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# POLICE HIGH IMPACT PROGRAM



Prepared by:

THE PLANNING & RESEARCH DIVISION PORTLAND BUREAU OF POLICE AUGUST 1972 Under the direction of:

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CITY OF PORTLAND OREGON TE VE AT



TERRY D. SCHRUNK, MAYOR BUREAU OF POLICE

The Honorable Terry D. Schrunk Mayor of the City of Portland Portland, Oregon

Dear Sir:

Contained herein is a description of the Police Bureau program for the reduction of stranger-to-stranger street crimes and burglary in compliance with the guidelines of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for Impact Cities.

I believe that the project, as advocated, will have an immediate and salutary effect on the incidence of crime in this community. Moreover, Police Bureau operations may be materially altered and improved for many years hence, once the programs are instituted.

Very truly yours,

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Donald I. McNamara Chief of Police NCURS

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#### I. THE PROBLEM AND JUSTIFICATIONS

The scope and nature of stranger-to-stranger street crime and burglary in the Portland area has been addressed in other papers.\* The problem confronting local law enforcement agencies is the means to reverse these trends, in concert with other community organizations.

There are five basic means to achieve improvements within a police department:

- (1) personnel additions,
- (2) improved recruitment methods and standards,
- (3) additional and higher quality training,
- (4) alteration of basic operations, and
- (5) improved equipment.

Adding large numbers of police personnel with program funding is ill-advised for two reasons: by the time training and experience prepares the newly appointed officer to assume his role as a qualified policeman, the three-year Impact Program will have terminated, and it is unrealistic to hire and train a considerable number of officers when local funds could not support their retention without federal aid.

Current police recruitment standards in the Portland Metropolitan area are among the highest in the nation, and additional prerequisite qualifications would seriously narrow the recruitment base and impair the hiring of officers from many segments of the community.

Training is an excellent means to improve

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efficiency, but an extensive training program aims for long range results while accepting a short-term reduction in operational capabilities, an approach ill-suited to a three year program which hopes to achieve immediate and dramatic results.

Alteration of basic police operations, if scrupulously planned, intelligently executed, and carefully evaluated, has good potential. Impact funding provides an unprecedented opportunity to field test new theories and approaches without impairing the current level of law enforcement.

Finally, there remains improved equipment as a means of upgrading Portland Police Bureau efficiency. It is contended that hardware acquisition is a major method of producing telling results in the reduction of stranger-to-stranger street crimes and burglaries.

The reasons are these:

- (1) Current and routine Police Bureau operations over-extends equipmental resources. For many years this agency has been "equipment poor". Last year, (1971) 92.8% of the police budget was for personnel cost, while only 1.4% was devoted to equipment purchase. For decades, Portland has been confronted with the same problem. The Bureau has some of the best quality police personnel available. What is needed is better tools to better do the task at hand.
- (2) The intention is to propose the formation of a special mission force that will act as an adjunct to what MUST be improved routine operations against the robber, the burglar, the assaulter, and the rapist, if the goals are to be realized. However, the current level of operations has insufficient equipmental support. It is illogical to

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field additional special mission forces which must, by their nature, draw on existing hardware resources.

Thus, altering basic police operations and acquiring improved equipment to support these operations is considered the methodology having the greatest promise of success.

The equipment portion of this program, particularly communications and related equipment, is inextricably involved with the Bureau's ability, as a police agency and as a formulator of a police task force, to cope with target crime.

In considering the formulation of a task force, the Bureau was confronted with a major problem.

Superimposed Police Functions. It is essential that any special mission effort be supportive of, and supported by, the routine operations of the Bureau. Too many other municipalities have had the unfortunate experience of having the police effort and morale, plus public support of law enforcement, seriously impaired by the imposition of a "select" and autonomous task force on the normal departmental structure.

This is true for several reasons. The task, or Strike, force members seem to acquire an inflated idea of their role in the total law enforcement effort (and the "supercop" syndrome is born).

When the Strike Force "cleans up" an area, it is with little regard for the residual effects their enthusiastic actions will have on the citizens in the target area. The officers who engage in the day-to-day frustrations of providing police service to their district, must suffer the ill will generated by the "outsiders".

These regular officers, their supervisors, and commanders bitterly resent the Strike Force temporarily usurping their responsibility to provide law enforcement to the citizens in their area. The result is a counterproductive and fragmented effort characterized by a willful lack of cooperation, a lowering of morale in all quarters, and a quality of performance which is far less than the potential of the sum of its parts.

It is therefore advocated that the Impact Task Force in Portland be an integral part of the Police Bureau structure, and that, insofar as practical, the program include regular officers working on an overtime basis. This will minimize the friction between special mission and regular duty operations, in that the same personnel will be engaged in both areas.

The use of overtime officers Overtime Personnel. involves several additional considerations. Police administrators estimate that it requires three to five years of academy training and experience before the average man becomes fully functional as a police officer. During Portland's 18 month probationary period, the new officer is primarily a student, either in a classroom environment or under the direct tutelage of an officer coach. In an agency (such as Portland and Multnomah County) which primarily operates one-man patrols, the new officer cannot function independently until he has reached an acceptable level of proficiency. Thus, by the time he can either assume the role of strike force member or regular district officer, the Impact Program will have terminated.

It is true that the wage for overtime personnel is half again as costly as for a full-time employee. However, there is a 23% savings in "fringe benefits". There is also a savings of \$9,860 which is the cost of recruiting, training, and coaching each additional officer.

The major advantage in the use of overtime personnel is the "cross pollination" between regular and Strike Force operations. Because Strike Force personnel will, in large measure, be drawn from officers who regularly work in the target area, they will bring their acquaintance with persons and places, their knowledge of the

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contemporary crime situation, and their feel for what is normal and what is abnormal or suspicious in the subject locale to their extra duty assignment. Conversely, when Strike Force officers return to their regular assignment, it will be with a heightened concern and awareness of the target crimes which will favorably affect their actions during the course of their normal duties.

The fatigue factor is a potential problem in employing overtime personnel for Strike Force duty. Any personnel detailed for Strike Force duty will be selected by the commanding officers for whom they work during regular duty (as described in the Activities and Methods Section). It is anticipated that individual job performance will be carefully monitored to avoid total duty hours in excess of the officer's optimum capabilities.

Another potential problem in utilizing officers on an overtime basis is maintaining a continuity of operation. This is particulary vital when confronted by organized burglary and street crime.

There will be two means of providing continuity. First, regular district officers may be assigned full-time to Strike Force teams when called for by ongoing operations. Their districts will be manned by fellow precinct officers funded to work overtime on their days off or vacation. Second, certain specialist positions will be increased. The budget request allows for six additional Detectives, three Communications officers, two identification personnel, and two intelligence unit officers.

The Detective positions will be utilized to handle the increased and more intensive investigation of target crimes as well as to provide a core of expertise on which interdiction of fencing operations, criminal information gathering activity, and other investigation-oriented Task Force operations can be based.

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The remaining additional, full-time specialists will also provide continuity, but will be mainly required to expand the capabilities of smaller divisions to accommodate the additional load generated by Impact Programs and programrelated equipment.

It has been stated that the Impact Task Force must be an integral part of the Police Bureau structure, rather than an autonomous unit outside normal command channels. The present Bureau organization, however, creates a problem in this regard.

Required Bureau Reorganization. The Portland Police Bureau is divided into three major units (branches): Uniform, Investigation, and Services, each commanded by a Deputy Chief. In terms of activity, the current organization lacks logic. The line operational units, which include the Uniform Precincts, the Traffic and Harbor Divisions, the Detective Division, the Special Investigations Division (vice and narcotics), and the youth-oriented activities (the Women's Protective and Juvenile Divisions) are separated between two major commands. (See Diagram IA.)

On the other hand, the administrative and management services such as Planning and Research, Personnel, Training, and accounting (the Chief Clerk) are combined with technical support activities such as Communications, Records, and scientific investigation under one command.

The primary reason for the allocation of units to the current branches is obviously not by activity; it is to provide a manageable span of control. If line operations are converted to one command, over 70% of the sworn personnel of the Bureau, and all of the basic police functions, will be the responsibility of one Deputy Chief; a burden that would not permit close leadership and guidance by him to his subordinate units.

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This problem is further magnified by the present role of each Deputy Chief, who serves as both commander of the units in his charge and staff advisor in his area of responsibility to the Chief of Police.

Therefore, although the desirability of a combined operations Branch has been generally recognized for a number of years, it has also been conceded that the Bureau could not afford the magnitude of staff assistance required by a theoretical Deputy Chief of Operations.

With the Impact Program, reorganization becomes both possible and essential. The Strike Force concept utilizes various line operations officers in teams specifically designed to meet an identified problem. A team may be comprised of several Patrolmen, one or two Detectives or SID personnel, and a Policewoman, all supervised by a Sergeant who may be either from Uniform or Invéstigations, depending on the nature of the team composition. Such a team, under the current organization, would include personnel from two branches, although all are line operations officers.

The alternatives in providing for unity of command are to impose a created Task Force headquarters outside of the normal police structure (which is unacceptable) or to reorganize the Bureau into functional units. It is the latter option that is advocated as part of the Impact Program.

The reorganization will entail the division of activity into three Branches: Operations, Administration, and Technical Services. The Operations Branch will be provided with a strong and balanced staff which will enhance the Deputy Chief's control of routine and Impact Program line operations.

The time required for the in-depth planning of a major reorganization, as opposed to the necessity of implementing the Impact Program at the earliest possible date, is another problem that must be resolved.

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A Planning assignment of this magnitude and with these time constraints cannot be assumed by the Bureau of Police Planning and Research Division without detrimentally affecting their normal planning commitments to a serious degree.

A special planning group will be created to identify activities and lines of communication, to conduct surveys among other agencies, to formulate recommendations, to receive staff suggestions and concurrences, to rewrite procedures and policies, to recommend Administrative Code revisions, and to assist in the required in-service training. At the same time, this group will be working toward the early fielding of Task Force/Strike Force activity.

Once the planning phase is completed, the same group will be converted to serve as the staff of the Deputy Chief of Operations. (See the Activities and Methods Section for a detailed description of the methodology.)

The effective deployment of patrol units and Strike Force teams under the newly organized Operations Branch is dependent on information concerning target crime occurrence. Two means to provide this information are advocated: a Crime Occurrence Information Program (computer file) and a Criminal Information Gathering Activity (undercover).

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The Crime Occurrence Information Program. The Police Bureau, as a user agency of the City-County Data Processing Authority, does not have the capability of retrieving crime information in a form that is usable for establishing current trends, setting priorities for Strike Force teams, or assessing the effectiveness of their operations.

Current summary information is both untimely and of questionable accuracy. Depending on the time of the month that a given crime is committed, computerized information concerning the offense is received from two to six weeks later. This is primarily due to a time-consuming coding system, batch processing, and a badly outmoded computer program. The Columbia Region Information Sharing System (CRISS) has scheduled a program which includes a crime occurrence file. There is no systems design for this program, although a standardized method of gathering statistical data within the geographic area served by CRISS is being implemented and will serve as an important data base.

Victim-oriented information was not included in the general concept of the CRISS Program. Victimization studies are an integral part of many phases of the Impact Program, with particular reference to crime prevention. This type of data will also materially aid Strike Force planning and evaluation. The Impact proposal for expansion and acceleration of CRISS includes provisions for this information.

Another problem confronting the Data Processing Authority is the lack of core storage to accommodate any program acceleration of CRISS. Equipment utilization is based on a long run scheduling with limited excess capacity. Without additional core storage, the ability to receive timely, usable crime information will not come to realization. Provisions are made in the proposal for an additional core storage unit.

Strike Force effectiveness will depend on the ability to recognize crime occurrence within specific areas. Data Processing does not have the computerized mathematical tools that can aid Strike Force planning. Under their current and projected programs, data is selected and put into summarized form. —The manual analysis and testing of this information will serve to reduce response time on the part of Strike Force planners. The tools necessary to perform basic statistical analysis on data is provided for within this proposal.

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Without the crime occurrence file, a long and laborious process of information gathering and analysis is the alternative. Under such a hand tally system, basic summarization becomes a monumental task.

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The Criminal Information Gathering Activity. The second information mode is the Criminal Information Gathering Activity which will provide the Bureau with an expanded capability to intrude police intelligence operations into the activities of the professional criminal.

The fruits of burglaries and robberies must be converted to more portable, concealable, and negotiable mediums, usually money or narcotics. The center for this exchange is generally the fence. The fencing operation may range from a large scale endeavor fronted by a legitimate business to a person-to-person contact on the street, in a bar, or in a private residence. A Justice Department booklet describing activities of organized crime, indicates that stolen property often finds its way into seemingly legitimate retail outlets for sale to an unwitting public.

Frequently, the object of muggings, purse snatchers, and theft from the person are identification credentials and credit cards. There is widespread trafficking in these items. The current street price of a stolen credit card is \$5.00 without backup identification papers. A full set of accompanying I.D. raises the card's value. Because of prosecution problems, (establishing proof of guilt of knowledge and concealing), bringing the holders of stolen credit cards to trial is difficult.

Once stolen property has left the possession of the thief or wholesaler (fence), it is problematical if the items will ever be recovered for evidentiary purposes or for return to the victim, because of the infinite number of possibilities for disposal.

This is a partial explanation for the 10% recovery experience of this Bureau for property taken during the commission of target crimes. This property normally takes the form of electrical appliances, firearms, cameras, jewelry, and clothing in the instance of burglary, while street crime losses primarily involve currency. There is no hard data on the intrinsic loss incurred from stolen credit cards, but it is believed that the return on the \$5.00 purchase price of this item is many times the original investment. As a point of interest, the Congressional hearings recently held regarding organized crime, uncovered the fact that Eastern organized rings have heavy dealings in stolen credit cards and personal identification.

Because of the difficulties in bringing justice to the "middle man" in target crimes, Criminal Information Gathering Activities will give particular emphasis to this area of operation. The fence is more than a passive agent; his availability not only assures a profit for burglars and robbers, but also encourages their criminal activity by reducing the hazards of stolen property disposal.

<u>Communications Systems</u>. Communications is the element most profoundly affected by the increased level of activity generated through Impact funding. There are two basic reasons: communications directly supports virtually all police line operations (which in turn carries the burden in attacking target crime) and communications is a function that lacks the capability to perform the current mission, with Impact Programs creating an activity level potential far beyond saturation. (See the Portland High Impact Plan).

Specifically, the increased communications demands are engendered by the following activities:

(A) the Assistant Chief of Operations and staff(B) the Strike Force

- (1) Uniform street units
- (2) Plainclothes units
- (3) Surveillance units
- (4) Scientific investigation units
- (C) Criminal Information Projects
  - (1) Informant system

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(2). Crime statistics computer program

In the formulation of a communications expansion plan, two confounding problems arose, both of which have been addressed and apparently resolved. The first problem was one of interfacing three facets:

- (1) The need for acquisition of equipment that would be usable with presently employed radio frequencies, and yet compatible with any future systems evolved.
- (2) The need to bring equipment necessary to increase overall efficiency and operate Strike Force teams to a user-ready status in a minimum amount of time.
- (3) The need to arrange for an orderly "inception" to operations continuum that, increases rather than <u>decreases</u> the hazards of already overloaded communications capability.

The second problem involves the necessity of any communications upgrading to be correlated and noninterfering with recommendations that might be forthcoming in October of 1972 as a result of a study by Public Safety Systems Incorporated (PSSI).

Toward solving the first stated problem, the PSSI staff was requested to offer an early opinion on future police radio frequency usage. Mr. Harvey Ryland, Project Director, recommends that the present frequency be employed in any future systems design. Thus, all initial equipment acquisitions will be compatible with both present and future systems.

The area of the second problem is addressed by programming the plan into three phases. The first phase of communications upgrading will be timed so that final PSSI recommendations would be published prior to any engineering design or implementation of this plan, yet items of hardware will be purchased for early usage by the entire agency and will be compatible with any possible future systems configuration. In keeping with PSSI's advice, all equipment is designated in the presently used frequency range. (Funding requests and phase implementation are illustrated in Diagram IIIC which is found in the Activities and Methods Section). Phase I will enable the early fielding of the Strike Force portion of the Police program. With the completion of the PSSI study, a second funding request will be submitted for systems engineering.

With design completion and bids return, the total systems cost will be ascertained. It is anticipated that implementation will be staged over the coming few years, but funding will be requested from LEAA and Impact Funds for the initial purchases and installations. It is also anticipated that the Police Bureau will request a total of \$2,000,000 in LEAA and Impact monies in funding requests Phases I through III.

As mentioned, each element of the Strike Force program will be an additional burden to the four basic components of the police telecommunications system. What follows is a detailing of related functional problems in each of these components:

> Telephone System. There are now 28 trunk lines coming into the Police Bureau. None of these are "non-pub" numbers to permit free lines for outgoing emergency calls.

Budget limitations have prevented equipment rental that would establish "call-in/busy signal" rate, but empirically, the ratio is believed to be quite high. PSSI has followed a standard of maximim access delay of 1/1000. Several other functional requirements have been detailed in the PSSI study that will not be discussed here, but will be part of a later submission after October 1972.

The telephone portion of the system is alluded to because it is the first link that will be effected by Impact Program activities. Each and every element of the project will add load. The addition of staff and activities will incur even more severe demands. For example, any crime prevention and public information project will carry on programs that seek citizen involvement in prevention. Their requests will result in more frequent telephone contact with the Bureau, i.e. calling in when noticing suspicious persons or circumstances, participating in block programs, and property identification activities.

Another project will also require extended telephone capabilities. The informant system demands secure and non-published telephone numbers, so that safe contact can be made.

This surge of telephone usage will be carried through to the radio portion of the communications configuration.

The basic operational configuration Radio. of the Portland Police Bureau's radio system utilizes four channels: F-1, F-2, F-3 (surveillance channel), and F-4 (Harbor Division and intrusion alarms). Channels F-1 and F-2 are duplex and operate on a limited repeater system that allows mobile unit to mobile unit transmissions, mobile unit to base, and vice versa. Channel F-3 is simplex and not on relay. It has only limited mobile-to-mobile and mobile-to-base reception. Channel F-4 is likewise simplex and nonrepeating. In addition, there are a small number of portable units for personal use. Experience has demonstrated that these are highly desirable and useful adjuncts to the system. Deficiencies and problems that reduce the capability to perform are, in part:

> Channel Loading. During peak hours, channel usage reaches the 90% level. A maximum peak hour saturation level of 45% is a recognized standard. APCO has established an access delay standard of a 5 second (during busy hours) maximum. Our delay averages minutes.

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Delays of the order indicated discourage officers from performing duties that are essential to line operations i.e. record checks for wanted persons, serial number checks for stolen property, etc. Beyond this, mobile units are isolated. They cannot reach the base station to summon help or service assistance, nor can they be reached for rapid dispatch to crime scenes. Strike Force activities will add to overloading. Additional personnel will be engaged in activities leading to increased airtime usage; i.e., surveillance, preventive and concentrated patrol, and command and coordination messages. This loading is an effective barrier to combating subject crimes.

101,403 allofon assistance a 1971. Radio Propagation Coverage. There are numerous areas in the City from which mobile units cannot communicate to the base station, and a few areas where base cannot reach the mobile units. Again, this isolates these units. Besides reducing efficiency, this deficiency endangers officers (the Police Bureau has a standard procedure of utilizing single-man mobile units).

ALTHOUGH NO DIRECT CORRELATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, it is a fact that the areas of poor signal propagation occur in most of the high crime districts of the City. These are the very areas where the proposed Strike Force would be concentrating initial efforts.

The use of personal portable communication units (handie-talkie radios) compounds the propagation problem. Equipping all patrol and traffic forces with these units is highly desirable,\* and one objective of funding request. The low power generated by those units (1.5W to 5W) demands excellent propagation patterns to ensure operating capability in 98% of the City. The limited use of these units by the Police Bureau (23 sets) has demonstrated both the popularity the use of the sets has with the uniformed officers, plus the discussed problems, i.e. propagation, loading, etc.

Another item in limited use that has shown excellent results is the radio (silent) intrusion alarm. Although mainly used as a device for detection and apprehension of burglars, these also have application of similar use in combating robberies. The Police Bureau employs 44 of these alarms. Fully half of them are of an antiquated tube type which is of limited value (due to placement problems). Even with the small number of alarms available\*, 33 burglars were apprehended in the act in 1970 as the result of alarm's use. Eighty nine cases were cleared as a result of these arrests. Statistics show that the value of alarms extend far beyond just the capture rate. Conviction and guilty plea rates are substantially increased with "in-theact" arrest. Officers' court time is thus dramatically reduced.

- \*(1) Many studies have shown the desirability of the operational use of this equipment. Literature reports indicate that in every case in which uniformed officers employ such equipment, response time to calls is reduced, officers' personal safety is enhanced, work activity is increased, and over-all efficiency rises.
  - (2) Of the 44 alarms available, two are maintained as emergency standby units, one is generally in for repair, and two used for routine maintenance. Five units are assigned to Oregon State Liquor stores as holdup alarms. 34 units are generally in a field at a given time.

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Several of the 1970 arrests could have been accomplished through the use of officers on surveillance. Many man-hours surely would have been expended in this activity, if it were not for the alarm.

The efficiency of the alarm system is also dependent upon radio signal propagation patterns. Again, this problem exists in the very areas where alarms are most needed. The system must be improved if alarming is to be effective.

The use of radio alarms does have a point of diminishing return. It is estimated that the time to process potential alarm users and to install alarms is approximately three hours. In addition to this resource allocation, the false alarm rate, when applied to residence installation, demands that alarm targets be carefully considered.

There is also a security problem. Every measure must be taken to prevent these units from falling into the hands of the very persons against whom they are directed. It is the concurrence of Bureau personnel that saturation installation of large numbers of alarms is ill advised. The strategic placement of a relatively small number of alarms is the desirable alternative.

Personal Portable. The use of these portables was mentioned in the previous paragraphs when discussing attendant propagation problems. Because of the limited number and quantity of portable units, virtually every officer on the street is tied to his vehicle. The officer is not free to check premises for security, meet the business people on his district, become familiar with the citizens, inspect potential trouble spots, or even go to lunch without absenting himself from call. He cannot be coordinated and supervised during larger scale tactical operations.

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Response Time. In 1971 the average response time for subject crimes was 11 minutes. No data is available for response time for crime-in-progress or similar "hot" calls, but it is generally conceded that this time was excessive. APCO and the President's Crime Commission reports (1968) both indicate that a 2-minute response time is desirable. Response time is an important factor in combating burglary and stranger-tostranger street crimes. Data shows that response time and apprehension rate are inexorably correlated. Over 45% of the arrests (subject crimes) in 1971 were made at the scene within one hour of the commission of the crime. Where response time is decreased by one-third, arrest rate also goes up by one-third. At the same time, the conviction rate increases, guilty pleas (with attendant reduction in court overload) go up, and police overtime is reduced.

Viewing the importance of response time from another standpoint, 59% of all burglars arrested are juveniles. They generally commit these crimes within ten blocks of their homes. Before these young people can be deterred from a future pattern of criminality, they must be identified. Before they can be identified, they must be caught. To apprehend, an early police response to the crime scene is essential.

The citizen is an important element in the apprehension pattern. Approximately 30% of the burglary arrests in 1971 were the result of the neighbor alerting police to a crime-in-progress. The citizens' import in apprehension of the robber is even greater. By shortening communication paths, the citizen will be able to report a subject crime more rapidly, thus reducing the response time.

Figure I-B indicates the "call-to-service" steps. Each step can be considered a sub-problem area, and will be explained as such.

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(Emergency Response Time)

Planning and Research Portland Police Burea July 1972 APCO points out that if a two-minute response time is sought, only thirty seconds can be consumed from steps three to seven. Five minutes are now used in this process. Only with substantial equipment upgrading and procedure modification can this standard be attained. A major portion of the future grant application will address this problem.

Two portions of this request have a bearing: an alleviation of air traffic congestion increase, due to strike force activities, by bringing F-3 and F-4 to operational status, and an assignment of personal portable radios to all field units.

The time involved in steps four to five often entails a polling to establish the availability of district units. Handie-talkies will allow officers to take the more routine calls at any time, thus allowing MORE in-the-car officers to be free for "hot calls". By this means, each officer can also remain in contact for calls to "assist officer".

Many more methods of reducing response-time exist, some in the form of automated or computerized processes. As previously stated, these will be considered in later studies and in the final grant application.

Voice Security. The present system does not provide a method of sending or receiving secure messages. In the past, many police tactical operations have been monitored by the very element toward which the operations were directed. This type of intelligence has hampered police efforts. For example, often police have arrested known burglars in possession of small transistor receivers. These have been coupled with crystals that match our operational frequencies. The units cost about \$14.00 apiece, and are valuable in negating police efforts directed toward "crimes-in-progress". Burglars have employed these radios to monitor police which direct units to a crime-in-progress. Intrusion alarms have been thwarted by this means. In considering new mobile radios, voice security devices are to be stipulated as function design constraints.

Dispatch Facilities. Of the many deficiencies of the dispatch center, only a few are germano to this project.

With the extension of activities, and the equipping of channel F-3 and F-4 for operational use, certain modifications of the dispatch area will be necessary. Presently, dispatch personnel must decide, receiving information by ear only, which channel (F-lor F-2) is being employed by the mobile unit broadcasting, and which base station receptor is best able to accept the signal. Manual switching allows this decision to be executed. Using three channels, the complexity renders incoming information unmanageable. Automatic control is a necessary adjunct to this project.

The second problem may not be solvable during this funding phase, but should be addressed as early as possible.

In the words of a Bureau of Communications report, "At present, the dispatchers must also act at certain times as A VOICE RELAY; i.e. if a senior officer wishes to get a message to a certain mobile unit or units, and he is not in a radio car but on a telephone, he must use the dispatcher as an intermediary. This frustrates the ability of command personnel to mobilize police forces to concentrate in areas of target crimes. In many instances, the dispatcher must perform the same function for a car to talk to another car, or a handie-talkie to another handie-talkie. Because of a lack of a telephone/radio patch, early description of suspects is delayed. Voice relay is presently required, but had to be discontinued because of air saturation time."

Maintenance. Although this problem is allinclusive and demands a new system, certain elements must be improved for support of this portion of the total project. Thus, equipment that will enhance the use of Channel F-3 and F-4, personal portable radios, and alarm systems is included in the budget section. The general need for this action can be gleaned from the following excerpt of a Bureau of Communications presentation: "It can be said unequivocally that the existing police communication system is in poor condition, unusuable, technologically obsolete, and loaded beyond capacity. It is extremely susceptible to failure from accidental or intentional fire and power failure. The poor status of communications definitely is hampering the ability of the Police Bureau to operate more effectively and efficiently to combat stranger-to-stranger street crime and burglaries.

All of the subsystem equipment, mobile units, fixed radio equipment, selective call equipment, car sirens and public address systems, remote control units, utility units, and associated police dispatch console facility are 16 to 20 years old and of vacuum tube type. The radio equipment is so obsolete that the Federal Communications Commission has notified all users that the equipment needs more frequent maintenance checks than those prescribed by FCC regulations. In addition, at least one type tube used in base station is no longer manufactured. Before the present stock (approximately two years) runs out, a substantial systemwide modification will have to be made to accommodate the use of another tube.

Maintenance experience on this equipment, mobile and base station alike, is poor. No records existed when the present Communications Director was employed by the City in the middle of March. For the periods starting March 26 - April 25, eighty-three police radio cars of a total 291 (almost 1/3) came into the radio shop for emergency maintenance. In the period of April 26 through May 25, 61 units of the 291 came into the shop for emergency radio maintenance. For the two-month (44 days) working period, more than half (147 of 291) the police mobile radio units needed emergency maintenance. It is estimated that the Police Bureau lost at least one-and-one-half man-hours per unit failure, or approximately 220 man-hours of officer time, primarily because of mobile radio equipment failure.

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In addition to emergency maintenance causes, mobile radio units are taken out of service for prolonged periods of time for equipment changes. Because equipment, (sirens, radio, public address systems, etc.) are not standardized in all vehicles, it is necessary to continually interchange equipment in cars as the Police Bureau shifts forces to different police functions. Some twenty-four cars were off the street in the period of April 26 - May 25, 71% of all police mobile units were off the streets for these causes alone at one time or another in two months.

In addition, during one 22-hour day period one major failure occurred in the police dispatch console, making it totally inoperative, and the Police Bureau experienced at least six base station failures during this same period. Fifteen other fixed police radios required emergency maintenance in this period."

The conclusion to be drawn from this statement, appropriate to this project's considerations, is that maintenance problems are severely hampering police effectiveness and that increased activity by Strike Forces.will magnify the problem which no routine or even improved costworthy maintenance will alleviate.

Surveillance Equipment and Silent Radio Alarms. The majority of the equipment needed to carry on successful surveillance is named in the Task Force/Strike budget, as well as silent alarms.

The necessary back-up communications equipment is either non-existent, or in poor repair. For surveillance and informant operations, reliable and secure equipment is essential. The resultant painstaking man-hours lost because of equipment failure, or lack of security for undercover officer's safety due to inadequate communications, cannot be over-emphasized.

Air-channel time must be available for instantaneous transmissions, "dead spots" must be eliminated from signal propagation patterns, alarms must not fail, and finally, the equipment must be available, and not "in the shop" for repair.

#### II. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Target crime reduction by phased amounts is the basic objective within which other accomplishments must be sought. Foremost among police intentions is the formation of innovative approaches in the problem of crime with specific reference to offenses related to the Impact Program. Impact funding will permit the flexibility to implement new methods and procedures on a scale and over a time frame that will insure validity of evaluation, while allowing the continuation of routine operations.

It is the Police Bureau's goal to not only reduce target crimes by specified amounts, but to also evolve and test concepts in dealing with these offenses that have applicability to the entire spectrum of crime, and have a reasonable assurance of effecting police operations for many years beyond the Impact Program. Based upon the evaluation of the Task Force operations hereafter described, this Bureau may largely alter present methods in favor of the approaches tested during the next three years.

The basic goal of the Portland Police Bureau in relation to the utilization of Impact Funding is stated as:

TO ACHIEVE BY THE TERMINATION OF THE PROJECT A 50% REDUCTION OF STRANGER-TO-STRANGER STREET CRIMES AND BURGLARIES IN TARGET AREAS SELECTED BY THE PORTLAND BUREAU OF POLICE.

To realize this goal, a number of intermediate objectives must be set:

- To provide for the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of target crime information in a timely and accurate manner.
- (2) To provide immediate in-depth and scientific investigation of target crimes.

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- (3) To provide for increased detection of crimes in progress.
- (4) To reduce police response time.
- (5) To interdict fencing operations.
- (6) To increase public awareness of the measures to be employed in protecting their persons and property.
- (7) To decrease citizen fear of victimization through concentrated police presence.

Each of these activities address themselves to one or more of four elements that are generally conceded to be necessary before a crime is committed, i.e. criminal intent, present ability, opportunity, and victim (target). If any or all of these elements are eliminated, the offense will not occur. The basic goal of target crime reduction will be realized.

### III. ACTIVITIES AND METHODS

The reasons for, and the methods employed in the commission of target crimes, are highly varied and complex. Segments of the total Impact Program will focus on the etiology of these crimes. The complexity of the problem prohibits a simple approach by law enforcement personnel in their tasks of prevention and suppression of crime, and the apprehension of offenders. In order to fulfill these tasks in combating target crimes, the Task Force proposal includes two distinct, but mutually supporting areas of activity.

The first activity will involve a "Strike Force" which consists of "custom designed" teams. The specific composition of these teams will be determined by the incidence of target crimes. The teams will be comprised of personnel from the entire spectrum of line operations: i.e. patrol, follow-up, and scientific investigations officers. In essence, the proposal will add teams of investigative and uniform personnel to the present system, but will retain the present authority of individual line commanders.

Revised Bureau Organization. It is proposed that a major restructuring of the Police Bureau be undertaken as soon as funds are available. This reorganization will combine all line operations into one Branch and will create an Administrative Branch, in addition to the Technical Services Branch. This will facilitate the coordination of line operations for both routine and Task Force activity, and will provide a logical division between administrative services and technical support.

A portion of the reorganization creates a strong supporting staff for the Deputy Chief of Operations. This staff is essential for two primary reasons: (1) the Operations Branch will be directly responsible for planning, implementing, and the internal evaluation of the Strike Force function and the Criminal Information Gathering Activity (the second of the two subprograms) and; (2) the Operations Branch will command better than 70% of the sworn officers of the Bureau and will have the authority to conduct all police operations, as delegated by the Chief of Police.

The reorganization of the Bureau to accommodate Impact activity and to enhance routine operations against target crimes will require a major planning effort.

The Planning Staff. At the onset of funding, several new positions will be created. (See Diagram III A). These positions consist of an Assistant Chief of Operations (AC/O) who will hold the same rank level as the Inspector (between a Deputy Chief and a Police Captain in the chain of command), two Lieutenants, a Sergeant, a civilian statistical analyst, a legal secretary, and a Police Records Clerk. At the same time, the Bureau's Legal Advisor will be assigned to this planning unit. A full-time management consultant will be retained for one year as a part of this team. For the first 90 days, all new personnel will engage in planning the reorganization of the Bureau. (Refer to Diagram III B).

Travel funds for the planning unit members are included in the budget. During the planning process, the organizational configuration of other law enforcement agencies will be studied on site to assist the planning process and attempt to avoid problem areas.

The management consultant will begin in-house processes leading to final organizational configuration. In addition, funds provide for one-man/year consultant fees for special areas such as accountant services (total Bureau budget format revisions are projected as neccessary in conjunction with the reorganization). Problems currently unidentified will be resolved through the utilization of these services. Although there are capabilities in many of the named disciplines within City Government, the

## BUREAU REORGANIZATION

# PLANNING STAFF



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demand for early completion of the planning product necessitates the employment of special consultants.

Part of the consultant's ongoing duties will entail examination of newly formed communications paths, lines of authority, intra-Branch working relationships, and functional systems. About 270 days after funding, he will evaluate the new organization and recommend alterations. His position is then terminated, and continuing activity of this type reverts to the Planning and Research Division.

As part of the planning team, a Lieutenant will assist in all processes, but he will be mainly concerned with Bureau documents (Manual of Rules and Procedures and Bureau orders) that reflect organizational changes and operations of Impact Task Force activities. The Legal Advisor will collaborate with this Lieutenant, and the City Attorney's Office in revising pertinent ordinances and Administrative Codes. Upon the implementation of the Bureau reorganization, this Lieutenant will become the public information officer.

During the planning phase, the other Lieutenant, (later destined to be involved in continuing inspection and evaluation of Task Force operations) will serve two primary functions. First, he will be the logistics officer. He will take steps to acquire equipment for the reorganized Bureau as well as special equipment for Strike Force and Criminal Information Gathering Activity operations. His second function will be to formulate and recommend policies, procedures, and strategic operations necessary for Strike Force activity. He will have the assistance of the Legal Advisor in fulfilling this function. This Lieutenant will be charged with fielding the Strike Force teams at the earliest possible date. This date (approximately 75 days after funding) will be largely governed by the acquisition of communications equipment, vehicles, and all other hardware necessary in the operation of Strike Force teams. Timing will allow the AC/O

two weeks of undivided attention to fielding the Strike Force. On the 90th day, the AC/O will assume his Operations Branch duties.

The Sergeant, in conjunction with the statistical analyst, will establish lines of communication with various data sources (the Planning and Research Division, the Records Division, the Detective Division, the Precincts, and the Data Processing Authority) and will formulate procedures for the collection of statistics. During the planning phase and early in the implementation phase, many "hand-counts" will be necessary to achieve a base for decision-making in the utilization of Strike Force resources. The Sergeant and the analyst will also work toward refining accounting techniques and upgrading the channels of data dissemination to all user divisions. At the onset of reorganization, the Sergeant will be a member of the AC/O staff and will act as ongoing field operations planner and Task Force training and briefing officer.7-

To support the increased level of activity due to Task Force operations, new positions for investigative and support personnel will be established by City Ordinance on the 30th day after funding. These additional positions should be filled within 60 days of funding, thus allowing for 15 days of "shakedown" time prior to Strike Force implementation. It is anticipated that Phase I of the Police Bureau communications system upgrading will be in the latter stages of the reorganization process (about 180 days after funding). At that time, each of the Bureau's sworn personnel will receive four hours of classroom training on revised radio communications procedures and new equipment utilization. The new equipment will be brought into Bureau-wide use upon completion of the training program. Detail communications activities are shown in Diagram III C.

Although Strike Force operations will be continually monitored and evaluated, i.e. officer fatigue level, proper deployment, economic utilization of overtime allocation, training needs, and data needs; two formal evaluation periods are designated. All command personnel from the

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## FUNDING REQUESTS, IMPLEMENTATIONS, STUDY DESIGN

	Jul	Aua	Sep	Oat	NOV	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Мау	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	0ct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
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new Operations Branch will participate in this evaluation. The findings of this evaluation will serve as a basis for planning the following year's Strike Force mode of activity.

The Operational Support Element. Following the planning phase, the Impact Program Operational Support element will be commanded by the Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch, who will report to the Chief of Police (Project Director). He will assure a balanced effort among Task Force activities and a complementary relationship between the police activities and the routine operational units under his command.

The Deputy Chief of Operations will be staffed with the following positions: (See Diagram III D).

 The Assistant Chief of Operations (AC/O).

> The AC/O will act as an executive officer to the Deputy Chief of Operations and will assume command of the Branch in his absence. In addition to his duties as second-in-command of the Branch, the AC/O will be responsible for coordinating the activities of the remainder of the staff of the operational support element. He will assist the Deputy Chief in directing Task Force operations and will continue his efforts in this activity for the duration of the Impact Program.

Specifically, the duties of the AC/O will include:

- (a) The administrative control of all personnel (to include both fulltime employees and augmenting personnel on an overtime basis who are funded under the Impact Program).
- (b) The dissemination and auditing of funds allocated to the Criminal Information Gathering Activity.

REVISED BUREAU ORGANIZATION AND TASK FORCE STAFF



- (c) Responsibility for all equipment, furnishings, and facilities funded under the program, other than electronic and technical equipment that are placed on the inventory of the user divisions.
- (d) Coordinating the personnel and material resources under his control to provide a well-balanced program.
- (e) Establishing the nature and priorities of tasks and providing broad guidelines for their implementation.
- (f) Directing a central repository of project related records and data, and insuring their processing and timely dissemination.
- (g) Maintaining a close and continuous liaison with agencies and individuals engaged in the Program.
- (h) Controlling a system of inspection and evaluation of all aspects of the Police Impact Program and the submission of periodic reports to the Project Director through the Deputy Chief of Operations.
- (2) A Police Lieutenant (Inspections). This Lieutenant will function primarily as an inspector. His working hours will vary according to need. He will personnally view Strike Force operations and monitor Criminal Information Gathering Activities. He will evaluate equipment usage and target crime related efforts within the standard units of the Operations Branch. Finally, he will submit weekly status reports of Impact Program activities and make suggestions for improvement to the AC/O.

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(3) A Sergeant (Tactical Planner). This officer will serve under the Lieutenant (Inspections) and perform a dual function:

> First, he will interface with all information sources. He will prepare a daily analysis of target crimes in terms of their nature, location, times of occurrence, types of victims, modus operandi patterns, and other data that will aid the AC/O in establishing priorities and transmitting operational guidelines to all subelements of the Task Force. He will supervise the preparation of charts, graphs, maps, and other operational planning aids to be used by the precincts and divisions. He will channel the information gleaned by the Criminal Information Gathering Activity to Task Force and routine operational units, as directed by the AC/O. Ho will conduct briefings and training sessions appropriate to Task Force operations.

The second function of this Sergeant will be to act as an ongoing <u>planner</u> of Task Force activities. Much of this planning will be generated by the inspecting Lieutenant on how to improve or refine various Task Force activities.

(4) A Sergeant (Communications Project). This position is not shown on the revised Bureau organizational chart, (see Diagram III C), although all of his activities will be related to the Impact Program. He is assigned to the Planning and Research Division staff where he serves as the coordinator of the communications project and the police consultant on functional requirements. The enabling ordinance for this position has already received approval and the Communications

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Project Sergeant commenced his duties in the early planning stages of the communications program. His duties will continue through the implementation phase and are to extend beyond the duration of the Impact Program.

He coordinates the activities of the consultants, the Bureau of Communications, and police users. He facilitates planning recommendations, advises in communications training, and assists in the preparation of standard operating procedures. He maintains contacts with agencies that employ similar systems in order to anticipate problem areas. He promotes compatible communications systems throughout the metropolitan area by meeting with other governmental bodies. He serves as ongoing planner in communications research, funding endeavors, and evaluations. He submits a bi-monthly progress report to the Project Director, with copies directed to the Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch.

(5) The Lieutenant (Public Information). This officer serves on the staff of the AC/O, providing citizens in the Portland Metropolitan Area with information on Task Force activity and measures that may be taken to thwart target crimes Until a Crime Prevention Program is established, this officer will utilize news media releases and communications public service time to disseminate information. Once the Crime Prevention Program is implemented, the Lieutenant will serve in either one of two capacities, depending on the structure of the Program. If the Crime Prevention/Public Information Program is placed under Portland Police control, he will command that unit. If the public information function is controlled by another agency,

the Lieutenant will act as police liaison officer. Whichever course of action results, this officer will devote all of his efforts in public information for the duration of the Impact Program.

(6) The Legal Advisor.

This individual is a member of the Bar. He will be reassigned to the Operations Branch and will be on the staff of the AC/O. He will provide an in-Branch capability to draw search warrants, aid in structuring sound cases for prosecution (in cooperation with the office of the District Attorney), offer guidance in assuring the rights of all citizens affected by the Task Force Operations, and maintain a research and training program on Appellate Court decisions and other trends related to the Criminal Justice system.

- (7)The Statistical Analyst. This individual will be assigned to the Operational Support Element and will be directly responsible to the AC/O. He will provide support to other members of the staff, particularly the Sergeant in his capacity as planner and information disseminator. The analyst will assist in converting raw data into timely and meaningful information; graphically illustrate the problem to operational units and personnel; prepare analytical projections for tactical planning; and assist in establishing new or untried data bases.
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(8) The Legal Secretary.

This employee will provide the Legal Advisor with clerical services. As her schedule permits, she will also provide general secretarial services to the AC/O, including the maintenance of office files and functioning as a receptionist. (9) The Police Records Clerk. This employee will perform general clerical duties for the Deputy Chief of Operations, the AC/O, and the Lieutenant in charge of public information. Since this position entails extensive typing duties, the AC/O may wish a Clerk Typist rather than a PRC.

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In summary, the Assistant Chief of Operations and his staff will be responsible to the Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch in assuring that all phases of the Police Impact Program be a well-balanced effort. The office will manage funds, establish priorities, and supply guidance and information. The AC/O and staff will provide ongoing evaluation and react to areas that need improvement by planning and implementing alternate methods. They will assure that Task Force operations supplement routine operations and will assist regular operational personnel in efforts to combat street crimes and burglaries. They will maintain communications with all law enforcement agencies in the Portland Metropolitan Area and facilitate an active exchange of information on target crimes and its perpetrat-They will assist in planning programs and ors. implementing communications to improve operations in reducing target crime. They will establish effective public relations in order to enhance citizen awareness and involvement in the crime problem.

Crime Occurrence Information Computer Data/Analyst System. This activity provides for a rapid and precise method of handling data that is collected by the standardized field reporting system. It will make available, a major tool to the Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch and the AC/O as they seek to improve the apprehension rates for target crimes.

In order to transform the collected crime data into timely, usable information, a new and automated file must be established.

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Currently, the Columbia Region Information Sharing System (CRISS) schedule calls for the completion of a Crime File subsystem in their development plans. The information within this file is similar to what the Bureau needs: data on crime activity. However, the rapid updating and retrieval capabilities under this program will be accessible by November of 1973 at the earliest. Under this proposal an acceleration of the CRISS schedule, with the addition of several other requirements and capabilities, would take place. The acceleration will narrow the gap between Strike Force implementation and the ability to receive up-to-date crime activity information.

Upon completion, the Crime File will be the primary statistical information source to the AC/O and staff. It will provide valuable assistance in the areas of patrol deployment, Strike Force deployment, patrol evaluation, and the evaluation of Impact Programs.

The Crime File. This support function can be accomplished by designing and implementing an on-line system of data entry and retrieval. Online entry of data will enable the Task Force and Portland area police agencies to process and retrieve large amounts of rapidly changing information. It will also provide for continuous updating that will be used in many areas which require rapid and accurate decisions. In addition to greatly reducing delay inherent in hand-coding and keypunch systems, edit routines can be applied by the computer that will keep errors at a minimum.

Knowledge of a crime will be made available within twenty-four hours after occurrence. This continuous monitoring capability will appreciably increase police effectiveness with regard to target crimes.

The Crime File will be in harmony with, and provide for, support of certain portions of the automated command and control systems currently being studied under an LEAA grant. This file would contain, but not be limited to, the following types of data:



(1) Type of Crime

(2) Month Occurred

(3) Day Occurred (of month)

(4) Day Occurred (of week)

(5) Year Occurred

(6) Time of Day Occurred (by hour)

(7) Case Number

(8) Radio District

(9) Grid Location

(10) Census Tract

(11) Stolen Value

(12) Type of Stolen Property

(13) Recovered Value

(14) Month Cleared

(15) Year Cleared

(16) Cleared by

(17) How Cleared

(18) Sex, Age, & Race of Person Arrested

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(19) Street Address Where Crime Occurred

(20) Recovery

(21) Type of Premise

(22) Method and Point of Entry

(23) Instrument and Force Used

(24) Location of Victim

(25) Victim's Activity

(26) Location of Property

(27) Unusual Actions

(28) Worthless Documents

(29) Age of Victim

(30) Sex of Victim

(31) Race of Victim

Many items on this list are not readily available. Presently, a period of two to six weeks is required to receive part of this information. Other elements of this list are not gathered at this time. The automated Crime File will fill both these deficiencies.

Another capability that will be made available to the AC/O and staff is the performance of basic mathematical tests on current and past data. Some of these tests include the projection of short and long trends, correlation of variables, and the allocation of resources through a linear programming model.

In order to make the automated Crime File accessible at the earliest possible date, priority of data needs to the Strike Force will direct the development efforts. In addition, the man hour time, as indicated in the budget, will be compressed. The divisibility of work load for this project is unknown. Development time may take as much as one year. Because the Data Processing Authority (DPA) does not have available personnel to accelerate their current schedule, additional outside analysts and programmers will be hired to work exclusively on this project under the supervision of DPA. These additional individuals will enable the project to become operational in the shortest possible time with high priority information made available first.

Strike Force. One of the two activities of the Operations Branch is the direct application of mission-oriented police resources to combat street crimes and burglaries.

In considering the nature of Strike Force activity, the Assistant Chief of Operations and his staff establish priorities for program requirements and account for the expenditure of Impact Funds. When applied to Strike Force operations, these functions translate to detailing when, where, and in what manner target crimes are being committed and are likely to be committed. To accomplish this, the AC/O must tap all available information sources, with the aid of the Sergeant and the Statistical Analyst.

Once the information is analyzed, the AC/O must recommend priorities to the Deputy Chief of Operations for Strike Force attention, and advise on the type of operation most appropriate. The Deputy Chief will allocate the number and designate the required expertise of the officers to be employed as a Strike Force Team. (Both priorities and team composition must be in keeping with available funds).

The criteria for priority establishment will be based on contemporary information. As the personnel of the Analyst's Section on the AC/O's staff become increasingly sophisticated in dealing with crime data, and as the Criminal Information Gathering Activity becomes fully operational, the timeliness and scope of the information will be at a level never before available to this Bureau. The Deputy Chief can then react to crime trends as they develop. With the aid of the AC/O, and the counsel of the division and precinct commanders, the Deputy Chief can design a Strike Force team specifically tailored to the nature of the problem.

The problem and its acuteness in relation to all other target crime activity in the Portland area will be determined through a data base which considers the modus operandi of the offense; the type of victim; the type of offender; the hour, day, and location of crime occurrence; and the frequency and seriousness of a given type of incident. Target areas will then be established. Teams of officers with professional talents that suit the nature of the operation will be fielded in accord with both past and projected criminal activity time patterns.

After determining high crime target areas, the AC/O will immediately contact the commander of the precinct which contains the selected target area to inform him about the target location, the time of operation, and the type of team(s) that will be allotted. The AC/O will provide the precinct commander with all available intelligence to aid the precinct in tactical planning. It should be emphasized that patrol-oriented operations will be planned and implemented by precinct personnel utilizing the broad guidance and resources provided by the AC/O.

If all or part of the Strike Force team is to be composed for uniform officers, the precinct commander will select these team members from volunteers. Selection will be based on the volunteer's demonstrated suitability for the task.

If the Strike Force teams will include investigative positions, the AC/O will notify the commanding officer of the appropriate unit to select the qualified personnel. If technical service positions, such as scientific investigation personnel are required, the Deputy Chief of Operations will communicate his need to the Deputy Chief of Services.

In most instances, a team supervisor will be required. He will be a superior officer from an assigned position appropriate to the nature of the task; i.e. a Detective Sergeant for an investigation-oriented Strike Force and a Uniform Sergeant for patrol type operations. The normal assignment of the supervisor and team personnel, and the nature of the operation will govern whether precinct or detective and other specialist unit commanders will establish tactics. This tactical planning function will be assigned by the AC/O.

The Strike Force will ordinarily report to the involved precinct or division before operating in the selected target area. The team supervisor or senior team member will coordinate with the Relief or Detail Commander and his staff.

As soon as equipment acquisition permits, and even before data gathering and analysis functions are fully operational, Strike Force teams will be employed. Immediate action is possible because previously acquired data shows that the high incidence of street crimes and burglaries reflect a definite and stable pattern. (See Diagram III E).

There is no sure way to anticipate how patterns will be affected by Strike Force operations. For example, it may alter crime rates or simply cause offenders to operate in another location. However, before significant pattern changes occur, the Criminal Information Gathering Activity and the Analyst Section will have gathered sufficient data to permit the AC/O to respond appropriately.

Operations Against Street Crimes. At the onset of Strike Force team operations, one Sergeant and eight Patrolmen will operate in a selected area of high street crime occurrence during hours and days when criminality is most frequent.

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DIAGRAM III E

This team will consist of four, two-man units drawn from the appropriate precincts and will be supervised by a patrol Sergeant. Initially, this team will operate approximately 30 hours a week.

Each sub-unit will be equipped with unmarked vehicles, night surveillance equipment, and person communications capabilities. The patrolmen will wear plain clothes.

They will be assigned to conduct a coordinated and covert patrol of the area to include surveillance of likely locations and victims of street crimes. Since the target area will be relatively small, four units will constitute a "saturated" patrol.

The regular district car will patrol the same area, but will not interfere with the covert operation.

The supervising Sergeant will submit nightly activity reports to the Precinct Commander and the Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch. Based on these reports and other indicators, the area of operation may be expanded, condensed, or altered. The team composition may also change to include the use of decoys, uniformed and marked patrols, walking beats, detailed identification of suspicious persons, and other proven methods of suppression or apprehension for this class of crime.

As a result of this operation, it is projected that the incidence of street crimes in the selected target area will be reduced by 75% within thirty days, provided the operation is maintained for that duration. In terms of actual offenses, this amounts to a reduction of approximately 16 cases of armed and unarmed robbery, and a "fringe benefits" reduction of other street crimes. It is estimated that previous robbery clearance rates of 23% to 24% will be increased to 35% due primarily to "on-sight" and approximate-to-the-crime arrest. It should be noted that while a covert operation is advocated, it is maintained that there will also be a crime suppression effect. This is largely because no unmarked patrol operation can remain surreptitious when working in a confined node of mixed business, residence and light industry, such as the potential target areas. Neighborhood frequenters, particularly those engaged in vice related activity, will very shortly pass "the word".

While this practice has a salutary effect on those contemplating the commission of a street crime in the target area, it also rapidly lessens the possibilities of apprehension. That is, although prolonged operation of a team in one area may facilitate comparative evaluation, after a time the rate of apprehension will decrease. Thus, after reaching this stage of diminishing returns, operations will be shifted to a "secondary" target until it is judged to be as profitable to rework the prime high incidence area. It is not feasible to specify the place, area, time of day, day of week, or team composition of Strike Force operations beyond the initially employed as herein described.

In summary, the street crime oriented Strike Force team will begin their operations through three basic activities:

- (1) Saturation of high target crime areas,
- Increased detection of crimes in progress,
- (3) Reduced police response time.

Operations Against Burglaries. It is advocated that initial efforts to reduce burlary rates coincide with the fielding of street crime as described above. Burglary, however, must be approached in a somewhat different manner, for national and local experience consistently indicates that suppressive patrol tactics do not dramatically affect this offense. Burglary apprehensions are enhanced by concentrated, wellconducted patrol, but to achieve optimum effect, this patrol should be complemented by quality investigation, excellent scientific processing



of evidence, and the intelligent use of intrusion alarm devices. The resulting increased apprehensions have a direct bearing on the risk factor for the burglar, thus deterring many who commit this offense on a casual or crime-ofopportunity basis.

At the outset of the program a primary target area will be selected for concentrated burglary Strike Force operations. This target area would be one of five locations suffering high burglary rates, although the exact location choice and timing of operation would, of necessity, be confidential information known only to the Operations Branch and the involved precincts and divisions.

An additional 20 to 30 intrusion alarm devices will be installed within the selected target area. Two Strike Force Teams comprised of Detective personnel with alarm installation experience will strategically locate these devices. It is projected that this phase of the program will require 60 to 90 man hours.

Although alarm installation sites will be designated on the basis of past victimization and the team's knowledge of the nature of burglary operations, it is anticipated that the vast majority of sites will be in business or light industry facilities. Past experience has demonstrated that accurate prediction of a "hit" in residential areas is extremely remote unless there are special circumstances, such as a pattern of deliberate vandalism or harrassment being perpetrated against a homeowner.

Following the installation of alarms, a Strike Force consisting of two teams will be fielded. One of these teams will operate with four unmarked vehicles manned by four uniformed Patrolmen. This team's primary task will be to provide ready response to activated alarms in conjunction with regular district officers. While it is desirable that these officers work from unmarked vehicles to reduce their visibility, it is necessary that they be uniformed for their protection and safety when they are required to search buildings and conduct block-by-block sweeps for suspects attempting to elude arrest. Both the Strike Force team members and the regular district officers and their supervisor must be equipped with individual communications devices to facilitate coordinated cover and search operations.

A secondary task of this team will be to gather and record information concerning suspicious vehicles, persons, and circumstances in the target area that could later be used for identification of burglary offenders. This intelligence will be largely gathered in a covert manner.

Expectations are that 80% of all incidents of alarms activated by intruders, will result in the arrest of one or more perpetrators while this team is operating in the selected target area.

The second team in the Strike Force operation against burglary will consist of a Detective and a Scientific Investigator. Their duties will consist of an immediate and in-depth investigation of burglaries committed in the target area in order to establish the modus operandi and to gather evidentiary material. These officers will be allocated field scientific investigation equipment and appropriate surveillance paraphernalia, and will operate out of the mobile crime laboratory.

Normally, a team of this nature would be best employed during the morning hours when the bulk of burglary offenses are discovered by businesses, or during the evening when homeowners return to their residences to discover that they have been burglarized.

For purposes of this operation, however, it is advocated that the investigative team maintain the same hours as the patrol team for two reasons: (1) when not engaged in investigative activities, they can supplement the surveillance efforts of the patrolmen, and (2) there is a greater likelihood of immediate crime discovery (with the attendant desirability of an immediate investigation) while the Strike Force is actually in operation. If circumstances prove that this team could better be employed during other hours, an adjustment may be readily made by the Coordinator.

It is estimated that this team could provide a concentrated investigation of burglaries at a maximum rate of four man hours for each offense. This would include a thorough examination of the premises, the collection and preservation of evidence, a definitive interview of known witnesses, and a canvass for undiscovered witnesses.

It should be emphasized that the investigative team will alleviate the task of the regular district to conduct the initial investigation, thus enabling him to carry out additional patrol activity.

With the patrol and investigative teams working in tandem, a 35% burglary clearance rate is foreseen; and after 30 days of operation in a selected target area, burglary offenses will show a 60% reduction.

To summarize, burglary-oriented Strike Force teams will initially institute a program that includes three basic elements: (1) immediate, in-depth and scientific investigation, (2) increased detection of crimes-in-progress, and (3) reduced police response time.

Training. As part of the Assistant Chief of Operation's responsibility to facilitate the functioning of various sub-units under his direction, he must provide necessary training. Because Strike Force members will be experienced police officers selected on the basis of their ability, much of the training will take the form of operational guidance published by the AC/O to assist the precincts and divisions in formulating specific tactics.

The Police Bureau Training Division's video tape equipment, with monitors at all precincts and major divisions, will be available to the AC/O. The video training tapes are provided for in the budget. The Bureau's video system is uniquely appropriate to aid the AC/O in transmitting the mission statement, operational guidelines, intelligence, background events, and operational techniques.

Additional Personnel Needs. Concomitant with expanded emphasis on investigative activities will be needs for an increase in personnel. Overtime pay provides for flexible use of manpower, but continuity of investigation and enhanced and extended uniform/detective communications paths will be best served by an additional six full-time investigators in the Detective Division. Four of these Detectives will be assigned to the afternoon relief in the Burglary Detail and two to the same shift in the Robbery Detail.

These investigators will work with both the Strike Force teams and the Criminal Information Gathering Activity. They will be the main point of contact for information exchange with the criminal intelligence portion of the Intelligence Division. It is anticipated that much of their activity will be carried on in the field. They will concentrate efforts in developing informants, working "undercover", and interdicting fencing operations.

Coupled with this effort will be an enlargment of field activity in scientific crime detection, involving two additional technicians assigned to the Identification Division. They will operate from a newly provided mobile crime laboratory in detection, collection, and analysis of evidence at the crime scene.

Since the present manning of the Intelligence Division cannot support additional activity, a Sergeant and a Patrolman will be added to this unit. The Sergeant will function as night supervisor (none presently exists). The Patrolman will work exclusively in the Criminal Intelligence field in target crime activity. These two officers will serve as the information collection, processing, and dissemination point for the Operations Branch. Finally, three new officer positions will be added to the Communications Division. Communications upgrading calls for one more dispatch position due, in part, to the implementation of an additional operations channel. The three proposed communications officer positions will be the minimal amount to man the upgrading.

The Criminal Information Gathering Activity. The most economical method of criminal apprehension is through the utilization of paid informants and the strategic submersion of undercover personnel into suspected criminal subcultures. These methods will be employed through the tactical support of the Operations Branch.

The effective use of informants and undercover personnel demands an appreciable amount of security. Thus, projected budgetary expenditures and operational plans must be stated only in general terms.

At its inception, the Assistant Chief of Operations will allocate funds to members in the Detective, Intelligence, and Special Investigation Divisions. The monies would be used for: (1) incidental expenses for informant's operations, (2) the "C.O.D." purchase of information of specific crimes, (3) the purchase of stolen property for evidentiary purposes, (4) the maintenance of undercover personnel, and (5) for ongoing cost of sustaining operations.

The Criminal Information Gathering Activity will interdict and reduce fencing operations in the Portland Metropolitan Area, thus reducing a source of revenue (and the profit motive) for the thief and burglar.

There are several methods of accomplishing this interdiction. Undercover officers, gaining the confidence of the criminal element, will purchase stolen property to be used as evidence for prosecution. Acting as a member of the criminal subculture, through introduction by an informant, the officer can obtain evidence in meeting places or points of contact for exchange of stolen property. Another interdictory activity focuses on the dispersal of stolen credit cards and personal identification. These items enter the stream of illegal usage through channels that differ from other types of stolen property. They are highly portable, concealable, and carry no intrinsic value until used by the individual, and generally go directly from the thief to a series of illegal users. Undercover agents find out from informants where contacts for sales are made, the identity of dealers involved, and then frequent these locations to witness transactions.

Evidence for prosecution can thus be gathered while the effects are still at or near the initial distribution level. Suppression will be enhanced when information of the covert operation is circulated by the criminal element.

Another means of facilitating prosecution for target crimes is the establishment of "storefront" operations. Local experience in this type of operation has shown it to be an excellent method of obtaining evidence by drawing stolen property to the light of scrutiny and identifying perpetrators of burglaries and robberies. This method calls for the maintenance of seemingly authentic fencing operations in a "storefront" and sufficient funds for expenses of officer time and the purchase of stolen property over a protracted period.

Other benefits derived from the Criminal Information Gathering Activity include the use of informants to identify active criminals for concentration by Strike Force efforts. Also included is the reduction of surveillance time by pinpointing criminal targets named by informants.

It is projected that there will be increases in rates of conviction and guilty pleas due to apprehension of offenders in the act.

Existing and projected strengths in the Detective Division (83-89), the Special Investigations Division (36), and the Intelligence Division (5-7) will be utilized to seek out and employ informants. The most appropriate investigative unit will be engaged in criminal information gathering activities in the same manner as Strike Force personnel.

The Deputy Chief of Operations will control the level of operation and be responsible for dispersing and accounting for expenditures of funds and manpower. Direct supervision of these activities will be by the normal command channels of the appropriate investigative divisions.

<u>Communications Systems</u>. While this request addresses immediate needs in radio communications, there has been a long recognized requirement for total system upgrading in this area. Studies by a private contractual firm (PSSI) should serve to technically articulate the problems and their solution.

Preliminary information has been presented to the Impact Task Force and a tentative commitment of \$2,000,000 in impact funds has been allocated to the total project.

The Diagram labeled IIIC portrays the activities scheduled for the entire communications project. The request in this document is designated as "Funding Request Number 1" and will be followed by other communications grant requests appropriate to planning studies being conducted.

Two hundred personal portable radios and attendant accessories are essential to Task Force and Police Bureau operations. This equipment will weld Strike Force Teams, patrol district units, and traffic units into a combined effort against target crimes by:

- Allowing ready communications access to all units for superior tactical flexibility;
- (2) Permitting patrol and traffic officers to contribute to the reduction of the subject crimes;
- (3) Facilitating Strike Force communications with normal street forces, so that

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coordination is enhanced and emergency support can be gained when necessary; Contributing to better police/citizen

relations by impartation of the feeling that when the police are on-duty they are always available;

(4)

- (5) Enhancing surveillance activites by providing better communications modes; and,
- (6) Improving the personal safety of officers by allowing for coordination in tactical operations and providing a method of instantaneous summons of assistance when he is alone.

This phase of the Communications Proposal also includes the funding necessary to bring channel F-3 into the voting receiver system and to bring both channels F-3 and F-4 to an operational level. In essence, this is a "stop-gap" measure until final systems upgrading is undertaken, but it is essential to accommodate present and projected activity demands.

A second temporary measure, necessitated by the Strike Force and accelerated Bureau operations, is the increased propagation reliability of channels F-1, F-2, F-3, and F-4, plus the modification of the dispatched facilities to accommodate the use of all four channels.

This calls for the installation of a temporary base repeater station in an area that will improve propagation and the upgrading of existing stations to enhance reliability. Placement of voting receivers will also be temporary, but in such a manner as to provide coverage in marginal signal areas many of which coincide with potential target areas of high crime incidence. These placements will be approximated and based on completed propagation pattern studies as well as analysis of weak signal areas.

Channels F-1 and F-2 will be standard Bureau operating channels. The systems support facilities will upgrade base stations and enhance voting receiver capabilities throughout the city. Channel F-3 will be made a duplex system and be designated a primary Strike Force channel, but will also be a standby operations channel (with channel F-1 and F-2) if overloading demands so indicate.

Channel F-4 will be maintained as a simplex system, but will have wider reliability and operating capabilities for alarms. In addition, audio capabilities are furthered, and this channel will be used as a secure (surveillance) communications path. This will allow for portable-to-portable transmissions over a limited distance without monitoring by other operational units. A fifth, channel (designated Fx) will be used in limited area, ultra-secure operations, relying on personal portable radios only.

It is also vitally important to extend the radio alarm system with the purchase of ninety (90) multiple outlet intrusion alarm devices. This will be accompanied by an expansion and upgrading of supportive equipment. These alarm devices are a key part of Strike Force operations against burglaries and should be acquired <u>prior</u> to the fielding of teams in selected target areas.

The Bureau of Communications will assist in setting the bid procedures for this equipment (with portable equipment ordered per the State Standing Bid) and will assume responsibility for direction of installation.

The Training Division, Bureau of Police, will provide for familiarization with the use of new personnel portables and channel F-3 and F-4. Each member of the Police Bureau will undergo this training.

With installation and training completed, this portion of the Communications Proposal will be put into immediate use by Task Force and Bureau operations.

# IV. EVALUATION

It is anticipated that the overall evaluation of the project will be the subject of professional attention provided by the Impact Task Force Committee staff. Such attention will come from additional evaluative criteria developed by the Evaluation Section of the Oregon Law Enforcement Council. Criteria contained in this section are suitable for internal and external evaluation of goal attainment. The internal evaluation, for purposes of control, will be the responsibility of the Project Director. He will be assisted by the Deputy Chief, Operations Branch, and his staff, who are specifically charged with instituting a programmed inspection system. One Lieutenant assigned to the staff of the AC/O will expend 80% of his efforts in an evaluative function. He will:

- Submit a weekly summary report of the accomplishments of the two Task Force activity areas. (Included in his report will be suggestions for improving and refining the activities),
- (2) Personally monitor Strike Force operations as well as measure their performance against the established objectives,
- (3) Conduct an evaluation of the Criminal Information Gathering Activity, giving attention to both the quality and quantity of the information as it applies to increased arrest rates in the area of fencing operations, and assistance in the efficient deployment of Strike Force personnel,
- (4) Examine the quality of the computer crime information program and the "turn around" time as applied to the stated objective of 24-hour return

on crime occurrence information, and

(5) Maintain contact with the progress of communications planning and implementation, and monitor the functional operation with particular reference to air time availability and receiptdispatch/dispatch-arrival time. (This would be accomplished in conjunction with the Communications Project Sergeant.)

It should be emphasized that a vital part of the evaluation process will be personal contact with members of the Police Bureau. Although command and supervisory opinions are of value, the estimations of <u>operational</u> personnel will be of particular benefit. It is the on-the-ground experience of members, as they implement the Task Force activities, that will be the major factor in both program alteration and recommendations for their continued utilization after the Impact grant period.

The following are criteria for evaluation of the communications project portion of the program proposal:

- A reduction in police response time for all calls to service, which averaged 11 minutes per call in 1971. (No data has been kept on calls of an emergency nature). It is anticipated that by the end of Phase III for communication upgrading, the response time for all calls will be reduced by 25%.
- (2) 'Increased record and property checks by mobile street units. As measured by radio call cards, the level of this activity can be established over the past year. With the employment of new communications equipment, a comparison may be made between the implementation year and the previous year, with the measure to be predicted at an increase

of 25% in activity.

- (3) A reduction of F-1, F-2 channel congestion experienced during peak usage hours. The peak congestion on these two channels at the end of the three year period will be reduced by 50%.
- (4) The successful placement of communications equipment to a predicted 98% reliability propagation pattern for both alarm signals and personal portable signals.
- (5) A decrease of emergency maintenance costs on alarms by 20%.
- (6) Officers "out-of-car" time will be measured indirectly by an increase of 20% in field contact reporting activity.
- (7) The positive viewing of the program by the public as measured by the change in before-and-after attitudinal surveys conducted by the Office of Criminal Justice Planning Coordinator.
- (8) A 10% increase in detection by police of crime hazards and crimes-in-progress,
- (9) A subjective evaluation of equipmentuser feelings toward communications capabilities, projecting a change in current negative reactions to a general positive feeling with a resulting improvement in morale.
- (10) Communications project planning and implementation measured, in part, by 99% utilization of newly acquired equipment in the final Phase III program design.
- (11) A lowering of the injury rate of police by 5%, using either the number or severity of police injuries due to

personal attack or resistance of prisoners.

In addition to the above evaluation criteria, other specific performance measures will be employed for use in the evaluation process. Such criteria measure the effectiveness of the functional areas of the remainder of the program, and serve as guidelines in the determination of whether each element is preceding in harmony with the project objectives. The following are specific criteria for these evaluations:

- (1) An increase in the number of initial, `. on-the-scene investigations of burglaries by detectives from a level estimated to be 1% of the crime detected, to 3% of the crimes detected,
  - (2) A 20% increase of scientific investigations carried on in the field by identification personnel,
  - (3) An increase in the annual clearance rate for burglaries from 23 to 35%,
  - (4) A reduction of 60% of burglaries occurring in areas selected for Strike Force operations after thirty days of concentration,
  - (5) An overall reduction of 50% in subject crimes in the selected target areas,
  - (6) A 10% increase in the number of burglary and robbery cases investigated by the Detective Division
  - (7) A 40% clearance rate by arrests for burglaries in areas of five primary targets (highest crime areas) where alarms are installed,
  - (8) A reduction in the number of strangerto-stranger street crimes by 75% in those areas selected for targeting by Strike Force personnel after a

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concentration of thirty days effort,

- (9) An increase in the number of prosecutions for receiving and concealing stolen property (including fencing charges) by 50% the first year, 30% the second year, and 15% the third year,
- (10) A 10% increase in guilty pleas of those charged with target crime.

Where a more long-term evaluation is desired on points (4), (7), (8), and (9), or concentrated effort cannot be exerted over the indicated time periods, trend change could serve as evaluation criteria. Trend analyses is appropriate for annual comparisons and success criteria designated as:

- (1) Reversal or declination of trend line positive slope, or
- (2) Increase in negative declination over preceding time period, or
- (3) Reversal or alteration of predicted trend (decreasing positive trend angle or increasing negative trend angle).

The preceding criteria measures goals and objectives that are optimistic. If there is a high degree of success towards attainment (that can be attributed to program activities) the future operational planning of the Portland Police Bureau will be materially effected. Seldom have the police been presented with the opportunity to implement large-scale procedural changes with a lengthy evaluation period, while not chancing a serious detrimental influence on contemporary levels of law enforcement.

## V. BUDGET

The proposed budget is prepared on a program attributed line item basis with a good portion of the justification either being self-evident in the item-user relationship or having been addressed in previous sections of the proposal. It is necessary, however, to expand and clarify certain areas.

The accounting for Police Impact funds will be accomplished as part of the normal accounting procedure through the office of the Chief Clerk, Bureau of Police. The responsible officer for funding implementation will be the Chief of Police, as Project Director. Assistant Chief of Operations (AC/O) will be delegated with the appropriate and balanced utilization of monies allocated for personnel services.

Initially, funds for consultant fees are included for Bureau reorganization efforts. The cost of this endeavor was computed on a man/year basis and included calculation of base salary plus a projection of consultant firm overhead and profit margin.

Salaries for positions currently in the City's personnel structure were figured on a full wage scale as of January 1973. Positions having no City government classification were scaled on comparable wages in the private sector.

A 6% pay increment increase was projected for 1974 and 1975. For sworn police officers, the standard 23% fringe benefit consideration is utilized. Civilian employees of the Bureau are shown at 20% fringe benefit. These figures represent actual costs to the City.

Personnel Costs. Flexibility in Strike Force operations is the necessary ingredient for an immediate, telling response to target crime incidents. It is therefore not feasible to place a personnel item in the budget for Strike Force teams in terms of a specific number of officers of particular rank working a given number of hours a week, other than the full-time positions named. Rather, the approach to this question consisted of establishing a "type" Strike Force composed of varying ways that would be generally adequate to projected requirements and then attaching a dollar cost. The figure arrived at was \$300,000 per annum or \$900,000 over the three year extent of the Impact Program.

In addition to overtime provisions for staffing of Strike Force activities, funding for several full-time positions is contained in the budget. It is anticipated that increased arrest and investigative duties will be the result of informant fund utilization and an upswing in undercover work. To handle this load, plus add continuity to investigations focused on fencing operations, six Detectives will be assigned as earlier indicated. The same holds true for an increased capability requirement in scientific investigation (Identification Division) and intelligence gathering.

Strike Force wage scales were calculated at time and a half and included the projected cost of living raises for the duration of the project. Because fringe benefit costs are included in the officer's regular duty wage, they are not a consideration in figuring time and a half cost. A Patrolman's salary, therefore, amounts to approximately \$11 per hour and a Detective and/or Sergeant averages \$13 per hour.

At these rates, the \$900,000 Strike Force personnel budget would provide 33,231 Detective/ Sergeant man hours (4,154 man days) and 42,545 Patrolmen man hours (14,182 man days) over the duration of the project. These figures are based on a ratio of 52% Patrolmen, 34% Detectives and specialists, and 14% Sergeants; percentile allocations believed to be realistic to the projected needs, but in no way incumbent upon the AC/O to maintain if the situation warrants otherwise. To assist in visualizing how these man-hour figures translate in terms of example team composition, the following is presented:

1. A sample team consisting of:

One Sergeant, Four Detectives, Two Identification or S.I.D. Officers, and Eight Patrolmen

could be employed four eight-hour days a week over a three-year period.

or

2. The same hours could be worked over the same period by a team consisting of

One Sergeant and Fifteen Patrolmen,

or

3. In case of investigation oriented operations, the same time could be worked by a team made up of:

> One Detective Sergeant, Ten Detectives, and Two S.I.D. Officers.

A factor that must be weighed in considering available police manpower for Strike Force activity is the time necessary for court appearance as a result of arrest occurring in conjunction with Task Force operations. A recent study from the Portland Police East Precinct reflects that officers assigned to the Afternoon Relief expend 10% of their duty time in court. Because the Strike Force would be engaged almost exclusively in felony cases, and not subject to routine radio calls, many of which are civil in nature or are resolved without an arrest, it seems logical to project that officers actively engaged in Strike Force activity may be required to spend as much as 15% to 20% of their budgeted time in court-related activity. This aspect will have to be closely monitored by the AC/O.

The Computer Program. The budget information on the computerized crime information package represents the best estimate of the project cost available at this juncture. Hardware cost estimates were supplied by an IBM representative. The Data Processing Authority was consulted concerning the program. It was their opinion that sufficient personnel is not available within existing governmental agencies to perform the task as a special project. Additional personnel would have to be acquired or the project would have to be referred to a consulting firm. In either case, project personnel should act directly under the office of the AC/O, in conjunction with the Columbia Region Information Sharing System (CRISS), so that maximum effort can be exerted toward attaining the goals of utilization of the information.

The analyst's time in the computer package budget is based on man-years, but in terms of real time this will be greatly compressed. The shared cost referred to in the budget will be that provided by CRISS. This sharing is appropriate because the program is actually an acceleration and extension of the CRISS Program. This shared cost is not reflected as a local match item because CRISS is a federally funded project.

The 256K core storage shown in the computer program budget gives a storage capacity for operations related information not presently available at the Data Processing Authority. This is the minimum storage increment obtainable. Other items shown include the equipment necessary to back up this unit, plus the normal continuous operating expenses for maintenance common to computer programs of this type. All core storage will be reserved for police use.

The Communications Package. Cost itemization for the communications package, Phase I, is based on a line item estimate by the Director of the Bureau of Communications, City of Portland. The major item appearing on the Phase I budget is personal portable radios. These units will have a frequency configuration selection and an operational capability that is most apt to be compatible with any future mobile radio. Budgetary provisions for engineering will permit the placement of satellite "voting" receivers to insure a 98% coverage for the two-watt power level personal portable radios requested.

Consultant costs are included to cover engineering and installation. The Bureau of Communications lacks resources to accomplish these tasks, and will mainly confine their efforts to drawing specifications and performing supervision and inspection.

Other budgetary items include vehicle mounted charging sockets and precinct based stationary battery chargers which will allow the units to be brought to 90% capacity charge in less than two hours. This precludes the expensive practice of purchasing three batteries for each unit.

The 100 milli-watt transceivers found on the line item budget are for undercover assignment in the Criminal Information Gathering Activity. Their use will be for concealment on police agents when they are making contact with the criminal element, an essential means of promoting officer safety.

DIAGRAM V-A

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LEAA

#### IMPACT BUDGET SUMMARY

#### OPERATIONS SUPPORT PROGRAM

<u>.</u>

### MATCH

TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION & SUBSISTENCE	6,000	3,000
EQUIPMENT	285,722	2,400
SUPPLIES & OPERATING EXPENSES	100,000	290,246
SUPPLIES & OPERATING EXPENSES	156.098	740,320

SUB TOTAL 2,156,098

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MATCH

PERSONNEL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION & SUBSISTENCE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIES & OPERATING EXPENSES	<u>30,000</u> 324,344	50,435  3,500 22,200
SUB TOTAL	354,344	76,135

COMPUTER PROGRAM

COMMUNICATIONS

PERSONNEL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION & SUBSISTENCE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIES & OPERATING EXPENSES

SUB TOTAL

TOTAL

54,800	70,741
متبو محد مند بنت بنيد عبد عند	
155,520 55,068	38,660
265,388	109,401
2,775,830	925,856

LEAA

3,701,686

PERCENT OF MATCH TO TOTAL = 25.0
## IMPACT BUDGET SUMMARY

PERSONNEL	LEAA	MATCH
OPERATIONS SUPPORT PROGRAM COMMUNICATIONS CRIMINAL INFORMATION COMPUTER PROGRAM	1,734,376	444,674 50,435 70,741
SUB TOTAL	1,734,376	565,850
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES	LEAA	MATCH
OPERATIONS SUPPORT PROGRAM COMMUNICATIONS CRIMINAL INFORMATION COMPUTER PROGRAM	30,000 30,000 54,800	
SUB TOTAL	114,800	
TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION, & SUBSISTENCE	LEAA	МАТСН
OPERATIONS SUPPORT PROGRAM	6,000	3,000
CRIMINAL INFORMATION COMPUTER PROGRAM		·····
SUB TOTAL	6,000	3,000
EQUIPMENT	LEAA	MATCH
OPERATIONS SUPPORT PROGRAM	285,722 324,344	2,400 3,500
CRIMINAL INFORMATION COMPUTER PROGRAM	155,520	
SUB TOTAL	765,586	5,900
SUPPLIES & OPERATION EXPENSES	LEAA	МАТСН
OPERATIONS SUPPORT PROGRAM COMMUNICATIONS CRIMINAL INFORMATION COMPUTER PROGRAM	100,000	290,246 22,200 38,666
SUB TOTAL	155,068	351,106

2,775,830 925,856

TOTAL

3,701,686

cagory PERSONNEL - A

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				Unit	Mod	el			LEAA	Grantee
		Item	Quantity	Price	<u>lst Yr</u>	2nd Yr	3rd Yr	Total	Support	Contrib.
	1.	OPERATIONS SUPPORT								
	<u> </u>	PROGRAM					and a second			
		Project Director (Chief)	10%		2,641	2,800	2,968	8,409		8,409
		Deputy Chief	20%		4,476	4,745	5,029	14,250		14,250
		Captain (Inspector level)	100%		18,720	19,843	21,034	59,597	59,597	
		Lieutenant	20100%		33,238	35,232	37,346	105,816	105,816	
		Sergeant	100%		14,310	15,169	16,079	45,558	45,558	
-		Detective	60100%		85,860	91,011	96,475	273,346	273,346	
		Identifications Officer	2@100%		28,620	30,338	32,158	91,116	91,116	
		Sergeant Specialist	100%		14,747	15,632	16,570	46,949	46,949	
		Patrolman Specialist	100%		12,189	12,920	13,695	38,804	38,804	
		23% Fringe			49,404	52,368	55,510	157,282		157,282
		Legal Advisor	100%		19,560	20,734	21,978	62,272		62,272
		Legal Secretary	100%		8,844	9,375	9,937	28,156	28,156	
		Clerk Steno I	100%		7,114	7,541	7,993	22,648	22,648	
		Statistical Analyst	100%		9,600	10,176	10,787	30,563	30,563	
		20% Fringe			10,377	11,000	11,660	33,037		33,037
		P&R Staff Planning Imp.	20%/10%/							
ы		(Capt, Lt, Op Anal, PRCII)	10%	· ·	13,793	6,897	6,897	27,587		27.587
a		Training TV Tech(W/20% Fr)	20%	11,520	2,304	2,304	2,304	6,912		6,912
de		Overtime Personnel			300,000	300,000	300,000	900,000	900,000	
7		Communications Proj Sgt.	100%		14,310	15,169	16,079	45,558	45,558	
Ч		23% Fringe			3,291	3,489	3,698	10,478		10,478
		Radio Dispatcher (Pt.Sp.)	3	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	43,596	46,212	48,987	138,795	46,265	92,530
		23% Fringe			10,026	10,626	11,265	31,917		31,917
	2	CRIMINAL INFORMATION								
		COMPUTER PROGRAM		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						
	· .	Data input Operators	100%(4)	7,260		29,040	29,911	58,951		58,951
	~	20% Fringe	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			5,808	5,982	11,790	·	11,790
	3.	COMMUNICATIONS								
	<u> </u>	Tech Facilitator (Dir	308	22,837	_6,851_			6,851		6,851
	·	Bureau of Comm.)							<sup> </sup>	
		<u>Sr. Comm. Engineer</u>	30%	20,866	6,260	÷		6,260		6,260
		Comm. Engineer		17,994	_5,398			5,398		5,398
	<u></u>	Sr. Technician	60%	15,600	9,360	·····		9,360		9,360
		Comm. Clerk	20%	9,134	1,827			1,827		1,82/
-	·	(All above include 20%					ан сараан сар			
		<u>tringe</u> )		·						
		Advisory Committee								
		(Capt, Lt, Sgt, Patr)	38		6,515	6,905	7,319	20,739		20,739
				······································						
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PERSONNEL - A

Diagram V-C

GORY PROFESSIONAL SERVICES - B

C

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## DIAGRAM DI

	<b>.</b>	<b>A</b>	Unit	Mode	el	<del></del>	·	LEAA	Grantee
	Ltem	Quantity	Price	<u>Ist Yr</u>	2nd Yr	<u>3rd Ir</u>	lotal	Support	Contrib.
	Mant Conculting Firm	7	opus - Alexandra, s. contracted admits another the			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
<u> </u>	Mgmt. Consulting Film	<u>1 man yr</u>		30,000			30,000	30,000	
- <u></u>	COMMINICATIONS	1- 1 <b>-</b>		·	·				
<u> </u>	Design Installation Ind					· · ·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	Consult			30 000	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		30 000	30 000	
	consurc.			30,000			30,000	30,000	
3.	CRIMINAL INFORMATION		*		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	COMPUTER PROGRAM								· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Systems Analyst	<u>60man wks</u>	\$15/hr.	36,000			36,000	36,000	
	Programmer	47 " "	\$10/hr.	18,800			18,800	18,800	
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PROFESSIONAL SERVICES - B

Diagram V-D

CARGORY TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION, & SUBSISTER - C

DIAGRAM\_ E

	Ttom	Quantity	Unit	Mode lst Yr	el 2nd Yr	3rd Yr	Total	LEAA Support	Grantee
-	1 OPERATIONS SUPPORT PROGRAM		11100					T	
· . <del>.</del>	Travel Fund	6 trips/	@ 500	6,000			6,000	6,000	
-		2 pers.							
	Comm. Liaison Sgt.	2 trips/							
		year	@ 400	800	800	800	2,400		2,400
	Subsistence	4 day							
		trip	\$25/day	200	200	200	600		600
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TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION & SUBSISTENCE - C

Diagram V-E

CALEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

## EQUIPMENT - D

## DIAGRAM

	<b>•</b>	Unit	Mode	e1	7.1.1	10 - 4 - T	LEAA	Grantee	
	Quantity	Price	<u>Ist Ir</u>	Zna Ir	<u>- Sra Ir</u>	<u>10tai</u>	Support	Contrib.	h
1. OPERATIONS SUPPORT PROGRAM		25.00	10 500			1 70 500	1 10 500		-
		3500	10,500			10,500	10,500		_
UTIICe									4
Desks (30x60 metal)	6	166		<u> </u>		996	996		4
Desk, Sec., Ped.	2	283				566	566		1
<u>Chair, Rev. Arm</u>	6	63			l	378	378		
Chair, Sec.	2	63				126	126		.]
Chair, Guest	10	26				260	260		4
Typewriter, Elec., 16"	2	468	·	· ·····	ļ	936	936		
Dictaphone & Transcriber	<u>2 ea.</u>	860				1720	1720		Į
<u>File Cabinet &amp; 3 drawer</u>		1 5 0							1
letter	2	150		<u></u>		300	300		
Cassette Tape Recorder	5	91				455	455		1
Cassette Tapes	450	1,70	425	170	170	765	765		
Bell Boy Alert	5	198/mo.	990	990	990	2970	2970		
Strike Force					<u>.</u>				
<u>Civilian Autos</u> • —	- 15	3500	52,500		<u> </u>	52,500	52,500		<u>+-</u> , ,
Mobile Scientific Invest.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·								151
Unit	1	9000				9,000	9,000		b
Laser Microprobe (Lab)	1	32000				32,000	32,000	K- '.	ſ.
Parabolie Microphone				·					ļ
(shotgun)	1	1700				1,700	1,700		
Silent Radio Alarm	90	1600				144,000	144,000		
Alarm Installation Kit	3	_107				321	321		]
Low Light TV Camera	1	7500				7,500	7,500		ļ
Attache Survival Kit									1
(Motorola)	1	1025				1,025	1,025		I
Elec. Survival Kit (SAC)	1	1825				1,825	1,825		[
100 mm Transmitters	4	475				1,900	1,900		
Binoculars	5	100				500	500		]
Camera (16 mm & Still)	2	1000				2,000	2,000		ł
"Starlight" lens Attach.	1	3500				3,500	3,500		
Surveillance Van									
(Equipped)	1	7200				7,200	7,200		
Alarm Sensor Devices									
Pads	15	10				_150	150		
Closing Clips	100 .	2				200	200		
Electric Eye									
Indoor	1	186				186	186		
Outdoor	1	243				243	243		
TV Training Equipment	20%	12000	800	800	800	2,400		2,400	
								1	

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EQUIPMENT - D

Page

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Diagram V-F

EQUIPMENT - D



		Unit	Mode	el			LEAA	Grantee
Item	Ouantity	Price	lst Yr	2nd Yr	3rd Yr	Total	Support	Contrib.
2. COMMUNICATIONS				1	[			1
Personal Port. Radios &		en ander anderskersenjagen in stagemann sagere se						1
Accessories	·····							
Portable Radios	200	1.029	205.800	·····		205.800	205,800	
Vehicular Chargers	200	85	17.000			17,000	17.000	
Earphones	100	10.20	1.020			1.020	1,020	
Speaker/Microphone	100	51.00	5,100			5,100	5,100	
Lapel Speakers	100	13.60	1,360			1.360	1,360	
Insulated Flat Antennas	200	2.50 (w/cr)	500	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		500	500	
20 Gang Battery Chargers	3	403.75	1,211			1,211	1,211	
10 Gang Battery Chargers	1	213	213			213	213	
Spare Batteries	20	42.50	850			850	850	
F-3 System Support								
Remote Sites - Voting Rec.	2	1,725.50	3,451			3,451	3,451	
(Antennas								
Feedlines								
Cavities								
Standby Battery Power)								
Local Site (Police Sta.)	1	3,591	3,591			3,591	3,591	
(90w Trans. Base Sta.								
Voting Receiver								
Cavities								
Antennas								
Feedlines)			·					
Emer. Op. Center Site	1	4,116	4,116			4,116	4,116	
(90w Trans. Base Sta.						-		
Voting Rec.								
Cavities								
Antennas								
Feedlines)								
Council Crest Site	L	4,716	4,716			4,716	4,716	
(90w Base Station								
Voting Receiver								
<u>Cavities</u>				· ····				
Antennas								
Feedlines)			10 - Million		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		-	
				·····			0.000	
<u>New Remote Site</u> .	1	8,000	8,000	-		8,000	8,000	
(90W Trans. Base Sta.								
Voting Receiver								
Cavities	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					and a second a second se		
Antennas								

23 - A

CALGORY \_\_

EQUIPMENT - D

			Unit	Mod	.e1			LEAA	Grantee
	Item	Quantity	Price	<u>lst Yr</u>	<u>2nd Yr</u>	<u>3rd Yr</u>	Total	Support	Contrib.
2.	COMMUNICATIONS (Cont.)								
	F-3 System Support	and all an experiment of the last of an experiment of the	a a fair a fair a suite an gur a' reals an faire a suite for a			1	1		1
·	New Remote Site (Cont.)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·							
	Feedlines				1		1	1	1
·····	Site Preparation)								
	F-1, F-2, F-4 Modifica-				1			1	
<u> </u>	tions to Existing System				1	1		1	
	Voting Receiver Sites	2	3,451	6,902			6,902	6,902	
	(Antenna				1	]	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1	1
	Base								
	Feedlines								
	Cavities)								
	Base Station Replacement					-	1		
	(F-1, F-2)	8	2,280	18,240			18,240	18,240	
	(Antennas	16	200	3,200			3,200	3,200	
	7/8" Foam Heliax Cable	3700'	1.80/ft	6,660			6,660	6,660	1
	Cavities	16	265	4,240			4,240	4,240	
р D	Heliax End Fittings)	16	52	832			832	832	
g	Misc. Hardware			600			600	600	
	Crystals	30	30	900			900	900	
76	Crystals	18	20	360			360	360	
	<u>Car (Comm. Sgt) w/Radio</u>	1	3,500	3,500			3,500		3,500
	Channel F-4 for Improve-								
	ment & Alarm Support								
	Equipment								
	Voting Receivers &								
	Encoders	5	1,496	7,840			7,840	7,840	
	Comparator	11	1,190	1,190			1,190	1,190	
. <u></u>	Comparator Channels	7	195	1,365			1,365	1,365	
	Receiver Antenna 5db	5	195	975			975	975	
<del></del>	Receiver Antenna Line								
<u> </u>	Kits	5	234	1,170			1,170	1,170	
	90w Base Sta. w/ voting	2	3,590	7,180			7,180	7,180	
	7/8" Heliax Trans. Line	800'	1.80/ft	1,440		l	1,440	1,440	
	End Fitting Kits	2	56	112			112	112	
	Tone Remote Consoles								
	w/mike	3	450	1,350			1,350	1,350	
	Base Antennas depressed								
	pattern 8db	2	230	460			460	460	
	Cavities	8	300	2,400			2,400	2,400	
<u> </u>					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		·····		
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			Unit	Mode	e1			LEAA	Grantee
	Item	Quantity	Price	lst Yr	2nd Yr	3rd Yr	Total	Support	Contrib.
3.	CRIMINAL INFORMATION								
	COMPUTER PROGRAM								
	Additional Core W/install	-						· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	(256K unit)	1	155,520	155,520			155,520	155,520	
				-					
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EGORY SUPPLIES & OPERATING EXPENSES - E



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			Unit	Mod	e1			LEAA	Grantee
Item	Qua	<u>ntity</u>	Price	<u>lst Yr</u>	2nd Yr	<u>3rd Yr</u>	<u>Total</u>	Support	<u>Contrib.</u>
] OPERATIONS SUPPORT		in . An ann an Airthean Airthean							
PROGRAMS	4								
Maintenance of vehic	les							1	
(20)									
Include:									
Operating Expense	18.0	000mi	10¢/mi.	36,000	36,000	36,000	108,000		108,000
Maintenance of Mobi	les 9.0	)00mi	10¢/mi.	900	900	900	2,700		2,700
<u>Miscellaneous office</u>									
supplies				500	300	300	1,100		1,100
Criminal Info. Gathe	ring						100,000	100,000	
Maintenance, Sgt's C	ar12,	000mi	<u>10¢/mi</u> .	1,200	1,200	1,200	3,600		3,600
Office Space:									
<u> </u>	1,00	)0 sq	4.50/sq	4,500	4,500	4,500	13,500		13,500
	fee	et	ft						
#2	300:	sq ft	4.50/sq	1,350	1,350	1,350	4,050		4,050
			ft	· · · · ·					
#3	400	sq ft	4.50/sq	1,800	1,800	1,800	5,400		5,400
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			ft	-					
<u> </u>									
#1 (2 lines, 3 instr	uments			498	248	248	994		994
<u>#2 (2 lines,3 instruction #2 (2 lines, 3 instruction #2 (2 lines, 3 instruction #2 )</u>	uments			<u>498</u>	248	248	994		994
<u>#3 (2 lines,2 instr</u>	uments			416	166	166	748		748
Training Replacement									
Personnel	1	5	9,860	147,900			147,900		147,900
Television Studio	2	08	175/mo.	420	420	420	1,260		1,260
2. COMMUNICATIONS				-		• •			
<u>Training Cost (Salar</u>	y for								
<u>Officers)</u>	74	0	7.50x4hr	22,200			22,200		22,200
3. CRIMINAL INFORMATION							• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	-	
COMPUTER PROGRAM					·				
Test Time, Computer	100	hrs.	\$135/hr	13,500			1 <b>3,</b> 500	13,500	
Test Time Overhead			-	11,500			11,500		11,500
Development overhead	107	man		20,200			20,200	-	20,200
	week	S		·		· ··			
Monthly Recurring Ch	arges								
<u>Video Terminal</u>	2	[	<u>\$155/mo</u>	-	3,720	3,720	7,440	7,440	
Printer	2		\$165/mo		3,960	3,960	7,920	7,920	
<u>Disk Drive</u>			\$1092/md		13,104	13,104	26,208	26,208	
<u>Core Maintenance</u>		<b></b> .	\$292/mo		3,480	3,480	6,960		6,960
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SUPPLIES & OPERATING EXPENSES - E

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Diagram V-G