


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EVALUATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ON

OREGON'S CORRECTIONS IMPACT PROGRAM

BY

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PREFACE

In conducting a comprehensive evaluation of this magnitude, the cooperation of many organizations and individuals is necessary. Foremost among these, in this instance, is the Oregon Corrections Division, including its management, operational and Impact staff. Without that organization's enabling access to information, providing certain data, and accommodating logistical support, this evaluation would not have been possible.

The American Justice Institute (AJI) also wishes to recognize the participation of Drs. Clinton Goff and James Heuser of the Oregon Law Enforcement Council Evaluation Unit and Dr. Richard Laymon of LEAA's Region X for review and comment on the evaluation design and analysis of results. Finally, AJI is indebted to the Justice Data Accounting Center of the Oregon Law Enforcement Council for the use of outcome data to assess the performance of the offenders involved.

The cooperative attitude of each of the above as we sought to assess the value of the project's approach, procedures and results is truly appreciated.

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Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Table of Contents	i
List of Tables	iii
List of Appendix Tables	iii
1.0 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>	1
2.0 <u>OREGON CORRECTIONS IMPACT PROGRAM EVALUATION</u>	5
3.0 <u>EVALUATION APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS</u>	7
3.1 TYPES OF EVALUATION USED	7
3.2 EVALUATION LIMITATIONS	7
3.2.1 <u>Preclusion of Control or Comparison Groups</u>	7
3.2.2 <u>The Cluster Analysis Approach</u>	9
3.2.3 <u>The "Natural" Selection Approach to Group Formation</u>	9
3.2.4 <u>Establishing the Criterion Variable(s) and the Pre and Post Comparison Periods</u>	10
3.2.5 <u>Follow-up Limitations</u>	12
4.0 <u>DIAGNOSTIC CENTER EVALUATION RESULTS</u>	13
4.1 PROCESS MONITORING RESULTS	13
4.2 DIAGNOSTIC CENTER OUTCOME RESULTS	16
4.3 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE DIAGNOSTIC CENTER	17
5.0 <u>FIELD SERVICES (FS) PROJECT EVALUATION RESULTS</u>	22
5.1 GENERAL FIELD SERVICES FINDINGS	22
5.2 FIELD SERVICE MONITORING RESULTS	24
5.3 FIELD SERVICES OUTCOME RESULTS	25
5.3.1 <u>Results of Analyses of Success/Failure Data on Those Exiting From Probation and Parole</u>	25
5.3.2 <u>Results of Analysis of Arrest/Convictions Data for Equalized Periods-of-Time-at-Risk Before and During Program</u>	26

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
5.4 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE FIELD SERVICES PROJECT	29
6.0 <u>CLIENT RESOURCES AND SERVICES (CRS) PROJECT EVALUATION RESULTS</u>	36
6.1 GENERAL CRS RESULTS	36
6.2 CRS PROCESS OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE	38
6.3 CRS OUTCOME RESULTS	42
6.4 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE CLIENT RESOURCES AND SERVICES PROJECT	45
7.0 <u>IMPACT PROGRAM SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS</u>	47
7.1 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS	47
7.2 SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS	55
APPENDIX A - Table of Contents	
1.0 <u>SUMMARY OF DC FINDINGS</u>	65
1.1 DC PROCESS OBJECTIVE FINDINGS	65
1.2 DC REHABILITATION AND OUTCOME FINDINGS	66
2.0 <u>SUMMARY OF FS PROJECT FINDINGS</u>	67
2.1 FS PROCESS OBJECTIVE FINDINGS	68
2.2 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF SUCCESS/FAILURE DATA ON THOSE EXITING FROM PROBATION AND PAROLE	70
2.3 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF ARREST/CONVICTION DATA FOR EQUALIZED PERIODS AT RISK BEFORE AND DURING PROGRAM	72
2.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING OUTCOME (ARREST) DATA	74
3.0 <u>SUMMARY OF CRS PROJECT FINDINGS</u>	78
3.1 CRS PROCESS OBJECTIVE FINDINGS	78
3.2 CRS PROJECT EFFECTS UPON CLIENT RECIDIVISM	80
APPENDIX B - PROGRAM PROCESS OBJECTIVES	83

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
<u>List of Tables</u>	
Table 1 - Impact Program Expenditures, Oregon Division of Corrections as of March 31, 1976	2
Table 2 - CRS Services Summary First 17 Months of Program, November 1974 - March 1976	37
<u>List of Appendix Tables</u>	
Table B-1 Diagnostic Center Process Objectives	84
Table B-2 Field Services Process Objectives	85
Table B-3 Client Resources and Services Process Objectives	86

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The High Impact Anti-Crime Program was initiated by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in 1972 to pilot test the crime reducing power of concentrated spending on criminal justice programs. Each of eight medium sized cities was allocated \$20,000,000 in the hope that new methods and coordination across organizational boundaries (e.g., police, prosecuting attorneys, courts, corrections, welfare, employment) would prove effective in combating the most serious street crimes.<sup>1</sup>

To allow maximum dollar impact, the monies were to be spent on the highest criminal risk populations so as to reduce the incidence of murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary. The LEAA Impact Program was clear and the opportunity for innovation virtually unlimited. Local control over use of monies promised development of customized methods and models for each city.

As the primary thrust of its Impact effort, Portland invested half of its money in correctional programs; \$6.4 million were allocated to the Oregon Division of Corrections alone. Because of implementation delays, program changes, and a variety of other factors, actual dollar expenditures by the Oregon Division of Corrections reached only about half that amount by March 31, 1976, the end of the period covered by this evaluation report. The Impact program has continued since that date with portions ending September 30, 1976, and others scheduled to end December 31, 1976. The actual expenditures of the Oregon Division of Corrections' six separate projects, as of March 31, 1976, are summarized in Table 1. Together these projects were intended as a model system to facilitate continuity of

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<sup>1</sup>The eight participating cities were Portland (Oregon), Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, and St. Louis; however, Portland Impact expenditures were approximately \$18,000,000.

TABLE 1  
 Impact Program Expenditures  
 Oregon Division of Corrections  
 as of March 31, 1976

<u>Project</u>	<u>Expenditures</u> <sup>1</sup>
Client Diagnostic and Tracking Services (DC)	\$ 485,303
Training and Information (TI)	109,094
Transitional Services-VRD (TS)	305,552
Institutional Services (IS)	878,299
Client Resources and Services (CRS)	843,428
Field Services (FS)	<u>617,441</u>
TOTAL	\$3,239,117

case processing and optimization of service effectiveness across divisional boundaries. The heart of the program was to be rational case planning, monitoring, and decision-making based upon case counseling by objectives (CBO). From the point of presentence diagnosis (DC) to prison (IS) or probation/parole (FS), rational case planning was to draw upon extra and innovative services generated through the Client Resources and Services (CRS) and the Transitional Services-VRD (TS) projects. The Training and Information (TI) project was to provide staff skill development for innovative case handling. Client Tracking was to provide a basis for recording and monitoring program progress at the line level for management purposes. Evaluation, separate from divisional operations, was expected to use the same data collection forms and procedures (e.g. Counseling by Objectives) as those used for day-to-day operations.

This report presents a summary evaluation of the effects of program implementation as measured by achievement of process objectives and client recidivism. Because evaluation resources were not adequate to support examination of all six

<sup>1</sup>Includes some administrative overhead as well as project costs.

Divisional projects, analysis was restricted to the three projects thought to have the greatest impact on crime. These were the Diagnostic Center (DC) (excluding Tracking), Field Services (FS), and Client Resources and Services (CRS) projects which serve as the main test-ground for Impact as operated by the Division.

This report presents the main conclusions and recommendations for correctional system change developed by the American Justice Institute (AJI), the evaluators of the Oregon Corrections Impact Program, as gleaned from an evaluation of the three referenced projects. Both conclusions and recommendations are based on detailed evaluation findings presented in the five earlier reports<sup>1</sup>. Hopefully, this summary evaluation report concerning the Oregon Division of Corrections' Impact effort will provide some guidance to sound correctional planning and assessment by the Division, the State Planning Agency, the Legislature, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

With this purpose in mind this document first provides an overview of the program objectives (Section 2.0) followed by

<sup>1</sup>"Initial Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 1975.

"Agreement of Court Dispositions with recommendations by the Oregon Corrections Impact Diagnostic Center", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, April 1976.

"Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Field Services Project", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 1976.

"Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Diagnostic Center Project", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 1976.

"Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Client Resources and Services Project", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 1976.

a concise statement of the evaluation approach and limitations (Section 3.0). Next, major evaluation results are discussed in three sections pertaining to the Diagnostic Center (DC) Project (Section 4.0), the Field Services (FS) Project (Section 5.0), and the Client Resources and Services (CRS) Project (Section 6.0). In each of these three sections a summary discussion is presented on process objective monitoring and effectiveness (outcome) results obtained for each specific project.

The evaluator's recommendations constitute Section 7.0. After the recommendations (Section 7.0) follows Appendix A setting forth detailed findings pertaining to the Diagnostic Center (DC), Field Services (FS), and Client Resources and Services (CRS) projects. These findings are referenced by numbers in this document; e.g. Diagnostic Center Finding #1 is DCF-1, Field Services Finding #6 is FSF-6, and Client Resources and Service Finding #10 is CRSF-10. Appendix B presents, in table form, the complete process objective statements for the Diagnostic Center, Field Services, and Client Resources and Services projects.

This summary draws heavily on three detailed documents:

- (DC) "Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Diagnostic Center Project", Sacramento California, American Justice Institute, September 1976.
- (FS) "Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Field Services Project", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 1976.
- (CRS) "Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Client Resources and Services Project", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 1976.

Citations of these documents will be represented as indicated in the following example: DC:5.1:19-21

This citation refers to pages 19 thru 21 in Section 5.1 in the DC evaluation document, i.e. "Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Diagnostic Center Project".

Other citations and references will follow normal conventions.

## 2.0 OREGON CORRECTIONS IMPACT PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

In applying to LEAA for Impact program money the Oregon Division of Corrections sought to *reduce Impact target crimes*<sup>1</sup> by soliciting funds for:

- Development of case plans and recommendations for individual services to be administered.
- Resources with which to acquire or implement those planned or recommended services.

The six projects, named in the previous section, were initiated to achieve this overall goal and its two objectives by accomplishing the following subobjectives:

- The provision of client evaluations and presentence investigation reports (PSIs), with treatment recommendations, for the use of Oregon's Multnomah County Judges and correctional personnel involved with client. [The Diagnostic Center (DC) Project].
- Augmentation of many institutional programs for "high risk" offenders in three Oregon Penal institutions. [The Institutional Services (IS) project].
- Increasing the number of probation and parole counselors,

<sup>1</sup>Homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary.

along with providing Human Resource Assistants, to reduce to a ratio of 35:1 the caseloads of those working with Impact clients. [The Field Services (FS) project].

- Increasing the Vocational Rehabilitation Division programs available for target offenders. [Transitional Services (TS) project].
- Providing for purchase of all types of services, transportation, subsistence, implements, and incidentals to assist client adjustment. [Client Resources and Services (CRS) project].
- Providing client tracking information for management and project staff (tracking component of DC project).
- Supplementing traditional staff training resources with innovative subject matter focusing on alternative client treatment models and their attendant procedures. [Training and Information (TI) project].

From the above it can be seen that the main thrusts of the Impact program were the:

- Rationalization of the correctional treatment process via DC staff and correctional counselors planning with the clients to identify needs and treatment plans.
- Implementation of those treatment plans using the resources of the IS, FS, TS, TI, and CRS projects.

This meant that, for perhaps the first time, correctional counselors would have at their call almost any existing service thought to be helpful. Included but not limited thereto were: vocational education, job development and placement,

psychological services, medical services, and subsistence such as rent, transportation, clothing, food, utilities, and incidentals (tools, etc.)<sup>1</sup>. Caseloads were to be reduced to a rate of 35:1 to facilitate planning and implementation of the services. Training was to prepare staff to do planning and implementation.

### 3.0 EVALUATION APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS

#### 3.1 TYPES OF EVALUATION USED

Evaluation efforts were directed toward: a) monitoring the Oregon Division of Corrections Impact Program processes utilized to implement the program; and b) measuring the Impact Program's effectiveness in achieving the goal of reducing target offenses. The objectives of monitoring are to determine whether the project was carried out as proposed and to define what was implemented. The objective of measuring effectiveness is to determine whether the program made any difference, regardless of whether it was or was not implemented as planned.

During the first eight months, ending June 30, 1975, all six projects were monitored and an evaluation report submitted<sup>2</sup>. The second evaluation period (ending March 31, 1976) due to resource constraints, has been limited to three projects; namely Diagnostic Center, Field Services, and Client Resources and Services Projects

#### 3.2 EVALUATION LIMITATIONS

##### 3.2.1 Preclusion of Control or Comparison Groups

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration awarded the grant

<sup>1</sup>See Table 1, CRS:2.3:6, for a list of the \$527,426 in services provided by CRS project for a portion of the Impact period.

<sup>2</sup>See Johnson, Glenn, et al, "Initial Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program". Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 1975.

to the Oregon Division of Corrections on the assumption that an experimental evaluation design would be utilized. Oft times, in such a design, two equivalent groups are formed, then one group is given the experimental treatment exposure and the other, the control group, is not. Then the two groups are compared on the criterion variable - target offenses in this case - to see if there are significant differences in the behavior of the two groups. The Administrator of the Oregon Division of Corrections at that time was not willing to use an experimental design employing randomization implementation. Among the reasons supporting his position was the issue of the offender's right to treatment.

Without a control group it is not known whether changes in the experimental group are due to treatment effects or other uncontrolled variables. For example, reduction in crime may be due to general improvement in employment conditions, a long period of severe weather, or other factors extraneous to the experimental treatment. It is assumed that the uncontrolled variables will effect the control group similarly, thus, when comparing the differences in change between the control and experimental groups, there would be a method of accounting for the uncontrolled variables.

One way of forming the equivalent groups is through random selection; another is to match the groups on characteristics thought to impact crime - the criterion variable. A third approach is to control statistically those variables on which the two groups may differ. The statistic used is Analysis of Covariance, among other techniques.

During the first project year, AJI began tracking approximately 2700 offenders in the Portland Region; it was hoped that a comparison group roughly equivalent of the Impact (experimental) group could be isolated by matching the two groups on characteristics thought to be salient to the program. This did not

prove possible; basically, the groups were comparable only on the stratified variables and significantly different on others. In addition, it was found that normal probation and parole operations resulted in persons in the comparison group receiving many of the same services as the experimental (Impact) group, but from a different source. AJI discontinued tracking the non-Impact group at the end of the first evaluation year, confining its evaluation effort to the Impact clients.

### 3.2.2 The Cluster Analysis Approach

The next plan was to utilize cluster analysis to form the clients into similar, homogenous clusters based on like needs and characteristics and then form two groups within each cluster; those that needed services and received them and, the other group, those that needed the service, and did not receive them from any source. This appeared appropriate because Impact, as a program, distills mostly to the simple provision of heavily augmented services. This approach failed when the case planning process, to establish client needs, was not implemented as planned.<sup>1</sup>

### 3.2.3 The "Natural" Selection Approach to Group Formation

AJI finally accepted the posture that those receiving the services needed them; we could not accept the converse - those not receiving the services did not need them - but it may or may not thwart the analysis, depending on the outcome results. This meant that the groups were selected from the Impact clients by correctional counselors "ala natural", that is in the normal course of their every day work, to become the recipient of none, one, or a variety of services.

It should be emphasized that this "natural" selection process was also used to define the Impact population from which those eligible for services were selected. At the time the Impact program started in November 1974, there were under supervision on Probation and Parole a large number of "high risk" and target offenders eligible for selection into the Impact program.

<sup>1</sup>See FS:5.0:45 as well as the next section.

A subset of these was declared "Impact" early in the program (November and December 1974); some had been under supervision over two years at the time, others only one month. Others were declared "Impact" later in the Impact program, e.g. in September 1975, to become eligible for a certain service. Many were shown as being in Impact since the start - November 1974, if under supervision at that time. The definition of "Impact" clients also changed at least twice during the program.<sup>1</sup> Thus, it should be noted that the evaluators had no control over who was placed in the Impact group, except that in January 1976, AJI refused to accept any more persons in the study population which had a July 1975 cut-off date. As late as January 1976, some still were being back-dated to the period between November 1974 and July 1975. This means that treatment during the period in Impact program up to point of service initiation, is, for some clients, no different than the period before the Impact program as far as activity or service is concerned. Thus, when attempting to evaluate the effect of services, AJI measured the criterion variables during the period-at-risk after the initial date of service and compared behavior on the criterion variables with an equivalent period-at-risk before service, not start of Impact program. The start date of the period "in program" was accepted as declared (back-dated), not as of the date of declaration. The potential biases that may arise from this "natural" selection process severely limits any evaluation.

#### 3.2.4 Establishing the Criterion Variable(s) and the Pre and Post Comparison Periods

The goal is to reduce the commission of target offenses - homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary. In order to determine if there has been a reduction it is necessary to measure target offenses or the number of convictions for target

<sup>1</sup>See "Initial Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Division Impact Program", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 15, 1975, Appendix B, pp. 146-149.

offenses. AJI, for a number of reasons, chose arrests for its primary measure of target offenses<sup>1</sup>, although, in some instances, convictions for target offenses were evaluated.

Typically, in assessing the impact of correctional programs, measurement addresses the number or proportion of offenders who recommit crimes during a certain time frame during or after exposure to program. This was done in this Project.

Another approach is to measure the reduction in the number of offenses. This, too, was done. When attempting to measure the reduction in the number of offenses during or after exposure to program it is necessary for the baseline and the post treatment periods to be equivalent. With the natural selection processes described above and the normal entry and exiting of program created by the regular criminal justice processes, the Impact clients had different individual exposure histories during the baseline and post program entry periods.

To overcome this problem, AJI decided to equate, for each individual, periods-at-risk in the baseline period and the during program period. By holding equivalent the periods-at-risk for each individual it enabled comparison of the number of arrests for offenses of interest in the baseline period with the during or after program period. The term "period-at-risk" means a period of time during which the individual is in the community in a position to commit and be arrested for a crime. All periods of confinement are deducted from the calculation. The period-at-risk during program determined the length of period-at-risk before program. The Impact study population intake period was from November 1974 to June 30, 1975, allowing for a minimum follow up period of nine months through March 31, 1976. Thus, the period-at-risk during or after program was a maximum

<sup>1</sup>FS;4.2: 27-35

of seventeen months. No one was followed after March 31, 1976, or after exiting the Impact program for any reason (violation, discharge, expiration), whichever occurred the earliest.

On the assumption that a service cannot expect to impinge upon arrest history before the service takes place the during program "period-at-risk" for each service started with the date the services started. Similarly, the baseline, or before period, ended on the same date. Again, the equal "at risk" periods were calculated for each individual; thus, each client had individual "at risk" periods for each different service or program received and for the Impact program.

#### 3.2.5 Follow-up Limitations

The period of follow up of the arrest histories of the Impact clients is necessarily short, particularly for some of the services received. This factor limits the value of the evaluation; a more extensive follow up period would be better. Oft times there is less than a year in the period-at-risk during program.

Most correctional research shows that initial differences found between special project clients and comparisons tend to disappear over time (within five years). Conclusions contained herein are based on case studies ranging from one to 17 months; the average Impact client has been at risk in the community for only a small portion (354 days)<sup>1</sup> of those five years by the end of the analysis period (March 31, 1976). Again, caution is necessary.

In summary, the evaluation results presented here concerning impact on arrests must be tempered with the knowledge that it is suggestive, that more rigorous evaluation approaches, (not permitted here) might show different or stronger results. Having discussed the evaluation approach, the criterion

<sup>1</sup>Table A-48, FS: APPENDIX:170

variables, and limitations and evaluations, we now turn to the three projects of concern - DC, FS, and CRS - to summarize the evaluation findings related to each.

#### 4.0 DIAGNOSTIC CENTER EVALUATION RESULTS

##### 4.1 PROCESS MONITORING RESULTS

The thirteen evaluation findings relative to the DC are set forth in Appendix A<sup>1</sup>. The first five could be considered to pertain to process objectives while the latter eight relate to outcome<sup>2</sup>. Therein one can see that the DC prepared presentence reports on 491 or 98% of the cases referred for such service which more than met the proposal objective of 90% (DCF-1). What is not known is why the courts did not refer to the Diagnostic Center the 57 cases which found their way in Impact probation supervision without presentence during the period November 1974 through June 30, 1975, as well as an unknown number of target offenders that entered non-Impact probation or the Oregon penal institutions, also without DC referrals. The DC was fairly timely in its response to requests for presentence investigations, 66% were completed within the required 15 working days (DCF-2)<sup>3</sup>. Several of the late reports were late for reasons beyond the control of the DC but a substantial thirty-four percent (165) exceeded the time allowed by the process objective.

In the future, this arbitrary objective of 15 working days for PSI production should be changed. A system of priorities

<sup>1</sup>Pages 65-67

<sup>2</sup>A complete statement of the Process Objectives appears in Appendix B.

<sup>3</sup>During the last five project months examined 76% were completed within 15 working days.

for completion of reports should be developed which takes cognizance of the overall justice system and offender needs. For example, the highest priority for earliest completion of PSI should go to those in jail (in contrast to those on bail or released on own recognizance [OR]), or to those serious offenders on bail who represent greatest risk to the community. This would lead to reduction in jail costs by shortening the time in jail awaiting sentence. Since the majority of those in presentence jail detention are not sentenced to confinement, a shorter presentence jail period also is desirable because it is less disruptive to family, employment and other aspects of civil life which must be reestablished upon release. The less these community ties are disrupted, the greater the chance of successful social reintegration.

One primary DC function is to recommend correctional actions to be implemented via court and/or correctional worker. One DC process objective was that 90% of the DC recommendations for treatment plans be implemented within 30 working days. Only 71% of 103 clients<sup>1</sup> had at least one of the recommendations implemented or continued (DCF-3) at all any time during the program. At most, 40% (41) had plans initiated within 30 days after FS intake (not 30 days after court order). One might conclude that this should be a measure of FS activities not DC recommendations. This may be true, in part. There are many reasons why plan initiation may not take place: 1) the Diagnostic Center recommendations may suggest activities or treatment not existent in the community or beyond the capabilities of FS staff to implement; 2) there may be too many needing the service - overloading available resources; 3) the client may not want to participate in the plan; 4) the FS staff disagrees with the recommendation, or 5) FS staff fails to overcome the inertia to act. Table 5 in the Field Services

<sup>1</sup>149 entered on probation after going through DC but only 103 had specific case recommendations; 104 of 212 recommendations were initiated, many quite late in the period of supervision.

evaluation report<sup>1</sup> reveals a wide variation in the degree to which various types of service recommendations were implemented - alcohol treatment being the most frequent (75%) and medical dental treatment the least (30%).

Further evidence of field staff failure to follow Diagnostic Center (DC) recommendations is apparent with respect to psychological treatment. Over half of the recommendations had not been implemented (30 of 54)<sup>2</sup>; yet, less than half of the psychological monthly hours (7 of 20) available through the DC staff were being utilized (DCF-4).

During the project operations, it was discovered there were two groups, roughly equivalent in size, entering probation supervision. One group had gone through the DC, the other (the DC By-Pass group) had not. They were tested for comparability on the criterion variable (arrests) and period-at-risk prior to Impact. They were found not to be significantly different. Therefore, a number of comparisons were made using analysis of variance and covariance.

When comparing these two comparable Impact groups, no significant difference was found in intensity of services rendered or obtained by FS staff for those that had passed through the DC in contrast to those who had bypassed the DC (DCF-5). One possible explanation is that treatment staffs are equally sensitive/insensitive to treatment requirements with and without the information presented in the DC version of a PSI. Under this hypothesis, it would be assumed that either information and judgments provided by the DC go largely unappreciated by probation staffs, or Counselors are simply able to reach the same conclusions (treatment need assessment and plan development) without the receipt of a DC PSI.

<sup>1</sup>FS:5.2:49

<sup>2</sup>Ibid

With ample dollar support from CRS, the recommendations should have been achievable to a high degree. The failure to implement diagnostic center type of recommendations is not uncommon in other correctional settings. In California, AJI has observed institutional staff ignoring guidance center recommendations. Results showing ineffective FS staff implementation of DC recommendations lead one to question the advisability of continuing the DC for the purpose of making recommendations for correctional staff implementation without steps to insure staff action. This may be even more apparent if the court ordered treatment plans were eliminated from those counted as initiated by field staff.

#### 4.2 DIAGNOSTIC CENTER OUTCOME RESULTS

When comparing the DC and DC By-Pass groups, analyses reveal no significant main effect differences between the two groups during program with respect to target (DCF-8) or non-target arrests (DCF-9), even when the levels of intensity of service or levels of subsistence<sup>1</sup> were different (DCF-10, DCF-11). Although there were no differences in the number of non-target arrests at the lower levels of service intensity, there was a significant difference as the level of intensity increased. There were significantly fewer non-target offenses for the DC group receiving higher intensity of services (DCF-7). In other words, at the higher level of service intensity, the group that had gone through the DC had significantly fewer non-target offenses. This was not true for the DC By-Pass group. This was probably due to client selection. Nearly half of those DC clients placed on probation by June 30, 1975, never entered Impact Field Services or were held out too long to be included in the study population.

Some investigators approach measurement of program effectiveness (outcome) in terms of proportions of clients repeating offenses

<sup>1</sup>(Rent, bus fare, etc.)

rather than total number of offenses committed. Consequently, the reduction in the proportions of Impact clients committing offenses in the DC and DC By-Pass groups before and during program were determined. There were no significant differences between the DC and DC By-Pass groups in the reduction of the proportion of clients committing target or non-target offenses during the Impact program (DCF-12, DCF-13).

#### 4.3 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE DIAGNOSTIC CENTER

The purpose of the Diagnostic Center is twofold. First, it is intended, via presentence investigations (PSIs), to provide information and recommendations to aid the courts in making dispositions regarding clients awaiting sentence. Second, the PSIs are to give direction to correctional processing after sentencing to enhance long term community protection through delivery of rehabilitation services. Corollary to the latter, the DC also provides, upon correctional counselor request, psychological services for clients. Diagnostic Center Conclusions (DCC's) presented below draw upon findings presented in two earlier reports<sup>1</sup>, and the foregoing discussion.

DCC-1      The DC, to a large extent, achieved its major purpose of providing timely presentence information and recommendations to the courts; however, due to the questionable value and the excessive costs of DC PSIs and limited utilization of DC recommendations, continuance of the DC under present conditions is not justified.

<sup>1</sup>"Agreement of Court Dispositions With Recommendations By The Oregon Corrections Diagnostic Center", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 1976.

"Evaluation Report On Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Diagnostic Center Project", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 1976.

The major contribution expected of the DC was the provision of presentence reports - timely and with case plans. To a large extent, this has occurred<sup>1</sup>. A previous report has established the partial utility of the DC PSIs to the courts although the latter only followed the DC recommendations 1% to 29% of the time on any specific type of treatment recommendation<sup>2</sup>. Some argue that the courts did not use DC as an effective aid to select between prison and probation. Certainly those placed on probation without DC processing (the DC By-Pass group) did as well on probation as those in the DC group. Ignoring selection factors influencing the referrals to the DC one could accept that argument. It also is supported by other decision-making studies that conclude dispositions in various stages of criminal cases are made on very few pieces of data of the type normally available in a Release-on-Own-Recognizance hearing.

Without doubt, there is a need to provide the courts adequate information for sentencing. There are questions as to: who should provide what information at what cost, and how soon after adjudication of guilt? The information traditionally has been furnished by the probation staff. In Oregon, it is reported, it has taken probation staff six to twelve weeks to prepare the PSI, if it has been done at all, and, even, then, the PSI may not have a case plan. It was outside the evaluator's charter to examine comparatively the quality of PSIs prepared by the probation staff and the DC. Neither was it the evaluator's charge to do a cost-benefit analysis.

<sup>1</sup>66% of PSIs were timely; 69% of those placed on probation had recommendations.

<sup>2</sup>"Agreement of Court Dispositions With Recommendations by the Oregon Corrections Impact Diagnostic Center", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, April 1976, p.57.

Nevertheless, some glaring facts became apparent. It is reported<sup>1</sup> a PSI completed by probation staff costs \$271; it is estimated that the cost of each DC PSI approximates \$727.<sup>2</sup> Such a cost differential, to be continued, must be justified by added community protection derived from DC PSI reports. Such benefits are not apparent at this time. Part of the cost differential is due to the fact ten professionals working in the DC produce approximately 27.5 PSIs a month. They appear to be underutilized, although with 34% of the PSIs taking longer than 15 working days, it is questionable whether many more PSIs could have been produced with reasonable speed. DC PSIs include psychological examinations and extensive testing which do not occur in regular probation staff investigations. The need for these extra examinations on a regular basis is not recognized in the large majority of cases.<sup>3</sup> If the court or probation staff can recognize the need, the referral to psychological resources in the community should take place on an as needed, not a routine, basis. The psychological services should be a community resource to which corrections could turn, not an in-house resource.

<sup>1</sup>"Governor Task Force on Corrections: Master Plan For Oregon Corrections System: Preliminary draft", August 13, 1976, p.2.

<sup>2</sup>DC costs have been averaging about \$20,000 per month exclusive of tracking; with PSIs averaging 27.5 per month, each costs about \$727. This could be compared to \$138 estimated as an average cost of a long presentence investigation in a rural setting in draft report by Donald J. Thalheimer in "Cost Analysis of Correctional Standards relating to Community Based Supervision: Probation, Community Service and Restitution", Washington, D. C. ABA, April 1976.

<sup>3</sup>DC recommended psychological treatment in 52% of cases going to probation, (Table 5, FS:5.2:49). Field staff initiated less than half of those services recommended (44%) while the courts ordered services in less than half of cases recommended (op cit. "Agreement of Court Dispositions...", p.57.)

The significance of the \$456 difference in PSI costs is striking when one considers that the average cost of probation supervision in Oregon at \$1.59 per day is \$580 per year<sup>1</sup> and that the average cost per recipient of CRS support was \$449.<sup>2</sup> The potential savings from less expensive PSIs (than DC PSIs) could pay a larger portion of the cost of more PSIs, augmented supervision, or resource support, if deemed desirable.

The critical test for the PSI is whether it assists the court to avoid mistakes in sentencing. The test is whether: (1) the court sends to prison those needing to be there for the protection of the public and does not send those that do not require prison to protect the public, or, (2) the converse, the court releases to the community those that will not harm the public, not those that will harm the public. Unfortunately, we only become cognizant of those released that later commit offenses. We seldom know of those that are committed to prison but need not be so committed to protect the public. The test of agreement between court dispositions and DC recommendations is meaningless unless we know the degree of agreement between the recommendations of the DC and the behavior of the client (arrests) while in the community. If the DC is continued, this should be the subject of future research following up those receiving DC recommendations pro and con, concerning probation. Even if the DC PSI recommendations could be shown to be 100% correct, they would be of little value unless the courts followed them. The problem remaining would be the acceptance of decision criteria by those accustomed to unbridled freedom to choose any alternative, within the broad limits of the law, in accordance with their own dictates.

DCC-2      With respect to adding to the effectiveness of the correctional process the value of the DC is highly questionable. There is no evidence

<sup>1</sup>Oregon Division of Correction estimate

<sup>2</sup>Table 1, FS:2.3:5

that DC Processing effects later client arrests or client servicing during probation.

Clients passing through the DC do not receive more services than do those not passing through the DC (DCF-5). Neither do Impact probationers going through the DC have greater reductions in target or non-target crimes than those not going through the DC (DCF-8, DCF-9). This may be due to the fact that: (1) the DC has failed to diagnose or to recommend actions that can be implemented or that bring about differences, (2) that the DC recommendations have been appropriate but they have not been implemented, or (3) both, in various degrees. For whatever reason, the Diagnostic Center Operations until now have neither had an effect on outcome, in terms of reducing client arrests during program, nor on the amount of correctional services.

Effectiveness of the DC was hampered by:

- correctional counselors, like the courts, failing to initiate about half the DC recommendations (in addition, initiation did not always mean complete implementation.)
- underutilization of the DC resource because field staff did not refer cases with diagnosed psychological needs; DC staff expended time available on non-FS clients, mainly determining client eligibility for VRD services under the Transitional Services project.

As long as correctional counselors choose largely to ignore or reject DC treatment recommendations, it does not appear wise to expend an additional \$456 (\$727-271) per case to attain those recommendations.

## 5.0 FIELD SERVICES (FS) PROJECT EVALUATION RESULTS

### 5.1 GENERAL FIELD SERVICES FINDINGS

The Field Services project was, in many ways, expected to be the catalytic delivery system for much of the Impact program. For the hundreds on probation and parole without DC processing, FS staff were to develop the case plans. Case plans consist of documented, measurable objectives, related to client specific crime causation, followed by a specified plan of action for meeting the specified objectives. Plans need to be documented because one counselor cannot remember 45 detailed case plans, each with multiple objectives and actions timed to meet them. In addition, plans must be documented to insure continuity in caseworker turnover and to provide a base for casework supervision and follow up.

Through referrals, or otherwise, FS staff were expected to initiate or implement the treatment/training plans recommended by the DC, ordered by the court, or evolving from their own case planning efforts. They were to monitor and supervise clients to help resolve problems and insure non-violation compliance. In order to achieve these subobjectives more effectively, the project was designed to augment field staff to reduce caseloads.

During the period covered by this report, November 1, 1974 through March 31, 1976, the FS project included up to 547 clients per month, and a total of 731 different clients. There was no attempt to restrict the number of clients entering the Impact program although "bad risk" and "good risk" were initially excluded on undocumented criteria.<sup>1</sup>

Measured from the midpoint of the Project, average caseload size for Impact staff remained near 42:1, above the 35:1 project goal. Impact clients supervised by non-Impact staff overflowed into caseloads averaging 65:1. Lesser difference in

size was observed comparing Impact and non-Impact parole caseloads (46:1 versus 57:1, respectively) than when comparing Impact and non-Impact probation caseloads (41:1 versus 69:1 respectively). As indicated, Impact clients overflowing the caseloads manned by Impact staff were placed in the larger regular caseloads staffed by non-Impact staff. Sometimes they were already there and declared Impact late in the program in order to receive Impact CRS services. These oversize caseloads resulted not only from the excessive number of clients but also from the failure to provide the prescribed number of General Fund counselors for Impact until January, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

Although the general reduction in caseload size to a goal of 35:1 was not attained because the Division of Corrections did not restrict Impact intake, the Division did achieve a considerable change in its operations in a comparatively short time. One should recognize that thirty-seven percent of the Portland Region clients were involved in the Impact program.

There is evidence that the Impact augmentation of staff is associated with substantial increases in services delivered to clients. For a sample of 74 clients, counselor contacts with clients, their families, and collateral contacts averaged 26.1 per year before Impact and 36.9 per year after project intake. Measuring intensity of services in terms of days of client enrollment in special treatment/training programs per year of probation or parole supervision, the rate of client involvement in special services grew by 393% (from 84.4 to 331.8 days enrollment per year of supervision.) The latter is related to the Client Resources and Services project as well as the Field Services project. The availability of FS staff to provide contacts and arrange for services was not only due to the additional Impact Field Staff but also their augmentation by DC staff which

<sup>1</sup>The project proposal called for 9 Impact funded correctional counselors, plus 6 General Fund positions.

<sup>1</sup>See FS:5.3:60-64

reduced the Field Staff time spent in PSI preparation. One should note that, in general, the improved delivery of services quantitatively was accomplished in the face of the fact that Impact counselors qualitatively tended to be newer and less experienced than the pre-Impact correctional counselors who tended to stay with the regular caseloads for tenure reasons.

Having covered a few general items, consideration now turns to the specific FS objectives of the proposal, starting with the FS Process Objectives.

## 5.2 FIELD SERVICE MONITORING RESULTS

AJI has set forth, in summary format, 54 field service findings (FSFs) pertaining to the evaluation of the Field Service project.<sup>1</sup> The first thirteen (13) of these findings pertain to the Field Service Process objectives set forth in the proposal funded by LEAA. The achievement of process objectives was considered necessary as a preliminary step toward the crime reduction goals of the project.

Nine of the thirteen process objectives were not successfully achieved. Six of these nine objectives were related to case planning. Since case plans identifying client problems and treatment plans were seldom achieved and rarely within thirty working days after referral (FSF-1), it was not possible to: initiate 90% of the plans within thirty working days of referral (FSF-2); initiate 60% of the specified activities within specified time frames (FSF-3); increase, by 50%, the number of recommended placements that were accepted (FSF-5); increase the resolution of family conflicts by 10% (FSF-9); or reduce by 10% the individuals' money management problems (FSF-10).

The other three process objectives not achieved pertained to employment. There is no evidence that the rate of client unemployment was reduced at all, let alone by the 40% required in process

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix A, pp. 68-77

objective six (FSF-6). Neither were the lengths of periods of unemployment reduced (FSF-7). Similarly, there is no evidence that the per capita earnings of clients were increased (FSF-8). There was evidence that the project did effectively identify and enroll clients needing employment services but it appears that the long delays in providing these services provided little opportunity for the effort to influence the measures utilized to evaluate performance on these related objectives. It is difficult to influence rates based on a 12 month performance if job development is slowed or hampered by the fact contracts are not completed in the first six months for whatever reason.

Four process objectives were considered to have been achieved. Since 71% (more than the 60% required) of the Diagnostic Center-recommended treatment/training plans (i.e., at least one recommendation) were initiated, it was concluded that not more than 40% had to be changed. Thus, Process Objective 4 was considered achieved (FSF-4). Twenty-nine percent (29%) of clients violating probation and parole absconded; thus, Process Objective 11, requiring no more than 30% absconders, was successfully attained (FSF-11). The observed reduction of 27% in target offender convictions between the Before and During Program equalized at risk periods was concluded to satisfy Process Objective 12 requirements of 10% reduction in target conviction (FSF-12). The reduction in length of time under supervision for clients receiving early release from probation and parole met Process Objective 13 expectations (FSF-13). The average length of supervision was reduced from 3.06 years (1118 days) to 2.27 years (827 days). Average length of supervision of those failing on probation and parole was not effected by Impact services. Although this reduction may be due to program effects, it could occur as a result of administrative policy as much as anything else.

## 5.3 FIELD SERVICES OUTCOME RESULTS

### 5.3.1 Results of Analyses of Success/Failure Data on Those Exiting From Probation and Parole

Using clients exiting from probation and parole in the Portland

Region, project results were examined based on statistics maintained by the Division. In summary, data show that regular, non-Impact probation clients did better (had fewer failure cases and more successes) than non-Impact parole, Impact probation, or Impact parole (FSF-15). However, both Impact and non-Impact parole did as well as Impact probation (FSF-16, FSF-17, FSF-18). The similarity between non-Impact parole and Impact parole could be explained by similarity of policy within the Division; however, similarity of parole and Impact probation strongly indicates that parolees may have been handled in the community as probationers at less cost and no greater risk. Moreover, these data suggest that supervision should distinguish more between clients than legal status. That is, perhaps the more serious offenders should be treated as a group separately from the least serious offenders, regardless of whether on probation or parole. If so, this has implications for the organization structure of the Corrections Division.

There were no significant differences among Impact and non-Impact clients, non-Impact probationers and Impact probationers, non-Impact parolees and Impact parolees, or Impact probationers and Impact parolees with respect to Early Release vs. Expiration of Jurisdiction (FSF-19, FSF-20, FSF-21). This probably stems from policy more than client characteristics.

### 5.3.2 Results of Analysis of Arrest/Convictions Data for Equalized Periods-of-Time-at-Risk Before and During Program

Using arrest and conviction records maintained by the Oregon State Police; connections between project aspects and client recidivism are summarized next.

Looking at the numbers of arrests and convictions for the study group of 465 clients during two equal periods-of-time-at-risk before and during Impact, State Police Records show that arrests for target arrests were reduced 55% and target convictions reduced 27%.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Table 9, FS:5.5:67

Tested in terms of numbers of clients arrested and/or convicted, similarly strong program effects are indicated. Thus, the number arrested for target crimes decreased 37% where the number of clients arrested for non-target crimes fell 49%.<sup>1</sup> In terms of convictions, non-target offense convictions dropped 57%; there was no significant change for target crime convictions.<sup>2</sup> There is a temptation to claim great success for the program based on these data but it must be remembered that the reduction in arrests may have been due to factors other than the Impact program, e.g., court processing, routine correctional supervision, etc. There was no control group with which to compare arrest and conviction rates. One should ponder why there was no significant reduction in convictions for target offenses, a major project goal. Analysis of Tables 15, 16 and 17<sup>3</sup> show that a substantial increase in target convictions for Impact probationers offset a statistically significant reduction for Impact parolees.

Generally, in terms of arrests, there were no significant reductions in the proportion of the parolees arrested for non-target arrests (FSF-25) but a significant reduction for target arrests (FSF-24). The number of probationers arrested for target and non-target arrests were significantly reduced (FSF-24, FSF-25). With respect to convictions, the number of probationers convicted for target offenses was not reduced (FSF-28); there were significant reductions in parolees convicted for target offenses (FSF-28) as well as significant reduction in the proportion of parolees and probationers convicted for non-target offenses (FSF-27).

Some, knowing maturation often leads to less crime, will question if the increased maturation of Impact clients did not contribute

<sup>1</sup>Table 15, FS:6.2.2:84

<sup>2</sup>IBID

<sup>3</sup>IBID, pages 84-87

to the result. Separate tests found there was no significant association between client age and arrest rates for target or non-target offenses (FSF-29) or between length of supervision and target or non-target arrest rates (FSF-30). Moreover, no differences in these dimensions were found comparing probation with parole.

The observed reduction in arrests and convictions occurred amongst those receiving services. The 111 clients receiving no services showed no significant change in the numbers of clients arrested before and during impact; the reduction observed was concentrated among the 354 clients receiving special services (FSF-31, FSF-32). These findings do not mean that increased enrollment (of the 111) would have paid off. Instead, client selection for service by "cause" the apparent connection between services and outcome.

Simply providing services does not assure success. Reduction in target arrests were not generally found for those enrolling in Educational/Vocational/Job Placement, Job Counseling, Psychological Counseling, or Residential Care Programs (FSF-33). Nor did drug related services have significant effects upon target or non-target arrest rates (FSF-37). Rather, success in reduction of arrests was related to finishing job related programs (FSF-46, FSF-49) and staying in personality oriented programs (FSF-47, FSF-48, FSF-52). Sometimes mere enrollment in a program is connected with the reduction of non-target arrests but not target arrests (FSF-33, FSF-35).

There is some evidence that target offenses are reduced significantly when a client is enrolled in two programs, but not when in more than two (FSF-40). When several problems exist, services appear ineffective. This is related to a similar finding that as the intensity of service is increased, there is no significant relationship to reduction in target arrests (FSF-41, FSF-43). More intensive services appear to impact non-target arrests (FSF-42). These findings mean that the more intensive (longer duration and/or multiple programs) go to those with the most

stubborn problems. This has major implications for correctional programs, e.g., put limited resources where they pay off -- not just where the need is.

#### 5.4 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE FIELD SERVICES PROJECT

The reader will recall that the overall Impact goal of the Oregon Division of Corrections was to reduce Impact target crime by (1) developing case plans specifying case objectives and recommendations for related services for clients, (2) employment of resources and services to acquire or implement those planned or recommended services, and (3) progress monitoring to allow timely plan/service modifications where needed. In view of the findings in the foregoing two sections, what Field Service Conclusions (FSCs) are possible about the Field Services project and its contribution to the attainment of Impact goals with respect to these Impact subobjectives? Several major conclusions are apparent. The first is:

FSC-1      The development and use of case plans, the foundation of the Impact program as proposed, in essence did not occur in the Field Services project.

The process to achieve this objective was Counseling by Objectives (CBO). Widespread utilization of CBO never occurred. This was a major program implementation deficiency. To be true, at the insistence of the evaluation team, a large number of plans were generated after the fact, i.e., plans were retroactively reconstructed several months after the client entered the Impact program or was declared an Impact case. The plans were not developed with the clients and then proactively pursued. The project start up process of ingesting into the Impact program several hundred clients already under supervision contributed to this problem. The Oregon Division of Corrections' attitude has been, to a large extent, to treat the Impact program as supplementary to its on-going programs; it has not been considered an innovative program,

the integrity of which was to be maintained to enable assessment of its effectiveness. Thus, there seemed to be little commitment to digress from normal operations which did not include CBO implementation.

FSC-2 Services rendered clients, although substantially increased through the Impact program, were too frequently too little and too late.

Half of the treatment recommendations for DC clients entering Impact probation were never initiated. One can conclude that, in the absence of treatment plans for probationers and parolees under field service supervision, many other undiagnosed needs were not met. In addition, those services rendered were delivered tardily much of the time, due to slow field services intake from the courts or lagging implementation of recommended essential services, e.g., employment placements.

FSC-3 Subject to the stated evaluation limitations, it appears that the benefits derived do not justify the costs of the Field Services and the Client Resources and Services projects as they are now operated.

Recognizing that any outcome conclusion is subject to the limitations of short term follow-up and potential natural selection biases, the data indicate there were significant reductions between the Before and During program periods-at-risk in: (1) the number of probationers arrested for target crimes (3.5% or 20) and non-target crimes (19.8% or 61); (2) the number of parolees (8.9% or 14) arrested for target crimes; (3) the number of parolees convicted for target crimes (7.6% or 12) and for non-target crimes (9.6% or 15). (There was an insignificant reduction in (1) parolees arrested for non-target crimes and (2) probationers convicted for target offenses).

A rough calculation of the cost benefit trade off of the reduction of 122 persons (arrests and convictions) against the total

expenditures of \$1,065,753<sup>1</sup> for Field Services and Client Resources and Services (both by March 31, 1976) quickly lead to the conclusion that the programs, as now operated, are not cost-effective.

Assume for the moment that every one of the 122 arrestees (90) and convictees (32) were sent to the Oregon State Penitentiary at a cost of \$20.09<sup>2</sup> per day, \$7,333 per year. At a total of \$894,626 per year, the 122 would have to serve nearly 1.19 years in order to use up the program costs. This ignores many indirect cost savings such as victim losses, the costs of criminal justice prosecution and defense and welfare payments to support families, but it also ignores the considerable shrinkage between arrests and convictions and the fact many non-target arrests are not felonies punishable by prison sentence. This quick calculation should serve to show that these specific Impact programs need considerable improvement to justify continuance as crime reducers. Although statistically significant reductions in arrests and convictions were obtained, they are not practically significant.

FSC-4 Program services decision criteria need to be specified and implemented to increase the impact of service dollars on crime reduction; analysis of outcome results confirm the original proposal notion that case analysis and service recommendations are prerequisite to success. Reduced caseload size, plus easy access to purchased services were not enough.

Clients receiving special services showed significantly reduced arrests (target and non-target); however, such reductions were

<sup>1</sup>\$617,441 for Field Services plus \$448,312 of CRS funds (85%) devoted to the field. (An underestimate of total costs since about 20% of Impact clients were supervised by non-Impact staff with no FS costs required.)

<sup>2</sup>According to the Oregon Corrections Division, daily costs per client budgeted for this biennium averaged \$20.09 for the Oregon State Prison and \$25.54 for the Oregon State Correctional Institutions; statewide (not specifically Impact) probation/parole cost equals \$1.59 per client day.

not found among clients without special programs (FSF-39). (There may have been some biasing factor entering into the non-selection of certain clients for services, but none is known). It takes more than simply finding a need and filling it to be successful. When considering individual programs/services often there was no significant reduction in arrests amongst all those enrolled (FSF-32, FSF-33, FSF-34, FSF-36, FSF-37). On the other hand, when considering subgroups within those enrolled, e.g., those completing, staying in program, receiving the greatest intensity, significant reductions are obtained.

When clients provided job placements through purchase of service stayed on the job 60 days, such services were connected with reduced crime, but 67% of those so placed were fired, quit, or laid off in less than 60 days. Similarly, personality related services (psychological, drug/alcohol, residential care) were shown effective only for those remaining in the program.<sup>1</sup> If criteria could be developed so that services are purchased according to ability to finish or remain in a program, not solely on a basis of need as appears to have been the practice of FS counselors, cost-effectiveness of providing correctional programs should improve. This does not always mean that services go to the most needy. Impact data indicate that those with multiple problems are most likely to recidivate. In times of limited resources, the first to receive the services should be those with the best chance of success to improve community protection.

Another implication from the FS findings is that for certain services (e.g., alcohol/drug programs), the one-shot assistance or short term efforts, current policy in some correctional settings, will in all likelihood end in failure. Long term participation is indicated. Like Alcoholics Anonymous programs, continuous, never ending help may be needed. Some way must be found to provide cost-effective services over the long haul.

Decisions regarding which Impact clients are to receive which services have been left almost entirely to correctional counselors. No decision guidelines have been developed; even the requirement for a treatment plan, imposed by CRS management, was abandoned during the project.

Prior work has shown that correctional efforts affect different clients differently. Impact data reaffirm that fact. The relationship of those differences to program performance and the relationship of program performance to reduction in crime must be sought diligently. Included therein are the relationships between the variety and number of programs/services undertaken and the reduction in crime.

FSC-5 One reason the Impact Field Services Project failed to achieve its full potential was the lack of proper management and planning.

At the outset the proposal, based on inadequate information, did not provide sufficient staff to achieve the stated reduced case-work goals of 35:1. Management aggravated the situation by not providing the additional matching staff until January, 1976. In addition, the woefully inadequate provision for tracking support and information handicapped the entire program by not providing information to hold Field Services managers accountable for inadequate performance. Counselors were not held responsible for CBO planning or fulfillment of treatment recommendations. In addition, great lags between time of sentencing (up to 76 days with 39 cases taking from 1 to 15 weeks) and time of Field Services intake dampened the opportunities for FS counselors to intervene at the critical time, just after sentencing, to introduce changes. Similarly, even after FS intake, it took, on the average, 34.5 working days to initiate treatment. In some cases, important services, such as job finding, were not implemented for months. Such delays waste the motivational impact of the court experiences and new supervision relationships.

<sup>1</sup>Table A-35, FS:APPENDIX:157 -32-

The poor Impact administrative structure, with Impact management outside of line operations, thwarted project objectives being achieved. When Impact objectives were not met, line managers, not subject to the Impact manager, had the real authority to insure project objectives were achieved. Lack of management coordination, responsibility, and/or interest left many available resources underutilized while client treatment needs went undiagnosed or unmet. For example, a maximum of 7 of 20 monthly hours of DC time available for probation and parole client consultation was used; yet, half of the DC clients entering Impact probation with recommendations for psychological services never received such treatment. CRS monies were abundant; yet, nearly half of all DC recommendations went unaddressed. Field Services policies and procedures did not provide management adequate information to know these difficulties were occurring.

These results may also stem from the fact that in the Oregon Correctional culture, the correctional counselor appears almost an autonomous agent except in crisis situations. Different correctional counselors approach their work with different philosophies resulting in different behavioral interactions with clients. They appear to have the power to accept or reject the DC recommendations and even fail to carry out court orders.<sup>1</sup> There are few guidelines from the Division of Corrections and management, at times, seems to be constrained in terms of the requirements to be placed on counselors, sometimes limiting said requirements to what it is thought the counselors will accept.

It is hoped this observation about autonomous counselors is not accurate, or, if it is, that change is possible. It may well

<sup>1</sup>A May, 1976 study by the Comptroller General of the United States entitled, "State and County Probation: Systems in Crisis" showed that among 300 clients exiting probation in Multnomah County in 1974, 67% of the special conditions ordered by the courts were never fulfilled (page 32).

be nigh impossible to bring about case decisions based on decision criteria, case accountability through supervision, counseling by objectives (CBO), or services delivered on a cost-effective basis if they depend on the voluntary acceptance of correctional counselors. The recent change in the Corrections Division top manager offers hope for a more management, effectiveness-oriented operation. Without top management support this cannot happen.

In summary, one cannot say that case planning with adequate resources for service implementation was tried and it did not work. One can say that it was only partially implemented and partially successful, or partially unsuccessful, as you prefer.

6.0 CLIENT RESOURCES AND SERVICES (CRS) PROJECT EVALUATION RESULTS

6.1 GENERAL CRS RESULTS

The CRS project served as a resource pool for purchasing treatment/training services upon request by correctional staff in other Impact units. Therefore, achievement of CRS project process objectives was completely dependent upon correctional counselors in the probation, parole and institutional units of the Oregon Division of Corrections requesting services from the CRS unit. Through administrative coordination of service planning and delivery within and across organizational boundaries CRS process objectives were then attained. It was hoped that such preplanning and coordination would result in delivery of more immediate, appropriate, and high quality services than were otherwise available. By supplementing service delivery with short-term subsistence (e.g., rent, food, clothing), it was hoped that clients would be both enabled and encouraged to participate in special treatment/training programs. This, in turn, was expected to contribute to crime reduction.

Looking first at questions concerning how CRS was used, Table 2<sup>1</sup> summarizes the expenditures for CRS services. From Table 2 one can see that CRS delivered a considerable amount of services to target offenders by March 31, 1976.

To what extent did the CRS project meet client needs? At the initiation of the project it was neither known exactly which services would be required nor in what amounts. In the absence of case counseling by objectives (CBO) to specify what treatment/training services were needed for non-DC probation and parole clients it is not known to what extent the CRS program met the services required. It is known that: 1) approximately 20% (111)

<sup>1</sup> Repeated from earlier document (CRS:2.3:6) where it appeared as Table 1.

TABLE 2

CRS SERVICES SUMMARY  
FIRST 17 MONTHS OF PROGRAM  
NOVEMBER 1974 - MARCH 1976

Type Service	No. Clients	No. Trans.	\$ Amount	Avg. \$\$ Per Client	% of Total \$
Voc. Education	120	254	\$ 37,418.04	\$ 311.82	7.1
College	55	116	8,380.90	152.38	1.6
Voc. Training	65	131	18,780.94	442.78	5.5
Basic Ed.	4	6	136.20	34.05	- -
Remedial Ed.	1	1	120.00	120.00	- -
Job Development	289	641	117,384.62	406.18	22.3
Psychological	80	162	20,798.78	259.98	3.9
Medical Services	284	384	12,308.11	43.34	2.3
Subsistence	864	6,478	258,710.68	299.43	49.1
Rent & Maint.	349	840	99,075.87	283.89	18.8
Incidentals	525	3,498	112,401.22	214.10	21.3
Transportation	474	1,625	16,759.03	35.36	3.2
Clothing	231	334	23,664.47	102.44	4.5
Food	35	47	2,805.71	80.16	0.5
Utilities	48	134	3,993.53	83.20	0.8
Institutional	509	2,263	80,660.81	158.47	15.3
Stipends	388	1,622	16,384.81	42.23	3.1
Lifeliners	139	281	42,738.00	307.47	8.1
Boost	38	39	1,989.00	52.34	0.4
7th Step	46	265	2,749.00	59.76	0.5
M-2 Sponsor	56	56	16,800.00	300.00	3.2
Recreation	13	13	145.50	11.19	- -
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,174</b>	<b>10,195</b>	<b>\$ 527,426.49</b>	<b>\$ 449.26</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: CRS-TIS

of the Impact Probation and Parole Clients received no services; 2) that only about half of the DC probationer needs, as recommended by the DC, were satisfied; and 3) a large amount of CRS resources were unused. If one subscribes to the notion the DC recommendations were sound it appears lack of implementation was due to field service deficiencies not CRS.

Next, how successful were the resources and services in meeting the objectives for which services were provided? Evaluation of the efficiency or effectiveness of the delivery system for each service was not contemplated. Obviously, the expenditure of such large sums as \$258,711 for subsistence, \$117,385 for job development and placement, \$64,276 for contacts of out-siders to institutionalized clients, and \$27,418 for vocational education warrant scrutiny and contemplation as to whether they should be continued. Further, if continued, should they be administered in the same way? For example, should corrections personnel administer subsistence funds when another agency exists in the community to do so? Or, should job development and placement continue to be provided by private agencies on a contract basis. To determine, in part, the degree of success attained by these programs the next two sections will examine the degree to which the process objectives set forth in the proposal were attained and the relationship, if any, of the delivery of services to the reduction of target or other arrests.

#### 6.2 CRS PROCESS OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE

The Impact proposal specified fourteen process objectives for which the Oregon Division of Corrections was to be held responsible. Appendix A of this report has 28 CRS findings (CRSFs); the first twelve pertain to the fourteen process objectives. They reflect mixed results: some successes (4), some failures (6), and some inappropriate objectives (4). Three of the latter were remedial educational objectives best met via educational, not CRS, resources (CRSF-1). Educational resources were used

to meet these remedial and G. E. D. objectives. The proposal objectives were: 1) to provide 250 target offenders with remedial or G. E. D. equivalency instruction each year; 2) have 50% of the enrolled illiterate probationers and parolees achieve the 5.5 grade level after 320 hours instruction; and 3) have 50% of the clients completing G. E. D. instruction pass the G. E. D. examination. The extent to which the actual target population needed these services or the extent to which they were attained were not established via CBO. Impact CRS funds were not needed to provide these resources, therefore, that activity was not followed. The fourth inappropriate objective, calling for clients to be self supportive while in residential care, was precluded from success by residential facility program policy against client employment (CRSF-11). Subsistence oriented objectives, including the provision of short-term subsidies and residential care placements, were easily achieved by providing residential care for 27 persons and 864 clients cost of living subsidies at the rate of \$299 each (CRSF-10, CRSF-12). The other two successfully achieved process objectives pertained to vocational training objectives of 50 target offenders enrolled, with 50% of those enrolled successfully finishing. There were 79 enrollees with 34 completing, 25 dropouts and 28 still enrolled<sup>1</sup> (some in more than one course).

The other six CRS process objectives involving purchase of services - other than subsistence - were only partially successful. First, the job development and placement activity in the original proposal expected 275 placements per year, or 390 for the period evaluated, in jobs "agreed to be appropriate and meaningful by both the client and the job developer" and that "50% of those placed will remain in that position for a minimum of six months unless promoted or transferred." The importance of employment and the amount of CRS resources expended, \$117,385, warrants a somewhat detailed discussion of this effort.

<sup>1</sup> See Table 5, CRS:3.3:20.

It is not known what proportion of the 731 total Impact clients were either unemployed or required placement services. The proposal anticipated 390 referrals by Field Staff for job placement. During the period November 1974 through March 1976 there were 243 referrals to two private placement agencies of which 76%, or 184<sup>1</sup>, were placed by the agencies. Thirteen found their own job -- raising the total placements to 197 or 81% of 243 referrals.

Limiting the discussion to the 195 referred through December 31, 1975, permits three months for placement activity to be completed by March 31, 1976, the end of the period evaluated. Of these 195, 79%, or 155, were placed by the agency; 7%, or 13, were self placed, and 14%, or 27, not placed.

It is known that, in part, CRS received the most difficult to place. For example, it received those the VRD program rejected as not being good potential benefactors of the VRD program. Some correctional counselors reportedly only referred those that could not place themselves. If this was done routinely, only the most difficult to place were referred to the private placement agencies. If so, placement of four out of five referrals would be an exceptionally good achievement, especially if "appropriate and meaningful" placements of "substantial duration" occurred.

Follow-up of the 195 referrals reveals that only 41 (21% of the 195 referred or 26% of the 155 placed) were still working on 3/31/76. Of these, 15 had been placed two to five times. Thus, about 65% (100 of 155) of those originally placed either quit, were fired, or were revoked. Another 24 were laid off. About 33% (27 of 83) of those placed before October 1, 1976 had been on the job six months or more. Many were placed several (2 to 5) times.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The actual number of persons referred is less than 243 since some individuals were referred to both private placement agencies.

<sup>2</sup>See Tables 7 and 8, CRS:3.4:25-26 for further details.

skills? Why the frequent turnover? About 63%, 118 of 186 primary and secondary placements, stayed on the job less than 60 days. Does this indicate the jobs were low paid, undesirable, or temporary? Were the clients unkept, inept, ill placed, flighty, or uninterested in long term work? Did those that found their own jobs have better tenure? How about those placed by public agencies? The relative costs and success of public employment services, in-house Division of Corrections efforts, and contracted private placements should be explored.

There obviously is a need for more than simple counseling and placement in just any available job. Who should prepare the clients, by doing what, when, and how? The general lack of results and the importance of employment indicate the critical need for improvement in this area. This fact is reinforced by the findings relative to the lack of improvement in employment earnings and reduction in unemployment - (Field Service Findings 6, 7, and 8)<sup>1</sup>. If some cannot be placed, the question of the cost tradeoffs of a sheltered workshop or some other supervised employment setting to aid in the development of marketable skills needs to be considered.

In summary, the employment process objectives were not fully attained (CRSF-4, CRSF-5). Unless improvements can be made to increase the tenure of those placed, it is questionable whether the program can be cost-justified. At a total cost of \$117,385, the 184 placements cost approximately \$638 each<sup>2</sup>, with approximately 63% of them lasting less than 60 days. A more precise judgment could be made if the actual number of months of employment and concomitant earnings were available. One should also consider the impact of reduction in crime attributable to job services. Field Service data indicate that reduction in crime is only associated with those staying on the job more than 60 days<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A, p 69.

<sup>2</sup> If 80 subsequent placements of the same individuals are included, the cost averages \$445 per placement.

<sup>3</sup> Table A-35, FS: APPENDIX: 157

What client or job characteristics are associated with even this short term job tenure? Are the needed client characteristics trainable, e.g., can clients become responsible or motivated via training? Can employment placement efforts be directed toward development and placement in jobs with the characteristics associated with such minimum tenure? Can the techniques of matching jobs and client characteristics be improved?

Approximately \$64,000 were spent to purchase contact services for institutionalized Impact clients. In one case, about 80% of citizen sponsors needed were found for institutionalized target offenders and about 79% of those made the regular monthly contacts. Thus, slightly over 70% of the intended contacts were delivered to inmates of institutions. The evaluation of the effect of these contacts was not within the scope of this evaluation effort; it can be stated without reservation, however, that the private vendor did not deliver the services as planned to meet the process objectives (CRSF-8, CRSF-9).

With respect to counseling process objectives (CRS objectives 8 and 9), one hundred forty-two (142), 134% of the required 108 clients, received counseling, but generally they had only one-third of the 82 hours expected to be delivered to each client (CRSF-6). There were no data to provide follow-up information on whether 60% of those counseled maintained employment and supported their families in keeping with a negotiated plan. There was no evidence of any negotiated plans in the files. (CRSF-7)

### 6.3 CRS OUTCOME RESULTS

As indicated before, measurement of outcome is in terms of client recidivism, i.e., target and non-target arrests. Evaluation efforts were directed toward searches for: 1) general associations between CRS involvement and probation/parole recidivism rates; 2) connections between the intensity of

of Impact services<sup>1</sup>, provision of CRS subsistence monies, and outcome behavior; and 3) connections between client maturation factors such as age or length of correctional supervision, probation/parole status and outcome behavior.

In short, there were no statistically significant relationships found between non-target and/or target arrests and:

- The provision of CRS subsistence (Tables C-12, C-13)
- Involvement in CRS services (Tables C-12, C-13)
- Intensity of Special Services (Tables C-14, C-15)
- Client age at intake (Tables C-16, C-17)
- Prior length of time under supervision (Tables C-18, C-19)<sup>2</sup>

Other findings were:

- that non-target crimes being significantly lower among probationers than parolees were found not to be related to CRS involvement
- CRS subsistence level was not associated with age or client assignment to probation or parole, or length of prior supervision
- that no significant interactions exist between age, intensity of service, CRS subsistence level, length of prior supervision or probation/parole status and outcome; in only one case does the data approach significant association - where target crime increased as subsistence level reached its peak. This may mean that the cases representing the greatest risk are receiving the most subsistence help. Causal relationships cannot be inferred.

<sup>1</sup>Intensity of service is defined as months of service per month of supervision; it is computed by compiling all the months of service received by the client for all program services and dividing by the months under supervision.

<sup>2</sup>Tables C-12 through C-19 are in CRS:APPENDIX:73-80.

The Field Service data clearly show that without services no reduction in arrests occurs but with specific services for specific kinds of individuals significant reductions do occur. In the CRS analysis all receiving CRS services (178) were compared with all others - those not receiving CRS services (176) together with those receiving no services at all (111). No differences in arrests were found. There should have been a difference due to the inclusion of 111 clients known to have no services and no reduction in arrests. Perhaps client selection accounts for the lack of difference. If the worst risk clients were handled by CRS - which we know occurred in some instances - and the better risk were among the 176 receiving services in the non CRS groups, no difference in outcome results would seem reasonable. Again, CRS provided the same kinds of service from the same sources available to non-CRS clients that received services.

It is only reasonable to assume that the provision of subsistence had practical value in overcoming transitional problems. It is not known to what extent these transitional money requirements were met by local resources in the past before Impact. Obviously, these needs exist and are being met for non-Impact clients. Except that spent for incidentals, the Impact monies may have just supplanted subsistence from other sources, private and public. In the future, the potential value of subsistence may be greatly enhanced if the ability to select clients for services improves the impact of those services on outcome. In other words, subsistence appears to be a facilitator, the value of which is dependent on the impact of that which it facilitates. It does not directly reduce crime by itself; in fact, when used heavily with the highest risk cases it is associated (not causally) with more frequent arrests. This pattern was also found in a recent study of the Oregon Corrections Division.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>James Heuser, Preliminary Evaluation Report on Community Based Subsidies Program Project", Oregon Law Enforcement Council, August 1976.

#### 6.4 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE CLIENT RESOURCES AND SERVICES PROJECT

The purpose of CRS was to serve in a reactive mode to requests from other units in the Oregon Division of Corrections. In so doing it was to provide, via purchase or otherwise:

- treatment/training services for clients
- short term subsistence (i.g. rent, food, clothing, incidentals)

From the foregoing three sections a number of Client Resources and Services Project Conclusions (CRSCs) can be drawn:

- CRSC-1 The CRS project had adequate resources and, in general, provided the resources and services requested by Division of Correction units.
- CRSC-2 Due to the lack of management emphasis on client need identification, documentation via CBO and implementation of DC recommendations many known and unknown client needs were unmet despite CRS.
- CRSC-3 CRS successfully reached the subsistence objectives directly achievable in its own organization as well as vocational training objectives.
- CRSC-4 CRS had only partial success (or failed) in reaching other objectives dependent upon service contracts with others.
- CRSC-5 CRS arrangements provided a reasonable percentage of placements (79%) for those referred to job development and placement services but the placements were not generally "appropriate or meaningful," resulting in short tenure and a great amount of turnover. Tentative analysis of cost-effectiveness suggests the present practice is questionable to continue without improvements that result in longer tenured jobs.

- CRSC-6 CRS inmate contact services fail to achieve coverage and frequency expectations and remain of doubtful value unless they can be associated with impact on client post release behavior.
- CRSC-7 CRS counseling more than reached the number of clients projected but in less depth than proposed; its value remains undetermined.
- CRSC-8 Subject to the reservation of differential client selection, CRS, as operated by the Division of Corrections, clearly was not cost-effective - there was no difference in outcome comparing clients receiving CRS services (178) with all others - those receiving services from non CRS sources (176) and no services at all (111).
- CRSC-9 CRS subsistence monies (e.g., rent, utilities, food, clothing, transportation, incidentals), by themselves, or in conjunction with other CRS services, were not associated with reduction in arrests; it appears less costly for any such services to be channeled through existing community agencies set up to provide those services rather than create a special, in-house corrections unit.
- CRSC-10 In order for CRS treatment/training services to be associated with reduction in crime in the future, they cannot be thrown at the problems without selection criteria (or just because a client has a need) without well defined objectives. Rather, expenditures should be disallowed until crime reducing objectives are documented for each purchase.
- CRSC-11 Setting aside the practical need for transitional support, the provision of CRS subsidy resources cannot be associated with reduction in crime unless they support effective training/treatment service delivery; subsidy by itself, does not reduce crime.

## 7.0 IMPACT PROGRAM SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Subject to the evaluation limitations set forth in Section 3.0 above, the following summary and recommendations are offered in the hope they may constructively assist the State of Oregon and LEAA to move forward toward more effective reduction of crime through the correctional process. In so doing the evaluator, AJI, carries the heavy burden of knowledge that \$3,239,177 were spent toward that objective and the state and federal governments deserve to acquire that knowledge that can be salvaged from the operation.

### 7.1 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

From the outset the Oregon Corrections Impact Program was in trouble. The top down LEAA award of \$20,000,000 made the total grant monies available without a preagreement as to what was to be done with the money. Clearly, there was not a meeting of the minds between LEAA and the Oregon Corrections Division about the general program purpose. LEAA wanted an experimental innovative program; Oregon Corrections Division merely wanted the funds to do some ordinary things they had been unable to get funding to do and did not want an experimentally controlled project that could be rigorously evaluated. Uncertainty about whether the Division would participate in the Impact program delayed initiation of operations after the grant award. Absence of any substantive documented plans for program implementation, shortage of coordinating agreements across organizational boundaries, and lack of agreement between LEAA and the Division regarding funding and evaluation requirements all figured in the reduction in the project operations from three years to 23 months (generally). The shorter program duration meant that large portions of the project period were needed just to gear-up (hire and train staff, arrange logistics) and gear-down (stop client intakes, relocate staff).

The Division-developed proposals included as its major innovation case counseling by objectives (CBO) supported by extensive resources and services to be carried out by increase counseling and supportive staff to reduce caseloads. Augmenting projects were to train staff and provide management information via Tracking. A number of specific process objectives were set forth, mostly in measurable terms, to be achieved enroute to the overall objectives of reducing target crimes.

Experience has shown there was not agreement within the Division about CBO or the process objectives. Absence of strong administrative support for the case management procedures spelled-out in the proposals to LEAA precluded its general development and usage. Combined with the Division's rejection of experimental evaluation methods, failure to implement CBO prevented the strong evaluation deserved by the people of Oregon. Failure to aggressively develop and implement CBO represents a major implementation deficiency which largely neutralized innovation and evaluation for Impact. Many cost/benefit questions cannot be answered in the absence of procedures for identifying and documenting service needs to be met, relative effectiveness of alternative treatment models, and costs associated with needs and alternatives.

Two major problems undercut the ability of the Impact Program manager to accomplish the proposal goals. First, he had little feedback about the progress of projects toward their goals and objectives. The major planning deficiency in the original proposal was the gross understaffing, under equipping, and under funding of the tracking program that would provide that information. Tracking never became a viable resource to meet the Impact program management needs at any time in the project. A major mistake, time after time, in funding projects is the misconception that information to support management and evaluation can be achieved by one or two people in a back room.

The second major problem confronting the Impact manager was that once he knew about problems he had limited authority to bring about change. That authority, early on, was clearly the domain of line managers. Data input from operations, implementation of DC recommendations at the 47% level, provision of staff for training on CBO (half of staff was still untrained on CBO eight months after project start), implementation of CBO, and provision of documentation of treatment purposes and needs for CRS all were under the control of line managers. The Impact manager could only use gentle persuasion on them or their superiors; responsibility and authority were not centralized in the same position.

What were the results?

- With respect to process objectives:
  - Diagnostic Center: One achieved, three not achieved.
  
  - Field Services: Four achieved; nine not achieved, including six not attempted.
  
  - Client Resources and Services: Four achieved, ten not achieved, including three inappropriate objectives and one not attempted.
  
- DC presentence investigation reports (PSI) were of partial value to the courts and the Field Service staff. The DC and the courts agreed on prison or probation for 72% of those considered appropriate by either party; the courts ordered DC recommended treatment 1% to 29% of the time, varying with the recommendation; DC treatment/training recommendation were to a large extent (47%) unaddressed by Impact Probation staff.

- Case processing by DC did not enhance court selection of "best risk" clients for probation; there was no difference in arrests during probation comparing DC-processed and DC-by passed new probationers.
- There was no difference in amount or intensity of services rendered to DC-processed and DC-by passed clients and there was no difference in arrests in these two groups; therefore, Impact probation staff can attain the same effects without DC recommendations.
- Impact probation and parole made little use of case consultation services offered by the DC; yet, half of the DC recommendations for psychological service were never initiated. (This was not due to shortage of resources as a mere telephone call to CRS would virtually assure availability of service).
- The DC is clearly not cost-effective under present circumstances. Given the apparent pattern of correctional staffs choosing treatment options independently from information provided by the DC, there is no evidence that the DC model for PSI preparation is better than preparation by regular staffs. Specifically, there is no evidence in the Impact experience that the DC recommended better or more effective treatment/training approaches than those actually initiated. In the absence of experimental methods, it is impossible to tell whether the DC or counselor decisions regarding treatment are most effective. Yet, preparation of PSI by the Impact Diagnostic Center cost \$727; regular staff prepare such reports at an average cost of \$271. These figures represent, 125% and 47%, respectively, of the \$580 cost per year of probation or parole under existing conditions. The

- difference \$456 would also fund experimental attempts at more effective programs approximating the magnitude of CRS for which the average outlay was \$449 per client.
- Documented case plans consisting of measurable objectives and planned actions toward their achievement in each case, to guide supervision and case monitoring and redirection, were never achieved as a routinized operation.
  - Case loads never reached the 35:1 ratio planned because the target offenders exceeded the number of Impact counselors provided, the General Fund counselors were provided a year late, and the number of target offenders was never limited to counselors available.
  - Reduced caseload size attained had no impact on crime reduction but it is associated with increased contacts and services when coupled with CRS.
  - Despite reduced caseload size about half of DC recommended services went unmet; in the absence of CBO and documented needs it is not possible to estimate what portion of service needs were met by CRS; often services were too little or too late.
  - Data clearly indicate that receipt of service is the key to crime reduction (111 clients receiving no service had no significant reduction in arrests); however, a rifle rather than a scattergun approach is required because certain services were only effective with certain clients.
  - Therefore the scattergun approach of FS/CRS of relatively new staff seeing a need and filling it was clearly not cost-effective even though there was a

significant reduction in arrests among clients:  
FS/CRS costs more than offset prison costs of the  
potential reduction in offenders.

- Development of treatment/training selection criteria and a policy that calls for their being followed is essential to cost-effective services.
- The rates of client unemployment were not reduced, the length of unemployment periods were not shortened, nor were client per capita earnings increased. In part, this could be due to the dampened economy.
- Less than 30% (29%) of violators absconded, achieving that objective.
- The observed reduction of 27% in target offender convictions between the Before and During Program equalized at-risk periods was concluded to satisfy FS process objective 12 requirement of 10% reduction in target convictions.
- There were no significant differences in failures/successes between Impact and non Impact parolee and Impact probationers indicating parolees may have been handled in the community as probationers at less cost and no greater risk (ignores any influence the term in prison may have had).
- Although there was a significant reduction (291 days) in length of time under supervision for those receiving early releases it may have been due as much to administrative policy as to program.
- For equalized periods-at-risk for the 465 study population there were significant reductions in arrests for target offenses (55%) and target convictions (27%).

- The number of clients arrested for target crimes decreased 37% while the number of clients arrested for non-target crimes fell 49%.
- The number of offenders convicted for non-target offenses dropped 57% but there was no significant change in the number of offenders convicted for target offenses (the latter stems from a substantial increase in target convictions for Impact probationers which could stem from the fact courts were placing higher risk clients on probation under Impact).

With respect to these seemingly great successes in crime reduction, it should be remembered that the follow up period is short, reductions in arrest may have been due to factors other than program, and, although the percentages are fairly large and statistically significant the number of offenders involved are too small to be practically significant or to offset effectively program costs.

- Success in reductions in arrests was related to finishing job related programs and staying in personality oriented programs.
- Service enrollment in two programs may be connected with reduction in arrests but when several problems exist services appear ineffective.
- Lack of management and planning resulted in;
  - failure to achieve the 35:1 caseload by providing adequate staff and/or limiting intake
  - inadequate provision for tracking support to provide management information
  - slow development and implementations of staff training programs

- counselors not held accountable for CBO implementation
  - counselors not held responsible for fulfilling DC treatment recommendation
  - great lags of time between sentencing and FS intake
  - 34.5 working days on the average, between FS intake and treatment initiation
  - unmet needs existing alongside unused resources
- CRS, with adequate resources, provided services requested and reached the subsistence objectives directly achievable in its own organization as well as vocational training objectives.
  - CRS had only partial success (or failed) to reach other objectives dependent upon service contracts with others.
  - CRS arrangements provided an unusually good percentage of placements (79%) for those referred to job development and placement services but the placements were not generally "appropriate or meaningful," resulting in short tenure and a great amount of turn over; tentative analysis of cost-effectiveness suggests the present practice is questionable to continue without improvements that result in longer tenured jobs.
  - CRS inmate contact service failed to achieve coverage and frequency expectation and remain of doubtful value unless they can be associated with impact on post-release behavior.

- Subject to limitation of differential client selection, CRS, as operated by the Corrections Division, clearly was not cost-effective - there was no difference in outcome comparing clients receiving CRS services (178) with all others - those receiving services without CRS resources (176) and no services at all (111).
- CRS subsistence monies (e.g. rent, utility, food, clothing, transportation, incidentals) by themselves, or in conjunction with other CRS services, was not associated with reductions in arrests; it may be less costly for any such services to be channeled through existing community agencies set up to provide those services rather than create a special in-house corrections unit.
- Setting aside the practical need for transitional support, subsidy, by itself, does not reduce crime; it must be used with effective services to achieve that objective.

#### 7.2 SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS

Serious planning is now underway for long term improvements to the correctional system in Oregon. Hopefully, this report and those it summarizes will be of some value to Oregon's decision-makers as they approach system modification. At all times the facts have been presented as the evaluators have perceived them; there has been no intention to be vindictive or to cover up. Constructive observation has been the intent and remains so as the following recommendations are made.

It was quite apparent that Oregon's Correctional Administration desires to do a good job. Much of the time, however, they are handicapped because they lack information. Many of the situations reported in the evaluators' reports were news to Oregon's Corrections administration. AJI feels many negative situations would not have persisted long if adequate facts were available

to assist management in planning, ongoing monitoring, process assessment, or effectiveness evaluation. More important to those making decisions about the future of Oregon Corrections, any future reforms or thrusts into new areas will be handicapped by the same lack of information. If nothing else is gained from this evaluation effort, it should be apparent that the limited information system effort imbedded in this evaluation process has demonstrated, in a small way, how much assistance management could receive from an adequate correctional information system serving the Corrections Division. Such a system has the potential of impacting the entire correctional process, providing an empirical tool for the future iterative improvement of the entire system. It will support evaluation of ongoing operations, some entrenched and some new, so management can discard those thought to be effective but, in reality, found to be wasteful. It should even provide data to suggest new approaches. Thus, the highest priority System Recommendation (SR) is:

SR-1 The Oregon State Legislature and the Oregon Corrections Division should move immediately to fund, develop and implement an expanded correctional information system that will track: (1) the offenders' movement within the system, (2) control and treatment/training decisions on each offender, (3) performance of offenders, Division personnel and others related thereto, and (4) criterion behavior (e.g., recidivism) of the offenders.

This will require substantial development costs over a period of two to three years, perhaps as much as \$1,000,000, and an ongoing budget for operations and additional modifications. It has the potential of cost recovery in a single decision. Perhaps some of the remaining recommendations will illustrate potential cost savings suggestions resulting from the limited information system developed for this evaluation effort.

SR-2 Due to the fact they are not cost-effective, the proliferation of Diagnostic Centers (DC), as they are now constituted, is not recommended; the Corrections

Division should explore alternatives to the DC for the delivery of less costly, prioritized presentence information, and more appropriate treatment/training recommendations for the courts.

Each DC PSI costs approximately \$727, about \$456 more than the \$271 for a PSI by probation staff. Policies, procedures, and resources should enable the Corrections Division to ensure delivery of PSIs to all courts on felony cases on a timely basis, in accordance with priorities established in conjunction with the courts, jail administrators, and others involved in the criminal justice process. For example, PSIs could be prepared for those in jail first, high risk cases on OR or bail next, etc. PSI preparation priorities should be geared to reducing unnecessary pretrial detention and avoiding unnecessary human costs, e.g., job loss or separation of families. Pending the development of more specific sentencing decision criteria the PSIs supplied the courts should contain only court specified decision data and court desired recommendations to assist them to select effectively the clients for probation based on the risk they pose to the community. A corollary to this is that data and recommendations not used by the courts should be eliminated. Preparation of unnecessary data on every case should be avoided.

SR-3 PSI recommendations for action by community correctional staff should await the development of case planning decision criteria, follow-up community corrections supervision procedures, and adequate resources to insure effective, rational recommendation implementation; meanwhile, community correctional workers should follow case planning decision criteria developed by the Corrections Division, case planning should be implemented with clients, and concomitant, documented supervision should monitor the process to insure rational case planning and implementation.

There is no need to continue spending resources to make PSI recommendations that are unacceptable or unimplemented. After case planning decision criteria are developed, recommendations

in terms of those criteria should be acceptable. Paramount is the ability of these criteria, where appropriate, to give guidance so that services are purchased according to the ability to finish or remain in program to enhance the prospects of crime reduction. Follow-up of planned actions is essential to implementation and to provide feedback regarding the adequacy of the planning criteria. Procedures must insure that implementation occurs. Supervisory observation and evaluative feedback, via an information system, permit iterative improvements to criteria pertaining to which clients should receive which services to reduce the commitment of new offenses. Embedded in this recommendation are notions, backed by empirical results, that:

- ⊙ Services are key to improved behavior.
- ⊙ Services must be individually selected for specific types of individuals; not grossly filled for grossly labeled needs of individuals.
- ⊙ Those making recommendations for services and those rendering or brokering services must be together on the decision criteria.
- ⊙ The system must provide a set of procedures to monitor offender and system performance in the delivery and receipt of services. Case administration and accountability via supervision need to be strengthened to avoid gaps and delays in services; present procedures and policies do not provide information or routinized procedures to assure adequate case management and more cost-effective delivery of services.
- ⊙ Evaluative efforts must provide information on the process and impact of the services to enable improvement or discontinuance of effort.

The recommendation (SR-3) is stated in functional terms rather than organizational terms (i.e., Field Services) to avoid the interpretation that a certain organization structure is recommended to carry out these efforts. Implicit in this recommendation is the need for staff training to disburse the concepts necessary

for consistency in case planning, plan documentation, supervisory monitoring and documentation, and information system implementation. Similarly, there is a need for coordinated community resources for plan implementation.

The two foregoing recommendations require the development of decision-criteria for sentencing and case plans. These and other correctional decisions are of such importance that it appears in order to single this area out for the next recommendation.

SR-4      The Corrections Division should be funded for the development of correctional decision criteria. Such criteria should be utilized to:  
(1) help the courts select the "best risk" clients for probation; (2) assist correctional staff to develop case plans; or (3) aid in making the custody/control decisions, including when supervision is no longer appropriate.

There have been times in the past when the actions having the greatest cost implications for corrections were not services for clients but the changing of decision criteria, e.g., what technical violation warrants return to prison as a violator. Every decision has cost implications; they may be in dollars or new offenses. It is important to know which criteria are impinging on decisions and if, in reality, they are the proper ones. Once the criteria for various decisions are specified, PSIs, case plans, and other system operations can be geared to provide the data and procedures to permit their utilization and evaluation.

One purpose of the Oregon Correctional Impact Program was to reduce caseload size. There was no connection established between caseload size and reduction in crime. In fact, one Impact finding was that there was no significant reduction in crime in the group that had regular caseload counseling and supervision without services. Is supervision and routine counseling important?

Without a control group, one cannot conclude that there would be no difference in the amount of crime if the regular counseling and supervision were eliminated and the group of clients just left with the conditional possibility of return to custody (probation or parole) as their primary motivation to conform. The question is prompted by the knowledge that in many jurisdictions a great many cases seem to "succeed" on probation or parole even though they receive only postage stamp supervision. It is also supported by a great many studies indicating that case load size, per se, cannot be shown to reduce crime. This suggests the next two recommendations.

SR-5 The Oregon Corrections Division should not routinely expend additional resources to reduce caseload size at this time.

Except in cases where overloads in individual instances result in excessive overtime and unbearable working conditions, the expansion of staff to simply reduce caseload size should not be implemented. There is no reason to expect reduced caseload size to reduce crime until the increased services that may result therefrom can become more effective services via the development of case planning decision criteria and, hopefully, more effective case plans. Once that occurs, it may be appropriate to consider reduction in caseloads to enable case planning and more effective interactions with supervision. Meanwhile, there is the possibility that Oregon's Corrections Division could examine a different concept that, if successful, could lead to the abandonment of the traditional one-on-one caseload approach, at least in other than predominantly rural areas. Thus,

SR-6 Oregon Corrections Division should explore one or more alternatives to the traditional, one-on-one, caseload model for delivery of services to correctional clients in the community.

Based on the assumption that routinized supervision and counseling, characterized in many places by approximately 30 minutes

or less contact per month per client, may not be cost effective in reducing crime. A new approach should be tried.

Impact evaluation data suggest that special services not routine supervision and counseling are the key to success in reducing crime; but, a multitude of services, or the wrong type of client in a service, is not likely to succeed. Under one suggested plan, clients would be on conditional release (probation or parole) for lengths of time specified by the proper authority. They would be assigned to a service unit serving a geographical area. The functions of the service unit would be to plan and manage delivery of services, serve as a contact intermediary between client and authorities, and as an information resource for the authorities. Participation of the client would be primarily voluntary; his conditional release status would make him eligible for services. Instead of a single, omnipotent correctional counselor, there would be a team of specialists to serve the several current caseloads assigned in the area, performing such functions as case planning, job development and community service liaison, intensive counseling, contact representation (ala Veterans Administration), and violations investigations. The objective would be to obtain the greatest community protection for the dollars expended. Concentration would be on delivery of services via community resources with adequate follow-up resources. A rigorous experimental evaluation model should be employed to test this or any alternative plan, with random assignments to this and regular probation/parole as the control group(s). The latter should be in the same geographical setting. This team approach has been tried elsewhere with reported success.<sup>1</sup> It is suggested that this or another alternative approach to the one-on-one caseload model be tested

<sup>1</sup>The Community Resources Management Team Project conducted by the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, P. O. Drawer P, Boulder, Colorado, 80302 and funded by the National Institute of Corrections, Washington, D.C.

for cost effectiveness. Emphasis should be placed on obtaining the greatest community protection (reduction in crime) for the dollars expended. The jobs of the service providers<sup>1</sup> should depend on their ability to deliver effective service. If they do not deliver, or the service is ineffective, the system should be abandoned and another tried. In essence, we are suggesting that eventually abandonment is in order for the one-on-one caseload model we have known for decades. Meanwhile, 1) the search for a different model(s) should be carried out under strict experimental conditions, and 2) the one-on-one model should not be expanded via reduction of caseload size.

- SR-7 Pending developments suggested above, the Corrections Division should consider organizing client field service caseloads by criteria other than legal status (probation or parole), perhaps by risk to the community or client service need.
- SR-8 The Corrections Division should develop policies and procedures that, in times of limited resources, call for services to go to those with the best chance of success; implicit herein is the iterative development of decision criteria related to prediction of successful services for specific clients.
- SR-9 The Corrections Division should examine its policies and procedures to insure that provision is made for long term client participation in personality related programs (e.g., drug programs) as required.
- SR-10 The Corrections Division should examine its management-line-correctional counselor relationships, guidelines, policy statements, etc., to insure that the working culture permits line authority to bring about case decisions based on uniform decision criteria, case accountability through supervision, CBO, or services delivered on a cost effective basis.
- SR-11 Future CRS type subsistence funds should be administered by appropriate local authorities under uniform policies to avoid the opportunity for coercion or inappropriate action by correctional personnel in their interactions with clients.

<sup>1</sup> Includes correctional staff as well as vendors.

- SR-12 A systematic follow-up study of the job development/ placement process should be directed toward determining the factors limiting continuity in employment and placement therein; training should provide the potential employees appropriate knowledge and skills to bring about long term retention of full time employment.
- SR-13 Future purchase of service program agreements should provide for close monitoring to insure completion and total performance as well as evaluation of impact; such services should only be provided to implement an existing, documented, case plan.
- SR-14 In view of the need implicit in the foregoing recommendations, the Oregon Corrections Division should acquire ongoing, technically capable, research and evaluation resources to assist management in selection, design, monitoring, and evaluation of correctional programs.

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APPENDIX A  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

APPENDIX A  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1.0 SUMMARY OF DC FINDINGS

Each Diagnostic Center finding (DCF) and its source<sup>1</sup> (document sections or table number) is summarily set forth in this section.

1.1 DC PROCESS OBJECTIVE FINDINGS

DCF-1 The DC completed presentence investigations on 491, or 98%, of those cases referred to it by the courts during the period of analysis, November 1974 through March 1976. This handily exceeded the DC-1 Process Objective of 90% of cases referred (Section 3.1).

DCF-2 DC Process Objective 2, to submit 90% of the presentence reports required within 15 working days of referral, was not achieved. The mean number of working days to submittal was 14.87 but 165, or 34%, of the reports exceeded the 15 working day time limit (Section 3.2). This was reduced to 59, or 24%, during the period July 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976.

DCF-3 DC Process Objective 3, to insure that 90% of the first phase of the DC treatment plans are implemented within 30 working days, was not attained. Restricting the analysis to those clients for whom court disposition and entry to Impact probation occurred with 30 working days before the end of the analysis interval March 31, 1976, 71% of 103 clients experienced initiation or continuation of at least one DC recommendation. Initiation of the recommended service usually began 34.5 working days after the court order, or 23.4 working days after Field Services

<sup>1</sup>"Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Diagnostic Center Project", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 17, 1976.

intake. Only 34 of 103 clients (33%) experienced initiation within 30 working days of sentencing and 41 (40%) within the prescribed time after Field Services intake. Both are far short of the 90% target of Process Objective 3 (Section 3.3).

DCF-4 DC consultations provided probation field services, averaging less than seven hours per month, fell far short of the 20 hours per month envisioned by Process Objective 4. Apparently the requests for service were not forthcoming as numerous other non-Impact referrals were accommodated (Section 3.4).

#### 1.2 DC REHABILITATION AND OUTCOME FINDINGS

Examining two groups (DC and DC By-pass) comparable in terms of Before Impact target and non-target arrests and periods at risk during Impact, there was:

DCF-5 No significant difference in the intensity of services rendered by Field Services staff to those who had gone through the DC and those who had not (except as need for services is implied by prior arrests, there is no assurance the need for services were the same (Table B-6).

DCF-6 No significant interactions between either of the two groups (DC or DC By-pass) and the amount of subsistence or intensity of service with respect to effect on target arrests (Table B-7).

DCF-7 A significant interaction found for the two groups (DC and DC By-pass) and their level of service intensity ( $P \leq .02$ ); the Neuman Keuls Range Test indicated that as the levels of intensity increased, there are significantly fewer non-target offenses for the DC group. The same relationship is not found for the DC By-pass group (Section 5.1, Table B-8).

DCF-8 No significant differences between the DC and DC By-pass groups in target arrests During Program (Tables B-5, B-7).

DCF-9 No significant differences between the DC and DC By-pass groups in non-target arrests During Program (Tables B-4, B-8).

Examining the effects of services on the 122 new probationers (65 DC and 57 DC By-pass) entering the Impact program during the period of analysis November 1974 to March 1976, there was:

DCF-10 No significant effect on target arrests resulting from different levels of intensity of services or levels of subsistence rendered the new probationers (Table B-7).

DCF-11 No significant effect on non-target arrests resulting from different levels of intensity of service or levels of subsistence rendered the new probationers (Table B-8).

Testing whether fewer clients arrested during Impact might have accounted for more offenses, data reveal:

DCF-12 No significant reduction in numbers of DC or non-DC clients arrested for target offenses after intake to Impact probation (Table B-9).

DCF-13 No significant reduction in numbers of DC or non-DC clients arrested for non-target offenses after intake to Impact probation (Table B-9).

#### 2.0 SUMMARY OF FS PROJECT FINDINGS

Each Field Services finding (FSF) and its source<sup>1</sup> (document section, or table number) is summarily set forth in this section.

<sup>1</sup>"Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Field Services Project", Sacramento, CA., American Justice Institute, September 17, 1976.

## 2.1 FS PROCESS OBJECTIVE FINDINGS

- FSF-1 The Project never developed case plans for a large portion of the cases; only a few of the 100% of the case plans required by Process Objective 1 were devised within thirty (30) working days of referral (Section 5.0). Case planning was the heart of the Impact Program and failure to do it was a major implementation deficiency which negatively influenced achievement of other project objectives.
- FSF-2 Without case planning being achieved in most of the cases, it was not possible to initiate plans within thirty (30) working days of referral for 90% of the cases; accomplishment of Process Objective 2 was not even approached. Most case plans developed were prepared after the fact to meet the evaluators requests.
- FSF-3 Without case plans and specified time frames for achieving specific activities it was not possible for 60% of the cases to be initiated within those time frames required by Process Objective 3.
- FSF-4 The intent of Process Objective 4 was met in that 71% (more than the 60% required) of Diagnostic Center-recommended treatment/training plans (i.e., at least one recommendation) were initiated or continued after case intake to Field Services Probation. Only 29%, less than 40% required by the process objective, were changed or unimplemented within the course of supervision. Interestingly, recommendations for job/vocational skill related services were the most frequently initiated; medical services were the least frequently implemented. (Section 5.1)
- FSF-5 Since placement recommendations were not made as planned, Process Objective 5 was not achieved (Section 5.0).

- FSF-6 The rate of reduction in client unemployment was not achieved as required by Process Objective 6; in fact, there is no evidence it was reduced at all (Section 5.2, Figure 7).
- FSF-7 The lengths of periods of unemployment of clients were not reduced as required by Process Objective 7; in fact, there is no evidence they were reduced at all (Section 5.2, Figure 7).
- FSF-8 The per capita earnings of clients were not increased as required by Process Objective 8; in fact, there is no evidence that they were increased at all. On the average, employment related services began six months after project intake, permitting little time for effective action to impact the employment results required by Process Objectives 6, 7, and 8. Evaluation explored the extent to which Impact differentially assessed client need for employment related services and enrolled the client in required programs according to need. It was found that the Project did, in fact, effectively identify and enroll such clients in programs based on need. With more timely entry into programs there may have been a chance for success on these process objectives.
- FSF-9 In the absence of case planning Process Objective 9 requiring resolution of client family conflicts was not measurable.
- FSF-10 In the absence of case planning Process Objective 10 requiring reduction of client money management problems was not measurable.
- FSF-11 Process Objective 11, requiring that those who abscond or lose contact with probation/parole staff not exceed 30% in the first year, was concluded to be realized, even though the time frames were adjusted. Twenty-nine

percent (29%) of clients violating probation and parole involved absconds. (Section 5.3, Table 8, Figure 9). Comparing Impact Probation and Impact Parole, no difference in the proportions violating by absconding were noted.

FSF-12 The observed reduction of 27% in target convictions between the Before and During Program equalized at risk periods for clients, was concluded to satisfy the Process Objective 12 requirement of a 10% reduction in target convictions, even though the time periods compared were not in year intervals. (Section 5.4). Some of the measured reduction will vanish as cases pending trial finish judicial process and OLEDS files are updated to show convictions. The residual reduction still should meet Process Objective 12 requirements.

FSF-13 The expected reduction in length of time under supervision for clients receiving early release from probation and parole was achieved, as required by Process Objective FS-13. Through provision of special Impact Services (e.g., job placement), average length of supervision was reduced from 3.06 years (1118 days) to an average of 2.27 years (827 days).

Impact did not significantly affect length of supervision among clients failing probation and parole. Failure cases receiving special Impact service average 1.60 years (585 days) compared to 1.66 years (606 days) for non-recipients of special Impact services (Section 5.5).

## 2.2 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF SUCCESS/FAILURE DATA ON THOSE EXITING FROM PROBATION AND PAROLE

With respect to clients exiting from probation and parole in Multnomah County during the period January 1975 through March 31, 1976 (the cut-off for data analysis):

- FSF-14 Significantly more non-Impact cases were successful (early release/death/expiration of jurisdiction) than Impact cases (52.6% vs. 38.9%, Table 11).
- FSF-15 Significantly more non-Impact probationers were successful than Impact probationers (53.6% vs. 34.6%, Table 13).
- FSF-16 No significant differences were found between success rates for non-Impact and Impact parole (Table 12).
- FSF-17 No significant differences in success rates occurred between Impact probation and Impact Parole (41% vs. 46.2%, Table 14).
- FSF-18 No significant differences in proportions of failure cases exiting by technical (abscond and/or rule violation) or criminal acts were noted comparing Impact probation and Impact parole (43.6% vs. 42.9%, Table 14).
- FSF-19 No significant differences were indicated between non-Impact and Impact success clients exiting by early release versus expiration of jurisdiction (57.8% vs. 60.2%, Table 11).
- FSF-20 No significant difference was revealed between non-Impact and Impact probationers in terms of early release rates vs. expiration of jurisdiction (58.3% vs. 59.6%, Table 13).
- FSF-21 No significant difference was shown between non-Impact and Impact parole relative to early release vs. expiration of jurisdiction (53.9% vs. 61.0%, Table 12).
- FSF-22 No significant difference was obtained comparing release rates vs. expiration of jurisdiction for Impact probation

<sup>1</sup>This is to be expected due to the fact that Impact and non-Impact cases are not comparable initially; a finding of no significant difference could, therefore, be contrary to expectation and of importance (see FSF-17). Similarly, Impact probation and Impact parole are not considered comparable.

and Impact parole (59.6% vs 61.0%, Table 14).<sup>1</sup>

### 2.3 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF ARREST/CONVICTION DATA FOR EQUALIZED PERIODS AT RISK BEFORE AND DURING PROGRAM

Based on arrest/conviction data (collected and maintained by the Oregon State Police OLEDS Rap Sheets) on the same individual for equalized periods at risk in Before and During Program periods, the following findings were made:

- Statistically significant reductions in arrest for all 465 Impact Study Cases were achieved as evidenced by:

FSF-23 A 12.7%<sup>2</sup> reduction (59) in the number of offenders arrested for any (target and non-target) offenses was realized during Impact (Table 15). Of these there was not a significant reduction (6 or 3.8%)<sup>3</sup> for Any offense for the parole subgroup (Table 16); there was a significant reduction (53 or 17.2%)<sup>4</sup> for the Probation subgroup (Table 17).

FSF-24 A 7.3%<sup>2</sup> reduction (34) in the number of Impact offenders arrested for target crimes (Table 15). Of these there was a significant reduction of 8.9%<sup>3</sup> (14) for the parole group (Table 16) and a significant reduction of 6.5%<sup>4</sup> (20) for the probation group (Table 17).

FSF-25 A 15.7%<sup>2</sup> reduction (73) in the numbers of Impact offenders arrested for non-target crimes (Table 15). Of these there was a statistically insignificant

<sup>1</sup>These data concerning Impact case closures cover the period March 1, 1975 through March 31, 1976. Data for the first four project months were unavailable.

<sup>2</sup>Based on 465 cases.

<sup>3</sup>Based on 157 cases.

<sup>4</sup>Based on 308 cases.

reduction of 7.6%<sup>1</sup> (12) parolees (Table 16) and a statistically significant reduction of 19.8%<sup>2</sup> (61) probationers (Table 17).

- Statistically significant reductions in convictions were as follows:

FSF-26 A 8.4%<sup>3</sup> drop (39) in the number of all Impact clients convicted on any (target and non-target) conviction during Impact compared to an equal at risk period before intake (Table 15). Of these, a 12.1%<sup>1</sup> drop (19) in the number of parolees (Table 16) a 6.5%<sup>2</sup> drop (20) in the number of probationers (Table 17) were both significant.

FSF-27 A drop of 9.2%<sup>3</sup> (43) in the number of all Impact clients convicted for non-target offenses (Table 15). Of these there was a significant drop of 9.6%<sup>1</sup> (15) in the number of parolees so convicted (Table 16) and a significant drop of 9.1%<sup>2</sup> (28) in the number of probationers (Table 17).

- No statistically significant difference was found when:

FSF-28 The target convictions for all 465 Impact study cases were only reduced 1.3%<sup>3</sup> (6) for all Impact offenders (Table 15), even though there was a significant reduction of 7.6%<sup>1</sup> (12) in the convictions of parolees (Table 16). This occurred primarily because there was an increase of 1.9% (6) in the number of target convictions for probationers (Table 17).

<sup>1</sup>Based on 157 cases.

<sup>2</sup>Based on 308 cases.

<sup>3</sup>Based on 465 cases.

## 2.1 FACTORS INFLUENCING OUTCOME (ARREST) DATA

Factors considered to have a possible influence on outcome were:

- Maturation (supervision and chronological)

FSF-29 There was no significant association found between client age and arrest rates (per client day at risk) for target or non-target offenses (Section 6.3.1).

FSF-30 Length of supervision prior to Impact had no significant effects on target or non-target arrest rates (Section 6.3.1).

- Enrollment in individual special service programs:

FSF-31 Clients enrolling in any type of special service program showed significant reductions in proportions of clients arrested for any (target or non-target) offense (Table 20).

FSF-32 Only clients enrolling in the Alcohol/Drug and Medical/Other showed significant reduction in proportions experiencing target arrests (Table 21).

FSF-33 Significant reduction in target arrests was not found for clients enrolling in Ed/Voc/Job Placement, Job Counseling, Psychological Counseling, or Residential Care Programs (Table 21).

FSF-34 Looking at clients thought to need job related services, provision/withholding of such services did not significantly effect target arrest rates (Tables A-9, A-11).

FSF-35 Non-target arrests were significantly reduced among "needy" parolees receiving job services (Tables A-10, A-12).

FSF-36 No significant change occurred in non-target arrests for "needy" probationers receiving job services (Section 6.3.2).

FSF-37 Drug related services had no significant effects upon target or non-target arrest rates.<sup>1</sup> Rather, only differences between parolees enrolled and probationers not enrolled were found (Tables A-13, A-14, Section 6.3.2) for target crimes.

- Variety of special service programs:

FSF-38 Those enrolled in special services tended to be the most in need, i.e., were more likely than non-enrollees to show arrests in their baseline (before) periods (Table 22).

FSF-39 Clients receiving special services showed significantly reduced arrests for any target offenses; such reductions are not found among clients without special programs (Tables 22 and 23).

FSF-40 No clear connection was found between variety of special services provided and outcome. Significant reductions in target arrests were detected among clients enrolling in two program types; Any arrests were significantly reduced among clients when four kinds of service were utilized (Tables 22 and 23).

- Intensity of exposure to special service programs:

FSF-41 Intensity of service was not significantly related to target arrests (Table 25).

FSF-42 Looking at any arrest, only the most intensive level of

<sup>1</sup>The difference between this finding and that presented in FSF-48 is due to the populations included in the tests. Specifically, FSF-48 measured connections between target arrests and client completion of alcohol/drug services once the client was enrolled. That test included 104 study clients enrolled in such programs. Results described by FSF-37 (above) relate to 134 clients with drug arrest histories; only 40 of these are among the 104 enrollees referenced in FSF-48.

service shows significant reductions in recidivism (Table 24).

FSF-43 Separate examination of different kinds of special programs reveals no clear pattern of connection between intensity and outcome for any (Table 26) or target offenses (Table 27).

• Client completion of special service programs

FSF-44 Client completion of one or more program is required to attain significant target offense reduction (Table 33).

FSF-45 Client completion of programs was not required to obtain a significant reduction in Any or non-target offenses.

FSF-46 With respect to specific service types, Program completion of job related services is required to show significant reductions for Any arrest (Table 28).

FSF-47 In terms of personality directed services (psychological, residential care, alcohol and drug) significant reductions in any offense are found where client remains in program (Table 28).

FSF-48 Only ongoing involvement in the alcohol and drug program is significantly connected to the reduction of target offenses (Table 29).

FSF-49 Probation and parole clients finishing<sup>1</sup> Ed/Voc/Job Placement services show significant reduction in any arrests (Table 30).

FSF-50 Target offenses among parolees are not significantly affected by Ed/Voc/Job Placement services (Table 31).

FSF-51 Probationers who fail Ed/Voc/Job Placement services display increased arrests for any crime (Table 30).

FSF-52 For drug/alcohol services, only probationers remaining in such programs show reduced arrests for both target and any offense (Tables 30 and 31).

• Variety of programs finished:

FSF-53 Statistically significant connections are found between client completion of one or two programs and reduced target crimes (Table 33).

FSF-54 With respect to reduction in any offense it is not clear whether reduction is due to enrollment or finishing programs (Table 32).

<sup>1</sup> Finishing means: a) completed all requirements; b) stayed on the job at least 60 days; or c) remained in school at least 90 days.

### 3.0 SUMMARY OF CRS PROJECT FINDINGS

Each Client Resource Service Finding (CRSF) and its source<sup>1</sup> (document section and/or table number) is summarily set forth in this section. The reader is reminded that any comparison of performance by different groups is limited by the fact that biasing selection may have occurred, therefore, the findings are only suggestive with respect to comparative groups.

#### 3.1 CRS PROCESS OBJECTIVE FINDINGS

CRSF-1 CRS Process Objectives 1, 2, and 3 were not attained; however, they proved to be an inappropriate use of project resources and should not have been Process Objectives (Section 3.2).

CRSF-2 Process Objective CRS-4, to provide 50 target offenders vocational training per year was fully reached (111% of goal according to Section 3.3).

CRSF-3 The goals of Process Objective CRS-5, for 50% to complete vocational training programs was achieved (50% completed is indicated in Section 3.3, Table 5).

CRSF-4 Process Objective CRS-6 was completed at the 57% level; 222 of 390 job placements were made during the project study periods (285 per year required, according to Section 3.4).

CRSF-5 Process Objective CRS-7, calling for 50% of those placed to remain on the job at least six months proved beyond project abilities as only 33% were able to do so (Section 3.4).

CRSF-6 Process Objective CRS-8 requires 108 clients and their families to receive an average of 82 hours of individual

or group counseling during the 17 months of project life. The number of clients receiving counseling (142) exceeded the goal (134% of goal); however, the number of hours 1979 were only 33% of goal (Section 3.5).

CRSF-7 Process Objective CRS-9 regarding counseling impact on employment and family support could not be evaluated because of lack of data.

CRSF-8 Efforts to match citizen sponsors (71 required) to institutionalized target offenders preparatory to their re-entry into the community fell 20% short (57) on Process Objective CRS-10 (Section 3.6).

CRSF-9 Monthly contacts of 79% of the matched sponsors with target offenders fell 11% shy of the 90% desired in Process Objective CRS-11 (Section 3.6). To this must be added the 100% lack of contacts on the 14 unmatched target offenders (Section 3.6).

CRSF-10 According to Process Objective CRS-12, an estimated 17 persons would be required to have had residential care by the seventeenth month of the project; 27, or 159% of goal was achieved (Section 3.7).

CRSF-11 Programs of all residential care facilities utilized precluded client employment; therefore, Process Objective CRS-13 was not achievable.

CRSF-12 Process Objective CRS-14 requiring the provision of \$120 to \$320 for each of 350 target offenders for cost of living subsidies each year, or for 496 offenders during the 17 month study period, was more than met (174%) by the provision of 864 clients with an average of \$299 each (Section 3.8).

<sup>1</sup>"Evaluation Report on Oregon Corrections Impact Program: Client Resources and Services Project", Sacramento, California, American Justice Institute, September 17, 1976.

### 3.2 CRS PROJECT EFFECTS UPON CLIENT RECIDIVISM

• In terms of overall effects of CRS operations on client recidivism, the following findings accrued (Tables C-1 and C-2):

CRSF-13 No statistically significant connection was found between CRS involvement with the case and client arrests for target or non-target crimes.

CRSF-14 Non-target arrests were significantly reduced among probationers; however, this was not connected with CRS case involvement (Table C-2).

CRSF-15 Neither target nor non-target arrests were significantly affected by CRS provision of subsistence monies.

• Looking for connections between intensity of Impact services, amount of subsistence dollars expended, and outcome (Tables C-3 and C-4):

CRSF-16 There is no statistically significant connection between intensity of service and arrest rates for target or non-target offenses.

CRSF-17 There is no significant connection between non-target arrests and subsistence level (Table C-4).

CRSF-18 Target arrests were not statistically connected with level of subsistence provided; yet, target arrests were highest among clients receiving the highest level of subsistence dollars.

CRSF-19 There is no significant connection between intensity of Impact services, subsistence level, and client arrests of target or non-target offenses (Tables C-3 and C-4).

• In terms of possible differential CRS effects on clients of varying age or prior exposure to the correctional process, data indicate that: (Tables C-5, C-6, C-7 and C-8)

CRSF-20 There is no statistically significant connection between client age at intake to Impact and arrests for target or non-target offenses.

CRSF-21 There is no significant connection between client age and probation or parole status; yet, non-target crimes are significantly lower among probationers than parolees (this is not, however, associated with whether the client was serviced by CRS).

CRSF-22 Subsistence level is not connected statistically with age or client assignment to probation or parole.

CRSF-23 No statistically significant connection was found between client age, assignment to probation or parole, subsistence level, and arrests for target or non-target offenses.

CRSF-24 There is no significant connection between prior supervision length and target or non-target arrests.

CRSF-25 There is no significant relationship between length of prior supervision and client assignment to probation or parole.

CRSF-26 There is no significant connection between age at intake to Impact, probation or parole status, length of prior supervision, and arrests for target or non-target crimes.

• In examining for possible effects of different combinations of client characteristics implied by age and prior supervision length, findings reveal that: (Tables C-9 and C-10):

CRSF-27 There is no significant connection between age, subsistence level, length of supervision - prior to

Impact program intake, and arrests for target or non-target crimes.

CRSF-28 There is no significant connection between combinations of age/prior supervision length and arrests for target or non-target crimes.



APPENDIX B

PROGRAM PROCESS OBJECTIVES

TABLE B-1

DIAGNOSTIC CENTER PROCESS OBJECTIVES

- DC-1 To provide presentence reports with social, psychological, vocational and educational evaluations, and/or recommendations for sentencing and treatment plans for 90% of the target offenders found guilty in the Circuit Courts of Multnomah County and referred to the Diagnostic Center for evaluation.
- DC-2 To reduce the time of presentence report submission to the Court to a maximum of 15 working days in 90% of the cases referred.
- DC-3 To insure that 90% of the first phase of the Diagnostic Center treatment plans (service categories) are implemented within 30 working days, provided the service is available and the client is eligible.
- DC-4 To provide probation field services with an average of 20 hours per month of consultation for target offenders upon request of field supervisors.

**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

TABLE B-2

## FIELD SERVICES PROCESS OBJECTIVES

- FS-1 Devise a case plan for 100% of the clients within thirty (30) working days of referral, to include diagnostic assessment and mutually established program objectives, sequential order of objective achievement and discharge goals.
- FS-2 Implement initial phase of case plan in 90% of the cases within thirty (30) working days of referral; maintain this rate for duration of project.
- FS-3 Insure that 60% of the cases, the treatment activities within the case plan are initiated within the specified time frames.
- FS-4 Insure that no more than 40% of the Diagnostic Center case plans have to be changed during the course of supervision, for each project year.
- FS-5 Increase by 50% over the first six months the number of recommended placement that are accepted by available resources, by the end of the first year, and maintain rate for project duration.
- FS-6 Reduce by 40% by end of year one, 50% by end of year two, and 60% by end of year three, the rate of unemployment of the client.
- FS-7 Reduce by % the length of periods of unemployment by end of year one, additional % by end of year two, and additional % by end of year three over the preceding year's performance. \*\*
- FS-8 Increase by % the per capita earnings of clients over the period of supervision. \*\*
- FS-9 Increase by 10% over the first six months the resolution of family conflicts which have previously figured in the client's criminal *crime risk* behavior; an additional 15% by the end of the second year, and 30% by the end of the third year.
- FS-10 Reduce by 10% by the end of year one, 25% by end of year two, and 30% by end of year three, individual's money management problems, as reported by parole officer or other key educators.
- FS-11 Of those clients who violate, insure that those who abscond or who lose contact with parole/probation staff do not exceed 30% in the first year, 20% in the second year and 10% in the third year.
- FS-12 Reduce by 10% in the first year, 12% in the second year, and 15% in the third year the frequency of convictions for target offenses by clients.
- FS-13 Reduce by 10% the first year, 20% the second year, and 30% in the third year the length of stay under supervision of those who successfully complete parole or probation (early release).

\*\* Never specified because baseline data not available at time of proposal.

TABLE B-3

## CLIENT RESOURCES AND SERVICES PROCESS OBJECTIVES

- CRS-1 Provide remedial and G.E.D. equivalency instruction to an average of two hundred fifty (250) county, state or federal supervised "target offenders" on release of discharge status each year when indicated in the case plan.
- CRS-2 Fifty percent (50%) of the released probationary and paroled illiterates enrolled will score at least 5.5 grade level on standardized examination following 320 hours of instruction.
- CRS-3 Fifty percent (50%) of those clients who complete G.E.D. qualifying instruction will pass the G.E.D. examination within 90 days of qualifying to take the test.
- CRS-4 Provide vocational training, which develops employable skills, in community colleges or state certified proprietary schools to an average of fifty (50) County, state or federal supervised "target offenders" and Corrections Division "high risk" trainees on release or discharge status each year.
- CRS-5 Fifty percent (50%) of those who are enrolled will receive certification upon completion of their training program.
- CRS-6 Place an average of two hundred seventy-five (275) unemployed target offenders and high risk trainees who are not placed by other projects in this program each year in jobs which are agreed to be appropriate and meaningful by both the client and the job developer.
- CRS-7 Fifty percent (50%) of those placed will remain in that employment for a minimum of six (6) months unless promoted or transferred to a more desirable position.
- CRS-8 Provide eighty-two (82) hours of individual and group counseling to an average of seventy-five (75) "target offenders" and their families each year.
- CRS-9 Following completion of counseling and/or release, within six months sixty percent (60%) of the clients will maintain steady employment and contribute to family support in accordance with negotiated plan for a period of six month.
- CRS-10 Job Therapy Incorporated will recruit, train and assign fifty (50) citizen sponsors to "target offenders" or institution "high risk" offenders during each year of the project to help offenders prepare for successful release.

TABLE B-3

(Continued)

- CRS-11 Ninety percent (90%) of these sponsors will visit once per month and maintain correspondence contact with clients over the course of commitment.
- CRS-12 Provide emergency and short-term (60-90 day) residential care and referral services for 40 target offenders during second year of project and an additional 40 during the third year.
- CRS-13 At any given time, thirty percent (30%) of the residents will have located employment and will be paying their maintenance expenses.
- CRS-14 Provide short-term (30-60 day) cost of living subsidies, at an average of \$40 per week, when recommended by Field Services supervisor, for an average of three hundred fifty (350) county, state or federal "target offenders" and Corrections Division "high risk" trainees on release or discharge status each year.

**END**

7. 11/11/11