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ECONOMIC CRISES AND CRIME

Publication No. 15
Rome, May 1976

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Correlations between the State of the Economy, Deviance and the Control of Deviance

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PREFACE

The research and the two colloquia on which this publication is based were to a large extent made possible by a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the United States Law Enforcement Assistance Administration * *which, though made in the depth of the 1973/74 energy crisis — has allowed us to explore a wider series of issues relating to the correlations and interaction between the state of the economy and deviant behaviour. We wish to thank the National Institute for its support, and also express our gratitude to Harvey Brenner, Clarence Dias, F.H. McClintock and their respective teams, and to the experts who participated in our Frascati (1974) and Rome (1975) workshops; their names are listed on pp. 245 to 248 below. At UNSDRI, the brunt of this project — workshop meetings, reports, editing — was carried by Giuliana Luna, James Moore and Satyanshu Mukherjee. Our particular thanks go to all three of them.*

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* Grant Number 74-N1-99-0017-G from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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INTRODUCTION

ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND DEVIANCE [1]

Validity and Significance of Correlations

> *"The Committee is not convinced that a study of the correlations between quantitative economic data and the development of social behaviour would produce interesting and useful results. Some of the hypotheses you propose seem contradictory; thus the rise of criminality is at times correlated with economic expansion, and at times with recession. Furthermore, the statistical data which you plan to utilize are by no means all available."*

This comment, recently addressed by an official economic planning body to one of our expert friends, sums up with admirable conciseness the methodological perplexities and conceptual problems that must be faced in exploring the link between economic dysfunctions and deviant (e.g. criminal) behaviour. The same perplexities and problems are reflected in the papers presented in this publication, and have coloured our workshop discussions in Frascati (1974) and Rome (1975).

There are in fact obvious dangers in concentrating the search for significant correlates on *quantitative* economic data (or, for that matter, on quantitative crime data). First of all such data may not be available, or if available they may not be accurate. This is particularly evident for crime statistics which, even if compensated by victimization or cohort research, present a very partial and socially biased picture of criminality. But beyond this weakness of the data

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[1] In this Introduction we have used the term "distress" to cover not only sharp dysfunctions of the economy, but also gradually deteriorating or chronic distress situations (cf. also fn. 8 below); similarly, the term "deviance" relates not only to breaches of criminal law, but also to violations of and departures from other societal norms; cf. "*Economic Crisis and Crime*", UNSDRI Publication No. 9 (1974) (hereinafter referred to as "Frascati Report"), pp. 4 to 9.

base — a weakness which might, conceivably, be corrected in new research models — there are conceptual dangers in attributing too much significance (analytic or predictive) to phenomena measured or comprehended only quantitatively [2]. To do so would mean to disregard essential variables that relate to income- and wealth-distribution patterns [3], to the political system [4], to social structures, and to a host of other cultural, " human " and historical factors active at micro- and at macro-level. In the present publication, we have attempted to cope with this problem by presenting Brenner's quantitative time-series analysis alongside with Dias' ethno-cultural observation study and McClintock's sociological verification of unemployment-crime correlations, and by relating all of them to what we called our " hypothesis game " at the Frascati workshop [5]: Brenner himself has prefaced his report with a discussion of current criminological theory as it refers to economic distress-deviance linkages.

The second point which emerges very clearly from our hypothesis game and from the data available not only to experts but also to the average newspaper reader, is that many crime and deviance phenomena seem to be associated *both* with economic downturns and with rapid economic expansion. This seemingly contradictory finding suggests of course that economic change may be criminogenic per se, whether or not the change is negative (e.g. " a crisis "). Why ? Obviously because rapid economic change generally implies unstable social relations, rural-urban migrations, the decay of traditional control mechanisms,

[2] For similar reasons the dychotomy " developing/developed country " appears largely irrelevant in connection with criminality, and any attempts to draw for analytic or predictive purposes upon neo-Lombrosian crime profiles or taxonomies of countries derived from standard economic development indicators (e.g. per capita GNP, savings rates, allocation of capital to the industrial sector or to services, balance of international trade, etc.) are not likely to be useful. Nor are superficial opinions which see crime as the exclusive attribute of wealthy or of very poor societies.

[3] Admittedly, a " distribution " coefficient could be (but rarely is) built into economic data; Brenner has attempted to do so in his research.

[4] Cf. in particular McClintock, p. 70 below.

[5] Frascati Report (op. cit., fn. 1 above); cf. also map of possible correlations reproduced as an annex to this Introduction. At the Rome workshop (1975), we also had the benefit of various published or unpublished papers submitted to the meeting, e.g. G. Kellens, " Banqueroute et Banqueroutiers ", in Psychologie et Sciences Humaines, Dessart et Maragda, Bruxelles (1974), Ulrich Martens, " Wirtschaftliche Krise, Arbeitslosigkeit und Kriminalitätsbewegung ", Research Proposal (1975), and a working paper by Dr. Steinhilper of the Bundeskriminalamt (FRG).

uncertainty, frustrated expectations, loneliness and often alienation of the individual, value conflict between generations, and so on [6]. This is nowhere more apparent than in expanding urban settings and megalopolis — whether depressed or not, and whether located in the industrialized world or, increasingly, in developing countries. The fact remains, however, that if *most* economic change [7] is to some extent crime-conducive (accounting for the steadily increasing crime- and deviance-rates visible in the very long time span covered by Brenner's data), negative changes — " crises " [8] — exacerbate these basic deviance phenomena (causing the sharp rises also recorded in the Brenner figures). The reason is of course that economic downturns entail deprivation and frustration, i.e. situations in which needs can often not be met by lawful activities. Also, economic crises tend to affect most sharply and thus further emarginate marginal socio-economic and ethnic groups. And lastly, control policies (e.g. excessive repression, incarceration or hospitalization) may aggravate the social alienation that underlies most crime and many forms of non-criminal deviance: this is true for lax enforcement of legal norms, but also for excessive repression or penalization [9].

[6] Cf. Brenner and McClintock, below, for a review of the underlying criminological theories. The Third World scenario described by Dias confirms these theories, but only in part.

[7] We have deliberately qualified this statement by referring to *most* economic change. In fact, political systems (or political " moods ") and social management appear to have a substantial impact, and have at times demonstrably succeeded in reducing or checking criminogenic effects of change — though the underlying choices (e.g. as to the amount of social coercion employed to combat crime) may pose problems of a different order, and should not be the object of invidious international comparisons.

[8] Although many of the considerations presented in this volume do not lend themselves to generalization (e.g. the Dias findings are probably specific to rural Asia), the term " crisis " is used here as a general concept referring not only to economic dysfunctions of a recession type — whether or not exacerbated by rapid inflation, as in the mid-seventies — but also to selective or local " crises " as may occur in the wake of a natural catastrophe or some mutation in industrial technology, to crises due to the inability of a society to " take off " into the industrial age or — increasingly — to " crises " attributable to politico-economic mismanagement. Brenner, whose data are also specific to North America and Western Europe, uses the terms " adverse economic fluctuations " or " downturns ".

[9] Cf. Ahmad Khalifa, " Evaluation Programs ", in " Evaluation Research in Criminal Justice ", UNSDRI (1976), p. 237: " ...failures and imperfections of the various components of the administration of justice constitute a criminogenic factor that deserves.... greater emphasis. "

Principal Findings and Hypotheses

With these comments regarding the validity and significance of correlations between deviance phenomena and the state of the economy, the following principal findings or hypotheses can be derived from the research presented in this volume, and from our speculative exercises in Frascati and Rome:

1. Economic *growth* correlates positively though differentially with higher rates for most categories of reported crime (Brenner, below). This data, as well as the data relating to points 2 and 3 below, has been obtained for North America and some parts of Western Europe over a seventy-year time span.

2. *Downturns* in the state of the economy (as measured by standard economic indicators which, at micro-level, are reflected primarily in unemployment/business failures and in the loss of purchasing power) are marked by a sharper increase of most categories of reported crime (Brenner, ibid.) [10].

3. The time-lag between economic fluctuations and increased crime rates varies by type of offence, country and over time, but has been shortened considerably in the post-World War II period (Brenner, ibid.).

4. A positive correlation between unemployment and crime/juvenile delinquency has been verified on the basis of criminal justice and especially recidivism records (McClintock, below); these data relate to England and Scotland. It was hypothesized (Frascati Report, p. 22) that a similar positive correlation would obtain with regard to " misemployment ", i.e. employment not consistent with the individual's educational and professional background and expectations (Ph.D. degree holders driving taxis).

5. In some sharp-crisis scenarios there may occur an increase of opportunity-conditioned offences (looting on the site of a natural disaster; street crime when public lighting was curtailed during the energy crisis). (Cf. Dias, below; Frascati Report, pp. 15 to 18.)

[10] A similar correlation appears to exist with regard to mental illness; cf. Brenner, *Mental Illness and the Economy*, The Harvard University Press (1973).

6. It may however by hypothesized that the *primary* [11] crime correlates of economic downturns are mainly conditioned by specific crisis-related needs and by frustrated expectations [12]; they include:

- economic offences (e.g. fraudulent bankruptcy; arson and insurance fraud; receiving of stolen goods; consumer fraud; welfare fraud; violation of rationing and allocation norms; capital flight);
- non-criminal norm violations (e.g. abandonment of dependents; non-payment of debts); Brenner also reports an increase of depressive-type mental disorders;
- minor criminal offences (e.g. petty or occasional theft; vagrancy; alcoholism; occasional drug traffic).

7. Often the most serious problem is posed by *secondary* crime phenomena that may occur where primary crisis-related deviance is either uncontrolled or condoned (e.g. abuses of economic power), or repressed and punished with excessive harshness (e.g. by indiscriminate imprisonment for minor offences, with the contamination, stigmatization and social emargination that inevitably result from it). In the latter case, individual crime careers may be reinforced, and crisis-related crime phenomena exacerbated; especially where the economic distress specifically affects and emarginates particular social or ethnic groups, and where repression and punishment are similarly biased, this may result in chronic patterns or sub-cultures of crime, and in linkages to polyvalent organized criminality (Frascati Report, p. 28) [13].

[11] We have introduced, for purposes of discussion, the concepts of "*primary*" and "*secondary*" crime correlates; the former include offences directly (immediately) correlated with economic dysfunctions, while for the latter — referred to in point 7 below — the control system intervenes as a determinant variable (as when an inept rationing system provokes black market phenomena).

[12] Frustrated expectations may in turn be conditioned by loss or shifts of social status, by mis-employment or by propagation (e.g. by mass media) of ideal standards or postulates which do not correspond to reality (Frascati Report, pp. 22 to 24); but see counter-hypothesis that crisis-related job- and financial uncertainties may *decrease* certain types of crime (McClintock, p. 71 below).

[13] It should be possible to verify and chart this hypothesis of a sequential progression from less serious to more serious deviance not only by case studies, but also — at macro-level — by an analysis of time-lag differentials among various types of crime (cf. point 3 above).

8. The flow of referrals to deviance-oriented institutions (prisons, juvenile justice institutions, mental health institutions) rises steeply in periods of economic distress (Frascati Report, p. 24).

9. Social and especially economic (vocational) reintegration of offenders and deviants released from closed institutions is particularly difficult in periods of economic crisis; this increases the social cost of institutionalization and increases the likelihood of recidivism or progression to more serious crime (inferred from recidivism data in McClintock, below).

10. Critical shortages of essential commodities (e.g. famines) tend to be associated with rationing- and allocation-norm violations; they may correlate with an increase of other crime rates, although the Dias data (admittedly specific to a rural Third World famine scenario) indicate in the short run also a *drop* of some types of reported crime, and a remarkable under-utilization of formal control mechanisms designed to cope with crisis-related offences. More importantly, it must be expected that ineptness or mismanagement of relief measures (corruption; favouritism; political patronage and protection of major hoarders and speculators) and frustrated expectations of continued welfare support will generate social disaffection, a sense of futility and generalised non-compliance with legal norms. Experience with rationing and various prohibition schemes suggests also the danger of large-scale black market phenomena and their link-up with other forms of organized crime.

Some policy conclusions

We cannot pretend to discuss here with any degree of specificity the policy implications of these findings or " hunches ", and of the data presented elsewhere in this volume. What our research intended to accomplish was simply to develop working hypotheses (perhaps " better " or " tighter ", but still hypotheses subject to verification in time and space, and possibly derived from more dependable and sophisticated data) [14].

[14] If these working hypotheses — like most hypotheses generated in our area of knowledge — were to inspire specific policies, we would hope that the policies themselves would be subject to continued monitoring, re-assessment and evaluation, and that they could be discontinued or adjusted if the facts (or a second generation of hypotheses) called for it.

It must also be recognized that — save in extreme situations of total law and order breakdown (and such breakdowns are rarely attributable only to economic factors) — the prevention of crime is but one of the postulates that determine policy. In economic crisis situations, the principal effort should naturally be to overcome economic dysfunctions and not to cope only with their crime symptoms. Whether criminologists like it or not, social defence policies are thus rarely more than an adjunct of other higher-priority policies. When they reinforce these other policies, and the imperatives implicit or explicit in them, social defence postulates may stand a chance of being acted upon. When not, or when their implementation seems too costly, or utopian or problematic, they will remain in the realm of wishful thinking.

At *technical* level, the implications derived from our findings essentially boil down to the need of strengthening and for a rational deployment of law enforcement and other criminal justice resources. Thus qualified police, prosecutors and judges are needed to deal with fraudulent bankruptcies, arson, consumer fraud and a variety of economic offences which must be expected in recession scenarios, or to deal with rationing and allocation-norm violations [15] Police may be required to patrol streets where cut-downs in public lighting may increase the likelihood of street crime, and on-the-spot intervention teams (police; armed forces; citizens' groups), possibly organized on a stand-by basis, should be available in time to prevent looting in the wake of natural disasters.

Many of these measures could easily be considered in advance whenever economic indicators signal a probable downturn or — as regards generally predictable natural disasters and sharp crises — be devised as part of disaster-relief or crisis-intervention plans.

Beyond these technical implications, a few *broad policy* conclusions may at this stage be drawn from our research. These conclusions are directed primarily at correcting costly and inefficient control systems which would otherwise compete for scarce financial resources, and seem therefore in no way incompatible with overall economic policy or social postulates.

[15] Cf. p. 19 below, with regard to alternatives to rationing.

Alternatives to Prison

One general conclusion relates to the need, especially pressing in periods of economic distress, to develop differentiated correctional policies. This means first of all maximum reliance on sanctions and other deviance-coping measures which do *not* involve incarceration and the removal of the individual concerned from the community.

The indiscriminate or excessive use of prisons and other closed institutions entails very specific dangers, regardless of whether their ostensible purpose is to punish or to " treat ", and quite apart from the budgetary costs involved [16]. It has in fact been noted (point 8 above) that in economic crisis situations the flow of referrals to prisons and other deviance-related closed institutions tends to rise sharply. Whether this is due to objectively rising crime rates in times of economic distress (point 2 above), to lowered tolerance levels for certain types of offences (Frascati Report, p. 9), to the fact that many " ordinary " coping instrumentalities (e.g. private welfare, medical services and charities; extended family) are themselves disrupted by the crisis, or to a combination of all these factors, it is evident that increased flows mean congested processes and crowded institutions. This in turn means ineffectual treatment and rehabilitation programmes, promiscuity, contamination, alienation from society and negative self-perceptions. When the individual is released from an institution, a heavier stigma will attach to him, and the probability of successful social and economic reintegration will be accordingly low. This is particularly so for those who re-enter society while economic crisis conditions (especially a depressed labour market) still prevail — i.e. also individuals sentenced or institutionalized for short periods of time during the crisis. The result — as confirmed by available recidivism/relapse data and by common sense — can only be more, and more serious crime, or a more massive and costly repression machinery.

The specific implications for social defence policy are evident. It is imperative in economic crisis conditions to develop the use of non-institutional sanctions, treatment, and after-care, whether this be for adult offenders, for juvenile delinquents or for individuals

[16] In many countries the per-inmate cost of incarceration (including standard security) compares favourably to the cost of hotel accomodations. See with regard to the rôle of prisons the chapter by Peter Young, p. 145 below.

with mental health problems. Even though, generally, economic crisis conditions may not favour innovations and expenditure for new programmes, non-institutional approaches do have the advantage of being labour-intensive, and seem therefore well-suited to depressed labour market conditions.

As to the specific nature of non-institutional penal sanctions and treatment, considerable experience has already been accumulated in a variety of settings. Fines (individualized to take account of the economic conditions of the particular offenders) and other sanctions can replace imprisonment, especially short or medium-term sentences, without any appreciable loss of deterrence effect or increase in recidivism. Semi-open correctional programmes, half-way houses, work release, probation, parole and suspended sentences are often as effective and considerably less expensive and disruptive than incarceration. Similarly, open treatment of mental health patients has proved workable in many situations. What most of these approaches have in common, of course, is the need for community support — an issue which was touched upon in the Frascati workshop and to which we shall revert below. If such support is given, economic crisis conditions (with their growing crime rates, congested processes and budgetary stringencies) may provide the necessary impetus for correctional reform and for differentiated criminal policies.

Economic Crime

A second broad policy conclusion relates to the crucial importance of coping firmly with crisis-related economic offences; by economic offences one should understand not only what is commonly called white-collar crime, corporate malfeasance, rationing violations, smuggling, etc., but also mismanagement and abuses of economic power that may not run counter to any current penal norms [17], but are nevertheless harmful to society and perceived as reprehensible in situations of socio-economic change, stress and crisis. Their

[17] It seems in fact important in this area to look beyond the traditional parameters of penal law and criminal justice: as a very minimum one should include civil norm violations. But crisis conditions often call for a fundamental re-assessment of the permissibility of particular types of economic behaviour without reference to existing penal or civil law norms. (Cf. also fn. 24 below.)

inadequate control not only tends to reinforce the crisis itself (e.g. by large-scale black market, capital flight, speculative manipulations or tax evasion) but it may generate wide-spread disaffection and non-compliance with the legal system at large. In the extreme situation reported by Dias, it seems to have resulted in a paralysis of important control mechanisms.

There is evidence at macro- and micro-level to show that, quite apart from their general criminogenic connotations, downturns in the economy and sharp crises generate or exacerbate specific forms of economic criminality (Dias, below; Frascati Report, pp. 21/2). And unlike for other types of crisis-related crime, the time-lag between economic dysfunctions and the increase of certain economic offences tends to be negligible, implying of course that effective control measures must be taken at once. It is equally evident that effective control of economic offences cannot be founded on penal measures, or on penal measures alone. While little is known about the specific deterrence effect of criminal sanctions in this area [18], one can surmise that with regard to many economic offences preventive measures are both as feasible and more effective than punishment. In other words: it will generally be preferable to prevent fraud or corruption by enforcing severe auditing and financial controls, and by strict public contracting norms, rather than to apprehend, try and imprison businessmen once they have committed these offences; similar considerations apply to preventive controls in other areas, e.g. in connection with consumer-, welfare- and insurance-fraud, receiving of stolen goods, abusive hoarding of essential commodities, and so on.

One category of economic offences, characteristic for crisis scenarios that involve commodity shortages, relates to rationing- and allocation norm violations. While rationing and allocation schemes may be inevitable, they always entail the danger of generating black market activities [19]; this in turn may develop linkages with other

[18] In general terms the deterrence effect appears to be low; it is in fact commonly known in many countries that economic offences are rarely punished; also, many economic offenders are both technically ingenious (as evidenced by typical corporate fraud patterns), and so pressed by financial needs that the risk of being " caught " may appear negligible to them.

[19] Cf. Frascati Report, pp. 28 to 33; some of these considerations correspond also to experience with non-crisis related prohibition schemes (alcohol; narcotic drugs).

forms of organized crime, produce or exacerbate socio-economic distortions in the availability of commodities (the poor can rarely buy black market food), and — if rationing offences are seriously penalized — reinforce system overloads in law enforcement, courts and prisons, the implications of which have been discussed in the previous section. It may thus be preferable, in situations where effective controls cannot be enforced (and such situations are quite frequent) to explore alternatives to formal rationing and allocation norms; among these are direct restrictions on consumption (" car-less " or " meat-less " days; limitations on public lighting and heat; price increases and higher indirect taxation) [20], white market schemes [21] and above all public education and information campaigns to ensure spontaneous consumer discipline.

A second category of economic offences — characteristic for recession-type economic crises — includes arson (as insurance fraud), fraudulent bankruptcies, consumer fraud and, as revealed by recent research in that area[22], receiving of stolen consumer goods by business enterprises facing financial difficulties. Here again, preventive measures could often be effective (including strict insurance practices and a variety of anti-theft precautions). To the extent that the criminal justice system is called upon to intervene, however, it must have at its disposal adequately trained investigative staff at police, prosecution and judicial level. And it should not be forgotten that the drawbacks of indiscriminate prison sentences for economic offences are here compounded by the demonstrated danger of prison-based alliances (networks) between sophisticated white-collar criminals and other offenders [23].

[20] However, price increases and higher indirect taxes as well as " white market " schemes (cf. below) may be socially biased.

[21] This term (at times referred to as " brown " or " grey " market) is used for rationing schemes under which standard rationing allocations may be legally sold or negotiated. The " white market " approach has been considered in various countries during the 1973/74 energy crisis. In the Netherlands, where such a scheme was used briefly for vehicle fuel, there was some criticism on the ground that border-area residents purchased their gasoline in the Federal Republic (where it was not rationed) and sold their coupons in other parts of the country. Also, whenever " white market " schemes are used for essential commodities, the social bias inherent in them is open to fundamental policy objections (the needy selling their food allowances for money).

[22] The results of an UNSDRI pilot research are scheduled for publication in the course of the year.

[23] Cf. A. J. Ianni, *Black Mafia*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1974.

We have not considered specifically other types of economic misbehaviour likely to occur in and to exacerbate economic crisis conditions: among them is tax fraud, capital flight, currency and commodity speculation and various corporate manipulations intended to evade either or both the tax collectors and creditors. Nor have we discussed abuses or mismanagement of economic power, whether or not criminally sanctioned, which may occur in such areas as credit, commercial competition, trade with and distribution of commodities and disaster relief. Their negative impact in times of crisis is often felt more sharply than that of traditional crime.

It is not contended here that economic offences (though particularly costly and disruptive to society in crisis conditions) should be punished more harshly than ordinary crime[24]. Indeed, economic sanctions may have a greater deterrence effect on transgressing businessmen than prison — the traditional form of " harsh " punishment. What must be postulated, on the other hand, is that control of, and punishment for economic offences should be *certain* and *consistent*. Where this is not possible — e.g. when economic malfeasance has become part of the social mores, or even of the machinery of state, or where the criminal justice system is simply inadequate — it must be expected that any such forms of deviance (business crime, fraud, hoarding and rationing violations, speculative manipulations, capital flight and so on) may very seriously aggravate both economic and political/psychological crisis aspects.

Community Involvement

Reference has been made to the importance of community support for differentiated correctional policies and for rationing or other schemes intended to cope with commodity shortages. In fact, the community or public plays a key rôle in most economic crisis scenarios and their deviance correlates, as well as with regard to the viability of crisis- or deviance-related intervention policies.

Fundamental to the very concept of " crisis " is the perception of the particular economic dysfunction by the public. A crisis or

[24] Although in the opinion of many there are cogent ethical arguments for particular severity toward economic offenders, and for the penalization of economic misbehaviour which, in a booming economy, may seem tolerable or part of healthy entrepreneurial aggressiveness.

economic downturn that is not perceived as such, or that is perceived as temporary, or not serious, has a lesser impact on behaviour (including crime) than one which the public perceives as a reality. Similarly, prevention and control measures may be accepted and complied with if the community perceives them as justified, efficient and equitable, but similar measures may be rejected where they are seen as socially biased, laxly administered or indeed where the crisis itself is attributed to malfeasance or non-feasance on the part of those who impose the control measures. This latter point is clearly demonstrated by instances of wholesale non-compliance with rationing norms imposed by wartime foreign occupants (black market seen almost as an act of patriotism). In the Dias study, distrust of the control system and its perceived inefficiency seems to have led to the under-utilization of essential crisis-control tools (Weights and Measures Act, Food Adulteration Act, Agricultural Marketing- and Shops and Establishments Act).

Public attitudes with regard to crime and deviance and their control are first of all expressed in specific levels of *social* tolerance (as distinguished from, and often contrasting with levels of *official* tolerance, i.e. those reflected in legislative norms and judicial or operational practices). One knows little about this area, and about the factors and processes by which society is made more or less tolerant of deviance in periods of economic deprivation. There are some indications (Frascati Report, p. 3) that under economic distress conditions social tolerance levels are *lowered* with regard to traditional forms of crime and deviance, but especially also for crisis-related norm violations — economic offences, hoarding, looting, etc. This would partly explain the crisis-related increase of referrals to the formal justice system, and of course also such extreme public responses as vigilantism and violent protest against economic malfeasance. What is certain, however, is that major discrepancies between *social* tolerance levels and *official* tolerance levels can be quite disruptive in any economic crisis scenario, and deprive coping measures directed either at the economic dysfunctions themselves or at their deviance correlates of much-needed public support. This is clearly reflected in the Dias observation study, and was discussed in our hypothesis game. In fact, a classic crisis-crime scenario involves official tolerance of economic offences (especially hoarding and corruption, which are seen as very reprehensible by the comumnity), leading to non-compliance and at

times to a generalized breakdown of law and order, and perhaps even to the serious socio-political upheavals characteristic for many societies particularly exposed to economic distress.

The operational conclusions to be drawn from this need for public understanding and support are self-evident. Never, in fact, is there a greater need for building upon basic community linkages and structures than in periods of economic crisis. This is, of course, above all a political choice. At the technical level it means an active community information policy both with regard to the crisis itself and with regard to the measures taken to cope with it: if the public understands and is aware, it will not only be more likely to comply spontaneously with the appropriate behavioural norms, but it may be expected to provide an active underpinning for particular prevention- and control-policies (including community support for correctional policies based on sanctions other than closed prisons, and for the rehabilitation of offenders).

* * *

In conclusion, then, one must both agree and disagree with the criticism quoted in the opening paragraph to this introduction. Quantitative analysis of economic and crime data at macro-level — even as sophisticated an analysis as Brenner's — cannot alone draw and explain correlations or inter-active patterns between economic dysfunctions and deviant behaviour. Brenner himself recognizes this. The fact remains, however, that his macro-data on correlations between economic *change* and crime — exacerbated where the economic change is a " *downturn* " or a " *crisis* " — do confirm what ethno-sociological and criminological observation and our Frascati " hypothesis game " had suggested [25].

Of course the information, " hunches " and conclusions presented in this volume are quite fragmentary. Dias' study focussed on a rural district in India, McClintock's on England and Scotland, and Brenner's on a relatively homogeneous group of countries in the Northern

[25] Admittedly, some of the Dias data — at least for *reported crime* — may seem to contradict the Brenner findings. But even there, most crime rates appear to have risen with a time-lag of two or three years. On the other hand, the Dias findings regarding the under-utilization of official controls, processes and laws make another important point, and might serve as a warning to overly enthusiastic legislators in other countries and crisis-settings as well.

Atlantic area. As to the Frascati and Rome workshops, on which we have placed considerable reliance, they were small three-day gatherings of experts from a variety of disciplines but with no specific knowledge of " crises " and " crisis management ".

One would naturally like to see whether and to what extent the Dias, Brenner and McClintock conclusions held true in other parts of the world, in other political systems, and in societies with a different cultural matrix. One would also like to know whether the Frascati hypotheses would make any sense to a group of prison inmates, of refugees from some disaster area, or of unemployed coal miners, and what implications police line-officers might draw from them. There is no doubt that to be really policy-relevant, the correlations and inter-action suggested in this volume should be analysed in further depth with regard to particular economic dysfunctions (e.g. recession, inflation, deflation), for very specific types of deviance (e.g. various kinds of economic misbehaviour), for particular sectors of the population (e.g. juveniles; first and second generation migrants, etc.), for particular environments (slums, inner cities, affluent or industrial suburbs), and to identify possible sequential patterns or clusters of deviance. What seems especially important is that these inquiries should be concrete, specific to issues which policy-makers can address, and not overly distorted by pre-conceived theory [26].

Obviously, such a complex task would have been beyond the resources and time available to us. What we wanted to achieve with this volume, however, was to propose certain hypotheses, encouraging others to challenge and verify them, and to more fully explore their implications. By " others " we do not mean only or primarily criminologists: indeed, their technical baggage, individualistic modus operandi and focus on phenomena and rights at the level of the individual may not be entirely appropriate for inquiries in this area [27]. It is on the other hand especially important that economists, political

[26] As for instance when all socio/economic dysfunctions are attributed to the free enterprise system or, conversely, when hoarding and speculation — serious forms of economic misbehaviour in economic crisis conditions — are disregarded even at the level of scientific inquiry in deference to the postulates of that same free enterprise system.

[27] There are some notable exceptions; cf., for instance, Radzinowicz, " Economic Pressures ", in Radzinowicz and Wolfgang, The Criminal in Society, Crime and Justice, Vol. 1, pp. 420-442, New York, Basic Books (1971); Kellens, " Banqueroute et Banqueroutiers ", fn. 5 above, and the criminological theories

scientists and politicians should also turn their attention to the interaction and mutual reinforcement between economic dysfunctions and deviant social behaviour. Hopefully, this will lead to realistic and coherent coping policies addressed both to economic crisis conditions and to their crime connotates.

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Director

reviewed by Brenner, McClintock and Cormack. But in general, only passing attention has been paid by criminologists to economic factors and to economic deviance: more has probably been written about the merits and de-merits of de-criminalizing pornography (to give only one striking example) than about any or all the economic offences considered in this volume. Cf. also Buikhuisen and d'Anjou, " Analysing Evaluative Research ", in Evaluation Research in Criminal Justice, UNSDRI (1976), pp. 121-23, 125; in which the following picture of criminological research is traced:

> " .... They have been primarily concerned with so-called repressive measures. It is also evident that not all forms of delinquent behaviour have been studied in equal depth. The emphasis has been on traditional criminality and traffic offences. There have been hardly any studies in the field of economic and environmental law and tax evasion » (p. 123).



ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CRIME: MAP OF POSSIBLE CORRELATIONS



PART ONE: TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS (1900-1970)

EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMY ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, ENGLAND AND WALES AND SCOTLAND

by M. Harvey Brenner

Summary of a study covering the experience of the United States, Canada, England and Wales, and Scotland during 1900-1970. Prepared for a Conference on Economic Crisis and Crime, United Nations Social Defence Research Institute, Rome, November 1975. It is expected that the complete report will be published in late 1976 by the author. For that reason none of the tables and graphs to which this report refers are reproduced here.

I. THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY ON THE INCIDENCE OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR

Theoretical Approaches

1. We have identified seven different theoretical viewpoints on the causation of crime that have a direct bearing on the question of the influence of changes in the economy on criminal behaviour. These theories concern (1) economic loss, (2) comparative decline in socio-economic status as a result of greater gain in such status by the majority of the population, (3) the development of delinquent careers as a result of reduced opportunity in legitimate sectors of the economy, (4) frustration-aggression theory, (5) development of sub-cultural deviance in both values and normative patterns as a reaction or " reaction-formation " to lack of social-economic integration, (6) differential association theory, and (7) urbanization and economic growth, potentially leading to poorer community integration.

2. The connection between economic change and criminal behaviour, as indicated by these theories, is as follows:

a) *Economic loss*

This is essentially the situation of decline in national income and employment levels. The model of " economic rationality " would argue that illegal activities represent a series of industries which come into play when other societal industries decline. This series of illegal industries then is thought to expand and contract in inverse relationship to the expansion and contraction of the general economy.

b) *Comparative decline in socio-economic status as a result of greater gain in such status by the majority of the population*

The argument here is developed from Merton's theory of anomie. This theory specifies that deviance, including " innovative " (in large

measure illegal) behaviour emerges as a result of disjuncture between social values, or goals, and the social-structural means of attaining them.

During periods of economic decline, many individuals have less opportunity to meet social goals; they thus become potential " innovators " under these conditions. At the same time, the rate of innovation should increase as a result of large-scale and comparatively rapid economic growth. This victimizes a substantial proportion of the population unable to participate in that growth, due to lack of the necessary education or acquisition of employment skills appropriate to integration into the economic system, at least at a moderate wage level. Both of these theoretical derivatives from Merton's theory apply to the economic change situation, but in somewhat contradictory ways. The first derivative would specify increases in crime during economic downturns, while the second would specify increases during intermediate-range periods of general economic growth. However, in this theoretical conception, it is the second derivative that is held to be the more significant for crime because the most numerous criminal subpopulation is theoretically imagined to be of low socio-economic origin (due to less effective socialization efforts).

c) *The development of delinquent careers as a result of reduced opportunity in legitimate sectors of the economy*

The classic piece of writing on this subject is Cloward and Ohlin's *Delinquency and Opportunity,* which specifies that delinquency occurs as a result of lack of economic opportunity within legitimate industry, as well as the lack thereof among organized illegitimate industries. The connection with economic conditions is straightforward. During periods of economic contraction, jobs and legitimate income will be less plentiful which will result in the tendency toward criminal behaviour. The well-organized criminal activities (typically prostitution, gambling, drug traffic, and black market activity in general) are not open to the potential newcomer — both because entry into them is highly controlled (they have been established prior to the onset of the economic contraction), and because of increased competition for entry into that illegal labour market.

d) *Frustration-aggression theory*

This traditional hypothesis relates to essentially non-utilitarian violence (though there is little reason why it could not be extended

to include instrumental criminal acts). It originates with the discipline of psychology as a result of attempts to develop a theoretical connection between psychoanalytic and learning theories of the tendency toward aggression. The basic idea is that frustration represents a blockage, or thwarting, of aspirations and expectations in general. Such frustration then results in a psycho-physiological response of the aggressive (or " fight ") variety. This aggressive response is thought to be common to many animal species, yet is influenced by genetic and socialization factors particularly as to the direction and subject of the aggressive attack. The theoretical structure of this hypothesis has not been completely developed (especially the psycho-chemical mechanism), and alternative psycho-physiological theories of aggression have been proposed (e.g., based on loss or attack); yet this theory continues to command substantial scholarly respect among the disciplines of psychology, psychiatry and ethnology. This hypothesis can be applied to either of the two derivatives of Merton's theory of anomie discussed above, as in Henry and Short, *Suicide and Homicide.*

e) *Development of subcultural deviance in both values and normative patterns as a reaction or " reaction-formation " to lack of social-economic integration*

This theory was developed by Albert Cohen as an expansion of Merton's theory of anomie where the reference is to " rebellion ", or an attempt to overturn social values which cannot be fulfilled in the current social-structural setting. Cohen offers the psychoanalytic view that, in order to safeguard the mental integrity of an individual or group, a substitute and often contradictory conception of reality is developed. In the case of the juvenile subculture in particular, there is thus a substitution of values with a rejection of adult, middle-class emphases on legitimate means of achievement for an advancement of youthful achievement and masculinity via criminal gain at high risk. Once the delinquent subcultural value system comes to be established, norms for the regulation of social life thereafter tend to denigrate the economic achievement values of the larger culture.

This theoretical perspective, while specific to delinquents of a juvenile subculture, is applicable to the establishment or maintenance

of a great variety of illegal subcultures, especially those with a set of ethnic and lower-class subcultural distinctions.

The influence of economic change on the development of such deviant subcultures could occur either as the result of (1) comparative economic loss among specific subgroups in relation to the general population, or (2) comparative lack of economic gain in comparison to that in the general population.

f) *Differential association theory*

This is a theoretical position initially advanced by Sutherland in order to explain the method by which criminal subcultural norms come to be diffused, especially among youth. The argument is almost atheoretical in the sense that it is descriptive of the mechanism by which individuals become familiar with criminal subcultures. This must certainly occur through extraordinary contact with those subcultures.

This type of theoretical orientation becomes particularly useful on consideration of the effects of unemployment. Where an increased number of individuals lose employment and income, they will tend to join the ranks of those who are more chronically unemployed or of low income, for whom the tendency toward illegal activity is already established. The linkage of the association of these newcomers with an already developed illegal subculture will tend to bring about an increased diffusion of skills, contacts, motivations, and technologies linked to criminal activity.

g) *Urbanization and economic growth*

The area of urbanization and economic development has probably been the largest single source of theoretical development in the social sciences. From the works of Toennies, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, Worth and others, there has developed a long-held assumption that the urbanization processes inherently contain elements of social disintegration and pathology. The basic notion appears to be that the bonds which traditionally united elements of the society, namely those relating to family, kin, and ethnic group, gradually lose their importance as society becomes industrialized and the power base shifts from kinship sources to those connected with the national political economy.

In the course of this political transformation, the fundamental indicators of social position change from those ascribed, on the basis of kin relations to the social structure, to those based on economic achievement in the industrial sector. Thus, increasingly, economic achievement alone comes to represent the definition of social value in the society. An additional result is that those sources of community integration, which were based on kinship and ethnic ties, come to be replaced by those based on economic inter-relationships. Therefore, with the long-term development of economic growth, there is a gradual increase in the degree to which social integration is dependent on the economic function of society.

The obvious implication of this conception is that with continued economic growth the entire fabric of social integration becomes more vulnerable to even minor disturbances in the national economy. Thus, social pathology in general and criminal behaviour in particular would increasingly come to be explained by instrumentalities of the political economy.

Another important component of urbanization and economic development, which is also instrumental in diminishing the influence of ethnic ties, is that of population heterogeneity. Under conditions of urban economic development, the industrial locations draw ethnically mixed populations from many areas into categories of employment defined only by industry and occupation. Thus, in the same economic region, there will be found groups of very different backgrounds engaged in similar occupations and utilizing the same goods and services made available through the urban network. With this heterogeneity of populations, there occurs subcultural pluralism with a multitude of often conflicting value and normative systems. The subcultural pluralism logically leads to moral relativism on the part of increasingly large proportions of the urban population. The resulting vagueness in moral values concerning appropriate conduct and goals, theoretically would, in turn, lead to increasing acceptance and practice of behaviour previously considered unequivocally immoral.

3. Issue of " rational " versus " irrational " models of criminal behaviour as related to economic changes.

The principal sources of hypotheses on which the present work is based derived from the medical and psychological disciplines (psychobiological) on the one hand, and the economic, sociological and political

(socio-cultural) on the other. The psycho-biological formulations centre around the impact of psychological stress on aggression, especially violence. In this mechanism, stresses which overwhelm the individual tend to bring about behaviour which is eruptive and irrational in the sense that it is not under the control of the individual.

The socio-cultural view, by contrast, is that economic and political conditions change in such a way as to make it more probable that the individual will resort to illegal methods in order to gain income or social position. These processes are at least assumed to be " rational ", or under individual control. The conception of illegal injury, whether it involves violence or deprivation of property, is that it represents a form of aggression. The mode of aggression used may itself be comparatively " irrational " or " rational " but it is rarely either purely one or the other. Probably both psycho-physiological and instrumental gain is influencing the criminal behavioural process. Moreover, it is not easy (nor perhaps even correct) to discriminate between psycho-physiological and material gain.

The position taken in this research is that the criminal behaviour attributable to economic change contains elements of both psychological stress and the means of coping with it through either violence or comparatively utilitarian crime. In this sense, both the psycho-physiological and socio-cultural models are operative. In this conception a property crime could well be considered an act of violence, or injury against another person, though not involving immediate physical harm. The loss in property, however, could ultimately result in substantial psychological harm.

Nevertheless, different forms of criminal responses to economic stress could be categorized by the degree to which conscious or unconscious factors dominate the response pattern. In this case, the degree of " rationality " does not logically depend on the extent of violence in the criminal act. By this we do not intend to argue that such stress-responses represent forms of mental illness, but rather that they are coping mechanisms to overwhelming stress situations of which the criminal subject may be more or less aware. Yet it is probable that a " solely " violent act without additional criminal implications, such as assault, can be construed largely within the " more nearly irrational category ". Also, it is probable that a solely utilitarian act of larceny may be largely " rational " under this definition.

Operational Measures of Theoretical Constructs

In translating the theoretical views listed above into operational measures which reflect on the state of the economy, we are considering six types of measurement. These are:

1. General cycles of economic upswing and recession;

2. Economic instability, or departures from smooth economic growth in general;

3. Change in the structure of economic inequality;

4. The extent to which specific (socio-economic or demographic) population subgroups tend to gain or lose employment and income during economic upturns and recessions, again as compared with the general population;

5. Secular changes in income distribution among population subgroups;

6. Secular changes in income levels according to population subgroups.

The basic mechanisms alluded to by these sets of measures concern:

a) Changes in the level of economic well-being;

b) Changes in comparative socio-economic position (or status) on the part of any specific subpopulation to the population as a whole (overall median) or to any other specific subpopulation (reference group, as in Merton);

c) The general extent of economic inequality in a population, where the measure would approximate the standard deviation (among subgroups) of overall population income;

d) The exact profile (pyramidal structure) of income distribution. This issue concerns the relative proportions of income distributed among the various subpopulations which may be inherently pathological or salutary;

e) Economic instability, or the degree to which levels of income and employment, in the general population or in any sub-

population, is subject to fluctuation. From a psychological standpoint, this is a problem of coping with, or adjusting to, situations of change per se. These economic instabilities are measured by the absolute difference between smooth economic trends and the raw economic data that they are taken to represent;

f) Urbanization, as measured by population size, density and heterogeneity;

g) Increasing dominance of the economy as a mode of societal integration, as measured by the extent to which national or international economic phenomena are causes of the socio-economic situation of subpopulations;

Measurement of the Effects of Economic Change on Crime and Criminal Justice System (CJS) Activity

1. Measurement of adverse effects of economic change:

a) Fluctuations in the rate of employment and unemployment (in combination with measures related to personal income, we can estimate the impact of " underemployment " or " misemployment ");

b) Effects of inflation: annual percentage changes in the Consumer Price Index;

c) Intermediate range (1-5 years to long-term) patterns of national economic growth. This measure may be inversely related to the crime rate where:

i) income distribution is not widened among specific subpopulations;

ii) there are no substantial concomitant economic instabilities.

d) Differential trends in income and employment among the various subgroups;

e) Differences between income and employment levels of selected minority groups, on the one hand, and the median of per capita income unemployment for the population aggregate on the other;

f) Combinations of several of the above stated measures in order to derive a comprehensive econometric model of adverse effects of economic change;

2. Measures of the incidence of criminal behaviour and effects on the CJS:

a) The problem: that at any single point in time criminal justice statistics do not accurately reflect the incidence or prevalence of crime in society, and that there is a substantial " dark figure " of unmeasured crime; and furthermore that the size of this " dark figure " varies greatly depending on which criminal justice indicator is used. In sum, the CJS statistics represent the " tip of the iceberg " of existing criminal activity, even if we consider crimes known to the police. This problem has traditionally been so overwhelmingly difficult that in comparing nations, provinces, cities, or even sub-units of cities, the issues of comparable reporting have prevented accurate assessment of relative crime rates.

b) In the present study, this problem of statistical validity and reliability is handled in several different ways:

1) While it is true that cross-population comparisons, at a single point in time, are extremely treacherous, there is considerably less danger in assessing trends over time for a specific locality since the same reporting system (with the same biases of reporting) can usually be assumed to prevail during the period of the trend analysis under consideration. Thus, various nations or other regional units may be compared with respect to variations in their trend levels if one does not assume the accuracy of the absolute levels (or rates) represented in the trends, but rather focusses simply on proportionate increases and decreases over time. In addition, multivariate time-series analytic methods have been established to separate the effects of different influences on the criminal statistical trends, and even the problem of trend changes in reporting can to some degree be estimated or at least statistically controlled.

2) A major safeguard in the assurance of both the validity and reliability of time trends in criminal statistics as they reflect *fluctuations* in criminal behaviour, is the use of multiple statistical indicators of crime drawn from CJS sources. These sources include police, criminal court, and prison. Thus, the range of data include the following indicators: crimes known to the police, arrests, crimes brought to trial, conviction and other dispositions, and imprisonment. All of these data are cross-classified by major crime. A major effort,

then, is to observe the degree to which there is correspondence among the various administrative categories of criminal justice statistics in their specific relationships to economic indicators. To the extent that there is good correspondence, we can be relatively certain that the relationships are not based on any one type of measure, but rather that all available sources of criminal justice data point to the same conclusions. This enhances the likelihood that specific problems in the validity or reliability of any single category of criminal justice data will be compensated for by the use of other indicators which do not present the identical problems.

For example, one of the most crucial issues in the validity of criminal justice statistics trends in representing trends in crime is that they may be influenced by long-term changes in the propensity of the general public to report crime. In particular, it has been suggested that over time the public might have shown a lowered tolerance of (what had earlier been thought of as) comparatively minor crimes, and thus might be more willing to report such crimes to the police. While such a suggestion, if factually accurate, would influence the rate of incidence of certain (comparatively minor) crimes known to the police, it would probably not influence the rate of imprisonment which we would assume to deal almost entirely with relatively serious crimes.

In any case, we would at least assume that as one moved from crimes known to the police to arrest, to prosecution, to conviction, and finally to imprisonment, if the relationships to economic indicators became *successively* weaker, then the reporting issue may well be the source of the problem. If, on the other hand, there were little differences among these criminal statistical indicators in their relation to the economy, then we would assume comparatively minor impact due to reporting. Finally, if we found that the criminal statistical indicators occurring later in time — the very latest representing imprisonment — showed the strongest relations to the economy, then we would assume that the reporting factor probably does not influence the later indicators (especially imprisonment), yet they may influence the earlier indicators (especially crimes known to the police) to some extent.

3) A third safeguard in assuring the validity and reliability of the estimated relationships between criminal statistical *trends* and

economic indicators is that they will pertain to a great variety of different crimes — a number referring to violent behaviour and another group dealing with property crimes. To the extent that we observe consistency in the relationships across each of the group of violent crimes, and the group of property crimes, we can infer generalizability of the relationships. We therefore counteract the possibility that the relationships are a result of any one type of crime or, as is often the case in this type of research, that a gross figure for crime is used which may indicate the predominant influence of one offence or category of offences.

4) A fourth method of assuring validity and reliability in the relationships found is that they will be matched for consistency across four major geographical and political units, namely the United States, Canada, England and Wales, and Scotland. This comparison is particularly pertinent because the Anglo-American legal tradition is common to all, yet the definitions of crime, public tolerance of crime, reporting systems, and criminal justice administrative procedures may vary considerably. We thus control, in part, for the effects of these differences through a determination of the consistency of the results (while exposing the most important differences in these systems).

5) One of the most important sources of obtaining validity and reliability of research results using criminal statistical data is to offer comparisons which are derived from outside of the CJS, and are otherwise not subject to the types of criticism that have been directed toward CJS statistics. The data we use in this respect derive from vital statistics of each of our four areas and pertain to homicide. Homicide is a diagnosis, within the specifications of the ICDA (WHO), by which the attending physician or officially designated coroner ascertains that mortality has occurred as a result of violence done to the deceased by another person. These data have been subject to the least amount of negative scholarly critique and, at worst, probably under-represent the true incidence of homicide by a small fraction.

In addition, as in the case of the other CJS-derived statistics, the four major political regions are compared. Also, additional multiple checks on consistency of results for homicide are obtained since the data are examined for each of several (i.e., ten) different

age-groups, cross-classified by sex and, for the United States, further cross-classified by race.

Finally, the homicide data offer a comparison (for consistency in terms of validity and reliability) with CJS statistics on murder in the sense that the homicide data pertain to victims who died, while the CJS data pertain largely to alleged criminals (apart from crimes known to police).

6) Another means of checking the reliability and validity of findings is to make comparisons among techniques used to establish the findings in the first place. There are four sources of comparison among techniques: differential trend examination, bivariate versus multivariate analyses, varying methods of establishing significant associations, and observations of the relationships over different spans of time. Altogether, to the extent that consistent findings are obtained among the different procedures, we increase confidence in the findings obtained.

The issue of differential trend analysis involves, first, the difference between removing, versus not removing, secular trends (since there are important schools of thought which suggest one or the other procedure). Also, there is the question of examining different levels (or intervals) of temporal change (1-11 or more year changes) in order to observe at which trend and interval levels the relationships can be found. Can we predict even on an annual basis, and can we predict for very large proportionate changes as well as medium-size changes? Also, can we predict to moderate-size changes rather than only to dramatic changes?

The second question concerns the distinction between observing the impact of different economic (and other social) indicators on crime versus observing their combined multivariate effect, where internal statistical controls have been employed. Does the explanation of the interactive multivariate model show consistency with the relationships indicated by simple correlation techniques?

Thirdly, do the two major techniques of over-time analysis, namely regression and spectral, lead to similar conclusions?

Fourthly, do analyses performed over different spans of time, namely 1920-1940 versus post World War II, lead to similar conclusions?

7) The next source of ascertaining validity and reliability of the findings pertains to explanation and interpretation of the findings themselves. Ideally, it is hoped that the findings are consistent with other established research findings in the area, and with theoretical positions that are most sophisticated given the state of the discipline at that time. In line with these considerations, in following standard scientific procedure one constructs hypotheses derived from previously constructed empirical generalizations and theory and either supports or falsifies them as a result of the research effort.

8) Again, some of the answers to questions about the reliability and validity of the trend data in CJS statistics are ascertained in connection with the findings of consistency of relationships vis-à-vis measures that are derived independently from the CJS statistics (the exogenous economic and social indicators). Given consistency of findings among all of the many types of cross-classifications of the CJS data *in relation to the economic and other indicators,* we can assume in large measure, general reliability at least of the trend components of the CJS data.

9) Finally, the existence of the consistent relationships themselves, despite the significant reporting problems inherent in the CJS data, would argue that the relationships found are *underestimates* of the true relationships, and thus the findings could be assumed to be stronger were the data to have carried greater validity and reliability. Yet the findings themselves are very strong in terms of statistical significance and variance explained. It is therefore not difficult to accept the conclusion that these are underestimates, and are thus the most conservative estimates, of the true relationships.

Research Methods

1. Data

The data gathered range over the twentieth century and as far into the present as feasible. They generally begin with the year 1900. These data include mortality, crimes known to the police, arrests, trials, and imprisonments for all major crimes including: (*a*) murder, (*b*) manslaughter, (*c*) wounding, (*d*) assault, (*e*) rape and other sexual offences, (*f*) offences related to possession and abuse of dangerous drugs, (*g*) robbery, (*h*) embezzlement, (*i*) forgery, (*j*) fraud, (*k*) burglary

(housebreaking, shopbreaking and entering), and (*l*) larceny and other theft. Where possible, the data are cross-classified by age, sex, and race. In addition, data on prison release by crime are obtained in order to analyse the impact of economic change on the discharge and parole processes.

The national-level economic indicators include employment, unemployment, and per capita personal income and inflation. These data have proven most representative of fluctuations in national economic-industrial indicators, and on the individual level bear a close relationship to per capita economic loss and gain.

2. Analysis

a) *Data transformations*

Three forms of the economic and criminal justice data are used in these analyses. We generally begin with the data transformed so as to eliminate the long-term trends. This process is accomplished after the data have been converted to rates, having first been divided by the appropriate population denominator. The long-term trends are estimated by fitting the best of five models of long-term changes (one linear type, two logarithmic types, a positive and negative reciprocal model, and a logistic type). The most appropriately fitting model is determined by the magnitude of the simple correlation coefficient representing the relationship between each hypothetical trend and the raw economic and criminal justice data. Once the proper trends have been fitted, they are algebrically subtracted from the respective economic and criminal justice series and the cyclic fluctuations remain. This data transformation is used only to investigate the cyclic effect of fluctuations in employment, income and inflation.

The second mode of " transformation " involves no alteration at all in the raw economic and criminal statistics. The use of the criminal statistics in their raw form enables determination of the total amount of variation in the criminal statistical trends that are due to trends in the economic indicators.

Finally, the third type of data transformation involves conversion of the economic and criminal statistics, arrayed over time, into percentage changes. Typically, four levels of percentage change were utilized: annual, 3-year, 5-year, and 10-year changes. These data

conversions allow us to examine the question of which levels of trends give evidence for the relationship between the economic and criminal statistics. It is theoretically possible that the relationships exist only at the level of 3-5 year changes, since these are the levels which are closest to cyclic fluctuations in national economic indicators. It is also possible that the relationships exist only at a relatively broad level of change, such as 10-year fluctuations, since the relationships may be mostly confined to comparatively large structural changes in the national economy. It is also possible that the relationships are so potent that they are predictable on a year to year basis, in which case they would be measurable at the level of annual percentage changes. The last possibility is that the relationships between economic and criminal statistics are so potent as to be measurable at all four of these levels of national economic change.

b) *Measure of association*

Standard methods of time-series are used, including:

1) Simple correlation (controlling for autocorrelated residuals);

2) Distributed lag analysis, through multiple regression, in order to determine the proportion of variance in the criminal justice indicators which are related to economic changes at lags of specific years (behind economic changes, from one to three years);

3) Fourier analysis, to determine whether the relationships are active over short (1-3 years), middle-range (3-5 years), and long periods (7-11 years) of recession or economic decline.

These relationships are being separately examined for the following groupings of years in order to determine whether the correlations obtained will show equal strength and predictability over time:

(*a*) 1900-1910
(*b*) 1900-1920
(*c*) 1922-1941
(*d*) 1936-1970
(*e*) 1941-1970
(*f*) 1948-1970

Graphic analysis of the relationships will also be an important component of the final presentation of data *. Such analyses enable the viewer to observe the magnitude of change in the economic and criminal justice indicators in relation to each other. They have traditionally had greater face validity among persons not fully acquainted with the more complicated mathematical aspects of time-series analysis.

Summary of Findings

1. Relationships between cyclic fluctuations in employment (and personal income) and criminal statistics

a) *Distinction between pre- and post-World War II relationships*

In the four major political units (United States, Canada, England and Wales, and Scotland), the overall relationships between instabilities in the economy and the major sources of criminal statistics show remarkable correspondence. In general, the rate of unemployment (or declines in employment and in personal income) show significant and strong relationships to increases in trends of criminal statistical data, for all major categories of crime and sources of criminal statistics.

In each country, however, it is also observed that the apparent significance of these adverse short-term economic fluctuations show a substantially heightened influence on the criminal statistics after the Second World War or, more generally, with the passage of time. This is indicated especially by the simple (or zero-order) inverse relationships between these economic fluctuations and the criminal statistics within one year of a decline in employment and income. In other words, without considering lags of criminal statistical data to economic fluctuations, the later decades of the twentieth century show substantially higher inverse correlation coefficients. The difference, in fact, between the strength of these correlations since World War II, as compared with the previous period, might lead one at first blush to imagine that the significant relations exist only since appproximately 1946.

Since a conclusion would be extremely misleading, however, a more sophisticated analysis, which takes into consideration the dispersion

* In the complete report to be published by the author.

of the lagged effects of economic stress over a period which includes 0-3 years (distributed-lag analysis), shows that the *overall* impact of the effects of these sources of economic stress on criminal statistics has probably not changed significantly from the pre- to post-World War periods. Rather, what appears to have happened is that particularly for Canada, England and Wales, and Scotland, the lagged effects are quite pronounced during the pre-war period while minimal since then. There has been, then, a speeding up of the reaction time to short-term economic adversity coincident with accelerated rates of inflation and economic growth during the last thirty years.

b) *Distinction between violent crimes against property and property crimes without violence*

The difference in reaction time (or distributed-lag effects) between the pre- and post-war eras is most pronounced when one considers the extent of physical violence involved in the criminal behaviour. Since the Second World War the relationships appear to be quite similar regardless of the extent of violence associated with crime. Perhaps the only remaining point of discrimination is that with increasing violence associated with crime there is somewhat more of a tendency toward a distributed-lag relationship with a lower inverse correlation for any single year.

Prior to the Second World War, however, there tends to be a substantially weaker simple correlation relationship for crimes of violence only, as compared with those involving violence with economic gain, or property crime alone. It therefore appears that the single most important source of the acceleration of reaction time to economic adversity has occurred with crimes of violence, even those involving violence with property crime.

c) *Distinction in these relationships among the four national regions*

There is a difference between the change in the relationship between adverse economic fluctuations and criminal statistics over time when one compares the United States particularly with England and Wales, and Scotland. It is especially for England and Wales, and for Scotland that the acceleration of the inverse relationship with economic fluctuations is observed. By contrast, the United States, while indeed showing some heightened sensitivity during the later years, also showed very substantial and rapid reactions of

criminal statistics particularly during the period 1921-1940, which included the Great Depression. In the United States incarceration in state and federal institutions, for example, for all major crimes show relationships so strong that virtually no other factors other than adverse national economic changes explain the trends. Canada appears to lie somewhere between the extraordinary sensitivity of pre-World War II United States and the more delayed and dispersed reactions of the English and Scottish criminal statistics. In the Canadian case, it is found that the majority of separate crime categories do show increased statistical sensitivity since the Second World War, yet there is a large minority of important categories of crime that do not show such an increased sensitivity.

2. The relationship between economic growth, as measured by changes in Gross National Product, and criminal statistics.

The long-term effects of economic growth during the twentieth century on criminal statistics generally show strongly positive relationships. This finding appears to coincide with the general effects of urbanization, but, perhaps more importantly, with the effects of structural (or technological) unemployment, underemployment (or misemployment) and *comparative* decline in income. This latter problem of technologically-based comparative decline in socio-economic status is more generally referred to as the problem of inequality in income distribution and job allocation. It appears to be engendered by two types of economic trends. The first of these pertains to economic swings of comparatively lengthy and deep variation, in which a substantial aggregate of the population is experiencing change in employment and income. Under these conditions of intermediate-range economic changes (a standard component of the economic growth process), that element of the population which ordinarily shows the highest rates of unemployment and the lowest income experiences only a minor decline in absolute income and employment levels. That lowest socio-economic group, however, simultaneously experiences a *comparative substantial increase* in socio-economic status in relation to the considerably larger declines in employment and income levels experienced by other population groups, (a situation which pushes the other groups into an economic situation which is similar to that of the more chronically unemployed and impoverished).

By contrast, in the case of intermediate-range economic upswings or long-term economic growth, while these lowest socio-economic groups do show increases in employment and income levels, those increases do not begin to compare with those for the general population. In other words, there is substantial *comparative* decline in socio-economic status among the lowest income and occupational skill groups during these periods of substantial economic acceleration or long-term economic growth.

In industrial societies, especially since the Second World War, the premium qualifications for middle to high income employment have been based on education and technologically sophisticated skills. The lack of acquisition of such skills by the lowest socio-economic groups, frequently in conjunction with the movement of such groups from rural to urban areas, has helped to create great disparities in income and subcultural living styles.

In all political regions examined, therefore, the secular effects of economic growth have served to increase the trends in criminal statistics. These pathological effects of rapid economic development have been far more pronounced since the Second World War, but were in evidence to some degree even prior to 1941. These trends, prior to 1941, were probably most important for Canada, less important for England and Wales, and Scotland, and least in evidence for the United States.

The pathological effects of economic growth are most apparent for crimes of violence unrelated to economic gain, moderately related to violent property crimes and least strongly related to crimes related to property alone. In many instances, in the four major political regions, certain exclusively property crimes do not show trend increases related to economic growth (e.g. occasionally burglary and grand larceny).

a) *Economic growth, trends in income inequality, and crime rates*

A number of different explanations can be proposed as to the causal factors behind the positive correlation between long-term trends in economic growth and crime rates, especially since the Second World War. The issue of changes in income inequality (or relative income change) are among the more prominently cited sources of feelings of deprivation. The finding that relative income deprivation explains the positive relationship between crime and long-term economic

growth, due to increasing economic inequality among specific population subgroups would be in line with the general thesis that it is the *sense* of economic deprivation which leads to crime. This finding would be coincident with those of this study which indicate that with *downturns* in the economic cycle, and with inflation, there are substantial increases in rates of criminal behaviour. Furthermore, it is illogical to make the direct interpretation that it is precisely the increase in income which is the antecedent of crime rate increases for the long-term trend, since exactly the opposite is indicated for small-to-moderate economic fluctuations of the " cyclical " variety.

In this study we have experimented with one major variable by which we hoped to operationalize an important component of the potential impact of changes in income inequality. This variable is the degree of income change of the population at different age-groups in relation to the general growth of population income over time since 1948. The reason that age was specified relates specifically to the variable it was intended to explain, namely homicide. It had been found previously in this study that the size of the population under age 30 was an important factor in the homicide rate since World War II. The further question was raised as to whether the youthful population was put at risk for homicide especially under conditions where their relative income had decreased in relation to that of a population as a whole.

The experiment indicated that since World War II there has indeed developed a very substantial relationship between the income gap of persons between ages 14 and 25 who are not living in families and the rate of homicide. This relationship appears to be so significant that it diminished the statistical importance of unemployment changes as well as the long-term trend in economic growth. Most important, however, is that focussing on age provides only a single indication of the possible impact of changes in income inequality over time on criminal behaviour. A similar type of quantitative operationalization of income inequality through time should be performed at least for specific income groupings (e.g., the lowest tenth of the population in income distribution), occupational, industrial, and ethnic groups. Such operationalizations of multiple indicators of income inequality should extend greatly the potential for explaining the effects of long-term economic growth on the sense of deprivation felt by specific subpopulations.

b) *General explanation of positive relationship between economic growth and crime rates*

Long-term economic growth appears to produce pathological effects which may involve (a) increased social inequality, or *relative* inequality, (b) urbanization, with its problems of decreased significant interpersonal relationships as related to population size, crowding, and reduced family structure. There may be a minor positive impact of general economic growth, in terms of urbanization, on pathology due to the " civilizing " effects of urban life, and a probable decrease in tolerance for personal violence. The following is an outline of some of the more important factors which may impinge on the crime rate:

— Changes in relative income distribution: or the issue of inequality or relative inequality.

— True differentials in *relative income* change coincident with economic growth (the problem of relative social mobility), according to income or unemployment level by;

- Occupation, industry
- Income group
- Age
- Educational level (i.e., differentials in social mobility as measured by education level alone).

— Increased perception of relative deprivation by comparatively low-income groups due to the (apparent) increasing dependence of economic growth on heightened consumer demand. This heightened consumer demand is, in turn, brought about by the communications industry in general, and advertising in particular. The following variables may be used to measure the growth and potency of these industries:

- Expenditures, or extent, of GNP related to communications in general
- Expenditures for advertising (also manpower involved in advertising)
- Expenditures and manpower in television
- Growth of market research and related industries.

— Increasing minority status of lowest income groups, according to:
  - Income rank
  - Occupation
  - Ethnicity.

— Greater *sensitivity* to loss due to the national median level of greatly increased economic affluence:
  - The higher the income level over time, the greater is the absolute income loss due to unemployment (or underemployment).
  - The higher the national median level of income, the greater the relative personal loss due to unemployment, underemployment, or inflation. The isolating effects of economic loss during periods of economic affluence, probably imply, in addition, that short-term and sharper economic downturns have a harsher proportional effect than larger sources of economic downturn in which a greater proportion of the population is involved.

— The problem of urbanization

— Physical dimensions of urbanization
  - Size and heterogeneity
    - Comparative insignificance of the individual in terms of personal status.
    - A larger number, but less individually significant and close, personal relationships — leading to a decrease in the social control exerted by individuals upon one another;
    - Decreased community integration leading to decreased effectiveness of police and decreased community relations engendering lowered inhibition to injure one's neighbours (1) Less accurate perception of who actually " belongs " or resides in the community; (2) The issue is raised as to who will become involved in helping others; (3) Decreased relationships with local police; (4) Lowered inhibition to harm others due to lessened protection normally afforded by close interpersonal relations.

  - Population density: the issue of crowding and stress levels;
    - The issue of privacy
    - The relative importance of the individual person and his influence on his life situation
    - Competition for resources, or pressure on the distribution of resources.
  - Environment
    - Noise levels
    - Pollution and odour intensity.
  - Decline in family structure (and structure of other primary groups)
    - Indicators of family structure (1) Family size; (2) Divorce rate; (3) Separation rate; (4) Illegitimate birth rate; (5) Number of persons residing together; (6) Marital status including singles and widowed, by age; (7) Growth of school education
    - Causal indicators (1) Growth of the female labour force; (2) Migration patterns, international, rural-urban, and inter-city; (3) Social mobility.

3. The relationship between inflation, as measured by annual percentage changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and criminal statistics.

There is little statistical doubt that the annual rate of inflation bears a significant positive relationship to the criminal justice statistical indicators. These relationships appear to behave very much like those observed for economic growth as measured by the Gross National Product (which has been deflated). Ordinarily, in fact, the rate of inflation, measured by CPI, and the GNP would be very highly correlated (at a level of correlation greater than 95). Since we wished to sharply distinguish the effects of general economic growth from those relating to inflation per se, annual percentage changes in the CPI were used to represent inflation, while the GNP (deflated) did not undergo transformation. Nevertheless, the greatly attenuated measure of inflation which (according to correlation coefficient

measures) bears little relationship to GNP, does show relations to the criminal statistics which are similar to those found for GNP.

In general, for all four major political regions there is a positive relationship of inflation to the criminal statistics during the full period covered by the twentieth century data. These relationships do not become very important, however, until after the Second World War for most of these regions and for the majority of crimes. As in the case of economic growth, they are most important for the violent crimes without reference to economic gain, least important for the purely property-labelled crimes, and moderately important for those crimes in which violence is associated with economic gain. For the United States, and England and Wales, the relationships between inflation and the criminal statistics are not important until the late 1940's and for the United States, in particular, they seem to be absent until that time.

4. Interaction among the three major national economic indicators (unemployment, GNP, and CPI), and criminal statistics.

Summarizing the combined effects of the three national economic indicators on the criminal statistics, it is found that when used together in the same predictive equation, they explain considerably more variation in the criminal statistics than any one does alone. The three economic indicators seem to have both independent effects and interactive effects. Each one of the three by itself exerts a measurable and statistically significant impact on the criminal data. The combined effect of these three indicators is such that for a great many categories of crime more than 90 per cent of the variation in trends in criminal statistics can be accounted for. This is often true for the entire period from the early 1900's through the late 1960's, but is especially noteworthy since the Second World War.

For the most part, cyclic fluctuations in employment and income appear to be the dominant factors affecting the crime rates prior to the Second World War; but even where they are dominant they may not explain more than 40-60 per cent of the variance in the majority of crime categories. Since the Second World War, however, the effects of economic growth and inflation have been especially pronounced so that in combination with the cyclic economic instabilities, the complete set of three economic indicators frequently accounts for over 90 per cent of the variances in the criminal statistics.

The cyclic economic fluctuations, particularly relating to employment patterns, have been traditionally the most important sources of influence on the crime rate. They continue to retain their significance during the last three decades, but become equal in importance to the economic disequilibria and inequalities subsumed in the economic growth indicator and including the features of long-term structural unemployment, underemployment, and chronically low and unstable income. Of the three economic indicators, inflation has exerted the least important influence, although that influence has been statistically significant. It has been especially significant in combination with declining, or comparatively low levels of employment and income, since it further acts to reduce real income levels. Inflation is also a variable which during the last few years, has shown very great potential for economic disruption at a level at least potentially equal to that of unemployment or economic inequality.

5. Combined effects of economic and non-economic factors on estimates of crime.

Apart from those factors which are inherently related to absolute or relative change in socio-economic position, it is also necessary to consider factors which influence the crime rate in conjunction with national economic changes. These additional factors could influence the crime rate either by directly interacting with the economic change factors or having an additional independent effect which either moderates or exacerbates the effects of economic change. Two factors which interact directly with the effects of economic change refer to the demography and community structure of a nation. Two major examples of such factors are 1) the expansion and contraction of the size of the comparatively youthful population involved in serious criminal behaviour, and especially violent behaviour, and 2) the extent of urbanization. The size of the youthful population at risk for crime, i.e., 20-30, depends on fluctuations in the birth rate — which are in turn generally positively related to long-term economic changes. Similarly, the extent of urbanization, as measured by the number of persons living in cities greater than village size (i.e., more than 10,000 persons), is a function of long-term economic development, which has been especially pronounced since the second World War even in industrialized countries.

A set of factors which would theoretically have an effect either moderating or making more acute the effects of economic change would be the efficiency and effectiveness of the CJS. While the operations the CJS are not necessarily dependent on the economy, outlays of national revenue for CJS expenditures, in the area of manpower and facilities for example, certainly are.

The impact of changes in the size of the population under age 30, the extent of urbanization, and the ratio of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions to crimes known by the police were investigated in terms of their independent and combined effects on the crime estimates. In addition, these effects were measured in combination with those due strictly to economic changes.

We have been able to experiment with these three groups of variables on the United States data on homicide and England and Wales data on major crimes in each segment of the CJS process (from crimes known to the police through imprisonment). It is quite clear that the size of the youthful population is a significant predictive factor in our measures of the crime rate. This is particularly true for homicide but somewhat less important for our measures of crime funds derived from CJS data.

The extent of urbanization also turns out to be a potent variable in the statistical explanation of crime indicators. It appears to have a positive relationship to property crime in general, at least as indicated by the British data, since 1948 pertaining to robbery, burglary, and larceny. In the case of homicide, on the other hand, it appears to have a comparatively mild effect and even an inverse relationship at times. It is possible, then, that urbanization has the effect of diminishing the extent of violence over the long-term trend while increasing the rate of property crime somewhat. It should be kept in mind that these relationships for urbanization pertain to the period following World War II. Prior to the war, there seem to be few significant observable relationships for urbanization during the twentieth century.

The impact of measures of effectiveness of the CJS does appear to be significant and consistent among the crime indicators with which experimentation has taken place (i.e., the data for England and Wales). While the results are significant, the measures do not explain a substantial proportion of the variation in crime rates as compared with the major economic indicators; the proportion of

variance explained by the CJS measures range from approximately 3-12 per cent. Nevertheless, these results are theoretically and practically significant, particularly considering that the relationship is always in the hypothesized direction — namely that the higher the ratio of arrests, prosecutions and convictions is to crimes known to the police, the lower is the crime incidence. This apparent effect on crime incidence of the CJS measures would lead to a deterrence explanation, and the greatest effect is observed on crimes known to the police. There is little or no negative effect, however, of the CJS measures on crimes which result in imprisonment — that is, the more serious offences. Indeed for crimes resulting in imprisonment, there is a significant positive correlation with the CJS measures, probably indicating the importance of police and prosecution functions in obtaining conviction even for major crimes.

In general, the demographic, urbanization and CJS data, while showing statistically significant results, do not appear to alter substantially the observed impact of national economic indicators on the measures of crime incidence. These additional factors do, however, serve to round out the explanatory model by which the trends in crime statistics can be understood.

6. The relationship between homicide mortality and national economic indicators.

There are two outstanding distinctions between the homicide data and the data representing changes in crime incidence derived from CJS sources. In cases of both types of data, the attempt is to ascertain relationships between national economic changes and criminal behaviour. In the case of the homicide data, however, the primary source derives from vital statistics reports of actual deaths. In addition, the homicide data are perhaps closest to representing " irrational " aggression, in the sense that most homicide occurs among individuals who are closely acquainted and especially among family members. Therefore, the homicide data are possibly the " purest " representatives of criminal activity without obvious utilitarian motive.

For each of the four major areas under investigation, the homicide findings are somewhat different from those pertaining to other crimes (as derived from CJS data sources). The primary difference relates

to the period between the first and second World Wars, whereas after the second World War the findings for homicide and the CJS-based data are virtually identical. For the period 1920-1940, data on homicide for the four major areas are consistent in showing the following relationships to national economic indicators: (1) a positive correlation with the inverted unemployment index, and (2) an inverse relationship to changes in the Gross National Product (GNP). By contrast, for the CJS-derived data (ie., robbery, larceny) these criminal indicators are inversely related to both the inverted unemployment index and GNP. It therefore appears that while criminal activity was in general strongly inversely related to all the major economic indicators during 1920-1940, homicide is inversely related to the major national economic indicator (GNP) but is positively related to changes in the employment rate (as measured by 100 minus the proportion of persons unemployed per civilian population).

Before attempting to interpret this apparent contradiction in findings, it is important to make reference to the only other study in recent times which dealt with the effects of national economic changes on homicide rates, namely that of A. F. Henry and J. F. Short, *Suicide and Homicide*. Using an index of industrial production for the United States, Henry and Short found a positive correlation with the homicide rate during the twentieth century through 1950. The explanation given by these authors focussed on the issue of relative, as distinguished from absolute, deprivation. They argued that since persons committing homicide are typically of considerably low socio-economic status, and during economic downturns such individuals lose less proportionately than the majority of the population, it is important to focus on the possible adverse effects of economic upturns for these individuals. Thus, while during economic downturns a sizable proportion of the population is actually reduced to a very low level of socio-economic status, during economic upturns the relative gaps between the lowest and higher income groups increases, and even in the best of times the lowest group shows high rates of unemployment.

The difficulty with Henry and Short's explanation is that they generalized to all economic downturns regardless of magnitude. However, while their interpretation might well be correct for an extraordinarily deep and lengthy economic depression, it probably

would not hold for the more usual short-term economic recession which involves a minority of the population. It is only in the case of a long and deep economic depression that economic change is so intense as to propel a significant number of the population to a status nearly equivalent to that of the lowest socio-economic stratum — in such a way, furthermore, that it is plainly visible to individuals of the lowest socio-economic positions. In the ordinary economic recession, however, probably the typical individual who experiences major income or employment loss is largely unaware of the effects on others, and in fact is likely to blame himself for the loss rather than attribute it to a national phenomenon.

The finding in this study of a positive relationship to homicide rates for the inverted unemployment index during 1920-1940 is coincident with this thesis. Observation of the unemployment rate during this period shows extremely dramatic changes during the period 1929-1936, essentially covering the Great Depression, but minor fluctuations during the other years of 1920-1940. Therefore, the entire relationship between homicide and the inverted unemployment index is dominated by the deep and lengthy economic adversity of 1929-1936. By contrast, the relationship between GNP and the homicide rate is in the proper direction for the hypothesis that absolute economic deprivation produces an increase in the homicide rate; i.e., the correlation is inverse. The validity of the absolute income loss hypothesis is supported by observation that while GNP fell substantially during the Great Depression, other fluctuations in GNP during 1920-1940 were far more important than were those in unemployment (comparing 1929-1936 with the remainder of the period 1920-1940).

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that during the period 1920-1940 the economic stress which precipitated very large increases in the homicide rate in all four major regions was due to both (1) absolute adverse changes in socio-economic status for substantial proportions of the general population, and (2) relative adverse changes in socio-economic status for the very lowest socio-economic groups normally having very high unemployment rates. In addition to the typically adverse effects of economic loss during periods of economic downturn (represented by changes in GNP during 1920-1940), we must also consider the positive effects of major increases in unemployment, during an extraordinarily deep economic depression, on those

who were already in an unstable economic situation (as represented by changes in the employment rate, especially during 1929-1936). In the case of the latter group of individuals of very low socio-economic status, their homicide rate apparently diminished during the early part of the depression (1929-1932), only to increase greatly during the second period (1932-1936) which was an upturn (after the low point of 1932) for most of the population.

There is, then, a real difference between the effects of the economy on homicide as distinguished from other crimes during the 1920-1940 period dominated by the Great Depression. The homicide rates apparently responded to both absolute and relative economic deprivation, while other major crimes (all involving property) responded to absolute deprivation alone. The distinction between homicide and property crime in their relation to national economic indicators during the period of the international depression may lie in significant differences between the populations who committed these crimes. It appears in general to be the case that more of the population who committed property crimes during this period were affected by absolute income loss than is true of the population committing homicide. While both populations did respond in the *same* way to absolute income loss, there was apparently an *additional* population of persons who committed homicide who were responding to the relative economic loss of other persons, and who were probably themselves of very low socio-economic status.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that while relative economic loss did have a significant effect on the homicide rate during the Great Depression, the *overwhelming* effect on the homicide rate resulted from absolute economic loss as it did in the case of major property crimes. In both instances, the international depression is associated with extremely large increases in the rate of criminal behaviour. Indeed, even for homicide in particular, the rates during the Great Depression were the highest recorded during the twentieth century. During the period since the second World War, however, the patterns for both the homicidal and property crimes are identical; they increase sharply during periods of short-term reductions in employment and income. In summary, then, recession and depression both overwhelmingly have the effect of increasing crimes against property and persons.

7. Effects of economic indicators on components of the criminal justice system.

Perhaps the single most consistent set of findings in this multi-national study is that the relations between economic indicators and criminal statistics are very similar for data derived from each component of the criminal justice system. The CJS-component data include: crimes known to the police, crimes cleared, pre-trial police and judicial activity, trial proceedings, sentencing, and incarceration. All of these show the similar and substantial effects of adverse economic conditions.

In addition, individuals acquitted, both prior to trial and as a result of trial, also reflect adverse national economic conditions. These acquittals may be a result of overload on the CJS which may produce less effective police and prosecution functioning, or possibly a greater rate of arrest of innocent citizens in response to public demand for resolution of a considerably higher rate of crime victimization.

Finally, we observe that the rate of discharge from prison is also considerably greater during periods of economic adversity. This is no doubt partly a result of new waves of inmates " pushing out " an older population of inmates under the management aegis of the prison administration. It is entirely probable that this released population, newly vulnerable to the same types of situations which brought them to the CJS in the first place, will return to prison under similar conditions within a short period.

8. Interpretation of the general relationship.

Interpretation of the relationships between measures of national economic changes and criminal statistics is based on the link between those empirical relationships and theories as to crime causation. The two outstanding findings of the present study are that both absolute economic loss and comparative decline in socio-economic status (as a result of greater gain in such status by the majority of the population) are the pre-eminent causes of variations in criminal statistical trends.

Absolute economic loss is indicated by real " cyclic " declines in employment and income, as measured chiefly by fluctuations in the unemployment rate. Economic loss is additionally measured by annual percentage changes in the rate of inflation.

Comparative decline in socio-economic status of the lowest socio-economic groups is indicated by accelerated levels of economic growth involving high rates of structural (or technological) unemployment and low (and unstable) income levels. This situation of accelerated economic growth levels, in which significant minorities participate minimally, is also heightened during periods of intermediate-range economic upswings.

Overall, then, to use traditional economic phraseology, the major causes of variation in criminal statistics lie in economic instability and economic inequality. In both of these cases, however, the common basis of causation lies in comparatively low socio-economic status, whether that situation has occurred unexpectedly or represents a chronic pattern. It is clearly no accident, therefore, that the principal theories of crime causation relate to the same condition of comparatively low socio-economic status.

Frustration-aggression theory, which relates most closely to violent crime but is easily applicable to " expressive " forms of property crime which have instrumental overtones, is basically linked to conditions of thwarted socio-economic aspirations. Similarly, the development of subcultural deviance as a " reaction-formation " to social-economic integration would stem from comparatively low socio-economic status. Differential-association theory would be especially relevant to the formation of subcultures of potential delinquents based on enlargement of the poor socio-economically malintegrated individuals, principally brought about by cyclic or structural unemployment patterns.

The issue of urbanization as a factor linked to economic growth, and potentially to criminal behaviour, bears additional discussion. From a general theoretical standpoint, it can be argued that long-term urban development is instrumental in replacing ethnic and socio-cultural modes of societal integration with those based on economic integration alone. Thus, with long-term economic growth the society's means of integration depends increasingly heavily on the stability of the economy and the " justice " or equity of its distributive mechanism.

From a purely empirical standpoint, in addition, the typical pattern of urbanization involves a population dynamic in which the occupational structure and industrial development are the bases for urban residential patterns. In the industrialized societies investigated in the present study, a typical pattern is for lower socio-economic groups, as defined by occupation and industry, to congregate in discrete residential areas. These residential areas of lower socio-economic status then expand or contract according to regional patterns of economic growth and stability.

During the last two to three decades, it has been frequently observed that urban rates of criminal activity have increased to extraordinarily high levels. In line with the previous discussion of the frequent pathological effect of economic growth on subpopulations of comparatively low socio-economic status, it appears likely that the growth in urban crime since the Second World War is related to (1) the migration of population of low socio-economic status and low technological skill and education into urban industrial and service occupations, and (2) the simultaneous out-migration of higher socio-economic groups somewhat beyond the political boundaries of these cities.

II. ADDITIONAL NOTES

THE EFFECTS OF FLUCTUATIONS IN THE INCIDENCE OF CRIME, VIEWED AS A DEMOGRAPHIC FLOW PROCESS, ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESSES: ARRESTS, TRIAL (PROSECUTION, DEFENCE, JURY), INCARCERATION, PAROLE, RELEASE

A. Each component of the criminal justice system is activated under conditions of economic change. Thus, it appears that CJS primarily acts as a repair mechanism for disturbances in the national economy and economically-based social structure.

B. It would be very important to analyse the structural changes that must continually disrupt CJS processes because of the " distributed lag " waves of economic instability. It is possible that the well-known congestion and unpredictability of " stochastic " sources of population impact on the subsystems of the CJS are largely due to national economic instability.

C. It appears that release from prison is also related to economic instability, particularly to recession. Since the recidivism rate is between 60 and 80 per cent or higher (within 2 years), it is possible that a major reason is that ex-prisoners encounter a hostile economic environment similar to the one which initially brought them to prison.

D. It is likely that larger numbers of individuals are released from prison during economic recession because of the congestion freshly caused by a new wave of admissions during the economically unstable period. There are important implications here for the legally proper administration of justice and for the danger to the society engendered by this process.

E. The question of the appropriateness of incarceration based on economic frustrations or economic crimes related to national economic instability. An important distinction must be made between the following two groups:

i) Comparatively " new " criminals motivated largely by impulse or expressiveness (whether or not the crime was " instrumental ").

ii) " Hardened " criminals with established records of recidivism.

Impact of fluctuations in the incidence of crime on the population victimized, or made fearful as a result of information about the crime rate

A. The pattern of urbanization in industrialized societies and underdeveloped countries is heavily influenced by economic changes on the national level. In industrialized societies, we observe the acceleration of outward migration of middle-income groups, with their investments, real estate, and tax base, from the central cities. Conversely, in non-industrialized settings, there is often a development of shanty-towns surrounding central cities, based on large income gaps and residential segregation.

B. There is a consequent decline in investment in central cities, leading to long-term economic deterioration and a further acceleration of social pathologies including crime.

Impact of the crime rate on political-legislative processes with regard to criminal legislation

As a result of the economic and population flow processes impinging on the crime rate, from time to time there appear to be " crime waves ". Under such conditions, the public in general may become alarmed and suggest alterations in the criminal law generally making sentences more severe on the assumption that this will deter crime. Such sentences may be inappropriate to the societal situation with regard to crime, and frequently there will be a subsequent need to repudiate the more severe laws.

Implications on the findings for evaluation of the CJS

There is a very substantial literature in the general area of evaluation of specific CJS efforts. Typically, the research attempts to link a particular CJS process with specific outcomes usually bearing on the incidence of recidivism. Just as typically, however, one finds a neglect of the types of factors which in the criminological literature have been linked, or been hypothesized to link, to the incidence of crime. It is rare, therefore, for criminology and CJS evaluation to meet in the same research project.

The findings of this study clearly show the impact of economic and socio-demographic factors on trends of criminal activity, regardless of which particular data are used to measure crime trends. Therefore it now appears to be not only theoretically important but realistic to consider the factors which normally affect trends in crime rates. It is only after explaining variation in the base rate of crime, at least as a function of national economic indicators, that we may properly determine the impact of additional factors such as those which stem from CJS activities.

It has been shown, for example. that taking into consideration only the three national economic indicators (unemployment, inflation, and per capita personal income), the size of the population under age 30, and the extent of urbanization, that the trends in crime can be " forecasted " to greater than ninety per cent accuracy for several major populations. Thus, future trends in crime rates could be reasonably accurately projected in any case by the use of these variables alone. Regardless of the activity of the CJS, then, the trends in crime appear to proceed under known and even measurable conditions. The implication is that far more precise methods than have been used in the past are available for the control of factors external to the CJS which impinge on the crime rate.

An example is provided in this study of the means of ascertaining an effect of a given CJS process, while holding constant the economic and socio-demographic factors which ordinarily influence that rate. An attempt was made to examine the impact of the effectiveness of three CJS processes on the crime rate in England and Wales. These processes were (1) police capacity to apprehend the perpetrators of crime, as measured by the rate of arrest per crimes known to the police, (2) the combined effectiveness of police and prosecution, as measured by the rate of prosecution per crime known to the police, and (3) the combined effectiveness of police, prosecution, and criminal court, as measured by the rate of conviction per crime known to the police.

It was in fact found that these measures of CJS effectiveness do have a statistically significant effect on lowering the crime rate (based on crimes known to the police). More important, however, is that these significant effects remain valid even when the impact of the other economic and socio-demographic variables have been statistically controlled. In addition, it is only possible to estimate the *proportionate* impact of CJS factors under conditions of control for the proportionate impact of other relevant factors. Thus, in the case of this study, it was found that the CJS indicators appear to account for between 3 and 12 per cent, depending on the specific crimes, of the trends in crime indicators in England and Wales.

Impact of the relationship between economic change and crime, and the question of criminal responsability for crime

A. Criminological theories appear to include three basic phenomena:

1. Individual background factors
2. Environmental influences
3. CJS processes.

B. To the extent that these theories are accurate, little room is left for deliberate choice. There is an empirical question however: we may in fact find that a certain proportion of crime is a

function of individual background and environmental influences (according to standard sociological classifications); this proportion, then, must be understood as not occurring under individual liability in the philosophical-scientific sense, but under criminal liability in the legal sense.

C. To the newer view among some economists, it is therefore possible to think of criminal behaviour as rational from the standpoint of economic modelling. In other words, crime may be undertaken through deliberate efforts to recoup economic loss. There are at least two major problems with this viewpoint, however:

1. There is no consideration of who, among those who lose income, will engage in illegal activity. Clearly, not everyone who suffers economic loss engages in criminal acts. Therefore, to the extent that factors other than simply the economic gain related to crime are motivating those individuals who do engage in illegal activity under conditions of economic stress, the " rational " model is inapplicable.

2. Another important point is that the rational-man economic model of crime assumes that crime, at least under economic stress, is rational. If we understand the term " rational " to mean normal, this model is clearly inaccurate because the majority of the population (average or normal) does not engage in economic crime even under conditions of loss. There is clearly a discrepancy between the economic model of rationality, and the sociocultural-psychological model which focusses on normality (in terms of society and culture) and irrationality (relating to deviation from adaptive modes).

One question, of course, is whether criminal behaviour is in fact adaptive. This depends on (1) whether the individual will escape punishment, which is in turn related to professional criminal skill, and (2) whether there is much guilt as a result of the criminal undertaking. In dealing with these questions, we must consider (a) whether the crime is new or represents hard core recidivism; in the latter case, the purely rational economic motive might well be paramount, because of the difficult economic situation of ex-convicts in the first place and because of their heightened professional skill, and (b) the nature of the crime committed — whether more nearly " expressive " or " instrumental ".

3. Perhaps most important, the " rational " model is incompatible with the fact that secular growth is as important in criminal trends. Thus, comparative rather than absolute economic loss is the key variable. It is not " rational " economic motivation but rather social-psychological stress which is the relevant factor.

Impact of the economic change-crime relationship on the understanding of government responsibility for protection of the public from criminal harm

A. Beyond the usual conception of state responsibility for societal protection through police actions, it is clear from this research that the government has a preventive rôle in protection of the population through proper management of the national economy.

B. Whether or not individuals are philosophically liable for criminal acts, or legally liable, the government is morally and practically liable because of the actual control it exerts on the economy on a routine basis. This control is not confined to major economic disturbances, but involves as well economic growth processes, inflation, urban development, migration, and education including the aquisition of technical skills.

Cost benefit analysis of the effects of national economic management on crime; including costs and benefits derived from the entire criminal justice process

A. It is necessary to compare costs and benefits related to management of the national economy with those of criminal justice processes, as they relate to crime.

B. We do not as yet know what effect criminal justice processes usually have on crime; it appears to be modest, yet statistically significant. With extremely severe punitive measures, these processes may have a more substantial impact. On the other hand, it is necessary to gauge the social costs and benefits of increasing or decreasing criminal sanctions.

C. While we do not know the effects on crime of CJS processes, we can measure the potential effects of national economic management on the crime rate. Thus, at the very least, we can infer that the crime rate might be reduced by a given proportion as a result of government expenditures of a certain amount, or the use of monetary or other economic-political policies.

PART TWO: CRIMINOLOGICAL VERIFICATION

UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME AND PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND

by F. H. McClintock *et. al.*

[Editor's Note:

The data presented in the following chapters are not specific to economic "crises" but they reveal striking associations (not necessarily causal links) between unemployment, unstable employment and parental unemployment on the one hand, and confirmed crime careers (recidivism) and delinquency on the other.]

I

UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIMINALITY

Introduction

This paper and the supporting research working papers have grown out of part of the discussions held at a workshop convened in June 1974 by the United Nations Social Defence Research Institute (UNSDRI) on Economic Crisis and Crime [1]. It became clear at that conference that one of the central ways in which various kinds of economic crisis had a bearing on criminality was through employment and unemployment. Yet little was known in any detail on the relationships between employment/unemployment and criminality. At the macro-level various statistical trends had been examined and speculative explanations had been put forward, but few systematic attempts had been made to examine the phenomenon at a micro-level [2]. The research working papers contained in Section II of this chapter include the results of several studies which attempt to make a contribution on the basis of research carried out in Great Britain [3].

Economic activity and the socio-legal system

One of the major difficulties in tackling the question of economic crisis and crime on the basis of the documentation prepared for the first workshop was that there an attempt was made to relate economic conditions *directly* to criminality rather than to construct a model, or models, giving a central place to the social institutions — including especially that of the law — which it has been argued are likely to be significant variables between economic conditions and crime, especially when economic crisis occurs [4]. In undertaking the research which is reported on in Sections II and III of this paper it became very clear that the legal and other social institutions in both England

and Scotland are fundamental to an understanding of the associations that were discerned between crime and unemployment, as well as the ongoing dynamic processes underlying the findings. Such an approach also indicates the dangers of direct comparisons, or the drawing of general conclusions, without giving full consideration to variations in the legal, social and economic institutions of different countries. In England and Scotland the existence of a social welfare system which provides under certain legal rules unemployment benefits, as well as a Trade Union structure affording legal protection and economic aid to its members, both have a direct influence on the standards of living of workers when economic crises or other economic disturbances occur. Such influences are obviously complex and can lead to underemployment and misemployment in the economic sense. But, on the whole, such legal and social institutions cushion employees from the full and immediate adverse impact of economic crises except in situations of national disaster or comparable sharp crises when, in fact, legal and other institutions of social control break down.

It is suggested, therefore, that in any appraisal of economic conditions, including employment and unemployment, and their relationship to changes in criminality, it is necessary to take direct account of the influence of the socio-legal system. In a general way the classical economists, as well as the Marxist economists, have been well aware of the extent to which an economic system is an integral part of a socio-legal system. Very recently Gunnar Myrdal, the Nobel Prize Winner, in reviewing the development of economic theory has shown that the emphasis placed upon the economics of production rather than upon the economics of consumption isolated economic issues from the socio-legal and the socio-political systems and thus tended to relegate to one side discussions on crime and other social problems. He has proposed a return to a more widely based economic theory where crime, like other social problems will be examined in the context of the political economy. In this way crime against property, as well as certain crimes against the person, would be viewed in juxtaposition to legally accepted economic activities instead of being regarded as merely a symptom of individual or social pathology as has been the traditional mode of thought in criminology based upon the biological and social functionalist schools of thought. We find the adumbration of this idea in Sutherland's pioneer study of the professional thief: " adequate control of professional crime cannot be

attained by proceeding against thieves one at a time either by punitive or reformative policies. Control calls, in addition, for modification in the general social order out of which professional theft grows [5] ". The importance of this perspective in the present context is that when one examines the employment/unemployment records of individual offenders, as in several of the research working papers in Section II, one is dealing with the problem on the individual social level, rather than on the social structural level, and one tends to take for granted the economic and social systems within which such social behaviour arises. On whatever level one is operating it is important not to lose sight of the other level, and ultimately attempts should be made to construct explanations that satisfactorily deal with both.

Economic impact on offenders, victims and criminal justice personnel

In assessing the impact of economic conditions and economic change on criminality it is suggested that there are three aspects to be considered:

(1) The behaviour of the offender or potential offender.

(2) The behaviour of the victim or loser or potential loser.

(3) The behaviour of those responsible for social control.

Each category of person will assess the economic, social and legal aspects of the situation according to his, or her, individual perspective. With increasing or chronic unemployment, for example, employees may be less likely to commit crime at work because of the fear of prolonged unemployment, whereas with an expanding economy such an outcome would be much less likely to occur. Similarly, with falling profits, management personnel will be less likely to " fiddle " large expense accounts. It is further suggested that in times of economic difficulties potential victims or losers of property through theft will be more prudent as regards the protection of their belongings, i.e. the level of carelessness among victims will decrease; also under such circumstances, when a crime does occur the victim may well be more likely to report it to the police than in more affluent times. Lastly, in times of economic difficulty — recession, inflation, etc. — those responsible for criminal justice, police and other forms of social control of crime will be expected to economize in relation to public expenditure. In conditions

of inflation they will be expected to continue to run the system on the same amount of money although its real value has fallen, and in some circumstances they will be expected to make considerable cutbacks in monetary expenditure. This alone may have an important influence on the development or change in penal ideology. In this context, therefore, it has to be stressed that the information we have, both as regards crime and unemployment, is a product of the changes in the economic and social system and cannot be regarded as entirely independent of that system. Furthermore, as Peter Young has indicated in his paper, the socio-economic role of the prison changes primarily with changes in the social structure of the community, and social structure changes either through fundamental economic change or as a result of other kinds of innovation.

Empirical findings on crime and unemployment

It is not proposed to give in this section a detailed resumé of all the findings contained in the various research working papers in Section II of this report. It is, however, important to draw attention to a few of the salient points that emerge from those studies, bearing in mind that they relate to conditions which prevail in an advanced industrial country with a highly developed social welfare system, and do not necessarily apply to the conditions that exist in developing countries or in industrial communist countries.

First, it should be noted that the various studies which examine the relationship between unemploment and crime on an individual basis must of necessity be restricted to those crimes where an offender has been apprehended or at least identified by the police. Increasing crime rates with constant or decreasing detection rates lead to an increase in the 'dark figure' of offenders with respect to the crimes recorded by the police. In addition to this there is, of course, the question of 'hidden delinquency' as such and the way in which this may change in relation to economic stress and crisis. These issues can only be adequately dealt with by 'hidden delinquency' studies that take into account life-styles of the offenders and their employment patterns.

The second point of importance is that the studies undertaken here and others that have been consulted indicate quite clearly that there is a significantly higher proportion of offenders who are

unemployed at the time of their offences or who have marked employment problems than would be expected from the unemployment levels prevailing in different regions and localities.

The third point worth noting is that with increases in unemployment rates it would appear that there is not a substantial increase in the number of regularly employed persons going into crime for the first time. The additionally identified offenders appear to be recruited from those with a background of unemployment or erratic employment patterns. The association between crime and unemployment is much more marked in the younger adult population than among the older age groups. But as Margaret Cormack's research pilot study indicates there are still a large number of questions to be answered in order to obtain a more reliable assessment of the situation.

A closely related fourth point is that the vast majority of unemployed offenders live in the socio-economically deprived areas: a finding which may indicate that such conditions when exacerbated by unemployment may be directly related to an increase in crime. But an equally strong interpretation is that such individuals are more likely to be already known to the police or strongly suspected by the victim and that the finding is related to a differential impact of social control rather than a measurement of social behaviour.

The fifth important point to note is that many of the offences were extremely trivial, and furthermore, not all of them were related to illegal material gain. The data available were not sufficiently detailed to make a comprehensive qualitative study of the crimes. But clearly the utility aspect of criminality in relation to the life-styles of offenders needs to be more closely examined. The general impression is that a great deal of this minor crime is not committed as an illegal alternative to legitimate economic activity, and also that the proceeds of such crimes are not rationally utilized in consumption on a comparable basis to that of legitimate earnings. However, these questions need further investigation. Major property crime, white-collar crime, business crime, tax evasion, etc. may very well vary significantly with sharp economic change or crisis. Being a more deliberately planned and executed economic activity, this is quite likely to be the case, and there are some instances of criminality indicating that this is so. Again, however, there is a need for separate research into these issues if one is to be on firmer ground than that of mere conjecture.

The sixth point worth stressing is that a disproportionately large number of juvenile delinquents come from homes in which there are frequently long periods of, if not chronic, unemployment among the parents. Mark Beeson and Mary McIsaac demonstrate this in their research work, and an unexpectedly high proportion of those studied in a closed English Borstal had family backgrounds where there was substantial experience of unemployment. The likely social and psychological impact of parental unemplomeent on growing children in the family is easy to imagine and the extent to which similar employment patterns develop among those children as they grow up is beginning to be documented and seems to be associated with adolescent recidivism. Further research on this question is obviously required; some of it has already been initiated[7].

The various studies on delinquency indicate a close association between criminality and employment problems. Such studies are based upon the known offenders, many of whom come from urban areas designated as socio-economically deprived, as well as from disadvantaged family backgrounds. There is some association between increases in unemployment rates and crime rates; but the association is a complex one and cannot be explained simply in terms of criminal behaviour as a substitute for obtaining income previously achieved through legitimate employment. Much of the association between known and recorded crime and unemployment in the British context seems to be directly related to the question of deprivation and inequality and its prevalence is therefore primarily a social structural question. Little is known about the changes in criminal behaviour relating to major property crime, white-collar crime, and business crime: such questions need separate study[8]. It is clear, however, that any development of meaningful comparative studies on economic change and crisis in relation to patterns of criminality, must take into account the legal and other social institutions of different countries. It has been shown that this is necessary when considering the relationship between economic conditions, unemployment and criminality.

Crime, unemployment and penal control

The first two studies included in Section II of this report emphasize the extent to which those responsible for penal measures put stress on reducing the likelihood of recidivism by dealing with the unsatisfactory

employment patterns of offenders. So does the paper by Young (Section III). This can be seen as part of specific penal control programmes within an ideology of reformation or treatment of offenders. The extent to which such programmes have been developed has, however, been restricted to the acceptance that they are within a control system that has basically a punitive purpose.

While most studies on criminal recidivism have indicated a close association with unemployment or poor work-records, none of the studies that have attempted to deal with the problems of employment in relation to criminality have had any marked success. This may, of course, be due to the pervasiveness of the doctrine of " less-eligibility " (see Young, below). Certainly the closed English Borstal study demonstrated that when the maximum effort was applied to this problem, within the institutional context, it had a nil result (p. 121 below). Probation studies have been no more successful, although here again the effort of the staff is confined to what is possible within the penal control system. In spite of these negative findings those responsible for penal systems still place a substantial effort and expenditure on work-training as a way of combatting recidivism.

Both Young and Beeson have indicated the complexities of the issues involved in relation to the development and maintenance of particular forms of penal control; not least among these is that of a penal ideology which may have a substantial impact or be no more than a form of "penological cosmetics ". It has been suggested that both the unemployment/crime phenomenon and the penal control system are grounded in the social structure of a community, but as each can be substantially affected by economic innovation, some form of rational planning might be possible for bringing about change, or dealing with the consequences of change, by constructing penal-system models that take into account the socio-economic variables as well as the crimino-legal ones.

Now that the direct current cost of keeping an offender in prison has increased to more than £ 1,000 a year under conditions that are barely humane, the role of the penal institution in crime control is under serious scrutiny. Consideration is also being given to the cost of crime as distinct from the cost of crime control. Less costly non-institutional crime control programmes are being developed, criminal justice diversion programmes are being worked out, and

where prisons are seen as a necessary last resort, short-term sentences are being advocated as being just as effective (or ineffective) as long-term sentences, and parole systems are developed to reduce wherever possible the longer sentences imposed by the judiciary. It can be argued that all these responses are as much economic as they are ideological. In the last analysis, however, the feasibility of such innovations is dependent on the socio-legal structure of the community.

REFERENCES

[1] *Economic Crisis and Crime* (UNSDRI Publication No. 9, September 1974).

[2] The study which deals with the assessment of the literature on economic factors and crime is still in progress but will shortly be completed.

[3] These research working papers relate to part of a pilot research programme financed by UNSDRI on the basis of a LEAA Grant.

[4] These issues were considered further at Edinburgh in September 1974 by Working Group II.

[5] SUTHERLAND, E.H., *The Professional Thief* (1937).

[6] " The Dark Figure " by F. H. MCCLINTOCK in *Collected Studies in Criminological Research*, Vol. 5, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

[7] " Cycles of deprivation and delinquency: a research study " by F. H. MCCLINTOCK and P. YOUNG (forthcoming 1976).

[8] *Major Property Crime* (forthcoming 1976). The proceedings of the Edinburgh Conference, September 1975, on policing and the private security industry, ed. by Z. BANKOWSKI and P. YOUNG.

II

SOME DATA ON THE CRIMINOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT

The Beeson Report: delinquency and unemployment in the North-East of England

by F.H. McClintock, based on a report by Mark Beeson

In the early 1960s research into unemployment and delinquency was initiated in the North-east region of England by Durham University. It was sponsored by the Home Office and undertaken by Mark Beeson, then of the Staff of Durham University and subsequently of the staff of Leeds University.

The full results of this research have not been published but several lengthy papers have been produced for the research steering committee of which I am a member. It is unlikely now that the report, as originally envisaged, will be published and it may therefore be useful to give some indication as to its scope and main findings in this short note which is substantially an edited version of summaries and conclusions prepared by Mark Beeson.

The basic material used in the enquiry was the collection of pre-trial reports compiled by the local probation service on young men appearing for ' more serious offences ' in one small area in the North-East of England. The age-range runs from fourteen to seventeen. This spans the usual school-leaving age, so that the enquiry deals with some boys who got into trouble while at school and others who got into trouble after they had left. The basic period was 1962 to 1963, when the general unemployment rate, particularly among juveniles, was fairly high.

The basic material of the pre-trial reports was added to from two other sources. Records of jobs for the boys concerned were obtained from the youth employment service, which covered the period up to the boys' eighteenth birthdays. Records of offences at any time up to the end of 1966 were obtained from the local police.

In addition, an attempt was made to get reasonably comparable information for a 'control' group of boys. These boys were a selection of those who left a roughly comparable set of schools in roughly comparable numbers over a similar period. The reason for including a control group was to give some idea of the incidence of unemployment among these, as compared with that for the 'offenders'.

The enquiry set out to answer a few fairly simple questions about the relationship between unemployment and offending, but was prepared to explore suggestive leads as they arose. The starting point was to ask how often boys had a background of unemployment at the time of their offence; how often they lost their jobs in the aftermath; whether unemployment made any difference to decisions by the court, particularly as far as fines were concerned; whether unemployment was associated with recidivism and what sorts of career patterns the boys had. Along the way, a number of other issues arose such as the likelihood of prior offending among unemployed boys and differences in the seriousness of offences in terms of the number of offences involved.

The results showed that up to half of the schoolboys who got into trouble came from homes where there was unemployment. Up to half the young workers who got into trouble had records of unemployment themselves. Of those who had jobs to lose when they got into trouble, one in five lost them.

Unemployment, even in a fairly sudden recession, was shown to be a very selective affair. Families of offenders where there was unemployment handed on unemployment to their youngsters. The boys who got into trouble were about five times as likely to have experienced unemployment as reasonably comparable non-offenders.

Although unemployment tended to be associated with more severe treatment by the courts and with greater recidivism, the unemployed boy who got into trouble was not likely to come up with as many offences as the employed boy, but this was complicated by the fact that the unemployed boy was less likely to be a first offender.

Superficially, the boy with a background of unemployment was rather less likely to be fined than the boy without. But the use of fines, as such, gave only a very partial picture, since as many boys again had other financial penalties imposed on them. This meant that unemployed boys were very much less protected from costs, restitution and so on than they were from fines.

A variety of case-histories showed that unemployment can be seen to have contributed to offences. On the other hand, employment also contributed to offences. What characterised the careers of the boys was the disruptive effect of unemployment and of underemployment and of the offence.

The discussion of these results led to some suggestions about the need for the courts, the probation service and the youth employment service to work out more effective procedures; but the cost of being ineffective should be assessed more in terms of the loss to the community of the employment potential of the boys concerned than in terms of their delinquency.

A further aspect of the study which was discussed was the involvement of officers of the Probation Service with problems of unemployment in relation to the nature of the service they provided. The point was illustrated by a tabulation showing a higher unemployment rate among the clientele of the Probation Service in one small area in the North-East than among the labour force in the same general district.

The centrality of concern about the client's employment in rehabilitative measures was noted, particularly as this arose in the work of the Probation Service. The hypothesis was proposed that members of the public and the law enforcement agencies behaved as if they shared this concern. It was suggested that they accordingly tended to 'further' incidents involving individuals affected by unemployment toward court hearings with a greater readiness than those not involving such individuals.

An enquiry in the area examined this hypothesis to provide other evidence bearing on the relationship between unemployment and offences attributed to juvenile males. The enquiry analysed information from pre-trial reports on juvenile boys between 14 and 17 years of age, compiled by the Probation Service in the course of 1962 and 1963.

In quantitative terms, the enquiry indicated that unemployment was more prevalent among the boys involved than would have been

expected of the general population of boys in the same district. There were more boys with histories of unemployment among those with earlier offences and there were more such boys among those subjected to more drastic treatment by the courts. The difficulties of relating these observations to hypotheses concerning the differential 'furthering' of offences attributed to unemployed boys were explored.

The enquiry also showed that the courts discriminated between employed and unemployed boys in the application of financial sanctions. In the case of schoolboys, those affected by parental unemployment were less often fined or subjected to financial sanctions. The financial sanctions that were applied were on average of smaller amount. The discrimination between boys who had left school, however, operated in the opposite direction. Overall, the amount of any financial sanction imposed was very little higher for a boy who was fined than for a boy who was not.

The distribution of the various forms of unemployment showed the incidence of one form to be highly associated with the incidence of others indicating that unemployment was a repetitive characteristic of the careers of individuals and of families.

In qualitative terms, the employment held by the boys was frequently of a low order in terms of career opportunity. In addition there was some evidence in the material indicating that offences were sometimes attributed to unemployment, suggesting that some of the public accept the fact that unemployment has a causative role in delinquency.

A wide range of points were raised in discussion, relating to the interpretation and strategy of criminological research. The static nature of the enquiry limited the scope of the questions to which answers might be sought. Yet the answers obtained suggest that unemployment should not be so conceptualised as simply to provide the starting point for the study of the relationship between this phenomenon and delinquency, but that both phenomena should properly be regarded as derivatives of the same social system. Evidence was quoted to show that law enforcement to some extent operates by recognising certain 'danger signals' or symptoms in individual offenders. The possibility that unemployment features among these symptoms was explored along with a general consideration of the symptomatological approach. The application of financial sanctions demonstrated in the enquiry was discussed in relation to the policy of the Juvenile Court.

On methodological issues, comment was made on conditions governing the use of case-reports for post hoc research purposes. Major problems in the conceptualisation of delinquency were also discussed particularly as they arose in proposed typologies of delinquent behaviour and the consideration of undetected delinquency.

At the conclusion of his research Mark Beeson suggested the following lines of inquiry:

1. Determining the nature of the individual's unemployment situation, with respect to himself, his family, his peers and his occupational group.

2. Interpreting this situation in terms of that individual's circumstances in relation to the juvenile labour market, his aspirations and his previous behaviour (including prior delinquency).

3. Assessing the impact of any unemployment situations to which the individual has been subject in terms of his:

   a) activities - allocation of time and income,

   b) associates - their prior delinquency and employment situation,

   c) attitudes - toward himself, his work, his behaviour and various aspects of his membership of society.

4. Relating the incidence of delinquency, in its narrower and wider senses of behaviour and attitudes, to the unemployment situations the individual has encountered and the impact of these upon him.

The research would involve fairly extensive interviewing of the individual himself and one or more members of his family. Where possible, this should be supplemented by reference to official files giving details of periods of unemployment, nature of employment and reasons for ending employment. The need for substantiation of this kind is raised by the serious difficulties to be anticipated in obtaining accurate information from the individual himself.

The association between crime and unemployment: a pilot study in Scotland

by Margaret Cormack

Introduction

The study sets out to examine the relationship between unemployment and crime. The aim was not to look closely at individuals and their histories of crime and unemployment, but rather to present a view of the situation existing in the population of part of the central Scottish industrial belt, to show the overall correlation between crime and the unemployment situation. This work was intended as a pilot study, a forerunner to a wider survey within Scotland which might in turn lead to a larger scale study of the complex relationship existing between crime and unemployment. The project was designed to highlight some main areas of interest and to point to the areas worth further investigation. The main published sources of information in the area are the Scottish Criminal Statistics and local police statistics, and the Department of Employment statistics, but there is no general habit of relating these together. The relating of these statistics seems an obvious first step in any investigation to establish the pattern of the relationship between crime and unemployment before examining a framework of causes.

The literature on crime and economic conditions suggests that, for various reasons, unemployment may precipitate crime. From the study design we can make no inferences about the specific causes or catalysts of crime which may affect the individual. Nonetheless, we can construct hypotheses about the broad effects of the impact of unemployment on criminal behaviour. Radzinowicz (1971), in reviewing the field, pointed to the multivariate factors which interpose

between the occurrence of unemployment and the commision of crime, but provided evidence from a number of sources that economic depression increases the crime rate [1]. During prosperity there tends to be an increase in crimes against the person, but theft, which represents roughly 70 % of all crime, is significantly increased during adverse economic conditions. Mannheim (1940) contended that when this did not happen it was only being prevented by the intervention of other factors.

The criminal response to unemployment is also affected by age, again in a variety of ways. It has been found (Gibbs, 1966) that those in the middle years display a direct relationship between unemployment and arrest rates whereas the very young and very old demonstrate an inverse relationship. This may be explained by Merton's theory of access to goals, where the young and old are not expected to pursue those goals which are characteristically achieved through employment. Mannheim, however, presents a different view, suggesting that the connection between unemployment and crime is stronger in the case of juveniles (and of recidivists). Again, Beeson (1965) found that parental unemployment was correlated with juvenile crime.

Method

The data collection was in two parts: firstly, taking information from police reports which were kept in area police headquarters, and, secondly, looking at the statistics on unemployment supplied by the Department of Employment. To obtain a representation of the data on crimes throughout the year a sample was selected from five months in which cases were disposed - March, June, September and December of 1974 and February of 1975. From these months information was taken from every fifth report card for all crimes and offences except motoring offences where every twentieth card was examined. The crime data were then compared with the data on unemployment in

[1] This is not substantiated totally: Sellin (1937) reported no conclusive evidence of a marked increase in the general crime rate during economic depression.

the general population for the months March, June, September and November 1974 and February 1975 [2].

For each case the following items of information were collected:

a) crime classification according to the classified list of crimes and offences supplied by the Scottish Home and Health Department,

b) employment category - employed, unemployed, not-applicable (as in the cases of housewives, retired persons and school-children) or not known,

c) name,

d) address,

e) age at the time of apprehension and date of birth,

f) the number, if any, of convictions,

g) brief details of the crime or offence.

The sample was categorized according to the areas defined by the Department of Employment to allow a correspondence to be made between the crime figures and the unemployment statistics, i.e. the case was allocated to the area of residence of the person charged, not to the police area within which the offence was committed. For comparisons to be made, all those whose employment was not known and those who were in the not-applicable category — the housewives, school-children, etc. — were excluded from the analysis except where stated [3]. Similarly, those who could not be assigned to an area because their address was not known or because they had no fixed abode were also excluded, except where stated. For the purpose of much of the analysis only the men were used. This was partly due to the very small numbers of women in both the employed and the unemployed categories, but primarily because unemployment may have a very different impact on women from that on men, and because crimes committed by women may not be comparable to the same crimes committed by men (Smith, 1974).

[2] It was intended to obtain data from every third month, but sometimes the month in question was not available in the records or statistics, so the adjacent month was taken.

[3] Details of this group are given in Table 14 and Graphs 1 and 2.

The numbers in the four areas who had committed crimes and offences are:

TABLE 1

	Men	Women	Not applicable
Edinburgh	927	78	360
Surrounding area	286	23	89
Bathgate area	310	166	96
Other	97	4	34
Totals	1,620	271	579

Before turning to the results of the study it will be useful to set the context of the work in the unemployment and crime situation in the Central Scottish industrial belt. The area comprises the planning regions of Edinburgh, Glasgow and Falkirk/Stirling, as described in The Scottish Abstract of Statistics. From the accompanying table it can be seen that unemployment decreased in 1973; the pattern of unemployment over the years being echoed in the pattern of crimes quite closely. Offences, however, do not display this distribution, but tend to increase over time. The Glasgow area showed the highest rates of both unemployment and crime for the years given.

TABLE 2: TRENDS IN UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIMES AND OFFENCES IN PLANNING AREAS FOR 1971, 1972 AND 1973

AREA	% Un-employed	% Crimes	% Offences
Edinburgh			
1971	4.8	5.34,[1]/2.15	5.31,[1]/3.91
1972	5.3	5.50, /2.16	5.94, /4.72
1973	3.8	5.18, /2.13	6.46, /5.78
Glasgow			
1971	6.8	5.51,[1]/2.01,/2.96	7.61,[1]/1.65,/4.20
1972	7.7	5.58, /1.08,/2.91	7.96, /3.83,/4.64
1973	5.5	5.16, /2.00,/2.65	8.39, /3.77,/5.39
Falkirk/Stirling			
1971	4.7	2.81	5.25
1972	5.8	2.92	5.40
1973	3.9	2.78	6.19

[1] The figures in the first columns refer to the cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow respectively.

TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OF MALES IN THE SAMPLE UNEMPLOYED COMPARED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS ON GENERAL UNEMPLOYMENT

AREA	Crime Sample (all crimes and offences)	Unemployment Rate
Edinburgh	20.8	5.1 [1]
Surrounding area	16.1	5.1 [1]
Bathgate area	15.1	5.7
Other	11.3	3.3
Total area	18.5	5.1

[1] Edinburgh and surrounding area assessed together.

From Table 3 it is seen that the percentage of unemployed men was higher in the sample than in the general population. Looking at the four areas we note that this percentage was highest in the city for the sample, whereas unemployment generally was highest in the industrial Bathgate area. However, Edinburgh and the surrounding area were assessed together by the Department of Employment; thus it is not known what the employment rate was for the city alone. It is likely that the rate was higher than 5.1. Despite this, there is no clear evidence that unemployment rates are directly reflected in the sample rates.

Looking at the variations in unemployment rates among different types of offence we have Table 4.

TABLE 4: PERCENTAGES OF MALES UNEMPLOYED BY TYPE OF CRIME

AREA	All	Property [1]	Violence [2]
Edinburgh	21	28	23
Surrounding area	16	41	21
Bathgate area	16	23	27
Other	11	30	—
Total area	18 n = 1620	29 n = 299	22 n = 209

[1] Including classes 3 and 5 of the official crime classification.
[2] Including both serious and petty assaults.

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

Considering the total area first, it can be seen that the highest unemployment rate occurs in the property crime sample. This does lend some support to Mannheim's (1940) findings that the most common offences connected with unemployment were petty thieving, unemployment frauds and, occasionally, some more serious property crime such as coining. His contention was that unemployment *caused* these crimes, his analysis of the situation being basically an economic one. It is interesting to note that a great deal of the shoplifting was done by housewives who were not included in the sample as they were neither employed nor unemployed. It might be hypothesised that they stole because they had insufficient housekeeping money, which is akin to Mannheim's analysis. However, there may be a number of other reasons, such as that housewives spend more time in shops than the employed and thus may be expected to over-represent the population on shoplifting. The unemployed, similarly, have the opportunity to spend time in shops, and it could be this factor rather than just their being unemployed which is of importance in determining their criminal behaviour.

It would be unwise to make any statement from the data presented about the cause of property crime. The high proportion of unemployed in the property crime sample may be interpreted as indicative of a propensity for those who steal to become unemployed, or, equally, that those who are unemployed turn to property crimes, or, in some cases, that stealing from an employer leads to being sacked. Whatever the direction of the relationship, the correlation between unemployment and crime is very evident and is of highest magnitude in those apprehended for property crimes.

Having seen the patterns of crime by areas and by types of crime, we can now turn to examining the distribution of crime by age-groups and the differential impact of unemployment by age. Tables 5, 6 and 7 represent the data on age-group, area, type of crime and unemployment.

From the age distribution of the sample, it is seen that the majority of offenders are below 30 years of age, the numbers dropping linearly thereafter with a slight levelling in the early 40s. The impact of this distribution is heightened when it is remembered that the first two age categories contain only two years each as compared to five years in the other categories. It is also the case, although the data are not included, that schoolboys constitute a high proportion of the crime

TABLE 5: NUMBERS OF MALES BY AGE-GROUP AND AREA

AGE	Edinburgh	Surrounding Area	Bathgate Area	Other	Total Area
16-17	134	51	40	13	238
18-19	113	46	32	14	205
20-24	164	56	71	24	315
25-29	159	38	39	9	245
30-34	91	33	37	12	173
35-39	76	15	21	12	124
40-44	76	16	34	4	130
45-49	50	11	23	4	88
50-54	26	7	5	3	41
55-59	19	8	4	1	32
60-64	13	5	3	1	22
65	6	—	1	—	7
Totals	927	286	310	97	1,620

TABLE 6: NUMBERS OF MALES BY AGE-GROUP FOR ALL CRIMES AND FOR PROPERTY CRIMES AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

AGE	All	Property	Violence
16-17	238	51	43
18-19	205	53	24
20-24	315	53	46
25-29	245	45	33
30-34	173	35	13
35-39	124	20	14
40-44	130	17	17
45-49	88	13	8
50-54	41	4	6
55-59	32	4	4
60-64	22	3	—
65	7	1	1
Totals	1,620	299	209

TABLE 7: NUMBERS OF UNEMPLOYED MALES BY AGE-GROUP AND TYPE OF CRIME

AGE	All	Property	Violence
16-17	50	7	6
18-19	49	7	6
20-24	58	11	10
25-29	37	10	3
30-34	29	9	3
35-39	24	9	7
40-44	13	1	6
45-49	23	7	2
50-54	8	2	3
55-59	3	—	—
60-64	5	1	—
65	—	—	—
Totals	299	64	46

sample, thus emphasising the finding that most of the people apprehended by the police are young.

Although the numbers are comparatively small, there is no striking evidence that the patterning of the age-distribution for violence and property crimes varies from the distribution of all crimes and offences, except that the numbers for property crimes reduce gradually, whereas the figures for all crimes and offences and for crimes of violence show a slight rise in the early forties.

Table 7 shows the distribution of the unemployed males in the sample by age. Although the overall pattern is fairly similar to that of the previous table — numbers decreasing with age — there is a difference in that the slight rise evident in the early forties in Table 6 occurs here in the late forties and is preceded by a distinct drop in the early forties.

Comparing the data from this table with the figures from the Department of Employment we have Table 8.

TABLE 8

AGE	Numbers of unemployed		Ratio of sample to general popn.
	Sample	General Popn.	
16-17	50	379 [i]	0.132 : 1
18-19	49	824	0.060 : 1
20-24	58	1,660	0.035 : 1
25-29	37	1,187	0.031 : 1
30-34	29	846	0.034 : 1
35-39	24	781	0.031 : 1
40-44	13	683	0.019 : 1
45-49	23	681	0.034 : 1
50-54	8	664	0.012 : 1
55-59	3	692	0.004 : 1
60-64	5	1,623	0.003 : 1
65	—	43 [ii]	0 : 1
Totals	299	9,684	0.031 : 1

[i] The numbers for the general population are taken from the Department of Employment figures for July 1974. As the maximum percentage change in unemployment from month to month is only 3.6%, it was felt that the figures be taken as representative of unemployment generally.

[ii] These figures are incomplete as some departments only supplied full figures for 18-60 years.

Table 8 provides some interesting data. Ignoring the age-groups 16-17 and 65 +, as we have incomplete data for these, we see that the reflection of general unemployment in the crime sample is fairly constant between the ages of 20 and 50, although there is a smaller association between unemployment and crime in the early forties age-group. The association is very much reduced after 50 but is high in the 18-19 age-group. The findings partially support Gibb's (1966) view that there is a direct relationship between unemployment and crime in the middle years, but an inverse relationship in the old and young. Our findings of a large direct relationship in the young is in accordance with Mannheim's thesis.

An alternative way of presenting the findings is to compare the percentages of unemployed within each age-group in the crime sample; Table 9 presents the figures.

TABLE 9: PERCENTAGES UNEMPLOYED BY AGE AND TYPE OF CRIME

AGE	All % (N)	Property % (N)	Violence % (N)
16 - 17	21 (238) [1]	14 (51)	14 (43)
18 - 19	24 (205)	13 (53)	25 (24)
20 - 24	18 (315)	21 (53)	22 (46)
25 - 29	12 (245)	22 (45)	9 (33)
30 - 34	17 (173)	26 (35)	23 (13)
35 - 39	19 (124)	45 (20)	50 (14)
40 - 44	10 (130)	6 (17)	35 (17)
45 - 49	26 (88)	54 (13)	25 (8)
50 - 54	20 (41)	50 (4)	50 (6)
55 - 59	9 (32)	—	—
60 - 64	23 (22)	33 (3)	—
65	—	—	—

[1] Numbers in brackets are totals in the categories.

Although this method of analysis is as relevant as the analysis in Table 8, the small numbers, particularly in the older age-groups, make comparisons across columns and between rows difficult.

TABLE 10: NUMBERS OF FIRST OFFENDERS AND RECIDIVISTS BY TYPE OF CRIME

	All	Property	Violence
First offenders	595	62	47
Recidivists	989	156	160
Totals	1,584	218	207
Percentage of first offenders	38%	28%	23%

In both property crimes and crimes of violence the majority of those apprehended have had previous convictions. This suggests that a great deal of crime is committed by people who have established a pattern of criminal behaviour to some extent.

TABLE 11: PERCENTAGES OF UNEMPLOYED AMONG FIRST OFFENDERS AND RECIDIVISTS BY TYPE OF CRIME

	All	Property	Violence
First offenders	10 (n = 595)	15 (n = 62)	15 (n = 47)
Recidivists	24 (n = 989)	34 (n = 156)	24 (n = 160)
	19 (n = 1,584)	28 (n = 218)	22 (n = 207)

This table demonstrates some distinct differences between first offenders and recidivists in the percentages of each who were unemployed. This finding, of a higher proportion of unemployed among the recidivists, corresponds to Mannheim's findings. The explanations of the relationship are numerous, ranging from a supposition that those who have been in trouble with the police are not popular with prospective employers to the contention that those with a history of criminal activity are more likely, when faced with unemployment, to react either by theft of others' property or by violence. Certainly, the connections between crime and unemployment and between crime and previous convictions can be seen to be in the same direction.

TABLE 12: NUMBERS OF UNEMPLOYED FIRST-OFFENDERS, RECIDIVISTS AND GENERAL POPULATION BY AGE

AGE	NUMBERS OF UNEMPLOYED		
	First Offenders	Recidivists	General Population [1]
16 - 17	18	29	379 [2]
18 - 19	12	38	824
20 - 24	8	44	1,660
25 - 29	4	34	1,187
30 - 34	8	22	846
35 - 39	3	22	781
40 - 44	3	10	683
45 - 49	2	22	681
50 - 54	1	6	664
55 - 59	1	2	692
60 - 64	1	4	1,623
65	—	—	43 [2]
Totals	61	233	9,684

[1] The numbers for the general population are taken from the Department of Employment figures for July 1974. As the maximum percentage change in unemployment from month to month is only 3.6%, it was felt that the figures could be taken as representative of unemployment generally.
[2] These figures are incomplete as some departments only supplied full figures for 18 - 60 years.

In each age-group the numbers of unemployed are higher for recidivists than for first offenders. It is only below 20 years that there are many unemployed first offenders at all. For the recidivists, unemployment is fairly high up to age 50. Table 13 clarifies these figures by showing the percentages within each age-category who are unemployed.

TABLE 13: PERCENTAGES OF EACH AGE-GROUP UNEMPLOYED BY HISTORY OF CONVICTIONS

AGE	PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYED	
	First offenders	Recidivists
16-17	18 (n = 103)	24 (n = 123)
18-19	18 (n = 67)	29 (n = 133)
20-24	8 (n = 101)	22 (n = 201)
25-29	4 (n = 90)	22 (n = 157)
30-34	11 (n = 70)	21 (n = 103)
35-39	7 (n = 45)	28 (n = 79)
40-44	7 (n = 43)	12 (n = 83)
45-49	6 (n = 34)	40 (n = 55)
50-54	7[1] (n = 15)	25[1] (n = 24)
55-59	8 (n = 12)	11 (n = 19)
60-64	9 (n = 11)	40 (n = 10)
65	—	—
	n = 595 *	n = 989 *

[1] Beyond here the numbers are so small that comparisons are not feasible.
* For 36 cases details were not available.

The percentage unemployed of recidivists is higher than that for first offenders in each age-group. The percentage unemployed drops after 19 years for the first offenders, but remains high for the recidivists with a drop in the early forties and a rise in the late forties. The different distributions suggest that unemployment is strongly associated with crime only in the young first offenders, whereas the association is evident throughout the age range of recidivists.

TABLE 14: NUMBERS OF HOUSEWIVES AND SCHOOL-CHILDREN BY TYPE OF CRIME OR OFFENCE

	Property	Violence	Other	Total
Housewives	36	9	65	110
School-children	40	4	15	59
School-boys	85	26	135	246
Totals	161	39	215	415

The 'other' category for schoolboys contained 48 cases of crimes against property with violence and 32 cases of malicious mischief.

Graph 1 shows the distribution of the numbers in the sample representing those involved in all crimes and offences by age-group and the numbers of these who are unemployed. For comparisons to be made easily, the pattern of unemployment in the general population is included. This is the actual number divided by 10 to demonstrate the distribution on a similar scale to the other figures. Although the trends are roughly in the same direction, crime and unemployment decreasing with age, with a peak in the early twenties, the numbers in the crime sample peak earlier than those in the sub-sample of the unemployed. In the population at large there is a rise in unemployment in the early sixties which is not reflected in the sample.

(The figures for the Department of Employment statistics for the age-groups 16-17 and 65 + are not included as they are incomplete.)

Discussion and conclusions

In the exploration of the relationship between crime and unemployment we have discovered that, in the areas of the Central Scottish industrial belt for which data were collected, there was a distinct direct relationship between these factors. The percentage of the crime sample who were unemployed was as high as 20.8% in the city and as low as 11.3% in the area which was primarily rural. Although it might be expected that city areas might include 'twilight' areas or slum areas where there are high populations of people both unemployed

and engaged in criminal behaviour, the figures were probably exaggerated somewhat by the low unemployment in the rural area in general.

In closer analysis of the figures, it is seen that property crimes are more closely related to unemployment than either crimes of violence or all crimes and offences together. This leads us to look for an explanation of the findings in an economic frame. From the design of the study we are looking at relationships rather than causes, at the extent of variations in crime rates and employment rates and at the factors which play a part in affecting these rates. Of paramount interest is the finding that most of the crimes and offences are committed by young men [4], and that in the younger age-groups are also found the highest proportions of unemployed when compared to general unemployment (Table 8).

In making sense of these results it is perhaps pertinent to split the samples into first offenders and those who have had previous convictions. In this, we see not only that the recidivists are more likely to be apprehended by the police, but also that the unemployment rate is much higher for this group. This suggests that the relationship between crime and unemployment is primarily one between unemployment and a ' career ' of crime, that not working and committing crimes and offences, especially theft, are linked in a social pattern, rather than in isolated actions. This link is shown to be strongest in city areas and among the young.

The hypothesis that increase in unemployment leads to an increase in previously regularly employed persons going into crime for the first time is not substantiated in this research. This may suggest that at a time of economic recession members of the public are firstly more careful about the protection of their goods and other property and, secondly, that they are more likely to report thefts to the police, but further work would need to be undertaken in order to ascertain the truth of such a conjecture.

[4] From the Scottish Criminal Statistics it is seen that the numbers of males between 17 and 21 years of age convicted are the same as those for all the years 30 and over, and only slightly lower than the numbers in the group 21 and under 30.

GRAPH 1

CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT BY AGE-GROUP



GRAPH 2

NUMBERS OF UNEMPLOYED RECIDIVISTS AND FIRST-OFFENDERS BY AGE AND COMPARED TO THE UNEMPLOYED IN THE GENERAL POPULATION



Graph 2 shows clearly that the recidivists, as well as having more unemployed in every category, follow the pattern of general unemployment more closely than the first-offenders.

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Employment problems of young offenders committed to a closed English Borstal [1]

by F. H. McClintock

Between 1962 and 1970 I was responsible for an action research project at Dover Borstal in England. This is a closed penal institution for young offenders aged 16 to 21 years of age. The research project was designed to evaluate changes in the penal institution designed to reduce the recidivist rate which stood at over sixty per cent [2]. As is well known the experiment did not live up to the expectations of the practitioners. But during the course of the research a great deal was learnt about the sample of 302 young men during the period of training under a modified training regime and during an after-care period of one year. One of the central issues facing the staff of the Dover Institution, as with most training institutions for young offenders, was that of the previous poor work records of many of the inmates. Under the modified regime a great deal of effort was put into attempting to increase job skills and job satisfaction. This was carried out on the basis that such aims were first of all desirable in themselves in that they contributed to " a more satisfactory life ", and secondly, that they should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of recidivism.

This working paper deals with some of the main findings relating to employment and criminality arising from that study.

Employment history and problems. It was perhaps not surprising to find that poor school behaviour and attendance and disappointing educational attainment were frequently followed by indifferent employment histories and serious work problems at the time of com-

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[1] Based on research project resulting in the publication of *Criminals Coming of Age* (1972) by A.E. Bottoms and F.H. McClintock.

[2] Based on a 2 year follow-up.

mittal to the penal institution. The question of unsatisfactory work records and criminal recidivism has received a fair amount of comment in official reports and penological literature [3]. However, there are a number of difficulties that stand in the way of a full analysis of work records, notably the problem of obtaining a detailed and verified work history [4] and the classification of data on extremely varied work records which often include substantial periods of casual employment [5].

An analysis of the employment situation at the time of the arrest immediately prior to the borstal sentence, showed that almost nine in ten of the offenders were either in labouring or factory work or were unemployed. Very few were in skilled employment, and the high proportion that were unemployed is particularly striking. Details are given in the following tabular statement:

Type of occupation at time of arrest	*No. of offenders*
1. Traineeships or skilled employment	17 (5.6%)
2. Labouring and factory work	130 (42.5%)
3. Personal service trades	17 (5.6%)
4. Others (including H.M. Forces)	11 (3.5%)
5. Unemployed	131 (42.8%)
Total:	306 (100.0%)

[3] See, for example, L.W. Fox, *The English Prison and Borstal Systems* (1952) pp. 373-8; Advisory Council on the Employment of Prisoners, *Work for Prisoners* (1961); *Work and Vocational Training in Borstals* (1962); *People in Prison* (Cmnd 4217, 1969) paras 45-66 and 84; Roger Hood, *Borstal Re-assessed* (1965) pp. 124-8, 148-51; Derek Miller, " A model of an institution for treating adolescent delinquent boys " in H.J. Klare (ed), *Changing Concepts of Crime and its Treatment* (1966) pp. 97-115; W. Norwood East, *The Adolescent Criminal* (1942) ch. 6. It is surprising that T.C.N. Gibbens, in his major study of the social and psychological characteristics of borstal inmates, makes no mention of their employment histories.

[4] All persons sentenced to borstal training have been the subject of police " antecedent reports " compiled prior to their appearance at assizes or quarter sessions. However, such reports often do not reach the training borstal, and, even when they do, generally relate only to the recent period of work activity and not to the whole period since leaving school. The police verify these reports with employers wherever possible, but this is not always practicable.

[5] On this, see H. Mannheim and L.T. Wilkins, *Prediction Methods in relation to Borstal Training* (1955) p. 101; Martin Davies, *Probationers in their Social Environment* (1969) pp. 59-60.

Even when the employment situation is considered on the basis of the last occupation before the committal to a custodial sentence [6] the main emphasis is still upon labouring and factory work, with the majority involved in general outdoor labouring which was frequently of a casual nature:

Last occupation before institutional training		*No. of offenders*
1. Traineeships or skilled employment		23 (7.5%)
2. Labouring and factory work:		
a) Trade assistants	34 (11.1%)	
b) Factory workers	52 (17.0%)	
c) Transport and garage workers	28 (9.2%)	
d) General outdoor labourers	123 (40.2%)	
Sub-total:		237 (77.5%)
3. Personal Service Trades:		
a) Hotels and cafés	12 (3.9%)	
b) Shop and clerical workers	15 (4.9%)	
Sub-total:		27 (8.8%)
4. Others (including H.M. Forces)		19 (6.2%)
		306 (100.0%)

One of the main preoccupations of staff in institutions for adolescent offenders relates quite naturally to the employment prospects of the inmates on release. In the development programme at Dover considerable attention was focussed on this area of social behaviour although perhaps less emphasis was placed on work skills and more time was given to considering work attitudes and social relations in the work situation [7]. Each training plan contained a section on problems

[6] That is, the 131 cases who were unemployed when sentenced to borstal have been re-classified on the basis of their last previous employment.

[7] A fuller comparison of the different approaches to employment in the traditional and modified regimes at Dover is given in *Criminals Coming of Age* (1972).

relating to employment history and from this has been developed a work typology which places emphasis upon what might be termed the social pathology of employment. This analysis focusses primarily on the most recent work period [8] and takes account of a number of factors including the amount of unemployment; frequency of dismissals; the average length of jobs; deterioration in job stability; and failure to complete apprenticeships and courses for obtaining recognised trade or other employment skills. A ninefold classification based as far as possible on objective criteria [9] was eventually evolved [10]. This attempts to locate the central work problem of each offender.

It can be seen from the following distribution [11] that three-quarters of the Dover population, under the modified regime, were regarded as having work behaviour problems of one sort or another [12].

[8] However, it does not consider *exclusively* the most recent employments, as is done by Davies, 1969. It is submitted that Davies' approach is incomplete and can be misleading since it is unable to distinguish, for example, between an offender who has a persistent pattern of very short jobs and one who has recently had two or three very short jobs following a long period of stable employment.

[9] Each job held, and each period of unemployment, was coded sequentially on to a special coding sheet, from which the classification was developed. In some cases precise data on the length of certain jobs were not available, and the best available estimates had to be taken. Although this introduces some imprecision into the analysis, this was not considered likely to produce serious distortion in the final classification, and is certainly preferable to other alternatives such as relying on certain variables such as the length of the longest job, as is done by Mannheim and Wilkins, *op. cit.*,; or of classifying into 'good', 'fair' and 'bad' work records on a subjective basis, following the example of Gordon Rose, *Five Hundred Borstal Boys* (1954) pp. 71-3.

[10] The classification was not evolved until the offenders had been discharged from the modified regime, but most of the ideas contained in it had been developed at the institution in collaboration with training staff.

[11] Details of the definitions used for each of the various categories are given in *Criminals Coming of Age*, fn. 7 above. It should be noted that a hierarchical principle is used in the classification: offenders were placed in categories 1, 2 and 3 (in that order) if possible, even though they might have come within the basic definitions of other categories; then, of the remainder, offenders were placed in categories 8 and 7 (in that order) if possible. The rest of the sample was finally distributed between categories 4, 5, 6 and 9. Category 9 includes some offenders for whom the information on employment history was very poor, making it impossible to place them in other categories in view of the objective definitions utilised.

[12] That is, all categories except 7, 8 and some offenders in group 9. Even some of these offenders, however, will have had an employment problem requiring attention from training staff, e.g. connected with attitudes to work, or problems arising out of the termination (as a result of committal to custody) of employments in which the offender has been working steadily.

Classification of Employment Histories and Problems

1. Serious or Persistent Unemployment		48	(15.7%)
2. High Dismissal Group		25	(8.2%)
3. Unemployment Problem Group *and*:			
a) Training Abandoned	23		
b) Recent Deterioration	20		
c) Very Frequent Job Changers	20		
d) Others	15		
Sub-Total		78	(25.5%)
4. 'Training Abandoned' Group		28	(9.1%)
5. Recent Deterioration in Job Stability		29	(9.5%)
6. Very Frequent Job Changers		11	(3.6%)
7. Relatively Steady Labourers		36	(11.7%)
8. Stable Employment Pattern		33	(10.8%)
9. Miscellaneous Group		18	(5.9%)
Total		306	(100.0%)

No less than forty per cent of the offenders had records of considerable unemployment (Groups 1 and 3), and in a high proportion of these cases the problem could be described as serious or persistent [13].

[13] A rather higher proportion of those with a short period of availability for work (see below, Table 1) had a high proportion of their time unemployed, in part because their more serious records of crime and penal failure caused interruptions in their work histories. However, no offender was categorised as having 'serious and persistent unemployment' unless he had spent at least nine months unemployed.

Of course, some of these offenders were faced with serious environmental difficulties which made the obtaining of employment arduous, but in the main their unemployment could be attributed rather to disinclination to work, which in itself was often related to personality problems. The high dismissal group (Group 2) is relatively small, but it includes only those offenders with continual records of dismissals, which frequently indicate an underlying attitude of hostility to authority in general. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that more than half of the offenders at Dover were known to have been dismissed from employment at least once in their relatively short working lives. Very frequent job changers (Groups 6 and 3c) present other kinds of difficulties to the training staff, especially as the attitude of such offenders towards their work record was frequently one of apathy.

One of the important dimensions in the analysis of employment histories and problems is that of the *effective period* available for work. This, of course, varies with the age at which the offender left school (including approved schools) and the current age on committal to a borstal institution. But a further consideration in the recidivist population is that of intermediate interruptions due to custodial sentences during which the offender was not available for employment in ordinary circumstances. The *effective period* available for work was therefore measured as the difference between age on committal to the Dover institution and age on leaving school, minus intermediate interruptions due to custodial sentences [14]. Using this formula it was found that almost half of the offenders had effective periods of employment varying from two to four years and the rest were more or less equally divided between the shorter and longer periods available for employment. As might be expected, there was a sizable minority whose work record was dominated by interruptions brought about by custodial sentences consequent upon convictions for criminal offences. In a third of the cases the offenders had held at least nine different jobs; while in half the cases the number of jobs held varied from 5 to 8. Details of the number of jobs held in relation to the effective period available for employment are given in Table 1.

[14] When a = age on committal to borstal, b = age left school, c = intermediate interruptions due to custodial sentences, and e = effective period available for employment, then e = a - b - c.

TABLE 1: NUMBER OF JOBS HELD, SHOWN ACCORDING TO THE PERIOD AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT

Number of jobs held	Effective period available for employment			All offenders
	Less than 2 years %	2 and less than 4 years %	4 years & over %	%
1 to 4	36.4	11.7	10.1	17.7
5 to 8	50.6	51.1	45.6	49.5
9 to 12	13.0	27.0	26.6	23.2
13 & over	0.0	10.2	17.7	9.6
Total * % . . .	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. . . .	77	137	79	293

* Excluding twelve cases in which the detailed information for classification was not available and one case in which the offender had gone straight from an approved school to a borstal without any period available for employment.

These and other data indicate that the patterns of work behaviour of the Dover population are very unrepresentative of what one might expect to find in a comparable sample of the general population, although of course one must avoid the danger of assessing the employment records of predominantly working-class adolescents from a middle-class standpoint. In this context it is regrettable that there is no detailed analysis of work records for a general sample of adolescents of a similar social class, but such data as are available — which relate solely to the first job held after leaving school — indicate the atypical nature of the work patterns of the Dover population [15].

[15] Comparisons are possible with respect to (i) the *length* of the first job held after leaving school, and (ii) the *nature* of this job. With regard to the first question, the Crowther Committee found that 53% of boys leaving secondary modern schools in 1955 were still in their first employment at least eighteen months after leaving school, but the corresponding figure in the Dover population was only 13%. In a more limited survey of Sheffield school leavers in 1959, Carter found that 15% had initial jobs lasting less than 3 months; the figure for the Dover population was 35%. See Central Advisory Council for Education (England), *15 to 18* (1962), p. 180. With regard to the nature of the first job held after leaving school, the *Ministry of Labour Gazette* regularly publishes information on this matter, and this shows that in the years 1961-2 (the two

Education and employment histories in relation to other factors. As might be expected, attendance at selective schools was positively related to high levels of intelligence and to the higher social classes [16]. But undoubtedly of greater penological importance was the finding that a considerable proportion of highly intelligent young men had not been to selective schools, and in many cases their formal educational attainment was much below the level normally expected [17]. Such a group is likely to be bored both in the school and the following work situations, and as a consequence their intelligence can be the more easily directed towards anti-social or deviant forms of behaviour of a serious kind [18]. On the other hand, it was perhaps somewhat surprising to find no statistically significant relationships emerge from a detailed analysis of educational histories in relation to either personality factors or criminal behaviour patterns [19].

An examination of employment histories in relation to other individual and background factors involves a great deal of complex data and the conclusions that can be drawn from them are not always very positive. However, on the fairly straightforward matter of employment and social class, it was found that there was a fairly strong positive correlation between the employment typology of the young offenders and the social class of their families, as ascertained by parental occupations. The statistical relationship between levels of intelligence, educational attainment and employment record is less clear but follows the direction expected: there was a slight tendency

years when most of the Dover sample became 15), 43% of the boys leaving school at fifteen went into employment other than apprenticeships, traineeships, or clerical employment. The corresponding figure for the Dover population was 63%. [The authors are grateful to the then Ministry of Labour Central Youth Employment Executive for making available the confidential notes of guidance issued to youth employment officers, upon which this comparison was based].

[16] That is, to having a father in a professional or supervisory occupation (Hall Jones scale, classes 1-4).

[17] Only 20% of the 173 offenders rated as being ' above average intelligence ' had been to selective schools.

[18] In this connection, see David Downes' discussion of the concept of " dissociation " in *The Delinquent Solution* (1966) pp. 237 ff.

[19] But, of course, there are considerable methodological problems in respect of the Cattell personality inventory and with regard to educational history, it must be remembered that much of the typology of criminal behaviour relates to *recent criminality*, and a detailed analysis of crimes committed before the age of 15 in relation to educational history yield a different result.

for those with greater employment problems to be less intelligent, while those with educational attainment tended to have severe employment problems. On the other hand, as in the case of educational records, there was no discernible relationship between personality factors and the employment typology.

The relationship between the prevalence of employment problems and that of defects in family structure and conflict with parents is by no means clear-cut. There was, however, some tendency for more of those with serious employment problems to come from incomplete families.

The extent to which the family situation had a *direct* bearing on the work situation was difficult to assess in general terms, although treatment personnel were aware that in many cases the two kinds of problems went together. In the sample taken under the modified regime more than forty per cent of the offenders had a considerable or major employment problem together with some problems of family structure and conflict. Details are given in Table 2.

The connection between employment histories and the basic categories of criminal behaviour patterns was also examined and it was found that in all but one class approximately a quarter of the offenders had major employment problems. There were, however, some variations between the classes in other respects: violent offenders, in the main, had less employment problems, while the professional or semi-professional offender had more than those in other crime categories. Some of the details are given in Table 3.

As already noted, vocational training courses were prescribed in just over a third of the cases, principally for those offenders whom staff assessed as requiring considerable attention with respect to employment problems [20]. Despite this, when the use of vocational training courses was considered in relation to the research typology of previous employment, it would appear that there was rather little evidence of a consistent application of the ideas underlying the modified regime. Details of the use of vocational training courses in relation to previous employment patterns are given in Table 4.

[20] Twenty-five per cent of those for whom employment was assessed as no problem or only a minor one took V.T.C's, as contrasted with forty-seven per cent of those assessed as requiring considerable attention in respect of work.

TABLE 2: DEGREE OF EMPLOYMENT PROBLEM SHOWN ACCORDING TO FAMILY STRUCTURE AND CONFLICT

Degree of employment problem		FAMILY STRUCTURE & CONFLICT					
		Complete families:		Incomplete families:		No parental reference group	Total
		no conflict (A 1, A 3)	with conflict (A 2, A 4)	no conflict (B 1, B 3, C 1, C 3)	with conflict (B 2, B 4, C 2, C 4)		
No employment problems . . (Group 7, 8)	N	18	18	14	10	1	69
	%	37.7	26.1	20.3	14.5	1.4	100.0
Some employment problems . (Groups 4, 5)	N	10	14	14	16	3	57
	%	17.5	24.6	24.6	28.1	5.2	100.0
Considerable employment . . (Groups 2, 3 a, b, d, 6) . . .	N	24	26	15	27	2	94
	%	25.5	27.7	15.9	28.7	2.2	100.0
Major employment problems . (Groups 1, 3 c)	N	15	9	20	19	5	68
	%	22.0	13.3	29.4	27.9	7.4	100.0
Total * . . .	N	75	67	63	72	11	288
	%	26.1	23.3	21.9	24.9	3.8	100.0

* Group 9 in the employment classification (the miscellaneous group) has been omitted in this analysis; the other employment groups have been amalgamated according to the approximate degree of the training problem they present to institutional staff, details being given in parentheses in the headings.

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEGREE OF EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, SHOWN ACCORDING TO THE BASIC CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS

CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR PATTERN		No employment problems (7, 8)	Some employment problems (4, 5)	Considerable employment problems (2, 3 a, b, d, 6)	Major employment problems (1, 3 c)	Total
I. Recent violence & recidivism in major crime	N	13	13	18	15	59
	%	22.0	22.0	30.5	25.5	100.0
II. Recent violence and potential recidivism in major crime	N	14	3	7	8	32
	%	43.7	9.4	21.9	25.0	100.0
III. Recent violence but no recidivism in major crime	N	15	4	13	3	35
	%	42.9	11.4	37.1	8.6	100.0
IV. Professional or semi-professional property recidivism without recent violence	N	4	7	13	8	32
	%	12.5	21.9	40.6	25.0	100.0
V. Other recidivists in major crime without recent violence	N	13	16	23	17	69
	%	18.8	23.2	33.4	24.6	100.0
VI. Potential recidivists in major crime or 'non-recidivists' with a recent major property crime, but no recent violence	N	4	7	8	10	29
	%	13.8	24.1	27.6	34.5	100.0
VII. Offenders with predominantly minor offences	N	6	7	12	7	32
	%	18.8	21.9	37.4	21.9	100.0
Total . . .	N	69	57	94	68	288
	%	23.9	19.8	32.7	23.6	100.0

TABLE 4: OFFENDERS SELECTED TO TAKE VOCATIONAL TRAINING COURSES SHOWN ACCORDING TO THE CLASSIFIED TYPE OF PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS

EMPLOYMENT TYPE	Total in group	V.T.C. TAKEN	
		No.	%
1. Serious or persistent unemployment .	48	16	33.3
2. High dismissal group	25	8	32.0
3. Unemployment problem with:			
a) training abandoned	23	6	26.1
b) recent deterioration	20	12	60.0
c) frequent job changing	20	5	25.0
d) others	15	2	13.3
4. " Training abandoned " group . . .	28	11	39.3
5. Recent deterioration in job stability .	29	11	37.9
6. Very frequent job changes	11	0	0.0
7. Relatively steady labourers	36	18	50.0
8. Stable employment pattern	33	12	36.4
9. Miscellaneous group	18	5	27.8
All offenders . . .	306	106	34.6

Offenders' anticipated social problems. Inmates' anticipation of future difficulties was examined in respect to family, employment, drink or drugs, and leisure. The outstanding feature of this analysis was the very high proportion of offenders who anticipated that no difficulties would arise for them in those problem areas after they were discharged from the institution. It was only with regard to expected family relationships that a high proportion (40%) anticipated some, or even considerable, problems. Details are given in Table 5.

TABLE 5: INMATES' ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE SOCIAL PROBLEMS

TYPE OF PROBLEM	INMATE ANTICIPATION (%)			Total **
	Very confident: no problem foreseen (1)	Some problems anticipated (2)	Anticipation of considerable problems or recurrence (3)	
I. Family	59.8	32.2	8.0	100.0 (N = 286)
II. Employment . .	74.5	17.5	8.0	100.0 (N = 251)
III. Drink/Drugs . .	81.5	9.8	8.7	100.0 (N = 287)
IV. Leisure * . . .	46.6	41.0	12.4	100.0 (N = 251)

* In the case of leisure, the column headings are rather different from the other problems, being based on inmates' expressed intentions re leisure pattern as follows: col. 1 = intention to engage in constructive activities; col. 2 = no clear idea of future pattern or intended unfocussed pattern; col. 3 = intended self-centred pleasure pattern.

** Totals are slightly different for the different problem areas as not all areas were always probed fully by interviewers and in some cases it proved impossible to code with certainty from the verbal material available.

The inmates' anticipation of work problems was closely related to whether or not arrangements had been made for a job prior to discharge. It was found that, of the sample interviewed, just under a half (40%) had made definite arrangements for subsequent employment.

After-care and Employment patterns. One of the main focal points of concern, both in institutional training and in preparation for after-care, is that of the future employment of offenders. The finding of a job is frequently difficult and the failure of young men from

borstal institutions to hold jobs for any length of time is one of the recurrent difficulties that after-care officers have to cope with [21]. The employment patterns during the after-care period were examined and were not found to be wholly satisfactory [22].

TABLE 6: ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR EMPLOYMENT ON RELEASE, SHOWN ACCORDING TO INMATES' ANTICIPATION OF LONG-TERM WORK PROBLEMS

JOB ARRANGEMENTS	Number of offenders	ANTICIPATION OF LONG-TERM WORK PROBLEMS (%)		
		Very confident	Some problems anticipated	Considerable problems anticipated
Definite job arranged, regarded as stable by inmate	104 (100.0%)	87.5	9.6	2.9
Temporary job arranged	18 (100.0%)	83.3	16.7	—
No definite job arranged but confident about obtaining employment	99 (100.0%)	68.7	25.2	6.1
No job arranged, no real plans .	30 (100.0%)	43.3	20.0	36.7
All offenders . . .	251 (100.0%)	74.5	17.5	8.0

[21] For a recent official discussion, see *At Odds: the employment problems of disadvantaged young people* (1970), a report by a working party of the National Employment Council, pp. 34-9.

[22] In the period after institutional training, the difficulties are somewhat reduced by the fact that all the young men are under compulsory supervision and the after-care officers generally know of their employment history. The classification of subsequent emplomet history set out in the text is based on similar principles to those of the classification of previous employment, with appropriate modifications (e.g., the categories of "training abandoned" and "recent deterioration" are important indicators of potential problems at the training stage but cannot realistically be reproduced for the after-care period).

Classification of employment history after institutional training

1. Marked unemployment pattern	43	(14.0%)
2. Unemployment pattern and frequent job-changing	21	(6.9%)
3. Unemployment pattern (excluding those in category 2 above)	3	(1.0%)
4. Frequent job-changing pattern, but no unemployment pattern	67	(21.9%)
5. Dismissal pattern	5	(1.6%)
6. Relatively steady employment pattern	112	(36.6%)
7. Stable employment pattern	55	(18.0%)
	306	(100.0%)

It can be seen that in nearly half of the cases the subsequent employment patterns were distinctly unsatisfactory (groups 1-5), and in less than one-fifth of the cases could it be regarded as entirely satisfactory (group 7). In the remaining cases, which comprise just over a third of the total, the employment pattern could be regarded as fairly reasonable in that the offenders had *relatively* steady employment patterns. This does not, of course, mean that the pattern of frequent job changes which was a predominant characteristic prior to the custodial sentence was improved during the after-care period. On the contrary, the average number of jobs per month at liberty was higher in the one year after discharge than the one year immediately prior to the custodial sentence. As can be seen from Table 7 a quarter of the offenders held five or more jobs in the period that they were at liberty during the first year after discharge.

When the nature of employment problems before and after the custodial sentence are compared it is found that the largest group consists of those offenders who have had no substantial change in their employment pattern. The group in which there was improvement

TABLE 7: NUMBER OF JOBS IN FIRST YEAR AFTER RELEASE, SHOWN ACCORDING TO PERIOD AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT DURING THAT YEAR

AFTER-CARE: PERIOD AT LIBERTY	No. OF JOBS IN FIRST YEAR OF AFTER-CARE				Total
	1-2	3-4	5-6	7+	
Full year	62 31.3	92 46.5	24 12.1	20 10.1	198 100.0
9 months - 1 year	9 25.7	15 42.9	7 20.0	4 11.4	35 100.0
6 months - 9 months	13 28.9	15 33.3	11 24.5	6 13.3	45 100.0
Less than 6 months	11 47.8	9 39.1	2 8.7	1 4.4	23 100.0
Totals *	95 31.6	131 43.5	44 14.6	31 10.3	301 100.0

* Excluding five cases in which the number of jobs was not known.

during the after-care period is larger than that in which the employment pattern deteriorated, nevertheless the latter group is still quite substantial. A detailed analysis of employment patterns before and after institutional training is given in Table 8.

On the basis of the analysis given in Table 8 an attempt was made to ascertain the change in employment patterns. For this purpose a five point scale was devised[23]. It was found that in 35 per cent

[23] This indicator was obtained from a comparison of the previous employment score with the subsequent employment score (Both scores are derived directly from the detailed employment classifications before and after training.) Definitions were: (i) *Marked improvement*: previous score 3, subsequent score 0 or 1 *or* previous score 2, subsequent score 0; (ii) *Improvement*: previous score 3, subsequent score 2, *or* previous score 2, subsequent score 1, *or* previous score 1, subsequent score 0; (iii) *No effect*: previous and subsequent score identical, *and* previous score 0, subsequent score 1; (iv) *Deterioration*: previous score 2, subsequent score 3, *or* previous score 1, subsequent score 2; (v) *Marked deterioration*: previous score 1, subsequent score 3, *or* previous score 0, subsequent score 2 or 3.

TABLE 8: TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT HISTORY AFTER INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING COMPARED WITH DEGREE OF EMPLOYMENT PROBLEM BEFORE SENTENCE

Degree of employment problem before institutional training	TYPE OF SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT HISTORY					Total
	Marked unemployment (1)	Unemployment & F.J.C. * (2)	F.J.C. * (3)	Relatively steady (4)	Stable (5)	
No employment problem	7 10.1	2 2.9	10 14.5	28 40.6	22 31.9	69 100.0
Minor employment problem	3 5.3	3 5.3	16 28.0	24 42.1	11 19.3	57 100.0
Considerable employment problem	18 19.1	4 4.3	28 29.8	31 33.0	13 13.8	94 100.0
Major employment problem	13 19.1	8 11.8	20 29.4	21 30.9	6 8.8	68 100.0
Total **	41 14.2	17 5.9	74 25.7	104 36.1	52 18.1	288 100.0

* F.J.C. = " frequent job changing. " The column headed simply ' F.J.C. ' also includes the eight cases of ' unemployment ' and ' dismissal ' patterns as shown in the tabular statement on p. 117 above.

** Excludes category 9 of previous employment typology. For the grouping of previous employment types, p. 105 above.

of the cases the assessments indicated improvement in the after-care period whereas in 23 per cent they indicated deterioration. Details are given in the following tabular statement:

Comparison of previous and subsequent employment patterns:	*No. of offenders:*	
Marked improvement	41 (13.4%)	35.0%
Some improvement	66 (21.6%)	
No change	129 (42.1%)	
Some deterioration	40 (13.1%)	22.9%
Marked deterioration	30 (9.8%)	
Total:	306 (100.0%)	

A close study of employment patterns indicates that very frequently they can be extremely complex and they are, of course, often interconnected with family problems and the offenders' social attitudes and leisure activities.

As so many institutional activities consist in work and vocational training, it was thought to be of considerable importance to examine the extent to which these activities affected the subsequent employment patterns of the offenders. Contrary to what might have been expected [24] no general association between work activities in the institution and subsequent changes in employment patterns was discernible. In fact, when those who were given the highest ratings on the three institutional assessments relating to work — standard in Vocational Training Course, work effect generally, and work skills

[24] Judging, for example, from the statement made by the then Director of Borstal After-Care to the Advisory Committee on the Employment of Prisoners: " even if allowance is made for the fact that boys who have taken courses are of superior general ability, they do better generally after leaving borstal than those who do not. " See *Work and Vocational Training in Borstals* (1962), p. 9. Other experienced administrators have, however, expressed more sceptical views. For a general discussion see ROGER HOOD, *Borstal Re-assessed* (1965), pp. 124-8, 148-51.

acquired during training [23] — were singled out and considered in relation to previous and subsequent employment patterns it was found that there was no correlation between high ratings in institutional assessments and improvement in subsequent employment patterns (see Table 9).

TABLE 9: IMPROVEMENT OR DETERIORATION OF WORK PATTERN OVER PERIOD FROM BEFORE TILL AFTER INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING SHOWN IN RELATION TO SELECTED FEATURES OF INSTITUTIONAL WORK ASSESSMENTS

Improvement or deterioration in work pattern after institutional training		All offenders	INSTITUTIONAL WORK ASSESSMENTS		
			V.T.C. first class pass	Work effort ' excellent '	' Good ' work skill acquired
Improvement		35.0	32.7	20.5	32.9
No effect		42.1	42.8	56.4	42.5
Deterioration		22.9	24.5	23.1	24.6
Total	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	No.	306	49	39	73

The absence of association between experience of Vocational Training Courses and subsequent work performance is of particular significance in the light of the importance traditionally attached to such causes in the English borstal system, especially since it was also found (i) that V.T.C. experience was not related to subsequent reconviction, and (ii) that, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, those who followed the trade for a period after the institutional sentence performed no better subsequently than those who did not. More generally, the lack of positive association between high work standards achieved in the institution and subsequent employment patterns clearly raises a number of penological issues relating to the

[25] Assessments of work effort and of skill acquired were taken from the monthly reports of work-supervisors in the institution. Those assessed as acquiring a good skill included some on vocational training courses, but also others such as those on ' works ' parties.

use of resources in training programmes which aim at the prevention of recidivism, especially when it is borne in mind that poor work records are closely associated with reconviction rates.

In the after-care sphere, it was also found that the variation in the types of supervision was fairly similar for each of the main categories of subsequent employment patterns, although, as can be seen from Table 10, the highest proportion given nominal supervision occurred among those with stable work records, and the more intensive supervision was somewhat more frequently applied to those with employment difficulties.

TABLE 10: TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT HISTORY AFTER INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING SHOWN IN RELATION TO TYPE OF AFTER-CARE SUPERVISION

TYPE OF SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT HISTORY		TYPE OF AFTER-CARE SUPERVISION				Total
		Nominal (I)	Straight-forward (II & IIIa)	More intensive (IIIb & IV)	Directive (V)	
Marked unemployment	No.	7	13	17	4	41
	%	17.1	31.7	41.5	9.7	100.0
Unemployment of F.J.C.	No.	2	10	7	2	21
	%	9.5	47.7	33.3	9.5	100.0
Frequent job changers	No.	3	33	30	5	71
	%	4.2	46.5	42.3	7.0	100.0
Relatively steady	No.	17	56	28	8	109
	%	15.6	51.4	25.7	7.3	100.0
Stable	No.	15	25	14	0	54
	%	27.8	46.3	25.9	0.0	100.0
Total	No.	44	137	96	19	295
	%	14.9	46.3	32.4	6.4	100.0

* Excluding ten cases in which no information was available on type of after-care supervision.

As might be expected on the basis of other criminological studies, there was a very close association between subsequent poor or unsatisfactory employment records and high reconviction rates. Those with patterns of unemployment and frequent job changing had much higher reconviction rates than those with relatively steady or stable employment patterns;

Reconviction rates according to type of employment patterns after institutional training:	*No. in group:*	*Offenders: % reconvicted:*
1. Marked unemployment pattern	43	81.4
2. Unemployment pattern and frequent job changing	21	57.1
3. Unemployment, dismissal, or frequent job changing pattern	75	81.3
4. Relatively steady employment pattern	112	44.5
5. Stable emploment pattern	55	32.7
Total	306	57.2

It should be noted that these results were obtained with respect to offenders dealt with under the modified training regime which attached considerable importance to the discussion of behaviour in relation to attitudes to work as well as to the acquisition of work skills; it may hence be regarded as somewhat disappointing to find the lack of impact of such activities on subsequent employment patterns, and the continuing high reconviction rates among those with subsequent unsatisfactory employment records. Clearly additional resources as well as probably more radical training methods are required if any decisive improvement is to be obtained. Some confirmation of the need for more basic changes in the institutional and after-care systems is obtained when the previous and subsequent employment patterns are considered in relation to reconviction rates as controlled on prediction risk categories. (See Table 11.) It is found that

deterioration in subsequent employment patterns adds weight to the predicted outcome for the better risk categories; but naturally among the highest risk classes (D and E) the previous employment record was usually so poor that even some improvement left the subsequent work record still far from satisfactory.

TABLE 11: RECONVICTION RATES SHOWN ACCORDING TO IMPROVEMENT OR DETERIORATION IN WORK PATTERN AND TO PREDICTION RISK CATEGORY

Improvement or deterioration in work pattern after institutional training	PREDICTION RISK CATEGORY						Total	
	A and B		C		D and E			
	No.	% F.	No.	% F.	No.	% F.	No.	% F.
Improvement	41	34.1	19	42.1	45	73.3	105	52.4
No effect	58	34.5	21	57.1	50	66.0	129	50.4
Deterioration	20	75.0	16	81.3	34	79.4	70	78.6
Total *	119	41.2	56	58.9	129	72.1	304	57.6
Variation between rows (p)	—	<.01	—	<.01	—	N.A.	—	—

* Excludes two offenders for whom data were incomplete on prediction categories.

Summary and conclusion

1. A study was made of the work problems of 302 youthful offenders committed to a closed English penal institution in the mid-sixties where special attention was given to social and personal problems thought to be related to increasing risk of subsequent recidivism.

2. Many of the offenders had considerable work problems; 40 per cent had records of lengthy periods of unemployment, and others had been constantly dismissed from employment, or had patterns of very frequent job-changing. Many had substantial interruptions of their work career due to their penal record, and the average number of jobs held was extremely high.

3. More than forty per cent of the offenders had *both* a considerable work problem and some problem of incomplete family structure or conflict. Violent offenders had, on the whole, better work histories than other offenders.

4. Inmates' anticipation of future work problems was closely related to whether or not arrangements for a job had been made prior to release. Three-quarters of the offenders were very confident that they would have no work problems after release. It was found that a high proportion were extremely over-optimistic about satisfactory future work situations and their own future conduct in this regard.

5. Subsequent employment patterns were often unsatisfactory: in nearly half the cases there was either unemployment or very frequent job-changing. Comparing previous and subsequent work patterns it was possible to identify thirty-five per cent who had improved, while twenty-three per cent had deteriorated. The apparent lack of real impact made by the modified regime on subsequent employment was confirmed when the numbers of those who had acquired high skills in vocational training, and those whose work effort at the penal institution was outstanding, were found to contain very similar proportions of improving and of deteriorating work patterns to those of other offenders. There was no very marked correlation of subsequent employment with after care supervision, but there was a strong connection with reconviction rates, after controlling on the prediction equation.

6. In this study it has been shown that the quality and the patterning of employment and unemployment among young adult offenders is an extremely complex phenomenon. Its unsatisfactory state is frequently related to economic, social and family deprivation and other adverse experience. Institutional sentences frequently in this regard exacerbate an already unsatisfactory situation. In the particular research experiment every effort was made within the penal institutional context to improve the work prospects for the young men on their release back into the community; but it was found that such efforts had no significant impact during the after-care period. The close association between continuing criminality and unsatisfactory employment patterns indicate the need for further experimentation and research evaluation.

Data on employment status of young offenders and their families in Scotland

1. Research on the characteristics of young offenders committed to penal institutions in Scotland

by Joanna Gordon

During the last few years research has been carried out in the Department of Criminology, University of Edinburgh, into the social background and personal characteristics of all young offenders aged 17 years committed to penal institutions throughout Scotland during the years 1964, 1968 1971 [1]. There are three types of institutions for offenders aged 16 to 21 years of age: Borstal, Detention Centres, and Young Offenders Institutions [2].

It is quite clear that one of the most important tasks confronting the staff of penal institutions dealing with offenders in this age-group is their subsequent settlement into regular employment, especially as so many of them come from urban areas with patterns of chronic unemployment.

On the basis of police and institutional records it was often difficult to obtain a detailed picture of employment and unemployment patterns from the time that these young offenders left school. Individual

[1] The research was planned in 1971 and began in February 1972. Until April 1975, when the collection of data was nearing completion, the research was under the direction of Dr. A.D. Smith of the Department of Criminology of Edinburgh University. Since April 1975 the research has been directed by Professor F.H. McClintock. It has been extended to cover female young offenders for all three years, and work has begun on comparing the performance of young offenders from different parts of the country in respect of previous and subsequent convictions in relation to their institutional experience. Miss Gordon has been employed full-time on the research throughout.

[2] The Borstal sentence may not exceed two years. Approximately 10 months to 1 year is served in the institution, followed by one year under licence in the community during which after-care is statutorily required. After assessment

case records do, however, reveal that a substantial number of these youths had, during the two years from the date of leaving school, numerous casual and short-term jobs intermingled with periods of unemployment. Details of number and length of jobs are given in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1: EMPLOYMENT SINCE LEAVING SCHOOL YOUNG OFFENDERS AGED 17 DETAINED IN BORSTAL OR YOUNG OFFENDERS INSTITUTIONS IN 1968 AND 1971

	1968				1971			
	BORSTAL		YOI		BORSTAL		YOI	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Less than 3 jobs:								
1 held for 1 month or less	8	3.7	1	.6	10	3.7	17	5.6
1 held for 2 - 5 months	13	5.9	14	8.3	18	6.6	32	10.5
1 held for 6 - 11 months	9	4.1	5	3.0	17	6.3	11	3.6
1 year or more	20	9.1	23	13.6	28	10.3	36	11.8
4 - 7 jobs	127	58.0	86	51.2	175	64.6	195	64.0
8 or more jobs	28	12.8	5	3.0	21	7.8	7	2.3
Never worked	1	.5	3	1.8	2	.7	3	.7
Not known	13	5.9	31	18.5	—	—	4	1.3
Total	219	100.0	168	100.0	271	100.0	305	100.0

at the central Borstal offenders are either allocated to one of two (or at one period three) other Borstal Institutions or to a place in the central institution. 16 is the minimum age for Borstal Training, a sentence which cannot be repeated. Recalled licencees, those who re-offend within one year of discharge from Borstals, or fail to comply with after-care requirements, are therefore committed to Young Offenders Institutions, four of which have been in existence since 1968 to accommodate all those offenders under 21 years of age for whom neither Borstal nor Detention Centre is considered appropriate. One of these receives no offender sentenced to more than six months, and another deals specifically with long sentences. In the other two long and short term young offenders spend all or part of their sentences. The research covers one year, 1964, before Young Offenders Institutions were set up, because it was considered useful to assess what impact if any this has had on the pattern of criminal careers. The third type of Institution, the Detention Centre, was in existence, though quite new, in 1964. The sentence is for three months, of which one month is normally remitted. Strict discipline and hard physical training are the basis of the Detention Centre regime, a short period of which is intended to interrupt criminal careers before offence patterns become habitual.

It can be seen that more than two-thirds of those sent to Borstals or Young Offenders Institutions in 1971, had 4 or more jobs in the brief period between leaving school and committal to a penal training establishment. Those in Borstals tendend to have more jobs of short duration than young offenders detained in Young Offenders' Institutions; but during 1971 over 50% of the young men in Young Offenders' Institutions who had held less than 3 jobs since leaving school did not remain in any job for more than 5 months and so could not be considered to be in ' steady employment '.

The previous employment patterns were, of course, in many cases intermingled with previous convictions and in some of such cases the earlier court appearances were associated with loss of employment, especially where the proceedings were related to custody including remands. It is important to note that in both years no fewer than 8 in 10 of these youths had three or more previous convictions before the committals which brought them into the present study.

One of the central problems confronting the training institutions for young offenders in Scotland is related to the levels of educational attainment and ability of many of these young men. This, coupled with other kinds of social inadequacy, had an important bearing on subsequent employment prospects and incidents of criminality during the follow-up period, especially as many of these youths came from and were returned to urban areas with high unemployment rates.

2. Education and Employment Histories of a Group of Young Offenders who were under consideration for release by the Scottish Parole Board

by Sheila Bannister [1]

Sample

102 offenders considered for parole from a Scottish Young Offenders' Institution during the period April 1973 to December 1974. The majority were aged between 17 and 21 when sentenced, (the technical definition of a young offender), but the group also included some younger detainees, in confinement under the terms of the

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Children and Young Persons Act, most of whom were in the Young Offenders' Institution along with the older group; 4 of them were in detention in List D schools.

Information

The data presented in this outline was taken from the files compiled for each offender for the purpose of parole consideration.

Criminal characteristics of the group

1. *Offence.* There was a very high preponderance of offenders serving sentences for violence in this group. More than three-quarters were sentenced for serious assault (76.5%, including a small group convicted for homicide or attempted homicide), and a further 8.8% for offences against property in which violence had ben used. Violence was also involved in the cases of the 3 sex offenders in the group, (2.9%). In all, 88.2% of these offenders had used violence in their current offence. The numbers of offenders convicted for other offences were small and together accounted for only 11.8% of the group. These included property offences without the use of violence (5 cases), perjury (4 cases), mobbing and rioting (2 cases), and serious infringements of the Road Traffic Act (1 case).

2. *Sentence.* More than a quarter of these offenders were serving sentences of 3 years or less (29.4%), but the majority were sentenced to lengthy periods of incarceration, which in part reflect the seriousness of the offences which resulted in their detention. Almost half of the group were sentenced to between 3 and 5 years, (49.0%), and one fifth, (21.6%), to periods longer than 5 years. (The longest was 10 years.)

3. *Previous record.* A large proportion of these offenders had considerable criminal experience especially bearing in mind the extreme youth of this group. 43.1% had 7 or more previous convictions and a further 25.5% had between 4 and 6. Less than a third of the offenders had 3 or fewer previous convictions, (31.4%), including 7 offenders for whom this was the first conviction (6.9% of the group).

4. *Previous institutional experience.* Further evidence of the extent of the criminal involvement of this group of offenders was given by their previous experience of institutions. Almost two-thirds of them had been in an institution of some kind prior to their current confinement (63.7%). The types of institution experienced were Remand Home; Detention Centre; Approved School; Borstal Training; Young Offenders' Institution.

A quarter of the group (24.5%) had previously experienced one type of institution only, a further quarter (23.5%) two types of institution, but 15.7% had undergone three or more forms of institutional training prior to their current term in a Young Offenders' Institution.

School record

Information of the offenders' performance at school was not systematically reported in the parole files. There was no reference to school performance for over a fifth of the group (22.5%) and in many instances in which information relating to this area was available it was very limited in extent. In 9 cases (8.8% of the total) it amounted to only a subjective appraisal, usually taken from a headmaster's report, of effort made at school. Usually more specific, though brief, statements relating to school work were recorded. These referred most frequently to the attainment (or non-attainment) of formal educational qualifications ('O' levels or more minor school-leaving certificates). Other details of performance at school, frequently given in addition to information of attainments, referred to lack of interest, ability and achievement in relation to ability (especially high ability and under-achievement).

Subjective assessments of school performance were available for a quarter of the offenders. Progress was described as poor in 11.7% of the cases, as reasonable in a further 10.9% and as good in only 2.9%.

References to conduct at school were made in almost a third of the cases (31.4%). Most frequently these were subjective assessments usually quoted from reports written by headmasters. This applied in 20.6% of the total cases. More specific details of conduct were given in some cases, however, sometimes in conjunction with a subjective overall appraisal. Such derails referred to dishonesty and unreliability, expulsion from school and referrals to Child Guidance Clinics resulting from behavioural difficulties.

TABLE 1: PROGRESS AT SCHOOL
(data available for 60 offenders)

	ATTAINMENT			Total
	No formal attainment	Formal attainment	N. I. attainment	
No additional information	31	4	—	35
No interest	—	1	3	4
Low ability/special school	4	—	8	12
Under-achievement	6	1	1	8
Other *	—	—	1	1
Total	41	6	13	60

* Offenders showing great improvement after discovery of deafness, but educationally retarded.

TABLE 2: CONDUCT AT SCHOOL
(data available for 32 offenders)

	SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT				Total
	Good/ No problem	Reasonable/ Some problem	Poor/ Serious problem	No subjective assessment	
No additional information	12	7	2	—	21
Dishonest/Unreliable	—	2	—	3	5
Expelled/Sent home	—	—	1	3	4
Child Guidance Clinic	—	—	2 *	—	2
Total	12	9	5	6	32

* Including 1 offender who was also expelled from school.

References to conduct during school years, though limited to only a proportion of the cases in the sample, indicated that no behavioural problems were shown by over one third of the offenders for whom information was available. Some cause for concern, indicated mainly by untrustworthiness, was given by the same proportion of offenders. Seriously problematic behaviour was experienced by a quarter of the offenders for whom information on conduct at school was available (25.0%), although these offenders account for only 7.8% of the total group.

Truancy was reported in the cases of 29.4% of these offenders. The actual incidence of truancy within the group was probably higher than this, as there was no reference to any aspect of school performance in over a fifth of these cases (22.5%).

TABLE 3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUANCY AND CONDUCT AT SCHOOL
(data relates to 45 offenders)

	CONDUCT				Total
	No problem	Some problem	Serious problem	N. I. Conduct	
Truancy reported	3	10	4	13	30
N.I. of truancy	9	2	4	—	15
Total	12	12	8	13	45

There was a fairly close association between reported truancy and reported poor conduct at school. Of the 20 offenders whose behaviour presented problems 14 were also truants (70.0% of poorly behaved pupils). However, a further 3 truants were considered well-behaved pupils. Unfortunately no details of conduct were available for 13 truants (43.3% of those for whom truancy was reported).

School performance and criminal record

Information on performance at school was extremely limited for most of these offenders but details which were available indicate an overall situation of boredom, lack of interest, lack of attainment and underachievement. This picture was so general that it was not possible to identify a large enough group of good school performers in order to test the association between the degree of effort made at school and criminal experience. When conduct at school was considered such a comparison was possible, although numbers were small. Previous convictions and previous institutions experienced were used as indicators of criminal involvement. Ratings of conduct were compared to each of these factors. The resulting tables indicated that those of poor behaviour tended to have had greater criminal experience than those whose conduct at school gave no cause for concern, both in term of previous convictions and number of institutions experienced.

TABLE 4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONDUCT AT SCHOOL AND NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS

(data on conduct available for only 32 offenders)

NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	CONDUCT			Total
	No problem	Some problem	Serious problem	
0-3	6	4	2	12
4-6	2	4	2	8
7 and over	4	4	4	12
Total	12	12	8	32

TABLE 5: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONDUCT AT SCHOOL AND NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS EXPERIENCED

(data on conduct was available for only 32 offenders)

NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	CONDUCT			Total
	No problem	Some problem	Serious problem	
0	5	4	2	11
1 or 2	7	7	3	17
3 or more	—	1	3	4
Total	12	12	8	32

Truancy and criminal record

As in the preceding section previous convictions and previous institutional experience were used as indicators of criminal experience.

The relationship between reported truancy and number of previous convictions was not a clear one. Although half of those reported as truants fell into the category of offenders with 7 or more previous convictions, the proportion of reported truants in the category 4 or 6 previous convictions was smaller than in the 0 to 3 category. Possibly the small numbers were responsible for the lack of clarity.

The association between the number of types of institutions experienced by truants was also confused. Over half of those reported as truants had been in 1 or 2 types of institution prior to their current incarceration (56.7%), but more truants had no previous institutional experience than those who had been in 3 or more types of institution.

Information on truancy was not presented in such a way that it was possible to identify with confidence offenders who had not been truants. Either truancy was reported to have occurred or there was no reference to the item and it can not be safely assumed that truancy had not occurred in cases in which there was no reference to it.

Employment

Details of work record (list of jobs held, periods of unemployment and the relevant dates) were not systematically recorded in the parole files of all the offenders and occasionally when reference to past work experience was made by more than one reporter the details conflicted. Consequently it was difficult to make adequate objectively based estimates of work records. A further difficulty was the disparate length of the working lives of the offenders, especially as some of them had spent so much time in institutions since attaining employment age that they had very little experience of work. Some were schoolboys when they committed the offence which resulted in their incarceration (6.9%), while a fifth of the group (21.6%), were committed within 2 years of leaving school. Over half of the offenders (52.9%), had been of employment age between 2 and 4 years at the time of their current offence. Because of the extreme youth of this group of offenders the maximum potential working life was under 5 years. This maximum applied to 18.6% of the group.

Job changes were common among this group of offenders, though

it is suspected that in many cases lists of jobs were incomplete. On the basis of the information available 63.7% of the offenders had held between 1 and 4 jobs. A fifth of them (21.7%) had tried between 5 and 8 jobs, while 2.9% had experienced 9 or more.

7.9% of the offenders had never worked but over a fifth (23.5%) were in a skilled job (or undergoing training), at the time of the offence. A further fifth (23.5%) had been in training for a skilled job at an earlier stage but had discontinued this. Those recorded as in a skilled job were mainly apprentices and covered such diverse training as bag-pipe making, panel beating, bricklaying, motor mechanics, weaving stone-masonry and draughtsmanship. It is doubful whether all reported apprenticeships were accurately described, for example, apprentice butcher may have meant no more than working in a butcher's shop. 45.1% of the offenders had held unskilled jobs only. They were primarily van-boys, warehousemen, labourers, factory workers and shop assistants.

Classification of the work patterns of these offenders presented considerable problems, for reasons outlined at the opening of this section on employment (incomplete data, varying length of working lives, disruption resulting from periods in detention). With these limitations in mind, an adaptation of the classification scheme used by Bottoms and McClintock (' Criminals Coming of Age ') was adopted to give a measure of stability in the employment patterns of these offenders.

This analysis revealed that a quarter of the offenders, (25.5%) had steady employment records characterized by infrequent job changes and the ability to hold jobs for lengthy periods. Almost half (47.1%) had moderately stable work records. This group includes those whose work patterns had deteriorated, mainly in terms of type of work, (e.g. those who had discontinued apprenticeships and progressed to unskilled work), but also in terms of the length of time jobs were held. Also included in the group with moderately stable work records are those who changed jobs several times or had experienced some unemployment. (Frequently these categories overlapped. An offender with a deteriorating work pattern would probably have had several job changes and may have encountered periods of unemployment as well.) 18.6% of the offenders had unstable patterns, which were characterized by frequent job changes, jobs of short duration or serious unemployment. (Again, these categories sometimes overlapped.)

TABLE 6: STABILITY OF WORK RECORD

	DESCRIPTION	No. of offenders	%
N.A.	Schoolboys; those in institutions since of work age	9	8.8
Stable	Infrequent job changes; jobs of some duration	26	25.5
Moderately stable	Deteriorating pattern; some job changes; some unemployment	48	47.1
Unstable	Frequent job changes; jobs of short duration; serious unemployment	19	18.6
Total		102	100.0

Because of the difficulty of forming valid assessments of work patterns resulting from the unavailability of accurate data, Mannheim and Wilkins (' Prediction Methods in Relation to Borstal Training ') concluded that the most reliable method of assessing work patterns is to consider the longest time a single job was held. They reasoned that although records of employment history were frequently incomplete details of this item were unlikely to be omitted. Bearing in mind that the entire working life of some of the offenders was short, for almost half the longest job lasted 9 months or less (47.1%). A further fifth remained in a single job for between 10 and 18 months, (19.6%) and 18.6% retained a single job for longer than this.

TABLE 7: DURATION OF LONGEST SINGLE JOB

	No. of offenders	%
N.A.	8	7.8
Up to 3 months	9	8.8
3-9 months	39	38.3
10-18 months	20	19.6
18 months and over	19	18.6
N.I.	7	6.9
Total	102	100.0

TABLE 8: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STABILITY IN WORK PATTERNS AND NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS

No. of previous convictions	WORK RECORD							Total	
	NA. *		Stable		Moderately stable		Unstable		
		%		%		%		%	
0-3	3	13	50.0	16	33.3	—	—	32	31.4
4-6	2	6	23.1	12	25.0	6	31.6	26	25.5
7 and over . .	4	7	26.9	20	41.7	13	68.4	44	43.1
Total . . .	9	26	100.0	48	100.0	19	100.0	102	100.0

* NA. Schoolboys/In institution since of work age.

When a comparison of ratings of stability in work history was made to previous institutional experience a similar pattern emerged, though the existence of considerable previous experience of institutions would itself adversely affect stability in employment. 61.5% of the stable workers had no prior experience of institutions, compared to 33.3% of the moderately stable workers and only 5.3% of the unstable workers. Conversely, only 7.7% of the stable workers had experienced 3 or more types of institution, compared to 13.5% of the moderately stable workers and over a third of the unstable workers (36.8%).

TABLE 9: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STABILITY IN WORK PATTERNS AND EXPERIENCE OF INSTITUTIONS

No. of previous institutions	WORK RECORD							Total	
	NA. *		Stable		Moderately stable		Unstable		
		%		%		%		%	
0	4	16	16.5	16	33.3	1	5.3	37	36.3
1 or 2	4	8	30.8	26	54.2	11	57.9	49	48.0
3 or more . .	1	2	7.7	6	12.5	7	36.8	16	15.7
Total . . .	9	26	100.0	48	100.0	19	100.0	102	100.0

* NA. Schoolboys/In institution since of work age.

Almost a tenth of the offenders were ineligible for work when they committed their current offence (9.2%), either because they were at school or were in custody for a previous offence. Almost half of the group (48.0%) were in employment when they committed their current offence. They were divided fairly evenly into those in skilled and those in unskilled jobs, of the types described above. Over a third were out of work (36.3%).

Employment history and criminal record

Again, previous convictions and experience of institutions were used as indicators of criminal involvement. Each of these factors was compared to ratings of employment stability, the inadequacies of which were discussed in the preceding section.

The resulting tables showed a marked negative association between stability in work patterns and criminal experience. Half of the offenders with stable work patterns had no more than 3 previous convictions, compared to a third of those whose performance was moderately stable and none from the unstable group. At the other end of the scale more than two-thirds of the offenders in the unstable work history group had 7 or more previous convictions (68.4%), compared to 41.7% of those in the moderately stable group and 26.9% in the stable work group.

Criminal experience (in terms of previous convictions and previous institutional experience) was also compared to work record in terms of the duration of the longest single job held by the offenders. Tables 10 and 11 revealed little distinction in the previous criminal experience of those whose longest job lasted between 10 and 18 months and those who had held a single job for a longer period. Both tables showed differences in the extent of criminal involvement of those whose longest job lasted no longer than 9 months and those who remained in a single job longer than this. Over half of those whose longest job lasted no more than 9 months were found to have 7 or more previous convictions (52.1%), compared to less than a third of those who had held a job for a longer period (36.8%).

An examination of previous institutional experience showed that half of those who had held a job for 10 months or more had not previously been in an institution (51.3%) compared to a fifth of

TABLE 10: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DURATION OF LONGEST SINGLE JOB AND NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS

No. of previous convictions	DURATION OF LONGEST JOB							Total	%
	NA/NI	%	Up to 9/12	%	10/12 - 18/12	%	18/12 and over	%		
0-3	4		12	25.0	10	50.0	6	31.6	32	31.4
4-6	4		11	22.9	5	25.0	6	31.6	26	25.5
7 and over . .	7		25	52.1	5	25.0	7	36.8	44	43.1
Total . . .	15		48	100.0	20	100.0	19	100.0	102	100.0

those whose longest job had lasted 9 months or less (20.8%). Conversely, 3 or more types of institution had been experienced by 22.9% of the offenders whose longest job lasted no more than 9 months, compared to 5.1% of those with a better record of job sustainment.

TABLE 11: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DURATION OF LONGEST SINGLE JOB AND EXPERIENCE OF INSTITUTIONS

No. of previous institutions	DURATION OF LONGEST JOB							Total	%
	NA/NI	%	9/12 or less	%	10/12 - 18/12	%	18/12 and over	%		
0	7		10	20.8	11	55.0	9	47.4	37	36.3
1 or 2	5		27	56.3	8	40.0	9	47.4	49	48.0
3 or more . . .	3		11	22.9	1	5.0	1	5.2	16	15.7
Total . . .	15		48	100.0	20	100.0	19	100.0	102	100.0

3. Parents' employment records and juvenile problems

by Mary W. McIsaac

It was possible to obtain some information on the employment status of the parents of children referred to the Reporters to the Children's Hearings system [1] in a city and a county in the central belt of Scotland in the first three months of 1972 and 1973.

The following tables show the parental employment, *where known*, for (1) all children referred, and (2) those children referred for offence behaviour, who constitute approximately 70% of total referrals in the city and over 80% of total referrals in the county.

The information is subject to a large error margin in that data was often unavailable, and where available was taken from varying sources in files such as police reports, social work reports, or notes made at other times. The information may at times have been out of date, for example, where Social Work Department submitted a family background report which was based on an earlier visit to the family or on information already filed.

For this reason the apparent drop in unemployment of parents from 1972 to 1973 must be viewed with caution. The only safe statement seems to be that the percentage of unemployment among parents of children referred is much higher than the population figures at a comparable time. The attempt to divide unemployment into short term (defined as under 6 months) and long term (over 6 months) was not very successful, so " unemployed " is taken as one category for percentages.

" Step-parent, guardian, etc. " refers to an adult person in the household other than father or mother but in a parental capacity. It does not include siblings.

[1] Cf. description of the Scottish Reporter and Children's Hearings in Juvenile Justice, An International Survey, pp. 83 to 94, UNSDRI (1976).

TABLE 1: ALL CHILDREN REFERRED TO REPORTER

	CITY				COUNTY			
	1972 Jan - Mar		1973 Jan - Mar		1972 Jan - Mar		1973 Jan - Mar	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
FATHER								
Disabled	8	2	13	3	2	—	7	2
Retired	3	—	4	—	1	—	—	1
Unemployed (long term)	14	2	46	13	7	1	7	—
» (short term)	2	1	9	3	—	—	1	1
Unemployed	61	18	18	9	17	3	19	1
Employed	145	40	244	69	76	12	157	33
Other	2	—	5	2	—	—	—	1
Total for whom information available	235	63	339	99	103	16	191	39
Unemployed	77	21	73	25	24	4	27	2
» as % of total	32.8	33.3	21.5	25.2	23.3	25.0	14.1	5.1
Total: Males & females	298		438		119		230	
Unemployed	98		98		28		29	
» as % of total	32.9		22.4		23.5		12.6	
MOTHER								
Disabled	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	—
Unemployed	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Employed Part time	52	13	103	28	7	—	29	2
» Full time	43	10	59	22	20	5	46	15
Housewife	140	48	225	69	57	8	19	31
	235	72	388	119	86	13	194	48
STEP-PARENT, GUARDIAN ETC.								
Disabled	2	—	3	—	—	—	1	—
Retired	1	1	1	2	—	—	1	—
Unemployed	7	3	13	3	—	—	3	—
Employed Part time	2	3	—	4	—	—	—	—
» Full time	11	4	11	4	1	—	8	5
Housewife	9	1	12	5	3	—	3	1
	32	12	40	18	4	—	16	6

Total number of children in sample (i.e. total referrals for January to March 1972 and 1973) from which above information is taken.

CITY		COUNTY	
473	651	170	302

TABLE 2: CHILDREN REFERRED FOR OFFENCE BEHAVIOUR

	CITY				COUNTY			
	1972 Jan - Mar		1973 Jan - Mar		1972 Jan - Mar		1973 Jan - Mar	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
FATHER								
Disabled	7	—	13	2	1	—	7	2
Retired	3	—	3	—	1	—	—	1
Unemployed (long term)	13	—	32	4	6	—	7	—
» (short term)	1	—	9	1	—	—	1	1
Unemployed	48	4	14	2	14	3	18	1
Employed	134	12	212	21	67	10	154	31
Other	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
Total for whom information available	208	16	290	30	89	13	187	37
Unemployed	62	4	55	7	20	3	25	2
» as % of total	29.8	25.0	19.0	23.3	22.5	23.1	13.4	5.4
Total: Males & females	224		320		102		224	
Unemployed	66		62		23		27	
» as % of total	29.5		19.4		22.6		11.6	
MOTHER								
Disabled	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Employed Part time	48	6	89	9	4	—	29	2
» Full time	42	4	52	6	17	5	44	12
Housewife	119	12	174	19	47	5	115	25
	209	22	315	34	70	10	188	39
STEP-PARENT, GUARDIAN ETC.								
Disabled	2	—	2	—	—	—	1	—
Retired	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—
Unemployed	6	1	11	—	—	—	3	—
Employed Part time	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
» Full time	10	—	10	—	1	—	8	4
Housewife	8	—	6	—	3	—	3	1
	29	2	30	—	4	—	16	5

Total number of children in sample (i.e. total referrals for January to March 1972 and 1973) from which above information is taken.

CITY		COUNTY	
330	432	138	226

III

THE THEORY OF THE ROLE OF PRISONS IN ADVANCED PENAL SYSTEMS

by P. YOUNG

Editor's Note

This paper does not focus directly on economic crisis-crime correlations. We nevertheless believe that it should be considered alongside with the other materials presented in this volume. The reasons for this are essentially two: firstly, Young confirms that prisons are an extremely costly form of social response to deviance; more importantly, "... the majority of these costs will be directed towards maintaining the internal requirements of the system, rather than directly devoted to the solution of the crime problem " (*p. 163 below, emphasis ours*). *If one adds to this evidence of high but sterile costs the fact that incarceration often exacerbates the "crime problem ", it is evident that (especially) in economic crisis conditions the very concept of prison as the standard social response to deviance, as well as its operation, requires serious re-assessment.*

The research described in this report grew out of work based upon a series of research proposals and projects,[1] whose object was to test the relationships that exist between economic factors, the propensity to criminality and the activities of the criminal justice and penal processes. The specific suggestion that lay behind this project was to analyse the " costing of imprisonment as a method of social control ", and bore the highly suggestive title of " A paper on the theory of the role of prisons and related institutions in advanced penal systems »[2]. Such a title is by its nature both stimulating and also somewhat foreboding; it creates, for the reader and researcher

alike, a sense of expectancy that demands considerable service if it is ever to be fulfilled. The work that follows is but a first tentative step towards providing this service and thus should be regarded more as an attempt to isolate the important questions to be asked, rather than a final statement containing definitive answers and conclusions.

I

In describing the theory that lies behind the costing of prisons in contemporary society one is immediately faced with problems of both definition and analytic approach. Presuppositions as to what is meant by " cost ", " economic " or, in this area of policy activity, " theory ", tend to predetermine not only the nature of questions posed, but also the general thrust of analysis contingent upon them. Existing research in this area has adopted a number of quite different definitions of these concepts, ranging from the more general and sociological to the highly circumscribed — but more quantitatively precise — econometric.[3] Whilst both exhibit advantages and limitations, the approach displayed in this report purports to be sociological in orientation. Although such analysis often seems to invite the criticism that it lacks sufficient — if any — quantitative support[4], it does nevertheless permit the researcher to work at an explanatory level that is both more inclusive and abstract. What is lost in apparent precision is easily gained in wider coverage.

The need for analysis at this level is particularly urgent in the subject area of this report. Any attempt to stipulate the basis upon which the prison system is costed necessitates the use of concepts which facilitate the isolation of criteria that guided the actual practice of governmental and penal administrators. For it is to the historical emergence of the concrete values upon which practitioners made decisions that the sociologist must look in part for any explanation of their activity. These values did not however exist in an historical void but were firmly rooted in a more general social structural backdrop and it is to an exploration of this level that this work is addressed. The corpus of this paper thus will be an attempt to provide an analytical framework with which to account for these changes.

Given this particular orientation then it is quite obvious that the type of evidence used to support arguments will be of the widest possible nature. Utterances of officials and those who commented upon problems of crime and punishment become just as important a source of evidence as quantitative data extracted from reports and documents. Although this does take one into the highly problematic region of the social analysis of ideological formations, this excursion is necessary if an adequate explanation is to be generated. Of course, the utilisation of quantitative data is still an important level of analysis but not one that exhausts all possible criteria of explanation. The implications of adopting a sociological orientation are thus that one widens the scope of what is acceptable as empirical data in the first place.

Given this change of emphasis then one also finds an equivalent re-orientation in the relationship between theoretical statements and empirical instances. The strength of an approach predominantly committed to the use of quantitative data is the close " fit " often found in research between these levels of analysis; theoretical statements are normally induced from the close observations and description of a firm statistical base line. Statements of ideology are not open however to this mode of explanation, but demand a quite different approach if objective research is to be achieved. The only way to achieve this goal is to possess conceptual tools which allow the description of ideological forms in their totality. Consequently the apparent close fit between " theory and fact " is somewhat altered and amended.

Basically, it is to this alteration in the methodological relationship between theory and evidence that critics point to when decrying the lack of support much sociological work seems to contain. It is suggested however, in the light of these comments, that much of this criticism is misplaced. Often it is not that sociological work lacks empirical substantation, but that the reference points of what is empirical and what constitutes a good explanation have changed.

The research described in this report then attempts a rather tentative sociological analysis of the historical changes that have affected the costing practices of the modern prison system. For the purposes of this paper three major areas are clearly important to study:

1) the social group which the nineteenth century prison attempted to control and the social attitudes towards this group;

2) the growth of the penal system as a centralised bureaucracy and the effect this change had upon costing practice;

3) the emergence and change of emphasis in conceptions of what the aims of punishment were.

II

One of the most notable features of the official statistics of crime is the imbalance they describe in the nature of the socio-economic background of the criminal population.[5] By far the greatest number of crimes recorded are committed by those of lower socio-economic status, a picture replicated in the figures of the prison population. Although various theories have been advanced to account for this situation [6] one factor which is abundantly clear is that this bias has a systematic nature. It is neither accidental nor coincidental but indicative of major social processes at the centre of society's mechanisms of social control. The following section of this report will attempt to explain the influence of this bias on the history of imprisonment.

As Mannheim [7] has pointed out, paramount in the attitudes of people towards the imprisoned is the desire to maintain a system of what Victorians called the principles of " less-eligibility ". These principles maintained that the style of the prisoners life, in terms of diets, discipline and general human rights, should never surpass that of the lowest minimum standard of outside free labour. If possible prison life should be continually below this level. As Whitworth Russel stated to the 1835 House of Lords Committee on Goals and Houses of Correction, it was not desirable under

> " any circumstances to give to a prisoner that which would place him in a better situation than be would have been had he never entered prison. " [8]

The fears that lay behind this statement were twofold. First that the supposed laxity and comfort of prison conditions would encourage the destitute idler to prefer prison life to outside existence, and second, that this extra inmate would be an additional burden upon the expenses of the prison authorities. Both situations would operate

against the deterrent aims of the prison system. Indeed it could create a situation where the apparently economically rational pauper preferred the prison to the workhouse to the extent of " committing... such acts of mischief and insubordination as will entitle them to a week's lodging in a favourite gaol ".[9]

Once it had entered the nineteenth century debate on prison life, the less-eligibility principle tended to act as an accepted criterion determining prison standards. Whilst it was not a new concept to English social history, its special significance at this time was the ideological transformation the concept underwent in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Shocked both by rising poor rates and prison expenses the reaction of the new emerging industrial bourgeoisie was to transpose what had previously been a diffuse attitude towards the poor into a sharply conceptualised economic tool for the management of institutions. Finding " scientific ' legitimation in the economics of Nassau Senior, the principle of less-eligibility was thus applied with increasing efficiency to prisons throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of its effect was the extensive controversy over prison diets and their uniform enforcement on local prison authorities.

Although not originating in the 1840's, the controversy was given impetus by the attemps of the then Home Secretary, Sir James Graham, to enforce a dietary system, based on the report of an especially constituted committee of prison inspectors, onto all jails throughout the country. It is interesting to note the rhetoric and terms in which the prison inspectors couched their report. They determined, " that quantity of food should be given in all cases, which is sufficient and not more than sufficient, to maintain health and strength, at the least possible cost ".[10]

This quotation succinctly catches the dual focus of the less eligibility principles. By keeping the prisoners lot to a minimum substantial costs could be saved and the deterrent effect of the prison system enhanced. Moreover in 1863 the dietary question received further impetus by the attempts of a commission once again to cut the cost of maintaining inmates. They produced a new diet that was not only supposedly of a higher health standard, but would save the country a further £ 16,000 if introduced.[11]

The attitudes implicit in the less-eligibility principle were thus of prime importance in structuring aspects of the prison system, and

as MacLachlan [12] has recently argued still continue to apply today. The question still remains however as to why these principles took the form they did and found such a ready reception in powerful circles. It is in the consideration of this wider problem that the significance of the preponderance of individuals of lower socio-economic status in the prison population is highlighted.

The applications of the less-eligibility principles were not isolated instances, but merely reflect a much wider and more generalised attitude expressed by the powerful classes of society against these of the lower orders. To their superiors the working-class manifested a threat to the social system in various ways. At the political level, the higher classes feared the possible political significance of a developing urban proletariat, this fear finding expression, as Radzinowicz [13] points out, in the notion of the " dangerous classes ". As the political scene obtained a greater stability the perception of threat shifted to the symbolic level, the new metaphor of the " criminal class " developing to express middle-class worry. Thus in 1840, the Quarterly Review gave an elegant airing to the political worries of the propertied classes in speaking of the urban poor as, " that vast inflammable mass which lies waiting to explode into mischief ".[14] Again in 1844 we find a similar expression of fear. Urban England apparently was a place where,

> " destitution, profligacy, sensuality and crime, advance with unheard-of rapidity in the manufacturing districts, and the dangerous classes there massed together combine every three or four years in some general strike or alarming insurrection which, while it lasts, excites universal terrors.... " [15].

The perception of deviance was thus underpinned by a quite explicit political dimension of class-conflict in a period of rapid industrial change and high unemployment. What is particularly interesting in this conception of the dangerous classes is that no attempt was made to differentiate between the various sections that composed this heterogeneous group. As Rude [16] has so convincingly argued, the political mob of the early nineteenth century was composed of individuals from quite different orders of society. The dangerous class was not simply made up of either a totally criminal or labouring element, but contaned a substantial number of individuals from the " middling orders " of society as well. However, in the early decades of the nineteenth century no such internal distinctions were reorganised by those in powerful structural positions. It was not until later in the century that one finds the emergence and recognition that the working class and dangerous classes were not synonymous entities. Then, the proliferation of such distinctions, to follow Mary Carpenter,[17] between the " dangerous " and " perishing " classes, or more generally between the " respectable " and " unrespectable " poor became of great significance in determining patterns of social control.

As Gatrell and Hadden [18] argue, these changes in the conceptions of threat and deviance are reflected in the activities of the prison and criminal justice system throughout the century. If one examines the prison population at the start of the period then it is apparent that it was both more representative of the general population at large and also contained more committals for seditous libel, arson etc. (all ' political offences ') than the prison population in the last decades of the nineteenth century. At this time the proportion of recidivists in the prison population increases quite substantially, indicating that the activities of the penal system were more concentrated against a restricted sector of the population. Consequently, the rhetoric of the system changes, concerning itself with the existence, and desired maintenance of a clear " criminal class ". Indeed the emergence of the criminal class was seen by Du Care as a positive achievement of the prison system. He stated

> " ..... the truth being that if by punishing those who have an incurable tendency to crime we can deter fresh recruits from joining the ranks of the criminal class, the object of punishment is effected; and obviously if we could possibly arrive at the result that all convicts were reconvictions, and none of them fresh sentences, we should be in a fair way to putting and end to crime altogether. " [19]

The nineteenth century was thus witness to a gradual change in the problem that the prison system was expected to deal with. The shift from dangerous to criminal classes indicates, it is suggested, the importance of the political and economic background to penological developments. Further support for this thesis is found if one considers the use of other institutions of incarceration in the nineteenth century. If a comparison is made (see Appendix I) between the commitments of able-bodied paupers to the workhouse and the commitments to local prisons then an almost identical pattern emerges. From 1851 to 1871 the curves describing daily average receptions into each institution closely follow one another, any divergence between the two only becoming apparent after 1872 when there was

a precipitous rise in prison receptions and an equally precipitous drop in pauper receptions. It is not too presumptuous to speculate that this abrupt change of direction in the curves is due to an exchange of population between the two institutions, enforced by changes in the poor law regulations in the late sixties and the emergence of crusading bodies such as the Charity Organisation Society. The impact of the " great depression " in the late seventies could, it is argued, have further reinforced this general process, thus implyng that, not only were there important and fine gradations seen to exist between different sectors of the working-class, but that the passage between these gradations was fairly easy and fluid, especially in times of depression.

The activities of the prison system were thus firmly rooted in the economic and political structures of the time. At the core of these processes lay an increasingly powerful middle-class group of people who not only took control of the administration of the system[20] but imbued the system with their particular set of values and ideologies. Central to this value system — indeed apparently summarising its essence — were the principles of less-eligibility. By laying a firm notion of requisite costing (in terms of dietary standards etc.) they functioned to operate the control propensity of the prison system in set and fairly constant directions. The subsequent patterns of the activities of the system are, of course, represented by the preponderance of individuals of lower socio-economic status incarcerated in its institutions.

What are the effects of the less-eligibility principle on the present-day penal system ? Two factors, one more apparent than real, have somewhat altered the situation today. First, the growth of the English penal system into a complex bureaucratic structure, has mediated the direct influence of middle-class pressure groups, and second the penal system today firmly denies the continued existence of the less-eligibility principles.

To take the second point first, it is obvious that an adherence to the principles of less-eligibility is quite incompatible with the changed ideological emphasis of the contemporary penal system. As *People in Prison*[21] makes quite clear in its opening pages, any progressive prison system cannot endorse the less-eligibility principle to any degree at all. However, as this document also observes, the actual resources devoted to prison management are not co-terminous with the implications of the idea of " humane containment ".

Especially in the sector of local prison management, the actual financial resources given to these institutions post-war has been adversely out of all proportion to the contribution they make to the prison system as a whole. Consequently, conditions in these prisons are of a low standard; there is over-crowding, lack of employment opportunity for prisoners and the buildings are mostly outdated. Indeed Sparks characterised local prisons as, " the lumpenproletariat of the whole English penal system ".[22]

Whilst the prison system may thus make explicit ideological disavowals of the less-eligibility principles, an analagous set of criteria do seem to be in operation in the real practice of the organisation. Local prisons house by far the largest population of the whole English prison system[23] yet the provision of resources to this area is highly circumscribed. This somewhat paradoxical situation is further compounded in the light of the nature of the criminal population found in these establishments. As Sparks[24] points out, the local prison population consists of the average, hard-core of the not very successful common criminal. If the rehabilitative ethic that characterised the penal system in the 1950 and 1960's, had anything but a purely rhetorical implementation, then it is to this group that one would expect the majority of resources to be devoted. As they are not, the inescapable conclusion must be that a revamped form of the less-eligibility principle seems to operate and effect the differential distribution and implementation of penal resources.

Whilst this structure of costing characterises the internal strategy of the prison system, it is not unreasonable to suggest that values akin to those of less-eligibility operate at the societal level. As Hood[25] has argued, the limits of modern penal reform find their restrictions in the nature of the appeal they have to current everyday concepts prevalent both at the public and Parliamentary levels. In the penal area proposals for reform must not violate the typifications that encircle common knowledge of crime and punishment, if they are to receive legitimation. To achieve reform, then, much contemporary debate centres around the re-categorisation of particular groups into knowledge that is acceptable to all concerned. Thus the pre-condition for reform of penal sanctions related to habitual drinking was the re-categorisation of the drunkard as " sick " rather than " evil ".[26]

The common knowledge current about matters in the penal system seems however to crystallise around conceptions of " threat "

and " danger " or of the criminal as an " enemy ". Although these conceptions are usually so much myth, the effect they have upon the penal system is considerable. Once mobilised, conceptions of danger and threat can function to legitimate the denial of status to those who pose such problems. This is certainly the situation that operates in relation to prisoners. The status given to them cannot be allowed to rise above a certain level without considerable conflict being generated. Hence the provision of extra financial resources to the penal system as a whole is limited by these symbols.

The principles of less-eligibility thus operate both internally to the prison bureaucracy and externally as a highly pervasive ideological form. The effect of bureaucracy on these processes is to routinise them into tacitly held ideas of what the structure of society is, what the typical criminal does and the acceptable mode of conduct towards him. Moreover, the functional necessity to maintain order in the prison similarly encourages activities, the content of which is determined by expediency rather than adherence to any specific therapeutic idea or value.

At a higher structural level, the effect of bureaucracy is to offset and mediate the direct power of access to the internal workings of the system. Activities are reduced to a lower level of social visibility. The final result, as Etzioni has observed, is that the prison operates on the basis of " negative compliance ". Patterns of authority tend to be orientated towards an alienation of the various groups inside the prison from one another, and so provide a context which has a structural conduciveness to encourage the principles of less eligibility to go unchallenged as the organisation routinely follows its everyday pattern.

The financial provision of the prison service as a whole must thus be in accordance with these ideas and values, and prisoners must be seen to be treated in a way consistent with these principles. The paradoxical situation that promoted these observations is thus resolved by the realisation of the power these knowledge forms have.

III

The last section of this essay described and traced the social construction of certain forms of knowledge which are basic to the current costing practice of the prison system. This next section is

concerned with illuminating what is perhaps the most fundamental historical change in the penal system — its emergence as a rational bureaucracy controlled by central government, but one which also generates its own internal dynamics which have obvious, but nonetheless major, ramifications on financial management.

The major part of the first half of this section applies more readily to local rather than central prisons. For whereas central or convict prisons have always been owned by the state authorities, local prisons and Houses of Corrections were originally in local government hands and run as a private profit-making exercise. The thesis put forward here is that it was not until this situation was fundamentally changed that the bureaucratic structure of our present prison system could emerge. Thus one context of this argument must inevitably be that of the relationship between local and central government in the nineteenth century. Of much more basic significance, however, are the changing patterns of state authority which formed part of the larger structural backdrop in which these other social processes were located. Other historians have variously labelled the debate which surrounds this problem as the growth of the welfare state, the passing of capitalism or the end of ideology.[27] For the purposes of this essay, however, the context of debate must be more focussed and specific, for we are concerned more closely with how these larger and wider changes affected the costing of prisons.

Given this more circumscribed objective, then, two major social changes are of key importance; first the separation of the ownership and control in the means of administration of the prison system and second the growth of a continuous organisation of prison staff with a hierarchical structure in which each office has its specified and limited sphere of competence.

The first of these social changes progressed by the state's expropriation of the ownership of local gaols and their installation as one part of its larger apparatus of social control. The second of these changes is in part both a cause and an effect of the present organisational structure of the prison system. Thus the distinction made here between these changes is primarily of an analytic nature.

The separation of the ownership and control of the means of administration in the penal system was neither a sudden nor absolute process but was enforced through a number of distinctive stages and

by a number of different mechanisms. Three such mechanisms may be discerned;

a) by the use of prison rules and the establishment of an Inspectorate (in 1835);

b) by the limited use of percentage exchequer grants to the local authority, which from the 1865 Act were dependent upon an adequate report by the Inspectorate;

c) by the use of legislation of differing coverage, power and consequence, culminating in the Centralisation Act of 1877. Often major examples of legislation were preceded by a special committee or commission, for example the 1865 Act.

Each of these mechanisms, which are roughly chronological in order, curtailed the scope of local control over prisons and extended central control. At one level, each can be analysed as a functional response and necessity to a structure of order based on the establishment of central authority. At another level, however, the use and extension of each mechanism had an effective cause in the perception of a supposed administrative problem or anomaly. For example, the Webbs [28] point out that the 1877 Act was only passed because a conservative government committed to the reform of local rating systems came into power in 1874 and prisons provided one of the *least* controversial ways by which to facilitate this reform. Again, the processes described here were neither self-regulating nor self-maintaining but regularly met with considerable conflict or indifference at different structural levels. The example of the Graham diets discussed in the second section of this essay are one such instance. Local Justices of the Peace either ignored or openly opposed their use, claiming that they were either too costly or encouraged the feared drift of free paupers into prison . Again, after the 1877 Act was passed, the Salford magistrates called a national meeting of J.P.s in London to discuss the reduction of their powers [29] and the apparent insult to local government thought to follow from the government's unprecedented move, and attempted to find Parliamentary support for the Act to be crushed.

Whilst some aspects of prison reform may thus have generated social conflict, the overall rationale of the government's programme received acquiescence from most bodies involved. By claiming that

centralisation would promote both uniformity of prison administration throughout the country and also save considerable money to the tax-payer the central government ensured themselves of final victory over any opposition (of which there was not much in Parliament). Equally their contention that such a streamlined system would create a more effective deterrent tool, and so guarantee the maintenance of public order, acted as a balm to the propertied classes worried over the emerging activity of labour unions.

The social processes underlying the separation of the ownership and control of the means of administration thus found their ultimate support in arguments that centred squarely on problems concerned with reducing the social and economic cost of prison management. By installing prisons deeply inside its apparatus of social control, the state at one time further extended its power over other institutions in society and also laid the basis for the growth of the penal system into a bureaucratic structure. The subsequent routinisation of the system, however, was dependent upon the existence of a staff to manage the system. Again legislative activity throughout the century had laid down a requirement for the employment of different grades of functionaries, from ordinary grade prison officers and chaplains, to the establishment of the Prison Commission in 1878. Modelled, as Thomas [30] notes, on a military basis, the structure of this staffing system was exceptionally hierarchical, in fact distinctly quasi-military in orientation. Of sociological significance is the fact that these employees were not charged with the ownership of the prison, but only operated to control its administrative requirements. Thus the financial basis that encouraged the use of the prison as a private profit-making activity to relieve burdens on local rates was gradually dissolved both by the extension of state control and the utilization of a salaried staff. Moreover, the employment of ex-military personnel by the prison authorities is testament to the Victorian faith in the use of paternalistic order in the areas of what they saw as social decay. Again, the unquestioned submission to authority implicit in a quasi-military structure operated to cement the less-eligibility principle into the administrative organs. And finally, it must be admitted that the prison system, in the years when it was managed by Du Care, did apparently fulfill the objectives of the 1877 Act. Costs per head of prisoner dropped from £ 36 per annum in 1867/8 to £ 26 per annum in 1880/81 (see Appendix II for an extended picture),

the average daily population settled down if not decreasing slightly, and the overall crime rate continued its downward trend. In these senses the late Victorian prison was thus an outstanding success both in economic and social terms.

The consequences of these changes for the present structure of the penal and prison system have been immense. This report will explore one area, the change in the direction of expenditure that is inherent in any institutional structure in the service-area that approximates the bureaucratic model.

Throughout the twentieth century there has been a general trend for the prison system to become 'labour intensive'. That is more money is continually directed to the employment and maintenance of staff services than to any other item (see Appendix III for a graphical description of this process). This process can be described by comparing the percentage of total expenditure distributed to central charges and cost of staff in establishments in selected years.

1935	—	57.2%	1969/70	—	65.3%
1939	—	57.9%	1970/71	—	66.9%
1944*	—	64.7%	1971/72	—	65.7%
1962**	—	56.4%	1972/72	—	65.4%

(Percentage of expenditure on staff and central maintenance)

These figures are especially illuminating if contrasted with the figures describing the percentage of total net expenditure directed toward the maintenance of inmates from 1969-1973.

1969/70	—	9 %	1971/72	—	8.6%
1970/71	—	8.8%	1972/73	—	7.8%

(Percentage of expenditure directed towards maintenance of inmates)

Although this downward trend is accounted for to some degree by the greater percentage rise in expenditure in other areas of costing (capital expenditure particularly) than staff, the situation is a little

* Figures as percentage of total gross expenditure (1935-44).
** Figures as percentage of total net expenditure (1962-73).

surprising. The late nineteen sixties and early seventies have been witness to a continuation in the increase in crime rates and commitments (see Appendix III) and witness also to an increase in the cost per head of keeping inmates incarcerated. Thus there are grounds for assuming at least a continuation of the status quo in the distribution of expenditure between different items. If these expenditure figures are further compared to the figure describing the increase in the number of prison officers employed, then the picture is further clarified. Whereas in 1958, approximately 6,000 prison officers were employed in the prison service, the figure in 1968 was approximately 10,000, with projected increases to 1973/74 of 14,000. In other words there has been an almost doubling of figures in a ten year period, which can only operate to increase the expenditure devoted to this item.

If the total expenditure on prisons is analysed, an even more striking picture emerges. In 1962/63 the total net expenditure on prisons was £ 24,026 (£ thousand) compared to £ 88,450 (£ thousand) in 1972/73. This is an increase of aproximately 370% in prison expenditure in one decade.

The conclusion that emerges from these figures is twofold. First, that prisons are becoming an increasingly expensive means of social control and second, that the major percentage in this increase is accounted for in terms of the money devoted to the maintenance of staff to keep the system running. At the same time the crime rate has been rising. In these admittedly crude economic terms the prison system can hardly be called successful in either a deterrence or rehabilitative framework.

The sociological interpretation of these trends is quite straightforward. Once established, a bureaucratic system develops its own inertia and dynamics which can generate objectives which are not those the system was obstensibly imbued with. In other words the organisation develops its own structure of priorities which are not necessarily coterminous with either the official objectives or rhetoric of the system. Apart from these statistics there is also firm historical evidence to lend support to this conclusion. From the first appointment of an Inspectorate in 1835 demands emanating from inside the organisation have had an effect upon the whole system little accounted for in most accounts of prison or penal history. For example, as Bottoms[31] has recently argued, a structural precondition for the

adoption of the Children and Young Persons Act (1969) was the existence of a group of administrators inside the Home Office receptive to ideas about rehabilitation. Again, the changed attitude towards prison labour in the 1850-60's was as much an effect of demands and comments stemming from the Inspectorate as it was an effect of changed market conditions.[32]

Once a bureaucratic structure emerges and develops a certain organisation inertia an internal dynamic also evolves, which tends to resist exogeneous stimuli. The organisation, especially an inherently conservative one as any penal system must be, tends always towards maintaining a state of equilibrium that is excessively hard to penetrate and shift. The bureaucracy thus obtains a social independence against direct assault upon its edifice; it establishes its own priority on expenditure and other patterns of activity and control, and tends always to maintain the values that pre-exist its everyday demands.

IV

The previous two sections of this report were concerned with tracing the effect of fundamental social values and processes of social change upon the modern-day structure of the prison system. By describing the importance of certain values (less eligibility) generated out of the relationship between classes and the social forces underpinning the emergence of the bureaucratic nature of the prison, it has been possible to indicate the direction of costing and expenditure in the prison system today. This next section of the report will be concerned with a brief review of the effects that conceptions about the aims of punishment have had upon the penal system.

The starting point for the majority of analyses concerned with discussing the objectives of punishment begin by distinguishing between what Shaw[33] has called the three " official " aims of punishment: deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation. The subsequent analyses then normally describe the process whereby the English prison system has progressed from a harsh commitment to an inhuman form of deterrence, through a reorientation to scientific rehabilitation, and settled most recently a new form of humane retribution.

The limitations of such analyses are twofold in nature. First such approaches accept a terminology and conceptual framework not generated out of the problem they are purporting to deal with, but gleaned instead from jurisprudential theory, and second, such approaches fail to come to terms with the fact that these conceptions are themselves ideological statements and stances. The ramifications for explanation are far reaching. Not only are these ideological stances fed into the fundamentals of description but the whole approach necessarily adopts largely an historical view of how the situation has changed. Further, by implication, the contention is made that the structure of the prison system can be explained only in terms of the supposed objectives of punishment.

The descriptions found in this report are, of course, totally opposed to such a view. The structure of the prison system is not simply an effect of the operation of certain ideas concerning the objectives of punishment, but is rooted in the social structural forces that characterised nineteenth century society. Nevertheless, ideology did have ramifications for the system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed to follow Sparks,[34] the current pattern of expenditure is largely a result of the influence of rehabilitative ideas. The sociological problem here, however, is in what terms this influence can be discussed and conceptualised.

Obviously, given the above comments, the conceptual frame supplied by the three " official " aims of punishment cannot be utilised as an adequate framework. An acceptance of these categories would be tantamount to accepting the co-option of this report by alien ideological forms. A solution must obviously be sought elsewhere. It is argued, therefore, that from a sociological perspective the adequate level of analysis is found in looking at the relationship between prison as an institution and the social structural context in which it is situated. In other words an attempt must be made to conceptualise the social functions of the prison as an institution. By doing so, the influence of ideology on the system is at least placed in a context where it is possible to view it in terms of its effect upon the totality of social structures, as well as the ramifications it may have for relationships and patterns of control within the organisational context of the prison system.

The work of Durkheim[35] is of considerable relevance here. To follow a Durkheimian analysis the function of punishment is to reinforce the central moral values of society; punishment functions to maintain the identity of the collective conscience. By supporting what another sociologist has called the " moral centre "[36] of society,

punishment acts as an integrative mechanism in the social order. It is thus a functional necessity for the continuation of social structure and social culture. Durkheim cannot be interpreted here as merely espousing a diluted sociological analogue of the jurisprudential concept of general deterrence. The framework of analysis implied by this approach which seeks the apparent justifications of punishment in its ability ' to protect society ', is not coterminous with the analytical framework suggested by Durkheim analysis. Durkheim intended his comments and descriptions to have the status of empirical statements rather than ethical imperatives. Although thus, there is an obvious similarity between the analysis of punishment in terms of deterrence and functional necessity, the basic intention behind the two conceptual schemes is entirely divergent.

By adopting this Durkheimian framework a considerable incisiveness is added to the analysis of punishment. Of course, a prior assumption in this mode of explanation is that a certain level of both crime and punishment are normal features of social structure. The definition of normality here is at two levels. First, that crime and punishment are statistical regularities in society at every stage of its evolution, and second, more importantly, that crime and punishment are necessary features of group life. This poses a question for the sociologist that is totally impossible to reach from a jurisprudential viewpoint. If a certain level of deviance is an inevitable feature of social structure, then attempts at rehabilitation find their natural limits not in the aberrant personalities of individuals, but in the sociologically relevant underpinning processes that characterise social structure as a whole; as Durkheim put it,

> " If crime is not pathological at all, the object of punishment cannot be to cure it, and its true function must be sougtht elsewhere. " [37]

There is thus a certain paradoxical situation in the promotion of social welfare programmes that are, at one level, a sociological nonsequitur.

From the perspective of this report, the relevant conceptual question to ask therefore is not whether one form of punishment is necessarily more effective than another, but why different conceptions about the objectives of punishment take hold and influence the penal system at all. In other words, the question is rightly returned to the

field of history and sociology rather than maintained in the already committed and circumscribed jurisprudential domain.

Freed from the restrictions of juridical theory the central problem that faces the sociologist concerns the general function of ideology in society. Here again, however, the mode of analysis adopted will be predetermined by the general conception of "ideology" that is utilized. Two conceptions of ideology are dominant in the social sciences; it is conceived of as a property of individual's consciousness or it is conceived of as a property of social structure. Whilst the use of the term in the second sense does not rule out its use in the first, the same cannot be said of the contrary. If ideology is only conceived of as a property of individual consciousness then the level of analysis following this conception rules out its use in the second sense; the notion of ideology is consequently reductionist and methodologically individualist in nature. Given these restrictions, the conception of ideology utilized in this report tends to adopt the second usage of the word; ideology is thus conceived of as a property of social structure.

In describing the influence and function of ideology in the prison system the sociological point of departure is thus to analyse the functional relationship between the ideology espoused by the prison system and the social structural forces which underpin it. The Benthemite attempt to combine " reform with deterrence " must therefore be looked at in terms of its expression as a totality; as a reflection of a certain conception of how society ought to be structured and how it ought to be reformed. It is here that the analysis offered in the second section of this report is of relevance.

The implication of the argument provided there is to suggest that imprisonment was used as a means to maintain public order in a period when different classes in society were committed to different conceptions and practices of how society ought to be structured. Or as E.P. Thompson so elegantly puts it,

> " One may even see these years as ones in which the class war is fought out in terms of Tyburn, the hulks and the Bridewells on the one hand; and crime, riot, and mob action on the other. "

The level at which the ideological statements espoused by Bentham and other reformers were posed, however, makes no reference to such concerns. The problem that we are faced with

is therefore to explain the nature of the relationship that existed between the underpinning social structural context and the function of ideological statements about the objectives of punishment. The argument of this report is that the ideological statements propounded by both the prison system and prison reformers function both to divert attention from social structural inequalities in society and to legitimate these inequalities. By removing the objectives of punishment from an historical context and placing them firmly and only in the realm of moralistic concern, the ideology of punishment distorts the real meaning of this activity to the social structure.

In this framework then, the function of ideology in the prison system is to provide a moralistic gloss legitimating the structure of the organisation beneath it. The spread of alternatives to imprisonment, like probation, can thus no more be explained by observation of the motives and ideological statements of police court missionaries than can the organisational priorities of the prison system. This, of course, does not mean that ideology has had no influence. As was explained before, different conceptions of the objectives of punishment have held sway at different historical periods. Indeed to follow Hood [38] and Bottoms [39] it is necessary for attempts at penal reform to fulfill certain ideological requirements before they can be adopted. All the analysis presented here claims is that, in sociological terms, the function of ideology in the prison system is to re-enforce particular conceptions of what is seen as the correct social order and so fulfill the historical objectives for which imprisonment was intended.

Conclusions

The analysis provided in this paper could obviously never adequately fulfill the requirements of the very wide objectives which were demanded by the original research proposal. A general policy conclusion that can be extraced from it, however, is that prison as a form of social control will become increasingly expensive due to its bureaucratic structure. Moreover, the majority of these costs will be directed towards maintaining the internal requirements of the system, rather than directly devoted to the solution of the 'crime problem'. Also, attempts to provide 'optimum' levels, which balance money spent with practical pay-off, will be considerably circumscribed in effect by the mediation of the organisational structure

of the bureaucracy. The relative quasi-independence of this bureaucratic entity limits attempts to impose exogeneous solutions to problems created internally to the structure. Thus, it will only be through concerted effort or through major social structural changes, that exogeneous changes will alter the directions in the operations of this method of social control. Because it is embedded in the structural system of societies the prison system will react to policy changes aimed at fundamentally altering this system.

The sociological context of modern-day prison reform is thus supplied by the hegemonic structure of prison systems in advanced industrial societies. The determining features of the "cost" of imprisonment as a method of social control are to be found in these structures and the effect they have on society.

APPENDIX I

Comparison of local prison and workhouse populations 1849 - 1882.

Source: Parliamentary Papers 1882.

Legend: A.B.P. = Adult Able-bodied Paupers in receipt of indoor relief.
D.A.N. = Daily average number of prisoners in local prisons in England and Wales.



APPENDIX II

YEAR	Expenditure in £s	Average No. of prisoners in each year	Cost per head per annum	No. of local prisons
1867 - 68	673,193	18,677	36	129
1868 - 69	620,561	20,080	31	127
1869 - 70	646,621	19,830	33	125
1870 - 71	574,834	18,465	31	120
1871 - 72	601,259	17,505	34	119
1872 - 73	562,508	17,680	32	116
1873 - 74	559,148	17,896	31	116
1874 - 75	552,575	18,487	30	116
1875 - 76	549,621	18,986	29	15
1876 - 77	560,135	20,361	28	113
1878 - 79	440,311	19,818	22	69
1879 - 80	497,913	19,835	25	69
1880 - 81	473,501	18,027	26	67

Returns for 1867 - 1881, showing the expenses of local prisons, average number of prisons each year, cost per head and number of local prisons.
Source: Prison Commissioners Report 1882.

Appendix III

Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics 1936-74.

Legend: E = Expenditure on prisons in England and Wales.
N.B. - From 1935-1961 figures refer to Gross Expenditure.
From 1962-1973 figures refer to Total Net Expenditure.

D.A.P. = Daily Average Population for Prisons and Borstal.
L.P. = Proceeds from sale of manufactures, and surplus stocks etc.



1 " = 5 years
1 " = £10,000 or 10

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[3] These remarks refer to general tendencies of approach only. Example of the sociological could include such works as E. DURKHEIM, *Two Laws of Penal Evolution*, or G. RUSCHE & O. KIRCHHEIMER, *Punishment and the Social Structure*. Examples of the " economists " approach are supplied by G. BECKER, " *Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach* ". Such works as M.H. BRENNER, *Mental Illness and the Economy*, seem to occupy a border-line between the others.

[4] See for example L. RADZINOWICZ, *Economic Pressures* in L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang, Crime and Criminal Justice, Basic Books, 1971.

[5] Many separate criminological surveys have noted this. For example. E. SUTHERLAND, *White Collar Crime*; J. BOWLBY, *Forty-Four Juvenile Thieves*, etc.

[6] The range of theories is really quite extensive and no review of them could be attempted here. By far the best up to date general survey of these contributions is I. TAYLOR, P. WALTON and J. YOUNG, *The New Criminology*.

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PART THREE: A RURAL CASE STUDY: FOOD SHORTAGES, FAMINE CRISES AND CRIME

by CLARENCE DIAS

Editor's Note

This case study was conducted in a setting of chronic scarcity, which an intervening crisis (a year of floods followed by a year of drought: droughts are almost cyclical occurrences in that part of the monsoon belt) transformed into a scenario of hunger and disruption. The case study is in that sense historical as it seems to have generated emergency relief plans and other interventions which, in future, may successfully cope with the distress that occurred in 1970 and 71 in the Osmanabad district.

Admittedly, Osmanabad lies many thousands of miles to the East and South of the areas in which the Brenner and McClintock crisis-crime correlations were developed. We nevertheless believe that the Osmanabad study (which might have been conducted in an urban slum area or in a depressed rural community in Europe or North America) has general validity, and that its conclusions — especially those which show the community maintaining its cohesion but also turning away from crisis-control instrumentalities which it perceived as ineffectual or biased — should be heard also by policy-makers in other parts of the world.

Our particular thanks go to the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court and to the officials who, after having been explained the reasons for the Osmanabad study, not only gave the research team access to court records, but generously contributed their time, guidance and advice.

THE FRASCATI HYPOTHESES

The first workshop on economic crisis and crime (Frascati, 1974) engaged in a hypothesis game discussing various possible and plausible propositions on the correlations between economic disruption or crises, crime or other forms of deviance, official and social tolerance levels of deviance and possible social intervention and control mechanisms. Among the various kinds of economic disruption situations considered at Frascati was the chronic and often deteriorating economic distress situation endemic in many regions of the Third World. One of the scenarios examined was that of the chronic distress situation brought to a breaking-point by processes of gradual deterioration or by some intervening sharp crisis such as a drought or an earthquake. The assumption was that such breaking-point phenomena converted situations of chronic distress into potentially criminogenic crisis situations. Some tentative hypotheses were generated applying this scenario to situations of food scarcity. It was hypothesized that in conditions of chronic food scarcity, an intervening breaking point factor would precipitate an increase in criminal law violations of the following types:

i) petty theft, possibly leading to serious/organized/habitual crime;

ii) mass violence, group violence and/or individual acts of expressive violence indicative of a build-up of levels of frustration;

iii) rationing and food control violations by producers, distributors, consumers and rationing authorities.

These hypotheses were built upon existing theoretical approaches to crime causation. The norms and sanctions of the criminal justice system exist to guide human behaviour away from socially undesirable options in situations where choice is available from alternatives. Economic necessity, promise of substantial reward or increased oppor-

tunity could also be factors influencing such choice. Rationing and food control violations could represent rational balancing of possible subjection to sanction against possible substantial economic gain. Petty thefts would represent the same sort of rationality. The sequence of petty theft leading to habitual crime draws heavily upon the theory of differential association. Deviance taking the form of individual or mass violence was hypothesized on the basis of a Durkheimian view of penal law, society and social cohesion and on a Mertonian theory of anomie. Group violence was hypothesized on the assumption that sudden economic crises tend to affect most acutely marginal social groups with the possible effect of further emarginating such groups.

Hypotheses were also generated relating to control-policy intervention mechanisms that might be involved in a breaking-point factor-induced crisis and the possible consequences of such intervention. Thus, for example, it was hypothesized that governmental coping measures could be directed both at the economic dysfunction (e.g., strengthening of rationing, price or quality control mechanisms, or strengthening of supply and distribution mechanisms) and at crisis-induced deviance (e.g. a change in official tolerance levels of deviance, or high penalization). Consequences of control-policy interventions might be an increase in opportunity-conditioned deviance, institutional overload, loss of credibility of control-policy mechanisms, community bypass of formal system processes, alienation of individuals or social groups and possible disruption or strengthening of social structures and institutions.

With a view to testing the above assumptions and hypotheses it was decided to select food scarcity situations as a typical chronic crisis scenario and to undertake within a specific time-frame and within a distinct geographic area a detailed inventory of historical experiences. It was hoped that such an inventory would provide:

a) possible tentative indicators regarding breaking-point situations;

b) confirmation or disconfirmation of hypotheses regarding deviant behavioural responses, regarding control policy intervention mechanisms and regarding the consequences of employment of such intervention mechanisms;

c) generation of further hypotheses on correlations between economic disruptions, deviance, social and official tolerance levels and coping responses.

The present paper represents one such inventory conducted in a rural district in India. The district studied (Osmanabad) represents a typical chronic food scarcity situation. In 1971, two successive years of crop failure brought about a famine crisis. By 1975, the year this study was conducted, conditions of " normalcy " were prevailing once again in the district.

OSMANABAD DISTRICT: SOME CONTEXTUAL ETCHINGS

The present study was conducted in the district of Osmanabad, which was formed as an administrative unit in 1904. Osmanabad, the southernmost district in the Aurangabad Division of Maharashtra state, has an area of 5,510.3 square miles and a population of 1,896,687 (according to 1971 census figures). Osmanabad district has 13 towns and 1,411 villages, of which 23 are uninhabited. For purposes of judicial administration, the district of Osmanabad is divided into 11 *tehsils*: Osmanabad, Kallam, Bhum, Parenda, Ausa, Nilanga, Latur, Umerga, Ahmedpur, Tulzapur and Udgir. Of these *tehsils*, the first four named were worst affected and the last three named were least affected by the famine conditions in 1971. Each of these 11 *tehsils* has a trial court presided upon by a Judicial Magistrate. (In the case of Bhum such a court was established in 1970. Prior to that year all cases from Bhum were handled in Parenda.) In 1969 a Sessions Court was set up in Osmanabad to hear appeals from the trial courts in the *tehsils* of Kallam, Tulzapur, Parenda, Bhum and Osmanabad. Earlier an appellate court had been established in Latur to hear appeals from the trial courts in the other six *tehsils*.

The average rainfall in the district is 34.73 inches and about 84% of this is received during the south-west monsoon, during the months June to September. Agriculture and services ancillary to agriculture engage about 83.52% of the working population in the district. The pattern of crop cultivation is largely determined by the season's rainfall. The district has been particularly susceptible to the vagaries of succeeding monsoons — seasons of extremely heavy precipitation tending to alternate with seasons of acute drought. The district is ill-equipped with irrigation facilities — the proportion of gross irrigated area to the gross cropped area being only 4.77% (according to 1959-60 figures — the latest figures available). The

population of the district display considerable adaptability to forces beyond their control and this is reflected in their approach to agriculture. During favourable monsoon years two crops are harvested — a *kharif* crop (in June-July) and a *rabi* crop (September-October). The crops sown include wheat, pulses, sugar, *jowar,* groundnut and cotton.

Only one third of the total population is engaged in any sort of occupation, with two thirds falling into the category of dependents. The heavy dependence of the population of the district on agriculture is evident from the fact that 532,855 out of the district's total working population of 640,848 are either cultivators or agricultural labourers. The rural population of the district outnumbers the urban population in the ratio of 8:1. Only 25% of the total population of the district is classified as" literate " by the census data. Population growth trends for the district and for the *tehsils* that comprise the district are indicated in Table 1 [1].

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGIES OF THE PRESENT STUDY

During the year 1971 several districts in the state of Maharashtra in western India experienced famine conditions. Among these was the district of Osmanabad, which was selected for study. Osmanabad was selected for a number of reasons, the most significant of which was the fact that one of the members of the three-man research team was born in the district and intended, on completion of his studies in law school, to practise law in one of the towns of the district.

The study was designed to gather information about the population and institutions of the district, the breaking-point factor, the relief measures undertaken, deviant behavioural responses to the crisis, control policy intervention measures adopted and the social impact and consequences of such measures. The study's first phase consisted of a review of journalistic coverage of the famine crisis and of government reports and news releases pertaining to the crisis. The second phase involved the collection of statistical data relating to the incidence of crime in the district from various administrative offices within the criminal justice system. Annual figures were compiled from court

[1] All the tables are reproduced in an Appendix to this Part, pp. 205 to 243.

records (for the period 1967-1974) of the criminal cases instituted both under the Indian Penal Code (India's basic penal law statute) and under other penal statutes such as Essential Commodities Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act. These data were collected for each of the 11 *tehsils* of the district so as to enable examination of the incidence of crime both in worst-affected and least-affected *tehsils* of the district.

With a view to testing the hypotheses outlined in the first section of this paper, annual figures for the entire district of Osmanabad were compiled of the number of criminal cases instituted relating to the following offences:

i) offences against public tranquillity (including acts of mass violence);

ii) offences against public health (including food adulteration);

iii) offences against life;

iv) offences of physical violence directed against the person of a human being (including the use of criminal force, assault, wrongful restraint and rape);

v) offences against property (including theft, robbery, criminal misappropriation of property);

vi) offences indicative of aggression and frustration (such as criminal intimidation and criminal trespass);

vii) offences under food and rationing control laws (such as the Prohibition Act, the Essential Commodities Act, the Food Adulteration Act, the Weights and Measures Act, the Shops and Establishments Act and the Agricultural Marketing Act).

These annual figures compiled according to nature of offence were also separately collected for two *tehsils* — one selected from amongst those worst hit by the famine (Kallam) and one least affected by the famine (Ahmedpur).

Data were also compiled from police records of the total number of annual offences registered by the police for the entire district for the years 1970-1974 and such data were also broken down according to the nature of the offence. It was not possible to obtain such data broken down according to *tehsil* from the police records.

Because of an awareness of the shortcomings and limitations of data collected from " official records " within the criminal justice system, the study employed in addition the methods of ethnographic observation and of semi-structured interviewing. The interviewing was originally designed to include the administration of a questionnaire. When this method proved too rigid in the field it was abandoned in favour of interviews which covered a structured set of topics but which did not involve a formal questionnaire. Interviews were conducted with the following categories of persons:

i) judges of the district courts;

ii) defence lawyers;

iii) prosecutors;

iv) individuals under trial;

v) police;

vi) probation officers;

vii) local government officials such as:

a) the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the *zilla parishad*

b) the *Sarpanch*

c) the Collector of the District

d) the Supply Officer

e) police *patils*;

viii) villagers;

ix) townsmen;

x) relief workers;

xi) the members of the State Legislature representing the district.

The interviews were conducted in as informal a setting as was possible — usually in the homes or places of work of the subjects interviewed. Villagers were interviewed both individually and in groups of five to ten. The full team of three researchers was present at every interview. A total number of 63 interviews was conducted.

FROM CHRONIC DISTRESS TO CRISIS

Lacking both political patronage and economic importance, the district of Osmanabad had long suffered the neglect and apathy of both State and Federal Governments. A fact-finding committee appointed by the (then) Government of Bombay in 1960 reported that due to the unreliable nature of rainfall patterns there, the district of Osmanabad was particularly likely to be affected by scarcity conditions and estimated the frequency of scarcity conditions in the district as once every ten years. In the decade since that report no effort was made to reduce the district's total dependence upon the vagaries of nature. Chronic poverty and scarcity conditions in the district persisted and were met with resignation and a degree of stoicism by the population of the district — a population that has through the years shown little desire to migrate to more prosperous areas of the State. Acute scarcity conditions during the decade from 1956-1966 failed to attract State intervention, particularly since a crisis situation was never reached — a season of drought or floods being followed by a season of average rainfall. In 1971, however, a year of drought succeeded a year when floods had completely destroyed crops. For the first time in over a hundred years there was crop failure in successive years and scarcity conditions deteriorated to what was described as the State's " worst famine of the century " (*Times of India*, 23 August 1971). Complaisance and inaction as much as natural factors contributed to the " breaking-point ". By the middle of August, though food, water and fodder were becoming extremely scarce, people were still " clinging to their villages " (*Indian Express*, 21 August 1971). By the end of August the State Government finally recognized the existence of a crisis situation and embarked upon a programme of scarcity relief.

RELIEF MEASURES

Once the existence of famine conditions was officially acknowledged by the State Government, relief programmes gathered momentum. Humanitarian efforts by private volunteer groups like the Rotary Club, the Lion's Club and some industrialists (notably the Majatlal Group of industries) attempted to alleviate some of the distress by providing food and health services. The State Government immediately

appropriated the funds necessary to embark upon schemes of procurement of food grains and fodder from neighbouring states. Emergency distribution systems were set up and, after the immediate problem of starvation was given attention to, the State Government turned to long-range measures. A programme of scarcity relief work was set up to provide employment to the displaced agricultural labour and the cultivators. Any individual who wanted to work could join this programme. The work involved manual labour (road building, stone crushing, etc.) and a daily wage of Rs3 (approximately $ 0.40) was provided. This wage of Rs3 per day was higher than the market rate for labour (agricultural or otherwise) prevailing immediately before the famine. Euphoria soon replaced crisis as government spending on relief work programmes had the result of placing increased purchasing power in the hands of those participating in such programmes.

THE INCIDENCE OF CRIME IN OSMANABAD: SOCIETAL PERCEPTIONS

During the pre-relief work period of the famine (1970-1971):

The hypothesis of a general breakdown of law and order at the start of a crisis was confirmed by the interview data. As families left their homes in search of food and water, thefts of movable property lying in vacant houses increased. Increased opportunity coupled with decreased chance of detection and apprehension would largely explain this pattern. But the generally shared perception was that the social fabric of village life was not destroyed and the tendency was to attribute these thefts to " outsiders ", i.e., people from other villages or members of a nomadic tribe (called the *Pardis*) who traditionally have lived through petty theft.

There was some reporting of an increase in crop thefts. Crop thefts were mainly in the areas of the district less affected by famine and both scarcity and increased value of the crop were given as possible reasons for the increase in crop theft. An increase in violence associated with crop thefts was also reported and the explanation offered was that what would otherwise have been crimes of stealth became crimes of violence since crops were better guarded during scarcity conditions.

Mass violence and group violence were claimed to have been non-existent. There appeared to be strong social cohesion in the communities studied and the interview data repeatedly stressed the perception that in times of crisis social cohesion increased rather than decreased. When attention of the interviewees was drawn to a press report of group violence in another district of the State undergoing famine conditions, there was obvious pride in the reiteration that such acts did not occur in their own communities.

During the period of the scarcity relief-work programme 1971-1973):

A marked decrease in crime was reported during the period when relief work was at its most active. The work programmes provided employment and a wage level sufficient to satisfy consumption needs. There was a widely shared perception that improved economic conditions (especially since the improvement went beyond the pre-famine level) had led to a marked decrease in criminal activity. Satisfaction of the economic wants of subsistence level communities was felt to be related to a decrease in criminal deviance. A factor not mentioned by the interviewees may also have been contributory. Due to scarcity of employment opportunities in pre-famine years there was a temporary migration pattern emerging with male members of households spending the 4-5 months a year of agricultural inactivity in search of employment in urban centres but returning to their homes during the rest of the year. During the relief work programme's continuance there was virtually no migration and this resulted in a strengthening of kinship and village organizations.

The hypothesis relating to an increase in opportunity-conditioned deviance was repeatedly confirmed by the interviews. There were reports of misappropriation by government officials of funds and food earmaked for the relief effort and of malpractices in the apportioning of relief work. These misappropriations were in violation of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code but, as one of the elected representatives from the district explained, many cases of misappropriation went uninvestigated because of a lack of adequate law enforcement machinery to cope with the increase in such misappropriations. Law enforcement officials, when interviewed, confirmed that they were aware of misappropriations but had to overlook them both

because of pressures of work and also because often, these misappropriations were being committed by State government officials from the State capital with sufficient influence to be able to thwart local investigations.

The post relief-work programme period (1973-1974):

Within a 24-month period after the commencement of the famine situation most of the relief-work programmes had ground to a halt. With the termination of these programmes there was a widely-shared perception of a marked increase in the incidence of crime. The frustration hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the interview data, which draw attention to the potentially criminogenic effect of the abrupt ending of a relief programme leaving substantially unfilled the expectations raised by it. But in addition to the frustration hypothesis, a number of other variables were perceived in the interviews as being related to the increased incidence of deviance. These variables relate to the political system, to patterns of income distribution and resource allocation, to social institutions and to a whole host of cultural and historical factors. The variety of these explanatory variables is striking:

i) politicization of aspects of village life was offered as an explanation for increased institution of suits in criminal courts. It was suggested that political factions intervened to encourage disputants not to compromise their disputes. The contending political factions lent their support to the disputants and thereby made it possible for them to channel their disputes into the courts. The outcome in court served to enhance the power of the political faction supporting " the winning disputant ";

ii) corruption and abuse of political power at village level was said to have led to an increase in sexual offences and sexual exploitation;

iii) annual migration of male members (for periods of 4-5 months at a time) to urban centres in search of employment was perceived as being disruptive of kinship and other village institutions. The impact of urban values and mores on rural life seemed to be increasingly felt;

iv) the development in three *tehsils* (Udgir, Umerga and Nilanga) of a moral re-armament type movement actively campaigning against gambling and prostitution in the villages was said to have led to a number of violent clashes between factions;

v) an increasing awareness of the economic insecurity of village life was feared to be leading to an increase in migrations away from the villages, thereby eroding the social structures of the villages;

vi) black marketeering and other violations of the distribution system was felt to be undermining morale;

vii) most food producers were forced into violating the government food procurement schemes because the price fixed by the government for purchase of food grain was felt to be unrealistically low. Villagers expressed what they clearly perceived to be an acute injustice. A more rational pricing system, they felt, was necessary. But they were doubtful that the government would ever introduce such a system for fear of causing a rise of food prices in the cities. As one villager poignantly expressed it " the government listens to people in the cities because they raise a hue and cry. No one heeds the poor villager ".

viii) thefts of money, it was claimed, were occasionally prompted by necessity after periodic efforts by the political machinery of various political parties to solicit " voluntary " contributions for electioneering expenses;

ix) the increase in cases of petty theft recorded by the police was, at times, attributed to the police taking preventive action in the guise of acting in response to (fictitious) complaints of theft;

x) in three *tehsils* — Bhum, Parenda and Kallam, crime was attributed to the presence in large numbers of members of the *Pardi* community — a group of gypsies said to live by petty theft. Members of this community, when interviewed, displayed their strong alienation from society. They repeatedly stressed that they never used violence. The " system " forced them to steal, they said. One member of the community interviewed had 9 convictions in a career spanning 30 years and " countless " thefts. His most recent theft was to obtain a sum of money which he gave to a " landlord " in return for the latter having posted bail for him on an earlier charge of theft ! His

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2 OF 3

own words succinctly sum up his community's way of life: " I feel nothing wrong in stealing to fill my belly since the government does not give me rice, land, a hut, a job. If the government gives me these I will make a bond not to ever steal again ".

It was repeatedly stressed in the interviews, however, that increasing frustration at deteriorating economic conditions was not manifesting itself in criminal deviance because social cohesion was still very high within the village. Thus, for example, it was mentioned that due to building frustration (and increased consumption of alcohol) the incidence of petty quarrels in the village was high. But these quarrels were not allowed to deteriorate into acts of major violence and were kept out of the formal criminal justice system. Most crimes that were processed by the formal system, it was felt, were intra-village and not inter-village disputes. Village communities seemed to have an almost exaggerated perception of the degree of community cohesion in times of stress and crisis.

FOOD AND RATIONING CONTROL VIOLATIONS: SOCIETAL PERCEPTIONS

The interview data confirms both classical theoretical formulations stressing the distinction between acts *mala in se* and acts *mala prohibita* and more recent theorizing as to the need for " double institutionalization " of legal norms (see generally Leon Mayhew, *Law and Equal Opportunity*). Total breakdown/non-enforcement of food control and rationing laws was not only candidly conceded but moreover was not perceived as involving criminal deviance. One of the local government officials interviewed estimated that 75% of the food control laws were being violated and that rationing was in fact — though not in law — " non-existent ". One of the senior law enforcement officials interviewed did not perceive rationing violations as being crimes " because the police are not involved in the investigation " of such violations. Government food procurement schemes were consistently violated by farmers in the district who felt no compunction in doing so because they felt that the scheme had a most unrealistic pricing system. Smuggling of food grain out of the district to evade the procurement scheme was rampant and leading police officials indicated their helplessness (due to manpower shortage) to intervene.

The chairman of the local government Agricultural Committee admitted that the district was really likely to be self-sufficient in food production but that the government food procurement scheme had the effect of driving the food produced out of the district. Hoarding of food grain by villagers for their own consumption was perceived as being a legitimate, prudent step to guard against future scarcity conditions. When they were informed by the interviewers that such possession in excess of 10 *quintals* was an offence under the Essential Commodities Act their reactions ranged from disbelief to indifference. Similarly, violations of price controls by shopkeepers (an offence under the Shops and Establishments Act) or adulteration of food grain (an offence under the Food Adulteration Act) were shrugged away as inevitable by consumers who realized that they themselves were also often in violation of the provisions of various food control laws. Corruption and maladministration seemed to be endemic in the rationing system. Most people knew of their rights under rationing law, since " politicians and government officials have been going around the villages making speeches about these rights ". Most people also had knowledge of malpractices and violations relating to the rationing system but adopted an attitude of futility towards the correction of such malpractices. The emergency distribution machinery set up during the famine crisis was perceived as working efficiently due to the fact that " outside experts " were brought in to run such machinery. The " normal " system of distribution set up thereafter was perceived as being fraught with inefficiency and corruption. Attempts by the research team to critically examine the operation of the supply and distribution system at village level were parried and resisted by some of the individuals concerned. Hence it was possible only to obtain a very rough map of the framework of the system. The key elements in the system were the Collector of the District who appointed a Village Vigilance Committee, and the Supply Officer who received the food stocks from the State Government and was required to distribute it to the *tehsildar* (a local officer whose functions related to a single *tehsil*). The *tehsildar* was required to distribute the food stocks to dealers operating licensed " fair price shops " in each village. The " fair price shop " dealer was required to furnish the Village Vigilance Committee statements of the amount of food stocks supplied to him by the *tehsildar* and of the way in which such stocks were distributed to the villagers. It was generally realized that the system created oppor-

tunities for corruption and profiteering at every level. Fair price shop licences, it was frequently stated, were handed out by politicians as gifts of patronage. As one local government official pragmatically expressed it, " Even good men commit crimes when given the opportunity through fair price shop dealerships ". It was generally conceded that the lay participatory device of the Village Vigilance Committee was not a success, and the general perception was that its members were corrupt. Specific inquiries about Vigilance Committees were evaded and had to be abandoned by the research team lest they jeopardize access to the other data ultimately collected at field level. Non-application of penal sanctions and general non-enforcement of food control laws were openly admitted however. Refusal to treat food control laws as penal, and their violations as criminal, was widely found in all segments of the population interviewed. Moreover, law was not perceived of as having a significant role in coping with the problems. Comments such as " the laws are rigid, hopeless and should not be implemented " and " if you have food control it enables the businessman to manipulate even better " were frequently made in the interviews. The call was repeatedly for more supervision of the officials involved in the distribution system rather than for invoking penal sanctions against them. The police officers interviewed suggested that one of the problems regarding the enforcement of food control laws was that such enforcement was left not to the police but to special bodies created under those laws. Thus for example, the supply officer has the power to initiate prosecutions or revoke licences of dealers violating the food control laws, but such power is rarely exercised and at most a violator suffers the revocation of his licence — criminal prosecutions are virtually non-existent. The police officers interviewed did stress that the enforcement picture was very different in respect of the Bombay Prohibition Act, and suggested that this was because the police themselves were the investigating *and* enforcement authority with regard to this Act. There are some interview data, however, which suggest that the enforcement of the Bombay Prohibition Act, though heavy, is selective, and allegations of corruption surround the enforcement of this law. Interviews with prosecutorial officials offer other explanations for the non-enforcement of food control laws. They stress the difficulties in securing convictions under such laws because witnesses turn hostile as a result of being bribed or as a result of local pressures being exerted upon them, or out of a desire not to harm the accused who is often part of a rather closely-knit village community. Thus attitudes toward enforcement of food and rationing control laws range from futility through indifference (prompted by perceptions that energies may better be directed elsewhere) to connivance and complicity in violations of the laws.

THE INCIDENCE OF CRIME IN OSMANABAD (1967-1974): THE WRITTEN RECORD

While court and police records may represent only the proverbial tip of the iceberg so far as quantifying criminally deviant behaviour is concerned, they are nevertheless important as indicators of social and official tolerance levels with respect to deviance. It is unfortunate therefore that only partial records have been maintained in Osmanabad, and that even these suffer from some serious shortcomings. The police records referred to in this section were compiled for the research team by the Osmanabad police department, since the researchers were not given direct access to the records. Police generosity with their time was extended to its limits when they compiled and furnished the researchers with the " crime figure " statements from 1970 to early 1975; they were unwilling (for lack of time) to go back beyond 1970. By " crime figure " they explained that what they meant was the number of criminal offences *registered* by the police. They furnished these data for certain categories of offences, and these categories do not always tally with the categories of offences used by the courts in their records. For example, while the court records use the category " offences against life ", the police records furnished are restricted only to " murder and culpable homicide " and do not include other offences such as reckless accidental killings or unsuccessful attempts to commit murder or any other offences against life. Similarly, while the court records use the category " offences against public tranquillity " the police records furnished are restricted only to riot and not to other offences such as affray or unlawful assembly. The selection of categories of offences on which the police were willing to furnish information was not within the control of the researchers, and the categories were selected by the police officials themselves using their judgement as to relevance to the purposes of this study and as to the amount of time they could spare to compile such data. Thus, while the very generous co-

operation of the police officials must be acknowledged with gratitude by the researchers, unfortunately and probably unwittingly the data furnished by them do restrict the possible analyses that can be made therefrom. It must also be stressed that the police records indicated " offences registered " and not " offences reported " and so cannot really be used as an indicator of social tolerance or levels of deviance. The data furnished by the police records are set out in *Table 2* *. They indicate a steady trend of increase in the number of offences registered between 1970 and 1973 and then a fairly sharp increase in 1974 and the first two months of 1975. They also bear out the interview data relating to the high degree of enforcement of the Bombay Prohibition Act and lack of enforcement of other food control laws, although there is reflected in the data a marked increase in registration of offences under the Essential Commodities Act in 1973 and 1974. The data for 1974 and early 1975 also indicate that there might be an increase in offences registered under other food control laws (because of the large number of offences registered under the category of " miscellaneous "). The police also furnished data on the number of times they had taken preventive action to forestall the commission of an offence and these data (as summarized below) do indicate a very substantial recent increase in the incidence of preventive action by the police:

	1972	1973	1974	1975 (up to 28.2.75)
Preventive Action	689	856	1,022	211

Turning to the data obtained from the court records, important weaknesses seem to attach to them as well. The form for keeping of records was designed in the cities and seems inappropriate for a rural district. The court records contain no data about the offender's sex, age, occupation or prior criminal record. They contain no data as to the legal representation, if any, of the accused at trial and no data as to the duration of pre-trial detention. The researchers did

* Appendix pp. 206-8.

not have access to the prisons, and hence were unable to even impressionistically attempt to fill these data gaps. For the crucial famine year of 1971 no records were available for each of the *tehsils,* and for the years 1967 to 1970 the data were not available in tabulated form and had to be compiled by the researchers from individual case files. It is within these limitations therefore that analysis was made of the court record data. *Table 3* sets out the number of criminal prosecutions initiated between 1967 and 1974 in the whole district of Osmanabad both under the Indian Penal Code and under other penal laws. The data indicate a steady trend of increase. *Table 4* contains similar data relating to cases instituted in the two appellate courts of the district at Latur and Osmanabad. The data merit comment on two points. Whereas appeals under the Indian Penal Code are increasing in Latur they are decreasing in Osmanabad. Moreover in both courts there are virtually no appeals filed from convictions under penal law other than the Indian Penal Code.

Tables 5 to *15* contain data in the number of criminal prosecutions instituted for each year from 1967 to 1974 broken down according to *tehsil.* The Mahrashtra State Government relief-work officers have classified these 11 *tehsils* according to the degree to which they were affected by the famine as follows:

I. Worst Affected *Tehsils*: Kallam, Parenda, Bhum, Osmanabad.

II. Moderately Affected *Tehsils*: Nilanga, Umerga, Latur, Ausa.

III. Least Affected *Tehsils*: Udgir, Tulzapur, Ahmedpur.

The worst affected *tehsil* was Kallam and the least-affected *tehsil* was Ahmedpur. Whereas in two out of four of the worst-affected *tehsils* (Kallam and Parenda) there are decreases in the number of criminal cases instituted after the famine period, in all three of the least affected *tehsils* there is an increase in the number of criminal cases instituted during the post-famine period. All four of the moderately affected *tehsils* display either a rise or a constancy in the number of cases instituted in the post-famine period. In the worst affected *tehsil* (Kallam) cases instituted under the Indian Penal

Code rose immediately after the famine but since then have been declining. In the least-affected *tehsil* (Ahmedpur) there was a very slight drop in the number of cases instituted under the Indian Penal Code immediately after the famine but since then there has been a marked increase. Too much cannot be read out of these data both because of the crucial gap in the data for the year 1971 and because, as mentioned earlier, the enforcement of penal laws other than the Indian Penal Code has been subject to too many extraneous variables to be susceptible of any definitive analysis.

Tables 16 to *37* contain annual data for the entire district of Osmanabad regarding the number of criminal prosecutions initiated, the number of acquittals and the number of convictions — broken down by category of offence. *Tables 38* to *53* contain similar data broken down by offence categories but for the least affected *tehsil* (Ahmedpur) and the worst affected *tehsil* (Kallam). Several caveats must be noted regarding these data. The numbers involved (especially in the *tehsil* data) are too small to permit tests of statistical significance. The lack of data for 1971 constitutes an important lacuna. There are inherent perplexities in the categories used and some of the data presented in the court records. The category termed " crimes reported " probably does not represent what it purports to, and it seems likely that some filtering out of offences has taken place because the court records also have a category termed " investigated and returned as true ". The figures entered in both categories are virtually identical and therefore tend to lend credence to the assumption that the category reading " crimes reported " in fact represents only those reported offences for which after investigating, the police believe they have a *prima facie* case, and not *all* reported offences. The court records also indicate that many offences are committed by several offenders since the number of individuals prosecuted generally is higher than the number of crimes reported. The court records also show a large number of persons under the category termed " pending trial, including prior pending ". It is often unclear exactly how these individuals come to be listed on the court records under this category and what happens to them since the figures totalling acquittal and conviction still leave a large number of individuals " pending trial " who later seem to disappear from the records. One plausible explanation of this perplexity is that

probably a large proportion of individuals pending trial just never reach trial as a result of being discharged or having their offence compounded. Despite all the above limitations the data do provide interesting trends when broken down by category of offence.

Looking to the entire district of Osmanabad, the data do indicate a rather dramatic increase in 1971, 1972 and 1973 prosecutions for offences against public tranquillity (including group violence) but a rather inexplicable drop in 1974. It is also notable that in 1971 when the crisis was at its severest and also in 1973 when the effects of termination of the relief-work programme began to be felt, the conviction rate for prosecutions brought under this offence was also high. The data relating to offences against public health (including food adulteration) show a marked increase in 1970 (when food was beginning to get scarce), a decrease in 1971 (when food was at its scarcest, the crisis at its severest and arguendo reporting of violations at its lowest), an increase in 1972 and high figures from then to date. Food adulteration offences could also be prosecuted under the Food Adulteration Act and the data reveal a spate of prosecutions in 1968, 1970, 1973, and 1974 but virtually no use at all of this Act during 1971 and 1972 in the immediate post-famine period. The data also indicate that very few prosecutions were brought under other food control laws such as the Agricultural Marketing Act. Violations of the Weights and Measures Act were frequently prosecuted (with strong likelihood of conviction) in 1971, in the post-famine period and in 1974. Hoarding and black-marketeering violations could have been prosecuted under the Essential Commodities Act but very few violations were reported during the crisis years 1970 and 1971. In 1974, however, prosecutions under the Act peaked. Prosecutions under the Shops and Establishments Act reveal a curious two-year cyclical trend which may perhaps be explained partially by law enforcement manpower problems. Under this Act the investigating and prosecuting authorities are merged under a specialized law enforcement body. It may be possible that due to shortages of manpower, cases investigated one year come to court the next, tying up staff that year in prosecutorial rather than in investigative functions. The court data indicate that offences against life maintained a constant trend until an increase in 1974; the police data reveal however that homicides (as distinct from other offences against life) have increased

in the post-crisis period. So far as other crimes of violence are concerned the data indicate an increase in rape in 1970 and an increase in use of criminal force and assaults in 1971. Minor offences involving violence (causing hurt) do not appear to have fluctuated but wrongful restraint (the use of force to confine a person to a particular place, usually to enable the commission of some other offence) peaked in 1972. Crimes against property showed fluctuations in the post-crisis period. Thus for example thefts and robberies have risen sharply since 1970, and this is reflected both in the court data and the police data, which provide some interesting breakdowns as to kinds of thefts. Offences of criminal breach of trust rose in 1970 (the crisis year) as did offences of criminal misappropriation of property and of cheating. These categories of offences did drop in 1971 but have started rising again since 1972. The incidence of criminal trespass rose in 1970 and 1971 and then dropped sharply in 1972 (when the relief-work programme was at its height) and rose again in 1973. Prosecutions for the offences of criminal intimidation and insult rose in 1970, 1971 and 1972 and so did prosecutions for a variety of minor offences coming under the category of mischief.

The data on the *tehsils* of Ahmedpur and Kallam, broken down by category of offence, indicate fluctuations similar to those in the data for the entire district. The two *tehsils* have similar populations, and interview data suggest that even at the severest point of the crisis, migrations from Kallam were only for a limited duration. The data for these two *tehsils* indicated the virtually total lack of enforcement of statutes such as the Food Adulteration Act, the Agricultural Marketing Act, the Shops and Establishments Act, the Essential Commodities Act and the Weights and Measures Act. The data also indicate a sharp rise in offences against public tranquillity in Kallam but not in Ahmedpur during and after the crisis. So far as crimes of violence are concerned, the data relating to the offence of causing hurt indicate that from 1967 to 1970 when economic conditions in the two *tehsils* were similar, the incidence of the offence was also similar — but in the post-crisis period, while the incidence of the offence was increasing in Ahmedpur, it was decreasing in Kallam. The data relating to the offence of criminal intimidation are also very similar (though the numbers involved are too small to be attributed much significance) and the trend of

post-crisis increasing incidence of crime in Ahmedpur, and decreasing incidence of crime in Kallam is also visible with regard to offences of criminal trespass and theft — thus suggesting that the crisis may have had a social cohesion-inducing effect in the *tehsil* where the crisis was most acutely experienced, but that it may perhaps even have had a socially disruptive effect in the *tehsil* where the crisis was least acutely experienced.

The court and police data tend to confirm several of the societal perceptions that emerge from the interview data and suggest that:

i) there was a general breakdown of law and order at the start of the crisis with an increase in thefts, and both petty (causing hurt) and more serious crimes of frustration and violence such as criminal trespass;

ii) there was a decrease in certain categories of deviance during the period when the relief-work programme was at its most active;

iii) there was an increase in the incidence of a number of categories of offences in the post-relief work programme period, and 1974 represents a peaking of incidence both for several categories of offences as well as for the overall total of offences;

iv) there was little enforcement (through prosecution of violators) of the food and rationing control laws.

In one significant respect, however, the court and police data are at variance with the societal perceptions emerging from the interview data. While most villagers stressed that mass violence and group violence was virtually non-existent during the crisis, the court and police data show a distinct rise in offences against public tranquillity. Exaggerated perceptions as to the strength of social cohesion or misreporting out of a desire to conceal acts of group violence they were ashamed of, may explain the disparity. It is also conceivable that the outbreaks of group violence were handled swiftly and discreetly by law enforcement officials to guard against a possible spread of such violence, and that therefore villages not directly involved in such incidents of violence may not have had knowledge about them.

The data relating to the *tehsil* of Kallam suggest hypotheses about possible relationships between severe economic crises, social cohesion and social tolerance-levels of dissent.

SOCIAL INTERVENTION AND CONTROL MECHANISMS: THE OSMANABAD EXPERIENCE WITH THE CONTAINMENT OF DISTRESS AND THE AVOIDANCE OF CRISES

The Maharashtra State Government has attempted to draw upon its experience with the 1971 famine crisis and prepare an integrated scheme of measures to avert a recurrence. The scheme involves remedial measures, e.g., improving facilities for irrigation. But the State Government has also set up, as a preventive measure, machinery for anticipation and detection of potential breaking-point situations. Machinery has been set up, officials have been designated and powers delegated to undertake programmes of scarcity investigation and primary preparation. The investigative body will also draft relief work programmes and relief measures if it considers it necessary. The body, headed by the Collector of the District, is empowered to make a declaration of scarcity conditions and to launch schemes for procurement of crop and fodder.

Much emphasis is placed on the careful design of relief work programmes to ensure the usefulness of the project itself and also to ensure that the expertise of engineers and technicians will be available to such projects when necessary. The work projects will concentrate on road building, construction of dams, wells and other irrigation facilities and construction of educational and health facilities.

A recent publication of the Government claims that " at the slightest hint of crop failure the government machinery plunges into action and tries to keep things right. Therefore, there cannot be a famine. The word famine no longer exists ". (Translated from *Maharashtra Government Scarcity Relief,* [1972, Government Central Press Publication].)

The problem remains acute, however, in respect of the distribution system in times of normalcy. Control of the distribution may be perceived by politicians as a mechanism for manipulating electoral constituencies. The gap between promise and performance

seems ever-widening and government blueprints and programmes seem to have little impact on the alleviation of chronic distress conditions in the district.

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND SOCIAL DEFENCE: THE OSMANABAD EXPERIENCE

The Osmanabad experience has tended to confirm several of the Frascati hypotheses. Sharp economic crises are clearly related to certain categories of deviance. Crisis-related needs lead to individual and group responses which may violate penal law. Crisis relief efforts may generate opportunity-conditioned economic offences. Apart from relationships induced in the immediate crisis period, a time lag phenomenon may produce relationships in the post-crisis period between economic disruptions and deviance. Both the interview data and the court and police record data indicate a sharp rise in the incidence of crime in Osmanabad in 1974. The flow of referrals to deviance-oriented institutions rises steeply in periods of economic crisis as is evident from the court records and the " pending trial " figures. The District Judge of Osmanabad, when interviewed, presented a very graphic picture of overcrowding in prisons when he revealed that over 470 individuals were being held in the Osmanabad District prison — a facility that was equipped to hold 100 male and 12 female prisoners. Not surprisingly, the research team was denied access to the prisons. Both the District Judge and the District Superintendent of Police described how badly overextended the law enforcement machinery was. One of the reasons for the large number of individuals undergoing detention pending trial was that the police force could not spare individuals to provide the daily escort necessary to accompany prisoners from the district jail to courtroom ! Both judicial and law enforcement officials stressed the need to strengthen law enforcement resources.

Rationing and other food control law violations in Osmanabad had the effect of emasculating coping measures directed at the economic crisis. The economic crisis in Osmanabad tended to affect most severely the economically weakest sections of the community and tended to aggravate the social alienation of marginal social groups like the *Pardi* community. Interviews with villagers from the most

economically depressed areas of the district brought out very clearly their seething resentments, and one villager was sufficiently provoked by his sense of outrage at a newspaper story (dramatizing the breakdown of law and order in the district) read to him by the researchers to exclaim, " Starving people are unnecessarily blamed the same way that *harijans* are ". The failure of the Village Vigilance Committees is indicative of some of the limitations of lay participatory devices to cope with distributional problems, and non-enforcement of the food control laws (as contrasted with the enforcement of the prohibition laws) suggests some of the limitations of law enforcement through specialized agencies. The post-crisis experience in the most severely hit *tehsil* of Kallam serves to underscore the role of community-based social institutions in coping with deviance. The Osmanabad experience also does serve to draw attention to the policy implications of relief interventions by demonstrating the potentially criminogenic effects of the abrupt ending of a relief programme.

At a more general level the Osmanabad experience does serve to raise fundamental questions about deviance in developing societies. Economic development may, in varying contexts, result in a destabilizing of social relations, a disruption of social institutions, the decay of traditional social control mechanisms, inter-generational value conflicts as well as urban-rural value conflicts, any of which may have deviance correlates. Moreover, given the extreme inequalities of income and wealth distribution in most developing countries, crime and social defence may need to be placed within the broader compass of the political economy The Osmanabad experience is suggestive of the scope for crisis manipulation by the political machinery. The recognition of the crisis proportions of the Osmanabad scarcity came slowly in the face of government complaisance. Without press dramatization of the crisis it seems unlikely that government intervention would have been either swift or adequate. It took stories in the newspapers playing up both the suffering (" No fodder — cattle are eating stones and dying "; " With blood oozing, farmers toil for a loaf of bread ") and the imminence of total breakdown of law and order (" Thefts, assaults and robberies on the increase ", " If the situation is allowed to worsen further, one cannot guarantee that peasants won't become criminals ") to get resources allocated for a relief programme in Osmanabad. [An Addendum to this paper presents verbatim a newspaper report published recently relating to a fresh " crisis " brewing in another rural district in India.]

The Osmanabad experience also serves to highlight the social defence correlates of resource allocation and distribution. The refusal by goverment to revise a food procurement scheme that exacerbates rather than alleviates local problems, as well as the inability to seriously enforce rationing and food distribution norms can be understood in the context of the symbiotic relationships between political power and control over scarse resources.

A social defence perspective that is limited to concern over criminogenic or potentially criminogenic variables is essentially a perspective of self-imposed impotence so far as the developing countries are concerned. An examination of some of the major approaches to the sociological study of development and of the implications of these approaches for social defence research and social defence policy may perhaps offer fresh perspectives and insights on deviance in a developing country context. By way of illustration of such an approach it may be appropriate to sketch out briefly two models of development theory — the equilibrium model and the conflict model.

The equilibrium model assumes that social relations are essentially harmonious, that inequities are a part of life and that the state exists to minimize inequities. It develops models of how to change individual behaviour rather than institutions. Some individuals will change sooner than others and will consequently receive a greater share of short-run profits, but these new income streams are in principle accessible to all and the State must assure that this will occur over the long run. The key development problems for the equilibrium model are problems that involve individual behaviour. The empirical referents may be derived from a set of research questions suggested by this model to examine individual behaviour, and to develop models to change human behaviour:

a) What are the principal reference groups employed by a given individual from which he takes cues for his behaviour ?

b) To what extent does the individual feel relatively deprived in relation to his significant others ? What actions does he take to reduce his feeling of relative deprivation ?

c) How is deviance viewed by the significant others ?

d) What are the legally defined limits of deviation ? What are the socially acceptable norms of evasion that the individual may employ ?

e) What are the relationships between social values and innovative behaviour ? How is innovative behaviour rewarded or punished ?

f) What role do the major political institutions play in changing legally defined rewards and punishments ?

This behavioural equilibrium model is drawn from the works of T. Parson, *Structure and Process in Modern Society* (1960), J. Kunkel, *Society and Economic Growth* (1970), and G. Homans, *Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms* (1961). The formulation of the two models of development theory and of the research questions relevant to each theory are derived from E. Havens, *Methodological Issues in the Study of Development* (1974).

If one accepts the philosophical tenets of the equilibrium approach, then development issues may become reduced to technical solutions to the problem of increasing rates of growth.

The conflict model of development proceeds from an assumption that all units of social organization are continually changing unless some force intervenes to arrest change. Change is ubiquitous. Conflict is ubiquitous. Societies are held together not by consensus but by constraint, not by universal agreement but by the coercion of some by others. Societal conflict is a creative force. Conflict is the motor for reform which will restore for a time the individuals' political, civil and social rights when institutions are tending to fetter them. The research questions suggested by this model are:

a) For any given point of time, what different groups are in conflict and what are the different interests of these groups ?

b) What are the authority relations and dependency relations between these groups ?

c) How intense is the conflict; how violent is the conflict ?

d) What are the coercive forces attempting to contain the conflict ?

e) What are the organizational variables that are brought into play in the attempt to change dependency relations and, thus, power relations ?

This structuralist, non-marxist conflict model is drawn from the works of R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Societies* (1959). A marxist conflict model could be drawn from the works of A. Mafeje, *Sociology and Development* (1970) and T. Szentes, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (1971).

Social defence research may proceed from the perspectives of either theoretical models and the choice of model could considerably shape the policy implications of such research. To the farmer in Osmanabad, the most impelling question is perhaps how to change dependency and power relations. What role can social defence policy play to secure such change ? Can social defence institutions operate to enhance accountability of public officials, and if so what organizational variables are involved ?

From the perspective of the equilibrium model, what could social defence research offer in the Osmanabad context ? Can it help bring greater congruence between social and official perceptions of deviance or between socially acceptable and officially acceptable norms of evasion ?

Appendix to Part three

STATISTICAL DATA

TABLE 1: OSMANABAD DISTRICT

Serial No.	NAME	Population at census of		
		1951	1961	1971
1	Osmanabad	15,007	18,868	27,279
2	Kallam	5,802	7,297	10,216
3	Latur	35,374	40,913	70,156
4	Ahmedpur	7,143	7,976	11,738
5	Udgir	16,522	18,814	30,647
6	Nilanga	7,271	8,918	12,521
7	Ausa	7,796	10,007	13,477
8	Umerga	5,647	7,505	11,651
9	Tulzapur	7,813	8,935	12,373
10	Parenda	5,509	6,723	8,798
11	Bhum	4,562	5,475	7,836
	Total . . .	118,446	141,431	216,692

TABLE 2: CRIME FIGURES FOR THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS AND CURRENT YEAR UP TO 28-2-75

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 up to 28-2-75
1 Murder including culpable homicide	69	65	70	81	76	19
2 Dacoity	24	49	56	64	52	4
3 *A*) Highway Robbery	—	5	6	9	3	—
4 *B*) Other robbery	100	115	144	150	215	37
5 H.B.T. by day (House breaking + theft)	48	64	75	109	105	17
6 H.B.T. by night (House breaking + theft)	358	454	452	390	670	88
7 All thefts	787	1,004	1,045	1,267	1,924	279
A) Cycle thefts	30	21	33	57	67	16
B) Cattle theft	128	209	178	288	476	53
C) Theft - Pick-pocket	50	55	58	82	52	15
D) Theft - copper wire	2	6	2	3	7	1
E) Standing crop	75	30	92	34	94	35
F) Other theft U/S 379 IPC	425	537	525	625	981	137
G) Theft U/S 380 IPC	67	136	146	161	224	20
H) Theft by servant	10	10	11	17	23	2

TABLE 2: CRIME FIGURES FOR THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS AND CURRENT YEAR UP TO 28-2-75

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 up to 28-2-75
8 Receiving of stolen property	—	—	—	—	—	—
9 Riots	80	49	103	77	89	12
10 Hurts	222	253	209	181	227	51
11 Cheating	10	10	16	43	19	4
12 C.B. Trust	100	73	53	66	81	11
13 Mischief	101	84	94	66	69	14
14 Kidnapping	9	12	18	19	26	4
15 Other offences	328	343	401	385	475	109
Total class I to V	2,236	2,579	2,731	2,899	4,031	649
16 *I.P.C. Class VI*	—	—	—	—	13	2
17 Gambling Act	116	152	157	182	132	24
18 Prohibition Act	1,403	1,377	1,168	1,331	1,373	305
19 *Classification*						
A) Distillation	35	32	15	22	10	5
B) Transport	13	2	3	3	2	—
C) Sale	—	4	1	6	3	—
D) Possession	609	770	603	604	742	147
E) Consumption	430	485	378	537	481	106
F) Other offences	316	184	168	159	135	47

APPENDIX

TABLE 2: CRIME FIGURES FOR THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS AND CURRENT YEAR UP TO 28-2-75

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 up to 28-2-75
20 E.C. Act (Essential Commodities Act)	6	10	29	113	62	5
21 M.V. Act (Motor Vehicles Act) . .	—	—	—	—	3	—
22 Misc.	—	—	—	—	840	269
Total class VI . . .	1,723	1,810	1,652	2,073	2,323	605
Total No. of offences registered						
Class I to V	2,236	2,579	2,731	2,899	4,031	649
Class VI	1,723	1,810	1,652	2,073	2,323	605
Total . . .	3,959	4,389	4,383	4,972	6,354	1,254

TABLE 3

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: District of OSMANABAD

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	2,651	3,045	5,696
1968	2,795	4,268	7,063
1969	3,150	4,670	7,820
1970	3,401	4,181	7,582
1971	3,638	4,337	7,975
1972	3,575	4,063	7,638
1973	3,702	4,466	8,168
1974	4,100	5,488	9,588

Population in Census Years: 118,446 (1951)
141,431 (1961)
216,692 (1971)

I.P.C. = Indian Penal Code

Other penal statutes =

Indian Arms Act
Bombay Police Act
Bombay Prohibition Act
Bombay Gambling Act
Defence of India Act
Motor Vehicle Act
Untouchability (Offences) Act
Bombay Village Panchayat Act
Wireless Telegraphy Act
Prevention of Corruption Act
Essential Commodities Act
Bombay Municipality Act
Agricultural Marketing Act
Food Adulteration Act
Weights and Measures Act
Shops and Establishments Act

TABLE 4: CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS - APPELLATE COURTS

(TABLE 4-A)

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Appellate Court - LATUR *

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	85	0	85
1968	107	0	107
1969	88	0	88
1970	77	0	77
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	83	1	84
1973	100	0	100
1974	133	0	133

* With appellate jurisdiction over the *tehsils* of: Ausa, Umerga, Udgir, Ahmedpur, Nilanga and Latur.

(TABLE 4-B)

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Appellate Court - OSMANABAD *

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	—	—	—
1968	—	—	—
1969	86	1	87
1970	81	1	82
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	54	1	55
1973	42	0	42
1974	45	1	46

* With appellate jurisdiction over the *tehsils* of: Kallam, Tulzapur, Bhum, Parenda and Osmanabad. This Court was set up in 1969.

TABLES 5 TO 15: PROSECUTIONS INSTITUTED, PER TEHSIL

TABLE 5

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of AUSA

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	204	118	322
1968	199	179	378
1969	283	302	585
1970	263	231	494
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	325	138	463
1973	323	171	494
1974	336	190	526

Population in Census Years: 7,796 (1951)
10,007 (1961)
13,477 (1971)

TABLE 6

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of UMERGA

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	202	163	365
1968	198	183	381
1969	238	340	578
1970	345	356	701
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	271	653	924
1973	305	378	683
1974	388	486	874

Population in Census Years: 5,647 (1951)
7,505 (1961)
11,651 (1971)

TABLE 7

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of NILANGA

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	250	129	279
1968	293	132	425
1969	258	123	381
1970	298	193	491
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	372	205	577
1973	386	346	732
1974	369	299	668

Population in Census Years: 7,271 (1951)
8,918 (1961)
12,521 (1971)

TABLE 8

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of BHUM *

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	—	—	—
1968	—	—	—
1969	—	—	—
1970	139	101	240
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	218	50	268
1973	206	70	276
1974	222	80	302

* Court set up in 1970.

Population in Census Years: 4,562 (1951)
5,475 (1961)
7,836 (1971)

TABLE 9

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of OSMANABAD

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	276	618	894
1968	298	666	964
1969	376	748	1,124
1970	425	754	1,179
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	420	778	1,198
1973	480	1,013	1,493
1974	570	1,546	2,116

Population in Census Years: 15,007 (1951)
18,868 (1961)
27,279 (1971)

TABLE 10

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of KALLAM

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	211	214	425
1968	259	268	527
1969	249	293	542
1970	264	281	545
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	322	222	544
1973	307	211	518
1974	249	187	436

Population in Census Years: 5,802 (1951)
7,297 (1961)
10,216 (1971)

TABLE 11

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of TULZAPUR

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	142	103	245
1968	153	154	307
1969	217	373	590
1970	247	384	631
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	228	334	562
1973	245	214	459
1974	283	291	574

Population in Census Years: 7,813 (1951)
8,935 (1961)
12,373 (1971)

TABLE 12

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of UDGIR

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	465	271	736
1968	247	428	675
1969	280	439	719
1970	280	399	679
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	359	523	882
1973	348	353	701
1974	367	565	932

Population in Census Years: 16,522 (1951)
18,814 (1961)
30,647 (1971)

TABLE 13

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Thesil of AHMEDPUR

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	158	275	433
1968	193	189	382
1969	252	194	446
1970	244	235	479
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	237	174	411
1973	278	181	459
1974	380	233	613

Population in Census Years: 7,143 (1951)
7,976 (1961)
11,738 (1971)

TABLE 14

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of PARENDA

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	267	224	491
1968	359	345	704
1969	405	343	748
1970	333	186	519
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	245	111	356
1973	224	167	391
1974	248	69	317

Population in Census Years: 5,509 (1951)
6,723 (1961)
8,798 (1971)

TABLE 15

No. of Criminal Prosecutions Instituted: Tehsil of LATUR

YEAR	Under the I.P.C.	Under other penal statutes	Total
1967	391	930	1,321
1968	489	1,724	2,213
1969	418	1,514	1,932
1970	405	1,060	1,465
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	441	873	1,314
1973	458	1,362	1,820
1974	510	1,541	2,051

Population in Census Years: 35,374 (1951)
40,913 (1961)
70,156 (1971)

TABLES 16 TO 37: BREAKDOWN BY PRINCIPAL OFFENCES OSMANABAD DISTRICT

TABLE 16: OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	10	10	10	2	8
1968	5	6	16	0	4
1969	10	10	10	0	10
1970	3	3	3	3	1
1971	101	152	773	187	261
1972	104	140	897	360	178
1973	133	179	1,517	368	531
1974	1	2	4	0	2

TABLE 17: OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	16	31	29	7	16
1968	18	25	26	4	8
1969	23	29	30	2	12
1970	50	67	74	17	28
1971	35	61	66	16	31
1972	41	60	65	9	40
1973	33	48	49	10	16
1974	38	61	63	12	24

TABLE 18: OFFENCES AGAINST LIFE (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	85	110	286	43	58
1968	122	159	323	62	49
1969	120	150	315	104	40
1970	119	157	255	96	56
1971	133	177	266	114	56
1972	121	163	303	126	46
1973	156	216	346	144	51
1974	177	232	409	151	43

TABLE 19: OFFENCES CAUSING HURT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	487	886	2,186	1,436	127
1968	634	920	2,703	1,832	164
1969	759	962	3,263	2,106	208
1970	736	1,029	3,362	2,131	184
1971	786	1,126	3,622	2,452	175
1972	773	1,098	3,378	2,012	243
1973	754	1,088	3,487	2,153	184
1974	783	1,120	3,414	1,796	116

TABLE 20: WRONGFUL RESTRAINT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	34	45	153	100	3
1968	27	41	133	102	12
1969	37	44	134	95	1
1970	33	46	142	88	7
1971	32	48	164	86	2
1972	51	71	220	131	22
1973	40	70	182	114	16
1974	41	57	180	78	7

TABLE 21: CRIMINAL FORCE (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	43	63	141	51	14
1968	58	85	167	84	31
1969	59	78	138	74	19
1970	44	72	161	76	22
1971	61	90	208	123	15
1972	51	81	171	61	10
1973	101	143	283	112	19
1974	73	148	284	127	19

TABLE 22: RAPE (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	10	14	30	9	11
1968	6	11	17	6	3
1969	7	11	10	6	1
1970	14	15	18	6	1
1971	17	24	24	10	4
1972	12	19	19	14	4
1973	9	10	30	4	1
1974	14	22	31	24	3

TABLE 23: THEFT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	318	474	817	383	208
1968	368	547	1,055	528	344
1969	268	357	873	321	190
1970	349	474	1,035	477	194
1971	478	664	1,329	623	309
1972	550	745	1,504	600	324
1973	506	768	1,574	720	303
1974	733	989	1,897	540	386

TABLE 24: ROBBERY (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	58	78	328	132	36
1968	50	84	359	150	44
1969	48	61	235	105	35
1970	71	92	295	160	17
1971	94	131	414	223	37
1972	97	146	510	224	60
1973	128	178	613	217	49
1974	164	231	665	286	73

TABLE 25: CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	6	7	11	6	4
1968	2	2	3	1	0
1969	2	3	4	2	0
1970	15	15	20	5	4
1971	5	11	14	3	1
1972	12	17	34	10	7
1973	3	14	23	13	3
1974	8	13	14	4	2

TABLE 26: CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	43	67	88	18	26
1968	30	52	72	32	13
1969	69	82	95	15	36
1970	80	109	187	88	35
1971	58	97	141	66	33
1972	51	75	107	36	24
1973	73	105	126	44	39
1974	63	99	146	27	18

TABLE 27: CHEATING (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	16	22	43	26	3
1968	25	30	45	33	2
1969	12	14	37	30	2
1970	33	44	90	33	14
1971	23	42	114	77	9
1972	28	39	81	31	6
1973	40	58	119	53	8
1974	45	73	142	59	8

TABLE 28: MISCHIEF (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	57	87	274	148	11
1968	53	77	199	127	18
1969	57	72	200	113	14
1970	85	105	329	196	18
1971	75	105	411	277	33
1972	78	105	381	225	7
1973	82	125	377	204	27
1974	84	126	376	217	14

TABLE 29: CRIMINAL TRESPASS (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	224	315	1,019	584	40
1968	241	365	1,262	713	121
1969	173	266	939	594	57
1970	264	301	1,149	547	68
1971	306	454	1,631	933	122
1972	15	23	56	7	11
1973	240	363	1,111	586	94
1974	278	410	1,253	523	98

TABLE 30: CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION AND INSULT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	19	29	68	45	4
1968	61	77	206	110	5
1969	77	102	247	152	25
1970	109	131	192	63	94
1971	155	172	389	171	81
1972	127	168	349	182	89
1973	92	119	260	144	64
1974	94	115	252	153	41

TABLE 31: BOMBAY PROHIBITION ACT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	422	587	724	196	282
1968	676	904	1,159	216	394
1969	642	895	1,097	311	513
1970	1,180	1,446	1,731	284	873
1971	1,099	1,508	1,844	395	898
1972	979	1,483	1,807	327	898
1973	1,200	1,583	1,148	292	978
1974	1,065	1,557	1,761	222	8

1975 - 610 pending

TABLE 32: SHOPS AND ESTABLISHMENTS ACT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	53	62	69	1	54
1968	640	650	702	102	469
1969	16	19	26	1	20
1970	108	180	202	12	128
1971	0	0	0	0	0
1972	146	169	173	23	141
1973	22	30	35	2	31
1974	116	117	120	2	83

TABLE 33: ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	46	47	63	24	20
1968	31	45	73	31	21
1969	27	35	81	22	42
1970	14	19	58	10	12
1971	2	12	40	13	24
1972	27	28	42	2	23
1973	57	67	130	33	32
1974	106	140	174	49	18

TABLE 34: FOOD ADULTERATION ACT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	0	0	0	0	0
1968	62	62	62	0	31
1969	4	4	4	0	2
1970	31	51	54	17	8
1971	1	23	30	25	5
1972	2	2	2	1	1
1973	35	35	57	2	6
1974	60	89	136	16	32

TABLE 35: WEIGHTS AND MEASURES ACT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	32	33	42	2	38
1968	6	8	10	1	9
1969	0	0	0	0	0
1970	3	3	3	1	2
1971	32	32	34	0	30
1972	8	12	12	1	8
1973	3	6	8	0	5
1974	72	74	87	3	40

TABLE 36: BOMBAY MUNICIPALITY ACT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	10	11	11	2	4
1968	16	21	21	3	12
1969	20	20	20	7	11
1970	10	18	23	16	6
1971	22	25	38	0	1
1972	24	48	60	3	44
1973	78	91	93	19	64
1974	9	17	20	5	9

TABLE 37: AGRICULTURAL MARKETING ACT (District)

YEAR	Crimes reported	Number of individuals prosecuted	Individuals pending trial	Individuals acquitted	Individuals convicted
1967	0	0	0	0	0
1968	0	0	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0
1970	1	1	1	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0	0
1972	6	6	6	0	6
1973	6	6	6	0	0
1974	0	0	6	0	6

TABLES 38 TO 53: BREAKDOWN PER OFFENCE, FOR TWO TEHSILS

TABLE 38: OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1968	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1969	0	8	0	8	0	8	0	0	0	0
1970	1	14	1	15	2	71	0	0	2	19
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	0	10	0	14	0	92	0	53	0	14
1973	0	17	0	20	0	381	0	20	0	339
1974	8	10	10	14	75	54	0	25	6	24

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)
Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 39: OFFENCES AGAINST LIFE (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	8	8	8	10	25	8	0	0	1	4
1968	6	6	8	10	19	5	2	4	0	1
1969	8	0	10	0	19	0	9	0	0	0
1970	12	4	15	6	20	15	7	1	3	1
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	12	6	14	7	10	17	2	0	1	1
1973	6	4	11	9	6	17	2	3	2	0
1974	12	5	14	9	19	19	0	1	0	1

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)
Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 40: OFFENCES CAUSING HURT (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	39	41	49	54	146	148	114	80	4	9
1968	60	63	70	84	238	255	106	193	10	16
1969	71	80	103	93	315	347	216	230	18	44
1970	68	65	93	87	312	300	215	147	16	10
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	64	72	93	96	228	273	168	138	7	35
1973	60	48	99	81	289	230	154	197	19	10
1974	81	48	123	60	346	175	102	147	13	0

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 41: CRIMINAL FORCE/ASSAULT (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	3	4	4	6	5	9	1	7	1	0
1968	4	11	6	13	12	26	3	13	2	2
1969	5	7	8	11	24	28	23	9	1	6
1970	3	3	3	7	9	8	1	6	1	1
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	3	1	6	5	13	7	13	6	0	0
1973	6	13	8	14	11	26	1	5	1	0
1974	12	5	18	15	37	30	6	23	0	1

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

APPENDIX

TABLE 42: RAPE (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	0	0	0	0	2	0	5	0	0	0
1968	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
1969	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
1970	1	2	2	2	1	2	0	1	0	0
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	0	2	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0
1973	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
1974	2	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 43: THEFT (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	30	36	39	51	77	115	31	62	14	30
1968	27	44	38	57	96	94	36	35	24	42
1969	25	50	38	57	104	127	18	52	9	26
1970	18	53	29	59	42	143	24	58	10	23
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	47	61	58	85	88	157	30	63	21	34
1973	41	59	63	91	114	156	39	62	35	38
1974	68	42	88	66	196	128	22	60	16	30

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 44: ROBBERY (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	11	6	12	7	59	8	4	2	1	4
1968	2	5	4	6	22	13	14	3	4	1
1969	2	6	3	7	4	19	2	10	0	7
1970	7	3	8	5	18	10	6	8	0	0
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	7	7	11	14	25	46	8	11	2	10
1973	10	10	13	13	77	28	17	28	2	0
1974	13	8	20	10	51	21	2	17	0	2

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 45: CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1968	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1970	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	0	1	0	2	0	4	0	3	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
1974	1	7	3	8	7	11	0	3	1	5

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 46: CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	1	6	2	8	2	12	0	7	1	3
1968	3	2	3	4	4	5	3	0	1	2
1969	7	3	7	5	10	3	0	2	0	1
1970	14	2	20	3	24	3	7	2	7	1
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	4	7	7	11	5	13	1	3	4	1
1973	2	4	2	11	7	17	0	5	1	0
1974	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 47: CRIMINAL TRESPASS (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	13	37	17	45	75	134	49	63	6	5
1968	11	21	15	42	63	125	31	90	8	17
1969	28	9	32	18	130	51	61	47	4	4
1970	15	28	30	28	111	80	64	37	21	9
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	8	30	15	49	46	119	22	53	6	42
1973	16	24	23	33	66	69	34	35	5	10
1974	36	23	45	34	115	82	28	34	10	16

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 48: CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	0	1	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0
1968	3	3	3	14	13	9	0	0	0	0
1969	3	11	6	13	18	49	15	43	0	0
1970	3	7	4	9	6	21	3	4	3	0
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	1	3	1	4	1	7	0	5	1	1
1973	4	0	4	0	8	1	3	0	2	1
1974	3	0	4	0	9	0	3	0	0	0

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 49: ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	0	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0
1968	0	3	0	4	0	11	0	8	0	3
1969	0	3	0	3	16	13	16	3	0	6
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	2	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 50: FOOD ADULTERATION ACT (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1968	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
1973	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1974	1	6	2	6	3	7	0	4	0	2

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 51: WEIGHTS AND MEASURES (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	10	0	10	0	10	0	0	0	10	0
1968	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1973	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
1974	13	0	13	0	13	0	2	0	0	0

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 52: AGRICULTURAL MARKETING ACT (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1968	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1970	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	6	0	6	0	6	0	0	0	6	0
1973	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

TABLE 53: SHOPS AND ESTABLISHMENTS ACT (2 Tehsils)

YEAR	Reported		Prosecuted		Pending		Acquitted		Convicted	
	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K	A	K
1967	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1968	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

A = Ahmedpur (Least affected by crisis)
K = Kallam (Most affected by crisis)

Note: Data for 1971 have not been kept, and are therefore missing.

Famine-stricken Offenders Prosecuted By The Police

From Our Correspondent

RAIPUR: Twenty-two farmers and labourers of the famine-stricken Kardul village in Raipur District who were prosecuted by the police have been let off by the court.

The police had prosecuted the 22 cultivators and labourers on the charge of committing crimmal trespass and dacoity of paddy in the premises of Mrs. Mastan Bai, a widow.

These cultivators and farmers had earlier tried to get paddy from all possible sources and later approached Mrs. Mastan Bai to give them some paddy. Her curt replies had irritated the starving farmers who were completely exhausted.

Mr. A. H. H. Abidi, Second Additional Sessions Judge of Raipur, before whom these accused were presented found 18 of them not guilty and only four guilty. The Judge however extended the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act of M.P.

The judge admonished and released the four persons and observed: "After hearing the accused, I am of the view that this is a fit case in which the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act be applied. From the record it is clear that the villagers including the accused were hit by the worst type of famine, which they found difficult to combat with their meagre means. They convened a village panchayat in order to get some redress at the hands of the affluent cultivators but met with disappointment."

Mr. Abidi further observed that there was no criminal intent in the real sense of the term and the farmers were not habitual criminals but "had to turn so by force of circumstances." He also ordered the return of the paddy and rice seized from them by the police and said, "These facts lead me to take a sympathetic view and I feel that they deserve the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act."

The police have taken many such cases to the courts. An M.L.A. who visited some of the jails told CURRENT that he had seen hundreds of undertrials who were prosecuted by the police for "picking up" half a kilo of paddy in desperation. In several villages, paddy has been "borrowed" thus, but with an undertaking to return it next year.

Inadequate relief works

On the one hand the State Government has failed to provide adequate relief work and supply foodgrains to the starving people and on the other it has directed its officials to maintain law and order with a firm hand.

The officials in their enthusiasm to cover up the grave famine conditions, are prosecuting the offenders under sections punishable with a life sentence.

Frascati and Rome Workshops

(15-17 June 1974; 20-22 November 1975)

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