

JCLEAR BLACKMAIL OR NUCLEAR THREAT ERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE ATE OF CALIFORNIA

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL
OR
NUCLEAR THREAT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
FOR THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

1 DECEMBER 1976

THIS PLAN WAS DEVELOPED AND APPROVED BY COMMITTEES CHAIRED BY THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA - OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES. THESE COMMITTEES WERE COMPRISED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS:

1. ALAMEDA COUNTY
   - Office of Emergency Services
   - Sheriff's Department

2. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
   - Headquarters, 6th Army
   - 548th Ordnance Detachment

3. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
   - Naval Intelligence

4. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (ERDA)
   - Nevada Operations Office
   - San Francisco Operations Office

5. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

6. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
   - Los Angeles Region
   - San Francisco Region

7. LOS ANGELES CITY
   - Civil Defense
   - Fire Department
   - Police Department

8. LOS ANGELES COUNTY
   - Fire Department
   - Health Services
   - Sheriff's Department

9. LONG BEACH CITY
   - Emergency Services
   - Police Department

10. RAND CORPORATION

11. RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

12. STATE AGENCIES
   - California Highway Patrol
   - Department of Health, Radiologic Health Section

13. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
   - Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

PREFACE

Acts of extortion, blackmail, and threats of violence involving radioactive materials pose a myriad of complex problems and require coordinated responses from many federal, state and local agencies.

The responses associated with such acts fall logically into two phases:

1. Actions dealing with the threat aspects; i.e., assessing threat credibility, searching for the device, deactivation and disposal, protection of the public from blast and/or the release of radioactive materials, and

2. Actions following the carrying out of the threat (the detonation or dispersal of radioactive materials); i.e., evacuation, decontamination and clean-up procedures, fiscal implications, etc.

This plan was developed to help governmental agencies fulfill their responsibilities associated with these acts. It is designed to utilize the resources of various agencies to cope with nuclear hazards and to minimize loss of life and property.

During the development of this plan, the "Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergency" (FRPPNE), which addresses the entire range of peacetime nuclear incidents, was also being developed. The two plans are compatible since those agencies involved in the Federal planning effort provided a summary of their current responsibilities and authority as input to this plan.

To reiterate, this plan summarizes the responsibilities of the various organizations involved and the actions each would take, within its jurisdiction and authority, as established by existing laws, statutes, codes or regulations, in response to a wide range of nuclear threats.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

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I. GENERAL

A. Purpose

To summarize federal, state, and local responsibilities in the event of attempted blackmail, threats, attacks involving radioactive materials, or nuclear weapons.

To provide planning assumptions and guidelines for local agencies; to develop operational plans and SOPs for responding to a nuclear threat; and to protect the public health and safety in the event a nuclear threat is carried out.

B. Objectives

1. To describe necessary organizations, preemergency preparations, operational concepts, protective actions, and supporting systems required to implement this plan. This includes:

   a. Delineation of responsibilities and task for each concerned agency;

   b. Establishment of lines of authority and coordination when the plan is in effect; and

   c. Selection of those protective actions most effective in ensuring the safety of the public.

C. Authorities

1. Federal

   a. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

   b. National Security Act of 1974, as amended.

   c. Energy Reorganization Act 1974.

   d. Disaster Relief Act of 1974.

   e. ERDA-60, Radiological Assistance Plan, July 1975.

   f. OPNAVINST 8027.1E, AR 75-14, AFR 136-8, MCO 8027.1B, Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

   g. ERDA-10, Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP), April 1975.

   h. Sixth U. S. Army Nuclear Chemical Accident and Incident Control Plan (USASIX NCAICP).

   i. Executive orders 11051, 11490, 11725, 11795 and others.

j. The United States Code.

k. Interagency agreements between:

(1) ERDA and DOD;

(2) ERDA and FBI;

(3) ERDA and NRC; and

(4) DOD and FBI.

2. State

a. Agreement between the State of California and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), pursuant to Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

b. California Health and Safety Code

(1) Control of Radioactive Contamination of the Environment, Sections 25600-25610.

(2) Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Sections 25650-25654.

(3) Radiation Control Law, Sections 25800-25876.

(4) Local Administration, Section 458.

(5) Standards, Sections 30250-30358.

c. California Administrative Code, Title 17. Radiation Control Regulations.

d. Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Health, Radiologic Health Section, and the California Office of Emergency Services.

e. California Emergency Services Act.

f. California Penal Code, Sections 12301, 12302, 12308, 12309, pertaining to destructive devices,

g. California Penal Code Section 409.5 securing incident sites.

3. Local

Local laws and ordinances for protection of life and property.

II. SITUATION

A. Type of Threat

There are many methods for using radioactive materials to threaten or extort; some are listed below:

1. Dispersal of radioactive material;

2. Detonation of a conventional bomb salted with any radioactive material;

3. Detonation of an improvised nuclear explosive device; and

4. Detonation of a stolen nuclear weapon.

B. Hazards

1. Plutonium (Pu)

Plutonium-239 is a fissile nuclear material used in nuclear weapons. It is radioactive, a metallic element with a long half life, very toxic, and internal exposure to small quantities may cause death or permanent injury. Entry into the body is by ingestion, inhalation, or through a break in the skin.

2. Other Radioactive Isotopes

Some of the more common radioactive isotopes other than plutonium which may be used in a threat are:

a.	P-32	(phosphorus)	f.	Ir-192	(iridium)
b.	Co-60	(cobalt)	g.	Au-198	(gold)
c.	Sr-90	(strontium)	h.	Ra-226	(radium)
d.	I-131	(iodine)	i.	H-3	(tritium)
e.	Cs-137	(cesium)	j.	Ca-45	(calcium)

These and other radioisotopes could be used; however, there is a wide variation in toxicity among radioisotopes depending upon their chemical, nuclear, and physical properties. Thus, identification of the isotope would be helpful in determining the proper response.

3. Fissile Materials

Plutonium-239 and certain isotopes of uranium (special nuclear material) are effective in sustaining a chain reaction and are, therefore, most suitable for use in constructing a nuclear explosive device. The use of other elements to make a nuclear explosive is either impractical or impossible.

4. High Explosives (HE)

A high explosive (HE) material is an essential part of a nuclear device. When a radioactive dispersal device is involved in the threat, HE may or may not be present. HE, in the form of TNT, dynamite, and other materials, is dangerous to handle at any time. In a bomb, they are especially dangerous since they may be used in crude and/or sensitive detonating devices. Therefore, no one except an expert, familiar with such devices, should attempt to disarm them.

5. Nuclear Detonation

In the event of a nuclear detonation, radiation (initial, thermal, and residual) and blast are added hazards in the immediate area. In addition, there is the potential for airborne residual radioactive materials spreading downwind and being deposited as fallout.

III. PLANNING

Nuclear threats (see Glossary) can be very complex requiring rapid and effective response to protect life and property. Only through effective planning whereby each organization is assigned its role, prepares SOPs and conducts training, can there be any assurance of an effective response to a real threat.

Planning, operating procedures, agreements regarding the establishment of operating centers, operational and support responsibilites, management of resources, and other requirements must be provided for in advance. Plans should provide for obtaining and using highly specialized personnel and equipment for search and analysis of nuclear devices, explosive ordnance disposal, and decontamination and disposal of radioactive debris. Plans must be formulated, written and tested.

Responsible government officials must consider the emergency environment that may result from the carrying out of a nuclear threat, and organize and plan accordingly to:

1. Protect life and property;
2. Institute a coordinated response;
3. Provide medical services;
4. Maintain order;
5. Investigate the threat;
6. Inform the public;
7. Provide resources for all phases of operations;
8. Provide recovery assistance;
9. Provide financial assistance;
10. Plan for the special requirements associated with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); evacuation, decontamination and monitoring;
11. Consider long range medical problems; and
12. Provide any other resources and services required to effectively respond to the threat.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This concept of operations provides for a task force of federal, state and local agencies to respond to a nuclear blackmail threat.

A sequence of actions and responses is shown in Attachment No. 1 on the following page. The agency or official receiving a nuclear blackmail threat will immediately notify the regional FBI office (see Attachment No. 2). The FBI will notify specified local, state and federal agencies (see Attachment No. 3), and will assemble and coordinate a task force of appropriate, concerned agencies (see Attachment No. 4).

The FBI is the lead investigative agency assisted by the affected local and state agencies. The task force determines the courses of actions which should be taken and coordinates all emergency responses, including but not limited to assessment of the threat, search for the device or material, explosive ordnance disposal, evacuation, and all other responses for the protection of life and property.

Local agencies retain operational control of their respective local response functions and forces.

If the threat is carried out, the task force will coordinate its actions with the local governmental body responsible for emergency and recovery operations.

A detailed discussion of various functions of threat operations is given below:

A. Response Actions

Should a nuclear threat occur which requires meeting demands or making concessions during a very short time interval, the local agency receiving the threat may, by necessity, have to respond using only those skills and resources immediately available. However, the nearest FBI field division should be immediately advised of the threat. The FBI will alert additional resources and skills and have them available as expeditiously as possible.

Consultation with FBI, ERDA and other agencies, may provide assessment of the data on any terrorist or group connected with the threat, the technical accuracy of the threat, and the kind and extent of damages expected in the event of nuclear detonation and/or radiological dispersion.

Other threats will provide time to meet the threat demand; time for more deliberate, orderly, and effective response to prevent or mitigate effects of the threat.

The following guidelines provide a basis for response action:

1. The Threat

A nuclear threat can be received in many different forms, such as a telephone call, tape recorded message, a note or letter. Regardless of the threat medium, it is imperative that the individual or

the agency receiving the threat acquire and preserve all threat related material and information (drawings, nuclear material or samples). See Attachment No. 5.

All information regarding the threat must be immediately forwarded to the FBI at the time the Bureau is notified. Since the exact wording and tone of the threat message can be of invaluable assistance in determining the credibility and the potential hazard associated with the threat, it is imperative that information be conveyed accurately.

Attachment No. 6 is an example of the type information the receiver of a telephone threat should attempt to acquire during initial conversation with the caller.

Everything associated with the threat should be handled carefully and preserved as evidence for possible future examination and evaluation by experts.

2. Notification

The FBI shall be contacted immediately upon receipt of a nuclear threat. For the telephone number of the nearest FBI field division, see Attachment No. 2.

3. Investigation

Investigation of the threat is the basic responsibility of the FBI. However, to mount an effective investigation the cooperation of local, state and federal agencies, coordinated by the FBI is necessary.

4. Threat Credibility Assessment

The FBI with ERDA support and local law enforcement will provide for assessment of the threat to determine its credibility and implication. Credibility must be continuously reviewed and assessed as investigative and technical intelligence is acquired.

5. Task Force

The task force will as a minimum be made up of representatives, the FBI, sheriff, ERDA, State OES, State Health, 6th Army/EOD, local law and local government. (See Attachment No. 4) The FBI, as the lead investigative agency, will communicate and coordinate with the members of the task force in order to maintain continuity and cohesiveness. Command decisions will be made by appropriate members of the task force, with regard for the discharge of their respective responsibilities, as the situation develops.

6. Operations Centers

Since the task force must coordinate their operations with all levels of government, it must have an EOC with good communications facilities. Such operations centers are to be found in many jurisdictions and should be used.



RESPONSE ACTION FLOW CHART

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Field command posts may be necessary to establish field operating points from which traffic control, evacuation, access control and other operations may be effectively directed.

7. Search

Once it has been determined that the nuclear threat is credible and protective actions commensurate with the situation have been taken, search for the device should begin. If the response time is very short, the search should be started by the local response agency and the information contained in Attachment No. 7 shall be considered.

When the demands are to be met in a longer time period, search for a nuclear device will be conducted by a search group designated by the task force. The group may require a field command post, or at least a location in the EOC separate from the task force, to perform their function without interference from others. This field command post must have effective communications with the EOC as well as its own search components.

Prior to the arrival of ERDA, a visual search by persons familiar with the threat area should be conducted. Concurrent with the search, law enforcement agencies, in concert with the FBI, will endeavor to provide additional information about the threat and its source.

If radiation detection equipment is used in the initial search, it should be remembered that most commonly available survey meters are incapable or unreliable for the detection of alpha, and low energy beta or gamma emitters.

8. Device Located

If a suspected nuclear device is found during a search prior to the arrival of ERDA, the area should be evacuated. Prior to arrival of trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel, NO ATTEMPT should be made to neutralize, deactivate, or move the device. If a military nuclear weapon is involved, only ERDA nuclear weapons experts and/or military EOD teams shall be involved.

9. Deactivation

a. Military Nuclear Weapon - When a U.S. or Foreign Nuclear weapon is involved, a military EOD team will be involved in the deactivation. ERDA designated personnel will assist the EOD team in assessment of weapon condition and provide assistance in determining procedures to be performed in the deactivation process.

b. Improvised Nuclear Device or Radioactive Dispersal Device - When a homemade device is involved, military and or civilian bomb squad personnel along with designated ERDA personnel must work together in both the assessment phase and the deactivation procedure. Deactivation should not be attempted without consultation with ERDA and DOD/EOD personnel, since conventional

EOD procedures for deactivation in many cases, may not afford the degree of assurance needed, and any procedure could cause a detonation.

10. Device Not Located

If the device cannot be located and the threat deadline is approaching, the situation must be reassessed. If the information available indicates that the threat is still credible then appropriate protective actions will be initiated (See B. below).

11. Threat is Carried Out

If the threat is carried out and either a detonation or dispersion of radioactive material occurs, local government in coordination with the task force assume the lead operational role and implements emergency recovery operations. Since the total area affected may vary greatly, planning should include a wide range of possible scenarios including the involvement of more than one governmental agency or several levels of government. Operations may be considered in two phases; emergency and recovery.

a. Emergency Operations include fire fighting, rescue, first aid, medical, radiation monitoring, decontamination and evacuation.

b. Recovery Operations includes re-entry procedures, radiation monitoring, radiation countermeasures, financial aid, decontamination, and long range medical services.

Many of the functions performed in emergency and recovery operations are the same or are similar to those in other types of emergencies. Current local plans or procedures may be adapted or used as the basis for developing nuclear threat emergency plans if radiation hazards are considered. Attachment No. 8 discusses hazards and exposure criteria that should be taken into account.

B. Protective Actions

Protective actions are nonsequential because it may be necessary to institute them at any time or reapply them. See Attachment No. 9 for a description of protective actions.

They should be considered in two phases.

1. Those actions (preventive) taken to prevent loss of life, injury or destruction of property; and

2. Those actions (recovery) that would be taken if the threat should be carried out.

Evacuation is an important protective action that may be taken either before or after a threat has been carried out. It is a major operation, even when done on a small scale, and will be a serious matter which the task force must consider in any threat. Attachments 10 and 11 briefly outline some things that must be considered in evacuating small and large areas.

C. Medical

In the event of a nuclear detonation or the dispersal of radioactive materials, special medical care may be required for people who were exposed to radiation and/or radioactive contamination. Many hospitals cannot treat such patients because they have neither the facilities nor trained personnel required.

1. Local

Local government is responsible for planning and coordinating medical services during an emergency and shall provide for:

a. Identification, coordination and control of local medical emergency response forces;

b. Medical planning including facilities designation, personnel training, and exercising medical facilities and personnel;

c. Special medical treatment, facilities and services required for care of radiation exposed and/or contaminated patients; and

d. Coordination of assistance provided by private hospitals, clinics, medical associations, health associations and societies and quasi-governmental groups.

2. State

Department of Health, Emergency Medical Services Section, is responsible for emergency medical care in support of local government. The Department will provide:

a. Technical advice;

b. Access to special equipment and services, such as whole body counters, laboratory services, decontamination facilities, radioactive waste disposal, etc.;

c. Emergency procurement, storage, distribution, and handling of supplementary medical supplies;

d. Liaison with the Office of Emergency Services; and

e. Procedures for procuring medical assistance from other State departments.

3. Federal

Federal agencies can provide technical advice, equipment, and supplementary resources in support of medical operations.

D. Health

Special health problems result from radioactive material contamination. Therefore, plans for health services must address this problem as well as related non-radioactive sanitation and other health problems.

1. Local

Local health departments are responsible for providing health and sanitation services. Emergency health plans should provide:

a. Health and sanitary services, and personnel decontamination;

b. Health and sanitation in reception centers, in the event of evacuation;

c. Supervision of food and drug supplies including detection and decontamination or disposal of radioactively contaminated food and drugs;

d. Potable water;

e. Decontamination and restoration, or replacement, of food preparation facilities; and

f. Protection of agricultural food products from radioactive contamination.

2. State

The Office of Emergency Services will coordinate the efforts of State agencies to support local emergency operations.

The State Department of Health will have primary responsibility for the administration and application of health services support, and will provide resources, personnel and technical advice as required.

In accordance with Section 207 of the Health and Safety Code, the Department will assume control of the public health functions in the affected area when the local health department requests aid or when their resources have been exhausted.

3. Federal

Appropriate agencies can provide supplementary emergency equipment, supplies and technical advice to local health authorities.

E. Public Information

Two types of public information may be required: (1) news releases, and (2) self protection information.

1. News Releases

All news releases will be coordinated through the task force.

2. Directions to the Public

Directions relating to self protection and requiring rapid and effective public action must be accurate, comprehensive, and expressed in understandable terms. These directions will be provided by the responsible local government and will be coordinated through the task force.

3. Coordination of media Releases

In coordination with the task force, local, state and federal agencies will be responsible for preparing releases pertaining to their activities.

F. Recovery Operations

The problems to be solved and the work required during recovery are extensive and may be complicated by the presence of radioactive contamination. The combined effort of many resources and disciplines is required and local government may require state and federal support.

1. Local

Local government is responsible for the recovery of, and re-entry into, affected areas. Tasks required during this period include:

a. Decontamination of people, property and food;

b. Maintenance of security in evacuated areas to prevent unauthorized entry and vandalism;

c. Mass care and welfare;

d. Monitoring of people and property for radiation contamination;

e. Transportation;

f. Disposal of radioactive or radioactively contaminated debris;

g. Engineering support;

h. Long-term radiation monitoring;

i. Control of radiation exposure to the public and workers;

j. With State and Federal assistance, a program for dealing with long-term medical problems.

2. State

The Office of Emergency Services will coordinate State support during emergency and recovery operations. The Department of Health is responsible for implementing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "Protection Action Guidelines".

3. Federal

Federal assistance will involve support to the local and state government upon request.

V. AGENCY TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The following outline of agency tasks and responsibility are provided for guidance and should be the basis for providing supporting plans and operating procedures.

A. Federal

1. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Although local government is responsible for the protection of the public health and safety, the FBI by Federal statute is the lead investigative agency in all cases where threats are made involving radioactive material. The nuclear aspects of threat assessment and search will be delegated to the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), or the State, or other agency as appropriate. In addition the FBI will:

a. Alert FBI Headquarters and appropriate local, State and Federal agencies (see Attachment No. 3);

b. Coordinate all investigative efforts with appropriate military or civilian law enforcement agencies;

c. Assist in the assessment of the threat;

d. Coordinate news releases regarding all aspects of the threat and operations through the task force; and

e. Provide a representative to chair the task force.

2. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA)

a. Threats Involving Special Nuclear Material (SNM)

The ERDA will accept from the FBI the responsibility for control and coordination of the nuclear aspects of the assessment and search operations in all cases where the threat involves special nuclear material (SNM) and, when requested, cases involving other radioactive materials. In addition, ERDA will provide radiological assistance to the State and local agencies having regularly constituted authority for the protection of the general public health or safety in accordance with the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan. Representatives from the ERDA San Francisco and Nevada operations offices will serve on the task force. ERDA actions will include, but not limited to:

(1) Alert State and Federal agencies as appropriate;

(2) Assist in assessment of the threat;

(3) Assist in the search for and analysis of the suspected nuclear device in accordance with current ERDA plans;

(4) Provide technical assistance to the EOD team; and

(5) Prepare input regarding nuclear and radiological aspects of the threat and operations for news releases.

3. Department of Defense (DOD)

a. Military Weapons

In threats involving military nuclear weapons, the military service responsible for weapons security has jurisdiction. However, when control of the nuclear weapon is lost in the civil sector, the FBI assumes jurisdictional responsibility for recovery and control of the weapon.

b. Other Threats

The DOD can provide technical support when requested through the FBI. Such support will include those functions within the purview of the Department and to the extent that the DOD principal military mission is not compromised. These functions include but are not limited to assistance in:

(1) Providing security;

(2) Locating the device;

(3) Deactivating and removing the device; and

(4) Recovery operations.

4. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)

ATF will provide assistance when requested by the FBI.

5. General Services Administration, Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA, FPA)

The GSA, FPA has the responsibility for coordinating the emergency planning effort of all Federal non-military and non-defense agencies.

B. State

1. Department of Health, Radiologic Health Section (RHS)

The RHS, if requested, will assist the FBI. This assistance may include, but is not limited to:

a. Provide a technical response team;

b. Assist in assessment of the threat;

c. Assist in locating the device; and

d. Provide protective action support to local government, and technical advice on radiological hazards, through the task force.

2. Department of Health, Social Services Section

The Division, in concert with participating federal agencies, coordinates the activities of those state and local agencies having welfare assignments. A description of these activities is given in Attachment No. 11, page 3.

3. Office of Emergency Services (OES)

When requested by the FBI, OES will:

a. Alert appropriate federal, state and local agencies;

b. Assist in assessment of the threat;

c. Assist in locating the device;

d. Provide monitoring and technical support equipment in the event of nuclear contamination and/or detonation;

e. Coordinate state emergency assistance;

f. Provide communications if requested; and

g. Provide protective action support to the task force.

4. State Police Division

The State Police Division of the State Department of General Services is responsible for security of state facilities. When a threat involves such a facility, the Division will:

a. Continue control of facility security;

b. Assist in control of facility access and evacuation;

c. Assist in locating the device; and

d. Assist in the investigative functions.

5. State Department of Justice

a. Assist involved law enforcement agencies as required.

6. California Highway Patrol (CHP)

On the State highways, roads and other places within its jurisdiction, the CHP will:

a. Assist in isolating and securing the threat area;

b. Assist in locating the device; and

c. Provide traffic control and evacuation assistance as required.

7. State Military Department

The State Military Department will support the primary response agencies by:

a. Providing transportation and manpower when requested and authorized;

b. Supporting civil law enforcement operations, including control of access to restricted areas; and

c. Providing medical assistance.

C. Local

1. Heads of Government

Local heads of government (mayors, boards of supervisors, city managers, etc.) are legally and morally responsible for the health and safety of the citizens in their jurisdictions. They must be privy to necessary operational information so that the best possible protective actions may be considered and initiated for the protection of the public. Accordingly, the head of government representative should be a member of the task force and local government should:

a. Develop local plans and SOP's designed to cope with emergency situations associated with nuclear threats;

b. Initiate appropriate protective actions recommended by the task force to mitigate the problem;

c. Coordinate with the task force in all public information releases; and

d. Provide other assistance as required.

2. Sheriff

The capabilities and operational responsibilities of the sheriff varies throughout the State. In some counties the sheriff has a central emergency coordination role for independent and contract cities as well as unincorporated areas. In others the primary responsibility is for the unincorporated areas, with specific countywide responsibilities outlined in State Codes. Regardless, the sheriff should always be a member of the task force.

Within the scope of defined operational jurisdiction and capabilities the sheriff should:

a. Assume operational control until task force is convened;

b. Establish a field command post and provide EOC manpower and communications as required and available;

c. Coordinate with appropriate local, state and federal agencies;

d. Assist in assessing the threat;

e. Assist in locating the device;

f. Provide traffic control, evacuation and other protective action as necessary;

g. Provide and/or support investigative operations; and

h. Assist in EOD, if possible.

3. Local Police

Within a city, the police will be expected to provide the same services as those described in C.2. (a. through h.) above.

4. Fire Services

The officer in charge of the fire service unit responding to an incident involving radioactive material will determine the fire fighting methods to be employed.

The fire service involved will, at the discretion of the fire officer:

a. Assist in search when requested;

b. Provide equipment and personnel for monitoring when available;

c. Provide protective action support when requested; and

d. Coordinate with ERDA and/or Health Department regarding fire fighting problems.

5. Local Emergency Services (CD)

Local emergency service organizations will provide assistance and equipment as requested.

6. Local Social Services

Local social service agencies will:

a. Coordinate agreements for emergency use of buildings for shelter, mass care centers, and other such facilities;

b. Make pre-disaster arrangements with local organizations and neighboring jurisdictions for sending or receiving mutual aid; and

c. Maintain current schedules for alerting welfare service personnel in emergencies and checklists of actions to be taken to put the emergency welfare plan into effect.

7. Local Health Department

Local health departments should be prepared, in so far as they are able, to provide to the task force:

a. Technical assistance;

b. Assistance in locating the device;

c. Protective action support; and

d. Other assistance as requested.

D. Supporting Systems

In addition to the federal, state and local assignments listed above, additional support from other public and private (American Red Cross, etc.) agencies may be required.

VI. GLOSSARY

ALPHA PARTICLE OR RADIATION - positively charged particle identical with the nucleus of a helium atom.

BETA PARTICLE OR RADIATION - negatively charged high-speed electron of nuclear origin.

CHAIN REACTION - any chemical or nuclear process in which some of the products of the process or energy released by the process are instrumental in the continuation or magnification of the process.

DISPERSAL DEVICE - a bomb or device designed to release and spread radioactive materials.

EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER (EOC) - a facility used by the task force and staffs of members for command and control purposes in an emergency.

EOD - explosive ordnance disposal.

FIELD COMMAND POST - an auxiliary or outpost of the EOC, generally where a specific function, such as traffic control, is carried out.

FISSILE MATERIAL - any material fissionable by neutrons of all energies, including (and especially) thermal (slow) neutrons as well as fast neutrons; for example, uranium-235 and plutonium-239.

GAMMA RAY OR RADIATION - short wavelength electromagnetic radiation like x-rays emitted from the nucleus of a radioisotope.

HALF-LIFE (PHYSICAL) - time required for a radioactive isotope to lose 50% of its activity by a process of radioactive decay.

INTERNAL RADIATION - radiation (including alpha, beta, and gamma radiation) resulting from radioactive substances within the human body.

INITIAL RADIATION - nuclear radiation (essentially neutrons and gamma rays) emitted from the fireball and the cloud column during the first minute after a nuclear detonation.

ISOTOPES - forms of the same element having identical chemical properties but differing in their atomic masses. A radioisotope is the unstable isotope of an element that decays or disintegrates spontaneously, emitting radiation.

NUCLEAR - technically, an adjective referring to the atom's nucleus. Commonly, refers to radioactive processes that involve the disintegration of the nucleus, as in "nuclear radiation", "nuclear particles", and "nuclear energy".

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL - See NUCLEAR THREAT

NUCLEAR DETONATION - an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of one microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by the detonation of four or more pounds of TNT.

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE - any assembly or subassembly containing fissionable or fusionable materials and high explosives or propellant capable of producing a nuclear detonation.

NUCLEAR THREAT - for the purposes of this plan "nuclear threat" shall include all criminal acts such as blackmail, extortion, threat of attack, etc., in which any nuclear material or radioactive substance is deliberately used or threatened to be used.

NUCLEAR WEAPON - a general name given to any military weapon capable of producing a nuclear detonation. Thus the A (fission) bomb, and the H (fusion) bomb are both nuclear weapons.

RADIATION - gamma rays and x-rays, alpha and beta particles, neutrons, protons, high-speed electrons; and other nuclear particles; but not sound or radio waves, or visible, infrared, or ultraviolet light.

RADIOACTIVE - exhibiting radioactivity.

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL - any material which emits radiation spontaneously.

RADIOACTIVITY - the spontaneous emission of radiation, generally alpha or beta particles, often accompanied by gamma rays, from the nuclei of an (unstable) isotope.

RADIOLOGICAL - a general term referring to processes that involve nuclear radiation.

RESIDUAL RADIATION - nuclear radiation, chiefly beta particles and gamma rays, which persists for some time following a nuclear detonation.

SOURCE MATERIAL - uranium or thorium, or any combination thereof, in any physical or chemical form, except special nuclear material, and ores which contain by weight less than one-twentieth of one percent (0.05 percent) or uranium, thorium or any combination.

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL (SNM) - "Special nuclear material" is (1) plutonium, uranium 233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing; but does not include source material.

THERMAL RADIATION - electromagnetic radiation emitted from the fireball as a consequence of its very high temperature; it consists of ultraviolet visible, and infrared radiations.

F.B.I. DIVISIONS

San Francisco Division
415/552-2155

Sacramento Division
916/481-9110

Los Angeles Division
213/272-6161

San Diego Division
714-231-1122

ATTACHMENT NO. 2

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL ALERTING



ATTACHMENT NO. 3

TASK FORCE

The task force should be made up of representatives from the following agencies and expanded as appropriate:

1. FBI
2. ERDA
   - San Francisco Operations Office (SAN)
   - Nevada Operations Office (NVO)
3. OES
   - State
   - Region
4. Sheriff
5. Health Department (State and/or Local)
6. Police Department
7. Local government representative
8. DOD 6th Army/EOD

The task force is responsible for:

1. Determining courses of action to be taken by responsible governmental officials to mitigate the problem;
2. Establishing an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and assist in establishing a Search Coordinating Center (SCC) for ERDA and Field Command Post (FCP) if required;
3. Directing the application of protective action;
4. Coordinating news releases;
5. Providing instructions to the public;
6. Coordinating communications;
7. Assessing the threat, and coordinate the search for, and disposal of, the device; and
8. Coordinate law enforcement assistance.

ATTACHMENT NO. 4

THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER

WHAT IS THE CENTER?

The Threat Analysis Center was established by the California Department of Justice for use by all law enforcement agencies in processing threat-type messages directed at public officials and private citizens. This center is the State's central repository for all such known threats and is maintained under strict security.

WHAT RESULTS CAN BE EXPECTED?

Upon request, the threat analyst provides law enforcement agencies with an analysis which includes an assessment of the potential threat danger as well as possible investigative leads or identification of the perpetrator.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO WHEN YOU RECEIVE A THREAT?

A. When a "written threat" is received, take the following action :

   1. Do not handle the document or envelope unnecessarily. Safeguard the documents as they may contain valuable latent fingerprint evidence.

   2. Promptly turn over the document and envelope to the appropriate law enforcement agency indicated in one of the boxes below.

B. When a "telephone threat" is received, note the following information and immediately notify the appropriate law enforcement agency indicated in one of the boxes below :

   1. Date and time of the threatening call.
   2. Exact words of the person making the call.
   3. Name of the caller, if given (request exact spelling).
   4. Sex and approximate age of the caller.
   5. Accent of the caller.
   6. Speech patterns (stuttering, lisp, slurred, etc.).
   7. Tone of voice (irate, calm, frightened, nervous, etc.)
   8. Is the voice familiar?
   9. Any background noises.
   10. Local or long distance call.

FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	FOR STATE OFFICIALS
Notify the police or sheriff's department having jurisdiction in your area.	California State Police Room 1162, State Capitol Bldg. Sacramento, CA 95814 Attn: Protective Services Bureau (916) 445-9636

Limited quantities of this notice can be obtained by writing to: California Department of Justice, OCCIB Forgery Unit-TAC P. O. Box 13357, Sacramento, California 95813. Telephone (916) 445-8797.

ATTACHMENT NO. 5

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL THREAT

THREATENING PHONE CALL FORM

1. Time call received _____ Time caller hung up _____

Try to get another person on the line and record the conversation

Exact words of person placing call: _____

_____

_____

Questions to ask if not already covered by the caller's statement; record exact words:

1. What is your name? (He may inadvertantly give it) _____
2. What are you going to to do? _____

_____

3. What will prevent you from doing this? _____

_____

4. Why are you doing this? _____

_____

5. When are you doing this? _____

_____

6. Where is the device right now? (Use the exact words used by the caller)

_____

_____

7. What kind of device or material is it? _____

_____

8. What does it look like? _____

_____

9. Person receiving the call

Department _____

Dept. phone No. _____

Home Address _____

Home phone No. _____

Date _____

Person Monitoring the call

Department _____

Dept. phone No. _____

Home Address _____

Home phone No. _____

Date _____

DESCRIPTION OF CALLER'S VOICE

Male _____ Female _____

Young _____ Middle Age _____ Old _____

Voice characteristics _____

Accent _____

Background Noise _____

Is voice familiar? _____

If so, who did it sound like? _____

Remarks: _____

SEARCH GUIDELINES

NOTE: THE SEARCH SHOULD BE CONDUCTED BY OR IN THE PRESENCE OF TRAINED PERSONNEL EQUIPPED WITH INSTRUMENTS CAPABLE OF DETECTING PLUTONIUM OR OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.

1. The search can be expedited if personnel are used who are familiar with the area and its surroundings.

2. Areas housing critical equipment/machinery should be searched by personnel most familiar with the area and the equipment.

3. Alert medical personnel to stand by during the search. This provides immediate medical attention in the event of accidental detonation or premature release or spread of radioactive contamination.

4. If a suspected nuclear or dispersal device is found.

   a. Do NOT touch or attempt to move the object.

   b. The danger area should be identified, and blocked off with a clear zone.

   c. Call for local and/or military EOD assistance.

5. Plutonium is an alpha emitter. An alpha source, since its radiation is easily shielded, may be carried into a building in any type of package. The alpha radiation cannot be detected through the package. However, in the case of plutonium (an alpha emitter) there is also a low energy gamma emitted which can be detected by sophisticated detection instruments available through ERDA.

6. The more common isotopes (except tritium) cited in II.B.2. of the Plan are capable of being detected by the civil defense CD V-700 Geiger counter. Nevertheless, only competent, trained personnel should be involved in the search for these materials.

NOTE: THE CIVIL DEFENSE CD V-700 GEIGER COUNTER OR ANY OTHER CD INSTRUMENT CANNOT DETECT ALPHA RADIATION OR THE LOW ENERGY GAMMA RAY ASSOCIATED WITH PLUTONIUM.

THEREFORE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT NO READING ON THE GEIGER COUNTER DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT NO RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IS PRESENT.

RADIATION HAZARDS AND EXPOSURE CRITERIA

A. Hazards and Exposure Criteria

Exposure to large quantities of nuclear radiation over a relatively short period of time can cause disabling sickness and death. Exposure to lesser quantities, either externally or through inhalation and ingestion, may result in chronic impairment to health.

Radiation exposure may also damage the genetic material in the body of individuals, resulting in health impairment in future generations. Therefore, stringent limits have been established as follows:

1. General Population

Section 30268 of the California Administrative Code, Title 17, Public Health limits permissible levels of radiation to the general population in an uncontrolled area. For accidents all practicable measures must be taken to limit whole body exposure dose to any individual of the general population to the recommended 0.5 rem in any one year.

2. Emergency Workers

Public employees and others registered with a disaster council or impressed into service by authorized officials are classified as disaster service workers in Section 3211.9 of the California Labor Code.

a. Emergency Operations

Emergency workers who are involved may be exposed to radiation and contaminated while carrying out their duties. All possible measures will be taken to limit radiation exposure of emergency workers to those values and conditions as described in Section 30265, Title 17, except when specific life saving actions or extraordinary emergency operations are required.

b. Life Saving Actions

If as a result of a release, entry into a radiation area is necessary to search for and remove injured or trapped persons, exposure limits described in 2.a., may be exceeded by workers involved. In such a case, the following guidance extracted from National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) Report 39 should be considered.

(1) Rescue personnel should be volunteers of professional rescue personnel (e.g., firemen who "volunteer" by choice of employment).

(2) Rescue personnel should be broadly familiar with the consequences of exposure.

(3) Women capable of reproduction should be advised of the risk before taking part in these actions.

(4) Other things being equal, volunteers above the age of 45 should be selected.

(5) Planned dose to the whole body shall not exceed 100 rems.

(6) Hands and forearms may receive additional dose of up to 200 rems (i.e., a total of 300 rems).

(7) Internal exposure should be minimized by the use of the best available respiratory protection, and contamination should be controlled by the use of available protective clothing.

(8) Normally, individual exposure under these conditions should be limited to once in a lifetime.

(9) Persons receiving exposures as indicated above, should avoid procreation for a period up to a few months.

c. Extraordinary Emergency Operations

This applies under less than life saving circumstances where it is still desirable to enter a hazardous area to protect facilities, eliminate further escape of effluents, or to control fires.

All elements listed under guidance given for b. above should be followed except (5) and (6). Change values in (5) and (6) to:

(5) Planned dose to the whole body shall not exceed 25 rems.

(6) Hands and forearms may receive additional dose of up to 100 rems (i.e. a total of 125 rems).

d. Persons receiving exposure as indicated above will be provided expert consultation, medical treatment, and necessary service.

PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

A wide variety of protective actions are available that can be used to reduce or eliminate the effects of radiation and contamination.

For the purposes of this plan protective actions are considered in two aspects: Preventive and recovery or restorative.

A. Preventive Actions

Preventive actions are those taken to prevent the exposure and/or contamination of people or things and include the following:

1. Covering to Prevent Contamination

Selected objects and material may be protected from contamination by covering them. All livestock feed should be covered. Machinery that cannot be decontaminated economically, should be covered. Windows and doors of homes should be closed and sealed, and air conditioners and forced air heaters should be turned off. Livestock should be put into the best covered space.

2. Water Systems

Closing water intake valves from a contaminated reservior to a municipal water distribution system prevents contamination of the water system and prevents the general public from ingesting contaminated water. This is no cost action that requires little planning and does not require public participation. It requires coordination with essential water consumers (fire service) and a public information announcement.

3. Shelter from Radiation

Shelter, if available, offers an alternative to evacuation. The average home offers significant protection. Shelter, to be used effectively, requires professional evaluation and planning beforehand. In many areas civil defense fallout shelters are available and should be considered for use.

4. Evacuation

Evacuation is a major countermeasure to prevent or reduce exposure and contamination. It is a complex operation involving several governmental departments. Its effectiveness is considerably enhanced by detailed planning. (See Attachments 10 and 11, for additional information.)

5. Respirators

Most respirators are effective in preventing the inhalation of airborne particulate radioactive materials. These are most applicable to emergency workers operating in the contaminated area. Respirators offer no protection from gamma radiation.

6. Protective Clothing

Protective clothing is worn to prevent contamination of the skin. Its principal value is to reduce or eliminate the need for skin decontamination, but offers no protection from gamma radiation.

7. Import Clean Food and Water

The radiation and contamination levels may be low enough to meet occupancy standards, but not low enough for contaminated food and water in the area to meet ingestion standards. Such food and water should be tested in a laboratory to determine if they meet ingestion standards. Meanwhile, food and water would be imported until local supplies are determined to be safe from contamination. Uncontaminated foods such as those stored in sealed containers, refrigerators, freezers, etc., could be used

B. Recovery Actions

Recovery actions are those necessary to allow re-entry into an area or release of things for use after having been contaminated. Some of these actions are:

1. Decontamination

Decontamination is the removal of radioactive material from surfaces. It is a corrective action to reduce the likelihood of inhalation, ingestion and, to a lesser degree, whole body radiation exposure. Decontamination may be a relatively expensive action that is performed under professional supervision.

2. Special Chemical Treatment

Special chemical treatment is a form of decontamination applied to contaminated water, milk, or other contaminated substances from which the radioactive chemicals can be removed. It is used to recover resources that would otherwise require disposal, or which would, if ingested, subject the population to internal contamination.

3. Radioactive Decay

Radioactive decay is a delaying action. It requires preventing public access to radioactive items and areas until, through natural decay, radiation levels meet acceptable standards for general population exposure.

4. Area Control

Control of access to contaminated areas so as to avoid the unnecessary exposive of persons or the spread of contamination.

5. Exposure Control

Control of the radiation exposure time of persons so as to keep their total dose at or below prescribed limits.

EVACUATION - SMALL AREA

Local officials may establish a policy to evacuate immediately upon the receipt of a threat. This reduces risk and gives prime consideration to the safety of personnel, but results in production downtime, and can be costly in terms of dollars if the threat is a hoax.

The following actions are presented for consideration:

1. Determine who will make the decision to evacuate.

2. Determine the means and routes to be used for evacuation and the destination of the evacuees.

3. If evacuation is effected and personnel held on standby pending completion of the search, a "holding" area should be established. This area should be at a distance and direction to protect personnel from blast and other effects.

4. Determine who makes the decision to permit re-entry.

5. In buildings, turn off air conditioning and forced air heating systems.

6. In the event that radioactive materials have been dispersed in the area, contamination control and decontamination should be planned for. See Attachment No. 9.

7. As feasible, reflect these consideratins in pre-planned evacuation procedures or SOPs.

EVACUATION - LARGE AREA

The nature of some threats may warrant efforts to evacuate large areas. This would be the case if the threat involves possible detonation of a nuclear weapon. Planning considerations for various levels of government is given below:

1. Local

   Local government has the responsibility for planning, initiating and coordinating local evacuation. Selection of evacuation areas and routes are governed by an evaluation of radiological and meteorological conditions. On warning that evacuation is or may be necessary the local head of government will take preparatory action as provided in the local plan. Local plan should:

   a. Be developed and implemented in coordination with federal, state, and local jurisdictions that may be involved in the evacuation routes to be used, and the reception of the displaced population;

   b. Designate areas which are likely to require evacuation and identify points of safety such as local CD fallout shelters, tunnels, mines, etc., (see your community shelter directory);

   c. Establish evacuation routes;

   d. Identify and make arrangements with sources of transportation for mass evacuation;

   e. Provide for barricading access roads to the exclusion area;

   f. Designate evacuee assembly and departure points to expedite evacuation;

   g. Set up procedures for orderly access to, progress along, and exit from evacuation routes;

   h. Designate relocation sites and coordinate reception arrangements with the government, private, and other appropriate welfare/relief agencies.

   i. Consider special needs for evacuation of school children, hospital patients, and other groups which may require specialized transportation and other attention;

   j. Provide for alert and warning of persons located in a potential evacuation area; and

   k. Provide for preparation and dissemination of appropriate public information and instructions.

2. State

OES has the responsibility to plan for and to coordinate the State response to requests from the local head of government for support in evacuation. Since evacuation is a large undertaking involving many resources, many state agencies may be involved. State agencies that may be involved are:

a. California Highway Patrol

(1) Has primary responsibility for traffic supervision and control on all state highways constructed as freeways and on highways within unincorporated areas of the state;

(2) Assists local law enforcement agencies in establishing evacuation routes and traffic control procedures;

(3) Assists in expediting movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic from emergency areas;

(4) Assists in preventing unauthorized traffic in, and controlling movement around, emergency areas;

(5) Assists in providing traffic control around mass care facilities; and

(6) Assists in providing traffic control during emergency operations.

b. Military Department

Within capabilities and as directed by the Governor, assists in the evacuation.

c. Department of Transportation

Provides emergency assistance and erects barricades around unsafe portions of state highways until restoration.

d. Division of Aeronautics

Provides or arranges for air transportation.

e. Department of General Services, Transporting Division

Provides motor transportation.

f. Department of Health

Supports local authority in arrangements for health and medical care for evacuees during evacuation and at evacuation centers or state medical facilities.

(1) Department of Health, Social Services Division - The Division, in concert with participating federal agencies, coordinates the activities of those state and local agencies having emergency welfare assignments. These activities include, but are not limited to:

(a) Coordinating emergency planning with OES and other state agencies supporting emergency welfare services;

(b) Providing guidance and technical assistance to local communities to assist them in developing their plans and capabilities, including:

1/ Recommending standards for assistance in the areas of feeding, shelter, and caring for special groups; and

2/ Development of manuals, training guides, and procedures in cooperation with the DHEW.

(c) Evaluating welfare resources in the state, such as supplies, facilities for care of people, and professional personnel;

(d) Coordinating emergency welfare activities with affected local communities and private relief agencies;

(e) Coordinating activities and resources of state and federal agencies having welfare support assignments; and

(f) Recommending interregional transfer of resources for care of people, including assistance to equalize distribution of the refugee care load.

g. Public Utilities Commission

Arranges for provision of emergency transportation from commercial or private sources.

h. Department of Food and Agriculture

Provides guidance and assistance in the evacuation of livestock, coordinates the identification and establishment of evacuation and reception areas for livestock, the care of evacuated livestock and assists in segregation of livestock and affecting the return of such animals to owners.

i. Department of Parks and Recreation

Expedite evacuation of State parks, beaches, and recreational facilities as required.

3. Federal

a. Department of Transportation

Has principal responsibility of coordinating all federal agencies having transportation resources suitable for conducting evacuation operations.

b. Veterans Administration

Provides personnel and equipment for care of evacuated injured persons at Veterans Administration facilities and installations.

c. ERDA

ERDA has the capability to predict or delineate the areas affected by fallout due to a nuclear detonation.

END