

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

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THE DETERRENT EFFECTS OF CASE DISPOSITION DECISIONS ON SPECIFIC FELONY CRIMES

Final Report

August 1976

by

Solomon Kobrin
Neil Bergman

Social Science Research Institute
University of Southern California

This study was funded by a grant (#75-NI-99-0038) from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

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INTRODUCTION

This is an extension of an earlier NILECH sponsored study that examined the deterrent effectiveness of the sanction resources employed by California criminal justice agencies in their efforts to control felony crimes (Kobrin et al, 1972). The prior study treated the seven Part I Uniform Crime Report felony offenses as a single offense pool. Utilizing the same analytic methods, procedures, and data base, the present study estimated measures of relationships between criminal justice sanction and crime rates separately for each of eight serious felony crimes, as defined in California's criminal code. The crime report and agency transaction data were drawn from the three-year period, 1969-1971.

The measurement of the deterrent effectiveness of justice agency operations presents problems of extraordinary complexity. The concept of deterrence virtually defies operational specification. In a recent treatment of the problem, Gibbs (1975) has concluded that deterrence represents not a theory, open to the verification procedures of scientific method, but a doctrine. He has argued that the concept of deterrence as usually stated is vaguely defined and poorly specified operationally, and that until and unless deterrence can be stated as a testable theory there is little prospect of useful research on the topic.

The idea of deterrence refers to two processes whose relationship to one another is highly problematic. The first reference is to the omission of an act in violation of law; the second to the assumption or supposition that the omission is a response to the perceived threat posed by the criminal justice system. Each of these processes considered separately is itself complex, and the complexity is compounded in their interaction.

A brief review of the issues that confront research on deterrence must begin with the fact that the omission of an act in violation of the law is

inherently unobservable. As such, it remains a matter of inference from the analysis of observable acts in motivational and situational contexts in which it is highly probable that opportunities for law violating acts have been foregone as a conscious act of choice. However, the chain of inferences that must be made to assess the crime control effect of deterrence does not stop there. In its commonly accepted definition the deterrence concept includes the proviso that the omission of the law violating act is a direct response to the threat of sanction posed by the agencies of criminal justice. Spontaneous conformity to law as a product of socialization must somehow be distinguished from conformity induced by external threat. It is only to the latter that deterrence refers. To complicate matters further, it may be argued that even spontaneous conformity may rest on the existence of a body of coercive criminal justice sanctions, so that the distinction usually made between specific and general deterrence remain essentially ambiguous (Gibbs, 1975: Chap. 2; Kobrin and Lubeck, 1975: 222-223).

Current knowledge of the deterrent effect of sanction is based on two types of research. In the first type motivational (reward and punishment) and situational (opportunity) factors are varied and controlled in laboratory experiments or indirectly in survey studies. This type of research generally has provided supportive evidence for the deterrent effect of sanction. Briefly summarized, such studies have found that sanction threats as well as appeals to conscience reduce cheating in reporting income for tax purposes (Schwartz and Orleans, 1967); that sanction threats have higher deterrent value for potential offenders than for non-offenders (Sinha, 1967); that opportunities to observe the imposition of punishment on offenders reinforces compliance in others (Bandura, 1969);

that sanction is an effective deterrent principally when the normative climate is supportive of compliance (Salem and Bowers, 1979); that the deterrent effect of sanction is in large part a function of the perceived risk of apprehension and punishment (Jensen, 1969); that perceived certainty of sanction is more effective as a deterrent with respect to offenses unsupported by moral norms than with respect to those that enjoy such support (Waldo and Chiricos, 1972); that sanction has relatively greater effectiveness not only with respect to unsupported moral norms, but also when the behavior is instrumental, i.e., directed to obtaining a desired reward and when there is no strong personal commitment to the particular form of deviance involved (Tittle and Rowe, 1973a); that as among the factors of severity of punishment, the probability of apprehension, the intent of the act, the utility of the act, and the type of victim, severity of punishment is the principal source of variation in the frequency of unethical acts (Rettig and Rawson, 1963); that those with a predisposition to cheat were less responsive to the deterrent effect of punishment than were those not so disposed (Rettig and Pasamanick, 1964); that while delinquents and nondelinquents have similar perceptions of the objective probability of apprehension and punishment, delinquents regard their personal risk of arrest and conviction as lower than do nondelinquents (Claster, 1967); and that the credibility of a threatened sanction as well as its severity were both inversely related to a rule compliance (Horai and Tedeschi, 1969).

As Tittle and Logan (1973:383) point out, these studies are generally suggestive of the deterrent effect of sanction. However, they remain inconclusive on a number of grounds. First, the findings with respect to the important matter of the role of moral support for rules are contradictory, viz., the Salem and Bowers (1970) and the Tittle and Rowe (1973) studies, Second, the

data in several of the studies are based on subjects' opinions respecting their perceptions of how "people in general" may be expected to behave in hypothetical situations, not how the subjects themselves would expect to behave. Third, and most important, such studies fail to reproduce the most crucial element of the situation they attempt to simulate: the existence of a realistic threat of punishment for infraction.

On the other hand, two conclusions seem reasonably well supported. Those predisposed to violate rules are relatively less deterred by sanction, and perceived certainty and severity of punishment are inversely related to the likelihood of infraction. However, when applied to the real life context of actual persons confronting the realistic threat of criminal sanction these conslusions beg the question. The predisiposition to violate rules is not an identifiably fixed attribute of persons, but varies in response to personal, situational, and social contingencies. Similarly, the perception of the certainty and severity of punishment remains an empirical question: all but the penalties for capital crimes is known only imprecisely by large proportions of any population. In brief, the insight into the deterrence process that may be gained from these studies is only marginally useful in understanding its dynamics in the real world of crime and punishment.

The arena of actual crime control action forms the focus of the second type of research. Data on crime rates and on justice agency sanction imposition are examined to answer a simply put question: does an increase in the certainty and severity of punishment result in a reduction of crime? Because of enormous deficiencies in the scope, continuity, and reliability of data on justice agency action the question in its researchable form becomes: what is the magnitude and direction of the association between crime rates and

the certainty and severity of punishment? In its changed form the question essentially sacrifices the causality issue. For the most part, cross-sectional rather than trend data are used because of the dubious uniformity of justice agency data through time and because it is difficult to control for shifts in legal definitions of crimes and in public sentiment, legislation, and crime control policy respecting conceptions of appropriate responses to law violation. The use of single time samples necessarily leaves unanswered the causal question whether crime rates are responsive to change in sanction levels or sanction levels respond to changes in crime rates.

Here, again, a brief summary of findings from selected studies in this research tradition will indicate its contribution to knowledge of the deterrence process. Increased certainty and severity of penalties were associated with a reduction in parking violations, but only for persistent offenders (Chambliss, 1966); a substantion negative association was found between homicide rates and length of imprisonment, based on data from States of the U.S. (Gibbs, 1968); with the exception of homicide, certainty rather than severity of punishment, i.e., imprisonment, showed significant inverse associations with UCR felony crimes, based on data from States of the U.S. (Tittle, 1969); an inverse relationship was found between the liklihood of arrest for all crimes except homicide and the rates for these crimes, based on arrest data provided by the FBI (Logan, 1971); arrest clearance rates and crime rates were inversely associated, based on data from Florida counties and cities (Tittle and Rowe, 1973b); and sanction levels (a compound measure of both certainty and severity) were consistently negatively associated with crime rates for the State of California and for groups of counties of differing population size (Kobrin et al, 1972).

Two studies that questioned the validity of such consistent findings of negative association between crime rates and sanction level include Schuessler (1952), who took into account the probability of the imposition of the death penalty for homicide. He found that the negative association was both reduced in magnitude and statistically non-significant. A second study by Chiricos and Waldo (1970) examined trends in the association between crime rates and the severity and certainty of imprisonment. They found the negative association between sanction and crime rates to be inconsistent and unstable over time, and concluded that the evidence failed to support the deterrence hypothesis. However, this conclusion was subsequently subjected to extensive critical review (Logan, 1971; Bailey, Gray, and Martin, 1971) and found to be unwarranted.

What may be said of the main body of evidence from this series of studies is that they quite consistently fail to disconfirm the deterrence hypothesis. But because of two shortcomings intrinsic to them their findings offer less conclusive support for it. First, the index of punishment certainty is restricted to the arrest rate and the index of severity to length of imprisonment. Both are inadequate in failing to include data of the proportion of arrests that result in convictions for use in the certainty index (information that is usually unavailable), and in failing to include data on sentence level for use in the severity index (also usually unavailable). As to the certainty measure, a very high proportion of felony arrests results in dismissals and charge reductions; as to the severity measure, a substantial proportion of those convicted on police initiated felony charges are placed on probation, fined, or are committed to local jails for limited terms of incarceration.

Second, criminal justice action is only one of many types of factors that can affect the crime rate. Factors extraneous to criminal justice sanction whose variation may be reflected in the incidence and prevalence of criminal activity include, among others, knowledge of the law and the sanctions for its violation, perceptions of the risk of actual sanction imposition, general attributions of legitimacy to particular legal prohibitions, and fear of the consequences of incurring social stigma. To assess the specific contribution of criminal justice operations to crime control, i.e., their deterrent effect, it is necessary to segregate for separate measurement the effects on crime rates of such social and psychological factors. Research to date has not accomplished this task, although a number of preliminary and crude efforts have been made (Sellin, 1967; Tittle, 1969; Kobrin et al, 1972). The need to address this task is pressing. Required is a theoretical model from which the relevant variables are identified and operationally specified, and an appropriate set of social and criminal justice data from which hypothesized relations respecting deterrent effects may be tested.

The study reported here is subject to many of the limitations summarized above. Its findings at best can only be suggestive of possible areas of fruitful further inquiry. It was undertaken, however, in order to exploit an unusually comprehensive body of criminal justice transaction data. These data permitted examination of crime rates for a set of specific felony offenses in relation to agency response at each major stage of the justice process. The unique feature of the data holdings of the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics is that they permit measurement of the certainty of sanction factor at a much more differentiated level than has been possible in past research of this type. Certainty of sanction has commonly been measured only through the

use of arrest data. Except for those available in California, there have been no systematic and reasonably reliable data on rates of post-arrest release by police, on rates of arraignment and indictment based on police charges, and on rates of charge reduction at both the pre-trial and trial stages. Use of the data in California made possible both a more comprehensive and a more differentiated measure of certainty. Similarly, the severity measure has commonly been based solely on length of imprisonment. Again, except for those available in California, there have been no systematic data on the distribution across the range of sentencing options.

The first section of this report describes the data of the study. This is followed in the second section by a presentation of measurement methods and their rationale, together with problems of data analysis and their resolution. The findings of the study are presented in the third section. These include index values for the measurement of the sanction in relation to each of eight felony crimes at the arrest, pre-trial, conviction, and sentencing stages for each of four population size groups of counties; and measures of association between crime specific rates and sanction levels. The final section assesses the implications of the findings and suggests directions of further research.

I

The Data

The data of the study were abstracted from summary tables of crime reports, arrests, arrest dispositions, superior court case dispositions, convictions, and level of sentence for each of the following felony offenses:

Homicide

Manslaughter (Non-vehicular)

Robbery

Assault

Burglary

Grand Theft

Auto Theft

Rape

(See Appendix I for definitions of offenses)

These data are reported to the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics by the 58 counties of the State on a monthly basis and summarized in unpublished annual basic data tables by county. Special arrangements were made to obtain copies of these basic data tables for the three years, 1969, 1970, and 1971.

Specific items abstracted from the data tables for use in the analytic design included the following enumerations:

(1) Crimes reported in each of the eight felony crime categories

(2) Arrests in each offense category

(3) Arrestees released without filing of charge

(4) Misdemeanor charges filed

(5) Felony charges filed

(6) Felony charges disposed of in superior (criminal) court

(7) Released and acquitted

(8) Convicted on a misdemeanor charge

(9) Convicted of a lesser felony

(10) Convicted of original felony charge of those convicted, the number receiving

(11) A fine only

(12) Probation only

(13) Jail and probation

(14) A prison sentence

(15) The death penalty

Data for the estimation of annual crime specific rates were based on the number of felony offenses in each of the eight categories as reported to BCS by all police agencies in each county jurisdiction.

Quality of the Data

Crime data are chronically encumbered with problems of validity, reliability, and comprehensiveness. Crime reports as initially recorded at the police level are often inaccurate and inconsistent, police tend to overcharge in the expectation of charge reduction at the prosecution stage, and the final disposition of cases is frequently untraceable through the complexities of arraignment and trial procedures. In the current, privitive state of statistical record keeping with respect to crime and criminal justice, it is possible only to assess the relative adequacy of any given data set. The California data are probably more comprehensive, reliable, and valid than most for a number of reasons.

Legislation enacted in 1955 mandated the reporting to a central agency, the Bureau of Criminal Statistics, of uniform criminal justice statistics by all police agencies of the State and by all county court jurisdictions. The process of establishing uniform definitions of offenses and complete and accurate reporting of agency transactions had, by 1970, some 15 years of development. During this period the BCS, by a combination of persuasion, instruction, and legal pressure, has succeeded in creating a remarkably high, if not perfect, level of uniformity and comprehensiveness in its body of criminal justice data. Residual inadequacies persist, and probably always will, in view of the autonomy of local justice agencies. However, given the uniquely detailed information on case transactions that BCS data provide, and their uniformity over the multiple jurisdictions of the State, their use in research is altogether warranted.

II

Measurement Methods and Data Analysis

The deterrent effect of criminal justice sanction was here measured by estimating the magnitude and direction of the relationship between the level of sanction exercised at each of four stages of the justice process and the crime rate for each of eight serious felony crimes during the single 1969-1971 time period.

Sanction Measurement

Following the classical criminological precepts of Beccaria (1767) and Bentham (1823), the traditional approach to the measurement of the justice system's response to crime has been to distinguish its three major components: certainty, severity, and celerity (Sutherland and Cressey, 1974:321). Leaving aside the last, the distinction between certainty and severity seems readily defined conceptually, e.g., the difference between the probability of apprehension by the police and the severity of the punishment suffered. However, the certainty and severity of punishment are difficult to segregate when viewed in their character as experience undergone. It is, after all, the action of the law as experienced that may be supposed to have the most direct consequences for deterrence. Those for whom there exists "probable cause" to suspect as guilty of an offense are arrested, charged, held or freed on money bail pending trial, and subjected to the jeopardy of conviction - all these prior to the possible formal imposition of punishment. The presumptive innocence of the suspect prior to conviction notwithstanding, it is plain that the very procedures required to establish the legal status of suspects represent a series

of intrinsically punitive sanctions. This is true regardless of the acknowledged importance of maintaining the strictest distinction in the law between pre-conviction innocence and post-conviction guilt. Arrest, arraignment, and trial do more than place the suspect in jeopardy of conviction. They simultaneously impose a sacrifice of time, money, and freedom of action, and the stigma, often severe, of coming under the suspicion of powerful authorities. It can hardly be held that such experiences are not inherently punitive, or that they may readily be distinguished from the final formal punishment imposed. Indeed, a monetary fine as a sentence for some suspects may well weigh less in a scale of punitive sanction than all that has been undergone to that point.

It is for these reasons that the certainty-severity distinction has here been replaced by a direct measure of the sanction level attained at the arrest, pre-trial, conviction, and sentencing stages of the criminal justice process. Obviously, it was feasible to do this only because the California data made it possible. Prior deterrence research has typically been confined to only two measures: the ratio of arrests to crime reports, and the average length of prison sentence served for given offenses. The first appears to be a reasonable operationalization of certainty (with no measure of other "certainties" before sentence), the second of severity (with no measure of severity other than length of imprisonment). In a word, neglect of the certainty-severity distinction and its substitution by the full range of sanction action available to the criminal justice system appears to be warranted.

The measurement of sanction level at each stage of criminal justice requires some way of anchoring the estimate to its maximum possibility. This was here done by defining maximum sanction possibility as consisting conceptually

of complete "success" in implementing agency goals at each stage, with attainment below that goal measureable as a ratio ranging 0 to 1.0. Thus, at the arrest stage maximum possible police sanction would be represented by a felony arrest for each reported felony crime; at the pre-trial stage arraignment on a felony charge for each felony charge brought by the police and prosecution agencies; and at the conviction stage a finding of guilty for a felony offense on each felony charge tried. The maximum level of sentence sanction would be represented by a prison sentence on each conviction for a felony offense.

Estimation of Sanction Levels

The level of sanction exercised at each stage is represented by the extent to which the sanction available was in fact imposed. At the police stage this was measured by an index number calculated as the ratio of those arrested for each of the eight felony offenses to the total number of felony crimes reported in each category. Options available to the police in disposing of cases of arrest include release at the station level, reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor, and the filing of a felony charge. Each option in this series was defined as representing an increase in the level of police sanction and was accordingly weighted in the following computation formula:

$$\text{POLICE SANCTION LEVEL} = \frac{(1 \times \#\ \text{Released}) + (2 \times \#\ \text{Misdemeanors Filed}) + (3 \times \#\ \text{Felony Charges Filed}}{3 \times \#\ \text{Total Felonies Reported}}$$

Sanction level at the pre-trial stage was estimated with the use of a simplified formula that reflected the net outcome of a complex process. Whether charges placed by police against a suspect are accepted as a basis for arraignment by a lower court or by the prosecutor for movement to trial often depends not merely on the adequacy of the evidence. Involved as well may be the prevailing degree

of cooperation between police and prosecutors and between enforcement and judicial agencies, the fluctuating size of the court calendar, the state of public outrage or anxiety respecting particular types of offenses, and the like. The net outcome of the pre-trial process, reflecting all of these variables, is represented by the ratio of the number of defendants appearing before the Superior Court to the number of individuals against whom the police have placed felony charges. Hence, the formula for computing the level of pre-trial sanction was:

$$\text{PRE-TRIAL SANCTION LEVEL} = \frac{\text{\# of Felony Defendants in Superior Court}}{\text{\# of Felony Complaints Filed by Police}}$$

Measurement of sanction at the trial stage was based on the relative weights of the possible outcomes as a ratio to the total number of those eligible for conviction on charges that brought them before the criminal courts. These outcomes included acquittal and release, conviction on reduced charges, i.e., misdemeanor or lesser felony, and conviction on the original felony charge, each appropriately weighted. Case dispositions were assigned increasing weights at unit step intervals, since there is no known empirical basis for determining interval magnitudes for the several dispositions. For example, the research has not yet been conducted to ascertain whether for those undergoing trial for a felony offense conviction on an original felony charge has in fact twice the sanction weight as conviction on a reduced misdemeanor charge. The formula for computing this measure was:

$$\text{CONVICTION LEVEL} = \frac{(1 \times \text{\# Acquitted and Released}) + (2 \times \text{\# Convicted of Misdemeanor}) + (3 \times \text{\# Convicted of Lesser Felony}) + (4 \times \text{\# Convicted of Original Felony})}{4 \times \text{Total Felony Suspects Disposed of in Superior Court}}$$

Measurement of sanction level at the sentencing stage required a judgment of an admittedly commonsense kind respecting the severity of the sentencing alternatives available to the court. Sentences on conviction range from a fine through probation, jail (if charge has been reduced to a misdemeanor), some combination of probation and jail, fine, prison, and in infrequent cases, the death penalty. In calculating this index it was necessary to subtract out of the total eligible for conviction those who were dealt with as juveniles, with commitment to the Youth Authority; as mentally ill, with commitment to the Department of Mental Hygiene; and those charged with felonious drug law offense and committed to the State's addict rehabilitation center. The remaining sentencing alternatives were weighted in a gradient from a fine (1), probation (2), jail plus probation (3), jail only (4), prison (5), and death penalty (6). While there was access to some data on length of prison sentence, these were not used in estimating sentence sanction level because they were available only for the metropolitan counties. Sentence sanction level was measured by the following formula:

$$\text{SENTENCE SANCTION LEVEL} = \frac{(1 \times \#\ \text{Fine Only}) + (2 \times \#\ \text{Probation Only}) + (3 \times \#\ \text{Jail and Probation}) + (4 \times \#\ \text{Jail Only}) + (5 \times \#\ \text{State Prison}) + (6 \times \#\ \text{Death Penalty})}{6 \times \text{Total Superior Court Convictions}}$$

Again, it should be noted that sanction at each stage was represented by an index number normalized to an identical scale ranging from 0.0 to 1.0, permitting direct comparisons of the level of sanction among the stages of the justice process, the county jurisdictions of the State, and in response to the several specific felony offenses.

The crime rate for each felony offense was calculated as the ratio of crimes in each category reported to the police, averaged for the three-year period, 1969-1971, to the 1970 population of each county jurisdiction. Rates were computed by the formula:

$$\text{CRIME RATE} = \frac{\text{\# of Crimes Reported per Category}}{\text{1970 Census Population}} \times 100{,}000$$

Objectives of Data Analysis

The content and scope of the data permit an assessment of the variation in the California justice system's sanction response to felony offenses. The specific variations of interest include differences in sanction level associated with each type of felony offense at each of the four stages of the criminal justice process, and among counties of varied population size. Tabulations of sanction level measures thus provide a "topography" of justice agency response to felony crime, identifying those locations in the justice process at which its punitive impact may be most evident.

The relevance of such information for the deterrence issue is that it has the potential for discriminating those features of the criminal justice process that have a direct crime control function from those directed to other legal and social values. Much of the activity of the institution of criminal justice is concerned with procedural safeguards designed to assure fairness, impartiality, "due process" - in a word, justice. Indeed, a not uncommon complaint in some quarters is that the pursuit of such aims has the effect of reducing the deterrent impact of criminal justice. Legal scholars view the two aims of the system, deterrence and justice, as intrinsically opposed, and as requiring skill in the functionaries of the system continuously to seek an optimal balance (Packer, 1968). It is consequently to be expected that judicial proceedings, as they are

not designed primarily for punitive effect, will exhibit lower sanction levels. However, it is of some interest to discover whether this is uniformly true of the action of the judiciary, in particular in those phases of its operations concerned with the conviction and sentencing of offenders.

The second and possible more crucial question that may be assessed through the analysis of these data is whether and to what degree given sanction levels at various stages of the justice process may have a differential deterrent effect on various types of felony offenses. But in dealing with this issue it should be said at the outset that because of data limitations the analysis can do no more than identify differential deterrent effects at some unknown level of probability. There are two reasons for this. First, as a cross-sectional study, the crime rate and sanction level data were available for the single time period, 1969-1971, (all measures averaged for the three years to obtain statistical stability), with no possibility of ascertaining the direction of causality as between sanction and crime rates. Second, the large number of demographic, economic, and sociological variables extraneous to criminal justice sanction that may simultaneously affect the crime rate were not controlled. Hence, use was made of only simple zero order correlations between sanction level and crime rate. At the same time, however, this information will be available in more detail than has heretofore been possible, specifically for each of eight types of felony offenses, four stages of the criminal justice process, and four types of communities defined by population size.

III
Study Findings

Findings of the study are organized in a series of tables presenting the sanction scores and their relationships to the rates of specific felony offenses. In addition to exhibiting Statewide scores and rates, the tables are designed for comparative examination among county groups of varying population size and with reference to the four stages of the criminal justice process - those of arrest, pre-trial, conviction, and sentence. So far as the data permit, inferences of limited scope are drawn regarding the relationship of sanction certainty (the probabilities of arrest, arraignment, and conviction) to crime specific rates, as well as the relationship of severity (sentence sanction scores) to these rates. Appended, finally, are the raw sanction scores by justice stage and type of offense for the counties constituting each population size class of counties, definitions of the offenses, and crime rates and sanction scores rank ordered for all counties of the State.

Statewide Measures

Statewide, average sanction scores differ substantially among the eight felony offenses (Table 1). They range from a high of 0.67 for homicide to a low of 0.40 for auto theft. The widest range among offenses occurs at the police stage with a high of 0.69 for homicide and a low of 0.10 for burglary. Of specific interest is the fact that the range of variation narrows steadily with progression from the arrest to sentence stage, suggesting, not surprisingly, that sanction level differences for felony crimes diminish with the movement of suspects through the system. This is most strikingly shown for burglary, whose low police sanction score escalates sharply as suspects are moved through the pre-trial stage to conviction.. This is not true, however, for the offenses

of assault and rape, suggesting for the first that a high proportion of arrested suspects encounter reduced sanction during later stages, and the second that the judicial process exerts little more sanction weight than enforcement. The reader is reminded that these data are based on averages for the entire State, and therefore reflect only general trends.

The relationship of stage specific sanction scores to crime specific rates, both Statewide averages, reveals a striking difference between the police stage and the remaining three (Table 2). Zero order correlations between police sanction and the rates of virtually all offenses are inverse and, with the exception of homicide and burglary, substantial. All but that for homicide are, however, statistically significant. On the other hand, six of the eight offense rates are inversely correlated with pre-trial sanction score, with only three substantial in magnitude, while two are positively related. Conviction and sentence sanction scores are on the whole also positively associated with sanction scores at these stages.

Thus, the major trend disclosed by Statewide average measures of sanction and crime rates is the consistency with which sanction at the police stage is suggestive of deterrent effect, and the dubious impact of sanction beyond this point. But it should be kept in mind that average measures conceal important distinctions. It remains to be seen whether the relationships that hold or the average for the State are true for jurisdictions of different population size and demographic character.

When sanction levels across all felony offenses are viewed comparatively for jurisdictions of different population size (Table 3), it is notable that police sanction is highest in counties of 25,000 - 99,999 population, and lowest for the largest metropolitan counties. On the other hand, sanction

levels for all of the subsequent stages tend to be highest in the metropolitan counties. It is also of interest that sanction levels for the pre-trial, conviction, and sentencing stages are lowest in the jurisdictions most remote from the metropolitan counties, those with populations below 25,000. Further, the greatest disparities in sanction level over all offenses occur at the conviction and sentencing stage, with the greatest contrast between the rural and the metropolitan counties. Overall, it appears that average sanction levels are highest in the counties of largest population size, lowest in those with small populations. In other words, average sanction level and population size would appear to be positively related. The question of interest is whether this relationship is uniformly true for all felony offenses.

Comparative Sanction Measures - Population Size and Felony Offenses

Counties have been grouped into four classes of population size, each roughly defining a specific level of urbanization and industrialization: the clearest cases are represented by the metropolitan counties with 1970 populations above 500,000, and the rural counties with 1970 populations below 25,000. The place on an urban-rural continuum of the remaining two classes is ambiguous. Those with populations between 100,000 and 500,000 include some large cities as well as (in California) farming areas of the agribusiness variety. This is in part true also of counties with populations between 25,000 and 100,000. For purposes of the present analysis, admittedly requiring substantial refinement, the classification of counties represents a first approximation to those control variables extraneous to the action of criminal justice agencies relevant to the deterrence issue.

When mean sanction scores for the group of felony offenses are compared by justice stage across classes of counties, there appears to be remarkable

uniformity across all justice stages (Table 3). However, classes of counties exhibit a declining gradient of disparity in sanction levels with decreasing population size. Highest disparities are found in counties above 100,000 population, least in the counties of smaller populations. This suggests the possibility that agencies in smaller communities may be more effectively integrated in their crime control efforts than are the urban counties.

Turning to specific felony offenses, sanction levels for homicide (Table 4) are markedly higher in populous counties. This is most notable at the police and pre-trial stages. Smaller communities appear to be less severe in the use of sanction for homicide cases at each of the four stages of the justice process. To be noted also is the fact that the widest disparities in sanction occur at the police stage, ranging from a high of 0.84 to 0.46.

The same appears to be true for the offense of manslaughter (Table 5). Here, again, counties with populations above 500,000 exhibit the highest (mean sanction scores for this offense (0.54). Mean sanction scores decline in a steep gradient to a low of 0.32 in counties with the smallest populations. As to justice stage, it is at the point of conviction that differences are greatest, with a score of 0.87 in the metropolitan counties and 0.41 in the small counties. The same is true to a lesser extent at the pre-trial stage (0.72 versus 0.42).

Justice sanction respecting the offense of robbery is with the single exception of conviction both low and uniform (Table 6). Interestingly, police sanction scores are lower in metropolitan than in rural counties, although this is reversed at the conviction stage. Here, the largest counties show a sanction score of 0.77 and 0.74, with a score of 0.29 for the rural counties.

For the offense of assault the severest sanction is levied in the smaller counties, and this notably at the police and pre-trial stages (Table 7).

Sanction scores in response to burglary are striking in a number of ways (Table 8). First, not surprisingly, they are lowest among all felony offenses at the police stage. Second, there is remarkable uniformity across every type of county in the level of sanction imposed at all subsequent justice stages. Third, sanction scores at the conviction stage are very high in every class of counties. In fact, the average sanction score at the conviction stage (0.79) exceeds by a considerable margin that for assault (0.59), robbery (0.60), manslaughter (0.64), homicide (0.64), grand theft (0.67), auto theft (0.67), and rape 0.44). In contrast, average sentence severity across counties is no greater for burglary than for any of the other felony offenses, with the exception of homicide.

With respect to the offense of grand theft much the same is true, with the exception that here pre-trial sanction levels are also relatively high (Table 9). Also, as in the case of burglary, police sanction scores are very low generally, although exhibiting a slightly rising gradient in the smaller population counties.

Somewhat greater differences in sanction levels for auto theft are apparent across classes of counties (Table 10). At the police and pre-trial stages there occurs a reversal of the sanction scores at the conviction and sentencing stages. Both police and pre-trial sanction scores are much higher in the counties of smaller than of larger population, with conviction and sentence sanction lower in the latter than in the former. Overall, average sanction levels are nevertheless higher in the larger population counties. But again,

as was seen to be true for several other felony offenses, the principal point at which sanction for auto theft is severe is the stage of conviction.

The offense of rape appears to incur the highest sanction levels in the metropolitan counties (Table 11). The counties of smaller population offer, in fact, a striking contrast in their generally much lower sanction scores for rape, with the single exception of the police sanction level. The major points of sanction in the largest population counties are at the pre-trial and conviction stages. For counties above 500,000 population these are 0.58 and 0.61 respectively. In counties below 25,000 population these sanction scores are 0.25 and 0.25. A similar contrast exists as well for sentence severity - 0.55 versus 0.41.

Average sanction levels embracing all four justice stages and all eight felony offenses in relation to classes of county population size are presented in Table 12. Again it is to be noted that they describe a declining gradient from the metropolitan to the rural counties. Stated otherwise, the criminal justice response would appear to be more severe and certain in the large urban centers of the State than in the rural hinterland. In fact, the difference in average sanction level lies specifically between the rural counties with a total average sanction score of 0.41, and the remaining three classes with populations above 25,000. Their total average sanction scores are 0.49, 0.51, and 0.51 respectively.

There are, however, interesting distinctions among these county classes respecting relative sanction scores for the set of felony offenses. Leaving aside sanction for homicide, highest in all classes, the most severe response in the counties with over 500,000 population was directed to manslaughter, robbery, and rape (0.54, 0.52, and 0.49 respectively), followed by assault

(0.46), burglary (0.45), and grand theft (0.46), with the least severe sanction reserved for auto theft (0.42). Counties with populations from 25,000 to 99,999 show a thoroughly mixed picture in their sanction distribution pattern, although showing higher sanction levels for robbery and assault. The rural counties exhibit a stark contrast to those that are more urbanized in that their sanction levels for manslaughter, robbery, auto theft, and rape are substantially lower, and that for assault substantially higher. The meaning of these contrasts is difficult to interpret in the absence of far more detailed information about differences in the policies and practices of justice agencies in the several types of jurisdictions than is available in the data set under analysis.

Measures of Association Between Sanction and Crime Rates

Following an examination of the distribution of sanction levels among classes of counties, justice stages, and the set of serious felony crimes, attention was turned to the question of deterrent effect. Given the cross-sectional character of the available data, this question could be raised only in its most elementary form: what was the magnitude and direction of the association between sanction level and crime specific rates? Since sanction measures were available by justice stage and for county classes of population size, there existed an opportunity as well to assess these associations in some detail.

In the metropolitan counties negative associations were found between all but one of the eight felony offenses and police sanction scores (Table 13). The number of such negative associations was reduced for the pre-trial (4), the conviction (5), and the sentence (5) stages. Curiously, the single statistically significant negative correlation was a substantial -0.71 between

sentence sanction score and auto theft. These findings suggest, although they hardly demonstrate, that for this group of counties the major source of deterrent effect is to be found in police sanction. Among offenses exhibiting inverse associations with police sanction, it may be noted that it is lowest with respect to homicide (-0.12) and highest for assault (-0.62).

The question of the statistical significance of these negative associations deserves comment. It is true that no claim is here made respecting the chance limits within which these associations occur, except that they exceed the 0.05 level. However, the almost uniformly negative direction of the association between police sanction and crime specific rates provide evidence of a trend that cannot be ignored. Moreover, as will be seen, the same trend is apparent in much of the data that follows.

For the next class of counties (100,000 - 499,999), again, there is a predominance of inverse associations between police sanction scores and crime specific rates (Table 14). Six of the eight correlation measures are inverse, with three statistically significant (assault, burglary, and grand theft). The remaining three justice stage sanction scores exhibit principally positive associations with crime specific rates. An exception is the high and statistically significant inverse association between the conviction sanction score and the assault rate.

The next tier of counties (25000 - 99,999) similarly provide evidence of the deterrent effect of police sanction, with the rates of seven of the eight felony offenses inversely related to police sanction scores (Table 15). Again, the number of such negative associations is reduced in the subsequent justice stages, sharply for the conviction sanction score.

For counties with population below 25,000 the curious situation arises in which virtually all the inverse associations between sanction and crime specific rates are found at the police and pre-trial stages (Table 16). As a tentative interpretation, it may be suggested that the character of social control in rural communities leaves to its criminal justice system only the most marginal function with respect to deterrence.

A more general view of the associations between justice stage sanction scores and crime rates for classes of counties is afforded in Tables 17-24. With reference to justice stage it is here again evident that police sanction exhibits most consistently inverse associations with the rates of felony offenses. If the 32 measures of association between police sanction scores and the rates of eight felony crimes in four classes of counties, 22, or 69 percent, are inverse. These associations are sharply reduced only for the offenses of homicide and rape, where they tend to be positive. For subsequent justice stages the proportion of negative associations between sanction scores and crime specific rates is sharply reduced. For the pre-trial stage 63 percent are inverse, and for the conviction and sentence stages 41 and 44 percent respectively.

A similar declining gradient is apparent among classes of counties in the proportion of negative associations between sanction scores for all four justice stages and the eight crime specific rates. For the metropolitan counties 66 percent of these associations are negative; 59 percent in the 100,000 - 499,999 group; 53 percent in the 25,000 - 99,999 group; and 44 percent in the group under 25,000 population.

The Measure of Deterrent Effect on Specific Offenses

The question of net deterrent effect of sanction on crime specific rates was assessed by estimating the proportion of variation in rates explained by the total sanction weight of the four justice stages (Table 25). The method of multiple correlation was used, with the multiple R^2 as the measure of explained variation.

The use of county population size as the sole classifying variable for the units of analysis admittedly confounds and obscures a large number of important policy, organizational, demographic, and social variables, for which data were not available in this study. Nevertheless, the magnitudes displayed in Table 25 suggest enormous differences in the crime control effect sanction across counties of different size and among specific felony offenses. For the metropolitan counties the proportion of explained variation ranges from 0.17 for rape to 0.73 for auto theft. For the next less populous group of counties the range is from 0.11 for homicide to 0.54 for burglary. Counties in the 25,000 - 99,999 group have highs and lows of 0.74 for assault and 0.08 for manslaughter. The rural counties, finally, show a high of 0.62 for assault and a low of 0.17 for robbery and burglary respectively.

Statewide, the proportions of explained variation are substantially lower for most felony offenses than in groups of counties, a reflection of the fact that in the latter a single control variable has been introduced. In any event, the data provide some evidence that in various types of jurisdictions and for various types of felony offenses the proportion of variation in crime rate explained by criminal justice sanction ranges from a low of 0.08 for manslaughter in counties with populations between 25,000 and 100,000 to a high of 0.74 for assault in the same group of counties.

IV
Discussion

Findings of the study provide evidence at a moderate level of conclusiveness that criminal justice sanction exerts a deterrent effect on serious felony crimes. For the State as a whole the deterrent effect is most apparent for the offenses of assault, auto theft, and grand theft, and weakest for those of homicide, manslaughter, and burglary. Further, the deterrent effect of the justice system is most in evidence at the phase of the enforcement process represented by police sanction. Deterrent effect is substantially reduced in the judicial stages.

The question may be raised in relation to the latter finding whether the judicial process is designed to accomplish a deterrent purpose, a notion that has won substantial current acceptance (Wilson, 1975). Judicial agencies have been designed rather to provide procedural and substantive fairness in the processing of criminal suspects, however onerous for them this experience may be. Even with respect to the function of sentencing, with its explicit purpose of imposing sanction, it is likely that retribution rather than deterrence remains on the whole its principal motive.

However this may be, the deterrent effect of justice sanction was found to be greater in the metropolitan than in the rural counties. Despite the substantially higher crime rates in the larger cities, this finding suggests that urban high crime rates persist in the face of the reasonably efficient crime control efforts of their criminal justice systems. Obversely, the lowered deterrent effect of rural justice systems on their much lower crime rates suggests the prominence there of effective alternative means of crime control.

Deterrent effects in relation to each of the felony crimes were found to vary widely by type of jurisdiction. Because the sole index of type of jurisdiction was population size of county, it has remained impossible on the basis of the data of the present study to account for these variations. Further research is needed to throw light on this phenomenon, utilizing a set of theoretically derived control variables of greater discriminating power. It may well be, for example, that greater homogeneity in the units of analysis can be achieved by combining county jurisdictions quite dissimilar in population size but similar in social, political, and economic composition and in the organizational patterns and policies of their criminal justice agencies. A study of this scope would, however, be a high cost undertaking.

A number of general observations on deterrence research are warranted. A focus on specific deterrence as a principal means of crime control may be misleading. Although it still remains to be conclusively determined, the crime control effect of specific deterrence was found in an earlier California study (Kobrin et al, 1972) to account for approximately one-third of the variation in Part I felony crimes treated as a single offense pool. Suggestive evidence was then found indicating that a substantial 50 percent of the variation might well be accounted for by sociodemographic variables.

The focus on specific deterrence as a major means of crime control derives ultimately from theories of human behavior based on utilitarian assumptions regarding the rationality of man. These assumptions are questionable, not because man is not rational in his behavior in some of his activities, but because, in addition, large areas of behavior are also subject to control by nonrational forces. On these grounds the focus of investigations useful for the planning of crime control policy should not be confined solely to specific

deterrence, but expanded to a concern with the more inclusive problem of social control. Such an approach would make it possible to take into account the more general and basic issues of socialization as these are affected by processes in various areas of human experience. These include primary group experience and those stemming from the ideological and value premises of ethnic, religious, social class, and occupational communities as these are differentially affected by more general political and economic forces. Studies of this type may discover how these complexes of factors interact with the rational capacities of human beings to determine in turn the character of the crime control problem.

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TABLE 1
CRIME SPECIFIC SANCTION SCORES BY JUSTICE STAGE,
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

OFFENSE	POLICE	PRE-TRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE	$\bar{X}$	OFFENSE RATE
Homicide	.69	.74	.63	.61	.67	6.89
Manslaughter	.25	.55	.64	.39	.46	2.29
Robbery	.32	.49	.60	.45	.47	82.02
Assault	.55	.42	.59	.48	.51	124.52
Burglary	.10	.49	.79	.47	.46	1,470.08
Grand Theft	.11	.60	.67	.46	.46	328.93
Auto Theft	.13	.32	.67	.46	.40	351.91
Rape	.36	.48	.44	.41	.42	21.42
$\bar{X}$	.31	.51	.63	.47	.48	298.51
S.D.	.20	.12	.09	.08	.08	

TABLE 2
CORRELATION OF SANCTION SCORES WITH CRIME RATES BY
OFFENSE AND JUSTICE STAGE,
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

OFFENSE	POLICE	PRE-TRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE
Homicide	-.19	-.08	.09	.01
Manslaughter	-.31**	.12	.05	-.07
Robbery	-.31**	.16	.36	.25
Assault	-.56**	-.31**	.15	-.20
Burglary	-.23	-.28*	-.03	-.08
Grand Theft	-.28*	-.08	.37	.40
Auto Theft	-.40**	-.17	.32	.28
Rape	-.38**	-.40**	.15	.44

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level

TABLE 3
MEAN SANCTION SCORES BY JUSTICE STAGE
AND COUNTY POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

COUNTY POPULATION	POLICE	PRE-TRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE	$\bar{X}$	S.D.
Over 500,000	.26	.54	.73	.51	.51	.17
100,000 - 499,999	.31	.51	.69	.53	.51	.13
25,000 - 99,999	.37	.51	.60	.46	.49	.08
Under 25,000	.30	.49	.49	.37	.41	.08
$\bar{X}$	.31	.51	.63	.47	.48	.11
S.D.	.04	.02	.09	.06	.04	

TABLE 4
HOMICIDE SANCTION SCORES BY
JUSTICE STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION				$\bar{X}$	S.D.
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000		
Police	.77	.84	.68	.46	.69	.14
Pre-Trial	.84	.75	.66	.71	.74	.07
Conviction	.66	.67	.64	.57	.64	.04
Sentence	.63	.67	.57	.55	.61	.04
$\bar{X}$	.73	.73	.64	.57	.67	.03
S.D.	.08	.07	.04	.09	.05	

TABLE 5
MANSLAUGHTER SANCTION SCORES BY
JUSTICE STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION,
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION				$\bar{X}$	S.D.
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000		
Police	.13	.28	.38	.20	.25	.09
Pre-Trial	.72	.54	.51	.42	.55	.11
Conviction	.87	.71	.56	.41	.64	.17
Sentence	.45	.44	.41	.26	.39	.08
$\bar{X}$	.54	.49	.47	.32	.46	.08
S.D.	.28	.16	.07	.09	.15	

TABLE 6
ROBBERY SANCTION SCORES BY
JUSTICE STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION,
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION				$\bar{X}$	S.D.
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000		
Police	.25	.33	.36	.34	.32	.04
Pre-Trial	.53	.55	.53	.37	.50	.07
Conviction	.77	.74	.60	.29	.60	.19
Sentence	.52	.57	.45	.25	.45	.12
$\bar{X}$	.52	.55	.49	.31	.47	.10
S.D.	.18	.15	.09	.05	.10	

TABLE 7
ASSAULT SANCTION SCORES BY
JUSTICE STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION,
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION				$\bar{X}$	S.D.
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000 99,999	UNDER 25,000		
Police	.45	.48	.63	.62	.55	.08
Pre-Trial	.32	.34	.43	.58	.42	.10
Conviction	.61	.59	.56	.59	.59	.02
Sentence	.47	.49	.48	.48	.48	.00
$\bar{X}$	.46	.48	.53	.57	.51	.05
S.D.	.10	.09	.08	.05	.06	

TABLE 8
BURGLARY SANCTION SCORES BY
JUSTICE STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION				$\bar{X}$	S.D.
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000		
Police	.07	.07	.14	.10	.10	.03
Pre-Trial	.47	.47	.47	.53	.49	.03
Conviction	.80	.79	.80	.75	.79	.02
Sentence	.45	.49	.50	.43	.47	.03
$\bar{X}$	.45	.46	.48	.45	.46	.02
S.D.	.26	.25	.23	.29	.24	

TABLE 9
GRAND THEFT SANCTION SCORES BY
JUSTICE STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION				$\bar{X}$	S.D.
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000		
Police	.09	.08	.12	.13	.11	.02
Pre-Trial	.57	.64	.60	.58	.60	.03
Conviction	.74	.73	.67	.53	.67	.08
Sentence	.45	.47	.44	.46	.46	.02
$\bar{X}$	.46	.48	.46	.43	.46	.02
S.D.	.24	.16	.26	.18	.21	

TABLE 10
AUTO THEFT SANCTION SCORES BY
JUSTICE STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION				$\bar{X}$	S.D.
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000		
Police	.07	.09	.16	.20	.13	.05
Pre-Trial	.28	.28	.40	.31	.32	.05
Conviction	.78	.76	.63	.51	.67	.12
Sentence	.55	.55	.42	.32	.46	.10
$\bar{X}$	.42	.42	.40	.34	.40	.03
S.D.	.27	.26	.17	.11	.20	

TABLE 11
RAPE SANCTION SCORES BY
JUSTICE STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION				$\bar{X}$	S.D.
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000		
Police	.23	.32	.54	.34	.36	.11
Pre-Trial	.58	.49	.47	.39	.48	.07
Conviction	.61	.54	.35	.25	.44	.14
Sentence	.55	.50	.37	.22	.41	.13
$\bar{X}$	.49	.46	.43	.30	.42	.08
S.D.	.15	.08	.08	.07	.04	

TABLE 12
MEAN SANCTION SCORES
FELONY OFFENSES BY SIZE OF COUNTY POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

OFFENSES	COUNTY POPULATION				$\bar{X}$	S.D.
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000 99,999	UNDER 25,000		
Homicide	.73	.73	.64	.57	.67	.07
Manslaughter	.54	.45	.47	.32	.45	.08
Robbery	.52	.55	.49	.31	.47	.09
Assault	.46	.48	.53	.57	.44	.04
Burglary	.45	.46	.48	.45	.46	.02
Grand Theft	.46	.48	.46	.43	.46	.04
Auto Theft	.42	.42	.40	.34	.40	.03
Rape	.49	.46	.43	.30	.42	.07
$\bar{X}$	.51	.50	.49	.41	.48	.04
S.D.	.09	.09	.07	.10	.08	

TABLE 13
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND FELONY OFFENSES BY JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE, COUNTIES OVER 500,000 POPULATION CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

OFFENSES	POLICE	PRE-TRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE
Homicide	-.12	-.20	-.32	.25
Manslaughter	-.39	-.17	-.27	-.57
Robbery	-.56	.40	-.20	-.31
Assault	-.62	.52	.32	-.53
Burglary	-.46	.10	.43	-.31
Grand Theft	.44	-.36	.43	.18
Auto Theft	-.37	.30	-.54	-.71*
Rape	-.31	-.02	-.02	.20

*Significant at the .05 level

TABLE 14
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND FELONY OFFENSES BY JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE, COUNTIES BETWEEN 100,000 and 499,999 POPULATION CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

OFFENSES	POLICE	PRE-TRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE
Homicide	.27	.07	-.18	-.16
Manslaughter	-.46	.39	-.18	-.36
Robbery	-.47	.15	-.22	.14
Assault	-.58*	.04	-.48*	.09
Burglary	-.71*	-.13	.15	.14
Grand Theft	-.57*	-.03	.10	-.29
Auto Theft	-.30	-.17	-.12	-.32
Rape	.45	-.34	.25	.15

*Significant at the .05 level

TABLE 15
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND FELONY OFFENSES BY JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE, COUNTIES BETWEEN 25,000 and 99,999 POPULATION CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

OFFENSES	POLICE	PRE-TRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE
Homicide	-.51*	-.12	.17	-.24
Manslaughter	-.13	.20	.13	.13
Robbery	-.53*	-.01	.74	.24
Assault	-.66*	-.59*	.28	.09
Burglary	-.07	-.43	-.18	-.01
Grand Theft	-.44	.12	.24	.38
Auto Theft	-.23	-.28	.00	-.02
Rape	.23	-.53*	.09	.50

Significant at the .05 level

TABLE 16
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND FELONY OFFENSES BY JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE AND COUNTIES UNDER 25,000 POPULATION CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

OFFENSES	POLICE	PRE-TRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE
Homicide	.10	.20	.13	.54
Manslaughter	.26	-.21	.06	.37
Robbery	.19	.13	.37	.32
Assault	-.46	-.54*	.27	-.45
Burglary	-.31	-.32	-.10	-.39
Grand Theft	-.29	-.20	.59	.57
Auto Theft	-.58*	-.52*	-.01	.10
Rape	.07	-.29	-.18	-.18

Significant at the .05 level

TABLE 17
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND HOMICIDE BY JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION SIZE CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION			
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000
Police	-.12	.27	.51	.10
Pre-Trial	-.20	.07	-.12	.20
Conviction	-.32	-.18	.17	.13
Sentence	.25	-.16	-.24	.54

TABLE 18
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND MANSLAUGHTER BY JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION SIZE CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION			
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000
Police	-.39	-.46	-.13	.26
Pre-Trial	-.17	.39	.20	-.21
Conviction	-.27	-.18	.13	.06
Sentence	-.57	-.36	.13	.37

TABLE 19
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND ROBBERY BY JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION SIZE CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION			
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000
Police	-.56	-.47	-.53*	.19
Pre-Trial	.40	.15	-.01	.13
Conviction	-.20	-.22	.74	.37
Sentence	-.31	.14	.24	.32

*Significant at the .05 level

TABLE 20
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND ASSAULT BY JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION SIZE CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION			
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000
Police	-.62	-.58*	-.66*	-.46
Pre-Trial	.52	.04	-.59*	-.54*
Conviction	.32	-.48*	.28	.27
Sentence	-.53	.09	.09	-.45

*Significant at the .05 level

TABLE 21
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND BURGLARY BY
JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION			
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000
Police	-.46	-.71*	-.07	-.31
Pre-Trial	.10	-.13	-.43	-.32
Conviction	.43	.15	-.18	-.10
Sentence	-.31	.14	-.01	-.39

*Significant at the .05 level

TABLE 22
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND GRAND THEFT BY
JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION
CALIFORNIA 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION			
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000
Police	.44	-.57*	-.44	-.29
Pre-Trial	-.36	-.03	.12	-.20
Conviction	.43	.10	.24	.59
Sentence	.18	-.29	.38	.57

*Significant at the .05 level

TABLE 23
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND AUTO THEFT BY JUSTICE PROCESS STAGE AND COUNTY POPULATION SIZE CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION			
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000
Police	-.37	-.30	-.23	-.58*
Pre-Trial	.30	-.17	-.28	-.52*
Conviction	-.54	-.12	.00	-.01
Sentence	-.71*	-.32	-.02	.10

*Significant at the .05 level

TABLE 24
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, SANCTION SCORES AND RAPE BY JUSTICE PROCESS STATE AND COUNTY POPULATION SIZE CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

JUSTICE STAGE	COUNTY POPULATION			
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000
Police	-.31	.45	.23	.07
Pre-Trial	-.02	-.34	-.53*	-.29
Conviction	-.02	.25	.09	-.18
Sentence	.20	.15	.50	-.18

*Significant at the .05 level

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

TABLE 25
PROPORTION OF VARIATION EXPLAINED BY SANCTION SCORES AT
ALL JUSTICE STAGES, BY SPECIFIC FELONY OFFENSES AND CLASSES OF COUNTY POPULATION SIZE
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71 (Multiple R^2)

OFFENSES	COUNTY POPULATION SIZE				
	OVER 500,000	100,000-499,999	25,000-99,999	UNDER 25,000	STATEWIDE
Homicide	.18	.11	.39	.52	.05
Manslaughter	.48	.40	.08	.45	.10
Robbery	.33	.37	.71	.17	.21
Assault	.63	.50	.74	.62	.37
Burglary	.53	.54	.22	.17	.11
Grand Theft	.51	.44	.42	.50	.27
Auto Theft	.73	.47	.09	.53	.23
Rape	.17	.35	.50	.14	.31
N	10	16	15	17	58

TABLE 26
AVERAGE SANCTION SCORES BY FELONY OFFENSES
COUNTIES WITH OVER 500,000 POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

	OFFENSE								
COUNTY	MURDER	MANSLAUGHTER	ROBBERY	ASSAULT	BURGLARY	GRAND THEFT	AUTO THEFT	RAPE	$\bar{X}$
Los Angeles	.74	.48	.51	.48	.49	.47	.40	.53	.51
Orange	.71	.54	.51	.44	.42	.46	.46	.53	.51
San Diego	.55	.49	.57	.50	.43	.48	.45	.51	.50
Alameda	.72	.49	.49	.46	.43	.48	.40	.44	.49
Santa Clara	.83	.54	.55	.47	.46	.43	.41	.51	.53
San Francisco	.70	.52	.49	.47	.46	.47	.39	.47	.50
San Bernardino	.77	.51	.51	.46	.44	.51	.46	.51	.52
Sacramento	.74	.58	.53	.49	.43	.46	.39	.45	.51
Contra Costa	.74	.62	.49	.41	.45	.47	.44	.51	.52
San Mateo	.83	.64	.52	.46	.46	.42	.40	.46	.52
$\bar{X}$	.73	.54	.52	.46	.45	.47	.42	.49	

TABLE 27
AVERAGE SANCTION SCORES BY FELONY OFFENSES
COUNTIES WITH 100,000 to 499,999 POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

	OFFENSE								
COUNTY	MURDER	MANSLAUGHTER	ROBBERY	ASSAULT	BURGLARY	GRAND THEFT	AUTO THEFT	RAPE	$\bar{X}$
Riverside	.69	.53	.50	.42	.40	.44	.40	.57	.49
Fresno	.76	.51	.53	.42	.47	.45	.41	.40	.49
Ventura	.72	.64	.49	.47	.41	.39	.42	.47	.50
Kern	.79	.77	.56	.50	.53	.56	.43	.54	.59
San Joaquin	.74	-.39	.51	.47	.45	.57	.34	.43	.39
Santa Barbara	.81	.48	.59	.48	.46	.50	.48	.53	.54
Monterey	.55	.49	.51	.49	.47	.38	.41	.52	.48
Marin	.69	.58	.50	.53	.47	.49	.42	.34	.50
Sonoma	.78	.48	.49	.40	.43	.55	.40	.38	.49
Stanislaus	.79	.46	.59	.49	.47	.34	.43	.47	.51
Tulare	.72	.47	.58	.48	.45	.50	.41	.56	.52
Solano	.83	.34	.49	.46	.45	.47	.42	.51	.50
Santa Cruz	.75	.48	.66	.47	.50	.57	.44	.51	.55
San Luis Obispo	.66	.54	.62	.50	.42	.46	.44	.49	.52
Merced	.67	.36	.60	.60	.50	.53	.43	.41	.51
Butte	.81	.47	.52	.43	.46	.51	.43	.30	.49
$\bar{X}$	.74	.45	.55	.48	.46	.48	.42	.46	

TABLE 28
AVERAGE SANCTION SCORES BY FELONY OFFENSES
COUNTIES WITH 25,000 to 99,999 POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

	OFFENSE								
COUNTY	MURDER	MANSLAUGHTER	ROBBERY	ASSAULT	BURGLARY	GRAND THEFT	AUTO THEFT	RAPE	$\bar{X}$
Humboldt	.73	.33	.58	.55	.46	.56	.40	.55	.52
Yolo	.69	.81	.49	.53	.46	.50	.46	.57	.56
Napa	.61	.39	.47	.44	.42	.39	.45	.16	.42
Shasta	.39	.51	.60	.68	.62	.45	.50	.45	.53
Placer	.78	.46	.57	.59	.48	.49	.48	.45	.54
Imperial	.72	.67	.48	.46	.45	.54	.39	.50	.53
Kings	.75	.70	.55	.48	.44	.38	.46	.40	.52
Mendocino	.74	.46	.67	.57	.53	.54	.46	.56	.57
Yuba	.56	.40	.58	.53	.49	.54	.16	.44	.46
El Dorado	.77	.37	.52	.46	.40	.53	.25	.48	.47
Sutter	.43	.56	.37	.48	.49	.57	.33	.47	.46
Madera	.74	.28	.61	.47	.49	.26	.32	.39	.45
Siskiyou	.53	.29	.17	.60	.51	.49	.57	.47	.45
Tehama	.50	.46	.27	.56	.63	.41	.65	.31	.47
Nevada	.66	.28	.31	.53	.31	.23	.15	.25	.34
$\bar{X}$	.64	.46	.48	.53	.48	.46	.40	.43	

TABLE 29
AVERAGE SANCTION SCORES BY FELONY OFFENSES
COUNTIES WITH UNDER 25,000 POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

	OFFENSE								
COUNTY	MURDER	MANSLAUGHTER	ROBBERY	ASSAULT	BURGLARY	GRAND THEFT	AUTO THEFT	RAPE	$\bar{X}$
Tuolumne	.42	.30	.50	.71	.49	.39	.42	.28	.44
Lake	.77	.29	.19	.41	.40	.53	.33	.21	.39
San Benito	.44	.32	.66	.56	.52	.24	.14	.37	.41
Glenn	.41	.46	.36	.62	.57	.60	.37	.24	.45
Inyo	.63	.32	.15	.69	.49	.34	.28	.43	.42
Lassen	.66	.28	.31	.53	.31	.23	.15	.25	.34
Del Norte	.54	.28	.23	.42	.50	.47	.45	.18	.38
Calaveras	.40	.23	.20	.49	.54	.53	.45	.46	.41
Colusa	.48	.22	.30	.63	.47	.44	.36	.11	.38
Amador	.77	.29	.19	.41	.40	.53	.33	.21	.39
Plumas	.54	.28	.23	.42	.50	.47	.45	.18	.38
Trinity	.66	.45	.25	.72	.25	.43	.21	.40	.42
Modoc	.57	.31	.31	.59	.56	.23	.23	.48	.41
Mariposa	.66	.45	.25	.72	.25	.43	.21	.40	.42
Mono	.74	.46	.67	.57	.53	.54	.46	.56	.57
Sierra	.56	.31	.24	.48	.48	.44	.49	.22	.40
Alpine	.48	.22	.30	.63	.47	.44	.36	.11	.38
$\bar{X}$	.57	.32	.31	.56	.45	.43	.33	.30	

TABLE 30
AVERAGE SANCTION SCORES BY JUSTICE STAGE
COUNTIES WITH OVER 500,000 POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

COUNTY	JUSTICE STAGE				$\bar{X}$
	POLICE	PRETRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE	
00 Los Angeles	.23	.72	.64	.47	.52
11 Orange	.28	.43	.76	.57	.51
14 San Diego	.19	.56	.71	.52	.50
20 Alameda	.25	.45	.76	.50	.49
22 Santa Clara	.29	.59	.69	.52	.52
21 San Francisco	.22	.52	.76	.48	.44
13 San Bernardino	.30	.49	.80	.50	.52
54 Sacramento	.33	.46	.70	.54	.51
30 Contra Costa	.20	.56	.78	.52	.52
33 San Mateo	.28	.60	.71	.51	.53
$\bar{X}$	.26	.54	.73	.51	

TABLE 31
AVERAGE SANCTION SCORES BY JUSTICE STAGE
COUNTIES WITH POPULATION 100,000 TO 500,000
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

	JUSTICE STAGE				
COUNTY	POLICE	PRETRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE	$\bar{X}$
12 Riverside	.29	.48	.65	.56	.50
40 Fresno	.29	.47	.73	.49	.50
16 Ventura	.34	.34	.77	.55	.50
41 Kern	.33	.63	.74	.65	.59
45 San Joaquin	.29	.53	.65	.46	.48
15 Santa Barbara	.35	.52	.73	.56	.54
60 Monterey	.31	.56	.65	.40	.48
31 Marin	.25	.50	.80	.46	.50
35 Sonoma	.33	.41	.68	.53	.49
46 Stanislaus	.31	.62	.54	.56	.51
47 Tulare	.31	.59	.66	.52	.52
34 Solano	.30	.50	.69	.50	.50
63 Santa Cruz	.33	.48	.75	.64	.55
62 San Luis Obispo	.32	.48	.78	.49	.52
44 Merced	.36	.52	.66	.50	.51
50 Butte	.31	.51	.60	.55	.49
$\bar{X}$	.31	.51	.69	.53	

TABLE 32
AVERAGE SANCTION SCORES BY JUSTICE STAGE
COUNTIES WITH POPULATION 25,000 TO 100,000
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

COUNTY	JUSTICE STAGE				
	POLICE	PRETRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE	$\bar{X}$
75 Humboldt	.44	.59	.59	.47	.52
58 Yolo	.33	.56	.82	.55	.57
32 Napa	.24	.37	.65	.41	.42
55 Shasta	.35	.48	.74	.52	.52
53 Placer	.46	.54	.64	.51	.54
10 Imperial	.46	.50	.68	.46	.53
42 Kings	.44	.57	.58	.48	.52
80 Mendocino	.44	.75	.58	.50	.57
59 Yuba	.31	.55	.57	.42	.46
74 El Dorado	.38	.39	.67	.44	.47
56 Sutter	.30	.55	.59	.41	.46
43 Madera	.35	.46	.49	.48	.45
86 Siskiyou	.34	.54	.50	.44	.46
57 Tehama	.52	.46	.52	.40	.48
83 Nevada	.31	.32	.39	.35	.34
$\tilde{X}$	.38	.51	.60	.46	

TABLE 33
AVERAGE SANCTION SCORES BY JUSTICE STAGE
COUNTIES WITH UNDER 25,000 POPULATION
CALIFORNIA, 1969-71

COUNTY	JUSTICE STAGE				
	POLICE	PRETRIAL	CONVICTION	SENTENCE	$\bar{X}$
88 Tuolumne	.36	.51	.51	.38	.44
77 Lake	.27	.40	.53	.37	.39
61 San Benito	.22	.52	.53	.35	.41
52 Glenn	.29	.59	.59	.34	.45
76 Inyo	.35	.48	.48	.34	.41
78 Lassen	.31	.32	.39	.35	.34
73 Del Norte	.23	.49	.42	.39	.38
72 Calaveras	.31	.49	.51	.34	.41
51 Colusa	.27	.39	.48	.36	.38
71 Amador	.27	.40	.53	.37	.39
84 Plumas	.23	.49	.42	.39	.38
87 Trinity	.30	.49	.52	.38	.42
81 Modoc	.37	.55	.36	.35	.41
79 Mariposa	.30	.49	.52	.38	.42
82 Mono	.44	.75	.58	.50	.57
85 Sierra	.30	.49	.42	.39	.40
70 Alpine	.27	.39	.48	.36	.38
$\bar{X}$	.30	.48	.49	.37	

APPENDIX I

The classification of offenses used generally in this report is based on the "Standard Offense Classification for Criminal Statistics" as adopted by the judicial section of the American Bar Association and the National Conference of Judicial Councils. The modifications of the standards classification which are employed by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics of the State Department of Justice are due to California's assignment of some offenses to statutory categories which vary from those to be found in the laws of many other states.

General Classification

1. Murder - Includes all degrees of murder.
2. Manslaughter - Including vehicular and non-negligent.
3. Robbery - Includes all offenses in which property is taken from the person or immediate presence of another through means of force or violence or by putting in fear.
4. Assault - Includes assaults and attempted assaults which might result in severe bodily injuries to the victim. Includes attempted

murder and all assaults and attempted assaults with the exception of assault to commit robbery or rape.

5. Burglary - Includes all offenses in which any building or structure is broken into or entered with the intention of committing a felony or any theft therein at any time, either day or night. Includes attempt to commit burglary. Includes theft from locked vehicle and shoplifting. It should be noted that these offenses are often looked upon as petty theft by law enforcement agencies and therefore are not always reported to the state bureau as felonious acts.

6. Grand Theft - Includes all felonious offenses of stealing which are committed under circumstances not amounting to robbery or burglary and attempts to commit such thefts. Any theft involving a value of over $200 is felonious, as is the theft of certain specified fruits and nuts having a value of over $50. In addition, the theft of any horses, cattle, swine, sheep, or goats is felonious regardless of value. Includes all offenses of fraudulent conversion, embezzlement, and obtaining money

or property by false pretenses. Check frauds are not included in this class. Includes buying and receiving or possession of stolen property.

7. Auto Theft - Includes all offenses in which a motor vehicle is stolen or driven away and abandoned by someone not having lawful access thereto. Includes attempt to commit auto theft.

8. Rape - Includes forcible rape, statutory rape, and assault with intent to rape.

APPENDIX II

These codes are used in Appendices III to XII.

Bureau of Criminal Statistics
County Codes

County	County Code
Los Angeles	00
San Francisco	21
Alameda	20
Imperial	10
Kern	41
Orange	11
Riverside	12
San Bernardino	13
San Diego	14
San Luis Obispo	62
Santa Barbara	15
Ventura	16
Contra Costa	30
Marin	31
San Mateo	33
Santa Clara	22
Solano	34
Napa	32
Sonoma	35
Butte	50
Colusa	51
Glenn	52
Placer	53
Sacramento	54
Shasta	55
Sutter	56
Tehama	57
Yolo	58
Yuba	59

County	County Code
Fresno	40
Kings	42
Madera	43
Merced	44
San Joaquin	45
Stanislaus	46
Tulare	47
Del Norte	73
Humboldt	75
Lake	77
Mendocino	80
Trinity	87
Alpine	70
Amador	71
Calaveras	72
El Dorado	74
Lassen	78
Modoc	81
Nevada	83
Plumas	84
Sierra	85
Siskiyou	86
Inyo	76
Mariposa	79
Mono	82
Monterey	60
San Benito	61
Santa Cruz	63
Tuolumne	88

APPENDICES III - XII

*All two-digit columns represent Bureau of Criminal Statistics codes identifying counties (see Appendix II).

APPENDIX III

CRIME RATES

MURDER		MANSLAUGHTER		ROBBERY		ASSAULT		RANK
55	[illegible]	56	[illegible]	91	552.7600	21	476.7700	1
83	15.9600	21	8.7000	20	359.7900	9	371.8201	2
21	13.7400	78	8.3500	6	321.4500	12	225.6500	3
85	12.9200	20	4.3000	45	213.4100	37	217.9500	4
74	10.4400	65	4.2700	54	165.1200	71	214.6600	5
20	10.5300	79	4.1000	30	154.1900	77	211.2600	6
45	10.4200	61	4.1100	34	127.2500	20	198.6100	7
71	10.3300	14	4.0500	69	124.6600	32	194.2900	8
77	10.2300	17	3.9200	40	121.1700	63	179.1300	9
8	10.0300	6	3.7900	12	117.8500	74	173.9600	10
78	10.0300	73	3.4300	61	113.1700	46	167.7300	11
41	8.9100	68	3.3400	13	112.2000	42	165.3500	12
42	8.1300	81	3.2500	37	109.0800	84	164.4300	13
49	7.5300	13	3.2500	63	108.0000	45	153.8100	14
47	7.3000	76	3.2100	74	107.2700	13	149.1800	15
76	7.2900	54	3.1300	14	102.1600	41	147.5700	16
34	7.1100	80	3.1000	46	95.7600	54	142.2400	17
61	6.8500	82	3.1000	11	91.6500	50	139.9900	18
62	6.8600	22	3.0500	59	91.6500	10	139.9500	19
12	6.8100	46	2.8300	22	81.9200	40	139.4500	20
57	6.7500	11	2.6600	44	65.4700	47	136.6000	21
87	6.5700	38	2.5500	16	62.5300	15	128.9100	22
44	6.4500	60	2.4000	31	61.1500	62	126.0800	23
84	6.4100	40	2.3600	10	61.0800	36	124.4500	24
19	6.3600	59	2.2400	32	57.8100	69	124.0600	25
60	6.3000	33	2.1600	47	55.4200	22	120.3600	26
43	6.1900	58	2.1400	50	56.1400	35	115.3100	27
51	6.0300	87	1.7500	35	51.4900	43	111.8200	28
70	6.0300	30	1.7000	15	49.0500	11	108.9500	29
54	5.9900	10	1.6800	53	43.0100	61	105.9900	30
32	5.6500	51	1.5300	61	41.1500	73	105.3100	31
88	5.6400	70	1.5200	43	40.2400	15	103.4100	32
13	5.5500	45	1.4600	55	37.6700	56	102.5600	33
75	5.5200	37	1.2600	57	35.7200	80	96.3500	34
63	5.4500	57	1.2500	76	33.7200	82	95.3500	35
30	5.3300	86	1.2500	58	33.1200	14	96.2900	36
73	5.1400	44	1.1900	56	32.1900	83	95.8500	37
59	5.0300	83	0.9500	51	32.1800	76	91.5200	38
15	5.0100	16	0.8600	70	32.1900	33	90.4300	39
50	4.9000	71	0.8500	42	29.0200	57	83.8500	40
58	4.9000	77	0.8500	75	28.6400	72	82.8100	41
14	4.5900	42	0.7700	73	20.5800	51	82.4600	42
53	4.5300	43	0.7700	78	18.3800	70	82.4600	43
36	4.5100	41	0.7600	84	17.0800	75	81.0000	44
55	4.1900	55	0.7600	90	17.0300	44	80.2800	45
79	4.1600	53	0.7500	82	17.0300	58	79.5300	46
46	4.1100	72	0.7500	83	16.1300	79	70.6600	47
33	3.9100	75	0.7500	26	15.7900	55	68.9100	48
35	3.7300	52	0.7200	57	13.5500	53	64.2700	49
72	3.6800	31	0.6100	79	12.4700	86	63.2100	50
16	3.1900	35	0.6100	81	10.0400	78	60.1600	51
81	3.1200	15	0.5700	87	9.9500	31	57.0300	52
80	3.1100	79	0.4500	71	8.9500	87	55.8100	53
82	3.1000	47	0.4000	77	8.9500	53	49.4800	54
22	2.6100	63	0.4100	72	7.3600	83	45.5500	55
11	2.6000	58	0.2700	86	6.7700	81	36.9200	56
31	2.0600	50	0.2500	85	4.2700	52	34.3400	57
52	1.4300	62	0.2400	52	2.8500	65	21.3600	58
MEANS	6.875		2.276		82.022		124.518	

APPENDIX IV

CRIME RATES

BURGLARY		GRAND THEFT		AUTO THEFT		RAPE		RANK
74	2769.3300	21	673.7300	21	1013.1600	21	75.9200	1
21	2594.2600	74	633.0801	4	953.0300	9	53.7500	2
20	2530.0900	51	625.5000	20	878.2000	20	39.6700	3
63	2223.1000	70	625.5000	40	775.0701	12	34.4700	4
45	2145.6800	72	456.3999	54	671.7000	61	33.1800	5
12	2140.6100	84	450.5501	45	665.5201	22	30.1300	6
9	2086.1000	54	443.5301	33	598.5501	30	29.4100	7
30	2012.7300	58	440.4199	22	592.1001	73	29.1500	8
40	1992.4200	50	429.7900	30	529.2800	63	28.2700	9
72	1945.7900	31	398.3501	13	456.4600	45	27.7300	10
32	1817.2300	71	397.7400	12	426.0701	46	26.9900	11
13	1772.3000	77	397.7400	34	425.7400	54	25.8500	12
71	1766.1090	60	394.4900	14	419.2900	11	24.5200	13
77	1766.1690	9	394.3201	63	407.7500	16	24.2400	14
54	1758.7900	76	393.7601	46	374.9700	49	23.7300	15
87	1746.5500	30	386.2000	41	369.5601	84	23.4900	16
94	1721.1800	45	378.6201	31	368.3999	13	23.2200	17
79	1645.8890	93	375.7700	74	362.7400	41	22.4800	18
11	1639.1690	34	364.5400	35	359.3501	74	22.2400	19
35	1612.9500	40	358.2500	11	355.9399	58	22.0600	20
41	1605.9200	63	354.4299	60	345.5000	35	21.6000	21
46	1594.9100	46	354.3501	58	342.6399	15	21.1900	22
34	1560.2500	33	346.1599	50	316.7600	71	20.4600	23
38	1504.9300	12	344.9299	16	308.9600	77	20.4600	24
50	1499.0790	87	341.0299	47	283.2900	33	20.4500	25
47	1495.0360	41	338.5100	56	277.8101	55	20.2900	26
17	1443.3000	20	337.7600	10	273.9501	62	19.9700	27
53	1429.3790	79	328.3501	61	269.8501	14	19.6300	28
22	1415.0310	35	318.2300	59	258.2400	34	19.2700	29
66	1412.3000	10	312.4500	15	255.5801	83	18.9000	30
51	1395.9200	56	308.2100	53	250.9500	56	18.4800	31
70	1345.8290	11	307.1899	71	244.2700	60	17.6900	32
55	1299.9000	53	302.6899	77	244.2700	10	17.4500	33
59	1297.0500	13	300.1499	44	235.5900	47	17.2600	34
15	1294.0600	57	298.1299	55	232.4500	59	15.7600	35
31	1263.2600	16	292.1499	73	229.7700	31	15.7400	36
83	1249.7090	73	279.4900	32	220.5000	80	15.6500	37
57	1238.3700	61	264.7300	62	207.4500	82	15.3500	38
61	1234.5000	15	264.5400	75	201.6200	50	15.2000	39
58	1192.6800	59	262.4199	86	200.7300	75	14.4500	40
56	1121.9690	62	255.7000	51	197.2500	44	14.3400	41
62	1103.4590	75	238.4800	70	187.0500	32	14.2200	42
14	1050.5500	89	237.9700	78	183.9200	51	14.0800	43
88	1034.1000	82	237.9700	42	180.3100	70	14.0800	44
44	1033.4090	22	234.4500	76	179.8200	43	13.1600	45
75	1032.4130	47	230.9500	79	170.4100	52	12.8400	46
10	1010.1790	44	229.6200	80	162.9200	42	12.7700	47
42	987.2601	14	228.8500	82	162.9000	73	11.7200	48
90	941.4199	88	225.5400	43	158.2600	79	11.7000	49
82	941.4190	32	209.1200	57	138.9000	81	10.0400	50
43	914.3301	52	201.1900	84	135.9100	53	9.3800	51
73	800.7500	55	196.1000	86	134.6900	72	9.2000	52
76	785.1101	78	190.5100	72	104.9000	57	8.4700	53
86	696.0100	86	164.7900	52	98.4500	75	8.2800	54
78	690.1699	43	163.6700	83	95.4800	67	6.5700	55
52	667.7700	81	160.6600	87	86.6400	85	5.0200	56
81	656.0400	42	150.5200	81	76.9800	65	4.2700	57
85	237.1000	55	93.2000	85	14.0500	88	2.2600	58
MEANS	1431.079		326.116		321.099		20.113	

APPENDIX V

POLICE SANCTION RATES

MURDER		MANSLAUGHTER		ROBBERY		ASSAULT		RANK
22	0.9351	22	0.7451	80	0.5421	55	0.8875	1
33	0.9545	10	0.6667	82	0.5521	89	0.9643	2
60	0.9644	58	0.6667	81	0.6250	79	0.8710	3
54	0.9599	52	0.6667	68	0.5500	87	0.8710	4
34	0.9571	41	0.5833	75	0.5005	86	0.8641	5
57	0.9550	15	0.5000	57	0.5000	76	0.8560	6
10	0.9514	74	0.5000	78	0.5000	52	0.8548	7
35	0.9501	75	0.5000	82	0.5000	60	0.8297	8
40	0.9492	96	0.5000	14	0.4636	82	0.8297	9
53	0.9275	16	0.4304	51	0.4722	59	0.8290	10
42	0.9465	38	0.3750	70	0.4722	44	0.7738	11
11	0.9461	56	0.3750	74	0.4614	78	0.7423	12
15	0.9458	62	0.3333	44	0.4468	83	0.7423	13
16	0.9436	78	0.3211	15	0.4218	56	0.7035	14
13	0.9430	72	0.2550	10	0.4139	85	0.6667	15
46	0.9762	83	0.2550	36	0.3989	55	0.6460	16
75	0.9760	31	0.2500	47	0.3980	56	0.6123	17
41	0.8651	44	0.2500	53	0.3980	43	0.5945	18
12	0.9514	50	0.2500	42	0.3916	46	0.5916	19
47	0.9417	55	0.2500	43	0.3746	33	0.5909	20
50	0.9135	59	0.2500	62	0.3712	74	0.5665	21
45	0.8094	61	0.2500	60	0.3534	51	0.5614	22
0	0.8066	71	0.2500	18	0.3367	70	0.5614	23
58	0.8000	77	0.2500	42	0.3328	19	0.5521	24
20	0.7974	85	0.2500	40	0.3285	16	0.5451	25
71	0.7917	45	0.2458	61	0.3183	34	0.5352	26
77	0.7917	12	0.2389	46	0.3152	15	0.5210	27
43	0.7912	53	0.2345	11	0.3096	31	0.5181	28
62	0.7731	13	0.2356	13	0.2980	42	0.5163	29
44	0.7656	40	0.2188	22	0.2963	75	0.5141	30
32	0.7576	30	0.2167	34	0.2943	14	0.5139	31
63	0.7274	72	0.2125	56	0.2898	61	0.4849	32
74	0.7208	54	0.2033	85	0.2833	35	0.4821	33
30	0.6612	51	0.2000	54	0.2800	60	0.4836	34
21	0.6600	70	0.2000	45	0.2755	22	0.4736	35
59	0.6504	79	0.2000	50	0.2751	58	0.4731	36
76	0.6520	87	0.2000	41	0.2708	11	0.4698	37
80	0.6383	88	0.2000	73	0.2694	62	0.4658	38
82	0.6388	22	0.1943	88	0.2694	13	0.4606	39
31	0.5750	33	0.1723	59	0.2672	47	0.4406	40
88	0.5633	73	0.1515	52	0.2500	20	0.4375	41
81	0.5555	84	0.1515	12	0.2346	40	0.4350	42
51	0.5000	43	0.1254	31	0.2300	73	0.4264	43
70	0.5000	35	0.1250	55	0.2250	84	0.4264	44
72	0.5000	46	0.1250	0	0.2172	63	0.4089	45
79	0.4500	57	0.1250	71	0.2083	24	0.4046	46
87	0.4500	80	0.1250	72	0.2083	72	0.4033	47
86	0.3750	81	0.1250	77	0.2083	57	0.4020	48
78	0.3333	82	0.1250	32	0.1979	45	0.4010	49
83	0.3333	47	0.1244	33	0.1923	50	0.3880	50
55	0.3229	60	0.1185	76	0.1750	12	0.3816	51
56	0.2885	21	0.0913	79	0.1667	41	0.3799	52
52	0.2500	20	0.0714	87	0.1667	71	0.3517	53
61	0.2500	34	0.0625	20	0.1558	77	0.3517	54
85	0.2222	52	0.0525	30	0.1283	0	0.2967	55
73	0.1667	0	0.0427	21	0.1204	81	0.2539	56
84	0.1667	11	0.0391	56	0.0981	30	0.2445	57
14	0.0128	14	0.0128	86	0.0667	32	0.2248	58
MEANS	.676		.256		.326		.555	

APPENDIX VI

POLICE SANCTION RATES

BURGLARY		GRAND THEFT		AUTO THEFT		RAPE		RANK
55	0.6778	62	1.3332	87	0.8871	57	0.8611	1
57	0.3463	57	0.2499	85	0.5000	72	0.7600	2
81	0.1766	79	0.2387	81	0.4201	57	0.7333	3
72	0.1660	87	0.2287	52	0.3592	75	0.7235	4
73	0.1619	42	0.2025	72	0.3518	17	0.6770	5
84	0.1619	80	0.1851	84	0.3318	80	0.6706	6
76	0.1496	82	0.1851	80	0.2321	82	0.6706	7
80	0.1387	72	0.1692	82	0.2321	81	0.6500	8
82	0.1387	55	0.1660	10	0.2034	43	0.6139	9
86	0.1242	43	0.1554	74	0.2032	86	0.5972	10
52	0.1234	81	0.1526	88	0.1778	42	0.5657	11
14	0.1176	21	0.1523	75	0.1618	50	0.5591	12
85	0.1049	73	0.1492	51	0.1587	56	0.5083	13
10	0.1019	84	0.1492	70	0.1587	55	0.4934	14
56	0.1019	76	0.1417	53	0.1451	74	0.4838	15
44	0.1002	12	0.1287	71	0.1467	35	0.4505	16
43	0.0911	75	0.1249	77	0.1467	47	0.4234	17
85	0.0891	44	0.1155	76	0.1433	78	0.4111	18
42	0.0871	13	0.1154	62	0.1425	83	0.4111	19
75	0.0845	78	0.1137	44	0.1253	54	0.3850	20
15	0.0823	83	0.1139	35	0.1224	76	0.3750	21
60	0.0820	15	0.1136	12	0.1196	58	0.3703	22
47	0.0617	20	0.1133	63	0.1114	45	0.3680	23
46	0.0812	85	0.1070	60	0.1066	79	0.3466	24
0	0.0758	14	0.1044	72	0.1000	87	0.3466	25
31	0.0784	56	0.1057	86	0.0693	85	0.3333	26
59	0.0765	59	0.1005	13	0.0955	62	0.3272	27
34	0.0739	10	0.0983	11	0.0936	44	0.3225	28
74	0.0798	88	0.0979	58	0.0823	34	0.3210	29
35	0.0735	0	0.0974	14	0.0875	46	0.3075	30
61	0.0702	62	0.0943	34	0.0875	71	0.2857	31
62	0.0700	45	0.0897	20	0.0840	77	0.2857	32
13	0.0704	16	0.0893	47	0.0814	41	0.2836	33
11	0.0691	62	0.0876	79	0.0792	16	0.2806	34
15	0.0690	46	0.0871	87	0.0792	60	0.2764	35
58	0.0678	54	0.0867	32	0.0786	20	0.2740	36
22	0.0664	22	0.0848	41	0.0786	12	0.2708	37
21	0.0653	47	0.0847	40	0.0781	13	0.2684	38
71	0.0653	11	0.0836	42	0.0778	61	0.2667	39
77	0.0653	41	0.0827	31	0.0744	11	0.2637	40
45	0.0637	60	0.0786	0	0.0736	63	0.2366	41
54	0.0637	71	0.0777	15	0.0734	15	0.2350	42
20	0.0621	77	0.0777	46	0.0721	59	0.2270	43
12	0.0591	53	0.0767	78	0.0701	21	0.2220	44
50	0.0584	58	0.0682	83	0.0701	40	0.2190	45
41	0.0582	61	0.0679	50	0.0696	31	0.2138	46
40	0.0577	54	0.0626	33	0.0632	88	0.2083	47
51	0.0563	74	0.0614	47	0.0603	0	0.2059	48
70	0.0562	33	0.0608	45	0.0569	14	0.1993	49
32	0.0560	35	0.0577	59	0.0567	22	0.1981	50
76	0.0557	50	0.0514	54	0.0564	32	0.1786	51
82	0.0557	32	0.0501	22	0.0539	30	0.1770	52
79	0.0514	40	0.0474	55	0.0527	51	0.1667	53
87	0.0514	30	0.0451	30	0.0512	70	0.1667	54
53	0.0501	31	0.0409	21	0.0500	73	0.1667	55
33	0.0482	51	0.0329	61	0.0458	84	0.1667	56
63	0.0479	70	0.0329	16	0.0426	33	0.1195	57
30	0.0432	85	0.0278	56	0.0364	52	0.1181	58
MEANS	.098		.110		.138		.366	

APPENDIX VII

PRETRIAL SANCTION RATES

MURDER		MANSLAUGHTER		ROBBERY		ASSAULT		RANK
32	[illegible]	37	0.8[illegible]	[illegible]	0.[illegible]	77	[illegible]	1
30	0.[illegible]	28	0.9167	62	0.[illegible]	67	0.[illegible]	2
75	0.9443	30	0.8750	52	0.9[illegible]	51	0.9167	3
34	[illegible]	41	0.8750	28	0.7500	73	0.8167	4
90	0.[illegible]	54	0.8125	46	0.7300	57	0.7847	5
82	0.9500	65	0.8125	39	0.7291	75	0.7215	6
35	0.9427	21	0.7937	42	0.6944	61	0.7583	7
42	0.9431	31	0.7777	15	0.6802	55	0.6971	8
33	[illegible]	11	0.7561	41	0.6629	0	0.6441	9
50	0.9375	50	0.7725	55	0.6612	52	0.6252	10
0	0.[illegible]	14	0.7500	43	0.6597	81	0.6250	11
41	0.9197	16	0.7500	0	0.6552	41	0.6164	12
46	[illegible]	34	0.75[illegible]	61	0.6500	75	0.5891	13
71	0.87[illegible]	43	0.7500	47	0.6481	80	0.5735	14
77	0.875[illegible]	52	0.75[illegible]	44	0.6382	62	0.5735	15
78	0.875[illegible]	60	0.7500	59	0.6090	65	0.5285	16
83	0.8750	80	0.7500	75	0.6011	78	0.5000	17
45	0.8654	88	0.7300	30	0.5849	83	0.5000	18
43	0.8567	49	0.6300	21	0.5818	60	0.4803	19
40	0.8750	22	0.6752	33	0.5656	59	0.4764	20
74	0.8333	0	0.6742	32	0.5655	45	0.4621	21
13	0.8291	12	0.6532	22	0.5475	44	0.4562	22
15	0.82[illegible]	56	0.6532	50	0.5427	14	0.4500	23
59	0.8125	79	0.6500	53	0.5406	45	0.4459	24
14	0.79[illegible]	91	0.6520	18	0.5326	72	0.4353	25
21	0.7953	87	0.6500	20	0.5163	73	0.4252	26
20	0.7844	75	0.5547	57	0.5056	84	0.4252	27
47	0.7631	33	0.5125	48	0.5051	65	0.4252	28
31	0.7[illegible]	10	0.5[illegible]	54	0.4850	53	0.4056	29
32	0.7500	20	0.5000	10	0.4823	31	0.3731	30
58	0.7500	42	0.5000	14	0.4729	47	0.3594	31
72	0.7510	57	0.5000	17	0.4782	10	0.3571	32
73	0.7500	59	0.5000	31	0.4688	21	0.3567	33
84	0.7500	62	0.5600	40	0.4562	22	0.3516	34
85	0.7500	55	0.4500	11	0.4172	15	0.3457	35
86	0.7500	71	0.4500	73	0.4167	59	0.3415	36
81	0.7245	77	0.4500	24	0.4167	42	0.3292	37
11	0.7227	65	0.4500	85	0.4167	68	0.3132	38
54	0.6971	13	0.4256	56	0.3833	62	0.3046	39
53	0.6633	76	0.4125	34	0.3523	12	0.2847	40
44	0.6821	72	0.3125	50	0.3750	37	0.2841	41
76	0.6533	15	0.2500	52	0.3750	55	0.2878	42
16	0.6576	32	0.2500	75	0.3750	33	0.2831	43
12	0.6714	35	0.2500	82	0.3750	32	0.2738	44
61	0.6250	45	0.2500	74	0.3474	40	0.2694	45
62	0.6250	51	0.2500	35	0.3131	20	0.2641	46
10	0.5000	61	0.2500	16	0.2793	63	0.2546	47
51	0.50[illegible]	70	0.2500	51	0.2500	71	0.2437	48
63	0.5000	74	0.2500	70	0.2500	77	0.2437	49
70	0.5000	79	0.2500	71	0.2500	50	0.2391	50
79	0.5[illegible]	83	0.2500	77	0.2500	43	0.2336	51
87	0.5000	86	0.2500	79	0.2500	34	0.2227	52
55	0.4300	47	0.2455	66	0.2500	13	0.2267	53
56	0.3750	73	0.2225	87	0.2500	54	0.2079	54
58	0.3542	44	0.2225	81	0.1500	11	0.1498	55
57	0.3125	85	0.2225	57	0.1250	35	0.1442	56
60	0.2555	46	0.2200	72	0.1250	74	0.1433	57
96	0.2500	63	0.2000	76	0.1250	16	0.1032	58
MEANS	.731		.529		.486		.429	

APPENDIX VIII

PRETRIAL SANCTION RATES

BURGLARY		GRAND THEFT		AUTO THEFT		RAPE		RANK
52	[illegible]	25	[illegible]	57	[illegible]	67	[illegible]	1
44	[illegible]	86	0.9534	40	0.8130	3	0.9120	2
81	0.7979	82	0.9374	36	0.6136	60	0.876[illegible]	3
80	0.7754	73	0.9500	50	0.5933	55	0.8333	4
82	0.7354	66	0.9500	6	0.5511	22	0.7975	5
61	0.7273	23	[illegible]	51	0.5341	63	0.7933	6
57	0.7179	64	0.9275	55	0.5336	59	0.7833	7
6	0.7173	75	0.9207	72	0.5300	73	0.7634	8
72	0.7144	67	[illegible]	14	0.4748	45	0.7598	9
88	0.6877	35	0.8737	52	0.4306	81	0.7500	10
86	0.6678	56	0.8625	73	0.4135	75	0.6725	11
51	0.6633	41	0.8624	84	0.4135	61	0.6667	12
70	0.6333	52	0.8532	85	0.4135	12	0.6571	13
76	0.6174	10	0.8264	46	0.4096	79	0.6500	14
65	0.5965	50	0.8125	44	0.4059	87	0.6500	15
63	0.5874	71	[illegible]	47	0.4000	59	0.6250	16
22	0.5812	77	[illegible]	38	0.3959	85	0.6250	17
60	0.5724	74	0.7895	53	0.3895	63	0.5942	18
59	0.5688	47	0.7722	15	0.3720	13	0.5741	19
33	0.5568	44	0.7633	58	0.3543	15	0.5510	20
47	0.5541	50	0.7556	70	0.3125	10	0.5500	21
15	0.5514	53	0.7222	32	0.3053	53	0.5476	22
50	0.5477	13	0.6997	41	0.3045	58	0.5455	23
58	0.5360	14	0.6985	57	0.3019	30	0.5318	24
77	0.5316	8	0.6852	73	0.3000	14	0.5278	25
84	0.5316	34	0.6748	87	0.3000	45	0.5109	26
85	0.5310	20	0.6253	54	0.2956	42	0.5000	27
10	0.5304	15	0.6146	17	0.2855	88	0.5000	28
40	0.5301	58	0.6103	33	0.2756	62	0.4583	29
30	0.5207	72	0.5904	32	0.2716	21	0.4533	30
53	0.4760	30	0.5397	80	0.2664	72	0.4500	31
55	0.4745	31	0.5297	87	0.2664	11	0.4481	32
42	0.4701	62	0.5176	21	0.2623	34	0.4158	33
21	0.4669	12	0.5125	40	0.2563	54	0.3828	34
75	0.4574	81	0.5000	13	0.2524	31	0.3708	35
56	0.4315	22	0.4982	51	0.2500	41	0.3655	36
13	0.4306	11	0.4979	70	0.2500	35	0.3632	37
45	0.4250	21	0.4595	81	0.2500	15	0.3625	38
31	0.4236	43	0.4586	62	0.2489	74	0.3625	39
41	0.4100	40	0.4555	75	0.2444	20	0.3553	40
34	0.3956	33	0.4532	31	0.2326	55	0.3485	41
20	0.3919	54	0.4529	45	0.2232	75	0.3333	42
14	0.3761	79	0.4333	71	0.2222	40	0.2557	43
54	0.3657	97	0.4333	77	0.2222	32	0.2500	44
12	0.3548	60	0.3537	12	0.1988	43	0.2500	45
43	0.3352	61	0.3535	34	0.1800	57	0.2500	46
32	0.3110	42	0.3431	20	0.1699	73	0.2500	47
62	0.3020	51	0.3333	59	0.1667	78	0.2500	48
35	0.2979	70	0.3333	43	0.1528	83	0.2500	49
74	0.2953	76	0.3025	62	0.1516	84	0.2500	50
11	0.2794	46	0.3019	74	0.1379	25	0.2500	51
71	0.2795	32	0.2759	30	0.1331	44	0.2000	52
77	0.2796	19	0.2722	11	0.1322	50	0.1566	53
79	0.2500	63	0.2333	61	0.1250	51	0.1250	54
87	0.2500	55	0.2083	79	0.1250	70	0.1250	55
16	[illegible]	57	0.1250	83	0.1250	52	0.1225	56
78	0.1533	78	0.1250	35	0.1047	71	0.1525	57
83	[illegible]	67	0.1250	16	0.0993	77	0.1525	58

MEANS .490 .601 .317 .471

APPENDIX IX

LEVEL OF CONVICTION RATE

MURDER		MANSLAUGHTER		ROBBERY		ASSAULT		RANK
74	0.9657	31	0.9937	61	0.9444	83	0.8519	1
63	0.9062	16	0.9888	74	0.9361	55	0.8349	2
58	0.8792	58	0.9866	53	0.8523	32	0.7674	3
31	0.8750	30	0.9833	55	0.8447	62	0.7521	4
79	0.8500	35	0.9653	59	0.8417	58	0.7259	5
87	0.8500	13	0.9500	11	0.8208	31	0.7255	6
86	0.8194	20	0.9200	57	0.8125	71	0.7222	7
53	0.7917	10	0.9167	31	0.7980	77	0.7222	8
15	0.7500	33	0.9167	50	0.7956	15	0.7119	9
56	0.7500	62	0.8750	62	0.7917	76	0.7083	10
34	0.7491	54	0.8715	33	0.7895	13	0.6940	11
10	0.7431	21	0.8452	41	0.7859	21	0.6884	12
22	0.7362	11	0.8382	16	0.7831	63	0.6869	13
41	0.7351	22	0.8214	14	0.7805	40	0.6796	14
14	0.7342	47	0.8125	22	0.7795	52	0.6667	15
13	0.7160	41	0.8056	20	0.7770	29	0.6610	16
62	0.6905	60	0.8049	21	0.7734	44	0.6604	17
33	0.6855	14	0.7778	13	0.7700	74	0.6464	18
16	0.6667	0	0.7736	40	0.7674	51	0.6444	19
80	0.6667	15	0.7708	47	0.7629	70	0.6444	20
82	0.6667	12	0.7500	30	0.7622	11	0.6442	21
12	0.6650	42	0.7500	43	0.7563	30	0.6392	22
45	0.6574	52	0.7500	54	0.7559	34	0.6302	23
30	0.6565	55	0.7500	34	0.7352	60	0.6083	24
81	0.6532	79	0.7500	58	0.7336	72	0.6071	25
20	0.6473	87	0.7500	15	0.7262	87	0.6071	26
21	0.6392	40	0.6944	44	0.7244	59	0.6042	27
40	0.6353	44	0.6824	32	0.7222	72	0.5972	28
42	0.6333	56	0.6667	12	0.7117	54	0.5890	29
46	0.6278	57	0.6667	42	0.7083	47	0.5857	30
73	0.6250	53	0.6250	45	0.7070	14	0.5849	31
84	0.6250	45	0.6119	0	0.6827	81	0.5833	32
85	0.6250	32	0.6111	35	0.6659	15	0.5820	33
75	0.6111	80	0.6042	46	0.6258	75	0.5684	34
0	0.6030	82	0.6042	75	0.5980	0	0.5578	35
54	0.5975	46	0.5476	10	0.5868	61	0.5536	36
76	0.5972	50	0.5000	60	0.5803	57	0.5506	37
78	0.5885	59	0.5000	52	0.5000	22	0.5399	38
83	0.5835	61	0.5000	80	0.4222	45	0.5329	39
11	0.5821	73	0.5000	82	0.4222	33	0.5243	40
35	0.5766	84	0.5000	86	0.4167	12	0.5233	41
47	0.5697	85	0.5000	56	0.3869	43	0.5064	42
50	0.5556	74	0.4167	79	0.2850	10	0.5056	43
71	0.5556	34	0.3833	87	0.2850	35	0.4971	44
77	0.5556	78	0.3333	51	0.2500	53	0.4957	45
61	0.5555	83	0.3333	57	0.2500	42	0.4886	46
60	0.5333	76	0.2857	70	0.2500	85	0.4782	47
51	0.5000	51	0.2500	72	0.2500	56	0.4778	48
70	0.5000	70	0.2500	81	0.2500	53	0.4752	49
44	0.4875	72	0.2500	71	0.1667	41	0.4648	50
43	0.4722	86	0.2500	76	0.1667	73	0.4500	51
32	0.4583	71	0.2221	77	0.1667	84	0.4500	52
55	0.4583	77	0.2221	78	0.1667	85	0.4500	53
52	0.4167	63	0.2000	83	0.1667	80	0.4471	54
57	0.4167	75	0.1667	86	0.1667	82	0.4471	55
59	0.3542	81	0.1250	73	0.1333	46	0.3389	56
72	0.2500	98	0.1250	64	0.1333	78	0.3333	57
88	0.2083	43	0.0833	65	0.1333	83	0.3333	58
MEANS	.629		.609		.574		.587	

APPENDIX X

	LEVEL OF CONVICTION RATE					
	BURGLARY		GRAND THEFT		AUTO THEFT	
		RANK		RANK		RANK
71	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
77	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
67	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
61	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
56	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
31	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
52	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
68	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
16	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
11	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
21	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
42	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
78	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
83	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
35	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
40	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
39	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
41	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
20	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
50	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
45	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
24	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
53	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
28	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
32	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
55	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
58	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
81	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
75	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
57	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
33	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
54	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
29	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
14	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
72	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
44	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
62	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
60	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
43	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
10	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
15	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
51	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
70	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
47	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
22	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
74	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
76	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
80	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
82	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
12	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
46	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
73	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
64	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
85	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
79	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
87	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
MEANS	.784		.658		.655	.417

APPENDIX XI

LEVEL OF SENTENCE RATES

MURDER		MANSLAUGHTER		ROBBERY		ASSAULT		RANK
50	0.9167	63	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	81	0.8750	1
71	0.8750	41	0.7455	61	0.7200	88	0.7222	2
77	0.8750	42	0.7417	46	0.6667	46	0.5837	3
63	0.8611	47	0.6625	43	0.6632	51	0.5823	4
43	0.8333	58	0.6250	59	0.6500	42	0.5677	5
78	0.8333	10	0.6042	50	0.6304	72	0.5417	6
79	0.8333	55	0.5729	75	0.6250	83	0.5417	7
93	0.8333	35	0.5625	80	0.6181	41	0.5397	8
67	0.7833	56	0.5417	85	0.6181	54	0.5349	9
15	0.7695	57	0.5417	55	0.6012	63	0.5331	10
46	0.7653	33	0.5387	35	0.6000	43	0.5271	11
44	0.7355	11	0.5131	54	0.5960	47	0.5246	12
58	0.7292	12	0.4347	22	0.5911	75	0.5203	13
53	0.7083	22	0.4672	44	0.5851	55	0.5200	14
37	0.6990	53	0.4583	40	0.5662	73	0.5187	15
47	0.6986	13	0.4479	34	0.5586	85	0.5169	16
21	0.6954	40	0.4444	33	0.5458	51	0.5139	17
54	0.6946	62	0.4375	53	0.5459	70	0.5139	18
80	0.6875	54	0.4356	14	0.5457	16	0.5128	19
82	0.6875	0	0.4330	16	0.5435	79	0.5083	20
86	0.6875	20	0.4226	45	0.5413	57	0.5083	21
14	0.6824	14	0.4242	41	0.5205	31	0.5051	22
16	0.6750	15	0.4167	47	0.5167	44	0.5008	23
10	0.6736	88	0.4167	12	0.5112	22	0.4991	24
13	0.6691	30	0.3958	20	0.5105	45	0.4972	25
34	0.6659	21	0.3760	31	0.5105	62	0.4963	26
41	0.6632	16	0.3750	15	0.5075	27	0.4945	27
35	0.6590	46	0.3681	11	0.5004	35	0.4911	28
11	0.6478	50	0.3622	13	0.5003	15	0.4839	29
9	0.6421	81	0.3533	21	0.5002	12	0.4868	30
39	0.6357	80	0.3472	50	0.4942	57	0.4861	31
20	0.6341	82	0.3472	58	0.4833	74	0.4821	32
73	0.6250	32	0.3333	9	0.4803	11	0.4808	33
76	0.6250	59	0.3233	30	0.4671	32	0.4759	34
84	0.6250	31	0.3125	10	0.4427	53	0.4735	35
85	0.6250	74	0.3056	42	0.4250	30	0.4725	36
45	0.6235	44	0.3036	56	0.4167	13	0.4706	37
40	0.6111	52	0.2917	32	0.3958	58	0.4602	38
23	0.6095	60	0.2917	62	0.3725	33	0.4598	39
12	0.6067	61	0.2917	57	0.3333	61	0.4583	40
62	0.5595	78	0.2917	74	0.3222	56	0.4569	41
31	0.5417	83	0.2917	79	0.3000	14	0.4489	42
74	0.5417	76	0.2535	87	0.3000	34	0.4458	43
42	0.5104	71	0.2500	98	0.2917	80	0.4444	44
75	0.4861	73	0.2500	51	0.2083	82	0.4444	45
32	0.4583	77	0.2500	57	0.2083	21	0.4366	46
60	0.4340	64	0.2500	70	0.2083	10	0.4330	47
51	0.4167	85	0.2500	72	0.2083	9	0.4327	48
59	0.4167	45	0.2476	78	0.2083	60	0.3977	49
70	0.4167	79	0.2033	81	0.2083	76	0.3972	50
55	0.3750	87	0.2033	63	0.2083	73	0.3958	51
81	0.3500	34	0.1771	65	0.2083	84	0.3955	52
57	0.3333	43	0.1667	71	0.1250	65	0.3958	53
61	0.3270	51	0.1667	76	0.1250	59	0.3373	54
56	0.2917	70	0.1667	77	0.1250	52	0.3333	55
52	0.2083	86	0.1667	73	0.1146	71	0.3194	56
83	0.1667	72	0.1250	64	0.1146	77	0.3199	57
72	0.0833	75	0.1146	35	0.1146	40	0.3032	58

MEANS .609 .381 .439 .483

APPENDIX XII

LEVEL OF SENTENCE RATES

BURGLARY		GRAND THEFT		AUTO THEFT		RAPE		RANK
41	[illegible]	72	[illegible]	1[illegible]	[illegible]	41	0.8717	1
43	0.7237	62	0.5753	30	0.7222	12	0.7940	2
53	0.6108	51	0.5[illegible]	11	0.7180	11	0.7532	3
73	0.6016	70	0.5494	57	0.6670	59	0.7292	4
84	0.6016	74	0.5522	15	0.6579	14	0.7125	5
85	0.6016	59	0.5456	13	0.6498	15	0.6861	6
62	0.5413	56	0.5437	12	0.6410	34	0.6042	7
35	0.5301	54	0.5418	86	0.6369	39	0.6022	8
55	0.5233	79	0.5417	46	0.6154	16	0.5787	9
59	0.5225	87	0.5417	34	0.6047	75	0.5536	10
80	0.5154	50	0.5307	31	0.5704	44	0.5486	11
82	0.5154	57	0.5303	60	0.5694	22	0.5222	12
54	0.5149	55	0.5236	82	0.5694	55	0.5208	13
56	0.5092	88	0.5231	62	0.5542	21	0.5194	14
45	0.5084	35	0.5114	22	0.5503	54	0.5036	15
74	0.5083	44	0.5050	32	0.5392	46	0.5035	16
46	0.5078	63	0.4977	40	0.5286	74	0.5000	17
75	0.5053	80	0.4982	35	0.5267	40	0.4935	18
72	0.5034	82	0.4832	50	0.5258	29	0.4772	19
57	0.5012	34	0.4920	55	0.5222	33	0.4667	20
34	0.4980	40	0.4781	20	0.5163	13	0.4603	21
86	0.4953	11	0.4776	33	0.5163	45	0.4583	22
32	0.4945	22	0.4761	75	0.5155	0	0.4535	23
91	0.4862	12	0.4757	3[illegible]	0.5093	52	0.4500	24
76	0.4740	75	0.4731	41	0.5064	63	0.4306	25
11	0.4712	15	0.4706	51	0.5000	42	0.4167	26
14	0.4710	71	0.4667	70	0.5000	50	0.4167	27
51	0.4709	77	0.4657	73	0.5000	86	0.4167	28
70	0.4708	47	0.4640	84	0.5000	72	0.4000	29
63	0.4699	41	0.4606	85	0.5000	43	0.3750	30
12	0.4695	31	0.4595	14	0.4853	62	0.3708	31
60	0.4693	73	0.4583	64	0.4808	35	0.3690	32
22	0.4673	84	0.4583	47	0.4750	47	0.3676	33
40	0.4657	85	0.4533	60	0.4704	52	0.3676	34
16	0.4605	20	0.4556	58	0.4667	31	0.3472	35
31	0.4607	46	0.4559	44	0.4549	80	0.3417	36
15	0.4595	45	0.4535	10	0.4520	82	0.3417	37
52	0.4571	58	0.4525	21	0.4387	62	0.2824	38
50	0.4560	52	0.4504	42	0.4305	56	0.2778	39
20	0.4533	21	0.4491	0	0.4189	61	0.2708	40
33	0.4528	10	0.4408	88	0.3750	57	0.2500	41
47	0.4504	0	0.4406	71	0.3542	71	0.2500	42
21	0.4421	33	0.4386	77	0.3542	77	0.2500	43
0	0.4395	16	0.4375	57	0.3333	81	0.2500	44
58	0.4301	32	0.4333	74	0.3264	10	0.2292	45
10	0.4174	76	0.4306	45	0.3255	53	0.2292	46
30	0.4164	30	0.4152	43	0.2917	73	0.2083	47
13	0.4067	14	0.4143	76	0.2500	84	0.2083	48
88	0.3820	13	0.3964	56	0.2188	85	0.2083	49
42	0.3659	86	0.3750	52	0.2083	79	0.2000	50
44	0.3390	53	0.3636	72	0.1975	67	0.2000	51
61	0.3247	42	0.3571	59	0.1667	76	0.1667	52
71	0.2853	60	0.3494	78	0.1667	89	0.1667	53
77	0.2853	78	0.3194	83	0.1667	75	0.1500	54
79	0.2708	83	0.3174	79	0.1500	83	0.1500	55
87	0.2708	61	0.3056	67	0.1500	32	0.1250	56
78	0.2500	43	0.1933	61	0.1250	51	0.0875	57
83	0.2500	81	0.1667	81	0.0833	79	0.0875	58
MEANS	.467		.458		.449		.393	

APPENDIX XIII

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION--SANCTION LEVELS AND MURDER

California 1969-1971

	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Simple r	r^2	Beta
Police	.1948	.04	.04	-.19	.04	-.1920
Pre-Trial	.1991	.04	.00	-.08	.00	-.0373
Conviction	.2221	.05	.00	.09	.00	.0895
Sentence	.2226	.05	.00	.00	.00	.0184

N=58

APPENDIX XIV

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION--SANCTION LEVELS AND MANSLAUGHTER

California 1969-1971

	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Simple r	r^2	Beta
Police	.3103	.09	.09	-.31	.09	-.3175
Pre-Trial	.3173	.10	.00	.12	.02	.0588
Conviction	.3176	.10	.00	.04	.01	-.0074
Sentence	.3194	.10	.00	-.06	.00	.0444

N=58

APPENDIX XV

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION--SANCTION LEVELS AND ROBBERY

California 1969-1971

	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Simple r	r^2	Beta
Police	.3077	.09	.09	-.31	.09	-.2896
Pre-Trial	.3874	.15	.06	.16	.03	.0818
Conviction	.4565	.20	.06	.36	.12	.3161
Sentence	.4568	.21	.00	.25	.06	.0324

N=58

APPENDIX XVI

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION--SANCTION LEVELS AND ASSAULT

California 1969-1971

	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Simple r	r^2	Beta
Police	.5574	.30	.31	-.56	.31	-.5114
Pre-Trial	.5768	.33	.02	-.31	.09	-.1327
Conviction	.5797	.33	.00	.15	.02	.0477
Sentence	.6087	.37	.03	-.20	.04	-.1866

N=58

APPENDIX XVII

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION--SANCTION LEVELS AND BURGLARY

California 1969-1971

	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Simple r	r^2	Beta
Police	.2284	.05	.05	-.23	.05	-.1784
Pre-Trial	.3245	.11	.05	-.28	.08	-.2349
Conviction	.3270	.11	.00	.03	.00	.0457
Sentence	.3270	.11	.00	-.08	.00	-.0092

N=58

APPENDIX XVIII

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION--SANCTION LEVELS AND GRAND THEFT

California 1969-1971

	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Simple r	r^2	Beta
Police	.2790	.07	.07	-.30	.09	-2443
Pre-Trial	.2923	.08	.00	-.08	.00	-.1477
Conviction	.4296	.18	.09	.37	.14	.1348
Sentence	.5161	.27	.08	.39	.15	.3448

N=58

APPENDIX XIX

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION--SANCTION LEVELS AND AUTO THEFT

California 1969-1971

	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Simple r	r^2	Beta
Police	.3987	.15	.15	-.40	.16	-.3263
Pre-Trial	.3997	.15	.00	-.16	.03	-.0526
Conviction	.4709	.22	.06	.32	.10	.1784
Sentence	.4775	.22	.00	.28	.07	.1101

N=58

APPENDIX XX

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION--SANCTION LEVELS AND RAPE

California 1969-1971

	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Simple r	r^2	Beta
Police	.3967	.16	.16	-.40	.16	-.3391
Pre-Trial	.5177	.27	.11	.15	.02	.0866
Conviction	.5352	.29	.02	.44	.19	.2026
Sentence	.5524	.30	.01	.37	.14	.1849

N=58

END