JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS

National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
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

JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS

A Preliminary Report
of the Center for Criminal Justice
of the Harvard Law School

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FOREWORD

In 1970 Massachusetts embarked on a series of reforms in its juvenile correctional system that culminated in 1972 with the closing of its training schools.

The Center for Criminal Justice of the Harvard Law School has been evaluating the process and results of the reforms since the beginning. Now in its sixth year, the statewide evaluation includes five interrelated studies: 1) an evaluation of how programs are set up and function, 2) an organizational and political analysis of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, (DYS) regional offices and their work in designing and implementing programs, 3) the political processes at the State level as they relate to the activities of (DYS), 4) a study of youth subcultures within the previous training schools and new community-based programs, and 5) long-term tracking of a sample of nearly 400 youth who have been served by and discharged from the programs.

This monograph is a collection of reports and articles written during the course of the first four years of the evaluation. It constitutes an interim response on a variety of topics, including the history of the reforms, the research design of the project, an analysis of what happens in communities that are establishing and operating the new programs, and a number of other areas.

These are important pieces about a reform that has the potential for changing juvenile corrections in the United States. The evaluation warrants the close attention of everyone concerned about youth and delinquency, and particularly community-based correctional programming.

Sincerely,

Milton Luger
Assistant Administrator
Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention

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Introduction

In 1970 the Center for Criminal Justice of Harvard Law School began a study following the course of reforms then taking place in Massachusetts youth corrections. The study included both a retrospective component and a proposal to follow the reforms for a number of years into the future. Directed by Lloyd Ohlin, Alden Miller, and Robert Coates, the project has typically operated with a full-time staff of about 12 or 13 persons, with additional full-time staff during some summers, and some part-time staff year round. Data collection staff were broken into groups: one group specialized in the collection of data in the central administrative office of the youth corrections agency and in the surrounding state-level political environment; a second group specialized in the collection of data in the actual programs serving youth and in the regional administrations; a third and fourth group specialized in intensive data collection on the day-to-day processes, or subcultures, in selected programs.

The Center undertook to evaluate the reforms in the Massachusetts youth correctional system and to study the process of reform itself in order to shed some light not only on the impact of the new versus the old, but also on the administrative, organizational, and political problems of instituting new programs. The seven-year project has had three major goals: (1) to study the process and progress of reform; (2) to evaluate the various treatment programs for juveniles; and (3) to develop a more effective methodology for evaluating new programs.

The Center for Criminal Justice and the Department of Youth Services agreed at the beginning of the project that the Center would have free, continuing access to all aspects of the department's operations. In return, the Center would provide to the department periodic evaluations and reports of the department's policies and programs. Thus the department has had the advantage of continuing counsel from a large-scale research project geared specifically to its long-term needs, and the project has had full access to its research subject.

The project is now, at the end of 1976, about to begin its seventh and final year. Data collection is nearly finished and more effort is being turned serve as the project's final reports. The present volume is a preliminary assembly of selected reports, providing a sampling of most aspects of the research. The several sides of the project are most easily described in terms of the following five types of evaluation studies.

1. *A Cohort Analysis.* The cohort study consists of a sample of youth in the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. The study utilizes a panel design with four successive interviews for data collection. The members of the cohort are successive admissions to DYS during designated periods for the seven regions of the state. The four interviews establish a baseline as youth enter the department through the court and the detention process and follow them as they progress through the department's program to the point of discharge. The use of panel analysis will bring to bear on the question of departmental effectiveness a special methodological and analytical power that is not available elsewhere in the larger study. The Center for Criminal Justice regards the cohort analysis as one of the most important components in the larger research project. From the cohort analysis the Center hopes to be able to develop the most persuasive and powerful data on the effectiveness of new programs for the reintegration of the department's clients. This part of the study will represent the crucial evaluation of the end product of the reorganization and program reformation monitored in the rest of the study. It will thus make the results of the study as a whole more immediately accessible and useful to agencies interested in reform in other parts of the country.

2. *Evaluation of Program Organization and Function.* This type of evaluation relies on observation,

surveys, and strategic interviewing. It seeks to identify program strategies and to document the reactions of staff and youth to the various strategies, including for example, programs funded by the Governor's Committee, the University of Massachusetts Conference in 1972, or the efforts of LEAA-funded group homes to neutralize the resistance of local communities. The data relate to program strategies, processes of entry and discharge, physical structure and space, location, costs, number and flow of youth, number of staff, program needs perceived by staff, and measures taken to affect the distribution of responsibility, power, and reward among youth, between youth and staff, and between youth and the community. Of equal importance is the assessment of the role of community groups in the development of these programs.

3. *Program Subculture Study.* This study tries to pinpoint the critical factors that create a favorable social climate for constructive work with youth. The 1973 subculture study of group homes and nonresidential programs was a replication of an earlier one done in 1971 in the institutions. It probes differences among institutional, residential, and community group home subcultures. Data collection methods included participant observation techniques and informal and structured interviewing. This type of evaluation study affords an intimate knowledge of day-to-day interactions in different settings, and thus provides an indispensable supplement to knowledge derived from the other evaluation studies.

4. *Organizational and Political Analysis of Regional Offices.* The organizational and political analysis of regional offices is a monthly survey supplemented by routine contact with the regional offices. It deals with the operations of the regional offices that have replaced the administrative offices of the institutions as the organizational centers of field activity in DYS. This type of evaluation study concentrates on the DYS organization and programs, although in describing how DYS works at the regional level it must also deal with community groups. The monthly survey reveals the range and concentration of types of programs in each region and the community relationship to these programs. It covers planning and implementation of programs on the regional level and documents the effects of organizational and political efforts by the Boston Office at the state level.

5. *Organizational Efforts in the Boston Office and Political Efforts at the State Level.* The project collects data from observation and interviews concerning operations in the central office of DYS and political efforts at the state level. This work monitors planning, operations, and decision-making in crisis situations. The data range from the operation of specific units in the Boston Office, including the planning and administration units financed by the Governor's Committee, to the larger process that led to the initial stages of departmental reform, the enactment of reform legislation, the appointment of a new commissioner committed to a reform program, and the securing of federal funding, including LEAA and Governor's Committee funds. This kind of evaluation study keeps the project in touch with impending change in programs and also makes it possible to understand the organizational and political processes of reform.

The five types of evaluation studies that make up the overall project use a wide range of methods, such as participant observation, informal and formal interviewing, survey work, and records and documents. Together, the five types of study provide a variety of data cross-checks to assemble a valid representation of change and program development in DYS. They furnish a rich and interrelated set of facts and observations for analyzing how change comes about and what it means for the general public, special interest groups, staff, and the juvenile offenders committed to the system.

This Report

The first article in this volume, "Radical Correctional Reform: A Case Study of the Massachusetts Youth Correctional System," was written almost two years after the closing of the training schools, and tells the story of the reform up to that point, in late 1973, identifying and discussing what seemed at the time to be the major continuing issues. The article thus describes the investigations and political action leading up to the passage of reform legislation and the hiring of a new commissioner in the fall of 1969, and goes on to describe the initial attempts to reform the institutions themselves. It describes how the commissioner became discouraged with the progress of the reform and resolved to close the training schools entirely and replace them with programs in the community. In the years since the article was written the diversified system of programs described in the article has held up and even increased in its range of alternative placements for youth.

Of 1,912 youth being served by the Department of Youth Services in June 1975, for example, 40 percent were on traditional parole, and 56 percent were receiving nonresidential services. A few of the youth in nonresidential services were also receiving residential services. Of all youth not on parole, 19 percent were in foster care arrangements, 23 percent were in group care situations, and 10 percent were in secure care settings.

The reforms have also involved changes in detention practices prior to adjudication. Under the old system all detention was in secure settings. Under the new system, in June 1975, 56 youth were detained in secure settings, while 89 were detained in shelter care settings, typically in YMCAs, and 68 were detained in foster care settings. A small number of youth were being detained on reception status after adjudication prior to placement. Twelve youth were on reception status in secure settings, while 27 were in shelter care settings and 23 in foster care reception.

Some observers have been concerned about the possibility that the lesser reliance by the Department of Youth Services on secure care would result in the courts binding more youth over for adult trials, in order to bypass the probable placements in open settings by the youth agency. In fact, however, bindovers decreased from 143 in fiscal 1973 to 96 in fiscal 1974. The present pattern of bindovers is one where only a few judges account for most of the bindovers, and where a new judge may radically increase or decrease the bindover rate for a given court, obviously reflecting the predilections of the judge, rather than changing characteristics of youth. However, there is also some indication that bindovers may be rising very recently as part of a more conservative pattern of greater use of incarceration and longer sentences for adults and violent offenders.

Concern has been expressed about the possibility of more youth being detained in or sentenced to adult facilities. In 1968, however, there were 347 youth awaiting court disposition in adult jails, and 39 more in temporary custody, while in 1973 these numbers decreased to 68 and 24, and in 1974 they decreased further to 44 and 12. The number of youth sentenced to state adult correctional institutions has always been low, and has not changed markedly, with generally fewer than 10 youth per year being sentenced to state adult institutions.

It is difficult to be precise in comparisons of runaway rates, but it appears that about 25 percent of youth in both the old and new systems ran at least once during their stay with department programs. Although recidivism data are not yet complete, it appears that the reforms have not resulted in rising recidivism rates. In fact it is clear from the Massachusetts experience that it is possible to have large numbers of youth in open settings without increasing the danger to the community from recidivating youth.

The second article, "Community-Based Corrections: Concept, Impact, Dangers," addresses a broader issue of defining a community-based program, and considers the question of what impact such programs are already known to have and what pitfalls seem most immediate. The article emphasizes and elaborates the idea of linkages between the client and the community as the key factor in the extent to which a program can be defined as "community based." This is in contrast to many common definitions of community-based programs that refer to such things as the absence of institutions, location, size, and other such superficial characteristics of programs. The emphasis on what actually happens to the youth, rather than on the administrative arrangements for implementing a program, is characteristic of the project's orientation toward the classification of programs. Since this article was written in 1972, the conceptualization of the definition of a program as community based has been carried further and incorporated in a larger conceptualization used to locate programs in a property space including dimensions related to the social climate within the program as well as the linkages between its clients and the larger community. The resulting classification will be used as a major independent variable in an ongoing analysis of the effects of programs.

"Subcultures in Community-Based Programs," the third article, is part of the project's research into the day-to-day life of programs. This part of the study involved placing observer-interviewers in programs full time for up to one month. The data thus produced allows us to speak to day-to-day concerns, including the balancing of such partially conflicting goals as providing a humane and livable program environment that does not alienate, harm, or embitter youth; altering in a constructive fashion the self-image, values, attitudes, skills, knowledge, or habits of youth; establishing or re-establishing positive and supportive relationships between youth and relevant persons in the free community such as parents, teachers, employers, police, and peers; and maintaining direct control over the behavior of youth while they are under the agency jurisdiction. All of these seem like reasonable and essential goals, yet a person trying to operate a program may find that each can create serious problems for implementing the others. In this preliminary report from the subculture study we try to speak to these dilemmas.

The fourth piece, "An Exploratory Analysis of the Recidivism and Cohort Data," was written in the first half of 1975. It represents a first look at as much data on our cohort of youth going through the new community-based system as was available at that time. The cohort consists of youth entering the system at various times since January 1973, as is explained in more detail in the article. The report emphasizes three aspects of the recidivism data. First, there is thus far no evidence of any major change in recidivism rates for the entire state since the late 1960s. Second, there are major differences between program types, both now and in the late sixties. In both cases secure care programs are the ones with the high recidivism rates. In the newer system, since around 80 percent of the youth are in relatively open settings with relatively low recidivism rates, the policy implication is clear: it is possible to put the majority of youth in open settings without exposing the community to inordinate danger. This policy implication holds regardless of

whether the program differences are due to selection or program effect. Third, there are regional differences in the new system. In particular, the region that appears to have implemented the range of new programs most aggressively has cut its recidivism rate virtually in half.

The same article also treats such issues as how placement decisions are arrived at and the consequences of those decisions on later relationships and recidivism. One particularly intriguing preliminary finding is the importance of the detention decision as an influence on later decisions and consequences for the youth. Whether or not a youth is detained prior to his court hearing even influences his likelihood of recidivating after release from a program, months later, holding constant his personal characteristics and the program intervention itself.

The fifth part of this volume, "Neutralizing Community Resistance to Group Homes," was written early in the project but has emerged as a piece of considerable practical value to persons attempting to set up programs in community settings, not only in corrections but also in such areas as mental health. It is a concrete discussion of the practical problems of six group homes as they attempted to move into their various communities. Three failed and three succeeded. The comparisons in the article make it clear that the difference between success and failure is for the most part not a matter of luck, but rather a matter of common sense and hard work. It is interesting to note that in following the group homes in this small study as they later operated their programs, it became clear that the people who were best at dealing with the community in setting up a group home were not necessarily best at running a group home once it was set up. The three group homes that failed to get set up, and whose failures are documented in the article, later tried again and succeeded. Some of them ultimately operated much better group homes than some of the agencies that succeeded in getting set up the first time.

The sixth article, "Some Observations on the Conceptualization and Replicability of the Massachusetts Reforms," draws, like the first, "Radical Correctional Reform," on all of the data of the project, but with more formal intent. The article was written in late 1975. It reports conceptual work begun in 1971 as part of the DYS project, which culminated in a mathematical simulation of the reform process in 1974. It includes compact interviewing instruments for generating summary or overview data on critical variables in 1975 and 1976. The mathematical simulation included a projection through 1976, which has proved accurate in pinpointing what are indeed now issues of great concern in 1976. The importance of the article lies both in its suggestion that there is something systematic and predictable about what has appeared to many as a chaotic process of reform and counter-reform and in its presentation of a method of interviewing to measure the critical variables in those processes in many different settings. The interview form reported on in the article usually takes about two hours. The project has since developed a closed ended interview that takes a little more than half an hour. The two interviews, one open ended and the other closed ended, work well together. In a current survey we are using the open ended form for one-sixth of the respondents and the closed ended form for the other five-sixths of the sample.

The final article, "Preliminary Thoughts on Generalizing from the Massachusetts Experience," was written in late 1975, and represents the project's first work in analyzing data relating to the question of whether Massachusetts as a setting for reform is sufficiently similar to other states for the assumption to be made that what took place in Massachusetts might also take place elsewhere. While much work remains to be done on the question, it is clear that Massachusetts is far from unique in its crime profile and in its basic socio-demographic characteristics. It seems likely indeed that necessary preconditions for reform could occur elsewhere.

Past and Future

The past two years, 1975 and 1976, have been a period of difficulty and consolidation for the Department of Youth Services. A new Democratic administration replaced the Republican one as a result of the gubernatorial election of 1974. The Commissioner of the Department of Youth Services, Joseph Leavy, was retained in an acting capacity throughout 1975 while the new state administration wrestled with a severe fiscal crisis in state services.

The change in the executive branch produced much anxiety within the department over policy direction and the security of jobs. These worries at times crept through the entire system and created a sense of paralysis. Many months during 1975 were devoted to the closing of Roslindale, the last major symbolic vestige of the institutional system. Owing to a number of pressures it was not entirely closed, although the number of youth were reduced to about 20. Whether that number will remain constant is a major question. Considerable work was achieved in planning programs for girls, and these efforts have been rewarded with a sizable federal grant.

In terms of secure care, the past two years have been frustrating. New programs were established and other new programs closed. That the department should have difficulty establishing secure care programs is not surprising. No state seems to have the answer to the problem of dealing with the most difficult youth. This problem continues to plague the new commissioner, John Calhoun, who took office in January 1976. To cope with it more successfully he requested the Governor of the Commonwealth to appoint a special task force, which is now preparing its report.

The final reports of the project, to which attention is turning now that data collection is nearly complete, will consist of five books. Two of the books report subculture studies – one based on data before the closing of the institutions, the other afterward, showing the new community-based programming. A third book will treat the conceptualization and theoretical analysis of the change process, while a fourth will report analysis and implications from the cohort data. The fifth book will combine a case analysis of the Massachusetts experience with a description and analysis of the ideological currents, both local and national, which came together to form the positions that became embroiled in conflict in Massachusetts. All five books will stress policy implications of the analysis.

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I. Radical Correctional Reform: A Case Study Of The Massachusetts Youth Correctional System

Lloyd E. Ohlin,
Robert B. Coates,
and Alden D. Miller

 This chapter first appeared in slightly altered form in *Harvard Educational Review*, 44 (February 1974), 74-111. The authors wish to express appreciation to John Albach, Judy Caldwell, Barry Feld, Robert Fitzgerald, David Garwood, Paula Garwood, Alan Johnson, Arlette Klein, Cliff Robinson, Barbara Stolz, Arthur Swann, Christian Teichgraeber, Ann Yates, and Alma Young for their work in collecting data for the project.

The most fundamental assumptions in the field of youth corrections are under attack, and since 1969 the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services has been the most visible national symbol of a new philosophy of corrections through its repudiation of the public training school approach and its advocacy of therapeutic communities and alternative community-based services. The radical symbolism of the Massachusetts reforms is heightened by the fact that the first public training school for boys in the United States was established at Westboro, Massachusetts, in 1846, and the first public training school for girls at Lancaster, Massachusetts, in 1854. Since then the public training school has become the last resort for dealing with delinquent youth, though a small number may face adult criminal court and confinement in adult prisons.

Punishment is a key organizing principle of traditional training schools. There are efforts at vocational and general education in the training schools, but the institutions are basically custodial and authoritarian. Resocialization efforts are commonly reduced to instruments for creating conformity, deference to adult authority, and obedience to rules. Regimented marching formations, shaved heads and close haircuts, omnipresent officials, and punitive disciplinary measures have been the authoritative marks of the training school, along with the manipulation of privileges, such as cigarette smoking, television viewing, home visits, or release to reward compliance.

Criticism of the traditional training school has come from three major sources. For many years the documentation of high rates of recidivism among training school graduates has created pressure for new solutions. For example, the pioneering studies of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck offered painstakingly assembled evidence of the high rates of arrest and conviction of new offenses among those exposed to training school experiences.[1] The classic studies by Shaw and McKay in the Chicago area project and the Illinois Institute of Juvenile Research documented the role of traditional training schools as agencies for socializing young people into adult criminal careers.[2] They showed how exposure to these institutions labeled young people as "delinquent" or "criminal," and how family, school, neighborhood, job market, and criminal justice agencies reinforced the stigma, resulting in high rates of recidivism. These early studies have been supported by more recent work.[3]

A second source of criticism has come from the development of new ideologies of treatment in the human services. These approaches argue that individual and group counseling and therapy will lead to personal insight and better social adjustment. They urge that the problems of youth offenders be considered in the context of family and communal relations where preparation for law-abiding adulthood ordinarily occurs.[4] This search for community-

[1] Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, *Criminal Careers in Retrospect* (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1943).

[2] Clifford R. Shaw, *The Jack Roller, A Delinquent Boy's Own Story* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); Clifford R. Shaw et al., *Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency, A Study for the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement*, vol. 2, no. 13 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931); Henry D. McKay, "Report on the Criminal Careers of Male Delinquents in Chicago," in President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).

[3] Paul Lerman, "Evaluative Studies of Institutions for Delinquents: Implications for Research and Social Policy," *Social Work*, 13 (July 1968), 55-64.

[4] President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency, Report*, chap. 2.

based treatment resources has derived support from research studies that document the pervasiveness of delinquent conduct through all social classes.[5] These studies have underscored the bias involved in employing public training schools as a principal means of control and treatment for primarily lower class offenders.[6] Practitioners have accordingly begun to stress the efficacy of benign nonintervention, diversion to noncriminal-justice treatment programs, or privately purchased services for the poor as more constructive and less stigmatizing solutions to the authority problems of lower class youthful offenders, and more nearly equivalent to solutions employed extensively in the middle class for similar problems.[7]

A third major source of challenge to the traditional training school has come from those concerned with protecting the civil rights of children. The U.S. Supreme Court decision *in re Gault* in 1967 stimulated test cases exploring the constitutionally protected rights of children.[8] These cases are beginning to focus on what due process means for children and to raise issues relating to a "right to treatment" as well as a "right to be let alone."[9] They have called greater attention to whether treatment programs adequately take account of the best interests of the child. Given this new critical exploration of the rights of children, it is understandable that the concepts and practices of the traditional training school have come under increasing attack.

These challenges to training schools have posed problems for Massachusetts and many other states. What new system of services or intervention criteria should replace the existing system? How is it possible to change the system into one which relies primarily on community-based treatment? What programs should be created? How should resources be reallocated, staff developed, and appropriate distributions of private and public responsibilities for service be arranged? Finally, how can we be sure that the new system produces better results than the one it supplants?

The response in Massachusetts to these questions is discussed in the following account. It draws freely on the evaluation studies of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services conducted by the Center for Criminal Justice at the Harvard Law School between 1969 and 1973. A final appraisal must await more complete analysis, but the widespread interest in the Massachusetts experiment justifies a review of the reform effort and some of the problems it encountered.

[5] James F. Short, Jr., and F. Ivan Nye, "Extent of Unrecorded Delinquency, Tentative Conclusions," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, 49 (November-December 1958), 296-302; Ronald L. Akers, "Socio-Economic Status and Delinquent Behavior: A Retest," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 1 (January 1964), 38-46; President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, *Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency Report:* Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).

[7] Elizabeth Vorenberg and James Vorenberg, "Early Diversion from the Criminal Justice System: Practice in Search of a Theory," in Lloyd E. Ohlin, ed., *Prisoners in America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).

[8] Sanford J. Fox, *Cases and Materials on Modern Juvenile Justice* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1972).

[9] Ted Rubin, *Law as an Agent of Delinquency Prevention* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social and Rehabilitation Service, Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration, 1971).

Phase I: Emergence of a Mandate for Reform

A series of crises in youth correctional services in Massachusetts culminated in March 1969 with the resignation of the director of Youth Services, which prepared the way for reform. Prior to 1948 Massachusetts judges committed children directly to individual institutions for the care of delinquent boys and girls. New legislation in 1948 and 1952 created a Youth Service Board and a Division of Youth Services (DYS) nominally within the Department of Education but administratively autonomous. The Youth Service Board, whose chairman was also director of DYS, made decisions concerning the placement of youth within the institutions, their transfer, parole, and discharge.

The director from 1952 to 1969, Dr. John D. Coughlin, was an articulate and vigorous advocate of the philosophy of youth training schools. Over these years the rhetoric of rehabilitation and conspicuous successes in such programs as the forestry camp and other helpful enterprises obscured the basically custodial and authoritarian grounding of this system. The available results of earlier studies are fragmentary but the rates of recidivism varied from 40 to 70 percent depending upon the age group, length of follow-up, and criteria of recidivism employed.[10] At the time of Coughlin's resignation in 1969 the DYS included a unit for delinquency prevention, an office for the supervision of parole for boys and one for girls, and ten institutions including four detention and reception centers, a forestry camp, a school for preadolescent boys at Oakdale, a school for younger male adolescents at Lyman, an industrial school for older boys at Shirley, the Institution for Juvenile Guidance for troublesome and emotionally disturbed boys at Bridgewater, and an industrial school for girls at Lancaster.

From 1965 to 1968 the DYS was the subject of six major critical studies. The initial investigations were stimulated by reports of brutal and punitive treatment of youth at the Institution for Juvenile Guidance at Bridgewater. The publicity attending these charges led Governor John A. Volpe to request a study and recommendations from technical experts in the Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

The HEW study found many deficiencies in the Massachusetts system.[11] It pointed to the dominance of custodial goals and practices over those of treatment, the lack of effective centralized supervision and direction of child care, the absence of an adequate diagnostic and classification system, the failure to develop flexible and professional personnel practices, and the ineffectiveness of parole supervision. These findings were confirmed by a blue ribbon committee of local experts appointed by Governor Volpe in 1967 under the sponsorship of Dr. Martha Elliot, chairman of the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth and former director of the Children's Bureau in HEW. The criticisms developed in these studies and their recommendations were supported by further investigations initiated by the attorney general and by senate committees. These investigations crystalized the formation of a coalition of civic and professional groups in support of major reforms. Periodic crises in the DYS became increasingly the focus of newspaper attention and mobilized a critical audience in the general public.[12]

The liberal coalition led by the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth introduced reform legislation in 1968, but passage was deferred until the following year. In the interim a new major crisis developed at the Institute for Juvenile Guidance at Bridgewater. Staff factions developed within the institution around clinical as opposed to punitive treatment of youth behavior problems and this conflict was documented in the public press. A local community group, the Committee for Youth in Trouble, organized to support the clinical services faction. It joined with the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth to broaden the attack on the goals and policies of the DYS and the ability of the director and his staff to administer an effective treatment program.[13]

[10] Estimates provided in interviews with DYS officials and former DYS officials.

[11] U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Welfare Administration, Children's Bureau, "A Study of the Division of Youth Service and Youth Service Board, Commonwealth of Massachusetts" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966).

[12] The exploitation of crises for the formation of coalitions of criticism and defense of public agencies in the process of reform is described more fully in Lloyd E. Ohlin, "Organizational Reform in Correctional Agencies" in Daniel Glaser, ed., *A Handbook on Criminology* (New York: Rand McNally, 1974).

[13] For a more detailed statement of these events *see* Yitzhak Bakal, ed., *Closing Correctional Institutions* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1973), pp. 151-180.

In January 1969 Governor Francis Sargent was inaugurated to complete the unexpired term of Governor Volpe. Governor Sargent expressed his strong support for the reform legislation. He secured the resignation of the director, appointed an interim one and a blue ribbon committee to undertake a national search for a new commissioner, signed into law new legislation reorganizing the DYS in September 1969, and appointed Dr. Jerome Miller as commissioner of the reorganized Department of Youth Services in October 1969, on the recommendation of the search committee.

Commissioner Miller took charge of the new department with a mandate from the legislative and executive branches of the state government and the liberal reform groups to initiate more progressive policies and treatment of delinquent youth. Though some specific recommendations for change in the goals of the department had been proposed in the earlier investigations, primarily in the direction of more effective clinical and diagnostic services and community supervision, the mandate was in the main broad and undefined.

Phase II: Reforming Institutional Treatment

Commissioner Miller had earned his doctoral degree in social work while in military service, and subsequently had organized a new institution for the disturbed or delinquent children of American Air Force personnel in England. For a brief period following his service discharge he served as training officer in the Department of Youth Corrections in Maryland. He then taught in the School of Social Work at Ohio State University where he helped develop training and treatment programs in both the juvenile and adult correctional services in Ohio.

The search committee was especially impressed with Miller's deep concern for youth in trouble and his sense of urgency, as well as confidence, that better ways could be developed to help them. He expressed special attraction to a post as commissioner where a commitment to reform had already been made. He thought that the effectiveness of institutional services for youth could be greatly increased by applying the treatment principles developed in therapeutic communities for adults by Maxwell Jones in England and Scotland.[14] These strengths overcame the search committee's two major reservations about Miller's administrative and political competence. First, his professional career had not tested his capacity to administer a human service agency of this size and scope. Second, he had not had experience dealing with the political considerations that deeply penetrate the organization and operation of state bureaus in Massachusetts.

During the first two years of his administration, Miller sought to humanize services for delinquent children, and to build a more therapeutic climate within the institutions. Throughout this period his efforts were severely hampered by financial and personnel constraints. First, it was almost a year before he obtained appropriations to staff the new positions and services authorized by the reform legislation. Appropriations were still allocated, within the line budget of the DYS, to particular institutions, staff positions, and services. To reallocate funds was a very cumbersome and lengthy process that wound its way through the state Administration and Finance Office and the legislative appropriations committee. Second, the rigidity of the civil service system made it virtually impossible to transfer personnel between institutions and services except on a voluntary basis. Massachusetts personnel practices mix political patronage with civil service procedures for recruiting and protecting employees in the positions to which they are certified. With few staff vacancies and without new or transferable funds the prospects of effecting major reforms during the first year appeared remote indeed. Even with additional funds during the second year the pervasive wait-and-see attitude of entrenched staff promised little change. The challenge confronting Miller was to mobilize and release energy for change.

Articulation of Goals

Shortly after his appointment as the new commissioner, Miller began to define the goals of his administration. He stated to the staff, the press, and civic, professional, and religious groups that he intended to humanize the treatment of offenders and to build therapeutic communities within existing institutional facilities. This model of treatment would require a democratic relationship between staff and youth in small units. A social climate had to be created in which both staff and youth were encouraged to express their feelings and concerns freely and honestly. Decisions relating to housekeeping problems, discipline, privileges, home visits, and release were to be made openly in cottage meetings after full discussion.

This treatment model challenged the basic features of the traditional training school system. Little change could be expected until the differences in philosophy, goals, staff and youth roles, and the processes of decision making could be dramatized, justified, and enforced.

One of the first directives, issued by the new commissioner in November 1969, ordered that henceforth youth in the institutions would be allowed to wear their hair as they chose. The "haircut edict" raised a storm of protest and cries of permissiveness among staff long accustomed to shaving boys' heads on admission, regulating length, and using haircuts as punishment. It is doubtful that Miller fully recognized at first the sensitivity of this issue. In the emerging youth style of the times thirty-eight-year-old Miller wore his own hair longer than most state officials. Hair style and length were hotly contested in many families, schools, and business establishments as a visible symbol of the revolt of youth against adult regulations. Miller vigorously defended the edict to dramatize the new administration's desire to accord committed youth greater freedom and shrugged off derogatory staff references to the "hippy commissioner." The resonance of this issue with a large number of moral issues relating to authority, allocation of discretion, responsibility, initiative, and self-expression gave the directive a symbolic value of great importance. It clearly cast Miller as a youth advocate in opposition to traditional expectations and established the basic issues and roles of future dramas.

As the protest simmered down, other directives followed. It was ordered that youth should be allowed to wear their own street clothes rather than institutional garments. The practice of marching in silent formation from one activity to another was discontinued. Staff protested: greater freedom of movement made running away easier and street clothes made committed youth more difficult to identify it they had run away. The edicts signified to staff that custodial concerns would increasingly be subordinated to treatment objectives.

Miller became convinced that he could not successfully establish the therapeutic community model until he had removed the basic supports of the traditional system. He looked especially to the fear of greater punishment, deprivation, or personal degradation that constituted the keystone of the authority system throughout the institutions. He immediately turned, then, to the Institute for Juvenile Guidance at Bridgewater and Cottage 9 at Shirley, reserved for those youngsters seen as most disturbed or rebellious. These institutions represented the final sanctions in a graduated set of possible control measures to induce conformity by restrictions on freedom of movement, denial of privileges, physical abuse, enforced idleness, silence, and gestures of deference toward adult authorities. Miller initiated measures to humanize both sites. A general order forbade any staff member to strike or physically abuse youth. Other directives tried to eliminate the stultifying routines of enforced idleness and silence in the punishment units and the use of strip cells and other measures of extreme isolation. An effort was made to introduce more constructive activities. Greater controls were imposed on screening and assignment to these units and the duration of stay. Frequent, unannounced inspection visits were used to discourage evasions of the new directives. Even these measures did not seem sufficient. By midsummer of 1970 the commissioner had paroled or transferred the youth committed to Bridgewater and he then closed the institution. Cottage 9 at Shirley remained in some measu a symbol of the old system until it the winter of 1971-72 it, too, was closed.

The difficulty the commissione encountered in changing procedur in these facilities testified to the tenacity of the principles of punish ment and enforced adult authority Cottage and program staff over the years had come to accept them as indispensable to preserving order a inducing conformity. Other metho of establishing adult authority thro superior knowledge, mutual trust a respect, admiration, emulation, and affection were also occasionally evi dent. The new administration sough to encourage these more difficult a demanding forms of authority relationships with youth. To achieve this, however, they felt convenient resort to traditional punishment measures had to be removed or mad more difficult.

The new administration took oth steps to alter the control system. Fc example, a new directive authorized youth eligible to smoke to carry the own cigarettes. Previously, youth ha surrendered their cigarettes to staff members who issued them as a reward for doing chores or withheld them as punishment. Doling out cigarettes or denying access to them constituted for staff a simple but very useful control measure for enforcing authority. Like the "haircut edict," the "cigarette edict" both dramatized a change in goals and altered control alternatives available to staff.

All of these administrative actions led to strong protests by line staff members to institution superintendents and friends in the legislature. Fo a time resistant staff members or their friends appeared regularly when Miller gave speeches to community groups to raise questions about the loss of control and the threat of mass runaways to local communities. To the extent that staff capacity to control youth relied on these traditional

[14] Maxwell Jones et al., *The Therapeutic Community* (New York: Basic Books, 1953).

control measures, their complaints were indeed justified. It was not clear when these directives were issued whether the administration could retrain staff in the uses of authority.

New Treatment Programs and Policies

The new administration sought to demonstrate the value and feasibility of new models of treatment. As funds became available staff was recruited and assigned to the newly created bureaus of institutions, education, clinical services, and after-care. Assistant commissioners were appointed to direct each of the four bureaus. By the end of Miller's first year, his central office staff exercised a more definitive role in the development of programs to implement the new philosophy of treatment. Despite the hostility of conservative staff members, many youth and especially younger professional staff members expressed a desire to experiment with a therapeutic community model. No one except Miller, however, seemed to know how such a treatment program should be operated and what it would require of staff and youth.

To help answer some of these questions the commissioner persuaded Dr. Maxwell Jones, whose methods he had observed in England, to lead a three-day conference of staff and youth at the Shirley Institution. Jones explained the principles of a therapeutic community and directed a series of demonstrations involving youth and staff. The demonstration groups created an open climate for staff and youth to express feelings and concerns and to direct them toward constructive ends. Jones' personal skill and warmth during these demonstrations drew applause from most staff and youth, but it was clear that for many staff members the shift from traditional staff roles would not only be very difficult and slow but in many cases impossible to achieve.

The conference reinforced the new policy of decentralization at Shirley so that not only cottage life experiences but also educational, vocational, and other forms of counseling or therapy would be self-contained within each cottage unit. The pressure from the new administrators at the Boston Office to adopt the new group treatment policies spread from Shirley to Lyman and Lancaster during the next year and a half, reinforced by dramatic changes in staff assignments, described below. Many cottages continued to operate in the traditional manner, but others experimented, sometimes with remarkable success, in establishing a therapeutic community.

In the summer and fall of 1971 the Center for Criminal Justice at Harvard University conducted studies in cottages at Shirley, Lyman, Lancaster, and Topsfield. These studies compared the attitudes of staff and youth in traditional cottages to those trying the therapeutic model. Table 1.1 shows differences in youth reactions to the social climate of experimental and traditional cottages just prior to the closing of the major institutions in the late fall of 1971 and early 1972. These, and results of related studies, demonstrate consistently that decentralized cottage treatment and group therapy could lead to remarkably better reactions and experiences even for youth within the same institution. The reactions of the youth reveal significance differences between the therapeutic community and the traditional custodial model. The idea of the therapeutic community is to restructure the authority system of the cottage, with youth taking new responsibilities for decisions affecting themselves and each other on matters ranging from privileges in the cottage to home visits and ultimately release on parole. It seeks to cultivate a sense of group cohesiveness to offset the usual tendency for the cottage to splinter into "tough," "punk," "good kid," and staff cliques, which achieve control by allowing the toughest youth to dominate the others.

Several attempts were made to create programs for girls and boys in the same institution and even the same cottage. The first such program set up a cottage at the Lyman School for Boys for girls transferred from Lancaster. A cottage was also created at Lancaster for young boys from Oakdale for whom home placements were difficult to find. This made it possible to train older girls in the care and management of younger children. After a serious fire at the girls' detention and reception center in Boston, girls were housed in the same building as boys in Boston and later at a new detention and reception cottage for girls at Lyman. Coed cottages were established on the grounds of the Shirley Institution and later at Lancaster and Topsfield. It was expected that if boys and girls shared the same institution or cottage, their demeanor, grooming, speech, and conduct would improve. Stereotypic sex role beliefs and attitudes on the part of both boys and girls might be changed. Comparative data on youth reactions in coed and non-coed settings are not yet available but staff reports suggest that many of these expectations were realized and a high level of staff acceptance emerged despite initial fears of sexual promiscuity and lack of discipline.

When Miller came into office the average length of stay for youth in the institutions was eight months. Since he had become convinced that the traditional training school programs ordinarily did more harm than good, he began to encourage a more rapid turnover. By the end of the first year, the more liberal parole policies had begun to create tension with the courts, probation, and police departments in a number of communities, especially urban ones. Many staff members in these agencies felt that confinement for less than nine months was too short to realize the benefits of re-education or community protection for which commitment had been ordered. To deal with these concerns, while the new treatment programs were being developed, the commissioner ordered that committed youth be kept in the institutions a minimum of three months before becoming eligible for parole, except in unusual cases. Youth and staff rather quickly interpreted the three-month minimum as a maximum, and so the normal institutional confinement dropped to around three months.

Table 1.1

Youth Response to Social Climate Items in Experimental and Traditional Cottages.

Social Climate Item[a]	Cottage Type	
	Experimental (%)	Traditional (%)
If the kids really want to, they can share in decisions about how this cottage is run.	94	85
Kids in the cottage will help a new kid get along.	91	65
Kids in this cottage usually tell someone when they think he's done something wrong.	89	77
I feel very much that I fit here.	82	52
The cottage staff deals fairly and squarely with everyone.	80	57
If a kid messes up, the staff will punish her/him.	66	81
Most kids here are just interested in doing their time.	65	81
If a kid does well, other kids will tell him so personally.	61	34
Other kids will reward a kid for good behavior.	60	37
Other kids here give you a bad name if you insist on being different.	38	61
The kids in this cottage have their own set of rules on how to behave that are different from those of the staff.	36	57
There are a few kids here who run everything.	35	59
There are too many kids here who push other kids around.	33	62
This cottage is more concerned with keeping kids under control than with helping them with their problems.	30	61
Real friends are hard to find in this cottage.	25	44
This cottage is pretty much split into two different groups, with staff in one and kids in the other.	19	55

[a] The items in this table differentiate between the experimental and traditional cottages more strongly than one would expect to be the case by chance at the .05 level. In the experimental cottages, the number of youth responding to each question varies from 85 to 89; and in the traditional cottages, from 82 to 86.

The more rapid turnover meant that educational and vocational training programs patterned on an academic year had to be redefined and reorganized. The emphasis shifted to tutorial programs involving community volunteers and paid professionals. The former vocational training programs that continued were used for basic maintenance services within the institution or for the occupation of idle time. STEP (Student Tutor Educational Program) illustrates the effect of changing policies on the organization of retraining programs. STEP used trained tutors for small group programs to create an interest in learning among imprisoned offenders and a desire to pursue higher levels of education. The program had been developed in adult correctional institutions but was introduced for youth at Shirley in 1970. Subject matter included both formal and informal instruction in such subjects as English, arithmetic, social problems, photography, and auto mechanics. Reading and arithmetic skills were taught in the context of auto mechanics, which interested many boys.

As the new administration policies shifted from centralized institutional programs to decentralized cottage programs, the STEP instructors confined their tutorial activities to particular cottages. They began to integrate their work into the counseling and therapy programs of the cottages. The shorter periods of confinement shifted emphasis from the assimilation of organized learning materials

to the redirection of attitudes, motivation, and training in social interaction. The STEP instructors gradually became full-time cottage treatment staff members and STEP as a special institutional program was discontinued.

The new commissioner urged staff members throughout DYS to suggest and implement ideas for better treatment programs. While some staff members enjoyed the new freedom to try out their ideas, they complained, sometimes bitterly, that their efforts were not sufficiently supported by the administration. For example, the STEP tutors complained on several occasions about the lack of adequate support for their program and particularly the lack of direction or a "broad master-plan."

The commissioner firmly believed the traditional training school practices would not be tolerated if they were fully exposed to public view. He therefore encouraged community visitors and volunteers to help run the programs in the institutions, advocated a much more active use of local community facilities and programs suitable for young offenders, and used people from universities and civic groups throughout the state in volunteer programs. In addition, youth left institution grounds for various educational and recreational field trips. These efforts to involve the community were not generally promoted vigorously by institutional staff. Perhaps one of the most successful programs was developed between the Westfield Reception and Dention Center and the School of Education at the University of Massachusetts. The Westfield institution was becoming severely overcrowded, and the staff saw community programs as a means of relief. The use of student and faculty volunteers as teachers and counselors was incorporated into the curriculum of the School of Education with students receiving academic credit for their work at Westfield.

The Problem of Staff Development

The new program ideas could not be realized without the help of staff committed to the new philosophy of treatment and competent to develop programs to implement it. Miller's problem of recruiting or retraining staff for this purpose was formidable. The civil service system in Massachusetts was grafted onto a system of political patronage grounded in an ethnically based structure of political power. The legal requirement to give absolute preference to veterans, in addition to the tradition of political sponsorship, had served on the whole to subordinate merit as a qualification for state employment. Once past the probationary period, employees obtained virtually absolute security in their civil service positions. Miller could not bring in many new staff members unless he secured new funds and created new positions or unless voluntary retirement and resignation became widespread.

Miller's options were limited. He could fill job vacancies with new staff members of his own choosing while searching for loyal adherents of the new philosophy within the existing staff; he could reassign authority and responsibility without regard to civil service classification; or, he could retrain and educate older staff members to the new philosophies of treatment. He pursued all three options, tentatively during the first year, and more vigorously during the second year as new funds became available.

A survey of staff members of the Department of Youth Services during the summer of 1970 showed that many of them, especially those in academic, clinical, or Boston Office assignments, wanted to give the new policies and philosophy of treatment a chance. Table 1.2 shows the percentage among various staff groups and committed youth who strongly approved of new or proposed policies and programs in the department. The vocational staff was least approving, followed by general staff (i.e., cottage parents or supervisors) and field administrators of the institutions. The parole staff members usually had little contact with the institutions. Predictably, therefore, they favored reorganization in general, since it pointed to institutional reforms primarily, but did not approve of cottage groups making decisions, especially about release on parole, furlough, or work in the community, which would affect the normal range of the parole officer's responsibilities. Youth responses were most enthusiastic about policies allowing personal discretion about hair style, clothing, smoking, and coeducational programs.

These responses sensitively reflect the new directions of DYS and the resulting internal distributions of power, responsibility, and reward.[15] Later, for example, one institution's barber reminisced about the days he taught his trade to a few boys well enough so they could obtain certification, because they stayed long enough to learn and short hair styles were mandatory. A printing shop instructor felt the same way. The general staff and field administrators also sensed the emerging challenge to their authority by program innovators from the Boston Office and the greater familiarity that academic and clinical staff seemed to have with the new cottage-based treatment programs. Parole staff were reluctant to share decision making with youth—an essential requirement for negotiating successful placements in new community-based programs. Most of the

[15] For the theoretical analysis relating the new goals of the department and the internal distribution of power, responsibility and reward, *see* Alden D. Miller, Lloyd E. Ohlin, and Robert B. Coates, "Before the Millennium Arrives," in this volume.

Table 1.2

Percentage in Each Interest Group "Strongly Approving" Reforms.

Item	Interest Group								
	General Staff	Academics	Clinicians	Vocational	Parole	Field Administrators	Boston Office	Committed Youth	Youth
Reorganization of DYS by the legislature in 1969.	12	16	32	16	33	22	33	–	6
Decision to transfer or parole boys (girls) up to the staff of the institution (instead of Boston Office).	24	48	48	20	0	28	21	17	28
Allowing cottage groups of staff and boys (girls) to make decisions about:									
Discipline	18	33	53	4	19	17	35	20	20
Release	8	22	38	8	5	12	21	22	13
Furlough and home visits	12	33	41	4	5	12	32	28	19
Assignments to work details.	15	33	48	4	10	12	27	13	19
Permitting boys (girls) to make individual decisions about:									
Hair styles	11	44	59	4	35	11	38	49	15
Clothes	7	44	56	4	25	11	38	50	13
Smoking.	5	26	34	0	14	0	29	45	13
Elimination of severe disciplinary measures such as long confinement in isolation, physical punishment, and hard labor.	35	67	77	28	57	59	67	–	45
Boston Office program developments to create a "therapeutic community."	12	41	41	4	20	12	29	13	19
Expanding the Outward Bound program and forestry camps.	26	41	37	20	40	28	49	16	34
Introducing STEP type of educational programs such as the one at Shirley.	7	22	26	12	43	12	29	8	11

Table 1.2 Continued

Percentage in Each Interest Group "Strongly Approving" Reforms.

Item	Interest Group								
	General Staff	Academics	Clinicians	Vocational	Parole	Field Administrators	Boston Office	Committed Youth	Youth
The following three plans suggested for development of Topsfield as:									
A staff training center	18	37	34	16	29	33	53		21
A special drug treatment center	32	52	28	20	33	22	38		30
An experimental center for group therapy programs.	20	48	32	4	24	17	50		21
Expansion of use of volunteers in institutional program activities.	26	41	44	8	14	22	44	18	19
Closing Bridgewater and allowing each institution to deal with its own security problems.	20	26	22	8	14	19	47	21	15
Making some institutions coeducational.	15	26	55	4	19	12	59	52	13
Number	76	27	31	25	21	18	34	166	53

parole staff defined themselves as much like juvenile bureau police officers: their job was to keep paroled youth out of trouble by advice, surveillance, and threats of official sanctions. The new image of the parole officer as a youth advocate and organizer of community services and opportunities for youth represented a radical and threatening change.

The commissioner relied on members of the existing staff able to relate to the new philosophy of treatment. At the same time he recruited new top aides among youth workers in Ohio and Massachusetts who had both professional credentials and enthusiasm for the job. As appropriated funds became available in the second year Miller appointed these aides to posts with program and policy development responsibilties.

The commissioner circumvented civil service constraints by assigning authority and responsibility without regard to formal civil service rank. This caused insecurity and administrative confusion when job titles and pay assignments bore little relationship to effective responsibility. At one point a new administrator functioning in effect as superintendent of the Industrial School for Boys at Shirley was in fact assigned and paid from the job category of maintenance worker.

The third tactic, retraining and re-educating the staff, met with relatively little success despite considerable staff interest. The three-day conference with Maxwell Jones, which gave staff for the first time a clear inkling of what Miller had in mind, was followed in September 1970 with a training session run by Dr. Harry Vorrath, superintendent of the Red Wing Reformatory in Minnesota. At this point some staff members had accepted the inevitability of training and were responsive to the mixture of control and treatment ideology which Dr. Vorrath espoused. An effort to routinize staff retraining at a new training center at Topsfield faltered when community resistance to this new Topsfield facility, acquired by DYS shortly before Miller's appointment, prevented its full use. These difficulties led to a gradual phasing out of this retraining effort. They demonstrated, however, that retraining would be at best a very gradual process. It would be financially costly and divisive since it would involve the articulation and resolution of fundamental differences in attitudes, values, and beliefs about the re-education of youth in trouble.

It would also have to be undertaken within each institution for all staff members to have lasting effect.

The Development of Fiscal Resources

Money was a constant problem. Unless funds could be freed from the support of traditional institutional programs, practices, and facilities, the chance to develop alternate treatment measures would be severely limited. The appropriation process in Massachusetts for all state agencies relies on supplemental and deficiency budgets to pick up and support commitments not adequately covered in the initial appropriation. This process is deeply immersed in political considerations and bargaining; whether a state department or subunit gets the funds it wants rests on its own capacity to influence the legislative process. For a newcomer like Miller, despite public support from the governor and his staff, acquiring these skills took time.

The commissioner did not rely exclusively on the state but requested federal support. He secured grants from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the U.S. Department of Justice both directly and through the Massachusetts Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, from Title I of the Federal Education Act, and Title IV of the Office of Manpower Development and Training in the U.S. Department of Labor. This federal funding permitted Miller to bring in top staff committed to his philosophy, without the restrictions of the civil service system, and to establish new types of community-based treatment services and supportive summertime educational, recreational, and training services in the institution. The new funds underwrote a planning unit directed by a vigorous advocate of community-based treatment for youth. This unit grew rapidly as a cadre of sensitive and dedicated people. In the spring of 1971 it worked with the key departmental administrators to produce a seven-point plan setting out the direction of reform. It called for: (1) regionalization; (2) community-based treatment centers; (3) expansion of the forestry program; (4) relocation of detention; (5) increased placement alternatives; (6) grants-in-aid to cities and towns; and (7) an intensive care security unit. These became the chief goals of DYS during the third year of the new administration. The planning unit and the top staff dealt with constant crises in the progress toward those goals. They also carried major responsibility for procuring new federal funds. Without this articulate infusion of new thought and ideas, the funds they procured and the crises they helped to solve, the rapid transition from the training school structure to noninstitutional alternatives would have been most difficult to achieve.

The Results of Phase II

The first two years of the new administration were a period of constant crisis, confrontation, and confusion. The commissioner possessed neither a blueprint, nor the staff and financial resources to impose a new model of treatment services. The only stable guidelines were the broad goals of the new system, i.e., that confinement of children should be as humane as possible and their treatment as therapeutic and responsive as staff could devise. The needs of children rather than administrative orderliness or staff prerogatives and preferments were to be given top priority.

The commissioner regarded most of the existing administrative rules and staff protections as major obstacles to change and believed the new philosophy of treatment could not be effectively established until the punitive aspects of the older system had been fully exposed and the system for distributing responsibility, authority, and rewards reconstituted. For twenty years under the previous administration, staff had acquired a set of beliefs about delinquent youth, conceptions of appropriate staff and youth relationships, and career expectations consistent with the traditional training school philosophy. Many felt rejected and threatened by the new philosophy of treatment and responded with hostility, acts of sabotage, passivity, or apathetic compliance. They magnified the confusion resulting from many of the new directives, passively endured or even encouraged runaways, and complained constantly of permissiveness and loss of authority. Although some older staff members were excited by the new philosophy and joined in with the new recruits, the first two years of the new administration were characterized by a progressive intensification of conflict and polarization of views.

During the first year the new commissioner was largely dependent on converts to his philosophy among older staff members to implement his directives. The fiscal and civil service constraints gradually produced a chaotic pattern for the assignment of administrative responsibility and authority. Former administrators placed on leave-status were replaced in effective authority by adherents to the new philosophy without much regard for rank or civil service status. A fluid pattern of staff assignment developed. Staff from the Boston Office and from the institutions were reassigned to new positions as crises developed. The frequent shift of staff members to new administrative positions undermined expectations and created insecurity about career advancement based on traditional criteria of promotion.

Deposed and alienated adherents of the older philosophy were not without resources for fighting back. Most of them had long periods of service in the DYS, relatives or friends in the legislature, and influential associations in the small towns in which they resided close to the institutions. They also had long established working relationships with many judges, probation officers, and public officials who shared their views about the function and operation of training schools. Stories about policies and case decisions that documented the permissive and chaotic state of administrative practices were magnified and circulated. Many judges, probation officers, and police officials, even those initially sympathetic to the idea of reform, began to oppose the new administration. And by the fall of 1971, two legislative investigations of DYS were underway.

The results of this phase of the reform movement are difficult to assess apart from a longer range evaluation of the total movement toward community-based treatment services. It is clear, however, that the concept of small group therapeutic communities had some success. This experiment showed that traditional training school environments based on a cottage system could be decentralized. One could organize within some cottages a group therapy approach creating for both youth and staff a new set of rules, expectations, and practices. The data revealed reactions from youth and staff that justified such efforts elsewhere and were consistent with previous studies in other settings.

The extent to which the favorable responses of youth to the group therapy approach were translated into better adjustment in the home, school, or neighborhood cannot yet be fully determined. The data on recidivism rates and community adjustment of youth in these different programs are still being assembled.

Phase III: From Institutions to Community Corrections

The new administration found itself unable to change staff attitudes and beliefs or to impose a therapeutic community in all of the cottages. Table 1.3 provides some evidence of this; it shows a consistent pattern of differences in staff response to the items on custody and treatment as one moves from the most traditional to the most treatment-oriented cottages. Miller was aware of the entrenched resistance thus reflected in many traditional cottages, and was impatient with the slow pace of change. He suggested late in 1970 that, despite the storminess of the preceding year and the feeling of traditional staff that DYS was being turned completely upside down, there had really been little or no fundamental change. He felt the same way a year later, even after some of the therapeutic community-oriented cottages began to achieve conspicuous success.

Miller finally concluded that therapeutic communities could be run successfully in only a few cottages within the institutions. However, he felt they might be much more successful outside the existing institutions. In community settings greater professional resources would be available to provide volunteer and purchased services in relation to which traditional expectations about juvenile prisons might no longer have force. The successful treatment cottages could then be redefined as staging cottages which would later be moved off the institutional grounds to become community-based facilities.

Closing the institutions raised the problems of building a new structure of services more closely integrated with community life. This would be the challenge of the third phase of reform. It came to involve the decentralization or regionalization of services into seven regions; the development of new court liaison staff working with juvenile judges and probation personnel to coordinate detention, diagnostic and referral

Table 1.3

Staff Selection of Statements They Feel Best Reflect the Purposes of the Institutions.

Tools of Institutions	Custody-Oriented Cottages				Treatment-Oriented Cottages			
	Cottage Nine	Cottage Eight	Elms Cottage	Westview Cottage	Sunset Cottage	Shirley Cottage	Tops-Field	I Belong
Percent of staff choosing three custodial purposes	47	33	32	37	13	21	15	9
		34				16		
Percent of staff choosing three treatment purposes	42	50	58	52	80	67	69	81
		51				72		
N	(27)	(15)	(40)	(29)	(15)	(16)	(15)	(8)

Source: Barry Feld, "Subcultures of Selected Boys' Cottages in Massachusetts Department of Youth Services Institutions in 1971," Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, October, 1972. Staff were asked to choose three from a list of 11 statements of possible goals commonly associated with institutions for delinquents.

policies, and individual case decisions; a new network of community services including residential and nonresidential placements for individuals and small groups; some centralized services for the institutional treatment of dangerous and disturbed offenders; ways to monitor the quality of services increasingly purchased from private agencies; and staff development programs to reassign, retrain, or discharge former staff members in ways minimizing personal hardship and injustice.

Deinstitutionalization

In the winter of 1971-72 DYS closed two major institutions, Shirley and Lyman. Lancaster was converted partly to privately run programs on the institutional grounds later in 1972. Oakdale, originally an institution for very young boys, and then a reception center, was finally closed in late 1972. No strong public reaction immediately appeared in response to the closing of the institutions. The commissioner had succeeded in exposing these facilities as brutalizing environments for youth and staff alike. When Shirley closed, the press featured stories and pictures of Miller, members of the legislature, staff, and youth formerly confined at Shirley sledge-hammering the bars and locks of the segregation cells of Cottage 9. The commissioner emerged as an advocate in the public eye of new opportunities for youth, his opponents as advocates of punishment and repression. The staff and supporters of the now "evil" institutions reacted with stunned disbelief and feelings of betrayal for their years of work. The radical shift in correctional philosophy seemed too swift and uncompromising to accord them their due. How could the new approach suddenly be so right and the older one, on which they had staked their careers and future, so wrong?

Closing the institutions involved finding alternative placements for the youth and reassignment for the staff. The University of Massachusetts Conference was organized to transfer a large number of youth out of the institutions into the community quickly enough to avoid excessive disruption and to get the job done before crippling opposition could develop.[16] Ninety-nine boys and girls from Lyman, Lancaster, and two detention centers were taken to the University of Massachusetts for a month in January-February 1972. College students served as advocates for the DYS youth while placement for them were worked out at the conference. The college students were selected from three colleges and universities in the area by members of the Juvenile Opportunities Extension, a University of Massachusetts student organization that had been participating extensively in the program at the Westfield institution. Arrangements for future placement of youth, e.g., sending them home, placing youth in a foster home or in a group home, were worked out in a collaborative manner between the DYS staff, the advocate, and the youth themselves by considering the range of

[16] For a fuller discussion of this conference *see* Robert B. Coates, Alden D. Miller, and Lloyd E. Ohlin, "A Strategic Innovation in the Process of Deinstitutionalization: The University of Massachusetts Conference," in Bakal, *Closing Correctional Institutions,* pp. 127-148.

program alternatives and the needs of specific youth.

The move was accomplished with much fanfare involving a caravan of cars from Lyman to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The governor appeared later at the conference to lend his support. The conference, through the student advocates, succeeded in placing 65 youth in other than institutional settings. Approximately equal proportions of those remaining were placed in other institutions, ran away, or remained unplaced.

The drama of the conference as a way of quickly closing institutions is suggested by reactions of staff members at the Lyman Institution. Staff there had been told months before that the institution would be closed but simply could not believe it. A cottage which had burned was painstakingly rebuilt by staff who were standing at the door waiting for youth to be assigned the day the motorcade to Amherst virtually emptied the institution in a matter of hours. A few weeks later staff members were exchanging rumors of mass escapes, chaos, and widespread sexual misconduct at the conference, which they thought would result in the youth being brought back to the institution. In contrast, one university official, after the conference, remarked that the DYS youth had actually been less trouble to the university than a convention of the American Legion.

Recidivism data obtained from the central probation office records after an eleven-month follow-up period yielded an overall official court appearance rate after the conference of 48 percent with most of the appearances (79 percent) occurring during the first four months. While calculations on the rates of reappearance in court on new charges are not yet completed for the various samples of youth in the research study, the recidivism rates reported here for youth in the conference are probably somewhat lower than court appearance recidivism rates characterizing youth from the traditional training school programs.

The youths relocated and the staff reassigned, the grounds and buildings of the large institutions which have been closed still remain with the haunting possibility that they may be used again as a primary treatment resource. Planners and administrators in DYS are convinced that DYS must divest itself of these institutions to consolidate the new policies. In addition, the Lancaster Training School is still in use although over half its population is in privately administered programs. The use of this institution probably constitutes a more serious threat to the stability of reform than the mere continuing existence of other facilities.

Regionalization

The shift from a custodial to a treatment orientation had already abridged institutional autonomy, lodging greater control in the central office; with the movement toward highly decentralized community-based services, control had to be reallocated to the new regional offices.

Each of these regional units consists of a small suite of business offices to serve the administrative need to coordinate and implement services for youth in each region. Unlike an institution, a regional office cannot house youth in the premises. Youth must be referred quickly to appropriate residential or nonresidential programs.

With support from the Boston Office, the seven regional offices have developed placement opportunities for youth referred or sentenced to the DYS by the courts. They make contractual arrangements, usually within the region, for these services. They also handle detention, so that a youth's contact with DYS now is always at least nominally through some regional office. DYS is also trying to organize the budget by regions, somewhat as it was organized around the institutions in the past, but with less stringent controls over intradepartmental transfers.

For the youth in the DYS, regionalization has immeasurably improved service since regional offices know more about possible placements in the communities, where the youth are, and how they are doing. This now makes successive trial placements feasible, if necessary, so that ultimately youth can hope to get the best possible placement. For example, a youth might be placed in one or more foster homes before assignment to a group home, perhaps with a program of group therapy better suited to his needs. Sometimes a trial period in a particular program is explicitly agreed on by the youth and the staff with the option of trying something else if it does not work out. In other cases, evidence of poor adjustment, such as a recurrent tendency to run away or persistent defiance of authority, signals the need for a change. Most staff members in interviews expressed their belief that regionalization provides new opportunities to work more effectively with youth - ways that simply did not seem available under the old system. For planners and administrators, regionalization has meant a closer fit between programs and the needs and resources of each region. The University of Massachusetts Conference placement staff had felt hampered by having to work on a statewide level.

There are still signs of newness in the work of the regions. Records and current operating information systems are only gradually developing to link the regions with the Boston Office. Perhaps the greatest continuing need associated with the transition from the institutional structure is to divert funds from excess staff positions left in the institution budgets to the new regional programs.

Development of New Detention, Court Liaison, and Referral Programs

Before 1972 nearly all youth detained prior to trial were held in high security institutions. DYS regards this as unnecessary for most youth and even destructive for those who are not dangerous.

Alternatives have been developed with the help of private agencies. Foster care has been greatly expanded for detention purposes. Shelter care units have been set up in several regions, each generally housing between 12 and 20 youth. These are group homes with program activities which allow for rapid turnover. Local YMCA's have proved to be the most productive private resource for such facilities. The units are staffed with a combination of YMCA and DYS personnel to involve youth in constructive activities and to discharge DYS's custodial responsibilities to the courts.

DYS created the court liaison role to deal more effectively with needs of youth while they are still under the care of the court. The court liaison officer recommends placement possibilities within the DYS system and sometimes, as well, other alternatives to conventional detention. Thus, if a youth is referred or committed to the Department of Youth Services the time between such action and placement is minimized, and the reception phase in many instances is no longer distinct from detention. In seeking other options to commitment and to reduce labeling effects, DYS has encouraged the courts to *refer* youth on a voluntary basis prior to or after adjudication instead of formally sentencing or *committing* them to DYS. From a legal standpoint *referred* youth are still within the jurisdiction of the court while *committed* youth are released to the jurisdictional authority of the department. The services available to both groups are much the same. The principal advantage of a referral status is that the youth avoids having a formal commitment on his record. Referrals have increased greatly throughout the system, with, of course, regional variations. It is estimated that between one-fourth and one-third of all youth in both residential and nonresidential programs are now referrals instead of commitments.

The DYS staff regard the detention, court liaison, and referral programs as important components in consolidating regionalization. The regional offices have largely taken over development of these programs while quality control, monitoring, and general administrative matters have remained in the Boston Office. The court liaison and referral programs also appear to have created more constructive working relationships with the courts. DYS is providing services which the courts did not previously have readily available and is able to draw on a statewide referral and quality control system difficult for the courts to develop themselves.

Private contracting agencies, especially the YMCAs, find these new programs an opportunity to expand their own services. A number of judges and probation staff have made effective use of the new referral opportunities and the assistance of the court liaison officers in utilizing these alternatives. In other instances they have been critical of the resistance of the DYS staff to high security facilities for a greater number of youth.

While the range of detention alternatives has been greatly increased, the older large security facilities, such as Roslindale, continue to be used. The inability of DYS to find a substitute for Roslindale or to make it a decent, habitable facility has puzzled visitors supportive of the Massachusetts reforms. A detailed history of Miller's efforts to humanize this institution—and their failure--would reveal the whole spectrum of forces (conflicting conceptions of the delinquent and his appropriate treatment, the abuses of authority, untrained staff, overcrowding, civil service constraints, court and police demands for security, community resistance to new shelters or secure facilities, boredom, idleness, fear, and violence) that turns large institutions for juvenile delinquents into prisons. Physically secure units are necessary for certain youth, but such units should probably be small in size, administer a diversified program, and provide responsive care.

As in the past, detention services for girls lag somewhat behind the alternatives available for boys. The court liaison program, while providing benefits to some courts and some regions, is still not operating across the entire state.

The new referral system is not without potentially serious policy problems. It is sound to reduce the harmful results of a youth being committed. However, if youth are now being referred who otherwise would not have been committed to DYS, the risk of labeling youth earlier is also enhanced. There is some evidence that referrals to DYS are increasing without compensating statewide reductions in commitments. Whether the additional youth will unnecessarily acquire invidious labels, or whether their presence will lessen the degree to which the youth who had always been in DYS acquire such labels, is a question demanding urgent concern and investigation. There are many issues to be resolved. If the DYS programs become less punitive, more therapeutic, and more readily available they will be used more often. Yet if they provide a treatment of last resort for the most dangerous and disturbed youth, all of the youth serviced may be perceived in the same way unless clear and possibly harmful distinctions are maintained.

Development of New Residential and Nonresidential Placements

One of the most pressing problems that confronted the Department of Youth Services as the institutions were closing was the development of alternatives to institutional confine-

ment.[17] The Boston Office had begun exploring placement alternatives in 1971, and stepped up its activities with the University of Massachusetts Conference in January 1972. At first this activity focused on the development of group homes, but when it became obvious that many youth might be stranded as the institutions closed, emphasis was shifted to the development of nonresidential alternatives, day or night programs in which youth participate while living at home or in some other setting. Since 1972 developing placements has become almost exclusively the responsibility of the regions.

There are roughly 80 nonresidential programs across the state, in which DYS places yourth, about 120 residential programs, and about 200 foster homes. About 700 youth are in placement in residential group homes, and about 250 in foster homes. About 800 youth are in the nonresidential programs such as Neighborhood Youth Corps, a recreation program at Massachusetts Maritime Academy, and programs at community colleges. The two most heavily used programs for committed and referred youth are group homes and nonresidential services, with foster homes being considerably less used, and the use of traditional parole varying greatly from region to region. The group homes represent an alternative of moderate cost, while the nonresidential services are inexpensive (see Table 1.4). If problems of providing prompt payment to vendors are worked out, the use of foster care, even less expensive than nonresidential services, will probably expand.

One of the serious problems plaguing placement in general is the time

[17] For a report on problems in overcoming community resistance to the establishment of community-based residential facilities *see* Robert B. Coates and Alden D. Miller, "Neutralizing Community Resistance to Group Homes," in this volume.

Table 1.4

Cost of Program Types per Youth per Week.

Type of Program	Cost per Youth per Week
Residential:	
Intensive Care	$145 – $290
Group Homes	$145 – $150
Foster Care	$ 30 – $ 40
Nonresidential	$ 50

lag between provision of services and payment for services. It has sometimes become so great that contracting agencies question whether regional directors really have the authority to contract for the DYS; as a consequence some smaller agencies are threatened with bankruptcy. The problem of long delayed payments is endemic to all the state services and especially in those departments which make substantial use of private vendors. The legislature has been reluctant to appropriate funds for purchased services especially when the somewhat unpredictable costs require deficiency appropriations. Even where funds are available, payments are delayed by a complicated system for setting rates, approving contracts, or authorizing payments in each case. All of these difficulties were aggravated in the case of DYS. Insufficient funds were available from the state, and the federal grants contained program and accounting requirements which DYS had difficulty meeting in time to establish the needed group homes. The rapid closing of the institutions created an immediate demand for alternatives which the cumbersome funding process could not meet.

No phase of Miller's administration has come under stronger criticism than his decision to initiate new programs before the resources to back them up were in hand. He took the calculated risk that the support of reform by federal funding agencies and the state executive and legislative leadership was strong enough to fulfill his promises of reimbursement in the end. In doing so he exposed his administration to a series of investigations and charges of fiscal mismanagement, irresponsibility, and administrative incompetence. In response, he has charged that the system had to be forced to meet the legitimate needs of youth for appropriate services or the development of these services would have been delayed many years.

There is ample justification for the charges on both sides. Miller's driving ambition to create a more flexible and responsive set of services for delinquent youth was reinforced by his impatience with red tape and his ability to tolerate a lot of administrative confusion as long as "helping kids" came first in every decision. His critics acknowledged his concern for youth and his credibility with them, but felt at the same time that the pace of change was harmful to both staff and youth. They argued that many youth committed to DYS needed more prolonged, professional, and intensive care than the hastily contrived new programs could furnish. DYS's readiness to place youth in newly created, untried programs might do more harm than good for many of them. The neglect of the legitimate needs of staff members showed a callous disregard for years of service and acquired skills which could still find fulfillment in the new system of services. In the new programs exploitation of staff idealism and commitment to youth services ought not to preclude provisions for their economic survival and career investments.

It is still too soon to judge fairly these claims and countercharges. Short-run assessments may lack fair consideration of the long-range goals which these changes were designed to achieve in terms of economic and social adjustment and community protection.

Development of New Special Programs for Dangerous and Disturbed Offenders

There is widespread agreement that most people, both youth and adult, who are now locked up need not be. There is also widespread agreement that some of those now routinely locked up, both youth and adult, really must continue to be confined. It is also widely recognized that it is extremely difficult to separate out with a tolerable margin of error those who need to be locked up from those who do not. However, recent experience in DYS with community placements has shown that with youth this problem is not as difficult as is generally assumed. Many youth clearly and obviously belong in community placements. Some clearly belong in secure settings. A few are problematic. An obvious need that emerged as the institutions closed was the provision of secure settings with intensive treatment for dangerous and disturbed youth, coupled with safeguards that would prevent misuse of these facilities.

DYS distinguishes youth who are behavior problems from youth who need psychiatric care. For both sorts of youth the department has tried to purchase services and, in December 1973, approximately 125 youth were in intensive care placements. For the youth with behavior problems, a program run by ex-offenders who relate directly to these youth while "taking no nonsense" has had some success. This program stresses use of community resources within a framework of appropriate custodial security. For youth needing psychiatric care, DYS has purchased services from private agencies. It has also tried to coordinate more closely with the Department of Mental Health. For example, in October 1973, it finally opened a special unit for up to six youths needing intensive psychological services at the Medfield State Hospital. Safeguards for the youth in these different settings rely on advance agreements

Table 1.5

Number and Percentage of Persons Committed to the State Adult Correctional System and County Correctional System, by Year and Age.

Year	State Correctional System			County Correctional System		
	Total Commitments	17 and Younger	Percent	Total Commitments	17 and Younger	Percent
Jan-March						
1973	199	6	3.0%	[a]	[a]	[a]
1972	1,127	50	4.4%	5,499	252	4.6%
1971	1,091	47	4.3%	6,474	240	3.7%
1970	859	38	4.4%	8,119	287	3.5%
1969	875	30	3.4%	8,108	247	3.0%
1968	855	42	4.9%	8,467	283	3.3%
1967	739	32	4.3%	8,550	263	3.1%
1966	826	39	4.7%	8,990	275	3.1%
TOTAL	6,571	284	4.3%	54,207	1,847	3.4%

[a] Data not available.
Source: Massachusetts Department of Corrections, May 30, 1973.

about decision making and frequent case review.

One danger is that the courts, lacking what they believe to be secure commitment facilities, will bind over youth considered dangerous or disturbed to adult courts. These might result in confinement in an adult jail or prison. So far (through March 1973) this has not happened. The commitment of persons 17 or younger from 1966 to 1973 remained very stable in the state correctional system (see Table 1.5). For the county jails there has been a slight rise in the percentage of all commitments represented by youth, but lower numbers of youth were committed in 1971 and 1972 than in previous years, except for 1969.

DYS has continuing needs in this area. It needs a program for girls, and it may need more funds for psychiatric treatment alternatives. It also needs to work with all juvenile judges to implement better ways of treating these youth than binding them over to adult courts, or relying excessively on maximum security facilities.

Development of New Quality Control Procedures

Quality control of detention, residential, and nonresidential placements, and high security programs received little attention in DYS until the development of new programs made the issue inescapable. The basic problem is how to maintain control over the quality of programs contracted to private agencies, since private groups have not been accustomed to account for program quality to a public agency.

Three units have become involved in evaluating ongoing programs. Two units in the Bureau of Aftercare have monitored some of the nonresidential and residential programs. Another evaluation unit more recently organized has been more systematic. Programs are now rated on such dimensions as quality of facilities, administration and staff, controls, program, clinical services, diversion, and budget. Information from all three units has been used by the Boston Office and regional staff for

recommending program changes, and in some instances program termination.

The Boston Office staff acknowledges that methods of control have not been developed fully, but the fact that some programs have been terminated on the basis of evaluations has encouraged staff in their belief that DYS can collect evaluative data and make decisions on the basis of it. Regional directors, a number of whom were at first skeptical of the evaluation and information system, are now calling for more evaluation to improve their own placement decisions.

The development of a fully operational quality control unit is the most essential requirement of a system that relies primarily on the purchase of services from private vendors. The latter are free from the rigid constraints of public civil service and line budgets dependent on the political process of legislative approval. However, this freedom does not in itself guarantee quality programs. DYS terminated placement at several group homes. In one case the facility was found to be structurally unsound and the treatment of youth inhumane; i.e., the building had broken windows which were not being replaced and youth were being fed only once a day to cut costs. In a second instance a project was terminated because the promised services, counseling, education, and work experiences, were not being provided. In yet another case the project was stopped because the program was administered in an overly regimented, institutional manner.

The experience of other states also justifies vigorous and powerful quality control procedures. The professional or sectarian orthodoxies of private agencies may prove as inflexible and ultimately as harmful to youth as the regimen of the traditional training school. Furthermore, their tendency to admit only those youth most amenable and acceptable for treatment leaves the public agency responsible ultimately for the care of the most difficult and most economically and socially disadvantaged youth. Great care must be taken in drawing up contract requirements for the purchase of private services to guarantee access for the quality control unit. DYS seems cognizant of these problems and has demonstrated its ability to evaluate programs and eliminate those that do not perform adequately. However, it has not allocated enough resources to build a quality control system capable of monitoring all programs regularly.

The Problem of Personnel Development

Early statewide attempts at staff retraining programs were not very successful. With regionalization and deinstitutionalization, staff training programs changed and are now handled regionally. Deinstitutionalization and the new practice of purchasing services have put old staff members in positions where they have had to learn new skills on the job. The Boston Office has attempted to provide displaced staff with opportunities to transfer to different work, including new casework and other alternatives under the regional offices, or to join private nonprofit treatment agencies that contract services to DYS. The problem nonetheless remains serious: half or more of the staff of DYS could be transferred out of the department without impairing its functioning since most of the services provided by staff in the past are now purchased from the private sector. DYS records for 1969 show that 531 employees were assigned to the major institutions that have since been closed or converted partly to private programs. The number currently assigned to these institutions is 120; of these, 61 provide maintenance services and care for 25 youth in two cottages at Lancaster, while 59 simply maintain the facilities of two other institutions. Forty-four of the 59 will be transferred to other departments in state government destined to take over those institutions in the near future. Many of the original institutional staff not thus accounted for are associated with regional offices, which did not exist in 1969, and now employ 269 persons. The central administration in Boston has dropped from 160 to 94 employees.

Many staff members who have involved themselves in the new system have been satisfied with it. Others who have been unable or unwilling to break with past traditions have found the experience distressing. Still, the staff union leadership, with increased understanding of what is being done and why, has not opposed the changes as it did in earlier years.

The staff development problem has also been hindered by the organization of the budget. The majority of the staff that actually operates programs for youth are now in private agencies contracting services to the state: this should be reflected in the budget if staff development is to continue successfully.

The Results of Phase III

Data on youth adjustment to the new community settings are being collected through cross-sectional surveys of youth in programs and by longitudinal cohort analysis involving periodic interviews with a sample of youth as they pass through programs of the DYS. Preliminary data from the cross-sectional survey of youth in representative residential settings in two regions compared with data obtained from youth in traditional and experimental cottages before the institutions were closed suggests progress in creating better environments.

Probably one of the more salient concerns in socialization, whether in the context of the family, the school, or a program designed to aid youth in trouble, is the distribution of rewards and punishments. The development of a reward-based system is documented in Table 1.6. Youth in the three types of cottage environments agreed that they would be rewarded by staff for good behavior. The initial cohort data shows specifically *how* they think they will be rewarded in the community-based programs. The most frequently mentioned response was "staff will make me feel good about what I am doing." The second most frequently mentioned response was "staff will give me additional privileges."

The role of youth themselves in the distribution of rewards provides some of the most striking contrasts across the three cottage environments. Only 37 percent of the youth in the traditional cottages believed that other youth would reward them for good behavior. In the experimental cottages the figure was 60 percent. This is a dramatic change which suggests that youth in community-based programs are learning how to support others in a positive manner, and are in turn being supported by their peers. If this contrast between the cottage types is supported by data we are

Table 1.6

Youth Perception of Reward and Punishment, by Type of Program.

Question	Traditional Institutional Cottage (%)	Experimental Cottage in Institution (%)	Community-Based Program (%)
The staff will reward a kid for good behavior			
Agree	77	78	76[a]
Disagree or DK	23	22	24
Total	100	100	100
N	85	89	34
If you do well, will the staff reward you?			
No			33[b]
Include me in things			7
Additional privileges			26
Make me look good in front of others			7
Make me feel good about what I am doing			28
Total			100
N			43
Other kids will reward a kid for good behavior			
Agree	37	60	80[a]
Disagree or DK	63	40	20
Total	100	100	100
N	82	87	35
If a kid messes up, the staff will punish him/her			
Agree	81	66	44[a]
Disagree or DK	19	34	56
Total	100	100	100
N	83	86	39
If you screw up, will staff here punish you?			
No			21[b]
Separate from group			13
Take away privileges			45
Hit			16
Embarrass in front of others			3
Make me feel guilty			3
Total			100
N			38

[a] *Source:* Cross-sectional survey of youth in programs
[b] *Source:* Cohort Analysis

still collecting, it will be a strong indication that the new programs are producing some important, positive, and immediate effects.

While reward patterns are important in any context of socialization, punishment patterns are equally important. Again, there are contrasts across cottage environments, here in the perceived frequency of staff punishing kids who "mess up." In the traditional cottages, 81 percent of the youth believed that staff would punish. Sixty-six percent of youth in the experimental cottages indicated that staff would punish. And 44 percent of the youth in the community-based programs reported that staff would punish. Punishment seems less salient in the community-based programs than in the other cottage environments; discipline relies more on reward. It is also possible that punishment in the newer programs is more sophisticated and less likely to be perceived as punishment *per se* by the youth. This may often be the case in more "caring" situations. On the basis of the preliminary cohort data the type of punishment most often perceived by youth in the community-based programs is the taking away of privileges.

Youth in the experimental and traditional cottages and in the community-based programs saw different purposes in their respective programs (See Table 1.7). Sixty-one percent of the youth in traditional cottages believed that the cottage staff were more concerned with keeping kids under control than with helping them with their problems. Only 30 percent of the youth in the experimental cottages reported that that was the case, and only 14 percent of the youth in the community-based programs believed that control is a greater concern of the staff than helping to solve problems.

Youth in the cohort study were asked how staff in the community-based programs try to help them stay out of trouble. The majority of respondents indicated that the staff

Table 1.7

Youth Perception of Staff Control and Support by Type of Program.

Question	Traditional Institutional Cottage (%)	Experimental Cottage in Institution (%)	Community-Based Program (%)
This cottage is more concerned with keeping kids under control than with helping them with their problems			
Agree	61	30	14[a]
Disagree or DK	39	70	86
Total	100	100	100
N	85	87	35
Do the staff here help you stay out of trouble?			
No			23[b]
Encourage			53
Help get jobs, into school, groups, etc.			23
Total			100
N			43

[a] *Source:* Cross-sectional survey of youth in programs
[b] *Source:* Cohort Analysis

encouraged them by telling them that they could make it. Over 20 percent of the youth reported that staff helped them find jobs, join youth groups, obtain placement in new school programs, and the like. We will be able to say more about the relative impact of moral support or encouragement and concrete support such as finding jobs as the cohort analysis proceeds.

In order to know how youth in the cohort analysis perceive relationships with others after they have been through a program, we have tabulated responses from the semantic differential test on two items, good-bad and fair-unfair, with respect to the youth's perceptions of each of nine categories of persons. The two items, good-bad and fair-unfair, are strongly related and are reliable indicators of a generally positive evaluation of a category. We have ordered the objects of evaluation in Table 1.8 by the ratings given them by our cohort youth on the good-bad item, and presented the average scale response to the good-bad item and the fair-unfair item. The scale range possible on each item was one to seven. Higher scores mean ratings indicating better or fairer.

"Mother" and "Program Staff" received the highest evaluations, while the "Department of Youth Services" and the "Police" receive the lowest, both on goodness and fairness. "Me" and "My Friends" are in the middle, along with "School Teacher." "My Friends" would rank higher in the ordering if the ordering were based on fairness instead of goodness.

Particularly noteworthy is the difference in evaluation given Program Staff and the DYS. Program Staff are, of course, the direct personal contact

Table 1.8

Mean Response Scores on Two Semantic Differential Items.

Category of Persons Being Described	"Goodness"	"Fairness"
Mother	6.0	5.7
Program Staff	5.2	5.3
Father	5.1	4.9
Me	4.9	4.9
My Friends	4.7	5.1
Schoolteacher	4.7	4.6
Other Kids Here	4.6	4.4
DYS	3.6	3.6
Police	3.0	2.4

N = 39.

between DYS and the youth, so the concept of DYS which is rated so negatively must signify something to the youth other than their immediate experiences in programs. The similarity of DYS and police evaluations suggests that youth see the DYS in general, as opposed to program staff, as linked with the police and the courts as agents of the youths' loss of freedom. It is also possible that the youth simply associate DYS with the old, unreformed system. The youths' ranking of categories of persons corresponds loosely to what we might expect a ranking of closeness and personalness of relationships to look like. In this context it is significant that Program Staff in the community-based programs are ranked second from the top, after Mother, on both goodness and fairness.

Conclusion

The traditional training school system that existed in Massachusetts prior to the recent reforms is still the dominant pattern for youth corrections throughout the country. In fact, preliminary results of a national survey of juvenile correctional practices reveal that there are as many states increasing the number of delinquent youth confined in institutions as there are showing decreases.[18] For many of these states the Massachusetts experience will provide useful guidance to the problems major reforms must confront.

The Massachusetts reforms have closed the traditional training schools and developed a variety of alternative residential and nonresidential services based in the new state regions. Our research on these reforms, however, is not yet complete. There has not yet been sufficient exposure time in the community for those in the new programs to provide a valid, follow-up comparison with those treated in institutions. In addition, the collection of recidivism information has been delayed pending the development of approved regulations for access by research personnel to criminal history information of juvenile and adult offenders. These arrangements have just been completed.

Additional issues need further analysis and study. One is whether the same broad changes could have been pursued as successfully more gradually. Miller and his aides have expressed the view that gradual implementation of such major changes would permit the mobilization of conservative groups inside and outside the agency to block changes. This view is not easily discounted, given other states' experiences in reform efforts.

Another issue concerns administrative confusion and neglect of staff development in the transitional period. The rapid changes in staff assignments and responsibilities created a highly fluid administrative situation. It provided greater freedom to experiment with new treatment methods, stimulated staff members to considerable creativity and initiative, and enabled the administration to avoid premature commitment and consolidation of insufficiently tested programs. However, it has been charged that this approach unnecessarily alienated both old and new staff members.

Commissioner Miller has also been criticized for leaving Massachusetts in January 1973 to become the new director of Family and Children's Services in Illinois. He left before financial and personnel problems had been resolved and before a new alternative system of residential and nonresidential services had fully replaced the old. He believed that reform commissioners are inevitably expendable since the hostility aroused by major changes becomes too great a barrier to further progress. He thinks that the consolidation of the Massachusetts community-based services will now proceed faster with his successor, Commissioner Joseph Leavy, in charge.[19] It is too soon yet to know

[18] Wolfgang I. Grichting, *Sampling Plans and Results, The University of Michigan National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections Project* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institution of Continuing Legal Education, School of Social Work, 1973).

[19] Interview with Jerome Miller by Center research staff, February, 1973.

if he is right. The 1974 departmental budget, with additional support from federal funds, enables the department to catch up with its financial commitments on purchased services. The budget also provides more time for staff transfers and retraining. This should greatly aid in consolidating a new consensus.

The Massachusetts Department of Youth Services has undertaken a major pioneering step in correctional reform. It has demonstrated that radical changes in the official ideology, policies, and programs of treatment for delinquent youth can be achieved in a short period of time. Evidence thus far indicates that youth perceive the new system as more helpful and staff more responsive. There is widespread agreement that it encourages more humane treatment of youth and offers staff more resources for reintegrating youth into their home communities. Whether in the long run these new policies and programs will result in better protection for the community and more effective help for troubled youth is still to be determined.

II. Community-Based Corrections: Concept, Impact, Dangers

Robert B. Coates

During the past decade, the field of human services, including correctional services, has gradually moved away from institution-based programs to community programs. Some observers would probably describe the trend as a passing fad or a surface phenomenon. The movement is probably not a fad; it seems likely to presist, but it most certainly has benefited from a "bandwagon" effect. Although nearly every state now has superficial showcase programs to publicize its progressive approach to serving human needs, many states are genuinely moving at a fairly rapid pace to reduce the numbers of persons housed in institutions.

Community-based services remains, however, an ill defined and heterogeneous collection of strategies for handling juvenile and adult offenders. For example, a halfway house can mean halfway in or halfway out. In what ways does a halfway house differ from a group home, a shelter care facility, a camp, or a ranch? What dimensions discriminate between community-based and institution-based programs? Is it location, level of control, public versus private administration, or range of services? There is little agreement among those who work in the field about the appropriate answers to these questions, and this probably hinders public acceptance and the effectiveness of community-based policies. It also makes systematic research, planning, and implementation difficult.

This chapter seeks to clarify some of the issues raised by community-based programs. First, a concept of community-based services is introduced to differentiate among correctional programs. Second, the historical origin of community-based corrections is briefly reviewed. Third, research findings are appraised to determine what is known about the impact of community programs; and fourth, potential dangers related to the implementation of community-based systems are explored.

Forming a Concept of Community-Based Corrections

The idea of community is central to the conceptualization of community-based corrections set forth here, but it can be used to mean many things: a small number of people sharing similar ideas; a specific territory in which a number of people reside; a group of similar background. For the arguments presented here, community will mean the smallest local territory that incorporates a network of relationships providing most of the goods and services required by persons living within the boundaries of the territory.[1] These services include schools, employment, food distribution, banks, churches, and sanitation services. This definition of community is helpful to our conceptualization of community-based services in two ways: (1) it is clear that a neighborhood is a subcomponent of community, for neighborhoods do not have networks of relationships to provide a large number of goods and services; and (2) the restriction to the smallest localized territory providing such a network means that we can talk of smaller units than metropolitan areas, or states, or nations.

How should we now conceive of community-based corrections? Specifically, how do we isolate those essential qualities that make some programs more community based than others?

The words *community based* focus attention on the nature of the links between programs and the community.

This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at the Massachusetts Standards and Goals Conference, November 18, 1974.

[1] Neil J. Smelser, *Sociology* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 95.

Key variables that sharply focus on this notion of linkage and provide a basis for differentiating among programs are the *extent* and *quality* of the relationships among program staff, clients, and the community in which the program is located. (If clients come from outside the program community itself, relationships need to be considered with both the community in which the program is located and the community from which the client comes or to which he/she will return.) The nature of these client and staff relationships with the community provides the underpinning for a continuum of services ranging from the least to the most community based. Before discussing the implications of that continuum, let us further explore variations in these community relationships.

The frequency and duration of community relationships are important in this concept of community-based corrections, but the quality of relationships is especially so. The chain gangs of an earlier era set inmates to work in the community outside the prison walls, but did not yield the kind of relationships with the community that is envisioned here. The relationships of particular interest here are those that support the efforts of offenders to become re-established and functioning in legitimate roles. These include relationships that encourage clients and enable them to appreciate their self-worth, that match community resources to client needs, and that advocate better community resources and freer access to those resources.

From a pragmatic point of view, a program can utilize a wide range of actions to create supportive client relationships with a community. Those actions can be directed toward at least four levels of community intervention. First, actions can be directed at private and public agencies to encourage support for a client and his family. This might entail efforts, for example, to persuade a Neighborhood Youth Corps or a State Employment Agency to supply jobs, a YMCA or YWCA to provide a place of residence, or a public welfare agency to provide financial assistance to a family. Second, actions can be designed to persuade community institutions such as schools and churches to provide alternative educational programs, lay counseling, emergency shelters, or "hot lines." Third, efforts can be directed at formal and informal voluntary community groups to educate the public about client needs and about ways by which civic groups can provide supportive assistance. And fourth, actions can be directed at local residents to elicit the residents' support for the program, the clients, and a redirection of the community's response to youth and adult offenders.

This concept of the central importance of the frequency, duration, and quality of the relationships to the community as key indicators implies that community-based services can be differentiated along a continuum from the least community based to the most community based. The continuum composed of the variable dimensions of community relationships adds more realism to the concept of community corrections than does constructing a classification with a small number of exclusive categories, which would sacrifice information and be less useful and workable. It is also realistic in recognizing that because of the varying needs of specific offenders and specific communities no system can afford to have all of its programs lodged at either end of the continuum.

The relevant relationships, then, are tangible and subject to measurement. Relationships among program clients, staff, and the community can be counted and assigned priority. For example, relationships may involve community residents participating in "in-house" activities, but a higher priority should be placed on the need for clients to develop relationships that permit exchange within the *larger* community. The quality of relationships can also be measured. They can be evaluated as helpful or harmful. Consider, for example, job training programs: programs that offer only job training could be compared to those programs that offer job placement along with training. Those that offer placement are likely to reflect a greater emphasis on generating supportive links between the client and the community. The continuum could be used specifically to compare the relative merits of different group homes or probation departments. More generally, data might be collected to compare broad strategies of treatment, ranging from maximum security institutions to nonresidential services. A data base could also be developed to allow comparison of systems from state to state. Thus the concept developed here, which focuses on relationships, has considerable import for research, quality control, and systemwide policy making.

The continuum, with its emphasis on community relationships, also helps the practitioner identify those aspects of a program that make it uniquely community based. Knowing the treatment model being used does not necessarily tell us whether it is community based. For example, if we know that program *A* employs guided group interaction, that fact tells us nothing about the program's relationship to the community. In short, the concept of a continuum underscores the idea that even a "happy, caring" group residence is not enough unless it affects relationships with the larger community. Pinpointing community relationships as the key set of variables, whatever the specific treatment model may be, renders most critical the consideration of two staff responsibilities: (1) matching clients with existing community resources, and (2) working with the community to generate resources where they are lacking.

This concept of "community based" differs in some important ways from other commonly encountered conceptions of community-based corrections. Five misconceptions will be outlined in order to clarify the importance of focusing on community relationships as the key set of variables in identifying the degree to which a program is community based.

1. *It is community based because it is so labeled.* Frequently, when administrators are asked to define a community-based program, they will respond by saying, "Program *A* is a community-based program." Yet, in another system a similar program is not regarded as community based. Simply labeling programs as community based provides no set of criteria that can be generalized from one system to another.
2. *It is community based because others are not.* Some administrators define community-based programs by describing others that are not community based. Most commonly they will describe an institution as a closed setting that attempts to provide to its clients a complete range of services that community-based programs ordinarily do not offer. Parenthetically, it should be noted that a total institution shares many of the same characteristics as a community, but it does not, except for staff, allow free passage of residents or outsiders across its boundaries. This manner of conceptualizing is somewhat helpful since it serves to remind people what it is they do not or should not like about the traditional institutional mode of dealing with people. It fails, however, to analyze the specific characteristics of community-based programs and, instead, merely describes what a community-based program is not.
3. *If it is located in a community, then it is community based.* Location is probably the most frequently used criterion to distinguish between institution-based and community-based programs. This, too, is deficient. Institutions, after all, are located in communities. There are opportunities for developing productive relationships between the residents of institutions and the surrounding local communities. The fact that offenders usually return to communities offers an opportunity to develop relationships. Yet institutions have a miserable record of community ties. It is feasible that they could improve to some extent, and certainly some institutions are better at developing those relationships than others.

   Placing a halfway house or a group home in the "community" is no guarantee that it will develop any ties with that community. Too many programs are merely islands within the community—*small* institutions, but institutions nonetheless.

   Because of this mistaken definition by location, some community-based programs are criticized because they do not treat clients in their home community. Frequently, this criticism implies a confusion between neighborhood and community, but it is also unrealistic to expect a neighborhood or a community to have a complete range of special services for every type of offender. In addition, some youthful, as well as some adult, offenders want to get away from their local communities. The location of the program does not tell very much about the quality of the program, and, indeed, can mislead people into assuming a program is community based.
4. *Programs with minimal control or supervision are community based.* A common belief in the field is that a community-based program means little supervision and therefore reduced community protection. Certainly some community-based programs do entail little overt supervision, and participation is quite voluntary. But even institutionally based programs can have outreach components that permit relatively extensive, unsupervised client participation in community schools, jobs, and recreational services. On the other hand, some nonresidential services exercise considerable control over clients. For example, intensive tracking programs that provide one counselor or advocate for two clients permit the staff person to be involved very closely in the daily life of the client. Thus, levels of control and security do not discriminate well across the continuum of correctional services. Moreover, if a definition of community-based programs rested on the degree of control, we would probably impede development and experimentation with innovative nonresidential attempts at handling those youth or adults defined as "more difficult to handle."
5. *Programs operated by private agencies rather than by the state are community based.* This need not be the case. Private agency programs can be just as isolated from community groups and services as state-operated programs.

These several misconceptions about location, level of control, public or private administration, and range of services overlook the importance of examining the programing of community-based services. Looking at the frequency, duration, and quality of the relationships of program staff, clients, and local community provides a basis for differentiation. The concept of *relationship* is concrete and measurable. It can be dealt with on a rather general level that permits broad comparison, or it can be measured in a fairly specific and exacting way that permits comparison among individual programs. The utility of this concept does not depend on our ability to neatly categorize programs as group homes, foster care, or nonresidential services, because the label of the program is unimportant. The more a program involves clients in supportive, legitimate community activities the more it is community based.

The Historical Development of Community-Based Corrections

As part of a broad movement in social philosophy, reforms in corrections

have been initiated, in part, by humanitarian concerns.[2] They have also drawn more or less explicitly on a theoretical perspective of criminal behavior and its prevention or control. This association between theory and practice is less evident in the emerging practices than in the designing of the policies to be pursued. The following discussion is a thumbnail sketch of thought and practice antecedent to what we now define as community corrections. Community-based corrections, like most other reforms, have roots that reach back over many decades. The historical periods described here are approximate and elastic, because no particular time can be characterized as uniquely representative of a specific kind of reform. The reforms of different eras coexist and overlap in different proportions in different localities.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century the modern prison system emerged in the United States partially in reaction to the excessive use of corporal and capital punishment.[3] During earlier times jails were used only for minor offenders or for persons awaiting trial. Almost as soon as the large congregate prisons were built, reformers began to consider ways to keep offenders out of them. As early as 1841 the first probation effort was begun in Boston.[4] The parole concept was developed abroad in England, France, and Ireland, where it was first known as the ticket-of-leave system.[5] The mid-nineteenth century also marked the beginning of public training schools and of greater efforts to separate juvenile and adult offenders by maintaining separate facilities.[6] By the end of the century the practice of sending convicts out into the community to work on farms, in mines, and on road construction was diminishing because of increased pressure from labor unions, who complained of the unfair competition. In 1913 the Wisconsin state legislature passed the Huber Law, which permitted certain misdemeanants to work at their regular jobs during the day while staying in prisons at night and during the weekend.[7] This was the germination of the idea of work release and furlough, but the practice was not commonly adopted in other states until the 1950s and 1960s. The fact that prison labor had been used outside the institution does not represent a significant step toward community-based corrections as conceived here. Most of the workers were quite isolated from local community residents and they were not paid. In short, such prison labor was slave labor, which provided income for the institution. The Huber Law, on the other hand, represents a precedent that was expanded to include other classes of offenders.

The 1920s and 1930s witnessed experiments in the slum neighborhoods of large cities to increase citizen participation in the prevention of delinquency; these experiments were influenced by the work of Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay on delinquency rates in Chicago.[8] The experience with community organization in the Chicago Area Project, which emphasized the involvement of indigenous residents, is a direct antecedent of our current interest in reintegration and advocacy programs. In the 1940s the emphasis shifted away from community programs back to a stronger focus on individual solutions, with interest centered on psychoanalytic treatment. This movement was also influenced by developments in psychological testing during World War II and by the belief that clients could be helped by various forms of individual counseling.[9] Experience with the resocialization of World War II veterans in the late 1940s was to become a motivating influence on the development of halfway houses and prerelease centers. Experimental halfway models were developed during the 1950s and early 1960s.

Even as this move toward individually oriented programs was maturing, Albert Cohen's 1955 work on *Delinquent Boys* was supporting correctional reform again in the direction of community-based efforts.[10] Cohen had indicated that lower class boys were becoming delinquents because they could not succeed in middle class schools and with middle class standards. In response more attention became directed at the role of the school and the community in generating and maintaining deviance or conformity. The 1960s were further influenced by the differential opportunity theory developed by Cloward and Ohlin and by the availability of new federal funds for preventing and controlling crime and delinquency.[11] Greater emphasis was placed on community work, more broadly conceived than it had been during the 1920s and 1930s, but also greatly enhanced by the federal funding. Concurrently, throughout the 1950s and on, the individual treatment model had begun to lose support. From a very practical point of view there were too many offenders to be handled efficiently.

Group models began to emerge. Guided group interaction stemmed in part from the differential association theories of Sutherland, and from contributions made by the subcultural theorists.[12] The 1950s and particularly the 1960s were marked by a push toward the development of a few pilot community-based programs. The bulk of these experiments took place in the juvenile field, spurred on by Highfields, Essexfields, Provo, and the California Treatment Project.[13] But the adult field had its own counterparts in work release, furloughs, prerelease centers and halfway houses.[14]

In the late 1960s and early 1970s labeling theory became a principal justification for further correctional reform and for removing more offenders from institutional settings. Quite possibly reaction to the "law and order" political campaigns heightened concerns with how particular acts become defined as deviant, how discretion is differentially utilized within the criminal justice system, and how the system, through its use of definitions, contributes to the solidification of delinquent careers. Perhaps more than other theoretical perspectives, the labeling school has been preoccupied with the effects of the structure and process of treatment rather than with the development of specific treatment strategies. This concern with structure and process has resulted in encouraging more use of community-based services to reduce

[2] The following section on correctional reforms and theoretical perspectives is necessarily brief due to space limitations. The notes provide an opportunity for the reader to pursue the development of reform in corrections.

[3] Harry Elmer Barnes and Negley K. Teeters, *New Horizons in Criminology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1959), p. 328. For an excellent history of the development of American prisons prior to 1915 *see* Blake McKelvey, *American Prisons* (Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1968).

[4] Barnes and Teeters, *New Horizons*, p. 553.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 423.

[6] For an analysis of the general historical development of reform during these periods *see* Anthony M. Platt *The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); David J. Rothman, *The Discovery of the Asylum* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971).

[7] Herbert A. Bloch and Gilbert Geis, *Man, Crime, and Society* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 470.

[8] Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, "Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency," in *Report on Causes of Crime*, vol. 2, no. 13, National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: 1931); Clifford R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929); Solomon Kobrin, "The Chicago Area Project—A 25-Year Assessment," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 322 (March 1959), 20-29.

[9] William Healy and August Bonner, *New Light on Delinquency and Its Treatment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936); Kate Friedlander, *The Psycholanalytical Approach to Juvenile Delinquency* (New York: International Universities Press, 1947); Kurt R. Eissler, ed., *Searchlights on Delinquency* (New York: International Universities Press, 1949); Eleanor and Sheldon Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: Their Treatment by Court and Clinic*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934); Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency*, (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1950); Starke Hathaway and Elio D. Monachesi, *Analyzing and Predicting Delinquency with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953); Starke Hathaway and Elio D. Monachesi, "The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory in the Study of Juvenile Delinquents," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (December 1952), 704-710.

[10] Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture Gang*, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

[11] Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs*, (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

[12] Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *Principles of Criminology*, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1934). Specifically note: Donald R. Cressey, "Changing Criminals: The Application of the Theory of Differential Association," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (September 1955), 116-120; Rita Volkman and Donald R. Cressey, "Differential Association and the Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts," *American Journal of Sociology* 69 (September 1963), 129-142.

[13] President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Corrections* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).

[14] *See* Bertran S. Griggs and Gary R. McCune, "Community-Based Correctional Programs: A Survey and Analysis," *Federal Probation* 36 (1972), 7-13; LaMar T. Empey, *Alternatives to Incarceration*, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967); Oliver J. Keller and Benedict S. Alper, *Halfway Houses: Community-Centered Correction and Treatment* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1970); Serapio R. Zulba, "Work-Release: A Two-Pronged Effort," *Crime and Delinquency*, 13 (October 1967), 506-512; and Elmer H. Johnson, "Report on an Innovation: State Work-Release Programs," *Crime and Delinquency*, 16 (October 1970), 417-426; Joseph K. Balogh, "Conjugal Visits in Prison: A Sociological Perspective," *Federal Probation*, 28 (September 1964), 52-58; Columbus B. Hopper, "Conjugal Visiting at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, *Federal Probation*, 29 (June 1965), 39-46.

the undesirable effects of institutionalization.[15]

In looking back over these historical developments as well as current theory, it is apparent that the field of corrections has followed four strategies for achieving its overall objective of deterring illegal behavior on the part of convicted or potential offenders: punishment, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and reintegration.

The rationale underlying punishment as a strategy for deterrence is that the right amount of punishment, meted out quickly after an offense, will make a criminal career too costly and undesirable. Incapacitation, on the other hand, is generally regarded as simply a device for providing protection to society at large by removing the offender from the larger community. Rehabilitation operates on the assumption that something is wrong with the individual offenders, and that it can and must be corrected. The individual's problem is identified and the appropriate treatment strategy matched to the problem. The larger community environment is only considered indirectly. Consistent with the illness or medical model is the assumption that once the offender's malady is treated he will no longer commit deviant acts.

The reintegration strategy, based on the assumption that offenders find themselves in trouble with the law because of situational factors at home, at school, or in the larger community, focuses directly on both the individual and his or her environment. Proponents of the reintegration strategy believe that adults and youth must be supported in their attempts to cope with the realities of their situation. The inability to cope, however, is not equated with sickness, or with sickness of the community. Rather it is perceived as a problem shared by the offender with others in his environment. This strategy tries to bring to bear on the offender and his situation appropriate community resources; e.g., experimental schools, counseling, jobs, and recreation—resources that will provide the necessary link for the offender to discover a legitimate role in the community and forestall further delinquency.

A fifth strategy, advocacy, is distinctively different from these four and merits attention as part of a comprehensive approach. While reintegration focuses about equally on both the client and the community while trying to link the client with existing community resources, proponents of the advocacy strategy place less stress on the need for the client to change as compared to the community. In the context of an advocacy strategy, it may not be enough to attach a client to existing resources. If resources are not available, appropriate agencies, service groups, or informal groups must be encouraged to develop them. If resources exist but are unavailable to the client, then actions must be taken to make them available. Examples of such advocacy include generating public concern for a class of clients such as drug users, intervening on behalf of a youngster with a vice-principal in a school, and mobilizing appropriate pressures and inducements for employers to permit hiring of ex-offenders.

In correctional systems in the United States, some or all of these five strategies are frequently pursued simultaneously, although their underlying philosophy and methods of implementation often conflict with one another. The priority given to any one strategy will of course vary from state to state. Incapacitation and rehabilitation are perhaps the most frequently used combination of strategies.

It is difficult to obtain reliable national data on rates of institutionalization because the quality and type of data reported vary greatly from state to state, and some states do not fully report to national sources. But conservative estimates show that the rate for adults imprisoned in state and federal prisons per 100,000 of the estimated civilian population has decreased over the last three decades. In 1940 the rate per 100,000 was 132.0; by 1970 the rate had dropped to 96.7.[16] In addition to the 196,428 men and women that the latter figure represents, there were another 160,863 men, women, and juveniles housed in jails.[17] Data from another source indicate that 57,171 juveniles, as of June 30, 1971, were held in state and local jurisdictions.[18]

The 96.7 rate referred to above is quite high when compared to rates of other countries. In England the rate was 72 and in Holland it was 19 prisoners a day per 100,000.[19] A factor affecting this low rate in Holland is the length of sentences—90 percent of all prison sentences are for six months or less. In addition, an extensive system of restitution is used.

Yet another indication of the schizophrenic pattern of prison reform in America is the fact that there are about as many state juvenile systems building or contemplating construction of new institutions as there are systems planning concerted efforts at deinstitutionalization.[20] Thus, correctional services in the United States are moving in a variety of different directions. Those who favor community-based corrections generally do so self-consciously as part of a continuing policy debate in the field. They generally make use of some or all of the following distinctive policy assumptions as the basis for their position:

1. Community-based settings will be more humane than the large, warehousing, congregate, or cottage-based institutions.
2. The further an individual is allowed to penetrate the formal criminal justice system the more difficult it is for him to be successfully retrieved and returned to the community. Providing services for individuals in localized community settings is supposed to minimize commitments and exposure to the more repressive institutions.
3. Community-based services are less costly than institutional services.
4. Community-based services, because staff and clients are closer to the community resources, will improve the probability of successful client reintegration. These policy assumptions should be kept in mind in the following discussion of the impact of community-based corrections.

What Have We Learned about Correctional Programing?

It is useful to evaluate periodically the accumulated experience of dealing with adult and youth offenders and to ask "What works?" Considerable time and money have gone into efforts to answer that question, although some of the research has been of questionable value. Research that fails to use comparison groups, fails to set out clear evaluation criteria, or fails to look at programs in the context of their system environments may provide misleading information. Nonetheless a sizable body of reasonably sound research literature does exist that can be called upon to answer the question.

The answer is disappointing: no single treatment modality by itself significantly reduces the rate of client recidivism. This is true whether one considers individual counseling, guided group interaction, behavior modification, vocational training, education, intensive probation, or field hockey. When we compare the results of experimental groups with results from control or comparison groups, we seldom find successful, durable effects, regardless of the treatment setting—whether a closed institution or an open community setting.

One of the more extensive analyses of correctional research was undertaken by Robert Martinson for the state of New York.[21] His findings were originally suppressed by the state, but are now being made available to the public. Martinson, over a two-year period, carefully scrutinized the evaluation research literature from this country and abroad. For an evaluation study to be included in his final analysis it had to have a clear independent measure of the desired improvement, and the study had to use a control or comparison group. In the end, 231 studies completed between 1945-1967 were analyzed, with the bulk of the programs best described as institution based. They would for the most part make a weak showing on our continuum for low to high community relationships.

Although additional outcome criteria were compared, Martinson's published work to date focuses only on recidivism because it is "the phenomenon which reflects most directly how well our present treatment programs are performing the task of rehabilitation."[22] Programs and policies evaluated by research studies include education and vocational training, individual counseling, group counseling, humanizing the institutional environment, medical treatment, effects of sentencing, decarceration, psychotherapy in community settings, probation or parole versus prison-intensive supervision, and community treatment. Martinson dramatically summarized his findings: "With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."[23] While the community treatment programs did not yield significant differences in terms of recidivism, they did show that clients did no worse than if they had been incarcerated. Clients did not pose an unacceptable threat to the community.

[15] *See* Edwin M. Schur, *Labeling Deviant Behavior* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Robert B. Coates, Alden D. Miller, and Lloyd E. Ohlin, "The Labeling Perspective and Innovation in Juvenile Correctional Systems," in Nicholas Hobbs, ed., *Issues in Classification of Children: A Sourcebook on Categories, Labels, and Their Consequences* (San Francisco: Josey Bass, 1974).

[16] U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, *National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions for Adult Felons, 1968, 1969, 1970* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 7.

[17] U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *National Jail Census* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 10-11. Recent evidence suggests that prison rates are going up.

[18] U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Children in Custody: A Report on the Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census of 1971* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 30.

[19] Netherlands, Prison Administration, *The Decrease in the Population of Dutch Penitentiary Establishments* ('s Gravenhage, 1973).

[20] Wolfgang L. Grichting, *Sampling Plans and Results*, University of Michigan National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections Project, co-directors Rosemary Sarri and Robert Vinter, Institute of Continuing Legal Education, School of Social Work, 1973.

[21] Robert Martinson, "What Works?—Questions and Answers about Prison Reform," *Public Interest* (Spring 1974), pp. 22-52.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 25

And many of these community programs were less expensive than traditional institutionalization.[24]

In 1971 a National Institute of Mental Health survey of community-based correctional programs, less comprehensive than the Martinson study but with more focus on community-based programs, arrived essentially at the same conclusions. It demonstrated that community-based programs can do at least as well as prisons: "a large number of offenders who are candidates for incarceration may instead be retained in the community as safely, as effectively, and at much less expense."[25] Some of the specific findings cited include: (1) the reduction of probation and parole caseload size is not related to recidivism; and (2) the claims of the California Community Treatment Project (designed to determine effect of differential treatment and classification of offenders) to reduce recidivism are confounded by parole officers' tolerance of behavior by clients in the experimental group while the same kind of behavior led to parole revocation for clients in the control group.[26]

Paul Lerman, in 1968, reviewed several studies of group homes and intensive probation. He, too, concluded that there was no evidence to support the belief that these offenders do worse in the community, but neither was there evidence at that time suggesting that potential failures would be decreased. Lerman points out several difficulties with research procedures which make findings difficult to interpret. Frequently only the number of persons *completing* the program are counted because it makes the program appear more effective. This counting procedure overlooks the possibility that those completing the program are a very select group. Others who started the program but failed should also be counted to provide an accurate picture of how well the program is working with clients. Lerman also claims that control groups and experimental groups reported in research studies are frequently not comparable. For example, by reanalyzing data he shows that the Jesness study of the Fricot Ranch in California, which cited reduced recidivism for experimentals when compared with controls, did not have comparable groups. The control groups consisted of significantly more blacks and youth from poorer homes.[27]

In addition to citing this faulty research procedure, Lerman also suggests that additional data, such as comparative length of stay, need to be included to provide an adequate comparative assessment of community programs versus institution-based programs. For example, youth entering a private residential center in New York State stayed an average of sixteen months. If they had gone directly to the state institution, the average stay would have been nine months. This difference could have damaging implications for the cost-effectiveness argument, as well as raising issues of individual rights.[28] In a detailed analysis, recently published, Lerman continues to make these points by reanalyzing data from the California Treatment Project and the California Probation Subsidy Program.[29] He concludes his 1968 review by claiming that a rational case cannot be made based on treatment effectiveness for community corrections. He argues for community corrections solely on humanitarian grounds. If offender recidivism rates are comparable in alternative programs we should select the most benign alternative, such as handling as many as possible in the community, so that offenders spend less time in institutions.[30]

In another NIMH report on current research, prepared by Marguerite Q. Warren at the Center for Training in Differential Treatment, the assessment of current research is similar, but her conclusions emphasize a different point.[31] She stresses the need to adapt a variety of treatment strategies to different types of offenders, although the evidence based on recidivism information is not fully developed. In fact, the recidivism data support Lerman's thesis. For example, Warren cites studies to show that reduced probation and parole caseloads have no effect; street work can encourage delinquency rather than discourage it; and Guided Group Interaction makes little difference.[32] She concludes that no treatment model can claim to be effective with all offenders, and she calls for more research efforts to discover what kinds of treatment are beneficial for what kinds of offenders.[33]

We agree with Warren's conclusion. It is imperative, however, that the range of "treatment programs" be expanded to include the possibility that some persons require no special rehabilitative treatment, but simply need to be more effectively linked to appropriate community resources and opportunities. Thus the range should also include the more radical possibility that for some persons the problem is not one of personal defect but rather the inability of communities to make resources available. Reasons for inhibiting access to such opportunities may involve racism, classism, lack of knowledge concerning the needs of the offender, or unwillingness to finance innovative, nonstigmatizing programs such as alternative schools or vocational training with guaranteed job placement.

These surveys of evaluation studies can be criticized justifiably for judging the effectiveness of different treatment modalities almost solely by the criterion of recidivism. Other shorter term program goals are also important, and some programs may be more successful in reaching them. For the purpose of considering policy it is important to document what actually happens in a program--the nature of the social climate of the program environment, and the impact on a client's self-image and educational or vocational skills. Furthermore, responsibility for recidivism is not solely the burden of particular service programs. It must be shared by a number of other service programs, community law enforcement, and institutional support policies as well as the individual offender. The correctional service programs, however, should not be allowed to duck the issue of recidivism entirely. Research, rather than falling back on long-term recidivism rates, should grapple with intervening questions that explain why some clients recidivate and others do not. Important intervening questions include: What is the program staff doing to facilitate successful reintegration? Are they developing community linkages? Are they working to persuade recalcitrant community groups? What groups from the community are supporting the returning clients? Who is hassling the client? Are police bringing the client to court on an old charge before he has a chance to succeed? Answers to these kinds of intermediate questions should provide system administrators with better information on which to base policy and devise treatment alternatives.[34]

Taken altogether these reviews of studies on community programs share several elements. They all implicitly conceive of community-based corrections in terms of "location" rather than the quality, frequency, and duration of community relationships. That may provide a partial explanation of why the success rates of community programs did not show a marked improvement over the success rates of institutions. If one compares a small institution, isolated from a community, with a larger institution, also isolated from the community, one cannot expect dramatic differences.

Together, the reviews provide very little support for the notion that community-located programs, or even weakly based community programs couched in any number of treatment philosophies, are superior rehabilitation tools. It is clear, however, that offenders do no worse in these programs and that many, if not most, can therefore be handled in the community without presenting a higher risk to the community. These appraisals and most of the original studies properly conclude that many more offenders should be handled in the community for humanitarian reasons. Not only are community-based programs more humane, but they are less expensive for the taxpayer.

These arguments for community-based corrections emphasize the first three policy assumptions mentioned earlier: (1) the desire to make the correctional process more humane; (2) the belief that the deeper individuals penetrate into the formal criminal justice system the more difficult it is for them to return successfully to the community; and (3) the belief that community corrections are more cost effective. The fourth policy assumption, that community-based corrections increase the likelihood of successful reintegration, is not emphasized, because of the lack of supporting recidivism data.

This overview of research findings does not offer a very glowing assessment of what is being done in community corrections. The data simply indicate that most offenders will do no worse in a community-based program than in an institution.

Perhaps long-run impact requires a larger focus than that generally used in traditional treatment models. For example, individual counseling and group counseling deal either with one person or with a group of individuals to encourage self-understanding and

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48. Since the writing of his paper the Martinson works have generated considerable debate. For further reference *see* Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson, and Judith Wilks, *The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies* (New York: Praeger, 1975); Sol Chaneles, "A Look at Martinson's Report," *Fortune News*, November 1975; Ted Palmer, "Martinson Revisited," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 12 (July 1975); and Robert Martinson, "California Research at the Crossroads," *Crime and Delinquency* 22 (April 1976).

[25] National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, *Community-Based Correctional Programs* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 33.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-9.

[27] Paul Lerman, "Evaluative Studies of Institutions for Delinquents," reprinted from *Social Work*, 13 (December 1968), in Paul Lerman, ed., *Delinquency and Social Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 317-337.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 321.

[29] Paul Lerman, *Community Treatment and Social Control: An Analysis of Juvenile Correctional Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

[30] Lerman, "Evaluative Studies," pp. 326-327.

[31] Marguerite Q. Warren, *Correctional Treatment in Community Settings*, National Institute of Mental Health (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972).

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19, 24-26.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

[34] Robert B. Coates and Alden D. Miller, "Evaluating Large Scale Social Service Systems in Changing Environments," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 12 (July 1975), 92-106.

better coping with group relationships. Counseling, skill training, education, recreation, and self-actualization programs still for the most part bring to bear on the individual a rehabilitation approach. Although much lip service is paid to reintegration models, the emphasis is concentrated on rehabilitative treatment of the individual. But "getting one's head together" is meaningless unless an offender is permitted access to useful roles in the community; skill training and education are useless unless meaningful jobs can be found. Reintegration and rehabilitation approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A reintegration model may be built upon a guided group-interaction group home. Its attempt to match community resources with individual needs makes it a community-based strategy. If the resources do not exist or are not made available for some reason then the advocacy model becomes appropriate. Reintegration models and advocacy models have not been implemented frequently enough (except as a weak adjunct to rehabilitation programs) or for long enough periods of time to permit extensive analysis.

Some Dangers Facing Community-Based Corrections

Significant Change or Window Dressing?

Nearly every state system in the country has a model community-based program, at least for juveniles, in addition to the more traditional probation and parole programs. In some cases these model programs represent sincere efforts to develop alternatives to incarceration. In many cases, however, the model programs are merely window dressing, with many of the participating clients screened so selectively that they would probably do equally well without any services, including parole. These programs have a negligible impact on the system. The danger with such window dressing is that we may convince ourselves that a great deal has been accomplished when, in fact, nothing has changed. A wide range of program alternatives, including secure programs, underscores the importance of developing a variety of ways to meet the needs of offenders. For example, it is unrealistic at this point to expect that all offenders will function well or be accepted in entirely open situations. Some offenders require a residential placement that provides shelter but permits free access to the larger community. A few others, either because of their own needs or for reasons of community politics, will be unable to participate in programs within the larger community.
These persons will need a secure setting—one that is humane and encourages community participation.
Each kind of program within the correctional system must do its best to encourage such relationships. It is only then that systems will be significantly influenced.

Community Participation or Community Control?

Given the concept of community-based corrections developed in this chapter, with its emphasis on the extent and quality of community relationships, genuinely community-based programs depend upon active community participation. To improve substantially upon the record of institutions one must do a better job at developing legitimate community ties for offenders. These links will to a considerable extent depend upon the responsiveness of local community groups and residents. Thus participation of the local community (professionals and lay persons) in the development, implementation, and monitoring of a community-based program is imperative—this should not really surprise anyone. Let us turn, then, to the more thorny issues of local community control.

Local community control poses a potentially dangerous situation for community-based corrections. When one listens to debates about community control it is clear that proponents of community control frequently argue that it is good for "them" but not for "us." In order to build a case for community services, one must be able to convince powerful community groups that certain needs exist and that they must be met. One of the richest counties in the country, for example, failed to acknowledge that a large proportion of its teenagers were involved in drug abuse. Some people in the county wanted to construct a combination live-in and outpatient drug rehabilitation center. Many families in the county could afford private care. The plan for the rehabilitation center was defeated. In its place a brand new jail was built to protect the community from "drug addicts" of the lower class. Local community control in this case meant blocking services from those who could not afford to purchase them privately. On a much larger scale this is one of the apparent problems with the California Probation Subsidy programs, where state monies are channeled to the counties. While the state system's institutional population is decreasing, new county jails are being built and filled.[35]

Shared community participation with a statewide public agency offers two distinct advantages. First, links with the statewide agency permit access to special services that it may not be practical to provide in each local community. Second, while allowing for community participation, the links also permit exertion of pressure from outside, if local communities fail to recognize and meet the special needs of its less powerful people.

[35] Lerman, *Community Treatment and Social Control.*

Handling the Extremes of the Client Spectrum

One of the subtle advantages of viewing community corrections as a continuum and recognizing that a system must have programs at more than one point on the continuum is that the "difficult to handle, hard core, aggressive offender" is not forgotten. Providing a secure setting while maximizing community contact either by allowing clients to leave the setting under close supervision or by permitting community groups and residents entry to the setting is imperative. To think that all offenders can be handled in the same kind of open community settings is naive, and this type of thinking can be the Achilles heel of a community-based system. To focus only on the youth or adult who can be easily handled in the open community and ignore the needs of the more difficult individual is irresponsible and paves the way for the creation of small maximum security prisons. Although these individuals make up a very small percentage of the total population served, they ought not to be forgotten.

On the other end of the client spectrum, a different sort of danger exists. Community-based services, as part of a broader diversion effort, become viewed as benign and potentially helpful and therefore something in which even more people should participate and benefit. Thus, more persons are encouraged or coerced, by the court sometimes quite subtly, to become involved in these programs. This process is potentially quite dangerous, for once again in our desire to help we have identified and urged more individuals to penetrate and be handled in the system.

This is just one of the possible unintended consequences of community-based reform efforts. Three other related consequences may occur. First, we may become so convinced that what we have to offer is beneficial that we are willing to coerce the *nonadjudicated* into accepting services. In accomplishing the objective of providing more services to more people individual rights are frequently disregarded. If a person must be coerced to accept services then his criminal case should be heard, in court, on its merits. Second, across the country we see a number of efforts to divert people from the criminal justice system to the mental health systems and/or, in the case of children, to departments of family and children's services. It is frequently assumed that once the individuals are diverted they are necessarily better off, and their cases are therefore obliterated from memory. Those people enamored of diversion ought to be as interested in what the client is being diverted *to* as they are in what he is being diverted *from.* Are individuals diverted to systems that provide better quality services, are they confined in less humane places for longer periods of time? If the latter, the reform is not complete. Third, specifically in terms of advocacy and community involvement there is a danger of diluting advocacy until it means simply one private agency advocating on behalf of an individual to another private agency; i.e., clients referred only from one private agency to another. If advocacy does not involve local community groups and residents, then the institutionalized client is simply being transformed into an "agency client," possibly an improvement over institutionalization, but quite removed from the concept of community-based services advanced here.

Maintaining a Creative Tension Among the Agencies

One of the problems confronting a system that seeks a change toward community-based corrections is that of maintaining for a long time a creative tension among the concerned agencies.[36] Agencies here include the principal agency groupings: the statewide correctional agencies, the courts, and the private vending agencies. These groups are all involved in a delicate balance of power. If any one group were to emerge with all the power, the reform would probably rigidify in some manner related to the orientation of that group. If the state correctional agency had all the power, it is possible that its reform urge would subside, and that clients and service concerns would take second place to bureaucratic concerns. If the courts were to have all the power, there would be no checks and balances on their decisions. If private vending agencies had all the power, they would tend to adopt whatever treatment modality was then in vogue; or they could decide that they were only going to serve the most tractable 25 percent of the total client population; or the larger vendors could eliminate their competition, thereby reducing possibilities for innovation. Although less comfortable, perhaps, for many participants, this system of checks and balances provides flexibility for continued innovation and provides each group with a forum for advocacy.

[36] Alden D. Miller, "Knocking Heads and Solutions to Functional Problems: Components of Change," *Sociological Practice,* 1 (March 1976); Alden D. Miller, Lloyd E. Ohlin, and Robert B. Coates, "Logical Analysis of the Process of Change in Human Services: A Simulation of Youth Correctional Reforms in Massachusetts," Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, mimeo., 1975; and Alden D. Miller, Lloyd E. Ohlin, and Robert B. Coates, "Some Observations on the Conceptualization and Replicability of the Massachusetts Reforms," in this volume; the need for creative tension and flexibility to encourage innovation is further documented in Solicitor General, Canada, *Report of the Task Force on Community-Based Residential Centers* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973).

Evaluating the Quality of Service

Evaluating the quality of service is one of the most critical pitfalls for the viability of a system that utilizes program services purchased from private vendors. Lack of an adequate quality control system could allow the community-based system to deteriorate to a point where clients would be better off placed in institutions. Disbursement of monies and quality control are the two principal mechanisms for maintaining control over what happens to youth and adults in a community-based system, particularly if the bulk of services are purchased from private groups. The state agency must have the determination to drop a poor program operated by a powerful private vendor. The state agency must be able to assess the quality of life within the program. It must be able to determine if the program is holding on to the easy clients and quickly discharging the difficult ones. The evaluations must provide preliminary, defensible answers quickly, long before recidivism checks are feasible. Responsible administrators cannot wait two or three years to determine if a program facilitates or hinders reintegration.

Conclusions

Several reasonable conclusions emerge from this review of the concept of community-based corrections, its theoretical underpinnings, and its implementation:

1. Rethinking the concept of community-based corrections in terms of a continuum of the *extent* and *quality* of program staff and client relationships with a local community should help to more sharply focus needs for further research, practice, and policy making.

2. Research has failed to show dramatic differences between matched comparison groups participating in community and institutional programs. Yet it is fairly clear that clients do no worse in the community programs. Many in the research community have tended to support the community-based process for humanitarian reasons. Some have shown that community-based programs are less expensive on a cost-per-client basis.

3. It is clear that reintegration and advocacy strategies have not been adequately implemented and studied.

4. Research designs should be developed to evaluate program processing. A greater range of goals should be developed to provide a broader assessment of programs than is provided by the current use of final recidivism measures.

5. Successful implementation of community-based programs may require extensive modification of existing systems rather than the patchwork repairs characteristic of pilot programs.

6. Community-based corrections are not without their own potential dangers. The client in need of intensive care can easily be forgotten and the community-based programing can be viewed as so benign that community-based systems may be pressured, internally and externally, to work with a part of the population that has not previously been labeled as needing services.

7. It is unlikely that community-based corrections will be rejected as a plausible strategy for handling juvenile and adult offenders. But the debate will certainly continue, focusing on such issues as the need to define a community-based program; the proportion and type of client population to be served by community programs; and participation in the operation and monitoring of the program.

III. Subcultures In Community-Based Programs

Craig A. McEwen

Programs for youth in trouble can be evaluated from either a long- or a short-term perspective. Because the widely accepted long-run goal of correctional programs for youth is the reintegration of their clients in the free community as law-abiding citizens, the recidivism rate of former participants is generally used as an index of the "effectiveness" of a program. Unfortunately, such measures of success with past clients are too remote and unrefined to guide practitioners in making day-to-day decisions about their current program members. Rates of recidivism do not furnish administrators with the information about what happens in the course of a program to prevent or foster violations of the law by former clients. Both practitioners and administrators are likely, therefore, to develop a set of implicit standards of short-run, in-program success or failure to use in making operational decisions.

Unlike recidivism, however, which is a widely accepted long-term measure of effectiveness, the several criteria of short-term success generate less consensus. Most of these criteria reflect in one way or another the achievement of four general and overlapping objectives in youth correctional services: (1) to provide a humane and livable program environment that does not alienate, embitter, or harm youth; (2) to alter in a "constructive" fashion the self-image, values, attitudes, skills, knowledge, or habits of youth (rehabilitation); (3) to establish or re-establish "positive" and supportive relationships between youth and relevant persons in the free community such as parents, teachers, employers, police, and peers (reintegration); and (4) to maintain direct control over the behavior of youth during the period they are under agency jurisdiction.

While each of these goals appears laudatory and essential to any correctional effort, the operation of a program for youth in trouble requires an ongoing series of choices in an awkward world where not all goals can be achieved at the same time. Some short-term goals have to be sacrificed in order to facilitate the accomplishment of others with higher priority. If one defines success only as the full achievement of the panoply of short-term correctional goals, it is easy to point out short-run failures in any correctional program. On the other hand, recognition that, of necessity, all correctional programs must fail to do some things in the short run if they are to succeed in doing others does not preclude criticism of such programs. Some of them may succeed too infrequently, and some failures may be worse than others. Correctional practitioners and administrators face the following formidable tasks: (1) sorting out the "tolerable" short-run failures from the "unacceptable" ones, (2) organizing programs so as to maximize desirable forms of short-term success, (3) both diversifying and balancing the correctional system so that its constituent programs complement one another, and (4) developing a method for matching clients with programs so that the needs of each youth are met by the unique strengths of individual programs.

The data and analysis in this report on the 1973 subculture study are specifically organized so as to address these problems of policy and practice. We shall examine the ways in which the choice of particular methods of organizing programs facilitates the achievement of some short-term goals but reduces the likelihood of attaining others, and, where possible, we will point out some of the characteristics that make different clients more responsive to one kind of program emphasis than to another. Clearly this is not the only way to organize or present the data--nor is this report an exhaustive survey or

summary of the results of the subculture study.[1]

During the summer of 1973, six people collected data for the subculture study through extensive field observation and interviewing in thirteen programs serving youth under the direction of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. Five of the observers studied two programs each and one studied three. They spent four to five weeks in each program observing and describing in detailed field notes its day-to-day operation, interviewing youthful participants, and securing completed questionnaires from staff.[2]

Because of the particular focus on subcultures in this part of the larger research project, programs were selected for study only if they involved enough group activity and interaction among clients to make the investigation of subcultures and group structure feasible. These programs cannot, therefore, be considered a "representative sample" of the approximately 200 programs serving DYS youth. Nevertheless, the lessons that we can learn from examining our limited sample are broadly applicable because they point to fundamental conflicts and inconsistencies in the short-term goals of correctional programs and to general techniques for achieving these goals.

Programs and persons are not identified in this report, and the names that do appear have been altered to respect confidentiality. In addition, since it is virtually impossible to provide a detailed description of each of the 13 programs and still preserve the promise of confidentiality, we shall present only a general indication of the types of programs we studied. Two programs were nonresidential; in both, some group recreational activities were undertaken for the 20 or so members, and staff visited families, went to court, talked with school officials and located jobs for the youth. Two programs provided short-term shelter care detention for youth prior to their court appearance or placement. The remainder of the programs were residential "group homes," accommodating anywhere from 10 to 70 youth. Four of these had highly diversified staffs and provided a wide range of services and activities for 25 to 60 youth. Teachers, child care workers, recreation staff, and social workers sought to provide individual counseling and educational and recreational activities. In addition, some staff members in each program devoted more or less time to establishing or re-establishing links between youth and parents, public schools, and jobs.

Four other programs, ranging in accommodations from eight to 60 youth, were organized to provide more or less intensive group counseling to their residents and through that medium to develop "positive peer group pressures." This group work was carried on in relative isolation from community contact in two of the four programs. The two other group programs made considerable use of community resources such as schools and employers to supplement their own work but differed in the degree to which residents were free to move in and out of the community as they pleased. Finally, one program with about 10 residents utilized an individual counseling approach in an open setting.

Each of these 13 programs was organized to achieve the particular short-term goals emphasized by the program staff. Staff members then reached decisions about how to organize relationships within the program between staff, staff and youth, and the youth themselves. They also decided how much contact to allow between youth and persons in the community and how many and what types of youth to include in or exclude from the program. These choices tended to direct particular programs toward the achievement of some short-term goals and away from the accomplishment of others. In the next three sections of this report we shall examine how these decisions affected the achievement of the short-term humane environment, rehabilitation, and reintegration goals in the 13 programs.[3] Because the goal of control is subsidiary yet pervasive, it will be examined in the context of discussing each of the other three goals. The final section of the report will draw out the contradictions among goals and their implications for policy.

[1] *Quarterly Report*, Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, January 1974 presents a preliminary analysis of some of the results of the Subculture Study. A book now in preparation will provide a detailed analysis of these data, compare them with similar data collected in Massachusetts training school cottages prior to their closing, and examine their implications for correctional policy.

[2] Robert Chilvers, John Fleming, Gwen Kinkead, Christian Schley and Mary Strohschein served as observer/interviewers, as did the author of this paper.

[3] Some of the incidents which are described in the course of this analysis may disturb the reader. It should be noted, however, that although we as observers never intervened to report incidents to program staff or DYS, both program staff members and DYS through its evaluation teams were aware of and took action to rectify where possible many of the problems underlying these events. As a consequence, a number of the programs described here no longer serve DYS youth and others have been radically restructured. It must be recognized, however, that problems will inevitably arise no matter how one provides services to youth in trouble. Our report of incidents is intended to highlight the fundamental conflicts which make such problems inevitable.

Humane Program Environment as a Goal

Program staff and outside evaluators derive much of their sense of a program environment from the responses of program youth: "If the kids like it, it must not be too bad a place." In this section we draw on this reasoning, although recognizing its limitations. Obviously youth will like programs that are in some sense "bad" for them, or dislike settings that are "good" for them. Nevertheless if we focus for the moment exclusively on the goal of providing a humane program environment, we must take youth evaluations quite seriously. Our analysis will begin, therefore, with the overall assessments by youth of the quality of life and activity in a program.

When youth from DYS were asked whether the program they were presently in was "one of the better places to be in DYS," over two-thirds of the youth agreed in 11 of the 13 programs (range: 67 percent to 100 percent). In the remaining two programs 41 percent and 60 percent of the youth asserted the relative "goodness" of their programs. For many youth, particularly inexperienced ones, the detention units, especially Roslindale, set the low DYS standard against which other programs were judged. Program staff were alert to this comparison and frequently exploited it. They kept alive stories about detention units and circulated implicit threats that youth might be transferred to them. Thus, when asked whether they liked their current program, many youth said they did because the program seemed so free to them or because their rooms had no locks.

The poor reputation of Roslindale was reinforced by stories of incidents like the following: a youth who had run from one program was visited at Roslindale by a staff member. The youth "cried and begged George to take him back with him to the program. George told him that he would think about it and let him know in a few days--but later relented and agreed to take him back." The story of this event and ones similar to it were repeated by staff and youth and effectively conveyed the message that "life here is pretty good by comparison."

A similar but more strikingly varied pattern of differences among client evaluations of programs is evident in the preferences of youth for being in the program rather than home.[4] Clearly such a standard of "humaneness" is an extremely high one, and, thus, it would be wrong to infer that programs which are low on this scale are "inhumane"; rather, they are relatively less attractive. It is surprising that even with such a stiff standard, a majority of youth in 11 of the 13 programs have high program preference scale scores (range: 52 percent to 100 percent). The same two programs which stood out in the less rigorous comparison, however, show only 18 percent and 20 percent of the youth with high scale scores. Faced with this considerable range in overall evaluation of the programs, we shall seek out in more detail the program features that appear to generate these differential responses on the part of youthful clients.

Program Preference and Size of Residence

The meaning of "program environment" and the nature of the judgments by youth of program preference differ so much between residential and nonresidential programs that these two kinds of programs will be examined separately. Generally, program preference among youth in the eleven residential programs is related to the size of the client population. From 86 percent to 100 percent of the residents in the four programs with populations of about 10 had high scores compared to 18 percent to 75 percent of the residents in the seven residential programs with populations of over 20. Size seems to make a difference largely because it affects the ease with which staff can control and supervise relationships among youth. In a program of 10 residents, there are 45 possible pairings among youth at any one time, but when the number of youth grows to 20, there are 190 possible two-person relationships. This rapid escalation of possible relationships as program size increases soon makes it impossible for staff members to keep track of and control over what is going on between each pair of program members. The likelihood then increases with program size that some of those relationships will make a youth's experience in the program a disagreeable one.

Staff do, however, develop ways of reducing the occurrence of harmful contacts between youth by structuring their activities and by introducing mechanisms for making antagonistic relationships public, thus subjecting them to some degree of control. The four large programs with highly structured activities were better liked than other large programs; in the four structured programs from 65 percent to 75 percent of the youth showed high program preference compared to 18 percent to 52 percent of the youth in the three less structured large programs.

That control over relationships among youth is indeed the underlying factor that distinguishes among large programs is made clear by the relative frequency of youth agreement with the statement; "Some kids here really push others around." While 89 percent to 100 percent of the youth in the

[4] This scale was composed by summing numerical scores corresponding to: *strongly agree; agree; uncertain; disagree; strongly disagree* responses to the following statements: "There are really more things I enjoy doing around here than at home"; "This place isn't nearly as bad as I thought it would be"; "For right now, I'd rather be here than home with my family." The cutting point between "high" and "low" on this scale was the mid-point of possible scale values.

three relatively unstructured large programs agreed, only 36 percent to 71 percent of the residents of the large structured programs agreed. Structure was created in a variety of ways, but in all cases it kept youth busy in activities that absorbed their attention and interest. Regimentation by itself is not likely to be a guarantee of resident satisfaction. Two of the structured programs provided a round of recreational and educational activities that filled nearly every waking hour. The other two structured programs filled the days with organized group work activities and group meetings and therapy. These group meetings often centered around confrontations in which one person challenged another for a variety of faults. This public airing of interpersonal disputes brought them to the attention of the staff and generally prevented them from getting out of hand.

The contrast between these four large structured programs and the three large unstructured programs is made clear by their differing approaches to "wake-up." In the three less structured programs the residents could choose whether or not to get up at a time that would enable them to have breakfast and get to the in-program school or other activities. Obviously failure to get up in time meant no breakfast. In two of these programs it also meant being docked some points that could later be exchanged for goods, such as clothes, or privileges, such as a weekend home; but these choices were generally left to the individual. Thus, in two of these programs youth were "lost" temporarily because they were still asleep (somehow oblivious to the noise around them), and the staff had to locate them in their beds. In contrast, youth in the large, structured programs were roused together and all were expected for breakfast after completing their housekeeping responsibilities.

The task of keeping track of youth and maintaining some control over their relationships was far less demanding in small programs. Since staff could maintain control over relationships in small programs without developing the same regimen of activities evident in the large, structured programs, most of the residents' time was free. In two of the programs much of this free time was spent out in the community; in the other two it was spent in the "house."

A second major difference between large and small programs was less directly measurable but nevertheless apparent and important. Generally, when large numbers of youth are present in a program the facilities required to accommodate them are imposing and "unhomelike." Thus, all the large programs were situated in buildings that were clearly something other than family residences. On the other hand, the youth in each of the small programs lived in some kind of "house" very much like those housing families in the same neighborthoods. This difference and all it symbolizes may also explain in part the differences in program preference scores between large and small programs.

A third major difference related to program size was the greater ease with which youth apparently felt involved in the operation of smaller programs. In each of the small residential programs there was little agreement that "When there is a problem in the program the staff should work it out without bothering the kids about it." From zero percent to 38 percent of the youth agreed with this statement in those four small programs compared to 50 percent to 56 percent agreement in four of the seven larger programs. The only larger programs that were able to give youth a strong sense of involvement in program decisions were the two group therapy programs (11 percent and 28 percent agreement with the statement) and one unstructured program (24 percent agreement). The staff in the group therapy programs involved youth by giving them some responsibility in program operation. By contrast, staff in the large, unstructured program encouraged a sense of participation by emphasizing repeatedly the precariousness of the program's existence and the necessity for youth to "shape-up" in order to prevent the program's closing. In all the small programs periodic "community meetings," informal consultation between youth and staff, and the intimacy of the setting combined to create a sense of shared involvement in the program.

Impact of Staff Decisions on Program Environment

With this general analysis of the impact of program size as a basis, we now turn to a more detailed evaluation of the impact of different kinds of staff decisions on the nature of the program environment. The two residential programs where youth were least positive were both large (over 25 residents), unstructured residential programs for boys. As noted earlier a major reason for negative evaluations of a program by its residents is the character of the relationships among the youth themselves. A scale derived from the semantic differential ratings each youth made of his peers shows that the youth of these two programs were far more negative toward their peers than were youth in any of the other nine residential programs. Of the boys in these programs, 65 percent and 74 percent compared to an average of 9 percent in the other nine programs (range: zero percent to 29 percent) were highly negative toward their peers. Not surprisingly, of all the placements (excluding detention units where the transient nature of the population made friendships difficult to establish), these two programs had the highest proportion of members indicating that they had *no* close friend in the unit--33 percent and 25 percent respectively compared to an average of 10 percent in the other programs (range: zero percent to 23 percent). These high levels of mutual distrust and dislike were also evident from our observation.

In one of these two least-liked programs there was frequent fighting, and, in the other, intimidation resulting from the significant size differences between sixteen and thirteen year olds had the same consequence. One boy aptly summarized the nature of this dominance with the cool assertion "You respect your elders. Remember that or I'll kick your ass." Relations between youth were, of necessity, constricted in these settings because the potential for conflict was ever present. Thus, when they were asked to advise "how best to get along with other kids," youth in these programs typically responded with "be cool" or "don't cause no trouble."

The nature of the population appears to interact with the type of program and manner of control by staff to foster such physical violence and its accompanying distrust and anxiety. A collection of twelve-to-seventeen-year-old boys are likely to be a volatile mix to work within any setting because these boys are experiencing traditional cultural pressures to "be men," with all the implications of strength, toughness, and aggressiveness. Although staff were concerned about the problems of violence and intimidation, many of them recognized, perhaps grudgingly, that most boys would return to a social setting where these pressures were very real indeed. Many of the youth in these two programs spent considerable time in the free community on weekends at home and on individual passes and sign-outs during the week. As a consequence, it was difficult for staff in these programs to draw a sharp line between those behaviors and attitudes that were possible or expected in the community or on the streets and those that were tolerable in the program. The staff in one of these programs were clearly concerned about community standards of masculinity in their discussion of one boy whose high intelligence was not equalled by his physical combativeness or skill in handling the aggression of others: "Well we should watch him because I think he is going downhill. He isn't mixing with the other kids, and if he is going to public school next year he needs to learn how."

Implicit or explicit staff support for the aggressive male role was manifested in a variety of ways in these two large, unstructured programs for boys. In the program that served younger boys, staff requests or commands often drew a relatively good-natured show of defiance, and the staff responded with threats of force until the "confrontation" became a playful/serious physical tussle leading to the nearly inevitable staff victory. Youthful capitulation to superior force was a face saving way of conforming to the staff, but it also encouraged physical aggressiveness among the residents. This ritualistic exchange was, of course, not so evident with older and stronger boys, in part because staff victory was not so certain. In addition, staff in both programs allowed and at times engaged in "play-fighting"--slap flights, wrestling, and general pushing and shoving. Many of the young staff shared with youth the same perspectives on masculinity and found it easy and natural to encourage a "rough and ready approach" to program life. In so doing they often won both the friendship and trust of the boys with whom they worked but made the task of containing or channeling aggression more difficult.

This encouragement of aggressive masculinity was not universal among the staff in these two programs, however, and in fact proved to be a point of contention among staff members distinguished from each other by professional identification (teacher and social worker vs. counselor), educational level (college vs. no college), and sex (female vs. male). These two programs were first and fourth among the 11 residential programs on a scale of staff conflict.[5] This conflict, together with the sharply divided staff responsibilities and large staff size, reduced communication among staff in these programs and made it more difficult to coordinate supervision and control of youth by staff members. Boys could and did play one staff member off against another under these circumstances "But John says I don't have to go . . ."

The high levels of freedom and choice given to the youth in these two least-liked programs appeared to increase the problem of controlling relationships among boys. Staff allowed the boys considerable choice about when and how they could become involved in group activities; a substantial portion of their time was free. In addition, the boys had considerable opportunity to go out into the community on their own or with individual supervision. As a consequence of this freedom as well as the large size, it was impossible for to staff to keep close tabs on everyone all the time--whether or not the youth were relatively confined. Staff members would sometimes move from

[5] The scale was composed of the sum of scored responses *(strongly agree; agree; uncertain; disagree; strongly disagree)* to the following statements of the staff questionnaire: "Around here all the staff play a pretty equal part in decision-making"; "The staff here is always in pretty full agreement about program goals"; and "The staff here is always in pretty full agreement about program methods." To this total was added the scored response to the statement: "The staff disagrees about how to handle a particular kid--*very often; often; occasionally; seldom; never.*" The cutting point between "high" and "low" scale scores was the midpoint of the range of possible scale values.

one pair of boys to another only to find trouble breaking out elsewhere. Only in these two programs did we observe an instance of staff striking youth in anger. The single incident in each case was inconsistent with the generally positive tenor of relationships between youth and staff, but it was consistent with the emphasis on toughness and aggressive masculinity in these programs.

In contrast to these two, a third boys' program with slightly smaller staff and youth populations maintained much closer watch on its residents by requiring universal participation in group activities, by drastically limiting the free time allowed each boy, and by preventing any individual community contact. Staff members also stepped in to prevent even the preliminaries of a fight—such as slap-fighting or playful wrestling—and refused to engage in these activities themselves. Only one fight occurred in this setting in the course of our observation, compared to dozens in the other two programs. Partly as a consequence, 72 percent of the boys indicated high preference for this structured program on the program preference scale despite the lack of choice in activities and the restriction on community contact (which many noted as the toughest part of being there). About 30 percent of the boys, when asked why they liked this structured program, responded in the following vein: "You don't get in fights or anything. It's a good place: kids don't pick on you."

Finally, the refusal by the staff in the two least-liked programs to systematically expel troublesome youth contributed to the lack of control. In one of these programs, for example, the staff brought assault charges against the strongest boy after he had beaten up one of the fellow residents. During the time the charges were pending and after they were dropped for lack of evidence, however, he remained in the program. The staff members in both the large, structured program for boys and a small, well-liked boys' program using group therapy would probably have expelled such a resident because of the negative effects of such physical aggression on the other residents. In one such instance, for example, a boy in the small program managed to get intoxicated, struck a staff member, and later had to be restrained by the police when he began angrily to vandalize cars parked nearby. Despite the boy's later repentance and the concern of the staff for his welfare, he was immediately removed from the program. Staff members expressed concern for the safety of other residents and for the social climate of the program. Expulsion can help control violence in one program, but it leaves to someone else the task of working with particularly aggressive youth.

Some of the same conflicts that we observed in large boys' programs were also apparent in large programs for girls. For example, there was tension between allowing freedom and community contact and achieving a well-regulated program environment in the two large girls' programs. Of these two, one was more highly liked by its residents than the other; 75 percent of the girls in the highly structured program gave it high scores on the preference scale. Many of the same factors that distinguished the well-liked from not-so-well-liked large boys' programs also differentiated these girls' programs. Nineteen percent of the girls in the less-liked program compared to none in the better-liked program were highly negative toward their peers on the semantic differential scale. All of the girls in the less-liked program agreed that "some kids here push others around" as compared to 71 percent in the better-liked program. At the extreme in the less-liked program this "pushiness" took the same form that it did in the less-liked boys' programs; on one occasion several girls beat up another resident with whom they were angry. Although these girls were charged with assault, most of them remained in the program after a short time at a detention center. Here, as in the two l s-liked boys' programs, the staff were very reluctant to "give up" on a youth. Discharging an unruly resident was by no means unknown, however, in the more closed and regimented program.

The differences in the nature of peer relationships in these two large programs for girls were clearest, however, in the varying amount of pressure exerted by peers to run away and to drink or use drugs. In the more structured and closely supervised program, such pressures were not evident and runs were fairly uncommon. But in the less structured and less well-liked program the pressures were great, with the result that runs were frequent and typically involved two or more girls. It was usual for these runs to take place on Friday or Saturday nights so that girls could attend parties in a nearby town. Almost inevitably the girls returned from such events drunk from alcohol or "stoned" from drugs.

In the less-liked boys' programs, one had sensed that many boys wanted external limits placed on their own physical aggresiveness because they could not advocate or impose their own limits without losing face. Similarly, in the less-liked girls' program one could see that the girls faced a dilemma over running away, drinking, and using drugs. Many did not really want to do these things, but they could not afford not to do them if they were to maintain standing with their peers. The staff willingness to forgive and forget repeated runs was to such girls a mixed blessing, because it prevented the establishment of clear external limits.

On the one hand, therefore, the girls lauded the freedom and the supportiveness of the staff in describing what they liked about the program; for example, one girl claimed, "I get 100 percent more freedom here than at home. They still trust me even though Jill [another resident] told everything we ever did, everything!" On the other hand, the girls seemed to push this freedom in the hope of having limits placed on them.

The degree of staff control over youth relationships in these two large girls' programs was, as in the large boys' programs, mainly a function of staff coordination and the level of choice and free time allowed the girls. Considerable coordination among staff was achieved in the better-liked program through regular staff meetings in which all staff participated as equals. Largely as a result of this regular forum for communication about youth and program policy, the staff in this program exhibited the lowest level of conflict of any program we studied. It was much more difficult for youth to manipulate staff under these circumstances than in the less-liked large girls' program where staff ranked second among the 13 programs on the scale of staff conflict. Sharp divisions between "professional" and "nonprofessional" both reflected and reinforced a lack of communication and inconsistencies in philosophy and technique between child care workers and social workers and teachers.

Staff coordination and control were made easier in the better-liked, large girls' program because of the full agenda of daily activities. The full schedule of activities and the mandatory participation in them (the girls had some choice in making the schedule) was the major complaint about the program by the girls; it was, said one, "like being cooped up." In contrast, the less-liked program gave the girls considerable choice about their participation in activities, and the girls appreciated the freedom. The program staff, however, had difficulty in keeping track of their residents and controlling relations among them.

In addition to examining the differences among the large all-boy and large all-girl programs, it is instructive to compare the evaluations by youth of the four residential group "therapy" programs which differed in both their intensity and their openness to community contacts on the part of their residents. The two large group programs with the greatest regimentation and most intense confrontations, replete with screams and vituperation, were looked upon less positively than the two smaller and milder group programs. The two intense group programs were given high scores by 65 percent and 70 percent of the residents compared to 88 percent and 89 percent in the less intense programs.[6] The constant pressure to perform tasks and to "relate" to staff and peers, as well as the public attack and ridicule that resulted from failures to perform properly, clearly created a high level of anxiety among residents in the more intense programs.

In one of these programs, for example, several youth who either took some pills or failed to report the taking of them to staff had their heads shaved (the boys) or had to wear signs around their necks (the girls). In the other program, a boy who was caught trying to look into the girls' shower room was subjected to a confrontation with the girls: "Billy *did* really break down at the encounter with the women. A staff member ran it, and the women 'hit below the belt,' as Catherine [another staff member] put it, insulting Billy's masculinity until he broke down in sobs. He talked to Catherine about it after that—his problems with girls, his insecurity, his great fear of rejection." In both cases these punishments were endorsed and administered largely by other residents. However, since most youth administered such punishments far more frequently than they received them, they were not totally alienated from the program by these temporary humiliations.

It is not surprising that most residents believed that the group confrontations were the toughest part of being in these two intense programs: "absolutely no privacy"; having to express all your feelings" (and facing verbal attacks); "getting blown away in group." In addition, the meticulous care required to carry out the work assignments, which ranged from picking lint out of a rug by hand to putting out a newsletter, was difficult for most residents. These intense group programs were the only two residential programs we observed where loud music from radios and records and television did not serve as major sources of diversion for youth; there simply was no time for such relaxation. Of the residents of the intense group programs 52 percent and 61 percent agreed that "There's so much to do around here, you never really have any time to just sit around and take it easy" while only 15 percent of the youth in the other residential program (range: zero percent to 25 percent) agreed.

In the two milder group therapy programs, group meetings never reached the pitch they did in the more intense programs although angry shouting occasionally took place. Challenges to other program members resembled "constructive criticism" more than hostile encounters. While this difference in style was the product of different

[6] The figure of 65 percent is a combination of two subunits which themselves varied considerably in intensity. Of the youth in the unit without the intense confrontations, 90 percent were high on the program preference scale while in the more intense unit 46 percent were high on this scale.

staff orientation, training, and experience, it may also have reflected the size difference in the programs as well. The milder programs had about 10 residents compared to 30 to 60 in the more intense programs. Greater intensity may be required in larger programs if staff are to maintain the same degree of therapeutic involvement, control, and supervision over relationships among youth as is possible in smaller and milder programs.

In addition, in these two "milder" group programs the daily routine was far less structured, and more contact with members of the community was allowed than in the more intense group programs. In this generally more relaxed atmosphere, youth complained most about boredom and the lack of program activities. This lack of structured activity, however, also made it possible for several residents of each small program to go to school or work at outside jobs and for others to venture out on their own to see friends in the community. The difference between the heavily structured and the less structured group programs is illustrated by the differing responses of staff to a hypothetical program participant who wants to take a trade school course out in the community. In the two less structured group programs 88 percent and 100 percent of the staff endorsed Brown's plan, but in the two highly structured programs only 50 percent and 45 percent did.

Nonresidential Program Environments

The quality of life in nonresidential programs has a different meaning than it does in residential programs because of the vastly differing amounts of contact among the program participants. In nonresidential programs, peer relationships are less likely to be of overriding importance in determining the general evaluations of a program by youth because peer contact is more limited than in most residential programs; it is one thing to go fishing for a few hours a week with someone you do not like but quite another to live with him in close quarters for several months. However, the activities in nonresidential programs take on greater importance than in residential programs because they must compete with the attractiveness of the "action" in the "street." Thus, when 88 percent of the youth in one nonresidential program give high ratings on the program preference scale compared to 61 percent in the other, it appears to reflect the greater attractiveness of the activities rather than better peer relationships.

The participants in the better-liked nonresidential program were, in fact, far less positive toward their peers than were the youth in the less-liked program. In the better-liked program, 38 percent compared to 23 percent were highly negative toward their peers on the semantic differential scale, and 71 percent as opposed to 31 percent felt that some kids "really push others around." The all-male composition and considerable range in age and experience of the participants in the nevertheless better-liked nonresidential program account in part for the relatively negative evaluation of peers; the older and bigger boys tended to dominate and intimidate the younger and smaller youth. The less-liked program was coeducational and evidenced little of this "masculine" aggressiveness.

On the other hand, the all-male population may have allowed the staff in the better-liked program to specialize in planning activities of particular interest to boys. Finding appealing coeducational activities in the other nonresidential program was difficult.

Putting up with some disliked peers for a few hours was fairly easy in the better-liked nonresidential program because the staff arranged a number of activities—refurbishing a boat, going fishing or boating, and building bicycles—which were attractive and otherwise unavailable to boys. Staff in the less-liked program, however, were harder pressed to come up with attractive activities appealing to all, especially since the youth in this program had more community resources available to them. Exacerbating this difficulty was the broad freedom to participate or not which staff allowed the youth. Several meetings to involve youth in planning activities were attempted in the less-liked program but with little success, and when the staff did plan an activity themselves, they frequently found that few youth showed up, forcing cancellation or change of plans. In the better-liked program, youth were picked up by prearrangement and taken to activities planned by the staff; this procedure allowed for greater certainty in planning but less initiative on the part of the youth.

Summary of Factors Contributing to a Humane Environment

The preceding analysis of the degree to which programs achieve the goal of a "humane environment" (as indexed by the expressed preferences of youth for the program) identifies a number of organizational factors that appear to increase youth satisfaction with their program experience. Before listing those conditions, we should note that the programs we studied and analyzed are probably all at the high end of a scale measuring "humane living environments." In none of the 13 programs we observed was there any evidence of physical brutality by staff; living conditions, though varied, were generally clean and the food was at least adequate and often good; most staff were concerned about youth and worked hard to help them although they chose to do so in differing ways. These conditions must, thus, be assumed in addition to the following:

1. There must be sufficient staff supervision over youth relationships to prevent peer pressures toward physical aggression, running away, and drug and alcohol use. This supervision seems to be accomplished in a number of ways.

a) By having small programs (about 10 participants) in homelike surroundings.

b) By organizing large programs (over 20 participants) so that they have a full schedule of supervised and mandatory group activities that may be educational, recreational, or therapeutic in nature.

2. Some of the more disturbing peer pressures may be moderated by having coeducational programs. Masculine and feminine identities can then be affirmed in day-to-day interaction with members of the other sex rather than through excessive aggressiveness on the part of the boys or the running away of the girls to be with boys. The same results might be achieved through regular interaction between program members and youth of the other sex living in the open community.

3. Youth participation in some decisions and in the general operation of the program seems to facilitate—though it does not guarantee—youth satisfaction with the program.

A number of conflicts between various organizational techniques and operational goals are evident in the preceding analysis. There is a conflict between maintaining a wide range of organized activities in a program and allowing youth considerable initiative and freedom of choice about participation in program activities. Since highly structured activities seem to be the major means of controlling peer relationships in large programs, there is a conflict in these programs between high staff supervision and control over youth relationships on the one hand and allowing youth considerable freedom of choice in their activities on the other hand. A number of other conflicts will become more evident in the following sections.

Rehabilitation or Treatment as a Short-Term Goal

Rehabilitation is conceived of here as a short-term strategy that focuses on changing a youth's attitudes, values, and skills, in a "positive" way. Since it is assessed here as a short-term goal, we must hold in abeyance any judgment about whether "rehabilitation" increases the chances of long-term adjustment by youth to life in the free community. The best indices of rehabilitation would involve a "before and after" measure of change in attitude, skills, self-conception or psychological well-being. The subculture study reported here is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, and no such measures are available. Nevertheless a number of indirect measures of rehabilitation are available and lead us to an interesting and useful analysis.

Relations between Youth and Staff

The most significant indicator of progress for staff in treating or rehabilitating a youth is whether or not the staff member has a "good relationship" with the youth as indicated by the youth's willingness to "open up," and talk with him about problems and feelings. One plausible indication that "rehabilitation" is or is not taking place in a program can thus be gained from the perception by youth of the staff and of youth-staff relations.

In the youth interview we asked "Is there someone on the staff here with whom you really can talk about your problems?" Most youth in all programs had such relationships: from 62 percent to 100 percent answered yes to our question. The five programs with the lowest percentage (range: 62 percent to 75 percent) include the two nonresidential programs where irregular and fleeting contact between staff and youth made the development of deep and confidential relationships difficult. The third program was residential but involved a very strong individual counseling arrangement where each youth was assigned a counselor and often had little contact with other staff. As a consequence youth could not freely seek out the staff with whom they were most comfortable. The inevitable failure to make perfect matches initially for every youth forced reallocation of counseling responsibilities at times but still left some youth without a confidant. The fourth program was the most formal one we observed; it was the only one where the youth used formal terms of address in speaking to staff and were careful of the language they used in front of the staff. The social distance between staff and youth in this program made establishing close, confidential relationships across these lines difficult. Finally, the fifth program was a small detention unit where one of the four youths answering this question had no close relations with the staff.[7] She had, however, arrived only five days previously and had not had time to establish close ties with a counselor.

The proportion of youth indicating a close counseling relationship with at least one staff member was higher in the other eight programs (range: 81 percent to 100 percent). Of these eight programs, four had group therapy sessions, which exposed youth to most or all of the staff members and gave them considerable chance to select a trusted confidant. The four remaining programs were all fairly large, with over 15 staff members in each program. In each of these considerable contact took place between youth and a variety of staff in different informal contexts; thus again it was possible for youth to find worthy confidants from this large

[7]Three of the seven respondents did not want to answer this question because they felt it was too private or confidential for us to intrude.

pool. One problem with such an approach, however, is that it may overload a few staff or leave out more reticent youth. Two of these programs therefore instituted similar administrative changes during our observation:

> Each youth was now formally assigned to a staff member for counseling purposes. This had been done informally before, but it was usually the youths who sought out a sympathetic staff member before if they felt the need to, and it was usually the same counseling relationships. By formalizing the procedure they hoped to involve more staff members, to diffuse responsibility for caring for the youths on an individual basis among the staff and to make sure that no one was left out.

We also asked the youths whether they felt most of the staff could be trusted. Analysis of variations in the youth responses to this item shows a somewhat different pattern of interprogram differences from that just noted. Having a confidant among the staff is not the same thing as having a generally positive attitude toward the staff as a whole. From 53 percent to 100 percent of the youth in the 13 programs expressed general trust of the staff. Large size and/or formal relationships between staff and youth and the resultant inability of youth to get to know most staff personally seemed to be the major reasons for variation on this scale.

Of the six programs with the fewest youth exhibiting positive attitudes toward staff (range: 53 percent to 67 percent), four were the programs with the largest number of staff (all had 20 or more) and most highly differentiated staff of the 13 programs under study. Of the four programs with highly differentiated staff, three had high proportions of youth with confidants among the staff; the fourth program had relatively formal youth-staff relationships and a lower proportion of youth with confidants. Thus, while a large number of staff made it possible for each youth to find someone to talk to, it also tended to make it more likely that many staff would be little known or in poor repute with the youth. The fifth program with a relatively low proportion of youth positive toward the staff was a small one in which each youth was so clearly paired with a staff member that little interaction occurred between the youth and other staff. In this setting neither general trust of staff nor the highest frequency of confidential youth-staff relationships were fostered. The sixth program was an apparent anomaly because it was a small, open group therapy program in which 88 percent of the residents felt they could confide in a staff member. Nevertheless only 62 percent of the youth had general faith in the trustworthiness of the staff as a whole. It was probably the internal dissension among staff and youth over changes in staff leadership during our observation that caused the relatively low level of trust.

The other three residential group homes—all group therapy programs—showed high levels of youth trust of staff (range: 82 percent to 100 percent). So also did both detention centers and both nonresidential programs (range: 83 percent to 100 percent). Three of these four detention and nonresidential programs were among the lowest in the frequency of close relationship between staff and youth.

By contrast, the high standing of the nonresidential and detention programs in the general level of trust of staff makes clear that relationships of trust or respect between staff and youth need not involve revelations of personal secrets or problems. They may instead be a product of the warmth of the staff and their ability to help the youth in other meaningful ways—as youth advocates, for example, in conflicts with school, family, and court in nonresidential programs and in the court and DYS placement process in detention programs.

Nevertheless, staff in the nonresidential program particularly are likely to be dissatisfied with a noncounseling relationship. One of the workers in a nonresidential program noted that the staff of his program had been very helpful in representing youth in court, but he felt that this service could lead youth to see the staff simply "as a group of people who were willing to break their necks for them in court." He went on to lament, "That's not too therapeutic." It is difficult, however, to be both an advocate and a "therapist." Our observations suggest that "breaking one's neck for a kid in court," in school, or with an employer is an extraordinarily time-consuming process and that much of that time does not involve any contact with the youth. Counseling is also time consuming, and time devoted to that task must ordinarily be drawn from time that could otherwise be devoted to advocacy.

Attitudes and Values of Program Youth

A second indicator of short-term rehabilitation or individual change can be drawn from attitudes or values expressed by youth during their stay in a program. One of these "values" is the widely held American belief that it is wrong to "tattle" or inform on others. Most of the youth we encountered shared this belief, at least at the start of their program experience, and many staff were at times frustrated by its invocation. Nevertheless, only the staff in the four group therapy programs directed their efforts with varying amounts of success toward changing this value as part of a more general attempt to promote beliefs about openness, expressiveness, and concern for others. The distribution of these beliefs among programs provides important insights into the nature of the "value change" process and its relationship to techniques of social control.

Using a number of questionnaire items, we developed a scale measuring youth approval of the idea of informing or "dime-dropping," on peers.[8] From zero percent to 96 percent of the youth in the 13 programs highly approved of informing. This huge variation is a function of two very different factors, both of which relate to the nature of social control within the program. Where staff do not exert pressure on group members to confront one another about rule violations and where little likelihood of interpersonal exploitation among youth exists to make informing a requisite for self-protection, anti-"finking" sentiment is strong.

Small size, a population of both boys and girls, and dispersion of program members into individual community contacts were all pointed to in the previous section of this report as factors conducive to reduced friction among youth. Some combination of these three factors characterized each of the four programs where opposition to informing on others was greatest. Only 8, 14, and 38 percent of the youth in these four programs favored informing. These programs were, respectively, a small program for girls in which there was some mutual harrassment but in which cooperation among the girls generally prevailed; a coeducational, nonresidential program in which relationships among youth were easy and tempered by their shared residence in a closely knit community; a residential program in which youth had little contact with one another but considerable contact with individual counselors; and a residential program whose attempts to promote group confrontations were diluted by the extensive community involvement and low mutual interaction of the residents.

The next set of six programs ranged from 44 percent to 55 percent endorsement of informing on peers and included one nonresidential program for boys, one detention center for boys, and all four of the large programs for boys or girls with highly differentiated staff. In each of these programs, regardless of the degree of structure and control, youth were potentially a threat to one another's physical well-being or social standing. The evenly divided attitudes toward informing reflect the conflict between peer loyalty and the need for self-protection. This conflict is particularly vivid in the reasons the youth in these six programs advanced for agreeing or disagreeing with the action of an imaginary Dooley who refuses to tell staff the name of the person who attacked him with a knife. For some youth in these programs Dooley's refusal was justifiable because "If he dimes [tells], the other kid will have to go to court." For others Dooley's refusal was foolhardy because of the danger of a further incident: "I'd tell on him—he might come back and try to cut me again." Peer pressure not to inform and the not so remote fear that informing would bring violent reprisals or contempt from one's peers is weighed in these programs against the need to protect oneself from other youth or from staff anger at complicity in rule violation.

Finally, the three programs where most support exists for informing (range: 61 percent to 96 percent) are, like those with the most resistance to it, safe places to be, but they are also programs with much staff pressure to confront other youth with their wrongdoing. These are the three "group treatment" programs in which youth are most isolated from contact with the community. Because of the pattern of rewards and punishments distributed by staff and peers, self-interest in these programs dictates against informing. There are few if any rewards for keeping silent and many sanctions for not doing so. In one of these programs, for example, two male residents broke into a locked medicine cabinet late at night and stole some pills which they used to get "high." When the staff later learned of the incident:

> Staff gave them both a haircut [literally] for breaking their trust with the house. Phil also got one because he said they got the pills the night he was on duty. He said, "They told me what they were going to do and I said "No, man, I came in here to get off that stuff. Man if I'd have looked at that bottle I'd have taken half of it." Further he said "I broke the house trust by not telling. . ." Reggie also got a sign [had to wear a sign around his neck] after group on Friday night because he said that his first week here, he saw another resident sniffing Right Guard and hadn't said anything.

While exerting considerable pressure to inform on or confront other youth, the staff also absolutely prohibited in-program violence, partly to prevent physical retaliation for criticisms or comments made in group meetings. The seriousness

[8] The anti-informing scale was constructed by summing the scored responses to three story questions about programs for youth which asked youth to indicate whether they approved or disapproved of the action of an imaginary youth in a particular situation. Respondents were asked to approve or disapprove of the actions of Dooley who refuses to tell the name of another program member who cut him with a knife, of Johnson who sees a theft of cigarettes and tells staff that robbing is going on without revealing the identity of the culprit, and of Long who hides some marijuana from the staff at the request of his friend Smith. To this score was added the score responses *(strongly agree; agree; uncertain; disagree; strongly disagree)* to the following statements: "A kid should not report a rule violation to a staff member if it will get another kid in trouble." "In some situations it is alright to inform on another kid." "The best way kids can help one another is for them to tell the staff when a kid breaks a rule."

of such a prohibition is illustrated by an incident that generated *major* concern in one of these programs—one boy threw an ice cube at another boy in anger and, as a consequence, provoked the moral outrage of the staff and several other youth in an emotional group meeting. Earlier we indicated that this firm regulation of violence was reinforced by the processes of selection and removal which weeded out youth who seemed unable to contain or channel their aggression.

Several other values or attitudes of the youth in these three fairly isolated group programs differed from the views expressed by youth in all the other programs. For example, the attitude toward privacy was distinctive in the three isolated group programs. On a scale measuring the degree of youth support for the idea that personal problems were private, only zero to 15 percent of the youth in these three programs endorsed the idea of privacy compared to 43 percent to 88 percent in the other 10 programs.[9] The rewards and punishments in the three isolated group programs were clearly directed toward the development of an atmosphere supporting the open discussion of emotions and problems. A group member might be lauded for participating—"Jimmy's really letting it all hang out and that's good"—or chided for silence—"Helen thinks she's too good for us" or "Roger, you've been awfully quiet lately." Ultimately nonparticipation meant denial of the privilege to go out of the "house" or demotion in the official heirarchy of youth because of "a bad attitude." In no other programs were pressures so consistently directed toward creating this kind of open expression.

Finally, the youth in these isolated group treatment programs stand apart, though not by much, from the youth in the other 10 programs by their implicit acceptance of responsibility for their plight. This sense of personal responsibility is exhibited by disagreement with the statement, "I don't have to change myself so much, what I mostly need is for people to stop hassling me and give me a chance." From 10 percent to 89 percent of the youth in the various programs disagreed with this statement. In the three isolated group programs 65, 78 and 89 percent disagreed, and 68 percent disagreed in the one nonisolated group treatment program. In two other programs—one the only large program with highly differentiated staff that heavily emphasized individual psychological treatment and the other the small girls' detention facility which did the same thing—disagreement was somewhat less common—56 percent and 60 percent respectively. In the remaining programs, none of which were heavily psychological in approach, disagreement ranged from only 10 percent to 38 percent. The staff in all the programs with a fairly well developed psychological approach emphasized that everybody had problems that could benefit from individual or group discussion. Staff pressure to be introspective and find problems apparently had at least a short-term effect on self-conception particularly in programs using group treatment approaches.

A further question arises from this analysis of differences in attitudes and values among the members of the 13 programs: do the differences actually reflect at least a short-term change in youth attitudes or do they simply reflect initial variations in attitudes and values which youth carried with them into the programs? We have considerable evidence that the three group programs did bring about changes in the attitudes about informing and privacy. In one program, for example, our observer was told by a DYS youth that "DYS kids almost always come in with very negative attitudes." As a consequence one should "at first act 'as if' and then it [the program's values] becomes a part of you." Other youth spoke of their rejection of "street values" and the changes in perspective they had undergone as a result of their program experience.

On the other hand, not all youth seemed equally susceptible to the pressures these programs utilized to promote change. Two of the three more isolated group programs admitted mixed populations composed of private young adult or adolescent clients and fairly "tough" youth from DYS.[10] At times the presence of youth from DYS clearly caused trouble for both of these programs. Both programs tried at one point or another to separate some or all of the DYS youth from the remainder of the population in order to avoid corrupting the whole group with resistant and rebellious youth, and each program ultimately limited the proportion of DYS youth in its population as a consequence. Generally, the staff in these programs felt that the lack of ability or experience in expressing ideas and feelings prevented some DYS youth from making full use of their stay. Most of the DYS youth in these programs were less well educated and from lower income groups than the private clients, and this difference probably contributed to their less frequent responsiveness. That verbal ability is not a prerequisite to success in all the relatively isolated group programs is made clear by the experience of the third isolated program, which was somewhat more selective in choosing its members. Although most members were from DYS, they were less "tough" than in the other two programs. This program handled several youth who had real difficulty expressing feelings and ideas, and it gradually coaxed them into halting but open expression of their feelings. The relative success with these youth is probably a result of the program's much less intensive meetings which were therefore perceived as far more supportive and less intimidating; there was no screaming in them and they included numerous compliments as well as confrontations.

Isolation as a Means of Promoting Short-Term Rehabilitation

The major difficulty in changing, at least temporarily, an individual's values or attitudes is that the individual often interacts with other people who support the very beliefs a program is attempting to change. Isolated group programs overcome this problem in two ways. First, staff may attempt to eliminate the "bad influences" within a program. By pushing members "to open up" and to interact publicly, the staff members bring much interaction under their supervision. Highly structured interaction will seldom occur, and the mutual establishment of group norms and pressures to make private interactions public helps guarantee that what is not supervised becomes known anyway. In a complex way then the "value changes" among some youth are themselves essential to the most efficient operation of the system of rewards and punishments that creates the changes in others. Second, staff may try to cut off any "bad" influences coming from outside the program. Generally, staff members in all programs made decisions and plans while recognizing that the free community is full of temptations and pressures. To allow a resident to leave a closed program for a visit to a nearby sandwich shop was also to expose her to the local drug peddlers who worked around the corner. A weekend home or visits by friends made the passing of drugs possible in several programs and for some youth this contact provided a regular "connection." Going on an outing to a beach meant selecting the location with the fewest beer drinkers and pot smokers. In one program runs were frequent on nights when parties were being given in nearby towns. From the perspective of the staff in some programs, this seduction by the open community was simply too great to risk if values were to be challenged and overcome. From the perspective of others, however, this was the reality of community life with which youth had to learn to cope on a day-to-day basis without getting into trouble.

When the choice of isolation was made, community contact was sacrificed in order to make it possible to control all relationships in which program members were involved. Staff members in three "isolated" group treatment programs had made that choice. At the extreme, that meant little or no supervised individual contact with people outside the program. In one isolated group program, for example, mail and phone calls were censored. That contact with parents or girlfriends could have "negative" effects on a resident is illustrated by the case of a boy in another isolated group program who had gotten permission to talk by telephone with a girlfriend. Learning of some problems she was having, he left the program and the state to be with her only a week prior to his completing a summer school session that would have brought him up to his grade level when he returned home and re-entered school.

As the contacts between youth and community increase, the control of staff over the whole range of rewards and punishments bearing on the behavior of youth in their programs decreases. The staff run the risk of losing the trust or respect of youth by pushing them too hard to reject beliefs or practices for which the youth receive support elsewhere. To some degree, staff in such circumstances must talk the language of youth rather than vice versa. Thus staff must repeatedly decide when intervention is worth the risk of alienating youth. In general there is less leverage available to staff for bringing about value changes when youth are firmly imbedded in community relationships than when youth are isolated from the community. The fact is also illustrated by the one group therapy program, which encouraged free movement of its residents in and out of the community. Such an arrangement not only made possible unsupervised relationships outside of the program but made it more difficult to structure and guide internal relationships. In large part, the openness of this program explains the difference between the attitudes of its youth and those of youth in the three more isolated group therapy programs on the privacy and anti-informing scales.

Not all contacts with the free

[9] To construct this scale the scored responses *(strongly agree; agree; uncertain; disagree; strongly disagree)* to the following statements were added together: "It's better if you don't let other people know what your feelings are"; "In life people should try to go it alone and not have to depend on others"; "Other kids have no business knowing what my personal problems are"; and "The best way to get along here is to pretend that you're trying to change yourself." To this total was added the scored response *(strongly approve, approve uncertain, disapprove, strongly disapprove)* of the youth to the story of an imaginary Henderson who withdraws from group acttivities and tells the staff he/she would rather be alone. The cutting point between "high" and "low" scale scores was the midpoint of the range of possible scores.

[10] "Tough" here means difficult to work with. One indicator of such difficulty is the number of programs or institutions that program members have been in prior to their current placement. The two programs mentioned here ranked first and third on this indicator among the 13 programs while the other isolated group program ranked fifth.

community bring youth under pressure to behave or believe in ways inconsistent with those of the program staff. In the one small, relatively isolated group program, some carefully planned and supervised community contact was allowed; three students attended classes at a local high school and a fourth at a trade school, but all were expected to be absent from the program only for the duration of the classes. Another resident worked on a job and his schedule was also checked. Even visits home were circumscribed by conditions limiting who the youth could see and where he could go; acceptance of these conditions by the youth and his parents was required before permission for the visit was granted. We saw instances of this kind of supervised contact in other programs too. In a fairly isolated, individual therapy program, dates were allowed for some residents, for example, but only after the prospective escort had visited the program and talked with the staff.

The preceding analysis should make clear that from the perspective of achieving the goal of short-term value change, the decisions that staff make about the degree and kind of community contact to allow their members are vital ones. Limited contact appears to facilitate change, but one might argue that the permanence of value changes is limited if it occurs in a too closely controlled context where competing influences are not allowed. Values and attitudes sincerely expressed in the context of a program that controls all relationships may not be applied in different contexts where other powerful rewards and punishments operate. The short-term effects of change may be all that staff intended in order to create and maintain an atmosphere where personal problems may be resolved. Unfortunately, however, the subculture study contains no measure of change in the psychological well-being of youth.

Providing New Skills and Knowledge

A final indication of short-term "rehabilitation" can be derived from our observation of efforts to give youth new skills or knowledge. All of the large residential programs with high staff differentiation employed teachers and had fairly elaborate school programs going on. Because of the requirements for teaching certification and the specialization and professional identity of teachers, programs that use them are, by definition, well along in the process of staff differentiation; the programs also have to be large enough to justify the expense of hiring teaching specialists. No other programs that we observed ran their own school program. The detention centers had contact with their residents for too short a time to run schools. The two large and intense group therapy programs had no regular teachers, in part, perhaps, because the staff believed school was too time consuming to allow simultaneously for intensive group therapy. The remaining small residential or nonresidential programs all had some youth attending public schools but no teaching programs.

Summary of Conditions for Achieving Short-Term Rehabilitation

The preceding analysis of the degree to which the programs we examined in the subculture study achieved the short-term goal of rehabilitation suggests the following conditions for maximizing the achievement of particular kinds of short-term rehabilitation goals.

1. Positive youth orientations toward the staff as a whole are most likely to be achieved when program size is small, staff differentiation is low, and high rates of interaction (as in group meetings) occur between most staff and youth.

2. The likelihood that youth will find staff members to whom they can talk about their personal problems depends upon the frequent exposure of youth to a variety of staff. These conditions were most likely to be met in large residential programs where youth had many staff to chose confidants from and in residential programs using group therapy techniques which allowed youth to get to know all the staff members well.

3. Short-term change of attitudes and values appears to be facilitated by isolation of youth from the community, the use of group therapy techniques, and, in large programs, a heavily structured routine of activities.

4. Short-term efforts by program staff to provide education and training to youth seem to require considerable program size and differentiation among staff members.

A number of conflicts among the short-term goals and between some of those goals and organizational factors also become clearer in this analysis:

1. Education and group treatment orientation seem to be in conflict.

2. Value change is inconsistent with allowing youth considerable freedom of choice and association within and outside programs.

Reintegration as a Short-Term Goal

As defined at the beginning of the report, reintegration as a short-term strategy or goal involves the adjustment or formation of relationships between youth in a program and community members. One index of short-term success in reintegration is the proportion of the program population that has some regular contact with members of the community. Obviously community contact is not the same as reintegration, but it is an essential step if reintegration is to occur. Because of the nature of our role as observers within the programs, however, we were not observers of all community contact; in fact, we were most aware of group rather than individual exposure to the community. Group activities were almost universally recreational, and, under such circumstances, interaction between youth and community members was usually minimal. When it did occur, it was typically along the lines of male-female relationships. Nevertheless, by watching the coming and going of staff and youth and listening to them talk of their activity, we learned something about their individual community contacts as well.

The two programs with the lowest level of contact between youth and community were the two detention units. Contact in both instances was largely confined to closely supervised recreational activities such as trips to a movie or public swimming pool. Staff efforts in these programs, however, were not directed solely toward providing a benign program environment and limited efforts at "rehabilitation" through counseling. Some staff in each program devoted considerable energy to helping arrange for DYS placements for their residents when such an effort was necessary. In this sense both detention units resembled placements that were actively preparing youth for their transition to the free community.

Next lowest in the frequency of community contact were the two most intense group confrontation programs where, as noted earlier, isolation was seen as a key to success in attaining rehabilitative goals. In these programs no more than 10 percent of the residents had much contact with the community beyond occasional group recreation. This contact amounted to an evening out on the town for residents who had attained higher levels of freedom. For those nearing the end of their residence and who were also old enough to work, contact meant work at a nearby job. Generally, since youth had to locate their jobs to demonstrate their personal growth, staff members did not cultivate a network of contacts among employers. The jobs obtained in this fashion—waitress or counterboy at a drive-in restaurant—were neither well-paying nor with much future.

Family contact was also limited in these programs. Weekend visits home, a staple in other programs, were infrequent. In one program the staff monitored phone calls and mail to and from parents, and visits to the program by parents were rare. The most regular contact between parent and youth was provided by a lengthy monthly report which a staff member composed and sent to the parents.

It was not possible to judge the amount of contact with local schools, since our observations were carried out in the summer, but these contacts, we were told, were also limited. In both programs contact occurred when either part-time teachers or local school groups came to visit the program in order to tutor or visit the residents, but residents did not go to the schools. In addition, contact with community peers was almost nonexistent.

In the programs with intermediate levels of contact between youth and the community, there was considerable variation in the extent and quality of contact. These programs include all the large residential units with highly differentiated staff and the third, mild and partly isolated group therapy program. All four of the large programs had their own schools and teachers, and they tended not to have much contact with local schools. Nevertheless, one program did try to move youth into local schools when staff felt their residents were capable of handling the situation. They were planning to utilize one staff member solely as a liaison with the schools and as a counselor to help the boys cope with problems of adjustment. Such problems tended to arise in part because youth accustomed to small informal classes in the program had difficulty making the transition to more structured and impersonal public school classrooms.

In the small group therapy program, relationships with the public schools were very good, in part because an active guidance counselor from the schools served on the program's board of directors. Three residents attended a summer school session and a fourth resident was enrolled in a private trade school during our observation. Although the three youths who went to the public school were able to complete a grade level in preparation for the fall semester, none of them resided in the area or would continue to attend school locally. As noted earlier this involvement in school work disrupted the operation of the "therapeutic groups," but the staff chose to sacrifice several group meetings a week in order to allow the youth to go to school. In the two larger and more intense group therapy programs, however, school attendance was sacrificed so that the youth would not miss being involved in therapeutic sessions and would not become involved in an uncontrolled network of relationship with teachers and classmates.

Contact with family was considerable in each of the five programs,

Policy Implications of the Subculture Study

The preceding analysis makes clear some of the dilemmas faced by correctional administrators and practitioners. In this report we have identified major conflicts between: (1) allowing youth in large programs freedom of movement and choice in activities and effectively controlling relations among them; (2) allowing youth freedom to maintain community contacts and bringing about changes in the values of youth; (3) closely supervising relations among program participants and reintegrating individual youth into the community; and (4) isolating youth from community contacts and reintegrating them into the community. Because of these conflicts, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for any one correctional program to achieve simultaneously and fully the short-term correctional goals of a humane program environment, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The organizational techniques most appropriate for achieving one of these sets of goals often make it more difficult to achieve the others. In the context of these conflicts and the inevitability of some short-term failures within programs, people who work with youth in trouble must make operational choices about individual programs and the system of programs as a whole.

In the introduction to this report we noted that the data of the subculture study are particularly relevant to four areas of operational decision making. First, correctional workers are faced with the question of whether some kinds of short-term failures are less tolerable than others. For the people working in individual programs these choices are very real because they must decide in what areas to maximize success and in which ones to tolerate "failure." Program personnel are likely, however, to be most committed and effective when they have chosen to emphasize short-term goals and program techniques with which they are comfortable. Yet some may be plagued by a sense of inadequacy because they are not "doing more." While the data reported here cannot make these choices for practitioners, they may help increase their awareness of the necessity of trade-off involved in these decisions about goals and means.

For the administrator concerned with a system of programs, the problem of choice may be less acute. Rather than choosing one particular set of goals and techniques to emphasize, such an administrator may instead try to insure that available programs offer a variety of techniques and emphases. Clearly, some programs may not have suffered successes to outweigh their failures, and decisions must be made to reorganize or eliminate such programs.

Second, both practitioners and administrators may be faced with more detailed, tactical decisions while trying to maximize success in achieving any particular short-term goal. A number of conditions for attaining specific goals have been tentatively identified in this report and summarized at the conclusion of each section. Generally, these conditions make clear that decisions about whether a program will be residential or nonresidential, how many participants it will have, what the ages and sex of those participants will be, how the staff will be organized, and what ideology should guide the staff are important factors in differentiating the degree of program success in achieving the various short-term goals. Unfortunately, because of the small numbers of programs which we have analyzed, it is not possible always to untangle all these variables from one another. Thus, for example, it is not clear that reducing the size of a large, unstructured boys' program with highly differentiated staff would by itself reduce the amount of fighting among residents. Our data do not allow us to conclude precisely which changes will have the greatest impact on the achievement of a particular goal. Nevertheless, the data do identify important sets of variables that might be manipulated to achieve particular results with youth.

A third major task for administrators, as noted above, is to diversify and balance the set of programs providing service within a correctional system. When one looks at the system as a whole rather than concentrating on the individual programs which compose it, resolution of many of the program and policy conflicts becomes possible. While no one program can do everything, an entire system of programs could accomplish a variety of goals at the same time. Youth with multiple needs that no one program can meet may be provided services by moving them through two or more programs either simultaneously or in sequence. For example, a youth in a close and isolated therapeutic program might later be moved into a nonresidential program to ease the transition back to an open community or to a program emphasizing education and training rather than psychological therapy. One danger of a policy of sequencing should be anticipated. It could serve to increase the time during which the correctional system has jurisdiction over youth by subjecting them to a lengthy series of programs. Clearly such an unrestrained sequencing policy could be very expensive in both human and monetary terms.

Fourth, both system administrators and practitioners are faced with deciding which youth should go to which program. In one sense our data have provided little help in identifying what types of youth are most suited to particular kinds of programs. The individual characteristics for which we have measures simply do not predict which youth will respond best to a particular program. This inability to indentify predictor variables may be a consequence of the small sample size and absence of longitudinal data in the subculture study.[11] It also appears, however, that so many idiosyncratic features of youth and programs interact to produce each youth's response that prediction using a standard set of general measures is unlikely to succeed very well. If this is, in fact, the case, the present method of giving youth periods of trial in a program and closely monitoring their adjustment and responsiveness makes more sense than an elaborate system for classification and placement.

The first placement in a program may be guided by a rough identification of the strengths and weaknesses of programs and an analysis of their correspondence to the needs of the individual youth. If the initial placement is not satisfactory, an examination of the situation and characteristics of youth and program which led to the failure could lead to a more knowledgeable second placement. This would also suggest the importance of utilizing detention center personnel to help provide placement advice to the youth since detention provides an initial program experience from which to learn about youth responses. This report may prove helpful in this process by calling attention to some of the features of programs and persons which are important to understand in making placement recommendations.

This report has examined short-term correctional objectives, methods of achieving these goals, and conflicts among them. It has only touched on the question of long-term successes in achieving humane environments, rehabilitation, and reintegration, and the long-run community adjustment of youth will be one of the important problems for subsequent analysis.

[11] The cohort study employs both a larger sample and longitudinal data. Some predictors of youth responsiveness to particular kinds of programs may thus emerge from this study.

IV. An Exploratory Analysis Of The Recidivism And Cohort Data

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Since 1972 the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services has operated a service delivery system without the backup of the traditional training schools. This new approach has created a fairly extensive community-based system that relies for the most part on the private sector to provide a range of services for youth in trouble. These services are purchased and monitored by the department. That youthful offenders in the care of DYS are more widely dispersed across the state and exposed to a wider range of program alternatives is obvious. However, the questions about the impact of the new system on youth in the program and after they leave the system are largely unanswered.

In the years since 1970, when the Center for Criminal Justice at Harvard Law School first began its extensive studies of the reform efforts, a wealth of material has been collected on the experiences of youth in different group settings. Comparative subculture studies have involved observation and interviewing of youth under the old and new systems. Cross-sectional surveys of the major programs used by the department have been conducted periodically to furnish an overview of the variation in social climate among different programs, the diversity of program strategies across the system, and assessments by youth of what is happening to them within the programs. In addition to these efforts, the Center has undertaken a major longitudinal study of the new system since 1973. Youth are interviewed at a number of points as they are processed through the system until they have been in the community for six months. This longitudinal study provides data for evaluating the immediate and long-run impact of the programs. It focuses especially on the changing relationships between youngsters and significant others such as parents, employers, police, and program staff; on changes in the self-image of youth; and on the ability of programs to link youth with positive, supportive opportunities in the community. In later analyses the subculture, cross-sectional, and longitudinal studies will be merged to provide a comprehensive account of youth in the new programs.

In this report we will present the most recent data available on recidivism to allow at least a partial comparison between the recidivism rates of the old training school system in the late 1960s and the new community-based system of the 1970s. This will be followed by a more detailed analysis of completed longitudinal data gathered on the youth cohort over the past two years.

Recidivism Based on Official Record Checks

In this section we will present some preliminary comparisons of official records for a sample of youth paroled during the fiscal year 1967-68 with youth in the first four regions sampled during the 1973-74 longitudinal study.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has a centralized criminal record system administered by the Department of Probation. A single record will indicate both juvenile and adult court appearances and dispositions. Access to such a centralized record system is a great asset to evaluation research, but like most official record systems in constant daily use for making individual decisions it also poses special problems. The value of the system depends on the recording of essential data by each of 72 juvenile courts in the state, and it is subject to any errors arising from lack of uniformity or completeness in court reporting to the central file. In addition, the centralized system is not yet computerized, and the sheer volume of the records makes human error likely. We discovered several cases of youth in our samples for whom no records could be found, and other youth in DYS at a particular time who had no record of a court appearance prior to their entry into DYS for a six-to-twelve-month period. Also, our comparison of two samples six years apart is potentially biased by any significant change in reporting or recording procedures used by the courts or the Department of Probation over that period. Even with these reservations, however, the centralized system will yield the best estimates of criminal history available.

The 1968 sample constitutes a representative sample of 308 youth paroled from the DYS institutions between July 1, 1967 and June 30, 1968. The sample includes 72 girls from the Lancaster School for Girls, 25 boys from the forestry program, 27 boys from Oakdale (an institution for young boys), 39 boys from the Lyman School for Boys, 102 boys from the Shirley Industrial School for Boys, and 43 boys from the Bridgewater Institute for Juvenile Guidance.[1] Table 4.1 shows the distribution of this sample for boys by paroling institution and region to which paroled.

The 1974 sample is made up of those youth included in the longitudinal cohort study. For comparison purposes we can only use those regions that were completed first in our study: i.e., those regions where the youth have been released to the community from treatment programs for a long enough period of exposure to allow for official recording of new delinquent activity. The sample consists of 48 youth from Region I, 61 from Region II, 49 from Region III, and 50 from Region IV. Regions V, VI, and VII are not represented here, because not enough time has passed to allow for a six-month official record check for any sizeable proportion of the samples in these regions.

Figure 4.1 gives a schematic view of the location of the regions throughout the state. Region I consists of the western part of the state, with the Springfield area being its most populous center. Region II is composed of the middle of the state, including the Worcester area. Region III includes Cambridge and Somerville and extends northward and westward, including such towns as Lexington and Concord. Region IV is the North Shore area, including at its southern tip part of the Boston area. Region V is the South Shore area including Quincy and Framingham. Region VI is Boston proper, and Region VII is the Cape Cod area, which also includes Fall River and New Bedford.

Two criteria of recidivism will be used for this comparative analysis. First, we will look at youth who have

Table 4.1

Distribution of 1968 Sample of Boys, by Region and Institution.

Institution	Region							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	Total
Oakdale	5	4	5	5	0	5	3	27
Forestry	3	6	3	2	4	4	3	25
Lyman	6	8	4	6	3	8	4	39
Shirley	18	16	15	17	6	21	9	102
Bridgewater	5	5	6	3	3	15	6	43
	37	39	33	33	16	53	25	234

[1] Youth for this sample were selected from parole release lists maintained by the former Youth Service Board institution for fiscal 1968. It should be noted that these numbers cannot be equated with the average daily population of youth in each institution. The sample is representative of those released to parole in a given year and is accordingly affected by department policies related to parole criteria, institutional transfer, length of stay, and related policies. Such a sample provides the closest possible comparison to the 1974 sample.



Figure 4.1

Regional Boundaries of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services.

reappeared in juvenile or adult court on any charge excluding traffic offenses. Reappearance in court for a delinquent or criminal offense, excluding traffic offenses, will thus be treated as an index of recidivism. Second, we will look at the disposition by the court. Youth who are either placed on probation or committed to the Department of Youth Services or to an adult institution will be classified as recidivists. The latter index, while more consecutive than the former, is probably a better estimate of the number of youth who continue to engage in the unlawful behavior that the courts respond to by restricting the freedom of the offenders. Six-month and twelve-month periods of time will be considered. For the 1968 sample, the period will begin from the date of parole; for the 1974 sample, the period begins when a youngster completes a residential program and is released to the community, or after he has been in a foster home or nonresidential program in the community for three months. Rates for boys and girls will be analyzed separately.

Table 4.2 records the number of boys recidivating by institution in the 1968 sample. Using the criterion of reappearance in court during the initial six-month period, the Forestry and Oakdale youth reappear at a slower rate than do youth from the other institutions. Bridgewater has the highest rate. A similar pattern of court reappearance is obtained during the initial 12 months, with the exception that the number of forestry program youth reappearing nearly doubles, making their record more like that of the youth from Shirley and Lyman than the youth from Oakdale. When we examine the disposition index–those placed on probation or recommitted to either DYS or adult institutions–the pattern remains the same for the six-month period, with Oakdale and Forestry youth less likely to recidivate and Bridgewater youth most likely. In this

Table 4.2

Recidivism Rates for Boys in the 1968 Sample, by Institution.

Recidivism Criteria	Institution					
	Oakdale (%)	Forestry (%)	Lyman (%)	Shirley (%)	Bridgewater (%)	Total (%)
Reappearance in court						
6 months	37	26	56	57	70	54
12 months	44	60	66	64	77	66
Probation or recommitment						
6 months	22	24	31	36	49	35
12 months	33	36	49	47	65	47
N =	(27)	(25)	(39)	(102)	(43)	(236)

case, however, the Oakdale and Forestry rates remain similar for the twelve-month period as well.

Table 4.3 contains court appearance and disposition data for boys in the 1968 and 1974 samples. The data are subdivided by region in order to permit comparisons. These data suggest that the reform effort has had a differential impact on recidivism across the regions. During the initial six months, rates of reappearance in court are about the same or lower for boys in Regions I, II, and IV in the 1974 sample as compared to the 1968 sample. In Region III the rate was lower in 1968 than in 1974. For the twelve-month period, the rate is similar in both samples for Regions I and II, slightly higher for Region III in 1974, and substantially higher for Region IV in 1974.

Turning to the disposition index in Table 4.3, the probation and commitment rates for Region I remain very similar in the two samples while Region II shows a considerable drop from 1968 to 1974 as measured by both the six-month and twelve-month periods. In contrast, Regions III and IV indicate a substantial increase in recidivism rates from 1968 to 1974 for both exposure periods. We would project, on the basis of our unofficial recidivism data, gathered by following youth in the longitudinal sample, that Regions V and VI will also experience an increase from 1968 to 1974 while Region VII will show a decrease.[2] We are not yet, however, in a position to determine what the relative size of these differences is likely to be when the full comparisons of official record data for the 1968 and 1974 samples are available.

It is also too early to tell what factors may account for these increases or decreases in recidivism rates between 1968 and 1974. Before one can attribute these differences to the effect of changes in the DYS system, a number of other factors with a potential impact on these rates must be considered. For example, there were substantial increases in juvenile arrest rates in the intervening period. The likelihood of recidivism may have been affected by the same factors that influenced these arrest rates. Densely populated areas, such as Regions III,

[2] For a presentation of unofficial recidivism data on the 1974 longitudinal sample see Table 4.16 and the accompanying text.

Table 4.3

Recidivism Rates for Boys in the 1968 and 1974 Samples, by Region.

Recidivism Criteria	Region								
	I %	II %	III %	IV %	Subtotal %	V %	VI %	VII %	Total %
Reappearance in court									
6 months									
1968	49 (37)[a]	61 (39)	30 (33)	48 (33)	49 (142)	50 (16)	64 (53)	68 (25)	54 (236)
1974	44 (40)	50 (42)	47 (38)	52 (40)	49 (160)				
12 months									
1968	73 (37)	69 (39)	48 (33)	58 (33)	62 (142)	62 (16)	75 (53)	80 (25)	66 (236)
1974[b]	74 (39)	71 (35)	53 (38)	71 (38)	68 (150)				
Probation or commitment									
6 months									
1968	22 (37)	59 (39)	18 (33)	21 (33)	30 (142)	31 (16)	40 (53)	44 (25)	35 (236)
1974	20 (40)	24 (42)	37 (38)	35 (40)	29 (160)				
12 months									
1968	40 (37)	67 (39)	24 (33)	36 (33)	42 (142)	44 (16)	57 (53)	60 (25)	47 (236)
1974	41 (39)	43 (35)	37 (38)	42 (38)	41 (250)				

[a] Parenthetical numbers give total sample in each category.
[b] Sample size for the 1974 twelve-month period is smaller than for the six-month period because a few youth in the sample have not been out of program for twelve months.

IV, V and VI, may have experienced a sharper increase in crime rates than less densely populated areas. Other criminal justice agencies may also have significantly altered their policies or resources for handling juvenile crime. Furthermore, changes in the characteristics of youth committed to DYS may have greatly influenced the rates.[3] Further analysis of the recidivism data on boys must therefore await the availability of the additional information that will permit such factors to be taken into account.

[3] Data reported previously, for example, indicate that boys committed to the DYS in recent years have included a much higher proportion of serious offenders and older boys over fifteen years of age. This in part reflects a shift in court practices to refer more of the younger status offenders to Welfare, Mental Health, and local service agencies. See Lloyd E. Ohlin, Robert B. Coates, and Alden D. Miller, "Evaluating the Reform of Youth Corrections in Massachusetts," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 12 (January 1975), 3-16.

A comparison of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicates that girls are less likely to reappear in court or to be placed on probation or recommitted than

Table 4.4

Recidivism Rates for Girls in the 1968 and 1974 Samples, by Regions I, II, III, IV, and Total 1968 Sample.

Recidivism Criteria	Total Sample	Regional Sample (I, II, III, IV)	
	1968 %	1968 %	1974 %
Reappearance in court			
6 months	17 (72)[a]	13 (39)	19 (48)
12 months[b]	24 (72)	26 (39)	35 (44)
Probation or recommitment			
6 months	8 (72)	8 (39)	12 (48)
12 months	10 (72)	8 (39)	16 (44)

[a] Parenthetical numbers give total sample in each category.
[b] Sample size for the 1974 twelve-month period is smaller than for the six-month period because a few youths have not been out of their programs for 12 months.

boys. Only 17 percent of the total sample of girls in 1968 reappeared in court during the first six months after parole and 24 percent during the initial 12 months. Similarly, only eight percent of this sample was placed on probation or recommitted during the first six months and 10 percent over the 12 month period. For boys the comparable rates were 54 percent, 66 percent, and 47 percent respectively.

In order to compare the two time periods—1968 and 1974—for girls, the recidivism rates are shown in Table 4.4 only for the regions where our court checks have been completed: Regions I, II, III and IV. Measured by court reappearance the rates are higher for girls in 1974—19 percent compared to 13 percent for the six-month period and 35 percent compared to 26 percent for the twelve-month period. This is also true of the disposition index. The 1974 rate for probation or institutional commitment is higher for the six-month period, 12 percent compared to eight percent, and also for the twelve-month period, 16 percent compared to eight percent. Although not particularly substantial, these differences between the 1968 and 1974 samples are difficult to interpret. Although practitioners in Massachusetts and elsewhere are quick to point out that girls are now committing more serious offenses than they were a few years ago, the fact that most of the girls in this portion of the 1974 sample were committed or referred as status offenders masks from empirical analysis any increase in seriousness of offenses. It is clear, however, that the former system tended to hold on to girls for a longer period of time. A greater percentage of girls were paroled at ages 16 and over (63 percent in 1968; 54 percent in 1974), which may mean that previously girls were more likely to be detained during the most critical adolescent years. It is also quite possible that as attitudes toward the status of women have changed in recent years judges and other criminal justice decision makers may be less likely to view girls as requiring protection from exposure to the correctional system. If such a change in attitude is taking place one would expect the recidivism rate for girls to increase.

These preliminary recidivism data suggest that the policy of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services to close the training schools has not resulted in a substantial increase in recidivism, but neither has it resulted in a substantial decrease. Region-by-region analysis shows rather dramatic shifts in both directions. Considerable work remains to sort out the impact of the reforms as compared to the impact of other factors that have also been changing over the five- or six-year period between the two comparison samples.

The Longitudinal (Cohort) Analysis

The longitudinal, or cohort, analysis, consists of a series of four interviews with a sample or cohort of DYS youth, and utilizes a panel design. The members of the cohort are successive admissions to DYS during designated periods for the seven regions of the state. The four interviews establish a baseline as youth enter the department through the court and the detention process and progress through the department's program to the point of discharge. The use of panel analysis will bring to bear on the question of departmental effectiveness a special methodological and analytical power that is not available in the larger study.

The sample was taken from youth passing through the system from January 1973, some months after the closing of the training schools at Shirley, Lyman, and Lancaster, through December 1974. Comparison of the results of the programs of the large institutions with the results of noninstitutional and small residential programs is being accomplished by contrasting the results of the cohort analysis with those of the three cross-sectional baseline studies of institutionalized youth conducted by the center between 1970 and 1972. These data were collected during the summer of 1970, the summer of 1971, and most recently from December 1971 to March 1972 just prior to the closing of the Shirley and Lyman schools. To these data we are adding longitudinal information from official records of court appearances and dispositions both prior to and after release from the institution.

The goals of these interviews and observations are twofold: (1) to develop data-gathering instruments for tracing change in delinquent youth as they progress through a correctional program (such instruments consist of record-check procedures as well as interviews with youthful offenders and staff); and (2) to develop a model of factors causing change in delinquent youth in the care of a corrections agency. The combined effort amounts to a crucial evaluation of the department's program strategies. Attention will focus on the expectations of delinquent youth as they enter the corrections system, their attitudes once they have become adjusted to the program before parole, and their reactions to the parole or aftercare experience. This attitudinal information, when combined with observations on behavior, should enable the project to develop and refine measurement instruments, to establish a model of factors causing change in delinquent youth, and to assess the effect of new programs on youth adjustment both within the Department of Youth Services and out in the community. The cohort analysis, as part of the larger study, represents the crucial evaluation of the end product of the reorganization and program reformation monitored in the rest of the research project. It will thus make the results of the overall study more immediately accessible and useful to agencies in other parts of the country.

Methodology of the Cohort Analysis

A youth may come into contact with the Department of Youth Services in several ways and at several stages of his journey through the criminal justice system. The court detains some youth prior to court appearance. We interviewed all youth who were detained for more than two days in DYS, securing information on individual background, current relationships, aspirations, and self-image. Some of these youth were released without additional contact with DYS. Others were committed or referred after court to DYS.

Youth who were either committed or referred to DYS were then interviewed after going through court. The interview at this stage dealt with the court and detention experiences and, again, relationships, aspirations, and self-image. Some youth, particularly referred youth, reached this stage without going through detention. As they entered a program these youth were then being interviewed for the first time. They were not asked about detention, since they had not been through it, but they were asked about their individual background, since they had not been asked before. In addition, a small sample of youth going through detention but not committed or referred to DYS by the court were interviewed a second time, for comparison purposes, just like those who were committed or referred.

Committed or referred youth were then interviewed again prior to the termination of a residential program. This interview concerned their experiences in the program, relationships, aspirations, and self-image. Because of the great variety of programs involved, this information was supplemented by information from a program survey which was a cross-sectional examination of programs on the basis of interviews with staff and youth. Not all the youth responding to this survey were cohort sample youth. The survey was needed because the cohort youth at this point became too dispersed to provide sufficiently comprehensive descriptive material on any particular program facility to interpret the findings from the cohort interviews. With the aid of these cross-sectional program data, the cohort results can be used to evaluate the effects of different types of programs on youth. Without the cross-sectional data the evaluation of effects might be clear, but the identity of the types of programs that work best would not emerge.

Finally, the most crucial interview occurred after the youth had been out of residential programs for about six months, or had recidivated. This interview focused heavily on relationships between the youth and members of the community, as well as upon aspirations and self-image. It was supplemented by information from DYS staff and by official record checks. The official record checks cover a period of time extending considerably beyond the last interview. The youth in the comparison sample of youth who were detained but not committed or referred, described at the second stage above, were given the same interview, and their records checked at this point, as were the youth who were committed and referred and who have gone through the DYS programs.

Some youth, of course, did not follow such clear paths through DYS, and the sequence of interviewing was adapted to the course they followed. For example, youth who moved from program to program were additionally interviewed as they left each program, unless this happened more frequently than at one-month intervals.

Thus the chief categories of data involved are the individual backgrounds of youth, their experiences in programs, their relationships, their aspirations, their self-images, the impressions they make on staff, and their official records. The youth involved are primarily those served by the Department of Youth Services, contrasted with a small comparison sample of youth in the criminal justice system who are not served by the department.

The sampling of youth for each cohort was accomplished in the following way. The seven administrative regions of the youth services system in Massachusetts were divided, for the purposes of the study, into four sets: three containing two regions, the fourth containing one very populous region. Beginning in one set, all youth staying longer than

two days in detention were interviewed, and all youth committed or referred to the department were followed through the complete sequence of interviewing. This process was continued until we reached the point of having approximately 70 committed or referred youth in each region, and twice that number in the very populous region. The 70 committed or referred youth from each region were the contribution of a set of regions to the projected sample of 400 committed or referred youth across the state for the cohort, allowing for attrition of the sample over time. Then the youth constituting the contribution of a set of regions to the comparison sample were selected. Youth neither committed nor referred but going through detention were represented by 12 such youth in each region, 24 in the very populous region. Thus the comparison sample for the entire state will reach approximately 80 after attrition.

The result of all this will yield samples of predetermined size of referred or committed youth and of comparison youth, plus a very large sample of detained youth who were not followed up because they did not continue under the care of the department. These detained youth must be interviewed because we cannot predict which detained youth will continue and become part of the sample of committed or referred youth. As a side benefit we will know a great deal about youth who are detained but then not placed under the care of the department.

Since the longitudinal study is still incomplete, the results presented here must be regarded as preliminary and tentative. Data are available, however, for a large number of cases on the entire process from detention to post-program experiences in the community, and we can begin to address five basic issues: (1) the factors affecting the detention decision; (2) the factors affecting initial program placement within DYS; (3) the immediate effects of program experiences; (4) how program experiences and other factors relate to longer run, post-program experiences; and (5) the impact that decisions made early in the process have on decisions made at later stages.

Given the overall rationale of the DYS reform effort to develop a more humane and more effective way to facilitate youth reintegration into the community, relationships provide the key concepts around which the longitudinal study revolves. It is assumed that any successful attempt to make the correctional process more humane must involve altering relationships between staff and youth and between the youth themselves. For example, the early reform effort sought to inform youth more adequately about what was happening to them as they moved through the "treatment process," and to involve them more fully in decisions about their future. The nature of punishments and rewards for good or bad behavior were also altered, deemphasizing physical punishment and involving youth to a greater extent in rewarding others for good behavior. The longitudinal study provides data on these changes in relationships.

Facilitating reintegration depends in part on shaping relationships between youth and significant adults such as parents, schoolteachers, employers, and police. Here also, the longitudinal study focuses on task-oriented relationships concerning information flow, decision-making, punishment, and rewards.

As discussed at greater length in an earlier chapter of this volume, the focus on relationships also enables us to assess the degree to which programs are actually based in the community.[4] The field of corrections has been characterized by confusion over the definition and conceptualization of community-based programing. It is common to hear the term used to identify any alternative to institutional confinement, but it is clear that a group home can be as isolated from the larger community as a large prison or training school. The words *community based* focus attention on the nature of the links between programs and the community. A key set of variables differentiates among programs on the basis of the *extent* and *quality* of relationships between staff and clients, on the one hand, and the community in which the program is located on the other. If clients come from outside the community in which the program itself is located relationships need to be considered with both the community in which the program is located and the home community to which the client will return.

The nature of these client and staff relationships with the community provides a continuum of services ranging from the least to the most community based. As the frequency, duration, and quality of community relationships increase the program is categorized as *more* community based. The range extends from an isolated institutional environment to residential or nonresidential programs where relationships with the community are essentially normalized—where youth have access to the full array of resources available in the larger community. This continuum of variable dimensions of community relationships adds more realism to the concept of community corrections. Because of the varying needs of specific offenders and communities no system can afford to have all of its programs lodged at either end of the continuum.

The longitudinal data, while permitting discrimination among programs in terms of community linkage, do not by themselves provide the most comprehensive basis for making that assessment. We can, however, make rough distinctions sufficient for this preliminary analysis. As the cross-sectional program survey data are completed and merged with the longitudinal data we will be in a better position to address the issue of community linkage.

The long-run impact of the new system is measured in the longitudinal study by looking at the kinds of relationships youth have with other significant persons six months after their principal experience with DYS. Such relationships should provide a partial explanation of why some youth recidivate and others do not. Recidivism will also be analyzed by considering the influence of the characteristics of youth and the types of programs they experienced in DYS.

The emphasis on relationships among significant actors in the system highlights another major concern of the longitudinal study. That is, how are youth perceived by decision makers and how do these perceptions affect their immediate decisions? What effect do these early decisions have on later decisions as the youth proceed further into the juvenile justice system? In other words, to what extent are decision makers influenced by the labeling effect of prior official actions rather than by personal characteristics, needs, conduct, or circumstances of youth?

[4] Robert B. Coates, "Community-Based Corrections: Concept, Impact, Dangers" in this volume.

From Detention to the Community: Analyzing the Cohort Data

This report presents data on youth who have been administered the full set of interviews as of March 30, 1975. There are a few youth in each of the regions who have not yet completed their DYS experience; Region VI, the last region sampled, has approximately 85 youngsters not yet "graduated" and therefore not in this analysis. Table 4.5 depicts the number of completed and uncompleted youth by the seven DYS administrative regions.[5] It is expected that we will follow some of the remaining youth through the summer of 1976 since a fairly substantial number of them stay in programs for a year or longer. The completion of the interviewing sequence marks the beginning of our record-check follow-up for recidivism. We would like a minimum of a one-year follow-up on each youth in that cohort sample, which means that record checking and data analysis in general will extend into 1977.

Much of the data analysis in this chapter has been accomplished by means of stepwise multiple regression techniques.[6] These techniques enable us to predict an individual's score on one variable, called the dependent variable, from

Table 4.5

Number of Cohort Youth Completed and Remaining to be Interviewed as of March 30, 1975, by Region.

Region	Number Youth Completed	Number Remaining
I	50	3
II	62	3
III	49	5
IV	56	6
V	50	16
VI	56	85
VII	49	24
Total N	372	142

[5] The term *region*, throughout this report, will refer to the regions through which youth entered the sample. Any given region may use programs beyond its own boundaries, but the youth remain the administrative responsibility of that region.

[6] Some readers will be surprised that we use these techniques even with dichotomous dependent variables. However, it happens that multiple discriminant function analysis reduces in the case of a dichotomy to the multiple regression, so that what we are actually doing in the case of the dichotomous dependent variable with multiple regression is a discriminant function analysis.

his scores on other variables, called independent variables. The regression analysis produces for each dependent variable a number called the regression *constant*, which is the average value of the dependent variable when all the independent variables equal 0, and a series of numbers called regression coefficients, each of which represents the increase or decrease in the dependent variable when one of the independent variables increases by one unit, without the other independent variables changing at the same time.[7] The regression coefficients are the most important results, for they represent the effect of each independent variable, controlling, or holding constant, all the rest.

In the presentation that follows we will frequently represent these results in tables. Each column of a table will represent the results for a dependent variable. The dependent variable will be indicated at the head of the column, the rows will represent the independent variables, and the numbers in the cells will be the regression coefficients. At the foot of each column we will indicate in addition the regression constant and also the *multiple correlation* coefficient. The multiple correlation coefficient is a number varying between 0 and +1 that indicates the degree to which the independent variables in combination predict accurately the dependent variable. A value of 0 means that the independent variables are of no help in predicting the dependent variable. A high value means they predict the dependent variable well.

When a variable consists of several unordered categories, like the seven administrative regions of the Massachusetts youth correctional system, we represent each category as a separate variable, scored 1 if a person is in that category, 0 otherwise. Thus a person who was in Region I would have a score of 1 on the Region I dichotomous variable, and a score of 0 on the other region variables.

Consider the following hypothetical results:

	School Placement
Region I	.4
Region II	.5
Region VII	-.3
Years of schooling	.2
Regression constant	.1
Multiple correlation	.78

Notice that Regions I, II, and VII are included and the other regions are omitted. The omission means that the regression coefficients of the omitted regions are not significantly different from 0. The regression constant gives the predicted value of the dependent variable school placement, when a youth has no schooling and is not in Region I, II, or VII (has scores of 0 on all these variables) or in other words has no schooling and is in Region III, IV, V, or VI. The regression coefficient for years of schooling indicates how much the predicted value for school placement increases for each year of schooling the youth has. The negative regression coefficient for Region VII indicates how much the predicted value for school placement *decreases* if the youth were in Region VII, compared to what it would be if the youth were in Region III, IV, V, or VI. Similarly the positive regression coefficients for Regions I and II indicate how much the predicted value for school placement would *increase* if the youth were in Region I or II, compared to Regions III, IV, V, or VI. The higher the predicted value for school placement the more likely the youth will be put into a school placement. The multiple correlation of .78 indicates that the independent variables region and years of schooling predict school placement rather well.

We will indicate the degree of statistical significance of the regression coefficients and the multiple correlation coefficients by asterisks. One asterisk indicates the .05 level, two the .01 level, and three the .001 level.[8] Thus, the more asterisks, the more significantly the coefficient is different from 0. Within a column representing results for a particular dependent variable the number of asterisks can be taken as a rough indication of the degree to which an independent variable contributes to the predictability of the dependent variable. The more asterisks the more the variable contributes to predictability.

Detention

Before moving to a discussion of detention decisions, we will present a few selected background characteristics of the youth in the cohort sample. Thirty-two percent of the 372 youth in the completed sample reported that they were committed or referred to the department because they had been charged with property offenses (e.g., breaking and entering and larceny). Twenty-one percent had been charged with stealing cars, 20 percent for juvenile or status offenses (e.g., runaway, stubborn child), 8 percent for property and person offenses (e.g., armed robbery, robbery), 9 percent for crimes against person (e.g., homicide, rape, assault), 3 percent for drug use, 2 percent for public misbehavior (e.g., drunkenness, loudness), and 5 percent for other miscellaneous offenses.

Males constitute 83 percent of the sample. They are most likely to be in DYS for stealing cars or for property offenses, while females are more likely to be in for juvenile status offenses. Fourteen percent of the sample are black, 82 percent white, and 3 percent other. Blacks tend to be in DYS for property and person offenses and not for juvenile offenses. On the other hand, being white is strongly and positively correlated with juvenile offenses, somewhat positively related to drug offenses and stealing cars, but negatively correlated with property and person or person offenses. While 62 percent are 16 years of age or over, there is no apparent relationship between age and type of offense. Forty-one percent of the sample attended school regularly prior to being placed in DYS; 13 percent attended infrequently, and 45 percent had dropped out of school. Youth attending school regularly are most likely to be in DYS for juvenile or status offenses. These youth are also somewhat associated with drug offenses and property and person offenses. Youth who have dropped out are more likely to be in for stealing cars. Leaving school is also somewhat related to crimes against property and crimes against persons.

Forty-one percent of the sample come from intact families; that is, both natural parents live at home. Thirteen percent come from homes with one natural parent and one stepparent. Thirty-five percent come from single parent homes, and 8 percent live with other adults. Four percent live in settings with no adult head of household before being placed in DYS.

Early in 1975 the center issued a report that specifically dealt with issues related to detention issues.[9] Accordingly, we will only describe here the key detention decisions in order to place them in their proper perspective as part of the process through which many DYS youth proceed.

In the course of the larger research project we attempt to describe the detention and the placement process and the criteria used in making these decisions by interviewing court liaison staff, regional placement personnel, and persons within the various programs who are responsible for intake. It is clear that matching youth with detention and placement programs involves a considerable amount of intuition and trial and error as well as reliance on the more objectifiable characteristics of youth. In this analysis, however, we will examine the assignment of youth to detention units and their initial placement simply by looking at the characteristics of the youth. This will serve to determine to what extent these characteristics will permit predictions about the kinds of programs to which youth will be assigned.

For the most part we will be concerned here with the department's decision about which type of detention facility to use. Of the 372 committed or referred youth comprising the completed sample, however, 237 were detained and 135 were not. Thus we can also look at sizable subsamples of youth who were either (1) committed or referred to DYS and previously detained; or (2) committed or referred to the department but not previously detained in a juvenile detention center.

After analyzing a wide number of background variables very little could be said about the factors that prompted the decision to detain or not detain the youth eventually committed or referred to DYS. It should be clear that our sample is not fully representative of the large number of youth coming before the court, for whom decisions about detention must be made. Further, since this is not a study of the actual court proceeding, we are unable to rule out the possibility that interpersonal interactions within the hearing process might tend to influence the decision in some systematic, reasonable manner. For the sample being analyzed here, we sought to reanalyze the detention decision, this time with the more

Table 4.6

Multiple Regression of "Nondetained" on Background Variables.

Mother in white-collar employment	.2317***
Years of schooling (grade)	.0614***
Region V	-.1976**
Region VI	-.1813**
Regression constant	.844
Multiple correlation	.313***

[7] The regression coefficients are expressed in the raw score units of the independent and dependent variables rather than in standard score units (beta weights) in order to enhance the comparability with analyses in other populations and in order to make it easy to compare the practical effects of raw unit changes in different independent variables in our own population.

[8] Significance tests with dichotomous dependent variables are frequently considered a problem. However the F test associated with the multiple correlation coefficient appears to be the same as Hotelling's T^2, a test used in discriminant function analysis. This would suggest that the significance test associated with the multiple correlation is appropriate even with a dichotomous dependent variable as long as there are continuous variables among the independent variables or as long as the dichotomous independent variables are numerous enough to add up to a discriminant function that is approximately continuous. Significance tests for the individual independent variables are probably accurate for continuous independent variables but only approximate for dichotomous independent variables.

[9] Robert B. Coates, Alden D. Miller, Lloyd E. Ohlin, "Juvenile Detention and Its Consequences," unpublished paper, Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, mimeo., January 1975.

powerful statistical technique of regression analysis. Again we discover very little to help us predict who will be detained and who will not among those subsequently committed or referred by the court to DYS.

We can say that youth whose mothers are employed in white-collar occupations are less likely than others to be detained. Also youth who are closer to completing their schooling are not as likely to be detained as youth in the lower grades. On the other hand youth residing in Regions V and VI (South Shore and Boston) are more likely to be detained than youth in other regions. Thus it may be the case that those who come from families with relatively higher status and who are closer to graduation are less likely to be detained. However, the decision seems to be largely influenced by where one lives, as a reflection perhaps of court policies, available facilities, and other variables as yet unexplored. In any case the decision to detain, in our sample, does *not* appear to be based on characteristics of the youth and his involvement in delinquency.

Once the decision to detain has been made by the court, DYS must decide where to hold the youth while awaiting court appearance. Again using the controlling technique of regression analysis we can determine which factors significantly influence that decision. The three kinds of detention alternatives are custodial, treatment, and sheltercare. Thirty-one percent of the detained youth in our sample were held in custodial units, 27 percent in treatment units and 41 percent in sheltercare units.

There is considerable variation of detention placement by region. Youth in Region VI are apt to be held in custodial detention and seldom in sheltercare. In Regions I and II youth will most probably be held in treatment units and not in custodial or sheltercare programs. Youth in the other regions tend to be detained in sheltercare and custodial programs. Thus where one is detained is also largely influenced by where one lives.

Table 4.7

Multiple Regression of Place of Detention on Background Variables.

	Custody	Treatment	Sheltercare
Region I	-.2431***	.8652***	-.6743***
Region II	-.2784***	.8870***	-.6209***
Region IV	.2663***		-.3568***
White-collar father	-.1976***		.1976***
Father only			.2267*
Current charge-person	.2707**		
Self-reported past crimes			
Cars alone	.1620**		
Cars with others			-.1203*
Ran from DYS unit	.1860***		-.2438***
Friends smoke marijuana			.1205**
Friends want to be part of society	.3329***		-.1712**
Do not "hang out" with DYS kids			-.1607**
Age			-.0390*
Female		.1425***	
Regression constant	.200	.022	1.302
Multiple correlation	.643***	.927***	.736***

Other factors related to this decision include characteristics of the family. Youth who have fathers in white-collar employment are not likely to be detained in custodial detention but will probably be detained in sheltercare units. Youth with only a father as head of household are more likely to be placed in sheltercare units than other children.

The nature of the current offense charge is also related to detention placement. It is likely that youth who are charged with crimes against persons will be detained in secure care. It should be noted, however, that the nature of the charge did not enable us to predict the decision to detain or not. Also, youth who have a history of stealing cars will probably be detained in custodial units, particularly if they engaged in this activity alone rather than with others.

The decision where to detain is also shaped in part by the experience that DYS has had with those youth in the past. Youth who have previously run from DYS are more likely to be detained in custodial units than those who have not, and those who have run are not as likely to be held in sheltercare units.

Youth whose friends use marijuana or are not generally former DYS charges are more likely to be held in the shelter care units. Youth who believe that their friends want to become part of society are more apt to be held in custodial units. Younger youth tend to be more often represented in the shelter care units than older youth, and females are more likely to be placed in treatment units than males.

While the sample thus displays little logic for the decision to detain, more justification appears for the decision about place of detention, particularly in terms of youth charged with person offenses and youth who have previously run from the department. Still the overriding factor determining where youth are detained appears to be where they reside; in other words, where the youth are detained may be largely influenced by the availability of detention places.

Initial Placement

We have classified programs in which DYS youth can be placed into four categories: secure care, a group home, foster care, and nonresidential care. Secure care consists of those programs, public and private, that provide fairly intensive services in a secure residential setting. In almost all instances these settings are locked. Types of treatment range from intensive group encounter programs specializing in the "concept model," or programs providing remedial educational skills, to programs which offer very little but shelter. Group home programs encompass a great variety of treatment or simple maintenance objectives. Treatment goals range from fairly intensive psychological change orientations to programs that try to provide a normal atmosphere from which participants may take part in the day-to-day life of the community. Foster care may be of short or long duration. As with the other programs, the nature of foster care varies considerably. Some youth in temporary placements receive shelter and routine casework from the regional offices. Other youth in longer term placements may become more involved in the normal routines of the community in which the foster home is located. Nonresidential programs refer to services provided to youth living in their own homes or in some alternative situation, but not in the program residence. The type of nonresidential service varies considerably, including different recreation facilities, tutorial education, counseling, or work experiences.

For this preliminary analysis these four program types can be ranged on our continuum of community-based programs from secure care as the least community-based through group homes and foster care to nonresidential care as the most community-based. This will permit us to make some tentative assessments of community linkage later in this report. The rationale for this arrangement is both *a priori* and based on extensive day-to-day observation of program operations. The placement of program types on the continuum will be much refined in later analyses. We intend to subclassify the group homes into several categories that reflect the principal programatic thrust of the programs. With the cross-sectional data combined with the longitudinal data, we plan to arrange program types on the community-based continuum according to a more comprehensive empirical assessment of the extent and quality of community linkages.

Given the four types of programs as they are currently classified, how do youth in these programs differ from one another if at all? Before trying to assess the immediate or long-run impact of the programs, we must try to determine why youth are initially placed in specific programs and the extent to which the different program types select different types of youth.

By region, youngsters in Region IV (North Shore) were less likely to be in group homes than youth in other regions; youth in Region II (middle) were more likely to be placed in foster homes; and, after controlling for other factors, none of the regions were positively associated with nonresidential programs except Region III (Cambridge and adjoining areas north and west).

Females in the sample correlate somewhat with secure care while males correlate strongly with group homes and nonresidential programs. This may in part reflect the less diverse range of programs available to girls than boys as well as their differential response to the various types of programs. Blacks and younger youth are associated with nonresidential placements.

Family characteristics are somewhat related to initial placement. Youth living with both natural parents are not likely to be placed in nonresidential programs. Nor are youth from families without fathers, or with fathers either in semi-skilled or unskilled employment, or where mothers are engaged in white-collar employment. Youth from families without mothers or with unemployed mothers are more likely to be placed in nonresidential alternatives.

Youth who were attending school regularly prior to being committed or referred to DYS are more likely to be in nonresidential programs and less likely to be held in secure care. Youngsters who do not hang around with other DYS youth are also more likely to be placed in nonresidential programs. Youth who indicate that their friends tend to be younger than themselves are likely to be placed in

Table 4.8

Multiple Regression of Initial Placement on Background Variables.

	Secure Care	Group Home	Foster Home	Nonresidential
Region I				-2.9957***
Region II			.2732***	-2.9405***
Region IV		-.2223**		-.2799***
Region V				.1609***
Region VI				-.7758***
Region VII				-.3408***
Female	.1729**	.2279***		-.2978***
Black				.3918***
Age				-.0446***
Mother and father				-.2644***
Father only				.5785***
Mother only				.1423***
Father unskilled				-.5087***
Father semiskilled				-.0819***
Mother white-collar				.3132***
Mother unemployed		-.1193*	.1115**	.1459***
Go to school regularly	.0241*			.0164**
Do not "hang out" with DYS kids				.1647***
Friends younger	.4434***			.1151*
Friends use marijuana				.3781***
Nondetained	-.1976***			.5246***
Detained in custody	.3358***	-.3132***		
Detained in treatment		-.3884***		3.1713***
Friends want to be part of society		-.1499*		.4010***
Friends want to get away from society				.3129***
Current charge				
Juvenile			.0980*	-.1169***
Person				.2662***
Self-reported past crimes				
Drugs with others		.2221***		-.2245***
Property with others				-.1697***
Property and person with others	.1423*			-.1623***
Cars with others				-.1787***
Cars alone		.1716**		
Property alone				.2307***
Juvenile alone		-.2633*	.2253*	.4002***
Aspirations				
Job-skilled				-.6398***
Job white-collar	-.2577*	.2872*		
Ran from DYS		-.1666***		-.1528***
Regression constant	.346	.878	.021	.355
Multiple correlation	.533***	.576***	.414***	.865***

either secure care or nonresidential programs.

The decisions to detain and where to detain have considerable impact on initial placement within DYS. Detained youth are more likely to be placed in secure care than youth who were not detained, while the latter are more likely to be placed in nonresidential programs. Furthermore, youngsters detained in secure care are likely to be placed in secure programs. Youth detained in treatment units are more likely to be placed in nonresidential programs; youth detained in shelter care units are more likely to be placed in group homes; and there is no significant differential impact of detention on foster home placement. Because we find little rational evidence as to why some youth are detained and others not, and because place of detention seems largely a product of the availability of services in the region of residence, the statistical relationship between the detention variables (being detained and being detained in a secure care unit) and placement in a secure care unit should raise a note of caution. It seems quite likely that some youth are being detained in custody units simply because slots are available. However, the fact that they have been detained prior to commitment and placement seems to signify to other decision makers that the youngsters thereafter require secure care services.

Youth who indicate that their friends want to be part of society or want to get away from society are associated with nonresidential programs (as opposed to those youth who want to hit back at society or simply coexist with society). In terms of offenses, youth charged with status offenses are likely to be placed in foster homes while youth charged with crimes against persons are somewhat likely to be found in nonresidential programs. Another way of looking at offense history is to determine what kinds of activities the youth were involved in, either alone or with other youth, that violated laws. Answers to these questions are not necessarily related to the current charge. Youngsters who participated with other youth in property offenses, drug offenses, property and person offenses, and car stealing are not likely to be found in nonresidential programs. The drug offenders will generally be placed in group homes, while the youth with crimes against property or person will be placed in secure care. Persons in the sample who tend to commit crimes alone are more likely to be found in nonresidential programs; this is also true for property offenders and juvenile offenders. The car thief, however, is more likely to be placed in a group home.

Youth who have white-collar job aspirations are not likely to be placed in secure care but will more likely be placed in group homes. Youth aspiring to skilled jobs are not likely to be placed in nonresidential programs. Youngsters who have run from DYS previously are not likely to be placed in nonresidential or group home programs.

To summarize initial placement, constellations of variables seem to be most directly related to a youth's chances of being placed in a particular program type. Placement in secure care tends to be strongly associated with the youth's detention history and whether he has younger friends. If he has positive linkages with the school he will most likely not be placed in secure care. Youth placed in group homes tend to have histories of drug or car-related offenses and have not previously run from DYS programs. Youth in foster homes tend to be juvenile status offenders from homes that are probably less financially secure. Youth placed in nonresidential programs tend to be black, from less stable and financially secure homes, to have committed crimes against the person, and to have done much of their criminal activity alone rather than with others.

In order to obtain a general assessment of experiences in the various programs, youth were questioned about the kinds of relationships they had with program staff. For this analysis, we treated each program experience as a case; because some youth experience more than one program as they move through the DYS system, the total number of program experiences exceeds the number of youth samples. Of particular interest were relationships involving communication, decision-making, providing help, and the punishing or rewarding of behavior. Responses to these questions in Table 4.9 indicate that youth have different experiences depending on the type of program with which they are involved. For example, 81 percent of the youth in nonresidential programs said that staff tried to explain to them what was happening in the program, as compared to 73 percent in group homes, 68 percent in foster care, and 56 percent in secure care. Nonresidential programs and foster care consistently received more favorable assessments than did group homes or secure care. Forty-seven percent in nonresidential and 44 percent in foster care indicated that they had opportunities to participate in decision making by actually making choices, while only 33 percent of youth in group homes and 26 percent in secure care said that they were able to make choices.

To determine to what extent program staff were actually trying to advocate for youth in the community or trying to reintegrate the youth by linking them with positive supports in the community, youth were asked how program staff tried to help. They were asked to decide whether staff were merely providing encouragement or whether they were actually trying to find jobs for them, place them in alternative schools, or introduce them to youth-oriented programs. Fifty-one percent of youth in nonresidential programs and 43

Table 4.9

Staff Relationships by Type of Program.

Relationship	Type of Program			
	Secure Care	Group Home	Foster Home	Nonresidential
1. Do staff try to make you understand what is happening?				
a) Yes	56	73	68	81
b) Sometimes	16	15	15	7
c) No	28	12	17	12
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	(106)	(259)	(53)	(43)
2. Do staff let you share in decisions?				
a) No	38	26	19	9
b) Yes, ask youth	36	41	36	44
c) Yes, let youth make choices	26	32	44	46
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	(105)	(255	(52)	(43)
3. Do staff help you stay out of trouble?				
a) No	37	19	15	12
b) Yes, encourage youth	39	52	41	37
c) Yes, help youth get jobs, into alternative programs	25	29	43	51
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	(101)	(250)	(53)	(43)
4. Will staff punish youth?				
a) No	11	17	17	39
b) Yes, separate from group	32	10	7	19
c) Take away privileges	45	64	61	37
d) Yes, hit youth	7	2	4	0
e) Yes, embarass youth	2	3	2	2
f) Yes, make you feel guilty	3	4	9	2
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	(105)	(253)	(54)	(43)
5. Do staff punish youth for what other kids do?				
a) Regularly	38	22	20	11
b) Sometimes	28	33	33	22
c) Never or hardly ever	34	45	47	67
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	(93)	(216)	(45)	(27)

Table 4.9 (continued)

Staff Relationships by Type of Program.

Relationship	Type of Program			
	Secure Care	Group Home	Foster Home	Nonresidential
6. Do staff reward you if you do well?				
a) No	31	21	34	16
b) Yes, include me	15	6	9	12
c) Yes, additional privileges	38	35	34	42
d) Yes, make me look good in front of others	3	7	2	5
e) Yes, make me feel good	13	31	21	26
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	(106)	(251)	(53)	(43)
7. Do staff reward you for what other kids do?				
a) Regularly	18	21	22	22
b) Sometimes	16	22	14	14
c) Never or hardly ever	66	57	64	64
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	(74)	(201)	(36)	(36)

percent in foster care indicated that staff tried to develop such linkages while 29 percent of youth in group homes and, somewhat surprisingly, 25 percent in secure care facilities felt this way. Over half the youth in group homes felt that staff tried to help by providing encouragement. While these data do not comprise an adequate test of how a program is linked with the larger community, it is clear that the group homes are not regarded by youth as helping them become re-established in the community to a significantly greater extent than the secure care facilities.

The cross-sectional data and subculture data should provide more detailed answers to the question of community linkage. If a large number of group homes create small, isolated environments, even though relatively humane compared to the training schools, then we will need to explore more fully the lack of community linkages. Is it because of the nature of the clients, the resistance of the community, the inclinations of the staff, or the role of group homes in the larger DYS structure of services?

The dominant pattern of punishment across all program types is to take away privileges. In secure programs separating out difficult-to-control youth is a close second response. Forty percent of the youth in nonresidential programs said that youth were not punished. There is also a greater tendency in secure programs to punish a group of youth for what one or two may have done. The dominant mode of rewarding good behavior is providing additional privileges. The second most often mentioned response, except in secure care, is "making the individual feel good." Few programs reward the entire group for what one person has done.

Some interesting response patterns not indicated in Table 4.9 occur when youth are asked to assess their chances of not getting into trouble again. Sixty percent of the foster care youth felt that they had an excellent chance, compared to 47 percent in secure programs. These responses represent what turns out to be a fairly realistic assessment of their chances, as will be seen in later sections of this report when recidivism is analyzed for the cohort sample.

This brief look at youth assessment of their relationships with program staff clearly indicates that from their point of view they do have qualitatively different experiences depending upon the type of program in which they are placed. Because initial placement is largely determined by the range of services available within the region in which one resides, rather than by other background characteristics, these data would tend to suggest that regions without adequate foster care and nonresidential programs should make concerted efforts to expand their program alternatives.

The Community: Long-Run Impact

Relationships with Significant Others

The long-run impact of program experiences in DYS can be measured in part by the quality of the linkages or relationships with various significant others in the community, but a full analysis of these linkages will have to await more comprehensive analysis of the data. Program experience is but one of many variables that influence relationships in the community. In Table 4.10, we explore one of these related variables. When we asked youth whether their "bosses" at work tended to help them or not in finding links to the community, we discovered that final nonresidential placement or detention in a treatment unit are the only program variables related to this variable. We have coded the "help" variable 1 if bosses were not helpful and 0 if they were helpful or if they were not in contact with the youth. The variable thus represents unhelpful contact. Participation in a nonresidential program is associated with bosses either helping or having no contact with the youth, while being detained in a treatment unit prior to court is associated with bosses not helping. This latter relationship is the strongest of all the variables related to bosses helping. Youth not detained are more likely to report that bosses do not help than youth detained. The detention relationships are indicative of a trend for early decisions in the juvenile justice process to contribute greatly to not only immediate but long-range consequences.

Regions I, II, and VI are related to bosses helping while in other regions youth are more likely to believe that bosses do not help. Males are more likely than females to view bosses as not helping. Blacks are not likely to consider bosses helpful. Youth living with both parents are less likely to find bosses not helpful than youth living with their fathers only. Youth with a history of participating with others in car theft, property and person offenses, or drugs are likely to find bosses helpful, while youth with a current charge of a crime against a person or a history of property or status offenses alone are more likely to find bosses not helpful.

Table 4.10

Multiple Regression of "Unhelpful Contact with Supervisor at Work" on Background and Program Variables.

Final nonresidential	−.8234***
Detention treatment[a]	5.5487***
Nondetained	.7907***
Ran from DYS unit	−.3187***
Region I	−5.1209***
Region II	−4.5973***
Region VI	−1.0306***
Female	−.6667***
Black	.4506***
Mother and father	−.3965***
Father only	.8763***
Father unskilled	−1.0708***
Mother white-collar	−.4558***
Self-reported past crimes	
Cars with others	−.4145***
Property and person with others	−.4898***
Drugs with others	−.3890***
Property alone	.3776***
Juvenile alone	.5873***
Current charge-person	.4961***
Friends smoke marijuana	.6396***
Aspirations: job-skilled	.9949***
Friends want to get away from society	.5934***
Friends want to be part of society	.6503***
Friends want to get back at society	.3251***
Do not "hang out" with DYS kids	.3403***
Regression constant	−.670
Multiple correlation	.954***

[a] The extraordinarily large absolute values of regression coefficients for detention treatment and Regions I and II in columns of this and other tables where these three variables appear together are probably contributed to by rounding error in the computer because of the high correlation of detention treatment with these two regional variables.

Another very crucial relationship for juveniles in trouble is their relationship with police. As noted in Table 4.11, youngsters in the sample who are status offenders, who have been detained in a treatment unit or who do not "hang out" with other DYS youth indicate that they either have rewarding experiences with the police or little contact at all. Generally youth who have been detained and youth initially placed in secure care indicate that police do not reward them for good behavior.

Table 4.11

Multiple Regression of "Unrewarding Contact with the Police" on Background and Program Variables.

Current charge-juvenile	−.2943***
Detention treatment	−.1692**
Do not "hang out" with DYS kids	−.1051*
Nondetained	−.0995*
Initial secure	.1465**
Regression constant	.931
Multiple correlation	.418***

Another key relationship for many youth is their association with a community service program once they leave DYS. Youth were asked to recall what they considered to be the best community program in which they participated. They were then asked whether this program evaluated them as "good kids." Youth in Regions I, II, and VI, as shown in Table 4.12, are less likely to perceive themselves as being considered "good kids" than are youth in other regions. Youth who were not detained and those detained in treatment units are likely to sense that the community service program regards them as "good kids." Males are more likely to have a positive perception than females, and blacks believe that they are viewed positively. Youth whose fathers are in unskilled employment or whose mothers have white-collar employment do not see themselves regarded as "good kids." On the other hand youth who live with their fathers only or whose mothers are unemployed are likely to feel that the program considers them "good kids." Youngsters who have a history of stealing cars or committing status or property offenses alone are likely

Table 4.12

Multiple Regression of "Best Community Program Thinks the Youth Is a Good Kid" on Background and Program Variables.

Region I	−2.4961***
Region II	−2.5467***
Region VI	− .5995***
Nondetained	.4263***
Detention treatment	2.8642***
Female	− .2219***
Black	.3477***
Father unskilled	− .6117***
Mother white-collar	− .2648***
Mother unemployed	.1542***
Father only	.6640***
Self-reported past crimes	
Cars alone	.1198*
Juvenile alone	.3162***
Property alone	.2112***
Property with others	− .1442***
Drugs with others	− .1945***
Current charge-person	.3315***
Sequence secure	− .3420***
Sequence nonresidential	− .7664***
Initial group home	− 2130***
Ran from a DYS unit	− .2054
Friends smoke marijuana	.2941***
Friends want to get away from society	.3403***
Friends want to be part of society	.2619***
Years of schooling (grade)	.0320*
Regression constant	− .503
Multiple correlation	.615***

to believe that they are regarded as good kids. Youth with a history of participating with others in drug use or property offenses do not believe that community service programs rate them as good kids. In terms of placement program, youth who begin and end their sequence of program assignments in a secure or nonresidential program and youth placed initially in group home programs do not share positive perceptions.

In addition to direct questions about relationships between youth and significant others, the longitudinal study relies on the more indirect semantic differential technique to probe those relationships. The semantic differential consists of having youth indicate on a seven-point scale bipolar adjective list, composed of such adjectives as good-bad and fair-unfair, their rating of several significant others such as mother, father, police, and program staff. Youth are first asked to indicate how they feel about the significant other in question and then to indicate how the significant other would rate them. In later analyses, responses will be scrutinized to provide a basis for assessing self-image and any change in self-image as the youth move through the juvenile justice process. At this time we will only look at the evaluation dimension of the semantic differential for a few significant others in order to indicate how the data will describe the nature of the relationships and thereby provide us with a description of the youths' links with the community.

Among the significant others are the police. Table 4.13 reflects the variables that influence how youth evaluate police. Youth charged with status offenses are more likely to be positive toward the police than youth charged with other offenses. Youth who do not hang around with other DYS youth, who come from white-collar families, and who attend school regularly are also more likely to perceive police positively. And

Table 4.13

Multiple Regression of "Youth Evaluation of Police" on Background and Program Variables.

Current charge-juvenile	5.1037***
Self-reported past crimes	
Property and person with others	-2.9837*
Property alone	-1.7444*
Do not "hang out" with DYS Kids	3.0164**
"Hang out" with same kids	-2.7644***
Father white-collar	2.3645*
Attend school regularly	.5348*
Region II	2.7112*
Regression constant	14.273*
Multiple correlation	.500***

youth in Region II (middle of state) tend to be more favorably disposed toward the police than youth living in other regions. On the other hand, youth who expect to hang around with the same youth they did before getting into trouble, and who have a history of either property or property and person offenses are more likely to be negatively disposed toward the police. These youth are more frequently cast in an adversary role with the police and this probably explains their differential responses.

Youth were also asked how they think their friends feel about them. As noted in Table 4.14, if they were black, male, young, had not been previously detained, or, if detained, held in a treatment unit, they tended to believe that their friends saw them favorably. This image was also favorable if they came from families where the mother was unemployed, or where there was only a father as head of household. A favorable image was also associated with a history of acting alone, particularly in status and property offenses, and having friends who use pot but are not former DYS charges and who want to either be part of or get away from society. Youth did not feel that their friends evaluated them favorably if they were from families with either both natural parents or the mother only, with a father engaged in unskilled employment or a mother engaged in white-collar employment. Unfavorable images were also associated with being previously committed to DYS and having run from DYS; or having committed crimes with other youngsters, particularly property, property and person, car theft, and drug offenses. In terms of DYS programing, youth whose final program experience was a nonresidential program were more likely to feel that their friends evaluated them less favorably than youth in other programs. This may have been because nonresidential program youth are more clearly identified to their friends as youth in trouble and receiving services. Youth from Regions III and V were more likely to believe that their friends viewed them favorably than did youth from other regions.

Table 4.14

Multiple Regression of "Friends' Evaluation of Youth" on Background and Program Variables.

Black	7.9225***
Female	-10.3102***
Age	1.4062***
Nondetained	16.4275***
Detained treatment	110.3262***
Prior commitment	-3.3910***
Father and mother	-13.5555***
Father only	16.7780***
Mother only	-7.6053***
Father unskilled	-17.4195***
Mother white-collar	-9.2402***
Mother unemployed	5.8528***
Current charge-person	10.6458***
Self-reported past crimes	
Juvenile alone	13.6359***
Property alone	8.9705***
Property with others	-6.6437***
Drugs with others	-8.6409***
Property and person with others	-7.6858***
Cars with others	-5.2431***
Ran from DYS unit	-8.7330***
Friends smoke marijuana	12.9899***
Friends want to be part of society	11.7072***
Friends want to get away from society	8.5997***
Do no "hang out" with DYS kids	5.7557***
Aspirations: job-skilled	-25.1287***
Sequence Nonresidential	-11.3423***
Final Nonresidential	-10.9449***
Region I	-107.1718***
Region II	-104.5654***
Region IV	-9.3425***
Region V	6.0468***
Region VI	-29.2460***
Region VII	-11.2363***
Regression constant	52.562
Multiple correlation	.941***

Finally we will look at those variables which tend to be associated with a positive self-image. Youth were asked to evaluate themselves, with the results shown in Table 4.15. Youth had more favorable self-images if they had been detained, and those detained in shelter care and custodial units were more apt to have positive self-images than youth detained in treatment units. Youth who had fathers employed in white-collar jobs and youth charged with status offenses were associated with positive self-images. Youth who indicated that their friends wanted to get away from society tended to think less favorably of themselves. Again we discover that the early experiences with detention have a stronger impact on long-run results than the more immediate program experiences. It is clear that caution must be exercised in the decision to detain since some youth apparently gain coveted reputations or enhanced self-images *because* they are detained; it would appear that for these youth detention fosters a greater stake in a delinquent career.

This very exploratory section on relationships has yielded some rather surprising results. The set of variables with high associations that appear consistently throughout the tables, with the exception of the evaluation of police, is the set of detention variables. We would have expected the more immediate program experiences to be more strongly related to the subsequent community relationships than detention, but these program variables appear only sporadically. In addition to the detention items, some background variables also influence the nature of relationships from time to time. Still, the long-run impact of not being detained or being detained in specific kinds of units comes through powerfully.

Table 4.15

Multiple Regression of "Self-Evaluation" on Background and Program Variables.

Nondetained	-2.1013***
Detention treatment	-2.0103**
Father white-collar	1.6586*
Current charge-juvenile	2.223**
Friends want to get away from society	-1.9159**
Regression constant	29.515
Multiple correlation	.303***

Recidivism

The most prominent question for many interested policy makers is whether the new DYS system has any appreciable effect on recidivism. In the beginning section of this report we compared current recidivism rates with those of the institution-based system in fiscal year 1968, as fully as presently available data permitted. In that analysis recidivism was determined on the basis of official record data. Since these data are not yet available for all regions, however, our analysis in this final section of the report will employ a measure of recidivism based on a follow-up of youth by means of our own network of contacts with the youth correctional system. Reappearance in court is the criterion of recidivism but this method picks up those court appearances specifically that come to the attention of personnel in the youth correctional system, ordinarily because the youth were detained by DYS for appearance in court on a new offense. This method thus tends to underestimate those court appearances that involve less serious charges, for which court appearances were not preceded by detention. Such court appearances frequently end in dismissal. Consequently the rates of recidivism obtained by using this method are more like those based on official records, where the criterion of recidivism is a court disposition involving probation or recommitment, as reported in the first section. To obtain these rates we followed the youth for six months beyond completion of a residential program, or for nine months from the beginning of a nonresidential program. We counted recidivism occurring during program contact as well as during the follow-up period.

We reported preliminary results of this measure of recidivism on incomplete samples of the first four regions two years ago.[10] Our more complete data now do not significantly change the estimates of recidivism for those four regions, but they do underscore the importance of the reservations we stated at the time concerning any generalization from those four regions to the state system as a whole. As data accumulate, it is apparent that other regions are turning out differently. Finally it must be kept in mind that we are talking only of six-month rates, and the longer term rates that will eventually be available from the official record checks may be different.

For the completed youth in the sample as of March 30, 1975, 34 percent had recidivated. As shown in Table 4.16, youth from Region I (western Massachusetts) were doing best at staying out of trouble, followed in order by youth in Regions II, III, IV, VII, V, and VI. Black youth and males are more likely to recidivate in this initial six-month period, as are youth who were previously committed or referred to the department. Detained youth, particularly those detained in custodial units, are more likely to recidivate than nondetained youth.

We can determine the relative impact of program on recidivism by looking at the recidivism rates in relation to the final program placement from which youth are released into the community. It should be noted that here we add a "no program" category to designate those youth who either were placed on traditional parole without any formal program experience or ran from a program and remained unattached to any other program. It is clear that youth from secure care recidivate at a faster rate than youth in less secure programs. It is possible that the department does a good job of selecting out those youth who are higher risks and holding them in secure care. This interpretation would be more convincing if the detention decision were not so closely related to placements. But because those decisions appear to depend to a large extent on factors unrelated to youth but instead to characteristics of regions, it is possible that some youth are misplaced in secure care, with this placement having a negative effect on their chances of subsequently succeeding in the community. Since the recidivism risk of permitting youth to participate in the less secure programs is much less, it would seem preferable to restrict secure care to juveniles who clearly need intensive supervision.

[10] *Quarterly Report*, July 15, 1974, Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School mimeo.

Table 4.16

Recidivism Rates by Selected Background Characteristics.

Background Characteristics	Percent Recidivating	Number
Region		
I	18	49
II	27	64
III	27	52
IV	33	51
V	51	47
VI	78	18
VII	38	45
		326
Race		
Black	61	28
White	31	286
		314
Sex		
Female	24	62
Male	37	264
		326
Prior commitment or referral		
Yes	46	135
No	26	191
		326
Detained/Nondetained		
Detained	43	209
Nondetained	19	117
		326
Where detained		
Custodial	59	61
Treatment	32	63
Shelter care	40	85
		209
Final placement		
Secure care	60	63
Group home	27	157
Foster care	19	41
Nonresidential	23	34
No program	48	31
		326

Taking all of the background and relationship variables in a regression equation with recidivism as dependent, shown in Table 4.17, we can assess the differential impact of those variables that tend to be most associated with recidivism while controlling for all other variables. The variable most strongly related to recidivism is Region VI, indicating a high probability of recidivating for youth in the region. While that is the case for the sample represented here, the reader should remember that Region VI is underrepresented in the completed sample, as of March 30, 1975. Subsequent but still incomplete returns indicate that the final recidivism rate for the full sample will be somewhat lower for this six-month exposure period in Region VI. Region V is also associated with recidivism. In this region almost all of

Table 4.17

Multiple Regression of Recidivism on Background and Program Variables.

Region V	.2833***
Region VI	.3673***
Region VII	.1525*
Nondetained	-.1725***
Final secure	.6175***
Sequence secure	-.4060*
Ran from a DYS unit	.1790***
Friends smoke marijuana	.1363**
Parents no help	-.1343*
Staff no help	.2092***
Current charge-person	-.1610*
Regression constant	1.296
Multiple correlation	.551***

the youth in our sample are completed cases and consequently we do not expect any significant change in the rate (see Table 4.5). A possible explanation for the high rate of recidivism in Region V is the relative lack of program diversity in that region. Most youth there are either in secure or group home programs with little utilization of either foster homes or nonresidential programs. Region VII is also slightly associated with the likelihood of recidivating. The importance of the original decision to detain for longer run consequences is once again underscored, since youth who were not detained are not as likely to recidivate as youth who were detained.

Controlling for other factors, the influence of final program is similar to what the original cross-tabular relationships suggested, although slightly more complicated. Youth who are in secure placements are more likely to recidivate than youth in other less secure placements, although this tendency is lessened if a youth began in a secure placement and subsequently ended there. This relationship supports the notion of building rigorous safeguards around secure care placements so that only those youth who really require close supervision are actually placed in such programs. It also emphasizes the importance of monitoring transfers from other programs to secure care. Secure care programs cannot simply be seen as convenient "little prisons" to force group home youth into conformity. The ramifications of secure care programs are too profound to be handled without vigilance.

We also discover that youth who have previously run from DYS are more likely to recidivate, as are youth who "have friends who smoke marijuana."

Only two of our relationship items emerge through this rigorous controlling process as related to recidivism. Somewhat surprisingly, youth who believe that their parents are helping or have no contact with the youth tend to recidivate more than those who feel their parents are unhelpful. On the other hand, youth who say that program staff do not help are more likely to recidivate. This is another indication that the type of program does make a difference. It also is an indication that where staff are not trying to build community linkages for youth, the youth suffer long-run consequences of further contact with the juvenile justice system.

The only offense category that is related to recidivism in this regression analysis is that of crimes against persons. Youth who commit these types of crimes are less likely to recidivate than youth committing other kinds of crimes.

Thus the types of variables that tend to influence the chances of recidivism most are: (1) the region where a youngster resides; (2) whether the youth was detained or placed in secure care; and (3) whether he believes that staff are trying to help him. Region is related to the youngster's program experiences in terms of the range of programs offered by a region and the availability of placement opportunities.

Implications of the Longitudinal Study

The above analysis, although preliminary, has considerable implications for policy and future research analysis. Clearly, the type of program placement is related to a youth's chances of recidivating within the first six months of exposure to the community. Although youth in foster care do best, followed by youth in nonresidential programs and youth in group homes, the differences among these program types are not particularly significant. But youth in these programs do far better than youth in secure care programs. That the youth in secure care are most likely to recidivate seems reasonable because of a tendency for the secure care units to work with higher risk youth. Given the analysis to date, however, it seems likely that the higher recidivism of secure care youth is not solely related to youth characteristics. Instead, their failure appears partially a result of experiences they have within the secure care programs and the attached negative labels which restrict their program alternatives and influence future decision makers.

Further analysis will incorporate relationship, aspiration, and semantic differential measures not included in the present exploratory analysis—especially measures based on initial interviews. These measures will be important in distinguishing the effects of selection from the efficacy of programs. We will also employ analytical techniques borrowed from econometrics in seeking to make this distinction. Even without such a distinction, however, it is clear from the present analysis that the great majority of DYS youth do well in nonsecure settings without presenting an inordinate danger to the public. Some critics claim that the new nonsecure programs have constituted a revolving door. That happens to be true of the secure programs, which have high recidivism rates and are much like the more secure among the old institutions in this respect. It is clearly not true of the more open programs. At this point it seems reasonable both to restrict secure care only to those youth who cannot be handled in a less secure program and to improve the quality of secure care. During 1975 the department, in fact, generated several new secure care programs to replace some of those in this sample, and it continues to wrestle with the difficulties of monitoring intake into secure care programs.

Another implication is that the regions with a more fully implemented broad range of program alternatives for youth are increasing the chances of their youth succeeding in the community. The data also display the considerable variability among group home programs in terms of their ability to build linkages for youth in the community. In future analyses, we will subclassify this category in order to determine the characteristics of the groups that are best able to establish the proper linkages.

The inordinate long-run impact of early decisions, particularly detention decisions, is very suggestive. Decisions made early in the process tend to restrict a youth's program options. For some youth this may be justifiable, but long-run consequences are so significant that the decisions to detain and where to detain require careful monitoring. These findings on the impact of detention have implications for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. In Massachusetts youth who fall into the category of children-in-need-of-supervision have been officially removed from the authority of the Department of Youth Services, but they continue to be detained in DYS detention centers. The data reported here certainly indicate that detention in units that are part of the juvenile justice system should be avoided whenever possible. The data would also tend to support the notion of developing outside the criminal justice system short-term emergency shelter care programs or youth hostels as alternatives to the customary detention units with their implicit and explicit stigmatization.

Finally, while the less secure programs seem to work out better for youth, it is probably unwise to assume that they are so benign that youth who would otherwise not be placed in DYS should now be adjudicated and exposed to those programs. It is possible that youth who minimally penetrate the formal justice system do better. Whether minimal penetration means avoiding DYS as much as possible or taking part in a minimal program of some nature is still very much in question. As the analysis continues we will be looking at a comparison group of youth who were detained but not placed in DYS. That analysis may go further in addressing this issue.

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

V. Neutralizing Community Resistance To Group Homes

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Part of the effort to reform the treatment of juvenile offenders in recent years has focused on changing the treatment setting. Attempts have been made to handle more youth within community residential centers or group homes in order to reduce the numbers of youth served by traditional reform schools and exposed to the degrading effects that are so often part of such institutional experiences. While the group home concept for troubled youth is often philosophically accepted in both professional and nonprofessional circles, the actual establishment of group homes in local communities is often vehemently resisted by residents.[1] Thus a very pragmatic issue confronting both state and privately operated agencies is how to handle community resistance to group homes. How can community resistance be avoided or ameliorated when it arises?

This chapter describes the first results of a continuing investigation into the dynamics of locating a group home in a community setting. We are concerned here with the political aspects of coping with community resistance to the initial establishment of the group home. We will not, in this report, deal with community reaction to the program of the group home once it is in operation, nor with the effect of the program on the youth residing in the group home. We will deal with the program only as it is represented as a proposal in the process of gaining entry into the community. Our analysis of resistance and strategies for neutralizing resistance will focus on the community level. Analysis at the state-wide and governmental levels is not included here.

The data supporting this study were gathered within the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. Massachusetts ranks in the forefront of states seeking to discover viable community-based alternatives to the institutionalization of juvenile delinquents. As part of the deinstitutionalization process during the spring and summer of 1972, the DYS sought to establish several group homes throughout the state under a purchase of service arrangement. That is, the DYS proposed to buy group home services from private agencies. This arrangement was adopted for several reasons: (1) it was believed that the closer the "treatment" program to the community and the more involvement of private agencies and private citizens, the greater the likelihood of successful reintegration of program clients; (2) it was also believed that private agencies, particularly the more experienced agencies, were better prepared to handle group residential homes than most DYS line staff who had only worked with youth in an institutional context, and (3) it was considered to be an easier task for existing or even newly created private agencies to work with communities in establishing group homes than it would be for DYS with its controversial image. The DYS had been strongly opposed by some interest groups in the state because they felt that the DYS deinstitutionalization effort was moving too quickly, and that the department's treatment approach was too permissive.

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[1] For example, a study conducted by Louis Harris and Associates for the Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower found that 77 percent of a representative sample favored the idea of a halfway house, 50 percent would personally favor a halfway house in their neighborhood, and only 22 percent believed that most people in the neighborhood would favor a halfway house in the area. Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training, *The Public Looks at Crime and Corrections* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 16-17.

Method

In order to isolate those issues that are most sensitive to community resistance and to identify the various strategies for handling resistance, we looked at several planned group homes that failed primarily because of community resistance, and at several other homes that were able to neutralize resistance and establish ongoing residences. Three homes were selected within each of the two categories. Two of the agencies that failed had previously operated similar homes and had therefore been confronted with some of the same problems before, while one agency that failed had never before operated such a program. Two of the successful agencies had previously operated similar programs; the third agency had a parent structure with some prior experience, but the specific people involved in setting up the group home had had no prior experience.

The homes were located in six of the seven DYS regions. The seventh region was not studied because there was at the time considerable political turmoil within the region over other issues related to corrections. Although the selected group homes do not necessarily represent the full range of all probable conflict situations, they do present a range sufficient to identify at least some of the key issues of strategy.

The data collection strategy focused on extensive interviewing of key actors. To learn most about the plans for each home, the first person contacted was either the executive director of the sponsoring agency or the director of the proposed home. During this initial discussion the interviewer identified other significant actors or interest groups to be interviewed at a later time. This snowball technique was followed until it became apparent that little additional, useful information could be gained by further interviewing. Typically the interviewing included agency representatives, police, clergy, neighbors, and city officials. In two cases the snowball technique was modified to accommodate the wishes of the group being studied. One involved an agency that failed and the other an agency that succeeded. The research team respected the intricacies of the ongoing political processes and tried not to endanger an operating program or the chances of any proposed home.

The interviews, although structured, were also quite flexible. During the course of an interview with a representative of the social service agency, the interviewer obtained the following information: (1) the goals of the program and strategies for implementing the program; (2) the process of communication of goals to interest groups; (3) the kinds of people who agreed or disagreed with agency goals and strategies; (4) the communications from vested interest groups; (5) the strategies for handling opposition and support; and (6) the expected outcome. When interviewing representatives of interest groups outside the agency, the major blocks of information included: (1) perceptions of the private agency and DYS goals; (2) the source of information about the group home; (3) interest group goals for home; (4) the strategies for attaining those goals; (5) the communication of goals and strategies—to whom, how, and why; (6) the kinds of people or groups that agreed or disagreed with goals and strategies; (7) the strategies for handling opposition and support; and (8) expected outcome. Three interviewers were involved in the data collection process. Each covered one group home that failed and one that succeeded.

In addition to interviewing the key actors, researchers analyzed local newspaper accounts as well as letters of support or opposition and minutes of planning meetings and hearings where available. Together the data project a fairly good picture of the process and problems of placing a residential home in a community.

Throughout this paper we will refer to group homes and their communities by fictitious names. Many persons cooperated with us in our data collection efforts in order to contribute to the understanding of the process of establishing or resisting a group home, with the express understanding that we would respect certain confidentiality about the information and not identify our sources. Fortunately this need for confidentiality does not interfere with our purposes in this analysis, since the actual identity of the communities and group homes is not important for the kinds of inferences we are seeking to make and support.

Results

The major variables and strategies involved in the process of establishing the group homes in this study are summarized in Table 5.1. Data from the individual case studies will be compared and contrasted in order to derive at least tentative responses to a number of policy and strategy issues. The nine critical variables include such items as selection of community, strategy for entering community, and resolution of conflict. These nine variables provide the backbone of our analysis. Before proceeding with a detailed comparative analysis of the six homes in the study, it will be helpful for the reader to have an understanding of the general flow of the processes involved in setting up group homes and the kinds of opposition encountered. We will therefore present two brief hypothetical case studies: one representing failure, Clarion, and one representing success, Kimberly. The nine critical variables will emerge in these hypothetical case studies, as they did in the six real case studies, as the major steps in the flow of action, resistance, and effort to neutralize resistance.

Table 5.1

Successful and Unsuccessful Group Homes.

Characteristics of Group Homes	Failures			Successes		
	Laurel	Palmyra	Whitewater	Eagle Grove	Sullivan	Hebron
Who established it?	An "established" agency with experience in group homes for drug cases	A sectarian religious group new to this sort of work	An established agency treating children with physical disabilities	"Ex-con" group new to this sort of work	An established agency with experience in group homes for welfare youth	An established agency with experience in group homes for delinquents
Selection of community	Knew community but not with respect to reaction to delinquents	Did not know neighborhood community	Knew community but not with respect to reaction to delinquents	Knew community well	Knew community well	Learned community well *after* site selection
	Residential area working and middle class	Residential middle to upper class	Residential middle to upper class	Transient community, disorganized	Mixed transient but neighborly and "liberal"	Residential working and middle or upper class
Strategy for entering community	Talk to "significant few" and then campaign	Talk to "significant few"	Talk to "significant few"	Low profile ("quiet")	Low profile ("quiet")	Talk to "significant few" and then campaign
Selection site	Across from school and no space for recreation	Fire trap, small yard	Busy road, small yard	Youth involved in improving house	Youth involved in improving house	Estate more than adequate, for expansion
Selection of name for program	Name designed to challenge youth	Name or label emphasized community's responsibility	Name or label emphasized community's responsibility	Name was de-emphasized	Name was de-emphasized	Name designed to challenge youth
Presentation of program-content	Presented as related to DYS-plan for a kind of problem-kid community did not have	No clear presentation or conception	Vague and too technical presentation	Presentation through youths' activity	Presentation through youths' and house parents' activity	Presentation in direct, informative style in meeting

Table 5.1 (Continued)

Successful and Unsuccessful Group Homes

Characteristics of Group Homes	Failures			Successes		
	Laurel	Palmyra	Whitewater	Eagle Grove	Sullivan	Hebron
Client and staff residence	Staff and supporters did not live in neighborhood	Staff and supporters did not live in neighborhood	Staff live in group home	Staff lived in group home	Staff lived in group home	Staff lived in group home
Serving the community	*Home* an unwanted service to community	*Home* an unwanted service to community	*Home* an unwanted service to community	*Youth* serve community	*Youth* serve community	*Youth* serve community
Resolution of conflict	Looking for middle ground	"Holy War"	"Righteousness" in getting community to meet problems	Avoidance of creating issues	Avoidance of creating issues	Straightforward meeting of issues

Clarion

A long-established social service agency, BURN (Boys United: Resources, Neighbors), attempted to set up a small group home for juvenile delinquents in the middle-sized city of Clarion. BURN had been operating a program designed to address learning disabilities in the city for six years. Its reputation was thought to be quite good, and on the basis of that reputation little opposition to the program's expansion was anticipated. The actual program was to consist of a "free school" environment and provision of work experiences within the community. The group home would house eight to twelve boys ranging in age from thirteen to seventeen.

The initial strategy for setting up the home involved talking to a few key people in the community—people who were generally considered to be friendly toward the agency. These people included the mayor, two of the town's five selectmen, and other wealthy backers of the agency. Response from the mayor was noncommital; the two selectmen and the financial backers were quite supportive. After these initial conversations a site was selected. The selected neighborhood was primarily residential in character, with one gasoline station and a small store. Although unknown to the agency administrators, the neighborhood had in the recent past taken two actions to maintain its residential atmosphere. The residents had organized to prevent a light industrial plant from moving into the area, and they had also closed a teenage drop-in center that had operated for a brief period of time. This lack of knowledge about the neighborhood's capacity for organizing was to be a major factor in the failure of BURN.

Before the purchase arrangements were completed, it was necessary for BURN to go before the town zoning committee to request modification of the zoning regulations in the case of the group home. Upon hearing of the group home for juveniles, abutters were incensed and alarmed. They were incensed because no one had told them about the plans previously, and they were alarmed because they believed that "gangsters were moving in next door." Over the next two-week period the abutters held a number of informal meetings to determine how the group home could be stopped. Neighbors indicated that their primary motivation for keeping the halfway house out of their neighborhood was to protect their own children. In addition it was pointed out that the neighborhood did not have any delinquency problem and did not want to be an "experimental lab for other neighborhoods who could not solve their own problems."

By the time of the zoning hearing, BURN was aware that it would encounter a little opposition. But it believed that the support of various public officials would outweigh a few "strident antagonists." This did not prove to be the case. The hearing was underscored by a very well thought out confrontation on the part of the informal citizens' group. They listed three reasons why the group home should not be allowed: (1) the site selected was inadequate for 10 to 12 teenagers because of its small size and tiny yard (the lack of space would also cause an undue nuisance burden for nearby neighbors); (2) children and elderly persons would be endangered by the "criminal types" who would be associated with the halfway house; and (3) the agency had no experience working with juvenile delinquents. One woman suggested that much of the fear expressed by residents was related to the acronym, "BURN." She said, "Why couldn't they simply call it AIDE or something like that."

Rather than attempting to deal with each of the specific reasons cited by the citizens' group, BURN administrators suggested that the citizens did not care about children, but only cared about property values. This righteous stance on the part of BURN only served to strengthen the bond among the citizens. Seeing the rift between the citizens and BURN the town selectmen had "no other choice" but to reject the home.

Kimberly

Several individuals who had previously worked with juvenile delinquents decided to set up a group home in the town of Kimberly. Eight to twelve boys would reside in the home; in addition another eight boys would participate in the program on a non-residential basis. The program would focus on informal counseling and getting the youth into activities occurring in the community. These would include work, schools, and recreation. According to the staff the program was to project the image of a "large but concerned family," concerned about its members and the community. Youth would typically stay in the residential program for three to four months. After their residential stay, program staff would maintain contact in order to support the youth as they returned to their own or foster homes.

The program staff selected an area of Kimberly they believed best fitted their needs. The locality had a junior high school and a senior high school nearby; a number of small businesses were also within walking distance.

The strategy for setting up the home operated on two levels. Program staff were talking with various influential town officials about their proposal, and concurrently they were talking with local residents and leaders of civic organizations functioning in the target area. Initially some of the neighbors expressed fear and concern for their own welfare. However, the program staff handled this situation well. They explained that dangerous youth would not be participating in the group home and that if youth did seriously act out in the community they would be transferred elsewhere. At the same time it was said that the community could expect some minor incidents but these inconveniences would be balanced by the service to the community that the home offered. First, the home obviously offered a service to area youth who may be beginning a delinquent career, and second, youth would repair the house used for the group home and would hire out their services to improve and maintain the neighborhood. This concern for property values handled some of the more subtle opposition to the proposed home. Moreover, many residents were concerned about the occurrence of delinquent acts in their neighborhood and saw the group home as one means for dealing with the problem.

Town officials were for the most part supportive of the proposed home. This was particularly the case once it became apparent that the bulk of opposition had already been mollified. The police chief had been contacted by the program staff. He did not anticipate problems, but was taking a "wait and see" attitude.

A zoning hearing was called to pass on the proposed home. Three or four residents living in the area voiced opposition. They indicated fear for their children's safety and did not believe the program staff to be particularly qualified to work with troubled youth. The program staff responded very straightforwardly. They acknowledged that there were minimal risks but argued that the value of the home for the community outweighed the risks. They also described the program in detail, thereby answering any question about their competency to work with youth. In addition to the defense put forth by the program staff, other community residents spoke on the group home's behalf. Preparation of the community and cooperation with the community had paid off; the group home passed the zoning hearing and was established.

Having these two brief vignettes in hand and a feeling for the general flow of the processes involved in setting up community-based group homes, we can now turn to a more detailed analysis of the data summarized in Table 1.

Discussion

The usefulness of studying the community resistance process comes from comparing those proposed homes that failed and those that were successfully established. This analysis should yield results which directly relate to policy and strategy considerations.

One of the initial questions administrators within the DYS raised as they closed the institutions and became involved in setting up community residences was whether the state should set up the homes, or whether it should contract this task to private agencies. DYS opted for the latter strategy for three reasons: (1) the DYS image was burdened by past controversy, and the private agencies were seen as potentially the easier way of obtaining the group homes; (2) privately run group homes appeared to offer better prospects for

real community involvement in the youth corrections process; and (3) private agencies with a number of years of experience were expected to have a greater level of expertise about moving into communities and operating community-based programs than DYS had at that time.

Because there are no state-operated group homes within this study we cannot speak directly to this issue, but we can say something about the use of private agencies. There is no guarantee that the well-established private agency has the capacity to set up a new residence without meeting the same opposition that a newly formed private agency, or for that matter the state itself, might face. The data within this study suggest that experience cannot be equated with finesse. Two of the proposed homes that failed (those in Laurel and Whitewater) were planned by agencies that had operated in those communities for a number of years. It may be that both agencies suffered from overconfidence, misreading of the community, and poor preparation for handling any resistance. In Hebron and Sullivan, we again have two agencies with years of experience, but each approached the communities very cautiously, with considerable preparation, and overall strategies for handling community resistance. As for the newly established private groups, one was a failure and one a success. The agency in Palmyra failed. And the agency in Eagle Grove, although it did have a nominal umbrella agency, was for all intents and purposes newly created and quite successful.

Therefore we must beg the question for the moment; it is apparent that the answer to successful entry is not simply a longstanding privately established group or a newly created group. The answer is probably more directly related to the way the agency plans strategy and approaches the community. Some of the issues discussed seem likely to arise from use of a sectarian religious organization in a pluralistic community if the organization stresses religion as an issue. It is certainly reasonable for a Catholic church or any other to function well as a sponsor in a community where no other church exists or where the religious inclinations of the community are predominately in that direction, and for that church to use religious arguments. But where there is much religious diversity, religious groups may be more successful as sponsors if they are ecumenical or nonsectarian in nature, and do not emphasize religious differences. Any strictly sectarian operation in a religiously diverse community has a good probability of becoming embroiled in a "holy war." The effect of such a conflict is to focus debate on false issues related to other interests and to personalities rather than toward the issue of community responsibility for handling troubled youth.

Selection and Survey of the Community

Comprehensive understanding of the community and the particular neighborhood in which the proposed home will reside is requisite for the sort of planning that is demanded. It seems reasonable to anticipate some community resistance to any group home; the question is where will that resistance come from and how can it be neutralized. The form the resistance will take can be anticipated if enough is known about how the community has reacted in similar situations. Has the community recently organized to defeat a drug program or an alcoholism center? What sort of people live in the area—are they professionals or day laborers? Is the community an integrated area? Do people in the community recognize a crime or delinquency problem in their area? Who has power and how do they exercise it?

The lack of such knowledge was detrimental for agencies in Laurel and Palmyra. In Palmyra, particularly, the proposed home ran into a very well organized community that had already gotten together to make a "passive park" and to object to college dormitories. This information perhaps should have suggested that the agency look elsewhere for the site or at least suggested potential problems which would have to be handled if the community were to be approached successfully in setting up the home. The agency in Hebron took ample preparatory time to study the area, the needs of the region, and the interests of the community. Here the primary problem involved the matter of timing. The agency took so long to complete the first phase of the preparation plan (that is, gaining support of regional professionals) that the second phase (talking with community leaders and abutters) was then made more difficult by news leaks. Information gleaned by surveying the community, its makeup and concerns, can be used for devising the appropriate strategy for entering the community. As we will see, some strategies are appropriate for some communities but not for others.

Strategy for Entering the Community

Once one knows something about the context of the community, the focus of power, and the way it organizes itself to serve the interests of its residents, one is in a position to consider alternative strategies for entering the community to establish a group home.[2] Three general strategies seem to have been put into operation by the group homes represented within this study: (1) maintaining a low profile; (2) focusing communication on a significant few; and (3) focusing communication both on the significant few and on the local resident. Some of these strategies seem to be appropriate for certain kinds of communities and very inappropriate for other kinds.

In general, the low profile entry into the community appears quite adequate for communities which are characterized by mobile populations, which have diverse groups in terms of age and race, and which have little experience in organizing to present a collective response to an issue. The purest type of low profile approach was discovered in the Eagle Grove community which could be described by each of the above characteristics. The agency sought a community with great diversity so that little attention would be attracted by a group of youth or by a staff made up of ex-offenders. This low profile approach, which could be called the "quiet approach," has certain risks which are minimized in the transient community but which could be exacerbated in a residential community. That is, the danger of being discovered before the program has had a chance of proving itself is always a risk. It seems improbable that one could actually place a group home in a middle-class residential community without being discovered and then becoming involved in a bitter struggle to remain before having a chance to show what one's program can do.

The other community in which a low profile approach was used successfully was Sullivan. That community can also be characterized as having a diverse and mobile population, but it also had the capacity to organize itself to promote community interests. The approach of the group home was to win community support by means of a functional approach. That is, the nondelinquent youth and staff became involved in the community on a personal level. They projected themselves as worthwhile persons and therefore sold the program. Then DYS youth were introduced into the existing group home, and were also urged to sell themselves. This approach probably works best where there is a sympathetic and widespread concern about community problems. In Sullivan, the residents recognized that a crime and delinquency problem existed and had to be handled; furthermore, they believed that the program was one way to deal with delinquency. It is problematic, however, whether this approach would work in a relatively isolated suburb unwilling to acknowledge the existence of delinquency in the community or to accept responsibility for coping with it. As long as delinquency is seen as another community's problem, the sympathetic support and understanding requisite for this low-key functional approach would be missing.

The approach that emphasized communication with a significant few persons in the community—the mayor, the selectmen, and key professionals—has had mixed success in residential areas. Usually it has worked fairly well only where it has been expanded to include a fairly comprehensive communication flow with grass roots neighbors and abutters. In communities where there are upper-middle-class persons who recognize the value and use of collective power, elected town officials and professionals will be unable to force acceptance of a group home even if the officials are in favor. In most cases in a conflict, the officials, because of their desire to be reelected, will probably go with the majority or a very vocal minority of the residents. The proposed group homes for both Whitewater and Palmyra were very dependent on political and professional support. The agency in Whitewater had an international reputation among professionals but that reputation was not particularly useful when community residents resisted the idea of a group home in their neighborhood. In Palmyra, the power and influence of the Protestant Council with town officials was considerable, but it could not match the tenacity of the neighborhood residents. In both cases, the agencies were open to the rather serious charge that support came from the outside, or from suburban communities that would probably not themselves accept such a group residence in their own neighborhoods.

This approach has a rather glaring liability. The fears and emotions of a few are allowed to spread and to be voiced in group meetings where such feelings can easily be reinforced. One-to-one contact, with its greater likelihood of neutralizing the fear, was not employed sufficiently in these two cases.

The combined approach which incorporated both communication with significant leaders and with the neighbors and abutters is perhaps more time-consuming than the above strategy. And it also has its risks. After all, the best-managed communication scheme may still be unconvincing, or perhaps the community is simply unwilling to accept the kind of responsibility that goes along with a group residence. However, for the organized residential community, the combined approach seems the most workable. The strategy revolves around a desire for a community to assess its needs and to take an active cooperative role in meeting some of those needs. This strategy was backed into in Laurel, where it became a face-saving if not agency-saving strategy, and it was the planned approach in Hebron. The original approach in Laurel seemed to emphasize the professional, civic leader, and town official support. It depended a great deal on what was believed to be a good reputation in the community. This strategy blew up. Negative publicity was so rampant that one would wonder about the safety of the agency's existing programs. The program staff withdrew from direct confrontation with the

[2] The importance of understanding the power structure and process of a community to facilitate community action is underscored by Roland Warren, *The Community in America* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), pp. 308-309; and Robert C. Wood, *Suburbia* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958).

residents of the community and began a massive education campaign directed at the press and at the local residents. This intensive communication with the grass roots seems to have stabilized the situation a great deal. Although the proposed site will be forgotten and the proposed home may be established in another community, the ongoing programs of the agency do not seem to be in immediate danger. In Hebron, the agency sponsoring the group home had developed a strategy which included emphasis on both the significant regional leaders and the community residents. There, however, the strategy was seen as sequential: first the significant leaders would be contacted and then the community residents. The time lag and the almost inevitable news leaks nearly proved to be the end of the proposed home. Again, a fairly concerted effort to communicate with concerned residents was instituted and the proposal was saved. Although initial groundwork may be necessary, requiring communication with the leadership of a community or a region, contact with the local residents cannot lag far behind or once again one will be open to the charge that the program does not care about the residents' concerns and that someone is trying to sneak a halfway house into the community.

This discussion suggests that specific approaches for entering a community with a group home can be tailored to the contextual makeup of the community. The "low profile" approach is most appropriate for the mobile, pluralistic community. The "significant few" approach may be adaptable in a residential community where the local residents are not particularly capable of organized opposition, but where the town and civic leaders are playing an active role in redirecting or shaping the image of the community. The combined approach, which stresses communication with both the significant leaders and the grassroots residents, seems to be one of the few strategies with potential for gaining access to a community that has the ability to organize itself in support of, or in opposition to, issues.

A survey of the selected community should provide the information necessary for choosing the best entry strategy. Well-laid strategies can be devastated, however, if conflict cannot be avoided over such technical problems as appropriateness of the site, presentation of the program content, and intake procedures. We will now describe some of the more technical issues that could produce conflict and impede entry into the community; such conflict might result in focusing debate on what the agency would view as nonessential issues, and away from the basic issue of what a community is going to do to help its youthful offenders. After this discussion we will describe the third major step for neutralizing community resistance—how to resolve conflicts.

The *selection of the site* is of great importance. Care should be taken to avoid giving grounds for legitimate complaints about the suitability of the site for a group residence that will house, let us say, eight to ten youths and two houseparents. If structural questions are legitimate, the whole proposal can be scuttled simply because the agency did not do its homework well. Certain problems can be anticipated, such as a small yard, heavy traffic, or an inadequate house. These are problems that any family buying a house must consider. The appeals board decisions in both Whitewater and Palmyra made specific reference to the shortcomings of the particular sites selected. One can debate such issues as maintaining the residential character of a community or the selection procedures to insure that only certain ages and certain offenders will be residing in the home, but it is most difficult to argue with these physical and structural issues which will inevitably be couched in terms of what is "good for kids."

Selection of a name for the program can also be strategically relevant. Program names are symbols that say something to the community as well as something to the clients. Some names may serve only to threaten and increase the anxiety of potential neighbors. In Hebron, one woman suggested that the name of the program caused as much concern within the community as any other factor. In many cases social service agencies try to put together acronyms that challenge the client but they may also raise red flags for community residents. Names such as BURN, SCARE, SMACK, BLOW-UP or JD may simply cause more problems with community relations than they are worth. Acronyms in the mental health field such as HELP and RECOVERY seem more neutral.

An issue related to selecting a name is deciding what generic label should be used to describe the program. Most of the agencies in this study did not refer to their proposals as halfway houses, even though many of the community's residents referred to them as such. Preferred labels were group homes, child-care centers, schools, or "family." Choice of a label has an effect not only on how the program will be perceived in the community, but also on whether a zoning variance will be required in residential areas. A residence with an educational program that will enable it to be called a school may find that in some areas the zoning question can be eased. In some communities the best strategy might be to set up a "family," which might avoid raising the issue of zoning regulations. This could be done by employing a couple, full time, to work with five to eight residents and who would bring into their home from time to time other persons with specialized skills to provide services for the youth. This could be seen as an expansion of the foster home model.[3]

Presenting program content carelessly can raise needless problems. It is ridiculous for a social service agency to lay itself open to the charge that it does not have a well-planned, well-articulated program for the residence. The proposed home in Palmyra was particularly susceptible to this charge, as was, initially the program in Laurel. In Laurel, an added complication arose because residents did not believe that a program which had been fairly successful with youthful drug abusers would necessarily be successful with juvenile delinquents. The program staff did not seem ready to handle this issue.

Issues involving selection criteria and procedures are included under program content. In Laurel and Whitewater residents were particularly upset over the possibility that tough older juveniles would be admitted to the program. The selection procedures must be worked out and articulated so that the community is assured the plan does not call for working with "dangerous youth" and that if such does manage to make his way through the screening process and become unmanageable in the program, he can be rejected. The residents may still not believe the argument, but at least a straightforward program has been presented.

The importance of this presentation of program content can best be illustrated by the experience in Hebron. Because of a news leak and because of the name of the program, many residents were ready to organize opposition to the proposed home. At the Taxpayers' Association meeting, convened to discuss the group home proposal, however, the program staff presented a very honest, straightforward appraisal of their program. While they could not guarantee the community's safety, they did present the safeguards built into the program. Most of the participants agreed that the presentation neutralized any further efforts to prevent the establishment of the group residence.

In Sullivan, the program was actively presented to neighbors by both staff and the boys. They did not seek to dramatically publicize the program, but they did quietly solicit the assistance of some neighbors, and the youth became involved in various work projects within the community. Again, the staff and youth knew what the program was about and could intelligently talk about it.

Client and staff residence can also materially affect acceptance of a group home. An issue that arose in the Laurel, Whitewater, Palmyra, and Hebron communities was the desire not to be a dumping ground for the problems of other communities. This was particularly the case in Laurel where councilmen from other communities were kidding the Laurel councilmen about Laurel's being the leader in social service and saying that other communities would like to send their "tough kids" to Laurel. In Palmyra there was the complaint that the support for the group home came from the suburbs. And in Hebron, there was concern that the home would serve youth from Boston and Brockton. Residents in Laurel seemed willing to serve the needs of their own youth. And most residents in Hebron were willing to serve youth as long as the youth resided in the resort area.

A similar issue has been raised about staff. In Laurel, it was said that the program staff worked in the program during the day but then drove home to rather plush suburbs at night. And in Palmyra, it was said that the Protestant Council should set up their group home in their own neighborhood. Although these issues were not raised in Sullivan or Eagle Grove, in both cases some program staff resided within the home or the community.

The issue of community control is related to this question. If a community recognizes the need for a residential program for its troubled youth, such as the need to generate more community contact while the youth are in a "treatment" program and being reintegrated into that community, it also is reasonable for the community to make certain demands on the program. This may include a request that at least a specific portion of the staff reside within the community, that youth from the community have priority for entry into the program, and that residents have some influence on decisions about the nature of the program. A problem with community control arises when a community decides it has no delinquency and can therefore simply reject the notion of a group residence; at that point it seems the state must assume an *in loco parentis* role and provide services for troubled youth. Where there is community interest, however, one probably should not resist real "community-based corrections" by denying *shared control* over the program.

Finally, emphasizing that the *program will serve the community* can greatly ease entry. Obviously the home should have some impact on handling the community's delinquency situation. Successful integration of clients will prevent at least some crime. But the clients can also be used as resources while participating in the program. One woman in Hebron recognized this when she suggested that some of the youth could help her with a local historical society. Youth in the Sullivan residence became a resource for filling part-time

[3] The Massachusetts Department of Mental Health has undertaken research concerning the definition of "family" in zoning ordinances. The department contends that "there is growing legal precedent in zoning cases in Massachusetts and other states to support the emerging definition of family [as] that of a group of people sleeping, cooking, or eating on a premises as a single housekeeping unit rather than as a group of people related by blood or marriage."

jobs. Youth in the Eagle Grove residence are becoming active in a delinquency prevention program.

Resolution of Conflict

We must reiterate that in most instances, with the possible exception of the very low profile approaches, any attempt to establish a group home in a community will incur some sort of resistance. Even if the issues discussed above have been well handled, some conflict will still probably arise over such issues as "we don't need a halfway house in this area," "this is not the kind of issue with which this organization should be involved," or "halfway houses are needed but in the next county." For successful entry into a community, it seems imperative for the social agency to develop strategies for resolving conflicts.[4] In general, an all-out fight will work against the interests of the social service agency and the youth whom the agency wants to serve. The administrators in Laurel recognized this when they said that it would be better for the youth to be located in a business-zoned area than to be in a residential community which simply did not want them. If all attempts to resolve conflict fail, this backing off may be one of the preferable alternative choices. Let us then turn our attention to ways of neutralizing conflict that may hold open the opportunity for establishing the proposed home. With this goal in mind, it is important to recognize that those conflict resolution strategies that make continued relationships of cooperation between the conflicting parties difficult or impossible are inappropriate in this case, although they may be helpful in other situations.

Any conflict will have at least two disagreeing parties. If each has a level of power sufficient to thwart the desires of the other, a situation where there can be no outright winner will probably result. Even if the social agency can "beat" the opposition on a particular issue, if its tactics are unjust, the opposition may simply regroup and become an even more intense enemy.[5] It is desirable therefore to have available face-saving devices. The opposition should be given the sense that it has had some impact on the outcome. In Laurel, when the agency sponsoring the group home realized that its whole program could be lost, it withdrew from direct confrontation to begin a massive education campaign. In a sense the education effort was a face-saving device; it provided a reason for avoiding direct confrontation and was a strategy which may reestablish the agency in the minds of the residents as a viable, worthwhile organization. Palmyra exhibited quite the opposite extreme. There, emotional invectives such as "unchristian" and "property-conscious" and "do-gooder" served to escalate the conflict and to make satisfactory resolution that much more difficult. In Hebron conflict was neutralized by confronting it, letting all the questions come, and dealing with them on the spot. There was no particular effort to "snow" the residents, but rather to be honest about the strengths and weaknesses of the program. The style that one uses to handle conflict can have considerable impact on its resolution.

A classic distinction in the study of conflict and conflict resolution is between realistic and nonrealistic conflict.[6] A basic principle that underlies this discussion is that of generating and rising to only realistic conflict.[7] Realistic conflict is over an actual difference of interest clearly and accurately defined. Nonrealistic conflict is over something other than an actual difference of interest, and is therefore not susceptible to resolution. Nonrealistic conflicts often tend to be impersonal, couched in terms of ideas rather than actual personal interest. Such abstractly defined conflicts can be pursued with greater fury than can personal conflicts. This truth is represented in the common recognition that holy wars are more bloody than others, in the fact that "lynch law" has frequently been activated by couching a personal economic interest in terms of some widely held ideal, such as the saving of Southern white womanhood, and in the fact that when the federal government has been actively and successfully involved in solving racial problems, it has done so by focusing conflict on genuine economic and social interests, not on symbols. The role of the mediator in labor-management relations is also to focus the conflict on realistic issues and to get rid of unrealistic ones.

The direct identification of the real issues and frank discussion of them by the group entering Hebron is a good example of focusing on realistic conflict with good results. So is the strategy of representing oneself to the neighbors in terms of what one is doing, and in terms of who the youth actually are, instead of as a halfway house, an abstract idea with nonrealistic connotations, or representing oneself by a highly symbolic name. The strategy of the Protestant Church Council in Palmyra is a good example of failure because of stubbornly generating and rising to nonrealistic conflict. Alinsky was fond of pointing out that when he approached church groups, he did it on pragmatic grounds of economics, power, and the like, not on the grounds of religious belief.[8] The conflict in Palmyra had clear realistic components, relating to property value, possible danger to residents, and the intrusion of an outside group. The Protestant Council, instead of meeting these problems and resolving them, chose to generate a nonrealistic conflict over the practice of religious values, a conflict it could never win. Realistic conflict, probably susceptible to solution by compromise, since many of the objections of the community were probably quite valid, was escalated by the Protestant Council into a "holy war," perhaps either out of naiveté or because of a need for martyrdom. It was perhaps fortunate for DYS as well as for the community that the Protestant group was decisively defeated, because their tendency to make a holy war would have had a generally alienating effect in the community.

To summarize, one must know the other side, its power and interests, be clear on the difference between one's own interests and the other side's, and do everything possible to focus the conflict on those realistic issues, avoiding nonrealistic conflict over loaded symbols. The voice of a group in determining the course of the community in which it lives should always be considered as one of the issues over which realistic conflict may arise. Thus one must consider the importance of face-saving. The possibility of escalating nonrealistic conflict by using a symbolic name, or by using a loaded shorthand description, such as halfway house, should also be considered, as should the danger of creating a holy war. Also much of the conflict about technical issues, such as the program name, selection procedures, and site selection can *simply be avoided* if one plans well and anticipates the consequences of decisions related to these technical issues. It is absurd as well as unfortunate to have a proposed home rejected because the sponsoring agency did not carefully do its own homework. Debates over technical problems and nonrealistic concerns allow for proponents and opponents to engage in conflict over petty issues while altogether avoiding discussion of the real issues. On the other hand, once the technical issues are out of the way, the possible value of forthrightly dealing with the real, unavoidable issues involved in differences of interest should not be underestimated, and meetings and educational campaigns designed to focus and resolve realistic conflict should be seriously considered.

[4] This is not to say that a certain level of conflict does not further efforts to establish group homes. Conflict does clarify boundaries of interest groups for example. The function of social conflict has been discussed in numerous works, for example Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 17-20; Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 206-213; Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).

[5] It has nearly become a sociological dictum that conflict often tends to strengthen the opposition into an even more formidable opponent. *See* Kurt Wolff, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950), p. 192; and Coser, *Functions of Social Conflict*, p. 38.

[6] Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict:* In order to regulate conflict "both parties to a conflict have to recognize the necessity and reality of the conflict situation, in this sense, the fundamental justice of the cause of the opponent," p. 225.

[7] Coser, *Functions of Social Conflict*, pp. 48-55; and Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, pp. 27-28.

[8] Saul D. Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 88.

VI. Some Observations On The Conceptualization And Replicability Of The Massachusetts Youth Correctional Reforms

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To many observers, the history of the reforms in the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services appears to be a collection of bewilderingly accidental, crisis-filled events, impossible to replicate. We have found, however, that the reforms followed what seems to be a clear, replicable pattern common to many other conflict and change situations. We believe an effective strategy for change requires an understanding, explicit or intuitive, of the system-wide ramifications of specific actions. The framework presented here is designed to facilitate the consideration of these ramifications. It employs an interview guide as a structure for describing a key phase of the reform—the period of transition from the training schools—and continues with a brief summary of the results of a more formal analysis of this period and other phases of the reform process.

In the late 1960s repeated investigations of youth corrections in Massachusetts led to the enactment of legislation to reform the Division of Youth Services.[1] The new, reform-minded commissioner tried to change the institutions, following the Maxwell Jones model, by converting the cottages into relatively autonomous therapeutic communities. This conversion effort was given up late in 1971 because of the difficulties engendered by much of the institutional staff's resistance to change. Instead, the commissioner decided to bypass the structure by purchasing services from the private sector. At first the services were envisioned as privately run group homes, or halfway houses, but they later included a much wider variety of services, such as secure care programs, group homes of various sorts, foster homes, and nonresidential services ranging from recreation to education, job help, and counseling.

The history of the reforms demonstrates that their implementation involves far more than the passing of reform legislation. Clearly, many other processes are involved. This lesson comes through on three levels. First, the reform legislation that passed in 1969 by an overwhelmingly favorable vote was supported by legislators who apparently hoped that this show of action and concern would come to nothing more than a way to resolve the current embarrassments in youth corrections. In addition, constituents within the agency were confident that they would not be disturbed by reform. Second, concerted administrative efforts by the new commissioner and a powerful coalition of interest groups failed to effect change during the first year. And third, the changes in 1972 that implemented the reform mandate had to surpass the specific intent of the reformers of 1969 in order to achieve the kind of basic change called for in the handling of youth, and had to be based on guerrilla administrative tactics - far beyond any legislative mandate. We are concerned here with a means of analyzing these processes and processes like them elsewhere so that these experiences can constructively contribute to future efforts at reform.

The question-and-answer format we use to describe a particular period of the reform movement is derived from an interview guide developed for use as a final survey of key participants in the Massachusetts correctional reform process. Developed in 1971 and gradually refined over the next four years, the questions have been used to organize data and analysis for the entire DYS project. This heuristic framework has supported much of the theoretical analysis of the project data and has constituted the structure of standardized observation forms

[1] See Chapter 1, "Radical Correctional Reform: A Case Study of the Massachusetts Youth Correctional System," in this volume, which provides the historical background of the reforms.

used to record the results of observation and informal and semiformal interviewing. On the basis of these successful experiences the questions have recently been refined to the point where they can serve as self-explanatory interview questions. They are also used as a framework for organizing data drawn from many sources, such as observation, informal, semiformal, and formal interviews, and official record checks.

As used in this chapter, the question-and-answer format provides brief analytical answers that highlight the events of early 1972. This period defines a pivotal point during which one can observe the intersection of two very different systems. We then show how a formal analysis in terms of certain variables, logical principles, and empirical principles grows out of the questions, and we will briefly indicate the character of simulation analysis based on these variables and principles. Finally we discuss the issue of replication.

Massachusetts Youth Corrections in Early 1972

1. Let's talk first about who is concerned with youth corrections. We will be asking about three broad categories of people. It may be that some people belong to more than one category.

a. What people or groups of people are in favor of the changes, for example deinstitutionalization, instituted by Jerome Miller and Joseph Leavey? If you had to attach a label to this group, what would it be?

In early 1972 this category was principally composed of the new commissioner, Jerome Miller, and the progressive staff members of DYS. It also included previously prominent groups, such as the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth. Another group, the Committee for Youth in Trouble, an *ad hoc* local organization, had uncovered a scandal involving the mistreatment of youth in one institution. Some legislators also belong in this category. We label this group the Liberal Interest Coalition.

b. What people or groups of people were against changes such as the deinstitutionalization directed by Jerome Miller and Joseph Leavey? If you had to attach a label to this group, what would it be?

This category included some legislators and many DYS staff members who had a vested interest in the old conservative system. Although they would assume a more important role later on, some judges belonged in this group. We label this group the Conservative Interest Coalition.

c. What people or groups of people in state or local agencies or in government were concerned with the question of who formally decides things like budgets, appointments and jobs, contracts, changes in fiscal authority, and the like that relate to youth corrections? If you had to attach a label to this group, what would it be?

In early 1972, the most important members of this group were probably the legislature, acting as a whole, the governor's office, central coordinating units in state government concerned with administration and finance, for example, and political parties. We label this group the Formal Decision-Making Group.

d. How would you characterize yourself? Do you belong to any of these groups? Which ones? Why?

In conducting the study, the Center for Criminal Justice took the role of a concerned group sympathetic to the reform, but avoided an active political or organizational role. Rather, it emphasized its interest in understanding the period from the points of view of each interest group. The Center supplied policy-relevant feedback from program evaluation research throughout the study, and made this available to all interested persons and groups.

2. What actions did the Liberals take to influence the policies, programs, or organization of youth corrections—or the standing of the Liberals as against other groups? That is, what were their tactics?

Having failed in their attempts to reform the institutions, the Liberals resorted to replacing the state-run institutions with small, private programs. This tactic involved circumventing the Formal Decision-Making Group by closing the institutions at a time when the legislature was not in session. It also involved repudiating the legitimacy of legislative investigation when a legislator began to visit an institution and ask questions.

3. Did some Liberals have higher standing than others?[2] Which ones?

The commissioner and the liberal DYS staff members were most prominent within the Liberal Interest Coalition; outside groups took a sideline position except when they were called upon to interfere with the legislature. Among the more active members, the distribution of power, responsibility, and reward changed mercurially to meet the tasks at hand; e.g., in finding placements for youth or establishing a regional administration of services.

4. What actions did some Liberals take that affected these differences in standing?

Supporting the fluid internal structure of the coalition, members of the coalition tended to ignore titles in assigning work, so that the distribution of power and responsibility would never become fixed.

5. What actions did the Conservatives take to influence the policies, programs, or organization of youth corrections—or the standing of the Conservatives as against other groups? That is, what were their tactics?

The Conservative tactic was to discredit the Liberals, largely by foot-dragging in the implementation of new programs, by encouraging escapes, and by publicizing these escapes as the effect of the new liberal programs.

6. Did some Conservatives have higher standing than others? Which ones?

[2]We use *standing* as a general term. Some people think more specifically in terms of influence or power, some think of responsibility, rewards, prestige, or prominence, and some think about stake or status. All these are ways of talking about *standing*.

Among the Conservatives, institutional staff occupied the most prominent position. Judges later achieved greater prominence when youth were transferred from institutions to community placements, and judges could exercise more authority.

7. What actions did some Conservatives take that affected these differences in standing?

Those Conservatives who were in a position to control youth used them as pawns in the political struggle. To these Conservatives, the youth were an important resource, whose placement in institutions or in the community, more so than the action of the Conservatives, determined differential standing among the Conservative Interest Coalition. The youth were considered an important resource because their behavior was conspicuous and an issue for the larger community.

8. What actions did the Formal Decision Makers take to influence the policies, programs, or organization of youth corrections—or the standing of the Formal Decision Makers as against other groups? That is, what were their tactics?

In early 1972 the Formal Decision-Making Group pursued liberalizing tactics, such as support of the liberal commissioner. This served to ally them with the more powerful coalition and ensured that some of their recommendations would be heeded. It also provided a basis for maintaining a reform-oriented constituency, which is frequently built up more rapidly than is a patronage-based constituency.

9. Did some Formal Decision Makers have higher standing than others? Which ones?

Before 1972 the legislative leaders of the Formal Decision-Making Group controlled the group. A shift in control, however, from the liberal leadership to the more conservative and patronage-oriented individual members resulted in the decentralization of the power structure of the group. Decentralization occurred immediately after the group's loss of power (noted in question 12) under the liberal leadership. During early 1972 members of the legislature were the most critical actors in this group. Leaving initiative to others, the governor pursued a policy of cautiously supporting the reforms.

10. What actions did some Formal Decision Makers take that affected these differences in standing?

During this period, the continued collective courting of constituencies supported a centralized group structure. Individual courting of constituencies through patronage, however, steadily gained, and thereby fostered the new, more decentralized group structure.

11. Thinking back over the actions or tactics of the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Formal Decision Makers, can you say how they all combined or interacted to affect correctional policies, programs, or organization? Have the actions of some groups been more important than those of others?

The tactics of replace, liberalize, and discredit resulted in a balance of the forces of action that distinctly favored the liberal impetus, and therefore helped to replace the old correctional system with a new one.

12. Let's talk about the way the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Formal Decision Makers stood in relation to each other.

a. Did some of these three groups stand higher than others? Which ones?

Early in this period the Liberals, who previously shared power with the

Formal Decision-Making Group, held power alone. The Conservatives remained relatively powerless.

b. What was each group's most important goal or reward, and how well did each group do, compared to the others, in achieving its goal?

The Formal Decision-Making Group aimed to further a consistent liberal policy rather than patronage (this later became the goal as a result of decentralization). Developing new programs was the goal of the Liberals, while the Conservatives sought to maintain conservative programing. Of the three groups, the Liberals were most successful.

13. How did the actions or tactics of the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Formal Decision Makers combine or interact to affect which of the three groups stood higher than others? Were the actions of some groups more important in this respect than those of others?

The tactics of the interest groups created a new balance of the forces of action, which served to shift power drastically to the left, leaving the Liberals in power without having to share it with the Formal Decision Makers. This radicalization, which occurred while the Formal Decision-Making Group was led by liberal leaders who supported the Liberal Interest Coalition, caused the decentralization of the Formal Decision-Making Group.

14. Let's shift now and talk about the relationship between youth and the community during and after a youth's stay in a program. What is the standing of youth in the community?

Youth held a rather low standing in the community during this period. Both lack of linkages with community institutions and a high rate of recidivism reflected their low position.

15. a. What actions by staff or youth affected relations between youth and the community?

Staff implemented new advocacy procedures designed to develop and maintain better resources for the youth in the community, such as the University of Massachusetts Placement Conference, and separate regional administrations. In some cases, these new procedures later improved the standing of youth in the community.

b. Which of the following factors prevented DYS youth from succeeding in the community:

1. the state of the economy
2. lack of cooperation from schools
3. fear or hostility on the part of employers
4. hassling by the police
5. lack of cooperation from the youths themselves
6. lack of support from DYS or its programs
7. bad family situations
8. other

Staff of DYS and its programs have always stressed bad family situations as the key to many of the problems of DYS youth. During the active transition from institutional to community placement, however, staff became extremely conscious of hassling by the police as a problem in reintegrating youth. On the positive side, youth themselves have consistently tended to stress their own determination and the help they received from people in the community. Recidivism studies suggest that help from DYS programs is also important.

16. What about relationships among people within the youth correctional system and the programs that serve its youth? How was standing divided:

a. among youth, between youth and program staff, or among program staff?

In early 1972 the therapeutic community orientation, which was developed in the institutions during the first part of the reform, prevailed. As a result, staff and youth shared responsibility and even a considerable amount of power. While there was still inequality in power, youth had more in relation to staff than was true in the old programs, and among youth the most physically strong were no longer automatically the most powerful.

b. among regional and state level staff?

The newly created regional offices took on the responsibilities for youth placement and tracking from the central office. Although the regions were given considerable responsibility for the development of new placement options for youth, the central office retained control of policy.

c. between regional and/or state level staff on the one hand and youth and/or program staff on the other?

At first, placement of youth in a given region, without notification (particularly during the closing of the institutions), aggravated the regional office staff; a regular pattern gradually emerged, however. The regional office placed youth and followed them through the programs. Thus, through its regions, the controlling hand of DYS extended into the programs and became a normal feature. The central office continued to control some programing, notably secure care and detention.

17. Thinking of all staff and youth in the entire youth correctional system and its programs, could you describe:

a. the nature and rate of the youth intake process?

The courts directed youth into the system. Intake into individual programs, however, was now allotted by trial and error—sometimes with formal trial periods, sometimes by virtue of the youths' running from programs they did not like. An intake of 70 youth was possible for a two-to-three month period in one region.

b. in general terms, the nature, size, and setting of program strategies?

Secure programing and therapeutic communities continued in this period, but an emphasis on support without heavy therapeutic intervention replaced the dominant emphasis of previous periods on therapy. Foster homes became important. At the same time nonresidential programing emerged as a significant strategy; indeed, somewhat later, half the youth not on traditional parole were in nonresidential programs.

c. the nature of the actions of youth in response to the program?

Youth responded to the new programs with more consistently positive subcultures than in the institutions. An interesting complication arose in what constituted a positive response—some of the most striking norms of the therapeutic community turned out to be antithetical to even the outside programs in the "straight" community. For example, the therapeutic communities encouraged a form of responsibility for the behavior of others known in other settings as "finking" or tattling. The new, more community-based programs, on the other hand, supported the anti-informing norms of the larger community into which they reintegrated their clients.

d. the nature and rate of the youth discharge process?

Staff periodically reviewed youth in temporary residential placements, and frequently released them after three months. Youth in foster homes, schools, and nonresidential programs stayed longer. The degree of follow-up after release varied greatly.

e. actions by youth or staff affecting staff relations and organization?

A great many staff members were frequently transferred or retrained in less specialized jobs, which affected staff relationships and organization. The placement of youth also had a major effect, because transferring youth from institutions to private programs deprived the institutional staff of much of their power over the system. Similarly, when regions were notified of the delivery of youth to regional offices those offices had to assume their new responsibilities quickly and effectively.

Conceptualization and Theory

We have just described a crucial six-month period of the reform process by answering 17 questions. The first of these questions identified the actors, and the remaining 16 described the process in which these actors were involved. It is the process that we wish to analyze here.

The sequence of questions develops in blocks that correspond to different relationships. Questions 2, 3, and 4 correspond to the Liberal Interest Coalition (i.e., the relations among members of the collectivity of liberals). Questions 5, 6, and 7 concern the Conservative Interest Coalition (i.e., the relations among its members). Questions 8, 9, and 10 concern the Formal Decision-Making Group (i.e., the relations among the collectivity of formal decision makers). Questions 11, 12, and 13 concern more generally the Relationship Among Interest Groups. Thus the questions shift the focus from how people relate within the interest groups to how the interest groups as a whole relate to each other. Questions 14, 15, 16, and 17, finally, concern what we will call the People-Processing Relationship, the actual correctional process, or the relationship between clients and staff and its effect on the relationship of youth to the community.

We can think of each of the five relationships as a connection among its members. The connection has an indirect aspect, which concerns the external relations of a given group, and a direct aspect, which is internal to the group. These two aspects can be described by means of four variables; and by cross-classifying these with the five relationships in Table 6.1 we can quickly uncover the basic structure of the 16 questions used to describe the first half of 1972.

External Variables

1. The focal properties of the environment of the group; i.e., the arrangement and functioning of whatever the

Table 6.1

Questions by Relationship and Variable, Part A.

Variables	Liberal Interest Coalition	Conservative Interest Coalition	Formal Decision-Making Group	Relationship Among Interest Groups	People-Processing Relationship
Focal properties of the environment					14
Actions affecting focal properties of the environment	2	5	8	11	15
Internal distributions of responsibility, power and reward	3	6	9	12	16
Actions affecting internal distributions of responsibility, power and reward	4	7	10	13	17

group seeks to influence or control outside itself.
2. Actions taken by members of the group that affect the focal properties of the environment.

Internal Variables

3. The internal distributions of responsibility, power, and reward among those in the group; i.e., who has what and how much.
4. Actions taken by members of the group that affect the internal distributions of responsibility, power, and reward.

The numbers in the cells are the numbers of the questions that measure the variables used to describe the specific aspects of each relationship. Note that in the row designating the focal properties of the environment, all the cells are blank except for the one under the People-Processing Relationship. This is because some relationships constitute the focal properties of the environment of others. Thus, the focal properties of the environment of the Relationship Among Interest Groups consist of the four variables that describe the People-Processing Relationship (PPR). These four variables account for the struggle among interest groups. The focal properties of the environment of each of the individual interest groups consist of the seven variables that describe the Relationship Among Interest Groups (RIG) and the People-Processing Relationship (PPR). We can now complete this as shown in Table 6.2:

Table 6.2

Questions by Relationship and Variable, Part B.

Variables	Liberal Interest Coalition	Conservative Interest Coalition	Formal Decision-Making Group	Relationship Among Interest Groups	People-Processing Relationship
Focal properties of the environment	(RIG, PPR)	(RIG, PPR)	(RIG, PPR)	(PPR)	14
Actions affecting focal properties of the environment	2	5	8	11	15
Internal distributions of responsibility, power, and reward	3	6	9	12	16
Actions affecting internal distributions of responsibility, power, and reward	4	7	10	13	17

The underlying structure identified in Table 6.2 serves as a basis for analyzing the relationships among variables—the key to describing the *process* of reform and counter-reform. The first step calls for the identification of logical principles and their implications, which flow from the underlying structure of the set of variables. We are then in a position to consider some empirically based principles that will allow us to make more specific predictions.[3] The four logical principles are:

1. *Externally oriented process and structure.* Actions affecting focal properties of the environment causally influence those focal properties *and* are causally influenced *by* them.
2. *Internally oriented process and structure.* Actions affecting internal distributions causally influence those internal distributions *and* are causally influenced *by* them.
3. *External and internal structure.* Focal properties of the environment and internal distributions causally influence each other.
4. *External and internal process.* A single concrete behavior may contribute to both of the more abstract categories, actions affecting focal properties of the environment and actions affecting internal distributions.

If the actions affecting the internal distributions and the actions affecting the focal properties of the environment are thought of as process variables and if the focal properties and internal distributions are thought of as structural variables, then principles 1 and 2 are concerned with the interrelationship of process and structure, while principle 3 concerns the interrelationship of aspects of structure. Principle 4 concerns the interrelationship of aspects of process.

These four principles, when applied to the structure in Table 6.2, produce the possible relationships among variables that are specified in Figure 6.1.

In using 16 variables describing three or four aspects of five relationships, we find it convenient to contrive code names for the variables. We use three letters in parentheses to identify the relationship, followed by a letter or two to identify which of the four "aspect" variables we are referring to. For the People-Processing Relationship we use PPR, for the Relationship Among Interest Groups, RIG, for Liberal Interest Coalition, LIC, for Conservative Interest Coalition, CIC, and for Formal Decision-Making Group, FDG. E signifies focal properties of the environment, and AE stands for actions affecting them. For internal distribution of responsibility, power, and reward, we use I, while AI represents actions affecting them.

Note that each of the 16 resultant variables directly or indirectly affects each other variable. The rows of Figure 6.1 indicate which other variables are *direct causes* of any given variable. The columns designate which other variables are directly *caused by* any given variable. By examining sequences of direct effects, one obtains indirect effects. For example, (LIC)I affects three RIG variables which in turn affect many other variables. All the variables appearing in this expanding chain are indirect effects of (LIC)I. Note also that, by its very nature, the Relationship Among Interest Groups is an abstract representation of combined effects of the interest groups and, therefore, serves as a set of intervening variables between the interest group variables and the People-Processing Relationship variables. Hence Figure 6.1 does not show direct effects of interest group variables on the People-Processing Relationship, since these duplicate the effects of the interest group on the Relationship among Interest Groups and the effects of the Relationship among Interest Groups on the People-Processing Relationship. We conceptualize each of the variables in Figure 6.1 as a simple nominal scale consisting of a few categories, or a multidimensional property space, or something in between.

To Figure 6.1, which represents *possible* effects, we add empirical principles that hypothetically apply to the specific situation with which we are concerned. The object is to specify the nature of each relationship between two variables indicated by an x in Figure 6.1. Some of these relationships may be null, but there can be no "new" relationships added that are not represented by x's in Figure 6.1. The added "empirical" principles are based on observation of the struggle over reform in Massachusetts from the mid-1960s to the present. While it is difficult to delineate fully all such principles, we summarize the main ones under the following five headings.[4]

1. Sequencing. Promoting change in a relationship other than in an interest

[3] *See* Alden D. Miller, "Radically Changing the System by Tampering with Its Functional Requisites, or Basic Change by Attention to Basics," in Donald Gelford and Russel Lee, *Ethnic Conflict and Power* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973); Alden D. Miller, "Knocking Heads and Solutions to Functional Problems: Components of Change," *Sociological Practice* (March 1976). *See also* Alden D. Miller, Lloyd E. Ohlin, and Robert B. Coates, "Logical Analysis of the Process of Change in Human Services: A Simulation of Youth Correctional Reform in Massachusetts," Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, mimeo., 1975.

[4] Miller, Ohlin, and Coates, "Logical Analysis."

Figure 6.1

Specification of Variables That Appear in Each Equation of the Model.

Predicted Variables for Each Equation	Predictor Variables for Each Equation																			
	(LIC) AE	(LIC) I	(LIC) AI		(FDG) AE	(FDG) I	(FDG) AI		(CIC) AE	(CIC) I	(CIC) AI		(RIG) I	(RIG) AI	(RIG) AE		(PPR) E	(PPR) I	(PPR) AE	(PPR) AI
Liberal Interest Coalition																				
(LIC) AE													X	X	X		X	X	X	X
(LIC) I			X										X	X	X		X	X	X	X
(LIC) AI		X																		
Formal Decision-Making Group																				
(FDG) AE													X	X	X		X	X	X	X
(FDG) I							X						X	X	X		X	X	X	X
(FDG) AI						X														
Conservative Interest Coalition																				
(CIC) AE													X	X	X		X	X	X	X
(CIC) I											X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X
(CIC) AI										X										
Relationship Among Interest Groups																				
(RIG) I		X				X				X				X			X	X	X	X
(RIG) AI	X	X			X	X			X	X			X							
(RIG) AE	X	X			X	X			X	X							X	X	X	X
People-Processing Relationship																				
(PPR) E													X					X	X	
(PPR) I													X				X			X
(PPR) AE													X		X		X			
(PPR) AI													X		X			X		

group is usually difficult unless one begins by moving to change simultaneously both actions affecting focal properties of the environment and actions affecting internal distributions. Internal distributions and focal properties affect each other, and, if attention is directed only to one, the other may neutralize the intended changes. Interest groups may not follow this rule because they are less likely to contain internal opposition to change in the course of pursuing a line of action.

The replacement tactic of the Liberal Interest Coalition, in affecting the Relationship Among Interest Groups, dramatically illustrated this principle. Taking the youth from the training schools and placing them in alternative settings in the community was, during the first part of 1972, the dominant force both in actions affecting the focal properties of the environment and actions affecting the internal distributions of the Relationship Among Interest Groups. A contributor to the actions affecting the focal properties of the environment, it led to new relationships between staff and youth. With smaller groups of youth, more personal relationships developed. Similar relationships developed in the community as the new programs capitalized on community resources in order to survive. Less immediately obvious, but equally important, however, was the contribution of the replacement tactic to actions affecting the internal distributions of the Relationship Among Interest Groups. Taking the youth out of the institutions and placing them in new settings had the effect of removing them away from one set of staff and handing them to another. As the youth were both prize and resource in the struggle among interest groups, much like territory in war, the move took away crucial resources from the institutional staff and gave them instead to the new community-based staff. The institutional staff lost the ability to sabotage reform by using its control over the youth to encourage escapes or to provide them with "mixed messages," conforming outwardly to established policy but tacitly supporting its subversion. The staff of the community-based programs, on the other hand, gained the ability to demonstrate that youth could be kept safely and sometimes productively in the community.

The early part of 1972 also marked a transition between two fundamentally different sequence patterns in the People-Processing Relationship. Actions that centered around the variable Actions Affecting Internal Distributions characterized both the custodial and reform-oriented institutional programs. In stressing obedience and respect for authority on one hand, and teaching new skills to youth on the other, the custodial programs took actions to affect the distribution of responsibility, power, and reward between youth and staff. The staff hoped that the newly formed relationship between youth and staff would have a constructive, almost magical effect on the relationship of the youth to the community. Similarly, the therapeutic programs took actions to affect the distribution of responsibility, power, and reward between youth and staff—emphasizing youth power in social skills and understanding. Once again, the hope was that these somewhat different, newly formed relationships between youth and staff would have a constructive effect on the relationship of youth to the community.

The new programs that emerged in 1972 were visible in the new actions affecting both the focal properties of the environment and the internal distributions, although they did not yet have visible consequences in the form of new focal properties or new internal distributions. These programs differed from the old ones in that they depended on developing such actions simultaneously rather than developing almost solely those affecting internal distributions alone, as the old program had done. In addition to affecting the distributions of responsibility, power and reward between youth and the staff, the new programs, unlike the old ones, served as advocates for the youth in the community. Thus staff members affected the focal properties of the environment by working to get youth into schools, jobs, and general community programs—and to keep them there, accompanying them to court, talking to employers and school officials. In a substantial number of cases, these actions replaced the actions affecting internal distributions; for some youth, the emphasis shifted from a therapy-oriented program to a totally resource-oriented program. In the system as a whole, however, the focus was on a mixture of support (affecting the distribution of responsibility, power, and reward between the youth and staff) and advocacy (affecting a comparable distribution between the youth and the community). In the years following implementation, this new approach, simultaneously employing both types of action in the People-Processing Relationship, proved that the majority of youth in the state's youth correctional system could be kept in open settings without increasing the state's recidivism rate; in fact, in one region, where the new programs were vigorously implemented, the recidivism rate was cut virtually in half.

2. The inertia of the People-Processing Relationship. The People-Processing Relationship, constituting the focal properties of the environment of the Relationship Among Interest Groups, carries great weight. It strongly influences (a) the internal distributions and (b) the actions affecting these focal properties; and thus makes it particularly difficult to change either of these variables. Yet such change is essential to produce change, by interest group action, in the People-Processing Relationship. However, the People-Processing Relationship and its self-protective influence over the other variables of the Relationship Among Interest Groups are prone to weaken under public investigation.

Our picture of early 1972 shows the *results* of processes described by this principle rather than the full processes themselves. The investigations of the Department of Youth Services and the scandals of the late 1960s that culminated in 1969 in a major public expose mobilized the public and government officials and led them to take remedial action. The public investigations of that period, aimed at the functioning of the correctional system itself, constituted actions affecting the focal properties of the environment of the Relationship Among Interest Groups or the People-Processing Relationship. In effect, they thoroughly disrupted the People-Processing Relationship and rendered it and the Relationship Among Interest Groups liable to change.

3. The Formal Decision-Making Group as a swing power. The Formal Decision-Making Group is an essential ally for either the liberals or the conservatives to win and it is not

much affected by the characteristics of the People-Processing Relationship per se since it is interested in the decision-making process, not in substantive issues.

Members of this group pursue liberal or conservative interests by means of their simultaneous membership in their own group and in either the Liberal Interest Coalition or the Conservative Interest Coalition.

The changes that occurred in early 1972 were made possible by a shift of alliances in the late 1960s. At that time, the Formal Decision-Making Group decided that continued support of the Conservative Interest Coalition constituted a liability and began, instead, to support the liberals in their attempt to implement change.

Alliances shifted once more during the early part of 1972. This time, the Liberal Interest Coalition had alienated the Formal Decision-Making Group. As a result the internal distributions of the Formal Decision-Making Group changed, with the members taking over control of the youth corrections issue as the group became decentralized (i.e., lacked a consistent policy on this issue). The consequence was that after 1972 a conservative backlash grew steadily behind the scenes, rendering Liberal control tenuous at best.

4. Responsiveness of the Liberal Interest and Conservative Interest Coalitions to the People-Processing Relationship. Liberal and conservative groups are both affected by the People-Processing Relationship per se, since both are interested in substance. Both are likely to use extreme tactics when they are in danger of losing control or cannot quite change that relationship as they want when they do have control. Both tend to stop pushing when they get what they want, and in so doing become more vulnerable to attack.

In early 1972, both the Liberal Interest Coalition and the Conservative Interest Coalition responded to the state of the People-Processing Relationship. The Conservatives tried to discredit the Liberals. Responding to their failure to completely reform the old institutional system, the Liberals adopted the extreme tactic of replacing the entire system. With the establishment of the new system, the Liberals, after 1972, relaxed their efforts and became more vulnerable to the growing possibility of a Conservative backlash.

5. Short and long-run effects of extreme tactics. Extreme tactics by Liberals or Conservatives that push the Formal Decision-Making Group aside alienate that group by upsetting its internal distributions, leading to changes in its goals. At the same time these tactics may achieve their immediate objectives, while risking long-run defeat.

Such a process began in early 1972 when the Formal Decision-Making Group shifted sides because of its own loss of power while supporting the Liberals. The process was slow enough so that the new system could be implemented and functioning before the Conservative backlash, supported by the Formal Decision-Making Group, became a real threat.

Having established and defined our variables and presented the logical principles by which they are manipulated and the empirical principles of their interaction, we move to a summary analysis that uses these tools simultaneously. If we establish an extremely simplified list of possible values for each variable and set up equations representing the relationships among the variables according to the principles indicated, we are struck by the degree to which the resulting simulation reproduces the history of the reforms.[5] Such a simulation tells the story of a Liberal group attacking a conservatively run corrections system by investigating it publicly, thus provoking the Conservatives to respond by dismissing their critics, including the members of the Formal Decision-Making Group. This dismissal alienates the crucial support of the Formal Decision-Making Group from the Conservatives so that the Liberals can then resume their investigations and topple the Conservative administration, replacing it with their own reform administration, which they subsequently replace in its turn with a new community-based regime. In the process of shifting from reforming the old system to replacing it with the new community-based one, the Liberals alienate the Formal Decision-Making Group, as the Conservatives had done earlier, by rejecting its right to criticize. While the Liberals were able to complete the implementation of their new programs, the possibility of backlash and restoration of the old, Conservative regime grows behind the scenes.

The story told by the simulation, which was calculated in early 1974, is indeed the story of the Massachusetts youth correctional reform, and the logical character of the process generating the simulation dispels much of the mystery that has been thought to shroud the reform process. The warning with which the simulation ends echoes an actual concern of observers and key actors in Massachusetts today, in 1976, although observations in our study suggest that additional factors are indeed intervening so that the new liberal system will not collapse in the next few years. These new factors can be summarized as the tendency for the political system to move on to new issues without waiting to see whether old issues are really resolved. Such a long-run tendency saves a specific issue area like juvenile corrections from being caught in a perpetual cycle of rapid, virtually identical revolutions. Nonetheless, as of 1976 the future remains in doubt. Consolidation has meant inactivity, rather than the tidying up of loose ends like secure care--the Achilles heel of many correctional systems. Failure to deal with the problem of what to do with a minority of "hard to handle" youth, about 125 out of 2,000 under the care of the DYS, has allowed pressure to build up around the issue. At the same time the department, although confronted by a court case and a mandate from the governor, has failed to close the last and most oppressive institution in the system, the detention center at Roslindale. Thus, even though the force of the Conservative Interest Coalition is weaker than that suggested in the simulation, the defenses of the Liberal Interest Coalition are also very weak, and tangentially related disturbances in budget and other legislative problems may have erratically favorable effects for the Conservatives.

[5] *Ibid.*

Implications for Replicability

The study described in these pages needs to be replicated not only in a wide variety of correctional settings, but also in other people-processing systems as well. In addition, it is important that the more general subject of study, the political process of reform, be a viable alternative in situations other than Massachusetts youth corrections. But a seven-year study, using a large staff and a wide variety of data-gathering and analysis techniques, raises difficult questions of replicability--not only whether or not the techniques are explicit and clear, but whether it is practical to repeat such a long-term commitment of resources. On a practical level, such studies are not begun lightly, and probably should not be. Therefore, one of the objectives of the DYS study has been the development of compact, readily transferable methodologies and techniques, so that the large-scale, diffuse work can underlie more compact methods in later projects without the need for repetition on the same scale. An important fruit of this endeavor is the set of questions from our key participant interview, which we used as the framework for the first section of this article. These questions represent the refinement of a set of dimensions that we have employed in the codification and analysis of data since the beginning of the project, and which we have subjected to repeated revision and improvement. Only recently have we come to believe that this set of questions has been sufficiently refined to stand alone as interview items. Our initial interviews indicate that the questions do work quite well and can be administered in an interview lasting less than an hour and a half or, if the interviewer chooses to exhaust all answers from the respondent, up to five hours. We have been amazed and gratified at the interest respondents have shown in the interview.

The interview provides a means of inexpensively collecting data in a variety of settings. Its questions can also be used as a guide in participant observation and in other data collection techniques. Finally, as indicated here, the formal structure underlying the interview permits an extensive analysis that is powerfully predictive and of great practical value in making policy decisions and in developing strategies to implement those policy decisions. People involved in setting up correctional and mental health group homes in specific neighborhoods, program evaluators and developers, and a variety of activist organizers with whom we have discussed the interview find it a useful tool.[6]

We now have a tool for doing comparative analyses of the change process in different settings. This comparative type of analysis is essential if the insights of case studies are now to be brought to bear on practical efforts to reform in diverse settings.

But what about the political process that has been the object of this study--can *that* be replicated? We believe it can, and that it is not a unique or new process. Massachusetts, in which we find a mixture of conservative and liberal groups, is not a particularly unique place; the basic shaping of interest coalitions, liberal, conservative and swing power, appears to be common to many conflict situations. The importance of the dynamics of the relationship of the other groups to the swing power has been present in a variety of other settings, notably in the civil rights movement of the early 1960s. Then, nonviolent tactics were used to provoke an opposing response that alienated support in the federal

[6] Robert B. Coates and Alden D. Miller, "Evaluating Large Scale Social Service Systems in Changing Environments: The Case of Correctional Agencies," in *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* (July 1975), pp. 92-106.

government and in the rest of the country. One finds the sequencing principle—the simultaneous promotion of new actions affecting internal distributions and new actions affecting focal properties—in major instances of correctional reform, such as the Wisconsin reforms of the late 1940s and early 1950s[7] and Hawaiian reforms of the same period. What happened in Massachusetts was neither an accident of forces nor the result of one person's personality. Rather, it evolved as a concerted, systematic movement that followed principles observable in other examples of major change. While it is true that some personalities are better suited for the leadership of change efforts, the basic principles of reform can be identified, learned, and taught.

[7]Lloyd E. Ohlin, unpublished manuscript.

VII. Preliminary Thoughts On Generalizing From The Massachusetts Experience

Project Staff

The possibility that the experience of one state might shed light on the problems encountered elsewhere has been a key motivation behind the Center for Criminal Justice investigation of juvenile corrections in Massachusetts. While the present study cannot fully evaluate the generalizability of its findings to other situations and other states, and the Center plans future research to address such questions, it is important to approach the question now with the data that are available. The results suggest that what has been learned in Massachusetts probably applies to developments in other states.

We will first describe in summary form some comparisons of the reformed system in Massachusetts with those of other states. We will then consider data drawn largely from the Uniform Crime Reports and the U.S. Census to determine whether Massachusetts is unusual in ways that are relevant to the possibility of reform.

Some Comparisons of the Reformed System in Massachusetts with Other State Systems

Table 7.1 shows that as of 1974 Massachusetts had as low a rate of institutionalization of juvenile offenders per 100,000 population as any state in the nation, and had tied with one other state.[1] Among 48 states measured it ranked first in the percentage of juvenile offenders in state programs who were placed in community-based residential programs, and as high as any other state in the percentage of its juvenile corrections budget allocated to community-based residential programs. In addition, LEAA's Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census of 1972-73 reported Massachusetts as having the largest percentage decrease in the number of juveniles in public detention and correctional facilities of any state.[2]

Table 7.2 demonstrates that Massachusetts has been ordinary in the number of its offenders in state institutions, camps, community-based residential programs, and foster care programs per 100,000 population, but ranked fourth out of 48 states in the number of offenders in state-released community-based residential programs per 100,000.

[1] The comparative data presented in this section have been provided by the National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections from a forthcoming report: *see* Robert D. Vinter, George Downs, and John Hall, "Juvenile Corrections in the States: Residential Programs on Deinstitutionalization, A Preliminary Report" (Ann Arbor, Mich.: National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, 1976).

[2] U.S. Department of Justice, LEAA, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, *Children in Custody: Advance Report on the Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census of 1972-1973.*

Table 7.1

Selected Statistics on State-Related Juvenile Corrections, Part A.

	Massachusetts	U.S.
Rate of institutionalization of juvenile offenders per 100,000 total population (1974)	2.1	
Rank	49	
Mean		17.8 (50)
Minimum		2.1
Maximum		41.3
Deinstitutionalization: percentage of all offenders in state juvenile programs who are in community-based residential programs (1974)	86.5%	
Rank	1	
Mean		17.7% (48)
Minimum		0
Maximum		86.6%
Percentage of state juvenile corrections budget spent on community-based residential programs (1974)	69.0%	
Rank		
Mean		9.4% (42)
Minimum		0
Maximum		69.0%
Percentage of offenders in state community-based residential programs who are in state-*funded* programs (1974)	100%	
Rank		
Mean		66.8% (42)
Minimum		0
Maximum		100.0%

Table 7.2

Selected Statistics on State-Related Juvenile Corrections, Part B.

	Massachusetts	U.S.
Number of offenders in state institutions, camps, community-based residential programs, and foster care programs per 100,000 total population (1974)	19.4	
Rank	27	
Mean		32.4 (42)
Minimum		8.3
Maximum		167.3
Number of offenders in state institutions, camps, and community-based residential programs per 100,000 total population (1974)	16.2	
Rank	34	
Mean		22.5 (48)
Minimum		7.9
Maximum		54.8
Number of offenders in state-related community-based residential programs per 100,000 total population (1974)	14.0	
Rank	4	
Mean		4.3 (48)
Minimum		0
Maximum		20.5

Table 7.3 shows that Massachusetts has spent less per capita for its correctional programs than most other states, and lies well below the mean in expenditures per offender. Massachusetts spent more than most other states only on per capita expenditures in state-related community-based residential programs.

In sum the reforms have resulted in a clear difference between Massachusetts and the rest of the country in the emphasis on community-based corrections. This difference is not, however, reflected in unusual total expenditures.

Table 7.3

Selected Statistics on State-Related Juvenile Corrections, Part C.

	Massachusetts	U.S.
Per capita expenditures for state institutions, camps, community-based residential programs, and foster care programs (1974)	$.60	
Rank	38	
Mean		$2.09 (38)
Minimum		.60
Maximum		8.17

Table 7.3 (Continued)

Selected Statistics on State-Related Juvenile Corrections, Part C.

	Massachusetts	U.S.
Per capita expenditures for state institutions, camps, and community-based residential programs (1974)	$.52	
Rank	42	
Mean		$2.16 (42)
Minimum		.52
Maximum		7.46
Expenditures per offender in state institutions, camps, and community-based residential programs (1974)	$3,223.00	
Rank	40	
Mean		$10,503.00 (40)
Minimum		3,223.00
Maximum		39,625.00
Per capita expenditures for state institutions and camps (1974)	$.16	
Rank	47	
Mean		$1.97 (47)
Minimum		.16
Maximum		7.40
Expenditures per offender in state institutions and camps (1974)	$7,436.00	
Rank	37	
Mean		$11,657.00 (47)
Minimum		3,798.00
Maximum		39,625.00
Per capita expenditures for state-related community-based residential programs (1974)	$.36	
Rank	5	
Mean		$.16 (43)
Minimum		0
Maximum		.98
Expenditures per offender in state-related community-based residential programs (1974)	$2,570.00	
Rank	29	
Mean		$ 5,501.00 (35)
Minimum		210.00
Maximum		17,800.00

The Problems of Generalizing

"Could these reforms occur elsewhere?" The answer to this requires formidably difficult generalizations that call for more than simple comparisons of Massachusetts and other states. The question requires an assessment of the particular conditions that seem critically necessary for reform to take place, and the prevalence of these conditions. In this report we can only begin the task.

We will compare three types of data from Massachusetts before the closing of its institutions with similar data from other states. First, there are data on admissions and detention rates, supplied by Vinter and Sarri's National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, which are relevant because we must know whether correctional practices in Massachusetts were already unusual before the state began to close its institutions. Second, data from the Uniform Crime Reports published by the FBI are relevant because we need to know if the crime problems of Massachusetts were unusual before the closing of the institutions. Unusually heavy crime rates raise the possibility that deinstitutionalization might be impractical or politically unfeasible. We have seen from the summary provided in the first chapter of this volume that the process of deinstitutionalization is a highly political one, subject to much uncertainty. How serious people perceive the crime problem to be may crucially affect their willingness to undertake liberal reforms. Third, there are census data, which provide a minimal profile of the constituency of the political actors in the process of reform. Posed briefly: Is the population of Massachusetts an unusual collection of people, and, therefore, more likely to tolerate or support reform?

Admissions and Detention

Table 7.4 shows that, according to Vinter and Sarri, Massachusetts was already below the national mean in rate of admissions to public institutions per 100,000 youths, but that it was also already lowering that rate substantially faster than average. In other words, in 1971, for which we have data, Massachusetts was already beginning to deinstitutionalize. Even so, Massachusetts was admitting youth to institutions in 1971 at a considerably higher rate than the minimum found in fifty states. In 1971 we also find Massachusetts about average in its rate of detention of juveniles, per 100,000 youths.

Uniform Crime Reports

Table 7.5 displays data on Massachusetts, selected other states, and the United States as a whole. Table 7.5 at once suggests that Massachusetts was not unusual at the turn of the decade in its crime rates and casts doubt on the relevance of crime rates as a precondition of reform in the first place. Massachusetts had a slightly higher than average total crime rate per 100,000 population. This total crime rate was made up of a considerably lower than average violent crime rate and a somewhat higher than average property crime rate. It might be tempting to conclude that the lower violent crime rate might have been a critical factor in allowing Massachusetts to begin reform, but two circumstances suggest caution. First, much of the rhetoric about crime and about troublesome youth concerns property crime; e.g., car theft. Second, it is clear from Table 7.5 that California, long known for its continual efforts at youth correctional reform, has one of the highest rates of violent crime, and Wisconsin, known specifically for its tendencies toward deinstitutionalization, has one of the lowest.

We are forced to conclude that nothing in the Massachusetts crime

Table 7.4

Selected Statistics on State-Related Juvenile Corrections, Part D.

	Massachusetts	U.S.
Rate of admissions to public institutions per 100,000 youths (1971)	76.5	
Rank		
Mean		127.6 (50)
Minimum		24.5
Maximum		396.6
Change in rate of admissions to public institutions (1966-71)	-40.3	
Rank		
Mean		-6.8 (50)
Minimum		-121.4
Maximum		159.6
Rate of detention of juveniles per 100,000 youths (1971)	17.1	
Rank		
Mean		16.5 (50)
Minimum		0
Maximum		75.3

Table 7.5

Crime Rates.

State	Crime Rate per 100,000					
	Total		Violent Crime		Property Crime	
	1969	1970	1969	1970	1969	1970
Mass.	2,740.2	3,004.0	187.9	202.9	2,552.3	2,801.1
Conn.	2,334.9	2,574.9	147.2	170.4	2,187.8	2,404.5
R.I.	2,793.4	2,925.8	175.0	204.7	2,618.4	2,721.1
N.Y.	3,566.4	3,922.1	569.8	676.0	2,996.6	3,246.0
Penn.	1,400.4	1,541.3	186.8	212.2	1,213.7	1,329.1
Ill.	2,228.2	2,347.1	448.5	467.9	1,779.8	1,879.2
Ky.	1,662.9	1,924.5	177.8	222.3	1,485.1	1,702.2
Minn.	2,022.8	2,103.4	142.0	152.0	1,880.8	1,951.4
Wisc.	1,382.6	1,514.4	80.6	85.8	1,302.0	1,428.6
Fla.	3,165.9	3,599.7	462.9	498.2	2,703.0	3,101.5
Cal.	4,137.6	4,307.0	462.3	474.8	3,675.4	3,832.1
U.S.	2,476.9	2,740.5	324.4	360.0	2,152.5	2,380.5

profile uniquely predisposed the state toward reform at the beginning of the decade. The rate for violent crime was indeed low, but Massachusetts shares its reform orientation with at least one major state with an unusually high rate of violence. The Center is currently making arrangements to secure more detailed data than is normally published in the Uniform Crime Reports; these will allow a much more exacting comparison and a fuller search for the special characteristics of Massachusetts that might be relevant to reform.

For the present, our results suggest that if anything in the crime picture contributes to the likelihood of reform, it is the uncertainty of the relevance of a particular crime profile. This may be no small contribution. The picture of the reform process in Massachusetts is one in which political forces predominate over certain technical knowledge. In general when uncertainty exists about what will work, there is more room for the kind of political maneuvering we have described. The uncertain relationship of crime to reform probably contributes to the political nature of reform where reform occurs, and to the political nature of the decision not to reform where reform does not occur. In other words, a crime profile can be used to justify reform depending upon the power of the relevant groups. A state cannot simply look around at other states and decide on the basis of its crime statistics compared to theirs whether it should be engaging in reform. The decision is left to internal political forces.

Census Data

The people of Massachusetts are the constituency behind the political process. Are they different from the people of other states?

Table 7.6 shows that the population of Massachusetts is not unusual in median age, percent between ages 10 and 17, or percent male. Massachusetts is one of the states with a very high percentage of white population, and this might be relevant to correctional reform, except that the white percentage is not unusual among the New England states, and California, known for its reform orientation, has a substantially lower percentage. Massachusetts again has an unusually high percentage of foreign stock, but this is also true of other northeastern states that have not pursued such drastic reforms. Massachusetts is slightly above average in median years of school completed, although not quite as high as California.

Table 7.6

Census Characteristics of States, Part A.

State	Characteristics					
	Median age	Percent between 10-17	Percent male	Percent white	Percent foreign stock	In places of 250,000 or more, for 14 yrs. and older, median years completed school
Mass.	29.0	14.2%	47.8%	96.3%	33.3%	12.2
Conn.	29.1	15.6	48.5	93.5	32.0	12.1
R.I.	29.2	14.6	49.0	96.6	32.9	11.5
N.Y.	30.3	14.7	47.8	86.8	32.9	12.0
Penn.	30.7	15.6	48.0	91.0	18.1	11.8
Ill.	28.6	15.8	48.5	86.4	19.8	12.0
Ky.	27.5	16.3	49.1	92.6	2.3	10.3
Minn.	26.8	17.0	49.0	98.2	18.6	12.1
Wisc.	27.2	16.8	49.1	96.4	16.9	12.1
Fla.	32.3	14.8	48.2	84.2	18.2	12.0
Cal.	28.1	15.4	49.2	89.0	25.0	12.3
U.S.	28.1	16.0%	48.7%	87.5%	16.5%	12.0

In Table 7.7 Massachusetts emerges as high in its percentage of white-collar workers, but again, it shares this distinction with other states—Connecticut, New York, Florida, and California, among others. It is also high in the percentage of its work force involved in manufacturing, but so are Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Wisconsin. It is low in the percentage of workers who drive their own car to work, and, notably, Massachusetts has been the scene of some successful political battles to cut down on investment in highway construction in favor of mass transportation. However, Massachusetts shares its low percentage of drivers with Pennsylvania, Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, and it is radically outranked by New York. Finally, Table 7.7 demonstrates that there is nothing spectacular in either direction about the median income of Massachusetts residents. The median income for households of six or more persons, however, does look a little better than that of many other states.

Table 7.7

Census Characteristics, Part B.

State	Percent white-collar (male)	Percent experienced civilian labor force 14 and over in manufacturing		Percent workers driving to work in their own car	Median income all households	Median income households of 6 or more persons
		male	female			
Mass.	42.8%	31.0%	23.0%	62.1%	$ 9,563	$12,718
Conn.	42.7	37.2	25.5	70.2	10,877	13,454
R.I.	36.8	33.6	32.9	67.2	8,617	11,521
N.Y.	44.3	25.0	19.1	45.9	9,268	11,890
Penn.	35.8	36.0	25.6	62.0	8,548	11,025
Ill.	37.5	32.2	21.8	59.6	9,706	12,408
Ky.	30.3	26.1	21.4	66.1	6,537	8,049
Minn.	39.0	23.7	15.3	62.6	8,753	11,728
Wisc.	33.5	35.5	20.2	63.3	8,997	11,664
Fla.	40.0	15.2	10.5	72.6	7,168	9,247
Cal.	43.6	24.2	14.8	74.8	9,302	11,815
U.S.	38.1%	28.1%	18.8%	66.0%	$ 9,586	$10,884 (6 persons)

Table 7.8 pursues that point further and shows that Massachusetts is low in the percentage of its families below the poverty line. Connecticut is even lower, however, and Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Wisconsin are close. In the percentage of families with six or more children below the poverty line, Massachusetts is more spectacularly below average, but, again, the distinction is shared with several other states. It is worth noting that Kentucky and Florida, two states with high percentages of large families below the poverty line, have also become known for some efforts at correctional reform.

Table 7.8 also shows Massachusetts low in percentage of owner-occupied housing with more than one person per room and also low in renter-occupied housing with more than one person per room. In neither case, however, is the low percentage unique. In owner-occupied housing, other states with low percentages are Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, and Pennsylvania, while in renter-occupied housing, other low states are Rhode Island, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Massachusetts is also low in the percentage of housing with simultaneously more than one person per room and less than complete plumbing. However, again, it is not atypical of the southern New England states.

Table 7.9 shows that Massachusetts has a high percentage of persons per square mile, but so do other New England states like Connecticut and Rhode Island. It is quite urban, but so are Rhode Island, New York, Illinois, Florida, and California. In the days before the current economic slump Massachusetts had a rather ordinary unemployment rate for all males over 16 years of age, but an unusually low unemployment rate for females, a distinction shared with Connecticut, although several other states came close.

Of special interest are the unemployment rates of the 15 and 16 year olds, since these are the ages where a reformed, community-based correctional system will be trying to get jobs for its youth, and since unemployment among these ages may be a factor in delinquency in the first place. In Table 7.9 Massachusetts is low in unemployment for boys, although it is outdone by Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, and equaled by Minnesota. For girls, on the other hand, the unemployment rate is indeed unusually low, being nearly equaled in this arbitrary sample of states only by Connecticut and Minnesota. This might be significant except that girls' delinquency and girls' correctional programs have not been the big issues in the Massachusetts reform, and, in fact, reforms for girls have lagged considerably behind those for boys.

The general result of all these comparisons is that Massachusetts is not

Table 7.8

Census Characteristics, Part C.

State	Characteristics				
	Percent families below poverty line, in areas of 250,000 or more	Percent families below poverty line with 6 or more children in areas of 250,000 or more	Percent of owner occupied housing with more than 1 person/room	Percent of renter occupied housing with more than 1 person/room	Percent urban housing with more than 1 person/room and lacking some plumbing
Mass.	6.2%	15.5%	5.5%	8.6%	0.2%
Conn.	5.3	18.8	4.7	8.8	0.2
R.I.	8.5	21.5	5.7	6.5	0.2
N.Y.	8.5	25.8	4.6	10.2	0.3
Penn.	7.9	24.7	4.7	7.0	0.4
Ill.	7.7	25.1	6.7	9.5	0.4
Ky.	19.3	50.3	8.2	15.3	4.1
Minn.	8.3	17.2	7.8	6.3	0.6
Wisc.	7.4	15.5	7.4	6.7	0.5
Fla.	12.7	47.5	6.3	14.8	1.1
Cal.	8.4	28.8	6.4	9.9	0.2
U.S.	10.7%	34.7%	6.7%	10.8%	not available

Table 7.9

Census Characteristics, Part D.

State	Characteristics					
	Population per square mile	Percent of population urban	Percent of civilian labor force, 16 and over, unemployed		Percent of 14 and 15 year olds in unemployed civilian labor force	
			male	female	male	female
Mass.	727	84.6%	3.7%	4.0%	8.9%	8.7%
Conn.	624	77.4	3.2	4.0	6.2	8.9
R.I.	905	87.1	3.6	4.8	8.7	10.8
N.Y.	381	85.6	3.6	4.6	10.3	13.0
Penn.	262	71.5	3.5	4.2	7.3	11.7
Ill.	199	83.0	3.3	4.5	9.9	12.5
Ky.	81	52.3	4.1	5.5	10.1	12.2
Minn.	48	66.4	4.1	4.4	8.9	9.3
Wisc.	81	65.9	3.6	4.7	7.1	11.0
Fla.	126	80.5	3.2	4.7	9.5	11.7
Cal.	128	90.9	6.0	7.0	12.4	13.6
U.S.	57.5	73.5%	3.9%	5.2%	10.2%	12.3%

exactly average, but is far from unique. We have not systematically addressed through more sophisticated multivariate technique the question of whether variations such as those we have looked at may be mildly conducive to reform. The National Assessment study will include analysis directed to that issue. What we have established is that Massachusetts, unique in its correctional reform, is far from unique in its general profile. There are two implications: (1) what happened in Massachusetts probably could happen elsewhere; and (2) the critical enabling factors were probably the vagaries of internal politics and not of general demographic profiles.

Generalizing about the Political Process

If Massachusetts is not unique in its general statistical profile and if it appears that the key to its unusual reform of youth corrections lies in its political process, the question arises, "How generalizable is the pattern of the political process found in the Massachusetts reform?"

Our preliminary analysis of such other data on reform processes as are available suggests that while some details of the Massachusetts experience are specific to Massachusetts, the broad outlines of the political process described in the beginning of this volume are widely applicable outside. Conflict situations frequently contain a "pro" group, an "anti" group, and some sort of formal decision-making group that operates as a swing power. That much is almost axiomatic in correctional and governmental politics. It is also strikingly evident in other major struggles for change, such as the civil rights movement of the 1960s, where much of the country, including the federal government, was mobilized as a swing power to affect the struggle between blacks and whites in the south.

The dynamics of manipulating this situation also appear to be generalizable. In Massachusetts the liberal group, out of power, provoked the conservatives, who were in power, to repudiate the authority of the formal decision-making group, thus alienating that group's support from the conservatives and making it available to the liberals. This kind of tactic was central to the nonviolent campaigns of the civil rights movement, where the southern whites were provoked into publicly alienating the support of much of the rest of the country. Analysis of other correctional reforms also suggests the general importance of this tactic. When Wisconsin succeeded in implementing major correctional reforms in the 1950s the former head of the system joined in the investigation and became second in command in the new system at the same salary. The press was moved to comment that in the stormy history of correctional reform in Wisconsin this man's reaction to investigation was unique. Almost all officials could be provoked to repudiate the formal decision-making groups, and hence to contribute to their own downfall. This Wisconsin administrator, who simply joined in the new movement instead, was truly unusual.

Most important, one can clearly generalize about the broad strategy of combining change efforts with the simultaneous development of new actions that affect the internal distribution of responsibility, power, and reward and new actions that affect the focal properties of the environment in any one of the five relationships we identified as critical. Other analyses of reform in the Hawaiian correctional system by McCleery and in the Wisconsin system by Ohlin and others show dramatic use of this strategy of "change on all fronts at once."

These issues will be explored at greater length in books forthcoming from the research project. In the interim we can point out that there is also another basis for evaluating generalizability. Quite apart from noting similar processes outside Massachusetts, we can point to similar processes at other levels of analysis within Massachusetts. The same principles of change strategy that are evident in the state level reform efforts in Massachusetts are also evident at the local community level (for example, when the issue is whether local residents will accept a group home in their neighborhood). We have also found that the same principles apply whether the group home is a correctional one or one for the mentally retarded. Additionally, in conferences with program evaluators in Massachusetts and across country, we have found that recognizing the same principles facilitates the evaluation of programs in corrections and in other fields where there are multiple interest groups and multiple goals associated with change. Finally, in consultation with program developers we have similarly found that the principles observed in the Massachusetts reform constantly reemerge. They can prove helpful, when recognized, in identifying desired directions of program development, such as the nature of community linkages for program clients, and the relationship of those linkages to other aspects of the program.

In conclusion, the reforms that have taken place in Massachusetts youth corrections are clearly not unreplicable freaks. They were brought about by common political means in a state that displays no statistical uniqueness. They can be replicated in other arenas within Massachusetts and in other states.

Publications of the Juvenile Correctional Reform Project, Center for Criminal Justice

Harvard Law School

1. Coates, Robert B., and Miller, Alden D. "Criminal Justice Sets, Strategies, and Component Programs: Evaluating Change in the Criminal Justice System," in Emilio Viano, ed., *Criminal Justice Research.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1975.

2. Coates, Robert B., and Miller, Alden D. "Evaluating Large Scale Social Service Systems in Changing Environments: The Case of Correctional Agencies," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 12 (July 1975), pp. 92-106.

   Identifies problems confronting research on changing systems and specifies strategies for looking at systems undergoing change. Stresses the importance of looking at entire systems rather than focusing on specific programs. Represents the project's early effort at coping with the ever changing DYS system and coordinating the project's organizational and evaluation interests.

3. Coates, Robert B., and Miller, Alden D. "Neutralization of Community Resistance to Group Homes," in Yitzhak Bakal, *Closing Correctional Institutions.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1973.

   Analysis of the process of setting up a group home. Three successful and three unsuccessful attempts were studied. Results underscore the importance of knowing the community and developing appropriate strategies for the type of community. Experience shows that an informed group using appropriate strategies can establish a program in a relatively short time period. Includes recommendations for dealing with conflict.

4. Coates, Robert B., Miller, Alden D., and Ohlin, Lloyd E. "The Labeling Perspective and Innovation in Juvenile Correctional Systems," in Nicholas Hobbs, ed., *Issues in the Classification of Children: A Sourcebook on Categories, Labels, and Their Consequences.* San Francisco: Josey Bass, 1975.

   The underlying ideas of the DYS reform effort rest, in part, on the labeling perspective. This article looks at the labeling perspective as it relates to reform in juvenile corrections around the country but most specifically in Massachusetts. It identifies key decision points in the correctional process and describes attempts to reduce the negative consequences of labeling at those points.

5. Coates, Robert B., Miller, Alden D., and Ohlin, Lloyd E. "A Strategic Innovation in the Process of Deinstitutionalization: The University of Massachusetts Conference," in Yitzhak Bakal, ed., *Closing Correctional Institutions.* Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1973.

   Description of an advocacy program at the University of Massachusetts used to enable the rapid closing of the training schools in January 1972. Provides fairly extensive case study description of the advocacy and placement processes, the roles of various actors, and an assessment of the process.

6. Miller, Alden D. "Knocking Heads and Solutions to Functional Problems: Components of Change," *Sociological Practice.* (March 1976).

This paper adapts material from other reports to address an audience of applied sociologists on the subject of strategies and conceptualization of change.

7. Miller, Alden D., Ohlin, Lloyd E., and Coates, Robert B. "Logical Analysis of the Process of Change in Human Services: A Simulation of Youth Correctional Reforms in Massachusetts." Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, 1975 (mimeo.).

8. Ohlin, Lloyd E. "Institutions for Predelinquent or Delinquent Children," in Donnel M. Pappenfort, Dee Morgan Kilpatrick, and Robert W. Roberts, eds., *Child Caring, Social Policy and the Institution.* Chicago: Aldine, 1973.

9. Ohlin, Lloyd E. "Organizational Reform in Correctional Agencies," in Daniel Glaser, ed., *Handbook of Criminology.* Rand McNally, 1974.

A discussion of organizational reform in correctional agencies. Identifies sources of resistance to change, and specifies the importance of considering the dynamics of reform particularly in terms of vested interest groups and crisis resolution. This article provided the orientation for formulating the original objectives of the research project.

10. Ohlin, Lloyd E. "Reforming Programs for Youth in Trouble," in Michael J. Begab and Stephen A. Richardson, eds., *The Mentally Retarded and Society: A Social Science Perspective.* Baltimore: University Park Press, 1975.

11. Ohlin, Lloyd E., Coates, Robert B., and Miller, Alden D. "Evaluating the Reform of Youth Corrections in Massachusetts," in *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,* 12 (January 1975), 3-16.

Provides a description of the project's research design and how the project is organized to look at the reform process and its impact. Contains a brief overview of the reform effort and some impact data.

12. Ohlin, Lloyd E., Coates, Robert B., and Miller, Alden D. "Radical Correctional Reform: A Case Study of the Massachusetts Youth Correctional System" in *Harvard Educational Review,* 44 (February 1974), pp. 74-111.

Represents the project's first effort at describing in some detail the reform process from the mid-1960s through 1973. Includes fragmentary comparisons of youth responses concerning the new system with institutional baseline data. While problems are identified, data tend to support the direction of the reform effort.

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