

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
HOUSING MANAGEMENT

**TRANSMITTAL
NOTICE** NO. 4

7460.4

4/1/74

1. This Notice Transmits the Following:
Handbook 7460.4, Security Planning for HUD-Assisted Multifamily Housing, dated 4/74.
2. Explanation of Material Transmitted:
This Handbook provides guidance to Local Housing Authorities and to managing agents and owners of HUD-insured multifamily housing projects regarding planning for protection against crime and vandalism. Area and Insuring Offices should provide the owners or managing agents of all HUD-assisted multifamily housing projects within their jurisdictions with a copy of this Handbook.

In addition, this Handbook is relevant to the responsibilities of HUD Field Offices, particularly the Security Specialists-HM, for providing assistance with respect to security in HUD-assisted multifamily housing projects.
3. Issuance Superseded:
Circular HM 7475.6, Supplemental Protective Services Chargeable to Operating Expenses for Low-Rent Public Housing, dated 1-18-72.

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SECURITY PLANNING FOR HUD-ASSISTED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING

APRIL 1974

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS AND HUD STAFF

A HUD HANDBOOK

HOUSING MANAGEMENT

**U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20413**

37520

SECURITY PLANNING FOR
HUD-ASSISTED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Handbook is to provide practical guidance to Local Housing Authorities (LHAs) and to owners and managing agents of HUD-insured housing in planning measures for the protection of persons and property against crime and vandalism in and around HUD-assisted multifamily housing projects.
2. INTENDED AUDIENCE. Throughout this Handbook, the terms "Management" and "Manager" (when capitalized) are used as convenient forms of inclusive reference to the audience to which the issuance is primarily addressed. These terms should be read as including owners and managing agents of HUD-insured multifamily projects, as well as LHAs. This Handbook is designed for use by executive-level Management personnel who have responsibilities for overall housing operations, and by Management staff specialists in security. Though resident managers and other project-level personnel may find the Handbook valuable, its broad planning perspective goes beyond the scope of their usual authority and functions. In addition, this issuance provides guidance for HUD staff, especially the Security Specialists (Housing Management) in the Regional, Area, and Insuring Offices.
3. SCOPE. This Handbook is designed as an introduction to the subject of residential security, and does not presume to exhaustive coverage of this very complex subject. It is strongly recommended that users supplement this introduction with further investigation of detailed technical information from other sources (e.g., other technical publications and consultation with qualified professionals in security and law enforcement). While it is hoped that every Manager can benefit from this Handbook, it is recognized that the more fundamental aspects covered here will be of greatest interest to those Managers who are only beginning to grapple with a systematic approach to their security problems. This Handbook focuses on HUD-assisted multifamily rental housing for low-and moderate-income residents, but much of the material included here can be adapted to unsubsidized housing and to cooperative and condominium projects. While the emphasis is on existing projects, many points are applicable to new or renovated housing as well. Most of the material is written in terms of large projects. However, attention is given to small projects at many points throughout the text.
4. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. The specific objectives of this Handbook are as follows:

- a. Awareness and Action. A pervading objective is to increase Management awareness of the importance and nature of residential security problems, and to stimulate initiative at the local level.
- b. Planning Methodology. The primary emphasis is on planning. No standardized set of security measures can be realistically prescribed by HUD for all of the enormous variety of multi-family housing projects throughout the nation. However, it is realistic to prescribe a relatively standardized planning methodology to be used by all Managers for the development of their security programs. See Chapter 3 below.
- c. Identification of Options. Incident to the emphasis on planning, this Handbook briefly identifies a variety of options for specific types of "hardware" and "software" measures which may be employed in a comprehensive residential security program. See Chapters 4 through 8 below. The terms "hardware" and "software" are used here, and in other provisions of this Handbook, to distinguish between the two general types of security measures - "hardware" denoting all kinds of tangible measures (including all architectural design and materials as well as equipment and such items as locks) and "software" denoting all kinds of intangible measures (including all types of services and personal involvement). However, in certain instances indicated by the context, "hardware" assumes the more limited meaning of locks and other accessories or equipment designed to promote surveillance and control of access.
- d. Identification of Further Resources. In addition, this Handbook identifies certain further sources of possible assistance, in the nature of both technical assistance and funding, which may be available to Management in planning and implementing residential security programs. See Chapter 9 below.

CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT

5. THE CONTEXT OF MANAGEMENT'S ROLE.

- a. Comprehensive Approach. The best approach to residential security is a comprehensive one, and Management must find its role within this broad context. Comprehensiveness implies a complete response by Management and other key participants to all of the problems of crime and vandalism confronting the project and its residents. This response must take due account of the complex interrelationships among different problems and remedies. Coordination is essential, in terms of both the involvement of key participants and the various corrective measures employed. A comprehensive approach should aim for short-term as well as long-term action and, where critical problems exist, should include appropriate emergency measures. There will, of course, be practical limitations to the degree of comprehensiveness which can be achieved in each instance. However, to the greatest extent possible, a piecemeal approach should be avoided, for the very practical reason that it is likely to prove wasteful and ineffective.
- b. Scope of Residential Security. Although there is general agreement as to the meaning of the term "residential security" in the setting of multifamily housing, that term is an elastic one and perceptions differ as to how far its scope should extend. No precise definition is attempted here, in recognition of the fact that there is a legitimate margin for differences of opinion. In each instance, Management, residents, and other key participants should feel free to determine for themselves the scope of their residential security concerns. The following considerations should be taken into account in formulating a working definition:
 - (1) Specific Types of Offenses. Residential security is usually defined in terms of the following types of offenses:

- | | |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| --Vandalism | --Burglary |
| --Assault | --Robbery |
| --Homicide | --Automobile theft |
| --Mail theft | --Purse snatching |
| --Rape/sex offenses | --Drug abuse (sale/distribution/ |
| --Arson | use) |

- (2) Location. Residential security is ordinarily defined in terms of project boundaries. However, this delimitation is not always fixed in the perceptions of Management and residents. Some offenses within the project may not be viewed as security problems, while others beyond the project's boundaries may be considered residential in nature. In common usage, residential security focuses on "stranger" crimes (i.e., where victim and offender are strangers), with less emphasis on crimes among acquaintances or members of the same family, even if committed within project boundaries. Opinions differ as to the extent to which crimes of fraud, the so-called "victimless" offenses (e.g. drunkenness, drug use, prostitution), minor disturbances of the peace and infractions of certain project rules (e.g., parking regulations) can or should be treated as security problems. On the other hand, crimes on adjacent or nearby streets may be seen as so closely associated with the residential environment as to merit treatment as security problems of the project itself.
- (3) Illegal Access. Despite the usual priority concern for restricting access to the property, residential security cannot in most instances be defined simply in terms of such restrictions. A "fortress" strategy may be an adequate solution in housing for the elderly, but is apt to prove infeasible in projects whose residents include a large number of children. While protection of the individual dwelling unit against illegal access is a basic requirement for good security, it is more difficult to enforce strict limitations on access to common interior and exterior areas. In many family projects, much of the total problem is attributable to offenses committed within common areas by residents themselves, so that measures to control access by nonresidents will not solve the problem.
- (4) The Subjective Sense of Security. In the minds of residents, Management staff, guests, tradesmen, public service personnel, and others who have reason to be concerned about crime and vandalism in the housing project, the word "security" can evoke different concepts. The word "security" can bring to mind the objective concern about the real and obvious risk of crime and vandalism in certain areas. It can also bring to mind, in other areas, the subjective concern relating to the probability of crime and vandalism where there is no actual known risk. For example, residents may nurture extreme fears, particularly with regard to violent crime, even though the actual danger is remote. On the other hand, they may

- feel tolerably secure in the face of a high degree of genuine danger. Fear of crime (or sometimes the absence of such fear) of itself constitutes a significant security problem. Moreover, feelings of insecurity may reflect deep anxieties about the individual's ability to cope with the overall physical, social, and economic conditions with which he or she is confronted.
- c. Types of Security Action. Where security problems are serious, and particularly in the large housing project, a comprehensive attack on crime and vandalism requires three types of action, as follows:
 - (1) Check. Directly deter or control the problem (e.g., prevent illegal access by hardware or policing).
 - (2) Treat. Address the surface causes of the problem (e.g., divert youthful energies from vandalism to wholesome recreation).
 - (3) Cure. Attack the root causes of the problem (e.g., provide economic and educational opportunities).
 - d. Applying Security Action. Action must be directed to each of these three levels simultaneously, with the goal of decreasing "Check" actions over time, while increasing "Treat" and "Cure" actions. However, "Check" actions tend to be prerequisite to substantial progress at the other two levels.
 - e. Key Participants. A comprehensive approach to project security requires the coordinated involvement of four key participants, during the planning as well as implementation phase. These four key participants are:
 - (1) Management
 - (2) The residents' organization
 - (3) The local Police Department
 - (4) Local social services agencies.
 - f. Roles of Key Participants. While arrangements may differ with circumstances, the normal roles of these four key participants, in connection with the three types of action described in subparagraph 5c above, are as illustrated in Figure 1 (page 9). These functions must be mutually complementary. An absolutely essential requirement for solving security problems is the establishment and maintenance of strong operating links among these four key participants.

6. FOCUSING MANAGEMENT'S ROLE. As illustrated in Figure 1, Management's normal role in the three types of security action described in subparagraph 5c above is as follows:
- a. Management's Role in "Check" Actions. Within the overall context of a comprehensive approach, Management's role should focus primarily upon direct protective measures ("Check" actions). Measures of this type are fundamental requirements for good security, tend to be susceptible of relatively short-term implementation, and are closely related to other aspects of Management operations.
 - b. Management's Role in "Treat" Actions. Although actions to address the surface causes of crime and vandalism ("Treat" actions) are a secondary focus for Management's role, there is usually much that Management can accomplish in this area and positive results can often be achieved within a short- to medium-term time span. However, outside resources and coordination with other key participants (especially local social services agencies) become more important for "Treat" actions.
 - c. Management's Role in "Cure" Actions. Management ability to attack the root causes of crime and vandalism ("Cure" actions) will vary greatly among different Management operations. Some large Management concerns (especially large LHAs) have in-house capabilities for delivering some types of services which go to the roots of criminal behavior, but in most instances primary reliance must be placed upon local social services agencies to provide such relevant programs as job training and placement, educational opportunities, family counselling, offender rehabilitation, health care, and help for the emotionally disturbed. Nevertheless, in one important type of "Cure" action--improving residents' attitudes and standards--Management can and should take a very strong role (see Chapter 6, paragraph 38 below). Long-term effort is usually necessary before measures of this type produce significant results, but all experts in law enforcement and criminal behavior agree that they offer the only really satisfactory solution to problems of crime and vandalism.
7. MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IN PLANNING AND COORDINATION. Whatever role is developed for a particular Management with respect to the types of security actions discussed in paragraph 5 above, there are two areas of prime Management responsibility in connection with the security of its project. These are as follows:

- a. Overall Planning Responsibility. Management should take the initiative in planning a security program for the project, and should exercise primary responsibility for carrying out the overall planning effort. Because of its controlling role, daily involvement, and long-term interests in the project, Management is in a unique position to take the lead in security planning. The plain fact is that, if Management does not assume this responsibility, none of the other key participants is likely to be willing or able to do so.
 - b. Overall Coordination. Management should take primary responsibility for overall coordination of the project's security program. The same imperatives cited in subparagraph 7a above apply here. This does not mean that Management ought to attempt to perform, or even supervise, all measures, but rather that it should monitor the functions of all key participants on a continuing basis, and initiate such actions as may from time to time become necessary to assure coordination of those functions.
8. REQUIREMENTS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS. The laws of certain State and local jurisdictions impose upon Management special legal responsibilities for security, aside from HUD policy or other Federal requirements. These laws differ greatly from locality to locality, and are thus not susceptible to uniform description. Applicable State and local law may impose such special responsibilities, and such responsibilities (or their absence) constitute one important factor to be considered in defining Management's role in project security. Each Manager must consult its own legal counsel to determine the possible applicability of the following kinds of State and local requirements:
- a. Housing Codes. State and local codes regarding requirements for elements of residential properties must be considered. Fire and safety codes sometimes prohibit measures which might be desirable from the standpoint of security alone. A few local jurisdictions have adopted codes setting minimum security standards, and this appears to be a growing trend.
 - b. Management Liability. In certain jurisdictions, the courts have held Management liable for damages attributed to its failure to provide protection against crime within the project. While there is great jurisdictional variation in the law on this issue, here again there seems to be a trend to greater Management responsibility for security in multifamily housing.
9. SUMMARY. The criteria for determining Management's proper role in project security can thus be summarized as follows:

- a. Management's role should be defined within the context of a comprehensive approach to project security.
- b. The coordinated involvement of the four key participants specified in subparagraph 5e above is essential to an effective residential security program, and Management's role must be assessed in relation to the roles of the other three key participants.
- c. Management's heaviest involvement should be with direct protective measures ("Check" actions), with important but lesser degrees of involvement in measures which attack the deeper causes of crime and vandalism ("Treat" and "Cure" actions).
- d. Management should take primary responsibility for planning the project's comprehensive security program, and for coordinating all of the elements of the program throughout the implementation phase.
- e. State and local laws may impose legal constraints and responsibilities upon Management, affecting its security role to an important degree.

ROLES OF KEY PARTICIPANTS IN SUGGESTED "CHECK," "TREAT," AND "CURE" ACTIONS

Key Participants	Simultaneous Actions		
	Check: Directly Deter and Control the Problem	Treat: Address the Surface Causes of the Problem	Cure: Attack the Root Causes of the Problem
Management	***	**	*
Residents Organization	***	***	**
Local Police Department	***	*	*
Local Social Services Agencies	*	***	***

*** - Indicates Heavy Involvement
** - Indicates Moderate Involvement
* - Indicates Minimal Involvement

Figure 1

CHAPTER 3. TECHNIQUES FOR SECURITY PLANNING

10. WHY PLANNING? It would be misleading to attempt to prescribe a standardized set of specific security measures for all of the enormous variety of HUD-assisted multifamily housing projects throughout the nation. For that very practical reason, this Handbook eschews a simplistic "how-to-do-it" approach. In each instance, the security program should be tailored to the unique set of needs and constraints which pertain to the particular project and its residents. This makes careful project-by-project planning imperative and, as noted in Chapter 2 above, such planning should be the primary responsibility of Management. Although this imposes a heavy burden upon Management, the time and effort invested in planning yields high dividends, whereas action without thorough planning risks waste, frustration, and even deterioration of project security.
11. BASIC PLANNING PROCESS. While no standardized result, in terms of specific security measures, can be recommended, a relatively standardized methodology for the planning process itself can be validly prescribed. The principles of security planning are much like those which are familiar to Management from its planning of other aspects of housing operations. Whatever the circumstances, the same basic planning process is recommended: Make a preliminary estimate; obtain and analyze the facts; build alliances; make decisions; assemble resources; evaluate and modify on a continuing basis. For the small project, this process can be telescoped into a relatively simple and speedy effort. For large projects, highly-structured planning may be necessary. Subject to such adaptations, however, the process is essentially the same for all projects.
12. DETAILED STEPS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS. The following is a step-by-step guide to the process of security planning, and can be readily adapted to the circumstances of each particular project:
 - a. Preliminary Estimate. At the outset, Management (with the assistance of other key participants) should make a preliminary estimate of problems, constraints, goals, remedial measures, and further planning tasks. This estimate must be completed quickly, and will thus be merely in the nature of a rough appraisal. It should, however, point a definite direction for further planning. The following procedure is recommended for preparing the preliminary estimate:

- (1) Staff Estimate. First of all, Management staff should prepare (in written format) its best estimate of problems, constraints, goals, remedial measures, and further planning tasks. This estimate should be based upon such information as is readily available to Management staff.
 - (2) Policy Input. The staff estimate should then be submitted to appropriate policy-level Management officials (LHA Board of Commissioners or executives of the private owner and managing agent) for their preliminary guidance. This can avoid unnecessary or mistaken effort later in the planning process.
 - (3) Resident Input. Next, the staff estimate (as revised after policy input) should be submitted to the residents' organization for its review and suggestions. At the least, quick resident input at this point will serve to indicate the major concerns of residents and identify options which are clearly unacceptable to residents. This step will also serve to bring the residents' organization into early partnership with Management.
 - (4) Revised Estimate. After the foregoing steps are completed, Management staff should attempt to reconcile all inputs and prepare a revised estimate which will include a detailed planning agenda. This agenda should specify all remaining tasks, and persons responsible for each. It should be recognized, however, that changes in the agenda will probably be necessary as further planning proceeds.
- b. Obtaining and Analyzing the Facts. Perhaps the most common defect in residential security programs is the implementation of protective measures without first ascertaining the exact nature and degree of the project's security problems. All too often, Managers have installed expensive systems for hardware, lighting, electronic surveillance, or security personnel without an accurate assessment of the probable effectiveness of such measures against particular types of offenses. Severe problems sometimes dictate action before all of the facts can be gathered and analyzed, but even quick response must be based upon the best factual estimate which can be made in the time available. See paragraph 14 below. The following procedure is recommended here:

- (1) The fullest possible investigation should be made of the facts bearing upon security problems, resources, and constraints. See paragraph 13 below for suggestions as to specific factual inquiries. Methods of conducting the investigation may differ with circumstances. In a small project, the task should be relatively simple. In a large project, the use of qualified specialists and elaborate investigative techniques (e.g., questionnaires, examination of police statistics, in-depth interviews of residents and project Management staff) may be necessary.
 - (2) Analysis of the raw factual data will then enable Management to determine the relative importance of the various factual elements discovered, and the relationships among those elements. Much of this can be done as investigation proceeds, but some overall analysis should be reserved until the factual picture is virtually complete.
- c. Building Alliances. Early in the planning process, Management should begin to build working alliances with the other three key participants, plus any other parties whose assistance and support are desired. Since the fact-finding phase involves considerable interaction with other participants, it provides excellent opportunities to cement these alliances. Each participant's role, and the resources needed from each, should be discussed fully.
- d. Making Decisions. Factual analysis merges automatically into decisions on the final content of the security program. With a thorough factual base, Management can make well-reasoned decisions as to the set of specific security measures which best meet the needs and constraints identified. It is recommended that, even in the small project, the security program finally adopted be put into written format, and copies distributed to appropriate Management personnel and to each of the other key participants. The following matters should be considered at this point in the planning process:
- (1) Policy-Level Ratifications. The final security program should be ratified by appropriate policy-level Management officials (e.g., the LHA Board of Commissioners or executives of the owner and managing agent). In addition to the procedural necessity for obtaining proper authorization, this step serves to sharpen such officials' awareness of, and involvement in, the program.

(2) Concurrence of Other Key Participants. While Management is entitled to insist upon its due prerogatives as to decisions affecting project security, as a practical matter other key participants must have a strong voice in major decisions. Most protective measures will prove ineffective without the support of residents and the Police Department. It may be wise to have the residents' organization give its formal endorsement of the plan. To the extent that outside resources are needed to implement the plan, concurrence must, of course, be obtained from the organizations controlling those resources.

(3) Goals. The plan should set forth realistic goals, with order of priority and reasonable target dates. Short-term goals are the most amenable to detailed definition at the outset, but longer-term goals should be projected as far in the future and with as much specificity as is consistent with realism.

e. Assembling Resources. To the extent that desired security measures depend upon non-Management resources, definite commitments must be obtained before final decisions can be made on the security plan. It is preferable to complete this task during the fact-gathering step. However, where major funding is to be requested, it is ordinarily necessary to prepare a detailed proposal before a commitment can be obtained. If phased action over a long period of time is planned, it may be possible to postpone assemblage of resources necessary for later phases. In any event, Management should be prepared to make changes dictated by the actual availability of resources.

f. Evaluation and Modification. Management's planning function should not stop when implementation of the security program begins. On the contrary, no program should be regarded as indefinitely fixed. Throughout the implementation phase, Management (again with the assistance of other key participants) should carry on continued evaluation and modification of the security program, in order to keep abreast of changing conditions.

13. FACTUAL INQUIRIES. For the full factual investigation described in subparagraph 12b(1) above, the following are questions which should ordinarily be answered in as much detail as possible (this list is not necessarily exhaustive):

- a. What Is the History of Crime in the Project? The fullest possible information should be obtained on specific types of offenses (completed and attempted) over the recent past. See subparagraph 5b(1) above. The Police Department and/or the local Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) may be able to assist in compiling these data.
- b. What Are the Relevant Characteristics of Offenders and Victims? Factors bearing on motivation of offenders and vulnerability of victims, in regard to specific types of offenses, should be explored. The ages of both offenders and victims are important here. In addition, the extent to which offenses are the work of residents or nonresidents should be determined.
- c. What Are the Probable Future Trends of Crime and Vandalism Within the Project? Opinions of law enforcement, correctional and social services professionals are especially valuable here, but Management should give independent weight to indications from the data produced by its other inquiries. This projection should be broken down by specific types of offenses. See subparagraph 5b(1) above.
- d. What Are the Relevant Characteristics of the Surrounding Neighborhood? Of primary interest here is identification of the nature, incidence, and trends of crime in the immediate neighborhood, as these data affect the project and its residents. Facts about neighborhood facilities and services are also pertinent here.
- e. What are the Relevant Social Forces at Work in the Larger Community? Such factors as economic trends, illegal drug traffic, migration patterns, racial tensions, land development, and general public attitudes should be considered for their implications for project security.
- f. What Characteristics of the Project's Residents Contribute to the Encouragement or Deterrence of Crime and Vandalism? Both positive and negative factors (e.g., those related to family stability, age, income, employment, racial discrimination, and social attitudes) should be assessed. See especially paragraphs 38 and 39 below.
- g. What are the Nature and Degree of Resident's Fear of Crime? See subparagraph 5b(4) above.

- h. What Specific Physical Characteristics of the Project's Buildings and Grounds Contribute to the Encouragement or Deterrence of Crime and Vandalism? Site layout, landscaping, structural design, equipment, lighting, and hardware are among the elements which should be studied. On this point, there is no substitute for a thorough inspection of the property by a qualified expert on the architectural aspects of security. See Chapter 4 below.
- i. What Are the Nature and Quality of Police Department Services to the Project and its Residents? In addition to information from the Police Department itself, residents' views and independent Management evaluation should be considered. See paragraphs 27 through 30 below.
- j. What Are the Nature and Quality of Other Protective Services Within the Project? Existing security personnel (e.g., Management and tenant patrols, lobby monitors, contract guards) and other "software" measures already in operation should be evaluated in terms of cost-effectiveness. See paragraphs 31 through 35 and Chapters 6 through 8 below.
- k. How Do General Management Policies and Practices Affect Security? Among matters for exploration here are existing conditions regarding organization, staffing, training, administration, maintenance, occupancy policies, and Management-resident relations. See especially Chapter 6 below.
- l. What is the Potential of the Residents' Organization for Assisting with a Security Program? See Chapter 6 below.
- m. To What Extent Does Management Have In-House Technical Capabilities in Security?
- n. What Additional Technical Assistance Is Needed and How Can It Be Obtained? See paragraphs 59 and 60 below.
- o. What Are the Options for Additional Hardware and Software Measures? As many reasonable options as possible should be identified and evaluated for cost-effectiveness. See Chapters 4 through 8 below.
- p. What Are the Residents' Views on Various Security Measures? This inquiry should cover hardware and software measures

- which have actually been employed and the additional options identified under subparagraph 13o above. Care should be taken to ascertain whether or not specific measures are acceptable to residents.
 - q. How Does Security Relate to the Project's Financial Condition? The effect of security problems and remedies on both the capital investment in the property and the operating budget should be studied.
 - r. To What Extent Can New Security Measures be Financed from Sources Other Than the Regular Operating Budget? See paragraphs 57 and 58 below.
 - s. What Social Services Are Needed in Connection with Project Security? Existing social services should be evaluated, and an estimate made of additional needs. Specific sources for meeting those additional needs should be identified. See Chapter 7 below.
 - t. How Do Federal, State and Local Laws and Regulations Affect Project Security? See paragraph 8 above and subparagraph 16e below.
14. EMERGENCY MEASURES. While thorough planning of the type indicated indicated in paragraphs 12 and 13 above will require considerable time, and is designed to produce a comprehensive program extending over the long term, such planning by no means precludes short-term or even emergency action. Intrinsic to this process is the setting of priorities and target dates for phased actions. It should normally be possible to launch some short-term actions (particularly of the "Check" type) before preparation for longer-term actions (particularly of the "Cure" type) is complete. Where critical security problems create a need for emergency measures, it will be necessary to modify the steps outlined in paragraphs 12 and 13 above. Nevertheless, blind action is never justifiable, and some advance planning is always both necessary and possible, even in emergencies. Accordingly, the following points should be observed in emergency situations:
- a. The maximum planning permitted by the circumstances should be undertaken in emergencies. At the least, a deliberate though rapid Management estimate of the facts should be made. Such planning steps as quick physical inspection of the

property and consultation with the residents' organization and the Police Department should ordinarily not result in unacceptable delay.

- b. To minimize the risks of hasty action, emergency measures should be limited to those which appear necessary to meet critical problems. Special caution should be taken in regard to measures which involve heavy expense, which are likely to be difficult to modify or which might cause undesirable "side effects." While this Handbook generally advises against a piecemeal approach, minimal "stopgap" measures may be the best interim approach to emergency problems.
- c. Options should be preserved for different or additional measures after further planning. Limited emergency measures can be made consistent with orderly phasing of actions, as part of a well-planned comprehensive security program over the long term.

15. SPECIAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEW OR RENOVATED HOUSING.

Where new construction or renovation of multifamily housing is contemplated, security planning takes on a special dimension. Here Management is not constrained by fixed physical conditions, but has many options to build in major security features at acceptable cost. In these situations, the following elements must be considered in adapting the planning process previously outlined:

- a. Site Selection. For new construction, security planning should begin with site selection. HUD Site Selection Criteria include provision for management analysis which would include security concerns. The site itself has major and sometimes irreversible consequences for long-term security. Subparagraphs 13d and 13e above are particularly relevant here.
- b. Residents' Characteristics. In planning for new construction or renovation, Management is afforded unique opportunities concerning the selection of a new generation of residents. The first choice relates to the types of households to be accommodated--family or elderly, large or small. Unit size will affect the number of resident children, with probable consequences for security. After targeting the general market, Management should cause security concerns to be reflected in its tenant selection policy. See paragraph 44 below. Even if Management does not fully

exercise its options in these respects, a thorough knowledge of the targeted market will at least let Management know what to expect as to security-related characteristics of prospective residents.

- c. Design and Hardware. One of the most important security options for new or renovated housing lies in the area of architectural design and hardware. See Chapter 4 below. Preplanning offers unique opportunities to build in good security features at feasible cost, and the architects should have a thorough knowledge of specific security problems anticipated and the state of the art of architectural planning for security. See paragraph 19 below.

16. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SPECIFIC PLANNING TASKS.

Subject to the overall responsibility of Management, responsibilities for specific planning tasks should be clearly assigned to particular persons or organizations. For the small project, this will probably be a simple matter, but in all instances responsibilities should be clearly fixed and incorporated in the planning agenda suggested in subparagraph 12a(4) above. The following guidelines should be observed in this connection:

- a. Central Responsibility. One specific person on Management's staff should be assigned central responsibility for security planning, even if an outside consultant is also retained to conduct the planning effort and regardless of what subsidiary responsibilities are assigned to non-Management participants. If Management has a Staff Security Specialist, that person would be the logical choice, but in any event the designated staff member should be an executive-level employee who is well-qualified to oversee a comprehensive planning effort.
- b. Planning Consultants. Particularly for a large project, it may be advisable to retain a qualified outside consultant to conduct all or a part of the planning effort.
- c. Resident Representatives. The residents' organization should be requested to appoint one or more of its members to take responsibility for that organization's planning input.

- d. Committees of Key Participants. Where an extensive planning effort is required, consideration should be given to use of a planning committee made up of representatives of the four key participants--Management, the residents' organization, the local Police Department, and local social services agencies. Representatives of other community organizations may be included if that promises practical advantages, but the committee should be kept small enough to function as an effective working body. The committee should begin its work after the preliminary estimate is written, and should continue to meet regularly, at least until a comprehensive plan is ready for implementation. If the committee proves valuable, consideration should be given to its continuation after the implementation phase begins, in order to assist Management with ongoing coordination and evaluation.
- e. Legal Counsel. Management's attorney should become involved in the security planning process as early as possible -- ideally, before decisions are made rather than after legal problems arise. The attorney's involvement should ensure that all legal problems are avoided or minimized.

CHAPTER 4. DESIGN AND HARDWARE

17. STATE OF THE ART. Concern for the physical aspects of residential security has traditionally centered on familiar types of protective hardware, e.g., locks, lighting, and window grilles. In recent years, growing attention has been given to new technologies for electronic alarm and surveillance systems. In addition, the enhancement of security through architectural design has become the subject of research and development. All of these trends represent significant advances in the state of the art, and even greater advances are probable for the future. However, the burgeoning development of new products and techniques confronts Management with a bewildering array of design and hardware options. This discussion is intended as a brief overview of these complex options, so as to provide guidance on choices incident to the planning approach described in Chapter 3.
18. DESIGN AND HARDWARE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY PROGRAM. Design and hardware measures are among the most important components of residential security. Some degree of physical protection is always essential, even in the small project with relatively minor security problems. However, design and hardware are not panaceas. To achieve maximum effectiveness, economy and resident satisfaction, they must be integral to a comprehensive security program which also takes maximum advantage of "software" measures. In this context, the following preliminary considerations are applicable to planning design and hardware improvements:
 - a. Potential for Different Types of Security Objectives. Security-related design and hardware measures offer an enormous variety of options for all three types of security actions described in Chapter 2, subparagraph 5c above (i.e., "Check", "Treat" and "Cure" actions). Since this Handbook emphasizes "Check" actions, aimed at direct defense against crime and vandalism, most of this Chapter is devoted to design and hardware measures whose potential is primarily of that type. However, some of those measures, as well as more sophisticated design and hardware measures, have great potential as "Treat" and "Cure" actions. See paragraph 19 below.
 - b. Phased Planning and Action. Decisions on design and hardware, like those on other elements of the project's security program, should largely be made only after the goals and priorities of the total security program are set. See Chapter 3, subparagraph 12d and paragraph 14 above. Since additions or alterations to existing projects are apt to be expensive, and once made, even more expensive to change, great caution should be exercised in implementing them on a short-term basis. Normally, the relatively simple types of protective hardware are most appropriate to short-

term action in existing projects, while basic changes in the design of buildings and grounds or installation of electronic surveillance and alarm systems require thorough advance planning. As accomplishment of "Check" prerequisites permits the security program to proceed on to "Treat" and "Cure" objectives, orderly progression can be made toward more sophisticated design measures.

19. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN. Although full exposition of sophisticated concepts of the relationship between security and architectural design is a complex subject which is beyond the scope of this Handbook, some further mention of this subject is merited before turning to discussion of the more familiar types of design and hardware features for residential security. While recent research in this field has produced much of practical value, it has by no means arrived at a fixed set of design standards, and Management should therefore realize that this is a changing, though highly pertinent, technical field. A useful introduction to one major concept is provided by a publication entitled Architectural Design for Crime Prevention (1973), National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA), U. S. Department of Justice (Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402, Stock No. 2700-00161, Price: \$2.60). That publication describes the "defensible space" hypotheses developed by Professor Oscar Newman of New York University. This concept includes the following four ingredients of physical design (as quoted from Chapter 1, paragraph B (page 2) of the referenced publication) which, independently and in concert, can contribute to residential security:
 - a. Territoriality. Design ingredients "which serve to define spheres of territorial influence by dividing the residential environment into subzones within which occupants can easily adopt proprietary attitudes."
 - b. Surveillance. Design ingredients "which improve the natural capability of residents and their agents to visually survey the exterior and interior public areas of their residential environment."
 - c. Common Facilities. Design ingredients "which enhance the safety of adjoining areas through the strategic geographic location of intensively used communal facilities."
 - d. Perceptions of the Project. Design ingredients "which through judicious use of building materials, the tools of architectural composition and site planning are able to reduce the perception

of peculiarity--the vulnerability, isolation of housing projects and their residents."

20. ANALYZING SPECIFIC DESIGN AND HARDWARE OPTIONS. Since there is virtually no specific type of security measure which is necessarily appropriate for every multifamily housing project, design and hardware must be analyzed in terms of choice among a multitude of options, always taking into account the possibility that a "software" alternative might be even better, and the fact that the effectiveness of design and hardware measures may depend upon ancillary "software" measures, e.g. surveillance, reporting, and police response. A useful method of analysis is to look at the project on an area-by-area basis. This permits evaluation of specific options in the context of their function. Paragraphs 21 through 23 below follow this method, providing a checklist of major design and hardware options which tend to be in the nature of direct protective measures designed to withstand criminal attack (or by evidence of their strength to dissuade the would-be offender from attempting attack), rather than to affect deeper levels of human motivation. Thus, these tend to be "Check" actions.
21. PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL DWELLING UNIT. Normally, the first priority for security in multifamily housing is the protection of the individual dwelling unit against burglary. The focus here is on doors and windows, although the existence of other portals (e.g., skylights and attic openings) calls for similar attention to those additional points of vulnerability. In any event, doors, windows, and other means of possible access should be analyzed as total systems, comprised of their frames, locks, and other accessories, as well as their basic components.
 - a. Exterior Doors. All exterior doors (including the back door, if any) should be sufficiently secure to withstand the degree of attack anticipated.
 - (1) The basic door component should be of sufficiently heavy construction to withstand the degree of force anticipated. Where security problems are serious, doors with glass panels should be avoided. It is strongly recommended that all exterior wooden doors be of solid-core construction with a minimum thickness of 1-3/4 inches. Both hollow wood doors and thin panel doors are inadequate where serious security problems exist. Although flush doors provide better security, if panel doors are desired, their panels should have a minimum thickness of 1/2 inch. Heavier-duty options are doors with solid wood cores and metal coverings and doors of hollow steel or aluminum construction.

- (2) Door hinges must also be of heavy-duty construction, and mounted on the inside of the door so that burglars cannot remove the entire door from its hinges. Spring hinges, which close the door automatically, are recommended.
- (3) Door locks are the one element in the entire security picture about which a standard recommendation can most validly be made for every multifamily housing project: Every exterior dwelling unit door should be equipped with a deadbolt mortise lock with a "throw" of at least one inch, constructed of case-hardened steel, brass, zinc alloy, or bronze. This, if no other, security design feature should be incorporated into every new and existing project. Locks equipped with spring latches only (but not deadbolts) are unsatisfactory, because an intruder can easily push back a spring latch with a celluloid strip. "Key-in-the-knob" locks should not be relied upon for primary exterior lock protection, since a determined burglar can break them with relative ease. The cylinder is a critical element of any lock and must be sufficient to withstand expert lock-picking efforts; it is desirable for a lock cylinder to have at least six pins. Protruding cylinders should be avoided, or protected by a spinner ring, a bevelled ring cylinder guard or escutcheon plate. There is, however, no such thing as a "burglar-proof" lock, which can withstand the attack of a skilled burglar with ample time and equipment to practice his skills. The value of a good lock is that it can withstand attack by the relatively unskilled burglar, or delay the skilled burglar until he is driven away or apprehended, or deter either from attempting to break in.
- (4) The door frame is often overlooked as a component of the security of a complete door system. All frames should be of heavy-duty construction. Metal-covered wood frames provide optimum cost effectiveness when used in combination with doors of similar construction, but are recommended for use with wooden doors as well. Wooden frames should be at least two inches thick. If hollow steel frames are used, the air space behind the frame should be filled with crush-resistant material, especially in the area of the strike. For in-swinging doors, rabbeted jambs should be used to prevent tampering in the area of the strike; addition of an L-shaped metal plate in the area of the strike affords extra protection to the lock. For doors opening out, an escutcheon plate, extending beyond the edge of the door and fitting flush with the jamb when the door is closed, will provide similar protection to the

- lock. All plates mounted on the outsides of doors should be attached with tamper-resistant connectors, such as round-headed carriage bolts or one-way screws.
- (5) Interviewers are devices installed on opaque doors to allow persons inside the unit to see and hear who is outside without having to unsecure the door. A wide-angle optical interviewer (peep-hole) should be installed on each exterior door (including the back door, if any). This is a relatively inexpensive measure and should be standard for all multifamily housing projects. The opening of an optical interviewer should be no more than ½ inch in diameter, and a double glass should be used for safety. Slide-chain interviewers (chain locks) should not be relied upon; they are easily defeated and impart a false sense of security.
- (6) Doors with glass panels, though highly undesirable for exterior use where security problems are serious, must be given special attention wherever they are used. Sliding doors should have break-resistant glass and should be equipped with a sturdy lock designed specifically for this type of door. For other types of doors with glass panels (e.g., French doors), the deadbolt mortise lock should be key-operated from the inside as well as the outside, in order to prevent the burglar from simply removing a portion of the glass and reaching inside to operate the latch by hand.
- b. Windows. The dwelling unit windows which are most vulnerable to attack are those situated on the first floor (or otherwise accessible from the ground) and those leading to fire escapes. Also vulnerable, but to lesser degree, are windows located over a canopy (e.g., above a lobby entrance), adjacent stairwell windows or on the top floor. Cornices, ledges or other architectural features can create further vulnerability. In some instances, the threat of determined and resourceful burglars has even extended several stories above the ground or below the roof. Since windows are a prime target for vandalism, that threat, as well as the threat of burglary, should be considered in planning measures for the protection of windows. Careful analysis of experience, trends and building design will enable Management to identify degrees of window vulnerability.
- (1) Window glass can be protected by the use of "unbreakable glass" made of polycarbonate materials, though at relatively high initial purchase cost. Other options which are

superior to ordinary window glass include plate glass, tempered glass, and bonded safety glass.

- (2) Window locks are an important element to which little thought is usually given. The only reliable window locks are those of the key-operated variety. However, such locks present problems of fire safety and inconvenience to residents. The standard crescent sash lock, the slide bolt latch, and various friction or pressure devices can easily be overcome, especially if the intruder is willing to break a small section of the glass.

- (3) Grilles, bars, and gates afford reliable protection for vulnerable windows where security problems are great. Such fixtures should be of heavy-duty construction, and should be securely attached to the window frame with machine or roundheaded bolts which cannot be easily removed from the outside. Fire safety requirements must be checked before window grilles, bars, or gates are installed.

c. Electronic Alarm Systems. The measures described in subparagraphs 21a and 21b above for the protection of exterior doors, windows, and other possible points of access to the dwelling unit can be reinforced by electronic alarm systems, although such systems should be used only where necessary and practicable.

- (1) Types of Alarm Systems. There are scores of electronic alarm products on the market, varying greatly in price, quality, and complexity. Some are very difficult to install; others need only be plugged into an existing electric outlet. Alarm devices fall roughly into two categories: contact devices and motion detection devices. In the simplest terms, contact devices are mechanical switches which detect the movement of a door or window. Foil strips are a related mechanism used to detect breakage of glass in windows and doors. The second type of alarm system detects the motion of an intruder as he moves about the protected space. Motion detection technologies include seismographic devices, photo-electric cells, and ultrasonic detectors. Great caution should be exercised in selecting alarm equipment. The advice of an independent expert is strongly advised.

- (2) Alarm Reporting Systems. Either a contact or motion detection system may be linked to a local alarm (bell, buzzer, lights on the immediate premises) or to a central alarm (via wires to a security force which is prepared to

react when so alerted). Local alarms aim at driving off the burglar or aiding in his apprehension, and at alerting residents and neighbors that a break-in is being attempted. The effectiveness of any alarm system depends to a great extent upon the ability to secure a prompt response from the police or other security personnel. False alarms are a major problem, because they diminish the credibility of the system and tend to slow or stop effective response from police, security personnel, and neighbors.

22. PROTECTING COMMON AREAS WITHIN MULTIFAMILY BUILDINGS. With regard to protection of common areas within multifamily buildings, a basic choice is the degree to which a "fortress" strategy can and should be adopted. For a project inhabited by families with children, such a strategy may be patently inconsistent with the normal pattern of residents' daily lives. An extreme "fortress" strategy is apt to be most workable in a high-rise building exclusively for the elderly. Acceptability to residents is always a commanding consideration, though it may be possible to obtain resident acceptance through careful educational efforts.

a. Lobbies are a first line of building defense. The degree and methods of controlling access must depend upon residents' attitudes and life styles and the availability of policing services. Nevertheless, in all instances, the lobby itself and the area immediately outside its doors should be brightly lighted and free of places of concealment. The following additional elements of lobby design merit special attention:

- (1) Lobby doors should have large glass panels, to facilitate two-way surveillance. Where security problems are great and policing services inadequate to control access, serious consideration must be given to keeping lobby doors locked, especially during evening hours. Where this is done, lobby doors should be equipped with heavy-duty metal frames, a good deadbolt mortise lock set, and a sturdy door closer.
- (2) Intercom (annunciator) devices permit residents conveniently to admit callers when lobby doors are locked. The familiar "buzzer reply" system is satisfactory, but should be installed during initial construction, because costs of wiring installation are very high in existing buildings. A functionally similar alternative is an intercom system utilizing regular telephone wires, instead of separate wiring, so that installation costs are relatively modest. However, a monthly service charge is made for each dwelling unit. If there is a telephone connection in the unit, this

system can be used even if the resident does not have a regular telephone. This type of system is available through some local telephone companies. A much less expensive, though also much less satisfactory, method is simply to have the telephone company install a public telephone outside the lobby entrance, so that callers can telephone residents, who can then come to the lobby to open the door. One potential problem with any of these systems is vandalization of intercom panels or telephones located outside the building's entrance. Difficulties with resident acceptance and vandalism tend to be greatest in buildings with many small children in residence.

- b. Secondary doors (e.g., emergency exits, delivery doors) each require analysis in terms of ordinary function as well as threat of criminal access. It is sometimes difficult to reconcile these two factors. Fire regulations require that occupants of the building be readily able to open emergency doors from the inside; the best solution here is a vertical-bolt latch or crash bar on the inside, keeping the door locked from the outside at all times. Exit alarms can be installed to alert security personnel upon the opening of emergency doors. All secondary doors should have automatic door closer devices. Glass panels should never be used in such doors, and the construction of the door and its frame should be sufficiently heavy to withstand the degree of attack anticipated. Where secondary doors are continuously used for resident ingress and egress (e.g., doors to garages or parking lots), they should be treated in much the same way as lobby doors.
- c. Garage access should be controlled, even if doors leading from the garage to other areas of the building are monitored and/or kept locked.
- d. Elevators are among the most problematical elements of high-rise multifamily buildings, from the standpoint of vandalism as well as crimes against persons.
 - (1) Surveillance is a prime factor in elevator security. Buildings should be designed so that the elevator area is fully visible throughout the lobby, and preferably from the area immediately outside the lobby and the street beyond. On levels other than the lobby floor, elevators should open directly on hallways, without recesses or blind corners to restrict two-way visibility. A common and inexpensive device to increase a person's ability to survey the interior of an elevator before entry is a

convex mirror placed in the upper back corner of the elevator cab.

- (2) Audio-intercom systems permit persons within the elevator to communicate with persons in elevator waiting areas or with security personnel. A continuous audio device is preferable to one which must be activated by pushing a button.
- (3) Closed-circuit television is particularly adaptable to elevator security (see paragraph 24 below).
- (4) Vandalism to elevators can be limited by a variety of measures, including use of stainless steel mushroom buttons, protecting indicator lights with a heavy-duty plastic shield and use of automatic sliding doors (rather than swinging doors). Door glass, though an element in surveillance, is so susceptible to breakage as to merit avoidance where vandalism is a problem. Where existing elevators have such glass, a piece of metal can be simply welded or bolted over the opening.
- e. Mailboxes and mail rooms should be located so as to permit maximum surveillance --preferably in or adjacent to the main lobby of the building. The mailboxes themselves should be constructed of heavy metal, with tightly-fitted doors. Locks should be of the cylinder type with at least five pins. Sizes of mailbox doors should be kept at a minimum. A locked mailbox room provides additional security, although it should be subject to full surveillance from the lobby by means of large windows and good lighting. Where back-loading mailboxes are used, a separate mail loading room is often provided. Doors to all such rooms should be of sturdy construction, should be kept locked on a 24-hour basis, and should be equipped with automatic door closers.
- f. Laundry rooms commonly invite attack on residents or pilferage of coins from laundry machines. A first consideration here is location. Laundry rooms are usually located in basement recesses, and Management should carefully consider whether that is the best choice. If acceptable to residents, the laundry room might better be situated in a more active area of the building, adjacent to social rooms or even the main lobby, and fitted with large glass windows to facilitate surveillance. This may accord well with social patterns, and there is no reason why laundry rooms cannot be made attractive. In any event, laundry rooms should be kept locked on a 24-hour basis, with tenants being provided keys. Laundry rooms may be further protected by audio intercom or closed-circuit television devices.

- g. Social rooms should provide protection for both people and such valuables as may be kept there. Proximity to other heavily-used areas (e.g., the main lobby) can facilitate mutual surveillance by residents in the ordinary course of their activities.
- h. Storage rooms for residents' and Management's property, merit heavy protective measures. Use of windowless rooms (e.g., in basements) is advisable, and door systems (including their locks and frames) should be of particularly strong construction. Dead-bolt locks should always be used. For residents' storage, the additional use of locked bins is recommended.
- i. Management offices should be protected to the degree they make attractive targets for burglary or robbery, with particularly strong measures where money, office equipment, or other valuable movables are kept in such areas. Measures similar to those employed for dwelling units are recommended (see paragraph 21 above). Where significant sums in money or checks are kept in the Management office, a strong safe (preferably bolted into the floor) should be used. Collection windows may be further protected by heavy metal grilles or bars and alarms which can be readily activated in the event of robbery. However, one of the best precautions is to avoid keeping large sums in cash or checks on the premises at any time.
- j. Hallways and stairs should be susceptible of easy surveillance. Open design is generally desirable, and all such areas should be well-lighted at all times. As in the case of elevators, convex mirrors can be used to permit an approaching view of possible places of concealment. Doors between fire stairwells and other common areas should be kept locked from the outside, with hardware to permit emergency egress only. Vertical-bolt latches or crash bars on the inside of such doors and automatic door closers are recommended. Exit alarms provide a local alert upon the opening of a fire exit door, but have the same weakness as all local alarms -- the necessity for prompt response and the problem of nuisance and credibility.
- k. Roofs merit attention, because of their potential as avenues of escape or access and as isolated areas which may be used for such offenses as drug abuse, assault, and rape. In addition, easy access to the roof presents a safety hazard to children. At the same time, fire safety requirements may demand that access to the roof be available from fire stairs. Where this is the case, doors to the roof should nevertheless be kept locked from the outside, with vertical-bolt latches or crash bar on the inside to permit emergency egress. However, if fire

- safety codes permit, such doors should also be kept locked from the inside. In either event, but especially where ready egress must be allowed, consideration should be given to installing exit alarms on these doors, and means for regular surveillance of roof areas. Rooftop lighting, closed circuit television, and (to the extent possible) avoidance of structural elements which provide opportunities for concealment on the roof are possible options to promote surveillance.
1. Interior lighting for common areas within the building has already been mentioned in connection with several of the specific types of areas discussed above. However, the generally applicable principle merits additional emphasis: all common interior areas should be brightly lighted at all evening hours when they are subject to ordinary use. For lobbies, elevators, hallways, and stairwells, this means 24-hour lighting. Where vandalism is a problem (as is most likely in lobbies, elevators, hallways, and stairwells), vandal-resistant lighting fixtures should be installed. Residents should be requested to make prompt report of inoperative lights, and maintenance staff should be required to make frequent lighting inspections and speedy repairs or replacements. Good lighting for interior common areas is one of the least expensive of security measures, and missing or burned-out bulbs are always a mark of poor management. (Energy conservation measures may impose constraints on lighting.)
23. PROTECTING EXTERIOR AREAS OF THE PROJECT. Normally, at least in housing for families with children, it is infeasible or undesirable to restrict access to the project's grounds to the same degree as with respect to interior common areas. On the other hand, in some instances (e.g., all-elderly projects), it may be both feasible and desirable to extend some degree of a "fortress" strategy to the exterior boundaries of the property. Again, the choice must depend upon a realistic appraisal of all the relevant facts. The following options merit consideration in this connection:
- a. Exterior lighting should be amply provided for all heavily-used areas, such as walkways, entry areas, and parking lots. Lighting levels in projects for the elderly should be well in excess of conventional standards, because light perception declines with advancing age. High placement of lighting fixtures results in wider coverage as well as less susceptibility to vandalism. High-intensity lights are well-suited to large areas, such as parking lots. A variety of vandal-resistant lighting equipment is now being marketed. The assistance of lighting engineers or consultants is recommended. (Energy conservation measures may impose constraints on lighting.)

- b. Recreational areas for children and adults merit individualized treatment, taking account of the particular use to be made of each, the particular group of users, and the social patterns of the project and the wider neighborhood. Generally, areas designed for use by different age groups (preschool, elementary school, teenagers, adults) should be sufficiently separated by space or other barriers to minimize conflicts. However, all recreational areas should be susceptible to intensive surveillance from streets and sidewalks, and, if possible, from the windows of dwellings. In addition, benches on the perimeter of playgrounds and areas for athletics can encourage adults to exercise casual surveillance. While vandalism to playground equipment is a matter of legitimate concern, hard use of such equipment should be no cause for discomfort. Particularly, where their number is high, children "use up" playground equipment during the ordinary course of play, and this is even desirable as a means of diverting normal youthful energies from damage to other elements of the property.
 - c. Fences and walls may be utilized to channel or restrain movement, so as to facilitate surveillance and policing. However, it is seldom feasible to erect complete physical barriers around the property. More widely appropriate is the creation of limited exterior zones for use by elderly residents or small children, with access only by way of an adjacent building. Fences and walls may be objectionable to residents. However, if they are well-designed in both their security and esthetic aspects, it is much easier to gain resident acceptability.
 - d. Approaches to building entrances are particularly prone to crime, and primary entrances should be near the street. Routes from parking lots to building entrances should also be kept short and direct. Dense shrubbery or other possible places of concealment should be avoided in these areas. Every opportunity for casual surveillance should be exploited.
 - e. Closed-circuit television can provide effective surveillance of exterior areas. (See paragraph 24 below.)
24. CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS. Where other means of surveillance are inadequate, the potential and feasibility of closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems should be explored. While initially costly, CCTV may be more economical than such alternatives as design modifications or security patrols, particularly in large projects. However, Management should exercise great care in deciding whether CCTV is suitable, workable, and cost-effective for the particular project. The following points are pertinent in this connection:

- a. CCTV equipment of great variety in quality and cost is now on the market, and choice of equipment as well as the manner of its use should be carefully studied. Expert independent advice is essential before any purchase is made. All equipment should meet the standards of the Electronic Industries Association for CCTV.
- b. Monitoring and response components are critical to the effectiveness of CCTV systems. Accordingly, a well-planned, well-trained and well-supervised personnel adjunct is essential. Regular police or project security personnel, or both, might be relied upon for dispatch to the scene of an offense, but there should always be a Management intermediary to monitor the system on a continuous basis and obtain prompt dispatch.
- c. Repairs of CCTV equipment must be given emergency priority. Breakdowns do worse than producing lapses in surveillance. They can also create a false sense of security or undermine the credibility of the system.
- d. Camera locations should concentrate on particularly vulnerable areas within buildings and grounds. Lobbies and elevators are prime locations. Remote pan and tilt mechanisms enable one camera to scan a large area. Protection against vandalism is an important consideration.
- e. Available lighting virtually dictates the type, and therefore the cost, of the camera needed to produce an image of adequate quality, and the cost of additional lighting must be balanced against the higher cost of more light-sensitive cameras.
- f. In-apartment monitoring by residents, by means of their own television sets, is possible by connecting CCTV equipment to a master antenna system within a building. Residents can be given the option of tuning into unused television channels to monitor the lobby, elevator, playground, and parking lot. While this does not assure continuous monitoring, in large buildings it can provide considerable back-up to the Management monitor. A microphone system can be added, permitting communication between the apartment and children at the playground or callers at the lobby entrance. The residents' organization might organize a voluntary monitoring program, with certain residents taking responsibilities for watching the CCTV image in their homes during specific hours.
- g. Widespread knowledge of how a CCTV system operates is desirable, provided the system is genuinely effective. If the potential offender knows of such features as in-apartment monitoring, the

deterrent effect will be strengthened. Therefore, Management should make every effort to brief residents and community groups on the system, and encourage people to spread the information as widely as possible. Notices posted outside buildings and in the lobby may help to get the message across.

25. MAINTENANCE. Strong physical security depends to an important degree upon good maintenance. Management's maintenance staff must be thoroughly trained in maintenance of security hardware and equipment, and repairs must be effected promptly. Continuous serviceability of all security hardware and design elements is essential to build and maintain resident confidence, to enhance their subjective sense of security, to prevent a false sense of security and, of course, to present a credible deterrent to would-be offenders. Both residents and maintenance staff must be instructed to report maintenance needs in both common areas and individual units. Regular maintenance inspections should cover all security features. Even with respect to special equipment beyond the repair capabilities of regular maintenance personnel (e.g., electronic alarm or CCTV equipment), such personnel should be trained to identify and report deficiencies.

CHAPTER 5. POLICING SERVICES

26. SCOPE OF POLICING SERVICES. As used in this Chapter, the word "policing" embraces the entire range of services which are devoted to police-type functions (e.g., patrolling, guarding, apprehension, restraint, arrest, and investigation), regardless of the nature of the method of their delivery. The term thus includes both regular Police Department services and protective services provided by "security personnel" (i.e., personnel other than those of the regular Police Department, whose function is to protect one or more specific housing properties, such as Housing Police Forces, Management and resident patrols, contract guard services, stationary guards, doormen, lobby monitors, etc.). This broad usage of the word "policing" reflects the importance, in planning a residential security program, of surveying the project in terms of total policing needs and the total range of options which might be used to meet those needs.
27. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. Consideration of policing services for multifamily housing must begin with examination of the role of the regular local Police Department. One fundamental point deserves heavy emphasis here: The primary responsibility for policing services in all HUD-assisted multifamily housing rests squarely with the local Police Department. Neither public housing nor HUD-insured housing projects are enclaves of Federal responsibility. On the contrary, HUD-assisted projects are intrinsic to the community as a whole, and are entitled to full Police Department services, except to the degree (if any) to which Management and the local government may expressly agree to some alternative policing arrangement. Maximum reliance upon the regular Police Department avoids the waste of resources and conflicts in operations which tend to result from fragmentation of the community's total delivery system for policing services. Where the nature of a specific policing service requires highly professional organization, training, discipline, and supporting services and facilities, the Police Department is ordinarily the best entity to handle it. Any deviation from these principles should be accepted reluctantly, and only to the extent that it can be clearly shown to promise better protection for the project and its residents.
28. POLICE DEPARTMENT DETERRENCE OF CRIME AND VANDALISM. While police arrests constitute a strong factor in deterring further offenses, they are of themselves an inadequate measure of Police Department success. Management must stress the primacy of deterrence and the need for a Police Department strategy which will either discourage attempts at crime or detect and stop them before they can be consummated. Accordingly, a highly visible police presence and thorough surveillance should be paramount considerations for Police

Department operations in the project. Police officers sometimes prefer to limit their activities to motorized patrols along public streets. They tend to be reluctant to engage in "vertical patrolling" (i.e., patrolling within common areas of apartment buildings) or to provide stationary guards within residential buildings and their grounds. However, where security problems are serious, these methods might well be suggested to be appropriate and cost-effective uses of Police Department manpower.

29. OBTAINING POLICE DEPARTMENT SERVICES. Management's ultimate objective should be to obtain from the Police Department all of the policing services needed for the property and its residents. Where additional services and/or changes in existing services are needed, the following steps are recommended:
 - a. Preparation. Before putting its full case before police or other local officials, Management should be well prepared to justify its demands for additional and/or different services. While contacts with police officials should begin early in the planning process (in order to obtain Police Department assistance in the planning effort itself and to begin to build a working alliance), full consideration can be given to the Police Department's role only after Management has completed a relatively comprehensive factual analysis. See Chapter 3, subparagraph 12b above. Before requesting additional police services, Management should be able to demonstrate that it has made reasonable efforts to remedy the project's problems through non-policing measures (e.g., reasonable improvement of the project's physical security features).
 - b. Requesting Additional and/or Different Police Department Services. The project's policing needs are matters for frank discussion between Management and Police Department officials, and Management must be forceful in pressing its demands. However, the best initial approach is one of amicable persuasion, with promise of full cooperation on the part of Management and the residents' organization. Management is advised to place its case before senior Police Department officials in a manner which will command their serious consideration. One or more conferences, backed up with a thorough memorandum describing the facts and proposed actions, are recommended. In such conferences, Management should be represented by executive-level personnel (plus its consultants, if any). It may be helpful to have a representative of the residents' organization attend such meetings. If a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) exists in the locality, it may also be advisable to bring that body into the matter at this and subsequent steps. See

that body into the matter at this and subsequent steps. See paragraph 48 below.

- c. Reallocation of Police Department Resources. If Management concludes that Police Department manpower or other resources are poorly allocated, from the viewpoint of the project and its residents, it should submit to police officials a detailed proposal for a more equitable and effective reallocation.
 - d. Appeal to Other Local Officials. If, because of funding constraints, or any other reason, the Police Department is unable or unwilling to satisfy the project's needs for additional and/or different policing services, Management should not resign itself to that state of affairs. Instead, it should carry a vigorous appeal to other appropriate officials in the local governmental structure (e.g., CJCC, Mayor, City Council). While it is highly desirable that such an appeal be a cooperative effort on the part of Management and the Police Department, if there is disagreement between them, Management should nevertheless give serious consideration to pressing its own demands. In either event, the support of residents and the wider community will greatly strengthen Management's case.
 - e. Continuing Efforts. If all efforts to obtain additional and/or different Police Department services fail, Management may be forced to turn to the use of security personnel (i.e., non-Police Department services), as discussed in paragraphs 31 through 35 below. However, even after such measures are instituted, Management should continue its efforts to obtain additional and/or different Police Department services, with the aim of reducing the need for security personnel.
30. SPECIAL POLICE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS. Where the project's needs cannot be met within the framework of regular Police Department operations, possibilities for special operational arrangements (still using Police Department personnel and supervision) should be explored. Such special operations might be funded under the Police Department budget, or with additional funds pursuant to an agreement among Management, the Police Department, and the local

governing body. The following are among the special operational techniques which should be considered:

- a. A special Police Department force might be detailed for service as patrolmen and/or stationary guards within one or more large projects. This arrangement allows creation of a force designed for the specific needs of particular projects, but still keeps that force within the overall Police Department delivery system. Another advantage of this technique is that it allows members of the special force to become closely involved in, and committed to, the project community.
- b. A project substation (i.e., located within a housing project) might serve as the base of operations and support for a special Police Department force in a large project, or a group of projects. This technique adds a highly visible element of on-site police presence and can also be helpful in promoting positive police-resident relations.
- c. Police monitors might be used to man electronic surveillance and alarm systems. Such systems can sometimes be tied into the regular police precinct headquarters. This kind of monitoring is a particularly appropriate use for a project substation.

31. PLANNING FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL. To the extent that adequate policing services cannot be obtained from the local Police Department, despite the efforts suggested in the previous paragraphs of this Chapter, Management must consider the use of "security personnel" (i.e., non-Police Department personnel to perform policing functions within project boundaries). This does not mean that Management should immediately establish a large security force. On the contrary, the need for careful planning increases with the degree of unmet policing needs. The options involved in security personnel services are many, reflecting the fact that such services have been developed locally in response to the needs and constraints of particular housing projects, rather than according to prescribed formulae. Paragraphs 32 through 35 below are devoted to examination of these options, but in order first to put the issues into a proper planning perspective, the following checklist of basic questions is offered:

- a. What are the total policing needs of the project which cannot be met by the Police Department? The answer to this question will define the limits for security personnel planning. Identification of priorities among total unmet needs will provide a firm basis for further choices.

- b. What should be the scope of the functions of security personnel? In the simplest terms, this is a question of the extent to which security personnel should use force. See paragraph 32 below.
- c. What specific types of security personnel functions should be used? The basic options include patrolling, stationary guarding, and monitoring electronic alarm and surveillance equipment. See paragraph 33 below.
- d. What type of organization should be used for security personnel? The major options here are management security forces, resident patrols, and contract guard services. See paragraph 34 below.
- e. What kind of administration, training, and equipment should be used for security personnel? See paragraph 35 below.
- f. How do funding considerations affect the choice of options? If (as is likely in most instances) available funding is inadequate to permit choice of all of the most desirable options, it will be necessary to consider less desirable and less costly options and to concentrate on high-priority needs. Even where generous funds are available, Management should consider whether some problems which are susceptible to policing measures can be remedied by more cost-effective nonpolicing measures discussed elsewhere in this Handbook.

32. SCOPE OF FUNCTIONS OF SECURITY PERSONNEL. In planning for security personnel, a basic question is the scope of the functions which such personnel are to perform. In the case of a small project, the area for choice will be relatively narrow. However, for a large project or a group of projects where a sizable security force is contemplated, the range of options is very broad. The following indicates the nature of these options:

- a. Housing Police Forces. A few large LHAs have organized their own "Housing Police Forces," a term used in this Handbook to denote security forces with functions and powers tantamount to those of a regular Police Department, but with jurisdiction limited to the boundaries of specific housing projects. These forces handle all, or virtually all, policing services, including patrolling, guarding, apprehension, arrest, and investigation. Since such forces totally or largely supplant the regular Police Department within their jurisdictional areas, their operations require enabling legislation and/or agreement between Management and the local governing body. Obviously, a Housing Police Force is suitable only for a very large housing operation, and detailed discussion of this complex type of operation is beyond the scope of this Handbook.

- b. Supplemental Security Personnel. For the great majority of housing projects, full-fledged Housing Police Forces are neither feasible nor suitable. Instead, the functions of their security personnel will be to supplement the services of the regular local Police Department, and so will be designed to provide only the services which the Police Department cannot provide. Since this is the type of security personnel which will be of interest for all but the very largest housing operation, paragraphs 33 through 35 below are written in terms of this type of supplemental policing services, and not in terms of Housing Police Forces. Whether such security personnel consist of a single night watchman or a sizeable force of patrolmen and stationary guards, their major objective should be non-forcible deterrence, designed to dissuade potential offenders from attempting crimes or to detect and stop crimes before they can be consummated. They should rely upon Police Department backup for apprehension and arrest. "Security presence" is of cardinal importance, and high visibility is essential. Of course, the credibility of security personnel of this type depends upon their actual and perceived ability to bring force to bear if need be, and they must therefore be able to obtain prompt Police Department intervention. Moreover, it may be necessary or advisable for security personnel themselves to have some capability for force (at least for self-defense) in emergency situations. However, it is generally preferable that their use of force be minimal. As this indicates, use of supplemental security personnel is subject to many functional shadings, ranging from mere surveillance to duties approaching those of a full-fledged Housing Police Force. The fundamental distinction is whether housing security personnel supplant or supplement Police Department services.

33. TYPES OF FUNCTIONS OF SECURITY PERSONNEL. Security personnel of the supplemental variety can perform three basic types of operational functions--patrolling, stationary guarding, and monitoring of electronic alarm and surveillance systems--which may be implemented independently or in combination. The choice among these options is a matter for close cost-effectiveness comparison.

- a. Patrolling. This familiar type of function is designed to provide maximum use of manpower in policing relatively large areas. Patrolling may be as simple as the use of a single night watchman in a small project, or as complex as the employment of a sizeable 24-hour patrol force in a large project or group of projects. While patrolling is a popular option, there is nothing necessarily superior about it. Generally,

it is the best choice where it is desirable to extend a personal security presence over a widespread area. Patrolling is most often used to cover project grounds, with on-call response to incidents within buildings. However, "vertical patrolling" (i.e., systematic patrol of common interior areas, such as lobbies, elevators, hallways, and fire stairwells) can be a highly effective use of security manpower.

- b. Stationary Guarding. Stationary guards are most often used to provide security at lobby entrances, and in that application are usually called doormen or lobby monitors. They may screen entry, perform general surveillance, and provide incidental assistance to residents. However, basically the same technique can be applied at other strategic points within buildings and even on the project's grounds. A guard positioned at an outdoor station which commands main exterior approaches, recreational areas, and parking lots may well be more cost-effective than patrolling. Design and hardware elements are crucial to control by stationary guards. For example, the existence of unsecured secondary access doors largely defeats the effectiveness of lobby guards.
- c. Monitoring of Electronic Alarm and Surveillance Systems. Monitors of electronic alarm and surveillance systems serve as informational relays and must be able to secure prompt dispatch of police officers or security patrolmen to the scene of a security emergency. Stationary guards might double as monitors of electronic surveillance and alarm systems, provided that they are able to give adequate attention to both personal and electronic duties.

34. TYPES OF SECURITY PERSONNEL ORGANIZATIONS. Where a sizeable number of security personnel is used, the type of organizational structure is a crucial consideration. However, sound planning requires that the previously-discussed issues regarding scope and type of functions be largely resolved before determining the specific type of organization to be used. Types of security personnel organizations can be roughly divided into the following three basic categories, which might be used independently or in combination (in actual practice, there are many possible variations which tend to blur these distinctions):

- a. Management security forces are an integral part of Management's overall organizational structure. Their members are direct, paid employees of Management, which thus has the normal authority of an employer over hiring, supervision, and discharge. The elements of strong Management control constitutes a major

advantage over other organizational options. Security forces of this type have varied considerably in the scope of functions, as discussed in paragraph 32b above, and may perform any one or more of the types of functions described in paragraph 33 above (i.e., patrolling, stationary guarding, and monitoring electronic alarm and surveillance systems). See paragraph 35 below for additional considerations relating to Management security forces.

- b. Resident patrols (or, as often referred to "tenant patrols"), in their purest form, are wholly comprised of volunteer residents of the project, and may operate as independent organizations or under the auspices of the general residents' organization. However, Management sometimes pays for such items as uniforms and equipment, and in some instances even pays patrol supervisors for their services. The degree of Management control depends largely upon its financial support. Even though an organization is called a resident or tenant patrol, if all its members become paid employees of Management, the real nature of the organization approximates that of a Management security force. Resident patrols have achieved positive results in a number of instances, in stationary guard as well as patrolling functions, and Management is advised to give due consideration to this option. While the impetus for establishing a resident patrol usually comes from residents themselves, if Management discerns a potential receptivity to this option among residents, it might well take the lead in encouraging and guiding resident participation of this type. As an "eyes and ears" operation enjoying close rapport with residents, a resident patrol may serve as a valuable adjunct to the Police Department or a management security force, and volunteer resident services can ease the financial burden of project security. Nevertheless, Management should be keenly aware of the potential drawbacks of resident patrols. Lacking effective control, Management may find itself in serious conflict with the resident patrol.
- c. Contract guard services may be purchased by Management from commercial agencies. Personnel are employees of the agency, rather than Management, and the basis for Management supervision is thus apt to be tenuous. Management's only recourse for poor performance may be the difficult one of terminating the contract. While the quality of services varies greatly among different contract guard agencies, a recent study published by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration stated: "In a real sense, many of the problems associated with the private security industry are the result of using low-paid, low-quality, under-educated and untrained employees." ("Private Police in

the United States: Findings and Recommendations", Vol. I, R-869/DOJ, p. 61, U.S. Dept. of Justice, LEAA). For these reasons, thorough investigation and negotiation is advised before concluding any such contract.

35. ADMINISTRATION, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT FOR SECURITY FORCES. Particularly where a sizeable Management security force is employed, careful attention must be given to the following points regarding administration, training, and equipment (some of which are also relevant to resident patrols and contract guard services):
 - a. Management control over the security force should be strictly maintained. The force should be an integral component of the overall Management structure, with clearly defined lines of accountability to the general Management staff. Care should be taken to prevent the security force from developing into a separate bureaucracy.
 - b. Strong supervision is crucial, particularly for larger security forces. Analysis of current security conditions and planning of operations are daily supervisory chores. Strict discipline must be enforced to assure that personnel stay on the job and perform their assigned tasks. Sanctions for infractions must be invoked firmly, fairly, and promptly. Supervisors should inspect and brief patrolmen and guards before each shift, and should make frequent spotchecks during each shift.
 - c. Qualifications for supervisors must be especially high. The chief supervisory officer of a large security force should be selected with extreme care, and should be well-qualified by training, experience, and temperament. The ideal person for this crucial job is one who has had professional police training and experience; who is able to exercise taut discipline, economy, and administration; who has a thorough appreciation of social dynamics; and who possesses a generous capacity for human sensitivity and compassion. The chief supervisor must be able to command respect and work closely with other Management personnel, residents, the Police Department, and local social services agencies. Such individuals can be expected to command high salaries, but it is false economy to accept serious compromise of these standards.
 - d. Personnel selection standards should be stringent, and applicants should be carefully screened. Security personnel must be able to inspire general confidence and respect, as well as to perform the specific tasks assigned to them. Screening should take special care to eliminate applicants who are

emotionally unfit or who are likely to abuse the authority entrusted to security personnel. The Police Department may be able to assist in screening.



- e. Employment of residents for Management security forces has generally brought highly favorable results, and is strongly recommended. A prime advantage is that residents know the project and the other residents, and they tend to become strongly committed to their jobs. In low-income projects, this serves the additional purpose of providing jobs for residents. A possible disadvantage is that residents may be subject to undue pressures by their neighbors. Some Managers have a policy of giving residents first preference for employment, but not necessarily restricting employment to residents.
- f. Performance standards should be clearly defined, and thoroughly understood by all security personnel. For a sizeable force, these standards, along with a description of the purpose, organizational structure, and functions of the force, should be spelled out in a booklet of rules and regulations, to be distributed to all members of the force and among residents in general. Residents should be requested to report significant infractions.
- g. Training is essential for all security personnel. A formal training course of four to six weeks duration is recommended for members of a large security force, but even a single doorman or night watchman should receive some formal or informal training. Training should be conducted by qualified professionals, and should cover general Management structure and operations, physical and social characteristics of the project, policing techniques and equipment, social aspects of the security guard's role and the purpose, organization, and specific functions of the security force. Regular police officers, social service professionals and leaders of the residents' organization, as well as Management officers, should participate in training sessions. Special attention should be given to use of weapons (if any), and where firearms are to be issued to patrolmen or guards, it is imperative that they receive thorough training in their use.
- h. The number of security personnel needed for a particular project is subject to too many variables to permit use of a general formula for manpower estimates. In practice, ratios range from a high of four persons (160 manhours per week) to a low of two persons (80 manhours per week) for each 1,000

residents. A single lobby guard cannot be expected to provide screening for more than about 200 apartment units.

- i. Scheduling of security personnel services for maximum cost-effectiveness requires thorough analysis of the chronological pattern of the project's security problems. Concentration of services during peak "trouble hours" is the best use of costly security manpower. Figure 2 (page 46) sets forth a chart showing a typical example of weekly crime patterns. However, this is merely an illustration, and may not be valid for a particular project. In scheduling security personnel services it is essential that a similar type of chart be prepared for the particular project, based on the factual analysis described in Chapter 3, paragraph 13 above. Characteristics and life styles of residents are important elements, and patterns for elderly projects are apt to differ greatly from those for family projects. In some projects, a special factor is added on days when Social Security and welfare checks are delivered, bringing an increase in muggings and mail thefts. In addition, consideration should be given to the mitigating effect of such measures as keeping lobby doors locked during nighttime hours.
- j. Costs of security personnel are high. Salaries and benefits take the largest part of overall costs, but equipment alone can require substantial expenditures. Salaries vary greatly, depending upon prevailing local wage rates and the qualifications and duties expected. If personnel approaching the qualifications and responsibilities of regular police officers are to be used, relatively high rates of compensation can be expected.
- k. Uniforms are strongly recommended for all patrolmen and stationary guards, in order to achieve a highly visible security presence and to instill pride and confidence. Uniforms may be similar to those usually worn by regular police officers, or may be of a more "civilian" design, if that is thought to create better rapport with the community, but they should in either case be professional and distinctive. Personnel should be required to maintain their uniforms in accordance with strict standards and shabby uniforms or the wearing of nonstandard garments or insignia should not be tolerated. Off-duty wearing of uniforms should be prohibited.
- l. Individual equipment should include reliable two-way communications units, linked to the security force dispatcher or Police Department. It may be advisable to add self-defensive weapons, although they should by no means be regarded as standard. Firearms are the most controversial type of equipment, and should be issued only if considered necessary for self-defense, and only to responsible and well-trained individuals. The

Figure 2 ILLUSTRATIVE CHART OF WEEKLY CRIME PATTERNS

NOTE: This is merely an illustration of a recommended technique for analyzing crime patterns, and does not necessarily reflect the facts applicable to any particular project.



question of firearms and other weapons should be discussed with residents, who are sometimes strongly opposed to their issuance to security personnel.

- m. Other equipment may be needed for larger security forces. Patrol cars can be justified only for policing large areas. Motor scooters or bicycles provide more flexible mobility. These, and central communications equipment, should be carefully selected, and the assistance of the Police Department or other law enforcement professionals is essential.
- n. Legal considerations should be checked out in advance by Management's attorney. State and local laws may impose strict requirements for housing security personnel, and licensing may be required. Certain types of communications networks are subject to Federal regulation. Possible liability for the acts or omissions of security personnel is another legal matter about which the advice of counsel should be obtained.

CHAPTER 6. RESIDENT PARTICIPATION AND OCCUPANCY POLICIES

36. THE ROLE OF RESIDENTS IN PROJECT SECURITY. The importance of the role of residents in controlling crime and vandalism cannot be overemphasized. No security program can succeed without the support and cooperation of at least a large majority of the residents themselves. Their role begins with individual responsibilities for their own self-protection and, of course, for observance of the law and other community standards. A major dimension of the role of residents is the potential of residents' organizations to participate in the planning and implementation of a security program. Management should take the lead in showing residents what they can do to improve security, and in bringing them into a productive relationship with other key participants in the security program. Once this start is made, residents can usually be expected to assume a considerable degree of initiative and responsibility, although Management should provide continuing support and guidance.
37. INDIVIDUAL SELF-PROTECTION. Among the types of potentially effective self-protective measures which may be employed by individual residents are the following, all of which should be stressed in a program of resident education.
- a. Informal resident surveillance in the course of daily activities can be one of the most effective of all security measures. However, opportunities for resident surveillance are often limited by design features, the large number of residents, high turnover in the resident population and fear of retaliation by offenders. Moreover, such surveillance is of little worth unless linked to a well-understood system which will produce ready response by the Police Department or security personnel.
 - b. Reporting procedures to be used in the event of observance of crime, vandalism, and suspicious behavior, should be clearly understood by all residents. Where police assistance is warranted, the resident should first contact the Police Department directly, and even small children should know when and how to call the Police Department emergency telephone number. Primary reliance should not ordinarily be placed upon security personnel or other Management staff to respond with force or to relay reports to the Police Department.
 - c. Keeping doors locked might seem too obvious a measure to deserve mention, but resident carelessness in this respect is in fact one of the most significant and most common of residential security deficiencies.

- d. Residents' temporary absences render their dwellings highly vulnerable to burglary and vandalism. Such measures as leaving lights and radios on and arranging for stoppage or pickup of newspapers and mail lessen the appearance of vacancy. While it may be desirable for a resident to inform Management and neighbors of the absence, it is unwise to spread the news widely.
- e. Cash and checks are among the most attractive targets for crime, and should not be kept on the resident's person or in the dwelling, except to the extent necessary. For lower-income people, use of normal banking facilities may be a problem. See paragraph 51 below.
- f. Admission of strangers calls for caution on the part of residents. Where lobby doors are kept locked, residents should not open the door for persons whom they cannot identify as legitimate callers. Peepholes or other "interviewer" devices should always be used before opening the door of the dwelling unit itself. Keys to dwelling unit doors should be carefully controlled, and their loss should be promptly reported to Management, so the lock can be changed.
- g. Movements in and around the property require due caution, particularly during night-time hours. The elderly, the disabled, and unaccompanied women are particularly vulnerable to criminal attack, and should be aware of the locations and times of greatest danger. Arrangements for companions may be the best solution.
- h. Confrontation with criminals should be among the subjects of security education programs for residents. For example, where robbery is involved, the safest reaction is usually to yield valuables without struggle. While self-defense may be warranted in some situations, aggressiveness may provoke bodily harm.
- i. Identification of property of types which are the most attractive targets for theft may deter burglary or at least facilitate police investigation. At the minimum, residents should maintain a list of valuable items, including descriptions and serial numbers of such items as television sets, radios, cameras, and typewriters. In some localities, an "Operation Identification" program is sponsored by Police Departments, and other local organizations, providing for valuable items to be marked with special devices, thus further easing the problem of identification if theft should occur.

- j. Mutual assistance among neighbors can significantly contribute to security. A resident who is at home throughout the day can keep an eye on the dwelling of neighbors who are at work. Younger residents can accompany elderly persons on shopping trips. Suspicious incidents can be checked out with neighbors.
 - k. Conduct of guests is a responsibility of resident hosts, who should make sure that guests understand both the standards and procedures adopted for the security of the premises.
 - l. Supervision of children is an individual resident responsibility, and parents should take special pains to educate their children about security standards and procedures.
38. RESIDENT ATTITUDES AND STANDARDS. To the extent that residents are apathetic about security, or are themselves prone to condone or commit crime and vandalism, the very foundation of a residential security program is imperiled. Efforts to build a positive security climate among residents, though among the most difficult aspects of the subject, should therefore pervade the entire security program. The crux of the matter is building a sense of community among residents. Everything which contributes to community cohesion--even ordinary social gatherings--is directly relevant to security. Anonymity is an obstacle to security, and one of the prime aims of a security program should be encourage residents to become acquainted with their neighbors. Positive peer-group pressures should be encouraged. Even where there is only a small number of community-minded residents, they can be encouraged to form the cadre for a growing circle of resident leadership.
- a. Apathy among residents should be one of the prime targets of a comprehensive security program. Apathy is often the product of resignation. A campaign to demonstrate that real improvement in residents' daily lives can be achieved is necessary to break this cycle. Such a demonstration in an area other than security may serve as the initial catalyst for the vital spark of hope from which resident concern and involvement can then be developed.
 - b. Self-interest is the most powerful motivation for positive resident attitudes and standards. Residents' own interests, rather than the interests of Management, the police, or other parties, should be the paramount theme of any security education program for residents.
 - c. Fear of crime may be well-founded, but can seriously impair resident participation in a security program. Means must

therefore be found to break the cycle by which the threat of crime creates fears which in turn contribute to an even greater threat of crime. Where good reason for fear exists, it is obviously unwise to encourage a false sense of security. The best approach is to impart a clear understanding of what the actual threat is, and the degree of caution which is realistically warranted. As various elements of a security program are successfully implemented, residents should be made aware of them, so that the cycle of fear can be reversed, building successive steps of community morale upon successive steps of reduction in the threat from crime. Both Management and the residents' organization should systematically combat inaccurate rumors about crime and vandalism.

- d. Fear of retaliation can significantly hinder resident cooperation, especially in large projects with a high degree of anonymity. Such fear may be amply justified, and where this is so, the only satisfactory remedy is to provide effective protection against retaliation. A resident who may be fearful of reporting a suspicious incident to the police may nevertheless be willing to channel a report through Management or the residents' organization, provided the confidentiality of the source is preserved. This can be facilitated by encouraging Management personnel who regularly work on the premises (e.g., office and maintenance staff) to become widely acquainted with residents and to respect residents' requests for anonymity in reporting offenses and suspicious behavior.

39. RELATIONS BETWEEN RESIDENTS AND POLICING PERSONNEL. A major problem, especially in lower income projects, is often that of poor relations between residents and policing personnel (Police Department officers and/or security personnel). Where this is the case, a fundamental task of a security program is to build mutual respect and cooperation among these elements. This should begin with frank discussion among representatives of Management (including the chief supervisor of security personnel), the residents' organization, and the Police Department. These parties should identify the roots of the problem, and plan a course of action which will realistically attack those roots. A useful

approach is joint sponsorship of meetings for both residents and policing personnel, at which each element can educate the others as to its circumstances and all can air their complaints in an atmosphere of constructive criticism. It is essential that police officers and security personnel make extraordinary efforts to understand residents and their problems, and to explain their own functions, limitations, and problems to the residents. While such educational programs have great potential, they are by no means adequate substitutes for daily operational efforts to create mutual understanding and cooperation.

40. INVOLVING THE RESIDENTS' ORGANIZATION. If a residents' organization does not already exist, security alone may be reason enough to create such an organization. In any event, security should ordinarily be one of the principal subjects of the organization's activities. Some of the specific kinds of activities which a resident organization may be able to undertake, in its role as one of the key participants in a comprehensive security program, are as follows (though this is not an exhaustive list):
 - a. Participation in Planning the Security Program. The residents' organization is uniquely suited for gathering much of the factual information which must form the base of Management's planning effort, including relevant facts on residents' characteristics and problems, the capabilities and attitudes of individual residents, and the residents' organization itself. The organization may also be able to assist in building alliances with governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The residents' organization should participate in making planning decisions, organizing security personnel systems, and monitoring security operations.
 - b. Participation in Resident Education Programs. The residents' organization is an ideal sponsor for security education programs designed to stimulate resident concern, create better attitudes, and inform residents about specific measures which they can take to combat the threat of crime and vandalism. Newsletters, as well as meetings, are excellent media for the residents' organization to use in carrying out its educational functions.

- c. Participation in Setting Standards for Resident Conduct. The residents' organization should participate in development of rules of conduct which supplement the basic lease agreement. Such participation places a stamp of resident endorsement upon what might otherwise appear as arbitrary Management policies.
 - d. Volunteer Resident Services. Certain tasks involved in a security program can be appropriately administered by the residents' organization. See subparagraph 34b above regarding resident patrols. Other possible volunteer services include clerical tasks and in-apartment CCTV monitoring. Security-related programs such as playground supervision or assistance to elderly or disabled people may be particularly suitable for volunteer resident services.
 - e. Support for Management Efforts to Obtain Municipal Services. One of the most useful functions of the residents' organization can be to support Management in its efforts to obtain additional Police Department services and security-related services of other agencies of local government.
41. ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESIDENTS. A security program can create economic opportunities for residents, both in the sense of full-time jobs within the program itself and in the sense of training for advancement into other jobs. In turn, these types of resident involvement can serve to enhance residents' sense of self-interest in, and commitment to, the security program. For both these reasons, Management should afford residents the maximum benefit of the jobs and other economic opportunities created by the security program. In this connection, see HUD's Instructor's Manual--Career Ladder and Curriculum Guide: Housing Management (April 1973), which includes materials on the following job positions: Resident Security Aide, Resident Security Officer, Security Officer II, and Community Security Aide. This publication is available from the Office of Housing Programs, Special Concerns Staff, HM, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 451 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20410.
42. YOUTH PROGRAMS. Most crime and vandalism is committed by young people between the ages of roughly 15-25, although even younger children may cause serious problems, especially in the area of casual vandalism. An effective security program must therefore give prime attention to this age group. In projects housing families with children, the following considerations are relevant:
- a. Parental responsibilities for supervision of children should be heavily stressed in programs of resident education, and in standards for residents' conduct.

- b. Young residents' participation in planning and carrying out the security program should be sought, preferably by the continuing participation of the young in the activities of the residents' organization.
 - c. Lines of communication between Management and young people should be carefully cultivated, and security personnel should be so trained and supervised as to achieve rapport with young residents.
 - d. Job opportunities for young people constitute one of the most important means for combatting crime and vandalism.
 - e. Recreation for young people is another essential ingredient for the control of delinquency. Particular attention should be given to recreation for teenagers.
 - f. Drug abuse among young people should be a matter of especially high-priority action.
 - g. Young males, who are the most prone to crime and vandalism, merit special attention. Athletic programs (e.g. Police Athletic Leagues, Little Leagues) are particularly important here. A major concern of a security program should be to provide boys and young men with positive leadership and models of behavior through such programs as Scouting, Big Brothers, Boys' Clubs, and YMCA's. This is not to say that girls and young women should be slighted, but only to emphasize that, from the security viewpoint, programs aimed at young males are of prime importance.
 - h. Youth leadership should be carefully cultivated, so as to provide peer-group encouragement for positive behavior and participation in the security program and related activities. For this reason, efforts should be made to enlist the support and participation of young men and women who evidence particularly strong leadership qualities. Employment of those individuals in connection with the security program may be advisable, e.g., as members of a planning committee or as members of a Management security force or resident patrol.
43. FEDERAL CRIME INSURANCE FOR RESIDENTS. Residents of HUD-assisted multifamily housing are among those eligible to purchase Federal Crime Insurance at reasonable premium rates in certain designated states which have a critical crime insurance availability problem and which lack appropriate state programs to provide a solution. The program is currently available in Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and the District of Columbia.

Other states may be added as they meet program criteria. Residential coverage may be purchased by residents from local property insurance agents and brokers under a combination burglary and robbery package, and policies cannot be cancelled or non-renewed because of losses. However, as a condition of eligibility, doors and windows must be equipped with locking devices specified by the Federal Insurance Administration. In states where Federal Crime Insurance is available, management and the residents' organization should inform residents about the program and encourage them to obtain coverage. Further information can be obtained from local property insurance agents and brokers in these states, or from the Federal Insurance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 451 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D. C. 20410.

44. OCCUPANCY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.

- a. Exclusion of Offenders. It is both permissible and advisable for Management to adopt and enforce policies aimed at excluding from the project those individuals or families who pose a threat of crime or vandalism. This principle extends to eviction of existing residents, as well as rejection of applicants for initial admission. The residents' organization should participate in developing these policies (see subparagraph 40c above).
 - (1) Screening of applicants for initial admission should be the foundation for excluding probable offenders. If possible, home visits or inquiries to the Management of the applicant's previous dwelling should be used to supplement application forms and interviews.
 - (2) For the existing resident, particular circumstances may argue for counselling before a decision is made to proceed with eviction. In appropriate cases, the resident should be given assistance and a fair chance to demonstrate a change to responsible behavior, but where Management believes the risk too great, it should take prompt steps to terminate occupancy. The credibility of the security aspect of occupancy policies depends upon firmness as well as fairness.
 - (3) LHAS and the owners and managers of HUD-insured rental housing may not establish policies which automatically deny admission or continued occupancy to a particular class of persons, such as welfare recipients or persons having criminal records.

However, Management may establish standards bearing on whether the conduct of particular families or individuals (in present or prior housing) does or would be likely materially to diminish other residents' enjoyment of the premises or to result in damage to the property. Such a decision must be based on the facts in each case, as related to the actual or threatened misconduct of the individual or family and must take into account all of the relevant circumstances, but may not be based solely upon such factors as police records. Within these legal limitations, there is considerable latitude for management discretion.

- b. Assignment Policies. Another security-related aspect of occupancy policies involves options for assignment of certain categories of residents to particular buildings or dwelling units. Buildings with exclusively elderly populations are virtually free of resident crime and vandalism; in a multistructure project, one technique of proven effectiveness is to provide separate buildings for family and elderly occupancy. Some Managers have found it helpful to assign larger families to low-rise buildings or to the lower floors of high-rise buildings.
- c. Informing Residents about Occupancy Policies. Whatever occupancy policies are adopted, they should be clearly explained to applicants and existing residents. At the least, a copy of the policies should be distributed in written form. It is preferable to list detailed standards of conduct in a set of project rules. The language of such standards should be readily understandable by every resident. As a part of the resident's orientation upon initial occupancy, Management should orally review these occupancy policies. Periodic review at meetings of the residents' organization should be a part of the continuing program of security education.

CHAPTER 7. COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE

45. INVOLVEMENT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AGENCIES. The role of local social services agencies as a key participant in a residential security program has already been mentioned in subparagraph 5e above, and is further discussed in paragraphs 46 and 47 below. In addition, this Chapter discusses how certain other local organizations, both public and private, may contribute to a comprehensive security program. Assistance from these sources tends to center on relatively long-term measures ("Treat" and "Cure" actions), but may in some degree also contribute to immediate ("Check") measures.
46. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCIES. A residential security program should be closely tied to the social service programs of local governmental and nongovernmental agencies. While some large LHAs have extensive in-house social service capabilities, in most lower-income housing projects, the need for such services far exceeds the capabilities of Management's own staff. However, one of the functions of Management of all HUD-assisted multifamily housing should be to maintain links with appropriate community agencies, so that the resources of the latter can be brought to bear when Management staff identifies a resident need. Even where a modest security program is contemplated, Management should contact such agencies early in the planning stage, in order to enlist their assistance in identifying relevant facts as well as for the purpose of extending its alliances. A member of Management's staff should be designated to compile current information on social services, to keep residents informed about those services, and to make individual referrals as needed. This person should maintain close liaison with the residents' organization, the Police Department and security personnel, all of which are prime sources of information about general and individual problems.
47. TYPES OF SECURITY-RELATED SOCIAL SERVICES. It is impossible to draw a precise line defining security-related social services, since all factors which contribute to a wholesome living environment are in some degree related to project security. The following list is suggestive (but not necessarily exhaustive) of the types of social services which tend to be most clearly related to combating crime and vandalism in multifamily housing:

- a. Drug abuse programs
- b. Alcohol abuse programs
- c. Employment services (training, counselling, and placement)
- d. Recreational and cultural programs
- e. Child-care services
- f. Family counselling services
- g. Physical and mental health services
- h. Offender rehabilitation programs
- i. Financial assistance programs
- j. Special services for the elderly
- k. Educational programs

48. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCILS (CJCC.)

- a. Nature of CJCCs. A number of local governments have formed Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils to increase communication among various criminal justice agencies, to provide a framework for comprehensive planning, and to determine funding requirements. The CJCC generally develops local policy and priorities, prepares local comprehensive criminal justice plans, reviews proposals for state and federal funding, develops and implements specific projects, and monitors and evaluates programs. CJCCs vary in structure and function, depending upon the organizational, political, economic, and social realities of the particular community. They are creations of local government, usually chaired by the Mayor or other local governmental structure of the locality. They are broadly representative of law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies, as well as of the executive and legislative arms of local government.
- b. Role of the CJCC in a Residential Security Program. Of the total functions of the CJCC, those of greatest interest from the viewpoint of the Management and residents of multifamily housing are, of course, the development and implementation of concrete programs with potential impact upon crime and vandalism in residential neighborhoods. It is therefore appropriate that Management and residents of multifamily housing become deeply involved in the work of the CJCC. A representative of the LHA should definitely be a member of the CJCC. In the case of HUD-insured housing, the best method of Management participation is probably for a designee of a local management association to be a member of the CJCC. Where a city-wide federation of residents' organizations exists, it should also

be represented. If there is no such federation, it is desirable that at least one project's residents' organization have a representative on the CJCC. Since one of the main aims of the CJCC is to improve communication among the various parties involved, the interchange of views and information itself can be highly productive for Management and residents. Further, representatives of Management and residents should press for policies, priorities, and programs which will meet their needs. For example, the issue of allocation of Police Department resources might best be pursued through the CJCC. The CJCC is a prime source for exploring needs for funding residential security programs. Aside from formal membership in the CJCC, particular Managers and residents' organizations should exploit opportunities to work informally with the CJCC staff, which may be able to provide guidance in planning a security program, or at least in identifying sources of further assistance.

49. OTHER FORMS OF COMMUNITY PLANNING AND ACTION COMMITTEES. In lieu of, or in addition to, a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, other forms of broad-based community organizations may be employed to plan and implement comprehensive security programs. The territorial scope, as well as the breadth of participation, may vary. A metropolitan approach is desirable. Minimal representation should include, in addition to Management and residents, the office of the Mayor or other local government executive, the local legislative body, and the Police Department. Representation from the offices of the Prosecuting Attorney; the Public Defender; educational, health and welfare agencies; church, business and other nongovernmental organizations, is also suggested. A neighborhood organization of this type may be advisable, even if a city-wide or metropolitan area organization also exists. If there is already an organization whose purpose is to represent the entire range of neighborhood interests, coordinated action in the security field might best be approached through a standing committee of that organization.
50. ASSOCIATIONS OF PROPERTY OWNERS AND MANAGERS. In all larger communities, there already exist strong associations of owners and managing agents of privately-owned housing. The Management of a particular HUD-insured project can take the lead in stimulating awareness and action by such organizations. Either by developing programs of their own, or by acting as advocates for their members before agencies of local government, these associations can play a

powerful role. LHAs have similar opportunities through local chapters of the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO). In metropolitan areas, the local NAHRO chapter may serve as a mechanism for cooperation among different LHAs.

51. BANKING SERVICES FOR LOWER-INCOME RESIDENTS. One security-related problem which ordinarily requires solution on a wide community basis is that confronted by lower-income residents in handling checks and cash. While more affluent citizens can use checking accounts and other normal banking services to safeguard their funds and facilitate financial transactions, service charges or minimum balance requirements may exclude lower-income residents from these services. As a result, lower-income people may be forced to cash checks at neighborhood stores and keep the cash proceeds on their persons or in their dwellings. The walk from the mailbox to the store and back home, with check or cash in hand, may be particularly hazardous. Purchase of Food Stamps and money orders may present similar dangers. Moreover, where residents rely heavily upon Social Security and public assistance, theft of checks from mailboxes is likely to be a problem. Where these problems exist, the local business community (especially banking institutions), as well as local social services agencies and other appropriate organizations, should be called upon to devise new systems for safe handling of residents' funds. The following are some of the techniques which should be considered:

- a. Cost-free checking accounts might be offered by banks to lower-income people, dispensing with service charges and minimum balance requirements. At the least, banking institutions might offer services for cashing assistance checks and purchasing Food Stamps as well as money orders.
- b. A neighborhood credit union might be established, providing a convenient and safe facility for check-cashing and purchase of Food Stamps and money orders, in addition to savings and credit functions.
- c. Direct deposit to residents' bank accounts of their assistance payments, without issuance of assistance checks, might be arranged through appropriate agencies and banking institutions.
- d. Special "check day" arrangements might be made for cashing assistance checks on the premises under adequate security conditions. In one LHA, off-duty policemen provide such service for elderly residents. Management itself might provide this kind of service, using security guards; or volunteers from the residents' organization might assist.

- e. Staggered issuance of assistance checks might be arranged by appropriate agencies, in order to avoid concentrated delivery on "check days."
- f. Group excursions, perhaps with accompanying policemen or security personnel, might be regularly scheduled for purposes of cashing checks, and purchasing Food Stamps and money orders.

CHAPTER 8. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING ELDERLY RESIDENTS

52. SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES REGARDING THE ELDERLY. The vulnerability of elderly residents to crime and vandalism constitutes a special dimension of the problem of residential security, whether in the context of an all-elderly project or one where both elderly persons and families reside. Aside from the direct threat of such crimes as robbery and assault, the elderly are also susceptible to the greatest hardships resulting from vandalism. For example, if elevators are put out of order by vandals, elderly residents will be virtually imprisoned in their apartments. At the same time, there are special opportunities for effective security where the elderly are involved. Elderly residents themselves are not a source of crime and vandalism. They tend to be acutely concerned about security, and are usually disposed to offer the fullest cooperation in a security program.
53. SEPARATION OF THE ELDERLY AND YOUNGER FAMILIES.
 - a. Security Advantages of Separation. There are generally good security reasons for giving serious consideration to a policy of housing elderly people in buildings or projects separate from those provided for family occupancy. The elderly do not commit crime and vandalism, but are prime targets for offenses by younger residents of family projects, including the casual vandalism of juveniles. Exclusively elderly buildings can be effectively secured by relatively simple controls on access. However, the question of whether a policy of separation is wholly desirable, taking all of the social implications into account, is beyond the scope of this Handbook.
 - b. Conversion of Buildings or Projects. Where the option is available (e.g., an LHA which owns and manages a number of buildings or projects housing a mixed elderly-family population), one measure to be considered is conversion of one or more existing buildings or projects to exclusively elderly use. This solution usually requires extensive remodeling, and may thus be an expensive one. An LHA or sponsor who is contemplating new construction, of course, has the option of designing the building for exclusively elderly occupancy from the start. Where other properties are under the same Management, such new construction may make it possible to shift present elderly residents of family projects, as well as to accommodate the new elderly residents.
 - c. Partial Separation. Short of complete separation of the elderly from families, there may be opportunities to assign the

elderly to particular mixed buildings or projects, to separate floors or wings, or to particular units which are more conducive to their protection. Older residents might be thus assigned to a building with particularly strong design and hardware features or with no large families.

- d. Locational Factors. The location of the project assumes particular importance in regard to security for elderly residents. The prime criterion is a generally low level of neighborhood crime, although the probable effect of introducing a large number of vulnerable elderly persons must be assessed along with favorable conditions. Elderly residents, whether in an all-elderly project or a mixed project, should be near shopping, medical clinics, check-cashing facilities, churches, recreational centers, and public transportation.

54. SECURITY FOR THE EXCLUSIVELY ELDERLY PROJECT. Where the population of the project is exclusively elderly, the key to good security is keeping unauthorized persons from entering the premises. The following measures deserve particular attention in this setting (see Chapter 4 above for further details):

a. Security Within Buildings

- (1) Control of access should not be difficult where an elderly population is housed in a high-rise structure. The number of secondary doors should be kept to the absolute minimum necessary for safety and convenience, and should be kept locked from the outside at all times. There should be only one doorway for ordinary ingress and egress, and its security must receive prime attention.
- (2) Visual monitoring is the best solution to control of the lobby entrance in all-elderly buildings. This may be provided by a stationary guard, closed circuit television, or by positioning the project office so that Management personnel can maintain surveillance and control during working hours. Strict screening is more feasible in all-elderly projects than in those housing families with children. During all hours when such measures are not operative, or wholly effective, the lobby door should be kept locked, and should be equipped with an annunciator system.
- (3) Lobby Surveillance can be further strengthened by designing the building so that the lobby is an extension of the lounge or social room, and is thus visible to persons sitting or participating in activities in the latter area. Elevators and mailboxes should also be positioned for high visibility

from the lobby. An unusual but highly effective design feature of one high-rise building for the elderly is a large see-through mirror which permits casual surveillance of the lobby by the resident manager and his family from the living room of their adjacent ground-floor apartment.

- (4) Emergency call buttons should be installed within individual dwelling units. Though primarily designed for use in medical emergencies, these devices serve a security function as well.
- (5) Electronic surveillance and alarm systems tend to work well in buildings for the elderly, because of the cooperation of residents and the relative ease of distinguishing intruders from residents and their guests.

b. Security of Grounds. A "fortress" strategy might possibly be extended to the entirety of the grounds of an elderly project, with an enclosure and controlled access gates, but a more common measure is to enclose a yard or terrace as a protected area for sitting and recreation in high-crime neighborhoods. Special attention should be given to the outside approach to the building's entrance. The door should be near, and clearly visible from, the street; dense shrubbery or other opportunities for concealment should be avoided; and the area should be well-lighted. If at all possible, lobby surveillance should extend to the outside approach. Parking lots and garages are another type of area requiring particularly strong security measures in projects for the elderly. Perhaps the most effective measure for protecting parking lots is a location near the building which is subject to continuous surveillance from the lobby and its approaches, social rooms, and a number of dwelling units. Lighting should be extraordinarily bright (subject to energy-conservation measures), because physical perception diminishes with age.

c. Resident Participation. In exclusively elderly projects, there is usually a particularly high degree of resident concern and cooperation regarding security. Ordinarily, elderly residents feel a strong sense of community, at least among themselves, and are ready to join enthusiastically in programs of mutual benefit. Because of their concern and the fact that they tend to spend much of their time on the premises, older people provide excellent agents for surveillance. Moreover, they have the time, as well as the willingness, to provide appropriate volunteer services incident to security and related programs. There are generally excellent opportunities for the involvement of the residents' organization in a security program. Management and the residents' organization should make special

efforts to conduct a continuing program of formal and informal instruction on security, reminding residents of the functions of particular security measures and how the resident can best cooperate. In particular, residents should be clearly informed about electronic surveillance systems, security personnel, procedures for reporting offenses or suspicious incidents, procedures for safeguarding dwellings during extended absences, and how best to respond to individual confrontations with criminals. Fears and rumors should receive the prompt attention of Management and the residents' organization. One protective measure particularly suited to the exclusively elderly project is a "buddy system," whereby pairs or groups of residents take the responsibility for looking out for the welfare of each other on a daily basis. While this is widely used for the primary purposes of maintaining an alert for accidents and other medical emergencies, it is obviously a useful security measure, particularly for persons living alone.

- d. Community Involvement. While special opportunities for community involvement in the protection of elderly residents also extend to those living in mixed elderly-family projects, all-elderly projects are especially conducive to this type of assistance. Generally sympathetic community attitudes toward the elderly can be focused on the exclusively elderly housing project. Local agencies may be persuaded to bring their services to the project on a regularly-scheduled basis, and on-site facilities should be provided for such services as medical check-ups and recreational programs. Some all-elderly projects make their meeting rooms available to neighborhood organizations in return for various types of direct or incidental involvement in the lives of the residents. Such arrangements provide an additional element of surveillance.

55. SECURITY FOR ELDERLY RESIDENTS OF FAMILY PROJECTS. Where the elderly live alongside families in the same project, their security must largely depend upon the general level of security for the project and all of its residents. However, there are some special measures which can provide additional protection to older residents in this situation. Assignment to units with particularly strong security characteristics has already been suggested in subparagraph 53c above. A similar technique is to provide special interior or exterior areas for sitting, strolling and recreation, restricted to elderly or general adult use. This at least provides places where the elderly can get out of their dwelling units without threat or annoyance from juveniles. It also encourages informal surveillance and social contacts which further mutual protection. The "buddy system" can be used in mixed projects, as

well as all elderly projects, and non-elderly residents are often more than willing to watch out for their older neighbors; the residents' organization might undertake this and other services for elderly residents. Even if special security measures cannot be justified for the benefit of nonelderly residents alone, the presence of older persons may argue for their adoption, perhaps on a limited or concentrated scale. For example, police or security guards might be instructed to exercise prime surveillance of the elderly and their dwelling units. If the vulnerability of elderly residents is an important factor in attracting crime by nonresidents, the security of all residents can be enhanced by eliminating that vulnerability.

56. SECURITY OFF THE PREMISES. One of the most serious aspects of security for the elderly is the threat of attack within the larger neighborhood in which they live. It is often especially hazardous for the older resident to perform the ordinary errands necessary to his or her daily life, such as buying groceries and cashing assistance checks. Residential security for the elderly must therefore take special account of their security needs within the larger neighborhood. Identification of relatively safe, as well as convenient, neighborhood facilities and pedestrian routes can be helpful as a part of a program of security education for older persons. New elderly residents should be briefed about especially dangerous areas and advised of options for safer use. It may be possible to make arrangements with the police to exercise heavier surveillance over neighborhood routes and facilities frequented by the elderly. Merchants, and perhaps crossing guards for school children, can assist with surveillance of elderly persons. In many instances, particularly where all-elderly projects are concerned, merchants and community organizations arrange transportation for shopping, church attendance, recreational outings, and other activities. In some communities, merchants will make free deliveries to the elderly, on a group or individual basis. Protection may be furthered by arranging for elderly residents to travel in groups to banks, grocery stores, churches, clinics, or other points within the neighborhood. Younger residents, or even police or security guards, may accompany elderly individuals or groups. In all-elderly low-income projects, "check days" (days of the month when assistance checks are regularly received) may require special protective arrangements. See paragraph 51 above. Finally, the support and assistance of the nonresident children or other relatives of elderly residents should be enlisted to the fullest extent possible. Such persons often need only suggestions as to how they may be of help. Among the many possibilities are providing safe transportation for check-cashing, shopping, and other errands.

CHAPTER 9. FUNDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

57. FUNDING NEEDS. Where crime and vandalism are serious problems, security should be recognized as a significant element of the capital and operating expenses of HUD-assisted multifamily housing. Where new construction or rehabilitation is contemplated, financial feasibility analysis must take realistic account of the level of operating expense needed for security measures. Where lower-income housing is concerned, achievable operating revenues from rents (plus operating subsidies, if any) may well be inadequate to satisfy security needs. Management should therefore be knowledgeable about other possible sources of funding, and be energetic and resourceful in pursuing these possibilities as a part of its security planning efforts.
58. FUNDING SOURCES.
- a. Operating Receipts and Residual Receipts. In the public housing program, operating receipts (including subsidies for operations) may be used for a wide variety of security measures, largely at the budgetary discretion of the LHA. In HUD-insured programs, operating receipts may be used at Management discretion, whereas residual receipts may be used only with HUD approval. These funds may well be inadequate where extensive security measures are needed. However, analysis of how to finance a security program should in all instances begin with consideration of such funds. Management should be prepared to demonstrate to potential sources of further assistance that it is making good use of its operating receipts. In analyzing the potential for financing security measures out of the regular operating budget, Management should take into account the extent to which losses or expenses due to crime and vandalism (e.g., vacancy losses, maintenance, repairs, damages assessed in liability lawsuits) might be offset against the cost of improved security. Additionally, in HUD-insured projects, Management should consider the feasibility of increasing rents to cover additional security expenses.
 - b. Low-Rent Public Housing Modernization Funds. Some LHAs may still have unexpended Modernization funds. Such funds can be used only for capital improvements. An LHA may, with HUD approval, use Modernization funds for protective hardware (locks, peep-holes, protective grilles or screens, electronic alarm or

surveillance equipment, etc.) as well as for structural modifications related to security, provided that such measures constitute capital improvements.

- c. Supplemental Loans may be insured by HUD under Section 241 of the National Housing Act to pay for alterations, repairs, additions or improvements to a multifamily housing project financed under a HUD-insured mortgage. An owner of such a project might use loan proceeds to fund the purchase and installation of security hardware or to make structural modifications designed to improve security. The HUD Area or Insuring Office should be contacted on this subject.
- d. LEAA-Funded Programs. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the Department of Justice makes grants to State Law Enforcement Planning Agencies and to state and local governments, which in turn fund specific local programs. Further information regarding this type of funding can be obtained from the appropriate State Law Enforcement Planning Agency or LEAA Regional Office.
- e. State and Local Governments. Management should explore possibilities for the funding of security programs through state and local governments. A single LHA or owner/managing agent of insured housing will probably find local government the more suitable approach, but wider community security programs may well be able to obtain support on the State level. In addition to straight grants, the possibilities include remission of taxes or of payments in lieu of taxes in consideration of Management-funded security services, and special funding arrangements for the augmentation of regular police services.
- f. National and Local Foundations and Other NonGovernmental Organizations. There have been several instances of foundation funding for security-related programs in multifamily housing. In some cases, directly-related costs (e.g., salaries for security personnel and security research) have been so funded. Related social services programs are particularly good possibilities for funding. Civic, religious, social and fraternal organizations, both on the local and national level, may also be able to provide financial assistance. Private as well as public educational institutions may have programs in law enforcement, criminal justice, and social services which can

involve a housing project and its residents in research, demonstration, and training programs. Funding may also be made available through local business and professional associations.

59. SOURCES FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. In addition to the need for additional funding, Management planning and implementation of a residential security program may also require expert technical advice and assistance beyond the capabilities of Management staff. The foregoing Chapters of this Handbook have already suggested a number of possible sources for such services. However, for the sake of convenient reference, the following list of prime sources for technical assistance is offered here, with the realization that in each case Management will have to choose those which are available and appropriate to its needs:
 - a. The local Police Department.
 - b. The local Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC).
 - c. The State Law Enforcement Planning Agency.
 - d. Appropriate departments of local educational institutions.
 - e. Local associations representing the interest of owners and managing agents of private housing or LHAs and their officials.
 - f. Architects and landscape architects qualified to provide security analysis of design and/or hardware.
 - g. Independent consultants who are qualified to provide security analysis.
 - h. The Regional, Area or Insuring Office (contact Security Specialists - Housing Management).
 - i. The LEAA Regional Office.
60. REFERENCE MATERIALS. For further references, see HUD Bibliography on "Safety and Security in Buildings" September 1973, attached as Appendix 1.

SAFETY AND SECURITY IN BUILDINGS

A Bibliography

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
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