


CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING

# The Coordinating Council

by Gordon Raley



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# FOREWORD

The criminal justice coordinating council has emerged during the past ten years as an effective model for local criminal justice planning. Although a number of approaches to such planning have been utilized in different cities, variations on the coordinating council model are the most common.

The function of criminal justice planning is an important one for building local capacity for crime prevention, justice reform, resource allocation, and community mobilization. Most important, however, a strong planning capacity can provide elected officials and criminal justice executives with the data and analysis which are essential for establishing policies and priorities concerning the complex criminal justice system.

In spite of continuing frustration with the serious problems of crime and justice, it is hard to deny that many cities have made considerable progress since 1967, when the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice recommended that in every city "there should be an agency, or one or more officials, with specific responsibility for planning improvements in criminal administration and encouraging their implementation." Since then, the need for local criminal justice planning has been restated by several national commissions and by the Congress, which in 1970 specifically authorized federal funding for criminal justice coordinating councils in cities above 250,000 in population.

Since that time, the National League of Cities and United States Conference of Mayors have been assisting cities to develop criminal justice coordinating councils. Although the form, structure, and place within government of the coordinating council is still evolving, this model for planning and policymaking has already had a substantial impact in many cities.

Prior to 1970, it was highly unusual for local officials and criminal justice executives to meet as a group to analyze common problems and develop a coordinated approach to introducing new programs or services. Police, court, correctional agencies and private service organizations generally functioned in an extremely fragmented fashion, with no attempt at structured communication and coordination.

After 1970, available funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration began to change that situation. Without communication and coordination, federal funds could not be obtained; without federal funds, a visible response to the great public pressure for crime control and criminal justice reform was difficult to mount; and local and criminal justice officials began talking, first about federal grants, then about complex problems which could only be addressed through planning, analysis, coordination, and cooperation. Brought together primarily by federal funding, officials in many cities soon moved on to concern themselves with planning for all resources available to law enforcement and criminal justice. The coordinating council played a key role in this evolution.

In exploring the coordinating council model, Gordon Raley provides the reader with a review of the concept; an analysis of relevant structural, political, and intergovernmental factors; a guide for organizing or reorganizing a council; and a basic resource document for local officials on how to develop the council as an effective problem solving and decisionmaking tool. We hope that this publication contributes to further experimentation and continued development of the criminal justice coordinating council.

William R. Drake  
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# PREFACE

This publication has been developed over the past year as an attempt to provide a brief history of the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) concept as well as some guides for its implementation. It does not presume to advance CJCCs as the only appropriate local planning model, but it rather suggests it as one model deserving strong consideration.

Several agencies and individuals contributed to this publication's completion. The Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils of New York and New Orleans both permitted copies of their respective enabling legislation to be included as Appendices A and B. Special thanks are also due to Don Manson, former Director of the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice in Boston, and to Frank Vaccarella, former Director of the New Orleans CJCC, for sharing their insights and personal experiences in developing CJCCs. Also, Al Montgomery, Director of the Detroit/Wayne County CJCC, helped with the staff development portions of this report.

Don Manson and his staff and John O'Sullivan, Director of the Hennepin County CJCC, reviewed early drafts and Joyce Latham and Laura Horowitz edited the final copy. Nancy Loving managed the publication of this report and deserves particular credit.

Gordon Raley  
October 1976

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- During the last eight years, three separate presidential commissions have recommended the creation of criminal justice planning and coordination offices in urban areas. The criminal justice coordinating council (CJCC) is designed to implement that recommendation.
- CJCCs are defined as broadly representative coordinating and planning units of general local government, with sufficient staff, authority, and funding to influence change in the areas of police, courts and corrections.
- CJCCs should have strong support from local chief executives and legislative bodies, and their membership should be representative of criminal justice leadership, local decision-makers, and citizens.
- Although they are often supported by federal funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), CJCCs can accomplish far more than simply managing LEAA grants. Through comprehensive planning, evaluation, and coordination, they provide local officials with a substantial resource for making decisions and for assuring that the criminal justice system is accountable to the public.
- There is an increasing tendency on the part of LEAA and state planning agencies to see CJCCs only as local "branch offices" of the federal-state LEAA program. However, crime is largely a local issue, and the development of federal and state requirements should be flexible enough to meet individual city needs. Also, although federal funds are now available through several LEAA channels, urban areas should begin to institutionalize CJCCs into their local criminal justice systems in case federal funds become unavailable in the future.

# INTRODUCTION

In our political system, it seems that we identify a national problem and then see waves of federal assistance roll in, only to recede as national priorities or political administrations change. Our wars on poverty, urban blight, drug abuse, and crime are examples, and evaluations of these efforts should focus not only on their immediate success or failure, but also on any long-term change they produce.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) is no exception to the above rule. During its period of prominence, an idea has emerged that may continue to have an impact even after formal federal support ends. This concept involves the coordination of local criminal justice participants and their involvement in comprehensive planning. One model for structuring this idea into a viable reality is the criminal justice coordinating council (CJCC).<sup>1</sup>

Some CJCCs existed prior to the Safe Streets Act Amendments of 1970,<sup>2</sup> which first authorized funds for CJCCs. With that legislation, they gained even wider acceptance. Specifically, the amendments authorized discretionary (Part C) funding for CJCCs under the Safe Streets Act. CJCCs have increasingly been viewed as an appropriate local recipient of planning (Part B) funds as well.<sup>3</sup>

Through the use of the CJCC concept, cities have attempted to plan and coordinate the functions of police, courts, and corrections under one organizational frame. This facilitation of a coordinated criminal justice system, in place of what could once best be described as a fragmented nonsystem, could well be the most enduring remnant of the Safe Streets legislation.

While LEAA funding has spurred CJCC growth, there is a real and increasing danger that, as a result,

CJCCs will be viewed only as local mechanisms for handling LEAA grants, rather than as overall coordinating bodies. If this happens, once grant funds expire, some CJCCs may also disappear. Perhaps more importantly, when viewed only as a means of grant management, CJCCs lose much of their potential for the local decision-maker.

If substantial change is to be realized, all levels of government must give priority to viewing the CJCC as a self-contained local planning and coordinating unit, rather than merely a local extension of LEAA or of LEAA-funded state planning agencies (SPAs). Since crime is a local problem, planning and coordination must be developed at the local level with state assistance and national leadership. However, the existing "new federalist," federal-state-local emphasis, should become local-state-federal instead.

The National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors (NLC and USCM) has played a primary role in local development of the CJCC concept. Two previous publications, *Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils* (1971) and *Survey of Local Criminal Justice Planning* (1973), addressed early CJCC experiences. Two remaining needs prompted this third report. First, there is no current description of the history and development of the CJCC model. This report brings together many separate pieces of information that the NLC and USCM Criminal Justice Project has collected during its four-year involvement with these groups. The intent here is to focus on how and why the CJCC concept evolved.

Second, some basic, uniform standards for CJCC implementation are needed. Based on historical perspectives, this report will (1) provide some general guidelines for implementation; (2) define basic stan-

dards and objectives for performance; and (3) describe some appropriate CJCC functions.

The form, structure, and name of CJCCs may vary from city to city, just as the characteristics of those

cities vary. The important factor is that the need is well established within local governments for a planning and coordinating body that is adequately staffed and has broad representation from the criminal justice system and the entire community.

# DEFINITION AND SCOPE

Several definitions are necessary both to begin and limit this discussion of CJCC development and methods for implementation. The term, *CJCC*, is generally applied to a formal or informal committee that provides a forum for the exploration of criminal justice problems among decision-makers in the governmental system.<sup>4</sup> Like local governments, the form and structure of these groups vary. However, some conceptual standards need to be reviewed if a relatively uniform planning and coordination capacity is to exist at the local level throughout the country.

The most recent State Planning Agency Guideline Manual (*M4100.1E*) from LEAA defines the CJCC as:

*... any body so designated which serves a unit of general local government, or any combination of such units within a state, with a population of 250,000 or more; and which has responsibility for assuring improved planning and for the coordination of local criminal justice agencies within its jurisdiction.*<sup>5</sup>

CJCCs may perform both the functions of the coordinating council and of the Regional Planning Unit. However, LEAA's authority to define CJCC activity extends only as far as the units it funds. Some CJCCs existed before LEAA's creation under the 1968 Safe Streets Act, and hopefully many will continue after LEAA support ceases. This report will discuss CJCCs in that context.

The 1967 Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (hereafter the Katzenbach Commission) pointed to three characteristics all CJCCs should have: broad representation, sufficient authority and prestige, and

adequate staffing.<sup>6</sup> This report adopts these criteria as minimum standards. These characteristics are found in planning units where the name CJCC is not used; conversely, some planning units using that title adhere to none of the three standards. For the purpose of this report, a *CJCC is defined as a broadly representative coordination and planning unit of local government, with sufficient staff and authority to influence change within the criminal justice system subareas of police, courts, and corrections.*

The term, local government, presents two definitional problems; these relate to population threshold and local governmental/political constraints. The Safe Streets Act Amendments of 1970 specified a population threshold of 250,000 as a minimum base for cities to receive funds for coordinating councils. However, medium-sized cities (100,000-250,000 population) and even many cities of less than 100,000 could also benefit from having some group responsible for system planning and coordination. For this reason, rather than assign some arbitrary population limit, this report will suggest that all sizable cities could benefit from a CJCC, and that all cities of more than 250,000 should strongly consider a full-time office.

Counties and combinations of counties (multi-county regions) are also eligible for CJCC funds if they have (1) a combined population of 250,000 or more, and (2) authority from the state and delegation of authority from local units of government. However, this report will address CJCCs primarily as they relate to cities or city/county combinations. Such systems may be either "unified" or "coordinate."<sup>7</sup>

It is admittedly arbitrary to consider cities to the exclusion of counties or county combinations. How-

ever, the problems of crime and criminal justice system coordination uniquely affect cities. Because of the difference in governmental structure and administration of justice in urban systems, as compared with areawide systems, a different approach should be considered for each. Since coordination is a primary CJCC role, the task of developing models for county or multicounty areas should be undertaken by organizations with specific expertise in county government.

The term, *criminal justice system*, appears repeatedly in current criminal justice literature. While there are many more technical and sophisticated definitions, reference to a system basically implies some unity of purpose and organized interrelationships. It should apply to police, courts, and corrections, but in most cities, these areas usually make up a "nonsystem." Daniel J. Freed, Professor of Law at

Yale University and a former Justice Department official, has described this phenomenon in the Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence:

*It is hardly surprising to find in most cities, not a smooth functioning system of criminal justice but a fragmented and often hostile amalgamation of criminal justice agencies. To the extent that they are concerned about other parts of the system, police view courts as the enemy. Judges often find law enforcement officers themselves violating the law. Both see correctional programs as largely a failure. Many defendants perceive all three as paying only lip service to individual rights. A full-time criminal justice office should be considered basic to the formation of a criminal justice system.<sup>8</sup>*

# HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CJCCs

## Origin of the Concept

The CJCC concept probably first emerged in the Office of Criminal Justice, which then Attorney General Robert Kennedy established in 1964 in the Justice Department.<sup>9</sup> The national elections of 1964 were the first in which crime became a national issue. As a result of increasing concern, the Katzenbach Commission was authorized to study the problem.

In 1967, the Commission presented its recommendations, which covered the entire scope of criminal justice. While most of the recommendations were not dramatically different from past studies (including President Hoover's 1931 Wickersham Commission), they did point to the lack of a coordinated local planning strategy. The Commission's report advised that offices be established at the state and local levels to provide for coordination of the criminal justice system.

*In every state and every city, an agency, of one or more officials, should be specifically responsible for planning improvements in crime prevention and in encouraging their implementation.<sup>10</sup>*

While recognizing the role of states, the Katzenbach report emphasized city involvement in planning and coordination:

*... much of the planning will have to be done at the municipal level. The problem of the police, and to a certain extent, of jails and lower courts, are typically city problems. Welfare, education, housing, fire prevention, recreation, sanitation, urban renewal, and a multitude of other func-*

*tions that are closely connected with crime and criminal justice are also the responsibility of the cities. In most cities there is as yet little planning or coordination.<sup>11</sup>*

In an immediate response to this recommendation, Mayor John Lindsay founded the first CJCC in New York City in 1967. Its general charge was to develop an overall coordinated approach to criminal justice problems. The New York City CJCC has been widely used as a model for other bodies of this type.

In 1969, the local office concept gained additional support from the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (hereafter the Violence Commission). This Commission's report indicated that money alone would not reduce crime, and it pointed to Commission recommendations as far back as 1931 that produced little follow-through:

*This pattern suggests the existence of substantial built-in obstacles to change. The pervasive fragmentation of police, court, and correctional agencies suggests that some catalyst is needed to bring them together. An assumption that parallel and overlapping public agencies will cooperate efficiently can no longer suffice as a substitute for deliberate action to make it happen in real life.<sup>12</sup>*

A full-time criminal justice office was suggested as that catalyst.

This Commission's recommendations are particularly important because they provided the basis for the 1970 amendments to the Safe Streets Act, which authorized funds for CJCCs.<sup>13</sup> One recommendation read as follows:

To encourage the development of criminal justice offices, we recommend that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the State planning agencies created pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act take a lead in initiating plans for the creation and staffing of offices of criminal justice in the nation's major metropolitan areas.<sup>14</sup>

### Impact of the Safe Streets Act

It was the 1970 amendments to the Safe Streets Act, rather than the 1968 Act itself, which really spurred the growth of CJCCs. During the development of the 1968 legislation, opponents feared the law would not be responsive to local needs, particularly in terms of planning input. According to one observer, "Most urban officials viewed block grants to states as nothing more than a stumbling block and another level of bureaucracy between the money's source (feds) and the need (cities)."<sup>15</sup> In fact, the Johnson Administration's original legislative proposal, the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1967, (H.R. 5037, S.917) would have permitted direct planning and action grants to cities of more than 50,000 population, without state involvement.<sup>16</sup>

As a result of efforts to allay local fears, the law as ultimately passed emphasized planning at all levels of government. It mandated local representation on the SPA supervisory board, and required that forty percent of all state planning funds be designated for local use. In addition, cities of more than 250,000 population were eligible for "large city" discretionary grants to support a wide variety of projects, including CJCCs.<sup>17</sup>

Difficulties still occurred. Cities and counties having the greatest crime problems were sometimes made part of multicounty regions. These regions usually contained rural and suburban areas as well, which dominated the regional council even though their crime concerns were different from those of the large cities. Most of the forty percent planning funds mentioned above went to these regions, rather than the cities and counties. In fiscal year 1970, for example, seventeen of the nation's thirty largest cities, including Baltimore, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Indianapolis, and San Francisco, received no federal money at all for criminal justice planning.<sup>18</sup>

In theory, the regional units were supposed to plan for both large cities and counties. However, they were understaffed (usually having only one to three staff members), and typically operated in isolation from local decision-makers. As a result, large cities found themselves with little input into planning efforts, as required in Part B of the 1968 legislation, and they also had difficulty obtaining funding for their priority action programs under Part C of the law. Thus more often than not, cities felt compelled to use their "large city" discretionary money to meet action priorities rather than long-term planning needs.

In 1970, these problems became major legislative issues, and city officials began lengthy discussions with top LEAA officials. As a result, the 1968 Act was amended to further emphasize the planning role of major urban areas and to authorize the funding of CJCCs under Part C action programs.

The following provision was added to Part B, Section 203 of Title I:

*In allocating funds under this subsection, the State Planning Agency shall assure that major cities and counties within the State receive planning funds to develop comprehensive plans and coordinate functions at the local level.*

In Part C, Section 303 of Title I, the following guarantee was inserted:

*No State plan shall be approved as comprehensive unless the Administration finds that the plan provides for the allocation of adequate assistance to deal with law enforcement problems in areas characterized by both high crime incidence and high law enforcement activity.*

Perhaps most importantly, CJCCs gained legislative recognition through the amendments and became eligible for separate funding under Part C. Subsection (a) of Section 301 was amended as follows:

*The Administration is authorized to make grants to States having comprehensive State plans approved by it under this part for:*

*The establishment of a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council for any unit of general local*

*government or any combination of such units within the State, having a population of two-hundred and fifty thousand or more, to assure improved planning and coordination of all law enforcement activities.*

This legislative action provided CJCCs with three potential sources of funds: State planning grants under Part B of the law, state action grants under Part C, and discretionary grants, also under Part C. Spurred by these changes, thirty-three of the fifty-five largest cities and their counties formed CJCCs by the end of 1971.

The availability of the new sources of funds, along with the rapid growth of CJCCs, began to tie local agencies closer to the bureaucratic structure of LEAA. Since funding came through LEAA, local planning units were under the jurisdiction of LEAA guidelines and state and regional planning agency directives. These requirements increasingly tended to mold CJCCs into local extensions of the federal and state system, rather than enhancing local planning capacity.

Recently, LEAA has moved to separate the planning function from that of coordination, even though LEAA's own definition of CJCCs lists both as responsibilities. This is evidenced in the 1976 *State Planning Agency Guideline Manual*:

*Multi-Purpose Regional Planning. If Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils perform both the functions of the coordinating council and of the Regional Planning Unit, they must be allocated Part B and Part C funds in proportion to the staff efforts devoted to each function. The State Planning Agency is responsible for documenting the formula by which it arrives at an equitable pro rata allocation of Part C and Part B funds. Any multipurpose unit which performs two or more kinds of regional planning and receives two or more grants from Part B or Part C funds must separate the functions clearly through provision for performance of these functions by distinct and separate units or staff members, or must assure that there is an allocation of funds in proportion to staff efforts devoted to each function.<sup>19</sup>*

This rather technical section has meant that local CJCCs have been required to keep two entirely

separate sets of books, based on a strict separation of function. In some cases, it has meant that staff members designated for planning functions have not been able to perform any activity that might be interpreted as coordination.

In truth, good planning requires good coordination, often and perhaps preferably by the same personnel. Artificially separating the two functions as a book-keeping device has no foundation in planning theory; instead it has had a destructive effect on local performance, and has trapped both state and local units in additional and unnecessary redtape. The purpose of making both Part B and C assistance available to local units of governments for CJCCs was to speed the development of local planning and coordination capacity. CJCCs are in real danger of becoming administratively ensnared by the very bureaucracy originally intended to encourage their growth.

### Early Experiences

With the passage of the Safe Streets Act Amendments in 1970, the formation of local planning units as a means to coordinate planning and spending for criminal justice now had support from the Katzenbach Commission, the Violence Commission, and finally, the U.S. Congress. By the end of 1970, cities were becoming increasingly aware of the need to take a total approach to the criminal justice system. New York, Cleveland, Boston, and Hartford had strong CJCCs. San Francisco, Denver, Miami, New Orleans, Indianapolis, Detroit, and Philadelphia were in the preliminary stages of organizing them.

Though the formation of CJCCs was rapid, their initial development was slow, as cities experimented with various models ranging from formula grant conduits to comprehensive planning agencies. Observers first began to express the feeling that CJCCs would not really be effective until they moved beyond the realm of simply managing federal grants. Different cities developed different organizational approaches, and the following summary of some of the first programs demonstrates that variety.

#### *New York, New York*

The New York CJCC was founded in 1967 by executive order of the mayor. Three years later, an executive committee was authorized to assume re-

sponsibility for spending the Safe Streets Act funds authorized in 1970. Another executive order in 1971 made the CJCC part of the mayor's office.

From its beginning, the New York CJCC demonstrated the necessary standards of broad representation, appropriate authority, and adequate staffing. The group had seventy-four members, including representatives from the city council, various city and criminal justice agencies, unions, community groups, and private citizens (who made up half of the membership). Through the use of working committees, more than 200 New Yorkers were involved.

Most of the initial staff work of the New York CJCC was done by a private nonprofit research group, the Vera Institute of Justice. The Vera approach was to take the project, set it up with grant money, then try to convert it into a private, nonprofit corporation funded by city money, but not subject to the bureaucratic structure and civil service requirements present in a city agency.<sup>20</sup>

In New York, the full CJCC acted mainly as an advisory group whose members were called on both individually and collectively for advice and assistance. A sixteen-member executive committee served as a planning board for the receipt of federal criminal justice funds, not only from LEAA, but also from the Departments of Labor and of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). This group did not actually vote on projects but discussed them and, when there was strong objection, the committee influenced the staff in certain funding decisions.<sup>21</sup>

The New York CJCC showed strong mayoral involvement, with the mayor serving as the head of both the full council and the executive committee.

#### *Hartford, Connecticut*

Hartford's approach was unique in two respects. Its CJCC was sponsored and financed by private organizations and foundations, and Hartford was the first medium-sized city to form a CJCC.

The Hartford Criminal and Social Justice Coordinating Council was originated in 1969 by the Task Force on Law and Order, created by Hartford's Chamber of Commerce. The group saw its sphere of operation ranging beyond the scope of police, courts,

and corrections, to include social service and business components. It began with a staff of two full-time professionals, funded by a \$50,000 grant from the Ford Foundation and the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving.<sup>22</sup>

This CJCC consisted primarily of agency leaders from the criminal justice, business, and social service community. The police department was the only city agency represented. From these members, an executive committee of seven was formed. As in New York, the executive committee did not have decision-making power, but was viewed as an "informal board of directors."<sup>23</sup>

#### *Cleveland, Ohio*

CJCC development in this city originated with the Administration of Justice Committee, funded by the Cleveland Foundation and the Greater Cleveland Associated Foundation. This CJCC also took in surrounding Cuyahoga County, since as many residents lived in the suburbs as within Cleveland's formal city boundaries. Because of its countywide responsibility, the Cleveland CJCC did not initially have strong mayoral leadership.<sup>24</sup> However, in August of 1970, Mayor Carl Stokes became its chairperson.<sup>25</sup> The Cleveland unit divided its membership into committees along functional lines and involved broad segments of the community including the school system, bar association, and health care experts.

#### *Boston, Massachusetts*

In 1969, Boston had six programs funded under LEAA; however, funding coordination problems developed, and city officials began to feel that Boston was not receiving its fair share of LEAA block grant funds because it came under the jurisdiction of a regional agency within the state. Early in 1970, the mayor formally organized the Mayor's Coordinating Council for the Administration of Justice, composed of various city agency heads. Initially, the group was chaired by the first assistant corporation counsel for the city, and had a staff of six professionals. Within the first year, this CJCC developed two separate committees—a coordinating committee made up of various agency heads, and an advisory committee composed primarily of citizens and private groups appointed by the mayor.<sup>26</sup>

## Current Issues

Despite the different approaches of these four cities, several patterns had begun to emerge by early 1971:

- All four cities had formed CJCCs with varying degrees of public representation.
- All had seen the need to form some policy-making body—usually an executive committee—within council membership to allow for broad public representation without sacrificing communication and coordination.
- All had secured some form of funding specifically for council operation, and all had professional staffs.
- Increasingly, the mayor or local chief executive began to be seen as the key to CJCC success.

In the summer of 1970, LEAA made a grant to the NLC and USCM for a program to help the thirty largest cities develop a criminal justice system planning and coordination capacity. In May 1971, a conference was held on "The Mayor and the Criminal Justice System." The meeting showed signs of CJCC progress but also illuminated many problems.

The greatest difficulty in many cities was still the existence in most states of regional bodies, usually dominated by suburban and rural representatives, which passed upon cities' block grant applications before they were submitted to state planning agencies. Officials from Milwaukee, Minneapolis, St. Paul, and New Orleans complained that essential city programs were often vetoed by regional boards, and that cities often had little or no representation there or on state boards, despite the 1970 Safe Streets Act amendments. As a result, many Councils, including New Orleans, San Francisco, Cleveland/Cuyahoga County, and Cincinnati, sought and eventually received regional status from their states.<sup>27</sup>

Questions began to arise. What form should CJCCs take? What powers should they have? What should be their ultimate relationship to the system? How could they deal with local agencies (e.g., courts) that were under county or state jurisdiction? The staff report to the Violence Commission had indicated in 1969 that a strong CJCC was needed, with the power to allocate resources and introduce innovations.<sup>28</sup>

Gary V. Dublin, of LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, even proposed in a book, *New Frontiers in Criminal Justice Research*, that state legislatures delegate "quasi-penal" powers to CJCCs.<sup>29</sup> The National Urban Coalition, who had been active in urging CJCC development, suggested that CJCCs needed review authority over local criminal justice budgetary spending.<sup>30</sup> However, most city representatives shied away from the role of the all-powerful CJCC. For example, Mayor Moon Landrieu of New Orleans said, "I don't see it as an administrative power. But it certainly should have persuasive powers to encourage agencies to change their ways by demonstrating effective programs."<sup>31</sup>

San Francisco Council Member Terry Francois added, "We had to convince everyone that the council would not take away powers from different agency heads."<sup>32</sup>

City representatives generally felt that adequate power would come from the mayor or from the influence that a planning document or agency staff could informally wield. But a question remained: Without formalized sanctioning power, would CJCCs be able to bring about fundamental system change?

The 1971 mayor's conference supplied answers as well as questions. As a result of the meeting, the Criminal Justice Project of the NLC and USCM produced the following CJCC checklist:

- It should be composed of a Committee representing a broad spectrum of the system, plus citizens.
- To be worth something, it must have an adequate staff which writes proposals, reviews proposals of other agencies, arranges meetings, etc.
- It must be adequately and regularly funded.
- It must be in government, but not part of any single criminal justice component.
- It must be provided with strong mayoral support.
- It must do comprehensive planning and coordination.<sup>33</sup>

During the next two years, the number of local criminal justice planning units continued to increase. By April 1973, all but ten of the nation's fifty-four largest cities had some variety of local planning capacity, and there was a marked decline in the number of multicounty planning units serving major cities.<sup>34</sup>

The development of CJCCs was given additional impetus by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (hereafter Standards and Goals Commission). In *A National Strategy to Reduce Crime*, the Commission formally recommended that "... all major cities and counties establish criminal justice coordinating councils under the leadership of local chief executives."<sup>35</sup> This was the third major presidential commission in a six-year period to recommend CJCC development.

Today, all of the largest U.S. cities, as well as many medium-sized ones, have developed some local planning capacity as a response to the Safe Streets Act. Most have chosen some or all of the elements represented by a CJCC. However, while stronger in both numbers and degree of acceptance, CJCCs still face many problems. In a June 1975 interview with Donald Manson, then Executive Director of the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice of Boston, he listed the following problem areas faced by CJCCs today:

#### 1. Administrative Survival

This is largely a question of "turf" protection by the various participants in the criminal justice process. Reluctant to share power, many of these participants would like to work around the CJCC or divide it administratively. Thus it is important to have strong mayoral support and an office separate from other system components.

Mayors sometimes face difficulties in providing strong leadership around the crime issue. First, their control of the entire criminal justice process is limited. For example, courts and corrections are often county- or state-controlled. In addition, crime cannot be isolated from other city concerns such as housing, poverty, education, drug abuse, mental health, and recreation needs. These areas also compete for the mayor's attention and leadership.

#### 2. Problems with LEAA and SPAs

Growing federal and state requirements and expectations have created increased bureaucratic complications and rules. The flexibility cities need to operate effectively is gone or disappearing rapidly, and this development has increasingly led to a general lack of responsiveness to city needs.

The reluctance to share power is a special problem in terms of SPAs. Presently it is the state, rather than the city, which decides how much money the city needs, what the funds are used for, and, in some cases, even how staff should be coordinated. The city of Boston, for example, has only two representatives on a forty-five person state planning board.

#### 3. Local Fiscal Crises

Federal programs are not free. Matching funds must be supplied and, in some cases, accompanied by overhead and fringe benefits. Also, it is difficult to explain to the public a \$100,000 experimental, innovative grant when layoffs of police officers, probation personnel, or other local officials are occurring.

#### 4. "Flak-Catcher" Role

It is unavoidable that a local planning unit takes the blame for other decision-makers when mistakes occur. Crime itself is a difficult area to cope with in terms of both planning and politics. There are few, if any, shortcuts, yet the public wants an immediate reduction of crime. Unfortunately, the innovative, experimental projects that may be needed are also high-risk endeavors.

#### 5. Crime Statistics

The present means of assessing crime is through Uniform Crime Reports from local law enforcement agencies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These data show that arrest rates continue to rise. This indicates a dilemma, in that arrest rates are often the result of effective law enforcement and public confidence. More and better trained police may make more arrests, which could increase public confidence and encourage more reports of crime. Thus, in a

sense, the more efficient the system becomes, the more arrests will be made, and the higher the crime statistics may be.<sup>36</sup>

A question suggested previously, with larger implications for the future, is the relationship of CJCCs to the federal program which facilitated their growth.

In light of their strong ties to LEAA, will CJCCs become only a local grants management extension of the federal agency, to perhaps decline or disappear with LEAA as national priorities change? Or will they be institutionalized into local systems of government as the necessary catalyst for effectively coordinated and well-planned change?

# COUNCIL IMPLEMENTATION

The history of local criminal justice planning and of the CJCC concept shows how the structure and objectives of CJCC organization evolved to the present. These historical perspectives can be used in establishing common guidelines for implementing the CJCC concept and evaluating existing CJCCs. While CJCCs vary widely in form and structure, it is generally agreed that to be most effective, CJCCs should provide broad community representation, have sufficient operating authority, develop adequate staffing and secure enough funds to function.

## Providing Broad Representation

Achieving this goal is usually addressed through the selection of CJCC members. However, before discussing selection methods, it is important to address the issue of why broad representation should be a CJCC criterion in the first place, especially since it definitely creates more work for planners and administrators. More time is needed to handle meetings, and advisory input will sometimes disagree with staff input. Also, having too few community leaders may create inadequate public representation, while too many members (or unrepresentative ones) can strangle CJCC progress. There are three basic reasons for this criterion.

- *Coordination.* If effective coordination is to exist within the criminal justice system, communication must take place among all its participants, and between them and the larger community. Otherwise, fragmentation, distorted perception, and tunnel vision are likely to result, and in fact occurred in most cities before CJCC formation. Previous intersystem communication tended to be one-to-one and irregular, depending on either personality or politics. The CJCC

offers a forum where system participants come together formally and discuss criminal justice issues with their peers and before the public.

This kind of communication allows the CJCC staff both to lead and be led, depending on the circumstance. It can "save" planners from working in isolation on efforts that may have little chance for implementation after exposure to political or governmental reality.

- *Comprehensive Planning.* The broad representation approach facilitates the comprehensive planning process by providing for participation by noncriminal justice agencies. As one observer has indicated, "Comprehensive criminal justice planning . . . must go beyond the police, courts, and correctional systems to include the social, physical, and economic environment, as well as the public and private institutions that deliver services to people."<sup>37</sup>
- *Constituency Development.* Broad representation also allows for the private citizen's participation and thus helps the criminal justice system develop a public constituency. The lack of public understanding of and support for the criminal justice system has been cited by Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark, retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, as one of the six principal inadequacies of that system.<sup>38</sup>

Constituency development is a first step in creating a public base of support for criminal justice activities. Consider, for example, the importance of this support in bond elections, where local appropriations that often far exceed federal

funds are approved or disapproved by the voters, whose understanding can lead to support.

A public constituency can be built through the CJCC membership by involving both private citizens and the local policy-making officials. These steps build a base of public support while also lending official authority and prestige to CJCC activities.

Several organizational questions remain. How large should a CJCC be? What structure will produce optimum performance? Who should be members and who should appoint them?

#### Size and Organization

In 1971, the Office of Policy Analysis of the NLC and USCM surveyed sixteen CJCCs regarding their size. The average was twenty-eight members, with the range from six in Buffalo to eighty-four in New York.

Two years later, the NLC and USCM surveyed membership rosters for thirty-one cities. The average CJCC membership had dropped to twenty-three, with a range of five in Wichita, Kansas, to seventy-five in New York.

The range between large and small CJCCs was considerable in both 1971 and 1973, and the later survey pointed to certain relationships that seemed to be a function of size. Said the study: "The larger the Council, the greater the proportion of public members that sit on it and the smaller the proportion of policy-makers and criminal justice officials."<sup>39</sup>

The issue is how to achieve the objective of increasing both public and policy-maker involvement, when large organizations tend to involve one group more than the other. According to the 1973 survey, adequate public involvement would seem to suggest a CJCC of more than thirty persons. On the other hand, the goal of involving policy-makers so as to increase coordination and further develop official

responsiveness seems to suggest a small group of fewer than sixteen people.<sup>40</sup>

The use of an executive committee has been the compromise solution in several cities. (See Figure 1.) In the 1973 survey, fourteen of the twenty-seven cities responding had such a body. Twenty-one had an executive committee, a task force structure, or a combination of these. Only one of the CJCCs, which had neither, had more than sixteen members.<sup>41</sup>

The typical task force structure involved three or more task forces devoted to law enforcement, courts, corrections, delinquency prevention, drug abuse, or other interest areas. The executive committee usually had decision-making authority, with input from the general CJCC membership and various task forces.

Development of an executive committee with decision-making authority allows a CJCC to conduct business in an efficient manner, even when it has considerable public representation. To assure the responsiveness of the executive body, at least half of its members should be local officials. They can lend credibility to committee and CJCC proceedings, thus allowing for a larger general body without sacrificing efficiency or productivity. CJCC membership could then easily consist of more than thirty members, with at least a third coming from outside the formal criminal justice system. If the task force structure is used in addition to an executive committee, totals might even be increased, as in the case of the New York group.

#### Membership Issues

The CJCC as a whole might best be seen as an advisory group. A wide range of expertise from noncriminal justice agencies could be included, and the input of private citizens utilized. While the executive committee took care of the day-to-day business of priority setting, system coordination, and grant and application review, the CJCC as a whole could provide a planning resource to staff and local decision-makers.

Ideally, the mayor or local chief executive should appoint the executive committee from the membership of the general CJCC, and should serve as the chairperson of both bodies. While serving as an advisory group, all CJCC members should be responsible for reviewing the annual comprehensive plan

developed by their staff, and for making formal recommendations to the executive committee. This assures ultimate staff responsiveness to the public. In terms of scheduling meetings, the executive committee might meet monthly and the whole CJCC quarterly. Task force meetings could be called on an as-needed basis.

No correlations should be drawn between the population of a given city and the advised membership size of its CJCC. If any relationship exists, it should best be considered inverse. The probability that smaller cities will have smaller planning budgets and hence smaller planning staffs is a sound rationale for having a more highly organized CJCC.

Even a planning office with one professional can staff a CJCC, given the voluntary participation of both system and nonsystem participants. In these situations, the use of task forces can supplement staff planning input, and CJCC members can assume what might be staff planning functions in planning agencies with larger budgets.


Once membership size is determined, the next question naturally concerns composition. Usually the mayor or local chief executive should chair the committee. Strong support from the chief executive seems to be one of the best indicators of CJCC success. When the mayor participates, other local elected officials and public and private agency heads also tend to participate actively. When the mayor is chairperson, he or she tends to be more active. When another local elected official is chairperson, it may be politically inexpedient for the mayor to participate actively or even attend meetings.

The 1971 survey of the NLC and USCM, covering sixteen cities with CJCCs, showed that the mayor served as chairperson for nine of these groups. In the seven where the mayor was not chairperson, the mayor participated in only one.

The composition of CJCC membership should enhance inner-system coordination, and should involve related noncriminal justice agencies, local policy-makers (i.e., local officials), and private citizens. How can one determine if these objectives are being met? Individual local politics, personalities, bureaucracy, and varying combinations of these factors make the recommendation of specific quotas unrealistic. This is coupled with the problem that some CJCCs, which also have local regional planning status, are

FIGURE 1

EXAMPLE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL ORGANIZATION CHART



required to have half of their membership made up of locally elected officials. This can become a particular problem when a city's only locally elected officials are the mayor and the city council. CJCC meetings may then become replays of city council meetings. Nonetheless, the following general guidelines for membership composition are appropriate:

1. The executive committee should have a majority of local officials, whether elected or appointed.
2. At least one representative each from police, courts, and corrections should be on the executive committee.
3. Private citizens should comprise approximately one-third of general CJCC membership. This should include women and minority group representatives; private, nonprofit agency heads; and education and business leaders.
4. Both the executive committee and the full CJCC should include representatives of the juvenile justice system.
5. The following key local positions should generally be included on the CJCC:

- Mayor or local chief executive
- City council or city/county commission representative
- Police chief
- Sheriff
- District Attorney
- Chief executive of local public defender's office
- Chief juvenile probation official
- Administrative or presiding judges
- Juvenile court representatives
- Executives of other public and private justice related areas
- Local correctional facility officials

### Obtaining Sufficient Authority

Some form of authority is needed to bring together criminal justice system participants. The CJCC can play the role of convener, but unless backed by sufficient authority, it is unlikely to overcome the fragmentation and sometimes open hostility characteristic of most local criminal justice environments.

Authority for the CJCC can be gained either formally or informally. Formal authority is usually derived from a resolution or ordinance adopted by the city council and/or county board of commissioners, or by an executive order of the mayor or county chief executive. Informal authority can be derived by a "request" from the mayor, with a mutual agreement of participation by members of the criminal justice system.

Of the two alternatives, the first is preferred. It is also possible for authority to be derived from public mandate, but a CJCC initially located outside local government, without the participation of police, courts, and corrections, has much less chance to effect change.

A city council ordinance or mayor's executive order should formally establish organizational boundaries for CJCC activity.<sup>42</sup> Either document should, among other things do the following:

1. Describe the location of the CJCC within local government (i.e., mayor's office, city/county executive's office).
2. Define the membership term, appointment, and confirmation process, and specify membership representation.
3. Designate the group's chairperson.
4. Describe the internal organization (i.e., executive committee and/or task force) and delegate the powers of various committees.
5. Describe staff specifications, and state the responsibilities and authority of the director.
6. Sanction agency activities, including but not limited to the following:
  - a. securing funds

- b. entering into contracts
  - c. advising criminal justice agencies
  - d. collecting statistics and relevant information, conducting research and studies, preparing and publishing reports
  - e. operating programs
7. Provide for submission of an annual comprehensive criminal justice plan.
  8. Authorize cooperation in data collection from other city agencies.

When authority is gained through informal means such as a mayor's request, the CJCC's administrative location within local government becomes more important. The fact that criminal justice system participants would agree to cooperate voluntarily without formal requirements certainly bodes well for CJCC success; however, the location of the CJCC staff within the local chief executive's office becomes more important as a continuing future sign that the chief decision-maker approves and is involved. Without this approval of CJCC coordinating and planning efforts, voluntary, informal cooperation may last only until the first compromise is required.

### Developing Adequate Staffing

Adequate staffing entails not only the existence of a group of individuals called staff, but also the assurance that they have the appropriate skills and knowledge to conduct business and create a work environment that will promote professional growth.

How large should a staff be and how should it be organized? What kind of experience and education should staff members have to fill specific positions? How should staff be recruited?

While answers to most of these questions vary from city to city, one point can be made consistently. Adequate staff means *full-time* staff, rather than part-time, temporary, or consultant help. Every city needs *at least* one full-time individual who advises decision-makers, directs comprehensive planning, and provides coordination and linkage among police, courts, and corrections, as well as noncriminal justice agencies.

Throughout this discussion of staffing requirements, the term *professional* will appear repeatedly. Unfortunately, there are no definite characteristics which consistently distinguish professional staff functions. The field of criminal justice planning is too new for specific professional standards of experience or education. Very generally, we might consider all staff with some degree of interagency decision-making responsibility as professional. This includes almost everyone except clerical support staff, volunteers, and student interns. As the profession develops, these criteria can be expected to become better defined.

### Staff Size and Organization

The average staff size of local planning units consistently has been related strongly to the size of the cities in which they are located. For practical purposes, cities (or city/counties) can be classified into four different population categories: those with 1,000,000 or more inhabitants; those with between 500,000 and 1,000,000; those between 250,000 and 500,000; and those with fewer than 250,000 people.

The NLC and USCM have done several surveys on the professional staff size of CJCCs; these may be useful for comparison. The results are presented in Table 1. These figures consistently demonstrate the relation of city population to planning unit staff size. In the latest survey, the average for thirty-seven large cities was 7.6 professionals. It is obvious from the range variation that almost anything is possible; however, for the best chance of success, cities anticipating CJCC development are urged to look toward the average in their respective population categories.

The organizational pattern emerging in CJCCs seems to point toward the specialization of planning tasks along functional lines. Staff activities can usually be grouped under two broad headings: comprehensive planning; and managing specific projects and grants (i.e., grants management).

The function of comprehensive planning involves a wide variety of activities that may include reviewing local criminal justice budgets, monitoring legislative activities, developing and researching policy positions and alternatives, and preparing the annual comprehensive criminal justice plan.

In project or grants management the staff helps

Table 1

AVERAGE NUMBER OF PLANNING OFFICE PROFESSIONAL STAFF BY CITY POPULATION

City Size	Staff Size*								
	1971 — (15 cities) <sup>a</sup>			1973 — (34 cities) <sup>b</sup>			1975 — (37 cities) <sup>c</sup>		
	Average	Range		Average	Range		Average	Range	
1,000,000 +	10.8	5	20	14.0	7	28	13.0	6	21
500,000 —									
1,000,000	6.3	2	15	6.9	1	11	8.8	1	25
250,000 —									
500,000	4.5	3	6	4.6	1	9	5.6	1	16

\*National League of Cities and United States Conference of Mayors, *Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils*, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>b</sup>National League of Cities and United States Conference of Mayors, *Local Criminal Justice Planning*, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>c</sup>Telephone survey conducted by NLC and USCM staff, January 1975. This total excluded cities in California, where staffs are regional and state-supported, and in the District of Columbia, whose CJCC is the equivalent of an SPA.

develop, implement, monitor, and evaluate specific local action programs. Staff members also provide administrative support to operating agencies, helping them articulate problem areas, prepare funding applications, negotiate grants, and oversee federal fund activities.

Staff structure and organization are likely to be contingent on economic and administrative constraints varying from city to city. An organizational model that is optimum for one city may be disastrous for the next. However, again for the sake of simplification, the following minimum staffing patterns should be considered.

• **One-Professional Model.** For large and medium-sized cities, one professional is a minimum requirement for the operation of a CJCC. A part-time person cannot be considered adequate, since the criminal justice field is too broad to allow for time-sharing with other interests. This model is anticipated in cities—predictably those with populations below 250,000—where economic or administrative constraints prevent more adequate staffing.

While a one-professional office is a bare minimum, several steps can be taken to enhance its operation. The CJCC itself can be more highly structured around task performance. This allows members to assume some of the planning and policy-making roles that might normally fall on staff, which means that members must necessarily work harder and be more involved.

It is probably helpful in this instance to emphasize community participation on the CJCC, and to invite assistance from community volunteers and student interns. Ties to the local chief executive should be close, and strong local authority should be firmly mandated, as the ability to generate power through staff will be limited.

The key point here is that the best way to insure CJCC success is to have sufficient authority, cooperation, money, and staff. Obviously, when deficiencies occur in one of these areas, compensation can be made by increasing another ingredient.


• **Three-Professional Model.** The support of just two more professionals considerably multiplies CJCC staff ability to effect change. Forming staffing patterns along functional lines, one professional can assume responsibility for planning considerations and the other for program management. The director then has more time to insure communication and coordination among system participants.

This model still represents a skeleton staff, and requires strong CJCC organization and the assurance of adequate authority. It probably represents the minimum staffing threshold for cities of more than 250,000 population.

• **Multiprofessional Model.** As the availability of professionals increases, staffing patterns can vary

FIGURE 2

EXAMPLE OF STAFFING ALTERNATIVES, BASED ON NUMBER OF STAFF PROFESSIONALS



more. The position of deputy director can be added to manage the office, freeing more of the director's time for system coordination. Under a chief planner, staff members can specialize in specific functional areas such as police, courts, and corrections. Fiscal accountants and program monitors can be added to the program management team, along with a unit that has the capability for program evaluation and information system design.

#### Staff Recruitment

The best way to recruit staff is to be very clear on what is expected from the various positions. Expectations will vary from city to city, depending on existing job and salary ranges within or outside the civil service structure. These expectations are best expressed through clear, well-defined job descriptions. Following are guidelines for those developing such descriptions:

- First, do not let the applicant or a civil service, budget, administrative, or federal program office write the job description for you. However, some outside ideas and suggestions can be helpful.
- Second, do not prepare the description hurriedly or copy it from a similar job description in another city. Use other experiences for ideas, but mold these ideas to fit your own situation.
- Third, formal job descriptions might include a job title, salary range, distinguishing features and examples of work; necessary knowledge, skills, and activities; and desirable preparation for work.

Once staff members are hired, they can be developed more fully through a clear definition of job objectives, responsibilities, and priorities. This process can be complemented by making CJCC members aware of the role, functions, and responsibilities of all staff. One means of assuring this awareness is having staff members report periodically to the CJCC or executive committee on their work and accomplishments. Staff can be further broadened by short-term loans or exchanges among the various agencies represented on the CJCC.

The question of what kinds of people should be recruited still remains. What qualities should they

have and what type of experience best qualifies an applicant? The most complete staff applicant rating system was developed by the Detroit/Wayne County CJCC and it provides the following useful list of criteria that all CJCCs can consider.

- Responsible work in and/or familiarity with local government, including criminal justice agencies.
- Responsible work in contract negotiation and administration; financial management and/or revenue forecasting; personnel and/or labor relations administration; or public policy development, social-economic planning, priority analysis and social research.
- Specific experience in operations research and analysis and in cost-benefit evaluation, and familiarity with both management information systems and planning-programming-budgeting-evaluation systems
- Successful performance in any work requiring a high level of individual initiative and persuasion.
- Ability to organize one's work schedule efficiently, and to communicate effectively in writing, speaking, or discussion.
- Successful performance in contributing to the achievements of professional, civic, and community organizations.
- Awareness and acceptance of the constraints upon public and private institutions, organizations, and individuals.
- Ability to handle conflict situations among agencies, officials, and individuals in a positive, constructive manner.
- Ability to perceive problems in a broad, well-organized frame of reference. Also important are high levels of objectivity, analytical ability, maturity, and the ability to reduce sophisticated theory to straightforward practical terms
- Academic achievement in areas relevant to work, including social sciences, social work, business administration, public administration, law, urban planning, accounting, and police science.<sup>43</sup>

#### Securing Funds

To be effective, local planning and coordinating offices must have sufficient funding. However, defining "sufficient" is sometimes difficult. CJCCs have so far been largely a product of LEAA sponsorship, and their budgets consist primarily of federal funds. Thus, the best available means of determining levels of sufficiency is probably to look at the operating cost of existing programs.

The most recent data come from a survey of local planning officials completed by the Criminal Justice Project of NLC and USCM in May 1975.<sup>44</sup> Responses were obtained from fifty local planning offices in the fifty-five largest cities.<sup>45</sup>

The amount of planning funds used by local planning and coordinating offices ranged from a high of \$1 million in New York City to a low of \$17,000.<sup>46</sup> The

Table 2

AVERAGE PLANNING FUNDS FOR THIRTY-FIVE CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING OFFICES, BY POPULATION CATEGORY

City Population Range	No. of Cities	Range	Average
Group 1 1,000,000 +	4	\$1,000,000 - \$ 116,000	\$474,000
Group 2 750,000 - 1,000,000	3	\$ 254,000 - \$ 30,000	\$160,000
Group 3 650,000 - 750,000	2	\$ 120,000 - \$ 46,000	\$ 83,000
Group 4 550,000 - 650,000	3	\$ 323,000 - \$ 101,000	\$224,667
Group 5 450,000 - 550,000	5	\$ 400,000 - \$ 20,000	\$168,000
Group 6 350,000 - 450,000	8	\$ 190,000 - \$ 43,000	\$102,875
Group 7 250,000 - 350,000	10	\$ 130,000 - \$ 17,000	\$ 77,000

Source: Nancy Loving, 1975 Survey of Local Criminal Justice Planning. (Washington, D.C.: National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1976).

Table 3

AVERAGE PLANNING FUNDS FOR THIRTY-FIVE CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING OFFICES, BY POPULATION CATEGORY

City Population Range	No. of Cities	Range	Average
Group 1 1,000,000 +	4	\$1,000,000 - \$ 116,000	\$474,000
Groups 2, 3, and 4 550,000 - 1,000,000	8	\$ 323,000 - \$ 30,000	\$165,000
Groups 5, 6, and 7 250,000 - 550,000	23	\$ 400,000 - \$ 17,000	\$106,087
TOTAL Cities over 250,000	35	\$1,000,000 - \$ 17,000	\$161,600*

\*Medium total was \$118,000.  
Source: Nancy Loving, 1975 Survey of Local Criminal Justice Planning (Washington, D.C.: National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1976)

reasons for this wide variation seem to relate to the size of the city, the variety of LEAA programs and funds available to the city, and the planning office's structure. Thus, some small cities that participated in the High Impact or Pilot City programs reported more planning funds for their offices than larger cities lacking that special status.

Despite several different variables, size is still the most helpful factor in approximating CJCC funding requirements. Thirty-five cities reported having some planning funds. Table 2 shows average reported planning funds and city population size. The variations are evident; they demonstrate that population is not the only variable affecting planning budget size, and that funding is not directly proportional to city size.

The relationship between planning fund requirements and size is demonstrated when population groups are combined into three rather than seven groups, as shown in Table 3. Based on averages of what now exists, cities can get a rough idea of how much funding they might expect to need in order to carry out planning and coordination efforts.

Another way of looking at these data is to determine a per capita estimate of planning budget requirements. Again, these averages are necessarily based on what now exists, not what should exist.

The thirty-five cities had a total population of 29,854,413, and their combined planning budgets were \$5,656,000. The per capita cost per city was nineteen cents. Thus, to operate a criminal justice planning office at a level equivalent to the large city average, the cost might be estimated at nineteen to twenty cents per resident. While this figure should be used only as a base, to be average, a city of one million might need between \$190,000 and \$200,000; a city of 500,000, \$95,000 to \$100,000; and a city of 250,000, \$47,500 to \$50,000. Adjustments should be made to this "ball park" figure, based on local goals, the amount of federal, state, or local money to be managed by the office, and the number of staff members deemed necessary.

The next issue is the source of planning and coordination dollars. Obviously, LEAA has been the primary source of funds—both from Part B and Part C of the 1968 Safe Streets Act. However, Part C funds are not available for CJCC development in cities of less than 250,000 population; nor should any federal sources be deemed secure until LEAA's status is assessed after the 1976 renewal legislation.

As described earlier, LEAA recently has seemed more prone to allow strings of state control to be tied to those offices funded through Part B and Part C. This development, coupled with the need for CJCC institutionalization, leads to the hope of more local sponsorship of the concept. Since the amount of money expended for law enforcement and criminal justice activities in most cities is roughly ten times that received in federal funds, the need for a local office to plan and coordinate these activities seems evident.

# CJCC FUNCTIONS

Once a CJCC is formed, what should it be expected to accomplish for local officials making criminal justice decisions? This section will address that question in terms of the broad, functional goals of comprehensive planning, evaluation, and coordination. First, however, a brief listing is needed of the practical tasks that fall under those goal categories. These are the activities which can be carried out routinely by the CJCC membership and staff:<sup>47</sup>

1. *Work on LEAA matters*
  - a. Pursue, receive, and manage funds.
  - b. Coordinate with SPA and with regional and Washington offices.
  - c. Plan for the use of LEAA funds.
  - d. Provide administrative support.
  - e. Monitor, audit, and evaluate LEAA projects.
  - f. Deal with related problems as they arise.
2. *Coordinate with other federal programs in the city—e.g. those funded through Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and Labor. This avoids duplication and promotes coordination.*
3. *Add to city administrative resources through staff, funds, and information about crime and criminal justice efforts.*
4. *Provide advice to local officials on city and county criminal justice-related budgets.*

5. *Provide legislative analysis and development at the local, state and federal level.*
6. *Develop and analyze local policy.*
7. *React to local criminal justice issues as they arise and encourage appropriate cooperative criminal justice agency response.*
8. *Work to improve local government and the criminal justice system.*

## Comprehensive Planning

In recent years, this term has had many applications and misapplications. Receipt of federal money through the grant process is not an indicator of successful planning. The annual production of a planning document is evidence only that planning has perhaps occurred; it is not the desired end product. *Planning should describe some systematic process of strategy development which, based on past experience and future implications, seeks to organize and evaluate steps leading to the implementation of decisions.* Comprehensive planning stresses the need for this process to impact systemwide decisions through a holistic approach. Stated simply, solutions should be derived by considering the sum of all parts.

Comprehensive planning within the area of criminal justice is still relatively new. Before the late sixties, planning related to criminal justice or law enforcement was practiced only in a few major police departments, correctional agencies, and the most sophisticated court systems. Aside from those CJCCs formed as a result of the Katzenbach Commission Report, there was no planning effort that sought to interrelate and coordinate these separate components.<sup>48</sup>

When initially mandated by Safe Streets guidelines, early criminal justice planning usually existed only as pure grantsmanship. Initially, the SPAs distributed descriptions of many criminal justice programs, and a "planner" for a given city chose among them, much as if shopping through a catalog. This became commonly known as the "Sears-Roebuck" approach to criminal justice planning. While the state of the planning art has matured, there is still a strong tendency to see planning as a means of obtaining grants, rather than seeing grants as a means of confronting problems identified through planning.

As stated earlier, local criminal justice planning units must develop beyond simple LEAA grants management. This problem was well documented by NLC's Public Safety Committee, in a statement that is now part of the League's *National Municipal Policy*:

*The rapid evolution since 1968 of local Criminal Justice Planning Agencies and Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils demonstrates the value of comprehensive planning and programming as a tool for improving law enforcement and criminal justice systems.*

*However, the reliance upon federal grants, which is the operating base for virtually all such planning agencies, seriously endangers the continuity and effectiveness of their efforts. Even more important, the inevitable orientation of local criminal justice planning agencies to grant planning and grant management undermines their development as legitimate, ongoing staff agencies which can provide both short- and long-term leadership on criminal justice improvements.<sup>49</sup>*

While it is clear that comprehensive criminal justice planning should not be limited to grants management, what it should entail is somewhat more at issue. To include the sum of all parts, it must go not only beyond federal grants, but also beyond the boundaries of police, courts, and corrections to include the social, physical, and economic environment, as well as the public and private institutions that deliver services to people.<sup>50</sup>

An important question which remains is at what level of government should the process of comprehensive planning be done: local or state? First,

comprehensive planning should not be done at any one level of government to the exclusion of others. However, its intensity and depth should be greatest at the local level. There the need for timely, accurate decision-making is greatest and has the most immediate implications. At the local level citizen input can also be more meaningful. Planning only at the state level involves crossing so many political and jurisdictional boundaries that the chances of gaining consensus on any improvement plan are minimal.

The most valid planning process would be one encouraging direct linkage between locally-defined need and federally-administered resources. Needs should be defined locally and the capacity to conduct comprehensive planning emphasized there. National leadership might seek to standardize the process rather than the product of this planning. In effect, federal, regional, and state officials should help local officials "plan to plan." It is appropriate for nonlocal officials to coordinate *how* to plan for LEAA money, but not *what* to plan.

## Evaluation

When applied to LEAA, this term has often been used loosely to describe any process that might give some clue as to whether or not a given program is working. Evaluation of LEAA programs has been and is increasingly becoming an area of controversy nationally. Questions involve whether or not such evaluation has in fact been done, what it should consist of, and where and by whom it should be performed.

The broad term evaluation is often used interchangeably to refer to two separate operations—evaluation and monitoring. With reference to the criminal justice system, *evaluation is an external measurement of the impact of the program on related criminal justice agencies. Monitoring is an internal process focused on the developmental and operational performance cost/ratio.*<sup>51</sup>

Evaluation is the more difficult of the two functions. Its purpose is to measure the overall effectiveness of programs and/or projects in meeting long-range objectives, such as reducing the social costs of various crime problems or the actual cost of crime control. This process should address the following types of questions:

1. What is the actual impact of the program on the problem area for which it was prescribed?
2. What are the program's benefits and where do they occur?
3. Has the program accomplished the specific goal for which it was funded?
4. Were the necessary resources actually made available for the program?
5. Were the tasks set forth in the work plan actually accomplished?

Evaluation is therefore oriented toward assessing overall *effectiveness*.

Monitoring, on the other hand, is a continuous, inward-looking, feedback mechanism. It should take place while the program is in progress, and should seek to promote performance improvement by providing information. The monitoring process should address the following types of questions:

1. Are work schedules and milestone dates being met?
2. Are accurate cost records being maintained?
3. Have unanticipated problems arisen?
4. Will the program meet completion deadlines?
5. Are in-progress changes indicated in the technical approach or scope of activity?

Monitoring is oriented, therefore, toward assessing *efficiency*.

Definitions alone do not answer the question of why evaluation takes place. If planning is seen as a process that develops strategy leading toward risk-taking decisions, evaluation can be seen as a means of reducing risk and improving future decisions. "Information supplied by evaluation can reduce the risk and uncertainty that shrouds decision-making in today's organizations."<sup>52</sup> At the same time, monitoring can help meet the public's need for better crime prevention and control programs by providing feedback on innovative approaches.

It is not the purpose of this report to suggest the "right" way to conduct evaluation and monitoring. Indeed, their structure and form will and should vary and many models can be adapted to local needs. The primary prerequisite is an initial acknowledgment that they should occur. Since the function of monitoring is to improve efficiency of a program during its progress, it seems evident that it should be done locally.

What remains is a discussion of where evaluation should occur. Should local CJCCs be encouraged to develop evaluative capacity, or should that function reside solely with the SPA? Within recent years, a trend in guideline interpretation has placed full responsibility with the state. The rationale for this interpretation has generally been that since CJCCs are funded by LEAA, they should not be allowed to evaluate other LEAA projects because of possible bias. In a telephone survey conducted by the Criminal Justice Project of NLC and USCM in 1974, several cities reported that they had been forbidden to perform any evaluation since it was a "state function."<sup>53</sup>

There would seem to be basic inconsistencies with this interpretation when it is viewed in light of evaluation's primary objective. If the ultimate goal of the evaluation and monitoring process is to aid decision-makers in ultimately improving program performance, the decision-maker with primary responsibility for program implementation should have access to the most immediate feedback. In short, because CJCCs are charged with primary responsibility in planning and implementing local action projects through LEAA, they should be encouraged to develop the internal capacity to evaluate those projects.

It is not to say that evaluation should be the sole function of local CJCCs, to the exclusion of SPAs. Rather, evaluation should be encouraged at both levels. CJCCs should monitor and evaluate the projects they are charged with coordinating, and SPAs could assess the CJCC's evaluation processes.

Such an approach is both reasonable and manageable. If SPAs attempt to directly evaluate all projects, the result could be disastrous. If any evaluation occurred at all, feedback to local implementers would be so untimely as to be unusable. SPAs would have only an after-the-fact judgment of success or failure, one with no relevance to improved program performance.

## Coordination

This is perhaps the most innovative function of the CJCC. Limited forms of planning and evaluation were performed by the separate components of the criminal justice system in the past and will probably be done in the future, with or without CJCCs. However, the coordination function is unique. It attempts to build a system from the disparate segments of police, courts, and corrections. This coordination did not exist prior to the development of CJCCs, and should they disappear, these agencies can be expected to return to their "nonsystem" style of performance. Whether or not a plan is ever written or a project ever funded, if ongoing communication takes place among system participants, the CJCC's existence is affirmed.

Lack of coordination was the whole impetus behind the congressional action that eventually resulted in CJCC development. Following the recommendations of the Violence Commission, "Congress envisioned that such Councils would be able to overcome the pervasive fragmentation of police, courts, and correctional agencies."<sup>54</sup>

Coordination is the least expensive CJCC function, as communication is an almost automatic byproduct of the CJCC organizational process. While cooperation cannot be expected automatically, deliberate action to encourage communication is the first step. When sanctioned by local authority, cooperation can be planned and structured.

CJCC coordinative efforts need to encompass more than just police/courts/corrections involvement, however. The 1973 Standards and Goals Commission portrays two systems in need of coordination. The first is the well-known system composed of traditional agencies with formal responsibility for crime control. However, many other public and private agencies and citizens are or ought to be involved in preventing crime, and the 1973 Commission also described a second, larger system<sup>55</sup> made up of educational units, state legislatures, welfare departments, youth service bureaus, city councils, recreation departments, churches, mental health programs, employment projects, and private citizen groups. Coordination should address both of these systems.

# CONCLUSION

A system implies some unity of purpose and organized interrelationships. The public's mandate to the criminal justice system seems three-fold: 1) to reduce crime; 2) to improve system performance; and 3) to maintain the quality of justice guaranteed U.S. citizens by the Constitution. No one part of the system—neither police, courts, nor corrections—can address these goals by itself. Each must understand the needs, objectives, and resources of the others, while retaining its own separate role. The three components do share a unity of purpose; and cause and effect relationships, however poorly organized, do exist among them. The question then is not so much whether or not a system exists, but rather how well it functions.

Our cities and the individuals who comprise them can no longer afford the financial and human costs associated with "nonsystem" duplication and inefficiency. A local planning and coordination office can provide the necessary linkage between police, courts, and corrections, while allowing each to retain its separate identity. It can help to better organize the interrelationships which already exist. Such an office is basic to the formation of a well-functioning criminal justice system in metropolitan areas. When supported with adequate authority and staff, and when representative of system participants and the community, the criminal justice coordinating council (CJCC) is a useful model for such an office.

# FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>See following "Definitions and Scope" section for explanation of this and other terms.

<sup>2</sup>Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Public Law 90-351, 42 U.S.C., Sections 3701 ff. (1970).

<sup>3</sup>Part B of the 1968 Act authorizes funds for planning efforts only, while Part C provides financial support for action programs set up at the discretion of the grant recipient.

<sup>4</sup>William Drake, "Criminal Justice Planning: Objectives for the Future," *Nation's Cities*, June 1974, p. 33.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Office of Planning and Management, *Guideline Manual M4100.1E—State Planning Agency Grants*, January 16, 1976, p. 22.

<sup>6</sup>President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Katzenbach Commission) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 280-1.

<sup>7</sup>In a *unified* criminal justice system, all major local functions are carried on by a single unit of general local government. In a *coordinate* criminal justice system, the major local functions are carried on by two or more units of government (i.e., city-county) serving the same or overlapping populations.

<sup>8</sup>Daniel J. Freed, "The Nonsystem of Criminal Justice," *Law and Order Reconsidered: A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 268, 275.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 278.

<sup>10</sup>*The Challenge of Crime in A Free Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, *To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility: Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 158, 169-70.

<sup>13</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, *Law Enforcement Assistance Amendments*, House Report 1174, 91st Congress, 2d sess., 1970, p. 10.

<sup>14</sup>To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

<sup>15</sup>Mark Hoffman, *Criminal Justice Planning*, Report No.

276 of the Planning Advisory Service of American Society of Planning Officials, January 1972, p. 20.

<sup>16</sup>Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Making the Safe Streets Act Work: An Intergovernmental Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 11.

<sup>17</sup>Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title I, Part B, Sections 203.

<sup>18</sup>National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors, Office of Policy Analysis, *Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils* (Washington, D.C.: NLC and USCM, 1971), p. 3.

<sup>19</sup>*Guideline Manual M4100.1E*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>20</sup>Henry S. Ruth in "The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council: A Report of Council Directors," convened by the National Urban Coalition, Washington, D.C., June 23-24, 1970 (mimeographed), p. 4.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>22</sup>Brian L. Hollander in "The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council: A Report of Council Directors," *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>Bruce L. Newman in "A Report of Council Directors," *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>25</sup>"Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils Make Slow Progress," *Criminal Justice Newsletter*, Institute of Judicial Administration (Pilot Issue) 2 (August 1970), pp. 1-3.

<sup>26</sup>Fred Scribner in "A Report of Council Directors," *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>27</sup>"Coordinating Councils Gain Despite Obstacles," *Criminal Justice Newsletter*, Institute of Judicial Administration, II, 10 (May 17, 1971), 74.

<sup>28</sup>Freed, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

<sup>29</sup>"Coordinating Councils Gain Despite Obstacles," *op. cit.*, p. 78.

<sup>30</sup>"Coordinating Councils Make Slow Progress," *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup>"Coordinating Councils Gain Despite Obstacles," *op. cit.*, p. 78.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 74.

<sup>34</sup>National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors, Criminal Justice Project, Local Criminal Justice

Planning: A Retrospective Review for Fifty-Four Major Cities (Washington, D.C.: NLC and USCM, 1973), p. xii.

<sup>45</sup>National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *A National Strategy to Reduce Crime*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 35.

<sup>46</sup>Donald B. Manson, Executive Director of the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice of Boston, interview conducted in Washington, D.C., June 1, 1975.

<sup>47</sup>Drake, "Criminal Justice Planning: Objectives for the Future," *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>48</sup>Tom C. Clark, Criminal Justice Coordinating Council of Greater Cleveland: Conference Report, sponsored by the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council of Greater Cleveland and the Administration of Justice Committee, Warren, Ohio, February 23-25, 1973, p. 15.

<sup>49</sup>National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors, *Local Criminal Justice Planning*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>52</sup>Examples of an executive order (city of New York) and a city council ordinance (city of New Orleans) are provided as Appendices A and B.

<sup>53</sup>Detroit/Wayne County Criminal Justice System Coordinating Council, *Operations Manual*, Summer 1975 (mimeographed).

<sup>54</sup>Nancy Loving, "Questionnaire on the Local Adminis-

tration of LEAA Planning and Funding," completed May 1975.

<sup>55</sup>The District of Columbia (Washington, D.C.) was excluded because its status more closely resembles that of an SPA than a CJCC.

<sup>56</sup>Several cities reported having no planning funds, but the survey staff felt that those answers related to the absence of federal funds. For the purpose of this report, they were not included in averaging.

<sup>57</sup>Manson interview, *op. cit.*

<sup>58</sup>Drake, "Criminal Justice Planning: Objectives for the Future," *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>59</sup>National League of Cities, *National Municipal Policy, 1975*, adopted at the Congress of Cities, Houston, Texas, December 5, 1974, p. 93.

<sup>60</sup>Drake, "Criminal Justice Planning: Objectives for the future," *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>61</sup>National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *Criminal Justice System* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 155.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 215.

<sup>63</sup>Gordon Raley and Nancy Loving, "Local Evaluation Survey Results" (memorandum), Criminal Justice Project, National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors, October 10, 1974.

<sup>64</sup>Office of General Counsel (LEAA), *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>65</sup>*Criminal Justice System*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

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**APPENDIX A: Executive Order of the City of New York Establishing the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council**

**EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 6 — APRIL 6, 1971**

Establishment of the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council

WHEREAS, there are numerous public and private agencies involved in the City's criminal justice system,

WHEREAS, there is a need to coordinate the efforts of these separate agencies,

WHEREAS, the President's Crime Commission in 1967 recommended that every City have a single planning agency for the coordination of crime control activities,

WHEREAS, the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act requires that local criminal justice agencies develop coordinated plans and programs,

WHEREAS, the New York State Crime Control Planning Board has asked the Mayor to designate an agency to serve as the City's planning body,

WHEREAS, the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, established in 1967, has provided the City with a single planning agency for crime control planning and reform,

NOW, THEREFORE, by the power vested in me as Mayor of the City of New York, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. There is hereby established in the Office of the Mayor, a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, which shall plan and coordinate crime control and criminal justice activities for the City.

§2. The Mayor shall serve as Chairman of the Council. He shall designate such other officers as he deems appropriate.

§3. The Mayor shall appoint a Director of the Council, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Mayor.

§4. The duties of the Director shall include but not be limited to the following:

(a) to confer with appropriate City, State, Federal, and private agencies concerned with the administration of criminal justice for the purpose of improving crime control programs and policies;

(b) to confer with appropriate City, State, Federal and private agencies for the purpose of securing funds for the support of the Council and for initiating programs of crime control and criminal justice reform, and, on behalf of the City, to accept, and enter into contracts for, grants of Federal, State or other funds to the City for such purposes;

(c) to advise the criminal justice agencies on improved policies and programs;

(d) to conduct research, operate programs, and conduct studies of crime control and criminal justice; and to contract with other public or private agencies and engage consultants for such research programs and studies;

- (e) to prepare and publish such reports and sponsor such conferences as he deems appropriate;
- (f) to encourage joint activities among the separate criminal justice agencies and to represent the overall interest and needs of the criminal justice system;
- (g) to advise the Model Cities Administrator and the local Model Cities Committees in the planning and implementing of Crime Control and criminal justice programs in the Model Cities areas;
- (h) to collect statistics and information relative to the criminal justice agencies, to design information systems for the standardization and collection of data and to prepare and publish reports, statistics and analyses of criminal justice operations.

§5. (a) The Mayor shall appoint the members of the Council to serve for four-year terms. The terms of the members first appointed shall expire four years from January 1, 1970.

(b) The membership of the Council shall include representatives from all public agencies substantially involved in the criminal justice system.

(c) The Council shall have no less than fifty and no more than eighty members.

(d) Approximately one-half the Council members shall be private citizens.

(e) The members of the Council shall serve without compensation.

§6. The Mayor shall appoint an Executive Committee of not more than sixteen members which shall act on behalf of the Council. The Mayor shall serve as Chairman of the Executive Committee.

§7. The Executive Committee: (a) is hereby designated to act as the planning agency for the City under the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, and (b) shall have the power to review and approve applications on behalf of the City for Federal and State crime control and criminal justice funds.

§8. All City agencies shall furnish the Director with such reports and information as he may deem necessary to carry out the functions and purposes of his office.

§9. The Director shall submit an annual report to the Mayor and the members of the Council.

§10. This order shall be effective immediately.

\_\_\_\_\_  
JOHN V. LINDSAY  
MAYOR

## APPENDIX B: Ordinance of the City of New Orleans Establishing the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council

ORDINANCE

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

CITY HALL \_\_\_\_\_

CALENDAR NO. \_\_\_\_\_

NO. \_\_\_\_\_ MAYOR COUNCIL SERIES \_\_\_\_\_

BY: COUNCILMEN MOREAU, CIACCIO, LAMBERT & SAPIR (BY REQUEST) \_\_\_\_\_

AN ORDINANCE to establish the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

WHEREAS, there are numerous public and private agencies involved in the City's criminal justice system;

WHEREAS, there is a need to coordinate the efforts of these separate agencies;

WHEREAS, the President's Crime Commission in 1967 recommended that every City have a single coordinating agency for the coordination of crime control activities;

WHEREAS, the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act requires that local criminal justice agencies develop coordinated plans and programs;

WHEREAS, the Justice Department and the State of Louisiana's Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Commission has awarded a grant to the City of New Orleans to establish such a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council; now, therefore

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SECTION 1. THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY</li> <li>2. OF NEW ORLEANS HEREBY ORDAINS, That there</li> <li>3. is hereby established in the Office</li> <li>4. of the Mayor, a Criminal Justice Co-</li> <li>5. ordinating Council, which shall co-</li> <li>6. ordinate crime control and criminal</li> <li>7. justice activities for the City.</li> <li>1. SECTION 2. That the Mayor shall</li> <li>2. serve as Chairman of the Criminal</li> <li>3. Justice Coordinating Council and</li> <li>4. shall designate such other officers</li> <li>5. as he deems appropriate, by and with</li> <li>6. the confirmation and approval of the</li> <li>7. City Council.</li> <li>1. SECTION 3. That the Mayor shall</li> <li>2. appoint a Director of the Criminal</li> <li>3. Justice Coordinating Council, who</li> <li>4. shall serve at the pleasure of the</li> <li>5. Mayor. Other members of the staff</li> <li>6. shall be appointed in the classified</li> <li>7. service of the City Civil Service.</li> <li>1. SECTION 4. That the duties of</li> <li>2. the Director shall include but not be</li> <li>3. limited to the following:</li> <li>4. (a) to confer with appropriate City,</li> <li>5. State, Federal, and private agencies</li> <li>6. concerned with the administration of</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. criminal justice for the purpose of</li> <li>8. improving crime control programs and</li> <li>9. policies;</li> <li>10. (b) to confer with appropriate City,</li> <li>11. State, Federal and private agencies for</li> <li>12. the purpose of securing funds for the</li> <li>13. support of the Criminal Justice Co-</li> <li>14. ordinating Council, and for initiating</li> <li>15. programs of crime control and criminal</li> <li>16. justice reform, and, on behalf of the</li> <li>17. City, to accept, and enter into con-</li> <li>18. tracts subject to approval of New</li> <li>19. Orleans City Council, for grants of</li> <li>20. Federal, State or other funds to the</li> <li>21. City for such purposes;</li> <li>22. (c) to advise the criminal justice</li> <li>23. agencies on improved policies and</li> <li>24. programs;</li> <li>25. (d) to conduct research, operate pro-</li> <li>26. grams, and conduct studies of crime</li> <li>27. control and criminal justice; and to</li> <li>28. contract, subject to the approval of</li> <li>29. the New Orleans City Council, with other</li> <li>30. public or private agencies and engage</li> <li>31. consultants for such research programs</li> </ol> |
|---|---|

32. and studies;
33. (e) to prepare and publish such reports
34. and sponsor such conferences as he deems
35. appropriate;
36. (f) to encourage joint activities among
37. the separate criminal justice agencies
38. and to represent the overall interest
39. and needs of the criminal justice system;
40. (g) to advise the Model Cities Director
41. and the local Model Cities Committees in
42. the coordination and implementation of
43. crime control and criminal justice pro-
44. grams in the Model Cities areas;
45. (h) to collect statistics and information
46. relative to the criminal justice agencies.

1. SECTION 5. That the membership of  
2. the Council shall be as follows:

3. (a) The membership of the Criminal Justice  
4. Coordinating Council shall include repre-  
5. sentatives from all public agencies sub-  
6. stantially involved in the criminal  
7. justice system; the two Councilmen-at-Large,  
8. and one district councilman to be selected  
9. by the New Orleans City Council.

10. (b) The Mayor shall appoint the members  
11. of the Criminal Justice Coordinating  
12. Council to serve for a one-year term, by and  
13. with the confirmation and approval of the  
14. City Council,  
15. except those members of the City Council  
16. who shall serve for their current term  
17. of office. The terms of the members first  
18. appointed, other than the City Councilmen,  
19. shall expire in May 1971 and then, if  
20. desired by the Mayor, to be reappointed  
21. for one year each May of the succeeding  
22. year.

23. (c) The Criminal Justice Coordinating

24. Council shall have no less than approxi-  
25. mately twenty members and no more than  
26. approximately thirty members.

27. (d) Approximately five members shall be  
28. private citizens.

29. (e) The members of the Council shall  
30. serve without compensation.

1. SECTION 6. That the Mayor shall ap-  
2. point an Executive Committee to be  
3. confirmed by the City Council of not  
4. more than ten members, three being councilmanic  
5. appointments as mentioned in Section 5,  
6. and the balance being selected from the  
7. general membership of the Coordinating  
8. Council which shall act on behalf of the  
9. Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.  
10. The Mayor shall serve as Chairman of  
11. the Executive Committee.

1. SECTION 7. That the Executive  
2. Committee: (a) is hereby designated to  
3. act as the coordinating agency for the  
4. City under the provisions of the Omnibus  
5. Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, and  
6. (b) shall have the power to review and  
7. approve all applications on behalf of  
8. the City for Federal, State, and local  
9. crime control and criminal justice funds.

1. SECTION 8. That all City agencies  
2. shall furnish the Director with such  
3. reports and information as he may deem  
4. necessary to carry out the functions  
5. and purposes of his office.

1. SECTION 9. That the Director shall  
2. submit an annual report to the Mayor,  
3. the City Council and members of the  
4. Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

1. SECTION 10. That this Ordinance be  
2. effective immediately.

The Criminal Justice Program of the National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors is funded by a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to assist local officials in the development of criminal justice policy and programs. During the past five years the staff has provided technical assistance, sponsored criminal justice training conferences, and developed a series of publications for local criminal justice officials. In addition, the staff provides on-site assistance and responds to information requests on criminal justice matters.

Additional publications of the NLC and USCM Criminal Justice staff include:

*Criminal Justice Planning: Five Alternative Structures*, November 1976, 22 pp., \$2.00.

*Proceedings of the National Conference on Women and Crime*, February 1976, 123 pp., \$5.00.

"Crime: Have We Lost Control? A Reassessment," special report reprinted from *Nation's Cities*, December 1975, 16 pp., \$1.00.

*Mayors' Action Report on the LEAA High Impact Program*, Fall 1975, 24 pp., \$1.00.

*NLC-USCM Task Force Report on Standards and Goals*, March 1975, 35 pp., \$2.00.

*A Workbook on Standards and Goals: The Police Function*, January 1975, 133 pp., \$5.00.

*State Municipal Leagues and Criminal Justice—Four Case Studies*, March 1975, 40 pp., \$2.00.

*Juvenile Justice in Metropolitan Nashville*, November 1974, 15 pp., \$2.00.

*New Directions in the Criminal Justice System*, June 1974, 16 pp., \$.25.

*Community Crime Prevention and the Local Official*, Winter 1974, 38 pp., \$2.00.

*Rape*, April 1974, 34 pp., \$2.00.

*Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: A Local Approach*, March 1974, 26 pp., \$2.00.

*Changing Police Organizations: Four Readings*, November 1973, 40 pp., \$2.00.

All publication requests should be mailed to the NLC/USCM Publications Center, 1620 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

**END**

