


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AN EVALUATION STUDY IN THE
AREA OF CONTRACT LAW ENFORCEMENT
A Review of the Literature

Submitted to:

THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
United States Department of Justice

Prepared under Grant Number 75-NI-99-0103 from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.



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AN EVALUATION STUDY IN THE
AREA OF CONTRACT LAW ENFORCEMENT
A Review of the Literature

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PREFACE

The National Sheriffs' Association, with the assistance of the University City Science Center, has prepared this report, AN EVALUATION STUDY IN THE AREA OF CONTRACT LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, under Grant Number 75-NI-9900103, of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

AN EVALUATION STUDY IN THE AREA OF CONTRACT LAW ENFORCEMENT presents the results of a critical survey of the literature on consolidation, in general, and contracting, in particular. Both primary and secondary source materials were examined and utilized in the production of this product. A complete listing of references consulted can be found in the annotated bibliography section of the product. Footnotes are at the end of each chapter.

THE REPORT

The text of this report is divided into seven chapters. Chapters I and II involve a debate of consolidationist doctrine as presented in the literature. Chapter I, "An Introduction to the Consolidationist World," reports the opinions of civic reformers, criminal justice analysts, and law enforcement managers who believe that "fragmentation" is the greatest single problem facing American law enforcement, and that concentration and centralization are the appropriate response. Chapter II, "The Alternative World of Public Choice," presents the contrasting views of modern political economists and advocates of community control who argue that the greatest danger to effective law enforcement is that in the search

for efficiency and economy, the desires and values of the citizenry - those who are served - will be disregarded.

Chapters III and IV present a structural examination of consolidation. Chapter III, "Ways and Means to Consolidate," defines ten identifiable methods of consolidating and examines the elements of each. Heretofore overlapping and nebulous terminology is brought into focus in this chapter. Chapter IV, "Postulated Governmental Roles in Effecting Consolidated Law Enforcement," looks at the degree to which the national, state, county, and municipal levels of government should or should not be involved in consolidation efforts as presented in the literature.

Chapters V, VI, and VII include a "real world" view of consolidated law enforcement efforts as stated primarily by opponents and proponents. Chapter V, "Factors of Acceptance in Law Enforcement Consolidation Efforts," presents the elemental factors involved in acceptance of consolidation and consolidated law enforcement. Chapter VI, "Implementation Phases and Factors in Consolidation," outlines the issues to be considered in the planning and design of consolidated law enforcement agencies and functions. Chapter VII, "Operational Experience of the Various Consolidation Efforts," reports the operational findings of law enforcement consolidationists and advocates.

A brief note assessing the quality of the data presented in the literature, public documents, other information materials and expert opinion follows the conclusion of the seventh chapter.

THE APPENDICES

Appendix A enumerates the advantages and disadvantages of consolidation - total, partial, and functional - found in the literature. Appendix B is an inventory of hypothesis generated by the literature dealing solely with contract law enforcement.

FOREWORD

In preparing this report it immediately became apparent that there is a great deal of misunderstanding as to the meaning of consolidation. Terminology and definitions on the subject were found to be confusing and, in many instances, contradictory. Some authors viewed the subject narrowly, while others saw it as an all-encompassing unit. This report employs the latter approach.

The consolidation of law enforcement thus is defined as any inter-jurisdictional arrangement which allows the sharing or transfer of authority for the accomplishment of a law enforcement function, no matter how slight or how complete. Consolidation, therefore, is the sum of the various methods employed to share or transfer authority to accomplish a law enforcement function. The distance between poles is great, ranging from informal agreements to annexations, but all the variant associations employing these elements are consolidation efforts.

Contractual arrangements that permit the provision of law enforcement goods and services by one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction for a fee are a form of consolidation. To fully understand contracting, or any other form of consolidation, would be next to impossible without an understanding of consolidationist theory in general. To this end, it is the hope of the authors that this report will be viewed as a learning tool, which can provide an in-depth examination of the totality of consolidation, including contract law enforcement.

CHAPTER I AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSOLIDATIONIST WORLD

Since at least the turn of this century, consolidationist thinking has predominated among proponents of "good government." Though many of the first principles underlying the doctrines of consolidation are now questioned more and more in other spheres of governmental activity, in law enforcement arguments for consolidating the production and provision of services are advanced with growing vigor and have won increasing acceptance. This chapter contains a reportage and a synthesis of what consolidation and consolidationists say about the need for reform and reorganization of law enforcement - most especially local law enforcement - in the United States. It is intended to introduce the reader to the consolidationist world as they see it.

SOCIETY IS LOSING TO CRIME

Many consolidationists believe that "our society today is losing to crime."¹ The dimension and intensity of this conviction ranges from the cosmic and catastrophic:

We are all haunted by the possibilities inherent in the violence, hatred, and fear that beset our society; and we are equally aware of the great responsibility that falls to the police service for preventing these possibilities from becoming reality. Here we pause fearfully. For if the police service of the 1970's responds to the challenges and the responsibilities of their decade as it did in the last decade, failure is assured.²

To the concrete and sober:

Admittedly, clearance rates can be misleading. But they may suggest an increasing inability of state-local law enforcement systems to control successfully criminal activities in areas with the greatest problems. Nationally, clearance rates for offenses known to the police declined from 25 to 20 percent between 1960 and 1969.³

It is this belief, combined with the increasing costs of law enforcement services, that provides the mainspring of the consolidationist drive for far-ranging reform.⁴

A METROPOLITAN MALADY

Consolidationist opinion on the deficiencies of American law enforcement is derived from their perspective of local government generally. To understand consolidationist thinking on problems in law enforcement, one must begin with an understanding of consolidationist thinking on problems in local government, most especially local government units in metropolitan areas.

To consolidationists, "a diagnosis of the metropolitan malady is comparatively easy and its logic is too compelling to admit disagreement."⁵ The problem is simply that units of local government are too many and too small.

A total of 20,703 local governments exist in metropolitan areas. Each urban complex contains an average of ninety-one units. This causes the pattern of local government to "resemble a crowded bus or subway."⁶

About one-half of the municipalities located in SMSAs (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) have less than 2500 inhabitants and collectively they comprise less than three percent of the metropolitan population. The geographic size of these units is miniscule. A large number encompass less than three square miles.⁷

The greater the population in a metropolitan area, the larger its number of local government units of all kinds.⁸ The Chicago metropolitan

area provides a telling example: In 1967, it contained 1,113 jurisdictions divided among counties, municipalities, townships, and special districts.⁹

THE INDIVISIBLE DIVIDED

This is "fragmented" government, and its consequences for public policy and management are frightening. The people, commerce, transportation, and technology of the center cities and their suburban and rural environs are a whole. Problems that people experience living together, for example, problems of water supply and sewage disposal, of health and environmental pollution, of transportation and traffic control, of public education and welfare and the like, people must solve together.¹⁰ The "multiplication of minute, do-nothing municipalities," however, has "divided among many governmental units what are actually indivisible problems."¹²

THE "BEWINDERING" MAZE

The existence of so many little governments has created a "bewinding maze" or "patchwork" of local officials, governmental bodies, and their disorganized interrelationships, conflicting objectives, and overlapping jurisdictions. The public interest is not served and the public business does not get done because of:

...duplication of services and facilities which wastes public resources; inefficiency in the provision of services because of inappropriate scales for production; unqualified employees and poor utilization of their skills due to the absence of centralized recruitment and training; inconsistent objectives and contradictory decisions among independent agencies that neutralize policy consequences; prolonged conflicts among

officials which prevent timely responses to problems; unsatisfactory compromises that limit the scope and force of necessary actions...and the surreptitious control of decision making by party bosses and other factions.¹³

The result has been "governmental chaos," "producing and service inefficiency," and "administrative impotence."¹⁴

ECONOMIES OF SCALE OR "BIGGER IS BETTER"

Many arguments against the continuing existence of large numbers of small local governments are derived from the concept of "economies of scale." Economies of scale is the tendency for unit costs to decline as output increases.¹⁵ This means that larger manufacturers selling to large numbers of consumers can produce and provide goods and services more efficiently, hence at less cost, than smaller manufacturers marketing to fewer consumers. Consolidationists believe: "Bigger is better."

Economies of scale result from a number of advantages that can be fully realized only through large size. Specialization of labor, the application of assembly line methods, the efficiency of centralized overhead functions such as purchasing and personnel, the lower proportion of fixed overhead costs assigned to a single unit of output, and the flexibility and lack of duplication in the allocation and management of production resources are some of the things that underlie economies of scale.¹⁶

This concept is central to mass manufacture and modern production science in the private sector. Consolidationists say that economies of scale are also to be found in the large-scale production and provision of public goods and services such as water, sewage, transportation systems,

and law enforcement. Here as well, bigger is better, and it logically follows that large governments are to be preferred.¹⁷

Though reliable "before and after" comparative statistical data are sparse,¹⁸ it is sometimes apparent that successful consolidations of small governmental units and their facilities for public goods and services have caused costs to rise. Where this has happened, consolidationists have admitted that, "The economic benefits of consolidation have not taken the form of lower costs per se," but argue, "This, however, does not rule out the possibility that savings were created in other forms." At a minimum, consolidating is beneficial, though "The benefits may likely be embodied in additional or expanded services rather than lower per unit costs."¹⁹ Thus, higher costs after consolidation are explained away.

"ONE BIG CITY"

The consolidationist objective is largely technocratic. They seek to obtain a more rational basis for executive control and governmental organization, administrative processes, and management procedures for budgeting, planning, and personnel. For many, the way to do this is to obliterate the "Berlin Walls" of local government boundaries and create "one big city" incorporating all the suburbs and rural urban fringes under a "single over-arching municipal government."²⁰ The cogency of this reasoning is self-evident, "Nothing, it would seem, could be more obvious or rational."²¹

THE "FRAGMENTATION" OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

Local law enforcement reflects the problems and diffuse disorganization of metropolitan and local government-at-large.²²

In the clutter of the Chicago SMSA alone, six sheriffs' offices and 201 municipal law enforcement departments exist to serve a six-county urban complex. Ninety-three communities of less than 5,000 inhabitants maintain their own departments. Cook County itself contains 112 law enforcement departments.²³

Conditions in nonmetropolitan jurisdictions are often worse. In the predominantly rural areas of Southern Illinois, 128 municipalities of fewer than 5,000 inhabitants operate their own departments.²⁴

Afflicted by fragmentation, fiscal impotence, duplication, and lack of coordination,²⁵ the traditional pattern of law enforcement under the American system of federalism "is a historical accident, followed by no other civilized nation in the world."²⁶ Though everywhere growing urban societies are single entities, law enforcement remains divided:²⁷ "The police power, fragmented among dozens or hundreds of municipalities, is frequently unused and sometimes abused."²⁸ In these circumstances, efficient law enforcement is impossible.²⁹

TOO MANY AND TOO SMALL

Consolidationists loose a cascade of numbers to support their contention that the production and delivery of law enforcement services is fragmented throughout all of the United States. The problem is again one of too many and too small.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations reports that in 1967 almost ninety percent of more than 38,000 units of local government maintained law enforcement departments of fewer than ten personnel.

Only about five percent of all such units fielded forces of twenty-five or more persons. These larger departments accounted for eighty percent of all local law enforcement officers. Almost sixty percent of law enforcement personnel employed by local jurisdictions were concentrated in fewer than 400 departments of more than 100 personnel.³⁰

Once again the situation in nonmetropolitan areas is the worst. Data for 1967 indicates that 29,000 nonmetropolitan local governments employed some 30,000 full-time law enforcement officers, or about one officer for each locality. Consolidationists contend that a large number of rural localities do not have organized law enforcement departments. Those that do, they say, maintain forces of between three and five full-time personnel. Ninety-six percent of the nonmetropolitan counties for which data was available in 1967, reported law enforcement forces of less than twenty-five personnel. Of these counties, seventy-eight percent had departments of less than ten full-time personnel.³¹

NO SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

In the consolidationist view, the United States does not have a system of criminal justice. A system requires solid, smooth interrelationships or interaction of parts of a unit, and this simply does not exist among fragmented local law enforcement and other institutional arrangements related to crime and justice.³² This lack of an integrated, uniform approach facilitates crime, hinders law enforcement, and undercuts this nation's avowed commitment to equal justice for all.

THE MOBILE MODERN CRIMINAL

Consolidationists are convinced that criminals nowadays are highly mobile, "He may flee or fly across state boundaries, and he can plan a

a robbery in one state, execute it in another, dispose of his loot in a third, and look for sanctuary in a fourth." They point out that since 1965, Uniform Crime Report statistics indicate that over sixty percent of the offenders arraigned in federal courts had arrest records in two or more states for serious index crimes, and that other data on rearrests show that forty percent of these arrests occurred in a state other than the one of original arrest.³³

Apart from interstate mobility, consolidationists stress that:

Undoubtedly, criminals in multicounty metropolitan areas have similar patterns of geographic mobility and it is well known that organized crime operations are often spread out through entire multicounty and interstate metropolitan areas.³⁴

For example, "Interjurisdictional Crime in the Washington Metropolitan Area," a recent study prepared for the Washington D.C., Council of Governments, revealed that in 1972 almost twenty percent of the arrests for serious crimes were of persons who did not live in the metropolitan jurisdictions in which they were arrested.³⁵

PAROCHIAL POLITICAL BOUNDARIES

According to consolidationists, old-fashioned, parochial political boundaries continue to fix the operations of each law enforcement department to its own particular area. The traditional insistence upon local responsiveness and accountability exacts an exorbitant price in life and property:

The results have greatly favored the criminal, never a respecter of jurisdictional boundaries, who finds it convenient to commit a crime in one city and then in a matter of minutes, flee to another where police interest in his activities is less intense, and where records of his operations are less comprehensive.³⁶

FURTHER EFFECTS OF "SPILLOVER"

Crime spillover from one jurisdiction to another can harm the public welfare in many ways. Effective law enforcement in one town forces professional criminals, hangers-on, and other undesirables to re-establish themselves in more hospitable surroundings. Frequently, "wide-open towns" or "fat cities" of dubious claim to fame result. Common in many metropolitan areas, the social costs of such localities, if unchecked, can spread far beyond their boundaries.³⁷

CONFUSION, CONFLICT AND IRRESPONSIBILITY

A fully developed system for law enforcement would efficiently allocate and clearly spell out the responsibilities of its component departments and agencies. As such a system does not exist, ambiguous, overlapping jurisdictions occur among county and municipal law enforcement forces in incorporated areas, among sheriffs' departments and independent county police, and, in some states, among state and county forces in unincorporated areas. Prerogatives are sometimes jealously guarded and conflicts over who is entitled to do what break out. Conversely, abdications of responsibility are possible. A small local police department may choose to do little if it knows state or county forces will bear the burden of local patrol. County law enforcement forces can ignore their duties in incorporated areas by hiding behind the rationale of "noninterference" with municipal police operations.³⁸

EQUAL JUSTICE IN DANGER

In the United States "equal justice for all" is one of the foundations of our culture.³⁹ A large number of consolidationists conclude that

fragmented law enforcement seriously threatens this pre-eminent social principle.

As formulated in the opaque language of political theory, the danger is this:

The concept of legal and political equality for all citizens of a state or nation may conflict with values suggesting that political liberty is advanced by a dispersion of powers to localities in order to permit a variety of approaches and provide a local base for the development of a power structure countervailing the broad authority of the state.⁴⁰

Which means that:

One of the more difficult problems in policing is the development of policy that is consistent with the democratic ideology of maintaining respect for the rule of law. The law requires universality in its application, but community standards often hold it should be otherwise. Whenever citizens are subject to widely varying standards in the application of any law, they lose respect for it and for the rule of law. Local control of police policy and practice, therefore, runs the risk of undermining the rule of law.⁴¹

Enlightened law enforcement managers working in the field are acutely aware of the hazards posed by local control in the form of community discretion and prejudice. Norman C. Parker, Chairman, Board of Police Commissioners, St. Louis, Missouri, offers his opinion:

I am convinced...that our department could do a better job throughout the country if it were the sole police department. We may not have the kind of law enforcement that some of our municipalities think they want. One of the most exclusive cities thinks that their police department is good because, if a resident gets stopped driving home at midnight, drunk, the policeman will pull him over to the side, push him over, and drive his car home and put him to bed. That's the kind of law enforcement some people want.

But if that car happened to be driven by a young, longhaired guy - black or white - they would expect the cop to hit him over the head and put him in jail and throw the key away.⁴²

INTERLOCAL COOPERATION A FAILURE

What about cooperation among law enforcement departments at the local level? Consolidationists acknowledge that it is there, but most are quick to deny that it has been implemented on a large enough scale to upgrade capabilities or to offset "minute particularization."⁴³ Not only do communities view independent local control rather than efficiency as the overriding concern in law enforcement, but law enforcement officers are themselves "intensely suspicious" of interlocal cooperation. Their opposition to cooperative efforts is motivated by selfish considerations of prestige, for though "the arrest of a criminal in a municipality by a county or state police force may well advance justice...at the same time questions immediately arise as to why the criminal was not apprehended by the local force."⁴⁴

Consolidationists contend that strong tendencies toward animosity, destructive petty rivalry, and jealousy are always present among small law enforcement departments.⁴⁵ So much so, that, "Although law enforcement officials speak of close cooperation among agencies, the reference often simply means a lack of conflict."⁴⁶

According to consolidationists, things are not going to get better. The history of law enforcement in the United States is that of a succession of inadequate forces piled one on the other.⁴⁷ The very number of small departments and their complex and burdensome interrelationships stifle common effort and create administrative problems that seriously retard the growth and functioning of centralized supportive and administrative services.⁴⁸

THE SMALL DEPARTMENT IS TO BLAME

Small law enforcement departments suffer from "inherent inefficiency."⁴⁹ There can be "no doubt" that this inefficiency is to blame for the fragmentation of law enforcement, for, "It is apparent that such multiplication of police units has been derived from the inadequacy of each unit standing alone."⁵⁰

SMALL DEPARTMENTS NOT "FULL SERVICE AGENCIES"

Consolidationists believe that all law enforcement departments in all places must produce and provide a complete range of all law enforcement services at adequate levels at all times. But small departments, unlike medium-sized or large departments, lack economies of scale⁵¹ and do not have the capacity to be "full service agencies."⁵² Although it is not certain what an "adequate level of services" is, or how it can be measured, it is apparent that small departments are in trouble:

Although there have been few empirical studies dealing with questions relating to minimal levels of police service necessary, their cost, and the relation of these to victimization rates and citizen satisfaction with police services, it is clear that many of the smaller law enforcement agencies...particularly the smallest town police departments are faced with very serious obstacles which impede attempts to provide adequate levels of service.⁵³

Because of their few personnel (studies do show that five officers are necessary to provide one officer full-time and around-the-clock),⁵⁴ many small departments must either concentrate on maintaining basic patrol at the cost of foregoing the provision of "back-up" services such as communications and records, or attempt to provide a minimum of these services at the potential cost of undercutting patrol capabilities.⁵⁵

As "this problem is well-nigh insoluble,"⁵⁶ it is frequently ignored. A large number of departments are unable to deliver even adequate twenty-four hour patrol coverage. Thus, ninety percent of the departments in Minnesota are unable to maintain around-the-clock patrol with a dispatcher or some form of emergency contact with the public,⁵⁷ and in Vermont some of the larger departments can provide twenty-four hour coverage only at the risk of having just one officer on duty.⁵⁸ Yet these departments usually attempt to produce and provide other law enforcement services as well.⁵⁹

but is it necessary

INADEQUATE HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Inadequate human resource development is most directly to blame for the many failings of small departments in the production and delivery of law enforcement services. Small departments are small. They cannot and do not "get a qualified man and pay him a just salary."⁶⁰

Lack of Staffing

Local departments are often undermanned. A study of such departments in Maine discovered that, overall, personnel strength was ten percent below authorized levels for local departments and twenty-eight percent below levels thought desirable. The lack of regular, well-developed recruitment and selection programs in small departments is partly responsible for such inadequacies in staffing.⁶¹

Poor Selection and Recruitment

Low entrance standards and poor selection and recruitment practices are common among small departments. Surveys of local departments in Georgia

revealed that only thirteen required written or oral tests of law enforcement applicants. Only thirty-six of the ninety-nine local departments surveyed in Maine required written examinations to screen applicants. Only the very largest departments at the local level use relatively sophisticated attitudinal and psychological tests to gauge the ability and aptitude of potential employees for law enforcement duties. The majority of local departments do not select out the unfit or select in the best qualified.⁶²

Training Neglected

Training is also neglected by small departments. Several surveys conducted in individual states have noted that many local departments require only two to five weeks of basic training for their recruits. A nationwide survey indicated that twenty-five percent of all departments serving communities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants had no established programs for recruit training. Where recruit training programs do exist in small departments, about half are administered in-house by instructional staffs of only one or two officers pulled from other duties and assigned to training on an intermittent, as-needed basis. Advanced generalist training, training in specialized skills, or training in administration and management are seldom offered.⁶³

Extensive Use of Part-Time Personnel

Small departments must make do with part-time personnel. In 1967, some twenty percent or more of the personnel of nonmetropolitan law enforcement departments were employed on a part-time basis. Part-time officers

have the fewest opportunities for training and experience and are seldom capable of handling the complex aspects of modern crime control. The employment of part-time personnel "can cause severe difficulties if the rural area has a substantial crime problem."⁶⁴

Career Development Marginal

Marginal prospects for career development are an integral feature of the small department. Large law enforcement departments can offer their personnel a number of opportunities for varied work assignments and the certainty of advancing according to merit. Attractive possibilities for promotion to a responsible post in an interesting field of law enforcement are conducive to increasing department morale and motivating individual officers to achieve top performance and efficiency.⁶⁵ In small departments, however, assignments are inflexible. Promotions stagnate because seniority is difficult to ignore, and impartiality is sometimes lacking.⁶⁶

Low Compensation and High Turnover

Salary scales in small departments are traditionally low,⁶⁷ and even larger local departments sometimes provide inadequate compensation and benefits.⁶⁸ Poor salary and benefits drive out many top qualified law enforcement officers and skilled administrators. Exceptionally high turnover rates of ten to twenty percent in local departments are not uncommon, and some departments experience turnover ranging higher than thirty percent.⁶⁹

Underlying Fiscal Problems

Consolidationists point out that fiscal problems underlie many of the difficulties in operations, administration, and personnel customarily experienced by small departments. Many smaller and rural jurisdictions do not have the fiscal capacity required to adequately finance their law enforcement forces.⁷⁰ To the small department, this means "instances of bald tires on cruisers, curtailment of telephone service, patched and shabby uniforms, lack of ammunition, and other budgetary strictures."⁷¹

Sometimes communities that produce and provide law enforcement services for themselves are forced to subsidize law enforcement services for neighboring communities who choose to avoid the cost of establishing their own departments.⁷² Seldom does the amount of money expended by local governments upon law enforcement correlate with their ability to pay or the value they receive.⁷³

A Daily Struggle

Given the conditions in which they labor, the lot of the law enforcement personnel in small departments is not a happy one. They must struggle with difficulties that can only be imagined by those law enforcement officers and managers who serve in larger departments:

The smaller police departments, that is those with less than ten employees, place unrealistic burdens on their personnel. Often the chief's wife and other family members may have to take telephone calls and do the dispatching. The officer is usually on call 24 hours daily. His work load is unlimited. He is not free for training since there is no one to replace him. Facilities and equipment are often poor. He has little or no clerical assistance. Rates of pay are inadequate. Generally there is inadequate provision for retirement. Other benefits such as false arrest insurance are frequently missing.⁷⁴

WHAT MUST BE DONE

Having diagnosed what ails law enforcement at the local level, consolidationists have no difficulty in prescribing the proper cure.

Consolidation

would provide an improved level of police services; increased efficiency; easier financing through a larger, more diversified tax base; better coordination of operational activities; specialists available when and where needed; greater flexibility in the allocation of human resources to meet operational needs; greater flexibility in developing human resources through better recruitment, selection, and pre-service and in-service training; greater possibilities of advancement in traditional agencies, and increased flexibility in assignments; reduction of duplication, overlapping, and often conflicting jurisdictions; reduction of double taxation; and improvement of supportive services (auxiliary-and staff-type services).⁷⁵

WHO MUST CONSOLIDATE

This being so, "the question policy makers should address is not 'Should police consolidation occur?', but rather, 'To what extent should police consolidation occur immediately?'" As to this question, consolidationists offer many answers. Garmire and Misner are of the opinion that "only cities of 50,000 or more should be allowed their own police agencies."⁷⁶ The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommends that, "At a minimum, police agencies that employ fewer than 10 sworn employees should consolidate for improved efficiency and effectiveness."⁷⁷ The Minnesota Governor's Commission of Crime Prevention and Control advances a much more modest proposal:

Communities with a population of less than 1,000 should contract with the sheriff or with an adjacent larger community to provide full time police coverage. These small communities should not attempt to maintain their separate police functions.⁷⁸

THE GRAND DESIGN

Collectively, theorists of consolidation have mapped out a detailed program for the reorganization and concentration of law enforcement resources. The following exhibits present a survey of consolidationist prescriptions for improving the production and provision of law enforcement services in the United States.⁷⁹

Exhibit I-1

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Field Operations - Field operations perform all tasks unique to the law enforcement mission. The fulfillment of these tasks requires ever increasing expertise, mobility, and concentration of resources. This can be accomplished only when field operations are reorganized and administered in a consolidated manner.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY	BASIC - Patrol is the most significant and visible law enforcement function. Patrol must change because society and crime have changed. The implementation of consolidation strategies can better fit this function to its role in the modern community.	
COMPONENT FUNCTION	PATROL	
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deter criminal acts • Apprehend offenders • Recover stolen goods • Preserve the peace • Provide non-crime related services 	
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates law enforcement presence • Performs mobile surveillance and inspection • Preserves crime scene • Responds to citizen requests and complaints • Intervenes in interpersonal conflicts • Reports public hazards • Accomplishes preliminary investigation of crimes 	
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>Patrol is the firstline defense against loss of life and property. Effective law enforcement begins with effective patrol. Patrol is among the first law enforcement functions that should be consolidated. But, because of the shortsightedness of small municipalities, it is likely to be the last.</p> <p>Throughout the nation differences in the procedures and frequency or intensity of patrol are the rule. This contributes to criminal opportunities, hinders immediate apprehension, and renders the coordination of field operations among law enforcement departments vitally necessary but almost impossible.</p> <p>The quality of patrol also varies widely, and this further obstructs productive cooperation. Thus the ill-advised actions of an officer from a local force at the scene of a serious crime can negate the potential success of the most expert centralized investigation.</p> <p>Citizens are victimized in many ways by fragmented law enforcement. Not only must they suffer the end results of ineffective patrol, but also, because of a multiplicity of law enforcement jurisdictions, citizens are often confused and unable to quickly summon emergency patrol assistance.</p>	
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	Mobile patrol should be consolidated at the county or metropolitan level. Small local departments are more suited to administer foot patrol.	

Continued

Exhibit I-2

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Field Operations - Field operations perform all tasks unique to the law enforcement mission. The fulfillment of these tasks requires ever increasing expertise, mobility, and concentration of resources. This can be accomplished only when field operations are reorganized and administered in a consolidated manner.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY	SPECIALIZED - Specialized field functions require training in highly developed skills and a degree of expertise that exceeds the manpower resources of most departments. They also impose prohibitive unit costs unless they serve a population large enough to utilize their capacity fully. Therefore, though directly concerned with the fulfillment of the primary law enforcement mission, specialized field functions mandate consolidation.	
COMPONENT FUNCTION	TRAFFIC SUPERVISION	
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Facilitate the safe and expeditious movement of automobiles and pedestrians	
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Performs regular and continuous traffic patrol• Routes and directs traffic• Provides information or assistance to motorists	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Summons or arrests violators• Investigates accidents• Reports dangerous road conditions
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>The traffic problem is one of the most complex and traumatic facing modern society. The loss of life and property arising from traffic accidents is enormous. The commercial and private use of motorized vehicles continues to increase steadily.</p> <p>More and more traffic is interlocal and interstate. Lax, sporadic, or uneven and inconsistent traffic control by one department can disrupt areawide arrangements for systematic traffic supervision.</p> <p>The use of "hole-in-the-wall" or "speed trap" enforcement tactics, are fiscally attractive to financially unviable jurisdictions hungry for revenue, but contributes little or nothing to effective traffic supervision and undercuts public support of all law enforcement.</p>	
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>Mobile traffic supervision on major highway networks and arterial expressways should be consolidated at the state, metropolitan, or county level.</p> <p>The supervision of locally generated traffic on city streets may be more effectively handled by local forces familiar with municipal traffic and parking regulations.</p>	

Continued

Exhibit I-3

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

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COMPONENT FUNCTION	CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Gather and evaluate essential information required for the effective disposition of criminal offenses.
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interviews victims and witnesses• Interrogates suspects and prisoners• Organizes and conducts lineups• Performs stake-out and fixed surveillance• Develops and maintains sources and informants• Collects and preserves evidence• Prepares cases for trial
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>The scope of many investigations cannot and should not be limited to a single jurisdiction. Reports of crimes must be systematically exchanged and integrated and information regarding suspects widely and timely disseminated on a continuing basis. Frequently, the investigators of law enforcement departments located in several jurisdictions are seeking the same person as a prime criminal suspect. When this occurs, fully developed arrangements for close coordination must be readily available and used.</p> <p>Usually small law enforcement departments do not have specialists in investigation. But if they do, small departments can seldom commit investigators on a full-time basis to time-consuming, continuing investigations. If the offense possibly involves powerful figures in the community or could affect sensitive parochial issues, the small department may not effectively pursue an adequate investigation or investigate at all. In all of these instances, external investigative assistance is required.</p> <p>Criminal investigations are a highly prized activity of any department, and experience demonstrates that prospects for interdepartmental cooperation are very poor. As long as large numbers of independent jurisdictions exist, conflict among investigators and investigations is almost inevitable. Much of the controversy, competition, and suspicion that now dissipate the effectiveness of law enforcement was generated originally by disputes arising from the investigative function. The presence of outside investigators with concurrent jurisdiction is, in particular, most heatedly resented by many departments. Generally, a request for assistance in completing an investigation is viewed as an open admission that the requesting department is unable to satisfactorily meet its responsibilities.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>Criminal investigation is guarded so protectively by most small departments that consolidation is seldom immediately feasible. The use of metropolitan case squads on an on-call and as-needed basis, however, has been successful when local departments were receptive. This approach should be encouraged whenever possible. Though it should be cautioned that the extensive employment of case squads or other special investigation units could retard necessary fundamental reforms. The only viable long-range solution is to reduce the total number of law enforcement jurisdictions.</p>

Continued

Exhibit I-4

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Field Operations - Field operations perform all tasks unique to the law enforcement mission. The fulfillment of these tasks requires ever increasing expertise, mobility, and concentration of resources. This can be accomplished only when field operations are reorganized and administered in a consolidated manner.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY	SPECIALIZED - Specialized field functions require training in highly developed skills and a degree of expertise that exceeds the manpower resources of most departments. They also impose prohibitive unit costs unless they serve a population large enough to utilize their capacity fully. Therefore, though directly concerned with the fulfillment of the primary law enforcement mission, specialized field functions mandate consolidation.
COMPONENT FUNCTION	CONTROL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CRIME
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suppression and prevention of delinquent and criminal behavior by youths
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigates specific types of complaints against youths • Diverts selected youth cases from formal criminal justice system • Participates in processing and handling of youth arrests • Assists criminal investigation unit in resolving serious offenses involving youths • Coordinates regulation of youth behavior with community service agencies • Patrols and inspects areas and premises where the presence of youths is illegal or problems involving youths are likely to develop
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>Because of the rapidly growing incidence of juvenile crime, the control of juvenile delinquency is a critical responsibility of every law enforcement department.</p> <p>In addition to generalist skills in law enforcement, programs to control juvenile delinquency require suitable personality traits and the practical application of a variety of knowledge and experience in the social and behavioral sciences. The attitudes and actions of the officer can significantly advance or hinder the potential rehabilitation of the juvenile offender.</p> <p>The control of juvenile delinquency is heavily impacted by the separate statutory and court procedures established for juveniles. Officers must be up-to-date and fully informed of these procedures.</p> <p>Many small departments do not have qualified juvenile specialists or the manpower base and training capabilities necessary to develop and maintain juvenile units. Even large departments may be lacking in some areas.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	Some degree of consolidation is required. Informal exchanges of information and ideas on a regular basis among associations of juvenile officers have been successful in upgrading capabilities for the control of juvenile delinquency and demonstrate the potential advantages of further cooperation and coordination.

Continued

Exhibit I-5

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Field Operations - Field operations perform all tasks unique to the law enforcement mission. The fulfillment of these tasks requires ever increasing expertise, mobility, and concentration of resources. This can be accomplished only when field operations are reorganized and administered in a consolidated manner.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY	SPECIALIZED - Specialized field functions require training in highly developed skills and a degree of expertise that exceeds the manpower resources of most departments. They also impose prohibitive unit costs unless they serve a population large enough to utilize their capacity fully. Therefore, though directly concerned with the fulfillment of the primary law enforcement mission, special field functions mandate consolidation.
COMPONENT FUNCTION	VICE, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND INTELLIGENCE
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforce laws regarding prostitution and illegal liquor, narcotics, and gambling
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participates in undercover investigations of the personnel, organization, and operation of commercialized vice • Assists patrol and investigative units in vice control • Investigates license applicants and inspects licensed places of business where vice activities frequently exist. • Collects, analyzes, and disseminates sensitive information regarding vice conditions and organized crime
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>Vice and organized crime usually are directly related and exist on a national basis. Profits from commercialized vice reach billions of dollars annually. Its cost in human welfare is incalculable.</p> <p>Greater cooperation among all law enforcement departments is urgently required to combat vice and organized crime. This is especially true for intelligence. Intelligence must be collected on a broad scale, evaluated and collated on a narrow scale by a single agency, and disseminated on a wide scale. All local, state, and federal intelligence units must contribute to the intelligence cycle. Coordinated investigations of suspects should be taken based upon this intelligence.</p> <p>Interlocal efforts attacking vice and organized crime have been ineffective and insufficient. Cooperation is spotty and unstructured. Centralized coordination rarely occurs.</p> <p>Too many departments prefer to focus only on local, isolated criminal acts. These departments refuse to acknowledge the existence of vice and organized crime in their jurisdictions. This gives crime syndicates virtually complete operational immunity.</p> <p>Because of their size, small law enforcement departments are unable to act effectively against vice and organized crime. Even very large departments have difficulty in obtaining the skilled manpower required to perform continuous surveillance and investigation of organized criminals. Local officers may not only be inadequate in number but also unsuitable for undercover assignments because they are too easily recognized.</p> <p>Investigations of commercialized vice are also too costly for most small departments. Frequently law enforcement departments refuse to share vital criminal intelligence because of a "trust gap."</p> <p>Improper community pressures can stymie investigations of commercialized vice conducted by local departments.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>Primary responsibility for the organization, direction, and execution of law enforcement operations against vice and organized crime should be fixed at the state level. Crime prevention councils, intelligence units, investigating commissions, and special investigative-prosecutive units have been successfully employed by a large number of state governments.</p> <p>The operation of mobile strike forces at metropolitan and county levels is also to be encouraged.</p>

Continued

Exhibit I-6

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Supportive Services-Supportive services directly assist line operations to fulfill the basic law enforcement missions. They generally involve the acquisition, processing, and maintenance of information, prisoners, or physical items. Supportive services are largely procedural or custodial and are subject to a high degree of routinization. Highly portable and susceptible to capital intensive infusions of advanced technology, supportive services are among the law enforcement activities best suited to consolidation.

COMPONENT FUNCTION	CRIME LABORATORY
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Detect and reconstruct criminal acts• Identify persons, substances, and things
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Assists the application of scientific techniques to evidence collection and crime scene search• Receives and processes evidence delivered from the field• Develops and maintains extensive files containing material samples and identification aids• Provides expert testimony
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>The application of the physical and biological services to criminal investigation is of increasing importance. More recent Supreme Court decisions on criminal procedure may curtail traditional investigative techniques. Many times the only "witness" to a crime is inanimate physical evidence.</p> <p>Laboratory services must be proximate, timely, and of high quality. Adequate crime laboratory services are almost impossible to obtain in many jurisdictions. The start-up costs for staffing, equipment, and facilities is prohibitive for all but a few large law enforcement departments. Continuing capital outlays for maintenance and operations are also high.</p> <p>A number of law enforcement departments, including the great majority of small departments, ignore the problem of receiving crime laboratory services. They make no attempt to provide laboratory services for themselves or to obtain services elsewhere. Local elected officials and local law enforcement managers do not in general appreciate the potential of adequate crime laboratory services. The widespread funding and development of even the most basic laboratory services in the future, therefore, is unlikely at the local level.</p> <p>Law enforcement departments that do have the resources tend to establish elaborate crime laboratories for ill-considered reasons of prestige. This causes the needless duplication of expensive facilities in a single area. Many crime laboratories are overloaded with work, while others are under-utilized.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>The key criteria in providing for properly operated crime laboratory facilities is service availability from a geographic standpoint. The distribution of facilities must be centrally planned on an areawide basis.</p> <p>Law enforcement departments that have crime laboratories are often reluctant to give them up regardless of how poorly these facilities are utilized. Nevertheless, the resources of mismanaged or inadequately equipped laboratories located in close proximity should be consolidated to form more viable facilities.</p>

Continued

Exhibit I-7

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Supportive Services-Supportive services directly assist line operations to fulfill the basic law enforcement missions. They generally involve the acquisition, processing, and maintenance of information, prisoners, or physical items. Supportive services are largely procedural or custodial and are subject to a high degree of routinization. Highly portable and susceptible to capital intensive infusions of advanced technology, supportive services are among the law enforcement activities best suited to consolidation.

COMPONENT FUNCTION	RECORDS AND COMMUNICATIONS
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Facilitate tactical dispatch and deployment• Store and retrieve information about criminal acts and the identity and status of suspects• Provide a data base for management and administrative decision-making and control
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Receives and records citizen complaints and requests for assistance• Monitors radio nets of other law enforcement and public safety departments• Obtains and disseminates data from records• Services teletype traffic• Reviews, indexes, and files reports• Provides dispatching and information services to mobile units
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>Records and communications are the essential supportive service. Operational records provide field personnel with critical data regarding wanted persons, identification of suspects, stolen and wanted vehicles, and other stolen or recovered property. Administrative records provide managers with vital data about the time and location of law enforcement services and manpower deployment. Communications insures that all relevant data is collected and disseminated in a timely manner. The value of law enforcement records is in direct proportion to ease in handling, accuracy, volume, completeness, and accessibility. The value of law enforcement communications is in direct proportion to their coverage, reliability, flexibility, and convenience. Only a handful of the largest departments can develop and maintain fully adequate records and communications systems.</p> <p>Most small law enforcement departments have meager, antiquated records systems that began as marginal compilations of simple local statistics. Records keeping varies greatly in quantity and quality from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Many systems are hopelessly incompetent and incomplete.</p> <p>Their enormous number and the lack of uniformity among records systems often require that many sources be checked, and this diminishes the speed and accuracy of inquiry and search.</p> <p>Upgrading records practices is impossible because the bulk of law enforcement managers fail to recognize the purpose and value of good records.</p> <p>Law enforcement managers believe that communications is a function that cannot be performed by another agency without serious loss of supervision and control. This belief is responsible for the present extravagant multiplicity of single department radio systems. These systems overcrowd radio frequencies and cause communications jams that prevent the orderly dispatch and control of field personnel.</p> <p>Duplicative records and communications systems are an exorbitant waste of scarce law enforcement resources.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>Among the supportive services, records and communications have perhaps the greatest requirement and largest potential for consolidation.</p> <p>An organizational structure that would combine in a single integrated records system all information now being collected at the national, state, and local levels is the best solution.</p> <p>The fuller development of a national clearinghouse and records center in Washington, supported by multistate records centers is another promising approach.</p> <p>Communications should be consolidated to the extent of maximum feasibility. Field radio nets can often be established on an areawide basis. More sophisticated electronic communications can be integrated into state, multistate, and national networks.</p>

Continued

Exhibit I-8

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Supportive Services-Supportive services directly assist line operations to fulfill the basic law enforcement missions. They generally involve the acquisition, processing, and maintenance of information, prisoners, or physical items. Supportive services are largely procedural or custodial and are subject to a high degree of routinization. Highly portable and susceptible to capital intensive infusions of advanced technology, supportive services are among the law enforcement activities best suited to consolidation.

COMPONENT FUNCTION	JAIL OPERATIONS
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detain arrested persons awaiting preliminary hearings or trial
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performs admissions processing • Maintains order and discipline • Accomplishes searches and other security precautions • Protects safety and health of prisoners • Transports prisoners
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>Present day jail operations at the local level is one of the most shocking failures of criminal justice in the United States. Most jails are human warehouses of the worst kind.</p> <p>Many jails were built more than fifty years ago. Physical plants are run down and often segregated facilities for women and juveniles are not available.</p> <p>Jail administrators face serious shortages in personnel. Hard-pressed local law enforcement departments are commonly forced to use sworn officers as jail guards. Their previous training and experience does not equip these officers to perform adequately in a specialized corrections role. The lack of sound correctional practices is much in evidence. Both law enforcement, which loses the skills of valuable manpower, and corrections, which gains untrained and often poorly motivated personnel, suffer from this situation.</p> <p>The cost of jail operations is a serious drain on tight departmental budgets for law enforcement.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>The detention service provided by jail operations is apart from, and not required for, the performance of the law enforcement mission. Jails should be removed from the control of local law enforcement departments and consolidated in a statewide correctional system. Failing this, all local jails should be consolidated at the county level.</p>

Continued

Exhibit I-9

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Administrative Services - Administrative services are designed to develop personnel and departments to effectively accomplish their responsibilities. They are largely concerned with technical tasks and provide many productive opportunities for successful consolidation.

COMPONENT FUNCTION	PLANNING AND RESEARCH
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Determine immediate and future requirements • Develop procedures and resources to satisfy identified requirements
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviews literature, records, reports, and documents • Interviews personnel and designs and administers questionnaires • Conducts field tests and experimentation • Collates and analyzes data • Formulates findings and recommendations • Produces plans, guidelines for policy and procedures, evaluations of methods and material, and indicators and estimates for the allocation and deployment of personnel
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>Planning and research can provide the law enforcement manager with valuable products ranging from reports of crime and traffic analyses to phased five-year program development plans. Almost unknown only a few years ago, demanding advanced techniques and resources, it is now one of the most necessary tools for the continuing improvement of law enforcement administration, management, and operations.</p> <p>Planning and analysis is conspicuous by its absence in local law enforcement. Small departments which already experience disproportionately high expenses for minimal supportive services do not have either the means or the knowledge and interest required to support this administrative function.</p> <p>Meaningful areawide planning and research programs are almost nonexistent. The prevalence of limited administrative and operational areas common to fragmented law enforcement jurisdictions denies specialists opportunities to develop and administer adequate areawide planning tools.</p> <p>Defective records and communications systems hinder the gathering of reliable and uniform data for the most effective possible areawide planning and research. The presence of endless variations in structures for the production and provision of law enforcement services also obstructs the comprehensive planning and research.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>Consolidated areawide planning and research is highly desirable but now largely impossible because of fragmented law enforcement. Though regional and statewide planning and research mechanisms are now available, the final solution lies in reducing the total number of law enforcement jurisdictions.</p>

Continued

Exhibit I-10

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Administrative Services - Administrative services are designed to develop personnel and departments to effectively accomplish their responsibilities. They are largely concerned with technical tasks and provide many productive opportunities for successful consolidation.

COMPONENT FUNCTION	INTERNAL CONTROLS
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insure the compliance of all personnel with established policies and procedures • Evaluate the utilization and adequacy of resources • Ascertain the effectiveness of present policies and procedures • Maintain the integrity of the department
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observes and evaluates operational performance • Inspects personnel, equipment, and facilities • Initiates corrective action • Follows up results of inspection and corrective action • Receives, records, and investigates complaints against personnel • Identifies and investigates misconduct
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>Adequate line and staff inspections and, when necessary, internal investigations, promote effectiveness and integrity in law enforcement. This assures public confidence and support for law enforcement.</p> <p>Well developed mechanisms for staff inspection are mandatory in progressive cooperative programs in which several law enforcement departments may share. Unless appropriate measures for internal controls are devised and applied, error, lack of uniformity, and other deficiencies arising from marginal or ineffective participation can stifle the program's potential.</p> <p>Within local jurisdictions, the management of many small departments is too weak to provide sufficient internal controls. A general lack of expertise in administration is usually to blame where line and staff inspections are inadequate. Sometimes, however, misinformed or ill-considered "blind eye" attitudes toward self-regulation and discipline are responsible for poor internal controls. This may be particularly true where internal investigations are called for.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>All cooperative programs must provide for continuing staff inspection of all participants.</p> <p>Staff inspection exchanges among departments could be beneficial.</p> <p>Though internal investigations are highly sensitive, the pooling of resources, or intervention and assistance from an external, objective source is sometimes warranted.</p>

Continued

Exhibit I-11

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Administrative Services - Administrative services are designed to develop personnel and departments to effectively accomplish their responsibilities. They are largely concerned with technical tasks and provide many productive opportunities for successful consolidation.

COMPONENT FUNCTION	PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop human resources
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develops advertising campaigns and recruiting packets • Interviews and evaluates applicants • Administers examinations and tests • Prepares training schedules and instructional materials • Formulates pay plans • Processes personnel requests, grievances, and other actions • Develops position classifications, performance rating systems, and career development tracks
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>As law enforcement is so very labor intensive, it is imperative that personnel be recruited, selected, trained, assigned, and compensated for their demanding tasks in the best manner feasible.</p> <p>But the recruitment practices, selection techniques, and standards of smaller departments are limited and ineffective.</p> <p>Most small departments employ large numbers of part-time personnel and provide new employees with little more than on-the-job training. Supervisory, advanced, and specialized training is rarely existent.</p> <p>Because of their size, small departments can offer few opportunities for advancement and there is little flexibility in assignments. Salary scales and benefits are not competitive and small departments find that it is extremely difficult to retain top quality personnel. High turnover rates are an enormous hidden cost.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>All law enforcement activities for recruiting, selection, and training should be organized and administered on a consolidated basis. Joint recruitments and selection programs among several departments using a basic set of minimum standards or qualifications offer the advantages of tapping larger labor markets and improved testing and screening. The employment of statewide clearinghouses and processing centers for recruitment and selection would be even more productive.</p> <p>The general absence of consolidated programs is an important reason for the lack of law enforcement training. Local orientation in department organization, policies, and procedures is properly only a small part of law enforcement training. All personnel should receive the same core of knowledge. State mandated training standards and programs are both desirable and possible. The development of stand-in officer manpower pools at the county or state levels is feasible to free personnel from smaller departments to fulfill mandatory training requirements. Financial subsidies may also be necessary. It should not be overlooked that consolidation provides the opportunity for a total review of law enforcement training and educational philosophy with the possibility of a complete redefinition of goals and methodologies. Improved opportunities for advancement, assignment, and more equitable compensation can be obtained only by reducing the total number of law enforcement jurisdictions.</p>

Continued

Exhibit I-12

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Administrative Services - Administrative services are designed to develop personnel and departments to effectively accomplish their responsibilities. They are largely concerned with technical tasks and provide many productive opportunities for successful consolidation.

COMPONENT FUNCTION	HOUSING AND EQUIPMENT
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide the facilities and means required for personnel to operate at maximum effectiveness
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participates in the design of buildings and service areas • Maintains physical plant and fixtures • Inventories and services armament and operational and automotive fleet equipment • Procures materiel and expendable items
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>The importance of satisfactory housing and equipment cannot be overemphasized. Adequate facilities and means of support can extend the capabilities and productivity of all law enforcement personnel.</p> <p>Nowhere are the disadvantages of fragmented law enforcement more obviously apparent than in housing and equipment. Though located in very close proximity, departments often construct duplicative buildings and facilities.</p> <p>Testing and evaluation of equipment is inadequate, and requirements and specifications for standard items lack rationality and uniformity. Shoddy products for law enforcement can always find a buyer and prices are high.</p> <p>The advantages of quality and economy offered by bulk purchases on a large scale are never realized.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>Departments should plan and construct common buildings and facilities wherever feasible.</p> <p>Many maintenance services and storage activities can be performed on a consolidated basis.</p> <p>All matters relating to the procurement of material should be centralized.</p>

Continued

Exhibit I-13

CONSOLIDATIONISTS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Administrative Services - Administrative services are designed to develop personnel and departments to effectively accomplish their responsibilities. They are largely concerned with technical tasks and provide many productive opportunities for successful consolidation.

COMPONENT FUNCTION	PUBLIC INFORMATION
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide citizens with accurate and full understanding of law enforcement purposes and activities • Secure citizen participation in crime prevention and community education programs
STANDARD PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluates community perceptions of law enforcement • Develops and disseminates informational materials and news releases • Advises and assists departmental staff and planning • Participates in informal discussions and conferences with citizens and groups within the community
REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES	<p>Public good will and cooperation is essential to successful law enforcement. Departments must be a part of, not apart from, their community. The true communities of today are areawide and overflow jurisdictional boundaries. The modern public is also highly mobile. Many citizens live in one jurisdiction, work in another, and travel daily through still others. In metropolitan areas especially, the life and property of the citizen is usually protected by a number of law enforcement departments.</p> <p>The insular public information efforts of fragmented law enforcement are no longer adequate to keep citizens fully informed. A broader perspective and dissemination is required.</p>
SAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION	<p>Far-ranging public information programs must be developed and implemented. Consolidated programs are most necessary in metropolitan complexes where suburban and center city law enforcement departments may be responsible for the protection of the same areawide community.</p>

CONSOLIDATION IN GREAT BRITAIN AND OTHER COUNTRIES

Advocates of consolidating law enforcement in the United States often point to the success of consolidation overseas, most especially in Great Britain. In Great Britain, "administrative efficiency has required a steady reduction in the number of police forces,"⁸⁰ and "nowhere in England, Wales, nor for that matter in Scotland, is there the slightest duplication of police authority."⁸¹ Expert opinion in Great Britain holds that the optimum size for a law enforcement force is "probably 500 or upwards."⁸² In fact, during the period 1938 to 1969, a gradual process of consolidation reduced the number of constabulary and police forces from approximately 1,100 to fewer than forty, and no British force today has less than 600 officers.⁸³ The steady progress of consolidation has provided the basis for British forces to adapt the most modern law enforcement equipment and practices.⁸⁴

The Home Secretary has an increasing "beneficial" control over Britain's law enforcement forces. Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary periodically evaluate the status of local forces and report upon their effectiveness. If the Inspector of Constabulary certifies that a force is efficient, the national government will fund one-half of its maintenance. If a penny-pinching local council refuses to purchase needed equipment for its police force, the Inspector of Constabulary can threaten to withhold certification.⁸⁵

The Home Secretary issues rules and regulations governing police standards, reviews and must approve the appointment of local chiefs of police, and can require the removal of any local police chief. His considerable authority protects British law enforcement forces from

improper local pressures. Before the Home Secretary stepped in, constables could be seen washing the automobiles of town and borough councilors. This no longer happens in Great Britain. On the other hand, in America "the pattern of police subservience to local elites is widespread and deeply rooted."⁸⁶

CONSOLIDATION STRENGTHENS DEMOCRACY

Consolidationists assert that perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from a survey of national forces in other countries is that consolidated law enforcement and democracy can go together. In their opinion, parliaments have proven far more energetic and effective in exercising oversight over law enforcement forces than have units of local government. Israel established a national force partly because of a desire for increased democratic control of law enforcement by its parliament.⁸⁷

The police have never overthrown or contributed in a decisive way to the overthrow of a democratic government. History shows that a centralized national force can stand as a bulwark of democracy; for weaker local forces can be overwhelmed by violent anti-democratic elements. The fate of the Weimar Republic testifies to this. In Weimar, law enforcement forces were not centralized and proved unable to suppress the Nazi hooliganism that prepared the way for Hitler's rise to power.⁸⁸

AN INDICTMENT OF THOSE WHO OPPOSE CONSOLIDATION

Advocates of consolidation are adamant about the necessity for reforming the production and provision of law enforcement services.

"Failure to provide minimum levels of essential services is simply not a matter of community choice."⁸⁹ To them, so powerful are the arguments for consolidation, that resistance is both disappointing and shocking:

While it is clear that consolidation of itself cannot solve our law enforcement problems, it is incredible that this necessary ingredient of efficient public administration has had such difficulty making headway in the face of the impending urban crisis, increasing public alarm over crime and disorder, and our growing understanding that even local autonomy requires strong, sensible, cost effective arrangements to realize its full potential for governmental service.⁹⁰

THE INFLUENCE OF THE "IDEOLOGY OF THE FRONTIER"

In their frustration, consolidationists propound a number of explanations for resistance to their vision. The "political and social pressures linked to the desire for self-government," which, "offer the most significant barriers to the coordination and consolidation of police services,"⁹¹ are derided as issuing from an outmoded "ideology of the frontier."⁹²

Ideologies probably never die entirely. 'They depart farther and farther from reality with the passing of time, thus representing the original truth less and less perfectly. At the same time they tend to command ever greater strength and ever wider acceptance partly because, since they have little to do with reality, no interest can be injured by protestations of platitude.' Thus the values of the frontier continue to influence the symbolism of politics today. In particular, Americans still believe that 'small' government is better than 'big' government; that an officeholder is more responsible to the people and likely to be more honest if he is directly elected; that rural government is more democratic and probably of a higher type than is urban government; that a local government of neighbors is more efficient and effective than a local government in the hands of a professional bureaucracy; and so on.⁹³

Thus ideology has great force because the "folk rationality"⁹⁴ of the individual person is incapable of assimilating the imperatives of reform.

Observers of the scene have often commented on the administrative inefficiency and consequent economic waste inherent in such governmental disunity. Whatever the facts of the matter, it seems fair to assume that many of the considerations involved in the present situation are either too technical or too inaccessible for the average citizen to be familiar with them. Hence his views on the subject might, without great injustice, be characterized as ideologically rather than empirically based.⁹⁵

In the 1960s, "a special frustrated version" of this ideology was purveyed by the "confused, angry protests of the far right."⁹⁶

THE "POP" THEORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Those who seek to justify the continuing political existence of small communities have developed a "pop" theory of local government. This theory rests upon the assumption that each little community does have common interests that are distinct and set it apart from neighboring communities. Supposedly, these interests can be clearly defined and expressed politically. "This quaint and bucolic idea, however, is somewhat in conflict with the economic, physical, psychological, and political facts of urban life."⁹⁷

THE REAL REASON FOR RESISTENCE

Some so-called public policy arguments against the consolidation of law enforcement are in reality but ploys concocted to rationalize improper and selfish considerations:

We might say the political leaders are more concerned with maintaining separate small departments than with the consequences of crime.

Taking a partial view of the argument one sees the factor of police discretion as an element affecting the consolidation. Summarizing the reasons against consolidation: municipal areas do not have the same problems...police administration would be removed from close contact with the resident of the local municipality; local police have a better appreciation for local problems.

AN ABSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Consolidationists assert that other arguments against consolidation are born of an absence of intelligence and are obviously without merit. They report, "it is sometimes argued that the authority of the local police department is lessened if the local government acknowledges deficiencies within the local law enforcement operation." They also say another common argument advanced in opposing consolidating law enforcement "is that no government should allow another to assume responsibilities it will not undertake itself."⁹⁹ To merely state such arguments is, of course, to refute them.

SUMMARY

Consolidationists believe there are too many governments and too little governance. They are urban engineers of programmed order and efficiency who propose technocratic solutions to problems that are seen as being largely deficiencies of the structure, scale, and mechanics. Thus results their distaste for the autonomy, smallness, and spontaneity of local government and law enforcement.

Consolidationists hold that effective administration is in large part synonymous with productive government and good law enforcement. They also believe that the present situation of local government and law enforcement must not continue, for "fragmentation" is the antithesis of sound administrative design and practice. Therefore, consolidationists give but little heed to public sentiment for the status quo: Popular opinion is not expert opinion.

Consolidationists argue that local law enforcement - its manpower and materiel - are evermore inadequate to meet the challenge of crime in the world of modern, interdependent society. Small departments, as small governments, are a luxury that can no longer be afforded. Depending upon circumstances and opportunities, law enforcement functions can be concentrated and centralized on a gradual and selective basis or at one stroke on a massive scale. But they must be consolidated. About this there can be no doubt, say the consolidationists.

Such are the facts of life in the consolidationist world.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER II

THE ALTERNATIVE WORLD OF PUBLIC CHOICE

In recent years a theory of public choice has been developed to provide fresh perspectives upon the processes and organization of government in the United States. This theory blends ideas of cooperative federalism and political economy to mount a rigorous challenge to the first principles of consolidationist thought. This chapter presents an overview of some of the more basic tenets of public choice theory as they pertain to law enforcement.

PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PUBLIC SERVICE INDUSTRIES

In large part, the public choice theory views modern metropolitan society as a marketplace. Its basic concepts are (1) citizens are consumers, (2) government activity is the production and provision of public goods and services, and (3) institutional arrangements for making decisions that affect the production, provision, and consumption of public goods and services have a critical influence on the performance of public enterprises.¹

THE CITIZEN AS CONSUMER

As consumers, citizens can have widely diverse preferences for public goods and services. Public choice theorists assume that individuals make choices on the basis of these preferences. Citizens are seen as acting in their own self-interest, but this self-interest may include a concern for the welfare of others in the community.²

THE PUBLIC SERVICE ECONOMY

Public choice theorists regard the tens of thousands of units of local government and jurisdictions in the United States as "so many different public firms or public enterprises in a public service economy." This economy exists to produce and provide citizens with public goods and services.

Public Goods Distinguished From Private Goods

Public goods are quite different from private goods. Private goods such as a pair of shoes, a loaf of bread, or an automobile are each separate and divisible units of consumption--they are "packageable." Because private goods are packageable, producers can prevent individuals from consuming these goods unless they are willing to pay the price.³

Public goods, such as national defense or law enforcement, are not packageable. Individuals cannot be excluded from consuming public goods once these goods are provided to someone else. Thus once the public goods of peace and security are provided to a neighborhood, they are freely available for anyone to enjoy.⁴

Free enterprise markets can handle private goods on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. But because of the problem of the selfish citizen or "free rider," only governments are capable of dealing successfully in public goods. From the standpoint of a public service economy, governments are coercive mechanisms created to see to it that every citizen pays his share in taxes for the public goods and services he receives.⁵

"Bigger is Not Always Better"

Public choice strongly emphasize that "in conceptualizing government activity as public enterprise, the presence or absence of economies of scale are assumed to vary with the nature of the good being produced or consumed," and because economies of scale vary, "Bigger may not be better under all circumstances."⁶

Small public enterprise firms may enable citizens best to satisfy the needs for services that exist within a relatively small neighborhood or community. Medium-sized firms enable these same citizens to most effectively meet the needs they have in common with wider communities of interest. Still other, larger jurisdictions and firms may provide the resources and capabilities necessary to fulfill requirements shared among even more extensive communities of interest. For example, the residential streets over which a local citizen and his neighbors drive are constructed and serviced by his municipality. When this citizen travels to work he and hundreds or thousands of other commuters may travel daily over thoroughfares maintained by the county. If he should go on vacation, it is likely that he will proceed along major highways maintained by his state government and serving countless numbers of citizens living in that state and throughout the nation. As this example demonstrates, some public goods and services are most appropriately provided by small political units; other goods are best provided by larger regional and other areawide jurisdictions.⁷

Public Service Industries and the "Invisible Hand"

Each of the governmental agencies that provide similar kinds of public goods or services to citizens sharing different communities of

interest are member firms in a public service industry. Public utilities, transportation, safety and so forth are public service industries. Contrary to the assertions of consolidationists, the existence of large numbers of public enterprise of firms and overlapping jurisdictions in a public service industry does not necessarily mean chaos or wasteful duplication. In fact, public choice theorists contend that:

When the diverse nature of public goods and services and the difficulties of meeting diverse demands of citizens through large scale bureaucracies are recognized, the complex governmental systems existing in many metropolitan areas appear to be not only rational but to be an essential prerequisite for an efficient and responsive performance in the public sector.⁸

Public choice theorists acknowledge that where large numbers of governmental units and jurisdictions exist: "One would expect that rivalry occurs and that some forms of rivalry are detrimental to wider communities of interest." But public choice theorists go on to maintain that

One might also expect a number of governmental units to take advantage of each other's capabilities and pursue mutually productive relationships through cooperative agreements, contracts, and joint operating arrangements.⁹

Public choice theorists insist that "the assumption that each unit of local government acts independent without regard for other public interests in the metropolitan community has only a limited validity."¹⁰ In reality, a "multiplicity of coordinating mechanisms" act as a "hidden" or "invisible hand" through bargaining, cooperation, and the like to achieve an integrated, functioning system of interdependent governmental relations at the local level.¹¹ According to the perspective public choice theorists:

Once we begin to look for new patterns of order among the multi-organizational arrangements existing in a political economy characterized by overlapping jurisdictions and fragmentation of authority, we can begin to see that the American system of public education, the American highway

system, the American police system, the American water resource system, and many other public service systems are operated by thousands of enterprises functioning at different levels of government. Each of these public service industries maintains and operates facilities serving diverse communities of interest.¹²

A perspective more distant from that of consolidationist thinking is impossible to imagine.

Citizen Preferences and Efficiency

Public choice theorists are adamant that "merely providing public goods and services without reference to citizen preferences makes no economic sense," and that "the major question when diagnosing the performance of governments is how efficiently they provide citizens with the public goods and services they prefer." Further, any criteria of efficiency must include responsiveness--defined as the capacity of a governmental organization to satisfy the preferences of citizens--as an essential element. Indeed, in public services industries efficiency and responsiveness are highly interdependent.¹³

THE NEED FOR CONSUMERISM

Because of the tax power, public enterprises do not go bankrupt if they fail to respond to the preferences of citizens. Therefore, some means must be found to introduce consumerism to the public service economy. Local government and competition among public enterprise firms are two such means highly favored by public choice theorists.

The Sensitivity of Local Government

Public choice theorists believe "citizen demands can be more precisely indicated in smaller than larger political units." They note that "bossism" is more prevalent in large cities than in small cities, and argue that though large governmental units can deal effectively with problems uniformly experienced by every citizen throughout their jurisdictions, smaller, more sensitive units of governments have an equally vital role:

Where neighborhood conditions and people's preferences vary substantially from one subarea to another...information about these variations is apt to be lost if people have recourse only to a single large unit of government. Both large and small units of government appear to be necessary if people are to be able to express their demands for different types of goods and services.¹⁴

Competition Possible

Public choice theorists point out that governmental units in a democratic federal system of government are not pure monopolists and stress the importance of encouraging competition among public enterprise firms. Competition can occur in many ways, for example, electoral contests are a form of public competition. A second kind of competition can result when citizens "vote with their feet" by moving from one jurisdiction to another in search of more satisfactory public goods and services. Or citizens may seek alternative goods and services from the private sector as occurs when parents choose to enroll their children in private schools. Overlapping jurisdictions can foster competition as when a citizen disturbed by the corruption of a municipal law enforcement department seeks law enforcement services from the county sheriff. Competition can

also result if one unit of government purchases public goods and services from the public enterprises of other units.¹⁵

In generating competition, the existence of fragmented government at the local level is a distinctly advantageous institutional arrangement.

We assume that the diverse nature of events in the world and the diverse preferences and life styles of people will make having recourse to multiple jurisdictions, both large and small, advantageous in the organization of urban governments. Rivalry and competition can alleviate some of the most adverse consequences of monopoly behavior in the public sector. If ample fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdictions exist, sufficient competition may be engendered to stimulate a more responsive and efficient public economy in metropolitan areas.¹⁶

LAW ENFORCEMENT AS A PUBLIC SERVICE INDUSTRY

Public choice theorists perceive the production and provision of law enforcement services as yet another public service industry within the public service economy. In accordance with public choice theory, the preferences of citizens dominate in any assessment of the effectiveness of law enforcement. Public choice theorists stress that "when the problem is to design institutional arrangements the first requirement is to decide what result is wanted."¹⁷ In law enforcement, as in other public service industries, public choice theorists want that result to be responsiveness to the citizen as consumer.

PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE CLIENT SERVICES APPROACH

The emphasis placed by public choice theory upon the importance of citizen preferences and a responsive law enforcement services industry, is fully congruent with propositions advanced by advocates of community

control and other diverse schools of thought. All agree that law enforcement must work for the citizen and that law enforcement cannot work without the citizen. The client services approach provides a useful tool by which to achieve a fuller appreciation and understanding of the rationale and goals of public choice theory.

THE THREE ROLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

"Crime control per se" by far seems to be the desired result in modern professional law enforcement. Thus the effectiveness of most departments "is still judged primarily in terms of their distinctive competence in criminal investigation and apprehension."¹⁸ But many social scientists and experienced officers have a different perspective of the functions of law enforcement: "One role is law enforcement. Another is keeping the peace. The third is furnishing services."¹⁹ Public choice theorists would agree that this is the better view.

Keeping the Peace

Keeping the peace is the "day-in, day-out routine of quelling a family disturbance or a backyard argument between two neighbors. It is assisting an inebriate to his home rather than arresting him...It is... investigating the auto accident, clearing the traffic jam."²⁰ Keeping the peace involves incidents or crises that sometimes, but mostly do not, result in violence or other serious violations of the criminal law.²¹ The officer "approaches incidents that threaten order not in terms of enforcing the law but in terms of handling the situation."²² Most frequently, the power of arrest is not used; effective law enforcement

intervention usually requires only warnings or the informal arbitration of interpersonal conflicts.²³

Furnishing Services

Furnishing services is helping distressed citizens to cope with a wide spectrum of problems experienced in daily life. Picking up stray dogs, aiding persons locked out of their homes, arranging for medical care or emergency welfare assistance - law enforcement departments do all these things and many more in their "catch-all" service role. For many citizens in the community, especially those lacking family ties, and who are without a close circle of relatives or friends to call on in time of need, law enforcement officers are the most readily available source of assistance.²⁴

Where the Resources Go

Regardless of whether or not a law enforcement department emphasizes peace-keeping and furnishing services, a considerable portion of the time and energy of its officers in the field is devoted to these functions.²⁵ Nationally, it is estimated that about eighty percent of all law enforcement activities are devoted to peace-keeping and furnishing services. One-fourth of these activities involve handling disturbances and another fourth involve dealing with accidents.²⁶

Studies of the operations of individual law enforcement departments parallel the national estimate. An investigation of citizen calls received by the Chicago Police Department revealed that forty-four percent sought a peace-keeping law enforcement response and that forty percent consisted

of requests for various forms of service and information.²⁷ An analysis of another large city law enforcement department indicated that in excess of eighty percent of an officer's on-call time was spent on peace-keeping and furnishing services. On the county level, an examination of citizen calls received by all law enforcement agencies in an Oregon county indicated that forty-four percent of the dispatches were related to peace-keeping and twenty-four percent were for furnishing services.²⁸

In assessing the role of the law enforcement officer, one noted criminal justice authority, after examining citizen calls transmitted to mobile units by the Syracuse Police Department, reported that:

Only about one-tenth of the calls afforded even potentially, an opportunity to perform a narrow law enforcement function by stopping a burglary in progress, catching a prowler, making an arrest of a suspect being held by another party, or investigating a suspicious car or an open window.²⁴

This does not mean that suppressing crime is not important. Protecting life and property from crime has rightly been described as the "primeval social service,"³⁰ and citizens today are increasingly demonstrating their serious concern with crime - vocally, through their elected officials, and by private actions ranging from cooperative neighborhood associations hiring a protective service to court watcher programs.³¹ But it does mean that in the real world, many citizens have additional and equally important expectations of law enforcement that must not be ignored:

The evidence concerning the nature of the police workload of what people who call the police expect is overwhelming...Whatever their reasons for calling, when the police do not provide assistance, the callers feel neglected by the government which they pay taxes to support. Most feel that since they help provide police salaries, police officers should help them when they seek assistance. In their opinion they seldom seek help from government and when they do their problem is as

important as the shoplifting incidents at the local department stores or the preventive patrol in another area, and they expect police attention.³²

That peace-keeping and furnishing services are also necessary must not be forgotten in the quest for improved "designs" promising more efficient crime control.³³

WORKING WITH PEOPLE

The client services approach emphasizes that law enforcement is working with people. The officer in the field, whether as adversary or friend, is the "third party" in countless situations and events experienced by the citizens of his community. These exchanges, contacts, or confrontations with citizens are direct and intimate. A study of citizen initiated encounters with law enforcement officers in eight high crime areas of Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., revealed that seventy percent of all calls investigated, other than traffic, occurred within or near "private places" such as dwellings, porches, yards and the like. Another twelve percent occurred in semiprivate places such as business premises. Only eighteen percent of these calls involved incidents in public places.³⁴

The Importance of External Relationships

As the field activities of law enforcement departments are in reality "outer directed" toward the communities they serve, it is wrong for those seeking improvements to focus exclusively upon internal departmental organizational structures and functions.

Unlike many organizations...the police have as their fundamental task the creation and maintenance of, and their participation in

external relationships. Indeed, the central meaning of police authority itself is in its significance as a mechanism for 'managing' relationships.³⁵

The importance of acknowledging fully the extent and sometimes antagonistic character of this continuous involvement with a public world of complex, dynamic, and often intense human inter-relationships must be recognized.

Directing traffic, investigating complaints, interrogation, arresting suspects, controlling mobs and crowds, urging prosecutors to press or drop charges, testifying in court... negotiating with civil rights groups, defense attorneys, reporters, irate citizens, business groups...even such an incomplete list indicates the probable values of a perspective that emphasizes transactions and external relationships. The list also indicates something else of considerable significance. All of these transactions can be and often are antagonistic ones.³⁶

In sum, the function of the law enforcement officer

which is unlike that of any other occupation can be described as one in which sub-professionals, working alone, exercise wide discretion in matters of utmost importance...in an environment that is apprehensive and perhaps hostile.³⁷

Dispensing Justice

At the same time they fight crime, keep the peace, and provide services, law enforcement officers adapt the rigid, formal standards of the statutes to the requirements of the citizens and public officials in their community.³⁸ According to Reiss:

On the one hand, the police are a fundamental representative of the legal system and a major source of raw material for it. On the other, the police adapt the universalistic demands of law to the structure of the locale by a wide variety of formal and informal devices.³⁹

Law enforcement officers do this by exercising their discretion to determine if infractions of the law have occurred, the degree of the infraction, and whether or not citizens should be taken into custody and charged.⁴⁰ In making this decision, "It is the individual agent of law enforcement who usually determines how far popular attitudes should control, to what degree official instructions shall be carried into effect, and what the net social result shall be."⁴¹ Because the facts are frequently unclear, and because the decision he makes is usually conclusive insofar as the system of criminal justice is concerned, the officer when evaluating if a wrong exists, how grievous that wrong is, who is to blame, and how the wrong doer is to be dealt with, is dispensing equity.⁴²

From the perspective of the client services approach, "What philosophers, social scientists, and lawyers have argued over for centuries the police must do everyday." It is both legitimate and necessary that the law enforcement officer act as a de facto "advocate, counselor, and officer of the court" when dealing with possible violations of the security, serenity, or well-being of the community. Law enforcement departments are not and cannot be staffed by "discretionless ministerial officers."⁴³

The Social Stage

When, for any reason, the law enforcement officer intervenes in the community he "moves onto a social stage with an unknown cast of characters." Further, "the settings, members of the cast, and the plot are never quite the same from one time to the next."⁴⁴ Almost every situation in which the law enforcement officer finds himself, involves a "societal myriad" in

which exist a system of norms shared by the members of his community and a set of unwritten expectations for a particular action.⁴⁵

The degree of social support for the officer frequently is critically important to the success of the intervention. Many times, especially in on-view incidents where the officer has initiated the intervention on his own authority, this social support may have to be obtained.⁴⁶ To do this, he must satisfy citizen expectations as to what he should do and how he is to do it.⁴⁷ In turn, this requires that the officer know his community - its citizens and their culture.

REFORM, SOCIAL DISTANCE, AND IGNORANCE

Many "progressive" urban law enforcement departments of today and many of the hallowed principles of modern law enforcement science and management are the finished products of several decades of sporadic "reform." In the early days, reform largely meant isolating law enforcement from the public:

Many felt that earlier police institutions had been too responsive to particular citizens' interests. They wanted to eliminate the corruption that had pervaded police departments. Citizens' preferences were considered to be based upon private or selfish interests which should be excluded from public decision making. Institutions should serve the general public interest rather than special or private interests.⁴⁸

The Success of Bureaucratization and Professionalization

To do this, reformers pushed bureaucratic organization and professionalization. They were amazingly successful. Most large urban law

enforcement departments now have the following characteristics:

- Hierarchical structures of formal authority, status, and ranks
- Quasi-military discipline and procedures for internal investigation and review
- Narrow divisions of labor into highly specialized activities, functions, and units
- Minutely organized rules and standards for dealing with all work activities and tasks
- Fixed routines that are learned largely through experience in the organization
- Impersonality towards personnel and citizens⁴⁹

The Ideal Weapons of Reform

Reformers considered such institutional arrangements an ideal weapon in the battle to purge law enforcement of partisan politics and corrupt practices. Bureaucratization and professionalization (1) provided fixed, neutral standards for organization, administration, and conduct that could be universally applied to any situation, (2) insulated personnel from improper citizen demands by restricting their responsibilities and discretion to specifically defined job descriptions supplemented by orders from immediate supervisors, (3) protected the prerogatives of managers and specialists through encouraging the development of an expert "in-house" knowledge of objectives, functions, and techniques which only they were in a position to understand and accomplish, and (4) limited the legitimate public role of law enforcement to criminal investigation and apprehension.⁵⁰

Continuing Reform

Reform during the 1930s and 1940s continued to emphasize bureaucratization and professionalization by stressing the development of

training, the adoption of mechanical aids, and the increased use of scientific techniques for crime investigation. The momentum built up in earlier decades carried through into the 1950s and 1960s with demands for the centralization of law enforcement operations and a more extensive employment of technology - especially electronic communications and the automobile. On a cumulative basis, these various proposals now are widely asserted as being the essential ingredients in any program designed to improve the production and provision of law enforcement services.⁵¹

The End Result: Neutralization of Civic Power

Those, however, who hold that "more effective public service depends upon fitting public services to the particular needs of a community,"⁵² are convinced that the progress of reform in law enforcement during the last half century has rendered many large urban departments unable to produce and to provide quality law enforcement. For though professionalization and bureaucratization "protect citizen interest by insuring that universalism, legality, and neutrality will govern discretionary decisions by public officials and civil servants," these institutional characteristics "also tend to neutralize civic power." Thanks to reform:

Attempts by citizens to hold police officers accountable for their behavior run on a collision course with an internal accountability system that maintains police personnel are best qualified to evaluate and sanction police conduct.⁵³

Citizens and Community Shut-Out

Direct citizen participation in the formulation of law enforcement policies and procedures in large urban departments is almost nonexistent,⁵⁴

and frequently these departments quickly develop an institutional psychology that shuts out the influence of general community opinion as well.⁵⁵ Even if large urban departments were sensitive to articulated citizen interests, the inflexibility of their bureaucratized organizational structure and professionalized patterns of occupational behavior render them incapable of effectively responding to the diverse needs and preferences of their communities.⁵⁶

Self-Interest and Fighting Crime

On the whole, many large urban departments prefer to ignore the consumer preferences and expectations of citizens in the community and provide what they think they are best suited to produce most efficiently and with the least effort.⁵⁷ In the United States, this means fighting crime, and though peace-keeping and furnishing services are given public lip-service, these functions receive a much lesser emphasis in the internal allocations of departmental resources, operational decisions, and evaluation and reward systems of law enforcement departments generally. Thus, whereas recently the "British police have tended to stress crime prevention, community service and maintenance of peace as the most important functions of civilian police," law enforcement departments in America "have moved toward stressing the protection of security and enforcement of the law."⁵⁸

THE DECLINE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES

The isolation from the law enforcement capabilities of professionalized and bureaucratized departments has been diminished greatly by their isolation from the communities they serve.

The Loss of Information and Consensus

A "decrease in local culture sensitivity" forces officers in the field to accomplish their law enforcement tasks without the benefits of information or consensus:

...we know that knowledge about the people of a neighborhood or local community makes possible the day-to-day activity of handling local incidents and adjusting laws, department policies, and rules to the vast range of individual problems confronted on the street. Being motorized, bureaucratized, and therefore less knowledgeable about local persons or the community and less able to use knowledgeable (adequate) discretion, the police officer is thus less prepared to handle ordinary non-crime-service-disturbance type incidents. Furthermore, the organization, through the previously outlined changes, has taken away primary knowledge (i.e., based on cultural participation) and not provided guidelines for handling these incidents.⁵⁹

As so often happens when perceptions of the community and the officer differ as to what his job is all about and how it should be performed in particular circumstances, conflict and tension become inevitable.⁶⁰

Crime Suppression Suffers Also

Ironically, it is very possible that the adverse impact of professionalization and bureaucracy is felt most heavily in suppressing crime. The majority of crimes cleared by arrest are not solved by either the inductive work of the detective division, or the application of new scientific methods and technologies. These crimes are solved because the violator is either "known" to the victim or to law enforcement officers.⁶¹ But "a major problem of large police forces is gaining adequate information about potential and actual offenders."⁶² This is because the

sources of knowledge (informers, quasi-officials such as hotel clerks, taxi drivers, etc.) have dried up from a lack of interaction. Moreover, under these changed organizational

circumstances it is much more difficult to cultivate the neighborhood itself for crime detection and crime-solving purposes.⁶³

"Unreformed" Departments Demonstrated More Effective

Considerable doubts have recently risen regarding the effectiveness of past efforts to design more effective institutional arrangements for the production and provision of law enforcement services. This reappraisal is prompted by the difficulties "in coping with current-day crises" that large professionalized and bureaucratized urban departments have experienced. Recent failures of these departments have been so marked that:

These developments offer substantial support for the observation that some of the older "nonprofessionalized" police agencies that have been bypassed by the several waves of "reform" have been more effective in coping with the problems that police are currently experiencing than have those agencies that have consistently adopted all proposals advocated for the improvement of police operations.⁶⁴

The Beginning of a Counter-Reformation

A substantial movement is getting underway towards a thorough "counter-reformation" of law enforcement emphasizing decentralization and citizens' participation through community control.⁶⁵

Thus, for example, the appropriateness of organizational arrangements designed to insulate the police from political influence is now being challenged in the light of the demonstrated need for greater responsiveness on the part of the police to the needs of the community. Purposeful efforts to assure a degree of detachment, on the part of individual police officers, from the community they police...are being abandoned in some jurisdictions...The view that almost all patrolmen should be assigned to squad cars is now being modified by the increased assignment of police officers to foot patrol. And the strong movement to a highly centralized form of control over police operations--especially in the larger cities--is being reversed by the establishment of storefront offices and by various other forms of decentralization intended in part to meet the kinds of complaints that give rise to demands from citizen groups for neighborhood control over the police.⁶⁶

Public choice theorists are one with adherents to the client services approach in applauding these recent developments.

THE ADVANTAGES OF THE SMALL DEPARTMENT AS A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

Public choice theorists and advocates of community control concur in their belief that there is little or no difference between community decisions regarding such issues as whether, on the one hand, its government shall produce and provide such public goods and services as prenatal care, free immunization programs, or a fluoridated water supply, and, on the other, whether the citizens of the community should act through their government to set priorities to combat a wide range of criminal behavior, control traffic on the local streets, intervene in domestic quarrels, remove inebriates from parks and sidewalks, and so forth. All of these issues are of appropriate community concern and within the broad limitations imposed upon the exercise of governmental power. Each requires a determination of the form of response and the amount of resources in the community to be devoted to effecting this response.

THE NEED FOR MAXIMUM CONTROL

Given the variety of circumstances and requirements that prevail in different localities, citizens in each community should have a maximum amount of control, through their governmental processes in setting the objectives, priorities, and standards of those employed in public enterprises to produce and provide public goods and services. This is especially true with regard to the public services industry of law enforcement, for

the local department, probably more than any other public enterprise in the community is intimately involved on a regular basis with the community, and its actions, or failures to act often have broad ramifications for the citizens of the community and their government.⁶⁷

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RESPONSIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT

It is becoming increasingly apparent that institutional arrangements for responsive law enforcement must reflect a sound understanding of the public service economy wherein the organization will function and be designed to facilitate (1) cooperation between law enforcement managers and community officials, (2) citizen participation, communication, and influence with law enforcement officers in their community, and (3) officer familiarity with the community and the people they serve.⁶⁸ High quality law enforcement can only be achieved when community officials, citizens, and law enforcement officers act in consort with each other.⁶⁹

SMALL DEPARTMENTS BEST FOR MANY COMMUNITIES

Public choice theorists are persuaded that the small local department is for many communities the most effective public enterprise design for the production and delivery of law enforcement services.

The Positive Role of Local Government

Contrary to the assertions of consolidationists, units of local government are alive and well: "They are not dying, but growing and expanding. All talk of weakness, helplessness, and ineffectiveness of... community government conflicts with the available evidence."⁷⁰ Moreover,

modern local governments have recently demonstrated their willingness to provide law enforcement with increased financial support through fatter budgets to support increases in staffing and compensation.

Above all, "It is important to recognize the change that has taken place in local politics and in municipal government generally since the days of Boss Tweed and the Pendergast machine." The record of local government is increasingly one of integrity and good management. The possibility of inept or selfish and corrupt political interference with law enforcement grows more and more remote.⁷¹

Small Departments Sensitive and Receptive

Public choice theorists assert that many small law enforcement departments have been established because larger departments did not adequately satisfy community needs.⁷² They are convinced that the local department is far more sensitive and receptive to citizen preferences and expectations than is its larger, more socially distant urban counterpart:

Officials chosen by the smaller community are more likely to be residents of that area and thus aware of the needs and interests of that particular community as well as more open to local demands. There is an immediacy of contact between citizen and official. Citizens are apt to know more policemen. Informal contacts are likely to be more frequent.⁷³

The high levels of informal and formal communication between officials, citizens, and law enforcement officers provides accurate sources of information for policy formulation and issues that community requirements are effectively translated into appropriate law enforcement responses. It follows that the capacity to satisfy the preferences of citizens is superior in smaller local departments.⁷⁴

The Results of Empirical Studies

A small number of recent empirical studies largely based upon comparisons of citizen-reported experiences and evaluations of citizens living in matched neighborhoods indicates that residents of small communities served by local departments are more satisfied with the quality of the law enforcement they receive than are residents of center cities served by large "reformed" departments.

In one study conducted in the Indianapolis metropolitan area, law enforcement services provided to three suburban communities by local departments of between eighteen and twenty-six officers were compared with services provided by the Indianapolis Police Department of 1,100 men to three center city neighborhoods adjoining the suburban communities. Another similar study was undertaken in the Grand Rapids Michigan metropolitan area. In this study, services provided by the Grand Rapids police force of 313 officers were compared with services provided by small suburban departments of from nine to seventeen officers.⁷⁵

The results of these studies demonstrated that citizens living in the small suburbs of both metropolitan areas consistently indicated that they received better law enforcement from their local departments than did citizens in the six center city neighborhoods. Thus citizens in the suburban communities rated their departments better with regard to response times, officer-citizen relationships, the likelihood of officers taking bribes, and the general quality of the job being done. These citizens were also less likely to have been a victim of a crime than citizens living in the center city neighborhoods, more likely to have reported a victimization and more likely to have received some form of law enforcement assistance.⁷⁶

In the Indianapolis metropolitan area the small local departments provided higher service levels at a slightly higher cost, but in the Grand Rapids metropolitan area, the local departments were providing better service at less cost than the service provided by the center city department.⁷⁷

From the results of studies such as these, public choice theorists have concluded that (1) small law enforcement departments can provide higher quality law enforcement than larger departments, (2) effective law enforcement does not require high degrees of specialization and professionalization, (3) professional law enforcement departments who do not interact with the citizens they serve can be less effective than nonprofessional departments subject to close community control.⁷⁸

THE MERITS OF CONTRACT LAW ENFORCEMENT

Public choice theorists believe that contract law enforcement has several advantages over more orthodox arrangements for law enforcement services.

INTERESTS OF PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS BOTH SERVED

One of the most important benefits of contracting is that it separates the function of producing law enforcement services from the function of providing law enforcement services.⁷⁹ Frequently, the interests of producers and consumers conflict in public service industries because "efficient scales or organization for the production of public goods may be quite independent of the scales required to recognize appropriate publics for the consumption of public goods."⁸⁰

Contracting for law enforcement services, however, assures producers of opportunities to pursue favorable economies of scale wherever they can be realized and gives the consumer an effective and responsive means of control. Thus producers can centralize and concentrate resources as they see fit while at the same time decentralized local governments can provide services tailored to the consumption preferences of small communities of citizens. This means that:

As long as ample overlap and fragmentation of authority exist, agencies at one level of government can take advantage of the capabilities of agencies operating at other levels. If economies of scale in the production of a public good can be realized by a larger agency, smaller-sized agencies can enter into contractual arrangements to buy services from the larger agency. In such a circumstance small, local government agencies can operate as buyer's cooperatives on behalf of their constituents in arranging for the production of public services in accordance with the preferences of local inhabitants.⁸¹

A QUID PRO QUO RELATIONSHIP

Because it is a quid pro quo relationship in which real value is exchanged for specified services, contracting for law enforcement "leads to an increase in information about the evaluation of the consequences of such relationships by parties on both sides of the transaction."⁸² Hard bargaining is possible,⁸³ and this increases the prospects and impact of consumer sovereignty. For example, in Los Angeles County where an extensive contract system now exists, the county administration has been forced to become more responsive to the preferences of the public service clientele who have organized through their local units of government. This has resulted in significant changes in operating procedures and organizational arrangements for the production of law enforcement services throughout Los Angeles County.⁸⁴

THE UTILITIES OF INFORMAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS

A 1968 survey of 834 communities of less than 10,000 population revealed that eighty-three percent had law enforcement service agreements with either county, state, or other local law enforcement departments.⁸⁵ It is a frequent practice, especially in rural areas, for both part-time, and small-full time departments to patrol in their own jurisdictions and to assist in patrolling and responding to calls in neighboring jurisdictions.⁸⁶ A variety of sources also maintain that, contrary to assertions made by some consolidationists, law enforcement departments in metropolitan areas regularly exchange information and cooperate in investigations, communications, identification, criminal statistics, and laboratories.⁸⁷

Public choice theorists contend informal cooperative agreements are an effective means of improving the production and provision of law enforcement services. A recent study of informal cooperative agreements among law enforcement departments in the St. Louis metropolitan area indicated that not only did the existence of informal agreements enhance the quality of law enforcement services (being especially important in the solution of serious crimes) but that informal agreements were superior to formal written agreements for cooperation.⁸⁸

Informal cooperative agreements are highly flexible. Users can easily adapt them to changing circumstances and requirements and quid pro quos can be worked out that accurately reflect on an up-to-date basis the changing conditions of supply and demand for specific capabilities and services law enforcement departments share.⁸⁹

PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
AND REFORMED LAW ENFORCEMENT

The public choice prescription for reforming the public services industries for law enforcement involves the establishment of both large and small law enforcement departments serving the same areas.⁹⁰ Public choice theorists recognize that many law enforcement problems are city-, state-, and nationwide. These problems can only be successfully attacked by a number of relatively large law enforcement jurisdictions. Further, some specialized law enforcement services such as communications and records, laboratory facilities, and specialized investigations units can be provided most economically by large departments.⁹¹

It would be highly advantageous, however, to establish small locally controlled law enforcement departments within the boundaries of larger law enforcement jurisdictions. These departments could provide patrol services responsive to the preference of individual city neighborhoods and suburban communities while maintaining minimum standards established throughout the larger jurisdiction. Finally, an extensive network of interjurisdictional contracts and agreements could be developed to most effectively allocate law enforcement resources within this system of overlapping jurisdictions.⁹²

THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OF
CONSOLIDATIONISTS

Consolidationists confuse the principles of public administration with the principles of democratic government.⁹³ There is an important difference: Administration gets things done. Government decides what is to be done. But consolidationists see government almost exclusively as an

administrative mechanism. They do not appreciate fully that the first objective of government is to serve a wide variety of human desires and values by providing every citizen a choice in "what is to be done."⁹⁴

THE HIERARCHICAL IMPERATIVE

Because of this fundamental error, consolidationists mistakenly attempt to apply theories of bureaucratic organization and authority to "good government." Convinced that public business is accomplished best by clearly defined hierarchies topped by a single center for decision-making and control,⁹⁵ consolidationists have developed a single-minded enthusiasm for sweeping reorganizations of "fragmented" political institutions toward ever larger administrative pyramids.⁹⁶

SPECIALISTS "ON TOP" NOT "ON TAP"

The consolidationist "obsession" with structural unification devalues still further considerations of choice and diversity. Indeed, consolidationists are suspicious of citizen control which to them threatens uninformed interference in technical tasks. Consolidationists work to provide governmental managers and experts with considerable professional discretion. They prefer specialists to be "on top" rather than "on tap."⁹⁷ Often, consolidation is welcomed as an opportunity for professionals to assert control and define "what ought to be."⁹⁸

THE CONCEPTUAL BLINDNESS OF CONSOLIDATIONISTS

So strong is their bias toward unification - of how metropolitan governments should be organized - that consolidationists are blind to the

possibility that small and independent units of government are viable and can make practical contributions to solving the problems of metropolis.⁹⁹ Instead of investigating how local government actually works, consolidationists assume it doesn't work.¹⁰⁰ They hurl epithets such as "crazy-quilt" and "organized chaos" from the perspective of ideology and ignorance. Generally, consolidationists like to believe that local government is "a pathological phenomenon."¹⁰⁰ Through these attitudes, consolidationists have locked themselves into an "iron cage" of orthodoxy.

SUMMARY

Public choice theory, if correct, means that the public service economy of local government has a resiliency and logic that is far beyond the customary expectations of conventional wisdom. Public choice theorists have developed an elaborate conceptual design founded upon a devout and wholehearted belief in the intelligence, disciplined, spontaneity of the individual and his institutions. They profess a polycentric world of consumer sovereignty in governmental activity and seek to provide a rationale for continuing diversity and preference in modern life.

Public choice theorists contend that there is still a place for the small law enforcement department in the American criminal justice system. They presume that the primary forces of inquiry in efforts to improve the production and provision of law enforcement services should be upon the citizen. Whereas consolidationists give but little heed to public sentiment, public choice theorists give a great deal indeed. Consolidationists value highly expert opinion, public choice theorists are much less enthralled.

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

Public choice theory argues that the virtues of the status quo in American law enforcement had best be assured before embarking upon sweeping reform. It is possible, say public choice theorists, that "fragmented" law enforcement is efficient law enforcement.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

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⁹⁵Phillip M. Gregg, "Units and Levels of Analysis: A Problem Policy Analysis in Federal Systems," Publius 4 (Fall 1974), p. 64;
E. Ostrom, Design, 1975, p. 277.

⁹⁶Bollens, p. 374;
Theoretical Inquiry, p. 831.

⁹⁷E. Ostrom, Design, 1975, p. 277.

⁹⁸William A. Sinclair, "Intergovernmental Contracting for Police Patrol in Michigan: An Economic Analysis," Ph. D. Dissertation (Michigan State University, 1975), p. 34.

⁹⁹Elinor Ostrom, On Righteousness, Evidence, and Reform: The Police Story (Bloomington, Indiana: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 1975), p. 34.

¹⁰⁰Bruce D. Rodgers and C. Lipsey McCurdy, "Metropolitan Reform: Citizen Evaluations of Performances in Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee," Publius 4 (Fall 1974), p. 23.

¹⁰¹Theoretical Inquiry, p. 831.

CHAPTER III

WAYS AND MEANS TO CONSOLIDATE

If the consolidation of law enforcement is defined as any interjurisdictional arrangement which allows the sharing or transfer of authority for the accomplishment of a law enforcement function, no matter how slight or how complete, the denominator common to any consolidation effort becomes change. It is the degree of change in the governmental structure and its component systems for the delivery of public goods and services that determines the degree to which consolidation takes place and allows it to be defined.

Consolidation, viewed in this manner, can be seen as a continuum. At one end of the continuum is the complete merger of jurisdictions into one new unit of government. At the other end are informal arrangements and sharing which involve little or no change in governmental structure. Along the continuum are such alternate methods of consolidation as federations, annexations, contracting, police service districts, etc.¹

Across the continuum of consolidation efforts, three distinct groupings of consolidations can be identified. For the purpose of this product, these groupings are labeled total, partial, and functional consolidation.

- Total consolidation is the complete or nearly complete combination of units of government for the production and provision of a totality of public goods and services.
- Partial consolidation is the combination of certain given units of government, or the creation of a new unit of government for the production and provision of specific public goods and services.
- Functional consolidation is the sharing of, or cooperative efforts by formal or informal agreement toward the production and provision of public goods and services without the necessity of change in units of government.

In reviewing the literature on consolidation it quickly became apparent that there is no universal system of terminology used to identify the various forms of consolidation. What was defined as merger by one researcher, would be called amalgamation by another and simply consolidation by a third. This lack of uniformity necessitates a redefinition of terminology. For the purposes of this product this redefinition is based on process and results in the identification of ten distinct forms of consolidation. These are:

- Informal Arrangements
- Sharing
- Pooling
- Contracting
- Police Service Districts
- Merger (Regionalization)
- Special Police Districts
- Federation
- Amalgamation
- Annexation

These alternative consolidation forms can be grouped based on degrees of change necessary to implement the process and identified as either total, partial or functional consolidation by asking three questions. Is there substantial change in the affected political structure? Is there substantial change in the law enforcement structure? Is there change in the method of delivery of law enforcement functions? (Note: in the method of delivery of law enforcement functions substantial change is not required for a consolidation effort to take place.)

In an effort to clearly enumerate the factors that have led to the identification of the various systems of consolidation, each system will be examined separately. Each system will be defined with definitions being based upon the essential elements of that system according to the works found in the literature review. The design of each system also will be examined in depth.

Exhibit III-1

DEGREE OF CHANGE AND METHODS OF CONSOLIDATION

	TYPE OF CONSOLIDATION	SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE	SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE	CHANGE IN THE METHOD OF DELIVERY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONAL	INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS			X
	SHARING			X
	POOLING			X
	CONTRACTING			X
PARTIAL	CONTRACTING		X	X
	POLICE SERVICE DISTRICTS		X	X
	MERGER (REGIONALIZATION)		X	X
	SPECIAL POLICE DISTRICTS		X	X
TOTAL	FEDERATION	X	X	X
	AMALGAMATION	X	X	X
	ANNEXATION	X	X	X

INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS

Informal arrangements are defined as unwritten cooperative agreements to collectively perform a task that would be mutually beneficial to the participants.

The most informal of arrangements may simply involve the monitoring of an adjacent jurisdiction's radio frequency so that necessary back-up can be provided when needed, or the sharing of information of a mutual concern by officers of adjacent cities. It may also be more formalized. The Metropolitan St. Louis Police - Juvenile Officers' Association is one example. With its formation in 1959, this Association successfully established procedures for the handling of juveniles. These procedures are followed by all police agencies in the St. Louis area, even those without regularly assigned juvenile officers.²

This effort to identify and understand mutual problems and communicate and work collectively towards a resolution is a first step, but a very important first step, in the struggle to eliminate fracturization through consolidation.

SHARING

Sharing is defined as the provision or reception of goods or services which enhances the completion of a law enforcement function or fosters uniformity.

Many services, provided at all levels of government, are available to law enforcement agencies free of charge. In Orange County, California, the

following Sheriff-Coroner services are available to all county law enforcement agencies at no cost:

- Criminalistic Laboratory Services
- Warrant and Fugitive Services
- Records and Identification Services
- Coroner Services
- Civil Division Services
- Prisoner Transportation Services³

The federal government is a major participant in the sharing process. This federal sharing comes in the form of grant monies, earmarked for law enforcement improvements, distributed by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration; training, information and statistical gathering and dissemination provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; technical assistance provided by many federal agencies, etc.

One of the most common forms of sharing involves inservice and pre-service training. Such agencies as the F.B.I., State Police, universities, the U.S. Army, a neighboring police department, etc., are all involved in police training which is commonly provided on a shared basis.⁴

Areawide training efforts include:

- major agency assistance to nearby smaller departments
- state and regional training programs
- institutes and academies for police training
- university and college programs⁵

State Police Councils, in addition to developing and implementing recruitment and selection programs, are often involved in police officer training programs as well.⁶ In California, the California State Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (P.O.S.T.) sets minimum standards for training and curriculum used in the training of peace officers in the state. Because it is a system where local departments are

reimbursed for training costs and because it has earned a reputation for excellence, the P.O.S.T. formula for training has gained statewide acceptance and has served as a model for the rest of the nation.

Many institutes and academies affiliated with a university or a federal agency have long provided instruction to American police.

The Dade County (Fla.) police training program is a good example of a cooperative effort on the part of a county and a school board. The school board has provided, without charge, State certified instructors and facilities at the Dade County Junior College for both recruit and inservice training. The Dade County Public Safety Department provides an officer to administer the program and maintain liaison with the junior college staff. The whole program is available without charge to all local jurisdictions within the county.⁷

Sharing, a very basic form of consolidation, involves a broad array of law enforcement services from simple information exchanges to specialized investigative techniques.

POOLING

Pooling is defined as the combination of resources by two or more agencies to perform a selective support service under the guidelines of predetermined formal commitments and with direct involvement by all parties. Pooling is limited to formal agreements and does not involve informal arrangements.

Under this kind of arrangement, departments agree to combine resources such as manpower, facilities, and funds to perform a selective function at a "higher level of service." Among functions amenable to effective pooling are communications, personnel recruitment and testing, training, records and identification services, and detention operations.⁸

One trend in pooling involves the construction of common city-county buildings to house law enforcement activities which can "be a first step toward the joint performance of law enforcement activities of the two governments."⁹

An example of an informal agreement that expanded into a pooling arrangement and appears destined to involve additional consolidation efforts was taken from the October 1972 F.B.I. Report. It involves Stark County, Ohio.

Actively assisted by the county prosecuting attorney's office, the chiefs of police of five cities and the sheriff started in 1969 an informal cooperative effort to combat narcotic and drug growth. The program included a regular exchange of intelligence, the development of investigative techniques, and a concentration of attention on those persons identified as engaged in trafficking drugs and narcotics. The value of this program was demonstrated by almost immediate success in producing significantly increased arrests and convictions, primarily on possession charges.

[By early 1970]...the Stark County law enforcement leadership agreed on the need for a special unit of undercover officers to be employed countywide to assist the various departments, both large and small.

[As a result the] Stark County MEG Unit continues to function, basically from its original plan. The plan for the unit necessarily covered supervision, personnel, logistics, and operations. As the duties of the MEG Unit were in the field of law enforcement, agreement was reached by the participating governmental units that its activities would be under the direct supervision of a seven-man coordinating staff including the chiefs of the police departments of the five cities, the county sheriff, and the author.

...the plan included funds to obtain laboratory services locally under contract. Accordingly, 24-hour laboratory services were retained...¹⁰

Local laboratories that provide basic services are subject to pooling. These services must be readily available within each area to handle routine requests for service. Facilities for such services can be jointly operated by two or more jurisdictions with costs shared on an agreed basis.¹¹

Both staff and line functions are subject to pooling; however, when pooling goes beyond staff functions (administrative and auxiliary activities that provide supporting services to line functions) to line functions, it generally involves a higher degree of consolidation.¹²

CONTRACTING

A Florida newspaper once described contracting as a "modern variation of the hired gun,"¹³ but for the purposes of this product contracting is defined as a limited and voluntary program in which one government enters into a formal, legally binding agreement to provide certain specified law enforcement services (either total or partial) to another government for a fee without altering the basic structure of either government.

Any level of government can provide contract law enforcement services to other governments.¹⁴ County to city, city to county, county to the federal government, city to city, and state to county and city contractual arrangements are presently in evidence throughout the country.

Under a full-service contract all police functions are provided by a law enforcement agency of one jurisdiction to the citizens of another jurisdiction. With a selective-service contract only selected functions are provided.¹⁵

The most frequently observed form of law enforcement contract involves the total provision of police services to a city by a county. This type of contracting, which began in 1954 with the incorporation of the City of Lakewood in Los Angeles County, California, involves the contractor acting as the police department for the contracting municipality.

As a result of the incorporation of the City of Lakewood, the frequently cited, but often misunderstood, term "The Lakewood Plan" was coined. The term refers to the package purchase of county services, only one of which is law enforcement, instead of individual services on a piecemeal basis.

Another approach to contract services can be seen in the City of Atlanta and Fulton County, Georgia, program. In this situation the city provides all police services to unincorporated portions of the county.¹⁶

The significant features of the Atlanta plan are provisions for continuing annexation by the City of Atlanta of urbanized areas contiguous to it and the reallocation of functions between the city and the county. As a result of the plan, law enforcement has become the sole responsibility of the city...

The City of Atlanta and Fulton County jointly decide the level of police service to be provided in the unincorporated area and prepare the contractual arrangements. Other municipalities in the county continue to maintain their own police departments.¹⁷

A new trend in contracting involves the federal government contracting with local jurisdictions to provide law enforcement services on federal lands. Two examples are: Marion County, Florida, is under contract to patrol the Ocala National Forest, and San Bernardino County, California, provides law enforcement services on a federal Indian reservation along the Colorado River. Both of these contracts are administered by the County Sheriff.

City to city contracts are similar in design and function to county to city contracts. This type of arrangement offers an alternative to a city contract with another unit of government which is unwilling or unable to meet the needs of the contracting city. "For example, the City of Yorba Linda, California, a city of 12,000, currently contracts for total police

services with its neighboring city of Brea, population 19,000."¹⁸ Prior to this, Yorba Linda contracted for law enforcement services with Orange County.

States have also begun to provide police services on a contractual basis to subordinate units of government. Various types of programs have been initiated by the states of Alaska, New Jersey, Kentucky, Maryland, Virginia, and Connecticut among others.

...in the State of Connecticut...the state police department may agree to supply a 'resident trooper' to a locality on a shared-cost basis for a two-year period. As of 1969, forty-seven Connecticut localities had such troopers.

The 'resident trooper' plan has two main virtues for the non-metropolitan locality. It provides the locality with a full-time, professional police service. It also may assist an urbanizing community in forming the nucleus of a full-time, organized local police department. Speaking of the latter benefit, one commentator explains, 'This program can also be of assistance in the formation and development of a local police department. Six Connecticut towns have some local, full-time police personnel working under the direction of the resident state policeman. In other towns, he usually trains and supervises constables and other special police. Thus, when a town grows too large for participation in the resident system, this trained personnel provides a ready-made police department.'¹⁹

This system of law enforcement delivery has served as the model for the development of similar systems in other states. Interesting to note is the fact that virtually every program of this kind relies on some degree of state subsidy for success. "Connecticut splits the cost on a 60% - 40% basis. Maryland State subsidizes the locality for 25% of the cost of their program."²⁰ "The State of Alaska does not share in these costs. Consequently, out of fifteen villages and towns formerly under contract there is only one left in the program."²¹

Quite common is the sharing of jail facilities through contractual agreements. Examples of this type of arrangement include the City of Oakland

and Alameda County, California, where, under the terms of the contract, Oakland pays the county for each city prisoner detained in the county jail and vice versa. The Portland, Oregon, police pay Multnomah County a fixed sum for every city prisoner held in the county jail, and Los Angeles County provides complete jail service on a contract basis for all but five cities in the county.²²

In outlying rural areas contracting for resident deputies is a popular trend. This concept, which is similar to a state resident trooper program, is presented as a viable alternative to individually maintained, uncoordinated, mini-police departments.²³

In its 1967 report, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice made the following observations about contracting:

- Contract law enforcement programs can be effective without altering existing governmental structures.
- Any level of government can provide contract law enforcement services to other governments.
- A contract program can be effectively utilized to meet law enforcement needs in staff, auxiliary, and certain field services; it also can accomplish complete consolidation of all law enforcement activities.
- Costs of a contract program of law enforcement can be distributed equitably among participants and need not work to the disadvantage of nonparticipants.
- Contract programs are limited and voluntary and do not necessarily cover areas that are contiguous.²⁴

The key to the popularity of contracting is its flexibility. Under a selective-service contracting system the contractual arrangement may be as uncomplicated as the St. Louis County Police Department's provision of radio communications services to more than forty municipal police departments on a contractual basis.²⁵ On the other hand, contracting may be as

complex, under a full-service contract, as the Decatur County (Iowa) Public Safety Commission Inc. which on July 1, 1973, represented the first total county-wide unified law enforcement system. This regional application of contracting is accomplished totally through the use of service contracts with the Sheriff of Decatur County.²⁶ Thus, in Decatur County, contractual law enforcement provided the basic framework of a regionalized law enforcement system.

Enabling legislation, sometimes referred to as a "joint powers" act or agreement, is a necessary legal protection for contractual arrangements and has been legislated in several states. Before a contract services program can be established, it is essential that a legal basis for this type of provision of services be established. State laws and constitutions, county and city charters, and all types of local ordinances, both county and city, must be considered when establishing such a program. In addition to enabling legislation governing the powers and duties of public agencies to contract with one another for services, it is also necessary to identify any state laws or local ordinances which must be complied with in the rendering of the service.²⁷

The two most popular methods of determining costs are through the "patrol beat method" or the "service unit method." The patrol beat method calls for a determination of the percentage of services provided to the contract city in comparison to all departmental services provided by the contractor in the previous year. This percentage is then multiplied by the current year's total budget to determine the contract city's cost for the current year.²⁸

More widely accepted is the service unit method. In this method, the basic unit of measurement is the radio car. The cost of a one-man radio

car (requires between 5 and 5.3 men to field depending on number of days off, sick and vacation leave, etc.) includes salaries, benefits, supervision, clerical support, staff support (detectives, etc.), and equipment costs. The basic unit provides for twenty-four hour coverage throughout the year and serves as a foundation for establishing an acceptable level of service to be provided to the contract city. In addition, supplemental services such as license investigators, community relations officers, school safety officers, etc., may be purchased on this basis. Thus, under the service unit method of costing, the total unit cost for each unit, total or partial or supplemental, is determined by adding direct costs (salaries, benefits, equipment) and indirect costs (units proportion of total administrative and support expenditures).²⁹

When a sub-regional or regional approach to contracting is utilized involving more than one contract city sharing purchased services, costing and staffing formulas must be determined to insure an equitable distribution of costs and resources to the cities. Costing is determined by assigning a weight to given factors and, based on the combination of weighted factors, determining each participant's percentage of the total operating cost of the area. In some cases examined, Ramsey County (Minnesota), for example, as little as two factors (population and area) were utilized. In others, Los Angeles County (California) for example, as many as five (population, area, assessed valuation, called-for-services, and seven major crimes) were employed. Staffing is accomplished in the same manner to determine the percentage of the total service to be provided to each participant. In addition, however, this basic level of service can be supplemented by purchasing extra coverage which is charged directly to the participant wishing this additional service.

Under a contractual system an abrogating of the "home rule" concept is not inherent, since the cities initiate the request for service, set the level and type of service, and negotiate the cost of the service and terms of the agreement.³⁰

An approach that is gaining popularity in assuring the quality of performance involves the assignment of a specific official to act as a liaison between the contractor and the contracting jurisdiction. This technique is being utilized in Lakewood, Cerritos, and Carson, California, and has been explored in other regions of the country as well.

The [Lakewood, California,] Director [of Community Safety] ...is a professional in the field of law enforcement. [He maintains]...direct contact with the sheriff's department for determining the needs and levels of law enforcement within Lakewood, and [is]...responsible for administering the law enforcement contracts which the city has with the sheriff's department.

Far from being an attempt at eliminating the contract system, the...[city's] philosophy is to enhance that system and make it more viable and therefore desirable for other cities as well, thus hopefully assuring a more efficient and economic overall provision of public safety services.³¹

Another approach to assuring police responsiveness to local officials is through the use of Public Safety Advisory Boards. In Carver County, Minnesota, the mayors of each contracting community meet monthly with the sheriff to discuss affairs pertaining to law enforcement. "Each community seems to have problems of a different nature, and these problems as a whole are taken up at the regular meetings."³² In Decatur County, Iowa, in addition to contract city representatives, representatives of the unincorporated area of the county are included in the regular meetings of the Decatur County Public Safety Commission.³³

POLICE SERVICE DISTRICTS

A police service district is created when police responsibilities are assigned under an existing governmental body to establish a level of law enforcement service funded by a system of taxation which includes both unincorporated and incorporated areas and may be supplemented in individual areas through the assessment of additional taxes. A subordinate police service district is a sub-division of a police service district which allows for a higher level of service to specific areas within the district and which is assessed a special higher tax rate than that provided for under the district level of service.

In a discussion of police service districts it is necessary to point out a fundamental difference between this form of police consolidation and special district governments. Service districts, unlike special districts, lack fiscal independence or administrative autonomy or both. They tend to be highly dependent upon a controlling governmental unit and are seen as nothing more than "adjuncts of governments such as counties, cities, townships, towns, states, and special districts."³⁴ Some service districts have their own governing board but remain dependent primarily because a superior unit of government reviews and modifies their fiscal requests. The usual reviewing agency in these cases is the county board of supervisors.³⁵

The two primary examples of police service districts in the United States are found in Suffolk and Nassau Counties in New York. The Suffolk County Police, through its police service district, provides complete police protection services for the majority of the county. Excluded from coverage are seven municipalities within the geographical boundaries of the district that elected to retain their own police departments and the

eastern portion of the county, including five municipalities, which has police protection provided by the elected county sheriff. The county police department supplements the efforts of the independent agencies by supplying all criminal investigation services and most staff, auxiliary, and field functions.³⁶ The Suffolk County Police budget illustrates the dual funding required in a district-subordinate district configuration.

The police budget is divided into two parts: one is for the services provided solely to the special police districts (in 1966, it amounted to an expenditure of \$14 million, or more than 85 percent of the total budget of \$16 million), and the other covers the cost of services that are provided county-wide. Services to the police district are financed by a tax on the residents of the district; countywide services are financed from county general revenues.³⁷

The Nassau County Police, which renders service to nearly eighty percent of the county population is divided into two legal units. A headquarters unit functions on a countywide basis, rendering police services to the entire county. The second unit renders uniformed police services through eight precincts, to the territory within the police service district. The district is supported by taxes upon real property within the district and is in addition to those levied to support the headquarters unit. Each precinct within the district functions to a great extent as an autonomous unit and relies upon the services of the headquarters unit only when needed.³⁸

The major functional difference between the police organizations in Suffolk and Nassau Counties is that Suffolk channels all activity through its central office, whereas Nassau pushes everything to the precinct. In sum, "Suffolk centralizes, and Nassau decentralizes operations."³⁹

Other police service districts are found in Fresno and San Mateo Counties in California, but they represent only minor subsidiaries

of the county governments and possess no governmental structure of their own.⁴⁰

MERGER (REGIONALIZATION)

Merger is defined as the formal combination of a mutual function of two or more governmental bodies under one agency, the goods and services of which are provided on a geographic rather than jurisdictional basis. This type of consolidation can occur without comprehensive reorganization of all local government units within a designated area.⁴¹

In its 1967 report the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice said:

A definition of region poses some problems. The word "region" immediately suggests some established boundaries, albeit artificial ones. The English common law concept of a region (or community)...[as] an area having a commonality of interests is accepted as a definition of a region in this study; thus, it is not restricted to defined political boundaries. Rather, one is speaking of two or more governmental jurisdictions with political, economic, social, or other ties and with common problems. And a region may encompass jurisdictions in two or more States such as in the Washington, D.C.-Maryland-Virginia area.⁴²

In July of 1973 the City of Las Vegas and Clark County, Nevada, merged their law enforcement agencies and formed the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Force with the Sheriff of Clark County as the chief executive of the agency.⁴³ This merger did not include the City of North Las Vegas. If it had, it would have been a countywide regionalization effort.

In Roseau County, Minnesota, and Ward County, North Dakota⁴⁴ all local police services were merged under the county sheriff. Some recently

formed county police forces have resulted from law enforcement mergers. In Pennsylvania, the Northern York County Regional Police Department is a multi-city police force servicing twelve communities in the region.⁴⁵

Recent studies in Maine and Vermont have called for a "two-tiered" system of law enforcement delivery with the states being divided into service regions with independent regional police departments that would be supplemented by the state.⁴⁶

In less inclusive mergers the establishment of local police authorities composed of elected officials from the participating governments is seen as helpful in planning and organizing a regionalized police department. These authorities, by having direct input to the police administrators, help to minimize the "disadvantage" of loss of local autonomy experienced in regional programs.⁴⁷

In a 1973 report the Oklahoma Economic Development Association recommended the formation of "joint administrative boards" responsible for administration of regional law enforcement undertakings. The recommended responsibilities of the boards included:

- power to request, receive, and expend funds
- enter into agreements or contracts
- pay or supplement salaries
- appropriate monies from governmental subdivisions which are parties to the contract to carry out law enforcement functions⁴⁸

SPECIAL POLICE DISTRICTS

A special police district is a single purpose unit of government. It is completely independent, both administratively and financially, from

existing units of government; it provides police services to a specific geographic area without regard to existing governmental boundaries; and it is financed by property tax assessments.

Like all other governmental units a special police district would have to have essential characteristics. It would be organized, possess structural form, have an official name, guarantee perpetual succession, and have the right to sue and be sued, make contracts, and obtain and dispose of property. It would have officers who are properly elected or are appointed by other public officials. It would offer a high degree of public accountability. Moreover, it would have considerable fiscal and administrative independence from other governments.⁴⁹

The key test of a special district as a separate unit of government is not whether its governing body is appointed or elected or even ex-officio. Some districts have elected governing bodies which are under close administrative and fiscal surveillance by another government; they are therefore dependent districts. The basic determinant is whether the district possesses substantial freedom from other governments in its fiscal and administrative operations.⁵⁰

There are more than 18,000 special districts in the United States⁵¹ but the literature has not revealed any examples of an independent special police district. Special police districts however were included in this product since this form of consolidation could conceivably be applicable to single-county metropolitan areas.⁵²

FEDERATION

Federation is defined as the consolidation of metropolitan-type services which are administered and delivered by a newly-constituted countywide government to compliment local services provided by municipalities which remain independent. Federations have two major features.

The first involves the establishment of a metropolitan government, usually paralleling the boundaries of the replaced county government, to which metropolitan-type functions are allotted. These services, consolidated under a federated system, are unified as a result of a preemption of total responsibility for former municipal services by the areawide government. The second involves the retention of existing cities, which continue to control local functions.⁵³

In the mid 1950's Toronto, Canada, established a federated system of government which called for the performance of certain metropolitan functions of government on an areawide basis and the retention of others by local governments. In Toronto, police protection was initially felt to be a local function but was assumed by the metropolitan government "when experience demonstrated to local officials that the municipalities could not perform essential police tasks acting independent."⁵⁴ Consequently, the only ties between Toronto's metropolitan police department and the municipality of metropolitan Toronto and the six other area cities are on matters of budget, finance, and taxation.⁵⁵

In Toronto federated consolidation was much easier to initiate than it has been in the United States. This is due to the fact that comprehensive reorganization in the vast majority of states requires a public referendum to alter the structure of local government. In Toronto, local referendums were not necessary. Consolidation was accomplished by action of the Provincial Government.⁵⁶

As a result, although several areas in the United States have made attempts to reorganize in this manner, only the Dade County-Miami, Florida, metro can be cited as having achieved a federated system of government.⁵⁷

In 1957 a Dade County home rule charter was adopted and the county government became, in effect, a metro government. The county government assumed a number of areawide functions previously performed by the twenty-six local municipalities in the metropolitan area, but many municipal functions, subject to minimum performance standards, were retained by the cities.

No single metropolitan police force was established in Dade County, but the county department of public safety has limited areawide jurisdiction and is responsible for some centralized police functions.⁵⁸

Among the enumerated powers of the county are certain powers pertinent to law enforcement including central police records, criminal investigations, communications, jails, and training. Further, the county can establish reasonable minimum standards for all municipal governments in the county.

Law enforcement services within the county are provided in a variety of ways. Every municipality except one offers at least a minimum level of basic police service, and a few provide most supportive services for themselves as well. The Dade County Department of Public Safety provides some police services to requesting municipalities as well as complete service to unincorporated areas.⁵⁹

AMALGAMATION

Amalgamation is defined as a complete governmental consolidation of existing units of government to form a new government with a single administrative framework which allows for the unilateral determination of policy.

Despite widespread consideration, this type of governmental reorganization has seldom been put into operation. Indeed, it is functioning in only eight metropolitan areas, exclusive of a few in Virginia where special circumstances prevail. Four of them -- New Orleans (1813), Boston (1821), Philadelphia (1854), and New York (1898) -- antedate the twentieth century, and until well into the 1950s such

consolidation was generally regarded as a matter of historical record. 'Often proposed, never adopted' might well have been its theme during this time. In recent years, however, the system has been installed in the Baton Rouge, Nashville and Jacksonville areas.⁶⁰

In Jacksonville, Florida, a consolidated charter abolished the former city and county governments and established a strong mayor-type government with an elected nineteen-man council, a sheriff, clerk of the court, tax assessor, tax collector, and supervisor of registration. All agencies of the former city and county governments were combined. All law enforcement responsibilities under the new charter were placed under the control of the sheriff who retained elective status.⁶¹

Jacksonville-Duval County's charter provides for five separate service districts and a general services district for the entire county area. The Metropolitan Council, consisting of five members elected at large and fourteen elected from single member districts, is authorized to provide varying service mixes to the service districts, as well as to expand the urban service district encompassing the former city of Jacksonville.⁶²

The Jacksonville amalgamation was originally designed to involve all municipalities in Duval County. Opposition to the charter in its initial form, however, stimulated the Florida State Legislature in a subsequent amendment to prohibit a complete merger of city and county governments and to permit any municipality to decline joining the new government. Five smaller municipalities in the county availed themselves of this opportunity.⁶³

As a result of the amalgamation of the city of Baton Rouge and Baton Rouge Parish, the parish is divided into three service areas, (1) the urban area; (2) the industrial area outside the city in which

no residences are permitted; and (3) the rural area. Under the amalgamation plan, each of these service areas is provided with a different level of police service.⁶⁴

ANNEXATION

Annexation is defined as the total absorption of existing governments or unincorporated areas into a larger metropolitan government which necessitates the provision of all governmental services (including police) by the absorbing body. Annexation is the most direct way of achieving full areawide consolidation of police services. It simply involves existing governments being absorbed into a larger, metropolitan government.⁶⁵

Between 1950 and 1967, a period dominated by small land absorptions, an impressive number of municipalities acquired large amounts of territory. Since 1950, for example, of a total of 148 cities containing an estimated 1965 population of at least 100,000, nine have added not less than one hundred square miles, while fifteen have gained between thirty and one hundred square miles of territory. Oklahoma City increased its size beginning in the early 1950's through huge annexations, so that the area of the city presently includes some 650 square miles of territory.

Large annexations have a more important consequence than merely increasing the territorial size of the central city.⁶⁶ The major strength of annexation as an approach to reorganizing local government is its broadening of the geographical jurisdiction of existing municipalities. It can forestall the creation of special districts or new municipal incorporations and thus help prevent local governmental patterns from becoming

more complex. Because annexations are usually of the fringe areas around cities, the cities can then include them in their total program of governmental services and prevent the fringe areas from becoming a source of spillover problems.⁶⁷

Recent large land acquisitions through annexation have taken place chiefly under conditions not generally present in metropolitan areas. Most cities involved in these actions have been aided by favorable annexation laws. Most large annexations have been completed under one of four procedures that preclude the outlying area from vetoing the action:

- an ordinance enacted by the council of the annexing city
- a favorable vote by the electorate of the initiating city
- a special act of the state legislature
- an order by a court after reviewing the proposal⁶⁸

Although there is a trend toward making annexation easier to accomplish through the use of quasi-legislative groups like state boundary commissions, in most states the laws do not work to the advantage of an annexing municipality and thus present obstacles to consistent growth through annexation.⁶⁹

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

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²³Albert S. Bowman, Police Services in Douglas County (Denver, Colorado: Colorado Division of Criminal Justice, Department of Local Affairs, 1972), p. 3.

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³¹Terrance J. Mangan, "Community Safety Department's Purpose and Function" (Lakewood, California, March 12, 1974), pp. 4; 5.

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³⁵Ibid., pp. 231; 232.

³⁶PAS, 1966, p. 160.

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³⁸Douglas G. Gourley, Effective Police Organization and Management (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 98; 99.

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⁴³"Las Vegas, Nevada, Police Department May Merge with Clark County Sheriff's Department. When Consolidation Comes, Sheriff Will Be in Charge," The National Sheriff (February-March 1973), p. 12.

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⁴⁶Governor's Commission on the Administration of Justice, Delivery of Police Services in Vermont: Study of the Past, Analysis of the Present, Proposals for the Future (Montpelier, Vermont: Governor's Commission on the Administration of Justice, 1974), pp. 122; 124;

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⁵³Bollens, pp. 58; 59.

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⁵⁵PCLEACJ, p. 102.

⁵⁶Norrgard, p. 48.

⁵⁷Gourley, p. 103.

⁵⁸PCLEACJ, p. 99.

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⁶⁰John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life, 2nd Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 297. (Hereinafter referred to as Bollens, 1970)

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⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Misner, p. 267.

⁶⁵Norrgard, p. 45.

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CHAPTER IV

POSTULATED GOVERNMENTAL ROLES IN EFFECTING CONSOLIDATED LAW ENFORCEMENT

The fragmentation of police forces in the United States is extreme. There are over 32,000 separate police departments in this country ranging in size from New York City's 37,500 police employees to thousands of small municipalities with only one part-time officer. In vast areas of this country, particularly rural communities and small jurisdictions in or near metropolitan areas, there is a lack of anything resembling modern, professional police protection.¹

To simply improve the quality of police personnel will not solve the ills that plague our "system" of law enforcement. The quality of personnel has risen tremendously over the years. The fault lies in a system which has tended to allow the basic pattern of law enforcement in this country to remain virtually unchanged.²

The need for change has resulted in a growing trend to provide police services on a more areawide basis, and away from exclusive reliance on municipal protection.³ This trend has been inspired by a number of nationwide studies on law enforcement in the United States, conducted over the last ten years, that have recommended varying degrees of consolidation.

The problem has been diagnosed, and the solution has been prescribed but, in many instances, obstacles remain. Before the consolidation of law enforcement services can take place, certain governmental responsibilities - federal, state, county, and local - must be crystallized and acted upon. Many technical responsibilities will be identified in the

remainder of this chapter, but the principle responsibility, one common to all levels of government, is seen as the provision of a proper political climate, receptive to efforts to consolidate. "First and foremost the development of a unified police system is a political problem, not a technical one."⁴

FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The role of the national government in effecting consolidated law enforcement is viewed by a majority of writers on the subject as largely supportive and participative rather than directive. Often cited are the limitations placed on the federal government by the United States Constitution which calls for the possession of police powers by the states. Consequently, the national government does not, for the most part, have the legal authority to intervene directly or act independently of the states.⁵ The federal government does, however, intervene indirectly with state and local governments through the utilization of a "carrot and stick" approach in the funding of police programs.

Federal legislation providing financial and planning assistance for state and local law enforcement has been initiated and has resulted in two Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Acts, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, etc. A large percentage of the \$800 million in grant funds offered by LEAA to state and local governments is for the support of plans for reorganization, regionalization, and consolidation of local police departments.⁶

Though many years have passed since Bruce Smith revised his book entitled Police Systems in the United States, his arguments against national

involvement in "our police institutions" remain timely and represent the tone of opposition opinion to this type of federal participation in law enforcement. In the following excerpt Smith addresses his perceptions of the undesirable results that can occur when the national government funds police programs of subordinate units of government.

By use of such a device at least the appearance of a narrowly restricted local autonomy in police affairs could be preserved for many years, since the local governments would then cling even more tenaciously to their several police forces in order to collect the subsidy, though wholly without regard for considerations of economy or the prospect of better protection by other means. Another and equally unfavorable result would emerge from the fact that state or national support would almost necessarily be conditioned upon some measure of state or national control. This would not be exercised through the natural avenues of command, but rather through rules and regulations which could not conceivably be adapted to our highly varied patterns of police agencies. Thus the hand of a remote bureaucracy would be laid upon local police forces both large and small, and the free and untrammelled development of our police institutions, now almost the sole outstanding virtue of the present scheme, would find itself restricted more and more as the years lengthened into decades.⁷

Even in the face of such opposition to national funding, the federal commitment to supporting consolidation efforts in this manner is substantial. An example of what has been sometimes viewed as the overriding federal commitment to consolidation can be found in a recent attempt by two "predominantly part-time" small Chicago area police departments (Phoenix and East Chicago Heights) to upgrade their departments with federal funding.

...when the police chiefs from these two departments sought federal or state funds to increase their financial resources, the only substantial grants for which they were eligible (because of their small size and low budget) were planning grants -- to consider consolidation with adjacent communities.⁸

In a 1972 report, the Committee for Economic Development examined the problem of America's fragmented law enforcement system and called for additional federal action:

Past experience indicates that few if any of the 50 states will, either on their own behalf or through their local units, take the wide range of measures needed to meet the present crisis.

New means of national policy formulation, bolstered by incentives powerful enough to energize the states, must therefore be established before substantial progress can be made.

This nation can bear the costs essential to assure criminal justice far better than it can afford the consequences of maladministration and injustice.⁹

Beyond financial support, consolidation of certain technical support functions under the federal government may be possible. Great Britain for example, has instituted several national programs that are seen as being applicable in the United States. A national electronic data retrieval system has been established which makes it possible for any police officer in any part of the United Kingdom to use his pocket radio to request and receive, within one or two minutes, the information that he needs to determine whether a car has been stolen or whether a suspect has a criminal record or is wanted by the police. Another computer system has been programmed to predict areas and times in which crimes are likely to occur. Its application in patrol scheduling is obvious. It is well known that the police forces of some major American cities, such as New York and Chicago, are using computers for the same purposes, but these systems are municipal in scope. The importance of the British program is its national scope.¹⁰

STATE RESPONSIBILITIES

The primary unit of government in effecting consolidated law enforcement is the state. The state can be both an active and a supportive participant in consolidation efforts. The fact that counties and

municipalities only possess those powers which are granted to them by state constitutions and/or statutes, attests to the power of the states.

The importance of state action in establishing a climate amenable to efforts to consolidate law enforcement functions cannot be over-emphasized. Before any effort to consolidate can take place, favorable statutory and constitutional conditions must exist.¹¹

Many states currently have legislation that permits consolidation or contracting for police services. These statutes are usually referred to as inter-local government agreement acts or joint powers acts. A considerable number of other states have no specific statutory provisions for such arrangements.

In its 1973 report, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals made the following recommendation concerning enabling legislation.

Each State that has not already done so should enact appropriate legislation to enable the various local governments, as well as the police and other criminal justice agencies, to enter into inter-agency agreements or to participate jointly in providing police services.¹²

Even though most states have now adopted legislation permitting some form of intergovernmental agreement, most of these acts limit application.¹³ Enabling acts that have been put into effect to meet a specific need as it arose in a particular area are seen as merely "stopgap solutions" that do not go to the basic issue of governmental reorganization. Enabling acts that are restrictive in nature are not an effective means of promoting inter-local cooperation.¹⁴

An example of enabling legislation that can be broadly interpreted is found in Chapter 28E, Subsection 1 - Code of Iowa:

The purpose of this chapter is to permit state and local governments in Iowa to make efficient use of their powers by enabling them to provide joint services and facilities with other agencies and to cooperate in other ways of mutual advantage. This chapter shall be liberally construed to that end.¹⁵

Enabling legislation alone may not be sufficient to insure the legality of efforts to consolidate law enforcement functions. Constitutional difficulties may materialize in some states even when statutes clearly encourage law enforcement consolidation. The basis for such constitutional challenges include:

- 'Home rule' provisions purporting to grant the several municipal electorates a range of inviolate control over the structure and/or power of local government
- prohibitions against enactment by the legislature of 'local' or 'special' acts
- prohibitions against the establishment of 'special commissions' to perform 'municipal' functions
- prohibitions against diversion of municipal assets

To note that plausible challenges can be raised, however, is neither evidence nor proof that courts will ultimately sustain them. In fact, there is a clear trend on the part of state courts dealing with the four classes of constitutional matters shown above to prevent them from interfering with metropolitan reorganization.¹⁶

The supportive attitude on the part of most states' courts when dealing with interpretation of constitutional questions concerning the consolidation of law enforcement is not without exception. In Illinois, for example, the courts have limited the authority possessed by counties and municipalities. They have permitted only that authority expressly and specifically delegated to counties and municipalities by the legislature under the authority of the State Constitution. "In cases where

questions have arisen as to their power in a given situation, the courts have observed the strictest interpretation against creation or delegation of any power to such body." An example can be found in Godfrey v. County of La Salle where the Circuit Court of La Salle County granted an injunction against the construction of a regional jail.¹⁷

An opinion held by many is that, even with their legally constituted leadership roles, the majority of states have not met their responsibilities in consolidating law enforcement.

The main constitutional responsibility for crime prevention and control rests upon the states, an assignment they have botched. They have failed to keep their criminal codes up-to-date, and they have turned responsibility for enforcement over to a welter of overlapping counties, municipalities, townships, and special districts. Despite the obvious and urgent need, the states have neither straightened out their tangled and ineffective patterns of local government nor assumed direct responsibility for law enforcement.¹⁸

At the same time, however, progress is being made. As of 1969, at least forty-four states provided some form of fiscal assistance to local police agencies. Nine were recorded as making state contributions to local police retirement systems; another twenty-one provided partial or full reimbursement for local police officer training; twenty-three states "bought into" the Safe Streets Act in 1969; and nineteen other states provided state aid for other purposes.¹⁹

In its 1973 report on police, the United States Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals suggested that states should encourage, but not force, programs involving combined services.

Such encouragement may be in the form of management consultation to determine need..., or it may go as far as providing financial assistance throughout planning and implementation of the project. Nevertheless, state legislature should acknowledge that police service is primarily a local responsibility and refrain from making any agreements mandatory.²⁰

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, however, has proposed that in instances where counties fail to provide basic police services to localities lacking them, "state legislation should mandate the merger of the police function in these jurisdictions with that of adjacent jurisdictions."²¹

The Committee for Economic Development advocates that the states assume an all-inclusive role in efforts to consolidate law enforcement. They call for the states to assume a larger responsibility for criminal justice by gathering together and coordinating separate units and agencies working in the criminal justice field "to form a coordinated system with- in a single department of justice."²²

Toward this end a number of commentators have advocated that the degree of state involvement in the consolidation of law enforcement involve an expanded sphere of authority for state police. They advocate that "state police forces should be expanded and strengthened to assure proper protection for the entire population, especially in areas without effective local forces."²³

Resident trooper programs, where state police officers are provided under contract to local jurisdictions, are in use in several states including Connecticut, Maryland, and Virginia. Under these programs state police officers, with full authority, act in place of, or supplement, local law enforcement officials.

Some advocates of a strong state police system have gone beyond this and recommended the abolishment of local units of law enforcement in favor of single statewide law enforcement agencies.

In commonwealths like Vermont and New Hampshire, which are small in area, predominantly rural, and have few urban complications, the state could effectively operate a single force without delegating any large powers of enforcement to local units. Likewise in Rhode Island, a single state-controlled police establishment would encounter no uncommon difficulties in protecting the urban core and the narrow margin of rural area that adjoins it. Even some of the far-flung western states, featured by large areas, low population density, and a total absence of complex urban centers, represent situations which may easily be met in the same fashion. These offer the most promising opportunities for thoroughgoing police unification.²⁴

There are, however, many who are critical of granting far-ranging prerogatives to state police forces. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations outlined the following arguments against increased state police authority.

By vesting State police agencies with full-scale police responsibilities and removing geographic limitations on the exercise of their powers, numerous interlevel jurisdictional conflicts probably would result. Opponents point out that the police capability in the Nation's largest cities is every bit as sophisticated as that of State agencies. If smaller localities were willing to forego some of their jurisdictional prerogatives, so the argument runs, they could consolidate smaller departments and achieve a level of police protection that would be comparable to that in the larger cities. Such capability would eliminate the need for additional State police protection and result in police service more responsive to local needs. Finally, some critics note that increased State police powers may produce too great a centralization of police responsibilities at the State level.²⁵

Of the forty-nine state police forces in this country (the State of Hawaii has no state police force) a wide variety of assigned tasks is in evidence. For example, in Alabama, Oklahoma, and North Carolina more than ninety percent of state police time was devoted to general highway patrol duties while in Delaware and New York as much as forty percent of their time was spent in statewide criminal investigation. Twenty-three such agencies are primarily highway patrol agencies and do not have

statewide crime control responsibilities. Because of the lack of general crime control responsibilities by many state police agencies, critics question the ability of these agencies to develop productive working relationships with local departments.²⁶

Aside from establishing a favorable legal climate for consolidation and initiating all-inclusive consolidation programs through the state police, there is a variety of additional roles that states can play in improving law enforcement through the unification of functions or agencies. These roles involve additional measures to insure a favorable climate for consolidation efforts and direct participation in the consolidation of support services.

State organized forums such as councils of government possess great potential in the area of consolidation and coordination of law enforcement, especially since they attempt to meet and solve areawide problems from a common viewpoint. Several such councils are in existence throughout the country, the best known being the Association of Bay Area Government (ABAG). ABAG includes in its members the political leaders of eight counties and seventy-eight municipalities in the San Francisco Bay area. It has been described as a "comprehensive, multiple (but limited) purpose, regionally-based institution for developing cooperative, coordinated approaches to areawide problems." Organized under the California Joint Exercise of Powers Act, ABAG is able to bring authority to bear upon areawide problems because "it is politically viable, representative of the local government in the area, and...concerned with maintaining effective local government institutions."²⁷

It is conceivable that more states could employ a statewide planning service to provide staff planning assistance on administrative and operational matters to subordinate law enforcement agencies.

The New York Division of Police Administration Services represents the first attempt of one government to provide this assistance to other governments on an organized basis. The opportunities for accomplishment in this approach are great. In the future, for example, departments in the same area might be using the same reporting forms to facilitate central records and crime analysis. They may, after study by the division, amalgamate communications or crime laboratories or many other costly facilities if it is shown that economies will result and service levels improved. The division is in a position to bring about standardization and improvement in many areas of New York law enforcement.²⁸

In another area, many believe that the development of the necessary expertise for intra-agency training is beyond the capacity of many small agencies. A state program for the training of instructors to be provided for local and regional training programs would help to overcome this deficiency.²⁹ The majority of states have already established police standards councils that develop and administer minimum selection and training standards for local police personnel.³⁰ Several of these training commissions offer financial inducements funded by the state, to secure compliance with standards.³¹

In its 1971 report the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations recommended that "...minimum selection and training standards be of a mandatory nature and that States should meet 100 percent of the cost of local training programs meeting these mandatory standards."³²

Other recommendations for functional consolidation under the states include jails, crime laboratories, staff inspection, internal investigation, criminal intelligence, communications, and records.

COUNTY RESPONSIBILITIES

According to the legal theory of local government law, the county has no independent sovereignty and possesses only such powers as are explicitly or implicitly conferred upon it by the Constitution or state statutes.³³ The demonstrated ability of many counties, however, to adapt to changing socio-political facts of life has been such that in many states there is no longer a clear delineation between "urban" and "rural" governmental functions. In instances where counties have assumed many new responsibilities it is unrealistic to view the county as simply an administrative unit of the state.³⁴

Across the nation, counties are performing an increasing number of governmental functions, particularly in urbanized areas. Traditional functions, including law enforcement, have been augmented both through the assumption of new services and through the transfer to the county of services once provided by other local governments. A variety of functions once considered properly those of municipalities, are now performed by counties, even in rural areas, so that "functionally the county is of greater importance today than a generation ago, and expansion of services provided by its government appears likely to continue."³⁵

In a very few states the opposite of this trend is true. Vermont, for example, "has never relied on its counties as units of general government." In the area of law enforcement, Vermont's counties have further declined in importance as the law enforcement activities of the sheriff have been replaced by municipal and state police, the detention of prisoners was taken over by the State Department of Corrections, and the county courts have yielded jurisdiction of criminal cases largely to district courts.³⁶

Because of a general trend toward the expansion of the role of the county in the provision of goods and services once the sole responsibility of municipalities, many observers see it as a pivotal unit of government and the logical form of a revamped areawide government. Because the office of the sheriff provides for the delivery of law enforcement services in most counties, it is seen as a natural repository for areawide police responsibilities in reorganized urban counties. "In rural areas, the sheriff assumes even greater importance as the county may be the only practicable level of government for adequate local law enforcement."³⁷

In examining these points, Los Angeles County's Sheriff Peter J. Pitchess sees the county as mid-point between the largeness of states and the smallness of municipalities offering the best of both in the delivery of law enforcement services.

A county will normally represent the optimum level at which law enforcement can be large enough to be effective - and yet small enough to be responsive. And the sheriff - as an elected official - must be responsive to the community at large - his career and livelihood depend on it.³⁸

The office of sheriff is a traditional feature of county government and this advantage cannot be ignored. The presence of highly professionalized sheriffs' departments in such states as California, New York, Florida, and Texas, among others, attests to the fact that urban police responsibilities can be handled by such agencies.³⁹ Many critics feel, however, that if the county is to become a viable instrument for providing urban-type services, especially law enforcement, the role of the sheriff will need to be modified.⁴⁰ The nature of the office itself, with its strongly political base, is seen as a problem.⁴¹ Two other problems are the restrictive features of tenure, which in many areas limits the length

of time one person may hold office⁴² and the extraneous non-police duties the sheriff must perform.

Sheriffs' departments exist in virtually all parts of the country. With the exception of some fifty counties with independent county police departments and Riley County, Kansas, that has abolished the office of sheriff, the vast majority of sheriffs' departments are legally responsible for countywide police duties. As such they are seen as viable units for the development of more capable organizations that already have law enforcement authority and a legal basis for more extensive financial support.⁴⁴

Like the states, counties must ensure a legally acceptable climate if efforts to consolidate law enforcement services are to succeed. County charters and county ordinances that restrict intergovernmental cooperation and consolidation represent potential stumbling blocks to unification.⁴⁵ Even when conditions would suggest that a consolidation could or should take place, unless there is a commitment on the part of the county administrators, it will not happen. Former Los Angeles County Chief Administrative Officer L. S. Hollinger described this commitment as a combination of three factors; attitude, willingness, and ability. Hollinger said, "You must have a strong, virile county government with an affirmative attitude, a willingness to provide service, and the ability to produce." In the absence of any one of these three considerations, a consolidation effort is impossible.⁴⁶

MUNICIPAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The problem facing municipalities in this country is basic. It simply involves providing the highest quality level of law enforcement that is

available for the tax dollar. In the view of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice, the options are clear.

Governments have a basic responsibility to provide needed services for their constituents. If it is beyond the ability of an individual jurisdiction to provide adequate basic services, there are three alternatives:

- abolish the jurisdiction and make some other jurisdiction responsible for the services
- continue inadequate services
- seek, through joint action, to meet its local responsibilities more adequately

The first choice usually is not feasible politically. The second choice invites an increase in criminal activity and direct action by a higher level of government to protect the public security. The best alternative is the third, the initiation of joint programs with other governmental jurisdictions. Such action is not a rejection or relinquishment of responsibilities but, rather the recognition that certain problems require resources beyond the capacity of a particular jurisdiction.⁴⁷

Understandably, most communities are reluctant to give up, or alter, their local police department because they are afraid of a loss of local control. But common sense dictates that for the public good, efforts to upgrade the quality of law enforcement services should be made wherever needed.⁴⁸ The consolidation of services for the sake of improvement need not conflict with the basic principles of home rule. "Local jurisdictions must work together to resolve common problems; such a relationship is not inimical to home rule but contributes to its responsible exercise."⁴⁹

Regional coordination of police functions should be based on need, and need will vary significantly from area to area. The need might be satisfied by an interagency arrangement no more complex than providing for two officers, each investigating a similar crime, to pool information and resources in working together toward a solution. It might require a loosely knit squad of officers who normally work within their respective agencies and jurisdictions, but who may be designated to

participate temporarily in a joint operation of specified scope. Or it might require an ongoing regional organization with a formal structure under the operational control of a board of directors and with personnel of participating agencies regularly assigned to it.⁵⁰

Opponents of consolidation argue that the solution to municipal police problems should be sought in the strengthening of those agencies. The logic used is that "it is sometimes more important for the physician to know all about the patient than to know all about the disease with which he is afflicted."⁵¹

City administrators have a responsibility to determine if a problem exists. It is often recommended that areawide committees be formed to study, and, if called for, effect consolidation. It is the city administrators' responsibility to initiate this, and certainly, to their benefit.⁵²

A city charter, like a state constitution or a county charter, represents a potential obstacle in a consolidation effort. It must afford a favorable atmosphere if unification is to take place.

Municipal ordinances may also tend to hinder consolidation.⁵³ It would be difficult for an areawide policing agency to properly enforce the municipal ordinances of a number of cities. Many of the twenty-nine contracting for law enforcement services in Los Angeles County have solved this problem by enacting a municipal ordinance which calls for the utilization of county ordinances when they duplicate city laws.

SUMMARY


In this chapter the roles and responsibilities of the nation, states, counties and municipalities in effecting the consolidation of law enforcement have been examined. If the fragmentation of our law enforcement

"system" is to be eliminated, an acknowledgment of these roles and responsibilities and a commitment to their execution, by each level of government, is a must. The greater the degree of commitment, the greater the elimination of fragmentation.

Exhibit 1 which follows, illustrates national, state, county, and municipal roles in effecting consolidation as perceived by consolidationists.

Exhibit IV-1

GOVERNMENTAL ROLES IN CONSOLIDATION



CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

¹Committee for Economic Development, Reducing Crime and Assuring Justice (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1972), pp. 30; 31. (Hereinafter referred to as CED)

²Gordon E. Misner, "Recent Developments in Metropolitan Law Enforcement," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Sciences 51 (July-August 1960), p. 507.

³Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State-Local Relations in the Criminal Justice System (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 70. (Hereinafter referred to as ACIR)

⁴Public Administration Service, Individual Technical Assistance Report: City of Davison, Davison Township, and Richfield Township, Michigan, Police Department (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1974), p. 6. (Hereinafter referred to as PAS, 1974)

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⁶Elinor Ostrom, The Design of Institutional Arrangements and the Responsiveness of the Police (Bloomington, Indiana: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 1975), p. 299.

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¹⁶PCLEACJ, p. 109.

¹⁷Clifford W. Van Meter and John J. Conrad, Pilot Study for Feasibility of Regionalization of Components of the Criminal Justice System in Gallatin, Hamilton, Hardin, Pope and Saline Counties (Macomb, Illinois: Law Enforcement Administration Program and College of Business, Western Illinois University, July 15, 1972), pp. 327; 328.

¹⁸CED, p. 14.

¹⁹ACIR, p. 82.

²⁰NACCJSG, p. 111.

²¹ACIR, p. 18.

²²CED, pp. 65; 66.

²³Ibid., p. 31.

²⁴Smith, Bruce, pp. 306; 307.

²⁵ACIR, p. 25.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 83; 173.

²⁷PCLEACJ, p. 71.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 78; 79.

²⁹NACCJSG, p. 186.

³⁰ACIR, p. 30.

³¹Norrgard, p. 16.

³²ACIR, p. 30.

³³So. Iowa C.C., p. 3.

³⁴Misner, p. 265.

³⁵Charles R. Adrian, State and Local Governments, 3rd Ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1972), pp. 203; 204.

³⁶Governor's Commission on the Administration of Justice, Delivery of Police Services in Vermont: Study of the Past, Analysis of the Present, Proposals for the Future (Montpelier, Vermont: Governor's Commission on the Administration of Justice, 1974), pp. 25; 26.

³⁷ACIR, p. 158;
Norrgard, p. 56.

³⁸Peter J. Pitchess, "The Law Enforcement Effort Must Be Collective," Minnesota Sheriff (Autumn 1974), p. 63.

³⁹ACIR, p. 28.

⁴⁰Public Administration Service, Coordination and Consolidation of Police Service: Problems and Potentials (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1966), p. 10.

⁴¹So. Iowa C.C., p. 11;
Norrgard, pp. 56; 57;
Misner, pp. 505; 506.

⁴²Misner, pp. 505; 506.

⁴³ACIR, p. 159.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 27

⁴⁵PAS, 1974, pp. 4; 5.

⁴⁶L.S. Hollinger, "The Lakewood Plan," County Contract Services Program (Los Angeles, 1969), pp. 16; 17.

⁴⁷PCLEACJ, p. 111.

⁴⁸Gary Hughes, "A Viable Concept for Measurable Improvement," The Minnesota Sheriff (Autumn 1974), p. 19.

⁴⁹Norrgard, p. 521

⁵⁰NACCJSG, p. 115.

⁵¹Smith, Bruce, p. 100.

⁵²Norrgard, p. 53;
George A. Lankes, "Central Services for Police," Journal of Police Science and Administration, 2:1 (1974), p. 75;

William L. Durrer, "The Growing Problems of Urban County Police Departments," The Police Yearbook 1968: Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-fourth Annual Conference (Washington, D.C.: The International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., 1968), p. 56.

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CHAPTER V
FACTORS OF ACCEPTANCE IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS

Municipalities and their decision-makers, faced with the necessity to improve or obtain law enforcement services, should consider that they will have to achieve acceptance to consolidation before they can decide which program they wish to implement. The same is true for law enforcement decision-makers, who must recognize that acceptance will play a dominant role in achieving lasting and effective change. Essentially, acceptance addresses these questions:

- What do the statutes say concerning state, county, and local law enforcement agencies and consolidation?
- What are the different types of consolidation?
- What has led others to attempt to consolidate? How have they fared?
- What part does cost play in acceptance of consolidation?
- What role does local sovereignty play -- how have citizens, politicians and police perceived the prospect of consolidation?

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Effecting changes in the production and provision of law enforcement services is easier when consolidation already is addressed fully in the statutes. This is especially pertinent when consolidation proposals are advanced. In the event that no or very limited laws exist, a variety of means can be used to obtain the needed laws. This can cause delays and increase the hazard of failure to achieving consolidation. For example, an amendment to a county charter through a countywide referendum would have to be drafted and voted upon before a consolidated Bureau of Public

Safety were established.¹ Efforts to achieve consolidation usually begin with existing charters or laws which favor or protect the efforts to effect massive change.

[M]ost large annexations have been completed under one of four procedures that preclude the outlying area from vetoing the action: (1) an ordinance enacted by the council of the annexing city; (2) a favorable vote by the electorate of the initiating city; (3) a special act of the state legislature; and (4) an order by a court after reviewing the proposal.²

For example, the courts allowed the unilateral annexations of parts of Davidson County by the City of Nashville. Such court action eased the way for the city-county consolidation which later took place.

One large consolidation move initially attempted to merge all city-county services through a charter establishing expanded service districts. Only after the charter was amended by the legislature did it succeed at the polls.

Opposition to the charter in its initial form, however, stimulated the legislature in a[n]...amendment to prohibit a complete merger of city and county governments and to permit any municipality to decline joining the new government...³

Statutes can provide the means for change, but proposals for consolidation also must surmount public referenda, state authority or the courts. Rarely can massive change be wrought by government fiat in the U.S. because of the existence of statutory protections which limit such actions. Legislative action also can hinder efforts to consolidate in other ways. For example, states seeking authority to consolidate only certain functional aspects of government services can run afoul of an unsympathetic legislature.

We did attempt to get a bill through our State Legislature two years ago that would have permitted individual cities and counties to vote an increase in their tax levies with the additional money to be used to pay for law enforcement services.

The bill ran into some problems in the legislature and did not get enacted into law. We are now working with our State Attorney General's Office in an effort to get a statewide foundation payment program for small cities that do not have the money to hire and maintain full-time law enforcement services.⁴

Those state statutes which permit functional consolidations such as in the case of contract law enforcement, should be up-dated regularly in areas of administration, taxation, services, etc., of contract law enforcement.⁵ This ensures continuity in statutory arrangements for timely, flexible, and comprehensive law enforcement programs.

Often in the literature when county to city contract agreements are discussed, the role of the sheriff arises since he is, in most states, the responsible county law enforcement official. As such, the sheriff's responsibilities under both the legal mandate of the state and contract specifications should be clearly defined and delineated. In Oklahoma, for example, the sheriff's salary is set by state statute, as are those of his deputies. Neither he nor his deputies may be reimbursed for mileage, nor may the sheriff's office purchase or own automobiles.⁶ On the other hand, the sheriff in Oklahoma is responsible for countywide law enforcement. Conversely, California, one of the largest contract law enforcement systems in the United States, does not set the level or nature of specific law enforcement service to be provided by the sheriff. "Instead, the law prescribes a minimum level of enforcement and a maximum scope of authority."⁷

In California, state law is flexible enough to permit a county contract law enforcement agency to meet a multiplicity of demands and to change when conditions dictate⁸ while, at the same time, ensuring that aid is rendered to municipal forces "...whenever requested..., or whenever local forces are unable to handle the situation."⁹

Other state legislatures in Michigan, Wisconsin, Florida, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, to name a few, have passed enabling legislation to permit a wide range of contract law, or other interagency arrangements. In Virginia, for example, towns, cities, and counties have entered into agreements to receive radio communications and criminal identification under the Virginia Code. Minnesota's "Joint Powers Act" permits contracting between communities, communities and counties, or between counties while also providing a clause which allows a community to reestablish its own police organization if it grows discontented with the contract arrangement.¹⁰ Wisconsin State Statutes permit contracting, although a former State's Attorney General pointed out that such arrangements do not absolve "the municipality of the authority" of having to provide law enforcement services.¹¹

TYPES OF CONSOLIDATION

The literature has revealed a complex web of interrelated factors which figure in acceptance of consolidation. Prior to examination of these factors, it would be beneficial for the reader to see what types of consolidation there are and how they have fared over the years. Usually in the literature when one sees "metropolitanization," "federation," or a "comprehensive urban plan," the general thrust of what is being discussed centers around a "complete or substantial merger of a county government with the principal city or all communities in the county."¹² Reactions to these consolidation efforts have been mixed. They are generally rife with difficulties in achieving success, or simply have failed. For example,

Metropolitan federation, in one form or another or at one time or another, has been proposed for many major metropolitan regions in the nation. Yet, with the exception of Toronto, Miami, and Nashville, proposals for metropolitan federation have been consistently rejected by both voters and political leaders throughout the nation.¹³

Reactions to consolidation in other areas are equally mixed.

- [Three city-county consolidations - Baton Rouge, Nashville, and Jacksonville]...are similar in a number of ways. Each included a single city. Each occurred in the South in a growing, but still not heavily populated area that had a few local governments. Each excluded small municipalities.¹⁴
- [Nashville]...can provide a model for those counties which contain few well established local governments, where governmental services are scarce, and where services such as police protection are not financially feasible. It is unlikely [however] that such a comprehensive reorganization plan will have much success in highly urbanized counties containing a large number of municipalities...¹⁵
- The important lesson in the success of the Nashville Metro is that it succeeded not because of an absence of city-suburban conflict, but because many suburbanites and others who were hostile to the city administration perceived metro government as a means of attacking the city. A metro proposal, which failed when it was presented as a reform, economy, and efficiency proposal, was later successful when it was presented as a political proposal.¹⁶
- ...[T]he [city-county] plan did not acquire either majority in the Memphis and Columbus, Georgia, areas. This may indicate a growing resistance to consolidation by central cities, long the main sources of support for the idea.¹⁷
- [Comprehensive urban county plans] have also encountered numerous difficulties along the way so that in only one locality (Metropolitan Miami) has the concept become a reality. Other cities including Cleveland, Dayton, Houston and Pittsburgh revealed five formidable obstacles to achieving a comprehensive urban county plan, e.g., few counties are sufficiently well organized to implement such a plan, that reallocation of functional responsibilities is a thorny political issue, that county governments lack adequate financial powers and bases and that implementation of such a plan may only come after amendment to the State Constitution.¹⁸

Annexation also has suffered from limited usage. One author felt that the distinction or differential in social status between suburban and core city residents was a distinct barrier to successful annexation efforts and probably other efforts at metropolitan consolidation.¹⁹

Formal governmental change in certain units like law enforcement departments, either by combining such agencies within a metropolitan area

or through creation of a new "district" or unit, can meet with some opposition, especially over the question of local control and administrative accountability.

The superimposition of these large police forces upon the already existing units of local government would necessitate - more than ever - the careful design of effective means of popular control. There is no assurance that election of members of Police Commissions would provide the optimum degree of popular control. Election on the basis of population would often be opposed by the suburbs. If the proposals for metropolitan police districts is acceptable at all, it would seem to be limited to the single-county metropolitan areas. Where a metropolitan area embraces the territory of more than one county, the existing organs of local government would find it difficult to accommodate the superimposition of multi-county authority. Such a proposal is likely to encounter overwhelming political opposition.²⁰

It would appear that of the options open to advocates and supporters of consolidation, an enormous amount of adverse reaction and possible rejection will greet their suggestions if they propose large institutional changes. Functional consolidation usually does not involve such comprehensive alterations to existing patterns of government, or require change in existing governmental structures and political systems that are found in total or partial consolidation.²¹ The nature of functional consolidation is such that it lends itself to less rigid, formalistic lines in a particular area of endeavor, e.g., police, or crime control. For example, law enforcement agencies can, without structural alteration, pool their individual resources in a variety of areas: records-keeping, crime laboratories, radio and other communications, arresting and booking procedures, data processing centers, and so on. An agency or department can provide full-service law enforcement under contract to municipalities without their own police department. In essence, any one of these moves has the potential for up-grading the level of public goods and services

provided to the municipalities which law enforcement must serve. Whichever avenue is chosen - intra-departmental pooling or sharing, or contracting for services - the possibilities are numerous.²²

ATTEMPTS TO CONSOLIDATE

Consolidation has been offered as one of the "solutions" to the many urban problems besetting American society, one of which is the rising crime rate. Government institutions are said to be fragmented, lacking in trained and skilled personnel, incapable of proper service delivery, highly bureaucratized, and generally unresponsive to the needs of its citizens.²³ In response to these problems, proponents of consolidation have agreed that by combining like organizations, systems or structures many of the institutional problems and much of the service delivery ones can be ameliorated. What we do not see, however, is an enormous groundswell of support or acceptance of many of the consolidation moves. With the exception of several functional consolidation options, consolidation has met more with resistance than acceptance. Of the more than sixty county mergers proposed in the history of the United States only twenty-one, or about one-third, have been successful.²⁴ Of the 127 SMSA single counties, only three have had city-county consolidations.²⁵ "Curiously, of the 13 post- World War II consolidations, five involved State capital cities,"²⁶ which could lead to the possible inference that political clout is an important ingredient of success in major consolidation moves. The exhibit on page 136 is a more complete illustration of the lack of success in effecting city-county consolidations for the period 1945-1974. Of the forty-nine attempts listed twelve were successful and two, Miami-Dade County and Nashville-Davidson County, went before the voters twice before success was achieved.²⁷

Exhibit V-1 CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION Voter Support for Local Government Reorganization 1945-1974

Year Reorganization Referendum	Reorganization Support (%)	
	Success	Defeat
1949 Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish, La.	51.5	
1952 Hampton-Elizabeth County, Va.	88.7	
1953 Miami-Dade County, Fla.		
1957 Miami-Dade County, Fla.	51.0	49.2
Newport News-Warwick, Va.*	66.9	
1958 Nashville-Davidson County, Tenn.		47.3
1959 Albuquerque-Bernalillo County, N.M.		30.0
Knoxville-Knox County, Tenn.		16.7
Cleveland-Cuyahoga County, Ohio		44.8
St. Louis-St. Louis County, Mo.		27.5
1960 Macon-Bibb County, Ga.		35.8
1961 Durham-Durham County, N.C.		22.3
Richmond-Henrico County, Va.		54.0**
1962 Columbus-Muscogee County, Ga.		42.1
Memphis-Shelby County, Tenn.		36.8
Nashville-Davidson County, Tenn.	56.8	
South Norfolk-Norfolk County, Va.	66.0	
Virginia Beach-Princess Anne County, Va.	81.9	
St. Louis-St. Louis County, Mo.		40.1***
1964 Chattanooga-Hamilton County, Tenn.		19.2
1967 Jacksonville-Duval County, Fla.		
Tampa-Hillsborough County, Fla.	64.7	
1969 Athens-Clarke County, Ga.		28.4
Brunswick-Glynn County, Ga.		48.0
Carson City-Ormsby County, Nev.		29.6
Winchester City-Frederick County, Va.	65.1	
Roanoke-Roanoke County, Va.		31.9
1970 Charlottesville-Albermarle County, Va.		66.4**
Columbus-Muscogee County, Ga.	80.7	28.1
Chattanooga-Hamilton County, Tenn.		48.0
Tampa-Hillsborough County, Fla.		42.0
Pensacola-Escambia County, Fla.		42.0
1971 Augusta-Richmond County, Ga.		41.5
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, N.C.		30.5
Tallahassee-Leon County, Fla.		41.0
1972 Athens-Clarke County, Ga.		48.3
Macon-Bibb County, Ga.		39.6
Suffolk-Nansemond County, Va.*	75.7	
Fort Pierce-St. Lucie, Fla.		
Lexington-Fayette County, Ky.		36.5
Tampa-Hillsborough County, Fla.	69.4	
1973 Columbia-Richland County, S.C.		42.0
Savannah-Chatham County, Ga.		45.9
Tallahassee-Leon County, Fla.		58.3**
1974 Augusta-Richmond County, Ga.		45.9
Portland-Multnomah County, Ore.		51.5**
Durham-Durham County, N.C.		27.5
Charleston-Charleston County, S.C.		32.1
Sacramento-Sacramento County, Calif.		40.4
		24.9
Total Outcome (#)		
Local Reorganizations Attempted	12	37
	49	

* Warwick, Virginia, was a city at the time of the referendum. It had incorporated in 1952; it was Warwick County just six years prior to the referendum. A similar situation preceded the consolidation of Suffolk and Nansemond cities.

** The type of majority requirement is vital in consolidation referenda. In these four instances city-county consolidation was not possible despite the majority voting percentage in its support.

*** St. Louis-St. Louis County Portions of the 1962 statewide referendum.

Source: Vincent L. Marando, "The Politics of City-County Consolidation," National Civic Review 64:2 (February 1975), p. 77

In general, city-county consolidation, as a

...one-government approach to area wide problems has passed its heyday, although it will retain its vigor in many situations concerning only a part of the metropolis... [I]n terms of the entire metropolitan area, the one-government approach is almost certain to be by-passed usually in favor of other techniques. (Emphasis added)²⁸

More simplistically, "big government" is "bad news" to many when viewed as being further removed from those it is supposed to serve.²⁹

When reorganizing government to improve the production and provision of public goods and services, two areas in the process merit attention - the structures of systems which are to be changed and the socioeconomic and political values of the persons to be affected. Large-scale total and partial consolidations usually seek to alter institutional structures in both a city and a county. While it may be possible to somehow choose the institutional framework of governments, it is not as easy to alter the attitudes and values underlying them. Potential "merging" of city-suburban-urban populations under a to-be-created "super-gov" has met with little success. Suburban residents are rarely in favor of large-scale consolidation and regularly have cast negative votes in such referenda.³⁰ There is also some indication that support among a growing number of central city residents - working class, blacks and other ethnics - is waning when it comes to consolidation.³¹

As central city populations have changed and the number of black citizens has increased, metropolitan merger increasingly has been visualized as an attempt to cheat black Americans out of their growing political power in the city.³²

Further evidence of the repudiation of total and partial consolidation can be seen in the results of a Gallup poll taken in 1966. It revealed that twenty-two percent preferred to live in cities, twenty-eight percent

in suburbia, eighteen percent on farms, and a plurality, thirty-one percent, preferred small towns.³³ These results reveal that most people do not want to live in the city. But why is that? One reason is that suburbia, or non-city residents, feel they have more access to their local governments.

As urban life became more impersonal with the growth of population and as the old-fashioned political machine, which had served as an access point to great numbers of citizens, declined, the feeling of isolation and of frustration on the part of the urbanite must have increased. The reform-period practice of electing all councilmen at large contributed to the barrier between the ordinary citizen and those who decide things that matter. But in the suburb, he found a reestablishment of those close relationships that symbolized democracy on the frontier, and he regained the comfortable feeling that goes with confidence in the thought of having influence over government decisions and of having office holders who share one's social values.

The local government to him is good, not because he has an emotional loyalty to it, but because through it he has influence and access in relation to governmental services while through any type of regional government he does not.³⁴

The metropolitanite has similar feelings about his government - "to the central city resident it is a polity within which his class or ethnic enclave has a stake and a voice."³⁵

Socioeconomic contrasts also can be made between city and suburban residents. Suburban residents generally are more highly educated, fill higher occupational classes, and earn more money than central city residents. Suburbanites have usually moved to the suburbs in search of more satisfactory housing and neighborhoods.³⁶ They seek to avoid the urban unpleasantness of inferior housing and lower income classes and to reduce the possibility of having to confront "muggings, fistfights and uncouth syntax."³⁷ When confronted with the prospect for merging with a central city of lesser socioeconomic background and ethos, suburbanites resist

because consolidation poses a definite threat to their life-style, and sense of local community.³⁸

At the heart of city-urban conflict are the differences in the kinds of people who live in cities and suburbs. And city-suburban conflict is at the heart of 'the metropolitan problem;' that is, the failure to achieve metropolitanwide consensus on public policy questions affecting the entire metropolitanwide area and the failure to develop metropolitan government institutions...We shall refer to the social, economic and racial differences between city and suburb as social distance. This social distance accounts for much conflict between cities and suburbs and constitutes the chief obstacle to the development of metropolitanwide policies and government institutions.³⁹

According to Robert Lineberry,

...the larger the metropolitan area, the smaller the probability of a successful reform campaign, and, second, the sharper the socioeconomic differences between suburban and central city areas; where there are distinct social-class differences between central cities and fringe areas, metropolitan integration would be most difficult.⁴⁰

Actual voting patterns of city and non-city residents in consolidation underscore these city-suburban differences. In St. Louis, for example, consolidation was defeated two to one in the city and three to one in the county.⁴¹ After substantial negative county vote in 1958 which caused the defeat of the first proposal for Nashville-Davidson County consolidation, the county subsequently reversed itself in 1962, but only because its portions of the county had been unilaterally annexed by the city.⁴² Faced with a choice of further annexation or consolidation, Nashville's fringe residents chose the latter as the lesser of two evils.⁴³ The inhabitants of the more distant rural areas still remained opposed to Metro.⁴⁴ The Miami-Dade County Metro was approved in 1957 by a bare majority of the twenty-six percent of registered voters in Dade County who went to the polls.⁴⁵ Subsequent attempts in 1968 to further unify local

and county police and fire departments were rejected by a vote of 164,760 to 72,171.⁴⁶ The majority of central city voters in Memphis and Columbus, Georgia, failed to give consolidation an affirmative vote.⁴⁷ Jacksonville-Duval County voters did pass favorably on that consolidation move, but the outlying municipalities voted to retain their own governments by a vote of 2,548 to 1,543.⁴⁸

CONTROL IN THE CONSOLIDATION DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Consolidation requires strong issues and strong advocates. The impetus for reform generally comes from two separate but interrelated sources within a given community: (1) local government services such as schools, police, sewer, water, and so on may be perceived as inadequate and (2) local coalitions of citizen interest groups, professional politicians, or governmental reformers may urge that reorganization can improve these services. For advocates of consolidation, the crux of the problem is to convince the voter and the decision-makers that reform is needed. Loss or gain of control over the allocation of resources and cost of resources in consolidation are the most important considerations in the battle for acceptance.

Consolidation is intrinsically tied to the public policy questions of resource allocation and distribution of services. How these questions are resolved is of importance to all community groups who will be touched by the changeover - the voter, the politician, and the law enforcement officer. Consolidation must not only be looked at from their standpoint, but also take into account the interrelationships among such groups. For example, politicians can attempt to persuade their constituency that law enforcement requires improvement. Or citizen or special interest groups can demand

better services from their elected officials, while law enforcement personnel can seek to better or enhance law enforcement functions and services by alliances with local officials and/or citizens on matters of consolidation.

The age of a community can have a significant influence on the end result. Resistance to change is more frequently found in those local systems which rely on traditional methods and means to problem solving through well-established groups and alliances.⁴⁹ Not all long-existing locales adhere to this outlook when confronted with proposals for consolidation which are marketed as providing improved service quality and attainment of economies of scale and effort.⁵⁰ Community socioeconomic ranking may also affect the probability of acceptance, as will racial characteristics of certain areas.⁵¹ If an area has a fairly large, well-established business community, the degree of potential resistance or acceptance to the consolidation effort by this element of the community should not be overlooked.⁵²

CITIZEN CONTROL

If the electorate perceives consolidation as a threat to the level of access it has to its decision-makers, it will violently resist proposed reorganization. "To challenge the local community through efforts to introduce change in the political structure and reduce access to the political decision-maker develops social pressures that can be translated into political obstacles."⁵³ The local voter often dictates whether consolidation succeeds or fails. Consolidationists should, therefore, develop ways of achieving the acceptance of the electorate before it is

put to the voters in the community or possibly seek ways to skirt putting the proposal before them at all.

...[T]hose interested in metropolitan government...must (1) somehow mobilize a winning party to fight on partisan grounds for metropolitan government, or (2) so educate the voters at large that the questions will precede the answers and the problems the solutions, or (3) avoid the direct democracy of the referendum. The first is unlikely, owing to the Democratic preponderance in the central city and the Republican strongholds in suburbia. The second requires a radical change in our political culture--one that might take generations. The third is most likely--deviously, covertly, we shall achieve metropolitan government.⁵⁴

It is an historical truism that most human beings do not accept change readily. People have to be prepared and conditioned over time to recognize the necessity for the change. They also must be persuaded of the means to effect changes. Since proposals for total consolidation invariably entail public referenda, conditioning or selling the public is most critical. Public advocacy involves polls, campaigns, voting, etc. Analysts of efforts to achieve total consolidation have found that:

A hard-hitting campaign...is just as important to the success of a consolidation campaign as it is to the election of a candidate to office...[when] 'grass-roots' campaigning did not take place [in Tampa] consolidation lost almost three to one with about 25 percent of the registered voters turning out.⁵⁵

Efforts to enlist public support should include telephone and door-to-door contact, mailings, ward and precinct activities, heavy media saturation, and favorable public endorsements.⁵⁶ Expert opinion holds that a well-run and well-structured campaign effort to garner public support and combat voter apathy may not guarantee acceptance, but that without such efforts chances are the consolidation may be doomed at the polls.⁵⁷

Proposals for partial and functional consolidation may not require the same level of campaign effort as proposals for total consolidation, but

all three require that the public be kept informed about the nature and possible impact of the changes.⁵⁸ Efforts should be made to keep the public informed, especially since sustaining public confidence and trust can be a reward in and of itself for public officials.⁵⁹

Those citizens who attend public meetings, held in conjunction with consideration of consolidated law enforcement efforts, generally voice no real opposition to the concept of consolidation. But considerations of practical implementation and operation can excite strong disagreement. Citizens are concerned most over such issues as financial sources, methods of or savings in proposed changes, the nature of the services to be provided, who is to make decisions on the level of services to be provided, the possibility of non-local personnel patrolling their community and the possible impact that that could have on the provision of services, and the impact which remoteness of a centralized authority could have on their individual municipality.⁶⁰

Better communications, a superior records system, increased efficiency and a general improvement in law enforcement are some of the advantages of police consolidation, say its advocates. Opponents cite lack of local knowledge, inside power struggles, and general alienation of the citizenry through sheer size of administration.⁶¹

CONTROL BY LOCAL OFFICIALS

The nature of the American political system is such that any shifts in the prevailing power structure among and between governmental units and its officials may bring up the possibility of political opposition from within. Elected officials are very protective of their responsibilities and prerogatives. Nowhere, is this more apparent than in the sensitive governmental area of law enforcement.⁶²

Elected officials must be made to feel and understand that any changes in traditional law enforcement methods and structures axiomatically will not mean relinquishment of local government control over law enforcement procedures and policies. It has been argued that political control is enhanced in total and partial consolidation to some degree because local officials play a role in consolidation structural design before submitting their proposals to the electorate.⁶³ Total and partial consolidation thereby reflect in large measure the extent of political control that officials were able to exert in the creation of the newly changed and reformed bureaucracy within which they will operate. On the other hand, political officials who participate in functional consolidation do not stand to lose any real control because the governmental structures that they work in will change very slightly or not at all.⁶⁴

Changes in law enforcement operations will stand very little chance of success if local officials are made to feel that these alterations are threats to their ability to exert control over the law enforcement function. Their reactions will be predictably in opposition if they feel that such changes are being forced upon them.⁶⁵ On the other hand, an environment of cooperation and consideration of mutual political points of view does much to enhance achievement of consolidation. One way to achieve a cooperative atmosphere is to provide for meetings between local government officials so that all the issues of consolidation can be discussed prior to implementation.⁶⁶ Having started with an air of cooperation before consolidation, the same mood probably stands a good chance to remain even after implementation. In addition, it provides a forum where local officials may discuss and decide the level of service to be provided, affording them the feeling that they are not losing any control under consolidation.⁶⁷

Of the three consolidation options - total, partial, or functional consolidation - the latter seems to afford a greater degree of control both before and after consolidation. This is particularly true of contracting since it affords local officials what one author has called both a "voice and exit option."

One thing which can make the voice option effective is for local officials to know what other sheriffs are willing to supply to contracting communities. It is easy for local officials, who must contract with their local sheriff, to be told that in the name of 'good professional law enforcement' only a certain type of service is possible. Some voice leverage is gained when the contracting operations of other sheriffs are known.

Further, the voice option can be made more productive if there is a feasible exit option. For a local community the cost of exit, when cancelling the contract, is either starting a local department or contracting with another community. The exit cost for a community with its own department is firing the police chief and hiring a new chief or contracting with some entity for the desired police service. The exit cost from a merger can be prohibitive in that no exit option may exist.⁶⁸

Contracting seems to permit local officials a greater voice in service delivery without being made to feel they have "lost" control over the law enforcement function of their community.⁶⁹ But, contracting is not without its thornier side. For example, when a sheriff contracts with a municipality, is the deputy responsible to the city or the sheriff?⁷⁰ At times, some local officials have decided that they could maintain greater control in having their own law enforcement departments and thus have not accepted contracting proposals.⁷¹

CONTROL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

The personnel of law enforcement agencies which are to be affected by consolidation is one other consideration in acceptance. Many consolidation

efforts run the risk of seeming to be removed from the populace they serve, which tends to contradict the rationale for the consolidation in the first place. Police should stay close to the community they serve.⁷² However, acceptance by police personnel of consolidation seems to hinge less on this concern and more on what the impact will be on ranking, salary levels, fringe benefits, training, etc. If given enough assurance by their supervisors and/or other command levels that they will lose virtually none of their benefits, acceptance can overcome reluctance.⁷³ In instances where commanders foresee possible loss of control over their functions through consolidation, acceptance can be limited or difficult to achieve.⁷⁴ This seems to reflect, to some degree, the recent thinking which has pervaded law enforcement agencies, that is, it is the police official who has sole control over the law enforcement bureaucracy and all that it entails. "They view civilian involvement in police operations with suspicion and cling to the more traditional bureaucratic criterion of police experience as the surest indication of competency to deal with police matters."⁷⁵ On those occasions, however, when the suggestion for change comes from within the law enforcement bureaucracy itself, change may take place with greater acceptance by such agencies, but still will not obviate the necessity for seeking public and official acceptance as well.⁷⁶

COST

When consolidationists discuss cost in the literature, they usually begin by discussing terms of cost of service versus level of service; that is, consolidation should not take place unless the same level of service can be provided at less expense, or the level of service can be increased at a slightly higher cost.

No State or local government or police agency should enter into any agreement for or participate in any police service that would not be responsive to the needs of its jurisdiction and that does not at least:

- a. Maintain the current level of a service at a reduced cost;
- b. Improve the current level of a service either at the same cost or at an increased cost if justified; or
- c. Provide an additional service at least as effectively and economically as it could be provided by the agency alone.⁷⁷

Unless through consolidation a political subdivision can improve the current level of service at a slightly higher cost or maintain the current level of service at a reduced cost, it should not be considered.⁷⁸

The literature indicates, however, that there is a shift in emphasis possible in the cost of service versus level of service argument. Daniel Skoler put it this way: "Consolidation must be a step toward aspirations not only for cheaper law enforcement but for better and more professional law enforcement." (Emphasis added)⁷⁹

The real value that should be recognized is that of improved efficiency, both in law enforcement itself, and in the tax dollars spent to maintain it. Increased efficiency leads to a reduction in crime; crime that costs more than just the tax dollars aimed at fighting it.⁸⁰

The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department does not feel that a cost only approach in law enforcement is realistic, "if the fruit of such discussion is merely...the establishment of a police department whose only 'accomplishment' is to operate within its budget."⁸¹ From a consolidationist's point of view this is valid if people can be convinced that they will be getting "more" or "better" service for their cash outlay. Acceptance of consolidation becomes more palatable to them if couched in this manner. For example, municipalities faced with the choice of establishing their own police department, or contracting with an already established law enforcement group, have been shown that setting up their

own police force would cost from two to three times more than what contracting would cost with the added benefit of quality law enforcement at a cheaper price.⁸² Other localities have been told (or learned) that consolidation would not bring them real savings overall, but that what their tax dollar was spent for would bring them better quality law enforcement.⁸²

SUMMARY OF ACCEPTANCE CONSIDERATIONS

STATUTES

- There is a need to have, seek or amend statutory provisions relative to consolidation.
- A lack of proper statutory authorization can ease or impede consolidation.
- The role of law enforcement, in general, and its officials, in particular, should be clearly delineated.

TYPES OF CONSOLIDATION

- Large-scale consolidation is difficult to achieve.
- Small-scale consolidation is easier to achieve.

ATTEMPTS TO CONSOLIDATE

- Suburban residents rarely approve of large-scale consolidation.
- Central city residential support for large-scale consolidation is waning.
- Suburban residents feel that their governments are more accessible.
- Central city residents feel that they have a stake in their governments.
- Suburban and central city residents differ in socioeconomic values.
- Socioeconomic values of suburban and central city residents contributes to lack of acceptance of consolidation.

CONTROL IN THE CONSOLIDATION DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

- Three population groups within a community contribute to acceptance of consolidation: the local citizen, the politician, and the law enforcement official.
- The local citizen will resist consolidation if he perceives it as a threat to his access to governmental decision-makers.
- Local citizens are the electorate which will decide, in most instances, whether consolidation succeeds or fails.
- The local electorate will have to be convinced of the necessity for change.
- Consolidation may require a well-planned campaign as an ingredient to achieving consolidation.
- Local meetings are useful in eliciting voter attitudes.
- Politicians may attempt to thwart consolidation if they perceive a threat to the control they wield.
- Politicians must be made to realize that consolidation does not mean they will lose control.
- Political officials do have built-in means of control.
- Law enforcement officials and other personnel must be given assurances if possible that they will neither lose financial and other benefits nor control within the bureaucratic structure over policy and procedure.

COSTS

- Costing is looked at in terms of cost versus level of service.
- A shift in costing considerations is possible, i.e., "cheaper for better."
- A cost only approach may not be realistic.
- Contract law enforcement may be cheaper than establishing a new law enforcement agency.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER VI

IMPLEMENTATION PHASES AND FACTORS OF CONSOLIDATION

Gaining acceptance to the idea of consolidation is but one link in a chain of events. Making the concept become a reality is the mid-point in the effort. As analysts of and participants in consolidation have pointed out, consolidation optimally should be a well-planned and thought out program. Design of the consolidation package should identify as many of the critical factors of consolidation at the planning stage as possible. In addition, enough leeway should be allocated for change of those factors which could not have been foreseen or which have arisen after implementation. Given adequate preparation time, consideration of impact and design of the package, most efforts should prove to be what its designers intended. Bruce Smith clearly enunciated the importance of package design in reform moves:

...simplicity of design is an important quality for any program that involves thoroughgoing reform. Here are posed not one or two problems, but half a dozen, each with its own type of solution, and no general rule which can readily be made applicable to all. Before such possible criticisms are taken too seriously, however, it should be remembered that it has been the application of general rules -- such as statutes permitting the unrestricted creation of police agencies by local governments regardless of size, location, or character -- which have put us into the troublesome position in which we now find ourselves. With this experience so prominently before us, care should be taken that the new arrangements are not so general in their scope that they do not fit actual conditions. Simplicity of design we must strive to achieve, but not by a distortion of the underlying facts.¹

PLANNING GUIDELINES

In considering a merger of police forces or departments under total consolidation, a considerable amount of time and effort should be given to

eliciting and gaining public and private sector acceptance. At the same time, adequate measures should be taken to carefully plan the consolidation move. Total consolidation is a complex undertaking; it involves such a wide range of structural and institutional changes that unless the design includes solid planning, it should be avoided.²

Planning, in general, should include consideration of the extent of organizational and structural change, changes in procedures and policies, possible jurisdictional alterations, and a wide range of budgetary matters. The literature concerning total consolidation also has revealed specific areas necessary to the planning stage:

- Legislation should fully detail the responsibilities, limitations and roles of the members of the groups to be consolidated.³
- Determine the totality of the police consolidation effort, e.g. level and degree of crimes in the area, workload analysis, identification of physical resources, personnel availability - civilian and sworn, fringe benefits, organizational structure, personnel policies, budgetary allocation and availability, training and educational levels, and so on.⁴
- Determine if the size of the area to be covered has an impact on the level of service to be provided and response time.⁵
- Try to allow a period of transition to iron out obvious standardization difficulties in combining two or more police departments.⁶
- Form joint planning groups/committees from all staff levels within the departments to be merged to gain their input about the consolidation move. This is useful in allaying fears about the impact and gaining useful and fruitful ideas about how to smooth the way. It also affords the merging units the opportunity to meet and discuss before the actual move takes place.⁷

Partial consolidation of law enforcement services has demonstrated that they too are served well when decision-makers have considered the

elements listed above in their planning stage.⁸ One additional phase possible in partial consolidation, as opposed to total, is that the possibility exists for a degree of flexibility in returning to original methods of operation if the consolidation proves to be less than satisfactory.⁹ Partial consolidation planning should include this option in its implementation design if at all feasible.

Certain aspects of functional consolidation do overlap with partial consolidation while others do not; a new agency or method of delivery can be formed by assimilating similar groups or functions under one unit. Those aspects who do not overlap are the informal patterns of cooperation and agreements prevalent among law enforcement agencies and other service organizations. The informality of such arrangements does not require the same intensity of planning in the implementation stage, although care should be exercised that the operational phase of informal arrangements provides the intended results.

Functional consolidation can overlap with partial consolidation when the law enforcement agency formally assumes the responsibilities of another agency or combines with another to form a new unit. Then legislation, jurisdictions, transition periods, joint personnel/management groups and consideration of the total police aspect (from types of crimes to organizational structure) are relevant factors.¹⁰ Other considerations such as police travel time and working conditions, job security, departmental transfers, and the benefits to the community and policemen also have been included by those planning contract arrangements under functional consolidation.¹¹

Prospective contractors and contracting agencies also might consider the recommendations of those states which already have law enforcement contracts or who have considered instituting functional consolidation.

- Provide a degree of flexibility in service delivery capabilities to meet contractor demands.¹²
- Provide a way of evaluating whether legislation needs up-dating, whether provided services meet demands, whether administrative and staff functions are adequate and so on.¹³
- Ascertain what other contracting programs offer in the area (if there are any) for possible impact on the program being considered.¹⁴

APPROACHES TO IMPLEMENTATION

When two or more law enforcement agencies merge to form one departmental superstructure, or when specialized functions are to be consolidated, the changeover may come about by executive fiat; i.e., it may be imposed from above with little or no consideration of mid-level management or line personnel input to the proposed move. Because of the impact on personnel morale such unilateral action will make effective implementation more difficult or lessen the chances of successful consolidation.

EMPLOYEE QUESTIONNAIRES AND PLANNING COMMITTEES

Participant and analytic sources have revealed the usefulness of employee questionnaires and planning committees in the implementation of consolidation. For example, in Shelby County, Tennessee, Jacksonville, Florida, and Los Angeles County, California, employee questionnaires and planning committees were used to elicit personnel responses to proposed departmental mergers. These were found to be useful since they served as

indicators of the thinking of the personnel to be affected by the change.¹⁵ The results of these efforts showed that factors affecting personnel morale were:

- salary levels
- promotional opportunities
- training
- manpower allocation and specialization
- standardization of uniforms, equipment, facilities, communication frequencies, and records keeping
- delineation of responsibilities¹⁶

One caveat the literature does reveal is that when employing questionnaires care should be taken that both upper-level management and the others involved understand that these are of an informational nature only. Not all the responses will be adopted in the final design, however, they will merit consideration in the overall decision-making process.¹⁷

The importance of active participative planning as an approach to achieving acceptance, however, was demonstrated by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the Los Angeles Police Department when they sought to merge certain specialized functions of their respective departments. The two departments previously had been unsuccessful when they had attempted to merge certain areas, but a change in implementation methodology came about which led to success instead of another failure.

It is important to realize that this effort worked, where prior efforts had not, because the 'working level' people were consulted and allowed to take an active part in the development and implementation of this project. (Emphasis added)¹⁸

Others considering consolidation could learn from the Los Angeles experience. The literature reveals that if agreement to the undertaking is lacking it could jeopardize the results sought.

Since lack of agreement about content would seriously weaken an area-wide records and communications system, all participants at every level must agree upon the scope and level of services to be provided by each component of the system.¹⁹

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Eliciting employee attitudes about consolidation does reveal their concern over rights and benefits. Consolidationists such as Sheriff Dale Carson feel that personnel fears in these areas can be allayed and intra-departmental conflict reduced, if employees are made aware of the fact that a particular consolidation move will mean an increase in pay and other benefits.²⁰ This is the case when two departments merge totally, and the salary levels of one agency's employees are higher than the other's. Salaries and other benefits in these instances will usually rise rather than fall.²¹ Other consolidation planners have found that training or re-training of integrated personnel will need to take place, that personnel slots will need to be combined or that promotion freezes will take place.²² Still others have found that civil service and other employee retirement services may have to be coordinated.²³

Agencies who do contract or who are thinking of contracting have shown that they too must consider salary levels, fringe benefits, training and educational requirements, retirement funds, etc.²⁴

INTEGRATION OF ACTIVITIES/FACILITIES

Any steps in integrating facilities and activities which can be taken prior to implementation of consolidation will serve to ease the process. Centralized administrative and other functional areas should be planned

and budgeted for with an eye to completing facilities as soon as possible so that the level of confusion can be cut to a minimum.²⁵ If radio frequency ranges, areas to be patrolled and covered, and assignments to duty stations can be mapped out prior to actual consolidation, the process of implementation will be eased.²⁶

COSTING

The ability of a community to pay for the services which they require or need is conditioned by the economic and financial resources of the area. Such aspects are an indication of the ability of the area to support given levels of law enforcement programs.²⁷ In most instances, the size of a community, in sheer numbers, predicates the level of police services which can be supported.²⁸ Both ability to pay and physical community size figure in the tax basis possible for a community to maintain. This is true especially when determining property tax which is "despite its challenged shortcomings, the principal method employed by local governments to raise revenues for public services."²⁹ Another way of expressing the relationship of need and ability to pay for police services is to determine the per capita value of taxable property:³⁰

$$\text{town ability to pay for needed police services} = \frac{\text{value of taxable property}}{\text{population}} = \text{per capita value of taxable property}$$

FINANCIAL ABILITY

It can be seen that financing law enforcement services and other municipal services as well comes primarily from income provided for by taxes. Any consolidation effort will have to take this into account when determining services to be provided. In some total and partial

consolidations such as Monroe County, Jacksonville and Indianapolis, for example, tax savings were initially forecast; however, given the greater area to serve and the increased demands for service, overall real savings were not realized, except in the case of Indianapolis.³¹

The available tax pool, that is, local sales and use taxes, city property taxes, fines and penalties, and other revenue sources also figure in contracting.³²

DETERMINATION OF COSTS

In contracting, however, how law enforcement costs are determined and passed on to the consumer is the core of the matter. This has been a subject long debated in California.³³ In other areas of the country, cost allocation methods are of equal concern - from both an ability to pay and the level of services to be provided.³⁴ Experience has also shown that any fears of double taxation (paying twice for the same service) which may arise can be allayed by contracts which stipulate that services already paid for by taxes will not be charged for under the contract.³⁵

"SAVINGS" vs "NO SAVINGS"

It has been the experience of those who have dealt with total consolidation that such an effort is not without a large degree of cost because of the large structural and institutional rearranging. It has been asserted that, along with inflation, costs are increased because:

- larger departments mean more people, higher salaries, benefit levels, etc.
- a larger staff involves more equipment and housing

- along with change exists a responsibility for improving and expanding services and programs
- a larger department means serving a larger population³⁶

Some savings may be possible, advocates say, through total or partial consolidation because:

- there will be a decrease in the fragmentation of police services (thereby releasing personnel involved in duplicative functions for use in other areas)
- centralization in records-keeping may cut down on administrative expenses

Again, however, even given these possible "savings," "operating costs will necessarily increase as the number of officers increases and/or police pay scales increase."³⁷ Consolidation therefore ought not be viewed within the context of "real" or "actual" cost savings or as a "prime factor" in consolidation.³⁸

The same holds true for partial consolidation as well; that is, if jointly sponsored programs are to develop and expand, the costs for such projects should be shared by all participating elements to keep down the level of cost.³⁹ If it is possible to merge certain departmental elements without additional funding or position restructuring, then centralization is made easier.⁴⁰

It would appear from the literature that contracting can provide a means of achieving quality law enforcement services without significantly high or higher costs. This is especially true for those areas seeking to determine whether a new police department should be created, whether a contract law enforcement agency could provide the necessary services and goods or, in some instances, whether a small police department has become

too expensive to maintain and run effectively. General considerations in looking to contract law enforcement agencies for police services could include:

- will federal funding for any period of time be necessary; if so, for how long and what will the impact of its cessation bring?
- will the state have to subsidize any portion of a municipality's contract costs; if so, on what percentage basis, and for what reasons?
- in the event of choosing contracting over formation of a new department, how do the costs for patrol compare and what portion of these costs are passed on to the contracting community?
- is "cost only" the singular valid criterion for measurement of provision of police services?
- what are the prices to be charged as compared to actual costs, and can patrol services be produced at a lower price by contracting than can small departments?⁴¹

Two final areas in functional consolidation to consider, however, which encompass those aspects previously mentioned, and which can cause a great deal of controversy are costing methods and the level of service to be provided.⁴² The nature of contracting is such that when a law enforcement agency agrees to provide police services for a price to a community or communities, it does so according to the terms of an agreement as well as by legal mandate of state statutory provisions. Thus, a department also should take into account what impact a decrease in provision of contracting services would mean for its operations should such a situation ever occur.⁴³

MODEL PROGRAM FOR CONTRACTING

The literature reveals that in some areas where contracts are in force or where they are being proposed, certain elements are included or

considered for inclusion in the contractual agreement even though the contracts offer differing levels of service.⁴⁴

The exhibit on page 167 has incorporated these many different factors.

POTENTIAL CHECKLIST FOR CONSOLIDATION IMPLEMENTATION

The areas of consideration in consolidation implementation are many and by no means mutually exclusive as has been demonstrated. There is not one right way to implement consolidation, but communities thinking of consolidation should weigh the various elements to see which move will afford them the most of what they are seeking for the least amount of discomfiture. (See exhibit on page 168 for a potential checklist.)

Exhibit VI-1

GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR INCLUSION IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTRACT

1. NATURE OF THE ARRANGEMENT
 - a. Description of parties involved
 - b. Explanation of need for contract
 - c. Citation of legal authority
 - d. Definition of terms
2. LEVEL OF SERVICE - WORK TO BE PERFORMED
3. LIMITATIONS
 - a. State statutes
 - b. Local charters
4. SERVICE CHARGES
 - a. Salaries
 - b. Depreciation on equipment
 - c. Overhead
 - d. Office supplies
 - e. Clerical work (support services)
 - f. Employee fringe benefits
 - g. Capital expenditures
5. FINANCING
 - a. Method of cost allocation
 - b. Revenue sources to include debt, bond issues, etc.
6. ADMINISTRATION
 - a. Units responsible for services
 - b. Control over responsible units
 - c. Joint agencies such as boards, commissions, etc.
 - Number, title, method of selection, term of office, compensation of officers
 - Number and frequency of meetings
 - Procedures and qualifications for voting and provisions/conditions for new membership
7. FISCAL PROCEDURES
 - a. Reports
 - b. Budgets
 - c. Manner and time of payments
8. PERSONNEL RIGHTS
 - a. Utilization of personnel
 - b. Safeguards for civil service rights, privileges, immunities and fringe benefits
9. STAFFING
 - a. Procedures
 - b. Terms
10. PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS
11. DURATION, TERMINATION AND AMENDMENT

Source: This model was developed by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Handbook for Interlocal Agreement and Controls, Washington, D.C., 1967, pp. 55-59 and used by Lee S. Nathans and B. Douglas Harman. "Contracting for Law Enforcement Services," Management Information Service, August 1971, 3:5-8, pp. 9-11.

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

Exhibit VI-2

CHECKLIST FOR CONSOLIDATION IMPLEMENTATION

ELEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION	TOTAL CONSOLIDATION	PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION	FUNCTIONAL CONSOLIDATION
1. Is it legal; does it require new legislation, or amended legislation?			
2. Will it require large-scale, moderate or slight changes in bureaucratic structures?			
3. What will be the jurisdictions to be covered or areas to be policed?			
4. What elements of criminality should be included: types, levels, frequency?			
5. What physical plant resources will need to be changed, improved, purchased?			
6. To what extent should affected personnel be polled to ascertain their opinions, ideas, etc? To what extent will this information be used?			
7. What will be the impact on salary levels, promotional opportunities, fringe benefits, training and educational levels?			
8. Can a transition period be allowed for to iron out problems before actual implementation?			
9. Should or must formal local government controls be provided for?			
10. What will be the cost of the move, on what will it be based, how will it be allocated, what are to be its sources?			
11. What is the potential of acceptance by the local community?			

CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER VII

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE VARIOUS CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS

The published data about consolidated law enforcement operations comes mainly from two sources: empiricists and users. The first group is composed of those few individuals who have conducted or been involved in empirically sound evaluation studies of consolidation efforts. The latter group is composed largely of "boosters" or proponents of consolidation who are, at the same time, members of the political or law enforcement community. The quality of data which comes largely from the "booster" group has been characterized by Elinor Ostrom as promotional-type literature instead of validly-based data.¹

One result of having to rely on this kind of information in evaluating consolidation operations, from a retrospective point of view, is that consolidation comes across as a highly politicized effort, concerned more with the "how-to-do-it" approach rather than the "how-it-operates." This is especially true when looking at total consolidation.

This preoccupation with the politics of adoption, and the neglect of past-metro experience, may be explained in terms of several factors. In the first place, there is a kind of law of supply and demand at work, with many metropolitan reform leaders already convinced that metro is virtuous and desirable for their city. Their greatest interest is in learning how other metropolitan areas were able to 'win the fight for metro' and how to apply this to their own area, rather than what has happened since its adoption.²

Several operational aspects of consolidation have been identified in the literature. These include:

1. Fiscal considerations
2. Impact on law enforcement operations
3. Impact on local service provision
4. Impact on crime

FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS

Of the several total or partial consolidation moves only one, "Uni-Gov" in Marion County, Indiana, has been able to point to a lowered property tax rate. In addition, it was felt that county "budget changes [downward by four percent] brought a shift in priorities..." with budgets for law enforcement and other community needs being given prime consideration.³

"Metro" in Nashville-Davidson County realized no tax savings for its citizens upon consolidation. In fact, an increase in the property tax rate was related to consolidation, with rural residents being levied at a higher property tax rate than city residents.⁴ At the same time, one of the reasons for the difference in taxing levels was stated to be the "replacement of the...[county law enforcement] patrol with a better manned, trained, and equipped metropolitan police department."⁵ When consolidation was effected, the county was divided into two districts with an urban services district (in effect the City of Nashville), and a general services district (the entire county).⁶ Two years after consolidation, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice pointed out that the urban service district was being charged a greater tax rate than the general service district with the former's tax rate based on entire police budget whereas the latter's was based on that portion deemed to be "normal police protection, or 55 percent of the total."⁷ While general service residents were paying less for "normal police services," residents of the urban services district felt that they were "paying more for police protection than they received from the metropolitan police department."⁸

The experience of Jacksonville-Duval County in consolidating law enforcement, and other government services, has been looked at from the perspective of having realized no real dollar savings but having the level of police efficiency and services rise. Proponents of the consolidation move frequently point out that the Jacksonville taxpayer is receiving more service for his tax dollar than was possible at the time of the merger.⁹

In the Jacksonville experience, total law enforcement costs went up while some component parts went down. For example, there was a decrease in per unit costs while increased police expenditures on the whole went up after consolidation. This occurred since reductions were possible in relative costs per clearance. In 1969, the relative cost per clearance was \$474 with a total cost of \$2,956,000 achieved on 6,236 Part I offenses. In 1972, 8,034 Part I offenses were cleared at a relative cost of \$434 or a total cost of \$3,487.00. "Therefore, although 'per unit costs' declined on a comparative scale, the number of 'service units' grew by such a margin that the total cost increased."¹⁰ On the whole, however, the sheriff of Jacksonville has stressed that those considering total consolidation will not save money. "Don't let anyone sell you on saving money through law enforcement consolidation. You can promise them a much more efficient operation, but adequate law enforcement is expensive."¹¹

Other consolidationists, such as those who offer contracting law enforcement programs, do point to possible savings for municipalities. The states of Connecticut, Maryland, Alaska, and Virginia offer contracting services under a project called the resident state trooper program. Under this program, a municipality receives police services from

the state police by contract with the state and the municipality splitting the costs. The state usually assumes the greater costing share.¹² Maryland justifies the necessity for state subsidy for the following reasons: (a) municipalities cannot afford the full costs of a trooper, (b) double taxation is avoided, (c) regular force support is reduced and manpower is conserved, and (d) the records keeping is enhanced.¹³

The point most consistently drawn by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is that contract law enforcement is demonstrably less expensive for municipalities than establishing one's own department.¹⁴

The Waukesha County Sheriff's Department, Wisconsin, also asserts that contracting cities, villages, and townships are obviated from having to establish their own departments which saves them money.¹⁵

William Sinclair in an unpublished doctoral dissertation undertook a large study of contracting arrangements in Michigan. His data showed that financially, contracting communities saved a considerable amount of money by having law enforcement services provided by the various county sheriffs.¹⁶ (See Exhibit 1 on page 177.) From the data on the table, Sinclair was able to show that the county charged less than the actual costs to the contracting communities. The non-contracting portion of the county, therefore, had to absorb the difference between projected and real costs. Sinclair feels that such differentials were due to inexperience in cost estimation since time-off compensation and base salary choices were overlooked in computing the cost of the contract.¹⁷

Contract law enforcement, however, is not without problems. Orange County, California, has had some difficulties with contracting although the

Exhibit VII-1

Comparison of resources used to the county estimate and the revenue received from contracting communities.

Community	Estimated Value of Variable Resources Used, 1974	County Contracted Revenue Received in 1974*	County Cost Estimate**
Avon	\$148,989	\$ 89,350	\$ 92,295
Commerce	114,003	71,480	74,196
Highland	112,751	71,480	74,196
Oakland	26,848	17,870	18,459
Independence	112,751	71,480	74,196
Orion	112,524	71,480	74,196
Springfield	27,216	17,870	18,459
TOTAL	\$655,082	\$411,010	\$425,997

* The rate charged by the sheriff including salaries, vehicle expense and uniform costs was \$17,870 for each man purchased. Avon purchased five units and thus the revenue they send to the county in 1974 is 5 x \$17,870 or \$89,350. Highland, Independence, Commerce and Orion each purchase four units (4 x 17,870 = \$71,480) and Springfield and Oakland each purchased one unit.

** The county estimated the cost of one unit, a man, vehicle and uniform to cost \$18,459 per year per unit. Avon purchased 5 units; so the cost, according to the county, is (5 x \$18,459 = \$92,295).

Source: William Sinclair

situation currently is being improved. In that county, it was alleged by the Brea Police Chief that city to city contract law enforcement is provided by the City of Brea to the City of Yorba Linda at a much lower cost than the County Sheriff's Office could have provided.¹⁸

The Sheriff of Teton County, Montana, also has encountered financial problems with contracting. Selected problems he cites are: a limited tax base in the cities and counties; restrictive Montana statutes which require that all employees be paid a deputy sheriff's salary; inability to charge cities actual contract costs because they cannot afford to do so. "Consolidation for a small area is very definitely not a means of saving money. A partial savings is available in the area of joint facilities, equipment, communications, etc."¹⁹

IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

It was possible in Jacksonville to achieve a single communications center, a combined records center, a central booking office, etc., all of which contributed to a more efficient operation and utilization of manpower. At the same time, however, a new communications center, new uniforms, and a remodeling of the old police station were made possible, which cut into the savings to be realized by the consolidation of the other operational functions.²⁰

The Miami-Dade County Public Safety Department is not a completely merged unit of city and county police forces. As late as 1972, efforts to further consolidate police departments in the area have been defeated by suburban voters.²¹ The Public Safety Department, nonetheless, has been

able to foster increased coordination in the areas of training, communications, and records.²² It does offer on a countywide basis such police services as the:

- utilization of central accident reporting,
- coordination of a hit-and-run program,
- administration of gun permits,
- administration of animal control programs,
- administration of the automobile inspection program,
- use of a central crime laboratory,
- services of a mobile laboratory,
- provision of a juvenile bureau service (to all but two municipalities),
- availability of homicide investigation (also accessible to Miami, Miami Beach, and Hialeah in major cases).²³

These services are possible because of the voluntary arrangements between the Public Safety Department and local jurisdictions.²⁴ In the meantime, however, the Miami Public Safety Department has experienced a number of problems. One of them has been the poor morale among the officers and a ten percent employee attrition rate.

Law enforcement groups in several areas have been able to sometimes share in training facilities, crime laboratories, communications, criminal records, criminal investigations, organized crime control, jail facilities, information exchanges, etc., on an informal basis.²⁵ St. Louis area police departments participate in a large number of cooperative arrangements, with information exchanges and police coordination accounting for over half of the informal agreements.²⁶ McDavid's study demonstrated that the extensive distribution of informal arrangements between the police departments has developed in these two areas (information exchanges and

police coordination) to such a degree, he asserted, that criminals could not escape detection merely by crossing multijurisdictional lines.²⁷

"The policy coordination element in sixteen percent of all agreements is an indication of the extent to which police departments in the St. Louis area have consciously developed means to articulate the joint interests of departments."²⁸ Additionally, if one department finds it units busy when a need arises, it may request assistance from another department. That agency probably will give the required assistance because it knows that it may have a similar future need which will be reciprocated. The capacities of a police department during peak workload periods also can be enhanced, by such arrangements.

...because such reciprocal agreements obviate the need of building producing units with a great deal of excess capacity, they result in substantial savings for any given department...; these exchanges tend to make agreements self-enforcing. The multiple number of associations also provide members with a means for exchanging information, advice and other valuable services that serve to reduce the degree of uncertainty and cost involved in the execution of their tasks.²⁹

St. Louis along with the cities of Atlanta, Kansas City, Topeka, Des Moines, and Tuscaloosa have developed specialized teams of investigators called major case squads. These squads bring together expert investigators in multijurisdictional settings to solve major crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault).³⁰ Homicide cases consume the majority of the squads' time, but during the course of such investigations it is not uncommon for evidence to turn up which can help "to solve scores of other crimes committed in the metropolitan area."³¹ The squads also lend themselves to the development of informal contacts information sharing, and a system to keep officers abreast of policing practices during training sessions. This can be done by providing the

latest information on stop and frisk procedures, anti-sniper procedures, homicide investigative techniques, etc.³² The value of special squads was amply demonstrated in Kansas City during a dual murder-rape investigation, where ninety-one police agencies contributed over 8,000 manhours of investigative work plus other resources to help solve the case.³³

Atlanta's "Metropol" had its genesis in the multijurisdictional problems which confronted law enforcement agencies there. One of these problems was the growing number of "metropolitan" law violators.³⁴ It was decided by the several law enforcement groups in the Atlanta area that intercounty-intracity cooperation could be enhanced by certain cooperative arrangements such as an areawide teletype circuit reaching all major police departments; an adoption of uniform call signals by all departments; the establishment of the metro fugitive squad; the employment of a training school for area policemen (particularly relatively new force members); and the publication of a daily departmental bulletin.³⁵

Arrangements such as these have also been occurring in other parts of the United States with seemingly favorable results.

- Utah - The Utah County Police Chiefs' Association, whose membership includes sheriffs and chiefs, meets monthly to exchange operational information and lends itself to establishing other cooperative efforts such as "improved police services through increased interagency cooperation."³⁶
- Minnesota - A joint recruitment and selection program provided two cooperating police departments with an increased number of applicants.³⁷
- Washington - Special detention facilities on a shared basis for youthful offenders eliminated two separate agencies from providing a full range of facilities.³⁸
- Michigan - Establishment of a combined dispatch center in Jackson County permits the sheriff, city police, and state police to monitor each other's calls to provide needed assistance.³⁹

- California - Compatible booking forms and processing techniques, automated want and warrant system adapted to two large law enforcement agencies computer systems, the Police Information Network (PIN) have all contributed to California law enforcement agencies' abilities to reduce spending, personnel, and wasted time and effort.⁴⁰

The consolidation arrangements thus far have been those between and among police agencies, and other law enforcement groups. They have involved formal, merging, and informal sharing of some specific functions within the departments to try to meet the demands of law enforcement more effectively. Agencies can more formally participate with one another on a contractual basis. The states of Oregon, Idaho and North Dakota, for example, use jail contracting extensively among cities and counties and among counties in their rural areas.⁴¹ Rural police departments, as a result, "do not have to finance extensive jail facilities and can apply their limited fiscal resources to other police services - mainly general patrol activities."⁴² Contract services on a county to city basis also seem to have a favorable result on law enforcement operations.

- Illinois - [T]he contract concept is proving popular and is providing more effective law enforcement to the cities... and [is] an effective way to end the fragmentation which exists in law enforcement in many localities.⁴³

County to city contract services in Minnesota have meant that most county law enforcement officials have had to increase their staff requirements because of demands for patrol coverage by contracting municipalities. One county sheriff is on record as saying that combined law enforcement proves "that officers operate more efficiently. They have the advantage of an established communication system, controlled supervision, and a centralized records system, all of which contribute to more uniform enforcement by the law."⁴⁴

IMPACT ON LOCAL SERVICE PROVISION

Do the levels of police services provided to consolidated areas rise, fall, or remain the same after consolidation? In Indianapolis the existence of Uni-Gov, notwithstanding, a referendum which would have brought a merger of the Sheriff's Department and the Indianapolis Police Department was defeated at the polls.⁴⁵

Two voter surveys, one in 1965 and one in 1974, tested the viability of Nashville's Metro operations by obtaining citizens' attitudes. The results of one survey showed that voter satisfaction about Metro was couched in abstract or theoretical terms: "more practical, logical way to do things," "eliminates duplication," "better overall planning," "makes people pay for services they were getting without paying for them," and so on.⁴⁶ Voter dissatisfaction was expressed in predominantly concrete or tangible reasons: "taxes too high," "being taxed without receiving promised services," and "poor services."⁴⁷ Ostrom in her study points out that fifty-eight percent of the Nashville fringe area residents interviewed in 1965 responded that local services rendered were about the same after Metro, while eight percent felt they were worse. Police services were underscored by fringe residents as the area of most dissatisfaction; sixty percent felt their local taxes were too high.⁴⁸

All levels of Davidson County finally came under the jurisdictional responsibility of the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department in 1973. The results of the survey undertaken in 1974 indicate that the incorporated cities within the general service district "did not receive as much police protection as areas in the urban services district."⁴⁹ This assumption

was predicated on the results of the community survey which demonstrated that residents of a small, independent community in the area were considerably more satisfied with and expressed stronger preferences for the services of their independent police force than a community of equal size and make-up served by the large, metropolitan police department. The conclusion reached by Rogers is that "[c]onsolidationist arguments that higher service levels and efficiency are associated with larger units of government are not supported by the data."⁵⁰

Miami-Dade County voters have twice defeated efforts to merge county police and fire services with those of the city. In 1968, fears of "'big' government, criticism of other public services [then] currently administered on a metropolitan basis, the inability to identify dollar savings, and the lack of an accurate area crime picture" contributed to the defeat.⁵¹

Most of the areas in Suffolk and Nassau Counties, New York, are provided a range of complete police production services by the Suffolk County and Nassau County Police Departments, respectively, under the auspices of a police service district. Analysts point out there are certain pluses and minuses to police service districts. The main disadvantage is that municipalities cannot choose what type of police services they will receive, or withdraw should they become unhappy with the level of service.⁵² On the other hand, there are several advantages:

- there need not be any restructuring of local governments;
- police service provided in such a manner could lessen jurisdictional problems while maintaining a consistent level of law enforcement;
- and municipalities could choose not to join the district and continue to operate their own police departments while still enjoying some areawide service benefits.⁵³

The largest segment of contracting currently existent in the U.S. are those arrangements between a law enforcement agency and a local government. County to city, city to county, city to city, and county to county agreements are the typical groupings with the preponderance of contracting between a county sheriff and a municipality. The extent of the services to be included in the contract is dependent usually upon what the contractee would like and what the contractor has to offer. Atlanta, Georgia, is one exception to the trend in county to city contracting. Provision of law enforcement services to Fulton County's unincorporated municipalities is the sole responsibility of the City of Atlanta. However, Atlanta and Fulton County officials jointly decide the level of services to be provided and prepare the contract agreements. The County's incorporated municipalities may then continue to maintain their own police departments.⁵⁴

Under the Connecticut style resident state trooper program, local officials have the right of approval of the trooper assigned, but a major drawback of the program is that only a single trooper is assigned and, under emergency situations in the locality, may be withdrawn temporarily to meet the crisis.⁵⁵

Four sensitive issues in county to city contracts, which the literature has consistently pointed to are problems with which local officials are concerned - retention of control, level of patrol service provided, patrol scheduling and activities, and rotation of deputies - seem to have been ameliorated in Michigan. With the aid of monthly reports, officials are kept as fully informed as possible about police activities and services. Local communities are given a choice in the level of service they feel they require as long as such service adds up to one full man

being employed. Police officials attempt to keep a good working rapport with local officials since both they and the citizens must be kept happy. Deputies are permanently assigned to the contracting localities.⁵⁶ Typically in Ingham County, the county sheriff is the chief of police in the contracting townships. Each township is a police precinct with one lieutenant and one sergeant. The lieutenant acts as a liaison officer between the sheriff and local government officials regarding police needs and services, affording officials some degree of local control.

California offers the widest range of comprehensive contract law enforcement services to municipalities wishing to contract. Los Angeles County offers its contract cities a full range of police service possibilities - patrol, investigative operations, central records, training, jails and crime labs, as well as unlimited back-up personnel in emergency situations and specialized investigative teams, all at a "very attractive contract price."⁵⁷ The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department has enumerated the advantages of contract law enforcement in six areas:

1. provision of professional, specialized services that are adaptable to the needs of any local community;
2. substantial savings;
3. each contracting city may purchase a desired level of service without having to absorb the costs of unneeded field work;
4. no initial cost outlay is required;
5. coordination of police efforts is facilitated in dealing with crime;
6. cooperation and coordination with local officials is enhanced.⁵⁸

The City of Irvine was at one time served by contract from the Orange County Sheriff but then switched contract agencies, receiving its law

enforcement services from the Costa Mesa Police Department. Subsequently, it started its own law enforcement agency. Reasons cited for the agency changes were that the called-for contract services did not meet the crime rates and the level of criminal activities which occurred in the City of Irvine.⁵⁹

Wisconsin and Florida also have achieved contract law enforcement programs. In Wisconsin contract services include a round-the-clock patrol car unit as well as other department services and operations such as investigations, crime prevention, records, jail, juvenile, and identification. The Waukesha County Sheriff's Department feels that the "single advantage of contractual law enforcement is that the Sheriff is able to provide professional, specialized services, administering to the overall crime situation, yet adaptable to meet the needs of any local community."⁶⁰

Contract policing in Florida offers the same types of service variety as do the other states already discussed in depth. It has had to overcome resistance by local officials and already established police departments but seems to be gaining in acceptance. Small towns are finding it advantageous because they usually get better service than they had been receiving, or they have begun to receive service where it had been virtually non-existent.⁶¹

Texas, Washington, and North Dakota also have reported advantages they feel communities receive under contract operations in their states.

- Texas - "...In addition to providing better, more coordinated policing for the entire county, a dollar savings of about nine percent is expected the first year."⁶²
- Washington - The Mayor of Leavenworth, Washington, a contract law enforcement city, was quoted as saying "We wouldn't go back to the old local police situation we had under any consideration."⁶³

- North Dakota - "Law enforcement has been put back on a personal basis in the rural areas and has given Ward County and small town citizens the benefit of a sophisticated deputy sheriff service, staffed, trained and equipped with law enforcement professionals. Since the program was initiated, Ward County has experienced a drop in major crime of about fifty percent. The apprehension rate has, at the same time, increased by about fifty percent. Traffic patrol in rural areas has been doubled."⁶⁴

The Sheriff of Ward County feels that law enforcement is on a more personal basis in rural areas and that towns receive qualified, trained, and properly equipped officers and staff.⁶⁵

IMPACT ON CRIME

The positive service benefits in Jacksonville (under a higher tax bill) have been cited as being:

- After three years of a heightened crime rate and ultimate leveling off, a reduction in crime in 1972 by 4.5 percent and 4.95 percent in 1973 was achieved.
- The reduced crime rate has meant decreased personal and financial losses to the community.
- A larger percentage of criminals being apprehended has had a deterrent effect on the incidence of new crime.
- Numbers of arrests per sworn officer has increased more than half; both the number of total citations and those issued per sworn officer for all traffic-related offenses have doubled.
- The per unit cost for certain measurable police services has declined.⁶⁶

As a result of the level of police consolidation which Miami-Dade County was able to achieve, 1965 crime was down 4.9 percent over 1964 in incorporated areas; traffic fatalities were reduced and traffic accidents increased marginally (1.82 percent) while vehicles and population increased over 5 percent.⁶⁷

The Las Vegas Police Department and the Clark County Sheriff's Department merged into one law enforcement agency in 1973. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Force is under the supervision of the Clark County Sheriff and provides all law enforcement services to the county, with the exception of the city of North Las Vegas, which did not join the merged unit. One result of the merger to which the new unit points is the fact that criminals can no longer operate in two separate jurisdictions successfully since now all law officers have at their disposal the necessary criminal data to battle crime.⁶⁸

The state of Ohio was able to combat drug and narcotic violations through countywide cooperative efforts. The Stark County Sheriff and chiefs of police of five cities (aided by the county prosecuting attorney's office) began regularly and informally to exchange intelligence, develop investigative techniques and concentrate attention on persons identified with trafficking in drugs and narcotics. Arrests and convictions on possession charges increased significantly. Subsequent efforts in Stark County, enhanced by the earlier success, led to the creation of a special unit of undercover officers to assist small police departments in combating the drug traffic problem.

[A]greement was reached by the participating...units that [the MEG Unit] would be under the direct supervision of a seven-man coordinating staff including the chiefs of the police departments of the five cities, the county sheriff, and [the prosecuting attorney].⁶⁹

Contract law enforcement agencies have been able to affect their crime rate as well.

- Iowa - Rural crime has decreased since the law enforcement system is more effective. There is a larger manpower pool and more aggressive program of law enforcement.⁷⁰

- California - Provision of contract law enforcement maintains "local crime rates within bounds of those experienced by Independent Cities [non-contract cities] and in achieving lower crime rates in some areas."⁷¹
- North Dakota - "Since the program was initiated [the county] has experienced a drop in major crime of about fifty percent. The apprehension rate has, at the same time, increased about fifty percent."⁷²
- Illinois - "The county's crime rates have decreased."⁷³

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

FISCAL CONSIDERATION

- Large scale consolidation overall means that the taxpayer will be paying more for law enforcement services.
- The taxpayer may be paying more, but the level of service he receives is greater in some instances.
- Contract law enforcement is less expensive for municipalities than establishing their own law enforcement agency.
- Some states subsidize contract law enforcement arrangements.
- Contract law enforcement is not always a means of saving money.

IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

- It is possible in total consolidation to achieve a more efficient operation by merging certain functions.
- Informal arrangements also are an effective means of achieving cooperative and coordinated law enforcement.
- Law enforcement agencies can contract with one another in a specific area, jails, for example.
- County to city contracts provide law enforcement agencies a means to end fragmentation.

IMPACT ON LOCAL SERVICE PROVISION

- Local police services are perceived by some citizens as the same or poorer after large-scale consolidation.
- Some police service districts may not afford municipalities the ability to withdraw from the district or the means of choosing the level of service they require or need.
- Police service districts may be formed without governmental restructuring; jurisdictional problems may ease, and municipalities can choose to maintain their own law enforcement departments and not join the district while enjoying some areawide benefits.
- The largest number contract arrangements are those between a county law enforcement agency and a city government.
- In county to city contracts, local officials are concerned with retention of control, level of patrol service provided, patrol scheduling and activities and rotation of deputies.

IMPACT ON CRIME

- Crime rates usually rise after large-scale consolidation, but do level off after some time passes.
- Combining jurisdictions allows law enforcement officials to more readily monitor criminal activity.
- Certain criminal activities can be reduced by cooperative exchanges.
- Contracting is an effective means of reducing the crime rate in rural areas.

CHAPTER VII

FOOTNOTES

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RESEARCH NOTE: AN ASSESSMENT OF DATA QUALITY

The data employed in the composition of this report came from a number of sources including articles in professional and scholarly periodicals, books, local government memoranda, federal, state, county, and municipal documents, feasibility studies and so forth. For the most part, the information extrapolated from the literature concerning consolidated law enforcement was based on statements made by local officials and law enforcement managers.

While unstructured personal and experimental assertions are useful in an overall evaluation of consolidation, they are not data of the quality necessary to conduct rigorous critical comparative examinations or assessments of findings. This is especially true when such information is the primary source from which to advise others about consolidation.

In large measure, the reported assessments of the efficacy or the utility of a particular program were found to be anecdotal or impressionistic evaluations with few offers of valid measurement criteria or other information upon which sound evaluative judgments could be made. Only a limited number of the available studies on the consolidation of law enforcement that sought to assess a particular program's overall utility or effectiveness or examine certain aspects of a program critically, did so by utilizing such criteria as comparative data collection methods and sound research design methodologies.

A small number of pioneering studies conducted by public choice theorists have isolated and critically examined basic propositions advanced by many proponents of consolidation. Most of these studies have

relied heavily upon citizen-reported evaluations and experiences of law enforcement services. The weakness - or for that matter strength - of this approach is not primarily methodological, as has been commonly supposed, rather it is theoretical. That is, in large part the utility of the results obtained by these studies is dependent upon the acceptance of the basic constructs of public choice theory.

Judgments made regarding the adequacy or inadequacy of a particular program will only be as sound as the source from which the judgments are derived. It is not enough to merely say that a particular consolidation effort was successful or unsuccessful because the local community had no complaints or because there were fewer complaints about some aspect of the law enforcement function than there were prior to consolidation. Nor is it sufficient to rely on statements that service levels rise and costs are reduced when fragmentation is eliminated through consolidation. What these sorts of statements do is point to aspects which should be examined more fully in an evaluation to determine the efficacy of a consolidation program, but the assertions are merely indications of reactions and not the total picture.

When personal and experimental assertions are tested by repetition through actual usage, the opportunities to validate these assertions increase. The utilization of contractual arrangements to provide law enforcement goods and services is substantial and destined to increase. Many assertions as to the efficacy of this method of consolidation have been repeatedly made by consumers and sellers as well as outside observers of contracting.

Thirty-eight such assertions about contracting have been labeled hypotheses by the authors and can be found in Appendix B. These hypotheses, among others, will serve as a basis for our further studies of the method of consolidation called contracting.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

SUMMARY OF ASSERTED PROS AND CONS FOR TOTAL, PARTIAL, AND FUNCTIONAL CONSOLIDATION

The following tables are a listing of the advantages and disadvantages of the three consolidation options as asserted in the literature by the opponents and proponents of consolidation. Each of the three consolidation options include as many of the arguments for and against the move as could be found in Chapters V, VI, and VII. None of the assertions are derived, but represent those affirmed or alleged to be a consideration by the participants or commentators.

Seven different topic areas are included under each consolidation argument. They are:

- Legislative Aspects
- Impact on Control
- Financial Considerations
- Impact on Duplication/Fragmentation
- Effects on Law Enforcement Services
- Effects on Law Enforcement Personnel
- Impact on Crime

SUMMARY OF ASSERTED PROS AND CONS - TOTAL CONSOLIDATION

LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS	IMPACT ON CONTROL	FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
<p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • well-designed charter enhanced possibility of acceptance by electorate <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • necessity to obtain favorable state/local legislative approval for charter, and subsequent charter amendments • necessity to seek and obtain citizen approval by referenda vote • reapportionment--one-man, one-vote rule • possible future adverse court action over charter provisions • suburban-influenced legislatures probably would not dilute suburban strengths by approving large-scale consolidation • charters may lack clearly defined division of functions, responsibilities and jurisdictional boundaries • law suits brought by municipal officials and county authorities over responsibilities • local and county ordinances not unified • referenda campaigns beset by poor organization, vague issues, lack of political leadership, organization and interest group support • mass media reliance is not substitute for well organized campaign • increased voter turnout will not ensure adoption/passage of legislative proposal 	<p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • local officials may participate in design of bureaucratic structures <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lack of general public receptivity to metropolitan solutions • urban and suburban residents may resist because of value beliefs • local government reorganization does not spring from grass roots or broad base of population • citizens feel large governments are removed from ability to respond to their needs • large units are unresponsive to public needs • minority and suburban community representation reduced • city officials foresee diminution of formal authority • question of impact on job stability of local government workers engenders anti-consolidation feelings • small police departments foresee dilution of authority in certain areas • uncooperative local officials can impede progress of new government • law enforcement personnel may resist if a loss in service benefits foreseen 	<p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • savings possible from centralized functions and materiel • administrative costs go down <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • no savings to taxpayer • citizens want more patrol coverage but such services are costly • more efficient law enforcement at a higher cost • large law enforcement departments do not lead to economies of scale
<p>IMPACT ON DUPLICATION/FRAGMENTATION</p> <p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • centralized communications centers, records keeping and identification procedures • combined non-line functions frees surplus manpower for duties in line functions such as patrol and investigations • larger manpower pool to serve in incorporated areas • personnel assignments centralized • jurisdictional lines and municipal boundaries eradicated <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • non-consolidated municipalities in same county or area retain small law enforcement departments • unincorporated areas pose jurisdictional problems and overlapping • an elected law enforcement official can attain less coordination and consolidation of several services from appointed officials of small municipalities 	<p>EFFECTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES</p> <p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • creation of larger and better law enforcement units and staff • specialized services possible in areas of crime laboratories and juvenile delinquency <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • local projects and preferences subordinated to city-wide programs • division of investigation responsibilities between one large unit and smaller, unconsolidated ones difficult • countywide services not integrated with central city 	<p>EFFECTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL</p> <p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • educational and training levels up-graded • personnel benefits equalized to ensure employees do not lose rights • agency jealousy and/or staff feuds reduced <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • personnel embroiled in jurisdictional disputes with local, unconsolidated departments which can reduce effectiveness and lowers public confidence • morale affected by lack of standardization in uniforms, cars, buildings, ordinances and laws to be enforced • municipal law enforcement officials reluctant to turn over staff and auxiliary functions to a locally elected law enforcement official
	<p>SOURCES: Published statements of support/opposition from books, articles, memoranda, critical analyses, cost comparisons, feasibility studies, newspaper articles, speeches and so on.</p>	<p>IMPACT ON CRIME</p> <p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • eventual decline in crime rates • ability to concentrate more resources will have positive effect on crime rate • crime solution rate will rise <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • initial crime rate may rise since there is one central agency to which crime is reported • lack of immediate crime reduction is not popularly received by citizens • lack of universally used crime reporting methods

SUMMARY OF ASSERTED PROS AND CONS - PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION

LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS	IMPACT ON CONTROL	FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
<p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> no statutory limitation for a unified law enforcement agency in a political subdivision <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> state legislatures do not allow for sufficient financing to pay salaries of increased manpower base or that required to bring personnel up to authorized strength local and county ordinances need unification provision of state-wide training programs need enforcement power to ensure uniformity of action and compliance. special district formation may need state statutory or local government action 	<p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> cooperation in service delivery by similar socio-economic groups possible some political control exists in special districts since members are appointed by state/locally-elected officials local officials have voice in design of consolidated law enforcement structure <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> formation of totally merged law enforcement units may require public approval law enforcement personnel may resist if loss of service benefits foreseen loss of decision making prerogatives for law enforcement managers possible when cooperative efforts instituted special districts may be remote from political control or need to be voted upon by electorate 	<p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> savings are possible if departments share equally in the cost of service provision administrative costs go down <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> larger law enforcement departments do not lead to economies of scale overall savings are not possible
<p>IMPACT ON FRAGMENTATION/DUPLICATION</p> <p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> centralized communications centers, records-keeping and identification procedures. training and educational standardization <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> jurisdictional boundaries remain unclear and hazy or continue to overlap formation of small independent law enforcement agencies not stemmed lack of standardized training can contribute to shortfalls in staffing 	<p>EFFECTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES</p> <p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> specialized law enforcement services--crime laboratories, jails, drug information exchange and control interagency cooperation enhanced in certain areas such as information exchanges and traffic control <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> insufficient numbers of law enforcement agencies achieving realistic cooperative or coordinated services 	<p>EFFECTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL</p> <p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> higher pay and increased benefits possible interagency feuding minimized greater personnel pools created <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> resistance to assimilation by another agency selection process complicated because of different training and educational levels chain of command and operational procedures unclear civil service benefits contradictory personality differences/clashes may arise between newly formed groups standardization of equipment not accomplished creating morale problems
<p>IMPACT ON CRIME</p> <p><u>ADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> criminal activities can be universally identified in multijurisdictional setting shared information reduces certain criminal activities apprehension and arrest rates may rise <p><u>DISADVANTAGES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> general public not appeased because no immediate or appreciable decrease in crime rates result lack of universally used crime report methods 	<p>SOURCES: Published statements of support/opposition from books, articles, memoranda, critical analyses, cost comparisons, feasibility studies, newspaper articles, speeches and so on.</p>	

SUMMARY OF ASSERTED PROS AND CONS - FUNCTIONAL CONSOLIDATION

LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS	IMPACT ON CONTROL	FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
<div>ADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">many informal arrangements require no statutory provision or actions</div> <div>DISADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">specific statutory language needed to provide for contract law enforcementsome state statutes prohibit "contracting away" law enforcement responsibilitysome state statutes regulate salary levels for sheriffs and deputies affecting level of personnel hired and services providedstatutes should be up-dated regularly</div>	<div>ADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">city officials may specify degree of service requiredcity officials have to justify law enforcement costs to local citizenspooling or sharing specialized services rarely means structural reform and affords participants an equal say in manner of delivery</div> <div>DISADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">question of who controls contract law enforcement personnel--the contracting municipality or the law enforcement supervisorlaw enforcement contracts may require public approval</div>	<div>ADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">contracting less expensive than establishing a law enforcement departmentinformal arrangements rarely require additional cash outlays</div> <div>DISADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">costs of contract law enforcement may rise after services are begunoption of having to establish a law enforcement department is expensive if contract arrangements do not work outextent of contract law enforcement capital investment in buildings, equipment, and supplies can be costlycosting methods are questionablemunicipalities contracting for law enforcement services may be billed for other than actual user costscontracting agency may not realize savings because patrol, a major service component, is a labor intensive activity, and the high salaries needed to attract experienced and trained personnel may outweigh savings possible through bulk purchases, for example</div>
<div>IMPACT ON FRAGMENTATION/DUPLICATION</div> <div>ADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">number of law enforcement agencies in small municipalities offering police services reducedneed to duplicate law enforcement services in small municipalities eliminated</div> <div>DISADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">informal interlocal cooperation can encourage fragmentation</div>	<div>EFFECTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES</div> <div>ADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">service, personnel, and enforcement capabilities increasedcooperative agreements upgrade servicesdisposition of scarce resources and policy coordination aidedan overall aggressive law enforcement program enhanced24-hour patrol coverage providedestablishment of better communications, controlled personnel supervision, central records keeping possibletraffic patrol doubled and roads better patrolledpatrol capabilities genera-ly up-graded</div> <div>DISADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">none indicated</div>	
<div>IMPACT ON CRIME</div> <div>ADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">rural crime rate cut drasticallyclearance rate increasedresponse time improved or reduced appreciablymultijurisdictional lines become less important when information and coordination pooled and sharedaids in solving major crimescriminal activities more universally known</div> <div>DISADVANTAGES<ul style="list-style-type: none">lack of universally used crime reporting methods</div>	<div>SOURCES: Published statements of support/opposition from books, articles, memoranda, critical analyses, cost comparisons, feasibility studies, newspaper articles, speeches and so on.</div>	

Appendix B

HYPOTHESES

The following series of hypotheses are those found to be most often put forth by proponents of contractual law enforcement arrangements. It is the opinion of the authors that these hypotheses will serve as a foundation for the further study of contractual arrangements which follow this report.

CONTRACTING IN GENERAL

- Hypothesis #1: CONTRACTING IS THE LEAST COMPLICATED MEANS OF COORDINATING OR CONSOLIDATING LAW ENFORCEMENT.
- Hypothesis #2: CONTRACTING IS ADAPTABLE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF ANY LOCAL COMMUNITY.
- Hypothesis #3: CONTRACTING CAN BE EFFECTIVE WITHOUT ALTERING EXISTING GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES.
- Hypothesis #4: CONTRACTING UTILIZES DECENTRALIZED POLICY DETERMINATION BY THE CONTRACTEE AND CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION BY THE CONTRACTOR.
- Hypothesis #5: CONTRACTING CAN BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED TO MEET BOTH TOTAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL LAW ENFORCEMENT NEEDS.

CONTRACTING AND EFFICIENCY

- Hypothesis #1: CONTRACTING ALLOWS A SMALLER JURISDICTION TO MAKE MORE EFFICIENT USE OF ITS RESOURCES PROVIDING LARGE-SCALE BENEFITS THAT IT WOULD BE UNABLE TO GENERATE BY ITSELF.
- Hypothesis #2: CONTRACTING PROVIDES FOR BETTER COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OVER A LARGER AREA THAN IS POSSIBLE UNDER A SYSTEM UTILIZING INDIVIDUAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS.
- Hypothesis #3: CONTRACTING ALLOWS FOR A UNITY OF ACTION WHICH FACILITATES OVERALL EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS.

- Hypothesis #4: CONTRACTING INCREASES EFFICIENCY BY PROVIDING FOR AN INCREASED NUMBER OF SOPHISTICATED SERVICES BECAUSE OF THE GREATER NUMBER OF SPECIALISTS ON A LARGER STAFF.

- Hypothesis #5: CONTRACTING INSURES THE USE OF THE FULL STRENGTH OF THE CONTRACTOR'S RESOURCES SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

- Hypothesis #6: CONTRACTING INCREASES EFFICIENCY BY PROVIDING FOR A UNIFORM AND CONSISTENT HANDLING OF INCIDENTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE CONTRACTEE AND OTHER AREAS POLICED BY THE CONTRACTOR, WHICH IN MOST INSTANCES WOULD BE ADJACENT.

- Hypothesis #7: CONTRACTING INCREASES THE EFFICIENCY OF THE CONTRACTOR GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT AND CONTINUALLY STRIVING TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF ITS SERVICES.

CONTRACTING AND IMPLEMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE

- Hypothesis #1: CONTRACTING IS MUCH EASIER TO IMPLEMENT THAN AN INDEPENDENT POLICE DEPARTMENT.
- Hypothesis #2: CONTRACTING REQUIRES SUBSTANTIALLY LESS OF THE CONTRACTEE'S ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF TIME THAN DOES AN INDEPENDENT POLICE DEPARTMENT.
- Hypothesis #3: CONTRACTING ALLOWS THE CONTRACTEE TO BE SELECTIVE IN PURCHASING SERVICES.

CONTRACTING AND COST

- Hypothesis #1: CONTRACTING IS MUCH CHEAPER THAN STARTING AN INDEPENDENT POLICE DEPARTMENT.
- Hypothesis #2: CONTRACTING ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR AN INITIAL COST OUTLAY NECESSARY IN ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT POLICE DEPARTMENT.
- Hypothesis #3: CONTRACTING ALLOWS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE.
- Hypothesis #4: CONTRACTING COSTS ARE LESS BECAUSE THE DUPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEAD ARE AVOIDED.

Hypothesis #5: CONTRACTING COSTS CAN BE DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY AMONG PARTICIPANTS.

Hypothesis #6: CONTRACTING COSTS NEED NOT WORK TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF NONPARTICIPANTS.

CONTRACTING AND "HOME RULE"

Hypothesis #1: CONTRACTING ALLOWS FOR THE POWER OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO BE RETAINED BY BOTH THE CONTRACTOR AND CONTRACTEE.

Hypothesis #2: CONTRACTING IS AN ALTERNATIVE TO REMAINING UNINCORPORATED AND POSSIBLY BEING ANNEXED BY A LARGER COMMUNITY.

Hypothesis #3: CONTRACTING ALLOWS SMALL MUNICIPALITIES TO RETAIN A LARGE DEGREE OF LOCAL INDEPENDENCE.

Hypothesis #4: CONTRACTING DOES NOT MEAN AN ABROGATION OF THE "HOME RULE" CONCEPT.

Hypothesis #5: CONTRACTING PERMITS LOCAL AUTONOMY AND CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS TO REMAIN WITH THE CONTRACTEE.

CONTRACTING AND CONTROL

Hypothesis #1: CONTRACTING OFFERS BOTH VOICE AND EXIT OPTIONS.

Hypothesis #2: CONTRACTING ALLOWS FOR POLICY DECISIONS TO REMAIN IN THE HANDS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS.

Hypothesis #3: CONTRACTING PERMITS CONTRACTEES TO RETAIN AUTHORITY TO ASCERTAIN THE QUALITY OF PERFORMANCE.

Hypothesis #4: CONTRACTING PROVIDES FOR A MUCH EASIER METHOD OF REMOVING AN UNSUITED EMPLOYEE FROM THE JURISDICTION OF THE CONTRACTEE THAN WOULD BE AVAILABLE THROUGH AN INDEPENDENT POLICE DEPARTMENT.

CONTRACTING AND RESPONSIVENESS

Hypothesis #1: CONTRACTING INSURES RESPONSIVENESS THROUGH THE POSSESSION OF THE EXIT OPTION BY THE CONTRACTEE.

Hypothesis #2: CONTRACTING GIVES THE CITIZEN A WIDER SET OF ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION FOR THE ARTICULATION OF DEMANDS.

Hypothesis #3: CONTRACTING PROVIDES FOR EQUITABLE LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR EVERY PERSON THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY WITHOUT FAVORING SPECIAL INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS.

Hypothesis #4: CONTRACTING PERMITS LOCAL IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN THE CITIZENRY AND THE POLICING AGENCY TO REMAIN.

CONTRACTING AND PERSONNEL

Hypothesis #1: CONTRACTING PROVIDES FOR BETTER EMPLOYEE MORALE DUE TO THE OPPORTUNITY FOR BETTER WAGES, MORE DIVERSIFIED JOB OPPORTUNITIES AND BETTER PROMOTIONAL OPPORTUNITIES IN A LARGER ORGANIZATION.

Hypothesis #2: CONTRACTING PROVIDES FOR BETTER EQUIPPED PERSONNEL DUE TO THE ADVANTAGES OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND EQUIPMENT SHARING.

Hypothesis #3: CONTRACTING PROVIDES FOR BETTER TRAINED PERSONNEL DUE TO THE AVAILABILITY OF INSTRUCTORS AND RELIEF PERSONNEL NOT LIKELY TO BE PRESENT IN SMALLER AGENCIES.

END