


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## NATIONAL EVALUATION PROGRAM

### PHASE I REPORT

#### VOLUME V

Towards Increasing Citizen Responsibility,  
Surveillance and Reporting of Crimes

by

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## INTRODUCTION

As with many great social problems, concern with crime waxes and wanes over time. At present we are in the midst of a public pre-occupation with crime due to apparently burgeoning levels of criminal activity, especially those crimes regarded as most serious (Time, June 30, 1975 and statements by President Ford, May 19, 1975).<sup>1</sup> In increasing numbers Americans are alarmed about their safety, angry that established institutions do not appear to be stemming the crime increase, and concerned that current trends will continue. Urban dwellers responding to a Gallup Opinion Poll regarded crime as the number one social problem facing their community (Gallup Opinion Index, 1975), and to some extent these feelings seem to be justified. Statistics recently released by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports indicate that 1974 had the largest yearly increase in serious crime since the Uniform Crime Reporting system was instituted. This was an increase of over 17% over the preceding year. The latest statistics also present a grim picture. The first quarter of 1975 indicated an 18% increase as compared to the same period in 1974.

Among the many solutions proposed to alleviate the crime problem, the concept of returning some responsibility to citizens for their own safety and the safety of their neighbors has been suggested. Citizen crime reporting programs (CCRPs) are one major

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<sup>1</sup> Whether or not crime is actually on the rise or if fear of crime is aggravated by media and law enforcement announcements are valid questions if one is to place current crime statistics in context. We deal with these questions in later sections.

way citizens can assume some responsibility to help fight crime. These programs serve to direct the public's concern with crime by educating the public to be alert to criminal activities and to report them to the police.

CCRPs are considered to be additional eyes and ears of the police. They promote the concept of citizen responsibility to report suspected crime and provide clear information on how to do so. There are several hundred of such programs throughout the country today, sponsored by police, civic or business organizations, governmental agencies, or groups of concerned citizens. Some programs simply use the media to heighten citizen awareness of the importance of reporting crimes while others may form neighborhood groups. Whatever their approach, the main goal of CCRPs is to increase surveillance and the reporting of a crime when it is observed. Some programs also attempt to further a sense of community involvement. It is anticipated that all of these practices will eventually lead to a decrease in crime.

This paper, the first of six products required by the National Evaluation Program, will outline the issues involved in the planning and execution of citizen crime reporting programs. The issues will be developed from general knowledge and past findings in the area. It will include background material, past research, historical development, and views of experts in the crime reporting and crime prevention areas. Development of a broad perspective on the key issues involved in the topic area will be of primary interest, and it should serve to establish the context in which citizen crime-reporting programs will be further studied during this Phase I project.

The Universe of Programs

Not all types of activities that could lead to increased crime reporting are represented in this Phase I study. The universe of projects encompasses formally designated programs in existence since June, 1974, that are organized (with a name and a staff) to encourage citizen crime reporting and the logically and functionally related activity of surveillance. Many programs combine these two components. Observational activities (e.g., being alert for suspicious events) are necessary for crime detection and hence crime reporting.

The focus of the present study will be on programs aimed at increasing the reporting of crimes against persons or personal property and programs dealing with both crime-specific and general categories of crime. Programs aimed at crimes against commercial establishments will not be considered. With the exception of Community Radio Watch programs, which are directed at citizens who already have access to two-way radios, programs will not be included that require citizens to obtain or use costly equipment (e.g., burglar alarms) for the purpose of crime reporting.

Because the present focus is on programs encouraging surveillance and awareness as the expected citizen response, citizen security programs emphasizing the techniques and devices designed to physically harden targets against burglaries will not be considered. Information campaigns of such programs are aimed at encouraging a concrete, one time action (e.g., installing locks and extra lighting) rather than constant surveillance and awareness. Moreover, this area of investigation is the responsibility of another National Evaluation Program grant.

Also, not included in the universe programs under consideration are citizen patrols. These programs are aimed at involving citizens in definite, organized and scheduled actions (e.g., guarding and monitoring building entrances) rather than in pervasive surveillance at all times. An additional reason for exclusion is that patrols are being studied by another National Evaluation Program investigator.

This study will necessarily also be limited in the number of crime-reporting programs that it will encompass, but it will include programs that are representative of the various types of programs and that are representative in other relevant respects such as geographic location.

#### A Larger Perspective

The goal of increasing citizen participation in crime prevention and crime control can be viewed in the larger context of the citizen's relationship to the government. In this bicentennial anniversary of the United States, a thoughtful reexamination of this fundamental question is called for. In such founding documents as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, a certain philosophy was expressed about the proper relationship between the individual citizen and government and the responsibilities of each in securing idealistic human goals.

In practice, however, it can readily be seen over the past 200 years the government and other social institutions have undertaken an increasingly larger share of responsibility in problem areas such as the economy, health, transportation, crime, and education, while the role of the individual citizen has declined. Although there has been some change in the proposed solutions, the problems have remained, and in some areas increased. It now appears unlikely

that any social problem can be solved unless citizens play some part in working toward a solution.

A primary issue in this paper involves the responsibilities of individual citizens in the area of crime prevention in general, and the act of crime reporting in particular. Directly associated with this issue is the question of how the activities of government encourage or discourage citizen involvement in solving the crime problem. Recent events indicate that the government is making attempts to promote such involvement. Several reports by national commissions (Eisenhower, 1969; Kerner, 1968; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973) and numerous government officials have emphasized the necessity of increased citizen participation in crime prevention. At the practical level, the government, through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has been providing financial support to various types of community-based crime prevention programs. There also exist numerous community groups that are pressuring the government to share some of its law enforcement power. Such events augur a return of responsibility to the citizen for at least some aspects of the crime problem.

Citizen involvement in dealing with crime has expanded in recent years. The public has been active in volunteer programs in the courts and corrections areas, but only a small segment of the population participate in these programs. In contrast, CCRPs offer an excellent opportunity for a greater number of our citizens to become involved in and responsible for dealing with crime. This sense of involvement, as discussed in the following section, can be viewed as a return to some of the responsibilities citizens have held in the past.

### Historical Context

Fundamental to an understanding of CCRPs is the historical development of the citizen's role in responding to crime. Although crime has been a concern in communities throughout history, the citizens role in dealing with crime has undergone several stages of development. The earliest, most rudimentary responses to crimes were revenge-oriented, self-help, or physical withdrawal from an area where victimization was likely. As communities stabilized, the response to crime was negotiation between the offender, the victim, and their kin, with restitution as the most common outcome (Schwartz & Miller, 1964; Spitzer, 1975).

With the development of state came the frequent use of criminal punishments and the establishment of specialized personnel to deal with law enforcement. Crime reporting itself did not become a problem until specialized law enforcement personnel were designated and the procedure established that all criminal behavior should be reported to them.

Citizens in our society may be reluctant to report crimes because it may lead to further involvement with the criminal justice system. However, in a historical perspective, the contemporary degree of involvement for the citizen who reports a crime is far less than was expected in less complex societies, where apprehension of offenders and participation in legal proceedings were generally inseparable from reporting.

With the further development of police forces, the citizens role in responding to crime required even less involvement. Early

police forces were instituted in the nineteenth century to control urban mobs (Silver, 1968). Similar to other governmental agencies, the police law enforcement responsibilities increased with time while citizens relinquished many of their former responsibilities in dealing with the crime problem. The police function expanded to include all types of crime, and the number of crimes officially known to them grew. A part of the rise in crime statistics in the twentieth century is undoubtedly due to the increasing jurisdiction of the police.

Increased formality in police record keeping, reporting, and the way the police handle reported crimes has also contributed to an increase in reported crime statistics. When police patrol was primarily conducted on foot, police were better acquainted with the people on their beats and more likely to hear of crimes through informal, indirect means. In less urban settings where police know the people with whom they interacted, many crimes could be handled informally. An informal solution would generally not lead to an official record being made of the incident. The contemporary use of patrol cars with short wave radios and the removal of police from permanent beats have created situations in which knowledge of a crime is more likely to lead to an official report being filed. Although police still attempt to handle many incidents such as domestic quarrels informally, the fact that the citizen report has typically come to the policeman from a call to police headquarters means a record has already been started. Therefore, decreased likelihood that the policeman today knows the people involved leads to a situation in which a citizen report is most likely to be recorded as a crime.



In contrast to the diminished degree of citizen involvement in responding to crime is the fact that crime reporting today is probably easier than ever. Accessibility to the police has been greatly improved by telephones, patrol cars, short-wave radios and other recent advances in communications technology. There is no evidence to deny that citizens were ever more likely to report crimes than they are today.

The current role of the citizen in responding to crime can be seen as a development from one of high-involvement and high-difficulty to low-involvement and low-difficulty. The typical response to crime is one which avoids personal involvement, but is perhaps more active than ever. In shaping the framework of their programs, implementers of CCRPs should consider the current response of citizens toward crime situations, and relate them to the potential desired outcomes of their programs.

#### The CCRP Concept

Implementers of CCRPs assume that if citizens are informed about crime prevention, know how to recognize and report potential crimes as well as crimes in progress, and are quickly assisted by law enforcement officers when they do report, there will be less criminal activity. The criminal should become aware of the increased likelihood that his activity would be reported and that he faces a greater probability of apprehension and prosecution. If this series of related assumptions is correct, CCRPs may be an important factor in reducing the incidence of crime and would be easy to implement in a currently aroused

and fearful citizenry. This series of activities and impacts are illustrated in Figure 1 and are given a more complete explanation in the text that follows.

CCRPs should be able to have a direct impact on a number of factors. One of these is increasing awareness of the crime problem in the community through publicity campaigns and personal contacts with citizens. Sensitivity to suspicious events is another potential effect of CCRPs. This enables the police to encounter criminals before they are given time to act if these behaviors are reported. Responsibility for reporting criminal and suspicious activities is encouraged and emphatically stressed by CCRPs.

CCRPs provide new methods for reporting, enlarging the range of responses citizens can make to the threat of victimization. In addition to their direct impact on crime-reporting behavior, CCRPs may precipitate other positive side effects. Fear of crime may be reduced in the community, better police-community relations may ensue, and citizens may cooperate to a greater degree with the criminal justice system. Citizen cooperation with the criminal justice system could have a positive effect on persons' willingness to be witnesses in court. This increased cooperation, however, is outside the focus of most CCRPs.

Changes in crime-reporting behavior, as mentioned above, is the most direct impact of CCRPs. Citizen crime-reporting programs may increase reporting of crimes which previously went unreported. The quality of reporting could be improved by educating the citizenry to the facts of more accurate and detailed reporting. Faster reporting of events by citizens to the police is also encouraged.




Figure 1 Flow Diagram of Activities and Potential Positive Effects of CCRP's.

Improved crime-reporting behavior should be an impact on other behaviors and events, which are outside the direct responsibility of CCRPs. Police response to citizen reports may be more satisfactory. One result of this might be more accurate crime statistics, another would be rapid aid to victims of crimes. A quicker response by the police, coupled with more and better information from citizens, could lead to better crime prevention and increased apprehension of criminals.

Increased apprehension could lead, in turn, to increased conviction of criminals. This is supplemented by the impact of citizens' willingness to be witnesses in court or increased convictions. Higher apprehension rates, better crime prevention, and more convictions could lead to increased deterrence. As the criminal becomes aware that he will be stopped and possibly convicted, he should be more likely to displace or cease his criminal activity. Ultimately, the positive potential effect desired--decreased crime incidence--should occur through increased deterrence.

This section has dealt with the general structure of CCRPs and the positive impacts they can make if they are successful. In the next section a more detailed examination of CCRPs is presented and a preliminary overview of the types of programs and their activities is discussed.

#### A Tentative Typology

Our study of CCRPs across the country has resulted in a preliminary overview of defining characteristics. It is important to

note here that this overview is an attempt to provide an initial organizing structure with which to clarify the phenomenon of citizen crime-reporting programs. We regard this structure as tentative and far from definitive.

In the universe of projects with which we dealt, there were several important dimensions along which CCRPs might be grouped. Programs that are similar to others in a given dimension can be thought of as constituting a family of CCRPs. One dimension, for example, is the type of assumptions program originators hold about the reasons why people do not report criminal activity, another is the kind of crime to which the program is directed, and still another is the type of sponsoring group that originates the program. Although there are many dimensions which differentiate among program types, the most useful one for the purposes of this paper is the operational nature or activities of a CCRP.

Two basic questions determine what the operational activities of CCRPs are: what does a given implementer of a CCRP do, and what is expected of citizen participants, if the program is functioning properly. In grouping programs into similar types of families along operational dimensions, we begin to develop an idea of the nature of CCRPs.<sup>2</sup>

#### Program organization

The activities program administrators perform are directed toward publicizing the program, encouraging citizen participation, and actually delivering the program to the recipients. These goals

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There is no doubt that such a snapshot presentation of citizen crime reporting lacks analytic sophistication, but given the dearth of primary information in this area, such a basic analysis is necessary.

may be accomplished in a variety of ways. The most far-reaching promotional technique is media usage. Many CCRPs take advantage of television and radio public service messages to inform citizens about the importance of crime reporting. Some programs place advertisements in newspapers, put messages on bill boards, and/or pass out materials such as pamphlets, bumperstickers or key chains. Person-to-person contact is also an important technique used by CCRPs to further their goals. This approach allows the program personnel to emphasize the interpersonal and social aspects of crime reporting--citizens helping society and society helping citizens. Many CCRPs send project personnel to citizen group meetings like the Kiwanis or PTAs. With this approach, not only can the program reach many citizens at the same time, but the CCRP is often able to enlist the group's backing for their crime-reporting efforts.

CCRP's may also organize people by blocks or neighborhoods. Implementers may use already existing block organizations, or they may initiate block organizations themselves. This requires more initial administrative investment, but once established such groups may constitute an involved citizenry and are more likely to devote full organizational time to the project than existing groups which have a range of purposes and goals. For example, Neighborhood Watch and Blockwatchers often direct their efforts toward organizing groups of neighbors on a block basis or within apartment complexes. Other CCRPs direct their efforts toward the individual citizen and reward citizens for their participation. Most CCRPs simply

reinforce citizens who do participate by stressing the importance of crime reporting. Some programs award a citizen for an especially important crime report, others, such as TIP and Silent Observer, actually pay money to deserving citizens once a conviction has been made. Finally, administrators may hold a crime education meeting to publicize their program and other crime-prevention activities or offer special hot lines which citizens may use to call in relevant information to the police. TIP programs, for example, have special hot-lines for citizen use.

#### Citizen activity

CCRPs vary in the sorts of activities they expect citizen participants to perform. We identified seven distinct activities, none of which are mutually exclusive. Perhaps the most basic activity is to learn about crime. Such learning involves knowledge about the extent of crime in a community, situations that are likely to tempt potential criminals, and general crime awareness. Closely associated with crime awareness is the idea of suspicious activity. Programs frequently ask citizens to report unusual or unexplainable behavior even if the citizen is unsure whether the behavior is criminal. The moving van at a vacationing neighbor's house is one classic example. An alerted law enforcement agency can then investigate and determine whether the situation calls for further action. Citizens are also asked to learn how to make a full and accurate report. Because many people are unaware of which details the police consider important, programs delineate specific points of information citizens should include if they intend to call the police.

In addition to learning about crime, suspicious activity, and accurate reporting, the public may be asked to publicly show membership in the CCRP. A citizen participant may be asked to carry a card, to put a bumpersticker on her or his car, or to place a symbol in a visible place at his or her place of residence. This extends the program in two ways; it broadens the range of publicity and provides a way in which a citizen can demonstrate commitment to the program's goals. Citizens also participate in some CCRPs by actively and habitually maintaining surveillance within their neighborhood or community. In addition, some programs request citizens to carry some device such as a whistle (WhistleSTOP) to call for help or to alert others in the community to a crime. Some "device programs", for example, Community Radio Watch, encourage citizens who normally work in vehicles with two-way radios to call their dispatcher when they observe a suspicious or criminal incident. In a surveillance capacity and as a reporting device user, the citizen crime reporter truly moves into an area that may be described as the additional eyes and ears of the police. Participating in a neighborhood organization and furthering the CCRP's support base in the community is yet another activity citizens are sometimes requested to perform. Activities performed by a citizen block captain, for example, tend to deepen the citizen's involvement in the program as well as to extend the crime-reporting and prevention net to other citizens.

To summarize, the results of our survey of CCRPs across the country and discussions with experts in the field may be analyzed in several different ways. For the present, the most salient description



of programs in our sample is along the dimension of operational activities. While there are other similarities that may be regarded as operational in nature and which also distinguish program families from each other, the following activities are judged to be most basic. Among program activities administrators typically perform are:

Use of the media: Administrators publicize the program in newspapers, T.V. spots and/or radio. The media are also used to publicize program successes and to provide feedback to citizens. In addition brochures are sometimes used to publicize programs.

Organizing blocks or neighborhoods: Administrators establish small neighborhood or geographical units and execute programs through each of these smaller units. Frequently, the administrator has home presentations on crime prevention in residents' homes.

Offering monetary rewards: Administrators give monetary reward in exchange for information concerning criminal acts. Disbursement of reward money is usually subject to the discretion of a citizen reward committee, and reward is usually given if a conviction results from the information.

Offering anonymity: Administrators offer anonymity to callers who report crimes as an incentive for reporting.

Using existing organizations: Administrators promote CCRP through already existing citizen, civic, business, community or special interest organizations and clubs, e.g. school PTA, block clubs, ham radio clubs, home owners associations.

Conduct crime information meetings: Administrators give presentations on crime prevention, target-hardening, how to report crimes, and similar information at regularly scheduled meetings of civic organizations, business groups, schools, community organizations, etc.

Conduct training sessions: Administrators formally educate citizens on crime prevention and crime reporting in structured information sessions. Typically, training manuals are used in training citizens in how to report crimes, what is suspicious activity, etc.

Educating law enforcement and other agencies: Administrators alert personnel directly involved with CCRPs to their role in citizen involvement and dealing with increased reporting of crimes.

Offering contact phone number: Administrators offer special number manned by agency personnel for citizens to use in reporting criminal acts or suspicious incidents.

Perform other crime-prevention activities: Administrators conduct other crime-prevention programs beyond the CCRP, e.g. Operation I.D., security checks, commercial and armed robbery protection, target-hardening information.

Among activities citizen participants are requested to perform are:

Learn about crime: Citizens learn the importance of the crime problem (awareness) and as a consequence learn the importance of reporting suspicious or criminal acts. Citizens learn what types of activity are criminal.

Learn about suspicious activity: Citizens learn what types of activity are suspicious and may possibly be criminal activities that should be reported to police.

Learn how to report crimes and describe suspects: Citizens learn from printed material or presentations what to tell the police about an incident, a suspect or a suspicious activity when reporting a crime.

Maintain surveillance: Citizens as a practice become more alert to suspicious events around them and watch out for their neighbor and their neighbor's property.

Publicly show membership: Citizen exhibits home window stickers, carries wallet card denoting membership, publicly displays symbol of program or formally "joins" CCRP group and attends meetings.

Use a device for reporting: Citizen uses a device during the chain of events which occur between the suspicious or criminal act and the time he informs the authority about it. Included in this category are Community Radio Watch programs, WhistleSTOP programs and hotline programs.

Participate in block organizations: Citizen becomes acquainted with his neighbors and participates in the CCRP with members.

The following table indicates the activities performed by administrators and citizens in a range of CCRP families.

Type of Program	Publically show membership	maintain surveillance	use a device	learn about crimes	learn how to report crimes, suspect, ident., etc.	learn what is suspicious	participate in neighborhood organizations		use of media	organize blocks and/or neighborhoods	offer monetary rewards	offer anonymity	use of existing organizations	conduct crime information meetings	conduct training sessions	educate law enforcement agencies	offer special contact number	perform other C-P activities
Neighborhood Watch (Block-Watch, Crime Blocks, Anti-Burglary)	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X/or			X/or	X	X			X
Crime Check		X		X	X	X			X			X		X		X		X
Crime Alert		X	X		X				X					X			X	X
TIP			X						X		X	X		X			X	
Chec Mate	X			X	X	X			X			X						X
Hotlines		X	X						X					X			X	X
Crime-Stop					X				X								X	X
Silent Observer									X		X							
WhistleSTOP	X		X	X					X				X	X				
Statewide programs MCM/HSC*	X			X	X	X			X					X				X
Community Radio Watch	X	X	X										X					

\*Minnesota Crime Watch/Help Stop Crime

Table 1

The above operational activities best characterize program families in our universe.<sup>3</sup> There are, however, some additional operational factors which vary from program to program and which, may differentiate CCRPs from other organizations concerned with crime and crime prevention. Sponsorship, funding, and type of staff are among these factors and deserve mention here.

#### Sponsorship

For a CCRP to exist it needs someone to initiate and help sustain it. Most programs are connected in some way with the local police or sheriff's organization. CCRPs directly sponsored by the police have both the advantages and disadvantages of being intimately associated with the actual law enforcement personnel. Programs that are primarily sponsored by non-police groups (e.g., Silent Observer) work indirectly with the police, since the police are the "proper authorities" to which suspicious and criminal activities are reported. The degree of cooperation between the non-police organization and the local police varies from program to program and is possibly an important dimension of program effectiveness. All CCRPs that we have contacted do ultimately rely on the police to follow up the information their programs' efforts stimulate.

#### Funding

CCRP receive their funds from various sources. An atypical example is WhistleSTOP, which supports itself almost entirely

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The names of the types of programs in Table 1 are tentative. We are aware, for example, that not all Neighborhood Watch programs organize neighborhoods. As more information concerning the actual operation of programs is received we will be able to develop more accurate representations of program types.

through its sale of whistles. Many CCRPs receive indirect funding from LEAA as part of a larger crime-prevention effort. Some, like, National Neighborhood Watch are directly funded from outside agencies. Other CCRPs are supported by business and citizen groups, and some even exist without any fiscal budget.

#### Type of Staff

The source of program funds influences the type and number of persons that the program can employ. Some CCRPs have full-time paid staff members who devote their total working efforts to program-related activities. Many other CCRPs, especially those connected with police crime prevention units, have full-time personnel paid by some larger organization who devote only part of their effort to the program. Many programs also have volunteers who give various amounts of time to help programs function. Some of these volunteers, such as those in the St. Louis Women's Crusade-Against Crime, devote a full-time effort to the CCRP.

No matter the size of the staff or budget, all CCRPs must attempt to overcome a major obstacle--nonreporting. The implements of CCRPs should consider the reasons why people do or do not report crimes, and develop their programs to stimulate or inhibit these factors.

#### WHY PEOPLE DO OR DO NOT REPORT CRIMES

Deciding to report a crime can be viewed as the result of two sets of countervailing forces: Factors encouraging crime reporting and reasons against such action. Any analysis of crime-reporting programs

must not only determine the nature and potency of these factors, but, more importantly, should also assess the extent to which CCRPs attempt to take advantage of the facilitating factors and overcome the inhibiting ones.

Generally there are two types of persons who may report crimes: those who are actual victims of crime, and bystanders who witness a crime or who have some other indirect knowledge of a crime. There are several reasons for considering these two types of people separately. First, it is already clear that while some programs focus on victims, the majority of CCRPs focus on witnesses. Second, while it may be the case that some determinants are the same for all types of potential reporters, there may also be unique determinants for each. Third, as noted, different research methods have<sup>4</sup> been used in studying victims and witnesses.

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<sup>4</sup> An examination of the research literature of many disciplines reveals that three different research strategies have emerged in studying why people do or do not report crimes. 1. Studies of crime victims typically take the form of victimization surveys (e.g., Ennis, 1967; Skogan, 1975; U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1974) which employ comparatively large samples of respondents representative of various significant social groups (e.g., race, sex, and age). These respondents generally provide three types of information: a) self-reports of criminal victimization; b) self-reports of the reasons why the incident was or was not reported to the police; c) demographic and attitudinal data. There are several possible sources of error in research of this type, e.g., people may forget an incident or the reasons for reporting or nonreporting, they may have misinterpreted an event, or they may be unaware of the actual reasons for their reporting behavior, or they may give responses or rationalizations for their actions that sound socially acceptable or otherwise apparently satisfying to the interviewer. 2. In contrast to the survey information about crime victims, the bulk of our knowledge about why witnesses (e.g., Hutson & Korte, 1975; Bickman, 1975; Latané & Darley, 1970) either directly intervene in or report suspicious events to authorities comes from field and laboratory experiments in social psychology in which persons are exposed

### Crime Reporting by Witnesses

Social scientists have only recently been concerned with why witnesses do or do not report 'crimes'. Rather than limit discussion to this small body of research, we shall include a larger body of research dealing with "helping behavior". This research describes conditions under which witnesses come to the aid of others. The aid given usually requires the direct involvement of the bystander with the victim. While there are major differences between helping situations and crime situations (e.g., the presence of a criminal), it will be assumed in the present paper that research findings dealing with witnesses to non-criminal incidents where someone needs assistance are generalizable to criminal incidents.

There is a fairly large research literature concerned with witness or bystander intervention. A book by Latané and Darley (1970), an edited work of original articles, (Macaulay & Berkowitz, 1970), an entire issue of a journal (Wispe, 1972) a number of review articles (Berkowitz, 1972, 1973; Bryan & London, 1970; Krebs, 1970; Midlarsky, 1968; Staub, 1974) all deal with altruistic behavior. It should be

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to contrived crime incidents. The witnesses involved in these studies are typically few in number and are not necessarily representative of significant subgroups of the general population. Moreover, it is not known whether the situations studied and the variables manipulated are representative of real life. But, by observing actual behavior in response to different experimental conditions experimenters can infer causal relationships between variables. 3. A third methodology that has been used to discover reasons for reporting (e.g., Hackler, et. al., 1974) involves presenting persons with a description of a hypothetical event and asking how they would respond and/or how they think other people would respond in the situation. This type of role playing may provide some insight into the reasons for reporting suspicious events. However, what people say they would do is a notoriously weak predictor of actual behavior (e.g., Deutsch, 1974; Liska, 1974), and responses to hypothetical situations have been shown to be considerably affected by slight variations in how the situations are described (Edwards & Tomino, 1974).

noted here that almost all of the researchers agree that nonresponsive bystanders are not uncaring or apathic but, for a variety of reasons, are unable to act. Most researchers note that the usual explanations that people are apathetic or do not want to get involved are not truly explanations but labels attached to certain behaviors. The focus of effort of researchers in this area is to provide a causal explanation for intervention and non-intervention rather than to pronounce moral judgments or label the behavior.

The characteristics of the witness. Witness intervention may, in part, be determined by the stable personal characteristics of the witness. If personal qualities are important then programs should be directed at attempts to educate children through the use of parental socialization processes, mass media, and the schools.

Most research in which situational and personality variables were investigated generally has found no impact due to personal characteristics. Huston and Korte (1975), however, note that there are a small number of experiments that do provide a consistent picture of the type of person they characterized as the "Good Samaritan." They describe this person as an individual who has "a strong sense of moral and social responsibility, a spirit of adventurousness and unconventiality, sympathy for others, and a tendency to reduce his or her own distress by social actions designed to reduce the distress of another (p. 35)."

Research dealing specifically with witnesses to crimes has generally found inconsistent relationships between demographic characteristics and reporting. For example, Gelfand et al. (1973) Latané and Darley (1970) and Bickman and Green (1975a) found that intervention was more likely if the individual grew up in a small



town rather than a large one. However this relationship has not been replicated in most other research (Schwartz & Clausen, 1970; Bickman, in press; Bickman, 1974; Bickman & Green, 1974 ). Other demographic variables such as age, sex, income, education, etc. also yield inconsistent results. A study by Brenner and Levin (1973), however, did indicate that off duty policemen offered aid more frequently than theology students. But this study had some methodological flaws which qualify this finding.

The only crime witness study known to the authors that used personality measures was conducted by Denner in 1968. He found that witnesses to a theft who had high need for information and high concern for distinction between reality and unreality were more likely to delay the reporting of a theft.

In summary, there appear to be minor relationships between personality characteristics of witnesses and reporting or helping. Although these results suggest certain directions that CCRPs could take in extending their efforts to children so as to have an impact early in the socialization process, it does not appear that the research findings are consistent enough to provide strong evidence for the development of programs in this area.


Situational influences. An alternative way to conceptualize factors which impact on reporting behavior is to examine the characteristics of the immediate physical and social environment. These characteristics, if related to reporting, should be more susceptible to change than personal characteristics. There are a number of factors that could be presented in this section. We shall review research that appears to have the most practical

implications for the success of CCRPs.

(a) The behavior of other bystanders. One of the most consistent findings in the research literature is that a witness is more likely to intervene if he believes that he alone witnessed the incident than if he believes others also saw it occur (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Rodin, 1969; Smith, Smythe & Lien, 1972). This phenomenon has been interpreted as the diffusion of responsibility. Basically, witnesses assume that when there are others present someone else will provide aid. This hypothesis has been confirmed by other research in which the responsibility for acting is focused on a particular individual even though others are present (Bickman, 1971; Korte, 1971). Thus, it would seem critical that CCRPs recognize the diffusion of responsibility phenomenon in their program and attempt to educate people about its impact on their behavior. Fostering a sense of personal responsibility should also prove to be effective.

Other witnesses may also influence each other by what they say to each other when the incident occurs. They may define both the situation and what they consider to be the appropriate reaction to the situation. Verbal definitions of this type have had an impact on witnesses in non-criminal emergency situations (Bickman, 1972; Staub, 1972a,b). In a series of studies dealing with reactions to a staged shoplifting (Bickman, 1974, 1975) it was found that when subjects were told by another shopper (actually an experimental accomplice) not to report the crime only 32% reported it compared to 72% who reported when urged to do so. Further laboratory and field research indicated that the power of other bystanders to influence others was not dependent upon whether the confederate had

seen the crime occur nor whether she remained at the scene to observe the subject's subsequent behavior. These findings may indicate that interpersonal influence is a very effective way to elicit witness reporting. The formation of neighborhood organizations and public meetings may be one place in which interpersonal influence could operate. As noted in the typology section, some CCRPs attempt to organize neighborhoods and most conduct some type of public meeting. Educating citizens about the ways in which others' behavior affects both the definition they may give to an incident and the definition of the appropriate action should also prove helpful. The following two cartoons illustrate how others can affect bystander behavior.



"Just our luck! Ordinarily nobody wants to get involved."


(b) Reward and costs. One of the major ways of conceptualizing why witnesses do or do not aid others is to take into account the relative costs and rewards associated with each behavior. Simply, if the costs of reporting outweigh the rewards then it is predictable that reporting would be less likely to occur.

One theoretical perspective on why people help uses cost reduction as the major motivating force (Piliavin, Rodin & Piliavin, 1969; Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972). This perspective assumes that people help others so as to reduce an uncomfortable negative state which they experience when they see someone in need of help. Some research has been conducted which indicates that as costs rise, the probability of intervention declines. Investigators have shown this to be true for financial costs (Bickman & Kamzan, 1973; Wagner & Wheeler, 1969; Schaps, 1972); effort (Darley & Latane, 1970; Suedfeld, Bochner & Wnek, 1972) threat of physical danger (Allen, 1972) and time pressures (Darley & Batson, 1973). Most of the above research involved non-emergency helping situations and not crimes. Thus some caution is needed in generalizing these results to crime situations. They do indicate, however, that reducing the immediate costs of reporting should have an impact. Thus, programs which reduce fear of reprisals (if such fear exists) or provide easy methods for reporting should prove effective. As noted earlier, programs such as Community Radio Watch and WhistleSTOP offer new means of communication and a number of programs (e.g., Crime Check, Silent Observer) do a great deal to preserve anonymity. The effect of reducing long-term costs such as number of court appearances is much more difficult to predict. But the impact of such

modifications would probably be greatest with those who have had experience with the criminal justice system. Moreover, the time perspective of witnesses is usually limited to perceptions of the immediate situation (Bickman, 1975).

Surprisingly, there has been only one study which has examined the effects of monetary rewards on helping or bystander intervention (Bickman & Bowman, 1974). In this study shoppers were told that they could receive a reward for reporting a shoplifting. This had no impact on their behavior. In addition, the majority of persons were not in favor of offering rewards for reporting a shoplifter. People tended to view this behavior as their duty rather than something for which they should receive a reward. Other social psychological research indicates that rewards, in the long run, may produce negative effects (Zimbardo, 1974). The widespread use of monetary rewards in programs such as Silent Observer and Turn in a Pusher should be very carefully examined in the light of this research.

Research using social reinforcement to motivate helping behavior has also been fairly infrequent. There appears to be some evidence to support the usefulness of this variable in eliciting helping behavior (Goodstadt, 1971; Feldman, 1968), but social science research in this important area is very sparse and further work is needed before any confident conclusions can be drawn. The usefulness of rewards in eliciting helping behavior seems to be commonly accepted by the public as the cartoon below illustrates.



The victim.

The bystander's relationship with and evaluation of the victim could be an important determinant of reporting. An examination of the helping behavior literature indicates that in non-emergency situations persons tend to help persons whom they have met rather than strangers (Latane & Darley, 1970), persons whom they like (Goodstadt, 1971) persons who are similar to themselves in either nationality (Feldman, 1968) political attitudes (Suedfeld, Bochner & Wnek, 1972) or style of dress (Emswiller, Deaux, & Willits, 1971). Generally, persons who are perceived to be dependent are helped more frequently (Daniels & Berkowitz, 1963). Recent research

(Sole, Morton & Hornstein, 1975) indicates that helping behavior is not affected by attraction itself but by a categorization of others into "we" or "they" groups. It can be concluded that research findings of the above nature would suggest that CCRPs attempting to get individuals to know each other, (e.g., Neighborhood Watch, Crime Blocks) and which develop a sense of community or togetherness, would lead to increased helping within that group. These data, however are based on non-emergency and non-crime situations.

Other social psychological research indicates that under some circumstances bystanders tend to derogate victims or minimize their suffering (Lerner, 1970). It appears, however, that reactions of this type are more frequent when the witness feels powerless to help the victim (Lincoln & Levinger, 1972). An implication of these studies is that CCRPs developing a sense competency in bystanders should not only increase helping but also should reduce the tendency to justify the victim's plight.

#### The criminal

The research literature relating to the characteristics of the criminal is extremely limited. Desire on the part of the witness or victim to seek retribution or revenge has often been cited as a reason for reporting a criminal. In addition, simulated jury research (Landy & Aronson, 1969) indicates that harsher penalties are more often meted out to negatively evaluated defendants. Gelfand, Walder, Hartmann and Page (1973), in a study dealing with reporting of shoplifting in a natural setting, found that reporting rate was not affected by the appearance of the

thief (whether she was conventionally dressed or in hippie garb) even though the customers disliked the hippie more. In a study by Bickman and Green (1975) a "thief" interacted with shoppers in a friendly or rude manner. She then shoplifted in full view of the shopper. Although shoppers expressed strong dislike for the rude shoplifter there was no effect on reporting. These findings suggest that the act of reporting a crime may not be related to the feelings one has towards the criminal. It should be recognized that the research cited did not test the limits of these feelings. A more powerful manipulation may produce effects similar to these found in jury research (Landy & Aronson, 1969; Efran, 1974). It would appear, however, that campaigns aimed at denigrating criminals may not achieve the desired effect of increasing crime reporting.

Research dealing with other characteristics of the criminal from the bystander's perspective is even rarer. Allen's (1972) research, however, is relevant. He found that bystanders were less likely to correct misinformation given by a "threatening" looking individual than by the same person when he did not appear threatening. However, Moriarty (1975) did not find that a muscular thief affected direct intervention. A violent criminal might very well inhibit bystanders from even indirect intervention, although this remains to be studied. In summary, it appears that the characteristics of and the relationship between the criminal and witness appears not to be strongly related to reporting of the criminal. The limits of this finding, has not been fully explored. However, as noted in the typology section, there do not appear to be



any CCRPs which focus on the witness-criminal relationship.

Attitude toward the police and other authorities

Citizen attitude toward the police has long been assumed to be important in determining whether a crime would be reported. Biderman and Reiss (1967) suggested that an improvement in police-community relations could lead to an increase in reported crime because of more favorable citizen attitudes. Hahn (1971) examined Detroit ghetto residents' willingness to cooperate with the police by asking them how they would react to five hypothetical incidents. There was no significant relationship between estimated cooperation and the respondents' approval of police behavior. Hawkins (1973) found a similar lack of any correlation between victims' reported attitudes toward the police and whether they reported the crime. Bickman (in press), conducted both laboratory and field experiments in which witnesses' attitudes towards the authority to whom they could report was experimentally manipulated. Although the bystanders' attitudes were affected rather dramatically, these attitudes had no overall effect on reporting. While the amount of research is limited, the consistent finding is noteworthy. Attempts to increase crime reporting by increasing positive attitudes toward police would not appear to be a successful approach.

We know of no CCRP that directly attempts to increase reporting by improving community attitudes towards the police. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. CCRPs are often used as a vehicle to improve police-community relations. Increased reporting may even be a secondary goal to improved police community relations in some CCRPs.

#### The Mass Media

As noted in Table 1, all CCRPs except one use mass media to publicize and motivate citizens and some use this approach exclusively. The widespread reliance on mass media indicates faith in their usefulness for conveying information and affecting behavior. Some experimental research on media effectiveness in changing behavior questions this faith (e.g., Robertson, Kelley, O'Neill, Wixom, Eiswirth & Haldon, 1975).

There have been, to our knowledge, only two studies which have attempted to increase bystander reporting of a crime (shoplifting) using the media. A study assessing the effect of a month long mass media campaign found some changes in knowledge and attitudes but no change in reporting behavior (Bickman, in press). A more carefully controlled study (Bickman & Green, 1974) examined the effects of signs describing how to report a shoplifting in two separate experiments. The results of this research indicated that the signs had no effect. In all of the above studies the signs were at or near the scene of the theft. It is likely that similar communications encountered in situations further removed from the crime scene would also fail to influence reporting.

#### Commitment

Many CCRPs attempt to get individuals to commit themselves in advance to reporting a crime. They may ask citizens to sign pledges and/or carry cards indicating such commitment. Moriarty (1975) conducted the only research we are aware of that is relevant to this variable. In two field experiments he found that if the potential victim simply asked a bystander to watch his belongings the bystander

almost always directly intervened and stopped someone attempting to steal them. As Moriarty notes, it is not known how long this commitment would last, under what conditions people would commit themselves, and whether this type of commitment would be effective when institutions are victims. As table one indicates, a number of CCRPs do try to obtain some form of commitment and furthermore suggest that citizens publicly display their commitment to the program.

#### Anonymity

The promise of anonymity is another major inducement CCRPs employ to motivate reporting. Anonymity has been studied mainly as a factor involved in antisocial behavior (Zimbardo, 1969). Such research has not been conducted in the area of helping behavior. Other research (Ziller, 1964; Maslach, 1974) indicates that reporting of a crime may be a behavior for which a person would prefer to be identified if the environment is perceived as supportive. For example, CCRPs often offer public rewards or awards for meritorious citizen behavior. The assumption of many CCRPs (e.g., TIP, Crime Check) however, seems to be that the social environment is threatening for some reporters. Thus it is assumed that an individual would prefer anonymity as opposed to publicity.

Two unpublished studies (Bickman & Bowman, 1974; Bickman, 1974) varied the degree of anonymity and found no impact on reporting. These results may be related to the fact that the type of staged crime was not fear arousing. If retaliation is feared, then anonymity may be important.

### Ambiguity

A situational factor that could affect reporting is the degree of ambiguity associated with the crime incident. Many crimes are not reported by witnesses simply because they do not recognize the incident as a crime. Although ambiguity is a difficult concept to define and operationalize, a few studies have indicated that the less ambiguous (and more serious) an emergency the more likely help is to be given (Clark & Word, 1972; 1974). Based on this research, it would seem that programs which teach citizens the defining characteristics of crimes should increase reporting behavior. Unfortunately, as noted in the section dealing with program typology, only a few types of programs attempt to teach citizens how to define a suspicious event.

### Severity of Crime

There is only one unpublished study known to the authors in which the severity of the crime was varied (Bickman, Hicks & Stumpf, 1975). This study found significantly more witnesses reported an assault as opposed to a non-violent theft. For some witnesses, however, the greater need of the victim may be offset by the greater danger of involvement. For thefts, the severity as measured by the price of the item may not be important. For example, in none of the studies conducted by Bickman (1975) did the price of the item shoplifted correlate with reporting. The policy implications for CCRPs is not at all clear from this research. Changing witnesses' perceptions of severity of crimes may not be advisable.

### The Nature of the Community

The characteristics of the community in which CCRPs operate

may promote or hinder the effectiveness of a CCRP. For example, Milgram (1970) found that residents of suburban communities as compared to urban residents were more likely to help a stranger. Hackler et al. (1974) posed a hypothetical situation to residents of 12 areas at Edmonton, Alberta and found that increased interaction within a community was related to residents' willingness to intervene. This pattern, however, was different in stable and unstable communities. These findings suggest that CCRPs should be knowledgeable about the characteristics of the communities in which they operate. As noted earlier, certain programs may be appropriate to specified communities. The delineation of these characteristics, however, is still needed.

Other characteristics. Beyond personal and situational variables are other factors which could influence the effectiveness of CCRPs. Included in this section are legal considerations and the operation of social norms. Two norms have been hypothesized to affect helping others.

(a) The social responsibility norm. This norm specifies that a person should help others simply because they need help i.e., it is the right and proper thing to do. When people are reminded of this norm they should be more willing to help. Expectations of reward or material benefit is not involved in helping motivated by this norm.

There is some evidence that people do aid others regardless of the potential for reward (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963; Berkowitz, Klanderman & Harris, 1964; London, 1970). However, it has been demonstrated that too much pressure to help or dependency created

by the victim's own behavior may result in providing even less help (Berkowitz, 1973). In addition, research on exhorting children to help has found little impact on social responsibility (Bryan, 1972).

One area of research that is supportive of the impact of the social responsibility norm is research dealing with models (Bryan & Test, 1967; Macaulay, 1970; Hornstein, Fisch & Holmes, 1967). Typically, persons observing a helping or non-helping model tend to imitate the model's behavior. Middlebrook (1974) notes four explanations for the model's effect; (1) the social responsibility norm is made more salient; (2) the model provides information concerning the appropriateness of behavior; (3) the model provides information about consequences of various actions, and (4) the model reduces constraints against helping. Media programs might want to use these findings to their advantage.

(b) Norm of reciprocity. Another norm which appears to have an impact on social behavior is the norm of reciprocity. This norm indicates that people should treat others as they have been treated. If someone helps you then you are obligated to assist them. Reciprocity has been demonstrated in a number of non-emergency helping situations (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Kahn & Tice, 1973).

The conditions under which the norm of reciprocity operates have been investigated. Inappropriate favors (Schopler & Thompson, 1968), "binding favors" (Brehm & Cole, 1966), expectation about receiving help (Morse, 1972), and social class (Berkowitz & Freedman, 1967) all affect the operation of this norm. It seems clear that programs, especially ones that organize neighbors, could use the

existence of this norm productively.

A word of caution concerning both norms should be introduced here. Norms are very general and may not be important in specific situations (Latane & Darley, 1970). For example the norm of social responsibility specifies that you should report crimes and aid people. But other norms, such as minding your business and not being a fink, may conflict with this norm. Applying normative concepts in an ad hoc fashion does not help us explain the behavior. The cartoon below illustrates the operation of such a conflicting norm.



*"My personal Golden Rule is never to interfere  
with what others do unto others."*

(c) Legal considerations. Another way of increasing reporting would be enacting laws which would increase the rewards and decrease the costs of reporting a crime (Kaplan, 1972; Ratcliffe, 1966; Huston & Korte, 1975). For example, bystanders could be made immune from liability suits. Such Good Samaritan laws have been enacted in a number of states. Moreover, compensation could be provided for those who are hurt in cases of direct intervention. As Huston and Korte note, we have no evidence which indicates whether these laws have any impact on bystander intervention or crime reporting.

The opposite approach to legally dealing with non-reporting is to make it a crime not to report a crime. In France (Tunc, 1966) law requires bystanders to assist others if there is no personal risk involved. The concept of misprison of felony requiring persons to report crimes has been suggested as a partial solution to the growing crime problem (Goldberg, 1966), but it would be a difficult law to enforce. Legal remedies may not only have a direct influence on reporting but may also dictate societal support for certain behaviors. Thus laws supporting intervention and punishing non-intervention might serve as models for behavior even though enforcement would be difficult. None of the types of programs discussed earlier attempt to use the law to develop more crime reporting in their communities.

The following table presents a summary of the findings and implications for program actions.



Table 2  
Witness Reporting Summary Table

IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS	SUGGESTED PROGRAM ACTIONS
1. Personality characteristics of witnesses affect reporting	School and media programs
2. Mere presence of others inhibits reporting	Educate citizenry concerning finding
3. Others' verbal behavior affects definition of situation and action	Hold public meetings where interpersonal influence can occur; educate citizenry concerning finding
4. Social rewards for some crimes encourage reporting	Citizen awards
5. Ease of reporting encourages reporting	Easily available means for reporting
6. Similarity or familiarity with the victim increases reporting	Get neighbors to know each other
7. Competency increases reporting	Train citizens
8. Police-community relationships have little impact	Do not depend upon attitude towards police to affect reporting
9. Attitude toward offender has little impact on reporting	Do not depend upon attitude towards criminals to affect reporting.
10. Mass media campaigns have little impact on reporting	Do not depend upon mass media campaigns to affect reporting
11. Exhortations to help have little impact on helping	Do not depend upon urging to affect reporting
12. Prior commitment increases reporting	Get citizens to commit themselves to report
13. Anonymity may have some impact on reporting	Use anonymity only when fear of reporting is important
14. Ambiguity affects defining and reporting	Train citizens to recognize crimes

Table 2 Continued

- |  |                                      |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| 15. Norm of social responsibility may affect reporting | Make salient                         |
| 16. Norm of reciprocity may affect reporting           | Make salient                         |
| 17. Legal considerations may affect reporting          | Involve state legislators in program |

Crime Reporting by Victims

As noted previously, most of our present knowledge about why victims do or do not report crimes comes from victimization surveys. One type of data provided by these surveys that is relevant to crime reporting is information from citizens about what crimes they have suffered, and whether or not those crimes were reported to the police. Examining this information reveals that the following factors are involved in a victim's decision to report.

Type and seriousness of crime. Ennis (1967), in a national sample of 10,000 households, found that the ratio of estimated to reported crimes ranged from less than 1.0 for homicide and auto theft to more than 3.0 for forcible rape and burglary. In a more detailed analysis of the data on assault, Block (1974) reported that 66% of those crimes involving weapons were reported to the police while 52% of those without weapons were not. Similarly, the National Crime Panel Survey (U.S. Department of Justice, 1974) revealed wide differences in reporting as a function of type of crime, e.g., an average of about 68% of all robberies with serious injuries were reported whereas only 31% of attempted robberies with no injury were reported. These discrepancies between victimization and reporting demonstrate that the type of crime is a significant factor in reporting decisions by victims. This fact has important ramifications for CCRPs. It may be that programs aimed at specific crimes may differ in their potential effectiveness due to the size of the gap between actual and reported rates of those crimes. A cost/benefit analysis may reveal that those crimes whose current reporting rates are most

susceptible to influence due to the interventions of CCRPs are just those crimes whose reporting rates are of lesser social concern. Hard decisions must be made about which crimes should be more fully reported, and the value basis of these decisions must be carefully scrutinized.

Characteristics of the victim. Victimization surveys can also reveal the importance of the victim's personal characteristics as a determinant of reporting. One general conclusion that seems justifiable from reports such as those by Skogan (1975) and Block (1974) is that social characteristics such as race, sex, and income, when considered individually are not critical factors in crime reporting although age is related to reporting. Often considered in constellations, certain types of people may emerge to be quite different in regards to reporting. The basic issue here involves what types of people are and should be served by CCRPs. During the present research project and any subsequent evaluations of CCRPs, careful attention should be given to the social characteristics of the target populations of these programs.

Relationship between victim and offender. Victimization surveys and police reports reveal that victims and offenders are frequently involved in some sort of continuing personal relationship. Although the chances of being victimized by someone you know varies from one type of crime to another, it is clear that in many cases the victim-offender relationship can affect whether or not an incident is defined as a crime and what action is deemed appropriate. For example, among married couples, certain incidents might actually constitute rape or assault, but not be defined as such by the victim, or may

be regarded as personal matters. Skogan (1975) suggested that the effect of the relationship on reporting is not as great as might be expected. For all crimes against persons, the average reporting rates were 42% for strangers and 34% for non-stranger offenders. However, these data may just indicate that victims were reluctant to tell interviewers as well as police about crimes committed by non-strangers (U.S. Department of Justice, 1974). Two exceptions were rape and assault-with-theft. These two crimes are more often perpetrated by strangers and are reported at higher rates to police than other personal crimes. Similarly, in the NORC data (Block, 1974) the reporting rates for assault varied from 66% for strangers, to 51% for acquaintances, to 44% for relatives. Obviously, if people were encouraged to turn in their relatives, a large proportion of currently unreported crime could be accounted for. Again, a value judgment is involved in deciding if this is a desirable consequence of CCRPs.

Compensations for reporting. There are several types of compensations available to victims, including intangible factors such as the feeling that an offender will be punished and tangible factors such as rewards, insurance recovery, and compensatory payments provided by some states. The importance of these factors is only weakly indicated by reporting rate data. For example, Ennis (1967) noted the very high rate of reporting for auto theft and injuries due to automobile negligence, both of which entail insurance recovery. One possible contribution of CCRPs might be to publicize availability of victim compensation.

Victim's involvement in crime. Another possible determinant of crime reporting is the extent to which the victim is involved in the

crime. Drug users may be reluctant to turn in their pushers, thieves do not usually report their fences, and so on. Moreover, as Curtis (1974) pointed out, a victim's own carelessness or provocation might have precipitated a crime, and this might deter reporting. These problems complicate the task of CCRPs, especially when potentially important factors in deciding whether or not to report a crime may vary as a function of type of crime, and when many of these factors are probably still unknown. The question becomes whether the global approach employed by CCRPs can hope to influence these numerous and idiosyncratic factors. Some assurance of anonymity, which is a central feature of some CCRPs, might facilitate reporting when the victim is involved in the crime. However, anonymity may not be a very salient feature of one's decision to report.

Reporting rate data is but one type of information obtainable in survey research. Another major type of data that is sometimes gathered is a subjective report by victims of their reasons for reporting. Following is a list of variables identified by this method that may influence victim reporting.

Perceived effectiveness of the police. In the NORC survey (Ennis, 1967) 55% of the non-reporting victims attributed their inaction to their beliefs about the effectiveness of the police. They felt that the police could not do anything, or would not catch the offender, or would not want to be bothered. A similar finding was obtained in the National Crime Panel data with about 35% saying that they did not report because nothing could be done because of lack of proof, and another 9% saying that the police would not want to be bothered. Somewhat similarly in a survey of victims who had all reported the crime to the police, a total of about 8% gave such

reasons as police effectiveness or feelings that the police would be interested in the case or helping the victim as the most important reason for their reporting (Knudten, et al., 1975). Given these beliefs, the comment that CCRPs may be nothing more than a public relations gambit of the police does not seem so condemnatory. More positive perceptions concerning police effectiveness might be a very valuable accomplishment of CCRPs. On the other hand, as Skogan (1975) pointed out, some of these beliefs about what can be done by police are correct in some sense. There is a strong negative correlation between the percentage of victims who say that nothing can be done and the clearance rate for the crime they have suffered. For example, in Skogan's data only 19% said that nothing could be done about assaults, a crime having a fairly high clearance rate of 63%; but 48% said nothing could be done about burglary, a crime having a clearance rate of only 18%. Programs designed to overcome these perceptions may produce further frustration due to unfulfilled expectations, if, indeed, nothing can be done about the crime. Taking a more optimistic outlook, perhaps something can be done if CCRPs are effective in producing more and better reports on crimes currently having low clearance rates.

It should be noted that the perception of the effectiveness of the police to deal with a crime ~~does not necessarily~~ relate to the attitudes victims may have toward police. For example, Hawkins (1973) investigated victims' attitudes toward police in a survey of Seattle residents. He concluded that the results of the survey indicated that "when someone needs a cop, they are likely to call him even if they hold negative attitudes toward the police" (p. 439). Hawkins pointed out that an important policy implication of these

results is that programs designed to improve citizen attitude toward the police will probably not result in an increase in crime reporting as Biderman and Reiss (1967) suggested.

Certain incidents are not regarded as police matters. A second reason given for non-reporting is that the incident was considered a private matter. In the NORC survey 34% gave this reason, but only 4% mentioned this factor in the National Crime Panel. However, in the latter survey, about 30% said they failed to report because the incident was not important enough, a response category not included in the NORC report. Possibly, private matters are deemed not important enough to report to the police. Similarly, Knudten, et al., (1975) also found that only about 4% of victims said that the most important reason for reporting was the feeling that the incident could not be handled privately as a personal matter. A related reason for non-reporting is that incidents are sometimes reported to other persons or agencies. For example, in the National Crime Panel data about 10% said this was their reason for not calling the police. The fact that many criminal events are defined as private matters and never enter the criminal justice system is interesting as it relates to the issue of individual versus governmental responsibility. For instance, government institutions are currently responsible for a great number of problems, but some matters are still regarded as personal business. Whether this "personal matter" rationale is given less frequently in areas where CCRPs are operating would be enlightening to know.

Retribution and revenge. As noted earlier, one possible motive for reporting a crime is the intangible reward of "getting even" with the offender. Knudten et al., (1975) found that about 14% of victims



**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

gave "You wanted the offender to be punished" as the most important reason for reporting, and another 3% said that the most important reason was that if the offender were caught he would get the punishment he deserved. Financial rewards, such as insurance, victim compensation, or direct rewards for reporting, such as those offered by TIP programs, need further study before any conclusions can be drawn about their salience in a victim's decision to report. Although the restoration of social equity by punishing offenders appears to carry some weight in a victim's decision to report, little or no emphasis is given to this idea in the activities of existing CCRPs.

Norms and values. The extent to which victims have incorporated certain social norms and values may play some role in reporting. For example, Knudten et al. (1975) found that about 6% of victims said that each of the following was the most important reason for reporting: when there's a crime, you call the police; the police are the ones to whom you should report a crime; and it was your duty as a citizen to report a crime. Values are involved in another sense in that people may report because of their concern for the welfare of others. For example, Knudten et al. (1975) found that 13% said the most important reason for reporting was that they thought reporting would keep the crime from happening to someone else. The activities of some CCRPs such as Neighborhood Watch may have some influence on the social norms and values of a community and its citizens, but the extent of this influence has not been directly assessed.

Fear of reprisal. Although fear of retaliation or further difficulties with the offender is regarded by some program operators as a factor in non-reporting, present evidence indicates that this

is not the case. Ennis (1967) found only 2% giving fear of further physical or economic loss as a reason for non-reporting, fear was mentioned by about only 1% on the National Crime Panel, and Knudten et al. (1975) found only 2% who said that fear that the offender would strike again was their most important reason for reporting. Similarly Skogan (1975) reports that only 5% of the National Crime Panel respondents cited fear of reprisal as a reason for not reporting. The apparently low relevance of fear of reprisal has important implications for CCRPs. For example, the guarantee of anonymity (which presumably helps eliminate this fear) that characterizes some programs such as TIP, may not be very crucial. However, it is likely that this may depend on the type of crime and the victim-offender relationships.

Inconvenience. Calling the police can be only the first step in a victim's involvement in the criminal justice system. Reporting may begin a chain of activities such as completing forms, appearing in court, etc. that take time away from work activities and sometimes result in loss of pay. However, this reason does not appear to be very pervasive. In the NORC and the National Crime Panel only about 5% mentioned these reasons for non-reporting, and in the Knudten et al. (1975) study, 15% said that "getting involved with the law would not take up too much time and effort" was the major reason for reporting. Although there is nothing that CCRPs at present could do about the inconvenience after reporting, many attempt to make reporting itself more convenient.

Not knowing what to do. Ennis found that less than 5% of the victims said they failed to report because they did not know whether

they should call the police or were too confused to do so. Providing information about what and how to report, which seems to be an immediate goal of many CCRPs, may not be that crucial since few people admit ignorance about what to do. On the other hand, direct social influence could be important. For example, 14% of the respondents to Knudten et al.'s questionnaire said the most important reason for reporting was that someone talked them into it. The importance of other people who may help label a situation as criminal and recommend action is also illustrated in Bickman's research on witnesses discussed earlier. CCRPs that use indirect influence such as electronic media and pamphlets may be less effective than those that feature direct contact with other people who encourage victims to report.

This review of self-reported reasons for contacting the police probably does not exhaust all the possibilities. Nevertheless, it reveals that some important factors such as perceptions of what the police can do, inconvenience resulting from reporting, or definition of an incident are not addressed by CCRPs. Some of them, of course, are currently beyond their scope.

Although victim surveys and data on reasons for non-reporting are one valuable source of information about the crime problem and what CCRPs might do to alleviate it, the previously discussed problems with self-report methods must be kept in mind. Not only must this kind of data be subjected to validity checks (e.g., by seeing if incidents that victims say they reported are recorded in police files), but this information must also be supplemented by other methodologies. One alternative method is to observe police-citizen interactions. Meyer (1974) used this technique in a study of calls

regarding non-criminal events, but his findings may also pertain to crimes as well. By observing calls and police reactions to them, Meyer identified several reasons why people contact the police: to maintain a social boundary, e.g., strangers are walking through the neighborhood; to relieve unpleasant situations, e.g., a noisy neighbor; to avoid getting into trouble yourself by directing attention to someone else; and to obtain some kind of emergency service. Using this method Meyer also identified three classes of people: those who do not call the police unless a crime is involved; those who, perhaps lacking certain interpersonal skills, call the police under many non-criminal circumstances, and those who do not call under any circumstances. One implication of Meyer's conclusions is that programs might engage in a variety of intervention activities in order to appeal to as many types as possible. A multifaceted approach, taking account of a variety of reasons for reporting such as Meyer noted, should reach a greater range and number of people.

In addition to surveys and observations, another major way to study victim reporting is the experimental method. The considerable practical and ethical problems involved in setting up the proper experimental conditions (e.g., manipulations of the seriousness of a crime) may explain why this method has not been used in studying victims. However, some steps are being made in this direction. Moriarty (1975) conducted a series of studies in which "little murders" were perpetuated by experimenters to explore reactions to violations of individual rights. Using a variety of "offenses" such as distracting people with loud music or accusing them of stealing, and employing a variety of types of subjects and experimental

settings, Moriarty repeatedly found that surprising majorities of subjects were "willing victims" who failed to defend their rights or seek help from others. Although these studies did not deal with reporting, per se, they do demonstrate the feasibility of experimental research on victims.

A summary of an appraisal of the existing literature, only some of which is reported in this paper, leads to the following conclusions about why victims do or do not report crimes. One factor that consistently appears effective is the seriousness of the crime. Beliefs about what the police can do and whether police involvement in certain matters is deemed legitimate are also important. Other factors such as demographic characteristics of victims, victim-offender relationship, victim involvement in the crime, inconvenience, not knowing what to do, and fear of reprisal are of lesser significance when examined separately, but may be important when considered in complex combinations. Our knowledge about victim reporting is far from complete for two reasons. First, certain categories of variables of possible influence (e.g., personality traits and psychological motives of victims) have not been explored. Second, the full range of research methods has not been applied to this issue. Despite these deficiencies, present evidence suggests that the activities of CCRPs may not entirely correspond to many of the factors that seem to determine victim crime reporting.

Although researchers investigating why victims and witnesses report crimes have used very different approaches, there appears to be a great deal of similarity in findings. For instance, the seriousness of the crime, the influence of others and norms appear to affect reporting for

both victims and witnesses, while factors such as personal characteristics, retribution or revenge and attitudes toward police appear to have little impact. Although there has not been any single study in which witnesses and victims are compared, the variables affecting reporting by victims and witnesses may be very similar.

In addition to a consideration of why victims and witnesses as individuals do or do not report crimes, implementers of CCRPs should also take into account psychological factors which influence sense of responsibility and fear of crime at the community level. The next section outlines many of these factors that influence the response of the community as a whole to crime.

#### COMMUNITY COHESIVENESS AND FEAR

One assumption held by many CCRP implementers is that it is a sense of community responsibility itself that may begin to make a difference in the psychological effects of crime. Proportedly, CCRPs will serve to modify citizens typical responses to the crime problem. If a CCRP is functioning successfully, proponents believe that citizen behavior should change. Rather than being fearful, isolated and non-intervention prone, citizens should become more knowledgeable about crime prevention, aware of their community, and more willing to give assistance. According to some experts, such a modification is nothing less than a restructuring of what the appropriate role of the citizen should be (Muehleisen, 1975; Newberg, 1972).

Developing citizens' willingness to assist in protecting themselves and their fellow citizens from victimization would be welcomed

by almost all segments of our society, but the force of a positive and widely accepted potential outcome should not obscure the fact that this outcome remains to be demonstrated. There are several questions which are appropriate here. Do CCRPs actually serve to facilitate a restructuring of the citizen role? Does that restructuring help to create a cohesive and aware community? Are citizens less fearful of crime in such a community? Or, conversely, is it the degree of cohesiveness in a community which makes the difference between success or failure for a CCRP? Could the police, for example, start a CCRP in a diverse--perhaps fractionated--urban community and expect it to succeed? Are positive attitudes toward CCRPs and/or their sponsors a necessity, or are levels of fear at such heights that most citizens would be eager to participate in any programs fighting crime?

The limited amount of research and evaluation of CCRPs to date does not provide an information base from which to draw comprehensive answers to questions like these. Some of these questions may be answerable only in the specific situation and community, if not the specific CCRP. Others may be analyzed by examining the findings of community organizers and community action groups. And some may be partially answered by drawing conclusions from relevant literature in other fields.

Do CCRPs facilitate restructuring of citizen role?

If a non-intervention public mentality does exist, it is certainly a relevant area in which CCRPs may direct their efforts as change agents. It may be simplistic, however, to assume that it will be easy to change the responsibility of the individual citizen to the community, despite the levels of fear and concern about crime. If non-intervention is the mode of operation in the modern world--and it is important to note



that some experts say it is not (Freedman, 1966; Seeman, 1971)--it is the result of a complicated interaction between societal conditions<sup>5</sup> and problems and individuals' reactions to them. Conklin (1975) notes that "Crime generates fear, suspicion, and distrust and this diminishes social interaction. As a community is atomized, solidarity weakens and informal social controls dissipate." (p. 131).

If CCRPs are to counter the non-intervention phenomenon by restructuring the legitimate citizen role, they must function as far more than police-community relations groups (Block, 1974). One way to do so is to appeal to the citizen's self-interest. If individuals feel it is in their self-interest to phone the police promptly when they suspect some criminal activity, and feel so because it is in the self-interest of everyone to do so, they are more likely to actually do so. (Newberg, 1972; Halverson, 1973; Schelling, 1968; Peterson, 1967). Furthermore, if the effort to involve citizens is seen to be part of a wider effort to combat other problems in our law enforcement and criminal justice systems,<sup>6</sup> it is likely that CCRPs can contribute to a restructuring of the citizen role. A comprehensive attempt to restructure the citizen role would lead citizens and authorities alike to believe that crime prevention and awareness are legitimate duties of a private citizen and not solely those of the police.

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<sup>5</sup> Some social scientists interpret the non-assistance-rendering disposition to be a reaction to the isolation, psychic overload, and feelings of vulnerability fostered by contemporary living. (Conklin, 1975; Alexander, 1972; Alinsky, 1971; Milgram, 1969; Gusfield, 1966; Gordon, 1965; and Mead, 1965). Others describe the growing emphasis on individual role specialization as a factor in the reduction of responsibility individuals are willing to take in ambiguous situations (Barth, 1966; Schwartz & Clausen, 1970; Parsons, 1961; and Durkheim, 1933).

<sup>6</sup> The list of these problems would be both diverse and lengthy and are discussed in the section concerned with the impact of CCRPs.

Does the restructuring of the citizen role form a cohesive community?

The proponents of CCRPs frequently believe these programs will reawaken citizens to the community in which they live and combat some of the isolation and psychological stress of modern life. This would happen because individuals would perceive, as discussed above, that it was their legitimate duty to be involved and helpful. We have found no empirical evidence that this would create a more cohesive community. But we are already aware of the existence of community groups, whose purposes are much wider than crime prevention or crime reporting using CCRPs as an organizing tool. Community groups can get at many issues under the CCRP rubric. Organizations that hope to attract a wide support base in a given community can use the law and order issue to bolster their publicity and membership.<sup>7</sup> This is not to say that they do not also work as other CCRPs do.

Whether CCRPs, functioning only as CCRPs, can mold a community toward cohesiveness may be dependent upon the kind of CCRP and/or local leaders. Block Watch has a neighborhood perspective of community--while Citizen Alert calls for a larger sense of community. In either case, a citizen might phone the police concerning a suspicious circumstance even though he or she is not any more likely to be involved in the community beyond the law and order issues level that is central to CCRPs.

Do CCRPs eliminate or reduce fear of crime because of community cohesiveness?

There are many statements in the criminology literature that refer to the disruption of modern life by the increasing probability of victimization. (Roundtree, 1974; Furstenberg, 1973; Conklin, 1975;

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<sup>7</sup> Existing groups which might use CCRPs for these secondary purposes, as well as for the the primary ones, include the police, minority organizations, political groups and special interest groups.

Madison, 1973). According to this concept, citizens have had to alter their normal patterns of living and behave in ways calculated to increase their safety. Because they have been isolated, these behaviors have tended to further their isolation and perhaps even be crime facilitating. If most people do not venture out after dark, the streets are deserted and victimization may be a more likely occurrence. Conversely, if people feel that they are in a community which is responsive and active they are more likely to feel safe and modify their behavior less (AFL-CIO American Federationist, 1971; Trojanowicz, 1975; Halverson, 1973; Fellin & Litvak, 1963).

The lack of community cohesiveness may be only one aspect of citizens' fear of crime. Other considerations mentioned in previous sections, such as sensational media coverage, perceptions of local police services and even the location of the community may affect citizens sense of safety. The urban resident, for example, may have a very different outlook on and reaction to crime from the suburban or rural resident. Residents of urban areas are faced with what Milgram (1970) called "overload". That is, urban residents may be unable to process inputs from the environment because there are too many inputs for them to cope with. The person adjusts to the overload with adaptive responses that essentially are responses of non-involvement, superficiality, and anonymity. Investigating this idea, Altman, Levine, Nadien, and Villina (1969) compared city and small town dwellers in their willingness to allow strangers to enter their homes to use the telephopne. There was a sharp increase in the proportion of entries gained by investigators when they moved from the city to a small town. The experimenters felt that the lower level of

helpfulness by city dwellers was due in part to their recognition of the dangers of big city living, rather than to coldness or indifference. Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether community cohesiveness contributes to a reduction of citizens' fears about crimes.

In a recent study Fowler and Mangione (1974) found that perception<sup>8</sup> of police efficiency and neighborhood cohesiveness had little to do with citizens' fear of crime. Their report suggested that other things, such as programs that stress increased surveillance by neighbors of each other's property, might help to reduce the fear of crime. Reducing the perceived likelihood of success of a burglary or robbery attempt might also have some impact, as would minimizing economic loss. Nevertheless, all of these factors, even when taken together, do not seem to account for a great deal of the variance in fear, and none have been measured for actual impact.

What Fowler and Magnione's study does indicate, however, is that people in high crime areas are more fearful about crime because they have been victimized or know someone who had been victimized. In other words, their fears are realistic. CCRPs can reduce fear of crime only if they actually do reduce crime. Their contribution to a sense of community by itself does not appear to be sufficient to reduce that fear. It follows that any evaluation of citizen crime-reporting programs that employs reduction in fear of crime as an indirect measure of success, might not be accurate.

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<sup>8</sup> Their use of census tract boundaries to define community is somewhat artificial. The methodological problems of obtaining a community not to be denied, census tract boundaries take little account of ethnic groupings, historical changes and other factors which are usually included in definitions of community.

Can CCRPs work only when a given community is cohesive or are levels of fear at such heights that most citizens would be eager to participate?

There is no definite answer to this question. It is undoubtedly easier to reach members of a community who have worked together on other issues when effecting a change in crime-reporting behavior. A great deal depends, however, on the degree to which program proponents successfully involve community leaders. Initiating a police-sponsored CCRP in an inner city area having a high level of citizen and community involvement in civil rights may provoke residents unless the program is carefully and honestly presented. If program administrators understand the community they hope to reach, they have a better chance of developing a program which best fits the community's needs. Furstenberg, (1971), for example, found that it is primarily lower class individuals living in high crime areas who show the greatest fear of crime. Middle-class persons living in low crime areas, on the other hand, express the greatest concern about crime. Furstenberg suggested that the lower class' fear stems from personal victimization experiences. The middle class, however, encounters crime primarily in a vicarious manner via the media, thereby developing a concern about crime. Thus, types of experience with crime seems to affect attitudes toward it.

If persons are fearful, a characteristic of citizens in high crime areas, they may be less likely to intervene and report crimes. These people may be less trusting of the police and may want to avoid contact with them. Also, they may not know what to do or how to report. Fear of reprisal and fear of contact with the police could loom as a greater problem for these citizens.

Attempts to motivate citizens to participate in the criminal

justice system should take into account the diverse orientations the citizenry may have in relating to the crime problem. Citizen crime-reporting programs successful in motivating the citizen who is concerned about crime may be less efficient when directed toward a citizen who is afraid of crime. Citizen crime-reporting programs might also expect a differential reaction to their general efforts from different types of citizens.

Block (1971) suggests that a police crime prevention unit should expect very little increase in citizen support simply because there is a corresponding increase in fear of crime within a community. He recommends that unless the police are seen as deserving of increased support, it should not be expected. An increase in concern for crime, on the other hand, may be more directly linked to increased cooperation with police activities.

If persons are too fearful or not concerned enough, this could pose a problem for citizen crime-reporting programs. Not all persons react to crime in the same way. Some are more likely to intervene than others. Fear may cause some people to hesitate or weigh all the costs before making an anonymous call to the police. Lack of concern would tend to prevent some citizens from developing a community cohesiveness or even learning what to do in the event of witnessing a crime. The success of a citizen crime-reporting program, then, depends upon the ability of administrators to provide a CCRP which best fits the particular community's needs. The levels of fear or concern about crime and the degree of community cohesiveness are factors that effect program success. They should be carefully analyzed by program implementers.

Other major considerations of CCRP implementers in determining what type program is most suitable for their community should be the potential positive and negative effects of the CCRP for the community. These considerations are discussed in the following section.

POTENTIAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CCRPS

Citizen crime reporting programs could result in a multitude of effects, both positive and negative. If a program is carefully planned and executed, it would presumably have a number of positive effects. Yet, even a well planned program could have some negative consequences. The potential effects of CCRPs given here are speculative and may or may not result from a given program. Some may take a presently unknown amount of time to emerge, rather than appearing immediately. These effects may not be common to all types of programs and to all degrees of implementation of these programs. This listing is preliminary and will be expanded or refined as more information is gathered. Many of the effects have already been presented in Figure 1 on page 10.

Positive effects of programs

Quantity of reports. CCRPs make a direct impact on crime reporting behavior. Citizen crime reporting programs frequently decrease the quantity of unreported crimes. This effect results in more accurate crime statistics. By making citizens more aware of the crime problem in the community and more sensitive to suspicious events, they are more likely to call the police. Citizens are educated to recognize those events that are potentially criminal.

Quality of reports. Besides the numerical increase of reports, the quality of reporting may also be improved. More accurate reports include better descriptions of suspects, cars or activities. Citizens taught how to give a report, what facts to look for and remember, and who to call, are more likely to report such details should the need to report occur.



Speed of reports. Reducing citizen response time is also a possible effect of CCRPs. Decreasing the time between observing an event and calling it in to the police may allow the police to arrive on the scene at a more opportune time.


Direct deterrence. Educating citizens to be aware of suspicious activities may bring them to report these suspicious events more quickly. Police should therefore be able to arrive on the scene in time to investigate and question any persons reported to be involved in the suspicious activities. As a result of such citizen reporting, offenders could be directly deterred, and crimes could be prevented before they occurred.

Apprehensions. Besides preventing crime from occurring, CCRPs may also enable the police to catch criminals "in the act." With more and better information at an earlier time, the police should be able to react more satisfactorily. A quicker response on the part of the police, coupled with good information from observers, could lead to increased ability to apprehend criminals.

Deterrence. Increased apprehensions could lead to increased convictions of criminals, possibly supplemented by the impact of citizens' willingness to be witnesses in court. The increase in apprehensions, prevention of potential criminal acts and convictions could produce more deterrence in general. As the criminal becomes aware that he will be stopped quickly and possibly convicted, he should be more likely to cease his criminal activity in a particular area. Thus, the probability of victimization is likely to be reduced.

More accurate statistics. An obvious impact of encouraging citizens to report criminal activity may be making crime rate statistics reflect more accurately the actual victimization rate. The present gap between

the victimization rate and the crime rate is a result of the attrition that occurs at each step in the chain from the occurrence of a crime to recording the crime. CCRPs may have an impact on this attrition chain in a variety of ways. The attrition chain can be illustrated in the following way:



Stage I: Citizens must recognize that some unusual activity has occurred. CCRPs, by encouraging citizens to be alert to potential criminal activity, hope to minimize the number of occasions when crime occurs unnoticed.

Stage II: Once a criminal activity is noticed, it must be labeled as such. By educating the citizenry to accurately define criminal behavior, CCRPs hope to minimize the loss at this stage.

Stage III: Once a criminal act is noticed, and defined as criminal, the citizens must take steps to notify the authorities. It is at this stage that CCRPs have their greatest potential impact. By encouraging the reporting of crimes, educating the citizenry as to why it is important to report crime, and reassuring them of the positive benefits to be accrued, CCRPs hope to lessen the attrition at this stage.

Stage IV: By helping citizens learn to make more intelligible reports, CCRPs hope to minimize the number of criminal reports the police consider unworthy of investigation. CCRPs can also exert pressure on the police not to lightly reject incoming citizen crime reports as not meriting police attention.

Stage V: This stage concerns the police decision to label the followed-up incident as an actual crime. Here again, CCRPs may exert indirect influence on the police not to casually filter out incidents.

Stage VI: At this point a decision must be made as to which crime statistic the criminal incident becomes part of. The dimensions of attrition at this stage are unknown, yet it is easy to imagine the temptation to manipulate crime statistics. CCRPs can indirectly minimize this mislabeling of crimes by educating the citizenry to the relative nature of current crime statistics, thereby easing the pressure on the police to illegitimately reduce the crime rate.

Community spirit. As noted in the previous section dealing with the community, the cooperation and organizing necessary to some CCRPs could lead to several indirect benefits. Community spirit or community cohesion is a potential effect of CCRPs. Becoming familiar with neighbors and their habits is often the basis for many citizen crime-reporting programs, and thus individual citizens may feel less alienated or alone.

Reducing fear and increasing concern. By developing this sense of community, CCRPs could also work to reduce fear of crime and increase citizen concern about the crime problem. CCRP organizers feel that providing the support for symbolic as well as actual duties citizens can perform helps to alleviate some of their fears, adding to the range of responses they can make to the threat of victimization. Not only do they act in ways that contribute to their safety, but they also perceive themselves to be safer. Fear may be reduced in the community as citizens band together to protect themselves and one another. They may feel that they can personally do something to combat crime and preserve their property and well-being. Once the citizens of a community are involved in a CCRP and their concern for crime is raised, it may lead to their joining or participating in other crime prevention programs.

Police-community relations. Better police-community relations are

another positive potential side effect of CCRPs. To implement a program, cooperation between the police and the citizenry is implicit. The police are usually the ones that encourage awareness, sensitivity to suspicious events and the citizen's responsibility for reporting. They are the primary educators of the citizens in this respect. In a like manner, police who participate in CCRPs should become more sensitive to the community's needs and attitudes. Thus, changes in both the behavior and attitudes of citizens and police may be a positive, although indirect, result of the successful operation of a CCRP.

Cooperation with criminal justice system. Cooperation of citizens with the criminal justice system is a possible indirect benefit of crime reporting programs. Citizens may become more involved in the system by providing information for it to act upon. Often simple cooperation in reporting is extended to the citizen's increased willingness to be a witness in court. This behavior, however, is beyond the immediate focus of CCRPs.

Costs. The preservation of citizens' physical and mental well-being is difficult to convert into dollar terms, but it may illustrate the costs of crime to society, and conversely, the savings that can be realized through CCRPs. Aside from these savings, CCRPs are considered to be relatively inexpensive to initiate and operate. They provide new and diversified methods of reporting crime to the authorities in a readily available and inexpensive way. Some programs, for example, use media public service spots and rely upon volunteer community members as workers. Finally, it is conceivable that with better reporting, at more appropriate times, the rate of recovery for stolen property could be improved.

Negative consequences of CCRPs

The positive effects of CCRPs are certainly desirable. These same programs, however, may have potentially deleterious effects for society.

Apparent increase in crime. Better reporting should lead to more accurate crime statistics. Though, in the long run, this may be a positive effect. In the short run, crime rates may appear to skyrocket. The surge in apparent crime rates may cause alarm and panic in the citizens, especially if these statistics are misused by individuals and the media.

Crime statistics may be easily misunderstood as well as misused. For example, the FBI Uniform Crime Report for 1973-1974 reported Portland, Oregon, to have a dramatic 26 per cent increase in burglaries. A survey of Portland residents conducted by the Oregon Research Institute showed that contrary to official statistics, the victimization rate for burglaries had declined. The Oregon Research Institute concluded that the increase in the official statistics for burglaries in Portland was not due to any crime wave, but resulted in part from the fact that a greater proportion of people were reporting burglaries to the police.

It may be difficult to disentangle increased reporting, however, from increased incidence. There may be a rise in crime rates and it may be impossible to say whether it reflects the incidence of crime or increased reporting. Ambiguous statistics can present a false picture of the "state of danger" to the public. This false perception may lead citizens to leave residential areas, to arm themselves with weapons, to become mistrusting and to isolate themselves from others. It may induce them to abandon crime programs altogether.

Displacement. Over a long period of time it may be that CCRPs will do nothing to reduce the incidence of crime or victimization because


displacement of crime may occur as a result of such programs. Persons involved in criminal activities may turn to other tactics and targets. This could be a positive, desirable effect for those in the area with an effective CCRP, but it would be a negative consequence for residents in areas not involved in a similar program. Reducing crime in the city, for example, may cause displacement to occur by moving a crime to the comparatively easy suburban and rural targets (Evaluation Of Crime Control Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, LEAA, 1972).

Paranoia. Instituting a CCRP may increase fear, rather than reduce it. Community members may feel that if they implemented a crime-reporting program it would announce that they have a crime problem that must be handled by special means. Encouraging the watching of neighbors' property and the reporting of suspicious events may induce a sense of paranoia in the citizenry. This paranoia may cultivate mutual distrust among citizens. Such an interventionist mentality could end in an atmosphere of constant surveillance by everyone. Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451 offers an extreme fictional example of a society organized so that everyone spied on friends and relatives. Under the guise of law and order, this sort of atmosphere also appeared in Nazi Germany and in the USSR in the 1930's purge.

Where is the line drawn between being a helpful and concerned citizen and being a nuisance or an informant? If this demarcation is not clearly defined or if moderation is not encouraged in deciding whether an activity or situation is criminal or not, an interventionist atmosphere may become a new problem and a burden. Instead of a means to solve the problem of crime, it could develop a police state atmosphere violating citizens' privacy and civil rights.

The difficulty in clearly defining the limits of suspicion is unintentionally illustrated on the front cover of a booklet, shown below, distributed by a police department. Although the police certainly intended that citizens report the apparant peeping tom, an alternative interpretation of the meaning of the cover is that citizens should spy on their neighbors. The booklet otherwise provides an excellent description of suspicious circumstances and the possible crime involved.

## what is suspicious?



Vigilantism. Citizen involvement in the fight against crime may be beneficial, but it has the potential to become citizen vigilantism. One Tucson, Arizona, newspaper expressed this concern (New Times, March, 1975). Residents in a Neighborhood Watch program, for example, are told to " ... Keep an eye out for suspicious characters." The effects of citizen cooperation and awareness could become one of citizens taking the law into their own hands.

Rather than calling the police, persons might try to capture offenders themselves or substitute themselves as law enforcers, or even judges. Conklin (1975) gave several examples of criminals who took refuge with the police because they had been harmed or feared they would be harmed by the persons who apprehend them and were holding them for the police.

Overload for police and the criminal justice system. Would increased reporting cause overload for the police? If reporting is encouraged, something must be done with the increasing number of reports. The effect of heavier inflow into the police departments has not been fully assessed, even though some officers interviewed by the project staff thought their departments are beginning to feel the impact of the citizen reporting programs. As mentioned previously, one positive effect of increased input could be higher apprehension rates.

Even if more criminals are apprehended, will the courts be able to handle the increased load? Better reporting may overload the criminal justice system as it presently stands. The chain of events put into motion by increased citizen crime reporting could have ramifications on case disposition. Would more criminals be released and returned to their environment? Will these environments be ignored or allowed to



remain the same? The question of whether our laws, prisons and courts are equipped to deal with increased reporting must be raised.

Unfulfilled expectations. With an emphasis and increase in reporting, citizens' expectations regarding what the police can do in response to a call may rise unrealistically. Bitterness, indignation and the withdrawal of citizen cooperation could result if the criminal justice system's capabilities and limitations are not made clear to citizens.

Police resentment. Police officers may resent the increased contributions to their work by citizens. They may feel that citizens are encroaching upon an area that has been considered exclusively theirs for decades. Law enforcement personnel have functioned to detect crimes and apprehend criminals, as well as to prevent the occurrence of crime. As citizens assume more responsibility for these duties and contribute to the final outcome, police may feel that their role in the community is threatened.

Undesirable increase in criminalization. Roles of the citizen, as well as the police, could be threatened by urging citizens to report crimes. There may be personal reasons why a citizen does not want to report. Urging the reporting of any and all criminal behaviors may bring harm to members of the citizen's family or to friends. Laws may not be legitimate or the citizen may appropriately define a given behavior as non-criminal in a given circumstance. A problem also may occur with so-called victimless crimes where a citizen is aware that some specific act - prostitution, for example - is illegal but personally does not consider it criminal. CCRPs should be sensitive to these types of crimes.

Cost-effectiveness of police investigation. Encouraging citizens to report all suspicious events and crimes could affect the apparent rational decision-making process that usually precedes the reporting of a crime. Often a person decides whether it would be worthwhile to report a crime or a suspicious event. Many times reporting a crime and having the police come to investigate it is a costly waste of money and time. This is especially true when a case such as burglary is reported long after the criminal is gone. Hundreds of dollars may be spent in visiting the scene of the crime, taking fingerprints, interviewing people, and looking for other clues, when the clearance rate for these kinds of cases is very low.

Reducing alternatives. Besides affecting rational thinking, CCRPs could promote a feeling that citizens should rely on the police and should define more activities as criminal. This could lead to the weakening of alternative, non-criminal means for dealing with problems, such as neighbors helping each other with domestic problems. CCRPs could lead instead to criminalization of ambiguous situations such as noisy or unusual behavior.

These potential positive and negative effects should be considered for evaluation. The following section discusses the general issues of evaluation; however, the detailed methodologies needed to evaluate positive and negative effects of CCRPs will be presented in other products.

EVALUATION OF CCRPS

Do CCRPs need to be evaluated?

Extensive evaluations have been conducted on expensive social programs that often die after federal funding is withdrawn and are too complex to be feasibly instituted in many locations. In contrast, CCRPs, which are relatively simple and inexpensive to implement, have not been thoroughly evaluated. It is conceivable that evaluations of CCRPs might be more expensive than the operation of CCRPs themselves, but the expense of initial evaluations would be more than justified if it is judged that CCRPs are effective. Steps could easily be taken to institute inexpensive programs of proven effectiveness widely. Thus, it is important to understand the actual impact of CCRPs. Both program operators and funding agencies also need information evaluation can provide for assessing current practices, giving feedback to the public and facilitating future planning.

Do CCRP operators want to be evaluated?

It is uncertain why so few CCRP evaluations have been performed. The questionnaire our project staff has sent to CCRPs requests information concerning evaluation. Responses should provide a better understanding of the number and type of evaluations which have been conducted. Most CCRPs directly affiliated with police departments have operators who appear cognizant of the need for evaluation. It is uncertain whether they understand this need exists because they know evaluation can be helpful in planning, or because they know that evaluation, i.e., accountability, is a reality of our times. Non-police affiliated CCRPs, on the other hand, appear less concerned with the need for a planned evaluation. These operators seem to believe that their own intuition or professional

judgment about the CCRP's impact is all the evaluation necessary.

Who should evaluate CCRPs?

If evaluations are to be of use, they themselves must be competently planned and implemented. A basic decision must be made as to whether there will be an "outside" and/or a "within-house" evaluation (Weiss, 1972). An outside evaluator should find it easier to be objective about the impact of a CCRP but might not be familiar enough with the workings of a program to take all relevant variables into account. Program operators must be assured that outside evaluators are not only experts in evaluation, but also knowledgeable in the functioning and purposes of CCRPs. Only in this way will cooperation, which is necessary to any adequate evaluation, develop between CCRP staff and evaluation personnel. A within-house evaluation has the advantage of using personnel that are already well acquainted with the workings of the CCRP. Using CCRP personnel for evaluation would also be a less potentially threatening approach in the eyes of program operators. People close to the program, however, may find it difficult to be completely objective about its evaluation. Careful consideration should go into any decision to choose evaluators of CCRPs.

How might CCRPs be evaluated?

An evaluation of CCRPs would focus on two types of effectiveness measures, external and internal (Maltz, 1973). The external measures would relate to the success of the CCRP in attaining its proposed impact, e.g., deterring crime in a target area, while internal effectiveness measures would concern process variables, i.e., primarily descriptive measures of what the CCRP is doing to achieve its impact. While internal measures should, in most instances, be easily collected and analyzed, the external measures, being of an inferential nature, will prove more

difficult to validate. Of special interest in any CCRP evaluation should be an assessment of unintended effects such as increased citizen fear of crime and displacement of crime. The detailed questionnaire our project has sent to approximately 100 CCRPs will provide much information pertinent to the issue of what can be and what cannot be done in a Phase II evaluation of CCRPs.

What problems might be encountered in evaluation of CCRPs?

The purpose of evaluation research is to measure the extent to which a program's goals are achieved. In a good evaluation there is also the expectation that controls are set up so that the researcher can tell whether it was the program that led to the achievement of goals rather than any outside factors.

One of the most important problems in conducting a good evaluation is planning the evaluation at the same time the program is being planned. If this is done, careful planning of evaluation measures that fit program goals and activities can be accomplished. Also, certain variables can be measured before a program is implemented for comparison purposes later. A comparison group can also be designated, and the program can be planned carefully so that the comparison group will not be exposed to the program. If an evaluation is conducted post hoc, however, none of these actions can be taken, and effects that occur cannot, with a strong degree of confidence, be directly attributable to the program.

There are many spurious factors that can influence the impact of a program. For instance, CCRPs are especially susceptible to regression, the phenomenon in which a fluctuating indice naturally falls to a lower level after reaching a high point, regardless of any intervention. A program instituted when the crime rate is at a peak could be subject to regression. The CCRP could claim misleadingly that the crime rate

dropped due to its efforts, when the crime rate , in fact, would have declined anyway. Such an example highlights the need for an evaluation that can control for this type of artifact. Using crime rate statistics from a comparable control group could indicate whether the drop in crime rate was similar for both groups.

Using a control group also eliminates other threats to the validity of the effects of a program. History is a threat when an observed effect might be due to some event that took place during the life of a program but had nothing to do with the program. Thus, if better lighting were installed throughout a city and the crime rate went down for the program area and a control area in that city, it would be clear that the lighting and not the program was responsible. If there were no control group, however, the program might claim that the reduced crime rate occurred as a result of its effectiveness. One way to minimize these problems in evaluation research is to use true experimental designs (Riecken & Boruch, 1974).

External validity, or being able to generalize from one evaluated program to others in different settings at different times and involving different people and methods, is also a problem that must be dealt with in conducting CCRP evaluations (Cook & Campbell, in press). Evaluations must be undertaken in different communities with different types of programs to draw definite conclusions about general effectiveness.

Have any CCRPs been evaluated?

In the initial screening interviews of the CCRPs selected for our project's questionnaire, 51 program operators indicated that some form of evaluation of their program had been conducted. At present, our files contain documentation of 21 of these evaluation reports. The quality and scope of these reports vary. In general, those conducted by outside

evaluators are more thorough and sophisticated than those conducted by CCRP personnel. Most reports are positive and optimistic in their conclusions, although the results used to substantiate these conclusions are not as clear cut as the evaluators seem to think they are. Below are descriptive rather than critical paragraphs describing each of the evaluations received to date. These descriptions are divided into three categories. First, programs having statistical information but no formal evaluation will be described. Second, programs having evaluation information presented in progress reports will be discussed. Third, programs having a formal evaluation report will be discussed.

Statistics only.

The Neighborhood Security Unit of the Nassau County, New York Police Department keeps records of statistics relevant to process measures. The program enrolled over 30,000 families in 1974, and members of the unit made 183 speeches. An evaluation of the program was conducted a few years ago, but we are unable at this time to obtain a copy of it. Similar statistics are also kept on the Community Radio Watch program. For example, there are a total of 8170 vehicles involved in the program.

The Crime Alert Program in Chattanooga, Tennessee, keeps careful records of calls made to the program, which run about 1,000 per month. Records on resulting arrests are also kept (e.g., total arrests in June 1975 reached 61).

The Golden Valley, Minnesota Police Department cites comparative crime reporting statistics for 1973 and 1974. On the whole, the number of crimes reported for the two years were rather equivalent; 11,922 for 1973, and 11, 972 for 1974. The police department has also conducted

a community survey on general attitudes toward social problems and government services. One important result of the survey was an assessment of the community's likelihood to report a specific event, e.g., marijuana smoking, (47% would report); loud party, (15% would report); shoplifters, (55% would report); etc.

The Silent Observer program in Battle Creek, Michigan has received over 500 clues since its inception in 1971. Rewards totaling \$21,871 have been paid out on the 86 calls that led to convictions. In the words of the program's founder, Battle Creek businessman, Ken Sholes, "more crime has been solved by buying this information than would have been possible by instituting more conventional police methods with the same amount of money."

The We TIP program of Pomona, California keeps a running count on statistics related to the program. They received 5,589 tips resulting in 640 arrests and 186 convictions. The worth of illegal drugs seized due to We TIP information is in excess of \$4 million. On the basis of these figures, the operators to the program have deemed it an unqualified success.

In the last year, the Salinas, California Police Department has received 384 calls on their Crime Tip line. These calls led to 20 arrests. Since the equipment needed to operate this CCRP cost less than \$300 a year, the police concluded that they "can think of no other single tool returning so much information for so little cost."

Block Watch in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, has been evaluated informally by its implementers, who cite a 25% reduction in burglary in the last year to support their assertion that the program is successful. They also indicate that participation in Block Watchers organizations



that have been formed is close to 100%.

Progress report evaluations.

The Neighborhood Alert Program of St. Petersburg, Florida, keeps track of process variables such as number of meetings held, number of home security inspections, and number of citizens receiving information. These figures are published in monthly reports. So far there seem to be no direct measurements of impacts, but a victimization survey has been conducted recently by another agency in the city showing that crime reporting is higher (e.g., 74% for breaking and entering) in St. Petersburg than is the case nationally (e.g., 50% for breaking and entering). The survey also produced information on feelings of safety, with 51% of the respondents indicating that they would feel unsafe walking alone in their neighborhoods at night, and 9% feeling unsafe during the day.

The Impact Awareness Project of Cleveland, Ohio, is evaluated in terms of process measures in the final report of the program. The materials distributed and the media campaign conducted by implementers of the program were carefully documented. For example, 24 billboards were displayed, awareness literature was randomly sent to 150,000 Cleveland homes, etc. No impact measures were tapped, however, so it is not known how the program was received by the public.

The Crime Check program, a division of the crime prevention unit of the Warren, Michigan police department, files quarterly reports that contain certain process measures, such as the number of presentations, (49 in first quarter, 1975) attendance at the presentation (3,500 in first quarter of 1975) number of people viewing a van display (10,000 in first quarter of 1975), etc. The program also has access to crime statistics compiled by the department.

The Crime Prevention Program in Waco, Texas, which implements

Friends for a Safe Neighborhood, compiles quarterly progress reports in which comparative crime statistics and figures concerning number of persons contacted, number of advertisements, etc., are listed. No inferences were drawn to suggest that the program's activities, e.g., contacting approximately 5000 citizens at public meetings, are related to the changing crime statistics.

~~Crime~~ Crime Stop program in San Antonio, Texas has been linked by the police to the city's reduction in crimes of robbery, burglary, auto theft, and other thefts. Police records show that in 1971, approximately 22,000 calls were logged over the Crime Stop telephone line. This figure is compared to 3,300 calls in 1966 when an earlier version of Crime Stop was tried. In 1971, 546 persons were arrested due to Crime Stop calls. This figure increased to 778 arrests due to Crime Stop calls in 1972.

The Crime Prevention Program operated by the Stockton, California, police department has yearly reports completed by an evaluation team at the University of the Pacific. The evaluation report cites a decrease in major crimes by 16% during the second project year. It does not attribute this decrease to any specific part of the crime prevention effort, but crime reporting calls were found to have increased during the second year by 38% over the project's first year.

In its fifth quarterly report since the inception of Crime Confidential, the San Jose, California, police department concludes that its advertising campaign has made the citizenry aware of the Crime Confidential hot-line. During this quarter the police received 177 CC calls, and the progress report cites examples of eight major cases which were solved

or assisted by information from Crime Confidential. For example, three persons were arrested with 700 pounds of marijuana.

Formal evaluation reports.

The lengthy evaluation of the National Neighborhood Watch Program by the Midwest Research Institute takes a descriptive approach focusing on the perceptions of NW by participating law enforcement agencies rather than its impact on crime reduction or public responses to the program. The study focuses on process variables (1,545 cases of literature have been distributed, 659 law enforcement agencies are participating) rather than on measures of impact, except for opinions of participating law enforcement officials, who overall felt positive about the program's success (e.g., average rating of suitability of materials was 8.8 out of a possible 11 points).

The Burglary Reduction Project in Seattle, Washington, set a statistically significant increase in the number of burglary-in-progress calls as one of its goals. This increase was expected to occur if the Seattle programs were effective in increasing the number of citizen reports of burglaries and suspicious activities. To test this increase the evaluators proposed to look at the increase in proportion of burglary-in-progress calls to total burglary calls. Unfortunately, data collection was interrupted and this goal will have to wait to be evaluated in the second year final evaluation report.

The evaluation of the Portland, Oregon, Neighborhood-Based Anti-Burglary Program by the Oregon Research Institute is an example of what an evaluation can and should be. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the impact of the program on burglary reduction and to examine other program consequences, e.g., increased crime reporting.

It was found in a victimization survey that 80% of citizens who had participated in the program's activities and were burglarized reported it, while only 68% of those who did not participate in the CCRP and were burglarized reported the burglary.

An article on Home Alert of Oakland, California, with a section on evaluation of the program, was published in the July, 1974 issue of Crime Prevention Review. The program was deemed resoundingly successful based on the downward trend in the indexes of serious crimes since 1970 when the program was instituted. Other impact measures did not appear to have been employed, though some process measures were referred to (e.g., number of Home Alert groups presently functioning).

The Public Information Education Program for All Neighborhoods (PIEPAN) of Manteca, California, recently underwent an evaluation of first year productivity and results by an outside researcher. The goals of the program were outlined and four objectives leading to the goals were specified. The activities of the program in relation to these objectives were examined and quantified, and suggestions for future activities were made. Most notably, requests for police service (including crime reporting) increased 40%, and it was suggested that if a victimization survey had been undertaken it may have resulted in an adjusted crime index, which would also have indicated a reduction in burglary.

The Multnomah County Crime Prevention Unit in Oregon has a formal evaluation report containing both process and impact measurements. For example, nearly 40,000 people were contacted by the program in the last year through block meetings, a display center, a property identification program, or premise surveys. The program keeps careful records of publicity

meetings and other records of project activities. Impact measures included a follow-up questionnaire to citizens attending block meetings which indicated that the recommendations from the meetings were being followed, and that 81% of the citizens felt more secure after attending a meeting. Burglary statistics before and after the program was started were also used in evaluating the program. The burglary rate dropped 14.9% in a test area of the county, while it dropped 9.9% county-wide.

The Neighborhood Alert program in Fresno, California has a number of measures of both process and impact variables, some of which have been written up in a yearly report for 1974 and in a justification for continuation of the program. The yearly report lists process variables such as number of home security inspections, number of people viewing the mobile display unit, number of presentations made to groups, number of Neighborhood Watch groups formed, and types of publicity the program has received. Impact variables included an increased number of burglary arrests and clearance rates over past years and the fact that one out of six homes that were not inspected by the program were burglarized, compared with one out of 100 for inspected homes. A recent survey of citizen awareness of the program also showed that 89% of the citizens surveyed were aware of the program.

How would CCRP evaluation results be used?

Program operators could best use results to modify their present procedures for greater effectiveness. Positive results could also be used as concrete evidence of the success of a program. Such evidence is increasingly being demanded by funding agencies and the public. Outside agencies should find evaluation results helpful in making decisions concerning financing, setting up new programs, stopping programs with

unintended negative effects, etc. Ultimately, evaluations of CCRPs could indicate whether CCRPs are a viable approach to crime prevention.

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