that for 1968-69 is somewhat lower. Their estimate of

* Op. cit.

** Either from reading the report or from conversations with knowledgeable Predicasts, Inc., personnel.

both the level and rate of increase of total guard employment is consistently higher than that of the BLS. Predicasts' estimate for in-house private guard employment is generally higher than that of the BLS and shows employment increasing through the 1960s and a projected decline occurring after 1973. In comparison, BLS figures show a steady decline from 1960 on. Predicasts' estimates of total 1960 guard employment agree almost exactly with Census of Population data (see Table 11), which include government guards.

Thus, the comparison of estimates from several sources tends to confirm the sharp upward trend of contract security employment, and the generally upward trend of total guard (private and public) and private police employment. While in-house private security employment trends are somewhat unclear, they appear to be headed down in the early 1970s. When the 1970 Census of Population figures become available, these employment trends and levels should become much clearer.

Table 13 summarizes the relative employment trends between the public and private sectors and within the private sector itself.

EXPENDITURES

We turn next to gross expenditure trends, beginning with those for public police. Table 14 and Fig. 4 display the trends in annual payroll expenditures for police protection between 1952 and 1969.* Payroll expenditures for law-enforcement personnel in all governments increased almost 350 percent between 1952 and 1969, reaching almost \$4 billion. For federal and local governments, increases over the same time period were slightly lower, about 310 percent, but increases at the state government level have been phenomenally high--over 500 percent. Presumably, the relatively larger increases in payroll expenditures, as compared to employment, for public police protection at all governmental levels are explained largely by the joint effects of inflation and real salary increases over that time period. Since police protection

* Sources of data used were the same as quoted in the discussion of governmental employment for police protection. The figures show only payroll expenditures; expenditures on retirement plans, insurance coverage, and other fringe benefits are *not* included.

Table 13

RELATIVE EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

Sector	Percent Employed			
	1960	1967	1970	1975 (Projections)
Public and private sector				
<u>All guards and private police</u> as a percentage of total private and public	54-57 ^a	52	50	47
<u>Gov't guards</u> as a percentage of all guards	26	30	32	36
<u>All guards</u> as a percentage of all guards and private police	92	92	93	94
Private sector only				
<u>Contract</u> guards and private police as a percentage of all private guards and police ^b	15-19 ^a	22-29 ^a	24-33 ^a	29-40 ^a
<u>In-house</u> guards and private police as a percentage of all private guards and police ^b	81-85 ^a	71-78 ^a	67-76 ^a	60-71 ^a

^aMore than one data source used to compute range of estimates.

^bGuards who work for governments are excluded.

Table 14

TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL ANNUAL PAYROLL EXPENDITURES FOR POLICE PROTECTION^a
(\$ millions)

Type of Employee	1952	1953	1954	1955	1957	1958	1959	1960	1962	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
<u>All governments</u>															
All employees	889	958	..	1133	1303	2030	1956- 2326	2586	2792	3033	2975- 3332	3535	3839
<u>Federal government</u>															
All employees	84	76	..	120	132	173	184- 196	220	243	257	241- 282	294	344
<u>State government</u>															
All employees	73	80	..	96	115	245	200- 276	315	348- 352	385- 390	411- 446	..	455
<u>Local government</u>															
All employees	732	802	..	917	1056	1612	1573- 1854	2051	2201	2391	2387- 2609	..	3040
<u>State and local govern- ments</u>															
All employees	805	882	952	1013	1171	1332	1433	1548- 1857	1772- 2130	2366	2549	2776	2734- 3050	3241	3494

^aExpenditures have not been adjusted to compensate for changes in the purchasing power of the dollar over time, which decreased 28 percent between 1952 and 1969.

Sources:


U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Public Employment in 1968, 1969, etc.*

U.S. Bureau of the Census, *State Government Finances* (various years).

Statistical Abstract of U.S.--1969.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, *State Distribution of Public Employment.*

1952, 1957, 1962, 1967 U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments.*



Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Employment in 1969
U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances in 1967
Statistical Abstract of U.S. - 1969
U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Distribution of Public Employment
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments, 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967

Fig.4—Trends in governmental annual payroll expenditures* for police protection

*Expenditures not adjusted to compensate for changes in the purchasing power of the dollar which decreased 28 percent between 1952 and 1969.

has been, and still is, quite labor intensive, estimates of *payroll* expenditures are a reasonable proxy for *total* expenditures. For example, in large municipal police departments, personnel costs account for 90 to 95 percent of the total. Thus, capital expenditures (police buildings, motor vehicles, communications equipment, computers, etc.) account for only 5 to 10 percent of total expenditures.

Expenditures on local police account for about 79 percent of the total of all governmental police expenditures, whereas state and federal shares are about 12 percent and 9 percent, respectively. State and federal expenditures account for 21 percent together, but state and federal police employment is only 15 percent. Conversely, expenditures on local police account for 79 percent, but the employment share is 85 percent. This reflects the generally lower average salaries at local levels compared with those at state and federal levels.

At the local level, counties account for 17 percent of expenditures, municipalities account for 78 percent, and townships account for 5 percent--a breakdown very similar to that exhibited by police employment at the local level.

We now turn to expenditure trends for private security. Estimates of spending and payrolls from a variety of sources are shown in Table 15. From the 1950 and 1960 Census of Population, we see that total wages and salaries earned by persons in all guard and private police categories (defined previously) were \$640 million in 1949 and \$1,124 million in 1959, or a 76 percent increase over the ten-year period. Thus, in 1959, security payroll expenditures for all guard and private police categories represented about 36 percent of total private and public security payrolls, whereas in 1949 the comparable figure was 53 percent. These figures, of course, do not reflect total spending on security. They do not include earnings of security personnel in other occupations such as clerical, administrative, and maintenance, and they do not include spending on fringe benefits for security employees. Also, they reflect little, if any, of the spending on security equipment such as vaults, safes, surveillance and monitoring devices, alarms, etc. When data become available from the 1970 Census of Population, the gross trends of payroll expenditures over two decades for the primary private security occupations will become more clear.

Table 15

A COMPARISON OF PRIVATE SECURITY SPENDING ESTIMATES
(\$ millions)

Source	1949	1958	1959	1963	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1973	1978
Overall spending or payroll ^a											
<i>Census of Population (Occup. Charact.)</i> ^b	640	..	1124
Predicasts, Inc., <i>Special Study 56</i> , 3/5/70	..	1170	1280	1730	..	2666	2900	3500	3500	4400	6350
<i>Wall St. Journal</i> , "Selling Security," 8/4/70	3000
<i>Newsweek</i> , "To Catch a Thief," 7/27/70	2000
<i>Barron's</i> , "Safety and Growth," 10/17/66	1200
<i>Forbes</i> , "Creeping Capitalism," 9/1/70	2000
Purchased security services and equipment											
<i>Barron's</i> , "Profits in Protection," 2/20/61	250- 300
Predicasts, Inc.	..	511	..	780	..	1272	1395	..	1773	2340	3670
In-house security services spending											
Predicasts, Inc.	..	659	..	950	..	1394	1505	..	1727	2060	2680
Contract guard and investigative services revenues and payrolls											
Predicasts, Inc.											
Revenues	..	177	..	289	..	481	530	..	682	910	1425
Payrolls	..	107	..	194	..	339	375	..	470	613	910
<i>Census of Business and County Business Patterns</i>											
Revenues	..	177	..	289	..	445
Payrolls	..	107	..	194	..	312	417	490

^aExpenditures not adjusted to compensate for changes in the purchasing power of the dollar.

^bTotal reported earnings in occupational categories of guard, watchman, doorkeeper, private policeman and detective, crossing watchman, and bridge tender. The estimate was obtained by averaging two estimates, each obtained as follows: (1) median earnings x number of wage and salary earners summed over the occupational categories mentioned above, and (2) number of wage earners x average wage in each wage or salary category, summed over all wage categories and over the occupational categories mentioned above.

^cIncludes guard, investigative, and armored-car services, monitoring and detection systems, plus crime-deterrent and fire-control equipment.

The most detailed and comprehensive estimate of overall spending trends on private security is contained in the Predicasts, Inc., special study of security systems.* That study estimated that overall spending rose 150 percent between 1958 and 1968, from about \$1.2 billion to \$2.9 billion. Their projections into the 1970s indicate a somewhat declining rate of growth, to \$4.4 billion in 1973 and \$6.4 billion in 1978. Using their projections, we estimate that overall spending in 1970 was about \$3.5 billion. As we indicated above, it was not possible to ascertain precisely how their estimates were obtained. We note only that for 1959 their estimate of overall spending was about 14 percent higher than the 1960 Census of Population figures for wages and salaries of private guards and police. Since Predicasts estimates include equipment in addition to salaries, we infer that their 1959 estimates of overall spending on private in-house plus contract security are probably low. When the 1970 Census figures are available, or if a specialized census or survey of private security is conducted, more reliable estimates of overall current and future spending on private security may be made.** We note, too, that estimates appearing in the financial and popular press from time to time over the last decade are generally somewhat lower than the Predicasts figures, as the table indicates. Those press estimates cannot be validated because they usually do not specify which spending categories are included, nor do they present detailed supporting data.

However, reliable data on revenues and payrolls of contract protective-service establishments and detective agencies (i.e., armored-car, guard, and investigative services) are available for 1958, 1963, and 1967 from the Census of Business publications and for 1968 and 1969 from County Business Patterns publications. From Table 14 we see that the Predicasts estimates for such contract security expenditures agree fairly well with the data from these sources. Note that contract guard and detective services revenues rose from \$177 million in 1958 to \$445 million in 1967, a 150 percent gain. In 1969 the revenues had increased

* Op. cit.

** However, we do attempt below to estimate recent (1967) spending.

to just under \$500 million. Payroll as a fraction of revenues is relatively stable at about two-thirds.

The Predicasts study estimated that overall purchased security *services and equipment* spending as a fraction of total (purchased plus in-house) security spending rose from 44 percent in 1958 to 48 percent in 1968, with a projected rise to 58 percent in 1978. In dollar terms, purchased security services and equipment spending almost tripled in a ten-year period, rising from \$511 million in 1958 to \$1,395 million in 1968. The financial and popular press* and the security industry itself have estimated that the contract security *services* share of the total security *services* market (contract plus in-house) is now about 25 to 30 percent.

Beginning with fairly hard data, there are at least two ways of checking the accuracy of these estimates, at least in a rough way. Let us take the year 1967, for which relatively accurate data exist from the Census of Business on receipts, payrolls, and employment for contract guard and investigative services. That figure was \$445 million. The first approach is to assume that the contract security industry's estimate of its share of the total protective-services market (i.e., 25 to 30 percent) is correct. Then we can calculate** the total market for protective services and add to it receipts of armored-car firms and firms that manufacture, market, and install fixed security equipment (safes, vaults, lighting, etc.), monitoring and detection systems, and fire-control systems. Armored-car receipt figures are available from the Census of Business. The only estimate for overall security equipment receipts is that available in the Predicasts study. Using this first approach, total private security spending is estimated to be between \$2,275 million and \$2,570 million in 1967.

* See sources noted in Table 14.

** Total protective-services receipts = $\frac{\$445 \text{ million}}{.25} = \$1,780 \text{ million}$

or alternatively

Total protective-services receipts = $\frac{\$445 \text{ million}}{.30} = \$1,485 \text{ million}$

The second approach involves using hard employment estimates from BLS data for the in-house security sector, together with an assumption about the relative costs of in-house versus contract security services. Knowing the approximate relative costs and manpower of in-house and contract security services and knowing the receipts for contract protective services, we can estimate in-house protective-services costs and add to them contract protective-services (including armored car) receipts plus security-equipment receipts. From our interviews with large and small contract security firms and from articles in the financial and popular press, the contract security industry estimates that the "overall" costs of contract services are about 20 percent less than those for comparable in-house protective services. From the BLS data (Table 12), total private employment in primary occupations of guards and police was 289,000 in 1967. We also know from BLS data that total employment in contract guard and private police firms (excluding armored-car firms) was about 92,400 in 1967. Assuming that only 90 percent are in the primary occupations of guards and private police (i.e., 10 percent are clerical, administrative, maintenance, etc.), contract guard and private police employment was about 83,000. Then we can calculate* the total in-house protection services costs and add the contract security services, armored-car, and equipment-sales receipts to arrive at total private security spending. This second approach results in an estimate of total private security spending in 1967 of \$2,556 million.

Comparing the estimates summarized below, we see that Estimate 2 is about 4 percent lower than the Predicasts figure. Note that Estimate

* In-house protective services costs (excludes government guards) = $\frac{289,000 - 83,200}{83,200} (1.2) \times (\$445 \text{ mil}) = \$1,321 \text{ million}$

It should be clear that the calculation of in-house security spending assumed that costs are directly proportional to relative employment in in-house and contract security sectors. But the proportion of part-time employment in contract work may be quite different from that in in-house security work. If so, this would bias the results. We know that part-timers represent a large fraction of contract security personnel. We are less certain of in-house security personnel, but that fraction is probably smaller. If so, the estimate using this second approach errs on the low side.

1 is 4 percent to 15 percent lower than the Predicasts estimate. Estimate 2 is clearly more reliable than Estimate 1, because it uses harder data. However, the estimates are highly consistent.

OVERALL PRIVATE SECURITY SPENDING FOR 1967

	<u>\$ millions</u>
Estimate 1	2,275 to 2,570
Estimate 2	2,556
Predicasts	2,666

We emphasize that some of the estimates quoted above are not as reliable as we would prefer. This is because accurate data on overall security employment and expenditures are sparse. This chapter has discussed the specifics of these data inadequacies, as well as the sometimes conflicting estimates derived from various sources. When 1970 census data become available better estimates can be made, but some gaps will remain.

SUMMARY OF GROSS TRENDS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION

The number of public employees with police powers in 1969 was approximately 395,000, while there were about 120,000 publicly employed guards and 290,000 private security workers without police powers. Thus, there were about 3 public and 7 private security employees without police powers in 1969 for every 10 public law-enforcement officers with police powers.

Since 1960 the trend in total security employment and expenditures has been markedly upward. Growth in the total public sector has been faster than that in the total private sector. Within the private sector, the contract security segment has been growing rapidly, relative to the in-house security segment.

The number of public law-enforcement personnel whose primary occupation is that of policeman or investigator* grew 42 percent between 1960 and 1969. In that same time period the state police and investigative forces grew the most (69 percent); local police and investigative employment growth was next at 40 percent; and federal forces grew the least (23 percent). Local police employment accounted for 85 percent of the total 1969 public police force, whereas state and federal employees accounted for about 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively.

The number of publicly employed guards increased 41 percent between 1960 and 1969, i.e., at about the same rate as public law-enforcement officer employment. Privately employed security workers whose primary occupation is guard or watchman numbered about 258,000 in 1969, an increase of only 6 percent since 1960. Accurate data are not available for part-time employees. They account for between 20 and 50 percent of major contract guard firms' employment, but the fraction of part-time private guards and detectives employed in-house is unknown. Part-timers in private security who list their primary occupations as nonsecurity jobs are not counted as security workers in the Census of Population. Of all personnel whose primary 1969 occupation was that of guard or watchman, approximately 32 percent were governmental employees and 68 percent were privately employed. Of those privately employed in 1969, it is estimated that between 23 and 32 percent worked for a contract security firm and the remainder were in-house employees of a firm or institution not primarily engaged in the security business. While the total number of private employees whose primary occupation was that of guard or watchman grew slowly during the 1960s, the contract guard employment segment grew relatively rapidly (approximately 90 percent between 1960 and 1969). In contrast, the in-house guard employment segment may have declined as much as 8 percent. The 1970 Census of Population data (available in early 1972) on occupation by industry will provide more accurate estimates of these trends.

* An estimated 75 percent of all public law-enforcement agency personnel have these primary occupations.

Total private employment in primary occupations of police or detective numbered approximately 32,000 in 1969, of which 8,000, or 25 percent, were employed by private contract security firms. The number of private police and investigators is only about 11 percent of the total of all private security employees and is estimated to have increased at least 19 percent between 1960 and 1969.

Considering all employees whose primary occupations were guard, watchman, policeman, or investigator, total 1969 private sector employment was estimated at 290,000, or 36 percent of the total (private plus public sectors). Employment growth from 1960 to 1969 was approximately 7 percent in the private sector as compared with over 40 percent in the public sector.

Security expenditures in 1969 are estimated to have been \$4.4 billion for public law enforcement, having grown 90 percent between 1960 and 1969,* or 7.3 percent per year on the average. Approximately an additional \$1 billion was expended for publicly employed guards and watchmen.

In the private sector, approximately \$1.6 billion was expended in 1969 for in-house guards, police, and investigators. An estimated \$620 million was spent for private contract guard and investigative services in 1969, while approximately \$128 million and \$120 million were expended for armored-car and central station alarm services, respectively. 1969 security equipment expenditures were an estimated \$800 million. Thus, an estimated \$3.3 billion was spent in 1969 on private crime-related security services and equipment. Adding the spending estimates for government guards and public law enforcement to private sector figures yields a grand total for crime-related security and law-enforcement expenditures of about \$8.7 billion.

*These data have not been adjusted to compensate for changes in the purchasing power of the dollar, which decreased 19 percent between 1960 and 1969.

V. PURCHASED SERVICES AND EQUIPMENT: THE
PRIVATE CONTRACT SECURITY INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION

Security *services* purchased by clients include guard service, investigative service, patrol, and armored-car delivery. Security *equipment* may be categorized as deterrent equipment, monitoring and detection systems, and fire-control systems. Each, in turn, may be broken down into finer subcategories. For example, deterrent equipment includes devices that make initial penetration difficult or discouraging, fences and gates, electronically controlled doors, fire doors, burglar-resistive file cabinets and safes, and bank equipment such as vaults, safes, deposit boxes, night depositories, teller windows, drive-in windows, and remote teller communications. Deterrent equipment also includes lighting equipment such as high-intensity lamps, area floodlighting systems, poles, and accessory items.

Monitoring and detection systems include central station alarm services, local and proprietary alarms, closed-circuit television (CCTV), and other detection and surveillance devices.* Fire-control systems include chemical fire extinguishers, automatic fire sprinkler equipment, and automatic sprinkler systems.

The Predicasts, Inc., study** referred to earlier is the most comprehensive source of estimates of the spending,*** payroll, and

* Detection devices involve local, central station, or proprietary alarms that are triggered by the intruder at the scene of a crime, producing a signal to which a guard, policeman, or fireman responds. A local system sounds an alarm only in the vicinity of the detection device; a central station alarm system alerts security forces off the premises; a proprietary system alerts a guard on the premises. The alarm systems may deter a crime if the potential criminal is aware of them. The basic types of intrusion devices include ultrasonic, magnetic, photoelectric, foil, resonance, and capacitance devices, as well as CCTV.

** Op. cit.

*** Expenditure, payroll, and receipts data in this chapter have not been modified to reflect changes in the purchasing power of the dollar, which declined 17 percent between 1948 and 1958 and an additional 21 percent between 1958 and 1969.

employment trends in the private security industry. It is also the only source we have located that attempts to present the structure, markets, and products of the industry in a comprehensive way. Official government sources such as publications of the Census Bureau (the Censuses of Manufactures, Population, and Business; County Business Patterns, Public Employment, etc.) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) paint only a fragmentary picture, because data on various segments of the security industry are scattered throughout these government publications and, more importantly, because there are large gaps in the information collected by the government on security forces. From the BLS sources we can obtain employment data by broad industry category only in the two primary security occupations, (1) guards, watchmen, and doorkeepers, and (2) police and other law-enforcement personnel. The BLS has data on in-house guards in each major industry but does not know precisely how many are employed in the contract security industry, because that category (detective agencies and protective establishments) is buried within the larger category of "miscellaneous business services."

From the Censuses of Business and Manufactures we can obtain the number of establishments, payroll, receipts, and employment only of a *part* of the security industry--namely, detective agencies and protective establishments and armored-car services. We cannot delineate employment and payroll for primary security occupations and for support (i.e., clerical, administrative, maintenance, etc.) occupations. We also cannot isolate data for alarm services, since they are buried within a larger category called "miscellaneous business services, not elsewhere classified." And we cannot isolate data on the manufacture of central station alarm and signal systems because they are buried within the broader Census of Manufactures category "alarm and signal systems, electric and electronic" (#36623).

PRODUCTS

A summary of sales of private security services and equipment (past and predicted) is given in Table 16. The figures are based on data from the 1970 Predicasts, Inc., study. The compound annual growth

Table 16

SALES OF PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES AND EQUIPMENT

Product	Sales (\$ millions)					Compound Average Annual Growth (%)			
	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978	1958-63	1963-68	1968-73	1973-78
Guard and investigative services	177	289	530	910	1425
Armored-car services	<u>42</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>190</u>	<u>290</u>
Total protective services	219	357	645	1100	1715	10.2	12.6	11.3	9.3
Fixed security equipment	69	91	144	215	320
Lighting equipment	<u>23</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>265</u>
Total deterrent equipment	992	140	235	375	585	8.8	11.0	9.8	9.3
Monitoring and detection systems	117	165	270	450	700	7.1	10.4	10.7	9.2
Fire-control equipment	<u>83</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>245</u>	<u>415</u>	<u>670</u>	7.3	15.7	11.1	10.1
Total	511	780	1395	2340	3670	8.8	12.4	10.9	9.4

rate during each five-year period is also shown for each major product group.

By and large, the greatest growth spurts occurred between 1963 and 1968. Purchased investigative and protective services grew at an annual rate of 10.2 percent between 1958 and 1963, increasing to 12.6 percent between 1963 and 1968, with somewhat smaller growth rates projected into the 1970s. These services accounted for about 43 percent of all private security sales in 1958, increasing to 46 percent in 1968, and projections into the 1970s show small, but continued, growth of their share of the market.

Deterrent equipment sales grew at a lesser rate, 8.8 percent per year, between 1958 and 1963, increasing to 11 percent per year between 1963 and 1968. Projections into the 1970s indicate a slackening growth rate. Deterrent equipment accounted for 18 percent of the private security sales market in 1958, about 17 percent in 1968, and projections into the 1970s show a decline to about a 16 percent share.

Sales of monitoring and detection systems grew slower between 1958 and 1963, at 7.1 percent per year, increasing sharply to 10.4 percent per year in the next 5-year period. A continued high growth rate of about 10 percent per year is expected through the 1970s. These systems accounted for 23 percent of the market in 1958, decreasing to 19 percent in 1968, and are expected to retain that share of the market into the 1970s. Fire-control equipment sales grew at rates similar to those of monitoring and detection systems, except for the period between 1963 and 1968, during which their growth rate increased to 15.7 percent per year. Fire-control equipment sales as a percentage of total security sales grew from 16 percent in 1958 to over 17 percent in 1968. Their share is expected to remain relatively constant into the 1970s.

We turn now to a more detailed description of sales within each major product group. Since investigative and protective services are discussed in more detail in a separate section below, we shall first consider deterrent equipment. Table 17 displays sales trends, based on the 1970 Predicasts, Inc., study.

Table 17

DETERRENT EQUIPMENT SALES BY PRODUCT
(\$ millions)

Product	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978
Fixed Security Equipment					
Safes and chests	15	24	21	25	29
Safe deposit boxes	9	12	15	19	23
Bank vaults and other bank equipment	21	33	54	88	140
Insulated filing cabinets	11	12	12	13	14
Other fixed security equipment	<u>13</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>114</u>
Total	69	91	144	215	320
Security Lighting Equipment					
High-intensity lamps	8	15	31	57	95
Area floodlighting systems	12	27	45	75	120
Poles and accessory items	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>50</u>
Total	23	49	91	160	265
Total Deterrent Equipment	92	140	235	375	585

Sales of fixed security equipment as a percentage of all private security spending have been declining, from 13.5 percent in 1958 to 10.3 percent in 1968. According to Predicasts, this trend is expected to continue due to increased miniaturization in information storage and the accompanying reduction in material handling. Sales of conventional equipment, such as safes and filing cabinets, are expected to show little growth. Specialized banking equipment sales are expected to grow the fastest as banks comply with regulations passed in recent legislation.

Diebold, American Standard (Mosler Division), and Walter Kidde are the major suppliers of fixed security equipment, including complete systems as well as equipment components. Together they provide more than 80 percent of the industry total.

Security lighting sales have increased nearly fourfold between 1958 and 1968. It is expected that lighting equipment sales will continue to be an increasing fraction of the total private security market.

Rising labor cost is one generally cited reason for rising sales of monitoring and detection systems (i.e., the cost advantage shifts from manpower toward equipment). Table 18 displays these sales trends,

by product type. Total sales have increased from \$117 million in 1958 to \$270 million in 1968 and are projected to reach \$700 million by 1978.

Table 18
MONITORING AND DETECTION SYSTEMS SALES BY TYPE
(\$ millions)

Product	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978
Central station alarm services	55	80	110	150	200
Local and proprietary alarms	30	36	54	80	110
CCTV devices	5	9	23	45	75
Detection, surveillance, and other	<u>27</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>315</u>
Total monitoring and detection	117	165	270	450	700

Central station alarm services have doubled between 1958 and 1968, reaching \$110 million, and are projected to double again by 1978. Their share of the total market for monitoring and detection systems shows a steady decline over time; in 1968 that share was about 40 percent. Large suppliers of central station services, including equipment installation, monitoring, and maintenance, are American District Telegraph (ADT), Walter Kidde, William J. Burns, Baker Industries, Wackenhut, and Morse Signal Devices.

Sales of local and proprietary alarms grew at a slower rate. Most suppliers of local alarms are located in cities with high crime rates. These companies include A. W. Fruh, Ademco (Division of Pittway), Morse Signal Devices, and Sargent and Greenleaf. Products are distributed in several ways: through mail order, by franchised hardware dealers or company-owned sales outlets, and by companies that encourage construction contractors to offer local burglar alarms as an option to apartment owners and home buyers. The largest suppliers of proprietary alarms are Walter Kidde and Honeywell.

Sales of CCTV devices have shown astonishing growth, from only \$5 million in 1958 to \$23 million in 1968, and are projected to reach \$75 million by 1978. Security users now account for about half of all CCTV devices. A large fraction of the growth in sales of this type of equipment is expected to result from the new security standards required of

banks in the recent Bank Protection Act. CCTV devices are distributed by dealers of electronic, audiovisual, and photographic equipment and by sales outlets of major companies such as Honeywell, General Electric, Ampex, and Babcock and Wilcox. Companies that market their CCTV equipment through distributors or on a franchise basis include RCA, Sony, Panasonic, Motorola, and Bell & Howell.

Sales of detection and surveillance equipment grew threefold between 1958 and 1968, reaching \$83 million. Legislation such as the Bank Protection Act and rising labor costs will affect and encourage the sales of these devices particularly. Many of the detection and surveillance devices have certain weaknesses, however. Ultrasonic devices* are well suited to protecting isolated areas but not large open-space areas. Magnetic detection devices can be circumvented fairly easily. Photoelectronic devices can be circumvented easily if intruders wear special lenses that can pick out the beam. Magnetic foil is circumvented by simply cutting a hole in the window or door without disturbing the system, which is usually placed around the edges. Resonance devices have a serious weakness in that they often trigger false alarms on the basis of sounds that are simply part of the environment. Other surveillance equipment, such as cameras, mirrors, etc., is often found in retail, financial, and commercial establishments; the major manufacturers of these devices are Diebold, Mosler, Eastman Kodak, and Bell & Howell.

Also included in the last category shown in Table 18 are fire-detection devices, such as smoke detectors, thermostats, and ionization detectors.

MARKETS

Table 19 summarizes the sales to the major markets of private security equipment and services. All of these markets have more than doubled in the past ten years, and all are projected by Predicasts to grow rapidly through the 1970s. Industrial markets have grown the

* Walter Kidde and Systron Donner each have about 50 percent of the \$3 million market in ultrasonic devices.

Table 19

MARKETS FOR SALES OF PRIVATE SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES
(\$ millions)

Market	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978
Financial, commercial, and retail	190	274	468	779	1208
Industrial and transportation	249	393	729	1223	1913
Consumer	10	15	23	40	67
Institutions and others	<u>62</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>298</u>	<u>482</u>
Total	511	780	1395	2340	3670

fastest, almost tripling between 1958 and 1968; they now comprise more than half the total. A large part of this growth can be attributed to increases in purchased guard and investigative services to replace in-house security; such purchased services now account for an estimated 58 percent of the security purchases of industrial and transportation organizations. Fire-control equipment is the second largest component of industrial security markets, accounting for about 20 percent of sales in 1968. Lighting equipment and accessories are next, with more than 8 percent of sales in 1968. Central station services and other alarms, surveillance systems, and detection systems each accounted for over 4 percent of sales.

Financial, commercial, and retail markets have grown less rapidly than the industrial sectors. These markets primarily use fixed security equipment and central station services, which have slower growth rates. Between 1958 and 1968, sales to financial, commercial, and retail consumers increased about 150 percent or 9.4 percent per year. Steady growth is expected, especially in the 1968-1973 period, because of the increasing number of branch banks.* Fixed security equipment accounts for one-fourth of all security expenditures by financial, commercial, and retail establishments, and armored-car services account for over 20 percent. Projections show this share of the market

* Although the number of banks in the nation has remained relatively unchanged at about 14,000, the number of branches has increased from 9,500 to 20,100 between 1958 and 1968 and is expected to reach 35,000 by 1978.

to remain relatively stable, but dollar figures will grow as the number of bank branches increases, especially in outlying areas. Pittston is the major supplier of armored-car services through its Brink's, Inc., subsidiary. Alarm, surveillance, and detection systems also account for about 20 percent of security expenditures, and central station services account for over 14 percent. Guard and investigative services account for only 11 percent of security sales in these markets.

Consumer markets remain a rather insignificant part of the total security picture. Although the potential for sales of residential security equipment and services exists, most of this potential has not been realized because of major problems encountered in the distribution, pricing, and servicing of these products. The total number of housing units in place in 1968 was estimated to be 64 million. If 100 percent of these residents were to protect themselves from crime and fire loss by installing alarm systems at a cost of \$200 per unit, the total market for this equipment would be nearly \$13 billion. Assuming 1.9 million units are added each year, another \$380 in potential would develop. Yet the residential alarm market accounts for sales of \$7 million, or less than 0.1 percent of the existing maximum potential. Much of the reason for this market remaining largely untouched is that suppliers have found the industrial sector to be the more profitable one and have concentrated their efforts on bidding for the internally supplied protection services. One rapidly growing area in the consumer security market, however, is automobile alarm systems. This growth has resulted from the increasing amateur theft of expensive tape players, radios, and other accessories. Nearly 70 percent of the residential and automobile security market consists of alarm, surveillance, detection, and fire-control equipment. It is anticipated that consumer security markets will continue to grow somewhat faster than residential construction. In 1958, consumer security spending was 0.051 percent of residential construction spending, whereas in 1968, it was 0.080 percent. By 1978 a figure of 0.105 percent is expected, due to trends toward multifamily dwelling construction and stricter municipal fire and safety codes requiring the installation of fire-extinguishing and control equipment.

Institutional security spending increased almost threefold between 1958 and 1968. The trend is expected to continue because spending by health and educational institutions has grown at a faster rate than has the GNP. Health and educational spending was 10.4 percent of the GNP in 1958 and is expected to reach almost 15 percent by 1978. Fire-control equipment and guard and investigative services each account for about 30 percent of the security sales to the institutional market. Fire-control expenditures will continue to grow rapidly because of major increases in the number of nursing homes and colleges and universities. Guard and investigative services have become increasingly important in combating increasing vandalism and violence and in protecting the growing value of assets. Although a large part of these services is provided in-house, a growing fraction is purchased externally. Alarm, surveillance, and detection systems account for about 14 percent of institutional security sales, while lighting equipment accounts for about 9 percent, and fixed security equipment accounts for about 7 percent.

PROTECTIVE SERVICES

In this section we examine more closely the trends in purchased protective services--guard, investigative, and armored car. The basic data sources are the Census of Business publications for the years 1948, 1954, 1958, 1963, and 1967. Table 20 displays the trends in number of establishments, receipts, payroll, and number of employees. In 1948 and 1954, only detective agencies were included by the Census of Business; beginning in 1958, detective agencies were included, together with other protective service establishments.

Between 1948 and 1954, the number of detective agency establishments almost doubled, annual receipts and annual payroll more than tripled, and total employment rose by 150 percent. In 1954, there were 1,123 detective agency establishments yielding about \$60 million in receipts, of which about two-thirds went for payroll; the industry employed about 17,000 people. On the average, a detective agency establishment in 1954 yielded about \$54,000 annually in receipts and employed about 15 people, of which 13 were full-time. It is not

Table 20

GROWTH OF DETECTIVE AGENCIES AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES^a

	1948	1954	1958	1963	1967
Detective Agencies Only					
Number of Establishments ^b	603	1,123	N.A. ^c	N.A.	N.A.
Annual receipts (\$ million) ^d	18.8	60.4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Annual payroll (\$ million)	11.7	41.2	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Number of paid employees ^e					
Full time	5200	14,800	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Total	6900	17,300	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Detective Agencies and Protective Service Establishments					
Number of Establishments ^b					
With payroll	N.A.	N.A.	1,525	2,169	2,547 ^f
Total	N.A.	N.A.	2,831	3,644	4,280 ^f
Annual receipts ^d					
Establishments with payroll (\$ million)	N.A.	N.A.	170	281	432
All establishments (\$ million)	N.A.	N.A.	177	289	445 ^g
Annual payroll (\$ million)	N.A.	N.A.	107	194	312
Number of paid employees ^e					
Full time	N.A.	N.A.	35,300	N.A.	N.A.
Total	N.A.	N.A.	42,100	67,000	92,400
Active Proprietors of Unincorporated Businesses	429	885	2,491	2,848	N.A.
Armored Car					
Number of establishments ^b	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	315	344
Annual receipts ^d (\$ million)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	67.3	90.6
Annual payroll (\$ million)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	36.9	52.0
Total number of paid employees ^e	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	8,400	9,400

^aThese data are from the U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Business. Detective agencies and protective services, as defined by Standard Industrial Classification 7393 (U.S. Bureau of the Budget 1967 Classified Index of Occupations and Industries), include establishments primarily engaged in providing personnel for detective, investigative, patrolling, night watching, or personal protection services for businesses or individuals. Data on armored car establishments are also included in SIC 7393 but are shown separately for the years 1963 and 1967. Data on establishments primarily engaged in installing and servicing protective devices are not available since they are included in the totals for SIC 7399, "other business services."

^bAn establishment is a single physical location at which business is conducted. Thus, a firm may consist of several establishments.

^cNot Available.

^dReceipts exclude amounts other than those received from customers, e.g., income from investments.

^eEstimated assuming the same ratio of total number to number with payroll as existed in 1963.

^fEstimated assuming the same ratio of receipts for all establishments to receipts for establishments with payroll as existed in 1963.

^gPaid employees consist of the number of employees, including salaried officials and corporate executives, who are on the payroll during the week of the census. Proprietors and partners of unincorporated businesses are not included.

possible to quantify the growth in detective agencies subsequent to 1954 because in the available data they are grouped within a broader category including protective service establishments.

Between 1958 and 1967, this broader category of detective agencies and protective service establishments showed rapid growth in receipts, payroll, and employment. For all establishments, receipts grew at a compound annual rate of 10.8 percent, from \$177 million to \$445 million; payroll grew even faster, at 12.6 percent per year, from \$107 million to \$312 million; and total employment grew at 9.1 percent per year, from 42,100 to 92,400. The number of establishments grew at a slower rate, 4.7 percent per year, from 2,831 to 4,280. Total growth over the nine-year period and the average annual growth rate are summarized in Table 21.

Table 21

PERCENT GROWTH IN DETECTIVE AGENCIES AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES
FROM 1958 THROUGH 1967

Item	Total Growth (%)	Compound Annual Growth Rate (%)
Total number of establishments	51.2	4.7
Annual receipts (all establishments)	151.4	10.8
Annual payroll	191.6	12.6
Total paid employees	119.0	9.1

The growth in the subcategory of detective agencies and protective service establishments has been much faster than that in selected services,* itself a rapidly growing sector of the economy. Table 22 shows the growth in selected services from 1948 to 1967, and Table 23 summarizes percent growth and average annual growth rate over the same nine-year period.

* Selected services, as defined by the Bureau of the Census, includes establishments primarily engaged in providing a wide variety of services to individuals and business establishments. Major categories included are hotels, personal services, business services, automobile repair and service, miscellaneous repair services, motion pictures, and amusement and recreation services.

Table 22

TRENDS IN SELECTED SERVICES^a

	1948	1954	1958	1963	1967
Number of Establishments ^b Providing Selected Services	665,475	785,589	979,195	1,061,673	1,187,814
Annual Receipts ^c (billions of dollars)	13.3	23.5	32.5	44.5	60.5
Paid Employees ^d	2,099,692	2,361,821	2,904,156	3,261,541	3,841,174

^aThese data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Business.

^bAn establishment is a single physical location at which business is conducted. Thus, a firm may consist of several establishments.

^cReceipts exclude amounts other than those received from customers, e.g., income from investments.

^dPaid employees consist of the number of employees, including salaried officials and corporate executives, who are on the payroll during the week of the census. Proprietors and partners of unincorporated businesses are not included.

Table 23

PERCENT GROWTH IN SELECTED SERVICES FROM 1958 THROUGH 1967

Item	Total Growth (%)	Compound Annual Growth Rate (%)
Number of establishments	21.2	2.2
Annual receipts	84.5	7.0
Paid employees	32.2	3.1

In terms of average annual growth rate between 1958 and 1967, the number of detective agencies and protective service establishments has increased at over twice the rate of selected services, employment has grown almost three times as fast, and annual receipts have grown one and one-half times as fast.

Although contract guard and investigative services are provided by thousands of establishments (e.g., 4,280 establishments in 1967), a few companies account for the greater portion of the market. These are Pinkerton's, William J. Burns, Wackenhut, Walter Kidde, and Baker Industries. Their share of the market is discussed more fully below.

Prior to 1963, data for armored-car services were not shown separately in the Census of Business. But between 1963 and 1967, annual

receipts grew 35 percent, from \$67.3 million to \$90.6 million; payroll grew 40 percent, from \$36.9 million to \$52 million; but the number of paid employees grew only 12 percent, to 9,400. Armored-car services include both the transfer of valuables in armored vehicles and the delivery of items by courier. Courier services are used to transfer items with little or no intrinsic value such as blood plasma, radio-isotopes, payroll checks, cashed checks, and legal briefs.

The armored-car services market is dominated by Pittston through its Brink's, Inc., subsidiary, which accounts for more than half the revenues. Two other firms are also large suppliers: Baker Industries, through its Wells Fargo Armored Transport Group, and Loomis.

Purolator is the largest supplier of courier services through its American Courier Company subsidiary, with operations in 41 states. Bankers Utilities is the second largest courier service and operates in a 7-state region in the Midwest. Brink's courier service serves some 20 cities, the Federal Reserve Central Banks, and the United States Treasury.

We turn next to a closer examination of the characteristics of the contract guard and investigative services industry--by size (employment and receipts) of firm, by legal form or organization, and by number of establishments per firm. Table 24 displays the trends in distribution of annual receipts per establishment from 1948 to 1963, based on Census of Business data. For 1948 and 1954, data are available only for detective agencies, whereas for 1958 and 1963, data are available for the combined category of detective agencies and protective service establishments. No data are available for 1967. The data for 1963 are displayed graphically in Fig. 5. There are a large number of firms with very small annual receipts. In 1963, over 40 percent of the firms had annual receipts between \$3,000 and \$15,000. However, there is a time trend toward bigness, i.e., establishments with high annual receipts. For example, between 1958 and 1963, establishments with annual receipts over \$300,000 increased from about 5 percent to 7 percent of the total.

Table 24

TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL RECEIPTS OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS

Item	Year				
	1948 ^a	1954 ^a	1958	1963	1967 ^b
Total number of establishments	603	1123	2831	3644	
Establishments operated for entire year	512	1063	2637	3196	
Number of establishments with annual receipts of:					
\$500,000 or more	}	21	66	125	
300,000 to 499,000		31	22	61	91
100,000 to 299,000		71	150	271	
50,000 to 99,000		50	87	183	240
30,000 to 49,000		55	99	158	267
20,000 to 29,000	49	108	175	240	
15,000 to 19,000	39	78	160	219	
10,000 to 14,000	62	131	259	319	
5,000 to 9,900	117	222	540	588	
3,000 to 4,900	53	126	417	408	
2,000 to 2,900	32	56	296	235	
Less than 2,000	24	42	172	193	

^aDetective agencies only.

^bData not available.

Table 25 shows the trends in distribution of paid employees per establishment. Figure 6 graphically displays the 1963 distribution. Here, again, the trend is toward bigness. The percentage of all establishments with less than 10 employees declined from 81 percent to 77 percent, but establishments with more than 50 employees rose from 7 percent to 9 percent.

Table 26 displays the trends of number of establishments and total annual receipts by legal form of organization. The same trends toward bigness occur, i.e., there is a percentage decline in individual proprietorships and partnerships and a rise in corporations. In 1958, individual proprietorships accounted for 21 percent of the receipts. By 1963, this figure had declined to 15 percent. On the other hand, in 1958, corporations accounted for 67 percent of the receipts, but by 1963, this figure had risen to 80 percent.




Fig.5—Distribution of annual receipts for detective agencies and protective services in 1963

Table 25

TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF PAID EMPLOYEES PER
DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE SERVICE ESTABLISHMENT

	Year				
	1948 ^a	1954 ^a	1958	1963	1967 ^b
Total number of establishments	603	1123	2831	3644	
Establishments operated entire year	512	1063	2637	3196	
Number of establishments with:					
0 paid employees ^c	144	396	1300	1275	
1 paid employee	79	110	226	374	
2 paid employees	62	76	194	208	
3 paid employees	49	63	112	184	
4 or 5 paid employees	63	82	149	214	
6 or 7 paid employees	37	49	89	136	
8 or 9 paid employees	24	36	69	79	
10 to 14 paid employees	}71	71	117	131	
15 to 19 paid employees		28	54	78	
20 to 49 paid employees		39	74	146	233
50 to 99 paid employees	22	39	81	115	
100 or more paid employees	13	39	100	169	

^aDetective agencies only.

^bData not available.

^cPrincipally individual proprietorships.

Table 26

TRENDS IN THE LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATION OF ESTABLISHMENTS
PROVIDING DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES

	1948 ^a	1954 ^a	1958	1963	1967 ^b
<i>Total number</i>	603	1,123	2,831	3,644	
Individual proprietorships	366	784	2,141	2,483	
Partnerships	47	86	177	182	
Corporations	190	250	498	963	
Cooperatives	--	3	10	8	
Other legal forms	--	--	5	8	
<i>Total receipts (\$1000)</i>	18,786	60,350	177,330	289,094	
Individual proprietorships	5,494	14,067	36,845	44,792	
Partnerships	11,660	5,640	20,293	13,502	
Corporations	12,126	40,589	118,672	230,364	
Cooperatives	--	54	690	318	
Other legal forms	--	--	830	118	

^aDetective agencies only.

^bData not available.




Fig.6—Distribution of employees in detective agencies and protective services in 1963

Table 27 displays a variety of characteristics of detective and protective services by number of establishments per firm for the year 1963. There were an average of 1.10 establishments per firm, but single-unit firms accounted for 89 percent of the establishments and 52 percent of the total receipts. On the other hand, 8 firms (less than 3 percent of the total firms) had 11 or more establishments per firm and accounted for 41 percent of the receipts. The industry in 1963 could be accurately characterized as consisting of roughly half small operators and half large operators, in terms of employment and receipts. The 8 large firms, on the average, operated over 28 establishments per firm. Also, the multiunit firms generally paid more per employee, and payroll as a percentage of receipts was generally higher compared to single-unit firms.

Tables 28 through 30 display similar characteristics by size of receipts per establishment, by employment per establishment, and by legal form of organization, also for 1963. Establishments with higher receipts paid more per employee, and the nonpayroll portion of receipts was generally lower for establishments with large receipts and employment, the latter being partially due to economies of scale. Cooperatives* tended to pay considerably more than organizations of other legal forms; but corporations tended to pay their employees more than individual proprietorships or partnerships. Again, because of economies of scale and higher salaries, payroll as a percentage of receipts was highest for corporations.

Table 31 shows how the average establishment has changed between 1963 and 1967. In the trend toward bigness, annual receipts and number of employees per establishment rose. Receipts per employee and payroll per employee also rose. Payroll as a percentage of receipts rose from 67 percent to 70 percent because of rising wages and because of a trend toward large firms which pay even higher wages and which have the advantages of economies of scale.

* Generally, a cooperative is a group of firms who band together to provide in-house security services. The parent firms are *not* in the primary business of selling security services.

Table 27

DETECTIVE AGENCIES AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN THE U.S. BY NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS PER FIRM: 1963*

Number of Units	Firms (Number)	Establish- ments (Number)	Receipts (\$1,000)	Payroll entire year (\$1,000)	Paid em- ployees workweek ended nearest Nov. 15 (Number)	Active proprietors of unin- corporated businesses (Number)	Average no. of estab- lishments per firm	Average annual receipts per firm (\$1,000)	Average annual payroll per firm (\$1,000)	Average employ- ment per firm	Average annual receipts per estab- lishment (\$1,000)	Payroll as per- centage of receipts	Average employment per estab- lishment	Average annual receipts per employee	Average annual pay per employee	Percent of total receipts earned by firms
Total	3,323	3,644	289,094	193,606	66,994	2,848	1.10	87.0	58.3	20.2	79.3	67	18.4	4,315	2,890	100.0
Single units	3,257	3,257	151,082	93,231	34,148	2,780	1.00	46.4	28.6	10.5	46.4	62	10.5	4,424	2,730	52.3
Multiuunits:																
2 establishment	33	61	5,092	3,335	1,423	37	1.85	154.3	101.1	43.1	83.5	65	23.3	3,578	2,344	1.8
3 establishment	14	40	9,891	7,561	2,046	12	2.86	706.5	540.1	146.1	247.3	76	51.2	4,834	3,696	3.4
4 or 5 establishment	7	32	2,140	1,318	304	5	4.57	305.7	188.3	43.4	66.9	62	9.5	7,039	4,336	0.7
6 to 10 establishment	4	28	3,186	2,049	440	14	7.00	796.5	512.3	110.0	113.8	64	15.7	7,240	4,657	1.1
11 or more establishment	8	226	117,703	86,112	28,633	--	28.25	14,712.9	10,764.0	3579.1	520.8	74	126.7	4,110	3,007	40.7

* Comparable data not available for more recent years.

Table 28

DETECTIVE AGENCIES AND PROTECTIVE AGENCIES IN THE U.S. BY RECEIPTS SIZE OF ESTABLISHMENT: 1963

Receipts size of establishment	Establishments (Number)	Receipts (\$1,000)	Payroll entire year (\$1,000)	Paid em- ployees workweek ended nearest Nov. 15 (Number)	Active proprietors of unin- corporated businesses (Number)	Average receipts per es- tablishment (\$1,000)	Payroll as per- centage of receipts*	Average annual receipts per employee*	Average annual pay per employee*
Total, all establishments	3,644	289,094	193,606	66,994	2,848	79.3	67	4,315	2,890
Establishments operated entire year, total	3,196	283,521	190,737	65,260	2,442	88.7	67	4,344	2,923
With annual receipts of:									
\$500,000 or more	125	155,682	112,737	36,491	7	1245.5	72	4,266	3,089
\$300,000 to \$499,000	91	35,868	25,535	8,683	23	394.2	71	4,131	2,941
\$100,000 to \$299,000	271	45,854	31,220	11,276	94	169.2	68	4,067	2,769
\$50,000 to \$99,000	240	16,801	9,752	3,890	132	70.0	58	4,319	2,507
\$30,000 to \$49,000	267	10,090	5,175	2,031	189	37.8	51	4,968	2,548
\$20,000 to \$29,000	240	5,803	2,726	1,120	189	24.2			
\$15,000 to \$19,000	219	3,691	1,341	581	181	16.9			
\$10,000 to \$14,000	319	3,712	1,184	512	257	11.6			
\$5,000 to \$9,000	588	3,953	840	520	555	6.7			
\$3,000 to \$4,000	408	1,404	142	104	398	3.4			
\$2,000	235	470	56	28	228	2.0			
Less than \$2,000	193	193	29	24	189	1.0			

* Data for establishments with annual receipts under \$30,000 excluded because many such firms are individual proprietorships or partnerships with no full-time paid employees.

Table 29

DETECTIVE AGENCIES AND PROTECTIVE AGENCIES IN THE U.S. BY EMPLOYMENT SIZE OF ESTABLISHMENT: 1963

Employment Size of Establishment	Establishments (Number)	Receipts (\$1,000)	Payroll Entire Year (\$1,000)	Paid Employees Workweek Ended Nearest Nov. 15 (Number)	Active Proprietors of Unincorporated Businesses (Number)	Average Receipts per Establishment (\$1,000)	Payroll as Percentage of Receipts*	Average Employment per Establishment	Average Annual Receipts per Employee*	Average Annual Pay per Employee
Total, all establishments	3,644	289,094	193,606	66,994	2,848	79.3	67	18.4	4,315	2,890
Establishments operated entire year, total	3,196	283,521	190,737	65,260	2,442	88.7	67	20.4	4,344	2,923
With no paid employees 11/15	1,275	7,668	290	...	1,279	6.0
With 1 paid employee 11/15	374	3,942	1,183	374	320	10.5		1.0		3,163
With 2 paid employees 11/15	208	3,589	1,322	416	162	17.3		2.0		3,178
With 3 paid employees 11/15	184	3,694	1,611	552	140	20.1		3.0		2,918
With 4 or 5 paid employees 11/15	214	6,211	3,132	950	136	29.0	50	4.4	6,538	3,296
With 6 or 7 paid employees 11/15	136	5,751	2,945	882	85	42.3	51	6.5	6,520	3,339
With 8 or 9 paid employees 11/15	79	3,742	2,122	671	53	47.4	57	8.5	5,577	3,162
With 10 to 14 paid employees 11/15	131	8,155	4,750	1,537	71	62.3	58	11.7	5,306	3,090
With 15 to 19 paid employees 11/15	78	5,956	3,720	1,326	55	76.4	62	17.0	4,492	2,805
With 20 to 49 paid employees 11/15	233	35,739	22,235	7,400	89	153.4	62	31.8	4,830	3,005
With 50 to 99 paid employees 11/15	115	32,200	22,454	8,031	31	280.0	70	69.8	4,009	2,796
With 100 or more paid employees 11/15	169	166,874	124,973	43,121	21	987.4	75	255.2	3,870	2,898

* Data from establishments with three or fewer paid employees excluded because of significant distortions caused by not counting working proprietors or partners as paid employees of the business.

Table 30

DETECTIVE AGENCIES AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN THE U.S. BY LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATION: 1963*

Legal form of organization	Establishments (Number)	Receipts (\$1,000)	Payroll entire year (\$1,000)	Paid employees workweek ended nearest Nov. 15 (Number)	Active proprietors of unin- corporated businesses (Number)	Average receipts per es- tablishment (\$1,000)	** Payroll as per- centage of receipts	Average employment per estab- lishment	** Average annual receipts per employee	Average annual pay per employee
Total	3,644	289,094	193,606	66,994	2,848	79.3	67	18.4	4,315	2,890
Individual proprietorships	2,483	44,792	20,280	8,288	2,484	18.0		3.3		2,447
Partnerships	182	13,502	7,577	2,674	364	74.2	56	14.7	5,049	2,834
Corporations	963	230,364	165,478	55,955	--	239.2	72	58.1	4,117	2,957
Cooperatives	8	318	195	51	--	39.8	61	6.4	6,235	3,824
Other legal forms	8	118	76	26	--	14.8	64	3.3	4,538	2,923

* Comparable data not available for more recent years

** Data for individual proprietorships excluded because of distortions caused by not counting working proprietors as employees of the business.

Table 31

THE AVERAGE DETECTIVE AGENCY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES ESTABLISHMENT
IN THE U.S. IN 1963 AND 1967

Year	Average Receipts per Establishment	Payroll as Percentage of Receipts	Average Employment per Establishment	Average Annual Receipts per Employee	Average Annual Payroll per Employee
1963	\$ 79,300	67%	18.4	\$4,310	\$2,890
1967	\$103,971	70%	21.6	\$4,816	\$3,377

LARGE CONTRACT SECURITY FIRMS

As a group, the handful of large publicly owned firms account for a very large fraction of the total revenues of the private security industry. Table 32 displays revenue trends between 1963 and 1969 for the large firms. The firms are grouped by major service category, such as guard and investigative services, central station alarm services, and armored-car services. Many companies sell services in more than one of these categories. Where a substantial fraction of the revenues come from more than one category, the revenues from each source are displayed separately, if data are available. The Welis Fargo Protective Services Division of Baker Industries, which sells security guard, alarm, and armored services, is a case in point. Also, when available, the revenue attributable to a particular service category is shown. For example, Walter Kidde and Company is a large, diversified corporation with 1969 revenues of \$786 million, of which only \$46.3 million is attributable to sales of guard services and equipment.

As shown in Table 32, the largest five firms selling guard and investigative services accounted for about half of all such services in 1967, or about \$35 million. This is actually a slight overestimate, since a small fraction of the total revenues shown for Pinkerton's, Burns, and Wackenhut are attributable to the sale of other services and equipment. Nevertheless, a few companies dominate the field, and their share of the market has grown over time. For example, in 1963, total revenues for Pinkerton's, Burns, and Wackenhut represented 36

Table 32

REVENUE TRENDS OF LARGE PUBLICLY OWNED PRIVATE PROTECTION FIRMS^a

Firm	Revenue (\$ millions)							Comp. Annual Growth Rate, 1965-69 (% per year)
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	
Guard and Investigative Services								
Pinkerton's, Inc.	42.7	64.1	66.7	71.3	82.8	99.4	120.5	15.8
Wm. J. Burns Intl. Detective Agency, Inc.	41.0	43.2	48.2	55.9	66.5	82.8	97.1	19.0
Wackenhut Corporation	9.6	10.8	17.8	22.4	29.0	36.7	48.5	28.4
Walter Kidde and Co. (Globe Security Systems) ^b	22.8	25.3	29.0	39.4	46.3	19.4
Baker Industries, Inc. (Wells Fargo Security Guard) ^c	3.3	5.8	8.1	11.7	15.8	45.5 ^d
Total	93.3	118.1	158.8	180.7	235.4	270.0	328.0
Industrywide total	289 ^e	445 ^e	530 ^f	620 ^g
Percent of industrywide total	36	51	51	53
Central Station Alarm Services								
American District Telegraph Co.	70.9	74.9	78.7	81.8	87.4	93.3 ^h	97.2 ^h	5.5
Baker Industries, Inc. (Wells Fargo Alarm Services)	3.3	5.8	8.1	11.6	13.6	45.5 ^d
Holmes Electric Protective Co.	15.0	17.5
Total	70.9	74.9	82.0	87.6	95.5	119.9 ^h	128.8 ^h
Industrywide total	80 ^f	110 ^f	120 ^f
Armored-Car Services								
Brink's, Inc.	40.6	44.5	48.9	56.7	64.0	12.1
Baker Industries, Inc. (Wells Fargo Armored Service) ^j	2.6	4.7	6.6	9.8	13.0	45.5 ⁱ
Loomis	6.1	7.1	8.3	10.0	12.7	20.6
Total	49.3	56.3	63.8	76.5	89.7
Industrywide total	67.3 ^e	87.0 ^h	90.6 ^e	115.0 ^h	128 ^k
Percent of industrywide total	57	67	70

^aData in this table have not been adjusted to compensate for the reduced purchasing power of the dollar over time; between 1959 and 1965, that purchasing power declined about 8 percent, while it declined an additional 14 percent between 1965 and 1969.

^bGuard services and equipment only.

^cWells Fargo Security Guard Group only (part of Wells Fargo Protective Services Division). Data prior to 1968 assume that the Security Guard Group revenues are 27 percent of total revenues of Baker Industries, Inc.

^dAnnual growth rate for entire corporation. Total income was \$54.9 million in 1969 and \$11.9 million in 1965. The large growth rates were due, in part, to acquisitions.

^eSource: Census of Business, op. cit.

^fSource: Predicasts, Inc., op. cit.

^gSource: 1967 Census of Business data extrapolated to 1969, using revenue growth ratios equal to those achieved by large contract guard and investigative agencies.

^hAt least 80 percent of the ADT total revenues are attributable to central station alarm services.

ⁱWells Fargo Alarm Services Group only (part of Wells Fargo Protective Services Division). Revenues prior to 1968 are assumed to be 27 percent of total revenues of Baker Industries, Inc.

^jWells Fargo Armored Service Group only (part of Wells Fargo Protective Services Division). Revenues prior to 1968 are assumed to be 22 percent of total revenues of Baker Industries, Inc.

^kSource: 1967 Census of Business data extrapolated to 1969, using revenue growth ratios equal to those achieved by large armored-car firms.

percent of the total sales of guard and investigative services. By 1967, they had captured 40 percent of the rapidly growing market. Between 1963 and 1967, the total purchased guard and investigative service market grew at a compound annual rate of 12.9 percent, based on Census of Business receipts figures. (Most of the larger corporations have grown at faster rates over the same periods.) And between 1965 and 1969, the compound annual growth rates of *all* the larger corporations had considerably exceeded these figures, as shown in Table 32.

Brink's dominates the field of armored-car services, with just under 50 percent of the total revenues. But two other firms, Loomis and Wells Fargo Armored Service Group (within Baker Industries), also account for a significant fraction of the market. In 1968, their revenues were about \$10 million each. The three firms together accounted for about two-thirds of the total market of \$115 million. Between 1965 and 1969, Brink's and Loomis sales grew at average annual rates of 12.1 percent and 20.6 percent, respectively. In just one year, between 1968 and 1969, the Wells Fargo Armored Service Group of Baker Industries increased revenues by one-third. In armored-car services, too, a handful of companies have increased their share of a growing market.

The central station alarm services market is dominated by American District Telegraph (ADT). Total revenues in this service have grown more slowly than in other security services, having a compound annual growth rate of 5.5 percent between 1965 and 1969. Of the total \$97.7 million in 1969 revenues, more than 80 percent, or at least \$79 million, are attributable to central station services. The Predicasts, Inc., study is the only source of industrywide revenue estimates (\$110 million in 1968), since central station alarm services are included in the broader category of "miscellaneous business services, not elsewhere classified" in the Census of Business. But assuming that this is a reasonable estimate, then 1968 central station services revenues of ADT, Holmes Electric, and Wells Fargo Alarm Services (of Baker Industries) together accounted for over 90 percent of the industrywide revenues.

The six largest guard, investigative, and armored-car service companies had 86,500 employees in 1969, as shown in Table 33. Most,

Table 33

1969 EMPLOYMENT IN LARGE SECURITY FIRMS OFFERING
GUARD, INVESTIGATIVE, AND ARMORED-CAR SERVICES

Firm	Total Employment	Full-Time Employment
Pinkerton's	27,000	17,000
Wm. J. Burns	29,000	14,500
Wackenhut	9,000	7,800
Globe Security (Walter Kidde)	8,300	5,400
Baker Industries	7,700	N/A
Brink's	5,500	N/A
Loomis	975	N/A
Total above firms	86,500	...
Total employment in protective services industry (excludes central station alarm services)	120,000 (approx.)	...
Above firms as a percentage of total	72% (upper bound)	...

but not all, of these employees were associated with these three classes of security services.* Figure 3 showed that about 120,000 people were employed in providing these purchased security services. Thus, an upper bound for the 7 firms' employment share is 72 percent, a figure greater than their 52 percent revenue share. However, the apparent inconsistency between revenue and employment shares is partly due to estimation errors resulting from lack of basic data (e.g., extrapolation of total employment and revenue data from Census of Business publications, unavailability of accurate breakdowns of revenue and employment by security service category for each firm, and so on). Also, part of the disparity is attributable to the fact that smaller

* However, detailed breakdowns of employees associated with each type of security service were not available for all companies.

establishments have considerably higher annual receipts per employee,* was shown in Table 27. The major point remains clear, however: *A handful of firms dominate the market, even though there are literally thousands of small firms selling private security services.*

Table 34 displays the trends in net income for the large firms. With the sole exception of ADT, compound annual growth rates between 1965 and 1969 were quite high, but generally not as high as revenue growth rates.

PROFILES OF SELECTED CORPORATIONS**

Among the major corporations that sell crime-protection services on a contract basis are American District Telegraph Company, Baker Industries, Brink's, Inc., William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Globe Security Systems (a subsidiary of Walter Kidde and Company, Inc.), Pinkerton's, Inc., and the Wackenhut Corporation. These firms provide contract guard, investigative, central station alarm, and armored delivery services.

Pinkerton's, Inc.***

Pinkerton's, Inc., is the oldest and largest firm providing contract guard and investigative services in the United States. The firm's total revenues in 1969 were \$120.5 million, with net earnings

* A working owner is not considered an employee.

** Information presented in this section is mainly from publicly available sources. Certain sensitive information, obtained during personal interviews with corporation executives, is presented in other chapters and reports in this series in a manner that will preserve the anonymity of the responding corporations.

*** Material drawn from personal interviews with Pinkerton's, Inc., executives; 1969 Pinkerton's, Inc., Annual Report; Prospectus for sale of Class B common stock in Pinkerton's, Inc., Ernst & Ernst, February 26, 1969; *The Pinkerton's, The Detective Dynasty that Made History*, by J. D. Horan, Crown Publishers, 1967; 1967 Census of Business; 1968 Bear, Stearns, and Co., report, *Crime Protection, A Growth Industry*; 1970 Predicasts, Inc., Special Study 56, *Security Systems*; 1970 Burnham and Co. report on investment opportunities in the Security, Protection, and Investigation Services Industry; "Last of the Pinkerton's Keeps Watch," *Business Week*, March 5, 1960.

Table 34

NET INCOME TRENDS OF LARGE PUBLICLY OWNED PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS
(\$ millions)

Firm	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	Compound Annual Growth Rate Between 1965-69
Pinkerton's		.7	.9	1.4	1.6	1.94	2.89	3.32	4.16	27.0%
Wm. J. Burns	.58	.83	1.04	1.18	1.39	1.57	2.12	2.58	2.45	15.2%
Wackenhut	.21	.14	.28	.34	.67	.67	.71	.82	1.45	21.4%
Globe Security (Walter Kidde) ^a					1.09	1.15	1.52	1.55	1.97	
Baker Industries ^b					.80	1.57	1.88	2.08	2.66	35.0%
American District Telegraph Co.		4.68	5.03	6.84	7.28	6.65	6.22	6.19	6.49	N/A (see text)
Holmes Electric (Bell Television, Inc.)								.95	1.22	--
Brink's					2.43	2.84	3.29	4.30	5.12	20.5%
Loomis					.26	.27	.32	.52	.59	22.8%

^aEarnings for the Globe Security Systems Division only.

^bEarnings for the entire corporation. Earnings for the various groups (guard services, armored service, and alarm services) within the Wells Fargo Protective Services Division are not easily available.

of 3.5 percent of revenues; the annual compound growth rate in revenues in the 1965-1969 period was 15.8 percent. In 1967, the last year for which reliable data on the contract crime-protection industry are available, Pinkerton's had 18.6 percent of the total "detective agency and protective service" industry revenues. Growth is achieved primarily internally, rather than by extensive acquisitions. Total employment in 1969 was 27,000, of which 17,000 were full-time and 10 percent were unionized.

The firm was founded in 1850 by Allan Pinkerton, who emigrated from Scotland in 1842 and became the Chicago Police Department's first detective. Eight years later, at the age of 31, he founded his own detective agency with nine men. For more than half a century, Pinkerton's was the only investigative force that crossed state borders and operated in all parts of the country. Pinkerton men were called upon for service by local, state, and federal agencies, as well as by private interests. Their colorful adventures included hunting down such notorious outlaws as Jesse James, and averting an assassination attempt on Abraham Lincoln. At the start of the Civil War, Pinkerton put his detective force at the disposal of the Union. This led to the first organized Secret Service, headed by Pinkerton himself. With the organization of the FBI in 1924 and the subsequent growth of effective public police investigative forces, Pinkerton's has concentrated on serving private business and industry. Since 1883, they have been the official detective arm of the Jewelers Security Alliance, and in connection with that assignment, they maintain information files on 1.5 million known criminals. The term "private eye" grew out of the unblinking eye that was Pinkerton's trademark for many years.

Over the years Pinkerton's has developed policies on the type of business it does and does not accept. Today, the company will not accept investigative business regarding labor organizing activities for either labor or management; domestic or marital problems; political personalities or situations; or the defense of persons under prosecution by the public police. Also, the company will not provide guard services in a strike, unless the firm being struck is a permanent client. Pinkerton's will not keep its guards in a struck plant unless both union and management agree.

The two prohibitions involving labor/management problems stem from two periods in Pinkerton's history that earned the agency the hatred of labor unions and the distrust of many persons outside organized labor. The first was its role in the infamous Homestead massacre of 1892, when Pinkerton guards were used to reopen a struck steel mill. After that incident, Congress decided that such agencies could not work directly for the federal government and passed the Pinkerton's Law. Pinkerton's also decided to eschew guarding struck plants unless both sides agreed. The second event occurred in 1936, when a Senate subcommittee, headed by Senator Robert La Follette, Jr., investigating labor espionage called in Pinkerton's executives. In that period, this work accounted for up to 30 percent of the agency's business. The work involved offering companies confidential reports on labor unrest in their plants and on the work of union organizers. La Follette's investigation produced much bitter questioning of Pinkerton's activities, and when it was over Congress passed a resolution saying that

...the industrial spy system breeds fear, suspicion, and animosity, tends to cause strikes and industrial warfare, and is contrary to sound public policy.

Simultaneously, Pinkerton's quit its labor espionage.

Today the primary source of Pinkerton's business is furnishing uniformed security personnel (90 percent of total revenues in 1969). They provide security personnel for industrial plants, institutions (especially hospitals and campuses), high-rise buildings, special events (the largest force ever supplied to a special event was 800 for a college football game), and race tracks. The largest single contract was for security at the New York World's Fair in 1964-65, when up to 4,500 personnel were on duty at one time. Investigation has declined relative to other services and accounted for only about \$7 million in 1969. The firm does not operate central station alarm systems but does manufacture security devices such as watchmen's clocks and anti-intrusion alarms. In 1969 they initiated a Patrol and Inspection Service. Security consulting and survey services are also offered.

The corporation is currently headquartered in New York City and maintains offices in 93 North American cities.

William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.*

In terms of revenues, Burns is the second largest contract guard and investigative services firm in the United States. A broad range of electronic security services, from central station alarms to CCTV, is also provided. The firm distributes but does not manufacture security devices because it feels that rapidly changing technology may render a product obsolescent in a very short time.

In 1969, Burns Agency revenues of \$97.1 million were accompanied by net earnings of \$2.45 million. From 1965 to 1969, the average compound annual growth rate for revenues was 19 percent. Growth has been both internal and by acquisition (22 companies since the end of 1966). The 1969 revenues came principally from guard services. Revenues from electronic security services to clients were only \$4.9 million, of which \$2.3 million were generated by central station alarm services. Only \$1.6 million of 1969 revenues came from investigation, undercover, and miscellaneous security services. Based on 1967 Census of Business data on the contract guard and investigation industry, Burns had about 15 percent of the total industrywide revenues in that year.

The firm was started in 1909 by William J. Burns, a former investigator for the U.S. Secret Service and later head of the Bureau of Investigation (predecessor to the FBI), and is still controlled by his family. The nature of the business has changed considerably; whereas in the early years, the business was almost entirely investigative, it had become heavily guard-oriented by the 1960s. The current trend is toward electronic security, especially central station alarm services.

Headquartered in Westchester County, New York, Burns has seven operating regions, each with its own sales, recruiting, and training

* Material drawn from personal interviews with William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., executives; 1969 William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., annual report; Prospectus for sale of Class A common stock in the W. J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., October 21, 1970; 1967 Census of Business; 1968 Bear, Stearns, and Co., report, *Crime Protection, A Growth Industry*; 1970 Predicasts, Inc., Special Study 56, *Security Systems*; 1970 Burnham and Co. report, *Investment Opportunities in the Security, Protection, and Investigative Services Industry*.

staff. There are 99 branch offices in the United States, Canada, Colombia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Bahamas. In 1969, 36,100,000 hours of guard service were provided to 12,400 clients at an average fee of approximately \$2.50 per hour (total guard revenues divided by total hours of guard service). The firm operates 21 central stations (many acquired as a result of divestiture ordered in an anti-trust ruling against the American District Telegraph Company). Electronic security services are provided to 9,200 clients, while 3,400 clients are provided with investigative, management control, and other security services. No single client accounted for over 1.5 percent of total 1969 revenues. Burns' prefers not to become involved in guarding businesses during a strike and avoids marital-related investigations. Especially noteworthy clients of over 40 years are the American Bankers Association and the American Hotel-Motel Association, for which the Burns Agency is official detective. In conjunction with those assignments, Burns maintains comprehensive files on over 50,000 persons suspected or convicted of crimes, especially those related to banks, hotels, and motels.

Burns employed 29,000 persons in 1969, of whom 50 percent were part-time and 19 percent were unionized.

The Wackenhut Corporation *

Founded in 1954 by George R. Wackenhut and three other former FBI agents, the corporation grew to be the third largest supplier of contract guard and investigative services in the United States in 1969. Revenues in 1969 were \$48.5 million. After-tax profits of \$1.45 million amounted to 2.99 percent of revenues. Total employment is approximately 9,000. In 1967, the last year for which reliable contract crime-protection industry data are available, the Wackenhut Corporation had 6.5 percent of the total "detective agency and protective service"

* Material drawn from personal interviews with Wackenhut executives; 1969 Wackenhut Corporation Annual Report; 1967 Census of Business; 1968 Bear, Stearns, and Company report, *Crime Protection: A Growth Industry*; 1970 Predicasts, Inc., Special Study 56, *Security Systems*; preliminary prospectus on the Wackenhut Corporation, dated 26 March 1970, by Francis I. du Pont, A. C. Allyn, Inc.

industry revenues. Growth has been achieved both internally and, unlike some major competitors, via acquisition of smaller contract security firms (16 acquisitions in the last 8 years). The compound annual growth rate of Wackenhut's revenues was 28.4 percent between 1965 and 1969.

The firm is headquartered in Coral Gables, Florida, and in 1969 serviced 6,000 clients from 70 offices in 36 states. The organization has 36 operating areas that report to regional offices. These, in turn, report to a strong central headquarters. There are subsidiary or affiliated corporations in four South American countries. Direct contracts with the U.S. government accounted for 14 percent of revenues in 1969, a decline from 20 percent in 1967. Subcontracts for protective services at governmental installations accounted for an additional 13 percent of revenues in 1969 (one subcontract alone accounted for 11 percent of revenue). The decline is not caused by a decrease in revenues from government contracts, but rather by the more rapid growth of nongovernmental business (98 percent of new 1969 business was with nongovernmental clients). The 10 largest clients generated 29 percent of revenues, with no single nongovernmental client accounting for over 2 percent of revenues.

The corporation primarily provides guard and investigative services, although they also provide a full range of other security services including polygraph, background information on persons through extensive central files (containing 2.5 million names, according to one report), physical security surveys, fire-fighting, patrol services, security consulting services, alarm systems, and specialized training programs. They have also supplied a complete municipal police department and a statewide anticrime force for Florida's former Governor Kirk (the latter activity prompted much criticism). Although 1,750 of the total 6,000 Wackenhut clients purchase alarm service from 5 major central alarm stations, nearly 91 percent of revenues are generated by the furnishing of physical security through uniformed guards and other personnel. Approximately 6 percent of revenues are generated by investigative services. In contrast to Burns' and Pinkerton's policy, Wackenhut will accept assignments from unions, will guard

struck businesses, and will accept marital-related investigations if handled through an attorney.

The corporation seeks to emphasize more sophisticated detective work and superior guard forces. For example, higher quality guard forces are provided to the Atomic Energy Commission (7 percent of 1969 revenues) and NASA (4 percent of 1969 revenues).

Of the 9,000 employees, approximately 7,800 (87 percent) work full-time. Of the 91 executive and management personnel, 31 are former FBI agents. A total of 8,100 (90 percent) employees provide physical security, with the remainder performing management, investigative, central alarm, and other services. One-quarter of the non-supervisory personnel are covered by collective-bargaining agreements.

Walter Kidde and Company, Inc.^{*}

Kidde is the largest single U.S. company in the safety, security, and protection business, with 1969 revenues of \$279 million from that source. They produce vaults, safes, locks, intrusion and fire-detection devices, fire-control systems, lighting equipment, and guard services and equipment. However, 64 percent of Kidde's total revenues of \$786 million were from nonsecurity-related sources. The 1969 Kidde revenues from guard services and equipment totaled \$46.3 million, with \$37 million generated by the subsidiary Globe Security Systems, Inc. Globe currently is the fourth largest guard and investigative service corporation in the United States, ranking behind only Pinkerton's, Burns, and Wackenhut. Based on 1967 Census of Business data on the contract guard and investigative service industry, Kidde had 6.5 percent of the industry revenues in 1967. Kidde's revenues from guard services and related

*Material drawn from 1967 Census of Business; Walter Kidde and Company, Inc., 1969 Annual Report; 1970 Predicasts, Inc., Special Study 56, *Security Systems*; 1970 Burnham and Co. report, *Investment Opportunities in the Security, Protection, and Investigative Services Industry*; 1968 Bear, Stearns, and Co. report, *Crime Protection: A Growth Industry*; October 12, 1970, underwriting follow-up Wire Flash on Globe Security Systems by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc.; Prospectus on Globe Security Systems, Inc., dated 25 June 1970, by Goldman, Sachs, and Company, and Lehman Brothers.

equipment have enjoyed a 19.4 percent compound annual growth rate since 1965.

Kidde has over 70 divisions, which operate with a high degree of autonomy. Growth has occurred both internally and by acquisitions. Globe Security Systems, Inc., for example, was organized as Globe Detective Service in 1913, began supplying guard service in 1945, and was acquired by Kidde in 1966.

Globe Security Systems, Inc., are headquartered in Clifton, New Jersey, with operations in 30 states, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Of their 8,300 employees, 2,900 are part-time. Globe's 1969 net earnings were 5.3 percent of revenues, which is reportedly higher than the profit rates of larger guard and investigative organizations. According to the sources quoted, the reasons are closer management control of overhead and overtime, and the absence of pension or profit-sharing programs, although Globe fees and wages are comparable to those of other major competitors. The revenue sources in 1969 were as follows: guard service, 90 percent; investigative service, 2 percent; and patrol, polygraph, electronic systems, etc., 8 percent. Globe serves 5,300 organizations, with no single client (the U.S. government included) accounting for more than 3 percent of revenues. Clients are reportedly about 50 percent industrial and 50 percent commercial and institutional.

Baker Industries, Inc. *

Baker Industries began in the fire-control and detection equipment business in 1909. In recent years, it has broadened its offerings of protection services. It seeks to offer clients a "total protection package" including guard, investigative, central station alarm, patrol, and armored-car services, as well as fire-fighting and protection equipment. While the firm is not the revenue volume leader in any of the

* Material drawn from personal interviews with Baker Industries executives; 1967 Census of Business; 1970 Predicasts, Inc., Special Study 56, *Security Systems*; 1970 Burnham and Co. report, *Investment Opportunities in the Security, Protection, and Investigative Services Industry*; 1969 Baker Industries, Inc., Annual Report.

functional segments of the contract protection services market, it provides significant competition in several of those segments. It presently ranks fifth in the United States in terms of revenues from contract security services. In 1969, revenues were \$55 million, with net earnings of \$2.7 million, amounting to 4.9 percent of revenues. Based on estimates of industrywide contract services revenues made by Predicasts, Inc., Baker Industries received approximately 2 percent of the guard and investigative services revenues in 1968, 11 percent of the central station alarm revenues, and 9 percent of the 1968 armored-car revenues. For the combined three segments, Baker Industries had 4.4 percent of the 1968 contract market.

Baker's growth in recent years had been spurred by acquisitions of other businesses, such as Wells Fargo. From 1965 to 1969, Baker Industries made at least 27 acquisitions; the number of employees grew from 271 to over 7,700, and revenues grew from \$12 million to \$55 million (a compound annual revenue growth rate of 45 percent).

The firm is headquartered in New York City and maintains offices in 28 states, Canada, and Puerto Rico. It has four divisions: Wells Fargo Protective Service Division (with an Alarm Services Group operating 11 central stations, a Security Guard Group, and an Armored Service Group, generating 24.9 percent, 28.9 percent, and 23.8 percent of 1969 corporate revenues, respectively); a Pyrotronics Division providing systems for smoke and fire detection (9.7 percent of 1969 revenues); a consolidated Support Systems Division (7.5 percent of 1969 revenues) providing personnel to control crowds and maintain facilities at commercial, public, and government installations; and a Chemical Division (5.2 percent of 1969 revenues) specializing in fire-extinguishing chemicals.

The American District Telegraph Company*

The ADT manufactures, installs, maintains, and operates burglar and fire-alarm systems and systems for supervising watchmen and various

* Material drawn from personal interviews with ADT executives; 1969 ADT Company Annual Report; 1967 Census of Business; 1968 Bear, Stearns

industrial processes. The four major types of alarm systems furnished are local alarms, proprietary (in-plant) alarm systems, alarm systems directly connected to fire and police departments, and central station alarm services.

Total ADT revenues in 1969 were \$97.7 million, growing at a compound annual rate of 5.5 percent in the 1965-69 period. Net earnings in 1969 were 6.6 percent of revenues. Over 80 percent of ADT's revenues are derived from central station alarm services. The firm is, by far, the leading installer and operator of those systems. Approximately 50 percent of ADT's total revenues are from crime-related central station alarm services.

The firm was founded as an offspring of Western Union in 1854 and was acquired by Grinnel in 1953. Grinnel also acquired the Holmes Electric Protection Company and the Automatic Fire Alarm Company, both of which provide central alarm services. In 1964 Grinnel had 125 of the 130 central alarm stations accredited by Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., and other certificating organizations.* Grinnel was charged by the U.S. Department of Justice with monopolizing the certificated** central station alarm business and was ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969 to divest itself of ADT, AFA, and Holmes; in addition, it was ordered to divest itself of central stations in 27 cities which yielded over \$3.5 million in revenues. Baker Industries (Wells Fargo) and Burns were major purchasers of the stations. In 1970, ADT owned 125 of the 230 accredited stations.*** Aside from a very few competitors with 10 to 20 stations each, most of ADT's competitors operate only one central station.

and Co. report, *Crime Protection: A Growth Industry*; 1970 Predicasts, Inc., Special Study 56, *Security Systems*; 1970 Burnham and Co. report, *Investment Opportunities in the Security, Protection, and Investigative Services Industry*.

* A subscriber to an accredited central station alarm service may receive up to a 70 percent discount on insurance rates, whereas a local-alarm subscriber may receive only a 10 percent discount.

** Approximately 10 percent of all subscribers to central alarm services have systems certificated by U.L.

*** Note that the total number of accredited stations increased from 130 to 230 between 1964 and 1970, an increase of more than 75 percent in 6 years.

The ADT has operations in over 100 cities in the United States and in several foreign countries. Its 5,300 employees (6 percent of whom are part-time) serviced over 80,000 clients in 1969 (usually on 5-year contracts). Approximately 65 percent, or 3,500, of the employees install and operate central stations.

Brink's, Inc.*

Founded in 1859 by Washington Perry Brink as a Chicago-based truck and package delivery service, Brink's, Inc., has grown to be the largest armored-car delivery service in the United States. It moved its first payroll in 1891 and owned a fleet of 85 wagons by 1900. Since 1962, it has been a subsidiary of the Pittston Company. In 1969, revenues were \$64.0 million, with after-tax income of \$5.1 million amounting to 8.0 percent of revenues. Brink's total employment is approximately 5,500. In 1967, the last year for which reliable industrywide armored-car data are readily available, Brink's had 54.0 percent of the \$90.6 million industrywide revenues. Growth has primarily been internal, rather than by acquisition of smaller corporations. The compound annual growth rate of Brink's revenues was 12.1 percent between 1965 and 1969.

The firm is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, and in 1969 operated over 1,100 armored vehicles from 135 offices in 27 states, the District of Columbia, and 7 provinces in Canada. Affiliated corporations provide service in several foreign countries.

Service is provided to over 20,000 accounts on a 1-year contract basis. While primary assignments are the transfer of valuables (principally money and securities) by armored car, the company also provides air courier service by armed personnel (generating 10 percent of revenues), payroll and check-cashing services, coin sorting and wrapping services, safe rentals and services, parking-meter services, check clearing, and bank patrol services. Valuables transported are fully

* Material drawn from 1967 Census of Business; 1970 Predicasts, Inc., Special Study 56, *Security Systems*; 1970 Burnham and Co. report, *Investment Opportunities in the Security, Protection, and Investigative Services Industry*; Common Stock Offering circular on Brink's, Incorporated, dated 19 February 1970, by Blyth and Company, Inc.

insured. In 1965 they transported items whose value was approximately \$1 billion on an average day and made 12 million pickups a year. The current breakdown of revenue sources is as follows: movements between commercial banks and industrial and commercial businesses, 40 percent; movements between commercial banks and their branches, and between brokerage firms and commercial banks, 25 percent; movement between Federal Reserve Banks, the U.S. Mint, the Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of Canada, and Commercial Banks, 15 percent; and other services, 20 percent.

Of the 5,500 employees in 1969, including 2,000 part-time employees, 90 percent were members of armored-car crews. Collective-bargaining agreements cover 81 percent of the employees.

PREFERRED TYPE OF SERVICE: IN-HOUSE OR CONTRACT GUARDS

We have shown that there has been an unmistakable trend toward the use of contract guards. Why? The question of whether a firm should maintain an in-house guard force or contract for guard services has no single answer. The two opposing schools of thought basically agree that contract guards are less expensive, but the relative quality of the two types of forces in various situations is the subject of much debate. We have discussed this question with officials of both contract and in-house guard organizations (including Burns, Pinkerton's, Wackenhut, a major bank, a major retail department store chain, and a major defense firm). Principal arguments presented by those officials and material from several articles on the subject* were incorporated in this section.

The relevance of each issue or reason favoring one type of service, and the weight given to it in arriving at a decision to hire in-house or contract guards, must depend on a variety of factors in the specific

* W. D. Wright, Jr., "An Industrial Security Profile," *Industrial Security*, February 1970; S. Astor, "The New Look in Corporate Security," *Business Management*, March 1969; J. Heaton, "Rent a Guard?" *Industrial Security*, February 1969; W. V. Waisanen, "Plant Security Guards: Outside Agency or Plant Personnel?" *Modern Manufacturing*, December 1968; A. S. Davis, "Company Guards vs. Subcontractor Guards," *Industrial Security*, December 1967; K. August, "New Complexities in Plant Security," *Dun's Review*, March 1965.

situation. These factors include the location to be guarded, the size of the force needed, the quality of personnel needed, the tasks to be performed, the quality of the specific contract guard firm being considered (in terms of management, training, supervision, manpower, etc.), and the length of time guards will be needed.

Reasons Favoring Contract Guards

Cost. A marketing technique used by major contract guard companies is to compute (or ask the potential client to compute) the total cost of each alternative for the specific job contemplated.

The average difference in total cost reportedly is approximately 20 percent, in favor of contract guards. One in-house guard-force manager told us his operation was less costly than contract guards would be, but he essentially was comparing his *wage* costs with contract guards' *fees* and neglecting to consider his costs for items such as fringe benefits and personnel processing.

Contract guards typically earn wages of \$1.60 to \$2.50 an hour. Fees charged for nontemporary guard service are typically \$2.50 to \$3.50 per hour. Temporary or special-event guard service fees run at least \$1.00 per hour more. Guards employed on government contracts are usually paid specified wage rates that may be higher than those quoted above; thus higher fees result.

The overall cost of in-house guards could be higher than contract guard fees for a variety of reasons. In-house guard wages are typically higher* because they are influenced by in-house, nonsecurity employees whose wages are higher, often because of collective bargaining agreements, and because in-house guards generally have more seniority on the job than contract guards.

Contract guards reportedly enjoy fewer fringe benefits than in-house guards. Large contract guard firms benefit from economies of scale in hiring, training, insurance, and other costs. For temporary or special-event guard service, the costs of procuring and training

* When available, 1970 Census of Population data will provide fairly accurate estimates of how much higher.

in-house guards may be prohibitive, even if such temporary in-house personnel can be recruited in sufficient numbers.

Administrative Unburdening. Hiring contract guards relieves the client of the need to develop and administer security personnel recruitment, screening, and training programs. It also relieves him of the need to provide close supervision and special liability insurance, uniforms, and equipment for the individual guards. Some sources argue that it relieves the client of the need to have a security expert on its management staff. Hiring contract guards solves the administrative problem of scheduling manpower when someone is sick or on vacation, or when additional man-hours of guard services are temporarily required.

However, clients of contract firms have some administrative problems that firms with in-house forces do not have. For example, an appropriate contract firm must be selected; the contract firm must be monitored to detect changes in quality over time; and the client must deal with both guards and contract firm management when changes are desired. But, all in all, there is little question that the administrative burden of a security program is less for a firm hiring contract guards than it is for a firm with in-house guards.

Availability of Manpower. During periods of illness, unexpected absence, vacations, or peak demands for guard services, it often is necessary to have substitute or supplemental guard employees. In a small in-house guard force, extra guards may not be available, resulting in a lapse of security. If extra in-house guards are available, they may be inefficiently used most of the time.* Contract guard firms with larger pools of manpower can use their personnel efficiently, while still having adequate substitute or supplemental guards on short notice. The smaller the guard force needed at one location, the greater the significance of this manpower-availability issue.

In a related vein, if it should be desirable to reduce guard manpower levels, or to eliminate a particularly undesirable individual guard, this is easier to accomplish with a contract guard force.

* Many firms that basically employ in-house guards often will supplement the force with contract guards during peak demands.

Unions. The three arguments presented by users of guards in favor of nonunion guards are (1) they are less apt to strike; (2) they are less apt to support overtly or sympathize with striking unionized nonguard employees; and (3) nonunion employees tend to earn less and have fewer fringe benefits. Since reportedly 90 percent of unionized guards are in-house guards, the above arguments favor hiring contract guards. Even if in-house guards are not unionized, they may benefit from gains made by unionized nonguard employees. Only 10 to 25 percent of the guards employed by the three largest contract guard agencies are unionized.

Impartiality. Contract guards may be more consistent and impartial in enforcing regulations than in-house guards. This is said to be possible because contract guards, having a different employer and relatively low seniority, form fewer close associations with non-guard employees of the client. This issue is especially relevant in cases where in-house guards tend to be long-time employees "pensioned off" to a guard post when incapable of adequately performing their former jobs.

Security Expertise. When a client hires contract guards, he also hires the contract guard agency management and its security expertise. This assumes that the contract agency being considered can attract or produce better security experts than an in-house force. This is probably true for a firm in need of a relatively small security force. Also, since contract guard management consists of full-time security men who must continually compete, there may be more incentives for them to stay abreast of the state of the art in security than for an in-house security manager.

Issues Claimed as Favorable by Both Sides

Training. The management of the large contract guard firms claim they offer better-trained guards than most in-house forces currently utilize. The large contract firms say they can afford to develop a good training program, hire good instructors, and efficiently train their employees because of economies of scale not enjoyed by most

in-house forces. The major contract firms typically give their permanent employees between one-half and one and one-half days of prejob training plus a day or two of initial on-the-job training. Temporary special-event employees receive less training. However, employees of some contract firms receive almost no training. We have no data on training of any statistically significant fraction of the in-house guards.

The validity of the arguments that contract guards are either better or more poorly trained than in-house guards depends on the particular contract guard agency and on the capability and desire of the user firm to establish and pay for a better in-house training program. It does not appear to be too difficult to provide better training than the typical contract guard receives. In fact, the training issue is one often advanced in favor of maintaining an in-house guard force.

Supervision. Proponents of contract guard forces and those of in-house guard forces both claim that the type of force they espouse typically has better supervision than the other. One of the major contract guard firms, which claims to have supervision that is "double that of any of our major competitors," has an average of 1 supervisor for every 17 guards. Two other major competitors claimed that data on supervisor-guard ratios were not available. We have no reliable comparable data for in-house guard supervision, nor do we have comparative data on the quality of contract and in-house guard supervision.

Reasons Favoring In-House Guards

Quality of Manpower. Proponents of in-house guards argue that in-house guards are of higher quality than contract guards because of higher pay* and better fringe benefits, and because the higher status of in-house guards attracts higher quality personnel. In-house forces are said to have better preemployment screening and lower turnover rates, resulting in better, more experienced manpower. While

*On the difference between a \$1.60 per hour guard and a \$2.00 per hour guard, one contract guard agency executive quipped, "The \$2.00 per hour guard is a person."

these arguments may be true, we have seen no evidence, beyond subjective opinion, to support the contention. We would prefer to measure quality in more objective terms, such as the actions the guard takes when an incident arises.

Length of experience should be related positively to the quality of work performed, since the guard would become familiar with company procedures and special problem areas and would have experience in handling common types of incidents. In-house guards typically have more experience than contract guards.

Communication and Control. An organization that employs its own in-house guards and guard supervisors plus an active in-house guard management should be able to exercise better control over its guard operation than an organization that hires an outside contract guard agency's services. Even if the client supplies all in-house supervision for the contract guards, he still may not be able to control some of them effectively because he is not their primary employer. On the other hand, if the in-house force is unionized and contract guards are not, or if an in-house guard cannot be easily fired, control over in-house guards may be less effective than control over contract guards. Having the contract firm's supervision between the guards and client management may impede communication of orders downward and impede the upward flow of information regarding problems.

Also, a firm with an in-house force has complete control of training and supervision and can adapt these to the company's particular needs. Having in-house supervision should allow a better evaluation of each individual guard's capabilities and shortcomings.

Company Loyalty. In-house guards are said to develop more loyalty and sense of responsibility to the firm they are protecting than do contract guards. Factors that might make a difference in loyalty are (1) contract guards must serve two masters and are frequently not "career employees," and (2) if rejected by one client, a contract guard is often shifted to another client without having his job placed in jeopardy. Because of relatively high turnover rates (up to 200 percent per year), many contract guards do not have the needed time to develop loyalty.

Prestige. The management of some firms take pride in having their own in-house security force. Others feel that "owning" rather than "renting" a security force enhances their firm's image with customers, clients, and employees. The relevance of the first point obviously depends on the depth of management's feelings. Although quantitative data are not available on the prestige issue, we suspect that this effect is marginal.

After weighing the relevance of each of the above arguments to his particular situation, the business manager considering whether to employ in-house or contract guards must also consider the quality of the contract guard firms available in his area (in terms of their personnel standards, training, quality of supervision and management, etc.). Situations that tend to favor contract guards over in-house guards are those where temporary guards are needed, where the level of demand for guards fluctuates, or where only a few guards are needed at a location (making it difficult and expensive to provide adequate in-house training, relief manpower, and management with security expertise). Situations that may favor in-house guards over contract guards are those in which a fairly large permanent guard force is needed.

ASIS Survey

Finally, we present the results of a recent survey* of responsible security executives in industrial firms, conducted by the American Society for Industrial Security, the trade association in the security field. Questionnaires were sent to 5,613 firms with over 500 employees each. Replies were received from only 427 firms, of which 249 used some contract services. The survey showed that respondents tended either to rely heavily on contract guards or not use them at all (Table 35). The two main reasons given for hiring contract guards were economy and to avoid labor and personnel problems. The degree of satisfaction with the quality of the contract guard service was generally good to fair.

*W. D. Wright, Jr., "An Industrial Security Profile," *Industrial Security*, February 1970.

Table 35

SURVEY OF INDUSTRIAL FIRMS USING CONTRACT GUARDS

Extent of Use of Contract Services		Reasons for Use of Contract Services		Degree of Satisfaction with Quality of Contract Services	
Extent (%)	% of Responses	Reason	% of Responses	Quality	% of Responses
100	28.4	Supplement regular force	13.5	Excellent	9.7
66	6.5	Temporary protection	10.4	Good	35.8
50	4.8	Economy.	31.6	Fair	30.6
33	1.7	Avoid labor and personnel problems	21.8	Barely satisfactory	16.8
25	6.3	Difficulty of hiring satisfactory help	14.6	Unsatisfactory	7.1
10	12.3				
0	40.0	Other	8.1		

SUMMARY: THE INDUSTRY THAT SELLS SECURITY

The private industry that sells security services and equipment may be categorized by the sale of guard, investigative, armored-car, and central station alarm services and other security equipment. Total 1969 revenues for this industry are estimated to be \$1.67 billion. Of that total, approximately \$540 million were for guard services, \$80 million were for investigative services, \$128 million were for armored-car services, \$120 million were for central station alarm services, and \$800 million were for other security equipment.

As was shown in Chapter IV, this industry's revenues are growing much more rapidly than total private security expenditures. In addition, the percentage of total private security services provided by contract, rather than by in-house employees is increasing.

Contract security employees whose primary occupation is guard or watchman numbered approximately 59,000 in 1969, while those whose primary occupation is policeman or investigator numbered approximately

8,000. Total contract security personnel, including part-time security personnel and clerical and administrative personnel, numbered approximately 120,000 in 1969.

The 1968 market breakdown for sales of private security equipment and services was estimated to be as follows: financial, commercial, and retail, 34 percent; industrial and transportation, 52 percent; consumer (i.e., private persons, residences, and autos), 2 percent; and institutions and others, 12 percent. However, these figures are only estimates. Limitations and inadequacies of data have been described in detail above.

Sales of deterrent equipment, such as safes, vaults, locks, and lighting systems, increased by about 155 percent between 1958 and 1968. The market is dominated by large firms such as Diebold, American Standard, and Walter Kidde.

Revenues from monitoring and detection systems rose an estimated 131 percent between 1958 and 1968. The approximate revenue breakdown for 1968 was as follows: central station alarm services, 40 percent; local and proprietary alarm systems, 20 percent; CCTV systems, 9 percent; and miscellaneous, 11 percent.

Of all security equipment categories, central station alarm systems are of primary importance in this study because private security personnel are usually dispatched in response to an alarm. In 1970, the major supplier in the central station alarm market was ADT, which had 125 of the 230 accredited central stations in the United States. It received about two-thirds of the total industrywide central station alarm revenues. About half of ADT's central station alarm revenues are for crime-related services. Central station alarm services revenues grew 100 percent between 1958 and 1968, or 7.2 percent per year on the average.

Private contract guard and investigative services have usually been discussed together in this chapter because the major guard firms in the industry also provide much of the investigative service, and because most data sources do not provide information on these two components separately. Between 1958 and 1968, contract guard and investigative service revenues increased about 200 percent, or 11.6 percent per year on the average. While there are over 4,000 establishments

providing these services, four firms (Pinkerton's, Burns, Wackenhut, and Globe) account for approximately half the total revenues. Furthermore, these large firms have been increasing their share of the market in recent years. Approximately two-thirds of the private security firms are individual proprietorships. The distribution of number of establishments by employment size, revenue size, and legal form has been presented earlier. In 1967, there were an average of 1.1 establishments (basically a physical location from which business is conducted) per firm; annual receipts and employment per establishment averaged \$104,000 and 21.7 persons, respectively; and average receipts per employee were \$4,800, with 70 percent of that amount paid out in wages.

Armored-car services are provided by over 300 establishments, and industry revenues have grown 173 percent between 1958 and 1968, or 10.6 percent per year. Brink's, Inc., accounts for approximately half the current revenues.

Thus, the contract security industry may be characterized as a rapidly expanding industry which is dominated by a very few large firms but which includes several thousand very small firms as well.

VI. THE ISSUES OF PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC
OR PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECURITY

THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE ISSUE

The issue of what level and type of police services are to be provided, at public expense, to which segments of the population is extremely complex and sensitive. It would not be difficult to document that significantly different levels and types of public police resources are presently expended on different segments of the public, e.g., on rich neighborhoods as opposed to slums,^{*} on business neighborhoods as opposed to residential, or on large businesses as opposed to small ones. Similarly, the differences are great in the level of public police services provided in different political jurisdictions,^{*} and in the same place at different times. The reasons for the variations in publicly provided police services are not completely clear. One might explain the variations by pointing to differing levels or kinds of need for police services; different abilities to effectively demand public police services; historical precedent; differing needs for non-police public services; differing inclinations and beliefs of political and police decisionmakers; the public's ability and willingness to pay for the services; variations in the quality and cost of public police personnel, equipment, and policies; or the nature, quality, and cost of the private security forces operating in the community. Consideration of the efficiency, need, and social welfare criteria mentioned above *might dictate inequality* in the provision of the services. The answer as to whether a particular security service is to be provided publicly, privately, or not at all depends partially on local situations. As such, we do not attempt to answer the public/private police issue here but only try to clarify it by raising some of the more

^{*} See James S. Kakalik and Sorrel Wildhorn, *Aids to Decisionmaking in Police Patrol*, The Rand Corporation, R-593-HUD/RC, February 1971, and James S. Kakalik and Sorrel Wildhorn, *Aids to Decisionmaking in Police Patrol: Survey Response*, The Rand Corporation, R-594-HUD/RC, February 1971, which document the differences in public police patrol service levels.

conceptually important subissues, indicating general factors that ought to be incorporated into the decision process.

From economic theory,^{*} publicly provided goods and services differ basically from those provided privately in one or both of the following ways: (1) The service yields widespread benefits to the public, some of whom will be able to consume without paying for the service, and/or (2) provision of the service involves sufficient economies of scale that a natural-monopoly situation exists. In the latter case costs decline as volume increases; competition would lead to monopoly as the firms expanded, lowered costs, and captured the market; and the monopoly would then charge higher prices and provide a lower volume of service output than would prevail under competition.

In the first case, where some individual citizens can consume the service without paying, the usual prescription is public ownership and production of the service, with publicly subsidized or free consumption. In the second case, where a natural-monopoly situation exists, the general textbook prescription is either to publicly operate that firm or to regulate it. Questions arise in interpreting these concepts in relation to the issue of whether a particular police service is to be provided publicly or privately; namely, to what *degree* does a natural-monopoly situation exist? To what *extent* is the organization providing the service unable to charge some citizens who benefit from the services? We suspect that a careful analysis of the economic theory would show that a public agency should perform such services as riot control and investigation of major crimes. The difficulty arises in cases that are borderline from the economic-theory viewpoint. Examples of such borderline situations might include crime preventive patrol in industrial parks or in high-rise residential buildings; crowd control at recreational events; investigation of minor thefts of property from retail or other businesses; and response to burglar alarms (most of which are false).

In situations where both the public and private police are capable of providing the particular service, at least three criteria should be

^{*}A. Alchian and W. Allen, *University Economics*, Chapter 39, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, California, 1964.

considered in deciding the issue: (1) the relative cost and quality of the public and private forces, (2) the nature of the security services that will be available to various population groups (i.e., the equity with which the services are distributed, and (3) the degree to which delegated legal police powers would be exercised in an acceptable manner (by public *or* private police), rather than abused.

Current private forces are much less costly in dollar terms than the public police. If wages and training are accurate measures of quality, then public police generally should be superior to private forces. Thus, private forces would be preferred if monetary cost were the only criterion but probably would not be preferred if a high-quality force were needed. Of course, the private forces could shift the preference balance by offering more costly but higher-quality services *where needed*, or the public police could depart from their tradition of furnishing only one basic quality of police personnel. In terms of nonmonetary costs, such as incompetence, malicious behavior, and abuses of authority, sufficient data are not available to provide a basis for preferring public or private police forces.

Equitable distribution can be measured in many ways, e.g., in terms of who pays, or in terms of who receives services. Because of the tax structure, rich people and businesses probably pay out more than they receive in public services. But poorer citizens may pay a higher percentage of their income for public services. Theoretically, public police distribute protection to each citizen and organization in an equitable manner, but the distribution of services will vary markedly, depending on whether the measurement criterion for equity is police man-hours per citizen, per crime, per value of property, or per call for service. Note that equitable distribution need not mean that every citizen receives equal amounts of service. In contrast, private security services presently go only to those who can afford them. Thus, under the current system, it is clear that poorer citizens and businesses will receive relatively fewer police services if more services are distributed privately rather than publicly. Note, however, that the government can affect the distribution of services without publicly *producing* those services. For example, the government can allow private production of the service subject to public *regulation* (e.g.,

the telephone system) or the government can publicly *finance or subsidize* privately produced goods or services (e.g., the Food Stamp Program).

The degree to which *public power* is *delegated* to private individuals must also be considered. A sovereign political state or a collective group, by definition, has the power to *coerce* members of its own group. The police and the military are the two agents of the collective group empowered to carry out this coercive power. Since coercive power is important and easily abused, members of a collective group are highly concerned about the delegation of such power. They may, for example, insist that persons delegated such power be made directly responsible to the group by way of being employed directly by or tightly regulated by the group. However, the degree of coercion that might be actually or potentially required differs among activities, and the collective group will nearly always allow some such coercive activities to be done by persons who are *not* direct public employees. Many examples of this are discussed in this report: private guards, officials hired for crowd control at sporting events, etc. Of course, other security methods may be substituted for coercion by personnel; this would reduce the delegation problem by diminishing the amount of coercion needed. For example, locks, searchlights, or vaults may deter crime to a point where the needed delegation is much reduced. However, the key questions for our purposes are, At what point does society forego the requirement that the person performing a security function be a direct employee of the state? In what circumstances does the state allow public police *powers* to be exercised by private forces? And, what regulations should be imposed on the private forces who are either permitted to perform security functions or given certain public police powers?

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ROLES^{*}

During the 19th century and until 1924, when the FBI came into

^{*}For a much more comprehensive treatment of the historical developments, see R. S. Post and A. A. Kingsbury, *Security Administration: An Introduction*, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1970; and J. D. Peel, *The Story of Private Security*, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1971.

existence, public police forces were provided on a local basis only. Law enforcement beyond local political boundaries was consequently provided only by private security forces. Some of these private forces, such as Pinkerton's Detective Agency, which was founded in 1850, protected industrial properties, investigated crimes, and arrested criminals nationwide. Brink's, Inc., and several railway police forces were established in the late 19th century. The Burns Detective Agency began in 1909 and conducted all investigations for the American Banking Association.

The public and private police forces can be characterized as two forces rapidly growing and evolving together. As public police forces began to develop the technical capability of conducting investigations beyond local boundaries, the private security forces shifted their roles increasingly from investigative to guard services. Today, as seen in Chapters IV and V of this report, private guard forces predominate, in terms of sheer numbers.

Certain general principles have emerged which in practice define the present-day roles of, and relations between, public law enforcement and private security in the United States. With some notable exceptions, in which responsibilities overlap, these principles are:

- The public police have the primary responsibility for maintaining public order, enforcing the laws, preventing crime, investigating crimes, and apprehending criminals.
- Public property is policed primarily by the public police.
- Policing private property is the primary responsibility of the owner, the management, or the householder, all of whom may provide or purchase private security services and equipment.
- The private police are primarily concerned with crime prevention and detection, rather than crime investigation or criminal apprehension.
- When invited or called, public police will enter private property for the purpose of restoring order and enforcing the law.
- When they have not been called, public police *may* enter private property if this is necessary to stop a crime from being

committed or to make an arrest. Depending on crime patterns, they sometimes perform preventive patrol on private property which is readily accessible to the public, such as shopping-center parking lots.

- The public police can, and sometimes do, advise owners, managers, and householders with regard to crime-prevention measures-- i.e., they play the role of security consultants.

As a general rule then, private police are concerned with private interests and their major functions are the prevention and detection of crime on private property and the gathering of information for private purposes. Public police are primarily concerned with the public interest and events in public areas; they have responsibility for the prevention of serious crimes against the person; they have responsibility for the apprehension of criminals; and they respond to urgent calls and requests from the public.

CURRENT ROLES AND FUNCTIONS--COMPLEMENTARY OR COMPETITIVE?

The previous general discussion of public and private police roles indicates that, typically, the two forces are complementary rather than supplementary or competitive. Reserve and other "special-purpose" public police, on the other hand, *supplement* the public police, since they generally perform some or all of the public police functions. We discuss below the roles and functions of each major type of private security job.

Private Guards

Part of a guard's job is crime-related: to prevent crimes against persons and private property, to detect and report criminal acts, and on occasion to stop, question, and even arrest suspects. In addition, he frequently is required to provide security against loss from fire or from equipment failure and to enforce private rules and regulations, such as work rules and dress codes. Often his major function is to control access to areas of a plant. He may also act as receptionist, chauffeur, or status symbol. In some situations, such as at sporting

events or fairs, he functions mainly as a crowd monitor to maintain order. The proportion of time spent on crime-related activity will vary widely from none to full-time, depending on the particular assignment.

Three things characterize all private guards: they are employed by a private individual, firm, or institution; at least some of their responsibilities are crime-related; and they usually work on private property to protect the interests of their employer rather than the interests of society at large.

With very few exceptions, guards perform work that the regular public police cannot or will not perform. The public police typically cannot be spared to prevent or investigate certain suspected, but unauthenticated, crimes such as employee pilferage, and by law they must refrain from crime-prevention activities on private property unless asked to do so by the owner. The public police are not legally charged with enforcing privately established rules and regulations, nor can they be expected to provide the level of service each citizen demands. Limited public police services should be distributed equitably. If specific private citizens, businesses, or institutions desire more protection or kinds of protection not offered by the public police, they draw upon private sources. Typically, private guards perform functions that *complement* those of public police.

Guard assignments may be continuing (when permanent protection is desired), limited to a few days or weeks (during a peak business season or period of threatened civil disorder), or limited to a few hours (during a sports event or convention). Assignments are usually pre-planned, but occasionally they are of an emergency nature (for example, guarding a retail store whose window has been smashed but not yet repaired). In a few situations private guard services supplement public police services. For example, private guards are sometimes deputized by local law enforcement to provide limited police services, such as traffic direction and enforcement in the immediate surroundings of the private property on which they work, because local law enforcement cannot spare the resources.

Private Investigators

While the mass-media image of a "private eye" is romantic and exciting, the reality is quite different. The private investigator is an information gatherer, and often the information gathered has little to do with either prevention of crime or apprehension of criminals. However, some of the private investigator's activities are crime-related. In terms of relative frequency, the primary activities of investigators are preemployment background checks on personnel, background checks of insurance and credit applicants, plainclothes undercover work to detect employee dishonesty and pilferage or customer shoplifting in retail stores, and investigation of insurance or workmen's-compensation claims. Marital-related investigations are rapidly declining in volume as divorce laws are liberalized. The largest category, the personnel background check, is far from a glamorous task. When investigators are hired to assist lawyers in developing evidence for a court case, it is often a civil, rather than criminal, matter. When a criminal matter, the attorney and investigator often are hired to defend the accused. In fact, criminal investigations are a small part of the private investigator's role. Such has not always been the case. In the late 19th century and up to the creation of the FBI in 1924, there was no effective public investigative force at the national level. Local police, if they had a detective bureau, were hampered by their limited geographic jurisdiction. Private detectives, notably Pinkerton's, filled the void until governmental officials recognized the need for an effective public crime-investigation force. In recent years the crime-investigation role has shifted dramatically from private to public agencies. However, private detectives still do some investigation of certain types of crime or crime targets. The American Banking and the American Hotel-Motel Associations, for example, both retain the William J. Burns International Detective Agency to supplement the public investigative agencies. The director of security at a major United States bank, who requested that the bank not be identified, said it was necessary to employ private investigators because the public police and investigative forces were too busy to devote the

amount of effort desired by his bank. Thus, some small portion of total private investigative effort supplements the work of the public police. Nevertheless, the vast majority of private investigative effort is *complementary* to the public police.

Private Patrolmen

Private patrolmen are those private security officers who routinely operate on public streets during part of their work period, either on foot or in patrol cars. They may be characterized as guards who service several locations on each tour of duty or shift. Although the private patrolman's function is principally crime prevention, he also plays a crime-detection role. He may have occasion to apprehend suspects whom he encounters. Like other private security workers, he may perform nonsecurity service functions, such as turning off display signs late at night. On one shift, the locations he patrols may represent several different branches of one business, several different clients, or both. A wealthy community may hire a private patrol agency, by means of contracts with individual residents, to have patrolmen routinely check their homes and grounds. Merchants in areas of increasing crime (a recent example occurred on Madison Avenue in New York City) may jointly hire a private patrolman to patrol on foot from store to store. Or, as recently occurred on the upper west side of Manhattan, residents of a small neighborhood hired private guards to patrol public streets in the hope of deterring crime. Private patrolmen often make rounds both inside and outside at several different business premises in the same tour of duty. The primary justification for hiring a private patrolman rather than a full-time security staff is economy.

The private patrolman's functions are different from those of other private security workers in the following principal ways: the guard will operate in one location, whereas the patrolman operates at several; the investigator's role is primarily investigative, whereas the patrolman's is primarily preventive; and the central station alarm guard or respondent generally visits a client's location only when an alarm is sounded, whereas the patrolman does this on a routine basis.

Because the private patrolman is employed to patrol private premises, his operation on the public streets is only incidental to his duties. Thus, his role is primarily *complementary* to the public police. But, to the extent that visibility of security personnel on the street deters crime, all citizens in the area derive some direct benefit from private patrolmen. In this latter sense, his services supplement public police services.

Private-Alarm Respondents

Some major types of alarm systems employ security personnel, some do not.

Local alarm systems detect intrusions and sound an alarm on the private premises. A passerby or personnel on the premises may then take action. A direct-connect alarm system is one that is connected directly to police headquarters. In these direct-connect systems, no action is required of private individuals. The public police are called automatically.

A central station alarm system consists of the detection devices, a communication link to a privately owned central station alarm board monitored by private employees, and private security personnel who respond to the alarm scene. When an alarm is received, the central station operator may merely relay the alarm to the public police headquarters, or, commonly, the operator will also dispatch a private "alarm respondent" to the scene of the alarm.

In this study we focus on alarm systems that provide a continuous means of detecting intrusions into restricted areas and a means of communicating the suspected intrusion to security personnel. Other alarm systems, which employ different sensors, are used to check for smoke, fire, temperature, water, or the status of equipment, or to monitor a guard making his rounds.

When continuous coverage is desired on more than a temporary basis at a specific location, alarm systems are significantly cheaper than full-time employees. While the full-time security employee is much more versatile than an alarm, the device may provide all the versatility

that is thought to be necessary at the scene. Unfortunately, the false-alarm rate for almost all currently operational intrusion systems is greater than 95 percent. High false-alarm rates are due principally to user error and equipment malfunction. Consequently, the direct connection of alarms to public police equipment has been banned in some cities. When alarms are received at a private central station, private security workers may play either passive or active roles. In the active role, they call the public police, proceed to the scene, and take steps to secure the area, sometimes attempting to apprehend a suspect if feasible. In the passive role, the alarm respondent notifies the public police of the alarm and proceeds to the alarm location to observe and await the arrival of the public police. After the public police have finished their work, the alarm respondent resets the alarm. The functions common to all intrusion alarm respondents are to notify the public police, to proceed to the scene, and to reset the alarm system. Although the respondents travel on public streets, they do not perform security functions, with the possible exception of hot pursuit of a suspect.

The intrusion alarm systems *complement* the functions of public police because they are intended to prevent crime (if the alarm system is conspicuous), to detect crime, and to report crimes that occur on the premises where alarms are located. However, when actively investigating the intrusion, the alarm respondent supplements the public police effort. In view of the high frequency of false alarms, much public police effort is expended in responding to these false alarms.

Armored Delivery and Courier Service Personnel

Armored delivery service personnel provide for the secure transfer of money, goods, information, people, or other items the employer may desire to move between locations. These security personnel are almost always armed. The transferring agent most frequently will use the traditional armored car but may also use airlines or other means of public transportation. Armored delivery service personnel are distinguished from other security personnel in that their primary function is

to provide security during transit of items between locations. Unless there is reasonable cause to believe that a crime is to be committed during the transfer, the public police will generally take no preventive action. Thus, the typical roles of public police and private armored delivery personnel are *complementary*.

RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERACTIONS

The relationships and interactions between public and private police are quite variable, depending on the particular city or county, the type of security job, the setting in which the private policeman works, the policy of his employer or client, and so on. The relationships range from cordial, close, and cooperative working arrangements to very limited, formal contacts required by law (e.g., where a police department licenses or commissions private police personnel or businesses), or to no contacts at all.

A recent survey probed such relationships.* Of 121 responding police departments in cities with population in excess of 25,000, 11 percent described the relationship as excellent, 39 percent as good, 40 percent as fair, and 5 percent as poor. When queried as to whether the establishment of a close, well-defined working relationship with private agencies would be considered valuable, fully 83 percent of the police departments answered affirmatively, whereas 12 percent responded negatively.

Cooperative arrangements take many forms. Public police may provide private police with arrest records; they sometimes operate a nightly call-in service for security agencies, and patrol cars are dispatched to check on those guards who fail to call in periodically; they provide retail merchants with bulletins describing known shoplifters; they respond to calls for aid; they complete investigations begun by private police; some departments provide private police with radios preset to the police frequency; some freely exchange information; some departments permit the installation of direct-dial alarms and/or

*Richard S. Post, "Relations With Private Police Services," *The Police Chief*, March 1971.

central station alarms which simultaneously notify the police department; and so on. Private police often act as extended eyes and ears for the public police; they occasionally assist in serving warrants and citations on private property, or in traffic control around private property; they report suspicious persons and circumstances to public police; they may make preliminary investigations; they may make, or assist in making, arrests; they may apprise police of impending, unusual situations, such as strikes; and so on.

Thomas Cahill, former police chief of San Francisco, described an illustrative situation in which the police department cooperated closely with in-house investigators:

...a special agent for the telephone company had a problem of burglaries of telephone booths. Working with our police department, they had put alarms on some of them. The moment they were touched, it was known to us. We could then, within moments, move into the area to make an arrest. All of this had to be planned, and the net result was crime prevention. For six weeks consecutively, no telephones were damaged or burglarized in San Francisco, even though others were being taken left and right in other areas during the same period.*

The private police view of the relationship is consistent with perceptions of the public police. In the main, private security executives feel that public police are helpful and that their relationship with them is good. Fully 77 percent of 275 private security workers queried in our survey** believe that the public police are helpful when called. Ten percent say public police are helpful only sometimes, and 5 percent say they are usually absent when needed and fail to arrive promptly when called. When queried as to what they thought the typical public policeman's attitude toward them was, 61 percent responded that public police view the private security service as being valuable and helpful, 22 percent felt that public police were indifferent toward them, and 12 percent thought that public police felt

* See *Industrial Security*, October 1963, p. 37.

** See Chapter IX of this report.

superior to them. But in the private security employee's view, public police viewed them in a more favorable light than did either the general public or their fellow nonsecurity employees.

In terms of actual contact with public police, 7 percent of the private security employees in our survey claimed they called local police for assistance once or twice a week, 14 percent said once or twice a month, 30 percent said once or twice a year, 15 percent said when necessary, and 27 percent said never. Very few felt that local police desired that they make more arrests, 25 percent thought that local police desired that they make fewer arrests, and 20 percent thought that local police felt that the status quo was satisfactory.

To private security contractors, public police who moonlight in private security jobs constitute unfair competition. The extent of such moonlighting cannot now be ascertained because published comprehensive statistics do not exist. But even if reliable comprehensive statistics could be gathered (perhaps by a survey of public police agencies^{*}), the mere fact that police moonlight is not necessarily a problem. One view holds that the market mechanism should determine who provides security services. If a user desires an off-duty policeman because he feels he will be more effective (due to better training and broader powers) than a private policeman, he should have that option. Some police agencies deny a conflict of interest but limit the number of hours per week that police may moonlight in *any* job, on the theory that extensive moonlighting makes the policeman less effective in his primary job. Still others are neutral and some even encourage their personnel to moonlight in private security. In our survey,^{**} 16 state and 26 local regulatory agencies, many of which are state or local police agencies, had few suggestions to offer regarding

^{*}It is not at all clear, however, that candid responses would be forthcoming, since some police agencies deny their sworn personnel the opportunity to moonlight in private security. Those policemen who nevertheless disobey such rules would certainly not admit to it. Thus, such a survey would almost certainly underestimate the extent of moonlighting.

^{**}See Chapter V of R-871-DOJ, *Current Regulation of Private Police: Regulatory Agency Experience and Views*.

the relationship and interaction of private and public police agencies. However, many voiced a strong desire for private police to report all crimes, and any information relevant to a crime, to public police agencies. These views, no doubt, reflect a serious concern shared by many observers; namely, that private police, with their employer's or client's explicit or tacit approval, often mete out their own justice, rather than involving the formal processes of our system of criminal justice. This private system of justice invokes its own sanctions, such as dismissing a dishonest employee, transferring the errant employee to a less sensitive job, inflicting physical injury on a suspect, releasing a shoplifting suspect with a warning on the condition that he make restitution, and so on.

Other regulatory-agency suggestions ranged from the very general to the specific:

- There should be a predetermined, clear-cut policy for public/private police interaction.
- Private police should call the public police whenever they effect an arrest or whenever they encounter some difficulty demanding police action.
- Private police should maintain a 24-hour communication capability with local public police.
- Private police should be deputized in times of emergency, such as riot, flood, tornado, and uncontrolled fire.

But a persistent minority of responding public police agencies, both in the Post survey and in our regulatory-agency survey, opted for either the status quo, or for reduced interaction. Grounds for such positions were that closer relationships would be unnecessarily burdensome and would create a responsibility for training; private security personnel cannot be trusted because of low-quality, untrained personnel attracted to such work; the private police's lack of training would reflect on the public police; private police may tend to become overzealous; the high personnel turnover in private security precludes close working relationships; private agencies would use public police services to further their own interests and profits; and it would be impossible to control private police.

One last comment regarding public police/alarm company interaction is in order. False-alarm rates* are generally very high--usually over 95 percent and sometimes over 99 percent--for central-station alarm arrangements and particularly for direct-connect alarm arrangements. Police departments are divided in their opinion. Some view residential and commercial alarm systems as quite valuable and are willing to expend resources responding frequently to false alarms on the grounds that these systems prevent crime as well as aid the police in apprehending suspects. Others refuse new direct-connect alarm hookups and are even considering disconnecting the ones they currently handle.**

COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE SECURITY

Our discussion above explored certain issues affecting whether police and security services should be provided publicly or privately. It also described how the roles and provision of these services are currently split between the public and private sectors as well as the relationships and interactions between them. Focusing solely on the private sector now, some basic questions are, What are the costs and benefits of the various types of private security services? What information does one need to make such estimates? Which criteria are appropriate for measuring the benefits or effectiveness of each service?

A major premise of this report is that private security services fill a perceived need and provide clear social benefits to their consumers and to the general public. One can speculate on how much higher crime rates might be if there were no guards protecting property, if there were no security men escorting the movements of large quantities of money, if there were no alarm systems, or if no one investigated the background of job and credit applicants. One can also speculate on how much higher retail merchandise prices would be if there were no private police. However, the questions that need to be answered have to do

*The police generally define a false alarm as a situation in which no crime complaint is filed.

** For example, White Plains Police Department (New York). See *Security Systems Digest*, November 11, 1970, p. 5.

with the *degree* of effectiveness of various types and mixes of private security forces and devices in various situations.

To make such questions meaningful, one must focus separately on each type of security service, examining alternate ways and mixes of privately providing each service. One natural way of categorizing security services is by their objective or function. Broadly speaking, private security performs three classes of functions: (1) information gathering, e.g., preemployment checks, insurance or credit-application checks, insurance claim investigations, antipilferage undercover work in retail and industrial establishments, criminal investigations, marital investigations; (2) maintaining order on and proper access to private property, e.g., guarding sporting events, recreational events; and (3) protection of persons and property by preventing and detecting crime, reducing losses to crime, and/or apprehending suspected criminals, e.g., guarding homes and commercial, institutional, and industrial establishments, antishoplifting activities in retail establishments, armored transport of valuables, alarm systems, surveillance systems, locks, and mobile patrolling.

To be sure, some security activities have more than one function. The guard at a football game may also be there to protect concessionaires from theft or robbery. The undercover agent's information may lead to the arrest of persons suspected of pilferage and thus to prevention of crime and reduction of losses to crime. And the plant guard's job may involve access control, as well as protection of property and prevention of crime. But a systematic approach to cost and benefit analyses in private security implies relating resource inputs to effectiveness for each function.

In what follows, we discuss appropriate criteria, outline the information needed for performing cost and effectiveness analysis, discuss the availability of such information, and describe work that has already been done. To anticipate, our general conclusions are that (1) *little systematic work has been done, and consequently, the degree of effectiveness is not well known; and (2) little of the required quantitative information is available to do cost-benefit analysis.*

We note that to do such an analysis requires close cooperation of users and providers of private security services. The executives we contacted in the contract security industry could not provide quantitative evaluations of the effectiveness of their services.* However, these executives paid careful attention to costs, since the low bidder often wins the contract. Perhaps the relative lack of information on effectiveness stems from the fact that demand for contract security services has increased rapidly over the past decade, that supply of such services is limited, that purchasers of such services are, for various reasons, often interested in obtaining low-cost service, not high-quality service, and that such effectiveness evaluations would require extensive and costly data collection.

One last general point. There are two dimensions to effectiveness, or benefits. One is objective, or measurable, benefits. For example, How much reduction in losses to crime has a specific security program effected? How many burglars were caught after, as compared to before, a particular alarm system was installed? The other dimension is the user's or purchaser's perceptions about benefits. A homeowner may feel more secure when he contracts with a central alarm services firm, even though there might be few objective benefits. On balance, one must conclude that users perceive the benefits of private security as being worth the cost, since its services are increasingly in demand.

Information-Gathering Services

In both theoretical and practical terms, a cost-benefit analysis of information-gathering services offered by private security is conceptually straightforward, if somewhat subjective. What is the cost

* We queried executives of the five largest contract companies on this point on the assumption that it would be in their self-interest to have evaluated the effectiveness of their services, the rationale being that if, on the average, a particular service which costs \$X per year could be shown to reduce losses to crime by several times that cost, the potential client would be more likely to purchase the service.

of doing an accurate preemployment check? An accurate insurance or credit check? An insurance claim investigation? These monetary costs are readily obtainable. We have not presented them because effectiveness data are not available to complete the cost-benefit analysis. Effectiveness of information gathering can be measured by criteria such as the number or proportion of reports containing information that changes a decision to hire, issue credit, or take other actions; measures of the consequences of those changed decisions; measures of the quantity and effects of incorrect information; or the number or proportion of reports for which illegal methods are used for collecting the information. Except for some anecdotal horror stories about the consequences of incorrect reports, we did not locate any reliable information on any of the aforementioned effectiveness criteria. Collecting such data would be relatively straightforward in theory; in practice, however, collection probably would be difficult.

Evaluating the effectiveness of undercover investigators would be somewhat more difficult because of problems in doublechecking the reports. Unlike background investigators, two undercover investigators may not be able to easily verify each other's information.

Maintaining Order and Controlling Access

Evaluating the costs and effectiveness of these security functions is also relatively straightforward. Over a substantial period of time the costs and performance of individual in-house guards (or groups of guards provided by different contract agencies) can be evaluated. Objective performance, or effectiveness, can be judged in terms of number and nature of occasions when order is maintained; the number and nature of complaints, insurance claims, or lawsuits resulting from guards' actions or behavior; the frequency with which guards deny unauthorized access; and so on.

Protecting Persons and Property

Evaluating costs and effectiveness for the function of protection of persons and property is much more complex and difficult than it is

for the two functions discussed above. Here there are often many relevant criteria to choose among, as well as many alternative types of security services, devices, or mixes of security services and devices.

Relevant general criteria of effectiveness, which should be compared over a period of time prior to, and after, implementing or purchasing a security service are type and volume of crime occurring or deterred, direct dollar losses to crime, social costs attributable to crime (e.g., fear, injuries), indirect economic costs such as medical costs, lost wages, etc.; number of criminal suspects apprehended and convicted; and number of improper actions by security personnel. For specific security services there may be additional criteria that are particularly relevant. For example, in transporting valuables by armored car, additional relevant criteria might include the expected dollar losses per 100 trips, the expected dollar losses per 1,000 miles, and the fraction of trips that result in a robbery. In evaluating central station alarm service, additional criteria might include overall false-alarm rate, false-alarm rate attributable to electrical or mechanical failures, mean elapsed time in responding to alarms, percent of time for which the elapsed response time was less than a certain value, etc. Depending on store policy, antishoplifting security programs might also be judged on the basis of fraction of losses which resulted in restitution. Frequency and seriousness of complaints or lawsuits lodged against security personnel are also relevant criteria.

In evaluating costs and benefits of alternative *mixes* of security services intended to, say, protect an industrial plant, careful attention should be paid to proper cost elements and cost comparisons of diverse services. For example, alternative security elements may be guards, closed-circuit television and other detection and surveillance equipment, perimeter fencing, special locks, etc. Since the security alternatives which are equipment-intensive may involve high initial (compared to recurrent) costs, whereas the labor-intensive alternatives such as guards involve little or no initial costs, but high recurrent costs, comparisons of alternative mixes based on 1-, 5-, or 10-year

system costs may look very different. And, in addition to the general effectiveness criteria cited above, the ability to obtain crime insurance as well as the insurance premium discounts available (if one or more specific security services are installed) may also be viewed as relevant criteria. For example, for some central station alarm systems, insurance-premium discounts of up to 70 percent are available. This premium saving alone may pay for part or all of the annual alarm-system service charge.

It is fair to say that few comprehensive cost-benefit assessments have been conducted. One reason for this is the paucity of relevant reliable data. Private security users and employers generally do not collect them. Federal, state, and local agencies do not collect them. However, the Underwriters Laboratories collects some relevant data related to alarm equipment and central station alarm services. It issues data annually on burglary attempts against premises with UL-certificated systems; however, no statistical comparisons are made either with similar premises without certificated systems, or with no systems at all. For example, Fig. 7 shows, for a recent year, the frequency of burglary attempts and captures of burglars as a function of elapsed police response time on premises equipped with UL-certificated central station alarms.

The few reasonably systematic attempts in the last few years to do benefit analysis of private security services have all been relevant mainly to alarm systems. One is an analysis of alternative protective systems for small business establishments.* The analysis considered those establishments having only "pure" protective systems, such as local alarms, direct-connect alarms to police stations, central station alarm systems, or no protection. Ten-year system costs were compared with expected 10-year losses for various sensor coverages. In addition, assuming that a central alarm system was already installed, a tradeoff analysis of losses and costs was conducted for

* See Small Business Administration's Report, *Crime Against Small Business* (Appendix C, Protective Devices Systems), transmitted to Select Committee on Small Business, U.S. Senate Document No. 91-14, April 1969.




Fig.7—Number of burglary attempts and number of burglars captured as a function of elapsed police response time (UL-certificated central station alarms)

various assumptions regarding possible reductions in police response time to alarms.

A second benefit-analysis attempt was the 1968 field survey (a follow-up of one of the 1966 National Crime Commission-sponsored studies) of business crime and insurance problems, sponsored by the Small Business Administration.* Some of its findings were summarized in Chapter III of this report. It studied crime rate and losses to crime in various businesses at different locations, with and without various private protective services and equipment. However, the study did not attempt to distinguish the effectiveness of the protective services by type of business using them, by type of merchandise sold by the business, by its degree of vulnerability to crime, or by whether or not the central station service used by the business conformed to UL standards.

A third attempt was an LEAA-sponsored experiment primarily designed to catch burglars, not to reduce losses to crime.** A relatively inexpensive and simple alarm system was installed in 350 Cedar Rapids, Iowa, business establishments which are favorite targets for burglars but whose owners typically find alarms too expensive. For about \$100,000 initial yearly cost (\$185 to buy and install, plus \$150 per year in maintenance and phone-line charges per installation), 40 burglars were caught in the first 18 months--more than in the previous 4 years combined. Conviction rate was 100 percent.

A fourth attempt involved an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oakland, California, burglary prevention ordinance.*** In general, that study attempted to show that large decreases in the volume of burglaries occurred at those businesses which complied with the ordinance and that most of the burglaries that occurred at businesses which did not comply could have been protected against had they complied. The

* Ibid.

** See *Security Systems Digest*, November 25, 1970, pp. 13-14, and "To Catch a Thief: Antiburglar System Works in Iowa Town," *Wall Street Journal*, November 24, 1970.

*** See Sgt. John G. Kearns, "Legislation in the Field of Crime Prevention," *Security World*, June 1969.

study also attempted to demonstrate that burglaries were not displaced from commercial to residential premises by the burglary-prevention ordinance.

All of these studies focused sharply on alarm systems. Alarm systems today have very high false-alarm rates,* usually over 95 percent and sometimes over 99 percent. In Los Angeles, police cite the overall rate as in excess of 95 percent. Moreover, they cite cases which illustrate the disbenefits caused by faulty alarm systems and false activations:**

A local company recently went into bankruptcy leaving 75 subscribers in possession of direct-dialing systems. The subscribers are unable to obtain service under the warranty, so faulty [error-prone] equipment is in use.

During the past three months 47 false alarms were received from one location serviced by a reputable company. All were attributable to error on the part of the subscriber's employees.

One direct-dialer made 22 false calls to our Communications Division in a single day.

In Beverly Hills, California, a survey of 1,147 alarm calls to which police responded in the last three months of 1970 revealed that 99.4 percent were unwarranted.*** The alarm industry admits to a 95 to 96 percent false-alarm rate, too.†

The problem of false alarms is not confined to self-dialers alone; they occur within any type of system currently in use. The SBA study suggests that equipment problems account for one-third to one-half of the false alarms; subscriber error accounts for one-fourth to one-third; and the remainder (20 to 40 percent) are unknown, i.e., the trouble cleared before investigation could be made or completed.††

* False-alarm rate is the percent of alarms for which no crime complaint is filed with the police.

** See "View from the Badge," *Security World*, October 1969.

*** See "Beverly Hills to Regulate Private Alarm Systems--Too Many Dry Runs," *Los Angeles Times*, January 31, 1971.

† See "False Alarms, an Industry View," *Security World*, October 1961, p. 31.

†† Op. cit., pp. 38 and 186.

However, alarm-company personnel believe that the majority of unknowns are actually subscriber infractions.

What is the result of high false-alarm rates? In responding to these alarms police expend valuable resources which could be better utilized elsewhere. Or, as in some cities, police reduce the priority of alarm response so that in busy periods they may arrive too late to apprehend the burglar. In others, they refuse new direct-connect alarm hookups and are even considering disconnecting the ones they currently handle.*

We do not intend, by devoting disproportionate space to the effectiveness of alarm systems, to slight other security services such as guards, mobile patrols, etc. There simply has been no quantitative evaluation of other services, and as we indicated above, relevant data are not gathered; we therefore cannot present a systematic quantitative analysis of their relative cost and effectiveness. Currently, consumers of private security services must make decisions primarily on the subjective basis of "professional judgment."

Two Suggestions

In the interests of aiding crime prevention by providing users of private security services with information as to which systems or services would be most effective, or most cost effective, for the intended application, we suggest that

- *The federal government should consider funding a research center that would evaluate the effectiveness and costs of private security personnel and equipment.*

The center's role would be to collect, analyze, and disseminate cost and effectiveness data from both operating and experimental security systems. By security systems we mean devices, personnel, and mixtures of the two. This center should be a continuing entity, since new systems are continually being developed. Perhaps it could be

* For example, White Plains, New York, is one such city. See *Security Systems Digest*, November 11, 1970.

associated with some organization such as Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. However, unlike the UL, its existence should not depend on fees collected for evaluation of systems which are *voluntarily* submitted. The center should be financially independent of the industry it is evaluating. The SBA report on *Crime Against Small Business* goes one step further with respect to security equipment. It recommends that the federal government "sponsor a central point of contact for manufacturers to evaluate and encourage research and development, standards, and perhaps testing."*

After evaluation of the various security systems available, a reasonable basis would exist for the widespread dissemination of protection standards. Minimum physical standards for protection against burglary have already been set for businesses by a 1964 Oakland, California, burglary ordinance and for banks and savings and loan associations by the recent National Bank Protection Act.

In Chapter III we discussed crime insurance and the private security industry. One particularly important point was the apparent lack of statistical relationship between insurance-premium discounts and experience or effectiveness in reducing crime and losses to crime. The SBA report recommended that:

...the [insurance] industry undertake a fundamental overhaul of its statistical reporting and attempt to obtain more centralized, more reliable, and more comprehensive statistics...discounts from standard premiums, because of installation by businessmen of protective device systems, should be applied on a rational basis consistent with experience data to be obtained from the overhauled reporting system.**

We concur with these recommendations, but in addition, we suggest that:

- Reliable and comprehensive information on the effectiveness of private security *personnel* (guards, mobile patrols) be included in the overhauled statistical reporting system.

* Op. cit., U.S. Senate Document No. 91-14, April 3, 1969, p. 12.

** Ibid., p. 17.

Such information would also provide a basis for more rational decisions on insurability and deductible loss levels.

A related recommendation was made in a 1967 report on crime insurance prepared for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Small Business.* It noted that the effectiveness of security devices is hard to establish due to lack of data and suggested the "building of a data bank of all pertinent information about insurable crimes." The report suggested primary uses of the data would be in (1) conducting the insurance operation; (2) providing technical assistance to security-device purchasers (recommending special protective measures and issuing alerts on new criminal and security methods); (3) providing useful information to public police; (4) evaluating existing protection systems; and (5) devising new crime prevention techniques.

SPECULATION ON TRENDS IN THE FUTURE

Our thoughts and prognostications on future trends in the security industry are impressionistic, rather than analytically based and, as such, should be considered to be food for thought rather than objectively supported conclusions of this research study.

Will the use of public and private security forces continue to expand? We see few indications of a lessening in the various forces thought to create demand for security services. Hence, the demand for security services and equipment should continue unabated.

How will public security forces grow relative to private security forces? With little indication that the pressures on public budgets will abate in the near future, we do not expect public forces to assume any of the roles presently filled by private forces. Perhaps the private forces may be called upon to do more preventive work, especially patrol, than they now do because the increasing public police workload forces public police to concentrate on response to crime rather than on the prevention of crime.

*"Contributions of Science and Technology to Federal Crime Insurance," report prepared for the Select Committee on Small Business for the U.S. Senate by the Science Policy Research Division of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, August 10, 1967.

Will the trend continue for private security to be purchased rather than to be provided in-house? Probably, although unionization of contract employees would erase the relative cost advantage of contract forces. Increased unionization should stabilize the contract security market segment.

Will security devices be used more than they are presently? Undoubtedly. Technological advances and engineering improvements will make more reliable and better crime-detection and prevention equipment increasingly available in the future. We anticipate that devices will assume more of the detection roles now played by personnel but that personnel will still be an integral part of the crime protection system in device-monitoring and response roles.

VII. SECURITY PERSONNEL

INTRODUCTION

Who are the personnel who work in private security? And how do personnel in private security work compare with personnel in public police agencies? Any reasonably complete profile should touch on sex, age, race, educational background, work experience, wages, fringe benefits, work week, turnover, and so on. For some characteristics, relatively reliable statistics are available; for others, little or no data are available.

The typical private guard is an aging white male who is poorly educated and poorly paid. Depending on where in the country he works and on his type of employer (contract guard firm, in-house firm, government), he has the following characteristics: His average age is between 40 and 55; he has had little education beyond the ninth grade; he has had a few years of experience in private security; he earns a marginal wage of between \$1.60 and \$2.25 per hour and often works 48 to 56 hours per week to make ends meet. If employed part-time, he works only 16 to 24 hours per week. Often he receives few fringe benefits; at best, fringe benefits may amount to 10 percent of wages. Guards have diverse backgrounds: Many are unskilled; some have retired from a low-level Civil Service or military career; younger part-timers are often students, teachers, and military personnel on active duty. Annual turnover rates range from less than 10 percent in some in-house employment to 200 percent and more in some contract firms. Few guards are unionized.

The typical private investigator or detective is a somewhat younger white male (averaging 36 to 49 years of age), has completed several years of high school, has had 8 to 10 years of experience in private security, and probably earns between \$6,000 and \$9,000 per year if employed full-time. Investigators have had varied prior experience: Some come to private security from local or federal law enforcement and from military security or intelligence; some have had no previous law-enforcement experience.

Public police are generally younger, better educated, and better paid and receive more substantial fringe benefits. Because lateral entry is rare, recruits often enter when young and remain; thus public police have considerably lower turnover rates.

In general, public police draw upon a different labor pool than do private security forces, with the possible exception of private investigators and security executives. The principal differences that lead to separate labor pools are the nature of the work, the levels of wages and fringe benefits, the age and education requirements of public police, and the lengthy screening policies for public police personnel. Only a small percentage of private security personnel have ever applied for a public police job, and former public law-enforcement officers seldom switch to nonmanagement private security employment.

The typical in-house director of security is about 45 years of age, has about 11 years of experience in industrial security, is college-educated just short of a Bachelor's degree, and earns (as of 1969) about \$15,000.

SOURCES OF DATA AND THEIR QUALITY

The U.S. Census of Population provides a partial portrait of personnel engaged in private and public security work in 1950 and 1960, at least with respect to age, sex, race, earnings, and education. Tables 36, 37, and 38 display these characteristics, by broad category of security job, for the 1950 and 1960 censuses. But a comprehensive, reliable, current picture is not yet available; relevant data collected in the 1970 census will not be published until sometime in 1972.

For a more current picture of private security personnel, which includes characteristics such as previous work background, transiency, and unionization trends, as well as those mentioned above, we have had to rely on impressions gained through interviews of private security executives and on results of a sample survey of guards, investigators, etc. Data collected from interviews of private security executives are impressionistic in nature but are reported here because more accurate statistics are simply not available. The Rand security employee survey, described in Chapter IX, focused on 275 security workers,

Table 36

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROTECTIVE SERVICE WORKERS IN THE
U.S. EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE

Type	Percent of Each Type in Selected Age Groups (Male Only, All Races)													
	24 and Under		25 to 34		35 to 44		45 to 54		55 to 64		65 to 74		75 and Over	
	1950 ^a	1950 ^b	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960
<u>Public</u>														
Policemen and Detectives	5.7	5.6	31.1	36.4	28.5	31.3	21.9	17.0	10.1	7.7	2.3	1.8	0.4	0.3
Marshals and Constables	0.5	2.2	12.5	12.9	20.3	23.5	23.4	20.3	26.6	25.7	15.1	11.9	1.7	3.4
Sheriffs and Bailiffs	3.8	3.2	16.7	21.4	22.3	24.3	23.5	23.2	22.1	18.0	8.8	7.6	2.9	2.2
<u>Private</u>														
Guards, Watchmen and Doorkeepers	2.8	4.6	10.1	10.1	15.0	16.1	21.8	23.9	30.1	31.0	17.6	12.1	2.7	2.1
Policemen and Detectives	3.6	4.3	14.1	16.9	23.4	19.2	25.8	25.1	22.6	25.5	9.3	7.7	1.1	1.2
Watchmen (Crossing) and Bridge Tenders	3.0	1.5	15.3	6.1	15.1	11.5	21.9	18.2	29.1	24.8	14.3	30.4	1.3	7.6

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population (1950)(1960) Subject Reports, Occupational Characteristics*.

^aBased on a 3-1/3 percent sample.

^bBased on a 5 percent sample.

Table 37

CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROTECTIVE SERVICE WORKERS
IN THE U.S. EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE

Type	Percent White ^a		Percent Male		Percent Full Time ^{a,d}		Median Age ^a		Median Earnings Full Time (\$) ^{a,d}		Median School Years Completed			
	1950 ^b	1960 ^c	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960	(All Males)		(Nonwhite Males)	
<u>Public</u>														
Policemen and Detectives	97.8	95.7	98.4	97.6	89.6	91.3	39.4	37.6	3314	5361	11.9	12.3	12.2	12.5
Marshals and Constables	99.0	97.6	93.7	96.7	85.3	83.7	52.6	50.6	2519	4453	9.4	10.2	(e)	--
Sheriffs and Bailiffs	98.1	97.0	96.0	94.8	86.1	87.7	48.2	45.5	3121	4902	10.7	12.1	--	--
<u>Private</u>														
Guards, Watchmen, and Doorkeepers	95.4	94.2	97.9	97.1	75.6	74.0	55.1	53.0	2776	4447	8.5	8.9	7.4	8.8
Policemen and Detectives	98.5	96.0	93.8	92.0	78.2	76.9	48.9	48.8	3365	5318	10.0	11.0	--	--
Watchmen (Crossing) and Bridge Tenders	96.1	91.3	96.4	54.1	78.1	48.7	52.7	60.8	2737	4499	8.6	8.5	--	--

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population (1950)(1960) Subject Reports, Occupational Characteristics*.

^aMale only.

^bBased on a 3-1/3 percent sample.

^cBased on a 5 percent sample.

^dFigures are for time worked and earnings in previous year.

^eMedian not given where base is less than 3,000 persons.

Table 38

YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROTECTIVE SERVICE WORKERS
IN THE U.S. EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE

Type	Percent of Each Type Completing Indicated School Years (Male Only, All Races)											
	Elementary School				High School				College			
	Under 8 Years		8 Years		1 to 3 Years		4 Years		1 to 3 Years		4 or More Years	
	1950 ^a	1960 ^b	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960
<u>Public</u>												
Policemen and Detectives	9.8	5.1	17.4	9.1	23.7	23.9	36.0	43.8	9.2	13.8	4.0	4.2
Marshals and Constables	21.3	18.1	25.5	24.4	26.6	19.0	18.1	25.1	6.9	11.2	1.6	2.1
Sheriffs and Bailiffs	16.1	10.9	21.0	15.4	22.7	20.5	24.8	33.8	10.7	15.2	4.7	4.2
<u>Private</u>												
Guards, Watchmen, and Doorkeepers	35.4	28.1	28.9	23.9	17.0	22.6	14.1	18.3	3.6	5.8	1.0	1.3
Policemen and Detectives	17.2	12.7	25.2	18.8	23.5	27.4	20.6	27.7	9.7	10.3	3.7	3.1
Watchmen (Crossing) and Bridge Tenders	34.4	36.6	26.8	26.8	17.3	18.4	15.8	13.3	5.1	4.0	0.5	0.9

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population (1950) (1960) Subject Reports, Occupational Characteristics*.

^aBased on a 3-1/3 percent sample.

^bBased on a 5 percent sample.

about 80 percent of whom worked in the Southern California area.* Because of its regionality and because the firms were selected as much on the basis of their willingness to cooperate in the survey as on how representative they are, the survey results cannot be generalized, with high confidence, to the universe of private security workers. Nevertheless, the results are interesting and do provide a rough current picture.

For purposes of comparison, we have also included results of two recent ASIS** surveys of companies that utilize private security personnel. About two-thirds of these companies purchase guard and investigative services and one-third utilize in-house security personnel exclusively. Some of the former use a mix of the two. About one-half use contract services exclusively. But all have an in-house security director--either part-time or full-time. The sample size and response rates are described more fully below in the discussion of the in-house industrial security executive.

With the exception of certain campus police characteristics (described in Chapter V of R-873-DOJ), personnel characteristics by type of premises secured, by type of employer, or by job subcategory are not available. For example, we cannot compare characteristics of contract guards and in-house guards assigned to manufacturing plants with those assigned to sporting or other recreational events, or undercover agents with store detectives who work at large retail establishments. As Tables 36, 37, and 38 show, Census of Population data only make broad distinctions between public and private security workers, and within the private category, they distinguish only among guards, detectives, and crossing watchmen. And data and impressions gleaned from our interviews and from our survey of private security workers provide an even more aggregated picture of the current scene.

*The remainder worked in various areas of the country.

**American Society for Industrial Security. See two articles by William D. Wright, Jr. (Executive Director of ASIS): "Industrial Security Profile," *Industrial Security*, February 1970, and "Industrial Security Profile--Part II," *Industrial Security*, December 1970.

SEX

Personnel in public law enforcement are overwhelmingly male, although between 1950 and 1960 there was a very slight decline in the proportion of male policemen and sheriffs. For example, the percentage of male policemen and detectives declined from 98.4 to 97.6 and that of male sheriffs and bailiffs declined from 96.0 to 94.8. But the percentage of male marshals and constables increased from 93.7 to 96.7.

Between 1950 and 1960, the proportion of male private guards decreased slightly from 97.9 percent to 97.1 percent, and the proportion of male private investigators decreased from 93.8 percent to 92.0 percent. But the percentage of male crossing watchmen and bridge tenders decreased greatly, from 96.4 to 54.1.

Many of the larger private security firms claim that the relative demand for, and employment of, female security workers has risen over the past several years, especially in hospitals, educational institutions, and retail trade.

AGE

In general, private security workers tend to be older than public police, but median ages for both groups have declined between 1950 and 1960.

In 1960, the median ages of public policemen, sheriffs, and marshals were 37.6, 45.5, and 50.6, respectively. In that same year the median ages for private security workers were considerably higher: 53.0 for guards and watchmen, 48.8 for policemen and investigators, and 60.8 for crossing watchmen and bridge tenders.

As to age distribution of public police, the proportion under 25 years did not change dramatically between 1950 and 1960, but the proportion between the ages of 25 and 44 did rise significantly. For example, the proportion of those between 25 and 44 years of age increased from 59.6 percent to 67.7 percent for policemen and detectives and from 39.0 percent to 45.7 percent for sheriffs and bailiffs. Correspondingly, the proportion over 55 years of age decreased from 12.8 percent to 9.8 percent for policemen and from 33.8 to 27.8 percent for sheriffs.

In private security, on the other hand, the proportion between 25 and 44 years of age showed little change between 1950 and 1960. Guards and watchmen in that age bracket numbered 26.2 percent and policemen and investigators numbered 36.1 percent (compared to 66.6 percent of all public police and detectives in the same age bracket). But trends in the over-55 age bracket were mixed; between 1950 and 1960 the proportion of guards and watchmen declined from 50.4 percent to 45.2 percent, but that of policemen and investigators rose slightly from 33.0 percent to 34.4 percent (compared to 9.8 percent of all public police and detectives in that age bracket).

From the results of our recent survey of 275 private security personnel, most of whom were guards, the trend toward more youthful guards may be continuing. Only 33.4 percent were over 55, compared to the 45.2 percent cited above from the 1960 Census of Population. In terms of median age, the 1960 census figure of 53.0 years should be compared to the figure of approximately 49 years from our survey.

At the largest contract security firms there seems to be considerable variation in age distribution among the firms. For example, at the Burns International Detective Agency, guards vary in age between 19 and 60; the average age is 48. Guards at special events, however, tend to be younger. At Pinkerton's, Inc., the average guard's age is higher--about 55, with relatively few guards under 30. Part-time guards average about 40 years of age. At the Wackenhut Corporation, the average guard is much younger--about 40 years of age; and at NASA installations (for which Wackenhut provides security), the average guard is even younger--about 34 years of age.

The ASIS surveys show the average guard is about 47 years of age--somewhat younger than his counterpart in some large contract guard firms. The average investigator or detective is considerably younger--between 36 and 44, depending on size of company.

RACE

Between 1950 and 1960 the relative participation of nonwhites in public and private security occupations rose slightly. But security occupations remained overwhelmingly white. In 1960, 95.7 percent of all public police and detectives and 97.0 percent of all sheriffs and

bailiffs were white. In that same year, 94.2 percent of all private guards and watchmen and 96.0 percent of all private policemen and investigators were white.

Although similar statistical data for recent years are not available, large employers of private security workers maintain that the relative participation of nonwhites in these occupations is increasing. And in some large urban areas the proportion of nonwhite public police has increased dramatically. Currently, for example, the proportions of black police in Washington, Atlanta, Philadelphia, New York, and Los Angeles are 35.9 percent, 28.0 percent, 18.6 percent, 7.5 percent, and 5.2 percent, respectively.* But in these, and most other cities, the proportion of black police is less than the proportion of blacks in the city's general population.

The reasons for relatively low participation of nonwhites in the public police are well known and will not be discussed here. However, we note that the issues go beyond racial prejudice and job preferences of individuals. Since a larger proportion of nonwhites are arrested or convicted for various crimes than are whites, a larger proportion of nonwhites both are discouraged from applying and are disqualified in the background investigation, once they have applied. Our main point here is that precisely the same factors are at work in the private security selection process. Because of statutory prohibition and/or because of company policy, one usually cannot work as a guard, investigator, etc., if one has had previous arrests or convictions for certain felonies and/or misdemeanors.

EDUCATION

In general, there is considerable difference in educational attainment between public police and private security personnel, although median school years completed have tended to rise for both groups. In 1960, the median number of school years completed by male public police and detectives was 12.3, and for sheriffs and bailiffs, 12.1,

* Alex Poinsett, "The Dilemma of the Black Policeman," *Ebony Magazine*, May 1971, pp. 122-131.

whereas the comparable figure for private guards was only 8.9, and for private police and investigators, 11.0.

In terms of distribution, 14.2 percent of all public police and detectives and 26.3 percent of all sheriffs and bailiffs had had no more than an elementary-school education in 1960, whereas 43.8 percent and 33.8 percent, respectively, had completed high school. In contrast, 52.0 percent of all private guards and 31.5 percent of all private police and investigators had had no more than a grade-school education in 1960 and only 18.3 percent and 27.7 percent, respectively, had completed high school. In 1960, 4.2 percent of all public police and sheriffs had completed four or more years of college; only 1.3 percent of private guards had attained that level.

Our 1971 survey of 275 security workers contained 28.4 percent who did not graduate from high school, compared to 74 percent in the 1960 national census sample. Further, 69 percent are high-school graduates or better, compared to only 26 percent in the 1960 national census sample. Our survey contained 30.5 percent with some college education, as compared to 7.1 percent for the 1960 census. We suspect that sample bias accounts for most of the observed difference. A small portion of the difference may be due to increased general levels of education in the United States and/or to possible transient effects of depressed economic conditions, which would serve to funnel better-educated, otherwise-unemployed males into private security occupations.

Most large cities and counties require that municipal police and sheriff recruits have a high-school diploma or its equivalent. On the other hand, most private contract security firms do not require guards to have completed high school. Although not always required, it is common for private investigators to have attained a high-school graduation level of education.

There seems to be considerable variation in average educational background of security personnel among the largest contract firms, but in general, average attainment is higher than nationwide figures from the 1960 census. At Burns, 70 percent of the guards are high-school graduates, or the equivalent. At Wackenhut, the requirement is that all guards must have attained that level. At Pinkerton's, investigators

are generally high-school graduates or better, whereas at Wackenhut, the typical investigator had completed two years of college.

From the ASIS surveys, the average guard had attained the level of 10th- to 11th-grade education (depending on company size)--somewhat higher than the 1960 nationwide figures. The average investigator had attained the level of 12th- to 14th-grade education (high-school graduate to two years of college), depending on company size. In those surveys, larger companies had better-educated security personnel.

EARNINGS*

In 1950, median earnings of full-time public and private security personnel were not dramatically different. For example, public police and sheriffs had median annual earnings of \$3,314 and \$3,122, respectively, whereas comparable figures for private guards and private police and investigators were \$2,776 and \$3,365, respectively. In fact, private investigators did as well as or better than public law-enforcement officers, but private guards' earnings were about 16 percent lower than those of public police.

By 1960, median annual earnings for both public and private categories had increased about 60 percent over 1950 figures; public police earned \$5,361 and private guards earned \$4,447. Private investigators' earnings were \$5,380, still roughly level with those of public police.

There is some reason to believe that certain relative changes have occurred between 1960 and the present. From impressions gathered in interviews with several private contract security firms, we note that current guard wages range typically from \$1.60 to \$2.75 per hour, depending on geographic location, type of client, and the guard's experience and responsibility. For example, an inexperienced guard in the Southeast would earn \$1.60 to \$1.75 per hour, whereas his counterpart in New York or Southern California might earn as much as \$2.00 to \$2.10 per hour. The "premium" experienced guard in Southern California assigned to a defense plant might earn \$2.75 per hour. For a 40-hour week, 50-week year, these hourly figures translate into a range of

* Earnings data have not been adjusted to compensate for the effects of changes in the purchasing power of the dollar, which decreased 18 percent between 1949 and 1959, and 21 percent between 1959 and 1969.

\$3,200 to \$5,500 per year. Although median figures will not be available until the 1970 census data are published, it does not appear that private guard earnings have increased significantly over this decade, if one assumes that full-time means a 40-hour week. However, because it is difficult for a private guard to make ends meet on the salary for a 40-hour week and because it is often difficult to meet the demand for guards, many contract guard firms allow their guards to work 48 or 56 hours per week. Since not all full-time guards work 48 or more hours per week, annual earnings, based on a 40-hour work week, of \$4,160 to \$6,900 should be considered the upper range. However, an experienced Wackenhut guard at an AEC installation might earn up to \$12,000 annually, based on a 48-hour week.

Full-time private investigators begin at between \$100 and \$150 per week, or \$5,000 to \$7,800 per year, based on a 40-hour week. Full-time central station alarm "runners" or respondents also earn between \$100 and \$150 per week.

Information regarding private in-house guards and investigators is much more limited, but our impression is that their earnings are generally higher by \$.50 to \$1.00 per hour (or \$1,000 to \$2,000 per year) than those of their respective counterparts in the contract security industry. One significant explanatory factor is that a higher proportion of in-house security personnel are unionized, and those that are not tend to receive wages commensurate with those obtained by other unionized nonsecurity employees of the same company.

In the ASIS surveys, the average guard in 1969 earned between \$5,700 and \$6,400 annually, depending on size of company. However, the hours worked per week per guard were not stated. Accounting for effects of inflation between 1969 and the present, these figures fall at the high end of the range quoted by executives of private contract security firms. The ASIS earnings figure for private investigators and detectives was about \$10,000 annually (or about \$200 per week)--considerably above the average figures quoted by executives of private contract security firms. The differences between the estimates obtained from contract security executives and those obtained by ASIS may be accounted for by the higher salaries paid in-house personnel, some of whom were included in the ASIS survey.

But wages of public police have increased much faster over the decade, especially in large cities and urbanized counties of the West Coast, Northeast, and Midwest. For example, current median entrance salaries for police in cities of over 250,000 population exceed \$7,800 per year,^{*} and in some cases are over \$10,000 per year. Median entrance salary for patrolmen in cities of all sizes is \$6,848 annually.

Fringe-benefit packages (medical insurance, life insurance, retirement benefits, etc.) are generally much smaller for private security personnel (especially of the contract variety) than for public law-enforcement personnel. Contract security guards, for example, often have no fringe benefits; at the better medium and large firms the package seldom exceeds 10 percent of earnings. At the larger contract security firms the typical 10 percent (of wages) fringe-benefit package might include \$1,000 to \$2,000 in free life insurance after 6 months or 1 year of employment; 1 week paid vacation after 1 year and 2 weeks after 3 or more years; free uniforms; very little or no free medical insurance; and rarely, profit sharing--at one firm the employee would receive \$200 per year after 3 years employment. Generally these firms offer few or no sick-pay benefits.

Turnover rate is often high. This means that even though some larger firms offer fringe-benefit packages, many security employees never work the 6 months or 1 year required to become eligible for these benefits. In-house security personnel tend to receive fringe-benefit packages more in line with other employees of the same company, for the reasons cited above. These benefits are generally up to double those for contract security personnel.

But public police, especially in larger urban areas, often receive fringe benefits that are much greater than those of the average private security employee. Contributions to retirement plans and health and life insurance alone often amount to 15 to 20 percent of salaries.^{**} Paid vacations could add an additional 4 to 10 percent of wages.

* See Table 4/6, *Municipal Yearbook*, 1971.

** See Table 4/1, *Municipal Yearbook*, 1971.

Sick-pay allowances are also generous. Thus, fringe-benefit packages in the public police may run as high as one-third of wages.

It is interesting to note that our survey of 275 private security personnel revealed that whereas 40 percent of the respondents do not receive any additional income from other sources, 12 percent have a second job, 18 percent receive a pension or social security, and 28 percent have wives who are employed. And only 8 percent are part-time employees, whereas 66 percent work a 40-hour week and 26 percent work 48 hours or more per week. The median annual wage in that survey was \$6,084, or \$2.77 per hour. This relatively high average wage again suggests a sample biased in favor of better guards.

PART-TIME WORKERS

In general, part-time work is more characteristic of private security than of public law enforcement. Between 1950 and 1960 the proportion of law-enforcement personnel working full time increased slightly, so that by 1960, 91.3 percent of public police and 87.7 percent of sheriffs and bailiffs worked full time. On the other hand, the proportion of full-time workers in private security decreased slightly between 1950 and 1960, except for crossing watchmen and bridge tenders, in which the decrease was large. By 1960, 74.0 percent of private guards, 76.9 percent of private police and investigators, and 48.7 percent of crossing watchmen and bridge tenders worked full time.

In contrast, about 86 percent of all state and local public police worked full time in 1967.*

Our interviews indicated that part-time contract guards account for between 20 and 50 percent of the total guards at the larger firms. Typically, part-time guards work two or three shifts on a weekend. Although current overall figures are not available, the interviews indicated that a larger proportion of in-house private security personnel work full time.

TURNOVER

Turnover in private security work, especially guarding, is much higher than in public law enforcement. Lateral entry is rare in the

* See Table 8 of this report.

public police; recruits generally enter when young and a substantial fraction remain until retirement. Precise, overall figures for turnover in public police, however, are not available.

In contract security work, especially in guard work, turnover is high, ranging from a low of about 20 percent per year for high-quality, more highly paid guards at government installations to a high of 200 percent and more per year for the low-quality, low-paid, hourly guard. For example, one large firm claims an overall rate of 75 percent; another claims that it is as low as 20 percent in some areas and as high as 200 percent in others. The highest turnover rates are experienced during the first several months of employment. We suspect, although we have no supporting data, that turnover rates of in-house private guards are much lower. For example, a large guard union, The United Plant Guard Workers of America, estimates that turnover of in-house guards in the auto industry is well under 10 percent per year. In fact, for the entire 20,000-man union, with the exception of turnover due to retirement, the rate is about 2 percent per year.

BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE

What are the backgrounds and previous work histories of private security personnel? Time and time again executives in private contract security firms stated or conveyed their feelings that the \$1.60-per-hour guards were simply "bodies in uniform" but that because of the user's desire to minimize security costs, they had to provide some such personnel or lose the business.

Private guards often have nonskilled backgrounds. Some have retired from Civil Service or a military career. Some younger part-timers are students or teachers, especially those part-timers who work summers and during holiday periods. Some younger part-timers are moonlighting military personnel on active duty, especially in areas adjacent to major military installations.

Private investigators, especially those who hold a state license, are often experienced in general police or investigative work. Many have served in the local public police, in military security, or in federal law enforcement. As far back as 1960, for example, the American

Society for Industrial Security estimated that of all in-house or contract security executives who were members of ASIS, 10 percent were ex-FBI agents and 25 percent had been trained by the FBI or by some other federal law-enforcement agency.* Private investigators, undercover agents, and retail store detectives employed in-house are often younger and more inexperienced in security work. For example, some firms prefer to hire completely inexperienced personnel for such in-house security work and then train them, because they feel that regular law-enforcement training and experience is inappropriate. Executives in these firms felt that personnel with prior training in public law enforcement were too enforcement-oriented rather than prevention-oriented. Further, they lacked familiarity with techniques designed to minimize shrinkage and pilferage of stock in the retail trade.

On the other hand, some contract security firms and others employing in-house investigators prefer more experienced personnel with regular law-enforcement backgrounds. For example, one large contract security firm hires only investigators with prior federal law-enforcement experience and will not hire former private investigators. Typically their investigators have had 10 years of prior government investigatory experience.

In our survey of private security personnel, the average respondent had been employed in that job about 3.5 years; 33 percent had worked at the present job for less than 1 year, whereas 32 percent had over 5 years on the present job. Almost half had had previous private security experience, 64 percent had served in the military, and 27 percent had had previous military law-enforcement experience. Eighteen percent had, in the past, applied for public law-enforcement jobs. But, of those, only a small percentage had failed either the written test or oral interview, whereas 18 percent had failed to qualify medically or physically; and 32 percent had passed all tests but either refused the employment offered or were waiting for their appointment. Also, of those who had applied for public law-enforcement jobs in the past, one-third had actually worked for a public law-enforcement agency; of those,

* See *Business Week*, October 15, 1960.

one-quarter had retired from that job and three-quarters had resigned. Over the past 5 years, one-third of the respondents had held only their present job, one-third had held one job in addition to their present job; and one-third had held two or more additional jobs; the average was 2.2 jobs (including their present employment).

The reasons given for working at their present jobs were also revealing. Fully 40 percent indicated that they had been unemployed and this was the best job they could find. Twenty-six percent felt that they enjoyed doing any type of police work, while 13 percent preferred private security over public law-enforcement work. Twenty-seven percent indicated job security and 20 percent indicated good working conditions as reasons. Eight percent said this was a second job and they accepted it because of their need to supplement their income.

In the ASIS surveys, depending on company size, the average guard had had between 7 and 9.5 years of previous experience in private security, and the average investigator or private detective had had between 7.5 and 10 years of previous experience.

UNIONIZATION

The precise extent of unionization of private security personnel is unknown. One large protective-services firm reported that 10 percent of its guards were unionized; another reported that 25 percent of its guards were unionized. One of these firms estimated that 90 percent of all *unionized* guards were employed *in-house*, rather than by contract agencies.

The United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA), the largest private guard union, has 20,000 members, or about 8 percent of all private sector guards. The Union estimates that its membership accounts for between two-thirds and three-quarters of all the unionized guards in the country. If true, there ought to be between 27,000 and 30,000 unionized guards in the United States. Ten percent (or 2,000) of UPGWA guards work for General Motors; that force represents almost half of the total 4,200 guards employed by GM.

It is no accident that most unionized guards work in-house rather than for contract guard firms. Since contract firms obtain contracts

through a competitive-bidding process, they resist unionization vigorously in order to keep costs, and hence wages, low. Even if a union obtains a foothold in an agency, or in a local office of a large contract guard firm, it is difficult to increase or even maintain membership. If a contract agency is unionized and the union pushes for higher wages and fringe benefits, the client can simply change to a nonunionized agency. Or, as it is alleged to have happened in at least one case, the large contract security firm can deunionize a local office, using the following technique. The newly unionized local branch bids high both for new business and for repeat business when contracts expire. As bids are lost, business declines and guards are fired. When the business of the local office has declined to almost zero, the firm is deunionized in that area. Then the firm begins to bid competitively for new business, using nonunion personnel.

THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY EXECUTIVE

Up to this point we have focused primarily on the characteristics of working-level private security personnel. It is also of interest to describe the characteristics of the private security executive. Fortunately, some data are available describing the *in-house* private security executive.

The following data are drawn from two separate surveys conducted by the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) Foundation, Inc. In the first survey,^{*} questionnaires were sent to each of 5,613 responsible security executives in as many business establishments; 5,006 of these went to various establishments with 500 or more employees and who had substantial industrial security staffs, and the remaining 607 went to security executives in banking. The response rate was only 7.6 percent, or 427 respondents. In the second survey,^{**} conducted by the same organization, questionnaires were sent to 15,000 responsible security executives in as many business establishments, but

^{*} See William D. Wright, Jr., *Industrial Security Profile*, Industrial Security, February 1970.

^{**} See William D. Wright, Jr., *Industrial Security Profile--Part II*, Industrial Security, December 1970.

this time the companies were smaller, having only 100 to 500 total employees. The response rate was even more disappointing; only 2.4 percent, or 362 respondents. The number of part-time security executives (who have other responsibilities in their companies) responding was both relatively and absolutely larger in the smaller companies.

Not surprisingly, some 75 percent of top security executives in smaller companies report to the president, a vice-president, or one of the three top officials of their companies, whereas the comparable figure for security executives in the larger companies was about 50 percent.

Table 39 lists the work backgrounds of security executives in both the larger and smaller companies. Roughly 25 to 33 percent have had previous experience in business administration, and between 8 and 12 percent had come to their firm directly from college. About 23 percent had had previous experience in local or state police agencies, between 3 and 8 percent had been employed in federal investigative agencies, and between 9 and 17 percent had had military experience in the Provost Marshal's office, in intelligence, or in investigation.

Table 39

WORK BACKGROUND OF IN-HOUSE SECURITY EXECUTIVES

Type of Background	Larger Firms (500 or more total employees, percent)	Smaller Firms (100 to 500 total employees, percent)
Business administration	27.0	34.0
College education only	7.4	11.5
Local or State Police	23.2	22.5
Military (Provost Marshal, Intelligence or Investigation)	16.8	9.0
Federal investigatory agencies (Secret Service, Narcotics, Post Office, etc.)	3.4	8.2
Other	<u>22.2</u>	<u>14.8</u>
Total	100.0	100.0

In the larger firms, the average security executive had three years of college education; 79 percent had had more than one year of college, and 50 percent had completed four or more years. Comparable figures for security executives in smaller firms were slightly lower.

In 1969 the average top security executive earned in excess of \$15,000 per year, and over two-thirds earned between \$10,000 and \$20,000 annually.

In the larger firms the average security executive is about 50 years old, and about three-quarters of them are 45 years or older. In the smaller firms, the average security executive is between 44 and 45 years of age, and only half are over 45.

The average executive in the larger firms had had almost 13 years of experience in industrial security, whereas the comparable figure in the smaller firms was 10 years.

In summary, then, the average top in-house security executive is about 45 years of age, has had about 11 years of experience in industrial security, is college-educated just short of a degree, and earns (1969 figure) approximately \$15,000. Data on executives in other segments of the private security industry are not available.

VIII. TRAINING

It is obviously very easy to become an armed private policeman in Dade County. George Fader proved it. He worked only one night. On a Tuesday morning he applied for the job with _____ Corp. On Wednesday he was hired, uniformed, armed, and given a patrol car. "They sent me to Gables Estates all by my little self," Fader says. "The man I relieved said, 'Here's a map of the place; go patrol it.'"*

INTRODUCTION

The current training programs for public police, federal law-enforcement personnel, federal guards, private guards, private investigators, private central station alarm respondents, and private security supervisory personnel are summarized in this chapter. Current government regulation of training standards in the private security industry is also described. In addition, we present various views and recommendations for improvements in current private security personnel training; these were obtained by a survey of state and local government regulatory agencies, by interviews with many executives in the private security industry and a national guard union, by a survey of several hundred private security guards, investigators, etc., and by discussions with personnel in the General Services Administration who set specifications for contract guarding services within the federal government,

In brief, although current private security training programs vary considerably in quality, most are inadequate. Total initial prework plus initial on-the-job training is less than two days for a great majority of the private security workers in the United States today. There is an admitted, as well as an apparent, lack of training for personnel. Throughout this study, we have contacted a wide variety of people who hold various positions in private security. In our contacts, there was never any doubt raised about the necessity for training guards. Nor was the existence of significant variations in quality

*"Security Guards Only Casually Regulated," *The Miami Herald*, July 19, 1970, pp. 11-A and 11-B.

among guard training programs ever questioned. However, the consensus that training is needed does not extend to the issue of *how much* training is needed, or whether it should be made *mandatory*. It is clear from our survey of guards that present guard training is not adequate to teach them their legal powers and authority. In our survey of 275 security employees, over 97 percent made serious errors that could lead to civil suits or criminal charges. The guard survey also indicated widespread disagreement and uncertainty even as to what their company policy was for handling specific but common types of incidents.

PUBLIC POLICE TRAINING PROGRAMS

Since the security roles and powers of public police are more complex and extensive than are those of private security personnel, we expect public police to need and receive more extensive training. Consequently, the training programs of the public police should be viewed generally as an upper bound on what can reasonably be expected of the private security industry.

In recent years the trend has been toward formal classroom programs as a supplement to on-the-job experience. A 1966 survey indicated that 97 percent of the 269 public police agencies responding had formal training programs ranging from one to twelve weeks, with a median length of six weeks.* While almost all police departments in cities over 250,000 in population conduct their own training programs of up to 20 weeks in length,** many smaller departments without their own training programs use the facilities of other larger police agencies.***

While police training programs are more lengthy than private security training (weeks or months for the public police as compared to hours or, at most, days for private security personnel), they are

* *Report of the Task Force on the Police*, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 11.

** *Supra*, p. 138.

*** *Supra*, p. 11.

still considered inadequate by many observers. The Crime Commission made the following recommendation:^{*}

Formal training programs for recruits of all departments, large and small, should consist of an absolute minimum of 400 hours of classroom work spread over a 4- to 6-month period so that it can be combined with carefully selected and supervised field training.

The same forces that make it difficult for small police forces to provide adequate training (primarily cost and inability to support a full-time high-quality training staff due to small, infrequent classes) are also relevant to small private security operations. The police solution of sharing a consolidated training program could provide part of the solution to the private security training problems. Consolidated public police training programs take various forms:^{**} (1) assistance by large city or county departments to nearby smaller departments; (2) state and regional training programs; (3) institutes and academies; and (4) universities and colleges.

Because retraining curricula of various police agencies overlap considerably and because considerable effort is required to develop quality training materials, the International Association of Chiefs of Police has developed training bulletins and films on specific topics, which it sells to local police agencies. The potential for profitable extension of this training mechanism to the private security industry should be explored.

The Crime Commission's Police Task Force recommended^{***} that each state establish a Commission on Police Standards with authorization to take the following actions:

To establish mandatory minimum training standards with the authority to determine and approve curricula; to identify required preparation for instructors; and to approve facilities acceptable for police training.

* Supra, p. 139.

** Supra, p. 75.

*** Supra, p. 218.

To certify police officers who have acquired various levels of education, training, and experience necessary to perform adequately the duties of the police service.

In 1970, thirty-three states had legislation which defines minimum standards for police recruit training and selection.* Of that number, 8 provided for voluntary compliance, while 25 established mandatory standards. An additional 17 states were processing such statutes through the legislature. A significant point is that even for public police, where the training need should be obvious, only half the states in the Union have seen fit to establish mandatory minimal standards for training. Thirty of the existing state statutes specify minimum required training hours; these range from 72 to 400 hours, with the average minimum length of just under 200 hours. Twenty-one states specify in-service training requirements. In general, the statutes create a state regulatory body or agency which establishes minimum preparatory curriculum requirements (in 32 of the 33 states) and approves facilities and institutions (in 31 states). However, detailed disciplinary provisions for violation of the mandatory standards are provided only in the Texas legislation. Thus, if mandatory statutory standards are necessary to encourage needed training of public police, it is unrealistic to expect that the private security industry would voluntarily provide needed training.

TRAINING FEDERAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL **

The formal initial training currently given federal law-enforcement personnel varies from 2 to 19 weeks, depending on the agency. Retraining

* John J. Thomas, "The State of the Art--1970," *The Police Chief*, August 1970.

** Information obtained from personal interviews with officials of the U.S. Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Forest Service, General Services Administration, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Internal Revenue Service, National Park Service, and the U.S. Postal Service. Also see *Unmet Training Needs of the Federal Investigator and the Consolidated Federal Law Enforcement Training Center*, U.S. House of Representatives Report 91-1429, Thirtieth Report by the Committee on Government Operations, August 14, 1970.

programs are not routinely scheduled in some agencies, whereas in other agencies, from 1 to 3 weeks of retraining is provided every 1 to 2 years. Personnel who must carry firearms typically receive firearms retraining every 3 to 6 months. Table 40 summarizes the length and frequency of training at eight federal agencies whose law-enforcement employees have limited legal authority above that granted to ordinary citizens.

Table 40

CURRENT FEDERAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS

Federal Organization Employing Law-Enforcement Personnel	Length of Formal Initial Training (weeks)	Frequency of In-Service Retraining	Frequency of Firearms Qualification
Bureau of Customs	11	N/A ^a	Every 3 months
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs	12	2 weeks each year	Every 3 months
Forest Service	None	Not routinely scheduled	Not routinely scheduled
General Services Administration	4	1 week each 2 years	Every 12 months
Immigration and Naturalization Service	9	3 weeks each 2 years	Every 3 months
Internal Revenue Service	16-19	Not routinely scheduled	Every 6 months
National Park Service	13-16	2 weeks each 2 years	Every 6 months
Postal Service	12	1 week each 2 years	Every 6 months

^aData not available.

Several of the federal law-enforcement training programs are in the process of change and consolidation. Current planning is for 19 federal agencies (a few agencies are excepted, such as the FBI) to cooperate jointly in establishing a consolidated Federal Law-Enforcement Training Center. This center would offer a core training program to personnel of several agencies as well as perform several other functions outlined below.

The study* that led to recommendations for creation of the Consolidated Federal Law-Enforcement Training Center concluded that (1) training is essential for both new and experienced law-enforcement personnel; (2) an absolute minimum of 400 hours of initial training and annual one-week intensive in-service training should be required for federal recruits; (3) a large common body of knowledge and skills is required by all federal law-enforcement personnel; and (4) a joint interagency training center is the best alternative. The study noted that failure to provide adequate training constituted a disservice to the public and to the officers themselves. The recommended 219-hour core curriculum presented in Table 41 was said to be essential to most, if not all, investigative personnel. Table 42 contains the full 510-hour recommended curriculum for basic investigators.

The mode of operation at the consolidated center would be to offer all new personnel the core curriculum and to conduct specialized courses covering special topics in depth to satisfy individual agencies' requirements. The center would also offer periodic retraining programs and develop new quality training methods and materials.

In recommending the consolidated center, the government studies indicated that there is a wide variation in current training programs for new agents; that training facilities being used by the agencies surveyed were "inadequate at best"; and that the federal law-enforcement agencies are too small to justify the construction of adequate modern facilities for each group of agents. In addition to economy, the consolidated center was said to offer the advantages of a full-time faculty; full utilization of the facilities; interagency cross-fertilization of ideas and techniques; formation of useful interpersonal relationships; opportunities for research into training methods, procedures, instructional techniques, and equipment; establishment of minimum-quality training standards; and consistency of course content.

The projected annual enrollment of new agents would be approximately 1,400 in FY 1973 and 1974.

*"Draft Survey Report of Federal Law Enforcement Training Facilities," Office of Management and Organization, Bureau of the Budget, June 1967; and House Report 91-1429, cited previously.

Table 41

BASIC FEDERAL INVESTIGATOR CURRICULUM

Curriculum	Hours	Minutes
Organization and functions of law-enforcement agencies	7	30
Ethics and conduct	2	..
Constitutional law and civil liberties	5	..
Court systems and procedures	12	30
Law of search and seizure	21	15
Preparation for trial	3	30
Testifying in court	21	30
Principles of evidence	30	15
Recognition of evidence	8	..
Collection and preservation of evidence	17	30
News media	1	30
Sources of information	3	..
Develop and use informants	7	30
Interviewing	22	..
Note taking	4	..
Report writing	10	30
Tort claims investigation	4	30
Questioned documents	6	..
Description and identification	6	..
Human relations	<u>25</u>	<u>..</u>
Total hours	219	0

Table 42

CONSOLIDATED FEDERAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER
PROPOSED BASIC CURRICULUM--INVESTIGATORS

Curriculum	Hours	Minutes
Organization and functions of law-enforcement agencies	7	30
Ethics and conduct	2	..
Constitutional law and civil liberties	5	..
Court systems and procedures	12	30
Law and search and seizure	21	15
Preparation for trial	3	30
Testifying in court	21	30
Detention and arrest	29	30
Illegal firearms	5	..
Principles of evidence	30	15
Recognition of evidence	8	..
Collection and preservation of evidence	17	30
Undercover investigation	4	..
Searches and raids	15	..
Search vehicles	4	30
News media	1	30
Presidential protection	24	15
Sources of information	3	..
Develop and use informants	7	30
Interviewing	22	..
Note taking	4	..
Report writing	10	30
Tort claims investigation	4	30
Photography	7	30
Radio communications	8	..
Fingerprinting	5	..
Questioned documents	6	..
Description and identification	6	..
Human relations	25	..
Appraising crowds and mobs	16	45
Surveillance	13	..
First aid (standard)	10	..
Handling disturbed persons	3	..
Driving training	20	..
Physical defense tactics	65	..
Defensive equipment	18	30
Firearms	<u>42</u>	<u>..</u>
Total training time	510	..

THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION--FEDERAL GUARDS

Current Training Program for Federal Protective Officers *

The U.S. General Services Administration provides a large portion of the security personnel who protect federal property. The GSA employs approximately 5,000 federal protective personnel and contracts for the services of 526 private guards. Those protective personnel, classified as Federal Protective Officers, have the same powers as sheriffs and constables to enforce federal law on federal property. These powers are derived from their appointment as U.S. Special Police by the Administrator of General Services.

The GSA's basic training program for Federal Protective Officers is being conducted at 5 newly established training centers, which serve all 10 GSA regions. The academies are located at Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts; Dobbins Air Force Base, Georgia; Washington, D.C.; Fort Worth Federal Center, Texas; and Alameda Federal Center, California. The basic course is 4 weeks in length. Some of the subjects being taught in the basic course include firearms training, bomb search and reconnaissance, arrest procedures, arrest laws, human behavior, and self-defense tactics. An outline of the basic course appears below. Every year, Federal Protective Officers will be scheduled to attend a refresher course. This course will be used to refresh the officers in basic security procedures and train them in the latest techniques of law enforcement. The GSA is also instituting a 40-hour supervisory course to upgrade its supervisory personnel. Special-Events Cadres have been established in major regional centers and are receiving training in the latest techniques of crowd and riot control. A manual is also being prepared to reflect the new role of the Federal Protective Service Division.

* Information provided by Mr. Thomas Derdock, Chief of the Federal Protective Service Division, U.S. General Services Administration. His office manages the federal guard force. Later information also furnished by a letter from A. W. Innamorati, Assistant Commissioner for Buildings, October 28, 1971.

The following course outline is used in the training of GSA guards:

<u>Administration of the Program</u>	<u>Time (hours)</u>
General introduction, registration, rules and regulations of the school	1
Reading skills inventory, classroom note-taking and study habits	1-2
Examinations	6
Graduation	1
Orientation to field training assignment	1
Field training (tentative 240 hours, three two-week shift assignments)	
	<hr/>
	10
 <u>Federal Protective Service Orientation</u>	
Overview and functional responsibilities of the General Services Administration	1
Mission, objectives, and organization of the federal protective service - general orders and memoranda	2
GSA personnel policies, practices and procedures (GSA Employer's Handbook)	1
Federal protective service employment practices and work requirements - rules and regulations	2
Duties and functions of the protective service officer	2
Principles of physical security	1
Security plan and emergency plans for protection of facilities	1
Consideration of security hazards	1
Methods of effective physical protection	1
Protective alarm systems	<hr/>
	2
	14

<u>Administration of Justice</u>	<u>Time (hours)</u>
History and philosophy of law enforcement - assigned reading	1
Crime in America - assigned reading: uniform crime reports	1
Criminal justice system	1
Federal and local law-enforcement coordination with the Federal Protective Services	1
Courts (overview arraignment to trial)	1
Law-enforcement ethics and professionalization	<u>1</u>
	6
<u>Professional Public Relations with Agency Employees and Visitors</u>	
Understanding human behavior	4
Abnormal behavior	2
Principles of communication	2
Importance of professional public relations	<u>2</u>
	10
<u>Basic Law</u>	
Authority and jurisdiction (building rules and regulations)	2
Constitutional law	2
Crimes	2
Arrest law	4
Evidence law and rules	4
Search and seizure laws	4
Arrest procedures - regional and local process	<u>2</u>
	20

<u>Protective Security Patrol Procedures</u>	<u>Time (hours)</u>
Patrol and observation	2
Patrol methods - recognition and control of beat hazards	2
Field note-taking and report writing	6
Response to disturbances, disorderly conduct and miscellaneous incidents	2
Response to crimes in progress	2
Implementing and enforcing a system of personnel identification, exit and entry control - desk book procedures	2
Identification, search and control of property, documents, packages and vehicles	2
Safety procedures	2
Fire prevention and fire fighting control measures	2
Traffic control and enforcement of parking violations	1
Accident investigation	1
Communication procedures	1
Policy and procedures for response to emergency alarms, bomb threats or suspect incendiary devices	4
Nature and control of civil disorder, demonstrations and riots	4
	<u>33</u>

Criminal Investigation

Preliminary investigation	2
Role of audits and compliance	1
Information development	1
Interviews and interrogation	1
Preservation of crime scene	1

Identification, collection and preservation of physical evidence	1
Crime against person	4
Crime against property	4
Narcotics and dangerous drugs	<u>2</u>
	17

Proficiency Areas

Firearms training - instructions in the use, safe practices and maintenance of the service weapon and chemical agents	16
Physical conditioning	6
Training in offensive and defensive tactics	10
Emergency medical assistance	10
Pedestrian and traffic direction	2
Courtroom demeanor and testimony	2
Crowd and riot control formations	<u>4</u>
	<u>50</u>
TOTAL:	<u>160</u>

Optional Courses

Crime scene search	4
Moot case (arrest to trial)	8
Public speaking	2

Guideline Specifications for Training Contract Guards

The GSA does not employ protective officers at all government installations. In some locations government property is protected by private guard firms under contract with the government. The GSA is revising the current guideline specifications* for contract guarding, and it is anticipated that the new contract guard training requirements will parallel those of the Federal Protective Officer training program.

The current guideline specifications are as follows:

Training

Firearms Qualifications. Qualify each guard initially at the beginning of the contract period in the use of firearms using the GSA qualifications standard or one with higher requirements. A written record of each guard's firearms qualification shall be provided the contracting officer's representative prior to a guard's entrance on duty.

Initial Training. The contractor shall within thirty (30) days following assignment to duty, certify to the contracting officer's representative as to the satisfactory completion of the following basic training of each employee:

- a. General orientation on conduct and attitude on and toward the job;
- b. Functions of the Protection Force and specifically the protection of the locations stated herein;
- c. Specific duties of the individual, including sufficient "breaking in" training;
- d. Guard orders--general and specific;
- e. Authority of the individual guard;
- f. Employee and public relations;
- g. Elementary fire protection, including the use or operation of special equipment, such as fire extinguishers, fire alarms, sprinkler control valves, and standpipe systems;

* *Guideline Specifications for Contract Guarding Services Part V, Training*, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration, April 1970. See the Appendix of Rand Report R-873-DOJ for the complete specifications.

- h. Traffic control;
- i. Report writing; and
- j. Discipline

Periodic Training. All of the contractor's Protection Force personnel shall undergo periodic in-service training to include review of basic material to insure their ability to perform satisfactorily.

Elevator Operations Training. Arrangements shall be made with the local GSA Buildings Manager for the training of contractor's Protection Force Members in the operation of elevators as required.

As written, these GSA guidelines contain several desirable features: training and retraining are both specified; firearms qualifications are specified; and general training topics are outlined. These specifications also have certain deficiencies which could allow a contractor to provide virtually no training yet still satisfy the guidelines. For example, the contractor could provide a training course of 1 or 2 hours duration yet cover every topic in a superficial manner. If, in teaching a guard what his authority is, the guard is told only that his authority is "that of a regular citizen," he will probably not know his powers. The specifications quoted above would be more usable, would help assure quality training, and would assist in keeping competitive bids on a consistent basis if training periods are specified, and if training-program approval by the contracting officer is required before an award is made.

The responsible GSA official indicated that training is currently the "weak link" in the existing contract guard specifications, but new specifications will help bring the private guard more in line with GSA's new federal protective officer.

CURRENT REGULATION OF TRAINING FOR PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL

The present state of regulation of private security personnel training is embryonic. Training requirements set by statute or by regulations administratively established by regulatory agencies are mentioned in only a few jurisdictions. In general, training is totally ignored. Two of the few notable exceptions are the State of Ohio and

the city of St. Louis. The state of California will be instituting a mandatory weapons training program for armed private security personnel. In addition, several jurisdictions, including Baltimore, Maryland, the state of Florida, and Jacksonville, Florida, are considering implementing mandatory training for certain types of private security personnel.

In St. Louis, Missouri, individual watchmen are licensed. Regulations specify that training is mandatory for three types of private security personnel: (1) watchmen employed by a business entity whose authority does not extend beyond the actual premises of the single company, i.e., *in-house guards*; (2) beat watchmen licensed to a specific geographic area and serving several clients, i.e., private *patrolmen*; and (3) employees of security agencies, i.e., *contract guards*. These licensed private watchmen operating in defined and limited locations may exercise police powers "by virtue of the license of a private watchman...under the same circumstances as would a member of the police force of the City of St. Louis."^{*} Applicants for the watchman license must complete and satisfactorily pass a prescribed *3-day* course of instruction at the *St. Louis Police Training Academy*. The applicant is charged a fee for the training program. One of the 3 days is devoted to firearms, and failure to pass that portion of the course leads to a restriction on the license forbidding the carrying of firearms. The following topics are covered:

- Rules and regulations governing licensed watchmen in the city of St. Louis
- Introduction to criminal law
- Arrest, search and seizure
- Criminal evidence to include the ramifications of recent court decisions
- Court and warrant office procedures
- Crime-scene investigations
- Defensive tactics
- Firearms instruction
- Plant and store protection techniques
- First aid

^{*}*Frank vs. Wabash Railroad Company*, 295 S.W. 2d 16 (Mo. 1956).

Desirable features of the St. Louis program are that it is mandatory, it is conducted at a quality police academy, and it includes all private personnel serving as guards (i.e., both in-house and contract personnel). One probable deficiency is the 3-day program which appears to be inadequate to train a person who will have the arrest powers of public policemen (although in restricted locations).

In the state of Ohio, a 120-hour training program must be completed at an accredited training school by every individual who desires to hold a private police commission and by every armed person employed at an educational institution. The Ohio Peace Officer Training Council must approve the school, instructors, and course content. A minimum model curriculum with subject time allocations is specified by the council. Appendix C presents the rules, procedures, and curriculum that have been established in Ohio. The council considers 120 hours an absolute minimum and it does not include time spent on employer regulations, personnel policies, or procedures. Individuals must be certified as trained within 1 year of the initial employment date (6 months in some Ohio cities). In Ohio, local political jurisdictions may issue a commission to private policemen or security guards. The commission typically implies no legal authority for the private security employee above that of an ordinary citizen. The training is mandatory for commissioned private personnel and voluntary for others. Excellent features of the Ohio training regulations include its mandatory nature, the explicit minimum hours and curriculum, and the accreditation of schools and instructors. A less desirable feature is that not all types of private security personnel are covered. The types of private personnel to be commissioned are determined by the local jurisdiction. Investigators and noncommissioned guards are excluded. Also, not all personnel of a specified type are commissioned. In Cleveland, approximately 4,000 private police, guards, and patrolmen have been commissioned, but an estimated* 1,000 to 1,500 employees performing the same functions are not commissioned. Another undesirable feature is the long (1-year) time period during which the private security employee may work untrained.

* Private communication from Colonel Cook, Executive Director of the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council, June 21, 1971.

Given the high turnover rates (up to 200 percent per year in some contract security agencies), a significant fraction of the private forces may never be trained.

Vermont requires private investigative agency licensees to pass either an approved training program or a comprehensive exam. Oklahoma City requires armed private personnel to attend an orientation class conducted by the public police; and ten states require polygraph examiners to graduate from an approved training school and/or complete 6 to 12 months of internship.

VARIOUS VIEWS ON TRAINING

Regulatory Agencies

In response to a Rand Corporation survey, 26 agencies that regulate the private security industry advocated mandatory training for certain types of private security personnel, while only 2 opposed it. A smaller majority, 18 regulatory agencies, favored mandatory retraining, while only 5 opposed it. Those recommending retraining typically favored firearms retraining 1 to 4 times each year, and other types of retraining once or twice each year. The length of recommended training programs ranged from 12 to 150 hours and averaged 58 hours. The Ohio Peace Officers Training Council, which has studied in some detail the issue of training private security personnel, recommends a 120-hour program; that program is described in detail in Appendix C. The length of retraining recommended ranged from 3 to 24 hours and averaged 12 hours. Initial training topics most frequently mentioned were the use of firearms, the law, and the legal authority of private security personnel. Detailed descriptions of each regulatory agency's recommendations on training times and curriculum are presented in Chapter V and Appendix E of R-871-DOJ.

Private Security Industry Executives

In our interviews with high-level corporate executives of ADT, Brink's, Burns, Pinkerton's, Wackenhut, and several smaller private

security firms, a variety of views emerged. A majority of the industry executives agreed that:

- Adequate training is necessary both to enable the security personnel to perform effectively and to protect the employer from lawsuits and insurance-rate increases or cancellation because of improper employee actions.
- Current training programs vary considerably in quality. Many private security personnel currently receive little or no training.
- Economic factors currently play a significant role in determining the extent and depth of training given.*
- The amount and type of training needed varies considerably with the type of security activity the employee will perform.
- All employees performing the same type of security work should be subjected to the same regulations, regardless of who employs them.

Not surprisingly, only one private security executive admitted that his company's training was inadequate. On the other hand, when asked what level of training they considered adequate, only two corporation executives cited their present program. The remaining declined to answer.

Although no consensus existed, executives of more than one major security corporation volunteered each of the following views:

- Current training is generally very inadequate. Many smaller forces provide no training except that which is received from fellow workers on the job.
- Quality security firms would provide more training if *all* security firms had to provide equivalent training. Otherwise, some "cut-throat" competitors would not train adequately, and thus could underbid on price and acquire an increased share of the market.

* One executive commented succinctly, "Cost is the key. We would train more, but can't afford it."

- Both in-house security forces and contract forces should be either regulated or unregulated. They perform the same activities in similar physical locations and are both expected to handle the same types of incidents. Thus, if one is regulated, they both should be regulated. The conventional arguments against regulation of in-house forces (e.g., in-house security forces are the direct responsibility of the employer, and government should not interfere in private business) apply equally well to contract security forces. With regard to training, regulation would be acceptable if *all contract* and *all in-house* forces were required to provide the same *quality* of training programs. To encourage more uniform quality, the training programs should all be accredited by the regulatory agency. If contract forces are required to be trained, while in-house forces are not, then fewer firms will hire contract security forces because the cost advantage of contract forces will be lessened.*
- A significant fraction of the users of private security services are more concerned with price than with quality. Some use private security forces only because it is necessary for them to do so in order to obtain insurance. Thus, the contention is that these users are not willing to pay for increased training.
- Weapons training both on and off a firing range is absolutely necessary for armed personnel. Weapons retraining should be given periodically.
- Clients of contract security firms need to be educated so that they do not expect personnel to do more than they are legally able to do.
- Training should follow a syllabus so that all necessary topics are covered.**

* Elsewhere in this chapter we estimate that the increase in contract fee required to cover the cost of a 3-week training program is at the very most 23¢/hour, assuming guard wages of \$2.00/hr, instructor wages of \$4.00/hr, and a 50 percent overhead cost, with 10 trainees per class if the average employee stays only 1 year. With a shorter program, larger classes, or assuming longer average employment, the cost could be considerably less.

** One executive who made this comment represented one of the largest contract guard and investigative corporations in the United

- The industry needs higher pay to cut turnover rates if training is to be economically feasible.
- There are certain roles the government could play in training that would be acceptable to the industry. Some suggestions are included below:
 - The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration could produce and distribute training materials, bulletins, films, and employee manuals. The IACP already has some films that could be used. Since production cost is about \$1,000 for each minute of film running time, most private sources will not produce films for their own security training programs.
 - Quality training materials could be prepared and made available nationally on specialized training topics (such as shoplifting, bank security, and hospital security) as well as on topics common to most private security personnel (such as legal authority, arrest techniques, first aid, and use of firearms).
 - The government could establish training academies or certify private training schools where attendance would be voluntary. These quality schools would soon become known and utilized by firms employing private security personnel.
 - Mandatory training places a greater financial burden on the small firm. Since they cannot afford to set up an economical training program themselves, voluntary government training programs or regional private training academies would help the smaller operators.

States. He willingly gave us his company's guard training syllabus, but when asked for the investigator's training syllabus he responded, "Not with a 10-foot pole." It is interesting to note that we have guard-training syllabi from several corporations but were unable to obtain even one investigators' training syllabus. The reader may draw his own inferences from these refusals.

- Quality is more important than quantity in training. Accredited academies are needed to encourage quality.

In summary, executives of contract security firms whom we interviewed appeared to feel that the issue of training is very important and that many current private security training programs are in need of improvement but that because of strong price competition, high employee turnover rates, and the abundance of very small private security firms, cost is a major factor inhibiting the industry from providing more training.

United Plant Guard Workers of America

With over 20,000 members, the International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America is the largest union of security workers in the United States. Headquartered in Detroit, they have members in all parts of the nation, but membership is composed primarily of industrial-plant guards. With the cooperation of President James McGahey, we have obtained union management views on training, and we have surveyed approximately 60 union members directly.

The UPGWA management wants industry and the government to help establish effective training programs for industrial guards and security personnel. The union's depth of concern about training is reflected in a set of training-program* recommendations which they are currently asking management of certain industrial firms to adopt. The training topics recommended are:

- I. "Human Relations Principles and Techniques: To be effective, a security officer must know how to deal with people both in normal contacts and in situations caused by mental, emotional, or physical stress. Guards should be trained to conduct normal security and investigative duties in such a way that they do not arouse antagonism or infringe on individual rights.... Such training shall include emphasis upon the legal rights and obligations of the guard, the employee, and citizens generally."

* Unpublished UPGWA documents supplied by President James McGahey.

- II. "Crowd Control and Theft Prevention..."
- III. "Emergency Procedures and Techniques..."
- IV. "Weapons Use and Handling: It is not the intention of the UPGWA to have private security personnel carrying weapons as a matter of course. However, since situations may arise in which security personnel will be required to carry and possibly use weapons, they should be thoroughly prepared for that eventuality.
"Guards should have expert training in the function, care, and use of the various types of weapons they may be called upon to carry....
"In addition to initial training and practice in the handling of such weapons, all security personnel should be given periodic refresher courses and they should be given time at company expense on a regular basis to practice weapons handling."
V. "Communications Procedures...."

In the area of retraining, the union recommends that "all employees, every six months, shall receive a refresher course in the basic techniques set forth...."

The union recommends that the initial training program be at least *40 hours* in length and that periodic 16-hour retraining programs be given twice a year. All training programs would be entirely at company expense, with the employee receiving full wages during training.

In commenting on a UPGWA survey of training at 188 industrial plants employing in-house guards, which is described later in this chapter, union executive Charles E. Lamb indicated strong views on the current lack of private security training. Sixty-seven percent of the plants surveyed reported no training in the last 2 years. He said,*

I think it is important to note the balance at the bottom of each [training] category which reports no training. It is the opinion of this union that this lack of training detracts very considerably from the quality of industrial security.

Fifty-four (54) of the 188 plants report being armed, while only 15 report any training in the use of firearms. This seems to me to create a very serious situation.

* Private communication by Charles E. Lamb.

...there is great need for training in the industrial security area and from the many comments of our members, they want very badly to be trained.

The union also surveyed contract agency guards but has not yet compiled the data. However, Charles Lamb indicated,

....from long experience in representing the agency guard, I can tell you that I have yet to see the guard agency that actually trains guards to any extent at all.

Private Security Employees

In our survey of 275 private security personnel, views on training were solicited. Full details are reported in Chapter IX of this report.

Fully 65 percent reported receiving no training prior to actually beginning work! Those receiving initial training typically read a manual or were interviewed by a superior. Less than 7 percent received more than 8 hours initial prework training, and 19 percent reported being put to work by themselves the first day. The remainder received small amounts of on-the-job training by a superior or fellow employee.

Less than 1 percent of the employees surveyed felt that they received too much training. Initial prework training was said to be "not enough" by 43 percent of the respondents, while 51 percent felt that they did not receive enough initial on-the-job training. Approximately 25 percent felt present training was adequate, and the remainder did not answer the question.

When asked in an open-ended question to specify the topics that needed additional training coverage, the employees most often listed security procedures and legal topics, followed in frequency by fire and first-aid topics.

Formal periodic in-service training was received by only 6 percent of the responding employees. Fully 50 percent reported no retraining of any type, while 38 percent reported receiving training bulletins. However, only 50 percent of the employees recognized a need for regular retraining. Of those who felt retraining was desirable, the topics most often suggested were new procedures, firearms, first aid, legal topics, and fire control.

While 47 percent carry guns, only 19 percent of the employees receive initial firearms training, and only 10 percent receive firearms retraining periodically!

Finally, in response to the open-ended question, How would you improve the private security force in which you work? about three-quarters of the employees made suggestions, and one-half of those suggested improving training.

We close this section on the views of private security employees on training with a comment from an ex-guard who was beaten while trying to stop a robbery:*

This business is one big goddamned rip-off. Those folks [clients] don't want real security. If they did, they would pay for it. For \$1.60 an hour I wouldn't stick my neck out again. Anybody who does is crazy. I got no stick, no gun, no power. I just stand around looking cute in my uniform. Don't let anybody tell you a guard doesn't need training. If I'd had it, I might have known what the hell was going on.

PRIVATE GUARD TRAINING

Current Training Programs

Several firms that train and employ guards were interviewed to obtain a description of current private security guard training programs. These included the 3 largest and 4 smaller contract guard firms, as well as 3 in-house guard forces. A summary description of the training programs appears in Table 43. We also summarize data provided by the UPGWA on training at 188 industrial plants, and data on the training actually given to the 275 security workers we surveyed. Current curricula are discussed in the next section.

Judging solely from the comments of the executives in the companies we interviewed, we felt their training programs are among the better ones in the industry and found no evidence to the contrary. Several sources indicated to us that many of the smaller guard forces, both

* James Norell and John Acqualino, "Scarecrows in Blue," *The Washingtonian*, August 1971.

Table 43

CURRENT PRIVATE SECURITY GUARD TRAINING PROGRAMS

Program	Initial Prework Training								Initial On-the-Job Training				Total Initial Training (hours)
	Talking with Supervisors (hours)	Read Manual	View Films/ Slides (hours)	Class (hours)	Test	Firearms Range	Trained on Previous Job	Total (hours)	By Supervisor (hours)	By Fellow Employee (hours)	Written Post Orders	Total (hours)	
Company A: Small Contract Guard Firm	1/2 to 1	None	None	None	None	N/A ^a	None	1/2 to 1	8 to 16	None	Yes	8 to 16	8 1/2 to 17
Company B: Small Contract Guard Firm	1 to 2	Yes	None	None	Yes	Yes	None	2 1/2 to 3 1/2	8 to 16	None	Yes	8 to 16	10 1/2 to 19 1/2
Company C: Medium Contract Guard Firm	1 to 3	Yes	1 1/2	None	Yes	Yes	None	5 to 7	8 to 16	None	Yes	8 to 16	13 to 23
Company D: Large Contract Guard Firm (full and part-time)	1 to 2	Yes	2	None	Yes	Yes	None	6 1/2 to 7 1/2	1 to 8	None	Yes	1 to 8	7 1/2 to 15 1/2
Company E: Large Contract Premium Guard Firm	1 to 2	Yes	2	40 to 80	Yes	Yes	None	46 1/2 to 87 1/2	1 to 8	None	Yes	1 to 8	47 1/2 to 95 1/2
Company F: Large Contract Guard Firm													
a. Regular	None	Yes	1	9	None	Yes	None	12	1 to 8	None	Yes	1 to 8	13 to 20
b. Temporary	3 to 4	None	1	None	None	None	None	4 to 5	1/2	None	None	1/2	4 1/2 to 5 1/2
Company G: Large Contract Guard Firm													
a. Regular	None	Yes	None	10	Yes	Yes	None	11	1/2 to 1	None	Yes	1/2 to 1	10 1/2 to 11
b. Temporary	None	None	None	8	None	None	None	8	1/2	None	None	1/2	8 1/2
Company H: Small Contract Patrol Guard Firm	1 to 2	None	None	None	None	Yes	None	3 to 4	16	None	Yes	16	19 to 20
Company I: In-house Guards (Bank)	2 to 4	Yes	None	None	None	Yes	Occasionally	5 to 7	80 to 120	None	Yes	80 to 120	85 to 127
Company J: In-house Guards (Research)	1 to 4	Yes	None	None	None	N/A	None	3 to 6	None	160	Yes	160	163 to 166
Company K: In-house Guards (Manufacturing)	1/2 to 1	Yes	None	None	None	N/A	Mandatory	1/2 to 2	None	24	Yes	24	25 1/2 to 26

^aN/A: not applicable.

contract and in-house, have essentially no training programs. Men in those smaller forces learn to perform their assignments from their fellow employees with an occasional bit of instruction from the guard supervisor.

The training that a private guard currently receives before beginning work is brief. Typically this prework training is no more than 8 to 12 hours, with many guards, including some who must carry firearms, receiving less than 2 hours of training. In a small fraction of the guard forces, formal prework training programs of 1 or 2 weeks duration are given. These longer training programs are sometimes required by contract, particularly for service at certain government installations.

Larger guard forces tend to have more structured training programs and the men are usually provided with a pocket-sized manual containing general instructions and information. The principal advantage to the structured programs is that the training information is more likely to be accurate and comprehensive than it is in an unstructured program. Although a pocket manual is not useful when rapid action must be taken, it can be of value if the guard has time to consult it regularly, or even occasionally in his spare time on the job.* However, with a few exceptions, the information usually contained in these manuals is too vague and general to be of much value. We have examined several of these manuals in detail and find them, like the training curricula described in the next subsection, to be fairly comprehensive but extremely shallow in their coverage. For example, the manuals typically contain only 1 or 2 pages on arrests. Terms like "felony," "reasonable force," and "citizen's arrest" are almost never explained in sufficient detail.

A few firms use films or slides as training aids. These are particularly useful where the employment of a qualified instructor is not considered feasible.

In some guard forces tests are administered following training. These serve to check on the quality of the learning and may be an added incentive for the guard to pay attention to the training material.

* See Appendix B for the GSA federal guard's manual, which is exceptionally detailed and comprehensive.

Firearms training sometimes includes lectures as well as firing-range instruction. Both types of instruction are highly desirable; the guard needs to be instructed not only on how, but also on when, to use or not to use his weapon.

Typically, guard recruits are inexperienced in security work; thus they generally have no previous training for the job. Only a few firms, generally those employing a relatively well-paid in-house guard force, require a prospective guard to have had prior quality security experience.

Temporary guard employees are generally given less training than permanent employees. Typical prework training periods for temporary employees vary from zero to one day. Lack of need, because of close supervision and cost, were often-cited reasons for meager training of temporary guards.

As can be seen in Table 43, initial on-the-job training periods vary markedly in the training programs. It is not uncommon for the guard to spend an hour or less with a supervisor and then be assigned to work alone. But typically, he would spend a few hours with a supervisor or fellow employee before working alone. Several training managers indicated that learning via the "buddy system" (from a fellow employee) was inferior to learning from a supervisor. The rationale given was that the fellow employees would have a tendency to teach short-cuts rather than accepted procedures and they may teach how to handle only common incidents, neglecting the procedures to be followed in the event of an important, but rare, situation. In some cases, the new guard will spend up to 4 weeks on the job working closely with a supervisor or fellow employee. Guard forces at banks and classified defense research facilities are two such examples and are listed in Table 43.

Every training program we examined included the use of written post orders outlining duties in general terms.

Thus, based on security force executives' descriptions, total initial prework plus initial on-the-job training is less than 2 days in duration for a majority of the private guards in the United States today. An occasional private guard force will receive up to 4 weeks of total initial training.

The training programs described to us by the guards themselves and by the UPGWA were even briefer than those described by the security executives. In many instances the guards and the executives were part of the same security force. We speculate that these differences in the descriptions could be attributed to changes in training programs over time, to incomplete implementation of the executives' training orders, or to employees' lack of recognition of certain methods of instruction as training.

The 275 private security employees we surveyed were primarily guards, patrolmen, or central station alarm respondents. Sixty-six percent reported receiving no training before actually beginning work. Less than 7 percent received more than 8 hours of prework training, and 19 percent were put to work by themselves the first day. The remainder typically received small amounts of on-the-job training by a supervisor or fellow employee. While almost one-half of those surveyed carried firearms on the job, less than one-fifth reported having received *any* firearms training! Further details are reported in Chapter IX.

The recent UPGWA survey of plants where guards work directly for the company rather than for a contract firm also produced interesting results. Each plant was queried as to the actual amount of training union members had received on various topics in the past 2 years. Examples of the responses are as follows: 11 percent of those 188 plants reporting had training on physical and personal safety techniques (typically 2 to 4 hours). Nine percent had training in theft prevention or detection (typically 2 to 3 hours). Twenty-nine percent had first-aid training (typically 2 to 10 hours). However, *only 8 percent had firearms training* (ranging from 1/2 to 8 hours, typically 2 hours). In contrast, *29 percent were equipped with firearms*.

Finally, we desired to know how well the training programs were conveying knowledge to the guards. One approach was to ask the guards themselves. Their views were presented in the previous subsection. Our survey of security employees, described in Chapter IX of this report, also contained several questions to test the guard's knowledge and his reaction in several hypothetical situations. Each employee surveyed was given a total of 44 chances in the questionnaire to make

a "mistake." Twenty of these 44 potential errors were "major," i.e., errors that could result in an improper guard action that might lead to civil or criminal charges. The results were shocking. Over 99 percent of the security workers made at least one mistake; the average was over 10 mistakes. More significantly, over 97 percent made at least 1 major error; the average was 3.6 major errors, any one of which could lead to civil or criminal charges against the employee and/or his employer! One very reasonable hypothesis is that these men were not well trained. These results are even more significant, in view of the fact that our employee survey was biased in favor of higher-paid, better-educated security workers, who were allowed time to think before responding to the questions. That is, they were not forced to make the decisions in a crisis situation.

Current Curricula

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the majority of the private guard forces in the United States do not have any formal training program or a specified curriculum. Thus, it is the exception, rather than the rule, when a guard force has written guidelines to assist personnel in training.

We outline below the guard training programs used by three large contract guard firms. This information was digested from interviews with executives of those three large firms and from training material provided by them. Executives of each of these companies asked that the company not be identified individually with their training program.

Company X: A total of 12 hours time is to be allocated among 17 very general topical areas at the discretion of the local trainer. These topic areas are described only briefly and superficially for the trainer in a list averaging approximately one and one-half typed pages. The topic areas include legal rights and authority of security officers; personal conduct and interpersonal relations; security problems; preventive law enforcement; first aid; record keeping and preparation of reports; surveillance and interrogation techniques; use of firearms; arrest and search procedures; self-defense; fire-fighting and prevention; criminal's methods of operation; traffic; sabotage; alarm systems; and

testing and evaluation of the trainee. Beyond the simple listing of topics to be covered, the trainer receives little guidance and must therefore, in effect, develop his own program and all of his own training materials, starting essentially from zero. This practice must result in considerable variation in the quality of training given in the many offices of this major corporation.

Company Y: A 2-hour presentation of approximately 50 narrated slides is shown to each new guard. A list of topics and the approximate percentage of narration time spent on each topic are shown below.

	<u>Time spent (percent)</u>
History and description of company	5
List of guard duties	3
Uniform and appearance	6
Written orders at each post	3
Use of telephone and guard station	3
Legal (arrest, search, use of force, etc.)	15
Keys and watch clocks	3
Report writing	9
Firefighting and prevention	30
Firearms--when to use	5
Firearms--how to use	<u>18</u>
	100

Company Z: A 10-hour basic guard course is presented in person to a class. The instructor has a training manual plus supporting reference materials. A course outline and approximate percentage time allocation are shown below.

	<u>Time spent (percent)</u>
General regulations, duties, and responsibilities	10
First aid	10
Prevention and fighting of fires	20
Use of guns	10
Uniforms and equipment	5
Reports	3
Arrests	3
Patrol	19
Personnel and vehicular traffic control	<u>20</u>
	100

Whereas Company X gives its trainers a list of topics to be covered, Company Z goes a step further and provides a brief description of

the major points to be emphasized under each topic. For example, the trainer is expected to spend 15 minutes on the topic of arrests. The arrest section of the training manual contains a few sentences (approximately 1/2 page) on the subject.

Essentially, the main points covered on arrest are:

1. Consult your supervisor before making an arrest whenever reasonably possible.
2. Do not arrest when someone tells you to unless you are sure it is legal.
3. Understand and obey the law so that false arrests are minimized.
4. Obtain identification and, if possible, statements from witnesses to the arrest.

While the concepts above are important, they do not seem to be very meaningful to the guard who is not knowledgeable on his legal powers of arrest. Company Z, apparently recognizing this point, urges the instructor to expand on the subject of arrest if he has enough time in the 15 minutes allotted to the topic. The instructor is referred to a reference paper on arrests by guards. This reference paper is about 3-1/2 double-spaced typed pages in length. It begins with the exhortation that it is not a complete coverage of the law of arrests and that civil and criminal liability may result from an improper arrest. The guard is told that he must let the public police make arrests whenever possible and that he generally has no more powers than any other private citizen. Terms such as law, crime, felony, and misdemeanor are defined. Crimes such as larceny, malicious mischief, and burglary are also defined. The guard is told he should arrest only for a felony that has been committed or is in progress. However, subtle and important points such as what constitutes an arrest and how much force may be utilized are slighted. The guard is asked to refer to the supervisor when in doubt about these points. Given this meager training, checking with a supervisor is wise advice indeed. However, the supervisor generally does not receive extensive training either and, in any event, if the guard feels he does not have time to call the police or his supervisor before the suspect leaves, he must still act, based on his own

meager training. The section of the training manual on the use of fire-arms is only one page in length. It indicates that the weapon should be used only to protect against death or serious bodily harm, to prevent a felony or the escape of a felony suspect,* or to call for help if no other method is available in time of absolute necessity.

While we found company Z's training manual much too brief, it was the most extensive used by any of the three large contract guard companies summarized in this section.

As can be expected, the topics covered by the three contract agencies' training programs are very similar. They are also similar to the material covered in the GSA federal guard training program. The differences between the training given in a program of a few hours duration and a program of 3 or 4 weeks duration are mainly a matter of depth rather than coverage. The short programs outlined above cover most topics fairly accurately but very briefly. Material is presented once without much explanation or example. The learning from such cursory programs of a few hours length will be very minimal.

Material from one of the three training programs described above contained an especially relevant point. The material apologetically indicated that a few minutes time is insufficient to adequately cover all legal points and that the high points would be discussed by the instructor.

True, the trainer can *talk* about the *high points* in a few minutes, but can the guard *learn* in a few minutes? It is clear from our survey of guards (see Chapter IX) that most of them have not learned the material. The president of one contract guard corporation with over 1,000 employees wrote to us after receiving the raw data from our survey of

* In some jurisdictions it is not legal to shoot a suspect who has committed a felony *property* crime and has not threatened bodily harm or death to anyone. This was not mentioned in the training manual.

his employees. His major observation was:

I was particularly disturbed by the apparent lack of training--knowing that our firm has the training tools available to all the men.

Our reaction to the data was the same as his. His firm's training program (Company C in Tables 43 and 44) is diversified and it includes lectures, films, testing, and periodic training bulletins. However, the briefness of the program (5 to 7 hours initially, with an additional 1 or 2 days on-the-job training) is probably the cause of the "apparent" lack of training.

One problem is that the topics are complex and the number of situations that may be encountered on the job is very large. For example, one manual asserts that the guard is justified in shooting a fleeing felon. But this action may be illegal for some felonies in some jurisdictions. Another manual asserts that he may arrest a known felon if he has reasonable cause to believe the suspect is guilty. However, the manual does not explain what a felony is, what reasonable cause is, or even what constitutes an arrest. It does not seem reasonable to expect a person with a high-school education or less to have prior knowledge of these concepts.

Current Guard Retraining Programs

Only a few guard forces in the United States have retraining classes that meet regularly once or more per year. For example, of 10 firms that described their training program to us in some detail, only 1 held 1- to 2-hour retraining classes "occasionally, as needed." This turned out to be "about once a year." However, the management of many guard forces issue regular training bulletins every week or every month. Security executives indicated that the majority of the guards that carry firearms receive retraining on a weapons range once or more a year. A brief description of several current retraining programs is given in Table 44.

Of the several retraining programs for which we obtained information, the extent of retraining ranged from none for a small armed patrol

Table 44

CURRENT RETRAINING PROGRAMS FOR PRIVATE GUARDS

Program	Type of Regular Periodic Retraining			Class (hours/year)
	Bulletins (times/year)	By Supervisor (hours/year)	Arms Range (times/year)	
Company A: Small contract guard firm	None	None	N/A ^a	None
Company B: Small contract guard firm	None	None	4	None
Company C: Medium contract guard firm	52	24	2	None
Company D: Large contract guard firm (full- and part-time)	12	None	1	None
Company E: Large contract premium guard firm	12	None	1	None
Company F: Large contract guard firm Regular	None	None	2	None
Temporary	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Company G: Large contract guard firm Regular	52	8	1	1
Temporary	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Company H: Small contract patrol guard firm	None	None	None	None
Company I: In-house guards (bank)	None	None	1	None
Company J: In-house guards (research)	None	2	N/A	None
Company K: In-house guards (manufacturing)	None	None	N/A	None

^aNot applicable.

force to a well-diversified retraining program given by one of the major contract guard companies. As described by company management, that diversified program consisted of weekly bulletins, annual firearms range qualification, short presentations several times a year by supervisors to each employee, regular questioning of guards by supervisors as to proper procedures to follow, and an occasional (perhaps once a year) class to cover in detail some particularly difficult or special training topic.

CURRENT TRAINING OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

Several firms that employ investigators were interviewed to obtain a description of current private investigator training programs. These included both contract investigative firms and some firms with in-house investigative forces. While the executives of these firms were cooperative in supplying information on most other topics, almost all dodged detailed questions on investigator training. Whatever their reasons for refusing to provide such information, we were able to obtain only very general investigator training-program descriptions.*

The following are general descriptions of several current investigator training programs:

- Company 1: This large nationwide contract guard and investigative firm has essentially no formal investigator training program. Executives indicated that an extensive training program was unnecessary for them, since they hire only experienced investigators. This firm has a policy against hiring private investigators from its competitors because they are "not trained."
- Company 2: Another large nationwide contract guard and investigative firm has a training program of "varying" length based on (reportedly) detailed written training material, which they refused to make available to us. The amount of training given

*The same executives typically described their guard training programs to us freely and in detail.

depended to a large degree on the previous experience of the new employee. They indicated that many investigative agencies, even those that do not hire experienced investigators, give new employees essentially no training.

- Company 3: This medium-sized guard and investigative firm hires most of its investigators on an hourly basis from a reserve manpower pool when work is available. A new investigator meets with the supervisor for an hour or two, reads an extensive investigator's manual, is questioned on the material, and then receives his assignment.
- Company 4: The in-house investigators for this major U.S. bank almost always have previous experience with the public police. They receive less than 4 hours of initial training by a supervisor and have a very extensive manual on the bank's investigative policy and procedures. They carry firearms and practice at a firing range semiannually.
- Company 5: The detectives for this major retail department-store chain are all former policemen or police science students. They receive less than 1 day of initial training and then receive "on-the-job" training by rotating through jobs in all phases of retail store operation over a period of approximately 4 months. On the other hand, undercover investigators are hired from Company 3 (described above) and receive no further training.
- Company 6: This large national hotel chain does not set standards for detective training programs at corporate headquarters level. Rather, each hotel does its own training. For example, in one of their plush hotels, the men (almost all inexperienced in police work) talk with the hotel's security director for a few hours, read a very brief manual, and work with a fellow investigator for a few days before working alone.

In terms of relative frequency, the primary activities of private investigators are credit, insurance, and preemployment background checks on individuals; plainclothes undercover work to detect employee dishonesty and pilferage, or customer antishoplifting work in retail stores

and other businesses; and insurance investigations. The relative volume of criminal and marital investigations is small and on the decline. The quality and depth of training needed for personnel assigned to these different tasks varies considerably. Also, the range of previous experience of new private investigators runs from none (in many cases) to several decades with high-quality government investigative forces. However, since the legal powers and authority of public and private police are quite different, even seasoned public investigators may need refresher training on the limitations under which they must operate as private citizens. Inexperienced new employees are especially in need of training on their legal powers and on lawful investigative and interrogation procedures, since the line between legal and illegal is sometimes quite subtle. In addition, new private investigators with previous public police experience need training in topics such as pilferage control.

CURRENT TRAINING OF CENTRAL STATION ALARM RESPONDENTS

The alarm respondent usually plays a dual role, acting both as a private policeman and as an alarm technician in resetting and performing minor repairs on defective equipment. In contrast to a security guard, the alarm respondent may deal with several potentially major incidents on each tour of duty. Even though approximately 95 percent of all alarms are "false," the alarm respondent often cannot distinguish in advance those which are false. Based on our survey, the typical alarm respondent is involved in an incident approximately once each 4 months in which a suspect is arrested at the scene. While the public police are usually called, sometimes they arrive later than the private alarm respondent. Thus, by the nature of the job, he must be trained to handle both the technical aspects of alarm systems and a relatively high volume of potentially dangerous incidents.

The current training program at one major central station alarm corporation consists of an in-service training period of approximately 1 month duration. Training is usually given on a one-to-one basis by a supervisor who is not provided with any written training guidelines. The manual for employees is essentially technical and describes primarily

alarm systems rather than the employee's conduct in dealing with an incident. This type of training program leaves the choice of topics and the depth of coverage to the discretion of each first-line supervisor. It assumes that first-line supervisors are capable teachers and that they know the proper procedures to be taught. It is not necessary to take this approach to training, since the employees' jobs are well defined and the development and use of standardized quality training material would be fairly inexpensive.

SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL

Current Programs in Private Security

While supervisors in any industry may be called on to direct subordinates in difficult situations and to train new employees, these two routine supervisory functions take on added importance in the security industry. The security supervisor is called on to train in a very few hours personnel, who are often of low quality, to perform in situations where a great deal of discretion and judgment may be necessary. The security employee who is armed must be guided in when and how to use deadly force in situations in which there is little or no time to reflect. He must be instructed in the scope and limitations of his legal power to act. He must be taught acceptable procedures and methods for handling people in a wide variety of situations which may rarely or never arise in the employee's career. These training functions certainly are not simple. Since security personnel typically are told to call their supervisor whenever a difficult situation arises and time allows, supervisors are involved in many more incidents than nonsupervisory employees. The discretion exercised by the supervisor in handling these incidents may have serious implications, involving life or death, great property loss, damaged personal reputations, and the violation of civil liberties. The need for well-trained supervisory personnel in the security industry is clear. The question is, How much of what type of training is required for the various types of security supervisors?

The training presently given to security supervisors varies widely. Some firms provide essentially no training. Often the rationale for this policy is that supervisors received all the necessary training and experience while working as nonsupervisory personnel. This rationale assumes that nonsupervisory personnel acquire all the knowledge needed to be capable supervisors and that management can select those employees appropriate for the supervisory role. Another argument often presented for not providing supervisory training is that the cost of such programs is prohibitive.

The most extensive supervisory training program we encountered is given by one of the major contract guard and investigative agencies. The course is 3 weeks in length. In it, each supervisor is given a training manual and a checklist to assist him in training his subordinates. For refresher training, monthly bulletins are sent to each of the supervisors. Another of the major contract firms gives each of its supervisors a 1-day refresher course every 6 months.

Pinkerton's, Inc., conducts a Security Training School for employees above the rank of captain. The course content is technical rather than management-oriented.

Current Training in GSA

The topics covered in the U.S. General Services Administration supervisory training course are as follows:

Guard Supervisory Responsibilities

- Supervisory responsibility
- Characteristics of a good supervisor
- Principles of guard supervision

Security

- Principles of security
- Responsibility of the supervisor
- Recognizing security problems
- Inspections
- Knowledge of buildings and facilities
- Suspicious conduct
- Action to be taken

Legal Authority and Procedures

- Jurisdiction
- Arrest procedures
- Cooperation with other law-enforcement groups

Public Relations

Relations with the public
Guard appearance and attitude
Guard behavior
The guard office
Telephone etiquette
Dealing with occupants
Special functions in the building

The Guard Supervisor as a Manager

Definition
Management cycle
Determining objectives
Planning
Organization
Coordination
Controlling
Improving the work situation

Employee Relations

Definitions
Supervisor's need
Employee's need
Using unfulfilled needs as motivators
Good supervision avoids problems
Individual differences
Key techniques of human relations
Disciplinary action

Communication

Definitions
Means of communications
Barriers to communications
Upward communications
Downward communications
Defining work requirements
Achieving complete understanding
Listening

Training the Guard

Preparing for a new employee
Inducting a new employee
Establishing training needs
Meeting training needs
How to instruct
Evaluating training accomplishments

Personnel Administration

Career development opportunities
Periodic pay increases

Merit promotion plan
Incentive awards
Probationary periods and placement follow-up
Administration and disciplinary actions
Grievances and appeals
Time and attendance

IX. SURVEY OF PRIVATE SECURITY EMPLOYEES

NATURE AND PURPOSES OF THE SURVEY

A comprehensive study of the private security industry would be incomplete without some knowledge of the experiences and viewpoints of the security workers themselves. A survey of 275 of these workers provided us with excellent data that could not have been obtained from security management or from the regulatory agencies.

Another purpose of our survey of these employees was to assess the potential for abuses by private security personnel by testing their knowledge of their legal authority and limitations and their reactions to certain types of common, though hypothetical, situations that they might encounter. The potential for abuse arises out of a congeries of opportunity, ignorance, inclination, supervision, penalties, etc. Because these factors (especially opportunity) differ between public and private forces and because there is a lack of reliable data on public police abuses, meaningful comparisons of abuse rates are difficult to draw for those two types of forces. Thus, we have not attempted such a comparison, but rather, we document the existence of significant potentials for abuse by private security personnel. The results of the survey exceeded our fears about the extent of the potential for abuses. It appears that ignorance of legal authority may also lead to ineffective security personnel who opt for inaction because of uncertainty about their authority.

The survey covers such topics as job and employee description; training; ways that security officers would act in several hypothetical situations; their knowledge of and attitudes toward their job; their attitudes toward their supervisors, the regular police, and the public; their views of how their company and their supervisors view them; and their suggestions for improving their own effectiveness. It also covers incidents they have handled; complaints against them; their knowledge of their legal powers and limitations; and their knowledge of illegal acts by other private security employees.

The managements of a representative cross section of different types of private security forces (contract and in-house guards, investigative, patrol, and alarm organizations) were asked to allow their

employees to be interviewed. Participation was voluntary and several firms declined to cooperate even though they were guaranteed anonymity. We received affirmative responses from 2 major, 1 medium-sized, and 2 small contract guard firms; 1 major central-station-alarm company; 1 major bank; 1 major research organization; 1 retail chain; 1 manufacturing firm; 1 small contract patrol organization; and 1 major guard union.

Within each security force, we tried to prevent the manager from handpicking interviewees by asking him either for a random selection from his entire force or for all employees at representative work locations.

The survey instrument used was a questionnaire; it is shown in Appendix D. A few questionnaires were administered in person to small groups of security employees; in those cases we could prohibit discussion between interviewees as well as prohibit access to their security manuals. However, in nearly all cases, the respondents were instructed to complete the questionnaire in private and return it directly to Rand in a pre-addressed envelope we provided. The questionnaire took approximately 45 minutes to complete. To encourage candid responses, anonymity was guaranteed to each interviewee; we asked no questions that would identify the individual employee, and he was told that his management would not see the completed questionnaire. The cooperating organizations were supplied with only a statistical summary of their employees' responses.

The size and randomness of the sample were restricted by the limited funds available to conduct the survey, by the cooperativeness of the organizations we approached, and by the type of employee that would voluntarily complete the questionnaire after being selected for our survey.

A total of 595 questionnaires were distributed, and 46 percent were completed and returned to us. As displayed in Table 45, about one-fifth of the 275 responses were from 4 in-house security forces, one-fifth were from members of a major guard union, and three-fifths were from 7 contract security agencies (1 alarm, 1 patrol, and 5 guard). Thus, our sample contains a larger percentage of union members and contract security forces than the national private security employee labor pool; the latter contains about 10 percent union members and about 33 percent contract security employees.

Table 45

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: QUESTIONNAIRE RETURNS BY TYPE OF FIRM

Firm Code	Type of Organization	Total Approximate Manpower of Organization's Office	Percent Given Questionnaires	Questionnaires Returned		Returns as Percent of Manpower	Percent of Total Returns of All Organizations
				Number	Percent		
	In-house security forces						
A	Bank	38	94.7	20	55.6	52.6	7.3
B	Research	28	35.8	10	100.0	35.7	3.6
C	Retail	50	40.0	13	65.0	26.0	4.7
D	Manufacturer	<u>25</u>	<u>76.0</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>31.6</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>
	Subtotal	141	60.3	49	57.6	34.7	17.8
	Contract security forces						
E	Central alarm	78	52.6	24	58.5	30.1	8.7
F	Patrol agency	42	23.8	7	70.0	16.7	2.5
G	Guard agency (large)	300	16.7	31	62.0	10.3	11.3
H	Guard agency (large)	1200	9.2	63	57.3	5.3	22.9
I	Guard agency (medium)	200	26.5	29	54.7	14.5	10.5
J	Guard agency (small)	35	71.4	4	16.0	11.4	1.5
K	Guard agency (small)	<u>40</u>	<u>52.5</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>22.5</u>	<u>3.3</u>
	Subtotal	1895	16.3	167	53.8	8.8	60.3
L	Guard union	<u>N.A.^a</u>	..	<u>59</u>	<u>29.5</u>	..	<u>21.5</u>
	Total of all organizations	275	46.2	..	100.0

^aN.A. = not available.

OVERVIEW OF SURVEY RESULTS

We believe that the results of our survey of private security workers are indicative and suggestive of problems, even though the sample size was relatively small and not fully representative of the total population of private security workers. About 80 percent worked in the Southern California area, while 20 percent were union members working in various other areas throughout the United States. Over 75 percent were guards, about 3 percent worked for a private patrol operator, about 9 percent were employed by a large central station alarm firm, about 5 percent worked in retail security, and 1 percent were investigators.*

The average respondent had been employed in his present security job for 5 years; and about half of those surveyed had had no prior private security experience. The most frequent type of prior experience was in the military police or in military intelligence. The average respondent had held 1.3 jobs in addition to his current one in the past five years; 10 percent of those surveyed were retired military men; 5 percent had resigned, and 2 percent had retired from public law enforcement.

The wages of the security guards sampled (\$2.24 per hour for contract, \$3.16 per hour for in-house, and \$3.98 per hour for union members) were consistent with national figures. The average age was 48 years; only 7 percent were over 65 years old. They appeared to be better educated than the typical private security worker. Thirty-three percent had not graduated from high school, but 20 percent had completed one or more years of college.

The men typically received very little or no training. Thirty-three percent reported receiving no training before beginning their present job; the average training, excluding on-the-job training, was 4 hours. Twenty percent were put to work by themselves the first day. Although 50 percent of the men carried firearms on the job, only 19 percent had received any firearms training.

* All but one of the organizations we contacted refused to allow us to survey their investigators.

Abuse of Authority

When asked whether they had seen any private security employee overstepping his authority, *22 percent of the respondents answered affirmatively*. Of these that answered affirmatively, fully 33 percent answered, "a few times," 20 percent answered, "many times," and the remainder answered, "only once." When asked to describe one such incident, each of fully 40 percent of the respondents described a case where excessive force was used; some of these cases involved use of a gun. Approximately 30 percent described improper arrest, detention, or search procedures--i.e., situations in which major lawsuits and/or criminal charges might have resulted. Two observations are in order here: (1) These figures almost certainly *underestimate* the true incidence, since an employee may be reluctant to admit that his co-workers have overstepped their authority, and the security employee's notion of what constitutes abuse of authority is quite faulty (i.e., as we indicate later, he would not include certain situations in this category that in fact should be included); and (2) the absence of some other problems associated with investigators, such as trespass, invasion of privacy, false statements, libel, defamation, etc., is explainable by the very few investigators (only 1 percent) included in the sample.

There is a striking consistency in the relative frequency of problems involving alleged assault or unnecessary use of force and improper detention when complaint and insurance statistics are compared with security employee responses.

In addition, about 12 percent indicated that someone had complained about some action taken by the respondent but had not threatened to sue. About 3 percent indicated that they or their employers had been threatened with a lawsuit as a result of some action taken by the respondent on the job, and in about 25 percent of these cases the threat actually resulted in a lawsuit. Again, these figures probably grossly underestimate the true incidence of complaints and threats of law suits, since we were asking the employee to voluntarily admit to his "improper behavior."

Potential Abuse of Authority

In response to a series of questions testing the security employee's knowledge of his legal powers and his judgment in several hypothetical situations, the average respondent was wrong 25 percent of the time (i.e., errors per respondent averaged almost 11 out of a possible 44). Moreover, out of a potential of 20 *gross* errors (a gross error is one which could lead to a lawsuit or serious criminal charges), the average respondent was wrong 18 percent of the time (i.e., there was an average of 3.6 gross errors per respondent). More significantly, *over 97 percent of all respondents made at least one gross error*. Details are presented in Table 46. These responses alone suggest that very serious *potential* problems exist with regard to abuse of authority. These types of questions, of course, only probe potential problem areas, since there is no guarantee that respondents would *act* as they suggest or, indeed, would find themselves in identical real situations. But a detailed inspection of the types of errors made by the respondents showed consistency with the types of abuses actually reported.

The responses to certain questions are particularly revealing. When asked how well they thought they knew their legal powers to detain, arrest, search, and use force, 18 percent stated they did not know their legal powers and an additional 23 percent were unsure of them--41 percent in all. In fact, less than 50 percent knew that their arrest powers were the same as any private citizen's, and only 22 percent knew under what conditions an arrest for a felony was legal. Few knew the difference between a felony and a misdemeanor, and some did not even know whether some actions were crimes or not. For example, 31 percent believed that it is a crime if someone calls them a "pig," and 41 percent believed that it is a crime for someone to drink on the job if it is contrary to company rules.

Although few knew which actions constitute a felony crime, fully 17 percent stated they would use deadly force or force likely to cause serious injury if necessary, to arrest *any* felony-crime suspect. A few would do the same regarding misdemeanor suspects. Six percent would use deadly force or force likely to cause serious injury to prevent any damage to property, but 20 percent would use such force to

Table 46

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: PERSONNEL CHARACTERISTICS AND ERROR RATES

Firm Code	Type of Organization	Average Years of Employment	Average Hourly Wage	Average Age	Average Hours of Initial Training ^a	Average Number of Previous Jobs, Last 5 Years	Average Number of Total Mistakes ^b	Average Number of Major Mistakes ^c	Percent Making Mistakes	Percent Making Major Mistakes	Percent Armed	Average Number Major Mistakes ^c by Armed Men
	In-house security forces											
A	Bank	3	2.89	50	3	1.4	10.4	4.2	100	100	100	4.2
B	Research	9	3.64	36	2	...	10.5	3.8	100	100
C	Retail	2	2.69	34	3	1.9	6.5	2.1	92	92
D	Manufacturer	<u>2</u>	<u>2.92</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>4.0</u>
	Subtotal	4	3.16	41	3	1.7	9.3	3.4	98	94	55	4.1
	Contract security forces											
E	Central alarm	7	3.38	35	8	1.4	11.4	3.7	100	100	83	3.9
F	Patrol agency	3	2.53	53	2	1.4	8.9	3.4	100	100	100	3.4
G	Guard agency (large)	2	1.97	48	6	1.6	10.5	3.8	100	93	52	4.1
H	Guard agency (large)	4	2.15	54	5	1.4	10.3	3.5	100	98	42	4.0
I	Guard agency (medium)	2	1.77	55	4	1.4	9.9	2.7	100	96	17	3.2
J	Guard agency (small)	2	2.00	45	1	1.5	12.0	4.8	100	100	75	5.7
K	Guard agency (small)	<u>1</u>	<u>1.98</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3.0</u>
	Subtotal	3	2.24	50	5	1.5	10.5	3.5	100	97	53	3.9
L	Guard union	<u>10</u>	<u>3.98</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>12.3</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>4.1</u>
	Total of all organizations	5	2.77	48	4	1.3	10.6	3.6	99	97	48	4.0

^aAs reported by employees and excluding on-the-job instruction by fellow employees.

^bOf a possible 44 total mistakes.

^cOf a possible 20 major mistakes.

prevent *extensive* damage to property. And 19 percent thought that as long as any arrest by a private security officer is made in good faith and nobody is physically injured, the security officer is not subject to criminal or civil action. Only 33 percent knew that a person may legally resist an unlawful arrest made by a private security guard.

Finally, when asked how often they felt unsure of their actions when handling actual crime-related incidents, 10 percent responded that they were usually unsure, and 19 percent were sometimes unsure.

Handling of Crime Incidents

Almost half of the respondents stated that there are some criminal activities that are handled by the employer and not reported to the police. Of those unreported incidents, employee theft accounts for almost 60 percent, 8 percent involve shoplifting (this percentage may be low because few respondents worked in retail security), 15 percent involve minor misdemeanors, and 17 percent are cases of fighting, often involving drinking.

The 275 respondents had made a combined total of 1,788 arrests on their current jobs; the retail-store security officers averaged over 100 arrests each, while the remainder averaged about 2 each. Force was used to effect the arrests in 7 percent of the cases.

Employee Recommendations

The four most frequent recommendations by the respondents for improving private security involved better training, higher wages, better-quality personnel, and better supervision.

Conclusions

The evidence from our survey of employees is clear. They do not know their legal authority, they exhibit faulty judgment in the stress situations we posed, and they sorely need training. And, on a national basis, the typical respondent was better educated than the typical security worker. Finally, the respondents admitted witnessing significant numbers of abuses of authority by their fellow security employees.

DESCRIPTION OF EMPLOYEE SURVEY RESPONSES

We summarize below the detailed responses to each question posed to security employees. The responses are reported as percentages of total personnel responding to a particular question. Where some of the respondents did not answer a particular question, the totals do not add to 100 percent.

Employer

The 12 organizations that permitted us to survey their employees were described above. Of the 275 men surveyed, 61 percent were employees of 7 contract security agencies, 18 percent were employees of 4 in-house security forces, and 21 percent belonged to a major guard union. Thus, our total sample is biased towards contract personnel (less than 30 percent nationally) and union personnel (less than 10 percent nationally).

A majority of those employed by contract security agencies served industrial and manufacturing clients, as shown in Table 47.

Table 47

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: CLIENTS SERVED BY CONTRACT SECURITY EMPLOYEES

<u>Percent Employed</u>	<u>Type of Client</u>
52	Industrial or manufacturing firm
7	Financial or insurance company
2	Agency of the government
2	Transportation organization
2	Retail store
13	Many types of clients for brief periods of time
3	Individual citizens
1	Lawyers
10	Other

Occupation

The most prevalent occupation of the respondents was that of guard, followed by central station alarm respondent, as shown in Table 48. Our sample of security employees contained very few investigators.

Table 48

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENTS

<u>Percent Employed</u>	<u>Occupation</u>
0	Armored-car personnel
9	Central station alarm respondent
3	Roving-car patrolman
6	Foot patrolman
1	Investigator
71	Guard
1	Special-events guard (sporting events, exhibitions, etc.)
5	Retail-store security officer
4	Other

As stated above, we sought to survey more private investigators, but many of the organizations contacted were not willing to cooperate.

Employment History

As shown in Table 49 the average respondent had been employed in his present security job for 5 years, although one-third had been on that job for less than 1 year. Contract and in-house employees had an average of 3 and 4 years of seniority, respectively, while union members averaged approximately 10 years.

Table 49

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: SENIORITY

<u>Percent Employed</u>	<u>Length of Employment at Present Job</u>
13	Under 6 months
20	6 months to 1 year
14	2 years
21	3 years to 5 years
16	6 years to 10 years
16	Over 10 years

The majority (56 percent) of those surveyed had had no security experience prior to taking their present job. Yet 17 percent had had up to 2 years of prior security experience, 15 percent had had 3 to 10 years

of experience, and 11 percent had over 10 years. Most often, such experience was in the military police or in military intelligence.

With regard to transiency of employment, the average respondent had held 1.3 jobs in addition to his current one in the past 5 years. About one-third had held no other job, one-third had held one other job, and one-third had held 2 or more other jobs. Union members exhibited the highest job stability, having held only 0.5 other jobs on the average in the past 5 years.

Fully 15 percent of the men were currently seeking other employment; most frequently they were those employed by contract security agencies. An average of 6 percent intended to remain less than a year; 42 percent wanted to remain until retirement; and 40 percent "didn't know." In contrast, over 70 percent of the union members intended to stay until retirement.

Military Service

Retired military personnel comprised 10 percent of our sample, while another 55 percent had served in the armed forces but not long enough to receive a pension. Thirty-three percent of the total respondents reported having no military service record, but 27 percent had served in some military police or intelligence organization.

Public Law-Enforcement Experience

Eighteen percent had *applied* for employment with a public law-enforcement agency at some time in the past. However, only 7 percent had ever *worked* for such a public agency; 5 percent had resigned and 2 percent had retired from public law enforcement. The average length of experience in public law enforcement was 7 years, and most of those personnel took in-house security positions after resigning or retiring. Those who applied and were rejected by the public agency either failed an examination (3 percent failed the medical and 3 percent failed the written or oral) or did not indicate the reason for not obtaining the public employment (5 percent).

Reasons for Accepting Security Position

The respondents were asked to check as many of the reasons for accepting a security position, listed in Table 50, as they thought applied to their situation. Two items were added to our list by several of the respondents (to supplement pension income, and to earn money to finish an education). A total of 40 percent said they had been unemployed* and this was the best job they could find; 26 percent said that they enjoyed any type of police work; and 26 percent said that they sought job security. Union members differed significantly from the total in that their two primary reasons were the high pay and fringe benefits.

Table 50

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: REASONS FOR ACCEPTING POSITION

<u>Percent</u>	<u>Reason</u>
15	Job pays well
14	Chance for promotion within company
40	I was unemployed and this was the best job I could find
13	I prefer private security work over general police work
8	This is a second job and I need the extra money
20	Good working conditions
20	Job has good fringe benefits
14	Work is stimulating
3	For the prestige connected with it
2	I thought it would be an easy job
26	I enjoy doing any type of police work
26	Job security
3	Need income to supplement pension ^a
1	Need income to finish education ^a

^aReasons furnished by respondents.

Income and Workweek

Part-timers accounted for 8 percent of the respondents; they most often worked 16 hours per week and were employed by contract agencies. Thirty-three percent of the employees worked a normal 40-hour workweek,

*Recall that over three-quarters of the respondents worked in Southern California. The survey was taken in spring 1971. Since this area had had a very high unemployment rate during the previous year or two, this survey result cannot be generalized.

but 20 percent worked 48 hours, and 7 percent worked *more* than 48 hours per week.

The average wage was \$2.77 per hour. Wages for contract and in-house positions averaged \$2.24 and \$3.16 per hour, respectively.

However, union members were considerably better paid; their average wage was \$3.98 per hour.

Nationally, the wages of typical contract security workers range from \$1.60 to \$2.75 per hour, with in-house personnel receiving \$.50 to \$1.00 per hour more. Thus, the wages of the various segments of the industry represented in our survey sample are consistent with the national figures.

As indicated in Table 51, a majority of the men (60 percent of all respondents, 50 percent of union members) have supplementary income sources.

Table 51

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: OTHER INCOME SOURCES

<u>Percent</u>	<u>Source</u>
40	None
28	Wife works
18	Receive pension or social security
12	Other job
12	Other income sources

Age

The average age of the respondents was 48 years. Contract employees averaged 50 years of age, while in-house and union personnel both averaged less than 44 years. As seen in Table 52, personnel over 55 years of age account for 33 percent of our sample. Since 1960 census figures showed that 45 percent of all guards nationally were over 55, our sample is either biased toward younger men or, if it is not biased, the guards are generally younger than was the case in 1960. The average guard age nationally (53 years of age in 1960) was also higher than our sample average.

Table 52

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: AGE

<u>Percent</u>	<u>Years</u>
1	Under 21
9	21-25
13	26-35
16	36-45
28	46-55
26	56-65
7	Over 65

Educational Level

The educational backgrounds of the men surveyed are summarized in Table 53. Note that almost 30 percent have not graduated from high school, while 20 percent have completed one or more years of college studies. More contract employees (36 percent) than in-house employees (10 percent) or union members (22 percent) had not graduated from high school. We note that our sample is probably biased toward higher-educated personnel. The 1960 national census reported that 74 percent of the guards in the United States had not completed high school.

Table 53

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

<u>Percent</u>	<u>Level</u>
28	Did not graduate from high school
38	High-school graduate only--no college
13	Less than one year of college work
16	Completed one to three full years of college
4	Bachelor's or higher degree

We also found that 15 percent of the men surveyed were currently attending college or adult school or were taking courses from a technical training school (only one-third of those attending school were taking courses related to the security field). However, 10 percent of the men had completed one or more security-related college subjects in the past.

Training

Sixty-six percent of the respondents reported having *received no training* before beginning work. Twenty percent were put to work *by themselves the first day*; the other 80 percent received limited amounts of on-the-job training from fellow employees and supervisors. Initial training, excluding that conducted on the job, averaged from 1 to 8 hours for the 12 forces surveyed (see Table 46). The amount of average initial training reported by the men was 4 hours, which typically consisted of reading a manual and/or being interviewed by a supervisor. Since accurate information regarding on-the-job training time is difficult to obtain, we could not collect these data in this limited survey. The initial training reported by the men was consistent with the description given to us by their management, but usually the men reported somewhat less training than did the management. This may be because employees hired a few years ago received less training.

The men themselves felt that their present training was inadequate; only 25 percent were satisfied with the amount they currently receive and less than 1 percent felt that they received too much. Details are presented in Table 54. Union members reported particularly strong feelings; only 15 percent felt training was adequate.

Table 54

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: OPINIONS ON THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT TRAINING

Percent Reporting Opinion on Initial Training	Percent Reporting Opinion on On-the-Job Training	Opinion
25	28	Adequate
0	0	Too much
43	51	Not enough
3	2	Material covered was not relevant to duties and job
0	0	Other

The respondents most often suggested job-related security procedures and the employee's legal powers as the topics that should be covered more extensively in training programs. Other suggested topics we listed in Table 55.

Table 55

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL TRAINING TOPICS

<u>Percent Suggesting</u>	<u>Topic</u>
22	Job-related security procedures
19	Legal powers
15	First aid
14	Fire control
11	Firearms
8	Self-defense
7	Company policy

Firearms Training

Although 49 percent of the men carry firearms, only 19 percent had received any firearms training on his present job. Their sources of previous firearms training are indicated in Table 56.

Table 56

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: FIREARMS TRAINING

<u>Percent Trained</u>	<u>Source of Training</u>
18	None
19	Training given me on this job
12	Training on previous security job
51	Training in the military
9	Training from a prior public police job
45	Self-taught from hunting and personal experience
14	Hobby is firearms
2	Other

Retraining

One-half of the respondents said they received no periodic in-service training. As indicated in Table 57, the most frequently used method of retraining is to issue bulletins periodically to employees. Note that only 10 percent receive periodic firearms range training, while 49 percent are armed with guns!

Table 57

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: RETRAINING

<u>Percent</u>	<u>Method of Retraining</u>
50	None
34	Yes, supervisor instructs me while I work
6	Yes, I attend periodic formal classes
37	Yes, I receive training bulletins
2	Yes, I receive firearms range training every 12 months
6	Yes, I receive firearms range training every 6 months
2	Yes, I receive firearms range training every 2 months

A majority of the respondents felt they should receive additional in-service training on a regular basis. The topics most often suggested were new procedures and firearms. Table 58 provides additional suggestions.

Table 58

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: SUGGESTED RETRAINING TOPICS

<u>Percent Suggesting</u>	<u>Topic</u>
24	New procedures
19	Firearms
18	First aid
16	Legal powers
16	Fire control
10	Investigation
7	Public relations
7	No recommendations

Weapons

Over half of all contract personnel and over half of all in-house personnel carry a firearm on the job at least 25 percent of the time. In contrast, only 19 percent of the union members surveyed were armed with guns. Overall, 48 percent of the respondents carried firearms at least one-quarter of the time; 40 percent carried them *all* the time.

However, one-third of the respondents felt that it was not necessary for them to carry firearms on duty. If they were not allowed to

carry a firearm, only 35 percent would want a police baton, only 28 percent would want a chemical spray, only 12 percent would want a sap or blackjack, and *one-third* said they *would not need any weapon*.

Supervision

Two-thirds of the respondents reported seeing their supervisor hourly or daily, but 22 percent see him only once or twice a week, 13 percent see him only once or twice a month, and a few (2 percent) see him only every few months. In a majority of the cases the supervisor just drops by for a few minutes occasionally to see how the employee is faring. However, in one-quarter of the cases, the supervisor spends 3 or more hours a week with the employee.

One-third reported that their supervisor does not give them training on a regular basis. Seventeen percent said he gave them regular training (15 percent felt he did it well). Yet half said that regular training was only to advise on change of policy.

Sixty-one percent felt that their supervisor had the necessary knowledge and training for his position; but 16 percent felt he did not, and 23 percent said they were not able to make the evaluation.

About 75 percent of the respondents indicated they felt that management trusted their judgment; 12 percent said management did not, and 17 percent did not know how management felt.

Instructions to Employees on Arrest, Search, and Use of Force

One-quarter of the respondents had been told *never to arrest* anyone. One-third had been told *never to search* anyone. And three-quarters had been told never to use force, except to protect themselves or some other person. Contract agencies are more apt to place such restrictions on the men than are in-house security organizations. From such prohibitions on arrest and search, we infer that management feels that the employees could not be trusted to exercise discretion. Several security executives indicated to us that such orders are issued sometimes to attempt to prevent incidents that might lead to law suits.

Knowledge of Legal Authority to Arrest, Search, and Use Force

One section of our survey questionnaire was a test covering the employee's knowledge of his legal authority.* While knowledge requirements will vary from job to job, certain very basic concepts of legal authority should have been understood by every employee that we surveyed. Otherwise, inadvertant abuses of authority are inevitable. The powers and limitations regarding arrest, search, and the use of force are clear in certain circumstances; our questions concerned some of those circumstances.**

For answers that clearly could be classified as either correct or incorrect, we considered the possible consequences of an error. If the error could lead to action from which serious criminal or civil liability could result, we considered the error a *major* one; there are 20 such major errors possible in our questionnaire. Other possible incorrect answers were considered *minor*; they totaled 24. While we expected that inadequately trained security personnel would be error-prone, we were surprised at the extremely large number of errors. And these men were typically better educated than most security personnel. As we indicated in Table 46, the average respondent made 10.6 total errors (out of a possible 44) and made an *average of 3.6 major errors (out of a possible 20) that could have led to civil or criminal charges. Over 97 percent of the respondents made at least one such major error.*

We began the series of test questions by asking each respondent how well he *thought* he knew his legal authority to detain, arrest, search, and use force. Twenty-five percent said they knew "very well," 34 percent said "fairly well," 23 percent were "somewhat unsure," and 18 percent admitted they did not know their legal powers.

Six percent thought that their legal powers were the same as those of a public policeman; this was considered a major error, since the security employees we surveyed had only the (lesser) authority of a

* See R-872-DOJ for a description of the legal authority of private police.

** Refer to Section III of Appendix D of this report for the questions posed.

private citizen. Another 22 percent were not sure if their powers were less than those of a public policeman. Seventy-one percent correctly knew that their powers were less than those of a public policeman.

When asked to compare their legal powers to those of a private citizen, 2 percent thought private security personnel possessed greater legal powers; this was considered a major error. Fifteen percent were unsure, 33 percent said their powers were greater than those of other citizens while on duty and/or in uniform, and 48 percent correctly knew that their legal powers were not greater than those of any other citizen.

The personnel were asked about the legality of an arrest "when you have reasonable cause to believe that the person [arrested] committed a felony." Only 22 percent correctly knew that the arrest would be legal *only if in fact a felony has been committed*. Eight percent thought it would always be a legal arrest; this was considered a major error. Twenty-three percent thought it would be a legal arrest only if in fact *some* crime (a felony or a misdemeanor) had been committed; this was considered a major error, since private citizens may not arrest for certain misdemeanors. Ten percent said all of the answers presented were wrong (including the correct one). One-third of the respondents admitted they were unsure which answer was correct.

Since the legality of an arrest or use of force depends on whether the alleged act is a felony or a misdemeanor, we asked the men to select the misdemeanors from an assorted list of noncriminal acts, misdemeanors, and felonies (citizens have greater powers with respect to felonies). The security officers, in general, did not appear to be able to distinguish felonies from misdemeanors, and some could not even distinguish crimes from noncriminal acts. Sixteen percent thought a (felony) theft of \$250 was a misdemeanor. Only 47 percent correctly thought it was a misdemeanor if "a person you ask to stop for questioning hits you with his fist and then runs away;" since respondents who thought this was not a misdemeanor probably thought it was a felony (thus mistakenly thinking they have greater legal authority than they actually possess), we considered it a major error

if this answer was not marked.* Only 75 percent correctly knew that trespassing was a misdemeanor. Seventy percent knew loitering was a misdemeanor. Eleven percent thought arson was a misdemeanor. Sixty percent thought intoxication was a misdemeanor. Forty-five percent thought a pickpocket's theft of a wallet was a misdemeanor. But, 31 percent thought that someone who "called them a 'pig'" was committing a misdemeanor; since this act is not a crime and the security officer who thinks it is a crime might take action as if it were, we considered this a major error. Fourteen percent thought tapping a telephone was a misdemeanor. Finally, 41 percent incorrectly thought drinking alcoholic beverages on the job against company policy was a crime.

The respondents were asked to indicate when they would use *deadly force or force likely to cause serious injury* to a person. Seventeen percent said they would use it if necessary, to arrest any felony crime suspect. Since the use of such force incident to an arrest is not justified for certain felony property crimes, this response too was considered a major error. Two percent would use such force to arrest any misdemeanor crime suspect; this was considered a major error. Six percent would use such force to prevent *any* damage to property; this also was considered a major error, since minor damage to property does not carry with it the privilege to use deadly force or force likely to cause serious injury to the person. Twenty percent would use such force to prevent extensive property damage. Fifty-five percent would use it to prevent serious bodily harm to someone. Seventy-five percent would use such force if someone's life were in danger, but six percent would never use force likely to cause serious injury or death.

Two-thirds of the respondents did not know it was legal for a person to resist an *unlawful* arrest being made by a private security guard. This was considered a major error.

One-quarter thought that force that may cause serious bodily injury may be used to complete any felony arrest if the suspect would otherwise escape. This was considered a major error, since, as

* Only 4 percent of the respondents skipped this section of the questionnaire.

we indicated earlier, such force cannot be used for all types of felony-crime arrests.

Twenty percent incorrectly thought any arrest made in "good faith," where no one is injured, could not lead to civil or criminal charges against the private security employee. This was considered a major error.

One-third thought that if they *suspect* that a person has committed a felony, they may use reasonable force to detain him for questioning. Since mere suspicion does not create the privilege to use force, this too was considered a major error.

With respect to search, 7 percent thought they could search a suspect before they arrest him, to ascertain whether they have enough evidence for an arrest. This was considered a major error.

Only 45 percent knew that laws governing the action of public police officers with regard to search, seizure, and interrogation do not generally apply to private security personnel. One-third admitted they were not sure of the answers to these questions.

Reactions of Security Employees to Hypothetical Situations

Six situations were presented to each respondent, along with an array of possible answers for each situation. The percentage responding to each possible answer is presented below.

1. THE MANAGER OF THE BUSINESS YOU ARE PROTECTING APPROACHES YOU AND INFORMS YOU THAT COMPANY PROPERTY VALUED AT \$250.00 IS MISSING AND HE SUSPECTS THAT JOHN DOE TOOK IT. HE WANTS YOU TO ARREST DOE. WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

- a. 2% Arrest John Doe immediately
- b. 23% Physically detain John Doe and call the police immediately so they can arrest him when they arrive
- c. 60% Tell the boss you can't make a legal arrest based only on what he has told you
- d. 12% Other (specify) _____
[5% would tell the boss to call the police]
[4% would call the police but not detain]

Mere second-hand suspicions do not justify an arrest here. Marking (a) is considered a major error. Marking (b) is also a major error, since the security officer justifiably could be charged with false arrest.

2. SUPPOSE YOU WERE WORKING IN A CAR AS A ROVING PATROLMAN IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA. THE NEIGHBORHOOD HAS CONTRACTED WITH YOUR EMPLOYER FOR YOUR SERVICES. WHILE ON PATROL ONE NIGHT, YOU OBSERVE A CAR DRIVING VERY SLOWLY DOWN THE STREET. YOU HAVE NEVER SEEN THIS CAR THERE BEFORE, ALTHOUGH YOU HAVE WORKED THIS SAME AREA FOR OVER A YEAR. WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

- a. 9% Stop the car and question the driver
- b. 79% Write down the car license number and driver description
- c. 39% Notify the public police
- d. 2% Do nothing about the car
- e. 0 Other (specify) _____

Since the private patrolman would have no right to stop and detain the car, marking (a) is considered a major error. We note that all the respondents who worked for the patrol agency marked (b).

3. SUPPOSE YOU ARE A SECURITY OFFICER WORKING IN A RETAIL STORE AND YOU *SUSPECT* SOMEONE HAS CONCEALED AN ARTICLE ON HIS PERSON WITHOUT PAYING FOR IT. WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

- a. 2% Approach him immediately and arrest him for shoplifting
- b. 24% Arrest him after he leaves the building
- c. 56% After the person leaves the store, ask him if he has forgotten to pay for something
- d. 6% Nothing
- e. 5% Take the person to the back room and search him
- f. 0 Other (specify) _____

[3% would follow company policy]

[2% would call the police]

Since "suspicion" would not justify an arrest, marking (a) or (b) is considered a major error. Nor would mere suspicion justify "taking"

the person to the back room and searching him. It is interesting to note that the majority of the respondents who worked for the retail security force would do "nothing."

4. SUPPOSE YOU SUSPECT SOMEONE OF STEALING PROPERTY FROM THE PLACE WHERE YOU ARE WORKING AND CONCEALING IT IN HIS CAR. WOULD YOU SEARCH HIS CAR?
 - a. 4% Yes
 - b. 3% Yes, but only if I have first made an arrest
 - c. 42% Yes, but only if I have the suspect's written or witnessed oral permission
 - d. 29% Yes, but only with my supervisor's permission
 - e. 22% No
 - f. Other (specify) _____
[1% would only if employees were subject to search by reason of a signed agreement at the time of employment]
[1% would only if the police were present]

5. SUPPOSE YOU ARE WORKING AS A GUARD CHECKING EMPLOYEES IN AND OUT OF THE PLANT AND ONE COMES TO WORK OBVIOUSLY DRUNK. WHAT WOULD YOU DO?
 - a. 35% Let him in, but call his immediate supervisor and let him know the man is coming into the plant drunk
 - b. 2% Immediately call the police and have the drunk arrested
 - c. 12% Tell the drunk to get back in his car and go home
 - d. 45% Prevent the drunk from entering the building, using whatever force is necessary and call my supervisor to help handle the situation
 - e. 7% Other (specify) _____
[5% would call supervisor but not use force]
[1% would do nothing]
[1% would call a cab]

6. IF AN EMPLOYEE OF THE PLANT OR BUILDING WHERE YOU WORK BREAKS A COMPANY RULE, LIKE DRINKING ON COMPANY PROPERTY, WHAT WOULD YOU DO?
 - a. 4% Advise the offender of the company rule, tell him not to do it again, and nothing else because we all violate rules occasionally

- b. 49% Notify the man's supervisor or management
- c. 10% Make him come with me to see his supervisor
- d. 46% Advise the offender of the company rule and notify my supervisor of the incident
- e. 3% I would do nothing. Enforcing company rules and regulations is not part of my duties
- f. 2% Other (specify) _____
[2% would notify the guard supervisor]

Relations with the Public Police

The majority of the respondents have contact with the public police in connection with their job only once or twice a year. The frequency distribution of contact is described in Table 59.

Table 59

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PUBLIC POLICE

<u>Percent</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
6	Daily
7	Once or twice a week
14	Once or twice a month
30	Once or twice a year
27	Never
15	When necessary

The respondents' attitude to the public police was generally positive. Three-quarters felt that the public police were helpful when called, 10 percent thought the public police were sometimes helpful, but 12 percent indicated that public police "think they are superior to private security personnel." Only 5 percent felt they were "not around when needed" and "take their time arriving."

The private security respondents' interpretation of the typical public policeman's attitude is generally positive too. Only 22 percent felt that the public police are indifferent to private security workers, while 12 percent felt that the public police looked down on private personnel.

With respect to crime and arrests, 40 percent of the respondents felt that the public police would like private personnel "not to bother them"; i.e., "for them to handle most of the problems without calling the public police." Another 25 percent thought that the public police would like them to make fewer arrests, letting the public police make them themselves. Only 7 percent felt that the public police would like them to make more arrests.

Finally, central station alarm personnel were asked what they would do if they arrived at the scene of an alarm before the public police. Most of these personnel clearly see themselves as "alarm technicians" and would leave apprehension of suspects to the public police. Forty-two percent would check the exterior of the premises and wait. Thirty percent would also check the interior of the premises but would make no attempt to apprehend a suspect. Only 13 percent would "make every effort" to apprehend possible criminals.

Views of the Attitudes of the Public and Nonsecurity Employees

Only a minority (40 percent) of the private security respondents thought that the public's attitude toward them was favorable. Forty-three percent thought the public was indifferent to them, but only 7 percent felt that the public "looked down" on private security workers.

The private security employees' interpretation of nonsecurity employees' attitudes toward them was slightly more polarized. Fifty percent thought that nonsecurity employees viewed them favorably, but 10 percent felt that they were "looked down upon."

Handling of Crime Incidents

Almost all respondents felt that each case should be handled on its own merits. However, 7 percent indicated that all suspects should be prosecuted to the "full extent of the law." Only 1 percent felt criminals were victims of circumstance and should be treated leniently.

The 275 respondents reported a combined total of 1,788 arrests in the course of their present employment. However, all of the arrests were made by only 38 of the respondents, and most (1,307 arrests) were

made by 12 men working in a retail-store chain. (One retail security officer reported making 450 arrests himself.) Excluding the retail-store arrests, a total of 481 arrests were made by 26 men. Thus, the average responding retail-store officer had made 109 arrests, while the average nonretail security respondent averaged only 1.8 arrests. The arrests reported most frequently were for theft, forgery, burglary, robbery, and assaults.

Force was used by a total of 25 respondents in only 132 of the 1,788 arrests; i.e., the men reported that they had used force in only 7 percent of their arrests. We note that of these 132 cases, 76 were reported by retail-store officers, and another 39 were reported by central station alarm respondents.

However, in another 165 cases, 38 private security officers reported using force to detain someone "for questioning or for the police to arrest later." (The retail-store officers accounted for only 5 of these cases.)

In handling crime incidents, 25 percent of the respondents reported *never* feeling unsure of their actions. (In light of the errors made in response to this survey, they are clearly ignorant of the potential for abuse of authority.) Thirty-three percent were rarely unsure, 20 percent were sometimes unsure, and 10 percent said they were usually unsure of their actions when handling crime incidents.

Our survey indicates that private security personnel may encounter and have to deal with incidents involving criminal activity as often as once every 1.5 weeks, on the average. Of the 275 security personnel we surveyed, 120 reported specific frequencies with which they encountered incidents involving criminal activity in the past year. Such incidents (4,546 in all) were reported at an *annual rate of 16 per man surveyed, or 38 per man reporting*, on the average. However, the number of criminal incidents encountered depended strongly on the type of work performed by the security officer. The incident rate for retail-store security officers averaged 133 per officer surveyed, or 193 per officer reporting incident frequencies. The annual rates for nonretail security personnel were considerably lower: 11 per man surveyed, and 25 per man reporting incident frequencies. A listing of the crime-related incidents encountered by the respondents is given in Table 60.

Table 60

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: TYPES OF CRIME ENCOUNTERED

<u>Percent of Respondents Encountering Incidents</u>	<u>Crime-Related Incidents Encountered</u>
29	Theft
10	Burglary
6	Crimes against vehicles
6	Drunks
5	Forgery
3	Holdups
2	Trespassing
2	Assault
2	Drug violation
2	Vandalism

Almost half of the security employees surveyed are not called for certain types of criminal incidents. Thefts by employees of the company were the crimes cited most often as being handled by the private rather than the public justice systems. Other nonreported crimes are listed in Table 61.

Table 61

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: TYPES OF CRIME NOT REPORTED TO THE PUBLIC POLICE

<u>Percent of Respondents Encountering Incidents</u>	<u>Crime-Related Incidents Not Reported</u>
3	Misdemeanors without "good" evidence
7	Minor misdemeanor
28	Employee theft
4	Minor shoplifting
8	Drunks and fighting

CASES OF ABUSE OF AUTHORITY BY PRIVATE SECURITY EMPLOYEES

We asked each of the 275 private security employees surveyed if he or his fellow security employees ever overstepped their authority. We expected most respondents to be hesitant in answering honestly. Also, certain incidents probably would not be reported because most respondents did not know accurately their legal powers and tended to overestimate their authority. Thus, the frequency of abuse of authority indicated by the responses is viewed as the lower limit on the true frequency.

When asked if they had "ever seen any private security employee overstepping his authority in handling an incident (for example, by using too much force, by searching someone when he should not have, or by committing other illegal acts)," 72 percent said no, 22 percent said yes, and 6 percent did not answer the question. Three percent had seen an abuse only once, 14 percent had seen abuses a few times, and fully 4 percent had seen abuses many times. The unionized security workers sent their responses directly to union headquarters rather than to Rand and may have been more honest in their responses. *Thirty-one percent reported seeing abuses by security workers, and 7 percent reported seeing such abuses many times.* We view the data above as indicative of widespread abuses in the private security industry.

Approximately 40 percent of the abuses described to us by the security employees involved use of excessive force. About 30 percent of the cases involved improper detention or false arrests. A smaller fraction involved improper searches. One to three cases of each of the following types of abuse were reported: issuing parking tickets, falsifying evidence, using abusive language, defamation, and impersonation of public police officers.

A total of 33 respondents (12 percent of the total) reported to us that someone had complained about their actions but had not threatened to sue. The security officer's description of the incident almost always indicated that the complaint was not an abuse in our meaning of the term. Usually the complaints concerned denying entrance to private property, enforcing company rules strictly, and so on.

Each respondent also was asked if he or his company had ever been threatened with a law suit because of his actions on the job. Eight men (2.9 percent of our sample of 275) responded affirmatively, but only two (0.7 percent) had actually been sued. The cases allegedly involved (1) illegally searching a handbag and car without permission, (2) false arrest, (3) assault and battery, (4) use of excessive force, (5) improper detention, and (6) false arrest. The remaining two cases were not described to us.

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING PRIVATE POLICE

The 275 private security employees were asked how they would improve the private security force in which they work. Their responses were in essay form, and a gratifying 75 percent of them offered suggestions. The most frequent suggestion, made by 40 percent of the respondents, was for better training. Higher wages, better-quality personnel, and better supervision also ranked high. Other suggestions are summarized in Table 62.

Table 62

EMPLOYEE SURVEY: SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING PRIVATE POLICE

<u>Percent</u> <u>Recommending</u>	<u>Recommendation</u>
40	Better training
27	Higher wages
15	Better-quality personnel
11	Better supervision
11	Improve communication with security management
7	Increased fringe benefits
5	More legal authority
5	Increased manpower
3	More equipment
2	Advancement opportunities
2	Better public relations
2	Strict enforcement of security regulations
2	Two-man patrol cars
2	Younger men
1	Training for management
1	Nicer uniforms
1	Better relations with public police
1	More government regulation
28	No recommendations

Appendix A

LISTING OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES OF SECURITY OFFICERS

This Appendix contains the complete listing of occupational titles as prepared by the Bureau of the Census for the five categories relevant to this study (categories 851, 852, 853, 854, and 860).^{*} Within each category we have grouped occupational titles under three sub-categories where appropriate: public security, private security, and special non-crime related public and private jobs.

GUARDS, WATCHMEN, AND DOORKEEPERS (CATEGORY 851)

Private Security Workers

Alarm investigator--miscellaneous business services industry
Armed guard
Attendant--art gallery
Attendant--museum
Bodyguard
Bouncer--eating and drinking establishment
Bouncer--miscellaneous entertainment and recreational service
industry
Camp guard
Captain of guards
Doortender--any industry except theaters, mining, and manufacturing
Floorman--banking and credit industry
Floorman--miscellaneous entertainment and recreation industry,
except game parlors
Gate guard
Gateman--all industries except mining and transportation
Gatetender--all industries except mining, electric light and power,
other nonspecified utilities, and industries providing services
incidental to transportation

* Material digested from 1960 *Census of Population, Classified Index of Occupations and Industries*, and 1960 *Census of Population, Alphabetical Index of Occupations and Industries*, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Gate watchman
Golf-course ranger
Guard--all industries except street railways and bus lines
Guard operator--miscellaneous business services industry
Houseman--miscellaneous entertainment and recreational services
industry
Investigator--burglar and fire alarm service
Maritime guard
Messenger--armored-car service
Patrolman--railroads and railway express service
Patrolman--street railways and bus lines
Patrolman--insurance
Plant guard
Plant patrolman
Plant protection guard
Plant protection man
Plant protection officer
Plant protection supervisor
Plant protector
Plant security guard
Police guard--miscellaneous business services industry
Private watchman
Roundsman--railroads and railway express service
Roundsman--petroleum refining industry
Roundsman--electric light and power industry
Salvage-corps man--insurance industry
Security guard--manufacturing industry
Shipkeeper
Timber watchman
Truck guard--armored-car service
Watchman--except city police department
Woods warden--logging industry

Public Security Workers

Convict guard
Correction officer
Cottage master--state reformatory
Cottage parent--state reformatory
Cottage supervisor--state reformatory
Deputy--city jail
Gang pusher--state prison
Government guard
Hall tender--public administration
Housefather--state reformatory
Housekeeper--state reformatory
Housemother--state reformatory
Houseparent--state reformatory
Jail guard
Matron--city police department
Park guard
Patrol mother--city police department
Police matron
Prison guard
Range rider--federal public administration
Reformatory attendant
Security officer--Immigration and Naturalization Service
Supervisor of police--federal public administration
Turnkey

Special Public and Private Non-Crime-Related Workers

Custodial officer
Custodial--service worker
Escalator attendant
Escalator operator
Fire guard--manufacturing industry, except logging
Fireman--insurance industry
Fire patrol--manufacturing industry
Fire warden--logging industry
Fire watchman--manufacturing industry

Lifeguard
Patrol fireman--privately employed

MARSHALS AND CONSTABLES (CATEGORY 852)

Public Security Workers

City constable
City marshal
Constable--public administration
Marshal--public administration (except fire department)
Peace officer--public administration
Town marshal

POLICEMEN AND DETECTIVES (CATEGORY 853)

Private Security Workers

Dance hall supervisor--private employer
Doorshaker--miscellaneous business services industry
Floorwalker--hotel and lodging places
House detective
House officer--hotel and lodging places
Intelligence man--retail trade
Investigator--private detective agency
Manager--private detective agency
Merchant patrolman
Merchant police
Patrolman--miscellaneous business services industry
Private detective
Private eye
Private investigator
Proprietor--detective agency
Railroad detective
Railroad patrolman
Sergeant--railroads and railway express services
Special investigator--detective agency
Special patrolman--patrol service
Store detective--retail trade

Public Security Workers

Agent--FBI
Alarm operator--city police department
Attendant--safety lane
Captain--city police department
Captain--county police department
Captain--state police department
Chief--city police department
Chief of harbor patrol
Chief of police
City detective
Communication officer--city police
Communication officer--state police
Cop
Criminal investigator--public administration
Dance hall supervisor--government
Desk man--city police department
Desk officer--city police department
Desk sergeant--local public administration
Detective
FBI special agent
Fingerprinter--police department
Fingerprint man--police department
Harbor-patrol policeman
Homicide investigator--local public administration
Inspector--city police department
Inspector, police--public administration
Investigator--Secret Service
Law-enforcement officer--local public administration
Lieutenant--city police department
Lieutenant--county police department
Lieutenant--state police department
Meter maid--city police department
Motorcycle policeman
Mounted policeman

Narcotics agent--federal public administration
Narcotics investigator--federal public administration
Officer--city police department
Park officer
Patrol driver--local public administration
Patrolman--public administration
Patrol officer--U.S. Customs
Penal officer--state public administration
Plain-clothes man--local public administration
Police captain
Police chief
Police lieutenant
Policeman
Police officer
Police sergeant
Police superintendent
Policewoman
Police worker
Private--city police department
Private--county police department
Private--state police department
Radio-division officer--state public administration
Radio-division officer--local public administration
Ranger--state police
Roundsman--public administration
Safety patrol officer
Secret Service man
Security policeman--harbor patrol
Sergeant--city police department
Sergeant--county police department
Sergeant--state police department
Signal operator--city police department
Special agent--U.S. Treasury Department
Special investigator--FBI
Special officer

Special policeman
State trooper
Superintendent--city police department
Traffic officer
Treasury agent
Trooper
Underground man--U.S. Department of Justice
Watchman--city police department

Special Public and Private Non-Crime-Related Workers

Chauffeur--city police department

SHERIFFS AND BAILIFFS (CATEGORY 854)

Public Security Workers

Bailiff
City bailiff
County bailiff
Court bailiff
Court officer
County sheriff
Process server--public administration
Sergeant-at-arms--city court
Sergeant-at-arms--county court
Sergeant-at-arms--federal court
Sergeant-at-arms--state court
Sheriff
Special deputy sheriff
Tipstaff
Undersheriff

CROSSING WATCHMEN AND BRIDGE TENDERS (CATEGORY 860)

Special Public and Private Non-Crime-Related Workers

Bridge leverman--railroads and rail express service
Bridgeman--transportation services
Bridgeman--ferry boat

Bridge opener--transportation
Bridge operator--transportation
Bridge tender--transportation
Collector--transportation services
Crossing flagman--railroads and rail express service
Crossing gateman--railroads and rail express service
Crossing guard--school--government
Crossing tender--railroads and rail express service
Crossing tender--street railways and bus lines
Crossing watchman--railroads and rail express service
Crossing watchman--street railways and bus lines
Drawbridge operator
Drawbridge tender
Draw operator--transportation services
Draw tender--railroads and rail express service
Flagman--street railways and bus lines
Flagman--sugar plantation
Gate operator--railroads and rail express service
Gate tender--transportation services
Patrol lady--school crossing
Railroad watchman
School-crossing guard--local government
School patrol--city government--government
School-traffic guard--city traffic department--government
Tender--bridge
Toll-bridge operator
Toll-gate keeper
Toll-gate tender

Appendix B

GSA FEDERAL GUARDS HANDBOOK

General Services
Administration

September 14, 1970

PBS P 5930.2A

CHAPTER 9. THE GSA GUARD

PART 1. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This publication is addressed to you, the GSA guard. Its purpose is to furnish you with basic information and instructions relative to the performance of your duties. It is a guide to you, your employment and training, as a guard or United States Special Policeman.
2. Applicability. This publication applies to all GSA employees (and to contract employees) who, in the performance of their duties, are responsible for the protection of GSA-controlled properties and personnel against the hazards of fire, accident, theft, trespass, civil disturbances, and sabotage, and are charged with maintaining order on public premises.
3. Authority. This publication is authorized by the GSA Physical Protection Handbook, PBS P 5930.2A, and is contained in the handbook as chap. 9. When additional information is desired, ask your supervisor to let you see the complete handbook.
4. The GSA guard. You are a uniformed civil servant who, by effectively performing your duties, contributes to the accomplishment of buildings operations. You perform a variety of duties which are outlined in part 3. Many of a guard's duties relate to people, and in performing your duties, your conduct, bearing, personal appearance, and association with the public must be such that you will be recognized as a responsible GSA employee who can capably carry out the requirements of your position.
5. Responsibility. It is your responsibility as a guard or U.S. Special Policeman to become thoroughly familiar with the contents of this publication and to carry it on your person at all times while on duty.
- 6 and 7. Reserved.

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PART 2. ORGANIZATION

8. Organization. The organization of the guard force is divided into line and staff operations. These operations and related supervisory channels are described as follows:

a. Line supervision. Guards are generally under the direction and supervision of a Buildings Manager in charge of a field office. A major exception is Region 3 in the Metropolitan Washington area where guards are supervised and directed by a Central Protection Force. This area incorporates Washington, DC, Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties in Maryland, Arlington and Fairfax Counties in Virginia, and the city of Alexandria, Virginia.

b. Staff supervision. In the regional offices, the Protection Branch (Protection Division in Region 3) is the staff office that plans, develops, and administers regional protection programs, including surveys of field operations. Members of the Branch also provide technical advice to regional office officials, field office managers, occupant agencies, and maintain liaison with law enforcement agencies.

c. Organization chart. To more clearly define the protection organization and the guard force, figure 9-8 is a chart which shows the line of authority. Changes in the organization must be approved by the Central Office.




Figure 9-8. Organization Chart

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9. Qualifications. Guards qualify for their positions under standards established by the Civil Service Commission.

10. Desirable attributes.

- a. Ability to learn and apply regulations and guidelines.
- b. Ability to be firm in applying protection procedures, methods, and techniques.
- c. Skill in the use of firearms.
- d. Physical fitness necessary to discharge assigned duties and responsibilities.
- e. Alertness.
- f. Tact and courtesy.
- g. Integrity.
- h. Possession of a valid drivers license and safe driving record.

11. The guard's function. GSA guards are full-time uniformed employees assigned to protect Federal facilities and personnel against the hazards of fire, damage, accident, thefts, trespass, sabotage, and espionage; to maintain law and order; and to enforce regulations.

12. Ranks of guards. A fully staffed guard organization is composed of captain(s), lieutenant(s), sergeant(s) and private(s), in sufficient numbers to provide reasonable guard protection under adequate supervision. (Region 3 is authorized the additional ranks of major and inspector.) When a facility or group of facilities in a field office does not require full staffing in all ranks, supervisory channels may be changed or adjusted. The overall protection duties and responsibilities, however, shall remain the same. The basic duties and responsibilities set forth below are typical of GSA guard operations in each rank.

- a. Major. (Section not reproduced.)

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b. Inspectors. (Section not reproduced.)

c. Captain. (Section not reproduced.)

d. Lieutenant. A guard lieutenant is under the general supervision of a guard captain except when the lieutenant is the highest ranking officer assigned to a field office or facility. When a lieutenant is the highest ranking officer, his duties and responsibilities are the same as those of a captain. When under the supervision of a captain, the lieutenant generally serves as the officer in charge of one of three reliefs of duty, with the direct supervision of guard sergeants and overall supervision of the guards on his relief. He carries out the orders and instructions of the captain and, in his absence, acts for the captain; assigns guards on his relief; makes daily inspections; trains sergeants, to act in his place during his absence; advises the captain of unusual happenings; acts as rating officer for subordinates; and remains within his area of responsibility until properly relieved, advising his headquarters of his whereabouts at all times while on duty.

e. Sergeant. A guard sergeant is under the direct supervision of a lieutenant except in an instance when circumstances cause him to be the highest ranking officer assigned to a field office or facility. In the latter case his duties and responsibilities are the same as a captain or lieutenant, as the situation indicates. When under the supervision of a lieutenant, he exercises direct supervision over guard privates within his area of coverage. He carries out the orders and instructions of the lieutenant and, in his absence, assumes his authority and responsibilities; makes guard and building inspections; advises his superior of

guard activities and unusual events; trains privates to act for him in his absence; evaluates the performance of guards under his jurisdiction; and maintains contact with his headquarters, remaining within his area of responsibility until properly relieved.

f. Private. A guard private is under the immediate supervision of a sergeant. His job is to protect the building or buildings and grounds to which he is assigned, including the contents, occupants, and visitors. He makes patrols as assigned; seeks out and takes immediate protective action against existing hazards or conditions which may cause damage, injury, or interference through fire, accident, theft, or trespass; reports such conditions or hazards by use of GSA Form 283, Notice of Work Required, when appropriate; enforces security regulations where applicable; handles lost and found articles; enforces rules and regulations governing the building; directs traffic; uses special police authority, when it is vested in him, to make arrests for cause, or, when no such authority exists, calls upon available law enforcement personnel to make necessary arrests; maintains order on his post and helps persons requiring assistance or information; observes good guarding practices and standards; and performs such other duties as are assigned.

g. Clark. A guard clerk functions under the direct supervision of the top guard supervisor. He may be either a private or a sergeant as determined by the extent of his duties. When his administrative assignment does not require his full time he performs other assigned duties. When on straight guard duty he is under the supervision of the officer in charge of the detail to which he is assigned. As general clerk to the top guard supervisor, maintains required administrative records; acts as custodian and recorder of equipment and supplies maintained by the office; prepares forms relative to incidents; accepts collateral from persons guilty of violations (when acting in this capacity the employee shall be bonded); prepares charge sheets and other documents relative to the processing of violations; informs the U.S. Magistrate of the number and types of violations scheduled for hearings; performs all other clerical requirements, and performs general guard duties as assigned.

13. Other types of guarding. In addition to the guarding provided by regular full-time GSA guards, protection is provided by employees known as combination guards, firefighter guards, and custodial, craft, and administrative personnel. A description of each is provided in the paragraph immediately following.

a. Combination guards. Combination guards are GSA employees who have been hired as guards, but who do not devote their full time to guarding. They are classified as guards according to Civil Service ratings and standards but they may be assigned part-time duties such as elevator operators, firemen, laborers, or other custodial type duties. When performing other than straight guarding assignments, they must apply themselves with the same degree of responsibility and application expected

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of full-time employees in these jobs. It is not essential that combination guards wear the complete uniform. However, during the performance of regular guard duties, such as patrols, manning fixed posts, etc., or when armed, they should wear insignia indicating they are authorized guards. These combination position personnel have the same duties, responsibilities, and powers while performing guard functions as GSA guards having straight guard duties. When dressed so that they can be identified as uniformed guards (such items of uniform to be not less than guard uniform cap with insignia, and visible GSA guard breast badges), they may be appointed, if required, as special policemen under the conditions set forth in par. 2, above.

b. Firefighter guards. Firefighter guards are GSA employees who are primarily firefighters, but who also have guard duties. They are trained both as firefighters and guards. They are hired, classified, and paid under the Civil Service Commission title of firefighters. They have the same duties, responsibilities, and powers as guards, and may be appointed special policemen if necessary. When so appointed, they will continue to wear the firefighters uniform and insignia, except for the breast badge which will identify them as GSA special policemen.

c. Custodial, craft, and administrative personnel. All such personnel are responsible for the protection of the property in the working area to which they are assigned. They are not given a formal course in guarding but are directed to report hazards noted to the guard on duty or to their own supervisors, and are advised as to immediate action to be taken in the event of fire or other emergency. They are not classified as guards, nor do they have the same duties, responsibilities, or powers as guards.

14 and 15. Reserved.

CHAP 9-13

PART 3. PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND UNIFORMS

(Section not reproduced.)

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PART 4. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND
WORK REQUIREMENTS

33. Information for employees. When you were employed by GSA, you were given an information booklet entitled "Information for Employees". This booklet provides valuable information on such subjects as how jobs are filled; how your pay is determined; health and safety; your training; your conduct; employee organizations; your leave benefits; the health benefits program; group life insurance; the civil service retirement system, and other information about which you may be concerned. Ask your supervisor to obtain a copy of the "Information for Employees" booklet for you if yours has been misplaced.

34. Conduct on the job. Each guard is expected to adhere to standards of behavior that reflect credit on the Federal Government. Guards must conduct themselves in such a manner that the work of GSA is effectively accomplished and must observe the requirements of courtesy, consideration, and promptness in dealing with or serving the public and employees or officials of Federal agencies.

35. Work requirements. In order that an organization can operate in an efficient and orderly manner, there must be regulations, procedures, and instructions. In the following paragraphs of this part of "The GSA Guard" are many of the requirements with which a guard is normally concerned.

a. Schedule. The working schedule for supervisors and guards are prepared and posted in work areas or locker rooms on a monthly basis. The schedules shall be prepared on GSA Form 1874, Hours of Duty Schedule. Changes to schedules shall be posted in work or locker areas 72 hours prior to the beginning of the workweek affected.

b. Contact relief. The duties of some guard posts require that a guard not leave his post until properly relieved. Where this is required, it is explicitly stated on the GSA Form 2580, Guard Post Assignment Record.

c. Lunch periods. A guard works a straight 8-hour tour of duty. He is authorized to eat his lunch during his tour of duty for a period not in excess of 30 minutes at a time to be determined by his supervisor. Lunch periods will be scheduled so as to least interfere with building protection requirements. During this lunch break the guard is officially on duty and subject to call.

d. Starting and stopping work. All guards shall be in uniform and ready to begin work promptly at the start of their relief and shall remain on the job and in full uniform until the end of their full tour of duty.

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36. Guard identification. The guard is issued an official identification pass, GSA Form 22, Employee Identification Credential--General. He must carry it on his person at all times. If it is lost, destroyed, or stolen, he must report the fact to his supervisor at once and submit a written report of all facts surrounding its loss.

37. Residence and telephone registration. Upon first reporting for duty you shall supply the guard supervisor with your home address and telephone number, or a telephone number at which you can be reached. Any change of address or telephone number must be reported within 24 hours. A current file of such information shall be maintained in each guard supervisor's office.

38. Emergency duty. Although the guard normally works certain regular hours, he may be called upon for emergency duties at times other than his regular duty hours. When in the vicinity of a building under GSA control in which a fire or other emergency occurs, he is expected to lend whatever assistance he can under the direction of the Buildings Manager or the responsible guard officers. When he is off duty during the time he lends this assistance, he should identify himself to the Building Manager, who will notify the regular guard supervisor of the time spent in coping with the emergency. Overtime payment or compensatory time off will be accorded if this emergency duty causes him to work in excess of 40 hours during any regular workweek.

39. Assignment procedures. (Section not reproduced.)

40. Relief assignments. (Section not reproduced.)

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41. Guard instructions. Instructions to guards may be verbal or written. Instructions or procedures other than those of an emergency nature should be in writing and filed in the Guard Desk Book. It is the responsibility of the guard supervisor on each relief to brief the supervisor of the on-coming relief on all new instructions in the Guard Desk Book and to review the Guard Operations Log.

42. Hours of duty. The guard works a straight 8-hour tour of duty which is referred to as a relief. The first relief is normally from midnight to 8 a.m.; the second relief from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.; and the third relief from 4 p.m. to midnight. Other reliefs may be established to meet operational needs. To properly carry out his responsibilities, the supervisor has, within certain limitations, the authority to schedule the working hours of his supervisory and operating forces to meet the demands of his workload.

43. Locker rooms and lockers. (Section not reproduced.)

44. Absence from work. Leave regulations, policies, and procedures may be procured from the guard supervisor. They explain the types of leave, the conditions under which each may be taken, and other procedures concerned with accrual and use of leave. These regulations are available to all guards and it is to the advantage of each guard to become thoroughly familiar with them. A few points of importance are listed here:

a. Annual leave. Annual leave must be asked for and approved in advance except in emergency.

b. Sickness. When a guard is absent because of sickness, he must notify his supervisor as early as practicable, and at least 1 hour in advance of his regular reporting time on the first day of absence.

c. Tardiness. Tardiness, except for emergencies beyond his control, will be grounds for disciplinary action.

d. Illness on duty. A guard must never leave his post without being properly relieved. If he becomes ill while on duty, he must notify his supervisor immediately, or have someone do it for him.

e. Contact information. Before going on leave, the guard if possible, should leave the phone number and address at which he can be reached during his leave.

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45. Jury duty. (Section not reproduced.)

46. Use of chairs. (Section not reproduced.)

47. Talking on duty. The guard must give his undivided attention to his job. When addressed, he shall answer courteously and correctly but he shall not enter into long or unnecessary conversations which will distract his attention from his responsibilities.

48. Reading and writing on duty. Reading, writing, and studying are not permitted while on duty, except as required in connection with the guard's duties, or during his scheduled rest periods.

49. Smoking and chewing on duty. (Section not reproduced.)

50. Sleeping on duty. Sleeping on duty is an extremely serious offense and will not be tolerated. Offenders will be subject to immediate administrative disciplinary action which extends to dismissal. The guard must be alert at all times and actively engaged in protecting the building for the entire period of his tour of duty.

51. Profanity. Profane language by guards will not be tolerated.

52. Use of intoxicants and narcotics. The use of intoxicants or narcotics while on duty is forbidden, and no guard will be permitted to enter on duty when under the influence of either. If a guard reports for duty after having taken either intoxicants or drugs, he will be considered unfit for duty if the supervisor is of the opinion that:

a. His breath smells of the intoxicant to such an extent that it can be noticed, and/or;

b. His physical or mental condition indicates that he is under the influence of an intoxicant or drug to such an extent that it is noticeable, and/or he is incapable of performing his duties properly.

53. Radios. Personal radios are not to be used on duty. Official radios will be used only in connection with operational requirements.

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54. Gambling. Gambling in any form while on duty or on GSA-controlled property is prohibited.
55. Lending or borrowing money. Guards are prohibited from lending or borrowing money from each other or from other persons on GSA-controlled property for the purpose of monetary profit. Supervisors are forbidden to borrow money from subordinate employees under any circumstances.
56. Misuse of badge or other evidence of authority. No guard shall display a badge or other evidence of authority at any place other than the area or location to which he is assigned for duty. Use of such evidence of authority for reasons not connected with official duties shall result in severe disciplinary action.
57. Vehicles - authority to operate. Usually all guards should be authorized to operate Government-owned motor vehicles. As Federal employees, guards are under the constant observation of taxpayers and are expected to obey traffic regulations, observe safety practices, and generally set a good example for fellow employees as well as the public. Before a guard is considered qualified to drive a Government vehicle, he must:
- a. Possess a current Standard Form 46, U.S. Government Motor Vehicle Operator's Identification Card, and a valid operator's permit issued by the official licensing agency for the area in which the guard is employed;
 - b. Be well-informed about his vehicle and the traffic laws;
 - c. Have sound knowledge of driving techniques; and
 - d. Observe proper driving courtesies.
58. Mechanical equipment - authority to operate. Guards are not permitted to operate mechanical equipment of any kind in the building, except that specifically authorized in these regulations or authorized by special written order or assignment.
59. Elevators - authority to operate. Only authorized persons, qualified by special training and holding a certification (GSA Form 375, Authorization for Part-Time Elevator Operation), are permitted to operate attendant-controlled elevators. Guards who have had this special training may be authorized to operate passenger and freight elevators for part-time or emergency duty. Whenever possible, guards should receive this training and special operating instructions for action in the event of fire or other emergency.
60. Inspection of building facilities and grounds. While making foot or motor patrols, the guard must be ever alert to detect things of an unusual

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nature such as the presence of unauthorized persons or vehicles, open fire or exit doors and gates, and safety and fire hazards (see part 11 and 12 for detailed information on safety and fire hazards).

61. Answering telephones. Telephone calls will be answered in a pleasant, businesslike manner. The guard should immediately name the location of the phone and give his name and rank, e.g., "Guard Office, 'X' Building, Sergeant Jones." He will not carry on unnecessary conversations nor will he use the guard telephone for other than official calls.

62. Requests for information. The major responsibility of the guard is to protect the facility, its contents, and its personnel. Much of his time, however, may be spent in areas where he has frequent contact with the public. The guard's manner must be pleasant and courteous and, when it does not interfere with his protection duties, he will assist visitors as follows:

- a. Help them to locate employees in the building;
- b. Advise as to which building facilities are open to the public;
- c. Provide general information as to the location of buildings, transportation facilities, etc.;
- d. Direct the visitor to where desired information may be available;
- e. Refer the visitor to the receptionist, information clerk, or other appropriate person of occupant agencies when questioned concerning the nature of the Agency's work. When questioned concerning GSA activities the guard should refer the visitor to the guard supervisor or to the Buildings Manager. He should not provide information on matters about which he is not positive or which involve the operations of any agency.

63. Interference with occupants and maintenance personnel. Guards will not interfere with the work of building employees or other people on authorized business. They shall, however, call attention to hazards and maintain order. They shall also ascertain that persons in the building after normal working hours are authorized to be there, and question any person engaged in what appears to be suspicious or unusual activity to be sure he is authorized to carry on such activity.

64. Unusual and difficult conditions. The guard must notify his supervisor as soon as possible concerning any unusual events or conditions. If he meets with a situation which appears too difficult for him to handle alone, he will ask his supervisor for assistance.

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65. Courtesy. A guard must be courteous, patient, helpful, and considerate. When asked to furnish his name, position, or badge number, he must do so politely and without hesitation.

66. Litter. Feeding birds from windows and other parts of buildings, failure to use refuse containers, and other untidy practices creates a cleaning problem. When the guard observes people deliberately and/or consistently creating litter, he is to report it to his supervisor.

67. Lost children. If the guard finds a child who is lost in the building or on the grounds, he shall try to learn his name and address. If able to get this information he will attempt to contact the parents immediately. If he is unable to get the child's name and address and/or reach the parents, he shall make arrangements promptly through the guard supervisor, to have the child taken to the local Receiving Home, Women's Bureau, or local police authorities.

68 thru 73. Reserved.

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PART 5. TYPICAL DUTIES

74. Typical duties. Typically, guards perform a variety of protective duties. Guards serve at fixed posts or patrol assigned areas on foot or by vehicle, enforcing pertinent laws and administrative rules and regulations such as "Rules and Regulations Governing Public Buildings and Grounds", traffic control, parking, and safety regulations. Guards carry out related duties such as driving emergency vehicles, detecting and reporting potential fire and accident hazards, making preliminary checks of violations, and preparing reports. Some guards perform "control desk" duties. They monitor various alarm systems and devices, telephone, and radio networks. These guards relay messages, maintain logs, and assist in dispatching men and equipment to meet emergency situations. It is the duty of the guard to enforce such other rules and regulations as are set forth in this publication, or made the subject of a GSA order, notice, memorandum, or other publications.

75. Types of guarding assignments. Listed below are descriptions of the usual types of guarding assignments and a brief description of the various duties performed. The duties of each guard post are described in detail on GSA Form 2580, Guard Post Assignment Record.

a. Fixed post. Guards at fixed posts are required to monitor security and fire protection systems and devices, operate communications equipment, and carry out any special orders as directed.

b. Entrance control post. Guards at entrance control posts are used to operate elevators, issue keys, accept registered mail and parcels, conduct necessary building patrols, open and control conference rooms, parking areas, etc., or operate and enforce a system of personnel identification.

c. Traffic control post. Guards utilized for this purpose direct traffic, control parking, issue parking tickets, etc. They must also have an operators license as required in par. 57.

d. Roving patrol post. Guards used for roving patrols are used to check parking areas, loading platforms, public entrances, and hazardous areas. A guard so utilized who is equipped with a radio is immediately available in the event of an emergency. Some of the more important duties on patrol are to:

(1) Check shop, locker, trash, boiler, and storage rooms, laboratories, machine areas, and other dangerous areas for fire; checking to see that materials that might spread fire have not been left close to boilers, stoves, hot pipes, etc., and that oily rags and flammable liquids

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that might cause spontaneous combustion are properly stored in metal containers.

(2) Check outside doors, windows, skylights, and other openings to prevent unauthorized entry and damage from weather. Building entrances are to be locked and unlocked, as directed.

(3) Turn off water outlets, fans, heaters, stoves, motors, machines, gluepots, soldering irons, coffeemakers, hotplates, etc., left on, unless there are specific directions to the contrary. Turn off lights.

(4) Correct or report tripping and other accident-causing hazards.

(5) Report unusual odors, especially smoke or gas. Burning wood, paper, rags, or overheated motors have their own distinctive odor.

(6) Note the general condition of fire extinguishers and other firefighting equipment, and when obstructed take corrective action or report condition to your supervisor.

(7) Check sprinkler control valves and other fire protection system controls to ascertain that they are in proper condition.

(8) Inspect safes, vaults, restricted or security areas as directed. When given the responsibility for checking specific safes, cabinets, or doors, the guard shall notify his supervisor and/or designated agency officials immediately when such is found unlocked. Instructions regarding those to be checked, and the action to be taken if found open, shall be maintained in the Guard Desk Book.

e. Security post. These posts are generally concerned with the protection of classified matters, and are established because of specific agency needs. Guards utilized on these assignments must obtain appropriate clearance and their duties are specified in detail by the requesting agency.

76 and 77. Reserved.

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PART 6. FIREARMS

78. Firearms. Revolvers, holsters, belts, and ammunition are issued, unless unusual circumstances exist, to guards who are capable of handling firearms and have passed the required test.

79. Use of the weapon. Guards armed with a revolver shall keep it holstered at all times except to fire in the line of duty, to transfer it to another authorized person, or to use during supervised training. It shall never be used to threaten, neither by removal from the holster, nor by making a movement toward it to give the impression that it will be used. When used in the line of duty it shall be fired only in extreme emergencies, and then only in actual defense of the guard's or another person's life. Mere belief that his or another person's life is in danger is not sufficient cause to fire at another person. The guard must be certain the situation is so serious, life is so greatly endangered, and the crime or attempted crime is of such magnitude, that he is confident that a jury would find him justified in shooting. Even when he is certain that all of these conditions exist, if to shoot would endanger the lives of innocent persons, he must hold his fire, sound an alarm, and pursue the criminal. If in doubt -- don't shoot.

80. Handling of the weapon. The revolver is a deadly weapon. The following are guides for handling the revolver while on duty. Range training rules will be provided by the supervisor or range officer.

a. Receiving the weapon. When accepting the weapon, check it to see if it is loaded. It should be offered to you unloaded with the cylinder lifted out of the frame. If it is not unlatched, release the cylinder latch, lift the cylinder out, and place your fingers through the frame so it cannot close. Eject the cartridges (if any), check the weapon, and reload with not more than five cartridges, leaving an empty chamber under the hammer. Never accept a loaded weapon.

b. Giving up the weapon. When transferring the weapon to another guard or turning it in to the guard office, release the cylinder, lift, do not swing, the cylinder free of the frame, and with cylinder still free, eject the cartridges and hand the weapon to the receiver. Never transfer a loaded weapon.

c. Refusal to accept the weapon. When the relief refuses to accept responsibility for the weapon and ammunition, immediately notify the guard supervisor. The supervisor will determine the reason and prepare a written report of the incident. A record shall also be made on GSA Form 1103, Guard Operations Log, which is located in the Guard Desk Book.

d. Safety precautions

- (1) Always check the weapon to see if it is loaded.
- (2) Never take anyone's word that the weapon is empty. Do not even trust your own memory.
- (3) Except for the purpose of firing, when the weapon is outside the holster the cylinder should be disengaged and lifted out of the frame.
- (4) When receiving any weapon, it should be checked with the finger off the trigger and the barrel pointed away from every one.
- (5) When receiving a weapon, remove the cartridges and check the barrel to be sure it is free of mud, heavy grease, cleaning patches, or other foreign matter. When loading, leave the chamber under the hammer empty and hammer offcock.
- (6) Never leave a loaded gun lying about where someone may pick it up.
- (7) Never place your finger on the trigger unless you intend to fire.
- (8) Never point the revolver at any one unless you intend to shoot.

81. Care of the weapon. Care of the revolver by a guard is restricted to keeping it clean and handling it with care and respect. Any gun in need of repair will be turned in to the guard supervisor for repair by a qualified gunsmith or by the maker. It is the responsibility of the guard to keep his weapon clean and lubricated and to handle it carefully. It is the responsibility of the guard supervisor to inspect the weapon at regular intervals and to supply cleaning materials and/or appoint qualified persons to keep the weapons in good condition.

82. Accountability. The designated officer (Buildings Manager or senior guard supervisor) at each field office shall maintain a record of each weapon and rounds of ammunition. GSA Form 715, Equipment Control Record, is authorized for this purpose. The accountable officer in turn issues weapons and ammunition to individual guards who retain them on receipt as an item of issue; to individual guards who receipt for them each time they are issued, and who return them to the guard office when they go off duty; or to several guards assigned to the same post on different reliefs. Regardless of the method of issue, a record shall be made of each weapon by serial number and the number of rounds of ammunition at the beginning and ending of each relief. GSA Form 1051, Firearms and Equipment Register shall be used for this purpose. These records

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shall be regularly monitored by the Buildings Manager or senior guard supervisor.

83. Storage. Weapons and ammunition not issued to guards during actual duty hours shall be locked in a file cabinet, the key or combination to which is retained under rigid control. Storage facilities for this purpose are not provided to contractors.

84. Carrying a weapon in transit. Guards who are issued firearms may, while on duty and as required, carry officially issued GSA firearms on GSA-controlled property and/or in transit between work assignments. The use and carrying of a privately owned weapon while on duty is not authorized.

85. Qualification in the use of weapons. Prior to issuance of a weapon, a guard must qualify in its use in accordance with the GSA-PBS Guard Pistol Qualification Standard. Each guard must requalify at least once annually. At locations where guarding is provided reimbursably, guards must qualify by such standards as the reimbursing agency shall specify, but the standards shall not be less than the GSA-PBS standards. Qualification shall be on an annual basis. Additional information is contained in the Physical Protection Handbook, PBS P 5930.2A Chap. 4.

86. Weapons.

a. Standard weapon. The weapon issued to a GSA guard is a .38-caliber revolver. To be proficient with the weapon, the guard must know it thoroughly. The following is a list of terms associated with the use of the revolver. Figure 9-86 shows the most important revolver parts, each identified by the number which describes it immediately below:

(Section not reproduced.)

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PART 7. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF PERSONNEL,
PROPERTY, AND VEHICLES

90. General. A properly organized and administered personnel identification system constitutes an important part of the physical protection program. Such a system identifies those who have a need to enter and leave an area and also detects unauthorized personnel who attempt to gain entry. Entry to most space under GSA control does not require identification for personnel during normal working hours. However, after normal working hours, personnel needing access to buildings and facilities must have proper identification.

91. Credentials and passes. Authorized GSA employees are issued credentials and passes allowing special admittance to buildings under GSA control. In addition, identification credentials are issued by other agencies or organizations to their personnel which will be honored for the conduct of official business within such buildings. The guard must be familiar with these different types of credentials and passes, know whose signatures to honor on such identifications, and the degree of authority each carries. Passes are primarily a means of identification. They do not relieve the guard of the responsibility of exercising good judgment and diligence in the discharge of his duties.

92. Types of GSA credentials and passes. Several types of GSA credentials and passes are authorized. They are described on the following pages. A picture of the front and back of each one is also shown to assist you in recognizing each credential and pass.

a. GSA Form 15, Night, Weekend and Holiday Pass. This pass may be issued to contract employees working for PBS and employees of other Government agencies occupying GSA-controlled space whose duties require admittance to buildings at times other than the established working hours. It is signed by the appropriate administrative official of the requesting agency and is countersigned by the Buildings Manager or his designee. To be valid it must bear the signature of the person to whom it was issued and the expiration date. When security restrictions are in force other special forms of identification may be prescribed. (See figure 9-92.1)

b. GSA Form 22, Employee Identification Credential - Regional. This credential is issued to regional employees whose official identification must include a photograph and/or whose duties require admittance to GSA-controlled buildings or locations at times other than established working hours or to GSA supply depots during regular working hours. The buildings or locations within which GSA Form 22 is valid shall be specified on the face of the credential and shall not extend beyond the

boundaries of the issuing region. When the regularly assigned duties of an employee require the inspection and/or removal of GSA property from GSA-controlled buildings, such authority may be delegated by this credential. (See figure 9-92.2)

c. GSA Form 277, Employee Identification and Authorization Credential - General. This credential is issued only to Central Office employees whose duties require travel or contacts outside the Central Office and who need credentials to show their official capacity in the General Services Administration. GSA Form 277 automatically delegates to the employee to whom issued authority, when engaged in performance of official duties, to enter or work in GSA-controlled buildings and, when required, to inspect and/or remove GSA property from such buildings. (See figure 9-92.3)

d. GSA Form 277A, Employee Identification Credential. This credential is issued to Auditors, Investigators and Equal Opportunity Office Compliance Specialists of the Office of Audits and Compliance, Office of the Administrator. (See figure 9-92.4)

e. GSA Form 277B, Employee Identification Credential - Official Courier. This credential is issued to communications officials who are required to carry classified cryptographic material outside of their office in the performance of official duties. GSA Form 277B identifies the bearer as an official courier and shall not be used for general identification. GSA Form 22, 277, 277C, or 208, as appropriate, shall be issued to communications officials for general identification.

f. GSA Form 277C, Employee Identification and Authorization Credential - General (R.O. only). This credential is the regional equivalent to GSA Form 277 and is issued only to regional employees whose duties require travel or contacts outside of their headquarters offices and who need credentials to show their official capacity in the General Services Administration. GSA Form 277C automatically delegates to the employee to whom issued authority, when engaged in performance of official duties, to enter or work in GSA-controlled buildings and, when required, to inspect and/or remove GSA property from such buildings. (See figure 9-92.5)

g. GSA Form 208, Employee Identification Card. This form may be issued to employees not holding one of the above forms of identification. It merely identifies the holder as a GSA employee and carries no authority or privileges. (See figure 9-92.6)

h. Property Pass, OF 7. This pass may be used by the Buildings Manager to authorize the removal of Government property from GSA-controlled buildings. It shall be signed by the Buildings Manager and shall be used by persons not authorized to remove property by the authority granted on GSA Forms 22 and 277. This pass or one similar may be issued

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by occupant agencies. When issued by an occupant agency, the Buildings Manager shall be provided with the official signature of the person designated to approve the pass. (See figure 9-92.7)

93. Other passes and credentials. In addition to GSA passes, other credentials will be recognized and honored for admission to the buildings before or after business hours, or on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, when such passes are properly accredited, the holders are on official business, and security regulations do not prohibit entry. Included in this category are:

- a. All Federal law enforcement credentials;
- b. Passes and identification credentials issued by occupying agencies to their own personnel, and
- c. Such others as may be designated by the Regional Administrator or his representative.

94. Admission of other personnel. There may be occasion for personnel to enter a GSA-controlled building before or after business hours, on Saturday, Sunday, or holidays, who do not have passes or credentials as cited above. In such cases the following procedure will apply:

- a. Local police, fire department personnel, military personnel, etc. shall be admitted when responding to an emergency.
- b. Press personnel. If there is a special reason for a reporter to enter the press room after it has been closed, a press pass will be accepted as identification and the reporter will be escorted to and from the press room.
- c. Other personnel. Credentials and passes of other personnel will be honored when it is evident that the holders are on authorized official business. Unless the credential specifies otherwise, the holders of such passes will be accompanied by a guard or other responsible person at all times while on the facility.

95. Photographs. It is the intent of GSA to assist news photographers to the extent that the regulations listed below will allow. In all circumstances, guards shall be as helpful as possible to assure that the taking of photographs is neither prevented nor delayed. While photographers may not be permitted into assigned space until occupant approval is granted, they may wait at the entrance, in the lobby, or in the guard office of the building, and should be extended such courtesies as are extended to other persons having official business in the building.

(a) During working hours. When the building is open for business, the following conditions shall apply in the areas specified below:

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(1) Public space. News photographers may, without prior permission, take pictures of buildings and grounds, in entrances, lobbies, foyers, corridors, and in auditoriums when used for public meetings, except where a Federal court order or rule or security of the building occupants require prior approval.

(2) Assigned space. News pictures may be taken of offices and other assigned space if a responsible official of the agency to which the space is assigned approves. Written approvals are not required except where such procedures are established because of special or security regulations.

b. After working hours and on Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays. Special handling of requests to photograph is required when the building is closed for business.

(1) Public space. All buildings are considered to be closed for business after normal working hours and on weekends and holidays. Approval to enter the building to take photographs during these times must be given by the guard supervisor or other responsible GSA official. Where possible, the GSA official shall arrange for an escort to accompany the photographer. Photographers must satisfactorily identify themselves (press credentials) and sign the building register. No other requirements are established for news pictures of buildings or grounds, lobbies, foyers, corridors, and in auditoriums when they are used for public meetings, except where Federal court order or rule or security considerations require the approval of the occupant agencies.

(2) Assigned space. News pictures may be taken in offices and other assigned space if the conditions of subpar. (1), above, are met and a responsible official of the agency assigned the space gives the photographer approval and arranges for the photographs to be taken. Written approvals are not required except where such procedures are established because of the special or security nature of occupant programs.

96. Radio and telecasts. When occupant agencies wish to make radio broadcasts or telecasts, the responsible agency official will coordinate with the Building Manager concerned who will direct the operation. The guard supervisor will be advised of the activity and he will pass on the information to the guards on duty in that area. If the guard has not been advised of the installation, and he observes radio antennae or similar apparatus being installed on the roof, wires being led into the building, or other activity which might indicate the installation of radio or television equipment, he will report it to his supervisor immediately.

97. Removal of property and equipment. It is the responsibility of the guard to prevent unauthorized delivery or removal of Government property.

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Form OF 7, Property Pass, as described in par. 92, may be used to authorize such movement and when used, it shall be the responsibility of the occupant agency to issue the pass for property under its control. This pass may be issued by the Buildings Manager for building equipment, office machines, and other property for which he is accountable. The pass shall be taken up by the guard and delivered to his supervisor for filing. The following are guard procedures to be followed when he observes equipment being moved into or out of buildings:

a. When the "property pass" system is in effect, and the mover does not have a properly signed property pass, or the guard has not been advised of the movement by responsible officials, the guard will prevent the movement and report to his supervisor immediately for instructions.

b. When the "property pass" system is not in effect, the guard shall require the mover of any property which appears to be Government-owned to identify himself and produce his authority for removal. If there is any question of authorization, he shall record a description of the property, including the serial number, if any, the time and date of removal, and the identity of the remover. This record shall be turned over to the guard supervisor who will advise the Building Manager of the action.

98. Controlled locations. The "property pass" system in par. 92h is always in effect at warehouses and depots (and at other specific locations) where entrances and exits are controlled.

a. Inspection of vehicles. All vehicles entering or leaving a controlled location are subject to inspection. Guards are not to inspect vehicles unless authorized by the supervisor. However, when a guard observes equipment in "plain sight" being removed from a controlled location, the procedures in par. 97b are applicable.

b. Action on objection to inspection. When an objection to inspection is made by the driver of an incoming vehicle, entrance of the vehicle to the facility shall be denied. When the objection concerns an outgoing vehicle, the parking permit will be confiscated and future access to the facility denied. Confiscated permits should be filed in a special "confiscated permits" file for ready reference.

c. Inspection etiquette. Guards shall approach people and inspect vehicles in such a manner as to avoid offending or harassing the individual. In cases where there is evidence of a theft due to an inspection or attempted inspection, a report shall be made on GSA Form 182, Report of Loss or Theft.

99. Construction and repairs. Construction and repairs of a GSA-controlled facility is normally performed by PBS employees or contracted for by PBS. Occupants are neither authorized to do such work nor to contract for it. The guard shall assure that persons engaged in such

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work are authorized to perform it. If the work is being performed without authorization and by other than PBS employees (or PBS contract employees), he should report it immediately to his supervisor.

100. Vehicle control. The vehicle control and parking plans the guard enforces are prepared by the Buildings Manager. Accurate and timely information that the guards supply him aids in administering these plans. When questions arise concerning vehicle movement and parking space assignments the guard must refer the person asking the question to the Building Manager.

101. Parking permits. Permits are required for each employee and visitor vehicle that is parked in GSA-controlled property. Application for a parking permit must be made on GSA Form 2368, Parking Application.

a. Employee parking. The Buildings Manager issues a parking permit for each vehicle for which a parking application has been approved. Permits may be windshield stickers, bumper decals, etc.

b. Visitor parking. When entry is authorized (usually by an occupant agency) the guard shall sign and date GSA Form 2368 and permit entry. The guard shall take back the permit when the vehicle leaves the premises. The guard shall also transfer the information recorded on the parking application to GSA Form 139, Record of Time and Arrival and Departure from Building, which is kept in the Guard Desk Book.

102. Traffic violations. When authorized by the Buildings Manager, a traffic violation notice or a courtesy traffic violation warning may be issued.

103. Control, issuance, and storage of keys. (Section not reproduced.)

104. Issuance of keys. (Section not reproduced.)

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105. Storage of keys. (Section not reproduced.)

106. Card keys. (Section not reproduced.)

107. Special control of keys. (Section not reproduced.)

108. Storerooms and supplies. If an emergency makes it necessary for an employee to obtain supplies from a PBS storeroom during other than regular working hours, the guard may allow him to enter the storeroom, provided the guard accompanies him. The guard will make a report directly to his supervisor not later than the end of the tour of duty during which the supplies were removed, identifying the person removing the property, the property removed, and stating the reason removal was necessary. It will be the guard's responsibility to see that a signed list of the material issued is placed on the storekeeper's desk.

109. Post Office keys. (Section not reproduced.)

110. Concessions. (Section not reproduced.)

111. Newstands. (Section not reproduced.)

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112. Distribution of literature. Distribution of leaflets, handbills, "throwaways," or other literature in the building or on Federal property outside the building is not permitted unless approved by the Building Manager. The distribution of such material beyond the premises is the concern of the local police authority.

113. thru 119. Reserved.

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PART 8. ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND CONTROL

120. General. Accident prevention is everybody's job, and particularly that of the guard. It is his responsibility to observe and report accident hazards, to warn people concerning such hazards, to caution them about observing safety rules, and to set an example by his own behavior. It is very important that he do this -- important to the people who might otherwise be injured -- important to the Government to protect it from claims and damages.

121. Unsafe conditions and practices. Too many accidents happen because of unsafe conditions which should have been noticed, reported, and eliminated, or through unsafe practices of employees who either have not been instructed, or whose unthinking actions have not been checked. The following are some of the conditions for which the guard should be on the alert, and practices which should be prevented.

a. Unsafe conditions. All unsafe conditions shall be reported to the guard supervisor on GSA Form 283, Notice of Work Required. The guard supervisor shall forward all such reports to the Buildings Manager. When the condition is one of emergency, the guard shall report it directly to the Buildings Manager's office. Unsafe conditions include, but are not limited to the following:

- (1) Wet floors;
- (2) Holes or defects in floors or floor coverings;
- (3) Poorly lighted areas, stairways, and halls; (Exit emergency and certain area lights are left burning at night as a safeguard against tripping or falling. In some areas, lights are required for this purpose during daylight hours. The guard should make sure these lights are burning.)
- (4) Extension cords or loose wiring across floors;
- (5) Failure to post warning signs in hazardous area;
- (6) Improper storage of flammable liquids and other highly flammable materials;
- (7) Open elevator and other shafts or unprotected openings in floors;
- (8) High voltage rooms left unlocked;

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(9) Material obstructing lobbies, corridors, and stairways which might be a tripping hazard or impede the emergency evacuation of the building;

(10) Fire Exits blocked or improperly locked;

(11) Fire equipment blocked by furniture or other material; and

(12) Inadequate clearance between sprinkler heads and storage (18- to 36-inch clearance required).

b. Unsafe practices. Persons engaging in unsafe practices are to be cautioned against them and advised that all such practices will be reported. The guard supervisor shall forward all reports of unsafe practices to the Buildings Manager. Unsafe practices include, but are not limited to the following:

(1) Running in the halls, corridors, and on stairways;

(2) Smoking in prohibited areas;

(3) Operating warehouse type trucks and other vehicles recklessly or at unsafe speeds;

(4) Using special equipment without authorization;

(5) Poor housekeeping;

(6) Using boxes or chairs for substitute ladders;

(7) Tilting back in chairs;

(8) Opening doors or gates carelessly; and

(9) Horseplay and practical jokes.

122. Handling injury, illness, and death cases. Local authorities generally assume jurisdiction in homicide, suicide, or suspicious cases. The guard, however, is usually the first person to be called upon in cases of accident, sudden illness, or death on property under GSA control. The actions set forth below will be taken upon notification of the existence of any of the above described incidents. Note: In all death cases the local police, coroner, FBI, etc., and the victim's next of kin will be notified as soon as possible.

a. When the victim is the guard himself.

(1) Guard action.

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(a) Report the injury or sudden illness immediately to supervisor.

(b) Follow the supervisor's instructions for obtaining first aid or medical treatment.

(c) Follow the supervisor's instructions for completing necessary report forms.

(2) Guard supervisor action.

(a) In case of on-the-job injury:

i. To obtain treatment, follow the instructions in the HB, Work Injury Treatment and Compensation Benefits, Chap 2, (PBS P 4610.1A) and regional implementing instructions.

ii. To report the injury, follow the instructions in the above mentioned issuance and in the HB, Accident and Fire Prevention, Chap. 3 (PBS P 5900.2) and regional implementing instructions.

(b) In case of sudden illness apparently not job-related, seek the assistance of the local health unit. When a local health unit is not available, help victim to get to his own physician, or in an emergency, to any physician or hospital in the area.

(c) In all cases, advise the Buildings Manager of the incident.

b. When the victim is any other person.

(1) Guard action.

(a) Get medical assistance as necessary.

i. When the victim is a Federal employee, seek the assistance of the local health unit.

ii. When a local health unit is not available, and it appears that the victim was injured in the line of duty, send him to the nearest medical facility designated by the Bureau of Employees' compensation.

iii. When the victim's life seems in danger, or he was not injured in the line of duty, help him to get to any physician or hospital in the area, or to his private physician if he so requests.

(b) Notify the guard supervisor.

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(c) Attempt to contact witnesses on the scene and procure statements of what occurred.

(d) Follow-up with written report to guard supervisor.

(2) Guard supervisor (or guard, when supervisor is not available).

(a) Notify the Buildings Manager.

(b) Forward the guard's written report to the Buildings Manager for use in the preparation of necessary report forms.

123. Motor vehicle accidents. When a guard is involved in a vehicle accident:

a. Stop immediately at the point of accident or as close thereto as possible. Try not to obstruct traffic. Turn off ignition of damaged vehicle immediately and do not smoke at the scene.

b. Call for medical aid when needed.

c. Prevent additional accidents by placing flares, stationing persons to warn other traffic, clearing the roadway, and taking any other possible precautionary measures.

d. Report the accident immediately to:

(1) Guard supervisor;

(2) Chief of the motor pool assigning the vehicle; and

(3) State, county, or municipal authorities as required by law.

e. Furnish name and address on request but do not write them for any one.

f. Make no statements regarding the liability associated with the accident -- do not attempt to take or place blame, merely give facts.

g. Obtain data and information and fill out one copy of Standard Form 91, Operator's Report of Motor Vehicle Accident.

h. Secure names, addresses, and telephone numbers of any witnesses at the scene of the accident and, wherever possible, have witnesses complete SF 94, Statement of Witness.

i. Cooperate fully with any GSA representative assigned to investigate the accident.

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j. Submit completed SF Forms 91 and 94 to guard supervisor.

k. The guard supervisor, upon notification of a motor vehicle accident involving a guard, shall, when practical, immediately visit the scene of the accident and make a complete investigation. Otherwise, he shall make such investigation as is necessary to fix responsibility and determine causes of the accident. In either event, he shall complete SF 91A, Investigation Report on Motor Vehicle Accident, and forward it along with the SF Forms 91 and 94 to the Buildings Manager.

124 thru 129. Reserved.

PART 9. FIRE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

(Section not reproduced.)

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PART 10. FACILITY SELF-PROTECTION

140. General. In the protection of buildings and occupants, there are circumstances which require special protection or "emergency" actions. Such emergencies include, but are not limited to, situations caused by bomb threats, civil disorders, fires, explosions, natural disasters, and potential or actual enemy attack.

141. Facility Self-Protection Organization. To cope with the above named emergency conditions, regulations applicable to all Federal Government agencies require that a Facility Self-Protection Organization be in effect for each building or facility. The highest ranking official, or his representative, in a building or facility is responsible for establishing a plan of action to be used during emergencies. Each occupant agency is responsible for assigning employees as required to the Facility Self-Protection Organization.

142. GSA responsibilities. GSA has continuing responsibility for the protection of all facilities under its charge and control and for the safety of occupants of those buildings. The Buildings Manager is, therefore, required to provide the Facility Self-Protection Organization with members who are qualified in the various phases of building operations.

143. The guard's responsibility. As a guard or U.S. Special Policeman, your services will be required. Some guards will be members of the Organization with assigned responsibilities, while other guards will be available for duty as directed by the leaders of the Organization. Each guard is expected to act at once in case of emergency in accordance with local instructions.

144. The guard's conduct. Of extreme importance is your conduct during emergencies. The uniform, badge, and weapon sets you apart from other people and by conducting yourself in a calm but positive manner you will demand and receive respect. By so acting, your job will be easier and danger to property and life, including your own, will be reduced.

145. Instructions. Questions concerning facility self-protection and special training to help you in time of emergency should be referred to your supervisor. He will be glad to answer them or assist you in finding the answer.

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PART 11. FLYING THE FLAG

(Section not reproduced.)

PART 12. CRIMES AND OFFENSES

162. General. The guard, in the performance of his duties, will be concerned with the prevention of, or the arrest for, certain crimes or offenses which are classified as felonies or misdemeanors. It must be noted that his police powers are not greater than those described in par. 67b.

163. Definitions. The following are some legal terms concerning crimes and offenses with which the guard must be familiar.

a. Law. A rule of civil conduct as directed by the supreme governing authority (Federal, State or local Government), commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.

b. Criminal law. That branch of law which deals with an act or omission which is forbidden by law and to which a punishment is annexed and which the governing authority prosecutes in its own name.

c. Crime. An act of commission or omission in violation of a law, and punishable upon conviction by any one or more of the following: death, imprisonment, fine, removal from office, or other punitive discipline.

d. Felony. A grave crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in a penitentiary for a period in excess of 1 year.

e. Misdemeanor. A lesser offense than a felony punishable by fine or confinement in a jail or workhouse for a period of a year or less.

164. Categories of crime. Guards should be instructed in the elements of the crimes they are likely to be called upon to prevent or for which they must make arrests. If formal instruction is not available, the guard must learn to identify them by personal study. The crimes listed below are those which the guard is most likely to encounter, and they are described so far as possible in nonlegal wording. It must be understood, however, that the definitions and elements of all crimes vary considerably in different states and political jurisdictions. It is necessary, therefore, that local statutes and ordinances be consulted for local application.

a. Felonies.

(1) Assault with intent to kill. The shooting at, stabbing, or beating another with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, maim, ravish, or rob the person.

(2) Mayhem. The maiming of a person by depriving him of the use of any part of his body, the use of which is necessary for him to defend himself.

(3) Carrying concealed weapons. The carrying (and concealing on one's person) of a weapon capable of inflicting a deadly wound.

(4) Malicious destruction. The willful destruction of another's property out of a spirit of wanton cruelty or revenge.

(5) Arson. The willful setting fire to or burning of any dwelling, factory, store, workshop, railroad car, the property of another, or any of the public buildings or public works.

(6) Grand larceny. The stealing of money or other things of the value of \$100 or more. (This amount differs in the various States, and is prescribed by law.)

(7) Robbery. The taking of the property of another from his person, or in his presence and against his will, by violence toward him or by putting him in fear of some immediate injury to his person.

(8) Burglary. The breaking and entering into a building of another with intent to commit a felony therein.

(9) Murder. The willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of another, or killing while committing or attempting to commit any felony, is murder in the first degree. The killing of another, purposely and maliciously, but without deliberation and premeditation is murder in the second degree.

(10) Manslaughter. The unlawful killing of another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel or unintentionally, while the slayer is in the commission of some unlawful act.

(11) Sodomy. An unnatural sexual act between two persons or a person and a beast.

(12) Receiving stolen property. The buying or in any way receiving goods, money, or other personal property, which have been embezzled, secreted, or stolen. State laws will specify the amount which determines whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor.

(13) Sabotage. Any activity by any person which, with intent to harm, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of the United States, does willfully injure or destroy, or attempts to injure or destroy any national defense premises or utilities.

(14) Espionage. The obtaining of information relating to the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to harm the United States or to be used for the advantage of any foreign nation.

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b. Misdemeanors.

(1) Breaches of the peace.

(a) Assault. An attempt with force or violence to do bodily harm to another.

(b) Assault and battery. An unlawful act of violent injury to another, unaccompanied by any circumstances of aggravation.

(c) Disorderly conduct. Any act or conduct of a nature to disturb the public peace, corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public decency.

(d) Affrays. The fighting of two or more persons in a public place, to the terror of the people and the disturbance of the public peace.

(e) Riot. A tumultuous disturbance of the peace by an assemblage of three or more persons who have agreed to, and intend to, by force and violence, perform unlawful acts against the persons or property of others, or against the peace, or to the terror of people, and who actually move to carry out such intent.

(f) Unlawful assembly. The meeting together of three or more persons to disturb the public peace and with the intentions of cooperating in the forcible and violent execution of some unlawful act.

(2) Violation of municipal ordinances, and police, and building regulations.

(3) Gambling. To play at a game of chance or skill with the expectation and purpose of winning money or other property.

(4) Petit larceny. The wrongful and fraudulent taking and carrying away by one person of the goods of another of the value of less than \$100. (The amount varies in different States by law.)

(5) Malicious destruction. Willful destruction of another's property out of a spirit of wanton cruelty or revenge. (Varies by State law in being considered a felony.)

(6) Indecent publications. The sale or offer to sell or give away any obscene, lewd, or indecent book, pamphlet, drawing, picture, instrument, or article of indecent or immoral use.

(7) Impersonating an officer. The false impersonation of a police or other public officer and the attempt to perform the duty or exercise the authority pertaining to any such office.

165 thru 167. Reserved.

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PART 13. ARREST PROCEDURES

168. Protection responsibility. Regardless of the degree of arrest authority possessed (see par. 170, below), all guards have the same degree of protection responsibility. Each shall carry out that responsibility by exercising his arrest powers to the degree authorized, and by following the arrest procedures established by GSA in conformance with Federal and local law. These procedures are treated generally in the following paragraphs of this part.

169. Preventive control. It is the duty of guards and special policemen to prevent offenses of all types on public property. Guards must be on the alert for incidents which appear to be leading to an illegal activity, and take steps to prevent them from growing into misdemeanors or felonies. To do this successfully, they must be tactful, use good judgment, remain calm, and act firmly and without hesitation.

170. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to the contents of this part:

a. Jurisdiction. It is important that a guard know and understand the jurisdiction over the GSA controlled property to which he is assigned. The types of jurisdiction are:

(1) Exclusive. The Federal Government has all the authority of a State except the State reserves the right to serve civil or criminal process in the area for activities which occur outside the area.

(2) Concurrent. The State has reserved to itself the right to exercise, concurrently with the United States, all of the same authority.

(3) Partial. The Federal Government has been granted some of the State's authority, but the State has reserved to itself the right to exercise by itself or concurrently with the United States, other authority more than merely the right to serve civil or criminal process.

(4) Proprietorial. The Federal Government has acquired some right or title to an area of a State, but has not obtained any measure of the State's authority over the area.

b. Power of arrest. Before making an arrest, a guard must know what authority he possesses. These authorities are:

(1) United States Special Policeman. Guards appointed Special Police have the same powers as sheriffs and constables on property under jurisdiction of GSA to enforce the laws enacted for the protection of persons and property, and to prevent breaches of the peace, to suppress affrays or unlawful assemblies, and to enforce rules and regulations

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made by the Administrator of GSA (Rules and Regulations Governing Public Buildings and Grounds, FPMR 41 CFR 101-19.3). The policing powers of U.S. Special Police do not extend to the service of civil process and is restricted to Federal property where the Federal Government has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.

(2) GSA guard. The authority of a guard to make an arrest is normally only that of a private citizen.

c. Committed in presence. It has been typically held by the courts that an offense is committed "in the presence of an officer" when he can detect its commission by the use of his senses, including the senses of hearing, smelling, as well as seeing.

d. Reasonable grounds or probable cause. Reasonable grounds or probable cause means personal knowledge of facts, or sources of information such as would justify a man of prudence in believing that a crime has been committed and that the person being arrested committed it. Mere suspicion is not probable cause or reasonable grounds.

171. Warrants and subpoenas. A warrant of arrest is a written order issued and signed by an authorized official, e.g., a U.S. Commissioner, District Attorney, City Attorney. It is directed to a law enforcement officer or officers or some other specifically named individual commanding him to arrest a particularly described or named individual who is accused of an offense. A subpoena is an order directed to a particular individual requiring his attendance at a specified time and place to testify as a witness. A subpoena may also direct a person to bring with him any books, documents, or other things under his control.

a. Service of warrants by GSA guards and special policemen. Arrests by GSA guards and special policemen are treated in paragraph 174, below.

b. Service of warrants and subpoenas by non-GSA personnel. Federal law enforcement officers may serve warrants of arrest and subpoenas in all buildings under GSA control regardless of Federal jurisdiction over the building. Local law enforcement officers may not serve warrants or subpoenas in GSA-controlled buildings over which the Federal Government possesses exclusive jurisdiction. In the interest of reducing operational disruption and embarrassment, service by either Federal or local law enforcement officers should be made pursuant to agreements and procedures concerned. Such agreements and procedures should provide:

(1) Initial notification of the guard of the Buildings Manager of the existence of the warrant or subpoena;

(2) In the case of a warrant for a misdemeanor, or service of a subpoena, for the guard or Buildings Manager to request, by phone or

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in person, the person or persons to come to the Guard Office or Buildings Manager's office to accept service;

(3) In the case of a warrant for a felony, for the guard to accompany the officer to the location where the officer will serve the warrant; and

(4) When the request made in (2) is not complied with within a reasonable time, action should be taken as in (3).

172. Arrests.

a. To arrest is to deprive a person of his liberty or freedom of movement, i.e., his freedom of choice to come or go. It may be effected by taking, seizing, or detaining a person. An arrest can also be accomplished by an act indicating an intention to arrest or conveying the impression to an individual through word or act that he is under restraint. It is not necessary to touch the person unless it is required to control him and then no more force than is necessary may be used. It is necessary that the person arrested realize that he is being placed under arrest by another being authorized to arrest. This knowledge may be imparted to the person being arrested by the following means:

- (1) Telling him he is under arrest and why;
- (2) Arresting him in the act of breaking the law;
- (3) Apprehending him while fleeing from the place where he broke the law;
- (4) Drawing his attention to the guard uniform and badge which are emblems of authority; or
- (5) Giving the impression to him by word or act that he is being deprived of his choice to come or go.

b. Warning and consent. When an arrest is made, the person placed under arrest must be warned that he is not required to make a statement. Figure 9-172.1 (Warning as to Your Rights) is the approved format to be used for this purpose. When the arrested person(s) consents to making a statement, his written approval must be obtained. Figure 9-172.2 (Consent to Speak) is the approved consent agreement.

WARNING AS TO YOUR RIGHTS

You are under arrest. Before we ask you any questions, you must understand what your rights are.

You have the right to remain silent. You are not required to say anything to us at any time or to answer any questions. Anything you say can be used against you in Court.

You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before you are questioned and to have him with you during questioning.

If you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be provided for you.

If you want to answer questions now, without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.

Figure 9-172.2. Warning as to Your Rights

CONSENT TO SPEAK

I know what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me or used against me.

Signature

Date and time _____

Statement was read by Defendant _____

Signature of Officer _____

Witnesses: _____

Figure 9-172.2. Consent to Speak

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173. Arrests, warrant required. Warrants are required to make an arrest unless a person authorized to make arrests sees the offense committed in his presence or has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony and there is no opportunity to obtain a warrant.

174. Arrests without a warrant. Arrests may be made without a warrant if the arrest is made for certain crimes and under certain conditions, and to the extent that the arrestor is empowered to act.

a. Arrest by guards appointed as special policemen. A guard who has been appointed as a special policeman may make arrests without warrants for the following types of crimes under the conditions indicated:

(1) Felonies. If the crime is committed in his presence, or if he knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been committed, and has probable cause to believe because of facts known to him or communicated to him by a reliable informant, that an individual arrested committed the felony.

(2) Misdemeanors. Breaches of the peace such as affrays, riots, unlawful assemblies, and violations of building regulations, State laws, and municipal ordinances constituting a breach of the peace, when committed in his presence. (If he leaves the scene of the offense or permits the offender to leave before making the arrest, a warrant will be required to make a lawful arrest.)

b. Arrest by guards not appointed as special policemen. A guard who has not been appointed as a special policeman may make arrests without a warrant for the following types of crimes under the conditions indicated:

(1) Felonies. When he is present when a felony is attempted or committed, or when he knows that a felony has been committed and that the person being arrested committed it.

(2) Misdemeanors. When a misdemeanor amounts to a breach of the public peace and the guard is present during its commission.

175. False arrest. Any unlawful physical restraint by one person of the liberty of another, whether in prison or elsewhere, is identified as false arrest. The guard must be sure that when he makes an arrest he does so for acts which are contrary to law or regulation and does so within the limits of his authority. To protect himself from civil liability for false arrest or false imprisonment, the guard must have acted upon facts which would have led a reasonable man to believe that the person arrested committed the offense charged.

176. Use of force in arrest. No more force than is necessary to make the arrest may be used.

177. Resisting arrest. When a person is being taken in a legal arrest, he is required to submit to arrest even though he may believe he has not broken the law. Should he resist a legal arrest, his resistance is in itself an offense against the law, and the guard has the authority to arrest him for the resistance.

178. Arrest of females. Arrest procedures for women offenders are the same as for male offenders, with the following exceptions:

- a. Housing. Special quarters are provided for imprisoning females.
- b. Female attendant. Every effort should be made to have a responsible woman present when the arrest is made, and she should accompany the guard and the prisoner to the detention point (place of imprisonment).
- c. Proper detention. The guard must know the correct detention point to which women arrested in his area of jurisdiction are to be taken.

179. Arrest of juveniles. The age which determines if a person is a juvenile and the manner in which he shall be treated varies in different jurisdictions. The guard, therefore, when arresting a juvenile, must be certain that he is following the procedures prescribed by local jurisdiction. The following practices, however, will be observed regardless of jurisdiction:

- a. Nonserious offense. If the offense is not serious, the juvenile should not be arrested but should be rebuked for his misbehavior and turned over to his parents for punishment by them.
- b. Parental notification. If it is necessary to arrest the juvenile, the guard should be sure that his parents are notified as soon as possible.
- c. Transportation to detention point. If the juvenile is not released in the custody of his parents pending the court hearing, he must be taken to the official detention point for juveniles in a vehicle which the public will not recognize as a police vehicle.
- d. Photographs and fingerprints. No photographs or fingerprints will be taken of an arrested juvenile except on an order of the juvenile court.

180. Detention of unsound persons. Persons of unsound mind apprehended in Government buildings must be treated as sick persons. When it appears that to allow such a person to remain at large would be dangerous to himself, or that he may endanger the rights or well-being of others, mistreat property, cause a breach of peace, or commit any crime, the guard must take action to restrict his movements.

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a. Procedures to be followed by guards. The guard must attempt to prevent any possible breach of regulation or law or other illegal activity by persons of unsound mind. When the guard is confronted with such a person he should take him into his care; establish his identity; and attempt to find out the identity of his family, close friends, and family doctor. He should then notify any of those persons identified immediately above and attempt to turn the person over to their care. If this is not possible, he must follow the procedures established by law.

b. Local regulations. Regulations concerning the detention, care, and treatment of persons of unsound mind may be made at local, county, State, or Federal levels for the areas under their jurisdiction and responsibility. In each such area it is necessary to establish local procedures to be followed by GSA guards in handling persons of unsound mind. These procedures shall be placed in the Guard Desk Book. When there is any question as to how he shall proceed, the guard shall consult with his supervisor before taking any positive action.

181. Diplomatic immunity. Foreign Ministers and other envoys representing foreign countries are not subject to laws of the country to which they are assigned. They and members of their immediate family are exempt from arrest for all charges whatsoever, no matter how serious. This is also true of all members of their official staffs. Attaches and domestic servants at their offices or in their homes are exempt only if their names are registered with the State Department. Such exemption is known as diplomatic immunity.

a. Offenses against holders of diplomatic immunity. Under the provision of section 112, Title 18, U.S. Code, it is a serious offense to assault, strike, wound, imprison, or offer violence to a person who has diplomatic immunity.

b. Consuls. Because consuls do not rate as envoys or diplomats, they, their relatives, and office assistants ordinarily have no diplomatic immunity, but they may have such by special treaties.

c. Arrest procedures against foreign government officials and employees not possessing diplomatic immunity. Usually each such person is issued some type of identifying credential. Since he is a representative of a foreign government, extreme tact should be exercised in dealing with him. If the offense committed is not grave, the guard shall confine his action to explaining the nature of the offense to the offender, recording his identity, and making a report of the incident to the guard supervisor. The supervisor shall report the incident through channels, to the Chief, Buildings Management Division, who may, at his discretion, notify the foreign government office concerned and the Chief of Protocol, Department of State, Washington, DC. If the offense is grave, the offender shall be detained and the guard supervisor shall immediately notify the Chief of Protocol, Department of State, Washington, DC, by the quickest means available.

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182. Medical attention for prisoners. If a prisoner is in need of medical attention, the guard must see that he gets it at once. If the prisoner suffers because the guard fails to secure such attention, or if the guard willfully neglects to attempt to do so, he may be liable for such failure or neglect.

183. Report of arrest. A complete report of each arrest is required immediately after arrest is made. GSA Form 1163, Statement of Case - United States Special Police (Figure 9-183) is used for this purpose.

184. Release from arrest. If it is found that a person has been arrested because of error, misrepresentation, or insufficient reason, and is relieved of the charges, he should be asked to sign GSA Form 1036, Release From Arrest (Figure 9-184) in the presence of witnesses, if possible. The signing of such a release is most important in the event of a civil suit for false arrest. The release shall be retained in the office of the guard supervisor or Buildings Manager.

185. Use of local law enforcement facilities. In each city where GSA protects property, arrangements must be made with the local police department for at least interim detention of prisoners and, if agreed to by the U.S. Magistrate, with the local courts for arraigning the violator when the U.S. Magistrate is not available to hear the case. In making an arrest for violation of the "Rules and Regulations Governing Public Buildings and Grounds," or for other misdemeanors or felonies committed on public property, the procedures followed will differ depending on the type of criminal jurisdiction held by the Government over the property, the arresting power of the guard or special policeman making the arrest, and agreements made with local law enforcement agencies.

186. Courtroom conduct. When appearing in court as a witness, or as the arresting guard or special policeman, the following should be displayed:

a. Knowledge of facts. Know all the facts surrounding the arrest and be prepared to give time, date, place, identity of persons concerned, offense for which charged, and any other pertinent information.

b. Self-control. Remain calm, think before speaking, and testify slowly and distinctly in a natural voice. Speak, move, and act at all times with dignity, quietness, and assurance.

c. Understanding of questions. Answer questions only when they are clearly understood; ask for clarification of any point in doubt.

d. Factual reporting. Make only accurate complete statements and relate only facts; do not give opinions unless specifically requested.

e. Proper use of notes. Refer to notes when necessary to refresh the memory; do not read directly from them.

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f. Sticking to business on hand. Confine statements to what is pertinent to the case; do not refer to past offenses or activities or to personal feelings regarding the prisoner or the offense.

187 thru 189. Reserved.

Appendix C

RULES AND REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES

of the

OHIO PEACE OFFICER TRAINING COUNCIL

for

SPECIAL POLICEMEN, SECURITY GUARDS OR
PERSONS OTHERWISE PRIVATELY EMPLOYED
IN A POLICE CAPACITY.

The purpose of the program shall be to provide approved training programs designed to qualify persons for positions as special policemen, security guards, or persons otherwise privately employed in a police capacity and issue appropriate certificates to such persons as provided in Section 109.78 (A) Revised Code of Ohio.

PC-3-01. Definitions

When used in regulations PC-3-01 thru PC-3-11, inclusive:

- (A) The term "council" means Ohio Peace Officer Training Council.
- (B) The term "commander" means the Director or other head of a Private Employed Officers' Training School.
- (C) The term "Executive Director" means the Executive Director of the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council.
- (D) The term "Private Basic Course" means the training prescribed in these regulations or a program which has been approved by the Executive Director, in writing, as meeting or exceed the minimum standards prescribed in section PC-3-11 of these regulations and filed with the Secretary of State.
- (E) The term "school" means any training program for a privately employed officer in a police capacity as certified by the Executive Director of the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council.

(F) The term "special police, security guard, watchman, or otherwise privately employed in a police capacity" shall mean a person employed by and compensated by a private organization for the purpose of enforcing the ordinances and laws they are empowered to enforce, also to secure the premises of their employer and to enforce their rules as outlined by said employer on private property.

(G) The term "agency" means an establishment engaged in doing business for another.

PC-3-02.

Private Basic Course Training Program

(A) Statement of Purpose: It shall be clearly understood that the basic program described is designed as an absolute minimum program. The commander and private agencies are encouraged to exceed this minimum program wherever possible. Regular in-service training beyond the basic program is strongly recommended for all privately employed officers.

Nothing in these regulations shall limit or be construed as limiting the private agencies and departments, to enact rules and regulations which establish a higher standard of training above the minimum required by this regulation, or which provide for the termination of the services of unsatisfactory employees during or upon completion of the training.

(B) Local Matters

Instructions in such matters as company, department or agency rules and regulations, local ordinances, personnel policies and procedures may be given entirely upon local initiative. No portion of the instructional time devoted to this part of the training shall be credited against the hours of instruction required under the minimum program.

PC-3-03.

Approval of School

- (A) The agency administering the private basic course shall complete and forward an approved prescribed form to be supplied by the Executive Director, which shall list all of the requirements as to subjects taught, or to be taught, hours of instruction, approved instructors, location of training school, cost of participation in the program and any other data pertaining to the operation of a school as requested.
- (B) Certification of training school will be made on the basis of on-site inspection conducted by Council staff members. Such inspection will be conducted according to the guidelines established in PC-3-06.
- (C) The Executive Director shall indicate in writing to the agency administering the private basic course approval for conducting the school.
- (D) The Executive Director may revoke the letter of approval of any school for failure to maintain the minimum state standards. The Executive Director shall notify the Commander of the school in writing of his revocation. The Commander may ask for a hearing with the Executive Director within 30 days of the notice of revocation, who shall grant a hearing in accord with section 119.07 of the Revised Code, or may ask for a hearing at the next meeting of the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council, except that if the next meeting of the Council is within 30 days of the date of notice, then the hearing may be either of the next two meetings after the revocation notice is given.
- (E) The limit on the number of persons to be enrolled, the number of approved instructors, and the time limit or extension for completion of the private basic course shall be determined by mutual agreement, in writing, by the Commander and Executive Director.

PC-3-04

Approval of Instructors

Each instructor is required to have the approval of the Executive Director. Such approval will be based upon the recommendation of the Commander and the submission on a prescribed form of a statement of qualifications for each subject or subjects he will teach.

The Commander and private agencies may request the assistance of any educational institution, agency or individual providing qualified instructional services.

PC-3-05

Certification of privately employed persons

- (A) Upon certification by the Commander, on a prescribed form, showing the privately employed person has satisfactorily completed the private basic course, a written certificate of satisfactory completion shall be issued such person by the Executive Director.
- (B) Receipt of the certificate by a privately employed person shall be considered as fulfillment of the required training, and shall not be construed as a limitation of the discretionary power of the appointing company or agency to terminate the services of an otherwise unsatisfactory employee.

PC-3-06.

School Facilities

Each school shall have available:

- (1) A classroom with adequate hearing, lighting and ventilation.
- (2) A chalkboard and chalk.
- (3) Tables or seats with arm for writing.
- (4) Projection equipment.
- (5) A lectern, stand or table for the instructor's use.
- (6) A gymnasium or large indoor area for teaching defensive tactics and first aid.
- (7) Access to firearms range when needed.
- (8) Training aids.

PC-3-07.

Attendance shall be required of each privately employed person at all sessions of the private basic course except for valid reasons. The Commander of the local training school is authorized to determine the validity of absences of not more than 20per cent of the hours of instruction. Any absentee from any scheduled class session shall make up such absence as required by the Commander. Persons required to carry firearms shall complete the full 16 hours of instruction.

The Commander shall be responsible for maintaining an accurate record of attendance, on the prescribed form, for each person at the private basic school. He shall forward such records to the Executive Director, where they shall be available for authorized inspection.

PC-3-08.

Notebook

Each person enrolled in the private basic school shall maintain, as one of the requirements for certification, an adequate notebook during the course and shall submit such notebook to the Commander for inspection. The notebook shall contain appropriate entries of pertinent material covered during the classroom sessions of the basic course. Among the factors to be evaluated in the notebook are: sufficiency of course content, organization, appropriateness of material, regularity of entries, neatness, accuracy, and legibility.

PC-3-09.

Examination

For certification:

- (A) A final examination must be taken and passed by each person enrolled in the private basic school. The assembling of examination material, and the preparing of the examination shall be the responsibility of the Commander. Supervision and grading of the examination shall be the responsibility of the Commander. The Commander shall forward the examination results and a copy of the examination to the Executive Director. The individual examination papers to be disposed of in accordance with the recommendation of the Executive Director.
- (B) Failure to pass the final examination is not an acceptable circumstance to justify an extension of training time and the conducting of another examination.

PC-3-10.

Firearms Training

Special policemen, security guards, or persons otherwise privately employed in a police capacity in which such person goes armed while on duty shall receive not less than 16 hours of instructions

in firearms. Said hours of instruction is to be in addition to the prescribed basic training course. The school commander and the Executive Director may, by written agreement, extend the hours of firearms training.

PC-3-11.

Minimum Basic Training Course Description

Explanation of the private basic training course.

In order to familiarize each person enrolled with the general content of the private basic course as promulgated, the following additional information is set forth. It should be noted that this information is intended to be suggestive only of some of the important topics which may be included in the separate subjects. Reasonable latitude is to be permitted in order that the individual instructor may develop his particular subject in his own way, and to permit the use of instructional methods and materials which he deems to be the most appropriate and effective. However, those subjects in the basic curriculum must be covered in their entirety.

Registration and Orientation	1 hour
Introduction of school officials and trainees. Statement of procedures, rules and regulations governing the classes. Filling in of personnel data and official records.	
Role of Law Enforcement	4 hours
A history of law enforcement, jurisdiction of authority, role in society, Bill of Rights, law enforcement Code of Ethics and Canons of Ethics are discussed.	
Note Taking	1 hour
A discussion of proper note taking and recording of pertinent information from lectures.	
Report Writing	3 hours
An introduction to police report writing. Discusses methods, styles and content of reports.	
Criminal Law and Procedures	4 hours
Instruction in legal procedures, court duties and jurisdictions, trial jury procedures and the classification of crimes.	
Laws of Arrest	4 hours
This important section deals with the legal authority to make arrests, due process, use of force and civil rights as well as constitutional guarantees.	
Search and Seizure	4 hours
An introduction to laws, rules and methods of lawful search and seizure	

Rules of Evidence	4 hours
A history of trial methods and procedures as well as instruction in the fundamental concepts of evidence.	
Techniques and Mechanics of Arrest	4 hours
Basic police techniques and methods used to make proper arrests and safe searches are discussed.	
Crimes and Elements	4 hours
A discussion of our most often used laws and the elements necessary for establishing a crime.	
Interviews	2 hours
How to conduct a successful interview, qualifications and preparation necessary, as well as a breakdown of the types of witnesses.	
Testifying in Court	4 hours
A discussion of court procedures and officer conduct when testifying.	
Legal Phrases and Definitions	2 hours
An explanation of most of the common legal phrases in daily use by police officers.	
Motor Vehicle Crimes	2 hours
A discussion of motor vehicle crimes most frequently encountered by officers	
Vehicle Traffic Laws and Control	4 hours
A brief discussion of vehicle traffic laws and problems confronting special police and private police in traffic handling.	

Handling of Juveniles	5 hours
<p>Matters relating to police work involving juveniles is given added emphasis because of rising delinquency rates. Laws involving juveniles and juvenile handling are discussed.</p>	
Mental Illness, Drug and Alcohol Abuse	6 hours
<p>An introduction to the problems of mental illness, alcohol and drugs in our modern society. A better understanding of the problems will hopefully lead to a more accomplished handling of all situations.</p>	
Self Defense	10 hours
<p>A discussion of defensive weapons and methods of defending oneself against attack.</p>	
First Aid	12 hours
<p>Basic first aid techniques in emergency situations. American Red Cross Standard Course will be taught.</p>	
Surveillance	4 hours
<p>A course designed to teach the student the proper methods of surveillance and its importance in modern police functions.</p>	
Homosexuals and Perverts	2 hours
<p>A short course to acquaint store and plant personnel with problems and terminology involving sexual deviates in public areas.</p>	
Patrol of Private Property	2 hours
<p>A discussion of functional patrol procedures and methods in private property patrol, both on foot and in cars.</p>	

Crowd and Mob Control

4 hours

Primarily deals with crowd control problems frequently faced by special officers and store personnel. Discusses state and federal laws and rulings, as well as police handling and control.

Firemanship

4 hours

A brief training period designed to familiarize the student with methods of fire safety, fire prevention, fire control and investigations.

Shoplifting

4 hours

A discussion in depth of the shoplifting problem, new state laws, and police handling of this rapidly increasing crime.

Firearms Training (if needed)

16 hours

Firearms training for those who go armed while on duty will be required, and will be in addition to the basic training course. Training will include weapons familiarization, weapons safety, and range firing of revolver and shotguns.

Examination

2 hours

An examination is given at the completion of the course covering all subjects. A passing grade is one of the requirements for certification in the basic course.

Appendix D

PRIVATE SECURITY EMPLOYEE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

This survey is being conducted by The Rand Corporation, a nonprofit research organization, as part of a study on private security forces for the U.S. Department of Justice. In addition to describing private security operations in the U.S., we will be making recommendations for improving their effectiveness.

Please be complete in answering all questions, and do not write your name anywhere on the questionnaire. You are guaranteed complete anonymity. Place your completed questionnaire in the mail envelope, seal it, and mail it directly back to The Rand Corporation. Thus, your supervisors and employer will never see your individual questionnaire.

Combined totals, and not individual responses, will be used to report trends, desires, deficiencies, and suggested improvements as seen through the eyes and experiences of working security personnel. There will be no way for individuals to be identified from the results. One example of benefit to you, the respondent to this survey, is in the area of improving security operations. As a group, you will be able to communicate to management what improvements you think you need, if any.

Please indicate your answers by placing a check mark at your choice and making comments where appropriate. Do not consult your manuals. Do not discuss the questions with your fellow employees until after both you and they have mailed your responses. This will enable us to obtain the most accurate information.

Your assistance in this survey is greatly appreciated.

PRIVATE SECURITY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

I. EMPLOYEE AND JOB DESCRIPTION

1. EMPLOYER (ACTUAL EMPLOYER, NOT CLIENT FIRM)

- a. Armored-car firm
- b. Contract guard or investigative agency
- c. Central station alarm firm
- d. Industrial or manufacturing firm
- e. Financial or insurance company
- f. Transportation organization
- g. Retail-business sales outlet
- h. Educational institution
- i. Research organization or business office
- j. Other (specify) _____

2. IF EMPLOYED BY A CONTRACT GUARD OR INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY, INDICATE THE TYPE OF CLIENT SERVED

- a. Industrial or manufacturing firm
- b. Financial or insurance company
- c. Agency of the government
- d. Transportation organization
- e. Retail store
- f. Many types of clients for brief periods of time
- g. Individual citizens
- h. Lawyers
- i. Other _____
- j. I am not employed by a contract guard or investigative agency

3. TYPE OF JOB (CHECK ONE JOB ONLY)

- a. Armored-car personnel
- b. Central-station alarm respondent
- c. Roving-car patrolman
- d. Foot patrolman
- e. Investigator
- f. Guard
- g. Special-events guard (sporting events, exhibitions, etc.)
- h. Retail-store security officer (shoplifting prevention and/or apprehension)
- i. Other (specify) _____

4. LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT AT PRESENT SECURITY JOB

- a. Under 6 months
- b. 6 months to 1 year
- c. 2 years
- d. 3 years to 5 years
- e. 6 years to 10 years
- f. Over 10 years (specify) _____

5. TOTAL YEARS OF PREVIOUS PRIVATE SECURITY WORK--NOT INCLUDING PRESENT JOB

- a. None
- b. Less than 1 year
- c. 1 to 2 years
- d. 3 to 5 years
- e. 6 to 10 years
- f. Over 10 years

6. HOURS WORKED PER WEEK, ON THE AVERAGE, AT THIS SECURITY JOB (CHECK CLOSEST APPROXIMATION)

- a. 8 hours
- b. 16 hours
- c. 24 hours
- d. 32 hours
- e. 40 hours
- f. 48 hours
- g. Over 48 hours (specify) _____

7. WAGES AT THIS JOB

\$ _____ per hour or \$ _____ per month

8. DO YOU RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT INCOME FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN THIS JOB (CHECK MORE THAN ONE IF APPROPRIATE)

- a. No
- b. Wife works
- c. Receive pension or social security
- d. Other job
- e. Other income sources

9. AGE

- a. Under 21
- b. 21-25
- c. 26-35
- d. 36-45
- e. 46-55
- f. 56-65
- g. Over 65

10. EDUCATION

- a. Did not graduate from high school (specify last grade completed _____)
- b. High school graduate only--no college
- c. Less than one year of college work
- d. Completed one to three full years of college
- e. Bachelor's or higher degree

11. ARE YOU PRESENTLY ATTENDING COLLEGE OR ADULT SCHOOL, OR TAKING ANY SPECIALIZED TRAINING COURSES GIVEN BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN YOUR EMPLOYER?

- a. No
- b. Yes, and the courses are related to security job
- c. Yes, but the courses are not related to security job

12. HOW MANY COLLEGE SUBJECTS HAVE YOU COMPLETED IN POLICE SCIENCE, LAW, AND OTHER RELATED AREAS? (Please specify) _____

- a. None
- b. 1-2
- c. 3-5
- d. 6-7
- e. 8-10
- f. Over 10 (specify) _____

13. HAVE YOU EVER SERVED IN THE MILITARY SERVICE?

- a. No
- b. Yes, and I retired and receive a pension
- c. Yes, with an honorable discharge, but not long enough to earn retirement

14. WERE YOU EVER IN THE MILITARY POLICE, A.P., S.P., C.I.D., OR INTELLIGENCE?

- a. No
- b. Yes

15. HOW MANY JOBS HAVE YOU HELD IN THE PAST 5 YEARS, NOT INCLUDING THIS JOB

- a. _____ (enter number)

16. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT AS A PUBLIC LAW-ENFORCEMENT OFFICER? (Police, Sheriff, Highway Patrol, FBI, etc.)

- a. No
- b. Yes (Specify Dept.) _____

17. IF THE ANSWER TO 16 IS YES, WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THAT APPLICATION?
- a. Did not pass written test
 - b. Did not pass oral interview
 - c. Did not pass medical examination
 - d. Was accepted as a cadet or trainee but did not complete department's training program
 - e. Did not fail any tests but did not complete the pre-employment procedures because _____
 - f. Worked for a department for _____ years and then resigned _____/retired _____
18. WHY DID YOU ENTER YOUR PRESENT SECURITY EMPLOYMENT?(Check as many as applicable)
- a. Job pays well
 - b. Chance for promotion within company
 - c. I was unemployed and this was the best job I could find
 - d. I prefer private security work over general police work
 - e. This is a second job and I need the extra money
 - f. Good working conditions
 - g. Job has good fringe benefits
 - h. Work is stimulating
 - i. For the prestige connected with it
 - j. I thought it would be an easy job
 - k. I enjoy doing any type of police work
 - l. Job security
 - m. Other _____
19. ARE YOU PRESENTLY SEEKING OTHER EMPLOYMENT TO REPLACE YOUR SECURITY JOB?
- a. No
 - b. Yes
20. HOW LONG DO YOU PLAN TO STAY AT YOUR PRESENT SECURITY JOB? (From this day on)
- a. Less than one year
 - b. 1-2 years
 - c. 3-5 years
 - d. Until they retire me
 - e. Don't know

II. TRAINING

1. UPON FIRST REPORTING FOR YOUR PRESENT SECURITY JOB, HOW MUCH INITIAL TRAINING DID YOU RECEIVE? (Do not include on-the-job training. Include only that time spent before actually going to work.)

- a. None
- b. Less than 4 hours
- c. 4-8 hours
- d. 9-12 hours
- e. 13-16 hours
- f. Other (specify. hours)

2. FOR THE INITIAL TRAINING MENTIONED ABOVE, SPECIFY THE TIME ALLOTTED TO THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF TRAINING

	<u>Time (hours)</u>
a. Classroom training: Lectures	
b. Classroom training: Viewing slides & films	
c. Reading manuals	
d. Firearms training on a range	
e. Interview with supervisors only	

3. DURING THE FIRST TWO MONTHS YOU ACTUALLY WORKED IN A SECURITY CAPACITY, WHAT TYPE AND HOW MUCH ON-THE-JOB TRAINING DID YOU RECEIVE?

	<u>Time (hours)</u>
a. Classroom training: Lectures	
b. Classroom training: Viewing slides & films	
c. Reading manuals	
d. Firearms training--range firing	
e. Instructions received from supervisor while actually working	
f. Worked with fellow employee	

If none (I was put to work by myself the first day) check here .

4. WHAT SUBJECTS WERE COVERED IN THE INITIAL AND IN THE ON-THE-JOB TRAINING? HOW MUCH TIME FOR EACH SUBJECT?

Subjects	Initial Time		On-the-job Time	
	Hrs.	Min.	Hrs.	Min.
a. General orders & employer's regulations				
b. Fire protection and prevention				
c. First aid				
d. Legal powers--arrest, search, seizure, etc.				
e. Firearms--except firing range				
f. Firearms--firing range				
g. Investigation procedures				
h. Other (specify)				

5. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF YOUR INITIAL AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING?

	Initial	On-the-job	
a.			Adequate
b.			Too much
c.			Not enough
d.			Material covered was not relevant to my duties and job
e.			Other _____

6. WHAT ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS DO YOU THINK SHOULD HAVE BEEN COVERED IN YOUR TRAINING? (Enter none if appropriate)

7. DO YOU RECEIVE PERIODIC IN-SERVICE TRAINING? (Check as many as applicable)

- a. No
- b. Yes, supervisor instructs me while I work
- c. Yes, I attend periodic formal classes

If yes, list subjects

Hours per year

- d. Yes, I receive training bulletins every _____ weeks
- e. Yes, I receive firearms range training every _____ months

8. DO YOU THINK YOU SHOULD RECEIVE ADDITIONAL IN-SERVICE TRAINING ON A REGULAR BASIS?

- a. No
- b. Yes

If you answered yes, please list what subjects you think should be presented

9. WHAT FIREARM TRAINING HAVE YOU HAD? (Check more than one response if appropriate)

- a. None
- b. Training given me on this job
- c. Training on previous security job
- d. Training in the military
- e. Training from a prior public police job
- f. Self-taught from hunting and personal experience
- g. Hobby is firearms
- h. Other _____

10. DO YOU CARRY A FIREARM ON YOUR PRESENT SECURITY JOB?

- a. No
- b. Approximately 25% of the time
- c. Approximately 50% of the time
- d. Approximately 75% of the time
- e. All the time

11. IF YOU CARRY A FIREARM, HOW OFTEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR HAVE YOU HAD OCCASION TO DRAW YOUR GUN IN THE LINE OF DUTY?

- a. _____ (Specify number of times)

12. DO YOU THINK IT IS NECESSARY FOR YOU TO CARRY A FIREARM WHILE ON DUTY?

- a. No
- b. Yes
- c. On occasion (specify) _____

13. IF YOU WERE NOT ALLOWED TO CARRY A FIREARM ON DUTY, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS DO YOU FEEL YOU WOULD NEED?

- a. Police baton
- b. Chemical spray
- c. Sap or blackjack
- d. None

III. LEGAL POWERS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

1. HOW WELL DO YOU THINK YOU KNOW YOUR LEGAL POWERS TO DETAIN, ARREST, SEARCH, AND USE FORCE?
 - a. Very well
 - b. Fairly well
 - c. Somewhat unsure
 - d. I don't know my legal powers

2. HOW DO YOUR LEGAL POWERS TO ARREST A SUSPECT COMPARE TO THOSE OF A REGULAR POLICE OFFICER?
 - a. The same as a public policeman's powers
 - b. Less than a public policeman's powers
 - c. Not sure

3. HOW DO YOUR LEGAL POWERS TO ARREST A SUSPECT COMPARE TO THOSE OF A PRIVATE CITIZEN?
 - a. They are greater than a private citizen's powers
 - b. They are greater than a private citizen's, but only during the time I am on duty or if I am wearing a distinctive uniform
 - c. They are the same as a private citizen's powers
 - d. Not sure

4. IF YOU ARREST A PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERSON COMMITTED A FELONY, THE ARREST IS:
 - a. Always a legal arrest
 - b. A legal arrest, only if in fact some crime (a felony or a misdemeanor) has been committed
 - c. A legal arrest, only if in fact a felony has been committed
 - d. None of the above
 - e. I am not sure of the correct answer

5. PLACE A CHECK BESIDE THE OFFENSES THAT ARE MISDEMEANORS. (Base your answer on just the facts given)
 - a. Theft of \$250 worth of equipment
 - b. A person you ask to stop for questioning hits you with his fist and then runs away
 - c. Trespassing
 - d. Loitering
 - e. Arson
 - f. Intoxication
 - g. Pickpocket lifts a wallet containing \$5.00
 - h. A man calls you a "Pig"
 - i. Tapping a telephone
 - j. A woman drinks alcoholic beverages on the job against company rules
 - k. None of the above

6. WHEN WOULD YOU USE DEADLY FORCE OR FORCE LIKELY TO CAUSE SERIOUS INJURY ON ANOTHER PERSON? (Check more than one response if appropriate)
- a. If necessary, to arrest any felony crime suspect
 - b. If necessary, to arrest any misdemeanor crime suspect
 - c. To prevent any damage to property
 - d. To prevent extensive damage to property
 - e. To prevent serious bodily harm to someone
 - f. Only if someone's life is in danger
 - g. Never
7. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE LEGALLY CORRECT? (You may check more than one)
- a. A person may resist an unlawful arrest made by a private security guard
 - b. If the suspect will otherwise escape, force that may cause serious bodily injury may be used to complete any felony arrest
 - c. As long as any arrest you make is in good faith, and nobody is physically injured, you are not subject to criminal charges or civil suit
 - d. If you suspect a person has committed a felony, you may use reasonable force to detain him for questioning
 - e. You may search a suspect before you arrest him to ascertain if you have enough evidence for an arrest
 - f. Laws governing the action of police officers in regard to search, seizure, and interrogation do not generally apply to private security personnel
 - g. None of the above
 - h. Not sure about most of the answers
8. HAVE YOUR SUPERVISORS TOLD YOU NEVER TO ARREST ANYONE?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
9. HAVE YOUR SUPERVISORS TOLD YOU NEVER TO SEARCH ANYONE?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
10. HAVE YOUR SUPERVISORS TOLD YOU NEVER TO USE FORCE, EXCEPT TO PROTECT YOURSELF OR SOME OTHER PERSON?
- a. Yes
 - b. No

11. THE MANAGER OF THE BUSINESS YOU ARE PROTECTING APPROACHES YOU AND INFORMS YOU THAT COMPANY PROPERTY VALUED AT \$250.00 IS MISSING AND HE SUSPECTS THAT JOHN DOE TOOK IT. HE WANTS YOU TO ARREST DOE. WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

- a. Arrest John Doe immediately
 - b. Physically detain John Doe and call the police immediately so they can arrest him when they arrive
 - c. Tell the boss you can't make a legal arrest based only on what he has told you
 - d. Other (specify) _____
-
-

12. SUPPOSE YOU WERE WORKING IN A CAR AS A ROVING PATROLMAN IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA. THE NEIGHBORHOOD HAS CONTRACTED WITH YOUR EMPLOYER FOR YOUR SERVICES. WHILE ON PATROL ONE NIGHT, YOU OBSERVE A CAR DRIVING VERY SLOWLY DOWN THE STREET. YOU HAVE NEVER SEEN THIS CAR THERE BEFORE, ALTHOUGH YOU HAVE WORKED THIS SAME AREA FOR OVER A YEAR. WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

- a. Stop the car and question the driver
 - b. Write down the car license number and driver description
 - c. Notify the public police
 - d. Do nothing about the car
 - e. Other (specify) _____
-
-

13. SUPPOSE YOU ARE A SECURITY OFFICER WORKING IN A **RETAIL** STORE AND YOU SUSPECT SOMEONE HAS CONCEALED AN ARTICLE ON **HIS PERSON** WITHOUT PAYING FOR IT. WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

- a. Approach him immediately and arrest him for shoplifting
 - b. Arrest him after he leaves the building
 - c. After the person leaves the store, ask him if he has forgotten to pay for something
 - d. Nothing
 - e. Take the person to the back room and search him
 - f. Other (specify) _____
-
-
-

14. SUPPOSE YOU SUSPECT SOMEONE OF STEALING PROPERTY FROM THE PLACE WHERE YOU ARE WORKING AND CONCEALING IT IN HIS CAR. WOULD YOU SEARCH HIS CAR?

- a. Yes
 - b. Yes, but only if I have first made an arrest
 - c. Yes, but only if I have the suspect's written or witnessed oral permission
 - d. Yes, but only with my supervisor's permission
 - e. No
 - f. Other (specify) _____
-

15. SUPPOSE YOU ARE WORKING AS A GUARD CHECKING EMPLOYEES IN AND OUT OF THE PLANT AND ONE COMES TO WORK OBVIOUSLY DRUNK. WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

- a. Let him in, but call his immediate supervisor and let him know the man is coming into the plant drunk
- b. Immediately call the police and have the drunk arrested
- c. Tell the drunk to get back in his car and go home
- d. Prevent the drunk from entering the building, using whatever force is necessary, and call my supervisor to help handle the situation
- e. Other

16. IF AN EMPLOYEE OF THE PLANT OR BUILDING WHERE YOU WORK BREAKS A COMPANY RULE, LIKE DRINKING ON COMPANY PROPERTY, WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

- a. Advise the offender of the company rule, tell him not to do it again, and do nothing else because we all violate rules occasionally
 - b. Notify the man's supervisor or management
 - c. Make him come with me to see his supervisor
 - d. Advise the offender of the company rule and notify my supervisor of the incident
 - e. I would do nothing. Enforcing company rules and regulations is not part of my duties
 - f. Other (specify) _____
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IV. RELATIONS WITH PUBLIC POLICE

1. APPROXIMATELY HOW OFTEN DO YOU CALL THE LOCAL POLICE FOR ASSISTANCE? INCLUDE TIMES WHEN YOUR SUPERVISOR CALLS THEM TO ASSIST YOU, BUT DO NOT INCLUDE PHONE CALLS MADE JUST TO OBTAIN INFORMATION
 - a. Once or twice a week
 - b. Once or twice a month
 - c. Once or twice a year
 - d. Never
 - e. Other (specify how often) _____

2. IN YOUR EXPERIENCE, DO YOU FIND THAT PUBLIC POLICE
 - a. Are helpful when you call on them
 - b. Are helpful sometimes, and sometimes not
 - c. Think they are superior to private security personnel
 - d. Are usually not around when they are needed and they take their time arriving when they are called
 - e. Other _____

3. IN YOUR EXPERIENCE, WHAT IS THE TYPICAL POLICEMAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL?
 - a. They think we are performing a valuable service that is helpful to them
 - b. They are indifferent toward us
 - c. They look down on us
 - d. Other _____

4. IN YOUR EXPERIENCE, WHAT IS THE TYPICAL ATTITUDE OF **NONSECURITY** EMPLOYEES WHERE YOU WORK TOWARD PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL?
 - a. They think we are performing a valuable service
 - b. They are indifferent toward us
 - c. They look down on us
 - d. Other _____

5. IN YOUR EXPERIENCE, WHAT IS THE TYPICAL ATTITUDE OF THE PUBLIC TOWARD PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL?
 - a. They think we are performing a valuable service
 - b. They are indifferent toward us
 - c. I don't think they know we exist
 - d. They look down on us
 - e. Other _____

6. I FEEL THE LOCAL POLICE WOULD LIKE PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL TO:

- a. Make more arrests
- b. Make fewer arrests; let public police do it
- c. Arrest about as often as we do now
- d. Not bother them but handle most of our problems without calling the police

7. IF YOU WORK FOR A CENTRAL STATION ALARM COMPANY, WHAT DO YOU USUALLY DO IF YOU ARRIVE AT THE SCENE OF THE ALARM BEFORE THE PUBLIC POLICE ARRIVE?

- a. Observe and check the scene from outside the building and wait for the police
- b. Go inside and check, but don't try to apprehend any suspects
- c. Make every effort to apprehend possible criminals
- d. Other (specify) _____

V. SUPERVISION

1. HOW OFTEN DO YOU SEE YOUR SUPERVISOR?

- a. Hourly
- b. Every day
- c. Once or twice a week
- d. Once or twice a month
- e. Other _____

2. HOW MANY HOURS A WEEK DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR SPEND WITH YOU?

- a. None, he just drops by for a few minutes occasionally to see how I am getting along
- b. 1-2 hours
- c. 3-5 hours
- d. 6-10 hours
- e. 11-20 hours
- f. 21-40 hours

3. DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR GIVE YOU TRAINING ON A REGULAR BASIS?

- a. Yes, and he does a good job of training
- b. Yes, but he does not do a good job of training
- c. Only to advise on change of policy
- d. No

4. DO YOU THINK YOUR SUPERVISOR HAS THE NECESSARY KNOWLEDGE AND TRAINING FOR HIS POSITION?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not able to make that evaluation

5. DO YOU THINK YOU COULD DO YOUR SUPERVISOR'S JOB BETTER THAN HE DOES IT?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Just as well

6. DO YOU FEEL THAT MANAGEMENT TRUSTS YOUR JUDGMENT?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Don't know

VI. INCIDENTS

1. HOW DO YOU FEEL TOWARD SUSPECTED CRIMINALS?
 - a. Most criminals are victims of circumstances and should be treated leniently
 - b. All people suspected, of committing crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law
 - c. Each case should be handled on its own merits

2. HOW MANY ARRESTS HAVE YOU MADE DURING YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYMENT? _____ . WHAT TYPES OF CRIMES WERE COMMITTED? _____

3. HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU, AS A SECURITY OFFICER ON YOUR PRESENT JOB, HAD TO USE FORCE TO MAKE AN ARREST? _____. WHAT IS THE MOST FORCE YOU HAVE HAD TO USE, AND WHAT WAS THE CRIME?

4. DURING YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYMENT, HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU HAD TO USE FORCE TO DETAIN SOMEONE FOR QUESTIONING OR FOR THE POLICE TO ARREST LATER? _____

8. WHILE WE REALIZE THAT THE PUBLIC POLICE ARE USUALLY CALLED WHENEVER A MAJOR CRIME-RELATED INCIDENT OCCURS, THERE MAY BE SOME MINOR CRIMES WHICH ARE NOT REPORTED, SUCH AS CERTAIN MINOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY EMPLOYEES, SOME SHOPLIFTING CASES, OR SOME CRIMES WHICH THE POLICE PROBABLY COULDN'T SOLVE. IN YOUR EXPERIENCE, IN WHAT TYPES OF CRIME-RELATED CASES ARE THE POLICE NOT CALLED?

9. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN ANY PRIVATE SECURITY EMPLOYEE OVERSTEPPING HIS AUTHORITY IN HANDLING AN INCIDENT? (FOR EXAMPLE, BY USING TOO MUCH FORCE, BY SEARCHING SOMEONE WHEN HE SHOULDN'T HAVE, OR BY OTHER ILLEGAL ACTS?)

- a. Yes, only once
- b. Yes, a few times
- c. Yes, many times
- d. No

If yes, please describe one such incident you have seen.

10. HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU OR YOUR COMPANY BEEN THREATENED WITH A LAW SUIT AS A RESULT OF ANY ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON YOUR SECURITY JOB? _____. WERE YOU EVER ACTUALLY SUED? _____ PLEASE GIVE DETAILS.

11. HOW MANY TIMES HAS SOMEONE COMPLAINED ABOUT SOME ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS JOB BUT NOT THREATENED TO SUE? _____
WHAT ACTIONS WERE THEY COMPLAINING ABOUT? _____
