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FINAL REPORT

EVALUATION OF ATLANTA-ANTI-ROBBERY UNIT PROJECT -
(April 1974 - March 1975)

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ACQUISITIONS

Georgia Institute of Technology

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Introduction

The Anti-Robbery Project (AR) is an outgrowth of a previous project known as the Anti-Robbery/Burglary Project (ARB). Evaluation of ARB revealed that the project was successful in reducing the rate of increase for robberies but was not effective in the burglary area. Utilizing this knowledge, the Anti-Robbery Project was formulated, employing the strategies and techniques which had been effective in ARB, but focusing only on robberies.

The purpose of the Anti-Robbery Project of the Atlanta Police Department is to reduce the number of commercial robberies and open space robberies committed in the City of Atlanta. The reduction in robberies is to be accomplished by use of police officers at stake out locations in high crime commercial areas and by the use of disguised police personnel at appropriate open spaces.

Police officers assigned to the decoy component of the project are placed in street environments disguised in a fashion to portray various social and economic character roles. Assignments as to location depend primarily on the analysis of current statistical data. Members of the individual squads are placed in various roles and physical settings as potential victims of a robbery. The disguises utilized portray individuals typical to the physical and social surroundings of the area in which they are working. Officers in each setting are positioned so as to assure the safety of all the officers and citizens involved, in addition to a safe and sure apprehension of the perpetrator.

Police officers assigned to the stake-out components of the project are placed in commercial settings in an attempt to effect a decrease in commercial

robberies. Officers make every effort to conceal their presence at the various business locations. They enter the location in plain clothes and then switch to police coveralls or a police shirt and cap in order to assure proper identification without sacrificing the project strategy. Assignments as to the type of business and specific location depend on statistical data pin-pointing the location as an area of high risk in addition to a coordination of concern and effort between the Commander of the Anti-Robbery Project and the management of the particular business. Officers working in this capacity conceal themselves either within the physical structure of the business or in a nearby location enabling the certainty of detection and apprehension of the perpetrator of a crime. Officers positioned within buildings utilize body armor and protective head gear in an effort to assure their safety in the act of disrupting a robbery in progress. Warning/monitoring systems were to be installed in order to confuse the perpetrator into surrendering and reducing the potential use of firearms to effect an arrest. Officers assigned in such commercial environments are armed with the 12 gauge shotgun. These weapons, with the proper ammunition, are considered to be the best available for use in this type of police activity. Appendix I specifies the standard operating procedures for the AR Project.

The AR Project was originally planned to operate from April 1974-March 1975. The grant award, however, was delayed until August 1974, and was not accepted by the City of Atlanta until September 3, 1974. During the period of non-federal funding, the unit consisted of nine superior officers, eleven detectives, thirty-one plain clothes officers, and one clerical person. Under federal funding there were two less superior officers and patrolmen were elevated to the rank of Detective. Selection and training for the federally funded AR Unit did not begin until October 17, 1974.

Sixty-six (66) police personnel passed the AR Unit selection test on October 17-27, 1974. Thirty-one (31) were selected and assigned permanent detective status in the Unit. The AR Project, which already had 11 officers of detective status assigned to the project, now had a full time operating staff of 42 assigned AR detectives, seven superior officers, a crime analyst, and one clerical person. During this same time period, 100 personnel were selected for permanent overtime status.

Training was conducted by the Training Division of the Bureau of Police Services for one week, November 11-15, 1974. The 40 hour classroom training period involved 42 detectives, 4 sergeants and 2 lieutenants. On November 18 and 19, the detectives received 16 hours of firearm training. The AR Project became fully operational on November 20, 1974.

Project Goals

Two goals have been established against which to measure the success of this grant. The first goal is a 20% decrease in commercial robberies by the end of the grant period (2 years after initiation). The second goal is a 15% decrease in open space robberies. Interim goals include a 10% reduction in commercial robberies approximately 12 months after grant initiation and a 5% reduction in open space robberies in the same period. Since the Anti-Robbery Project was originally planned to operate from April 1974-March 1975, baseline data for the purposes of grant evaluation were to be taken from the period April 1973-March 1974. Due to the delays in project implementation, it appeared that the original baseline should be changed to the 12 months immediately preceding project implementation (November 1973 to October 1974). However, closer examination of the situation revealed that a non-federally funded Anti-Robbery Unit conducting the same activities as described for the project existed in the Atlanta Bureau of Police Services from the end

of the ARB program until November. Therefore, it was only during the November training period that the AR unit did not have the capability of producing the desired effects since AR personnel were actively "on the street" the rest of the time.

Given these considerations, the choice was made to use the original baseline data taken for the period April 1973-March 1974. It was further decided to compare data for the 12 months before ARB, during ARB, and from April 1974 to March 1975.

The baseline data, summarized in Table I, include 2,084 open space robberies and 1,233 commercial robberies. The goals for the AR unit for the year (April 1974-March 1975) would be to reduce the number of commercial robberies by 10% and to reduce the number of open space robberies by 5%.

Table II extends the data shown in Table I to include the first quarter of 1975. As previously noted, the end of March 1975 marks the end of the first full year after the baseline data were taken. It is appropriate, then, to measure the results of the Anti-Robbery Project against the interim goal specified above.

Table I

ROBBERIES COMMITTED, BY TYPE, DURING ANTI-ROBBERY BASE YEAR AND PROJECT

Base Year

Type of Robbery	1 9 7 3										1 9 7 4			Total Jan-Mar 1974	Total for Base Yr
	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total Apr-Dec 1973	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Open Space	76	140	176	212	194	197	181	186	186	1548	221	129	186	536	2084
Commercial	65	64	88	114	105	121	106	121	137	921	134	88	90	312	1233
Residential	22	34	21	31	28	32	26	41	70	305	58	50	44	152	457
Miscellaneous	<u>146</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>331</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>113</u>	<u>444</u>
TOTAL	309	269	299	368	350	375	345	376	414	3105	468	300	345	1113	4218

PROJECT

Type of Robbery	1 9 7 4									Total for Apr-Dec 74	Total for 1974
	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec		
Open Space	153	152	113	176	183	148	149	142	212	1428	1964
Commercial	78	67	86	86	75	71	95	171	145	874	1186
Residential	36	40	39	45	44	31	50	67	79	431	583
Miscella- neous	35	52	64	32	19	44	36	81	111	474	587
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	302	311	302	339	321	294	330	461	547	3207	4320

Table II

Robberies Committed, by Type, During 1975

Type of Robbery	Jan	Feb	Mar	1st Quarter Total	Total for Apr 74 - Mar 75 (First year of AR Project)
Open Space	143	126	116	385	1813
Commercial	86	64	69	219	1093
Residential	80	44	54	178	609
Miscellaneous	<u>94</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>305</u>	<u>779</u>
	403	336	348	1087	4294

Achievement of Goals: Commercial Robberies

The goal for commercial robberies for the first year of the project was a 10% decrease in the number of commercial robberies. From Tables I and II we see that 1233 commercial robberies were committed during the base year and 1093 commercial robberies were committed during the first full year after the base year. This represents a decrease of 11% from the base period. Hence the interim goal for the reduction of commercial robberies by 10% has been slightly exceeded. If current trends continue, the second year goal will also be met or exceeded.

Achievement of Goals: Open Space Robberies

The goal for open space robberies for the first year of this project was a 5% decrease. From Tables I and II we see that 2084 open space robberies took place during the base year while 1813 open space robberies were recorded during the first full year after the base year. This represents a decrease of 271 open space robberies or a decrease of 13% from the base period. Thus the interim goal for reduction of open space robberies by 5% has been far exceeded. Indeed, the two year goal of a 15% decrease in open space robberies has almost been met.

Achievement of Objectives for the Anti-Robbery Unit Project

In addition to specific goals for reducing robberies in Atlanta, several additional objectives were established in the AR grant. One of these objectives was for the project operations to achieve twenty-five on-site apprehensions in commercial and open space robberies per quarter. As shown by Table III, the actual success during the period April 1974 - March 1975, significantly exceeded the objective. 81 on-site apprehensions were recorded during the first quarter (April-June 1974), 77 were recorded during the second quarter (July-September 1974), 42 were recorded during the third quarter (October-December 1974), and 54 were recorded the fourth quarter.

Another objective was to obtain at least 250 operations (disguised police and stakeouts) each month. As Table III shows, in every month except July 1974, this objective was achieved. In July, the AR unit was not federally funded, and thus the specific objective did not apply. During the actual period of full operation under federal funding (Dec. 1974 - March 1975), the objective has been significantly exceeded.

A third objective was to achieve a conviction rate of at least 90% for on-site robbery apprehensions. From the data available, only eight such convictions resulted during the period of evaluation. This abnormally low conviction rate could be explained by lengthy court processing times, and possibly inadequate data keeping measures. Often a conviction does not occur until many months after the crime is committed.

Special Study: Correlation Analysis

In an effort to gain further insight into the effectiveness of the Anti-Robbery Unit, the evaluation team performed a correlation analysis.

Table III

Summary of Anti-Robbery Unit Operations

	Number of AR Operations*	Disguised Police Operations	Stake-Out	Total	Number of On-Site Apprehensions				Resulting Number of Convictions
					Total for Quarter	Non AR Officers in AR Operating Areas**	Total	Total for Quarter	
April, 1974	279	35	0	35		19	54		---
May	311	12	0	12	81	9	21	120	4
June	279	33	1	34		11	45		---
July	243	26	4	30		24	54		---
Aug	371	30	2	32	77	18	50	148	
Sept	324	15	0	15		29	44		---
Oct	320	6	0	6		16	22		---
Nov	320	8	0	8	42	21	29	92	3
Dec	563	22	6	28		13	41		---
Jan 1975	523	23	3	26		27	53		---
Feb	496	10	2	12	54	26	38	122	---
Mar	501	12	4	16		15	31		1

*Includes only commercial and open space robberies

**Includes all robberies

This analysis examined the following:

- 1) Were AR operations concentrated in high robbery sections of the city?
- 2) Did AR operations result in short term reductions in robberies?
- 3) Were AR operations responsive to short-term increases in robberies in various sections of the city?
- 4) Were the number of apprehensions by AR personnel related to the number of AR operations?

Data for this analysis consisted of eleven (11) monthly AR reports, with data listed by census tracts. Since in many census tracts, police operations were recorded in only a few months, only those census tracts in which data was recorded in five or more months were considered.

Twenty-nine (29) census tracts fit this criteria and monthly data for open space robberies, commercial robberies, total robberies, number of disguised police operations, number of stakeouts and number of on-site apprehensions for each of the census tracts were incorporated in the study. Simple correlation coefficients were computed using all data points of the various categories. This coefficient, the Pearson r , ranges between -1.0 and $+1.0$. A coefficient of $+1.0$ denotes perfect correlation, that is, if the value of one variable increases, the value of the other will increase. A coefficient of 0.0 indicates that no relation can be established between the two variables, and a coefficient of -1.0 indicates that if the value of one variable increases, the other will decrease.

A correlation coefficient indicates only a relationship and does not provide cause and effect information. In the Anti-Robbery Unit's environment, with a multitude of important uncontrolled variables, the correlations can only be used to make general implications.

The results of the first correlation run are shown in Table IV. For purposes of this analysis, a correlation coefficient is probably meaningful if it is larger than .25 or smaller than -.25.

Table IVA displays a number of significant correlations. The number of disguised police operations is correlated strongly with open space robberies, total robberies, and number of apprehensions. This would suggest that these operations were concentrated in the areas of highest robbery incidence. The number of stakeouts, however, shows no significant correlation, whereas total AR operations are moderately correlated with all robbery types as well as the number of apprehensions. This suggests that, in general, the highest number of disguised police and stakeout operations were in areas of highest robbery incidence. Also, the number of apprehensions were related to disguised police operations and total AR operations, but not stakeouts. In the future correlations for specific types of apprehensions (disguised police or stakeout) could be determined to find the relationship between stakeout operations and stakeout apprehensions.

Correlations between current month's police operations and previous month's robberies were derived in an attempt to establish the responsiveness of the AR unit to increases in robberies in specific sectors of the city. If robberies increased in a given census tract one month, AR operations should increase the next month. Correlations between previous month's AR operations and current month's robberies were also derived. These calculations were performed to find the effect of AR operations on short term robberies. If AR operations increased in a given census tract in one month, robberies should decrease the next month. Tables IVB and C display the computed coefficients. The evaluation team determined that these results were not really reliable since they represented gross

Table

A) Correlation Coefficients of Monthly Census Tract Data

Current Month's Data	Current Month's Data	Number of Disguised Police Operations	Number of Stakeouts	Total Number of AR Operations	Number of Apprehensions
Open Space Robberies		.7721	-.1224	.3290	.7204
Commercial Robberies		.2483	.1857	.3096	.3037
Total Robberies		.6749	-.0343	.3539	.6705
Number of Apprehensions		.5328	-.0342	.2721	--

B) Correlation Coefficients of Current Month's Police Operations and Previous Month's Robberies

Previous Month's Data	Current Month's Data	Number of Disguised Police Operations	Number of Stakeouts	Total Number of AR Operations	Number of Apprehensions
Open Space Robberies		.7353	-.0715	.3026	.2789
Commercial Robberies		.2483	.2277	.3568	.1545
Total Robberies		.6748	.0045	.3507	.3229
Number of Apprehensions		.4939	-.0576	.2039	--

C) Correlation Coefficients of Previous Month's Police Operations and Current Month's Robberies

Current Month's Data	Previous Month's Data	Number of Disguised Police Operations	Number of Stakeouts	Total Number of AR Operations	Number of Apprehensions
Open Space Robberies		.7721	-.1224	.3666	.7204
Commercial Robberies		.3054	-.0859	.1032	.3466
Total Robberies		.6719	-.1205	.2889	.5259
Number of Apprehensions		.2387	-.1033	.0475	--

results rather than actual changes. In order to derive more reliable correlations, the percentage change from one month to the next was computed for all data in each category. The correlation coefficients were then computed in the same manner as shown in Table IV. These results are shown in Table V. Only one coefficient in the entire set of tables shows any degree of significance. This is the correlation between the % change in disguised police operations and the % change in open space robberies during the current month. The positive correlation can be interpreted two different ways. One implication is that disguised police operations respond to an increase in open space robberies in a census tract by increasing their activities. Another quite different implication is that as the number of disguised police operations increases, the number of open space robberies increases. Without significant correlations between other variables, this question cannot be resolved. The general lack of significance seen in Table V could suggest several situations:

- 1) Short term responses are accomplished in much less (or much more) than a month's time and, thus, do not show up in the monthly data, or

- 2) The AR Unit has not responded to short term changes in robbery rates in different areas, (communications with the Project Director have indicated that the AR Unit has responded to bi-weekly and, in some incidences, even weekly changes) and increased operations have had little effect on the robbery rate in a census tract, or

- 3) Census tracts are not the proper area for this type of analysis; changes in the robbery rate occur either in a much more confined area (e.g. Underground Atlanta) or in a much larger area (e.g. Northside Atlanta).

Effect of Anti-Robbery Program on all Robberies

Figure 1 shows the historical trend of the incidence of robberies in Atlanta. A least squares regression line was fitted to the data shown in Table VI in order to estimate the number of robberies which would

A) Correlation Coefficients of Percentage Changes in Monthly Census Tract Data

	% Change-In			
	Disguised Police Operations	Stakeouts	Total Number of AR Operations	Number of Apprehensions
% Change in				
Open Space Robberies	.255	-.036	-.0245	.128
Commercial Robberies	-.064	.031	.0331	.161
Total Robberies	.028	-.058	-.0025	.096
Number of Apprehensions	-.045	.038	.0276	-

B) Correlation Coefficients of Previous Month's % Change in AR Operations and Current Month's % Change in Robberies

	Previous Month's % Change In			
	Disguised Police Operations	Stakeouts	Total Number of AR Operations	Number of Apprehensions
Current % Change in				
Open Space Robberies	-.162	-.086	-.0306	-.577
Commercial Robberies	-.088	-.107	-.1035	.026
Total Robberies	-.122	.076	-.0751	-.099
Number of Apprehensions	-.063	-.053	-.0544	-

C) Correlation Coefficients of Current Month's % Change in AR Operations and Previous Month's % Change in Robberies

	Current Month's % Change In			
	Disguised Police Operations	Stakeouts	Total Number of AR Operations	Number of Apprehensions
Previous Month's % Change in				
Open Space Robberies	-.059	.032	.0073	-.041
Commercial Robberies	.028	.174	.1784	.002
Total Robberies	-.012	.100	.1101	.257
Number of Apprehensions	.021	-.028	-.0353	

Figure 1, Time History
of Total Annual Robberies
Committed in Atlanta




Table VI

REPORTED ROBBERIES

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Robberies</u>
1966	573
1967	742
1968	926
1969	1229
1970	2184
1971	2323
1972	3074
1973	4146
1974	4320

occur in 1973 and 1974. Since 1970 seemed to be an anomalous year, one regression line was fitted without using this year's data. In 1973 and 1974, anti-robbery programs existed in Atlanta, (the Anti-Robbery/Burglary Project (ARB) operated from March 30, 1973, until April 30, 1974, a non-federally funded anti-robbery unit operated from April until November of 1974, and the Anti-Robbery Unit operated from November 20, 1974, until the present). To determine the overall effect of these programs on robbery in Atlanta, the number of robberies estimated by the regression line can be compared with the actual number reported. The ARB Project was designed, as was the AR unit, to reduce commercial and open space robberies. In 1973, when the ARB Project operated, robberies in Atlanta followed the regression lines almost perfectly. The consistency with which total robberies, during the period April 1973 to March 1974, followed the long-run historical rate of increase would tend to downgrade the success of the ARB Project in reducing the overall occurrence of robbery. In the Final Evaluation Report on the ARB Project, however, an analysis of overall robberies within a short term time scale (April 1971-March 1974) showed a more significant impact. This analysis indicated that robberies increased 76.2% between the year beginning April, 1971 and the year beginning in April 1972. However, robberies increased only 16.4% between the year beginning April 1972, and the year beginning April 1973, (when ARB was in operation). This significant reduction in the rate of increase can be partially attributed to the ARB Project's effectiveness.

An analysis of specific types of robberies committed during the ARB Project shows that commercial robberies declined significantly (-13.3%) when compared to commercial robberies committed the previous year (see Table VII). Evaluating the effect of the ARB Project on open space robberies

1971	252	234	320	269	1095
1972	299 (18%) ¹	405 (73%)	358 (11.9%)	314 (17%)	1376 (28%)
1973	217 (-27%)	340 (-15%)	364 (2%)	312 (-1%)	1233 (-10.4%)
1974	231 (6.4%)	232 (-31.8%)	411 (11.4%)	219 (3%)	1093 (-11.3%)

Open Space and Miscellaneous Robberies

YEAR	AMJ	JAS	OND	JFM	TOTAL
1971	212	246	252	199	909
1972	346 (63.2%)	545 (122%)	501 (98.9%)	594 (198.5%)	1986 (118.5%)
1973	583 (68.5%)	662 (21.5%)	634 (26.5%)	649 (9.1%)	2528 (27.3%)
1974	569 (2.4%)	602 (-10.0%)	731 (13.3%)	690 (6%)	2592 (3%)

No Anti Robbery Program ☐

Anti Robbery/Burglary Program ☒

Anti Robbery Unit (non-federally funded) ☒

Anti Robbery Unit Program ☒

¹Percentage change in robberies from the same quarter of the previous year.


was more of a problem due to robbery categorization changes which occurred at the beginning of 1973. Many types of robberies which were previously classed as "Miscellaneous" were brought under the "Open Space" classification. For this reason, no comparison could be made between the number of open space robberies committed during the project and in the base year. By evaluating the combined open space and miscellaneous robberies, some indication of the effect of ARB can be achieved. As seen in Table V, open space and miscellaneous robberies had been increasing at rates equal to or greater than 100% during the 9 months prior to the initiation of ARB. During ARB's operation, this phenomenal rate of increase gradually slackened, and declined to a 9.1% increase between the first three months of 1973 and the first three months of 1974.

Although the success of the ARB Project in achieving the goal of a 30% reduction in reported robberies was questionable, the program did seem to have an effect on the incidence of robbery, especially in the commercial robbery classification.

The Anti-Robbery unit operating after the ARB has been somewhat more successful to this point in time. The success of the unit in reducing commercial and open space robberies has already been discussed. If one attributes the changes in the robbery rate to the Anti-Robbery unit, its effect on all robberies has also been quite significant. Although the total number of robberies committed in 1974 represented a 4.2% increase over those committed in 1973, this represents the smallest increase over the past eight years. Figure 2 displays this substantially lowered rate of increase which has been approached in only one other year, 1971. The percentage increase in 1971 could be classed as anomalous since it followed the massive increase in robberies committed during 1970. If we average the percentage increase over the two-year period 1969 to

Figure 2

Percentage Increase in Robbery Rate From Previous Year



1971, the increase from 1969-1970 and from 1970-1971 can be assigned a 37.4% annual rate. This alteration is shown as a dotted line in Figure 2. By viewing the historical trend in this manner, the percentage reduction in 1974 is shown to be an even greater exception to the historical trend. As seen from the data for the first quarter 1975 these moderating trends are continuing (see Table II).

The two linear regression models graphed in Figure 1 predicted robberies totalling 5317 and 5751 in 1974. The actual number of robberies (4320) represents a 19% decrease in the former prediction and a 25% decrease in the latter. Considering the difficult economic times of 1974, which are often hypothesized to contribute to increases, rather than decreases, in the rate of crime growth, the record of the Anti-Robbery unit is quite impressive..

Another effect of the Anti-Robbery Project has been increased reliance on quantitative data. The Anti-Robbery unit now issues a weekly report which is distributed to other units in the police department as well as to Anti-Robbery personnel. All zone commanders and the Majors in charge of Field Operations and Special Operations receive enough copies to provide each unit under their command with the information. Other impact projects which are receiving the benefit of these reports include Helicopters, High Crime Foot Patrol, and the Model Cities Crime Control Team.

These reports give a detailed analysis of robberies committed during the week. They provide a means of monitoring current situations and enabling quick reaction to potential problem areas. A sample report is included as Appendix II.

Cost Analysis

In order to better understand the value of the Anti-Robbery project, an analysis of project costs was also performed. The analysis was divided into three phases, corresponding to the three different patterns of project organization over the total life of the anti-robbery effort.

- Phase I: April, 1973 through April, 1974. During this phase the project was a combined Anti-Robbery/Burglary project, sponsored by LEAA under the Impact Program. Decoy tactics were employed against robbery, and stakeout tactics were used against both robbery and burglary.

- Phase II: May, 1974 to mid-November, 1974. This phase is an interim phase between the Impact-sponsored projects of Phases I and III. Decoy and stakeout operations were continued against robbery, but burglary activity was discontinued. In addition, most project staff were reduced from Detective to Patrolmen rank, and no overtime charges were allowed.

- Phase III: mid-November, 1974 through April, 1975. This phase covers the portion of the Impact-sponsored, Anti-Robbery project for which data was available at the time of this report. The full project will extend through June, 1976. During this phase decoy and stakeout tactics were used against robbery only.

Tables 1, 2, and 3 summarize the results of the cost analysis for the three phases.* Decoy and stakeout operations are considered separately in Tables 2 and 3, and combined totals are shown in Table 1.

A number of observations can be made about the information presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3. First, the data illustrate the wide variations in division of activity between stakeout and decoy which have occurred

*See the discussion at the end of this section and Tables 4, 5, and 6 for details on the calculation of information in Tables 1, 2, and 3.

TABLE 1

ALLOCATION TO ROBBERY BY PHASES-SUMMARY

	Phase I ¹ (4/73 thru 4/74)	Phase II ² (5/74 thru 11/11/74)	Phase III ² (11/12/74 thru 4/75)	Total
Salaries	\$681,200	\$346,300	\$442,900	\$1,470,400
Travel	800	500	400	1,700
Equipment	34,600	19,800	16,700	71,100
Supplies & Operating Expenses	<u>14,800</u>	<u>12,400</u>	<u>11,900</u>	<u>39,100</u>
Total	\$731,400	\$379,000	\$471,900	\$1,582,300
Average Monthly Cost	\$ 56,262	\$ 58,308	\$ 85,800	\$ 63,292
Number of Opera- tions ³	4,140	2,192	2,735	9,067
Average No. of Opera- tions per month	318	337	497	363
Cost per Operation \$	177	173	173	175
Arrests ³	205	133	109	447
Average No. of Arrests per month	15.8	20.5	19.8	17.9
Cost per Arrest \$	3,568	2,850	4,329	3,540
Arrest per Operation	.050	.061	.040	.049

¹Includes Robbery Stakeout and Decoy but not Burglary Stakeout Aspects of the Anti-Robbery/Burglary Project.

²Includes Robbery Stakeout and Decoy

³From Impact Evaluation Data

TABLE 2

ALLOCATION TO DECOY - SUMMARY

	Phase I (4/73 thru 4/74)	Phase II (5/74 thru 11/11/74)	Phase III (11/12/74 thru 4/75)	Total
Salaries	\$249,900	\$159,800	\$ 55,500	\$465,200
Travel	300	200	100	600
Equipment	9,200	5,600	2,200	17,000
Supplies & Operating Expenses	3,900	3,800	1,100	8,800
Total	\$263,300	\$169,400	\$ 58,900	\$491,600
Average Monthly Cost	\$ 20,254	\$ 26,062	\$ 10,709	\$ 19,664
Number of Operations	1,084	692	249	2,025
Average No. of Operations per Month	83	106	45	81
Cost per Operation	\$ 243	\$ 245	\$ 237	\$ 243
Arrests	189	126	91	406
Average no. of Arrests per month	14.5	19.4	16.6	16.2
Cost per Arrest	\$ 1,393	\$ 1,344	\$ 647	\$ 1,211
Arrests per Operation	0.17	0.18	0.37	0.20

TABLE 3

ALLOCATION TO ROBBERY STAKEOUT - SUMMARY

	Phase I (4/73 thru 4/74)	Phase II (5/74 thru 11/11/74)	Phase III (11/12/74 thru 4/75)	Total
Salaries	\$431,300	\$186,500	\$387,400	\$1,005,200
Travel	500	300	300	1,100
Equipment	25,400	14,200	14,500	54,100
Supplies & Operating Expenses	10,900	8,600	10,800	30,300
Total	\$468,100	\$209,600	\$413,000	\$1,090,700
Average Monthly Cost	\$ 36,008	\$ 32,246	\$ 75,091	\$ 43,628
Number of Operations	3,056	1,500	2,486	7,042
Average No. of Operations per month	235	231	452	282
Cost per Operation	153	140	166	155
Arrests	16	7	18	41
Average No. of Arrests per month	1.2	1.1	3.3	1.6
Cost per Arrest	\$ 29,256	\$ 29,943	\$ 22,944	\$ 26,602
Arrests per Operation	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.006

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TABLE 3
 ALLOCATION TO ROBBERY STAKEOUT - SUMMARY

	Phase I (4/73 thru 4/74)	Phase II (5/74 thru 11/11/74)	Phase III (11/12/74 thru 4/75)	Total
Salaries	\$431,300	\$186,500	\$387,400	\$1,005,200
Travel	500	300	300	1,100
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Supplies & Operating Expenses	10,900	8,600	10,800	30,300
Total	\$468,100	\$209,600	\$413,000	\$1,090,700
Average Monthly Cost	\$ 36,008	\$ 32,246	\$ 75,091	\$ 43,628
Number of Operations	3,056	1,500	2,486	7,042
Average No. of Operations per month	235	231	452	282
Cost per Operation	153			
Arrests		140		

TABLE 4

ALLOCATION TO DECOY DETAIL

	Phase I (4/73 thru 4/74)	Phase II (5/74 thru 11/11/74)	Phase III (11/12/74 thru 4/75)	Total
Staff Salaries	\$209,500 40,000	\$159,800 -0-	\$43,000 12,500 -0-	\$412,300 52,900 -0- \$465,200

TABLE 3

ALLOCATION TO ROBBERY STAKEOUT - SUMMARY

	Phase I (4/73 thru 4/74)	Phase II (5/74 thru 11/11/74)	Phase III (11/12/74 thru 4/75)	Total
Salaries	\$431,300	\$186,500	\$387,400	\$1,005,200
Travel	500	300	300	1,100
Equipment	25,400	14,200	14,500	54,100
Supplies & Operating Expenses	10,900	8,600	10,800	30,300
Total	\$468,100	\$209,600	\$413,000	\$1,090,700
Average Monthly Cost	\$ 36,008	\$ 32,246	\$ 75,091	\$ 43,628
Number of Operations	3,056	1,500	2,486	7,042
Average No. of Operations per month	235	231		
Cost per Operation	153			

TABLE 5

ALLOCATION TO ROBBERY STAKEOUT DETAILPhase I
(4/73 thru 4/74)Phase II
(5/74 thru 11/11/74)Phase III
(11/12/74 thru 4/75)

Total

Salaries \$313,000

\$186,500
-0-\$242,800
70,600

74,000

\$742,300
130,900

132,000

\$1,005,200

TABLE 3

ALLOCATION TO ROBBERY STAKEOUT - SUMMARY

	Phase I (4/73 thru 4/74)	Phase II (5/74 thru 11/11/74)	Phase III (11/12/74 thru 4/75)	Total
Salaries	\$431,300	\$186,500	\$387,400	\$1,005,200
Travel	500	300	300	1,100
Equipment	25,400	14,200	14,500	54,100
Supplies & Operating Expenses	10,900	8,600	10,800	30,300
Total	\$468,100	\$209,600	\$413,000	\$1,090,700
Average Monthly Cost	\$ 36,008	\$ 32,246	\$ 75,091	\$ 43,628
Number of Operations	3,056	1,500	2,486	
Average No. of Operations				

4)

0
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00
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5,300

STAKEOUT DETAIL

TABLE 3

ALLOCATION TO ROBBERY STAKEOUT - SUMMARY

	Phase I (4/73 thru 4/74)	Phase II (5/74 thru 11/11/74)	Phase III (11/12/74 thru 4/75)	Total
Salaries	\$431,300	\$186,500	\$387,400	\$1,005,200
Travel	500	300	300	1,100
Equipment	25,400	14,200	14,500	54,100
Supplies & Operating Expenses	10,900	8,600	10,800	30,300
Total	\$468,100	\$209,600	\$413,000	\$1,090,700
Average Monthly Cost	\$ 36,008	\$ 32,246		

Number of Oper-

allocated to the various phases of the project in

-29-

relation to the length of the phases. Within phases, travel cost was allocated on the same base as regular staff salaries. For example, the \$300 for Phase III - Stakeout was calculated

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} \$300 = & (85\% \text{ of man-days}) & \times & (5 \frac{1}{2} \text{ months}) & \div & (39 \text{ total months}) & \times & (\text{Total Travel}) \\ & \text{in Stakeout} & & \text{in Phase III} & & & & \text{of \$2,900} \end{array}$$

SUPPLIES AND EXPENSE

1. Vehicle Maintenance. Total vehicle maintenance costs for the periods 7/73 - 11/73, 1/74 - 3/74 and 11/74 - 4/75 were obtained from police fiscal records. Data for other periods was estimated at the monthly average of \$1632 experienced in 7/73 - 11/73 and 1/74 - 3/74. Allocation to crimes and tactics within phases was on the basis of the number of operations recorded in police files. Thus, the \$9,700 for Phase III - Stakeout was calculated

$$\$9,700 = \left(\begin{array}{c} 2486 \text{ Stakeout} \\ \text{Operations} \end{array} \right) \div \left(\begin{array}{c} 2735 \text{ total} \\ \text{Operations} \end{array} \right) \times \left(\begin{array}{c} \$10,700 \text{ total} \\ \text{vehicle maintenance} \\ \text{for Phase III} \end{array} \right)$$

2. Other Supplies and Expenses. Totals for other supplies and expense items (including especially ammunition and disguise supplies) were obtained from police fiscal records. The method of allocation for these costs was identical to that described above for Travel.

EQUIPMENT

1. Motor Vehicles and Accessories. Total cost information on motor vehicles and accessory equipment (blue lights, etc.) was collected from police fiscal records and depreciated on a straight line basis over a 60 month period. The allocation

$$\$1300 = \left(\begin{array}{l} 1250 \text{ Burglary} \\ \text{Stakeouts} \\ \text{Phase I} \end{array} \right) \div \left(\begin{array}{l} 4306 \text{ Total} \\ \text{Stakeouts} \\ \text{Phase I} \end{array} \right) \times \left(\begin{array}{l} 13 \text{ months} \\ \text{Phase I} \end{array} \right) \div \left(\begin{array}{l} 60 \text{ month} \\ \text{useful} \\ \text{life} \end{array} \right) \\
 \times \left(\begin{array}{l} \$20,400 \text{ heavy} \\ \text{armor cost} \end{array} \right)$$

5. Weapons. Cost allocations for rifles and shotguns used in stakeout were calculated exactly as described for Heavy Body Armor.
6. Body Bugs. Cost for body bugs were determined from police fiscal records and allocated exactly as described for Disguises except that a useful life of 60 months was assumed.
7. Radios. Analysis was identical to Motor Vehicles and Accessories.
8. Light Body Armor. Analysis was identical to Motor Vehicles and Accessories.
9. Optical Equipment. Analysis was identical to Motor Vehicles and Accessories.
10. Monitoring and Warning Devices. Cost allocations for monitoring and warning devices were made from estimates contained in the grant applications because actual costs have not yet been established. The assignment of costs was made in the same manner as heavy body armor.

APPENDIX I

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR
ANTI-ROBBERY PROJECT

FROM THE COMMANDER:

This manual contains the standard operating procedures of the Anti-Robbery Section. It shall set policy for the formal operation of the Anti-Robbery Section, and includes the following areas of concern:

- A. Procedures for the selection of officers to be assigned to the AR Section, review of past service records, minimum standards, objective oral review, etc. (Psychological testing excluded)
- B. Rules regulations and policies governing the operations of the AR Section, ~~required~~ basic in-service training, policies on officers' conduct, use of deadly weapons, reasons for removal, etc.
- C. Policies concerning conduct during decoy and stakeout operations as it relates to entrapment, i.e. lying down with money displayed, proper identification of officers after discovery, level of supervision on the streets, etc.

Each member of the Anti-Robbery Section will receive a copy of this manual, and shall thoroughly familiarize himself with same, particularly the sections applicable to his specific duties and responsibilities.

The procedures in this manual will be strictly adhered to by all Anti-Robbery personnel.

A. A. Harris
Capt. A. A. Harris
Anti-Robbery Section

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

Anti-Robbery Section

Bureau of Police Services
City of Atlanta, Georgia

Capt. A. A. Harris, Commander

OBJECTIVES AND GOALS

The primary purpose of the AR Section is to detect and apprehend robbers during the actual commission of robberies of businesses and pedestrians. The objectives and goals of the AR Section are to reduce the number of robberies in the City of Atlanta in accordance with the AR Grant: 10% reduction in commercial robberies by the end of the first year; 20% reduction of commercial robberies by the end of the second year; 5% reduction in open-space robberies by the end of the first year; 15% reduction of open-space robberies by the end of the second year. Also, 25 on-site apprehensions for commercial and open-space robberies per quarter and a conviction rate of at least 90% for on-site apprehensions.

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STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

AR COMMAND AND OPERATIONS

Psychological Deterrent

One of the methods of the AR Section is to strategically locate its detectives in various locations throughout the city, in conjunction with the statistical data, in an effort to instill in the would be robber's mind that a stakeout detective may be in any establishment he may choose to victimize.

Another program in AR which serves as a psychological deterrent is the stakeout sign poster which is visably posted at the entrance of participating commercial establishments, which reads:

ROBBER/BURGLAR NOTICE

This is a Stakeout Location
When Challenged by Police
Do Not Move or Turn!
Drop Your Weapon Immediately!
Raise Your Hands Immediately!

Atlanta Police Department
Anti-Robbery/Burglary Section

AR Work Operations

The AR Section is organizationally structured in the Criminal Investigations Section of the Field Operations Division of the Bureau of Police Services, and under the direct command of Captain A. A. Harris.

AR Detectives are divided into four squads, working day, evening, and morning watch hours.

Due to changes in robbery patterns, the AR command must be flexible in its assignment and deployment of personnel, and for this reason the strength and working hours of the squads may be changed from time to time, also the detectives are subject to call at any time.

C. AR Personnel

The AR Section has a total complement of 51; one captain, one executive lieutenant, one field lieutenant, four supervisory sergeants, 42 detectives, one analyst, and one secretary.

(Also the utilization of 50 extra overtime personnel the first year, and 25 extra overtime personnel the second year who will be selected from patrolmen and detectives throughout the department.)

D. Selection of AR Personnel and Training

The procedure for the selection of officers to assigned to the AR Unit will be as follows:

1. Notice will be placed in the police daily bulletin that vacancies are available. (Officers with not less than 16 months service.)
2. Recommendations from superior officers and AR detectives will be requested.
3. Past history records of all applicants will be thoroughly examined, particularly extra overtime personnel.
4. Past supervisors of all applicants will be consulted as to applicants suitability for a duty. Performance and background records from Internal Investigations will be checked.
5. Interviews of all remaining applicants will be conducted by AR Sergeants and Lieutenants, who will each document in writing, their reasons for acceptance or rejection of remaining applicants.
6. The documents (Section 5) from the sergeants and lieutenants will then be submitted to the AR Captain, who will, himself, conduct interviews and make the final selections.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPERIOR OFFICERS

A. Captain

The AR Captain is the commander of the AR Section and is responsible for the overall planning, operation, and direction of the AR Section in reaching its objectives and goals in accordance with the AR Grant.

B. Executive Lieutenant

W. J. Williams, Jr.

The AR Executive Lieutenant is second in command of the AR Section. He is responsible for administrative matters of the AR Section. He is also responsible for the monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports; the proper keeping of the AR personnel time book; the inventory and accounting of AR equipment; the ordering and maintenance of AR supplies; the proper handling and channeling of AR correspondence, complaints and requests for service, and other duties at the direction of the AR captain.

C. Field Lieutenant J.C. McC

The AR Field Lieutenant is primarily responsible for the field supervision of the AR Sergeants and Detectives. He is also responsible for the conduct, efficiency, and performance of the sergeants and detectives in relation to their assignments, duties, apprehensions, and criminal charges in accordance with the AR Grant, and other duties at the direction of the AR Captain.

D. Sergeants

The AR Sergeants are the immediate field supervisors of the AR Detectives. The AR Sergeants are directly responsible for the conduct, efficiency, and performance of the AR Detectives during performance of their official duties.

1. Sergeants shall insure that persons apprehended are not willfully mistreated or mishandled, and that proper booking procedures are followed.
2. Sergeants shall issue subpoenas to the detectives, and follow up on same.
3. Sergeants shall keep abreast of directives, memorandums, policy, rules, regulations, and changes in the AR Section, and shall relay the same to the detectives.
4. Sergeants shall counsel the detectives to help alleviate personal problems that may hinder performance and satisfaction with the program.
5. Sergeants are responsible for the periodic inspection of all AR equipment.
6. Sergeants shall make the first contact with commercial establishment personnel to advise them of prearranged actions to be taken in the event of a robbery attempt.
7. During open-space disguised assignments, sergeants shall maintain close proximity with the disguised team of detectives and be readily available for advice, direction, discipline, and whatever other supervisory measures may be needed.
8. When there is an insufficient number of detectives to deploy a disguised operation, the sergeant will utilize the detectives in stakeout assignments rather than subject the detectives to unnecessary risks due to an insufficient number of men to properly cover a decoy.

E. AR Analyst

The AR crime analyst is responsible for analyzing robbery statistics and maintaining pin maps by type, day, hour, month, year, and place of occurrence, and for keeping records to show the success or failure of the AR Section in reducing robbery.

1. Code daily robbery reports, detailing various classifications, and pin maps according to those classifications, to day of week, and time of day (morning, afternoon, evening).
2. Keep records of the number of robberies in each census tract of the city by location, time, and day of week.
3. Maintain victim profile.
4. Maintain perpetrator profile.
5. From the above statistics, the analyst is to determine AR Section's most efficient appropriation of personnel.
6. Keep records of AR detective assignments and apprehensions for the purpose of preparing the monthly, quarterly, and yearly evaluation reports.
7. The analyst will also attend periodic staff meetings, determined by the AR captain, for the purpose of evaluation and coordination of the progress of the AR program.

F. AR Secretary

The AR secretary is responsible for providing the AR staff with clerical assistance.

1. The secretary is under the direct command of the AR captain.
2. The secretary handles the typing, and distribution of AR correspondence.
3. The secretary types the quarterly and yearly evaluation reports.
4. The secretary handles the filing of AR correspondence and other secretarial and office duties as directed by the captain.

BASIC IN-SERVICE TRAINING

In-Service Training

The AR grant provides for one week of training by the training academy of the Bureau of Police Services to all AR personnel and will include the following:

1. Probable cause and the laws of arrest. (Entrapment, etc.)
2. Search and seizure.
3. Court room testimony.
4. Due process and civil liberties.
5. Evidence handling.
6. Firearms training.
7. Surveillance techniques and the AR function.
8. Bribery and corruption hazards.
9. Handling and use of communication equipment.
10. Simulated robbery situations.

B. Firearms Qualifications

All AR detectives will be required to qualify periodically with the 38 revolver and shotgun in order to remain assigned to the unit. This also applies to the extra overtime personnel.

C. New Officers Training

New officers that may be assigned to the AR program after the above training has been given will be trained by the AR sergeants and lieutenants, who will also have received the above outlined training, pending the next regularly scheduled police academy training program which will be given one year after the first program or earlier if there is an attrition rate of 50%.

AR COMMAND REQUIREMENTS

A. Roll Call Attendance

All AR detectives will punctually attend their respective roll calls, and will not absence themselves without the specific knowledge and authority of their supervisor.

B. Promptness to Assignments

All AR detectives will, after receiving their assignments, proceed promptly to their assigned locations unless otherwise authorized by their supervisor, and will not leave said location earlier than the regular and stated time as authorized by a superior officer.

C. Conflict in Assignments

If an AR detective is given an assignment and later learns that someone else is already on it, or the business is closed or is closing early, or AR protection is refused, or any other conflicting situation, the detective is to contact his supervisor for re-assignment immediately.

D. Conflicts with Business Personnel

AR detectives are assigned to commercial establishments for the specific purpose of apprehending robbers. Shoplifting, minor disturbances, drunks, etc., should be referred to the regular patrol. AR detectives assigned to these establishments are not to request gratuities of food, money, etc., for stakeout protection. If any AR detective enters into a conflict with business management regarding the above or any other matter, he is to refrain from engaging in debate or argument with said personnel and contact his supervisor immediately.

E. Chain of Command

The AR chain of command will be strictly adhered to by both superior officers and detectives. Anti-Robbery personnel will not abuse the chain of command and prevent the smooth and orderly operation of the AR program.

In the absence of the field lieutenant, the sergeant in charge will be the senior sergeant, or the sergeant designated by the field lieutenant or the captain.

F. Obedience to Superiors

All AR detectives shall promptly obey any lawful order given them by any AR superior officer. Should any such order conflict with the previous order of a different superior officer, the detective shall respectfully inform the present superior officer of the conflict of orders. If the present superior officer does not resolve the conflict, the detective will proceed to obey the last order, without responsibility of disobedience to the previous order. The superior officer giving the last order will be accountable.

G. Court Appearance

The appearance of detectives in court to prosecute cases of which they are involved is necessary and mandatory. Failure to make court dates will not be tolerated.

H. Abuse of Sick Leave

No AR detective is required to work when he is unable to do so. However, the AR grant provides funds for a specific number of work days for each detective, and a requirement for a specific number of stakeout assignments per month. Therefore, abuse of sick leave may require replacement of such personnel in order to reduce the loss of funds, and to meet the obligations of the grant.

DEADLY WEAPONS

A. Use of Deadly Force

Of all the actions and in-actions taken or not taken by a police officer, there is probably none that arouses the condemnation of the public, or that gets a policeman in trouble, more than the misuse and unlawful use of deadly force. This is particularly true with the AR detectives because of the nature of the AR program: Apprehending persons who are in the actual commission of armed robberies.

A well placed and legally fired shot may result in the life saving of a commercial employee, an innocent victim, or a fellow detective. On the other hand, a precipitous or illegally fired shot may result in the taking of an innocent life. An old rule of thumb is never draw your weapon unless you intend to use it.

Under the Criminal Code of Georgia, (amended through 1973, Sec. 26-902) a person is not justified in using deadly force which is

intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm, unless he reasonably believes that such deadly force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or a third person, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. AR detectives must carefully note that the use of deadly force may be justified to prevent the commission of a forcible felony, but it may not be used against a felon after the commission, when there is no life at stake.

B. Inside Stakeouts

AR detectives working inside commercial stakeout assignments must develop a keen sense of observance. The mere sight of a gun in the hands of a person does not automatically mean that a robbery is in progress. It could be a fellow employee returning a gun over the counter to the cashier after making a trip to the bank, or it could be a member of the criminal element attempting to sell a gun, etc. This means that the detective is to observe closely and not take hasty or precipitous action.

Personal safety is a prime factor in each of the AR projects operations. Safety is stressed for the citizens who may become involved in a robbery as well as the detectives. It is hereby established that whenever it is reasonably possible to apprehend a robbery suspect without the use of deadly force, even though such use may be legally justified, AR detectives will refrain from such use.

C. Warning

There is no state law that requires a person to be warned before the legal use of deadly force is used against him. However, it is hereby established that whenever it is feasible to warn a suspect to relieve himself of firearms, announce in a loud, clear, and distinct voice: "Police! Drop your weapon!" or words to that effect, or by any other means, AR detectives will do so.

D. Warning Shots

The firing of a warning shot implies that there is no lawful reason or moral desire to wound a suspect. If a suspect or an innocent by-stander is wounded in a warning shot situation, the detective subjects himself to civil or criminal action. Warning shots are hereby prohibited. However, in some rare cases, a warning shot may be justified as in the example of distracting the attention of a suspect to prevent great bodily harm to another. However, such situations are matters of discretion and does not relieve you from legal responsibility in the misuse of such discretion.

E. Discharging Firearms

Whenever a firearm in the possession of an AR detective is discharged during his tour of duty, either accidental or in the performance of duty, even if no one is injured, the detective will make out a "discharging firearms" report.

F. Prisoner Abuse

AR detectives are prohibited from the use of unnecessary violence, or willful maltreatment or brutality to any person under arrest or being arrested. Each member of the AR Section is required to perform in a quiet, civil and orderly manner; to maintain decorum and command his temper; to be discrete; and to refrain from harsh, profane or insolent language toward citizens.

G. Reasons for Removal from AR Section

AR personnel will be released from the section without prejudice and returned to regular patrol duties if:

1. They fail to continue to meet standards during in-service training.
2. The commanding officer or supervisor finds them unfit for AR type of assignment.
3. The individual police officer requests to be returned to regular patrol duties.

DECOY-STAKEOUT CONDUCT

A. Detectives Responsibilities

AR detectives are charged with the actual on-site apprehensions of persons committing robberies. Detectives should always be physically fit, mentally alert, and morally conscious in performing their duties to themselves and to the public. AR detectives should discuss with their superior officers any and all problems that may hinder their best performance.

B. Questionable Techniques Prohibited

- The use of AR detectives lying down with currency exposed, and the use of any other questionable techniques that hinges on the borderline of legal entrapments is hereby prohibited.

C. Concealing AR Vehicles

When detectives utilize AR vehicles on stakeout or observance assignments, they will make every reasonable effort to conceal the vehicle as inconspicuously as possible.

D. Concealing Identity

AR detectives shall, whenever possible, conceal from the general public their profession or assignments, except when necessary to discharge their duties.

E. Identify Self

Each AR detective is required, at all times, to have in his possession and readily accessible, his badge and police identification card. And in an attempt at making an apprehension, to announce verbally, in a loud, clear, and distinct voice that he is a "police officer", and/or show his ID when feasible, or as soon as reasonably possible.

F. Stakeout Police Attire

When working inside stakeout assignments, readily visible police attire will be used in order to distinguish AR detectives from criminal suspects in the event regular patrol officers or private citizens arrive at the scene of a confrontation. Inside stakeout detectives will therefore wear their blue police coveralls, or a police shirt and police soft cap. AR detectives must also have one or more of the above items of the attire in the AR detective car when on patrol assignments. Also, a police soft cap concealed on their persons when working street or disguised assignments.

G. Stakeout Equipment

On inside stakeouts, detectives will also have their shotguns, vests, and helmets.

H. Coverage Methods

AR detectives are assigned as teams on a street (open-space) operation, and on the inside of commercial establishments as stakeout detectives. In cases where placing stakeout detectives inside commercial establishments are not practical, the detectives may be placed in an adjacent building, surveillance vehicle, or some other inconspicuous place.

I. Owner's Responsibility

Owners of establishments requesting stakeout protection must make the request in writing and make whatever necessary renovations to the establishment in order to provide a stakeout. Usually, this requires no more than the installation of a two-way mirror in a rear room suitable for observation. Some establishments not having a rear room may install a red light on the top of the building which may be activated in a robbery attempt, thus notifying outside surveillance detectives. Owners and employees are instructed to minimize to the fullest extent the presence of AR detectives on the premises.

J. Owner's Action in Robbery Attempt

It is a requirement in the AR program that whenever AR detectives are manning an inside commercial stakeout assignment, a pre-determined and coordinated system of action or in-action be understood and agreed upon by the commercial personnel in the event of a robbery attempt to prevent possible injury to personnel.

It is the responsibility of the assigned AR detective to familiarize any new personnel of such actions and to keep regular personnel mindful of same. AR detectives are not to take for granted that said personnel has been informed by prior assigned detectives. Such excuses will not be acceptable.

K. Knowledge of AR Program

Every member of the AR Section should familiarize himself and maintain current knowledge of pertinent matters in the AR program relative to himself, such as, guidelines, regulations, memorandums, etc.

L. Knowledge of Location

On stakeout locations, AR detectives should thoroughly acquaint themselves with the building as to all entrances and exits, inner rooms (locked and unlocked), sky lights, trapdoors, basements, windows, etc., and on street operations, alley ways, side streets, dead ends, etc.

M. Maintaining Radio Contact

Each AR detective is required to maintain radio contact unless the specific nature of his assignment makes radio contact unfeasible, or non-radio contact is authorized by an AR superior officer.

If more than one detective is on an assignment together, then the detective in actual possession of the radio is responsible for radio contact. In the event it is necessary to interrupt radio contact without the knowledge of your supervisor, contact must be re-established and your supervisor advised as soon as possible.

N. Intelligence Gathering

AR detectives are primarily concerned with robbery in accordance with the AR grant. Often times AR detectives are in a position to observe offenses of a lesser degree. These offenses are to be brought to the attention of the patrol section, or the proper detective squad. The AR Section's cooperation with the patrol and other sections of the of the bureau, is of utmost importance. This section is particularly applicable to the decoy detectives.

O. Cowardice Prohibited

Coolness and firmness is required of every detective when carrying out assignments. They must act together and assist and protect each other at all times and shall not shrink from danger or responsibility during the time of peril.

P. Work Concentration Required

AR detectives are to keep themselves fully awake, alert, sober, and attentive while on their assignments. They are not to allow personal visits to their location. They are to refrain from constant telephone usage or any other distraction that may hinder their most concentrated effort in performing their duties.

The non-performance or the mis-performance of any AR detective jeopardizes the safety, success, and public opinion toward every AR detective. Any detective having knowledge of a fellow detective not performing to the betterment of the AR program shall bring it to the attention of a superior officer for corrective action. Any detective having such said knowledge and fails to report it, subjects himself to corrective action.

REPORT REGULATIONS, AND MISCELLANEOUS

A. Robbery Reports

Copies of all robberies reported in the city are received by the AR Section. The AR analyst then incorporated the information from the robbery reports into several categories and cross reference

files of location, time of day, day of week, place of occurrence, etc. AR assignments are primarily based on this information.

Report Making

Following the apprehension of robbery suspects, etc., the arresting detectives are required to make all of the necessary reports and forms pertaining to the arrest.

C. Additions to Arrest Folders

A complete folder is required for each AR apprehension with all pertinent documents included. Suspects age and education level should be noted on all waivers or counsel forms. The suspect's criminal history record should be noted on the inside of the folder itself, or on an added page.

D. Victim and Prisoner's Property

Whenever property is relieved from a victim or a prisoner, the description and the disposition of such property shall be included in the offense report.

E. Shootings

Whenever an AR operation results in a person shot, seriously injured by other means, or killed, the AR detectives will abide by the following procedures:

1. Notify the Homicide Squad immediately. Protect the crime scene, and retain all witnesses until the homicide investigator arrives.
2. The homicide investigator, once on the scene, will have the responsibility for the entire investigation. He will be assisted by other officers as he requests.
3. The Anti-Robbery Unit investigators will book any robbery cases necessary. He will also book the court date, unless otherwise directed by the homicide investigator in charge. If the court date is left open at the request of the homicide investigator, that investigator will be responsible for notifying the concerned Anti-Robbery Unit investigators when he is ready for a court date to be set. Once notified, the Anti-Robbery Unit investigator will be responsible for booking a court date relative to any robbery charges, and will be responsible for the prosecution of such cases to final disposition.

F. Robberies

Whenever an AR operation results in the arrest of a robbery suspect, commercial or open-space, which does not result in a person shot, seriously injured by other means, or killed, the AR detectives will abide by the following procedures:

1. When an Anti-Robbery Unit investigator working an inside or outside stakeout or decoy assignment arrests a suspect for robbery or other charges, the Anti-Robbery Unit investigator will be responsible for the complete investigation.
2. The Anti-Robbery Unit investigator will be responsible for all police reports, supplements, and statements of witnesses, the collection and preservation of physical evidence and the disposition of the same.
3. The Anti-Robbery Unit investigator will book all cases relative to the offense and will book court dates and prosecute the cases in court to their final disposition.
4. The Anti-Robbery Unit investigator will furnish the squad that is responsible for that particular type of offense, in the Criminal Investigation Section, a copy of their investigative file. This will be done as soon as possible after the investigation is completed. If the squad supervisor in the Criminal Investigation Section finds it necessary to delay the preliminary hearing for the purpose of investigating the suspect in other offenses, he will notify the Anti-Robbery Unit investigator of the new court date and the Anti-Robbery Unit investigator will handle the case in court at that time.

G. Detectives Injured on Duty

Whenever a detective is injured in the line of duty, he will promptly notify his supervisor of the injury and report to Grady Memorial Hospital for treatment. If able, the injured detective will then make out an "officer injured on duty" report, including the name of the examining physician and diagnosis made. The detective shall also fill out the blue workmen's compensation form, (including social security number), immediately. The detective will bring or forward his sick/injured request for pay form to his supervisor as soon as possible to prevent delay of pay for days off due to the injury.

H. Damage of Equipment Reports

All AR detectives are required to submit a "damage to city property" report whenever there is damage to any AR equipment. Detectives are also required to sign for equipment taken from the

AR office for use. Detectives should check before use of equipment for prior damage, and if any is found, notify a superior officer and submit a report if necessary.

I. Shopping Vehicles

Whenever a detective is operating a defective vehicle that needs shopping, the detective will notify his supervisor before shopping the vehicle and then place a tag on the key board showing the vehicle shopped, the date shopped, and what shopped for.

J. Service of Vehicles

Each detective who signs out for a vehicle will have the vehicle re-fueled, oil, and water checked before returning the vehicle to the station.

K. Current Address & Phone Number

Each AR detective is required to maintain his current address and phone number on file in the AR office and the director's office, and to immediately notify the AR secretary or a superior officer of any change.

L. AR Office Personnel Accountability

All AR detectives temporarily assigned to the AR office will not absence themselves from the office without authorization from a superior officer. If no superior officer is present, verbal notification to fellow office personnel, or written notice on the AR message board under their immediate superior officer's name is required.

APPENDIX II

SAMPLE CRIME ANALYST WEEKLY REPORT

Crime Analyst Weekly Report
April 1-5, 1975

by
Edriene L. Johnson, Crime Analyst

April 1-5, 1975, recorded 51 robbery cases, with pedestrian robbery accounting for 56.86% of the total robbery picture. Business robbery recorded the second highest category of robbery, reporting 27.45%; residential robbery 9.80%, and miscellaneous robbery 5.88%.

Chart I below illustrates a picture of robbery city-wide by robbery category.


Robbery City-Wide
April 1-5, 1975

Type	Zone 1	Zone 2	Zone 3	Zone 4	Zone 5	Total
Ped.	2	9	6	1	11	29
Bus.	6	2	1	2	3	14
Res.	0	2	0	2	1	5
Misc.	1	1	1	0	0	3
Total	9	14	8	5	15	51

During the week of April 1-5, 1975, robbery had a high incidence in Zone 5, recording 15 robberies and Zone 2 closely following with 14. The graph below illustrates robbery city-wide for the week of April 1-5, 1975.

Robberies: High to Low City-Wide
April 1-5, 1975

No. Robberies



BUSINESS ROBBERIES
14 cases reported

This report analyzes business robbery city-wide for the first five days of April, 1975, with a study of stakeout operations, the need for, the increase or reduction of operations, manpower allocations per zone, suggestions, and conclusions.

ZONE 1

Sector A.

Sector A recorded two business robberies to Church's Fried Chicken establishments on evening watch between 2100-2330 hours on a Tuesday. Census Tract 85, Beat 109, Church's Fried Chicken at 1552 Bankhead has had two hits since the writing of this report, however, the manager at this location informed Anti-Robbery detectives that he would prefer them not to stakeout his location. His reasons were the community may disapprove and an employee may be shot during the apprehension of a robber.

NOTE: This information was submitted to the Anti-Robbery Unit by Dets. Coggins and A. L. Williams on April 3, 1975.

Sector B.

Sector B involved two robberies to gas stations in Census Tracts 98 and 99, Beat 101, however, no relationship was found between the two robberies.

Census Tract 89 has had a slow increase in business robbery as reported last week, however, there is a need to study the types of businesses located in Census Tract 89 so that future stakeout operations can be implemented.

ZONE 2

Sector A.

Sector A recorded two business robberies, one resulting in an on-site apprehension by others. The latter robbery occurred in Census Tract 13, to the Pizza Hut, a previous location where stakeout operations resulted in an apprehension.

After studying this report, it was found that a robbery projection made in the March 16-23, 1975 analyst report did occur to the Star Service Station at Edgewood Avenue and Jackson Street between the times suggested for stakeout operations, however, the perpetrator returned the money to the business and hit the Pizza Hut at 2400 hours. The legitimacy of this robbery is questionable and I would suggest studying the location for internal problems.

Sector B.

Unbelievable, no robberies! Thank goodness.

ZONE 3

Sector A.

Only one robbery was recorded, that being in Census Tract 73 to the 7-11 Food Store on evening watch. At the writing of this report, this robbery has been cleared and the perpetrator arrested.

The management at this location has not complied with regulations for setting up an inside stakeout operation.

Sector B.

No robberies reported.

ZONE 4

Sector A.

Sector A reported two robberies, one to the well renown Tenneco Food Store and the other to a fast food restaurant.

Sector B.

No robberies!

ZONE 5

Sector A.

Sector A recorded two robberies on corner type grocery establishments on day watch. These locations are in Census Tract 38 and are presently being covered by Anti-Robbery stakeout operations.

Sector B.

One robbery recorded.

ANALYST 'SUM-UP' CORNER

1. April 1-5, 1975, reported a low incidence of business robbery, however, it should be taken into account that this week includes only five days, Tuesday thru Saturday.
2. The highest increase of robbery occurred on evening watch between 2201-2400 hours.
3. The type business most often robbed April 1-5, 1975 were restaurants.
4. The day most robberies occurred was on Wednesday.
5. Only one apprehension was recorded for this week. It was by others and occurred on a neighborhood grocery store, Census Tract 17, Beat 209.

4

6. The need to find stakeout locations suitable and willing to meet Anti-Robbery's regulations for setting up operations is essential. A study to do so has been suggested by the Anti-Robbery Commander, and is necessary that it be done as soon as possible. Anti-Robbery superior officers please take note this week of locations suggested in your past weekly reports and from past experience so that effort expended in organizing a list will prove worthwhile.

ANTI-ROBBERY UNIT

Business Robbery Manpower Allocation 14 Robbery Cases

1344 Manhours Expended
86 Operations

Zone 1

10 operations
152 manhours expended

Business Robberies	6
Sector A	2
Sector B	4

Zone 2

20 operations
320 manhours expended

Business Robberies	2
Sector A	2
Secotr B	0

Zone 3

32 operations
512 manhours expended

Business Robberies	1
Sector A	1
Sector B	0

Zone 4

12 operations
192 manhours expended

Business Robberies	2
Sector A	2
Sector B	0

Zone 5

12 operations
168 Mnahours expended

Business Robberies	3
Sector A	2
Sector B	1

PEDESTRIAN ROBBERY

April 1-5, 1975
29 cases reported

This report analyzes pedestrian robbery city-wide for the five days of April, 1975. A study of decoy operations, manhour allocations, suggestions and conclusions for deployment of personnel is discussed.

ZONE 1

Sector A.

Of the two pedestrian robbery cases reported, one was recorded in Census Tract 24, Beat 108. Census Tract 24 was suggested for decoy operations in the March 16-22, 1975 weekly report and operations are still suggested for future decoy operations.

Sector B.

No robberies reported.

ZONE 2

Sector A.

Sector A recorded the highest incidence of robbery city-wide the first five days of April, and Zone 2 the highest incidence of pedestrian robbery cases the month of March, 1975.

Sector A has been flooded with decoy operations and I am happy to report an on-site apprehension by the decoy team.

Census Tracts 12, 13, and 14, Beats 206, and 207 reported continuous problems of street robberies and decoy operations need to continue vigorously in these locales! However, Census Tracts 11 and 15 are not to be overlooked. Decoy operations are still advised here.

Sector B.

Sector B recorded one robbery.

ZONE 3

Sector A.

For the second consecutive week I am happy to report--"Hurray, no robberies!"

Sector B.

The same cannot be said for the latter sector of Zone 3; it continues to record an increasing number of robbery cases. The robbery cases reported this week are randomly occurring throughout this sector without a particular trend or perpetrator analysis being revealed. Census Tract 33, Beat 301, Decatur and Bell Streets did report another day watch robbery, but no significant trend was seen here other than a slow increase in pedestrian robbery cases in this locale.

ZONE 4

Sector A:

One robbery recorded.

Sector B:

No robbery cases reported.

ZONE 5

Sector A:

Sector A recorded four cases of pedestrian robbery. One, again, in Census Tract 25, Beat 501 suggested for decoy operations.

Sector B:

Sector B recorded the second highest number of cases sector-wide and as a zone, placed number one this week recording 11 pedestrian robberies.

Census Tract 27, the well renown census tract worked by Anti-Robbery decoy team, recorded three cases of pedestrian robbery, one involving an intoxicated victim on day watch; one involving a purse snatch at 0640 hours; and only one evening watch robbery.

I am still closely monitoring Census Tract 27 and have not noted any serious problem to date that would call for the re-instatement of the Anti-Robbery decoy team's efforts, however, I feel it is too early to draw any definite conclusions.

ANALYST 'SUM-UP' CORNER

1. The first five days of April, 1975, recorded its highest incidence of robbery on Friday with Thursday and Saturday placing second, recording six robberies each.
2. Pedestrian robbery, this week, target hit time was from 2001-2200 hours. Its victims were predominantly male, age 18-35, and evenly distributed among black and white.
3. The most probable location to be robbed this week was on the street, and the weapon most often used was physical force.

ANTI-ROBBERY UNIT

Pedestrian Robbery Manpower Allocation
April 1-5, 1975
29 cases

344 Manhours Allocated
9 operations

Zone 1

No operations
No manhours expended

Pedestrian Robberies 2
Sector A 2
Sector B 0

Zone 5

3 operations
96 manhours expended

Pedestrian Robberies 11
Sector A 4
Sector B 7

Zone 2

4 operations
168 manhours expended

Pedestrian Robberies 9
Sector A 8
Sector B 1

Zone 3

2 operations
80 manhours expended

Pedestrian Robberies 6
Sector A 0
Sector B 6

Zone 4

No operations
No manhours expended

Pedestrian Robberies 1
Sector A 1
Sector B 0

END

7 miles/more