

FOREWORD

The physical protection of public officials is a relatively new function of law enforcement; in recent years there has been an alarming increase of violent incidents aimed at prominent businessmen, government officials and their families, and members of the criminal justice profession throughout the world. These incidents have included bombings, assassinations, and political and criminal kidnapping. These are the result of revolutionary groups and disturbed individuals who attempt to achieve their individual goals through violence. Such extraordinary criminal emergencies pose special problems for law enforcement agencies. It has become obvious that these activities will increase in number, and that defensive tactics employed by law enforcement in relatively peaceful years are inadequate to cope with the new revolutionary and extremist movement when the target is the public official.

In 1974, the California State Police was awarded a grant by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration through the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning to develop both a methodology for state officials protection and a plan for statewide mobilization of contingency protective services teams. This manual is the result of our efforts to meet these very important goals and objectives.

It is hoped that various procedures and techniques included in this manual will be material assistance to all law enforcement agencies in preparing for and responding to the ever increasing threats directed toward government officials in the United States.

CALIFORNIA STATE POLICE

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INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Every government official is vulnerable; he epitomizes the authority of the law and seemingly controls the direction of social development. The official is a public figure and as such must expose himself to the public, due mostly to the very nature of the job. The threat to his well-being comes not from the public at large, but from one citizen or group of citizens in ten thousand who has selected him as a target and a means of achieving a personal or political goal.

The official can represent many things to many persons; he might be seen as belonging to an opposite political party, a well-known personality, a progressive leader, or merely another politician. He may not be known to the general public at all. For the most part the official is not seen as being a means of achieving a radical end; however, he may become a very real victim of violence.

There are many reasons why an aggressor may select a public official as his target, but basically they may be classified in three categories; psychological, criminal and political.

In terms of psychology of the assault, a person may be suffering from delusion or the inability to distinguish reality. The official frequently represents an archetype. The assailant may have received a "message from God" that the official must be killed.

Another common cause of assault against a government figure is paranoia; the subject feels the public official is "selling us out" or is personally responsible for all the problems the paranoiac may be experiencing.

Aggression might have been transferred from either an unknown or unreachable source to the official. As with the father who "takes it out on his children", a weak personality might attack the most readily available representative of authority.

The psychopath or sociopath is an element nearly impossible to predict. The assault is merely built-up aggression vented by a sick personality.

A person suffering a weak ego may attempt to gain recognition or achieve a distorted self-realization by slaying a well-known person.

In America, the majority of assassinations of prominent politicians have been accomplished by the mentally ill. In the past several years, however, there has been an increasing number of incidents caused by much more foreboding elements: political extremists and criminals.

A person or group of persons who plan to assault a government official have a much more organized approach. The assault is well thought out and coordinated, though the actual operation is usually simplistic. The assailants can choose the time, place and method of attack, usually utilizing a number of support personnel.

The criminal is after personal gain or satisfaction, resorting mostly to kidnap and ransom tactics. The actual payment of ransom, however, does not preclude the killing of the victim by kidnappers. Terrorists resort to violent tactics for political purposes. As demonstrated repeatedly, ransom usually involves a payment of some kind to the underprivileged, release of "political" prisoners, or an attempt to coerce social change. Assassination is at any time a very real prerogative of the terrorists.

There is no way to specifically describe the potential assailant, though Appendix I outlines some successful and would-be assassins. He may be a face in a crowd, a passer-by, or a casual shopper. The terrorist may be a young girl driving around the block or a telephone repairman. The possibilities are endless.

To those of the criminal justice community, the problem of public official protection exists because of the current state of society and inherent human weakness. It is a problem with no easy solution.

Objectives of the Public Officials Protection Program

The goal of this program is to improve the security and survival capability of state officials. To obtain that goal, objectives were formulated:

1. To broaden and enhance the capabilities of State Police and other law enforcement agencies to provide protective services through training.
2. To provide equipment, procedures and administrative support for California law enforcement to provide protective services on a contingency basis.
3. To compile information relating to current planning concepts and methods of operation of the protective task, with emphasis on contemporary violence such as threat, kidnap and assassination.
4. To establish a response force capable of reacting to threats or violence occurring to a state official anywhere within the state.
5. To provide an improved security plan for the protection of state and other elected officials on a continuing basis.

This manual is a result of having achieved those objectives. Use of the manual and adoption of the training program developed by the California State Police should enable law enforcement agencies in other states to be better prepared to respond to their respective areas of responsibility in the protection of public officials. Emergency situations may then be supervised and administered by trained, experienced personnel who have been provided with proper planning, preparation, logistical support, operational tactics, and preventive methods. Capable personnel should be able to coordinate their plans during times of crisis and better understand the abilities and limitations of others having similar tasks.

Legal Authority and Funding

Although the group or agency having the responsibility of protecting state officials will vary from state to state, a lawful authority to provide the protection function will normally be required. Section 14613 of the California Government Code states that, "... the California State Police may provide for the physical security of the constitutional officers of the state and the legislators of the state". Accordingly, the Protective Services Operation is financed through the state's General Fund. Additional funds may be made available by statute during a declared emergency.

Planning the Protective Services Contingency Program

For general reference with regard to the overall planning approach, two phases should be considered: (1) the Preliminary Planning Phase, which entails administrative considerations, and (2) the Implementation Phase which, once in motion, will embody the actual operational organization. The latter phase may be evaluated for purposes of refinement, adjustment and ultimate activation.

THE PRELIMINARY PLANNING PHASE

The Preliminary Planning Phase is focused upon a multitude of administrative tasks. Budget, as the heart of all such planning, will of course be of principal concern. While no discussion of budgetary details will be offered in this manual as methods of funding are immensely variable, it should be pointed out that contingency programs often cause fiscal problems which require substantial skill to resolve; insurmountable budgetary variables which could otherwise be anticipated in advance can in effect terminate an emergency program. Communications equipment, construction and maintenance costs are most subject to variables and must be skillfully projected. On the other hand, salaries, training and travel expenses can be reasonably estimated although they will constitute the bulk of fiscal commitments.

The actual planning tasks to be included in the Preliminary Planning Phase might include:

1. Personnel selection criteria.
2. Development of a training program which involves:
 - a. The establishment of a training staff.
 - b. The formulation of curriculum.
 - c. The training of selected personnel.
3. Development of a statewide protective services organizational structure.
4. Formulation of operational needs.
5. Selection and establishment of an administrative and support staff.

Personnel Selection Criteria

Personnel selection criteria will vary with the scope and nature of the protective operation. The background of prospective personnel will lend a great deal of knowledge about character, but background criteria need not be limited to law enforcement. The protective function is not exclusively limited to mere ability to personally defend; in fact, technical ability can be as important as the ability to respond offensively under stress.

In practice, the elite group of officers assigned to the protective team as bodyguards will be the final perimeter between an assailant and his target. Persons protecting an official primarily function in a deterrent role as opposed to a preventative role. Assassination attempts are more often prevented by thorough technical and advance preparation personnel. Substantial police and military experience must be considered in light of the function; the ability to respond to a danger may not be as critical as the ability to foresee the danger.

In performing the protective services function on a state level, economy must often take precedence over perfection. An ideal team might include innumerable specialists, but more often than not a diversity of expertise by one individual must be sought.

Special Weapons and Tactics (S.W.A.T.) teams, for example, have a legitimate and valuable position in law enforcement and are viable as a specialized unit in protective services operations. The members of these teams, however, are by necessity trained to attack vigorously. The primary goal of protection is to defend and then immediately evacuate the protectee, to hit and run instead of stay and fight. Care must be taken in the selection of such personnel in terms of the psychological subtleties involved.

Other special qualifications must be equally scrutinized. The talents an individual may have in a related field can be beneficial to the protective team provided that the skill is in addition to other basic requirements.

The protective assignment is in many ways the most demanding of law enforcement duties. This demand is not only placed upon the person himself, but upon his family as well. Protection of a public official involves much time away from home, long and unusual hours, and sometimes an additional financial burden. Family relationships of protective services personnel can suffer severely from demands of the job, consequently resulting in psychological stress to the individual officer and a resultant slackening of performance.

Psychological stability is a key element in protection. As noted before, a good, aggressive "street cop" might not be able to adapt to the subtleties of close affiliation with highly placed public figures and the primary goals of protection. At the same time, an individual's inexperience and naivety may hinder his ability to "sense" when something is wrong. Intuitiveness is a beneficial trait in protection.

The ideal protective services officer must have achieved a delicate balance between experience and other less tangible considerations. He must be polite, sociable, even-tempered, and responsible. The job demands good grooming and a pleasant appearance, as he will be closely associated with the public as a representative of the protectee. All things considered, the protective services officer must be professional, since he will have a great deal of contact with other law enforcement agencies, political groups and individuals, and the public. (See Appendix 2 - Personnel Criteria for Selection.)

Establishment of a Training Staff

Project instructors should consist of state enforcement command, supervisory and specialist personnel trained and experienced in protective services techniques and procedures. For this purpose, it will be necessary to select the training staff based not only on the factors of training experience and normal protective services qualifications, but also on ability as well as availability to instruct. In most cases, after the selection of instructors has been made, the training of those instructors will more than likely be done by an outside agency*. After appropriate training, instructors should be responsible for the development of curriculum, training aids and related items.

*The California State Police will accept applications for protective services instructor training at the State Police training facility, Sacramento, California.

The Development of Curriculum

Once the training staff has been established, curriculum development constitutes the next major consideration. Assuming that those enforcement personnel selected for assignment to the contingency force have had an adequate level of training and experience in regular enforcement work, the curriculum can then be concerned only with theory, practice and operational procedures. Of course, specialized support team members should not be excluded from training in the total protective services function.

Training of Personnel

While the curriculum developed by the California State Police was designed primarily to suit the contingency needs, it was also intended for use in preparing recruits for better assisting protective services personnel when uniform assignments are necessary and for the possibility of eventual assignment to the Protective Services Bureau (see Appendix 3 — Course Syllabus). Upon completion of the course the officers will normally resume their regular duties except when called to protective services assignments or training.

Essentially, trainees should be given as much field exercise as possible and visual aids should be stressed, including films of recent assassinations and color slides. Group interaction and individual participation may be heightened by an informal atmosphere, which is essential to the theoretical nature of many of the procedures. Though the classes may consist of several different law enforcement agencies, a mutual understanding and comradery can be easily established.

Development of Organizational Structure

The protective services contingency force which will provide protection for state officials should consist primarily of state law enforcement personnel (e.g., State Police, Highway Patrol, etc.) specially selected and divided into units or teams trained for assignment to operational areas throughout the state. Use of state personnel also allows for ongoing travel protection of officials on statewide trips, if necessary or desired by the official involved.

The number of personnel assigned to teams and the location of those teams will vary depending upon geographical, demographical and other considerations. For example, after carefully assessing the needs in California, it was decided to establish ten contingency teams of fifteen officers each, including a team leader of supervisory rank. These teams were designed to supplement existing protective services resources. The teams are located in five principal cities of California from San Diego at the southern border to Sacramento in the north-central portion of the state. Three teams are located in the three major population centers — San Francisco, Los Angeles and Sacramento.

Because a high degree of centralized operational coordination is a vital element to the success of a protective services contingency force, an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) should be established at a location selected primarily to facilitate ease of operations as opposed to other less important factors, such as capitol city, State Capitol building, etc. An unobtrusive atmosphere can offer good physical protection for critical communications facilities at all times, little public traffic and little or no notoriety as to its purpose. The EOC can normally be used as a police administrative office when not activated for the protective services function.

From a centralized operations center such as the EOC, statewide protective services activities can be monitored, directed and coordinated. Statewide communications capability might then be possible with all protective services teams and would provide needed control from command personnel who, in turn, could be in direct contact with the office of the protectee.

Formulation of Operational Needs

Equipment and support needs can be basically established when the number of team personnel are known, communications needs established, and geographic logistical considerations determined. All these factors will vary depending upon the scope of the operation; however a listing of basic needs follows later in this manual.

The primary problem in establishing needed logistics is anticipation of cost less available resources. It is imperative, however, that the quality of operation not be sacrificed for an unexpected demand exceeding available supply. To this end, a margin of surplus should be allowed.

Selection and Establishment of Administrative and Support Staff

As compared to the selection of protective services personnel, the task of selecting support personnel is not as difficult, though just as critical. Proficiency in the area of responsibility is the primary criteria; a second criteria is the ability to keep information confidential.

Administrative and support staff perform many essential duties, from maintenance of records to disbursement of pay. A good staff will assist in maintaining good morale, an efficient operation and a source of constructive evaluators (see Appendix 4 — Administrative Support of Personnel).

Much of the protective function exists as theory; operational procedures must necessarily be reevaluated and updated as circumstances dictate. Experienced law enforcement personnel having good analytical ability are an invaluable asset to the support staff.

THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

Equipment

Equipment for use by protective teams may be stockpiled in the locations selected as operational bases in quantities determined by the number of personnel at that base. The amount and type of equipment which are minimal requirements for a team of ten protective services officers are as follows:

1. Ten handi-talkies with remote microphone and earphone, as small as possible, and equipped with a belt clip on the back.
2. Five double-unit, handi-talkie battery chargers capable of both trickle and rapid charge.
3. Twenty handi-talkie batteries.
4. Ten revolvers, .38 special caliber, 2" barrel or similar, with a six-round cylinder. Automatic hand guns are not recommended for protective assignments, as accidental discharge is more likely than with the use of revolvers.
5. Ten holsters for revolvers, soft leather with clip, fitting inside the belt area.
6. Ten ammunition pouches, undercover flip-down style, holding six rounds of compatible ammunition.
7. Ten handcuffs, blue instead of chrome.
8. Ten identification pins, a distinctive form of tie tack or lapel pin, coordinated with those pins utilized on the statewide level.
9. One portable base radio such as the Motorola PT-400 or similar if VHF, 10 watts. If a UHF frequency is to be used, a 10 watt console fitted in a modified briefcase with a remote antenna works very effectively. If the VHF radio is to be used, a battery charger and three batteries are required. The UHF station is AC powered.
10. One undercover vehicle with inside hood and trunk lid release, preferably an intermediate size four-door sedan with at least a mid-performance engine.
11. One electronic siren with an undercover speaker mounted beneath the hood. The siren control may be visible, but is best mounted beneath the seat or in an accessible, inconspicuous location. There should be a minimum of control features on the siren.
12. One undercover (red or blue) light of a style preferred by the agency. Cigarette lighter plugs as a source of power connection are not recommended.
13. One high wattage mobile radio with undercover antenna and concealed mounting.
14. One automatic rifle or submachine gun, capable of being collapsed and placed in a modified briefcase. The 9mm Uzi submachine gun, an Israeli Army weapon, is preferred. Four full clips of ammunition are sufficient.
15. One 12 gauge shotgun with a collapsible stock. Use No. 6 or No. 4 shot instead of No. 00.

16. One rifle, no larger than .308 caliber, in a fiberglass case. The rifle should be equipped with a variable-power scope and be supplied with at least 15 rounds of ammunition.
17. Three protective vests, Sacramento vest or equivalent, with three front inserts and at least one back insert. Fiber vests in addition to the plate vests are optional.
18. One resuscitator with demand valve regulator in case, and two face masks (child and adult).
19. One spine board, collapsible, with straps. A spine board is a stiff wood or aluminum stretcher, necessary in the event a subject has received back injuries.
20. One briefcase first aid kit containing:
 - a. One inflatable arm splint.
 - b. One inflatable leg splint.
 - c. Six ounces saline solution.
 - d. One S-shaped plastic airway.
 - e. Four multi-trauma pads, 4" x 7".
 - f. CPR face mask.
 - g. One package ammonia inhalants.
 - h. One 3-inch cotton elastic bandage.
 - i. One roll adhesive tape, 2" x 180".
 - j. One muslin arm sling, 37" x 37" x 52".
 - k. One compress bandage, 7½ x 8".
 - l. One dozen safety pins.
 - m. One pair heavy-duty cast or bandage scissors.
 - n. One pair straight surgical scissors.
 - o. Two hemostats, one straight and one curved.
 - p. One military style web tourniquet.
 - q. One roll Saran Wrap or similar material.
 - r. One scalpel (optional, depending upon the training of the personnel).
21. Two sets of binoculars, mid-power.
22. One spotting scope, 60X.
23. Miscellaneous tear gas devices.
24. Twelve gas masks.

When a protective team is mobilized, the vehicle and other equipment is issued to the detail leader. Each officer should be issued a revolver, holster, ammunition pouch, identification pin, an issue of 12 rounds of compatible ammunition, earphone, microphone and handi-talkie. Depending on operational circumstance, the command post or vehicle retains control of the portable base radio and miscellaneous supplies. The briefcases containing the automatic rifle or submachine gun and the first aid kit must remain with officers in the proximity of the protectee (or principal) at all times; the shotgun is usually carried near the principal only when need dictates.

Depending on amount of use, the following maintenance schedule is recommended:

1. **Vehicle:** Should receive a thorough check by officers prior to each use. In addition to normal preventive maintenance, a qualified mechanic should examine the entire vehicle every 1000- to 2000-mile period.

2. *Weapons:* Personal revolvers should be inspected by the detail leader at least once a month. Other weapons should receive a weekly check and cleaning, and be field-tested once each month.
3. *Communication Equipment:* All communications equipment should receive a maintenance check every month, primarily for frequency drift, wattage output and sensitivity. Batteries must be replaced when weak.
4. *First Aid Equipment:* The first aid kit must be checked daily for content. The resuscitator should be tested twice a month, and the oxygen content checked prior to any movement.
5. *Tear Gas:* Tear gas should be checked monthly for pin-placement, leakage, and dates of expiration. Gas masks should receive preventive maintenance and air-tightness tests monthly.

A full inventory of team equipment should be supplied to the EOC on a monthly basis containing dates of expiration, condition of equipment, any maintenance performed and persons to whom the equipment is issued.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

During mobilization of a protective team, the EOC will be the primary center of activity. As such, it is important to provide adequate supplies and communications facilities.

The protective services communications center should be separated from normal operations; it need not be manned except during mobilization of a team. In addition to any critical radio equipment, communications should be supplemented by a National Crime Information Center teletype, local law enforcement teletype, an All-Points-Bulletin teletype and a Western Union teletypewriter.

Telephone communications are also very important. A telephone with a capacity of several lines will enable a receptionist to receive calls and direct them to the proper staff personnel. Other telephones consisting of "hotlines" to local police, fire, and ambulance agencies and a special unlisted telephone for use by principals and their staff can also be installed.

The configuration of the EOC facility depends upon both the physical location and individual operational needs; however, the dispatch center should generally be separate from the primary conference and operations room. A storage room is normally required, as well as restroom facilities for both male and female staff. Since private conferences can be anticipated, an office for this purpose should be provided.

The EOC facility, as noted before, can also be used as an administration office. As such, certain inconveniences would be experienced during team mobilization, and selection of the EOC site should provide for alternative administrative offices.

Several items should be in storage at the EOC:

1. Large chalk board.
2. Status board.

3. Folding conference tables.
4. Folding chairs.
5. A water bottle and dispenser.
6. Large first aid kits.
7. Resuscitators.
8. Stretchers.
9. Bunk beds.
10. 12-gauge shotguns.
11. Handi-talkies with battery chargers.
12. Miscellaneous office supplies.

EOC Administrative Staff

The EOC administrative staff should consist of the chief or director of the primary protection agency, representatives of the principal, representatives of other related state agencies and personnel from other law enforcement agencies as necessary. These persons need not be physically present at the EOC facility, but must remain accessible to the EOC support staff, which consists of dispatchers and other support personnel as determined by the primary protection agency (see Appendix 5 -- EOC Administrative Staff; and Appendix 6 -- EOC Support Staff).

EOC Functions

The primary functions of an EOC are: (1) to direct, coordinate and maintain communications with the protective services teams; (2) to receive, collate and disseminate information; and (3) to provide information, logistic and technical support to mobilized teams. To achieve these objectives the following records should be maintained at the Emergency Operations Center:

1. ***Communications***
 - a. Contacts with communications representatives of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.
 - b. Multi-agency radio codes.
 - c. Teletype codes and procedures.
 - d. Locations of equipment distribution points.
 - e. Operating and maintenance manuals of radios.
 - f. Telephone company representatives.
2. ***Liaison***
 - a. FBI contacts.
 - b. U.S. Secret Service contacts.
 - c. Contacts with operations units of police and sheriff's offices.
 - d. Contacts with other related agencies (i.e., explosives technicians, AT&F, local public works, etc.).
 - e. Military contacts.
 - f. Other state agencies contacts.
3. ***Technical Security***
 - a. SWAT and TAC teams and locations.
 - b. Local power companies.
 - c. Technical security units of other agencies.
 - d. Specialized law enforcement teams locations.

4. *Intelligence*

- a. Centralized intelligence files.
- b. Intelligence cross-references for files.
- c. Protective services intelligence personnel (PI) telephone numbers.
- d. Listings of municipal and sheriff's intelligence units.
- e. Federal agency contacts.
- f. Other sources.

5. *Operations*

- a. Team personnel files.
- b. Radio log.
- c. Activities log.
- d. Airlines contacts.
- e. Vehicle lessors.
- f. Standard operating procedures.
- g. Contingency plans.
- h. Records on principal, including medical (see Appendix 7 -- Principal and Family Checklist).
- i. Itineraries of principal.
- j. Teletype logs.
- k. Advance reports listed by location.
- l. Telephone directories of major cities.

The agency administrator in charge of the program is a key figure in the EOC concept. He is responsible for advising the staff of operational needs, coordinating and evaluating the function of the support staff, and is in charge of initial and ongoing team training.

It is important to consider the Emergency Operations Center in terms of concept rather than physical location. The EOC can be fully operational with only the presence of a dispatcher and one supervisor who has the authority to make interim decisions. The EOC staff may only consist of the head of the protection agency, the principal or his executive assistant, or become as large and complex as to include several law enforcement agency heads and a governor with his full cabinet. The final responsibility for decisions, however, rests with the chief or director of the primary protection agency.

PROCEDURES

Theory of Protection

An officer assigned to protecting an individual rarely is able to comprehend the full scope of his responsibility. It would be reasonable to state that any officer not totally aware of the environment surrounding a principal is not doing the job well enough; such total awareness can determine whether or not the principal is to survive.

Spheres of Control

Protection of a principal consists of controlling his immediate environment in varying degrees. In theory, protection can be considered as a series of concentric spheres radiating outward from the principal, who is at the center. Four spheres totally surround the principal:

First Sphere – Exclusionary Zone

The first sphere is the most important sphere because it surrounds the principal himself. Known as the exclusionary zone, it is an area that no unauthorized person can enter.

Second Sphere – Restricted Zone

The second sphere, called the restricted zone, is an environment in which access to the principal is strictly controlled. Persons entering this zone do so by having proper identification; i.e., it is not accessible by the general public. An example of this might be a large auditorium where persons may enter only with a specific ticket or invitation.

Third Sphere – Controlled Zone

The third sphere, or controlled zone, encompasses that area where the environment, if not totally controlled, has been identified. It may be the route by which the principal walks or drives to work or the auditorium in which he is speaking to a group.

Fourth Sphere – Uncontrolled Zone

The fourth sphere is the uncontrolled zone. The principal, ideally, is never exposed to the uncontrolled zone, where security factors are either unknown or without control. This zone is nebulous; an effective intelligence system is able to provide some information, but there are always threats of unknown hazards.

An example of this concept can be illustrated by considering the principal's residence:

1. *Exclusionary Zone:* The interior of the residence.
2. *Restricted Zone:* The perimeter of the yard.
3. *Controlled Zone:* The area visible from the yard of the principal's residence, as well as the surrounding residential blocks.
4. *Uncontrolled Zone:* The remaining area outside the controlled zone.

Potential and real hazards are innumerable; e.g., the principal's vehicle, a faulty lamp, contaminated food, a loose stair, poorly constructed speaking platform, etc. The primary goal of the protective services officer is to protect the principal from these hazards, whether that hazard is a person intent on harming the principal or an object which could cause illness or injury. The key term in total protection is "environment."

Another goal of protection is the prevention of embarrassment to the principal. This involves many factors. A principal may have poor vision and have a tendency to bump into objects; he may walk up to the podium and attempt to turn on a small lamp, only not be able to find the switch; he might be photographed in many compromising situations which could have been avoided. Above all, the officer must not allow the principal to fall if he should lose his footing.

Elements of Protection Teams

The protective services team assigned one principal should consist of the following:

1. *Detail Leader*: The detail leader is a protective services officer, usually a supervisor, who is in overall charge of the team. He is under the direction of the EOC staff.
2. *Shift Leader*: The shift leader is a protective services officer who is in charge of a particular working shift.
3. *Advance Man*: The advance man is a protective services representative who precedes the principal's visit or movement to any area. He is responsible for all security measures involved in the visit, liaison with local law enforcement, and preparation of advance survey reports (see Appendix 8 -- Advance Checklist).
4. *PI Advance Man*: The protective intelligence advance man is a representative of the EOC support staff, intelligence section. He participates in the advance by establishing liaison with local law enforcement criminal intelligence bureaus, collects and collates intelligence information, and assures that all intelligence information is coordinated with the EOC and the advance man. On some occasions, the advance man (or team) must perform this function.
5. *TS Advance Man*: The technical security advance man coordinates explosive ordnance disposal activities, mail and package examinations, utilizes X-Ray and fluoroscopic equipment, and is responsible for "sweeping", or securing, a facility prior to a principal's arrival.
6. *Principal's Driver*: The principal's driver is responsible for maintaining and protecting the vehicle used or to be used by the principal. He normally stays with the vehicle until it has been properly secured (see Appendix 9 -- Driving Procedures).

The Working Team

At least one officer should accompany the principal when he is outside the exclusionary zone. This is usually the detail leader. The exact number of personnel on the protective detail might vary based on location, amount of people to be met, nature of the function attended, intelligence information and wishes of the principal.

In providing physical protection of the principal, there are two important concepts:

1. The officer is the shield between any hazard or threat and the protectee; as such, it is his job to place himself between the principal and any such threat even at the sacrifice of his own life.
2. A police officer assigned to protective services ceases to be involved in the enforcement of laws. He must not vary from the total goal of his presence — the protection of an individual. A blatant violation of a law could be a diversionary tactic designed to draw the protective services officer from the principal — such a tactic must be ignored.

Members of the protective detail, in order to maintain control over the perimeter of the exclusionary zone, must observe the hands of the crowd in the proximity of the principal, protect him from thrown objects, prevent persons from being able to grab at the protectee's clothing or hands and insure his movement through crowds.

Driving the Principal's Car

The principal is extremely vulnerable when in transit. The driver of the principal's vehicle should be skilled in high speed evasion tactics, must be conscientious and have at least a moderate mechanical aptitude. It is important for him to be able to quickly evaluate and react to situations while driving the car; above all, he cannot stop the vehicle at any time there appears to be a deliberate or potential "setting up" of a kidnap attempt or assault.

Whenever there is a vehicular movement of a principal, his car should be accompanied by a follow-up car. The follow-up car follows the principal's car closely, precluding the chance that another vehicle might come between. The protection detail, excepting the detail leader, is transported in the follow-up car. The detail leader rides in the right-hand front seat of the principal's vehicle.

Advance Survey

Prior to the movement of a principal to another location, an advance man, PI advance man, and if required, TS advance man will visit the location to establish liaison and security. Depending on the circumstances, this may be from several weeks ahead of time to only a few minutes. Regardless of circumstances, someone should precede the principal's exposure to an area.

The detail leader receives and reviews the advance survey and report (see Appendix 10 — Site Surveys; and Appendix 11 — Sample Building Survey Format), after which it is routed to the EOC for evaluation. The route survey, which is performed by the advance man, is reviewed by the principal's driver (see Appendix 12 — Motorcades and Route Security; and Appendix 13 — Preliminary Route Survey).

Mission Abortion

The protective detail, principal and detail leader normally begin the movement after notifying the EOC of both departure time and estimated time of arrival at the site. Advance security personnel can then begin the complex task of preparing the site for arrival. Any late developments should immediately be relayed to the EOC by the advance man; if applicable, the EOC may then route that information to the detail leader. Should the environment become too hazardous, the EOC staff can order the mission aborted prior to the principal's arrival.

Site Preparation

The site should be prepared by establishing a command center, security room, holding room and security beats:

1. **Command Center:** The major security force operations center for a movement or activity, separate from the EOC. A portable base radio should be located here, where all large scale security and support activities can be directed and controlled. It should be equipped with at least two telephone lines. The command post is usually located in an inconspicuous room, well away from either the principal's room or the activity area. From here, constant contact with the EOC may be maintained. If utilized, it is manned 24 hours a day.
2. **Security Room:** A temporary or permanent location used as a squad room for officers not on duty or for pre-duty briefings. Various items of equipment, such as ammunition and battery chargers, are kept in the security room. On smaller activities or movements, it is often the command center as well.
3. **Holding Room:** A secure, private area at a visit site, usually set aside for the principal's convenience. It should have a telephone, bathroom, commercial radio and television set. This room is ideal if a principal arrives too early at a speaking engagement.
4. **Security Beats:** Areas of responsibility established to form a part of the security network. It is best that protective services officers man these beats, but, if necessary, local law enforcement may supplement. There are three types of security beats:
 - a. **Checkpoint:** This type of security beat is a control point limiting access to a secure area or restricted zone. Everyone entering must be cleared by security personnel operating the checkpoint. These beats are usually established in doorways, hallways, stairwells, and at admission gates.
 - b. **Surveillance:** A surveillance beat involves observation of a specific area and the people in it. It can be surveillance of rooftops, buildings, entrances and exits, or highway underpasses and overpasses.
 - c. **Special Assignment:** This type of beat can be the responsibility of maintaining the security of a principal's luggage which is very important, or the command center, security room or driving the follow-up car.

Operating Procedures

As with any effective organization, an established set of standard operating procedures is essential; however, the protective assignment is subject to so many variables that operating procedures must be minimal. This type of assignment relies on the quality of training given team members as well as the basic abilities and experience of the officers selected for the assignment.

An operational procedures manual might include the following:

1. **Team Mobilization:** Upon request for mobilization of a protective team, the EOC staff shall confer and determine which team is to be mobilized.
2. **Detail Leader:** The EOC shall contact the appropriate detail leader in such a manner as determined by his agency and provide him with information for mobilization. At that time, the detail leader shall contact each member of his team to be mobilized and so advise them. When team members have been notified, the detail leader shall contact his appropriate EOC staff representative by telephone or in person for a mission assignment briefing.
3. **Team Mission Briefing:** A team briefing shall be conducted as soon thereafter as possible by the detail leader. The EOC shall receive a report by telephone or teletype upon completion of all initial briefings.
4. **Communications with EOC:** The detail leader will maintain communications with the EOC by radio, telephone or teletype. During movements outside radio coverage, or as determined by the EOC staff, other available local government radio will be utilized. Essential messages may be relayed to the EOC by the nearest local law enforcement dispatch, at the discretion of the EOC staff. Whenever possible, the detail leader shall advise the EOC of a telephone number by which he may be contacted at all times.
5. **Equipment Issue:** The EOC staff shall arrange issue of appropriate and available equipment to the detail leader upon mobilization of a team.
6. **Requests for Field Support and Information:** Due to the confidential nature of a mission assignment, all requests for support and information shall be made by the detail leader to the EOC as is practical and conducive to operational flexibility.
7. **Reporting to EOC of Status:** A periodic status report shall be made by telephone or teletype to the EOC; such status reports will be made at 0001 hours of each day of mission assignment, as well as prior to and at the conclusion of each major event or movement. A 24-hour daily log of any assignment shall be maintained by the detail leader.
8. **Termination of Mission:** No team shall terminate its mission until so authorized by the EOC staff.
9. **Mission Assignment Summary:** Upon termination of mission, the detail leader shall present to the EOC a Mission Assignment Summary, essentially outlining the conduct of the mission.

Radio Communications Procedures

The key to effective team operation lies in the ability to instantly communicate with individual units and the EOC. Depending on the location

of the team, compatible radio communications equipment can be issued. The team may then be able to have access to a repeater system to a major dispatch point. Also, it will be necessary to design a specific radio code for use during protective assignments. Some of the coded items which should be included are:

1. Command center.
2. Arrival sites.
3. Principal's aircraft/scheduled airline.
4. Principal's office.
5. Principal's residence.
6. Principal's family.
7. Principal's wife.
8. Principal.
9. Abort mission/mission aborted.
10. Return or go to command center.
11. Movement initiated.
12. Movement completed.
13. Unscheduled stop or delay at _____.
14. Out of service.
15. Contact EOC by telephone.
16. Contact unit _____.

Each protective services officer and team should have radio call signs. The entire code may be revised every six months.

Office and Residence Security

Normally a principal's office should be secured by protective services officers in civilian clothes, the procedures being essentially the same as those practiced at a visitation site. At the residence, on the other hand, it is usually better to protect the residence with uniformed officers who are supplemented by protective services personnel when necessary.

Uniformed officers should be trained or at least briefed on protective services operations; the two groups, while having similar jobs, are sufficiently diverse to cause misunderstanding. The uniformed officers need anticipate the reactions and procedures of protective services teams to enable effective coordination.

The residence or office security perimeters may be supplemented by electronic devices, such as video, microwave intrusion, low-light cameras, seismic sensors, trip wires, and electric eyes, but costs are usually prohibitive. Though liberal use of electronic security devices is recommended, such devices can never replace foresight in taking other action to improve physical security weaknesses (see Appendix 14 — Office and Residence Security). Above all, electronic equipment must only be used to supplement and enhance a good security network established by the use of personnel.

CONCLUSION

The responsibility of protecting a public official is demanding. The key to an effective protective services program lies eventually in the dedication and skill of the people who organize, support and participate in the program.

Selection and training are the most important factors in providing this service, and the greater the number of selected personnel who can be trained the greater the chance of being able to effectively respond to the threat.

Most police agencies engaged in performing protective services necessarily rely on existing resources to do the job. In order to cope with this serious problem, it is essential that everyone in the law enforcement profession cooperate. To this end, the California State Police will make every effort to assist other protective agencies to the full extent of our capability.

Appendix 1

THE PROFILE OF ASSASSINATION

Assassination is as old as civilization. Early societies, in fact, accepted assassination as an inherent political tool, to be utilized as a means of deposing unwanted officials or gaining personal power. For a time in American history, assassination was regarded as the work of madmen. It was believed that our government had other alternatives for achieving political goals.

It might be said that any person who kills another is a madman; though the majority of assassins in America were mentally unstable by definition, only a fine line distinguishes them from the political extremist who attempts to attain his goals by violent methods.

Richard Lawrence

The first person to attempt the assassination of an American President was Richard "King Dick" Lawrence. On January 30, 1835, while President Andrew Jackson was leaving a funeral at the east portico of the Capitol, Lawrence jumped from behind a pillar and fired two pistols point-blank at Jackson. Both pistols misfired.

According to various accounts, Lawrence suffered from delusions of grandeur. Believing he was the rightful heir to the thrones of England, Holland, Italy, and the United States, he considered President Jackson to be little more than his personal aide. He was employed as a house painter in Washington, D.C., and in his poverty conjectured a Jackson-led conspiracy which would ultimately deny him access to his throne and riches.

To those who knew him, he was a normal person capable of intelligent conversation. He thought, however, that persons laughed behind his back and conspiracies loomed about him. Lawrence ran up large debts which he claimed he couldn't pay until Congress gave him the money they owed him; he attempted to charter a ship to England, failed, and tried again only to abandon the effort because he believed the newspapers were carrying stories of his plans.

Jackson was a controversial President. Influenced by Congressional dissatisfaction and editorials of the time, "King Dick", as Lawrence became known, believed the country wanted Jackson assassinated. When the President decided not to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States, Lawrence interpreted the action to be an overt attempt to take his money away from him. He then tried to ask Jackson for money but, when that failed, he decided that the President must be killed.

John Wilkes Booth

President Lincoln's assassin had both a need for recognition and a political goal of defending the Confederacy during the Civil War.

John Wilkes Booth was a sensitive boy who maintained dreams of glory on the stage. His father was considered to be one of the finest actors in America although he was reputedly insane. John, however, was not exposed to the trying theater circuit until later in life when he had already failed to master the techniques of acting.

When their father died in 1853, John and his brother Edwin accepted the responsibilities of supporting the family. With his brother, who was by this time an accomplished actor, John Wilkes Booth appeared on stage but received unpopular criticism. Despite the dismal failures, John developed a need for recognition equal to that given Edwin.

In 1858, however, John Wilkes Booth finally found success in a Petersburg, Virginia, playhouse and proceeded to become very popular in the south. This not only supported his need for attention but made him totally loyal to the Confederate cause as the nation plunged into Civil War.

To Booth, Abraham Lincoln became an enemy. At first, Booth and several conspirators planned on kidnapping the President and making 100,000 prisoners of war the ransom. As the condition of the south deteriorated, Booth resolved that the last hope for his cause lay in the assassination of the President and high government officials.

Charles Julius Guiteau

At 9:20 a.m. on July 2, 1881, Charles Guiteau assassinated President James A. Garfield in the waiting room of the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Station.

As Garfield and Secretary of State William Blaine walked through the room, Guiteau calmly approached the President and shot him in the back. Bolting for a doorway, he nearly ran into a policeman. "It's all right officer," Guiteau said, handing over the murder weapon. "I wish to go to the jail."

Charles Guiteau was born on September 8, 1841, in Freeport, Illinois. His father was police magistrate and county school superintendent as well as an unconventional theologian who supported eccentric religious movements. Guiteau adopted his father's leanings toward offbeat religions.

Guiteau lived in the Oneida Community, a communal religious group headed by the Reverend John Noyes and considered by Guiteau to be the center of God's Kingdom on earth. Failing to become a religious leader and tired of the menial chores assigned him, he studied law and became an attorney in Chicago.

Later, Guiteau married a girl he had met at a Y.M.C.A. library in Chicago but was soon divorced after contracting syphilis from two prostitutes. Though adultery was the primary reason cited for the divorce, his marriage had not gone well.

Guiteau's opulence soon led him into indebtedness. Bored with law and running from collection agencies, Guiteau began an evangelistic crusade on the Second Coming of Christ. He again failed as a minister and his interests turned to politics.

Charles Guiteau campaigned vigorously for Republican Presidential Candidate James Garfield. After the election, Guiteau sought a political appointment, believing that a muckraking pamphlet he had written in support of Garfield was a major factor in the successful election. He was turned down. A rift developed in the Republican party at that same time, which Guiteau thought was an attempt by the President to destroy national unity. Believing that God wanted Garfield assassinated, Charles Guiteau made elaborate and bizarre preparations for his assigned holy endeavor.

Prior to the assassination, Guiteau, disguised as a minister, toured the jail facilities in which he would be placed. He told the jailer that the accommodations were adequate, thanked him, and promised to return soon. He then purchased an expensive, pearl-handled, .44 caliber, "English Bulldog" revolver because Guiteau reportedly thought that it would later look good in a museum.

After reading in a newspaper of President Garfield's plans to take a vacation the next day, he wrote a letter of explanation to the American people and prepared for his mission.

Later, after the assassination, Guiteau posted signs in his jail cell proclaiming his autographs for sale. He wrote a poem in honor of his own execution which he suggested should be put to music:

"I am going to the Lordy
I am so glad.
I am going to the Lordy,
Glory Hallelujah!

"I wonder what I will do when
I get to the Lordy.
I guess I will weep no more when
I get to the Lordy.

"I wonder what I will see when
I get to the Lordy.
I expect to see most splendid things
Beyond all earthly conception.
When I am with the Lordy,
Glory Hallelujah!"

Leon Czolgoz

Leon Czolgoz was a simple factory worker who, because of labor disputes, developed a hatred for authoritarian symbols. As a result, Czolgoz became listless and unpredictable, spending most of his time reading spy novels and campaigning for any radical political movement. He expressed no particular political stance, retaining only a vague belief that authority itself was an enemy of the working man, with absolute anarchy the only salvation.

Czolgoz quit his job in 1898, claiming illness and fatigue; in reality, he was suffering from the mental stress of trauma and had become unable to maintain interest in work. He dreamed of revolution and secret societies and of overthrowing both industrial tycoons and government officials by violence. Repeated rejection in his attempts to join anarchist groups only convinced Czolgoz of the need to prove himself. He saw President William McKinley as the prime target.

McKinley was to appear at the World's Fair in Buffalo, New York. In the evening of September 4, 1901, the assassin tried to get near the President but was held back by a crowd of 70,000 fairgoers who had gathered to see President McKinley. Two days later, on September 6, while people in a reception line shook hands with McKinley, Czolgoz carried a .32 caliber revolver in a handkerchief wrapped about his hand and shot the President twice at close range.

John Nepomuk Schrank

In 1912, President Theodore Roosevelt announced plans to run for an unprecedented third term in office. Schrank, a Bavarian immigrant who had inherited his uncle's tavern and was a moderately successful businessman, was incensed by the announcement.

Some years earlier, it was reported, Schrank had experienced a vision in which the dead President McKinley identified Roosevelt as his assassin. To Schrank, Roosevelt had "abused our best and most venerable citizens, calling them liars and scoundrels..." as well as attempting to become a virtual third-term dictator. On September 14, 1912, Schrank had another McKinley vision which convinced him that he must kill Roosevelt.

For eighteen days, while Roosevelt was campaigning across country, Schrank stalked his would-be victim. Finally, on October 14, 1912, Schrank fired a .38 caliber revolver wounding Roosevelt in the chest.

Afterward, while in prison, Schrank wrote a letter attempting to explain his actions. The letter contains details which clearly explain Schrank's motivations. He addressed his letter to "The People of the United States", and went on to state, "The dead President (i.e., McKinley) said this is my murderer, avenge my death." Schrank, in a further comment, also explains, "...let every third term be regarded as a traitor to the American cause...", and finally Schrank identified the holy character of his mission. "I am willing to die for my country. God has called me to be his instrument..."

Grisellio Torresola and Oscar Collazo

Oscar Collazo, a Puerto Rican, was a dutiful family man and a leader in his community. From 1932 to 1941 he served as a member of the Puerto Rico Nationalist Party and developed a friendship with Pedro Albizu Campos. Both men were dedicated to overthrowing the American government because they believed Puerto Ricans were being oppressed. Aside from his political activities, Collazo was not otherwise notable until he attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman on November 1, 1950.

Collazo's partner in the attempt was Griselio Torresola. Little is known about Torresola except that he was a transient and heavy drinker. Apparently, Pedro Campos was able to influence Torresola into believing, among other things, that the United States was attempting to bombard Puerto Rico with atomic rays.

The assassination attempt took place one afternoon while President Truman napped at Blair House in Washington, D.C. Collazo and Torresola, armed with pistols, rushed the premises. A gunfight with White House policemen ensued, Torresola was killed, Collazo was captured, and the attempt failed.

While each of the examples cited above are unique, in many respects they bear certain similarities; public officials are obviously vulnerable to attack by the unpredictable elements of society.

Lee Harvey Oswald was a rejected, ineffectual failure who found his own distorted goals in politics. Arthur Herman Bremer suffered a poor family life and was obsessed with masturbation, sex fantasies, suicide, and black people; at one point he complained that he was only "one three-billionth" of the world's history. James Earl Ray wanted to make a name for himself and hated blacks. Sirhan Bishara Sirhan was a man seeking identity and became a fanatic when Robert F. Kennedy supported Zionism.

It is impossible to anticipate the assassin. As evidenced by the outrageous crime rates in our society today, the potential for assassination and violence has greatly increased. Leaders in our Democracy have become the targets. We, as professional law enforcement officers, have accepted the burden of protecting these officials from the threat no man can profile.

Appendix 2

SELECTION OF PERSONNEL

1. Background Experience
 - 1.1 Police
 - 1.2 Military
 - 1.3 Professional
 - 1.4 Other
2. Special Qualifications
 - 2.1 S.W.A.T. (Special Weapons and Tactics)
 - 2.2 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 - 2.3 Officer Survival
 - 2.4 Female Officer
 - 2.5 Technical Expert
 - 2.6 Other
3. Other Qualifications
 - 3.1 Family Stability
 - 3.2 Psychological Stability
 - 3.3 Demeanor
 - 3.4 Appearance and Physical Fitness
 - 3.5 Intelligence and Alertness

Appendix 3

STATE SPECIALIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT REGIONAL ACADEMY OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE POLICE

Protective Services Training Class

SYLLABUS		Number of Class Hours In Session
Required Subjects		
1. <i>ADVANCE PRESENTATIONS</i> :	Oral presentations of advance reports.	2 Hours
2. <i>ADVANCE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES</i> :	This subject will cover the methods of conducting an advance and preparing related reports.	4 Hours
3. <i>ADVANCE REPORT</i> :	Will include the preparation of the results of an advance conducted.	2 Hours
4. <i>ADVANCE SURVEY</i> :	Will be the culmination of a comprehensive study of an area or place to be visited by a principal.	2 Hours
5. <i>ASSASSINATIONS — PREVIEW</i> :	A preview of some assassinations and attempted assassinations, foreign and domestic.	1 Hour
6. <i>ASSASSINATIONS CRITIQUE</i> :	A guided critique of various aspects of actual assassinations and attempted assassinations committed.	2 Hours
7. <i>CARDIO-PULMONARY RESUSCITATION</i> :	American Heart Association method of mechanically starting blood circulation and counteracting heart stoppage.	2 Hours
8. <i>DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY</i> :	The subject will acquaint students with terms commonly used in protective services operations and their definitions.	1 Hour
9. <i>DRESS AND DEMEANOR</i> :	To include guidelines regarding the type and mode of dress. Also how one should conduct himself during a protective services assignment.	1 Hour
10. <i>EXAMINATION AND CRITIQUE</i> :	A written examination covering material presented in the course.	1 Hour
11. <i>EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) SEARCH</i> :	This subject will cover identification of explosive devices, their use in terrorist activities and threats against public officials and how to conduct a bomb search.	2 Hours
12. <i>FIREARMS ORIENTATION</i> :	Orientation regarding the type and use of firearms used in protective services assignments.	2 Hours
13. <i>GRADUATION</i> :	Closing remarks and the issuance of certificates.	1 Hour

SYLLABUS (Cont'd)

Required Subjects	Number of Class Hours In Session
14. <i>IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS</i> : Methods and means of identifying certain persons when on a protective services assignment.	1 Hour
15. <i>INTELLIGENCE</i> : Basic methods of obtaining and analyzing intelligence information, and sources of information and its use in the protection of a principal.	2 Hours
16. <i>INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION</i> : Introductions, summary of course content and orientation regarding students' participation.	2 Hours
17. <i>LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS</i> : Statutes and practical aspects related to the providing of security and protection of public officials.	2 Hours
18. <i>MOTORCADES</i> : Methods of providing protection in motorcades. To also cover alighting from and returning to follow-up cars. The coverage of the protectee in automobile and basic formations for providing on-foot protection.	2 Hours
19. <i>OFFICE AND RESIDENCE SECURITY</i> : The strategic location of men and other aids in providing security in an office and at a residence.	2 Hours
20. <i>SECURITY POSTS</i> : Strategic location and placement of men in manning security posts.	1 Hour
21. <i>TEN-MINUTE MEDICINE</i> : Basic method for keeping a person alive for ten minutes.	2 Hours
22. <i>VEHICLE KIDNAPPING</i> : Methods for responding to kidnap or assassination attempts while driving a vehicle.	1 Hour
23. <i>WORKING THE PRINCIPAL</i> : Methods for providing protection for principal on-foot.	2 Hours


TOTAL 40 Hours

Appendix 4

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF PERSONNEL


1. Instructions
 - 1.1 Creation of Procedures
 - 1.2 Publication of Instructions
 - 1.3 Distribution of Instructions
2. Salary and Pay
 - 2.1 Maintenance of Pay Vouchers
 - 2.2 Accounting for Time
 - 2.3 Provisions for Overtime
 - 2.4 Advance Travel Expense Payment
 - 2.5 Travel Expense Claim Procedures
 - 2.6 Sick Leave, Vacation and Disability Records
3. Personnel Records
 - 3.1 Means of Notifying Next-of-kin in Emergency
 - 3.2 Medical Records and Personal Physician Notification
 - 3.3 Medical Insurance Record
 - 3.4 Additional Information
4. Training
 - 4.1 Formal Training
 - 4.2 In-service or On-going Training Programs
 - 4.3 Video and Film Briefings
 - 4.4 Publication of Training Bulletins
 - 4.5 De-briefing
5. Evaluation of Personnel
 - 5.1 Evaluation of Initial Selection Criteria
 - 5.2 Weekly Evaluation (First Two Weeks)
 - 5.3 Monthly Evaluation (First Six Months)
 - 5.4 Bi-monthly Evaluation (After Six Months)

Appendix 5
EOC ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF



Appendix 6

EOC SUPPORT STAFF



Appendix 7

PRINCIPAL AND FAMILY CHECKLIST

I. Family Personnel

1.1 Composition of Family

1.1.1 Principal:

Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]

Phone Number _____ Address _____

Occupation _____ License No. of Auto _____

Marital Status Married [] Single [] Divorced []

1.1.2 Husband or Wife of Principal:

Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]

Phone Number _____ Address _____

Occupation _____ License No. of Auto _____

1.1.3 Children:

Number of Children _____

1.1.3.1 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]

Address _____ Phone No. _____

1.1.3.2 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]

Address _____ Phone No. _____

1.1.3.3 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]

Address _____ Phone No. _____

1.1.3.4 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]

Address _____ Phone No. _____

1.1.4 Relatives Residing at Residence

Number of Relatives Residing at Residence _____

1.1.4.1 Name _____ Relation _____

Sex M[] F[] Age _____ Permanent [] Visiting []

Length of Visit _____

1.1.4.2 Name _____ Relation _____
Sex M[] F[] Age _____ Permanent [] Visiting []
Length of Visit _____

1.1.5 House Guests

Number of House Guests _____

1.1.5.1 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]
Residence Address _____
Duration of Visit _____

1.1.5.2 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]
Residence Address _____
Duration of Visit _____

1.1.5.3 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]
Residence Address _____
Duration of Visit _____

1.1.5.4 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]
Residence Address _____
Duration of Visit _____

1.1.6 Servants

Number of Servants _____

1.1.6.1 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]
Live In [] Live Out [] Address _____
Phone Number _____ Duties _____

1.1.6.2 Name _____ Age _____ Sex M[] F[]
Live In [] Live Out [] Address _____
Phone Number _____ Duties _____

1.1.7 Day Workers

Number of Day Workers_____

1.1.7.1 Name_____ Age_____ Sex M[] F[]

Residence Address_____ Phone_____

Duties_____ Employment Agency_____

Phone Number of Employment Agency_____

1.1.7.2 Name_____ Age_____ Sex M[] F[]

Residence Address_____ Phone_____

Duties_____ Employment Agency_____

Phone Number of Employment Agency_____

1.1.8 Babysitters

1.1.8.1 Name_____ Age_____ Sex M[] F[]

Residence Address_____ Phone_____

1.1.8.2 Name_____ Age_____ Sex M[] F[]

Residence Address_____ Phone_____

1.1.9 Invalids Residing at Residence

1.1.9.1 Name_____ Age_____ Sex M[] F[]

Relationship_____ Type of Incapacitation_____

Doctor_____ Doctor's Phone_____

1.1.9.2 Name_____ Age_____ Sex M[] F[]

Relationship_____ Type of Incapacitation_____

Doctor_____ Doctor's Phone_____

2. Daily Activities of Household Members

2.1 Principal:

Wakeup Hour (Time)_____

Pework Activity (Jogging, etc.)_____

Depart for Work (Time)_____ Arrive at Work (Time) _____

Licensed Driver Yes[] No[] Mode of Transportation_____

Chauffeur Yes[] No[] Police Officer Required Yes[] No[]

Escorts Required Yes[] No[]

Destination/Location of Parked Automobile_____

Office Phone Number _____ Lunch (Time) _____

Eat In [] Eat Out []

Are Lunch Activities Planned, Screened and Recorded_____

Depart for Residence (Time)_____ Arrive at
Residence (Time)_____

Are Civic Activities Scheduled, Screened and Recorded_____

Are Social Activities Scheduled, Screened and Recorded_____

Is Principal a Member of a Church Congregation_____

Address _____ Type of Church _____ Number
of Members _____

What is the Daily Routine Relationship with Neighbors? Casual [] Close []

Do any other Members Accompany Principal to Designated Stops
or Destinations_____

2.2 Husband or Wife of Principal

NOTE: If individual is husband, daily work activities must be scheduled.

Wife: Wakeup Hour (Time)_____

Prebreakfast Activities_____

Shopping or Personal Appointments (Times)_____

Locations of Shops (Addresses) (1)_____ (2)_____

_____ (3)_____ (4)_____

Licensed Driver Yes [] No [] Mode of Transportation_____

Chauffeur: Yes [] No [] Police Officer Required Yes [] No []

Escorts Required Yes [] No []

Destination/Location of Parked Automobile_____

Lunch (Time)_____

Are Lunch Activities Planned, Screened and Recorded_____

Are Civic Activities Scheduled, Screened and Recorded_____

Are Social Activities Scheduled, Screened and Recorded_____

What is the Daily Routine Relationship with Neighbors? Casual [] Close []

Do Neighbors Visit Residence Throughout the Day_____

Is Wife an Active Club Member_____

Name of Club_____ Address _____

Club Phone Number _____

Frequency of Meetings Daily [] Weekly [] Monthly []

2.3 Children (Per Each Child at Residence)

Wakeup Hour (Time)_____

Prebreakfast Activities_____

Depart for School (Time)_____

Name of School _____ Address _____

Phone Number of School_____ Principal's Name_____

Mode of Transportation _____

Arrive at School (Time) _____ Depart from School (Time) _____

Are School Activities Scheduled, Screened and Recorded_____

Are Civic Activities Scheduled, Screened and Recorded _____

Scouting_____ Clubs _____

Are Social and Athletic Activities Scheduled, Screened and Recorded_____

Are Church Activities a Part of Daily Life _____

Choir _____ Youth Groups _____

What is the Daily Routine Relationship with Neighbors _____

Casual [] Close [] Study Partners [] Playmates []

Do children have Boy or Girlfriend? Name _____

Address _____ Phone _____

Do Children spend Nights away from Residence _____

Do Teenage Children Have Driver's License Yes [] No []

Do Teenage Children Own Vehicle Yes [] No []

How Many Children are Preschool Age (Number) _____

Are Playing Habits with Neighbor Children At Residence [] At Neighbor's
Residence []

3. Normal Operation and Management of Household

3.1 Are packages and mail screened upon delivery? Yes [] No []

3.2 Is household serviced by vendors? Yes [] No []

3.3 Who screens deliveries _____

3.4 How are service repairs accomplished? _____

3.5 Are strangers near or at residence screened? Yes [] No []

3.6 Are telephone calls logged in journal? Yes [] No []

Who answers telephone _____

3.6.1 Emergency Telephone Numbers and Locations

3.6.1.1 Police _____ Address _____

3.6.1.2 Fire Dept _____ Address _____

3.6.1.3 Doctor _____ Address _____

3.6.1.4 Hospital _____ Address _____

3.6.2 Are Emergency Telephone Numbers Conspicuously Posted_____

3.7 What procedures are followed in care of family pet? _____

3.7.1 Veterinarian_____ Address_____

Phone Number_____

3.7.2 Grooming Parlor_____ Address_____

Phone Number_____

Are pets fed outside or inside? _____

Do Children feed pets? _____ Servants?_____ Principal?_____

Appendix 8

ADVANCE CHECKLIST

1.	Preparations	Yes	No
1.1	Roster and Schedule of Personnel	_____	_____
1.2	Airline Tickets	_____	_____
1.3	Hotel Reservations	_____	_____
1.4	Vehicles Available	_____	_____
1.5	Personnel Briefed	_____	_____
1.6	Travel Expense Advance Payment	_____	_____
1.7	Record of Itinerary	_____	_____
2.	Equipment		
2.1	Communications Equipment	_____	_____
2.2	Weapons	_____	_____
2.3	Telephones at Command Center	_____	_____
2.4	Teargas Equipment	_____	_____
2.5	Personal Equipment	_____	_____
2.6	First Aid Supplies	_____	_____
2.7	Surveillance Equipment	_____	_____
2.8	Administrative Supplies and Keys	_____	_____
2.9	Other (List):		
	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____

3. Liaison with Local Jurisdiction

3.1 City Police

3.1.1 Chief of Police

Name_____ Phone and Extension_____

3.1.2 Assistant Chief of Police

Name_____ Phone and Extension_____

3.1.3 Principal Officer Assigned

Name_____ Phone and Extension_____

3.1.4 Assistant Principal Officer Assigned

Name_____ Phone and Extension_____

3.2 County Sheriff

3.2.1 Sheriff

Name_____ Phone and Extension_____

3.2.2 Assistant Sheriff

Name_____ Phone and Extension_____

3.2.3 Principal Deputy Assigned

Name_____ Phone and Extension_____

3.2.4 Assistant Principal Deputy Assigned

Name_____ Phone and Extension_____

3.3 State Police

3.4 Highway Patrol

3.5 Federal Agencies

3.6 Support Agencies

4. Operational Briefings - Local Jurisdictions

Have the following agencies been briefed?

Yes No

4.1 City Police

4.2 County Sheriff

4.3 State Police

4.4 Highway Patrol

4.5 U. S. Secret Service

4.6 FBI

4.7 Military

4.8 Support Agencies

5. Local Communications Liaison

5.1 Have radio communications systems between local agencies been coordinated to compliment the individual systems?

5.2 Have communications been established at the principal's residence?

5.3 Have communications been established at the office or place of business?

5.4 Are local agencies able to monitor your communications?

5.5 Have local agencies and protective services personnel been briefed and issued mutual radio codes?

5.6 Does the principal use a commercial auto radio-telephone?

5.6.1 If so, what is the number? _____

6. Vehicle Usage

6.1 Commercial automobile?

6.2 Private automobile?

6.3 Aircraft?

6.4 Helicopter?

		Yes	No
6.5	Marked police vehicle?	_____	_____
6.6	Unmarked police vehicle?	_____	_____
6.7	Limousine?	_____	_____
6.8	Train?	_____	_____
6.9	Have arrangements been made for a sufficient number of backup vehicles?	_____	_____
6.10	Have parking facilities been arranged?	_____	_____
6.11	Has a qualified mechanic been made available in the event of a breakdown?	_____	_____
7.	Facilities		
7.1	Has the principal's room been secured?	_____	_____
7.1.1	Telephone?	_____	_____
7.1.2	Television and commercial radio?	_____	_____
7.1.3	Adequate facilities?	_____	_____
7.2	Have you arranged for a holding room?	_____	_____
7.2.1	Telephone?	_____	_____
7.2.2	Television or commercial radio?	_____	_____
7.2.3	Adequate facilities?	_____	_____
7.3	Do you have a command center secured?	_____	_____
7.4	Do you have a security room?	_____	_____
8.	Surveys		
8.1	Has the route survey been completed?	_____	_____
8.1.1	Have all personnel reviewed the route survey?	_____	_____
8.1.2	Has the detail leader verified the route with the principal?	_____	_____
8.1.3	Has the route been approved?	_____	_____
8.1.4	Do local agencies know of the selected route?	_____	_____

		Yes	No
8.2	Have the appropriate building surveys been completed?	_____	_____
8.2.1	Has the detail leader reviewed the building surveys?	_____	_____
8.2.2	Have all personnel involved received a copy of the building surveys?	_____	_____
8.2.3	Have all security deficiencies reported in the building surveys been corrected?	_____	_____

Appendix 9

DRIVING PROCEDURES

1. Become familiar with the operation of the vehicle and its accessories. .
2. Adjust all equipment to your comfort (seat, seatbelts, mirrors).
3. ALWAYS FASTEN YOUR SEATBELT except in motorcade.
4. Keep your car clean and keep fire extinguishers and first aid kits readily available.
5. Pay attention to driving and traffic conditions.
6. Accelerate, decelerate and turn smoothly.
7. Visually scan the area several hundred yards in advance of your vehicle as you drive, keeping alert for hazards (things in the road, such as, bricks, lumber, pot-holes, pedestrians, weaving autos and anything appearing out of the ordinary).
8. When driving the principal, signal lane changes, turns and stops to assist the follow-up car.
9. Learn the conditions of your routes, i.e., narrow bridges, construction, narrowing roadways (e.g., 3 lanes down to 2) and anything which might create a hazard to the principal.
10. When driving follow-up, keep your eyes on the principal's car, anticipate unsignaled turns and stops, stay close in heavy traffic, drop back slightly in light traffic and keep alternate plan of action in mind.
11. Be considerate of the men working in the follow-up since their lives depend on how well you operate the vehicle.
12. When the principal's car signals a lane change, open the lane for him by blocking oncoming traffic until the change has been made.
13. Turn wide on corners to protect the exposed side of the principal's auto on turns.
14. DO NOT BLUFF OTHERS! You may have the right of way, but it is not worth the risk.
15. DO NOT leave your auto unless directed to do so by your supervisor.
16. DO NOT engage in conversations, play commercial radios, smoke or skirt-ogle.
17. DO NOT get out of the car to open doors for either the principal or guests.

18. DO NOT stare at the lane dividing lines or at the area directly in front of the car, since this tends to promote "road hypnosis".
19. DO NOT lull yourself into a false sense of security in new cars, because they frequently break down (at the most inopportune time!).
20. DO NOT LET another car in between you and the principal's car.

Appendix 10

SITE SURVEYS

1. *Definition*

The investigation and resultant plans of security for a given location. Generally involves all security measures taken at a place to be visited by a principal.

2. *Purpose*

2.1 Identify undesirable elements and physical hazards, taking necessary action to reduce risk of harm to the principal

2.1.1 Compared to any complete, thorough, professional criminal investigation

2.1.2 Likened to looking for clues, but attention is given to factors either embarrassing or harmful to the principal

3. *Procedures*

3.1 Contact person in charge of area or site

3.2 Evaluate

3.2.1 Building manager or owner

3.2.2 Area where event is to occur

3.3 Consider time principal is to be exposed

3.4 Examine factors difficult to control

3.4.1 Crowds and locations

3.4.2 Press sites

3.4.3 Items outside secure area

3.4.3.1 Building across street

3.4.3.2 Forests and parks

3.4.3.3 Curious passers-by

3.5 Check all travel times and distances involved

- 3.6 Check and evaluate all emergency data
 - 3.6.1 Phone numbers
 - 3.6.2 Equipment on hand
 - 3.6.3 Emergency escape routes
 - 3.6.4 Panic bars, locks, etc., on all doors and times secured
- 3.7 Decide on identification, press area, general public area, holding room
- 3.8 Determine personnel and logistical needs
- 3.9 Establish security beats
- 3.10 Prepare preliminary survey reports

4. *Method*

- 4.1 Determine safety hazards
 - 4.1.1 Improper lighting
 - 4.1.2 Inadequate emergency exists
 - 4.1.3 Overcrowding
 - 4.1.4 Faulty equipment
 - 4.1.4.1 Elevators
 - 4.1.4.2 Chairs, etc.
 - 4.1.4.3 Stage
 - 4.1.4.4 Podium light, etc.
 - 4.1.5 Delay problems hindering rapid movement of principal
- 4.2 Preventive measures
 - 4.2.1 Provide buffer zone between principal and public
 - 4.2.2 Control of and limited access to area
 - 4.2.3 Screening of all things entering area after sweep
 - 4.2.4 Change and control untenable situations

- 4.2.5 Control Movement of principal
 - 4.2.6 Reduce principal's exposure
 - 4.2.7 Effect continuity of security
- 4.3 Health hazards
 - 4.3.1 Smoke
 - 4.3.2 Fumes
 - 4.3.3 Water
 - 4.3.4 Food
 - 4.3.5 Heating and air conditioning
 - 4.3.6 Electric blanket, grounded lamps, etc.

5. *Types of site surveys*

- 5.1 Airports
- 5.2 Ballrooms
- 5.3 Auditoriums
- 5.4 Hotels
- 5.5 Coliseums
- 5.6 Private residences
- 5.7 Open-air activity

Appendix 11

SAMPLE BUILDING SURVEY FORMAT

Address _____	City _____
Nearest Intersection _____	Area _____
Type of Building _____	Floors _____
No. Tenants-Workers _____	Vacant-Storeroom Areas _____
Owner of Building _____	Address _____
Day Phone _____	Night Phone _____
Person in Charge _____	Home Address _____
Day Phone _____	Night Phone _____
Position or Title _____	Employer _____
Occupant Contact (If other than above) _____	
Home Address _____	Home Phone _____
Position or Title _____	Employer _____
Business Phone _____	

	Yes	No	
Possible Concealment on Roof	_____	_____	Type of Roof:
View of Route from Roof	_____	_____	Flat
Do Windows Open	_____	_____	Peaked
View of Route from:			Slanted
Balcony	_____	_____	Combination
Porch	_____	_____	Other
Patio	_____	_____	
Ledge	_____	_____	
Windows	_____	_____	

Access to Roof

Outside _____ Inside _____ Fire Escape _____ Ladder _____ None _____

Other _____

Explain _____

Are Any of the Following in Building? If so, how are they secured?

Firearms _____

Explosives _____

Explain _____

Recommendations

Yes

No

Man on roof

Man inside building

Other Security Recommendations

Remarks

Survey Officer(s) _____ Agency _____

Date _____ Action by E.O.C. _____

Appendix 12

MOTORCADES AND ROUTE SECURITY

1. *Motorcades*

1.1 Definition

A formally organized group of motor vehicles traveling along a specified route in controlled formation

1.2 Composition

May consist of autos, trucks, buses and/or combinations thereof

1.3 Size

The size of the motorcade will vary depending on the nature of the movement. Ideally, for security purposes, a motorcade should be as small and inconspicuous as possible.

1.3.1 On-record movement (publicized in advance)

1.3.1.1 Parade

1.3.1.2 Campaign situation

1.3.2 Off-record movement (not publicized, no press coverage)

1.3.2.1 Private visit

1.3.2.2 Pleasure

1.3.2.3 Shopping

1.4 On-record movements

1.4.1 Factors

1.4.1.1 Provides additional security

1.4.1.2 Maintain order in motorcade

1.4.1.3 Maintain flow of motorcade

1.4.1.4 Time factor, speed may be necessary

- 1.4.1.5 Keep non-motorcade vehicles out
 - 1.4.1.6 Reduce risk of collision
 - 1.4.1.7 Provide emergency escort if needed
 - 1.4.2 Use of emergency equipment may vary with principal; advance agent will know wishes of principal
 - 1.4.3 At times no escorts are used, such as:
 - 1.4.3.1 Private dinner party
 - 1.4.3.2 Visit personal friends
 - 1.4.3.3 Visit family members
- 1.5 Alignment formal
 - 1.5.1 Pilot car
 - 1.5.2 Lead car
 - 1.5.3 Principal car
 - 1.5.4 Follow-up or chase car
 - 1.5.5 Staff car
 - 1.5.6 Press car
 - 1.5.7 Spare car
 - 1.5.8 Tail car
- 1.6 Alignment informal
 - 1.6.1 Lead
 - 1.6.2 Principal
 - 1.6.3 Follow-up or chase car
 - 1.6.4 Spare
- 1.7 Marked police vehicle(pilot)

Police and protective services radio, police department and protective services representative

- 1.8 Marked police vehicle (lead)

 Local police official, protective services advance man, political advance man,
 protective services radio
- 1.9 Principal vehicle

 Principal, detail leader and driver
- 1.10 Follow-up car

 A chase car, driver, shift leader and two protective services officers
- 1.11 Spare vehicle

 Protective services or law enforcement driver, protective services radio
- 1.12 Tail

 Protective services officer, police department, protective services radio
 (should be a law enforcement vehicle, marked so one could be left at the
 scene of any problem)

2. *Route security*

- 2.1 Points considered in the selection of routes
 - 2.1.1 The most direct and shortest route which also offers maximum
 obtainable security
 - 2.1.1.1 Trouble areas
 - 2.1.1.2 Underpasses
 - 2.1.1.3 Overpasses
 - 2.1.1.4 Tunnels
 - 2.1.1.5 Culverts
 - 2.1.1.6 Deserted buildings
 - 2.1.1.7 Congested traffic areas
 - 2.1.1.8 Railroad crossings/switchyards
 - 2.1.2 Emergency route

 Location of nearest hospitals and routes to them. Also escape route
 from assault.

- 2.1.3 Alternate route used to avoid unexpected situations
- 2.2 Route security
 - 2.2.1 Route survey, to eliminate or neutralize security hazards
 - 2.2.2 Building survey
 - 2.2.2.1 Owners contacted
 - 2.2.2.2 Occupants identified and evaluated
 - 2.2.2.4 Verification of occupants and visitors on day of event (make sure all belong)
 - 2.2.2.5 Make sure owner or manager knows who and how to contact responsive team
 - 2.2.3 Route patrol
 - 2.2.4 Zone car
 - 2.2.5 Foot patrols
 - 2.2.6 Building surveillance posts
 - 2.2.7 Helicopter
- 3. *Follow-up car procedures and driving procedures*
 - 3.1 Follow-up car or chase car

The automobile or vehicle which follows immediately behind the principal's vehicle
 - 3.2 Uses of the follow-up car
 - 3.2.1 Spare car for principal
 - 3.2.2 Support personnel carrier
 - 3.2.3 Support equipment carrier
 - 3.2.4 Defense against vehicular assault
 - 3.2.5 Mobile command center

- 3.3 Types of automobiles utilized as follow-up cars
 - 3.3.1 Closed sedans
 - 3.3.2 Station wagon
 - 3.3.3 Open convertible
 - 3.3.4 Formal follow-up car
- 3.4 Categories of protective equipment carried in the follow-up vehicles
 - 3.4.1 Health
 - 3.4.2 Fire
 - 3.4.3 Weapons
 - 3.4.4 Accidents
 - 3.4.5 Convenience
- 3.5 Basic positions when on foot around a principal's automobile in motorcade
 - 3.5.1 No. 1 right rear fender
 - 3.5.2 No. 2 left rear fender
 - 3.5.3 No. 3 right front fender
 - 3.5.4 No. 4 left front fender
- 3.6 Personnel positions in an open convertible follow-up in on-foot motorcade
 - 3.6.1 Driver, front seat
 - 3.6.2 Shift leader, front seat
 - 3.6.3 No. 1 right rear seat (nearest right rear door)
 - 3.6.4 No. 2 left rear seat (nearest left rear door)
 - 3.6.5 No. 3 right rear seat (nearest center)
 - 3.6.6 No. 4 left rear seat (nearest center)
- 3.7 Positions in a station wagon follow-up
 - 3.7.1 Driver, front seat

- 3.7.2 Shift leader, front seat
- 3.7.3 No. 1 right rear seat
- 3.7.4 No. 2 left rear seat
- 3.7.5 No. 3 middle rear seat
- 3.7.6 No. 4 gun man facing rear
- 3.8 Positions in a closed sedan follow-up
 - 3.8.1 Driver
 - 3.8.2 Shift leader
 - 3.8.3 No. 1 right rear seat
 - 3.8.4 No. 2 left rear seat
 - 3.8.5 No. 3 middle rear seat
- 3.9 S Safety precautions to keep in mind when working a follow-up in on-foot motorcade
 - 3.9.1 Think of what is to be done
 - 3.9.2 Move when told
 - 3.9.3 Outside foot hits first when exiting moving vehicle
 - 3.9.4 Keep hands off door post
 - 3.9.5 Watch for road obstructions
 - 3.9.6 Keep fingers in contact with principal's car when walking alongside
 - 3.9.7 Be careful of snagging clothes
- 3.10 Preferred type of holster for protective movements
 - 3.10.1 Leather, compact, inside-the-pants type, designed to fit your specific weapon
- 3.11 Standard hand signals used in protective movements, walking beside Principal's car
 - 3.11.1 Raise outside hand (relief)
 - 3.11.2 Tap officer on shoulder when relieving from behind

3.12 Preferred type of clothing to wear on protective movements

3.12.1 Not loose or floppy

3.12.2 Shoes with rubber heels

3.12.3 Shoes with arch supports

Appendix 13

PRELIMINARY ROUTE SURVEY

1. Know the distance to be traveled.
2. How much time is required for this trip?
3. Diagram the route in detail from point of origin to the event site using direction (left) or right) and compass directions for all streets used and turns. Use exact street names and numbers.
4. State the approximate total number of separate buildings along this route (buildings that are physically separated or appear to be separated by occupancy, usage or construction).
5. How many of these buildings are government buildings?
6. Approximately how many windows will the motorcade pass by?
7. How many intersections will the motorcade pass through?
8. How many man hole covers are there along the route?
9. Approximately how many parked automobiles will the motorcade pass (consider the time of day)?
10. Are there any trash receptacles, storage areas, mail boxes, etc., along the route where an explosive device could be placed?
11. Approximately how many people did you pass along this route?
12. How many overpasses are on the route?
13. How many underpasses are on the route?
14. Are there any parks or wooded areas along the route?

In addition to the above activities, route surveys may also include the following:

15. Interview building owner, manager, security officer in charge of building or portion of a building overlooking the motorcade route in order to advise him of the activity, and request that he assist by keeping the windows closed and keeping occupants off rooftops and ledges and advising this service of any suspicious or unusual activity in or near his area.
16. Verify legitimacy of the business as a means of evaluating their assistance and information.
17. A much more detailed security sweep of the route, such as opening of all mail boxes by postal inspectors, checking all storm drains and man holes, checking all trash receptacles, remove all parked cars, etc.

Appendix 14

OFFICE AND RESIDENCE SECURITY

1. *Objective*

The establishment of effective security concerning a principal's residence or office.

2. *Principal of perimeter security*

2.1 The application of four defined concentric zones encompassing the critical area, the principal's person

2.1.1 Exclusionary zone – inner perimeter

2.1.2 Restricted zone – middle perimeter

2.1.3 Controlled zone – outer perimeter

2.1.4 Uncontrolled zone – that area where the factors are variable

2.2 Subsequent to a security survey of the affected area these adjacent zones should be established simultaneously.

In the event this is not practical the exclusionary zone should be developed first. The remaining three zones follow, working out from the inner perimeter.

3. *The security survey*

3.1 Conducted in detail to identify deficiencies which will be corrected or compensated for in planning and application.

3.2 Basic survey considerations

3.2.1 Location of affected area

3.2.1.1 Is residence in upper, middle or lower socio-economic environment?

3.2.1.2 Is residence in rural, suburban or urban area?

3.2.1.3 Is residence on large lot (estate), medium lot (bedroom community) or small lot (multiple-unit dwelling)?

3.2.1.4 Is the residence a single family unit with some ground or yard, a townhouse or duplex, a one-floor flat in a multiple story unit or an apartment?

- 3.3 Specific survey considerations
 - 3.3.1 Specific configuration of residence
 - 3.3.2 Survey entire structure and obtain complete floor plans which have been thoroughly checked for accuracy during security survey inspection
 - 3.3.3 Ascertain exact location of:
 - 3.3.3.1 Exterior doors
 - 3.3.3.2 Exterior windows
 - 3.3.3.3 Balconies
 - 3.3.3.4 Porches
 - 3.3.3.5 Adjoining patios
 - 3.3.3.6 Field of vision from all exterior doors and windows, noting obstructions caused by shrubs, trees, fences, walls and adjoining structures
 - 3.3.3.7 Electrical service panels
 - 3.3.3.8 Telephone outlets and service drop to house
 - 3.3.3.9 Gas connection
 - 3.3.3.10 Water service connection
 - 3.3.3.11 Air conditioning ducts
- 3.4 Ascertain household routine, including what domestic services are provided to residence
 - 3.4.1 Maid, cook, housekeeper, tutor
 - 3.4.2 Barber, hair stylist
 - 3.4.3 Cleaner, druggist, bakery
 - 3.4.4 Garbage service
 - 3.4.5 Newspaper delivery
- 3.5 Ascertain who, if any, are live-in domestics
 - 3.5.1 Live-in domestics' work schedules, including hours of operation, days off, etc.

- 3.5.2 Substitute domestic help
- 3.6 Specific configuration of yard or grounds
- 3.7 Survey entire yard or grounds and obtain complete grounds plan, thoroughly checked for accuracy
- 3.8 Ascertain location and type of:
 - 3.8.1 Out-buildings, including gardener's shed, pool service building, garages and other service structures on grounds; detailed floor plans noting doors, windows, service panels, etc.
 - 3.8.2 Walls, fences, vehicles, pedestrian and service gates
 - 3.8.3 Driveways and walks
 - 3.8.4 Services ducts, manholes, water valves
 - 3.8.5 Outside lighting facilities
 - 3.8.6 Portable ladders, trelliswork
 - 3.8.7 Shrubbery, trees, hedges, etc.
 - 3.8.8 Swimming pools, ponds, canals
- 3.9 Ascertain residence service routine, including what grounds and maintenance services are provided to residence
 - 3.9.1 Groundskeeper, gardener, nurseryman
 - 3.9.2 Pool service, trash pick-up
 - 3.9.3 Veterinarian, etc.
- 3.10 Specific configuration of immediate neighborhood
- 3.11 Obtain or prepare detailed maps of the immediate neighborhood
 - 3.11.1 Utilize aerial photographs
 - 3.11.2 Developer's maps
 - 3.11.3 Utility company charts
- 3.12 Survey entire affected area (immediate neighborhood) including in detail:
 - 3.12.1 Relationship of adjacent residences to principal's home, indicating driveways, houses, service buildings, fences, walls, trees, swimming pools, etc.

- 3.12.2 Occupancy of adjacent residences, indicating status of residents, i.e., established, newly occupied, renter, vacant.
- 3.12.3 Affected area, streets and alleys must be clearly identified, indicating direction of travel, number of lanes, names, traffic controls.
- 3.12.4 A security survey map should be prepared in such a manner that at least one major, well-known intersection is indicated.
- 3.12.5 Routes that afford the most expedient direction of travel in and out of the residence should be clearly indicated, noting areas of high traffic congestion, road repairs in progress, etc.
- 3.12.6 Routes of travel that the principal or members of his family utilize to visit friends in the immediate neighborhood, or utilize to neighborhood parks, tennis courts, gas stations, dry cleaners, shops, grocery stores, druggists, schools, churches, etc., should be clearly noted.
- 3.12.7 Existing utility service ducts, manholes, stormdrains should be noted on the survey map.
- 3.13 During the security survey of the immediate neighborhood, it must be determined as to what type of security patrol exists in the affected area
 - 3.13.1 Routine police or sheriff patrol coverage
 - 3.13.2 Private security residential patrol service
 - 3.13.3 No active patrol – on-call service
- 4. *Application of perimeter security*
 - 4.1 The security survey completed and all data critically examined, most security deficiencies will be recognized and the study can be utilized in a planned application of effective security measures.
 - 4.2 Step One – Establish operation control point
 - 4.2.1 Ideally a command center at the residence can be established immediately. The command center may take many forms dependent upon the actual configuration of the principal's residence.
 - 4.2.1.1 Specially constructed facility immediately adjacent to the residence; large enough to accommodate communications, electronic surveillance monitors, alarms, interview and briefing rooms, emergency equipment, lockers, etc.

4.2.1.2 A room connected to an existing service building, such as, a garage or maids' quarters.

4.2.1.3 A room inside the residence in an area easily accessible from the the outside and not in the immediate proximity of the principal's living area.

4.2.1.4 In cases where it is impossible to obtain space, a mobile van.

4.2.1.5 Regardless of its actual form, the command center is the nerve center of all residence or office security operations. It should be established well removed from the principal's living area due to the necessary distractions, noise, movement of personnel, etc., caused by the operation.

4.2.1.6 The command center should not be located in the exclusionary zone, the actual living environment of the principal.

4.3 Step Two – Establish the exclusionary zone

4.3.1 Utilizing information, observations and knowledge developed during the security survey, the inner perimeter is created. Security deficiencies are corrected or compensated.

4.3.2 Primary emphasis must be placed on correcting deficiencies in this zone involving:

4.3.2.1 External windows (may necessitate the installation of special glass)

4.3.2.2 Exterior doors (may require the installation of non-glass type with more effective locks)

4.3.2.3. Windows and doors may also need installation of alarm system

4.3.2.4 Internal communications, installation of no-dial intercoms to command center

4.3.2.5 Internal alarms, installation of panic button devices in all critical areas of residence tied to command center

4.3.2.6 Balconies and porches (may require protective screening)

4.3.2.7 Air conditioning ducts (may require protective screening)

4.3.2.8 Fire alarms (may require installation of fire alarms and sprinkler system, plus hand-held fire extinguishers placed in key locations)

- 4.3.2.9 Electrical service panels (may require locks)
- 4.3.2.10 Emergency power supply
- 4.3.2.11 Gas and water connection (may require construction of security enclosures)
- 4.3.2.12 Emergency water supply
- 4.3.3 Domestic and service personnel roster may be required and identification credential utilized. Newly employed or substitute help may necessitate screening.
- 4.3.4 Emphasis must also be placed on the entire exterior of the residence structure which will normally be the outer shall of the exclusionary zone. Measures should be taken to:
 - 4.3.4.1 Adequately illuminate the exterior
 - 4.3.4.2 Provide intrusion alarms
 - 4.3.4.3 Screen large glass doors and windows
 - 4.3.4.4 Provide surveillance equipment; i.e., video monitors
- 4.4 Step Three — Establish the restricted and controlled zones
 - 4.4.1 Subsequent to establishing the command center facility and applying necessary security measures in the exclusionary, the next two perimeters will be developed.
 - 4.4.2 Restricted zone — under ideal circumstances, the buffer zone between the residence structure and the maximum extent of the controlled area. An unobstructed field of vision is most desirable. If necessary, take affirmative action concerning:
 - 4.4.2.1 Adequate illumination
 - 4.4.2.2 Stationary obstructions — trees, hedges, walls, large shrubs, trelliswork, service buildings, etc.
 - 4.4.2.3 Irregular ground, built-up flower beds
 - 4.4.2.4 Pressure-sensitive alarms in connection with high intensity lights
 - 4.4.2.5 Television surveillance

4.4.3 Controlled zone — the outermost area controlled in the security operation. Literally the “first line of defense”. Under ideal circumstances, this zone will be established with cyclone-type fencing, affording limited obstruction of vision. In the absence of cyclone fencing, walls or solid fencing is favorable. However, other devices may be required in absence of any physical barriers. The application of a wide variety of electrically operated alarm systems may be utilized in connection with or in the absence of physical barriers. As in the restricted zone, unobstructed vision is critical and action should be taken concerning:

4.4.3.1 Adequate illumination

4.4.3.2 Stationary obstructions

4.4.3.3 Irregular ground

4.4.3.4 Alarms in connection with high intensity lights

4.4.3.5 Television surveillance

4.5 Step Four — Establish operational procedures

4.5.1 Standard operational procedures (SOP) must be established to effect the overall security program at any given residence. A complete, current and frequently inspected set of those procedures should be immediately accessible to all security personnel involved. The SOP will be restricted to authorized personnel and should be secured in the command center. The SOP must include, but not be restricted to, the following key information:

4.5.1.1 Emergency notification listings

4.5.1.2 Specific post instructions and description

4.5.1.3 Post relief and rotation

4.5.1.4 Residence floor plan

4.5.1.5 Grounds map

4.5.1.6 Affected area map (immediate neighborhood)

4.5.1.7 Medical emergencies

4.5.1.8 Fire

4.5.1.9 Bomb threats and search

4.5.1.10 Explosions and natural disasters

4.5.1.11 Evacuation

4.5.1.12 Unannounced visitors

4.5.1.13 Intruders

4.5.1.14 Pickets

4.5.1.15 Civil disturbances

4.5.1.16 Arrests

4.5.1.17 Press

END

7 11-11-11