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Policy Development Report  
on  
The Community Crime Prevention Program

Prepared by:  
City of Seattle  
Office of Policy Planning  
Law and Justice Planning Office  
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ACQUISITIONS

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The Office of Policy Planning/Law and Justice Planning Office offers the following recommendations based on its analysis of the Community Crime Prevention Program.

1. The Community Crime Prevention Program should continue. The Community Crime Prevention Program has been shown to be an effective means of reducing the priority crime of burglary. It makes extensive use of citizen initiative, as envisioned by Seattle 2000 Commission.
2. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be funded with City general fund resources when its present grant funding expires in August, 1977. The project will have been supported by LEAA grant funds for approximately four years at the expiration of the present grant. Enough experience has been gained to determine if the project is worthy of City support. By seeking other grant support, the day of reckoning would only be delayed.
3. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be institutionalized into the Department of Community Development as of January 1, 1977. During its demonstration phase, the Community Crime Prevention Program has been managed by the Law and Justice Planning Office, and the project's personnel positions are created in the Office of Policy Planning/Law and Justice Planning Office. OPP/LJPO is not the proper organization to manage a fully operating project.

Of the possible departments, including the Department of Human Resources, the Seattle Police Department, the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs and the Department of Community Development, it is recommended that the Department of Community Development be chosen to house and manage the Community Crime Prevention Program. DCD's management style, characterized by strong neighborhood improvement orientation, strict adherence to achievement of goals, objectives and schedules, and flexibility of staff working hours, can best accommodate the Community Crime Prevention Program, which has similar characteristics.

4. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be funded and maintained at its present level. The program operating at its present level will achieve full City coverage at the 40 percent level of participation in eight

and one-half years. The 40 percent level represents an increase from the present goal of 30 percent participation. This increased goal is due, in part, to the increased experience and skills of project staff and due, in part, to the addition of the Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit which is designed to aid in delivery of the Primary Service and increase the acceptance level of citizens.

5. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be continually monitored and evaluated. The Community Crime Prevention Program remains an experimental program, although it has a history spanning more than three years. To insure continued success along with further controlled experimentation, the Community Crime Prevention Program should continue to be monitored and evaluated.

The Office of Management and Budget should require a strict program budget, the Law and Justice Planning Office should continue its crime impact evaluation and a project steering committee should be formed made up of representatives of the Seattle Police Department, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Community Development and the Law and Justice Planning Office, to provide oversight of the project.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM IMPACT ON BURGLARY

The overall goal of the Community Crime Prevention Program is to reduce residential burglary. The specific, technically stated objectives of the program are as follows:

Objective One: To produce a statistically significant decrease in the number of residential burglaries in the program's target areas.

Objective Two: To demonstrate a statistically significant increase in the number (or percentage) of burglary-in-progress calls received by the Seattle Police Department.

To determine whether the objectives were achieved, data from three separate and independent sources were analyzed. The sources were official Seattle Police Department records on reported residential burglaries, three separate victimization surveys and official Seattle Police Department dispatch records. Analysis of these data allow the following conclusions:

1. Participation in the Community Crime Prevention Program significantly reduces the risk of residential burglary victimization, by between 48 percent and 61 percent.
2. The proportion of actual residential burglaries that are reported to the police increases from about 50 percent to 76 percent following CCPV activities. This also holds for the proportion of burglary-in-progress calls, which increased 27 percent in areas of the City treated by the Community Crime Prevention Program.
3. No evidence of residential burglary displacement to either adjacent non-CCPV households or non-CCPV treated census tracts was found.
4. The Community Crime Prevention Program achieved its objectives.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

Alternatives for the Community Crime Prevention Program's future range from cancellation of the program to massive expansion. Using productivity quotas of the existing program and a goal of 40 percent acceptance of offered CCPP services, the following projections can be made:

1. Maintenance of current CCPP resource commitment (ten field staff) will allow Primary Service to be offered City-wide in eight and one-half years.
2. With a 50 percent expansion to 15 field staff, the entire City would be serviced in five and two-thirds years.
3. To complete the entire City in three years would require an expansion to a level of 28 field staff.

Relatively little is known about methodologies which depend upon the use of volunteers, recruitment via media campaigns and how these compete with Seattle's systematic door-to-door provision of services by civilian paid staff. The national experience suggests, however, that participation would be substantially less (2 percent to 17 percent).

The crime impact evaluation shows the greatest advantage of the program accrues to households which accept property marking, home security inspections and become part of a block watch. This suggests that high rates of participation are desirable.

Projections using evaluation data show that if program effects can be maintained, the contribution of single-family and duplex households to the City's burglary problem can be reduced substantially. The proportion of victimizations reported to police will increase, but reported residential burglary will also decline.

Maintenance of program effects is the most questionable assumption of the CCPP strategy. Citizens change their places of residence at a surprisingly high rate (about 50 percent in a five-year period), and evaluation results suggest a decay of program effect between six to 18 months after services are provided. Future program planning and evaluation should focus upon remedies for this weakness.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM BACKGROUND

In late 1972 and early 1973, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office conducted an extensive analysis of the crime of burglary. That analysis revealed the following:

1. that the majority of residential burglaries occur during daylight hours when it is possible for citizens to witness them;
2. that in about 40 percent of Seattle's burglaries, entry is gained through open doors and windows;
3. that police patrols cannot be reasonably expected to prevent many burglaries; and
4. that the majority of victims were not able to provide identifying numbers of their lost property which would aid police in apprehending offenders and returning recovered property.

These findings became the basis for the Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) design. The program employs Community Organizers and Home Service Technicians who, on a block-by-block basis, perform the following tasks:

1. Organize Block Watch groups. These block watch groups are made up of eight to twelve neighboring families who mutually agree to watch their neighbors' homes and report unusual occurrences to police.
2. Conduct Home Security Inspections. CCPP staff go through the residence and point out security weaknesses and offer advice on how the weakness could be remedied.
3. Perform Property Marking. CCPP staff engrave an identifying number, usually the driver's license number, on frequently stolen property items and post a decal that so informs would-be burglars.

The program's goal has been to involve at least 30 percent of the single-family and duplex residences in a neighborhood in at least one of the above activities or "Primary Services."

A "Maintenance Service" is also provided. It is designed to sustain block watches which have been established. Block watch captains are recontacted at six month intervals, and a monthly newsletter is published, in order to rejuvenate anti-burglary interest in a community.

On a City-wide basis, the program provides "Educational and Informational" materials advising residents on how to protect themselves from burglary. This activity or "Advisory Service" makes extensive use of the media, mailers, speaking engagements and other public events and gatherings.

The Community Crime Prevention Program has been supported by a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant since September, 1973. Its purpose has been to test the strategy outlined above to see if it would reduce residential burglary.

Between September, 1973, when the program began, and June, 1976, approximately 20 census tracts (20 percent of all residential tracts in Seattle) have received the program's Primary Service (block watch, home inspection and property marking). An additional 24 tracts have received the program's Advisory Service (education and information).

By June 1976, the program had involved 8,708 households in block watch, conducted 8,047 home security inspections, performed 8,765 property markings and provided educational and informational services and materials to an additional 2,000 citizens.

The areas of the City covered by Primary Service include the Central Area and most of West Seattle. Advisory Services have been provided to all of South Seattle, Queen Anne, Magnolia, Laurelhurst and parts of Lake City and Broadview.

The Advisory Service is the weaker component of the program, in terms of its impact on burglary and is provided essentially due to citizens' demand for services.

The cost of the program since its beginning (approximately three years) has been \$562,813.



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### INTRODUCTION

The Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) is a City of Seattle response to the priority crime of burglary. The program is designed to reduce burglary through delivery of crime protection services directly to Seattle's citizens. As such, it is a direct response to the Seattle 2000 law and justice goals and objectives which have been approved by the Mayor and City Council. It provides an opportunity for citizens to become involved in direct service roles to reduce crime (Goal C) and represents the City's principal opportunity to expand citizen crime prevention programs (Objective 2). Specifically, the Seattle 2000 Commission report stated: "Citizens must share the responsibility for prevention of crime--law enforcement agencies, the courts and corrections cannot and should not handle it alone."

The Seattle 2000 theme that we must involve citizens in the reduction of crime has little meaning unless we know what works to reduce crime. If the City encourages citizens to participate and spend their time and money on a cooperative burglary reduction program, it is especially important to know that the program, in fact, has the desired effect of crime reduction.

This necessity to inform ourselves is the driving force behind this presentation. In the arena of crime reduction efforts, failures have consistently outnumbered successes and scholars with national reputations are claiming that "nothing works." Crime reduction programs which offer an honest promise of success are extremely rare. The current fiscal environment accommodates program failure much more gracefully than success. Here we are faced with a problem of large magnitude, where a program which responds to adopted City goals and objectives has demonstrated success.

The purpose of this paper is to make recommendations for the Community Crime Prevention Program's future based on information generated in its demonstration phase.

The discussion which follows is consistent with the legislative intent of the Seattle City Council, which resolved in Resolution 24975 to reaffirm the intent of the City Council and the Mayor "to proceed with the development of a comprehensive policy plan for the City," and which approved "a schedule of initial priority components of the comprehensive policy plan to be developed by the Office of Policy Planning." A principal policy element in the comprehensive policy plan work for 1976 was "community participation in crime reduction." The responsibility for this work was assigned to the Law and Justice Planning Office.

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The description of this element, included as an attachment to Resolution 24957, reads:

"There are substantial opportunities to encourage and facilitate citizen actions in crime reduction. Possibilities range from broad educational efforts to intensive house-to-house crime prevention services. Having accumulated experience with citizen action programs, both successful and unsuccessful, Law and Justice will undertake a synthesis to develop City policy which considers citizens as public safety resources and which can guide City resource allocation decisions for facilitating and encouraging citizen actions to reduce crime."

This paper responds to that work element.

## SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION

### PURPOSE

The Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) is a City of Seattle response to the priority crime of burglary. The program is designed to reduce burglary through provision of specific services directly to Seattle's citizens. As such, it is a direct response to the Seattle 2000 law and justice goals and objectives which have been approved by the Mayor and City Council. It provides an opportunity for citizens to become involved in direct service roles to reduce crime (Goal C) and represents the City's principal opportunity to expand citizen crime prevention programs (Objective 2). Specifically, the Seattle 2000 Commission report stated: "Citizens must share the responsibility for prevention of crime--law enforcement agencies, the courts and corrections cannot and should not handle it alone."

The Seattle 2000 theme that we must involve citizens in the reduction of crime has little meaning if we are not able to describe precisely what action can be taken which will result in reduction of crime. If the City is actively encouraging citizens to participate and spend their time and money on a cooperative burglary reduction venture, it is especially important to know that the program, in fact, has the desired effect of crime reduction.

This necessity to inform ourselves is the driving force behind this presentation. In the arena of crime reduction efforts, where failures have consistently outnumbered successes and where scholars with national reputations are claiming that "nothing works," program evaluation and analysis results which offer an honest promise of success are extremely rare. The current fiscal environment accommodates program failure much more gracefully than success. Here we are faced with a problem of large magnitude, where a program which responds to adopted City goals and objectives has demonstrated success.

It is therefore the purpose of this paper to make recommendations regarding the use of the information generated through the demonstration phase of the Community Crime Prevention Program. It is also the purpose of this paper to make recommendations regarding the future of the Community Crime Prevention Program as a successful response to the City's priority crime of burglary.

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In the joint proposal between the City Council's policy analysis staff and the Office of Policy Planning (February 3, 1975), the purpose for the comprehensive plan was described as being necessary "to provide policy guidance for the City's decision-making systems while integrating these systems into a rationalized whole." Further, this February 3 document specified the following:

"City decision makers who must allocate resources, exercise regulatory authority or evaluate programs are hard-pressed to do so in support of long-range community interests without some prior consensus concerning those interests. The comprehensive policy plan will strive to provide a systematic framework for forecasting important policy issues, setting priorities for analysis and decision making, examining policy and program options and their fiscal/legal implications, and recording policy decisions for future guidance."

SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION

ORGANIZATION

The presentation which follows is designed to provide within one document the information available to decision makers regarding the Community Crime Prevention Program.

Section Two, Program Background, describes the history of the program in terms of planning, development and implementation. In the second part of Section Two, the Community Crime Prevention Program methodology is described in detail. The mechanical workings of the program in terms of services provided, organization, staff productivity, duties and responsibilities, and program costs are developed.

Section Three, Community Crime Prevention Program Impact on Burglary, describes CCpp impact on burglary for the last three and one-half years of experience. Specific conclusions regarding the program's success in reducing burglary victimization of Seattle citizens are presented.

Section Four, Analysis of Alternatives, deals with projections of future alternatives for operation and projections of future impact of the Community Crime Prevention Program on Seattle residential burglary. The analysis of alternatives provides a framework for discussion for an array of resource level alternatives for the Community Crime Prevention Program. In this Section, assumptions based on program performance during the demonstration phase are made, and program size and levels of participation by citizens are varied in order to predict the program's future impact on residential burglary.

Section Five, Policy Recommendations, is a presentation of specific policy recommendations based upon information presented and developed in this paper. These policy recommendations include discussions of expected long-term impact on burglary and the logic arguments for establishing the Community Crime Prevention Program as a permanent public safety obligation of the City. Also included in this Section are recommendations on staff size, productivity and additional experimentation with Primary and Maintenance Service dispensing functions. Considerable discussion of potential administrative control mechanisms is included in Section Five, as well as computations of cost for the Community Crime Prevention Program service for future years. In addition to these policy considerations, Section Five contains a discussion of permanent organizational placement. Specific organizational placement recommendations are made.

Section Five is followed by two appendices. The first is the full program evaluation report. The second is a synopsis of the entire paper, using a question-and-answer format.

SECTION TWO: COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM BACKGROUND

PROGRAM HISTORY

Planning and Analysis

In late 1972 and early 1973, the Law and Justice Planning Office conducted an extensive analysis of the crime of burglary. The results of this analysis were presented to a Law and Justice task force consisting of planners, citizens, police and policy makers, and resulted in two major decisions. First, burglary, as compared with other serious predatory crime, emerged as a priority crime for the City. In addition to its high frequency, citizens were more concerned about becoming burglary victims than any other crime. The crime of burglary represents an invasion of personal security, as well as property loss. In terms of severity, burglary exceeds all other property crimes because of the element of forcible or unauthorized entrance to the victim's dwelling, in addition to theft or other felonious acts which occur after entry of the premises has been gained.

Specific findings of the analyses indicated that burglary might be amenable to reduction through citizen actions. These included the following:

1. that the majority of burglaries occur during daylight hours when it is possible for citizens to witness them;
2. that in about 40 percent of Seattle's burglaries, entry is gained through open doors and windows;
3. that police patrols cannot be reasonably expected to prevent many burglaries; and
4. that the majority of victims were not able to provide identifying numbers of their lost property which would aid police in apprehending offenders and returning recovered property.

These problems became the basis for the second major decision and the Community Crime Prevention Program design. Basically, the program provided for a systematic block-by-block personal contact of citizens by City staff. In these contacts, the following activities occur:

1. information is provided to citizens about the burglary problem in their neighborhoods;
2. home security inspections are provided, and citizens are encouraged to make their homes less vulnerable to burglary by making physical security improvements;

3. property marking services are provided so that valuables can be identified, should a burglary occur; and
4. block watches are organized, and participants are asked to watch each other's homes for suspicious activities and to report that information to the police.

#### Definition of Terms

There are four functions which are referenced in the following descriptions of program activities. These functions include the three Primary Services and an Education and Information Service, which is advisory. For these functions, the following definitions apply:

1. Home Inspection: A tour of the home by trained, paid CCPP staff who advise the resident of vulnerabilities and remedies.
2. Property Marking: Engraving of the driver's license number (or other identifier) on frequently stolen property and posting window decals that so inform would-be burglars.
3. Block Watch: A group of eight to twelve neighboring homes with an elected leader organized around a collective concern about burglary.
4. Education and Information: City-wide service for the general public, using mass media, mailers, speaking engagements and events.

#### Program Purpose

The Community Crime Prevention Program was specifically undertaken as a demonstration program. It was designed to answer the questions of whether helping citizens to recognize their burglary vulnerabilities and to take actions to reduce risks would reduce residential burglary sufficiently to merit investment in the CCPP method as a permanent part of the City's public safety obligation. Because of its demonstration nature, the Community Crime Prevention Program has been subjected to substantial influence by the planning office, in order that specific questions about its effectiveness could be answered. These influences have included selection of experimental target areas for provision of services, definition of data collection responsibilities for the program, intensive monitoring to maintain the design integrity of the program and annual evaluations of crime impact.



### Program Resources

The Community Crime Prevention Program has been funded during its demonstration phase from four sources. The principal sources have been Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funds, along with City and State cash match required to receive grant funds. In March, 1975, funds from the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) were used to expand the staff level of the program. The fourth source consists of small donations to the program from private industry for printing of literature and program support costs. The three year cost for the program exceeds one-half million dollars: \$562,813.

From program inception in late August, 1973, until March, 1975 (one and one-half years), the staff totaled eight positions: a Director, a half-time Clerk Typist, a Data Coordinator and five field staff titled Community Organizers. In March, 1975, CETA funds permitted the addition of two Community Organizers, four Home Service Technicians and a full-time Clerk Typist. In July, 1975, one of the Community Organizer positions was lost due to a budget reduction, leaving six Community Organizers.

For the first year and one-half, CCPP field staff was comprised of five Community Organizers. For the latter year and one-half, the field staff has been comprised of six Community Organizers and four Home Service Technicians.

### Program Operations

The program's method of operation is characterized by focus upon one neighborhood at a time, and focus is on solely one subject: residential burglary. Because of both the systematic geographic and subject matter focus, the program has operated outside, but cooperatively with, the Seattle Police Department. The arrangement is viewed as preferable in that metropolitan police agencies, by nature, are principally response oriented. The block watch function recreates a proactive mechanism for informal neighborhood norm-setting to reduce burglary. That process typically includes meetings with police officers who provide police services in that neighborhood.

The program's design includes two fundamental operating axioms.

1. That a 100 percent participation of any Seattle neighborhood in the program is unrealistic. Thus, the program has sought a minimum saturation of 30 percent of all occupied single-family and duplex households in an area. As a practical matter, the program has achieved a 40 percent minimum saturation in all areas where it has recently operated; this is the basis upon which a new minimum participation quota of 40 percent is recommended for future CCPP operation.

2. The program concept assumes that a systematic block-by-block approach is more likely to yield high levels and quality participation. The program attempts quality control in its citizen participation through paid field staff making the initial contacts and organizing the neighborhood block watches. This is found to be more effective than reliance on neighborhood volunteers. The City staff professional organizer is able to outstrip the neighborhood volunteers because City-paid staff work adds a degree of official formality to the effort.

### Geographic Coverage

The systematic block-by-block approach carries with it the need to select areas cautiously. Since the program obviously is not able to cover the entire City at one time without great cost, clear geographic selection of neighborhoods to be covered each year is extremely important.

The City coverage which has been attained in three years of CCPP operation may not look impressive by itself. It is evident that the systematic, neighborhood-at-a-time operation of the Community Crime Prevention Program is as time consuming as it is tedious. Other programs operated nationally which have attempted tasks similar to the Community Crime Prevention Program are able to cover a larger geographic area more quickly but cannot claim the high levels of participation attained by the Community Crime Prevention Program.

Since the program began in September, 1973, 20 residential census tracts out of an estimated 98 predominantly residential census tracts have been serviced with the Primary Program Service. An Advisory Service has been provided Citywide where citizens or community groups have requested information and assistance. This service is viewed as a practical necessity in order to insulate the Community Crime Prevention Program's neighborhood-by-neighborhood systematic and proactive coverage of the City without denying information to citizens who wish to protect themselves from burglary. The percent of City census tracts treated in three years is 20/98 (20 percent) with the Primary Service. (See Map, page 15, following Program Methodology section.)

SECTION TWO: COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM BACKGROUND

PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

What the Community Crime Prevention Program does can be divided into three general categories.

The Primary Service is the program's principal operational methodology. Target neighborhoods receive advance mailed notice of services to be available, followed by doorbelling and telephoning, then by home inspections and property marking services, and finally by the organization of block watch meetings. The project attempts to "saturate" the community with anti-burglary actions, with a goal of enrolling at least 40 percent of the neighborhood's occupied single-family and duplex households. In the third program year, nine of the program's ten field staff spent 90 percent of their time rendering Primary Service. (See Community Crime Prevention Program Flow Chart, page 16.)

An Advisory Service is provided to some communities. During the demonstration phase of the program, this service has been used only outside the boundaries of the program-selected neighborhoods, and to a limited extent. This service is offered in response to citizens' requests for information and assistance in developing anti-burglary programs. The program provides educational material and advice, organizational advice, home security training for volunteers and criminal justice system liaison (including speakers at meetings and gatherings). Neighborhood volunteers conduct block watch meetings and carry out home inspections and property markings. Also included among Advisory Services are activities such as the numerous speaking engagements at the invitation of civic organizations and clubs. (See Community Crime Prevention Program Flow Chart, page 16.)

The Maintenance Service is designed to sustain block watches already established. Each Community Organizer recontacts and interviews the block watch captains at approximately six month intervals after each block watch has been formed, in order to evaluate jointly the condition of the group, arrange any further meetings desired and have adjacent block captains meet to form area-wide linkages. The Community Crime Prevention Program monthly Newsletter represents a mechanism designed to rejuvenate anti-burglary interest in a community.

Program Staff and Resources

CCPP field staff consist of six Community Organizers and four Home Service Technicians, with the former responsible for block watch and related activity and the latter responsible for property marking and home security inspections. The workload output required of each community organizer is to enroll an average

of no less than 20 block watch households per workweek. The Home Service Technicians are required to supply both property marking and home inspection services to an average of no less than 25 households per workweek.

Position descriptions: The activities of field staff are described as follows:

CCPP Community Organizers

1. Conduct pre-implementation contacts with local groups two or three weeks in advance of entering a new community, including setting up police car rides to establish police relationships and getting press releases to community newspapers. (Examples of the pre-implementation contacts during the third year are the Mt. Baker Community Club, the Community Accountability Program, the Riverview Community Club, South Park Area Redevelopment Committee, West Seattle Herald and White Center News.)
2. Before entering the new community, complete the "master log" of the area and a grid map (described below).
3. Plan and execute mass mailings.
4. Doorbell and telephone after the mailing to determine which households desire what services.
5. Post all doorbelled or telephoned households in the master log, and send standard "dud" letters to households that could not be contacted.
6. Conduct block watch meetings for an average of no less than 20 new households per week.
7. Pass to the Home Service Technicians any new services requested at block watch meetings.

CCPP Home Service Technicians

1. Schedule service appointments in households shown on the Citizen Interest Forms (already completed by the Community Organizers) that desire home inspections and property markings.
2. While conducting home inspections and marking property, seek and recruit block watch meeting hosts as needed by the Community Organizers.
3. Announce any already scheduled block watch meetings while in each nearby home in order to increase interest and attendance.

4. Provide a home inspection and a property marking in an average of no less than 25 homes per week.

For elaboration of these tasks applied to the total program effort, please refer to the Community Crime Prevention Program Flow Chart, page 16.

#### Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit

An additional resource available this year is the Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit, a converted recreational vehicle recently purchased by the City from the State Department of Labor and Industries with Law and Justice funds.

Inherent to the design of the Community Crime Prevention Program are at least two conditions that either limit its coverage or increase the cost of its coverage. By design, the program attempts to provide burglary prevention services to a realistic proportion of the single-family and duplex households in its target areas in a systematic, but time consuming, fashion. An additional design limitation was discovered in the first-year operating experience of the project. It was found that some residents cannot be persuaded to allow project staff to enter their homes for the purpose of providing a security inspection and to engrave valuables. The staff commitment required to gain more than 30 percent participation causes the unit cost of services to be high.

The other design limitation of the project--that it systematically serves only limited target areas--necessarily excludes large parts of the City. To expand the staff of the program to a size whereby the entire City is covered simultaneously would require a financial commitment that in the judgment of the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office would be intolerable.

Separate grant funds were obtained to purchase a Mobile Citizen Involvement vehicle in an attempt to address these two limitations of the Community Crime Prevention Program. The mobile unit addresses the problem of limited citizen involvement by making it convenient for residents to avail themselves of burglary prevention information. The mobile van is equipped with target hardening displays, literature and engravers. A CCPP staff person is available to provide information.

The mobile unit will facilitate the City's obtaining additional information pertinent to cost by speeding up the Community Crime Prevention introduction process, thereby reducing the unit manpower cost of providing its burglary prevention service. It is expected that the highly visible van will reduce citizen reluctance to admit project personnel into their homes and will allow a new goal of 40 percent participation to be attained.

Project Management and Productivity Quotas

The 1970 U. S. Census of the Population reports 136,972 occupied single-family and duplex dwellings within the corporate boundaries of the City of Seattle, of which the Community Crime Prevention Program seeks to serve a minimum of 40 percent, or 54,800. The program has served approximately 10,000 in three years. Therefore, 44,800 homes remain to be served City-wide. Ten field staff can service 5,280 households per year with all three services offered (6 Community Organizers at 20 homes per week x 44 weeks per year).

The program's field staff and productivity more than doubled with addition of the CETA-funded positions: In its first calendar year of operations, the program enrolled 1,602 households in block watches and in its third year enrolled 3,624. The doubled productivity may be attributable to the division of labor made possible by the addition of the Home Service Technicians to the CCPP staff.

Five of the six Community Organizers have been assigned to Primary Service responsibility. At 20 households each per workweek, the team thus provides block watch membership to 100 homes per workweek. All four Home Service Technicians are assigned to the Primary Service field team and, at 25 households each per workweek, they thus serve the same number of homes (100) per workweek. The program uses the government and private industry standard of 44 productive workweeks per workyear, or 85 percent of a full calendar year, as a base for productivity quotas and measurement.

In the third year of program operation, the Community Crime Prevention Program invested 186 productive Community Organizer workweeks and 150 productive Home Service Technician workweeks in the Primary Service field team during the third program year. At the end of June, 1976, the number of Seattle households that had received Primary CCPP Services since program inception in August, 1973, was as follows:

<u>BLOCK WATCH</u>	<u>HOME SECURITY INSPECTION</u>	<u>PROPERTY MARKING</u>
8,709	8,047	8,765

The total number of households participating in the program defined as receiving at least one of the three services was 9,129 households as of December 31, 1975. At the time of this report, it exceeds 10,000 households.

Since the average Seattle household includes 2.48 persons, the Primary Service can be estimated to have been provided to approximately 24,800 citizens.

Program Costs and Unit Costs

The three year total program cost is more than half a million dollars, including CETA funds: \$562,813. To put that figure in perspective, however, it should be noted that the Seattle Police Department spends approximately that three year total sum every five days. In the year 1975, citizens lost to residential burglars eight times the total three year cost of the Community Crime Prevention Program (\$4,073,700 stolen and not recovered).

For an 11-month period from August 1, 1975, to June 30, 1976, the Community Crime Prevention Program cost was \$223,310, or \$20,301 per month. A monthly program cost of \$21,925 (\$20,301 plus an estimated 8 percent cost-of-living increase) is viewed as the best estimate of costs for the program in the next program year and is based upon a field staff operating level of ten. The program's cost-per-home-served has dropped every year for the three years of program existence. The first-year cost was \$68, second-year cost was \$30.56 and third-year cost was \$28.56. It should be noted, however, that these costs are not limited to the Primary Service and include much less costly informational and educational contacts. Future costs are expected to decrease further due to use of the mobile unit to speed the home security inspections and property marking services. Thus, program costs per household served should be reduced. The mobile unit is also expected to increase the level of participation by citizens.

Program Compliance

In the third project year, the Community Crime Prevention Program organized 3,421 citizens into approximately 340 separate block watch groups.

Telephone surveys by program staff six months after a home has been inspected showed a steady increase in the rate of citizen implementation of security recommendations offered.

<u>CALLS MADE</u>	<u>RESPONDENTS WITH HOME INSPECTIONS</u>	<u>MADE IMPROVEMENTS</u>	<u>SPECIFIC INTENTIONS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Sept.-Dec., 1975	1,279	500 (39.0%)	63 (5.0%)	44.0%
Jan.-March, 1976	850	345 (40.6%)	49 (5.8%)	46.4%
April-June, 1976	589	248 (42.0%)	36 (6.0%)	48.0%

2618

Third Year Average: 46.1%

Future Coverage

The character of the Community Crime Prevention Program after the fourth year has ended in August, 1977 (the end of federal funding) is not expected to change. During the fifth year, the scheduled activities are as follows:

1. Supply Primary Service to untreated areas, with emphasis on using the Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit to the maximum extent possible.
2. Continue Maintenance Service to all then existing block watch groups Citywide.

Methodology after institutionalization will retain its focused geographical character but may be modified slightly to account for the following:

1. Maximum utilization of the Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit.
2. Experimentation with techniques of block watch maintenance such as forming block watch clusters or area wide associations of block watch groups. In addition, experimentation with methods of notifying new residents and their respective block watch captains about the Community Crime Prevention Program and the services it offers.
3. Experimentation with methods to increase the level of participation.

The projected functions for future years are described by program service feature in the following Future Annual Service Matrix (page 17).



COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

Primary Service Coverage

Done: Years 1,2,3   
To be done by end  
of Year 4

Broadview  
Advisory  
Service

Advisory  
Service

Maintenance Service now in  
progress in areas having  
had Primary Service.

Scattered  
Advisory  
Service

Laurelhurst  
Advisory  
Service

Advisory  
Service


Advisory  
Service

Advisory  
Service

CITY OF SEATTLE  
1970 CENSUS TRACTS



SCALE 1/4 MILES



COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM: FUTURE ANNUAL SERVICE MATRIX


SERVICES	PRIMARY SERVICE	MAINTENANCE SERVICE	ADVISORY SERVICE
HOME INSPECTIONS	Each of 4 Technicians performs a home inspection in 25 homes per week for 44 productive workweeks per year = 1,100 per year x 4 Technicians = 4,400 per year.	Each of 6 Community Organizers will contact the elected captains of five block watches per week x 44 productive workweeks = 220 per year x 6 Organizers = 1,320 block captain contacts. Each captain represents an average of 10 households = 13,200 households served.	One Community Organizer has supplied 2,000 households with inspections through use of citizen volunteers and self-help advice. During the next year, the Advisory Service will be the responsibility of the director, supported by incremental use of all staff. (This will not count toward staff quotas.)
PROPERTY MARKINGS	Each of 4 Technicians performs the same number of Property Markings as stated above for same total of 4,400.	Computation is as above. Note as to property marking and home inspections are not supplied directly by Maintenance Service; rather, the continuation of those security actions is encouraged. However, each should increase by 10 percent due to Maintenance for an added 440.	Property engraving to 2,000 households per year has been the rate.
BLOCK WATCH	Each of 5 Community Organizers enrolls 20 homes per week (two average block watch meetings) for 44 productive workweeks = 880 per year x 5 Community Organizers = 4,400 per year/ with 6 Community Organizers providing the Primary Service again, the total = 5,280.	The monthly Newsletter will grow from its present distribution in increments of about 400 per month to a total of 140,400 Newsletters mailed for the coming year.  Maintenance Service should produce a 10 percent increase in new block watches or 440 new households.	The past rate has been block watch membership of 2,000 households per year.
EDUCATION AND INFORMATION	In order to reach the 40 percent minimum participation offer quota, general information, local newspapers and meeting attendance are often necessary.  Mobile unit in neighborhoods provides general burglary prevention information.	Mass media as a Maintenance function should reach 200,000-300,000 based on circulation of leading Seattle newspapers and viewing audience of local television.	Provide information about burglary and its prevention City wide at speaking engagements.

**PRIMARY SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE**

**ADVISORY SERVICE**

**STEP ONE**

**STEP ONE**





Review letters and regular assignments Respond as necessary to requests for information; identify best type response

Project Director - 25% PTE to Educ. Advisory Presentation\*

Time required for response to these requests usually one week

**STEP TWO**




\*Before the increased demand, the Director had been solely designated to respond to requests.

Activities: When citizen groups hear about the program and wish information or request staff attend meetings or speak to them, this service allows the program to be responsive.

**STEP THREE**

**STEP TWO**



FIELD CONTACT


Community Organizer Six Contact Organization, Set up Block Watches

Quota: Establish at least two rev block watches per week

Activities: 1) Sign up interested households for property marking and security inspections; 2) Attempt to get a block watch organizational meeting host; 3) Take opportunity to inform about the program

Get information from Seattle Police Department on the requesting area's burglary program - present to group (crime analysis, pin map)

**STEP FOUR**




Activities: Help neighborhoods help themselves on request in neighborhoods outside the program target area.

Tasks: 1) Use volunteers from neighborhood to doorbell; 2) Set up geographic area they intend to serve; 3) Help train volunteer effort/Organize block watches; 4) Provide all necessary written materials to group; 5) Help coordinate necessary tasks.

**STEP FIVE**

**STEP THREE**



FIELD CONTACT

Community Organizer Six Technical Assistance to Block Watch Groups

Quota: 20 block watch group contacts per week


Activities: Provide written materials as requested; publish newsletter and distribute to all members; hand deliver to block captains; follow up contact with block watches, attend additional meetings.

Distribute monthly newsletter & tips  
Evaluate the volunteer effort

Activities: 1) Continue to have training contact with block watch groups; 2) Continue training of volunteer neighbors in property marking and home security inspections; 3) Assist in overall coordination of effort.

**STEP SIX OR MAINTENANCE**

**STEP FOUR OR MAINTENANCE**



Community Organizer Six Follow up on Advisory Surv. Block Watch Groups

Activities: 1) Contact block watch captains at 6-month intervals after the block watch has been formed; 2) Collect block watch evaluation information, assist to determine more effective ways to keep block watch active; 3) Decide on additional block watch tasks and meetings, attempt to get additional enrollments; 4) Set up city-wide block captain conference once a year; 5) Form clusters of block watches on geographic basis, recruit and train block captain area coordinators, notify block captains with neighborhood turnover data, distribute monthly newsletters; 6) Feed back burglary information - letter when a burglary occurs in a block captain's area.

*Victimization*

SECTION THREE: COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM IMPACT ON BURGLARY

CRIME IMPACT OBJECTIVES

The Community Crime Prevention Program has two crime reduction objectives: (1) to produce a statistically significant decrease in the number of residential burglaries occurring in the target areas, and (2) to demonstrate a statistically significant increase in the number (or percentage) of burglary-in-progress calls received by the Seattle Police Department. Changes are considered to be statistically significant if the observed difference would happen five or fewer times out of 100 by chance alone.

Residential burglary rates can be measured in two ways: by official reports and by victimization surveys. In the past, reported residential burglary in Seattle has been approximately 50 percent of "actual" burglary. However, to measure the program effect on actual burglary occurrence, the number of reported burglaries cannot just be doubled. There are two reasons for this:

1. Burglary reporting rates vary widely from one area of the City to another. Some census tracts in the City may have a low reporting rate, while others have high reporting rates. Since this program moves systematically from one test area to another, the burglary reporting rates of the respective test areas must be known in order to determine program effects. In addition, information on crime reporting rates collected in Portland, Oregon, shows that reporting rates change upward or downward for the same area at different times.
2. Program action designed to sensitize citizens to the burglary problem may produce an increase in their propensity to report their victimization. In fact, one of the aims of the program is to encourage citizens to report their victimization so that police have increased opportunities to apprehend suspects and prevent the occurrence of burglaries.

For these reasons, determination of whether the Community Crime Prevention Program reduces burglary cannot depend on reported crime data alone. This problem has been recognized in the evaluation design, and victimization surveys have been used to increase the reliability of the evaluation. A victimization survey is the best available method of determining actual burglary rates. Basically, the method consists of asking citizens in a structured interview whether they have been victimized during a set period of time; for example, in the last six months or year, or since some event took place--for example, since becoming involved in the Community Crime Prevention Program.

Using both victimization surveys and officially reported data as measurement tools, the following analyses were performed.

Objective One: To produce a statistically significant decrease in the number of residential burglaries in the project treated areas as compared with those areas before project operation and with other non-treated areas during similar time periods.

There are three groups for which burglary data are necessary to assess Objective One. These groups are as follows:

1. Households which chose to receive at least one of the three Primary Services offered by the program in census tracts where the program provided services.
2. Households which chose not to receive any project service in the census tracts where the program operated.
3. Households which were not offered any of the Primary Services by virtue of ~~their~~ being outside the census tracts where the program operated.

With these data, it is possible to answer the following important questions.

1. Is the Community Crime Prevention Program effective in preventing burglaries for households receiving at least one of the three Primary Services?
2. Do the non-participating households in a treated neighborhood benefit from their neighbors' participation, even though they do not participate themselves?
3. How long are the effects of the project's burglary reduction efforts maintained without additional project efforts?

The answer to the first question is yes. The Community Crime Prevention Program is effective in reducing residential burglary for households participating in the program.

#### Victimization Data

To reach this conclusion, three sets of victimization data were collected: CCPP project victimization survey; Law and Justice Planning Office in-person victimization survey; and Law and Justice Planning Office telephone victimization survey.

Project victimization data are collected by CCPP staff members at two different times. First, prior to entry into the program, each household's residents are asked if they have been burglary victims in the past six months. Second, these same households

are recontacted and asked if they have been victimized during the six-month period.

Analyses of these data show that there has been a significant decrease in burglary victimization. For 9,129 residences interviewed at program entry, there had been 4.46 burglaries per 100 households per six months. For 5,903 residences interviewed after six months of program involvement, there had been 2.34 burglaries per 100 households after services were provided. While reported burglary rates (according to CAPP data) increased from 84 percent to 89 percent, this difference was not statistically significant.

In early 1975, 1,474 randomly selected households in federal census tracts 96, 97, 98 and 105 were questioned about their crime victimization during calendar year 1974. In early 1976, 917 additional randomly selected households in the same areas were interviewed concerning their crime victimization during calendar year 1975.

Census tracts 97 and 98 were experimental census tracts. That is, during early 1975, of the 5,536 single and duplex residences in tracts 97 and 98, 2,111 or 38.1 percent received home security inspections; 2,089 or 37.7 percent had property marked; and 2,224 or 40.2 percent were organized into block watch groups by CAPP personnel. During the same time, no CAPP services were provided to the 2,861 single or duplex residences in tracts 96 and 105 (the two control tracts contiguous to tracts 97 and 98, to the immediate north and south).

For the control tracts 96 and 105, 10.43 percent (60 of 575) of the residences were burglarized in 1974, with 46.7 percent (28 of 60) of the burglaries being reported to the police. In 1975, 9.95 percent (42 of 422) residences were burglarized, of which 57.1 percent (24 of 42) were reported. Neither the decrease in burglary nor increase in reporting was significant.

For the experimental tracts 97 and 98, 6.34 percent (57 of 899) of the residences were burglarized in 1974, with 50.9 percent (29 of 57) being reported to the police. In 1975, 4.04 percent (20 of 495) of both CAPP participants and non-participants were burglarized, with 76.5 percent (13 of 17, reporting status unknown for three cases) being reported to the police. Both the decrease in burglaries and the increase in reporting were marginally significant (that is, the differences were less than what would be expected by chance five times in 100 but greater than what would be expected by chance 10 times in 100; if one-tailed statistical tests are used, these differences are statistically significant, i.e.,  $p < .05$ ).

Although the preceding results are impressive, they represent project-collected data and, thus, their objectivity could be

questioned. To insure the objectivity of the present evaluation, in 1975 and 1976, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office conducted two victimization surveys to determine actual burglary victimization and reporting rates to the Seattle Police Department. All surveys were performed in-person at the respondents' residences.

Within the experimental tracts, victimization data for both 1974 and 1975 were analyzed separately for households participating and households not participating. This allows us to answer question number two above: Do the non-participating households in a treated neighborhood benefit from their neighbors' participation?

There is a significant decrease in burglary for participating households and an apparent benefit of the Community Crime Prevention Program that carries over to non-participating households in the same neighborhood. In the two surveys, program participants' burglary victimization rate dropped significantly from 6.2 burglaries per 100 households to 2.4 burglaries per 100 households. For households in the target census tracts who chose not to participate in the services offered by the program, there was also a drop, although not significant, from 6.5 burglaries per 100 households in the pre-program period to 5.7 burglaries per 100 households in the post-program period.

The Community Crime Prevention Program can be shown to have a definite impact upon burglary for those participating and may have some impact on those households who choose not to participate.

Since we can answer both questions one and two affirmatively, we can also draw an important conclusion about displacement of burglary. Many have hypothesized that by successfully preventing burglaries at participating households, offenders would simply choose another target. Since the burglary rates of both participating and non-participating households went down (although the decrease for non-participants was not significant), there is no evidence that burglary is displaced to non-participants. Further, there is no evidence that more distant displacement took place, i.e., from the experimental to the adjacent control census tracts.

Although the analysis of the in-person victimization surveys is favorable to the project, all of the data were collected in West Seattle. Therefore, to broaden the base for the present analysis, a third data source was obtained.

This third victimization survey was performed by telephone as a means to obtain more interviews at less cost and more quickly than could be obtained with in-person interviews. The survey was conducted in August and September, 1976.

*decay effect*

The telephone survey sought victimization data for the preceding six months from both program participants and non-participants within CCPP treated areas. A total of 3,292 telephone interviews were conducted in five CCPP census tracts and 711 additional non-CCPP residences Citywide. The five tracts were chosen on two criteria: (1) census tracts recently treated by the project (having been completed no more than 18 months nor less than six months prior to August, 1976); and (2) census tracts in which the Community Crime Prevention Program met or exceeded minimum standard participation (30 percent or more of all single and duplex residences in a census tract received burglary reduction services). Telephone numbers of program participants were obtained from CCPP records; an equivalent number of non-CCPP telephone numbers (excluding businesses and apartments within the census tract boundaries) were randomly selected from the Pacific Northwest Bell Street Address Directory for Seattle. This telephone survey provided data for a later time period for both CCPP participants and non-participants to supplement the 1975 in-person surveys.

The results of this survey show that participation in the Community Crime Prevention Program is significantly likely to reduce a household's chances of being burglarized. When the data for 1,970 CCPP participants and 1,322 non-CCPP participants are converted to a yearly rate and added to the in-person survey rates, there were significantly fewer burglary occurrences in participating households than non-participating households. For households which did not choose to participate, the burglary victimization rate was 11.1 burglaries per 100 households for a twelve-month period. Participating households had a burglary victimization rate of 9.2 burglaries per 100 households for the same twelve-month period.

The third question we asked pertinent to the first objective was: How long do the positive results last?

This is an important question in institutionalization considerations. Ultimately, we need to know whether CCPP effects can be considered temporary or whether it has lasting value. A permanent City response in the form of the Community Crime Prevention Program would need to consider the degree to which re-treatment for neighborhoods once serviced is necessary to sustain the lower burglary rate.

The comparisons above are based on intervals of (1) varied six-month pre- and post-, (2) twelve months pre- and post-, and (3) between six months and eighteen months after program services. The results show that the program effect holds up to between 12 and 18 months after service. A decay effect does occur at this time. This may be due to a combination of factors: (1) It is likely that citizen voluntary initiative lessens with time, without reinforcement. (2) A City-wide household turnover rate of



51.6 percent over five years indicates that homeowner mobility may contribute to a decay effect.

### Reported Burglary Data

When we began this discussion of Objective One, we began with victimization information. It is also appropriate to ask, "What effect did the Community Crime Prevention Program have on official reported burglary?" Specifically, what effect does CCPP's efforts to reduce burglary and simultaneously increase reporting rates have on official data?

Data were organized into first-, second- and third-year treated areas and a Seattle-minus treated (City-wide control) area. The 11 Youth Service Bureau-Community Accountability Program census tracts were excluded from the City-wide control area.

For each operational year, twelve month pre- and twelve month post-periods were identified. The twelve month pre-period was defined as those months immediately prior to entering the first tract served in that year. The twelve month post-period was defined as those months immediately following completion of services in the last tract served that year. Official Seattle Police Department residential burglary reports were summarized for the pre- and post-periods for the City-wide control area and the tracts the Community Crime Prevention Program served in each year.

Two conclusions are clear from this and the preceding analyses:

1. Burglary reporting rates increase for both participating and non-participating households as a result of CCPP activities within treated areas (from victimization survey data).
2. Official police data for census tracts treated by the project are inconsistent indicators of CCPP effects. This is likely due to the combined effect of decreased incidents with increased reporting. Additionally, official police data for the first year include the effects of other programs operating in the same tracts.

A comparison of pre- and post-period reported burglary rates for the City-wide control area and for areas served by the program in the first year showed a significant decrease in CCPP tracts when compared to the City-wide control area. While reported burglary in the City-wide control area increased 11 percent (from 5,949 to 6,586 reports), the first-year CCPP tracts decreased by 2 percent.

For the second-year CCPP areas, only 11 months post-data were available for analysis. These data were converted to a twelve-

month rate for comparison purposes. While the City-wide control area experienced a 16 percent decrease in reported burglaries (from 7,066 to an adjusted 5,925), tracts served by the program in the second year had a -9 percent decrease (from 906 to an adjusted 828) in burglaries. Although both areas experienced a decrease in reported burglaries, post-data for the CCPP tracts indicated a marginally significant increase relative to the City-wide control area.

The inconsistency between first- and second-year reported burglary data and the victimization data previously presented is most likely due to the increased reporting rates for areas treated by the program. However, it does not explain why there was a significant drop in reported burglaries for first-year CCPP treated tracts. It may be that the officially reported results of the first operational year of the program represents not just CCPP efforts but also the efforts of the various coordinated police projects in the same area. However, in the areas treated by the second and third years of the Community Crime Prevention Program, there were no such special police projects operating in the treated areas.

Objective Two: To produce a statistically significant increase in the number of burglary-in-progress calls received by the police department from citizens living in the target areas as compared with other non-treated areas of the city.

Prior to presenting the results of the analysis, it is important to discuss why an increase in calls is an important indicator of program success. First, CCPP block watches are designed to increase citizen observation of suspicious neighborhood activity as a prelude to burglary. Second, as neighbors become more sensitized to burglary and pre-burglary activity, they should be more likely to report burglaries-in-progress. Sensitized citizens would be less likely to hesitate for a critical period of time between the observation of suspicious activity and the reporting of that activity. Third, it was postulated that the quality of information provided by burglary-in-progress calls would increase (quality as defined by more suspect information and arrests generated).

The results of the analysis can be summarized in two statements:

1. The reporting of burglaries-in-progress as a proportion of all burglary calls to the police has increased significantly for those areas treated by the Community Crime Prevention Program.
2. The quality of burglary-in-progress calls has not been significantly changed as a result of more burglary calls being received by the police. Both the number of calls including suspect information and resulting in arrests have increased, although non-significantly.

The method used for this analysis was similar to that used to assess the impact of the Community Crime Prevention Program on reported burglary. The CCPP target areas were put into one category and the remainder of Seattle was defined as control areas for comparison purposes.

From the pre- to post-period in the City-wide control area, the burglary-in-progress call rate increased 4 percent, or from 8.5 percent to 8.8 percent of the total calls. For the treated tracts, the burglary-in-progress call rate increased 27 percent, or from 9.1 percent to 11.6 percent of the total calls. There was a significant increase in burglary-in-progress calls in the treated areas as compared with the City-wide control areas.

Given that Objective Two was achieved, additional questions relating to the objective were asked concerning: (1) the location from which burglary-in-progress calls originated, (2) whether there was an increase in suspect information, and (3) whether these burglary-in-progress calls resulted in more arrests on the scene.

In attempting to answer these questions, it was found that in approximately half of the reports taken by 911 telephone operators, the address of the person making the call was not recorded. Therefore, our ability to determine block watch impact on burglary-in-progress calls was severely hindered. In the City-wide control area, there was a 1 percent increase (from 23.0 percent to 23.3 percent) in burglary-in-progress calls originating from addresses other than the victim's, and within the treated areas, there was a 17 percent decrease (from 27.5 percent to 22.8 percent) in calls from other locations. Neither of these changes is statistically significant. The inconclusiveness of this particular analysis may be due to missing data on callers' locations cited above.

To determine if there had been an increase in suspect information, burglary-in-progress calls were analyzed on the basis of whether a description of the suspect(s) or the suspect's vehicle was included when the call was made. In the City-wide control area, there was a 17 percent increase (from 55.2 percent to 64.0 percent) in the suspect information rate. This increase is statistically significant. An 8 percent increase for treated areas was not statistically significant. For both control and treated areas, approximately 65 percent of all calls included suspect information during the post-period.

Another way to examine the quality of the additional burglary-in-progress calls received by the Seattle Police Department as a result of CCPP activities is to analyze the outcome of such calls. Does the increase of burglary-in-progress calls in CCPP areas cause more immediate response dispatching of patrol officers to crime scenes without a corresponding increase in favorable outcomes

(i.e., arrest of suspects)? It is possible that burglary-in-progress calls were generated through project efforts that are actually counter-productive in terms of police manpower use.

To answer this question, burglary-in-progress calls that resulted in the arrest of suspect(s) for the City-wide control area and CCPP areas were analyzed. In the City-wide control area, the number of burglary-in-progress calls resulting in arrest decreased 6.9 percent (from 18.1 percent to 16.9 percent), while for the treated area, the arrest to burglary-in-progress rate increased 9.7 percent (from 17.5 percent to 19.2 percent). Neither of these changes is statistically significant.

Thus, although these were statistically non-significant differences, there is some indication that CCPP areas had higher quality burglary-in-progress calls as a function of arrests.

SECTION FOUR: ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

INTRODUCTION

The preceding sections of this report have described in detail what the Community Crime Prevention Program is, how it operates, what it was intended to accomplish and what the results have been. This section uses that information in a comparison of alternatives and discusses several variables of future implementation of the Community Crime Prevention Program.

The choice of an alternative for future implementation of the Community Crime Prevention Program should be made on the basis of accumulated information and lessons learned from the demonstration program. In order to consider this information, a relatively simple operational model of the program was developed. The model considers the rate at which CCPP services can be offered to single-family and duplex households and bases these rates on operational data presented in Section Two. In addition, it uses burglary victimization rates and reporting rates from the crime impact evaluation results. Following immediately is a discussion of the methodology, along with an example which uses evaluation data from two experimental and two control census tracts in West Seattle. Following this section is a discussion of four alternatives in which the staff size of the program, the proportions of households participating and burglary victimization and reporting rates are varied and predictions of program impact are presented. Finally, this section discusses the somewhat troublesome factors of turnover, or change of ownership, of Seattle's housing stock and the evaluation conclusion that program benefits may decay with the passage of time.

SECTION FOUR: ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

METHODOLOGY AND AN EXAMPLE

Current implementation of the Community Crime Prevention Program represents one of many possible alternatives for institutionalization. The range of alternatives is best described in terms of the rate at which the City's single-family and duplex households are offered CCPP services and the proportion of these households that actually accept the offer of services.


In a discussion of alternatives for future implementation of the Community Crime Prevention Program, it is useful to define three specific types of households:

1. Direct Service Households: Those single-family and duplex households in the target areas which have been offered CCPP services and which have accepted them.
2. Indirect Service Households: Those single-family and duplex households in the target areas which have been offered CCPP services and have refused them.
3. Unserviced Households: Those single-family and duplex households in the City which have not yet been offered CCPP services.

The purpose for making the distinction of indirect service households is that even though these households refuse direct services, they do enjoy program benefits in the form of non-significantly lower victimization rates (approximate 12 percent decrease). (We would hypothesize that this benefit accrues because the neighborhood has been organized into block watches and, in general, the vigilance of the neighborhood has been increased.) However, a much larger effect of the program on these households is the increased rate of reporting which appears to result from the combined education and sensitization of citizens caused by project recruitment attempts. In West Seattle experimental tracts, reporting rates for indirect service households increased from 40 percent to 64 percent following CCPP recruitment attempts. The relevance of this information is that indirect service households experience a slight decrease in victimization rates and a much larger increase in reporting rates. The impact upon official reported rates is a net increase in reported burglary. As the proportion of households accepting and refusing CCPP services increases, it causes an increase in the proportion of burglaries reported. For direct service households, however, the opposite occurs. The decrease in burglary rates is greater than the increase in reporting, producing a net decrease in official data. Therefore, as the proportion of households offered and accepting services increases, there is a net decrease in reported data.

Figure 4-1 is a Venn diagram of these definitions. The rectangular area represents all single-family and duplex households within the City limits; the rectangular area minus the larger circular area is unserviced households; the larger circular area minus the smaller circular area is indirect service households; and the smaller circular area is serviced households. The larger circular area represents all single-family and duplex households to which CCPP services have been offered.

Figure 4-1--Venn Diagram Illustration of Household Definitions



With these definitions and some simplifying assumptions, it is possible to define a series of relationships for the purpose of examining different implementation alternatives.

Households serviced by CCPP: First, from the 1970 Census,<sup>1</sup> we know there are 136,972 occupied single-family and duplex households within the City limits and from Figure 4-1 that:

$$\text{Serviced households} + \text{indirect service households} + \text{unserviced households} = 136,972$$

At this time, since the City has approximately 10,000 serviced households and 15,000 indirect service households, there are

<sup>1</sup>"Table H-2, Structural, Equipment and Financial Characteristics of Housing Units: 1970," Seattle-Everett, Washington, SMSA, prepared by the U. S. Bureau of the Census.

there are 111,972 unserved households.

Second, we know from the demonstration program that a certain staffing level of Community Organizers and Home Service Technicians has a capability of offering CCPP services to (n) households per month, and that a proportion (p) will accept and become serviced households. Consequently, during the period of time that the Community Crime Prevention Program is moving through the City, the following relationships would apply.

$$\text{Serviced households} = 10,000 + p(n)t$$

$$\text{Indirect service households} = 15,000 + (1-p)(n)t = 15,000 + nt - pnt$$

$$\text{Unserved households} = 111,972 - [p(n)t + (1-p)(n)t] = 111,972 - nt$$

Where (t) is time in months

These relationships allow us to predict what can be expected in the future from CCPP implementation alternatives. As was discussed in Section Two, the current staffing of four Home Service Technicians and six Community Organizers are offering CCPP services to 1,100 households per month, and approximately 40 percent are accepting the services or becoming serviced households. Thus:

$$p = .40$$

$$n = 1,100/\text{month}$$

and the number of:

$$\text{Serviced households} = 10,000 + 440t$$

$$\text{Indirect service households} = 15,000 + 660t$$

$$\text{Unserved households} = 111,972 - 1,100t$$

If these relationships are solved for a point where all households in the City have been offered CCPP services, i.e., unserved households = 0, then  $t = 101.79$  months or approximately eight and one-half years.

Future burglary victimization: The crime impact evaluation shows that as the Community Crime Prevention Program offers and delivers burglary prevention services, changes in burglary victimization rates for both serviced and indirect service households occur. In addition, there is no evidence that burglary is being displaced out of the CCPP target areas. Consequently, we would not expect that burglary victimization rates outside CCPP target areas, i.e., unserved households, would be affected by alternative implementations. Continuing with the example of the current CCPP implementation alternative, the number of burglaries for each type of household would be as follows:



Number of households x victimization rate

Thus, burglaries in serviced households would be the number of serviced households multiplied by their victimization rate ( $BV_{sh}$ ). Similarly, burglary victimization rates for indirect service households and unserviced households ( $BV_{ih}$  and  $BV_{uh}$ ) can be applied, respectively, to the equations listed above. Thus, the number of burglaries as a function of time could be represented as:

$$\text{Burglaries, serviced households} = BV_{sh}[10,000 + pnt]$$

$$\text{Burglaries, indirect service households} = BV_{ih}[15,000 + (1-p)nt] = BV_{ih}[15,000 + nt - pnt]$$

$$\text{Burglaries, unserviced households} = BV_{uh}[111,972 - nt]$$

Using the victimization rates observed in West Seattle during the second year of the project ( $BV_{sh} = .0243$ ;  $BV_{ih} = .0565$ ; and  $BV_{uh} = .0995$ ; see crime impact evaluation) and solving these equations at  $t = 0$  months and  $t = 101.8$  months produces the following results, shown in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1--Burglaries by Type of Household

	t = 0 months	t = 101.8 months
Serviced households	243.00	1,331.34
Indirect service households	847.50	4,643.25
Unserviced households	11,141.21	5,974.59
Total	12,231.71	5,974.59

Thus, in this example, we would expect the actual number of burglaries occurring in single-family and duplex households to decrease from 12,232 to 5,975 in a period of 101.8 months, or approximately 51 percent.

Reported burglary: The crime impact evaluation also shows that the proportion of burglaries reported to police changes as a result of CCPP treatment. If we define additional variables  $R_{sh}$ ,  $R_{ih}$  and  $R_{uh}$  as the proportions of burglaries reported in serviced households, indirect service households and unserviced households, respectively, it is possible to write the following relationships:

$$\text{Reported burglaries, serviced households} = R_{sh}\{BV_{sh}[10,000 + pnt]\}$$

$$\text{Reported burglaries, indirect service households} = R_{ih}\{BV_{ih}[15,000 + nt - pnt]\}$$

$$\text{Reported burglaries, unserviced households} = R_{uh}\{BV_{uh}[111,972 - nt]\}$$

If these equations are solved at the beginning of program implementation ( $t = 0$ ) and at the point at which all households have been offered CCPP services ( $t = 101.8$  months) and using reporting rates observed in West Seattle of  $R_{sh} = .100$ ;  $R_{ih} = .64$ ; and  $R_{uh} = .57$  (see crime impact evaluation), the following results are obtained, shown in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2--Reported Burglaries by Type of Household

	t = 0 months	t = 101.8 months
Serviced households	243.00	1,331.34
Indirect service households	542.40	2,971.68
Unserviced households	6,350.49	-
Total	7,135.89	4,303.02

Thus, in this example, we would expect reported burglary to decrease from 7,136 to 4,303 during the time required to offer CCPP services to all City single-family and duplex households.

SECTION FOUR: ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

Four alternatives for CAPP operations in the future are presented here to examine their possible impact upon the occurrence and reporting of residential burglary in the next one, five, ten and fifteen years.

The first alternative (present operation) envisions no change in staff level, mode of operation or number of people being offered and accepting CAPP services. As previously mentioned, this alternative would require approximately eight and one-half additional years to cover the entire City.

Alternative two (moderate expansion) envisions a 50 percent improvement in the number of households being offered and accepting CAPP services. This might be achieved in one of two possible ways. First, a 50 percent increase in staffing levels (to nine Community Organizers and six Home Service Technicians), with no change in method of operation. A second way to achieve such an increase would involve the conversion of the present four Home Service Technicians to Community Organizers and reliance upon citizens to perform their own property marking and home security inspection, following a training session. The Community Organizers would later inspect such citizen-performed services and either approve them or make suggestions for additional work at that time. Alternative two would anticipate services being offered to 1,650 households a month, with 40 percent of them accepting such services. At this rate, the entire City would be serviced in five and two-thirds years.

Alternative three (massive expansion) is based on the assumption that the entire City should be offered project services within three years, using current project methods. To achieve this, 3,110 households a month would need to be offered project services. This would represent an increase of 183 percent over present levels of operation. If the staff levels needed to provide these operations are linearly expanded, this would represent a need for 17 Community Organizers and 11 Home Service Technicians.

Alternative four (media recruitment) would involve a drastic departure from present methods of operation. Rather than relying upon door-to-door canvassing, citizens would be subjected to massive media (television, radio, newspaper and mailing) campaigns within various neighborhoods of the City. The advantage of this method would be that staff time spent recruiting households could be used in providing services. This would allow the entire City to be covered within an estimated two years. However, the disadvantage of such an approach is that past experience

both nationally and locally indicates that only a small proportion of people become involved (from 2 percent to 17 percent, with the majority of such programs recruiting less than 10 percent of those informed). Based on first-year experience of the Community Crime Prevention Program in the Ballard area, a 7 percent recruitment rate would be considered extremely high. On a monthly average for the two years to cover the City, this would represent the provision of CCPP services to approximately 327 (7 percent acceptance of 4,666 offered a month) households, or 74 percent of the present level. This alternative might allow a reduction of staff to four and one-half Community Organizers and three Home Service Technicians.

To determine the relative merit of these four alternatives, projections of the total number of residential burglaries in single-family and duplex households that would occur and would be reported to the police within one, five, ten and fifteen years were developed. The projections were made using the equations previously presented for the number of households serviced, the number of expected burglaries and the number of reported burglaries. Assumed values for (n) (number of households offered services per month) and (p) (proportion of households accepting services) for each model are presented in Table 4-3 below.

Table 4-3--Assumed n and p Values for Various Alternatives

Alternative	n	p
1	1100	40
2	1650	40
3	3110.3	40
4	4665.5	.07

Burglary victimization and burglary reporting rates for serviced households are presented in Table 4-4 below. The sources for these estimates are as follows. The unserviced household burglary rate was based upon a telephone survey of 711 randomly chosen, non-CCPP households within the City of Seattle conducted in August and September, 1976. Of those called, 31 (4.32 percent) indicated that they had been burglarized in the preceding six months. Converted to an annual rate, this represents 8.72 burglaries per 100 households per year.

Table 4-4--Burglary Victimization and Reporting Rate for Different Households

Type of Household	Burglary Rate per 100	Reporting Rate
Serviced household (CCPP member)	3.83	90%
Indirect service household	8.04	64%
Unserviced household (not yet offered CCPP services)	8.72	57%

Within the West Seattle census tracts for which pre- and post-victimization data were available for both serviced and indirect service households, victimization rates for indirect service households decreased 12.4 percent, while in two adjacent non-treated tracts burglary decreased 4.6 percent. Therefore, the net decrease in indirect service households due to being in a treated area is estimated at 7.8 percent. A 7.8 percent decrease in the City-wide burglary rate would represent a rate of 8.04 burglaries per 100 households per year.

For serviced households, the decrease was 60.7 percent which, when adjusted for the 4.6 percent decrease in neighboring non-treated tracts, represents a decrease of 56.1 percent. Such a decrease in the City-wide rate would represent 3.83 burglaries per 100 households per year.

Burglary victim reporting rates were taken from West Seattle victimization data previously presented in this section. The one exception was for serviced households. Given the low number of burglary cases ( $n = 6$ ) upon which the reporting rate (100 percent) was determined, it was felt that such a figure was unrealistically high. Therefore, for present purposes, a 90 percent reporting figure was used as one intermediate between CCPP project figures and the Law and Justice Planning Office conducted in-person surveys.<sup>2</sup>

For each of the four alternatives, the estimated number of burglaries that would occur and that would be reported on an annual rate are presented in Figure 4-2 and Table 4-5 below. All projections are based on the assumptions that:

1. actual residential burglary and reporting would remain constant over time without further CCPP activities; and
2. no decay of program effect would occur.

With these assumptions, the number of estimated actual burglaries within single-family and duplex residences would be 11,353 a year, of which 6,682 would be reported if no further CCPP services were provided.

In Table 4-5, the number of burglaries that would have been prevented is given as a cumulative figure from time = 0, or the beginning point of the projection. For example, alternative 4

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<sup>2</sup>Given an assumed CCPP population reporting rate of 90 percent or proportion equal to .90, the probability of randomly selecting six CCPP residences which were burglarized and in which all were reported would be  $p = .53$  (assumed population proportion to the power equal to the number of samples, or  $.90^6$ ).

Figure 4-2--Number of Burglaries per Year




Table 4-5--Projected Burglary Rates for Four Alternative CCPP Operations

Alternative	1 Year			5 Years			10 Years			15 Years		
	Actual	Reported	Prevented	Actual	Reported	Cumulative Prevented	Actual	Reported	Cumulative Prevented	Actual	Reported	Cumulative Prevented
Present (#1)	11,041	6,615	312	9,793	6,350	1,560	8,706	6,117	15,197	8,706	6,117	28,432
Moderate Expansion (#2)	10,885	6,582	468	9,013	6,183	2,340	8,706	6,117	18,955	8,706	6,117	32,190
Massive Expansion (#3)	10,470	6,494	883	8,706	6,117	9,265	8,706	6,117	22,500	8,706	6,117	35,735
Media (#4)	10,807	6,714	546	10,261	6,745	4,368	10,261	6,745	9,828	10,261	6,745	15,288

in Table 4-5 would result in 10,261 burglaries occurring, with 6,745 being reported after five years of operation. Within that five years, a total of 4,368 burglaries would have been prevented. Alternative 1 would result in 9,793 burglaries, of which 6,350 would be reported and a cumulative 1,560 burglaries would have been prevented in five years.

An additional alternative would be to discontinue the Community Crime Prevention Program. If this were to occur, the estimated present number of residential burglaries per year in single-family and duplex residences (11,353) would increase to 11,944 (5 percent increase) within 18 months as project effects begin to decay. Assuming that reporting rates would revert to pre-treatment levels, the present-level 6,682 reports would increase to 6,808 (2 percent increase). These figures are based on the assumption that, in the absence of CCPP efforts, burglary occurrences and reports will remain constant. If the assumption of no future decay is made, the level of burglary incidents and reports would remain unchanged in the absence of other factors. This is an experiment to learn who the readers of law and justice policy work are. If you have reached this point, please call Larry Gunn at six two five, four five one two and receive a gift worth dollars. Please keep your discovery confidential and please continue.

While the program evaluation indicates a decay of CCPP effect after 18 months of residences receiving services, the maintenance function of the Community Crime Prevention Program is designed to reduce this problem. However, at this time, we do not know enough about the impact of the proposed maintenance service to determine whether or not it will be capable of totally or partially eliminating the observed decay effect.



SECTION FOUR: ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES

The projections generated in the preceding paragraphs allow some additional discussion of the alternatives for the Seattle CCPP efforts. The model focuses upon three essential variables as predictors of future levels of burglary victimization and reporting. These are the capacity of the City to offer CCPP services to households, the program's methodology for recruitment of participants and the level of participation achieved by the recruitment methodology.

Alternatives 1, 2 and 3 differ only in terms of the City's capacity to offer services. Alternative 1 is basically descriptive of the current effort. Although the minimum standard for the program has been 30 percent acceptance of CCPP services, program experience shows that higher levels may be obtained, especially with the addition of the Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit. Thus, we would expect to achieve approximately 40 percent participation through the systematic door-to-door, block-by-block methodology. This methodology is inherent in Alternatives 1, 2 and 3. Capacity to offer CCPP services can be increased in two ways:

1. increase the CCPP staff by hiring additional Community Organizers and Home Service Technicians, or
2. through the use of volunteers.

The principal advantage of the use of volunteers, of course, is that the program implementation costs could be reduced. It is useful, however, to consider other somewhat analogous public safety services provided by the City. For example, in the conduct of inspections with motives of fire prevention, maintenance of health, construction and housing adequacy standards, there appears to be an element of technical competence which would preclude the use of volunteers. A similar argument could be made with regard to security inspections which are conducted in the interest of preventing burglary. Just as a fire prevention inspector must be trained to identify fire hazards and make convincing and acceptable suggestions for their removal, Home Service Technicians must operate from a base of knowledge regarding common points of entry, a variety of hardware available for securing these points of entry, and must be able to convince citizens, from a marketing point of view, that suggested remedies should be implemented.

Finally, there is some evidence<sup>3</sup> which suggests that a methodology which uses program staff in an official City capacity will achieve greater compliance and participation in the program. However, the use of volunteers to perform CCPP staff activities raises several possible problems. At this time, we do not have sufficient data to assess these potential concerns, but the project will be collecting such data in the coming year. First, there are no data at present regarding the relative cost/benefit of recruitment and training of volunteers, and replacing volunteers who quit. Second, data on community acceptance of such volunteers as authoritative sources of information and compliance with such suggestions are lacking. Third, we have no data regarding the availability of volunteer assistance in difficult neighborhoods in the City. Fourth, project experience with volunteer workers through its Advisory Service cannot presently be said to have had any impact upon either burglary victimization or reporting rates, since no such data presently exist.

In summary, the best alternatives for increasing the capacity of the Community Crime Prevention Program to offer services appears to be additional staff. Proceeding with this conclusion, the four alternatives present two related choices for the City:

1. At what rate should CCPP services be offered to the remaining unserved households?
2. What level of resources should be committed to an institutionalized CCPP capacity?

Expanding CCPP staff from its present level (Alternative 1) by approximately 50 percent or 183 percent (Alternatives 2 and 3, respectively) is considered undesirable for several reasons. First, the level of information generated by the CCPP demonstration program and its demonstrated success suggest that policy makers should be thinking in terms of a permanent CCPP capacity. In other words, the Community Crime Prevention Program should not be viewed as a temporary service designed to achieve an acceptable level of residential burglary. We do not believe that a City-wide blitz with no residual capacity is a good choice

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<sup>3</sup>Evaluation of the Program's Effectiveness; Phase I Evaluation of Operational Identification, Volume 1, Institute for Public Program Analysis, St. Louis, Missouri, 1975. In a national review of operation identification programs, the majority relying on media and volunteers to recruit and perform services have found typically low compliance with project suggestions (e.g., approximately 2 percent to 17 percent of informed persons). While this information does not relate directly to this question, it represents the best available information at this time.

for controlling residential burglary. This belief is based upon several lessons learned in the demonstration program and its evaluation, as well as intuitive argument.

One important factor which should be considered is the rate at which citizens change their place of residence.

As mentioned above, the fact that citizens frequently change their place of residence is somewhat troublesome to the CCPP concept. Census data for 1970 show that 48.4 percent of Seattle's residents occupied the same dwelling in 1965. In other words, 51.6 percent resided at a different location than they did in 1965. These data suggest that, to the extent program influence depends upon citizen actions, there would be a natural decay in program effectiveness. That is, to the extent program success depends upon participation in block watches and marking of personal property, we might assume a loss of program effectiveness because 8 percent to 9 percent of the participating occupants would move each year. On the other hand, target hardening benefits (security improvements) could be expected to be unaffected by a change in occupancy because they accrue from physical changes to the dwelling itself. In addition, we would expect that marked personal property, to the extent it is not sold, exchanged or burgled, would continue to contribute to overall program impact.

The neighborhood turnover problem is one which is troublesome to any attempt by government to organize neighborhoods, whether the motivation is crime reduction or some other goal. As mentioned in Section Two, the Community Crime Prevention Program is attempting to reduce the impact of the turnover phenomenon through block watch Maintenance Services.

Although the Maintenance Service is designed to sustain block watch activities and interest, as well as provide the opportunity for new program enrollment, it does not address completely the change of residence problem. Within a relatively long period of time, we would expect that turnover among CCPP participants would have brought the level of organization among block watches to the point where retreatment with the Primary Service would be needed to maintain the program impact.

A discussion of the proper length of time between the provision of Primary Service approaches speculation. We simply lack the experience with the Maintenance effort to say with any certainty whether households should receive Primary Service every 10.4, 6.9 or 3.7 years (Alternatives 1, 2 and 3, respectively). The most conservative choice would be the longer cycle represented by Alternative 1. Selection of this alternative reduces the amount of resources necessary to maintain the program and allows the accumulation of information regarding the important issue of maintenance of program effect.

Our recommendation, then, is that Alternative 1 is preferred over Alternatives 2 and 3. The consequences of this choice, in terms of the level of burglary as predicted by the model, are shown in Table 4-5 and Figure 4-2. While the model predicts a slower rate of decrease in burglary victimization and a slower accumulation of burglaries prevented than Alternatives 2 and 3, these rates are viewed as acceptable, given the uncertainty regarding program maintenance and the City's current fiscal position.

Alternative 4, while it is potentially the least expensive (depending upon the availability of free public media use) and the most rapid, is the least effective over the long run in terms of lowering annual burglary rates, preventing burglaries and producing higher victim reporting rates. While the number of reported burglaries would increase 1 percent at the completion of this two-year program, burglary victimizations would decrease 9.6 percent, with 66 percent of all burglaries being reported; while with Alternative 1 (at completion), reported burglaries would decrease 8 percent while burglary victimization would decrease 23.3 percent, with 70 percent of all burglaries being reported.

Alternative 1 is recommended for institutionalizing the Community Crime Prevention Program.

SECTION FIVE: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CITY POLICY

1. The Community Crime Prevention Program should continue. Public safety is a responsibility of the City of Seattle. For the priority crime of burglary, the jurisdictional responsibility of the City resides in the law enforcement function. Law enforcement encompasses prevention and detection of crime and apprehension of offenders.

The Community Crime Prevention Program is responsive to all three of these burglary enforcement elements and, in this way, is responsive to the City's public safety obligations. The Community Crime Prevention Program is a direct response to burglary prevention and an indirect response to detection and apprehension.

Prevention: The target hardening and increased security measures encouraged by the Community Crime Prevention Program are the best known means to prevent burglary. Evidence is substantial that where burglars are discouraged from entering, the burglary does not take place.

Detection: It is often not possible for police agencies to know of crime or detect that a violation of law has occurred where it is not brought to their attention. The Community Crime Prevention Program aids in early detection of burglary. The chance that patrol officers could be in the right place at the right time to observe a burglary is very slight. It takes only seconds for most burglars to enter a home, and it is mathematically improbable for police to be strategically positioned to observe many burglaries through patrolling a neighborhood. It is more likely that neighbors on the watch for suspicious activity would detect burglary; this fact is supported by the experience of an increased number of burglary-in-progress calls received by the police in neighborhoods where the Community Crime Prevention Program operates.

Detection is also enhanced by the CAPP target hardening effort. Where homes are made less easily penetrable, more effort is required to gain entry. This increases the likelihood for immediate detection by increasing the time that burglars are exposed to potential observation by witnesses.

A third way that the Community Crime Prevention Program increases detection of burglary is by encouraging more reporting to police. In this way, the program facilitates police obtaining more complete burglary information upon which crime analysis and investigative work can be based.

Apprehension: The Community Crime Prevention Program increases the likelihood for police apprehension of burglars by increasing the likelihood that the burglar will be observed by a conscientious citizen. Apprehension is enhanced by a witness' identification of the suspect or other witness information. Since more persons are watching for burglary, more potential witnesses are available.

The Community Crime Prevention Program is a successful burglary reduction response. The compelling reason to continue the Community Crime Prevention Program is that it works to prevent and reduce burglary and helps enable the apprehension of burglars.

2. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be a permanent City public safety service. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be viewed as a permanent public safety activity of the City. Since public safety is not a temporary responsibility of City government, the Community Crime Prevention Program should not be a temporary response to burglary. This statement is qualified as follows:
  - a. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be discontinued at the time that it no longer reduces burglary.
  - b. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be replaced by another strategy when something which works more effectively to reduce burglary is found, or when something which works just as effectively to reduce burglary, but costs less, is designed, tested and proven.
3. The unique methodology of the Community Crime Prevention Program must survive. The Community Crime Prevention Program should continue to operate in essentially the same manner which has been tested for over three years.

The Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program is substantially different from others which pursue similar objectives by other means. There are identifiable ingredients of this project which must survive as the program becomes permanent.

The staff should remain civilian rather than sworn. Civilian staff are much less costly than sworn police personnel.

The Community Crime Prevention Program should retain its narrow focus on residential burglary. CCPP administration must not allow the tedious and repetitious nature of the CCPP effort to justify staff involvement in novel and ancillary activities.

The Community Crime Prevention Program should not sacrifice quality of services delivered for inducements of delivering the services more quickly or more broadly.

The Community Crime Prevention Program should retain its systematic block-by-block approach, with a minimum of uncontrolled experimentation. The basic program methodology should not be changed. The Community Crime Prevention Program should continue to offer principally three services: (1) home security inspection, (2) property marking, and (3) block watch organization. Although the work is repetitious for staff, it is these three Primary Services which form the methodology which has been exposed to test for the last three years. These are the tasks that work to reduce burglary.

It is known that there are cheaper and faster ways to cover the City with anti-burglary information. However, it is not known if cheaper and faster dispensation of services works as well. Once the program has been institutionalized, the same high expectations for results must be maintained. Experimentation with the design which could adversely affect burglary impact by the Community Crime Prevention Program should be avoided. That is not to say that different techniques to reduce costs and speed service delivery should not be tried. However, program refinements should be attempted in a cautious, systematic and experimental way.

The offer of CCPP services should continue to be made by paid professional Home Service Technicians and Community Organizers. Although less costly than professional field staff, the use of volunteers has not been tested and may not be as effective as service delivery by City-paid staff. Seattle citizens have paid for the provision of these protective services with tax dollars. In the Community Crime Prevention Program, citizens go one step further. They volunteer time and energy in forming block watch groups, and they spend their money to make security improvements. In this way, the citizens assist the City in providing them protection from burglary. If the City additionally were to expect the organizational efforts also to be the responsibility of citizens, the City could potentially be exposed to the criticism that citizens are being asked to contribute more than their fair share to the burglary prevention effort.

4. Additional information on maintaining program effect should be generated. The Maintenance function must be refined and expanded as the proportion of the City covered by the program expands.

Some work has been done in an attempt to understand how to maintain the burglary prevention effect of the Community Crime Prevention Program. It is reasonable to expect some loss of sustained energy on the part of citizens volunteering time to burglary reduction. Some experimenting with rejuvenation methodologies currently being done will have to continue, and perhaps be enlarged, in the next several months in an attempt to "fine-tune" the complete CCPP response. In this way, it is hoped more precise understanding of the effective use of several mechanisms to keep program interest high in neighborhoods can be obtained and described.

5. The program participation quota should be increased from 30 percent to 40 percent of single-family and duplex households in an area. The 30 percent participation minimum saturation quota for single-family and duplex households in an area should be increased to 40 percent minimum participation saturation. We should continually attempt to improve on the proportion of citizens accepting CCPP services. Most areas in which the Community Crime Prevention Program worked in the second and third years had a participation rate of between 40 and 50 percent. With the addition of the Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit, a 40 percent minimum for citizen participation appears to be realistic. The Analysis of Alternatives shows that with 40 percent participation, the burglary reduction capabilities of the Community Crime Prevention Program improve considerably.

Productivity quotas for staff should be maintained, and additional productivity requirements related to the Maintenance function for staff who have had several years to develop and refine skills should be considered.

6. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be placed in the City's general fund budget. For 1977, five months of operation costs to cover the period from August 1, 1977, to December 31, 1977, \$109,625, should be budgeted in the 1977 annual City budget. The present size of the staff should be maintained. The larger the field staff, the greater the Primary Service coverage, which results in greater burglary reduction benefit to the City. However, it is known that the City faces serious budget problems, and increases in staff size are, therefore, not recommended. The present staff size consisting of ten field staff involves 1,100 new households per month; at this rate, the entire City will be covered in 10.4 years.
7. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be permanently placed in the Department of Community Development. During its demonstration phase, the Community Crime Prevention Program has been placed administratively under the Office of Policy Planning/Law and Justice Planning Office. It appears



that it is the program's strict adherence methodology which has allowed the Community Crime Prevention Program to succeed where others which pursue similar objectives have failed. Therefore, maintenance of program methodology is a principal issue in deciding into which City department to place the program.

The services provided and the maintenance of high levels of productivity in the provision of those services depend to a great extent on flexibility in work scheduling and discipline with regard to attention to the philosophy of systematic treatment, as opposed to response.

The work being accomplished by the Community Crime Prevention Program is tedious and can be boring. Consequently, suggestions for work activities different from those prescribed by the implementation design can be expected to receive positive reception by the staff. The demonstration experience has shown that there is a tendency for staff to become distracted and to substitute a work agenda for that which is prescribed by the objectives, as a solution to routine.

The Community Crime Prevention Program could be placed in one of several City departments including the Seattle Police Department (SPD), the Department of Human Resources (DHR), the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs (DLCA), the Department of Community Development (DCD) and the Law and Justice Planning Office (LJPO).

The Law and Justice Planning Office can be quickly dismissed as a reasonable alternative because it is not an operating department, and because the City Council has provided clear instructions that no permanent operating programs are to be placed in the Office of Policy Planning, of which the Law and Justice Planning Office is a part.

The Seattle Police Department would be a poor choice to manage the Community Crime Prevention Program. The Seattle Police Department appears to lack the flexibility needed to accommodate the Community Crime Prevention Program. SPD work rules are necessarily strict and structured; violation of these rules normally results in disciplinary action. In order for the Community Crime Prevention Program to operate in the Seattle Police Department, many SPD work rules would have to be set aside. To do so would practically guarantee morale problems in the division to which the Community Crime Prevention Program would be attached and would probably create substantial management and supervision problems.

Historically, the police department has maintained a response orientation. Generally, the police department responds to complaints and calls and provides police services thereafter. There is a high probability that this response orientation would have a negative effect on the Community Crime Prevention Program. LJPO experience with management of the Community Crime Prevention Program has shown that there are many requests or calls from citizens and groups to apply CCPP resources in other than a systematic fashion. No doubt the Chief of Police and his staff receive multiple requests of this sort daily. It is important, and expected, that the police department be responsive to citizen requests for service. In order to do its job, the police department needs to have the support and cooperation of the citizenry; one way of gaining that support is to be responsive to citizen requests. Consequently, a major concern is that if CCPP resources were under the control of the Chief of Police and his command staff, the Community Crime Prevention Program might become primarily a community relations unit whose resources would be applied to meet the specific demands of current situations, as opposed to maintenance of the proven systematic block-by-block treatment methodology.

In order to maintain the implementation design, the Community Crime Prevention Program will have to be insulated from day-to-day requests for a response different from that prescribed.

The other alternative departments, DCD, DHR and DLCA, have a lesser tradition in being response-oriented. All have tended to take proactive approaches to their activities. DCD, DHR and DLCA are all accustomed to managing activities and programs that have strong community-based components. They all have personnel who work irregular hours, attend evening and weekend meetings and work under minimal direct supervision, all of which are characteristics of the operating methods of the Community Crime Prevention Program.

Both DHR and DLCA could operate the Community Crime Prevention Program. However, it appears that DCD would represent the best overall choice.

DCD has a strong neighborhood improvement orientation. The management style of DCD, while allowing for a wide range of flexibility, is characterized by a strict adherence to achievement of stated goals and objectives. This latter quality may be a function of its programs that often require meeting certain schedules as a prerequisite for further funding.

8. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be continually monitored and evaluated. The Community Crime Prevention

clearly remains an experimental program, although it has a history spanning more than three years. Upon institutionalization into the Department of Community Development, the experimental character of the program will be further confirmed. Placement of a public safety program in that department is a direct challenge to tradition.

The Community Crime Prevention Program should be carefully monitored in its early institutionalized state. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should apply in its strictest possible way a program budget process to the institutionalized CCPP. That is, OMB should require, through the budget preparation and review process, that the productivity of the Community Crime Prevention Program is maintained.

The Law and Justice Planning Office should continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the Community Crime Prevention Program in reducing burglary. In addition, LJPO should design and carefully monitor in controlled experiments new approaches to providing CCPP services.

A project steering committee should be formed to provide a forum for on-going discussion of any new developments relating to the Community Crime Prevention Program. This project steering committee should be made up of representatives of OMB, DCD, LJPO and SPD. Additionally, a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) should be prepared that outlines specifically what will be done, by whom and on what schedule regarding the Community Crime Prevention Program. This SOP will provide the basis and means for regular City Council review of the project.

Third Year Evaluation of the  
Community Crime Prevention Program  
from July 1, 1973, to August 31, 1976  
Grant Award Contract #1161, #1485,  
#1701 and 75-C-0137

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Third Year Evaluation  
 Community Crime Prevention Program  
 Grant Award Contract #1161, #1485,  
 #1701 and 75-C-0137  
 July 1, 1973, to August 31, 1976

**Project Description and Funding**

Like almost all metropolitan areas, Seattle has experienced a rapid increase in reported residential burglary. During the ten years from 1965 through 1974, reported burglary, both residential and non-residential, increased from 4,965 to 14,219--an increase of 186 percent, while the population decreased by 7 percent (from 545,000 to 507,000).

The Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) is an attempt to use citizen-based action as a burglary reduction strategy. The project consists of a number of community organizers who help neighborhood residents plan and carry out burglary prevention and reporting measures consisting of three primary activities. First, organizers offer to engrave an identifying number (usually the driver's license number) on certain types of easily stolen property, such as typewriters, television sets and stereo equipment. Second, the organizers offer to conduct a security inspection of the residence, looking at common points of entry by burglars and suggesting various improvements in security devices. Third, a system of block watch organizations is set up in which members of the neighborhood agree to watch their neighbors' residences and to report any suspicious circumstances or probable burglaries.

The basic hypothesis tested by CCPP activities is that the establishment of block watch organizations and the provision of home security inspections and property marking will significantly reduce the occurrence of residential burglary for those residences and areas receiving CCPP services, when compared to residences and areas not receiving these services.

During the period examined in this evaluation, CCPP was funded through the following LEAA grants:

<u>Award Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Amount Funded</u>
1161	Burglary Reduction Program*	7-1-73/9-30-74	\$100,000*
1485	Burglary Reduction Program-B	8-1-74/7-31-75	139,855
1701	Expanded Community Crime Prevention	7-1-75/6-30-76	42,383
75-C-0137	Community Crime Prevention-C	8-1-75/10-31-76	151,927
			<u>\$431,165</u>

\*This grant included a number of police projects running concurrently with CCPP operations. The total combined CCPP and police operations were funded at \$333,333.

## Project History

The following presents a capsulated history of the major events during the CCPP period of operation between July 1, 1973, and August 31, 1976.

- July 1, 1973 Official beginning date of grant #1161 funding CCPP as part of a larger burglary reduction project
- August 15, 1973 Project director and initial staff hired (five community organizers, data coordinator and clerk-typist)
- September -  
October, 1973 CCPP began field operations, with services being provided in SPD census tracts 91 and 92
- May, 1974 Decision to involve at least 30 percent of all single family and duplex residences within target tracts in each of the three services and to exclude apartment dwellers from active organizing efforts
- May, 1974 Decision to de-emphasize mass media and professional public relations approach to organizing communities because of minimal response in police sector Boy (Ballard area)
- June, 1974 First completed tracts (91 and 92) with 30 percent of single and duplex residences receiving project services
- July, 1974 Clerk-typist position made half-time position
- October, 1974 Four tracts begun in first year completed (SPD census tracts 91, 92, 101, 111)
- March, 1975 Nine CETA positions added to CCPP staff (two community organizers, six home service technicians and one clerk-typist)
- August, 1975 Seven tracts begun in second year completed (SPD census tracts 100, 102, 114, 141, 142, 160, 170)
- August, 1975 One community organizer and one home service technician position vacated, not refilled
- October, 1975 One home service technician position vacated, leaving 14-1/4 full-time equivalency positions
- February, 1976 Planning began on the provision of maintenance or followup services to residences within CCPP
- March, 1976 Maintenance followup services began by one organizer

August, 1976

All community organizers began to provide maintenance services

August, 1976

Seven tracts begun in third year completed (SPD census tracts 90, 154, 161, 171, 188, 191, 193)



### Services Provided

During the first 34-1/2 months of operation, CCPP services provided by project year were the following.

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Services</u>			
	<u>Home Security Inspection</u>	<u>Property Marking</u>	<u>Block Watch</u>	<u>Information and Education</u>
8-15-73/7-31-74	1,067	1,345	1,404	2,285
8-1-74/7-31-75	3,788	3,728	3,209	11,917
8-1-75/6-30-76	<u>2,775</u>	<u>3,172</u>	<u>3,421</u>	<u>14,962</u>
Total	7,630	8,245	8,034	28,962

In the period July 1, 1973, to June 30, 1976, CCPP personnel conducted 7,630 home security inspections, performed property marking in 8,245 residences and organized 8,034 residences into 753 block watch groups. The majority of primary services (92 percent, or 22,031 of 23,909) were provided in 17 census tracts in Central, South Central and West Seattle in which at least 25 percent of potential program participants have received at least one of the project services. Based upon project six-month followup during September, 1975, to June, 1976, 40 percent (1,093 of 2,718) of residences receiving home service inspections had implemented at least one of the suggested security improvements.

During the third year of operation (August 1, 1975, to June 30, 1976), 9,368 primary services were provided (3,421 block watch, 3,172 property marking and 2,775 home security inspections) with an additional 14,760 education and information contacts. CCPP staff estimated that cost per service unit during this period (including education and informational contacts) was \$7.14. If only primary services are considered, the cost per service unit was approximately \$18.39 ( $24,128 \div 9,368 \times \$7.14$ ).

## Data Analysis

### Crime Impact Objectives

During the past three years of program operation, the CCPP's crime impact objectives have varied from grant to grant.

The originally stated goal of the Community Crime Prevention component of the Burglary Reduction grant, #1161, was the "...reduction of predicted burglary rates for all areas of program activity by 10 percent." Subsequent discussions conducted among the Community Crime Prevention Director and personnel, Burglary Reduction grant staff and Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office research and evaluation staff resulted in a restatement of CCPP goals and objectives. The restated goal was to "Bring about a statistically significant reduction in the number of residential burglaries in test communities during...operational months of the project." The reasons for this restatement were to set statistical criteria for evaluation rather than an arbitrary standard, i.e., a 10 percent reduction and to eliminate the use of predicted versus observed burglary rates as a data base.

The restated objectives against which the CCPP was to be evaluated were the following:

1. Given the implementation of a community crime prevention effort within patrol sectors, a statistically significant decrease in the number of residential burglaries will be demonstrated when these sectors are compared with the City as a whole minus these sectors.
2. Given the implementation of a community crime prevention effort within patrol sectors, a statistically significant increase in the number of burglary-in-progress calls will be demonstrated.

Grant #1485 for the second year of operation expanded greatly upon these objectives; specifically, the crime impact objectives were the following:

1. Given the implementation of a burglary reduction program in Charlie and George sectors, a statistically significant reduction in residential burglary offenses will be demonstrated when burglaries in these sectors are compared with the comparable prior months residential burglary in that sector (pre-post) and the residential burglary activity for the same months in the City of Seattle (minus Charlie, Boy and George Sectors).
2. Given the implementation of a burglary reduction program in Charlie and George sectors, a statistically significant increase in "burglary-in-progress" calls will be demonstrated when these emergency calls are compared with comparable prior months (pre-post).

3. Given the implementation of a burglary reduction program in Charlie and George sectors, a statistically significant increase in on-scene apprehensions by police will be demonstrated when apprehension rates for previous comparable months in those sectors are compared (pre-post).
4. Given the implementation of a burglary reduction program in Charlie and George sectors, a statistically significant increase in overall apprehensions by police (excluding on-scene apprehensions) will be demonstrated when apprehension rates for previous comparable months in these sectors are compared (pre-post).
5. Given the implementation of a burglary reduction program in Charlie and George sectors, a statistically significant increase in cases accepted by the prosecutor's office will be demonstrated when acceptance rates for previous comparable months are compared (pre-post).
6. Given the implementation of a burglary reduction program in Charlie and George sectors, a statistically significant increase in the number of "successful" prosecutions will be demonstrated when prosecutions for previous comparable months are compared (pre-post).
7. Given the implementation of a burglary reduction program in Charlie and George sectors, a statistically significant increase in the dollar value and/or number of returned items ~~should be demonstrated when compared with the City as a whole (minus Charlie and George sectors) and the comparable prior months in these sectors.~~

The lack of data relating to Objectives 4, 5, 6 and 7 and the remoteness of these measures from project operation led to their exclusion in the third year grant 75-C-0137. Impact objectives for the third year grant were identified as the following:

1. To demonstrate a statistically significant reduction in residential burglary rates in the target areas as compared with that area before the project's operation and with other areas during and after the project's operation.
2. To demonstrate a statistically significant increase in the number of burglary-in-progress calls received by the police department from citizens living in the target areas as compared with other selected areas of the City.

Additional information of potential interest to the project's evaluation was identified in the supplemental third year grant #1701. These issues were not objectives in and of themselves but rather related to the specific effectiveness of CCPP's burglary reduction activities. The issues were the following:

1. Whether the project produces any significant displacement of burglary to unserved communities.
2. The duration of the effectiveness of a community crime prevention campaign and the timing and amount of followup required in order to sustain or prolong effectiveness.
3. The extent to which population mobility may affect item 2.
4. The relative effectiveness of the components of the project, i.e., Block Watch, home inspection, property marking.
5. A thorough analysis of cost effectiveness.
6. Whether the rate of recovery of stolen property is higher in the case of marked property than in the case of unmarked property.
7. Whether demographic patterns of burglary victimization are observed.

As a result of the evolution of project objectives, the present evaluation was performed to assess the following crime impact objectives:

Objective One: To produce a statistically significant decrease in the number of residential burglaries in the project treated areas as compared with those areas before project operation and with other non-treated areas during similar time periods.

To assess this objective more completely, analyses were performed to examine three related questions. One, to what extent, if any, does CCPP operation produce displacement of residential burglary to adjacent, non-participating households? Two, how long are the effects of the project's burglary reduction efforts maintained without additional project efforts? Three, what is the relative effectiveness of the three project services (block watch, property marking and home security inspection)?

Objective Two: To produce a statistically significant increase in the number of burglary-in-progress calls received by the police department from citizens living in the target areas as compared with other non-treated areas of the city.

Three additional analyses to assess this objective were performed: One, what proportion of burglary-in-progress calls originated from addresses other than the victimized site? Two, what proportion of burglary-in-progress calls include suspect description information? Three, what proportion of these calls result in arrests of suspects?

While the question of recovery of marked property was to be evaluated, the lack of systematic and reliable data sources with sufficient numbers of both program and non-program participants made such an analysis impossible.

#### Reduction of Residential Burglary

Objective one, to reduce significantly the number of residential burglaries (hereafter referred to as burglaries) in project treated areas, was evaluated using two different types of data sources. One type of data used consisted of official law enforcement data. Specifically, these data were the official Seattle Police Department (SPD) data processing summaries of residential burglary offense reports received on a monthly basis by census tract for the city. These summary reports represent all such incidents that are reported to the police.

Victimization surveys conducted both on a national basis by LEAA and locally by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office have found that approximately 50 percent of residential burglaries are reported to law enforcement agencies. The LEAA victimization survey (1975) of 13 American cities found that the median average reporting rate across cities was 52.0 percent, with a range of from 46 to 58 percent. A victimization survey of approximately 1,500 residences within five Seattle census tracts found a comparable 52.2 percent reporting rate for burglaries in 1974 (source: SEA-KING Victim Information Project). An earlier Seattle victimization survey (Schram, 1973) found a 45.9 percent reporting rate for burglary victims in 1972.

Because official police department data do not represent all burglary incidents that occur, and since reporting rates may show marked changes within short time periods (e.g., Schneider, 1975), the exclusive use of official data as an indication in the change in burglary incidents can be misleading. For example, Schneider found that while the actual burglary victimization in Portland, Oregon, declined from 151 per 1,000 households in 1971-1972 to 130 per 1,000 households, the percentage of such crimes that were reported to police increased from 50 percent to 71 percent (as indicated by information obtained from crime victims rather than police records). This resulted in the official Portland Police statistics showing an apparent increase in the official burglary rate of from 75.3 per 1,000 (total 1971 and 1972 data) to 84.8 per 1,000 (1973 and first-half 1974 data), when in fact burglary occurrences had decreased.

Because of the above finding, victimization information regarding the actual rate of occurrence and reporting was considered a crucial second data source in the present evaluation. This was especially true since one of the aims of CCPP operation is to encourage victims to report burglaries to the police in those cases in which they are not successful in preventing the crimes' occurrence.

Victimization data to assess whether CCPP services were instrumental in reducing residential burglary were obtained through three major sources: CCPP data, SEA-KING and an LJPO telephone survey. CCPP data consist of project-collected victimization data. At the time a household joins the project, project staff ask participants whether they have been burglarized within the preceding six months (CCPP pre-data). Six months following program entry, participants are recontacted and asked if they have been burglarized since becoming involved in the project (CCPP post-data). While these data sources provide pre- and post-treatment data on actual (as opposed to officially reported) burglaries for program participants, several methodological questions arise (cf. Campbell and Stanley, 1963, pp. 7-12, The One-Group Pretest-Posttest Design). Specifically, the questions are as follows: (1) Do program participants accurately represent the general population, in terms of prior burglary victimization (self-selection)? If not, pre-post comparisons of project data may include a statistical artifact which incorrectly represents program impact. (2) Does the fact that project staff collect the CCPP post-data influence respondents to understate followup victimization rates? (3) Does the manner in which CCPP post-data are collected lead to understatement of burglary rates because participants have moved (conceivably because of burglary victimization) and, therefore, no followup information is obtained for some number of program participants who had been burglarized after project involvement?

To resolve these questions, a second major source of victimization data was used. This data source (SEA-KING Victim Information Project) consisted of two sets of in-person victimization surveys in West Seattle (federal census tracts 96, 97, 98 and 105) and the Green Lake area (tract 28).<sup>1</sup> The surveys were conducted under the supervision of the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office. The first survey conducted in mid-1975 dealt with crime victimization in calendar year 1974 and interviewed 1,494 residences (SEA-KING pre-). The second survey conducted in mid-1976 inquired about crime victimization in calendar year 1975 within 1,216 residences (SEA-KING post-). Within all five census tracts, approximately half were re-interviews of residences interviewed in the prior year. Within the treated tracts (97 and 98), half of the residences interviewed were randomly chosen on the basis that they had received CCPP

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<sup>1</sup>The areas represented by federal census tracts 97 and 98 were randomly chosen for program treatment in late 1974 and began treatment in early 1975. Census tracts 96 and 105 were chosen as adjacent control tracts to establish what the trend of burglary would have been in tracts 97 and 98 in the absence of program efforts. Census tract 28 was randomly chosen as a distant control tract to assess the possibility that burglary was displaced from tracts 97 and 98 to tracts 96 and 105.

services, while the remaining half had not received such services (e.g., had refused, had not been offered services, were unaware, had recently moved into the area).

The SEA-KING surveys provide data for a non-equivalent control group design (Campbell and Stanley, 1966, pp. 47-50) and provide information concerning burglary victimization without the problems identified with ( ) victimization data. That is, data were collected for non-program participants on a comparable pre-post basis; data were collected independently under the direction of the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office; and the possibility of victims moving to flee crime was equally present in both project treated and untreated residences. In addition, the use of a distant control group theoretically allowed the assessment of burglary displacement from treated census tracts to adjacent non-treated tracts. Unfortunately, followup telephone verification of in-person surveys conducted in the distant control tract indicated an unacceptably high rate of surveyor falsification of data and had to be excluded from the present analysis.

The third source of victimization data was the Seattle LJPO telephone survey, conducted in August and September, 1976. The survey sought victimization data for the preceding six months from both program participants and non-participants (n = 3,292) in five census tracts (federal tracts 87, 89, 95, 97 and 98) and 790 additional residences city-wide. The five tracts were chosen on the basis of being recently treated (having been completed no more than 18 months nor less than six months prior to August, 1976) and having met CCPP criteria for successful treatment (i.e., 30 percent or more of potential single and duplex residences received burglary reduction services). Telephone numbers of program participants were obtained from CCPP records; an equivalent number of non-CCPP telephone numbers (excluding businesses and apartments within the census tract boundaries) were randomly selected from the Pacific Northwest Bell Street Address Directory for Seattle. The city-wide sample was chosen by taking the first residential phone number occurring in the second, third and fifth column of each page listing for the area Zip codes at least 50 percent in the city.

The LJPO telephone survey provided additional data for a later time period for both CCPP participants and non-participants to supplement the in-person SEA-KING post-surveys.

#### Victimization Data

CCPP data: If project victimization data are examined (see Table 1), there has been a statistically significant decrease ( $p < .05$ ) in burglary victimization, from 4.46 burglaries per 100 households per six months prior to program entry to 2.34 burglaries per 100 households per six months. This represents

Table 1--Total CCPP Victimization Data

Year	Burglary Victimization per 6 Months											
	Pre-CCPP						Post-CCPP					
	Total	Not Burglarized	Burglarized*	Reported			Total	Not Burglarized	Burglarized*	Reported		
Yes				No	Unknown	Yes				No	Unknown	
1973	676	620	56	43	11	2						
1974	3,042	2,894	148	119	25	4	1,298	1,252	46	40	5	1
1975	5,411	5,208	203	164	27	12	2,641	2,584	57	45	7	5
1976							1,964	1,929	35	31	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,129</b>	<b>8,722</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>5,903</b>	<b>5,765</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>

\*Burglarized one or more times



407 burglaries within 9,129 residences interviewed at program entry between September, 1973, and December, 1975, and 138 burglaries within 5,903 residences after six months of program involvement interviewed between February, 1974, and June, 1976, ( $x^2 = 46.13$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .001$ ). While reporting rates (according to CCPP data) for burglaries that occurred have increased from 84 percent to 89 percent, the difference was not significant ( $x^2 = 2.27$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .22$ ).

SEA-KING data: During the year 1974, 117 (7.94 percent) of the 1,474 residences interviewed in federal census tracts 96, 97, 98 and 105 were burglarized. Of those burglarized, 48.7 percent indicated they had reported the burglary to the police. Within the experimental area (tracts 97 and 98) for the year prior to program entry, 57 (6.34 percent) of 899 interviewed residences had been burglarized, and 29 (50.9 percent) were reported to the police. In the adjacent control tracts, 60 (10.43 percent) of 575 residences had been burglarized, and 28 (46.7 percent) were reported to the police. While the burglary rates were significantly different during 1974 ( $x^2 = 8.04$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .01$ ) with the adjacent control tracts experiencing more burglaries per capita, the reporting rates were non-significantly different ( $x^2 = 0.207$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .65$ ). (See Table 2.)

During 1975, of the 5,536 single and duplex residences in tracts 97 and 98, 2,111 (38.1 percent) received home inspections, 2,089 (37.7 percent) had property marked and 2,224 (40.2 percent) were organized into block watch groups by CCPP personnel, with the majority (58.8 percent) being performed in the first six months. During the same time, no CCPP services were provided to the 2,861 single or duplex residences in tracts 96 and 105.

Within the control area, 42 (9.95 percent) of the 422 residences interviewed indicated a burglary had occurred, of which 24 (57.1 percent) had been reported to the police. When compared to the preceding year, the change in victimization rate from 10.43 percent to 9.95 percent was non-significantly different ( $x^2 = 0.06$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .85$ ), as was the reporting rate increase from 46.7 percent to 57.1 percent ( $x^2 = 1.08$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .30$ ).

Within the experimental area, for both non-participants and program participants, 20 (4.04 percent) of the 495 residences interviewed had been burglarized. Of the 20 burglaries, 13 were reported to the police, four were not reported and the reporting status was not known in three cases. If the three unknown cases are excluded, the reporting rate was 76.5 percent (13/17). If they are assumed to be not reported, the rate was 65.0 percent. When compared to the preceding year, the change in victimization rate from 6.34 percent to 4.04 percent is marginally significant ( $x^2 = 3.24$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .07$ ). In terms of reporting to police, the change from 50.1 percent to 76.5 percent was also marginally significant ( $x^2 = 3.49$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .06$ ).

Table 2--SEA-KING Victimization Data

Area	Burglary Victimization per 12 Months									
	Pre-Treatment (Jan.-Dec., 1974)					Post-Treatment (Jan.-Dec., 1975)				
	Total	Not Burglarized	Burglarized <sup>1</sup>	Reported		Total	Burglarized	Not Burglarized <sup>1</sup>	Reported	
Yes				No	Yes				No	
Control (federal tract 96 and 105)	575	515	60 (10.43%)	28 (47%)	32	442	380	42 (9.95%)	24 (57%)	18
Experimental (federal tract 97 and 98)										
--CCPP:	356	334	22 (6.18%)	15 (68%)	7	247	241	6 (2.43%)	6 (100%)	0
--Non-CCPP:	543	508	35 (6.45%)	14 (40%)	21	248	234	14 (5.65%)	7 (64%)	4 <sup>2</sup>
Total	899	842	57 (6.34%)	29 (51%)	28	495	475	20 (4.04%)	13 (77%)	4 <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Burglarized one or more times

<sup>2</sup>Does not include three cases where reporting data were unknown

In summary, for total areas, when total treated areas (tracts 97 and 98) are compared pre- and post-CCPP treatment, there is a marginally significant decline in the burglary rate (-36.3 percent, from 6.34 burglaries per 100 per year to 4.04 per 100 per year), with a corresponding marginally significant increase in reporting rates (52.1 percent, from 50.1 percent to 76.5 percent). During the same period, adjacent areas (tracts 96 and 105) experienced a non-significant and minimal change in burglary rates (-4.6 percent, from 10.43 burglaries per 100 per year to 9.95 per 100 per year), with a non-significant increase in reporting (22.3 percent, from 46.7 percent to 57.1 percent).

While these results are favorable to the project, they do not necessarily reflect the true project effect. Since approximately 60 percent of the single and duplex residences in the treated area did not become actively involved in the project, it is conceivable that factors other than CCPP caused the observed results. On the other hand, if the majority of the observed change occurs in treated residences, while non-treated residences reflect the rate of change noted in the control area, it would establish that first, CCPP actions are responsible for the observed change; second, displacement of burglaries to neighboring non-treated households did not occur.

To determine the precise effect of CCPP on burglary, interviews conducted in the treated area for both 1974 and 1975 were separately tallied on the basis of whether interviewed households joined the project in 1975. (See Table 2, rows 2 and 3.) If pre-treatment data (1974) are examined, 356 (39.6 percent) of the 899 interviews conducted in the treatment area were of residences that were to join the project in 1975. Of these, 22 (6.18 percent) had been burglarized and 15 (68.2 percent) were reported to the police. Of the 508 residences that did not join CCPP in 1975, 35 (6.45 percent) had been burglarized and 14 (40.0 percent) were reported to the police. A comparison of pre-treatment burglary rates for the two groups indicates that they were virtually identical ( $x^2 = 0.03$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .86$ ). This indicated two things: first, that the decision to join CCPP is not influenced by prior victimization and, therefore, self-selection is not a bias built into a comparison of pre- and post-program victimization rates; second, the lack of initial significant differences in pre-treatment burglary rates allows a methodologically and statistically valid comparison of post-treatment burglary rates for the two groups.

A comparison of reporting rates for the 1974 data indicates that those persons who eventually were to join CCPP had a significantly higher reporting rate ( $x^2 = 4.29$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .05$ ) than those who did not join. Given that 52 percent of persons failing to report burglaries in Schram's (1973) survey of Seattle residents gave as a reason, "Police couldn't do anything," this significant difference is not too surprising. One would expect that those who do report burglaries are those who expect the police to take some positive action; by logical extension, those individuals

might be expected to take positive action in the future to prevent reoccurrence. At the same time, those who do not report such crimes would probably feel that, just as the police can do nothing, neither can they to prevent future burglaries.

A comparison of 1975 data for the two groups (CCPP and non-CCPP members) in the treated area shows a statistically significant lower burglary rate for CCPP members ( $z = 1.818$ ,  $p = .03$ , one-tailed test). In terms of burglary rates, this reflects a 61 percent decrease in the risk rate for treated residences (6.18 per 100 per year to 2.43 per 100 per year). Given the extremely small number of burglary cases occurring for these two groups in 1975, it was not possible to perform a valid statistical test to determine if CCPP reporting rates were significantly higher than non-CCPP reporting rates. However, it should be noted that all burglaries ( $n = 6$ ) occurring in CCPP member residences were reported.

LJPO telephone survey: An extensive telephone victimization survey was conducted under the direction and control of the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office during August and September, 1976, to determine the burglary rates for both CCPP members and non-members within treated census tracts. This was believed necessary because of the relatively small number of CCPP participants (247) and CCPP "refusers" (248) included in the SEA-KING post-survey. In addition to increasing the numbers of interviews, the telephone survey allowed data to be gathered from three additional CCPP tracts (for a total of five out of 17, or 29.4 percent of all treated tracts as of June 30, 1976).

When the raw data for the 1,970 CCPP members and 1,322 non-CCPP members (see Table 3) are converted to a yearly rate<sup>2</sup> and added to the SEA-KING post-survey (see Table 4), there were significantly fewer burglary occurrences in the CCPP membership than non-CCPP members ( $z = 1.90$ ,  $p < .05$ , one-tailed test). An unexpected finding with regard to reporting rates was that non-CCPP members indicated a significantly higher rate than did CCPP members ( $\chi^2 = 6.07$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

In the process of recording addresses and phone numbers from CCPP files of program participants, data on services received (property marking, home security inspection and block watch membership) were also recorded. This allowed the collection of burglary victimization information on the basis of service(s) received. However, the subsequent analysis should be viewed

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<sup>2</sup>Conversion from six months to 12 months was performed by doubling the victimization rate and subtracting the resultant figure from the total number interviewed. Reporting data were obtained by doubling the rate obtained for six months.

Table 3--LJPO Telephone Survey.

Census Tract <sup>1</sup>	Date Completed	Residential Burglary Rate for Preceding 6 Months at Time of Call							
		CCPP Members				Non-CCPP Members			
		No Burglary	Burglary	Reported <sup>2</sup>	Not Reported	No Burglary	Burglary	Reported <sup>2</sup>	Not Reported
87	5/75	177	12 6.4%	8 67%	4	143	9 5.9%	5 56%	4
89	7/75	335	23 6.4%	15 65%	8	176	20 10.2%	19 95%	1
95	12/75	424	29 6.4%	22 76%	7	370	36 8.9%	28 76%	9
97	9/75	445	13 2.8%	8 67%	4	251	9 3.5%	7 100%	0
98	4/75	490	22 4.3%	16 76%	5	302	6 2.0%	4 67%	2
Total		1871	99 5.0%	69 71%	28	1242	80 6.1%	63 80%	16

<sup>1</sup>Federal census tracts

<sup>2</sup>Totals of "reported" and "not reported" may not add up to total "burglary" because, in some cases, respondents were not sure

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Table 4--Combined SEA-KING Post- and LJPO Telephone Victimization Survey Data

	Total Interviewed	No Burglary	Burglary	Reported	Not Reported
CCPP	2,217	2,013	204 9.2%	144 72%	56
Non-CCPP	1,570	1,396	174 11.1%	140 83%	29
Total	3,787	3,409	378 10.0%	284 77%	85

only as suggestive and by no means definitive. These problems arise both out of the manner in which the data are initially recorded and errors in the manner in which the data were recorded for the present survey. When individuals initially join the project, the services to be received are recorded, along with CCPP-pre victimization information. In the case of home security inspections and property marking, these services have already been performed, have been scheduled to be performed or have been refused. In the case of block watch participation, the decision is frequently not known until some time later. Although eventual participation in a block watch organization is recorded by CCPP, it is routinely recorded in a different set of records that are not readily cross-matched with individual residence addresses, although the project makes an attempt to enter block watch status on the records used for this survey. In the process of recording services for participants in federal tract 98 (SPD tract 141), errors were made in all 412 contacted residences, in terms of block watch membership in that "no block watch" status was confused with "unknown block watch" status.

In total, there were 1,676 completed calls to CCPP members in which services received information was totally or partially available (including 408 from tract 98/141 and excluding 294 calls to addresses which either were in the program but services received information was not recorded, or the addresses were initially selected as control addresses but during the interview claimed membership in CCPP). Of the 1,676, complete information was available for 790 residences; in 886 residences, block watch status was unknown. For purposes of the present analysis, "unknown block watch" status was counted as non-participation in this service.

For those residences in block watch organizations (either in combination with other services or alone), 4.84 percent (37 of 764) had been burglarized in the preceding six months. While a lower rate than the 5.59 percent (51 of 912) of these were known not to be in block watch groups, the difference was non-significant ( $x^2 = 0.47$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .50$ ). For those receiving property marking in combination with other services or in isolation, the burglary rate was 5.29 percent (72 of 1,360), compared to 5.33 percent (16 of 316) for those not receiving this service. This difference was non-significant ( $x^2 = .03$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .86$ ). The residences receiving home security inspections had a 5.28 percent burglary rate (72 of 1,363) which was non-significantly different from the 5.11 percent (16 of 313) of those not receiving home security inspections ( $x^2 = .01$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .90$ ).

Summary of victimization data: All three sources of victimization data collected at different times for different areas and in different manners indicated a statistically significant ( $p \leq .05$ ) decrease in the occurrence of residential burglary

for program participants when compared on, (a) pre-post basis for program participants only (4.46 burglaries per 100 households per six months to 2.34 burglaries per 100 households per six months), (b) combined pre-post, program participants and non-program participants (on a rate per 100 households per 12 months, pre-CCPP = 6.2, post-CCPP = 2.4; pre non-CCPP = 6.5, post non-CCPP = 5.7), and (c) post-comparison of project participants with non-project participants (9.2 burglaries per 100 households per 12 months versus 11.1 per household per 12 months).

Data from the SEA-KING surveys indicate that burglary displacement did not occur to any detectable extent, and that CCPP members do not appear to be self-selected on the basis of either higher or lower than average victimization rates. There does appear to be some self-selection of those that join CCPP on the basis of tendency to report to police if victimized. However, this tendency to report is further increased by CCPP involvement and tends to occur also for non-CCPP members, in that SEA-KING data indicated that while reporting of burglary incidents increased from 47 percent to 58 percent in a control area (federal census tracts 96 and 105), during the same time, reporting in an experimental area (tracts 97 and 98) increased from 51 percent prior to project activity in that area to 76 percent following project activity. The pre- to post-increase in reporting rate for the experimental area was marginally significant ( $p = .06$ ).

#### Officially Reported Data (SPD)

To determine what effect CCPP's efforts to reduce the incidence of burglary and simultaneously increase reporting rates has had upon official police department data, the following analyses were performed. Data were organized in a non-equivalent control group design by identifying first, second and third year treated areas ( $T_1$ ,  $T_2$ ,  $T_3$ ) and a Seattle minus treated ( $S^-$ ) area.  $S^-$  was identified as all 121 City of Seattle census tracts, with the exception of 18 tracts either having achieved 30 percent project coverage in the lifespan of the project, or in the process of receiving such services as of August, 1976, and the 12 tracts comprising another burglary-related project (Seattle Community Accountability Program, formerly known as Youth Service Bureau System). Since one census tract overlaps both projects, 92 non-treated census tracts were identified. This overlapping tract (SPD 171, or federal 95) which was treated in the third year ( $T_3$ ) was not included in the data for the  $T_3$  treated group. This census tract and the other 11 YSB-CAP tracts were totally excluded from the data analyses.

For each operational year, 12 month pre- and 12 month post-periods were identified. The 12 month pre-period was defined as those months immediately prior to entering the first tract

served in that year. The 12 month post-period was defined as those months immediately following completion of services in the last tract served that year. (See Table 5 and Map 1 for a listing of operational years and tracts included. SPD official residential burglary reports were summarized for the pre- and post-periods for S- and the tracts served in each year. (See Table 6.)

A comparison of pre- and post-period rates for S- and tracts served in T<sub>1</sub> indicates a significant decrease in CCPP tracts when compared to S-. While S- increased 11 percent (from 5,949 to 6,586 reports), the T<sub>1</sub> tracts decreased -2 percent (from 567 to 544;  $x^2 = 4.02$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .05$ ). When the additional nine months' data beyond the 12 month post-period are added to post<sub>1</sub> period and converted to a 12-month basis (total 21 months post-data ÷ 1 year and 9 months), the total converted post- for S- was 6,256, or a 5 percent increase over the pre-period. For T<sub>1</sub>, the comparable figures were 577, or a 2 percent increase. This difference was not statistically significant ( $x^2 = 0.28$ ,  $df = 1$ , p.n.s.).

For T<sub>2</sub>, only 11 months post-data were available for analysis. These data were converted to a 12-month rate (11 months post-data ÷ 11/12) for comparison purposes. While S- experienced a -16 percent decrease in reported burglaries (from 7,066 to an adjusted 5,925), tracts served in T<sub>2</sub> exhibited a -9 percent decrease (from 906 to an adjusted 828) in burglaries. Although both areas experienced a decrease in reported burglaries, post-data for the T<sub>2</sub> tracts indicated a marginally significant increase ( $x^2 = 2.83$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .09$ ) relative to the S- area.

No followup post-data were available for the T<sub>3</sub> tracts.

The inconsistency between first and second year police data and the victimization data previously presented is most likely due to the increased reporting rates for areas treated by CCPP. However, while this would explain the results for T<sub>2</sub> tracts (which included the two experimental tracts surveyed by the SEA-KING interviews), it does not explain why there was a significant drop in reported burglaries for T<sub>1</sub> tracts. It may be that the results of the first operational year of CCPP, which was a part of a larger project including a number of coordinated police projects in the same area, represents not just CCPP efforts but also the efforts of the various police projects. In this regard, it should be noted that census tracts treated in T<sub>2</sub> and T<sub>3</sub> and included in the victimization surveys do not include this mixing of crime prevention programs (with the exception of SPD tract number 171, which was excluded in the present analysis).



Table 5--Census Tracts Receiving CCPP Services

Operational Year	Census Tract SPD/Federal*	Period of Treatment	
		Begin	End
One (T <sub>1</sub> ) Sept. 73-Oct. 74	91/63	10-73	6-74
	92/64	10-73	6-74
	101/78	9-74	10-74
	111/76	8-74	8-74
Two (T <sub>2</sub> ) Nov. 74-Aug. 75	100/77	11-74	11-74
	102/88	1-75	2-75
	114/87	4-75	4-75
	141/98	2-75	3-75
	142/97	5-75	8-75
	160/90	7-75	8-75
	170/89	6-75	6-75
Three (T <sub>3</sub> ) Sept. 75-July 76	90/62	7-76	8-76
	154/108	2-76	4-76
	161/94	1-76	2-76
	171/95	11-75	12-75
	188/112	5-76	7-76
	191/113	4-76	6-76
	193/107	9-75	10-75

\*Although tract boundaries are identical, SPD uses a different numbering system than the Census Bureau

Table 6--Residential Burglaries Reported to the Police


Treatment Year	Number of Reported Residential Burglaries					
	CCPP Tracts			S-		
	Pre	Post <sub>1</sub>	Post <sub>2</sub> *	Pre	Post <sub>1</sub>	Post <sub>2</sub> *
T <sub>1</sub> 10-73/10-74	567	554	456	5949	6586	4362
T <sub>2</sub> 11-74/8-75	906	759**		7066	5431**	
T <sub>3</sub> 9-75/7-76	677	***		6701	***	

\*Post<sub>2</sub> consisted of 9 months (11-75/7-26) following the end of the 12 month post-period for T<sub>1</sub>


\*\*Post<sub>1</sub> for T<sub>2</sub> consisted of 11 months (9-75/7-26)

\*\*\*Post<sub>1</sub> data for T<sub>3</sub> not available because completion of the last tract occurred August, 1976

Map 1.



CITY OF SEATTLE  
1970 CENSUS TRACTS



Summary of Data Analysis for Objective One, Reduction of Residential Burglary

The data examined in the preceding analyses indicate that CCPP has been effective in preventing the occurrence of residential burglary. Victimization data from three different sources present consistent, statistically significant decreases in burglary rates for program participants. Further, this effect is not due to either a self-selection bias or a failure to contact CCPP members who may have moved as a result of a burglary during the followup period (SEA-KING survey data). The lack of consistent indications from police data is most likely due to a mixture of increased reporting rates caused by CCPP activities and a confounding or mixing of CCPP effects and related police projects in the census tracts treated in the first year.

Additional questions (crime displacement, length of project effects and relative effectiveness of the individual CCPP services) that were identified as being related to this objective can be addressed at this point.

Crime displacement: SEA-KING data indicate that those persons joining CCPP in two census tracts experienced a -61 percent decrease in burglary rates (from 6.18 percent to 2.43 percent being burglarized). In two adjacent tracts not treated by CCPP, for the comparable time, the decrease was -5 percent (from 10.43 percent to 9.95 percent). If crime displacement were to occur, one would expect that it would most likely occur in non-CCPP households within the treated tracts. If this happened, the change in burglary rates for non-CCPP residences in the treated area would be relatively higher (more post-burglaries) than the change occurring in the adjacent tracts. In fact, this did not occur. In fact, the change in burglary rates for non-CCPP households in the treated area was more favorable (-12 percent, or from 6.45 percent to 5.65 percent of those interviewed) than in the adjacent tract. This finding rules out burglary displacement to neighbors not participating in CCPP activities.

Length of project effects: The most reliable (and only) data source relating to the continuing effectiveness of CCPP activities can be derived from Table 3, the LJPO telephone survey. Of the five census tracts interviewed in this survey, the length of time since completion of service varied from nine to 18 months. (It should be noted that these would be estimates of the lowest possible time length, since some of those interviewed would have joined CCPP when the program initially entered the tracts.) If data for tracts 87 and 98 (which were completed 17 and 18 months prior to the completion of the survey) are combined, victimization rates for the most recent six months for CCPP and non-CCPP participants are non-significantly different ( $\chi^2 = 1.73$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .19$ ), with 4.9 percent of CCPP members being burglarized and 3.3 percent of non-CCPP members being burglarized. For combined tracts 89, 97 and 95

(completed 14, 12 and nine months prior), the most recent six months' victimization data indicate statistically significant differences ( $\chi^2 = 5.24$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .02$ ) in that while 5.1 percent of CCPP members had been burglarized, 7.5 percent of non-CCPP members had been victims in the same time period.

From these data, it may be estimated that project effect lasts from 12 to 18 months. Data from tracts 87 and 98, while not significant, could possibly suggest that with the passage of time, CCPP members begin to become burglary-prone and that some sort of retreatment may be necessary. However, without further data and considering the non-significance of the difference, this second suggestion should be viewed as tentative.

Relative effect of CCPP services: Data reported in the section on the LJPO telephone victimization survey suggest that the three services are equally effective, with block watch activities providing non-significantly better results in preventing burglary. However, considering the difficulties experienced in performing the analysis, any conclusion at this time with regard to this question is premature.

#### Increase of Burglary-in-Progress Calls

Objective two, to increase significantly the number of Burglary-in-Progress (BIP) calls, was evaluated using SPD computerized dispatch records (SELECT system).

A non-equivalent control group design was used to examine BIP calls as a proportion of all burglary calls received by the SPD between September 30, 1974, and August 8, 1976. This time period was dictated by the availability of information at the time of data collection in August, 1976.<sup>3</sup>

As in the case of official SPD residential burglary data, an S-area and a treated area were identified, and pre- and post-data were separately determined. However, because of several differences in the manner in which data are maintained in the SELECT system, neither the areas nor the data are necessarily consistent with SPD data processing reports. The specific differences are as follows. First, SELECT data represent dispatch and patrol determination and classification of calls received,

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<sup>3</sup>Between April 13, 1974, and September 29, 1974, the SELECT system had averaged approximately 20 percent "down" time, or periods in which calls were not being entered into the computer data base. Following September 30, 1974, through the end of the year, down time averaged less than 8 percent. For 1975 and 1976, down time averaged less than 6 percent. Because of the more complete data beginning September 30, 1974, these data were chosen as the beginning phase.

responded to and disposed of by patrol officers. As such, a call initially classified as a burglary by dispatch and patrol may subsequently be classified as some other offense, or no offense at all, and not be included in SPD data processing reports as a residential burglary. In the same fashion, calls initially dispatched as other offenses may subsequently be classified as burglaries on data processing reports. [This difficulty results from (1) inconsistencies between the Revised Code of Washington (RCW), which is the basis of patrol actions, and the Uniform Crime Reporting system used by data processing; (2) "unfounding" of cases; that is, upon further investigation, it is determined that no crime occurred; and (3) in some cases, the difficulty of distinguishing other offenses closely related to residential burglary.] Second, SELECT data are recorded on a patrol car beat basis which does not correspond to census tracts, which are the bases for both SPD data processing reports and CCPF operation.


Since CCPF does operate within census tract boundaries, direct comparison of SELECT data for all of the treated tracts was not possible. For the 18 tracts previously identified (Table 5), each of the SPD car beats was examined to determine if the area of the car beat was made up of 50 percent or more of CCPF treated census tracts. This procedure identified 13 patrol car beats within police sectors Charlie, George and William (see Table 7 and Map 2). The remaining seven car beats were excluded from any analysis since they received partial treatment without reaching the criterion of 50 percent of their area. For each of the 50-percent-or-more treated carbeat areas, the period from September 30, 1974, to the month services began in that area was identified as a pre-period. The month following completion of services in that area up to August 8, 1976, was designated as a post-period. For the 13 car beats, there were a total of 98 pre-CCPF treatment carbeat months, 139 post-treatment carbeat months and 49 during-treatment carbeat months. Since pre-treatment time represented approximately 41 percent of the total pre- and post-carbeat months, S- data were split into a corresponding 40-60 percent split of a pre-period of September 30, 1974, to June 30, 1975, and a post-period of July 1, 1975, to August 8, 1976.

For each of the 13 treated car beats and the S- area, the following data were hand tabulated from computer printouts of SELECT data for pre- and post-periods: (1) the number of calls disposed of by patrol officers as "051" or residential burglary; as such, these would all generate a major offense report by officers that would initially be classified as a burglary case; (2) the number of these calls that were assigned to patrol as crimes in the act of being committed (BIP); (3) the number of BIP calls that were initiated from addresses other than where the crime occurred; (4) the number of BIP calls that included either suspect or suspect vehicle descriptions; and (5) whether an arrest occurred as the result of the BIP calls.

Table 7--SPD Car Beats Including 50 Percent or More of Census Tracts Treated by CCPP.

Police Sector and % Treated			SPD Tracts Treated		Treatment Dates	
	Car Beat	% Treated	Tract	% in Car Beat	Begin	End
<u>Charlie</u>	1	56%	80	100%	8-76	9-76
			90	80%	7-76	8-76
	2	51%	92	70%	10-73	7-74
			110	20%	8-74	8-74
	3	83%	91	100%	10-73	7-74
			92	20%	10-73	7-74
	6	75%	101	5%	9-74	11-74
			92	10%	10-73	7-74
			100	67%	11-74	12-74
			111	40%	8-74	8-74
<u>George</u>	2	57%	114	100%	4-75	5-75
	3	100%	102	100%	1-75	3-75
			101	50%	9-74	11-74
	4	73%	160	100%	7-75	8-75
<u>William</u>			161	33%	1-76	2-76
			170	33%	6-75	7-75
			171	7%	11-75	12-75
	5	100%	170	67%	6-75	7-75
			171	60%	11-75	12-75
	6	50%	161	67%	1-76	2-76
<u>William</u>	2	66%	141	17%	2-75	4-75
			142	66%	5-75	9-75
	6	82%	154	80%	2-76	4-76
			191	33%	4-76	6-76
	7	100%	188	100%	5-76	7-76
		191	67%	4-76	6-76	

Map 2.



From the pre- to post-period in S-, the BIP rate increased 4 percent, or from 8.5 percent to 8.8 percent of the total calls. For the treated tracts, the BIP rate increased 27 percent, or from 9.1 to 11.6 percent of the total calls. (See Table 8.) When the post-treated data are adjusted to exclude the 4 percent increase observed in the S- area, the 9.1 percent to an adjusted 11.2 percent BIP rate is statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 4.82$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

Table 8--Burglary-in-Progress to Total Burglary Calls

Number of Calls Classified	Treated Car Beats		S- Car Beats	
	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-
Burglary-in-progress (BIP)	160 9.1%	276 11.6%	431 8.5%	540 8.8%
Not BIP	1592	2109	4634	5583
Total	1752	2385	5065	6123
Calls per carbeat month	17.88	17.16	13.73	11.27
Number of carbeat months	98	139	369	543

Given that objective two was achieved by the project, additional questions relating to this objective concerned the location from which BIP's originated, whether there was an increase in suspect information and whether such BIP's resulted in more patrol arrests.

Location of person making BIP call: The rationale for objective two was that with block watch organizations and education of citizens in treated areas, suspicious incidents (e.g., an unfamiliar person walking around a neighbor's house when the residents were known to be gone) would be more likely to be reported to the police. If this were to occur, one would expect that this would be reflected in a larger proportion of BIP calls being initiated from addresses other than the burglarized residence. To determine if this were the case, BIP calls were examined and grouped as coming from same or difference addresses (see Table 9). Unfortunately, the accuracy of this particular analysis is unknown. Upon examination of SELECT data, it was found that over 50 percent of BIP calls did not include information concerning the location of the person calling the police department. In all such cases, it was assumed that they originated from the same address at which the burglary occurred.

Table 9--Location of Person Making BIP Call

Caller's Location	Treated Car Beats		S- Car Beats	
	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-
Other address	44 27.5%	63 22.8%	99 23.0%	126 23.3%
Same address	116	213	332	414
Total	160	276	431	540
BIP calls per carbeat month	1.63	1.99	1.17	0.99



While S- showed a non-significant 1 percent increase (from 23.0 percent to 23.3 percent) in BIP calls from other addresses within the treated car beats, there was a non-significant 17 percent decrease (from 27.5 percent to 22.8 percent;  $x^2 = 1.19$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .28$ ) in calls from other locations. The inconclusiveness of this particular analysis may be due to missing data on callers' location cited above.

Suspect information included in BIP calls: In line with the rationale that block watch and educational efforts of CCPP would lead to more BIP calls occurring, these same efforts should sensitize persons to the need of suspect description information. To examine this possibility, BIP calls were analyzed on the basis of whether a description of the suspect or the suspect's vehicle was included (see Table 10).

Table 10--Suspect Information and BIP Calls

Suspect Information Was:	Treated Car Beats		S- Car Beats	
	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-
Included	97 60.6%	181 65.6%	283 55.2%	350 64.8%
Not included	63	95	193	190
Total	160	276	431	540

For the S- area, the 17 percent increase (from 55.2 percent to 64.8 percent) in the suspect information rate was significant ( $x^2 = 9.24$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .01$ ), while the 8 percent increase (from 60.6 percent to 65.6 percent) for treated areas was not significant ( $x^2 = 1.08$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .32$ ). Some part of this unexpected result might be due to the fact that the S- area had a lower suspect information rate to begin with, and the resultant change in the post-period was a regression phenomenon, since both the S- and treated area had virtually identical rates in the post-period ( $x = 0.05$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .82$ ).

Arrests resulting from BIP calls: Another way to examine the quality of the additional BIP calls received by SPD as a result of CCPP activities is to analyze the result of such calls. Specifically, the question of interest is, does the increase of BIP calls in treated areas cause more high "precedence" dispatching of patrol officers to crime scenes without a corresponding increase in favorable outcomes (i.e., arrest of suspects)? It is possible that BIP calls were generated through project efforts that are actually counter-productive in terms of police manpower use.

To answer this question, BIP calls that resulted in the arrest of suspect(s) for the S- and treated areas were analyzed (see Table 11). In the S- area, the number of BIP calls resulting in arrest decreased -6.9 percent (from 18.1 percent to 16.9 percent), while for the treated area, the arrest-to-BIP rate increased 9.7 percent (from 17.5 percent to 19.2 percent). While these were statistically non-significant differences,

Table 11--Arrests Resulting from BIP Calls

Arrest	Treated Car Beats		S- Car Beats	
	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-
Did occur	28 17.5%	53 19.2%	78 18.1%	91 16.9%
Did not occur	132	223	353	449
Total	160	276	431	540

they indicate that the increase of BIP calls in the treated area has not occurred at the expense of the quality of such calls. That is, the BIP calls have shown a non-significant increase in favorable outcomes (arrests) within the treated area, while decreasing in the control area.

Summary

1. Victimization surveys indicate that CCPP has significantly reduced program participants' residential burglary rate.
2. Program participants are representative of the general population in that their pre-program entry burglary victimization rate is comparable to those persons not participating in the project. They are neither more nor less likely to be burglarized than the general population.
3. Program participants are not representative of the general population in terms of their reporting behavior. Prior to program entry, they are significantly more likely to report burglary victimization to the police than those who do not join the program.
4. There is no evidence of burglary displacement to non-treated neighbors of program participants.
5. Reporting rates for burglary appear to increase for both members and non-members as a result of CCPP activities within treated areas.
6. Official police data for census tracts treated by the project are inconsistent indicators of CCPP effects. This most likely is due to the combined effect of decreased incidents with increased reporting. Additionally, first year SPD official data include the effects of other programs operating in the same tracts.
7. Victimization data suggest that program effects last from 12 to 18 months.
8. While the separate services provided by CCPP do not differ significantly in their effectiveness to prevent burglary, block watch activities appear to be the most beneficial. However, this conclusion should be treated as extremely tentative.
9. The reporting of burglaries-in-progress as a proportion of all burglary calls to the police has increased significantly for those areas treated by CCPP.
10. The quality of burglary-in-progress calls has not been significantly changed as a result of more burglary calls being received by the police. Both the number of calls including suspect information and resulting in arrests have increased, although non-significantly.

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COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question: What is the City's policy on reduction of crime through citizen crime prevention programs?

Answer: The Seattle 2000 Commission recommended and the Mayor and City Council adopted law and justice Goal C, "Reduce crime," via Resolution 24283. A specific objective of this goal is that: "Opportunities to commit crime should be minimized; citizen crime prevention programs should be expanded." The Commission suggested that "Citizens must share the responsibility for prevention of crime--law enforcement agencies, the courts, and corrections should not handle it alone."

Question: Does the Community Crime Prevention Program respond to the City's policy?

Answer: Yes. The goal of the Community Crime Prevention Program is reduction of residential burglary. Burglary has been adopted as a priority crime for the City since 1974, and analyses have suggested that burglary is particularly amenable to reduction through citizen actions. The Community Crime Prevention Program represents a systematic expansion of citizens' participation in crime prevention and allows citizens to assume the shared responsibility for crime prevention suggested by the Seattle 2000 Commission.

Question: What does the Community Crime Prevention Program do?

Answer: The program provides primary, maintenance and advisory services. Primary services include property marking, security inspections and block watch organization; these services are provided on a systematic block-by-block, neighborhood-by-neighborhood schedule. Advisory services consist of providing more limited assistance to communities which have the necessary incentive and organization to provide the primary services through the use of community volunteer resources. Maintenance services involve re-contacting block watches on a six-month schedule and attempting to reinforce continued community crime prevention emphasis.

Question: During the past three years of operation of the program, to what extent has it been effective in reducing burglary against residences?

Answer: According to victimization surveys, burglary rates have been reduced 48 percent to 61 percent for program participants, the specific reduction depending upon the program area and time period involved.

Question: Did reported burglaries go down? If so, by how much?

Answer: If all data on reported burglaries for areas treated in year one and year two are combined, there was a 9.94 percent decrease in the monthly average of reported burglaries for areas involved in the program and a 5.62 percent decrease in the monthly average for areas not involved in the program. This represents a 4.31 percent decrease over that experienced by Seattle minus the treated areas.

Question: Which program element seems to be most effective in reducing burglaries (property marking, home security inspections or block watch)?

Answer: Block watch activities appear to have the most impact on burglary rates, as measured by victimization surveys; however, block watch versus other project services did not produce statistically different effects.

Question: How much of the City has been covered by the Community Crime Prevention Program?

Answer: About 20 percent. The program has had a minimum standard of providing direct services to 30 percent of the occupied single-family and duplex households in the program's target area. Recent experience has shown that in some areas, 40 percent to 50 percent is attainable. Next year, the minimum participation goal will be 40 percent, rather than 30 percent. With the goal set at 40 percent participation, 54,800 homes would need to be serviced. More than 10,000 have received direct services from the Community Crime Prevention Program thus far.

Question: In the report to City Council in June of this year, the Law and Justice Planning Office said it was not possible to state conclusively that the Community Crime Prevention Program was effective in reducing burglary. What has changed in the following three months to make the Law and Justice Planning Office now report to the City Council that the Community Crime Prevention Program is a resounding success?

Answer: Two victimization surveys necessary for the evaluation were not complete at the time of the earlier report, the SEA-KING Victimization Survey (in-person interviews conducted in West Seattle) and the Law and Justice Planning Office telephone victimization survey; these surveys were just beginning in June, 1976. The only change since then has been completion of independently collected victimization data, and the more thorough analysis of dispatch and burglary-in-person data for a large period of time (22 months) and larger areas treated by the program.

Question: Has the Council Audit staff approved or certified the evaluation process?

Answer: The City Council Audit staff has been working with the Law and Justice Planning Office and has had full access to program staff, Law and Justice staff, evaluation data and program data. It is not known at this time what conclusions will be drawn; however, the audit report should provide an independent assessment of the Law and Justice evaluation and its validity.

Question: How many burglaries have been prevented by the program? How many burglaries will be prevented in the future?

Answer: As of December 31, 1975, 9,129 households were involved in the program. Assuming a 48 percent to 61 percent reduction in burglary rates, this represents approximately four fewer burglaries per 100 households per year. Conservatively, assuming that CCPP efforts last only 12 months, this would represent the prevention of 365 burglaries (9,129 x .04).

Prevention of future burglaries will depend upon assumptions regarding CCPP maintenance efforts and their ability to sustain program effects, the number of households served and the period of time in the future that is projected. At present, the most conservative estimates would be four burglaries prevented per year for every 100 households.

Question: What did the program cost during year one, year two and year three?

Answer: Costs are as follows:

Year one	-	\$117,924	(11 months)
Year two	-	\$170,690	(12 months)
Year three	-	\$274,199	(13 months)

For 1.5 years, the program had five field staff. For the second 1.5 years, the program had ten field staff. Thus, the second year costs reflect six months at the five field staff level and six months at the ten field staff level. The calendar year cost for the third year would be \$243,612.

Question: What did it cost per burglary prevented? How does this compare with the loss that would have occurred in the burglary?

Answer: Assuming 5,280 households served a year (based upon CCPP productivity quotas) at an annual project cost of \$243,612, the cost for servicing 100 households would be \$4,613.86, or \$45.14 per household. Based upon the Seattle Police Department monthly crime capsule for September, 1976, the average dollar loss for residential burglaries was \$457.78. Therefore, at a cost of \$4,613.86, four burglaries costing citizens a total of \$1831.12 in stolen property could be prevented (or, 39.7 percent of cost expended). These figures do not include either damage to the

residence or property or the criminal justice system cost of processing burglary reports and cases.

Question: How many more years should the program operate?

Answer: The Analysis of Alternatives, Section Four, shows that the primary service delivery to the entire City will take between eight and ten years to complete once. Population turnover data indicate about a 52 percent Seattle turnover every five years. By ten years' time, we would expect the entire City households to have substantial turnover. Every ten years, the primary service process will have to be started over again. The complete coverage of the City takes ten years with ten field staff and will have to be begun over again after ten years. The Community Crime Prevention Program responds to permanent City crime problems for which the City has jurisdictional responsibility. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be viewed as a permanent public safety response.

Question: What will it cost per year to operate the Community Crime Prevention Program?

Answer: The current resource level of the Community Crime Prevention Program is recommended as the institutionalized model. Currently, the budget is approximately \$263,100, 82 percent of which is salaries. If we assume that a reasonable estimate of salary increases and cost increments for other supplies and operating expenses is 8 percent, the annual operating costs for the program in future years one, three, five, seven and nine would be approximately \$284,148, \$331,506, \$386,494, \$450,953 and \$525,936, respectively.

Question: Where will the Community Crime Prevention Program operate in the coming years?

Answer: The Community Crime Prevention Program will move through yet untreated areas of the City until the entire City has been offered the primary service once. After providing the primary service, maintenance service is continually provided at six-month intervals. After ten years, the primary service sweep is begun again.

Question: Does the Community Crime Prevention Program intend to serve every household in the City?

Answer: The service is designed for single-family and duplex households. The operating goal will be to serve at least 40 percent, but ideally the project would like to serve 100 percent of the single-family and duplex households.

Question: Will the Community Crime Prevention Program serve apartment units, commercial establishments?



Answer: No, the Community Crime Prevention Program was never designed to serve apartment units or commercial establishments.

The environment of apartment units and apartment unit turnover are such that the methodologies of the Community Crime Prevention Program are not likely to have a great effect. Information on burglary protection is, of course, provided to all Seattle citizens who request information, but we do not consider this the primary service of the Community Crime Prevention Program. The specific environmental difficulties are that a number of apartment units are designed such that doors open on corridors and hallways. This makes block-watch type activity difficult. Because apartment residents are renters, they cannot be expected to purchase and install security devices, or make structural changes. For these reasons, the City has chosen a different course to protect citizens residing in apartments from burglary. Specifically, the Seattle security ordinance provides for solid core doors and deadbolt locks for all apartment units in the City.

The burglary protection problems of commercial establishments are different in character from those of residences. While most residential burglaries occur during daylight hours when the burglar could be observed, most commercial burglaries occur after the establishment is closed, or at night. Thus, block watch would be ineffective. The Seattle Police Department will soon begin a Law and Justice funded demonstration project which represents an expansion of their past commercial security advisory service to Seattle businesses. This new program will test a target hardening strategy for commercial establishments, through provision by the Seattle Police Department of target hardening recommendations on appropriate security and alarm systems.

Question: Are there ways to reduce costs (for example, use of volunteers, use of patrol officers, building inspectors, fire fighters, etc.)?

Answer: The most appropriate answer to this question is that since we have tested the current methodology and established its success in reducing burglary, efforts to reduce costs by dramatic changes in methodology should be approached cautiously. In other words, the burglary reduction success of less costly methodologies should be established before they are adopted by the Community Crime Prevention Program. At this time we have no indication (1) that this program is too costly compared with other City services which attempt to reduce burglary, or (2) that any strategy modification to reduce costs of the Community Crime Prevention Program would be as effective. The program continually tries to refine its operations so that the cost per unit of service consistently goes down. As the program staff increase their efficiency in delivering services, it is expected that the cost per unit of service rendered will be reduced.

Question: What department will house this program?

Answer: The Department of Community Development is recommended as the permanent organization for the Community Crime Prevention Program. This appears to be the best choice for long-term maintenance of the systematic block-by-block, neighborhood-by-neighborhood methodology.

Question: The Attorney General's Office is operating a Crime Watch Program. Does that program duplicate the Community Crime Prevention Program?

Answer: The project operated by the Attorney General's Office is a recent statewide effort to provide support for many burglary public awareness efforts that have been launched recently around the State. This program does not duplicate local efforts at all; rather, it is designed with the intent to support these local efforts through a statewide mass media campaign. It is hoped that by increasing the public awareness in general, local governments may be better able to involve citizens in crime prevention programs like the City's Community Crime Prevention Program. The Attorney General's Office provides no public safety service directly at the local level. Since the Attorney General's program began mass media advertising in August, 1976, only a few (20-40) calls have been received by the City's program.

Question: What are the possible sources of funding for this program: Block Grant, HUD, LEAA, other Justice Department funds, State Attorney General, County, insurance companies, etc.?

Answer: The range of possible discretionary federal or private sources is viewed to be an inappropriate choice for funding of the Community Crime Prevention Program beyond July 31, 1977. The principal reason for this is that four years of demonstration using federal LEAA funds have led to the conclusion that this program is effective in reducing burglary. Because federal dollars were used to facilitate the City's learning how better to protect its residents from burglary, and because the functions provided by the Community Crime Prevention Program represent a City public safety service obligation, we believe that City funds should be used to continue the program as a permanent response. Patching together funding for this program using private, federal block grant or categorical grant funds should be viewed as only deferring the inevitable decision. We see no advantage in using short-term federal dollars or grants to continue a proven program. If a commitment to the Community Crime Prevention Program is made by the City, the experience of the last four years and the issues presented in this paper should be the basis for a decision being made now.

Question: Does the program save the City any money? If not, why not; or, how much?

Answer: Probably not. However, if one were to pose the question, Does the Community Crime Prevention Program generate any funds for the City?, the answer may be quite different.

While no money would be saved so long as the Community Crime Prevention Program did not replace traditional police services designed to prevent burglary, the program could be viewed as revenue generating for the City. Although an analysis is not yet possible it is reasonable to believe that numbers of people residing in Seattle may, in the course of the next several years, consider moving due to the fear of or a result of an experience of being victims of burglary. Citizen surveys show that residents of the City fear burglary more than other crimes. A strategy which works to reduce residential burglary may encourage current residents to remain, as well as attracting new residents to the City. If out-migration were reduced, the tax base would be strengthened, property values would remain high and monetary benefits to the City might accrue.

Question: Can the police department's budget be reduced as a result of this program? Where? If not, why not?

Answer: It is quite possible that traditional police services which are provided to support the functions of detection, apprehension and prevention could be examined for potential reductions because the Community Crime Prevention Program meets objectives for these functions. However, those decisions should be made in an atmosphere of independent and cautious consideration. There is little doubt that this program offers citizens more protection from residential burglary than traditional police preventative patrol. However, the conclusion should not be reached that because this program prevents burglary better than preventative patrol, the number of patrol units can be reduced on this basis alone. Efficient car dispatch capability is vital in order to meet the response emergency needs of citizens.

Question: How does the cost of this program compare to the cost of traditional police approaches to burglary?

Answer: The Seattle Police Department's response to burglary includes command staff, detectives, patrol officers and support services. Each function of the police department structure provides some response to the crime of burglary. For this reason, it is difficult to compare the Seattle Police Department's response to burglary on a one-to-one cost basis with the Community Crime Prevention Program's response to burglary. The cost of investigating a burglary (detective cost alone) is approximately \$54 per case; the additional cost of patrol response to burglaries is unknown. Comparatively, the cost of providing the prevention service units of the Community Crime Prevention Program is approximately \$30 per service unit rendered. However, since not all households where services are provided would be burglarized, the cost per burglary

prevented is considerably higher. The Seattle Police Department costs citizens \$1 million every ten days. Thus, in rough terms, the police department spends an amount equal to the three-year cost of the Community Crime Prevention Program every five days.

Question: What is the most important lesson learned with regard to how the City should deal with burglary?

Answer: Perhaps the most important lesson is that a public policy of involving citizens in crime prevention efforts and direct support of City public safety objectives can work to protect citizens from crime and can serve as a model for citizens working cooperatively with government to alleviate common problems.

Question: What would happen to the burglary rate if this program is not funded? Explain.

Answer: There is no definitive answer to this question in an absolute sense--that is, residential burglaries will increase or decrease by x percent a year. Over the last 12 years, reported burglaries have increased approximately 8.4 percent each year. From 1974 to 1975, reported residential burglary decreased by 7.4 percent, and for January through September, 1976, compared with the same period in 1975, the decrease has been 9 percent. These data illustrate the difficulty of trying to say what burglary will do in an absolute sense. Depending upon the various lengths of time periods used, a linear projection of future burglary rate would be either for more increases (a 12-year base) or for decreases (using a two-year base).