INTRODUCTION

This issue of Residential Security is the third of a series of reprints that the Office of Assisted Housing has produced. It consists of reprints of articles in HUD Challenge, written and published during 1974-1977, bringing together materials of significance to those interested in and concerned about the problems of residential security.

It should be noted that throughout, the important mix of resident and building, person and property, is stressed. Locks and doors are not sufficient, but used correctly by a group that works toward common concerns, they can be very helpful in assuring that very precious sense of personal security.

I look forward to the use of these materials as we gradually change buildings and projects that were community sorespots over to havens for satisfying and successful living. In particular, I hope to see more multifamily highrise buildings converted to the use of the elderly, while the families that formerly occupied them are steadily dispersed throughout the community under our newer Section 8 program.

Nancy S. Chisholm
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Assisted Housing
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Living Arrangements and Security Among the Elderly: A Study
by Edmund Sherman, Evelyn Newman, and Anne Nelson

Professional gerontologists have long held that age-integrated neighborhoods are better for elderly people than age-segregated neighborhoods. They assume that different age groups in normal neighborhoods will develop needed social intercourse and mutual support.

Many criminal justice experts advocate age-segregated housing for the elderly. They maintain that crimes against the aged in public housing can be nearly eliminated if buildings are exclusively designed and reserved for the elderly. In addition, social welfare experts have noted that services delivery to the elderly is considerably enhanced where client groups are concentrated as in age-segregated housing situations.

The Institute of Gerontology, a part of The School of Social Welfare of the State University of New York, conducted a survey among elderly residents in different types of public housing in the Albany-Troy area to determine the effects of different living arrangements on the numbers and kinds of crimes involving elderly victims. The survey was also aimed at identifying their fears and attitudes as far as personal safety was concerned and to assess attempts to ensure their safety.

Two projects in the City of Albany were selected to represent an age-integrated pattern of housing. Four residents were interviewed from the John Boyd Thacher Homes and 60 from the Lincoln Park Homes which consist of 275 units with 110 of those allocated to the elderly who live side by side with families of different ages. The results of this study are based on their responses.

Kennedy Towers, a single high-rise building in Troy, New York, was selected as the site for the age-segregated setting of the study. The 266-unit building is occupied entirely by the elderly. Finally, the mixed housing pattern was represented by the Ida Yarbrough Homes in Albany which consist of two high-rise buildings of 112 units each for the elderly. These buildings are situated in the midst of low-rise buildings which house younger adults and their families.

Interviews
The goal was to interview a minimum of 50 respondents in each type of setting in order to calculate percentages and make comparisons among the types of settings.

A total of 169 interviews was obtained: 64 in age-integrated housing, 55 from the age-segregated setting, and 50 from the mixed setting. The interviews were conducted either by the research project or by paid graduate students from the School of Social Welfare at the State University of New York, at Albany. The majority of the questions in the 14-page interview were structured, with a few open-ended ones for more exploratory items. Even though the residents had been notified regarding the interviews and the interviewers carried identification, there were some who were so fearful that they would not admit any strangers to their apartments. Initially, there were 15 refusals of in-person interviews in the age-integrated setting. We attempted to compensate for this by obtaining some interviews by telephone rather than face-to-face. Eleven interviews were obtained in this manner, thereby leaving only four outright refusals in that setting. There were three refusals among the age-segregated.

A second major facet of the study was a survey of project managers, public housing officials, security personnel, and police officials concerning security practices and problems in the study settings. The interview consisted of general open-ended questions of an exploratory and descriptive nature. It was conducted with 15 officials on various aspects of public housing security and measures designed to protect the elderly. In addition, demographic data based on census tracts and data on crime frequency were obtained.

Findings of the Survey
The survey showed there were markedly more respondents in age-integrated housing who had been victims of crime. Of the 25 victims in the age-integrated setting, four had been victims of robbery, five of larceny (purse snatching), two of assault and eight of burglary. Five respondents had been victims of unclassified crimes (vandalism and harassment) and one respondent reported a crime but refused to elaborate.

Of the seven victims from the mixed setting, two had been victims

*One respondent reported keeping a can of bug spray next to her door for protection against unwanted visitors. She insisted that she trusts no one. The interviewer was unable to gain access to the apartment and the interview was conducted over the telephone.
of robbery, two of larceny, and three of burglary. Of the eight victims in the age-segregated setting, five had been victims of larceny, one of assault, and two of unclassified offenses. Three residents in the age-integrated and two in the age-segregated settings were victims of a crime more than once while living in their respective projects. Also, a higher percentage of respondents in the age-integrated housing were aware of other residents in their buildings having been victimized than was true in the other two types of housing. Further, the majority of the crimes in the age-integrated setting occurred in the building: 11 inside the apartments, five in the elevator, and five elsewhere in the building. In the age-segregated building, on the other hand, only two of the eight crimes reported occurred in the apartments, whereas four occurred on the grounds, one on the neighborhood streets and one elsewhere.

Sixty percent of the crimes reported happened in the daytime. In the age-integrated setting most crimes occurred in the apartments, elevators or somewhere else in the building. In the age-segregated setting most crimes occurred in apartments or on the grounds.

The differences between the types of housing in terms of fear of crime is even more dramatic than the differences in the actual incidence of crime. Thus, the evidence is quite clear with respect to incidence and fear of crime that age-integrated buildings are the least preferred. It should be noted that the “mixed” type of housing in this study is in fact age-segregated by building, so that it can be said that segregated buildings show more positive results from the standpoint of security and morale.

Other Findings and Recommendations

Another interesting finding that has implications for public housing policy is the discrepancy between feelings of safety in the building by type of housing and feelings of safety in the neighborhood. Residents of the age-segregated project showed a somewhat higher degree of fear of crime in the neighborhood than did residents of the other two types of project. However, despite their fear not one of the residents nor one from the mixed setting, indicated that he or she wanted to move from current housing because of fears of crime, whereas 42 percent of the respondents from the age-integrated setting said they wished to move. This was further evidence of the more secure feelings of residents of age-segregated buildings.

Recommendations for Change

The respondents’ primary recommendation for better security in all types of settings was to hire more and better guards. This recommendation was far greater in frequency than any other safety measure suggested, including locking doors and greater care in the selection of residents. When respondents were asked what they thought of having residents patrol the building most did not like the idea.*

This finding tended to dovetail with findings from the security survey. Most of the security staff in the study settings were also residents, and they felt a role conflict which made for poor morale on their part and little confidence in them on the part of the tenants.

Other findings of interest from the security survey indicated that security practices and staffing tended to follow the age patterns of the buildings. In the age-integrated housing the paid security staff were more numerous, more formally organized and more active with regard to patrolling of the premises. In the age-segregated and mixed housing, on the other hand, security tended to be more passive or less patrol-oriented, with more informal security activities on the part of the tenants themselves and a major reliance on monitoring the main entrance. One other safety feature of the age-segregated and mixed settings that differed from the age-integrated

* A major reason for the dislike of having residents act as patrol is that they are not able to keep each other’s children under control without causing hard feelings.

Implications of the Findings

Findings of this study tend to support the concept of age-segregated housing for the aged as a means of reducing the incidence and fear of crime among the aged. Residents of age-segregated buildings feel more secure in their buildings even while feeling anxious in the neighborhood. Most public housing developments are built in urban areas with low land values, high crime rates and in undesirable locations from a commercial standpoint. If this is truly dictated by economic necessity, then the implications for public policy become apparent. It is necessary to plan for more secure age-segregated buildings.

Policy Alternatives

Based on the implications of our findings, and with the primary objective of reducing crime and fear of crime among the elderly, we are recommending that: Priority in future planning for assisted housing for the elderly be given to age-segregated projects; where age-segregated projects are not feasible, economically or otherwise, certain buildings be set aside for the aged within projects; better trained and paid security personnel be provided for in future budgetary considerations; periodic instruction in safety and security for assisted housing residents be developed by police, housing agency or HUD staff—respondents in this study who received such instruction attested to its helpfulness; and where appropriate, increased use of electronic safety devices, not only as an adjunct to the security forces, but to enhance the natural surveillance capacity of the residents themselves.

Dr. Sherman is project director; Ms. Newman is project coordinator; and, Mr. Nelson is research assistant for the study, which was conducted under a grant from the Institute of Public Policy Alternatives, State University of New York.
Since 1971, the Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority has been renovating the public housing development of Millvale. Improvements have included completely new prefabricated gable roofs, refurbished building exteriors, additional outdoor lighting, a number of new sitting areas and large and small playgrounds. Individual yards were created by moving sidewalks further away from the buildings, along with the addition of low brick walls to subdivide front and rear yards. These extensive efforts were an attempt to salvage an unattractive, deteriorating and unpopular project.

Approximately a fourth of the 573 units planned for renovation had been completed by the architectural firm of Glaser and Myers, Inc., when Henry Stefanik, housing authority executive director, decided to obtain additional planning and research assistance. William Brill Associates was selected. WB/A’s assignment was to prepare a comprehensive security plan for Millvale and evaluate the effectiveness of the existing architectural designs for the proposed renovations in terms of their impact on the problems of crime.

The WB/A approach for developing the Millvale Safety and Security Evaluation is founded on Oscar Newman’s theories of “defensible space.” Newman determined how specific architectural characteristics, symbolic and real, facilitate or deter residential criminal activity. By subdividing housing developments into smaller lots and locating playgrounds, sitting areas and parking lots adjacent to dwellings, buildings and building clusters, security is enhanced.

Aspects of Plan
The specific designation of property and the provision of desirable activity areas foster territorial attitudes and...
provide for social interaction and communication. Residents then begin to feel responsible and eventually can become instrumental in curtailing destruction of their habitat.

In order to recommend an appropriate safety and security plan for Millvale, WB/A determined the environmental characteristics that either contribute to crime or make it difficult for the residents to form the supporting relationships necessary for protecting their environment. This involved an extensive survey of 22 percent of Millvale heads of households plus observations during a series of on-site visits and discussions with residents, management personnel and guards.

From the analysis, WB/A determined that the proposed renovations for Millvale would assist in the reduction of crime. Some additional recommendations, not covered under the planned renovations, were made. Millvale's physical division into two distinct sections, north and south, created various problems for residents. Dwellers passing between north and south had the option of using a connecting road, Beckman Street, or a short cut path through the wooded area, both of which alternatives were seen as exceptionally dangerous. In addition, the council headquarters management and maintenance office and community center are located in North Millvale. The interview data pointed out that the resident council is operating with very little participation from residents in South Millvale. An important element to the success of a comprehensive security plan would be a strong and active resident council with broad participation among residents.

WB/A suggested that a well-lit walkway to improve access between the two sections be instituted, to strengthen the perception of Millvale as a unified housing environment, increase resident participation in Millvale activities and expand the potential network of supporting social relationships.

One of the important concepts necessary to the security of large multifamily housing sites is the surveillance of site activities from apartments. The study recommended increasing the visibility of the small sitting areas and playgrounds. It was felt that residents should be able to monitor the activities of their children, friends and strangers in areas adjacent to their home from convenient locations within the house.

Ways for more extensive control of undesirable pedestrian circulation and access to the site needed to be instituted. Residents living in apartments at the bottom of a large hill in South Millvale suffered interference in their backyards from children running up and down the hillside. WB/A suggested additional fences or hedges to close off these backyards from the perimeter of the site. A gateway to define the formal entrance to the housing site as a symbolic barrier separating the interior site areas from the public city streets also would be helpful.

**Long Term Solutions Sought**

The recommendations to improve the visibility and effectiveness of guards on the site and the installation of unit-hardening equipment including solid core doors and window locks, are viewed by WB/A as minimally beneficial. It was felt that they create a false sense of security and in effect isolate residents within fortress walls. Criminal activity is a social sickness not to be solved by locks and bolts alone. Long-term solutions should aim at providing a neighborhood that residents wish to identify with and feel like protecting. By providing various means for residents to actively and effectively control social behavior, a community is maintained.

One such long-term solution was achieved when the architects converted the barrack-like housing into esthetic, individualized units by adding gable roofs and refurbishing building exteriors. This setting provides
residents with a way to assimilate middle-class norms and pride in ownership.

The most interesting aspect to emerge from the Safety and Security Analysis is that it seems to confirm that apparently minor features of design can serve as major determinants in the reduction of crime. By comparing the criminal victimization data from the renovated and unrenovated areas, the success of improvements was measured. In the renovated areas fewer criminal victimizations, less fear of crime and behavioral alterations due to crime were reported. Not a single successful burglary occurred in the sampled households in renovated areas as compared with 20 successful burglaries which occurred in the sampled unrenovated areas. Residents in the renovated areas also perceive their environment as less dangerous. Situations such as being alone at home at night, using the back door at night, walking from a bus to the house, talking with a friend in front of the house and crossing the project were perceived as significantly safer. Respondents there worried less that their children would be assaulted in the project or going to and from school. Residents also altered their behavior less by leaving on lights, TV or radio when they were out.

The success of the renovations so far is apparent. The actual incidence and success of burglaries was notably reduced as well as residents' fear and alterations in their behavior. Yet experience over the years has shown that the success or failure of housing developments is directly related to the services delivered by the management program, the manager and the management staff. An effective security program will depend on the combination of physical improvements and competent management. In order to achieve an accurate verification of this phenomenon, an analysis could be made when all the renovations are completed. Millvale may hold one key to some of the social problems besetting public-housing projects today.

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HUD CHALLENGE / March 1977
Measuring Residential Security

By William H. Brill

The Dade County, Fla., Management Improvement Program is coming to grips with some of the fundamental issues critical to the design of a housing security program. These issues include assessing the severity of the security problem, defining the most frequent crimes, the relationship of crime to site design and the design of individual housing units. Another vital question is who is victimized, and under what circumstances.

These issues form the backbone of any security program. Yet, as it stands now and Dade County is no exception—there is usually little data to go on. Police data is usually not specific enough, is often hard to get and to use, and frequently understates the problem because crime is invariably underreported in low-income areas.

No Means for Assessment

These limitations have generally meant that problem assessment as a formal planning step is often slighted. Administrators are often forced to make judgments based on intuition, their own fears or fantasies or on the basis of a dramatic criminal act. Hard facts are rarely available.

A second fundamental issue is the approach taken to meet the problem, however the problem might be defined. Should tenant patrols be emphasized, for example, or should reliance be placed on improved site
design and electronic devices?

What is done in a particular project is usually based on an assessment of the problem, the available resources, and, on how one perceives the scope of security in housing. Should a security program, for example, be directed at simply preventing or stopping vandalism, burglary, and robbery, or should it include measures designed to limit interpersonal violence among residents, as well as measures intended to reduce the residents' fear of crime and the way in which they are restraining the use of their environment because they have either been victims or are afraid of being victims.

Whatever the security planner's perception of the problem might be, he usually has few alternative strategies from which to select. He is not only limited by the absence of good data, but by the absence of good theory. There are few theoretical propositions or hypotheses to use in determining alternative measures for preventing or restraining criminal activity in housing environments.

In Dade County, the third inescapable issue we found is that of evaluating the success of what is ultimately done. Although in most cases evaluation is not done formally, it does occur. Judgments are made about what seemed to work and what did not, and conclusions are transmitted to others in the field who have similar interests. The difficulty, as in the problem assessment and planning phase, is that few hard facts are available. Conclusions are usually based on anecdote, casual observation and "a feeling" that things are better or worse.

**Demonstration Site Established**

One of our objectives under the Management Improvement Program in Dade County was to help develop and test methodologies and approaches that would increase understanding of these issues. Our demonstration site has been Scott/Carver Homes, an 850 unit public housing project that has most of the problems generally associated with a sprawling low-rise project.

One of the first steps taken to solve the problem assessment issue was to develop a means of measuring the "vulnerability" of Scott/Carver Homes to crime. The methodology, called a vulnerability analysis, is intended to be applicable to any housing environment. It includes three components: (1) a resident survey that measures the residents' victimization rate, their fear of crime and the degree to which they are altering their behavior because they are either afraid of being victimized or have actually been victimized; (2) an examination of the housing site—lighting, location, and areas likely to be scenes of crime; this involves surveying access from outside, identifying unassigned areas and other features that would make residents unlikely to protect these areas or identify them; (3) unit-by-unit security inspection.

**Program Devised from Study**

The Dade County security plan based on the vulnerability analysis involves the formation of small social clusters of roughly 80 families each. These clusters are intended to provide the first line of defense in the area of security. We are hoping that by breaking up the project into smaller social units we can humanize it and give families the precious support that a neighborhood provides.

From a practical standpoint, however, we know it is not enough simply to announce the formation of clusters and expect them to take hold. We know they need to be reinforced if they are going to work. We therefore plan to accent their designation with limited architectural improvements; the clusters have already been color coded. But our principal "reinforcer" has been the environmental fund. This fund, made available under the Management Improvement Program, operates under a system whereby each cluster receives several thousand dollars to spend on the environment of the project in a way it sees fit.

The environmental fund is intended not only to insure that resources are spent in a sensitive way, but also to give the clusters a happy and productive enterprise around which to organize. This approach probably represents one of the first times small groups of public housing residents have been given this kind of opportunity and responsibility.

Our security plan, therefore, consists of coordinating both physical and social improvements. Individual units will be made safer on the basis of the findings of our vulnerability analysis, and limited site improvements will also be made. We also intend to strengthen the social cohesion of the residents by organizing them into clusters and reinforcing these organizations architecturally and by giving these cluster organizations freedom to allocate resources to improve their own environment. Additional components of our security program include increased coordination and planning with the local police department. This will take the form of calling groups at the project level to be composed of residents, authority staff, and police officials.

Our work in Dade County will not provide all the answers to the problems of security in housing environments. But thus far, we have developed a reliable series of instruments to measure a housing environment's vulnerability to crime. We are testing an approach that goes beyond those taken by others in the past and which already indicates a high probability of success.

The author heads William Brill Associates, which is responsible for the safety and security component of the Management Improvement Program in Dade County. Dr. Brill is a former professor of government at Georgetown University and has held governmental posts in housing and drug abuse.

It was impossible to read this book without the continuous reminder of the fate of Friedrich, 81, father of a close friend. Friedrich was a German who had survived the concentration camps. He was a superb violinist who was attacked one day in the elevator of his Queens apartment house for the few dollars in his pocket. Savagely beaten, something inside him snapped, and he died a few months later, victim, as far as could be ascertained, of a broken spirit and a broken heart.

A bit less than three years ago, the editors of this book, Jack and Sharon Goldsmith, sat in my office. They had just received a grant from the Administration on Aging, and they were designing a conference for an area of very rapid change, crime against the elderly. Together, we surveyed all the major practitioners in the field. They proved to be diligent in their search, and visited many others, as they sought out the best ideas and research.

The conference that resulted, the National Conference on Crime Against the Elderly, was held at the Statler-Hilton in Washington for 3 days during June of 1975. About 160 persons attended the various sessions, and some excellent discussions were conducted. Out of the mass of presentations the Goldsmiths selected 15 of the papers and grouped them under three headings: "Patterns of Crime against the Elderly"; "Criminal Victimization of the Elderly"; and "The Criminal Justice System and the Elderly Victim." Readers of Challenge will recognize some of these materials, since the Van Buren and Sherman/Newman/Levin articles were first printed there, while Cunningham and Lawton have written parallel materials for us, discussing some of their findings.

Some gerontologists and criminologists have been guilty of a serious neglect: they assumed that since the elderly are victims of crime at a lesser rate than their percentage in the population, the problem of crime for them is relatively unimportant. Nothing could be further from the truth. William Brill has begun to show the enormous power that fear has in immobilizing the person in multifamily housing, by a factor of 10-20 times the actual incidence of crime. The limitation of lifestyle can be overwhelming, and this was the fact that some researchers have neglected to study and understand. As a result of the fear of being victimized, the older person hesitates to shop, to open the door, to participate in community, social and recreational activity.

One solution, of course, has been the construction design of age-segregated housing. The studies of Van Buren and of Sherman and his associates discuss this in detail, and their general conclusions are the same as those of housing authorities throughout the U.S.: elderly housing works and is essentially safe for the older person. This does not solve the problem of going out of the building, but it creates a refuge that is increasingly utilized, just as fortresses were successfully used in the Middle Ages.

The conference and the book highlighted some newer explorations in coping with the effects of crime, which is defined broadly to include white collar crime. (We are reminded by Attorney-General Evelle Younger of California that in one six-month period twice as much money was lost in Los Angeles by the elderly in con games such as "bank examiner" and "pigeon drop," as was lost by the banks to robberies.) Medical quackery, consumer frauds, and mail frauds all are covered in his discussion.

Phyllis Brostoff presents a very creative use of criminal events to serve as a case-finding process in the District of Columbia. In essence, the social workers of the various District agencies were called upon to follow up on problems that police uncovered in the course of their daily activities. In the process, the problems created by crime are sometimes solved, along with others. (It is a surprise to discover that about one-tenth of all purse snatchings result in arm or shoulder injuries to the woman victim.)

David Friedman follows up with the report of an LEAA-financed study undertaken in the Bronx, where actual assistance was given to the victims of crime, shaped to the needs uncovered by the incident, as well as those created by the event. He describes case after case where with thoughtful, sensitive treatment, the person's life was, to some extent, straightened out, after some rather dreadful events had threatened to destroy or seriously cripple it.

Perhaps we are approaching a turning point in our awareness of crime and the consequences of criminal activity. To date, we have tended to think of the consequences of crime as purely a personal matter: a person is injured, robbed, or in some way the victim of a tragic criminal act. What happens afterward is strictly that person's affair. But is that the way it should be? When we view the extraordinary fragility of the life of the older person; the bitterness of rejection by society at large; the eating up of meager assets by inflation; the successive insults of the aging process itself; the inability to work creatively at economically productive tasks; the dispersal of the reassuring family—in the light of all the foregoing—the impact of crime on the old can be catastrophic.

Perhaps we need to reexamine the role of the victim and the total impact of crime. If the given crime has strong social causes and increasingly this is being asserted in the courts), then the consequences for the society must imply some form of either correction, assistance, or restitution on the part of the society for the victim. Here again the elderly can prove to be pioneers. Our collective sense of guilt for neglect can perhaps push us to devise new solutions, rather than have us assert that the incident that happens to the older individual is an individual event out of a social context.

This book assembles some fine materials presented by the best practitioners. For those concerned about the elderly, and for that matter, those concerned about crime, it is an enlightening and significant contribution.

--Morton Leeds
HUD Office of Assisted Housing

HUD CHALLENGE / July 1977
Crime and the Neighborhood Environment

By Richard A. Gardiner

Are we building crime into our cities? Recent research suggests that we may be unwittingly contributing to urban crime problems by creating environments that promote crime and fear. This research indicates that there is an important link between the physical characteristics of the environment and the crime rate in residential areas. As our understanding of this link grows, the question arises as to what can be done to correct past "errors" and avoid the same problems in the future.

During the 1960's, research and programmatic attention was mainly directed either at the socioeconomic environment of crime—motivating factors which make a person become an offender or at the roles of the law enforcement and criminal justice systems in dealing with crime and criminals. The failure of the ambitious social programs of the 1960's to achieve significant reductions in crime has led to widespread interest in addressing the other half of the "crime equation"—opportunity. In addition, it has been recognized that the fear of crime is at least as significant to the quality of life as the actual crime rate, and that the two are not always correlated. While many factors relate to whether or not a particular situation provides an attractive opportunity for crime (socioeconomic characteristics of potential victims, quality of security hardware, etc.), the design of the physical environment seems to figure prominently in the expectation and occurrence of some types of crime, particularly the fear-provoking crimes of burglary, robbery, and stranger-to-stranger assault. Initial forays into the field of crime prevention through environmental design have vividly documented the roles that site plans and building design can play in the incidence of crime in public housing projects.

Current Projects

Current research and demonstration efforts funded by HUD and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration are attempting to build and expand upon past work in two ways: through a total environmental approach, and by enlarging the scale of application.

The total environmental approach combines three major aspects of the physical and non-physical environment of crime: urban planning and design; community organization and participation; and law enforcement techniques. While each of these components had been attempted previously in some form, they had never been brought to bear in the same place at the same time. Further, physical environmental design techniques had only been tested at a rather small scale (buildings, housing projects), where the number of uncontrolled variables is not great. Several current and on-going projects being directed by Gardiner Associates of Cambridge, Mass., are applying environmental design concepts at the scale of large, complex urban districts, the scale and complexity that characterize most American cities.

Based upon current projects, a multi-faceted planning and design process has been developed which (1) identifies physical environmental conflicts that facilitate crime offenses and (2) develops strategies and designs for dealing with these conflicts in each particular setting.

Not surprisingly, the wide variety of urban environments found in American cities do not exhibit the same problems, nor is a uniform strategy for solution suitable in all settings. The process for identifying types of problems and types of solutions is, however, applicable over a broad range of urban situations. Information is gathered from a variety of sources; data is compiled on the reported incidence of the subject crimes and interviews conducted with adjudicated offenders to determine their behavior patterns, particularly the role played by the physical environment. Victimization and attitude surveys provide information with respect to actual victimization rates (as opposed to reported crimes), the degree and nature of the fear of crime, perceptions of the neighbor-
hood, and attitudes toward the police. An urban planning and design analysis of the physical environments under study provides an understanding of how each component works and relates to the entire physical fabric, identifying the environmental conflicts that contribute to crime and fear.

Major Findings: What Makes a Neighborhood Safe
By assembling and analyzing the information from all of these sources, it is possible to identify some of the crime-related problems and understand the physical context in which they occur. While each city and neighborhood exhibits unique problems, we have found a number of common themes—environmental configurations that make it easy for the offender to operate and difficult for the residents to live without constant fear of victimization. These analyses have led to a number of hypotheses, and conclusions: a few are described below.

1. Where the “urban support systems” (circulation, public facility location, open space, zoning, parking, etc.) are not supportive of the dominant land use in an area, there is a greater potential for crimes of opportunity and for fear. For example, if residential streets in the interior of a neighborhood carry a great deal of heavy traffic, then the semi-private residential character of the neighborhood is undermined. The residents can no longer exercise effective control over their environment and assure their own security, primarily because they cannot differentiate between neighbor and stranger.

2. The presence of open parking lots, vacant lots, and open block interiors both helps the offender and contributes to the residents’ fear of their immediate surroundings. This so-called “porosity” offers the offender easy covert access to victims or burglary targets and a multiplicity of unobserved escape routes, while undermining the residents’ sense of being able to observe, predict and control what happens around their homes.

3. The presence of certain types of facilities in residential areas can be “crime or opportunity generators,” either by attracting potential offenders or victims. For example, a hospital in a residential district would attract both patients and staff to the neighborhood streets, which could also be used by youths (some of them offenders) on their way to or from a nearby high school. Thus, the location of these two “generators” causes the paths of potential victims and offenders to cross, creating an opportunity for crime and a reason for fear.

4. When the traditional “focal point” of a community is “taken over” by outsiders or unruly youths, the potential for crime, and particularly fear, is enhanced. Often the focal point of a community or neighborhood (be it a park, playground, school, small shopping area, or landmark) serves a variety of functions from which it derives its significance: as a community facility, as a gathering point for informal interaction, as an amenity and as a symbolic statement of the community’s identity.
When use and control of this focal point is dominated by outsiders, the role or that place changes markedly. Where a park was once the center of community life, serving as a gathering place for informal social interaction, it can become a feared and avoided intrusion into the community, used by teenage gangs as a hangout and a place from which to "scope out" potential victims.

5. Clearly defined and easily understood boundaries between districts or neighborhoods tend to reduce their vulnerability to crime. They enhance residents' identification with the area within which they are "at home," and inform outsiders when they cross the threshold into an area that "belongs" to other people. Examples of typical successful boundaries are water bodies, transportation corridors, large parks or cemeteries, and dramatic topography changes.

6. The transition zone between two areas of different type or intensity of use is very significant with regard to security. If transitional areas are clearly marked by hedges, fences, changes in pavement, circuitous paths and changes in building scales, security will be enhanced.

From these and other findings, one can begin to describe a neighborhood that has a high probability of being relatively free of crime and fear, even if located in a high-crime area: through traffic, both auto and pedestrian, is very light; the edges and "gateways" into the area are clearly defined; the scale of buildings is small enough to relate well to the ground level; there is a clear demarcation between the public areas associated with the street and more private areas associated with the dwellings; open space areas, including parking, are small in scale and surrounded by areas of human activity that provide casual surveillance and security; and the living spaces of the dwellings are oriented to the exterior areas, again providing informal surveillance opportunities. In other words, all of the "urban support systems" work with the grain of the residential fabric.

Neighborhood Undermined by Mix
Unfortunately this is not the case with many of our cities. What may once have worked well in homogeneous, stable neighborhoods now undermines the security of residential areas inhabited by the more heterogeneous mix of highly mobile people which is characteristic of urban populations today. The neighborhood no longer "belongs" to the residents, who cannot differentiate between neighbor and stranger because outsiders enjoy complete freedom of movement and action within the neighborhood. Their identification with the community wanes, leading to a sequence of neighborhood decline: the feeling of collective responsibility diminishes, use of community facilities declines, and they are "taken over" by bands of youths or derelicts. The residents become alienated from the environment, suspicious and fearful of unknown people, and eventually "barricade" themselves inside their dwellings, or even leave the city for the less fearful suburbs.

The Major Concept: Territoriality
The pivotal concept that seems to tie together the complex factors involved in neighborhood security is territoriality: in some areas residents will protect only their own dwelling units and property, while in other areas they extend their sphere of felt responsibility to include the surrounding buildings, or even the whole block. Very simply, territorial behavior involves three conditions:

- the resident feels a proprietary interest and responsibility over areas beyond his own front door, a responsibility shared with his neighbors;
- the resident can perceive when this "territory" is potentially threatened (i.e., can discriminate between
neighbors and strangers) and is willing to act on that perception; and
- a potential offender perceives that he is intruding on other people's domain and is likely to be deterred from criminal behavior.

Thus an area where territorial control is exercised by the residents provides fewer and less attractive opportunities for the offender to exploit.

While the classic examples of defended human territory derive from close-knit homogeneous ethnic enclaves, our work suggests that territoriality is not necessarily limited to such groups. Certainly stranger recognition is easiest in a neighborhood with a very tight social network, but it does not follow that it is impossible where that condition is lacking.

What, then, does make territorial behavior possible? Clearly, if the resident perceives the world as being divided between his own private domain and a completely public "outside world," he is unlikely to extend his sphere of responsibility or control. On the other hand, if there is a series of clearly-demarcated and easily-understood territorial zones of increasing size, where responsibility is shared with clearly-defined groups, then the likelihood of successful territorial control is increased markedly. The configuration of the physical environment plays a significant role in the delineation of this "territorial hierarchy." The environmental factors listed earlier in this article are among those that provide clarity to this hierarchy; all of the elements of the urban structure can affect it.

Thus in the "ideal" urban environment configuration, the territorial zones and responsibilities for control would appear as below.

The transitions between territorial zones are crucial and can be successfully achieved in many of the ways cited earlier. Even where this ordered hierarchy is somewhat lacking in a given urban environment, successful transitions can still be achieved through a restructuring and redesign of various urban systems and elements. In most existing neighborhoods, the territorial hierarchy or use of land is predominantly public, where the home is the only oasis of privacy. Sketch I below illustrates a neighborhood with such an existing land use, while Sketch II illustrates what the same neighborhood's territorial hierarchy should be.

The Process/Model: Territorial Planning & Design

Territorial control in residential areas is a major goal from the point of view of reducing the opportunity for crime and the fear of crime. The means to achieve an environment that facilitates territorial behavior are extremely complex, because they are precisely the means by which cities come to be what they are. All of the elements of the urban environment, both physical and non-physical, are involved. While the design of each element of the urban environment is significant in terms of security, the manner in which these elements are woven together to form the urban fabric is of utmost importance. The spatial relationships among the various elements of the structure of the city all bear on the degree of territorial control that is possible. Thus a security-oriented model or
process for designing the urban environment would consist of "performance standards" for each system or element and for the relationships among the various elements at every urban scale—block, neighborhood, community area, district, city, or even metropolitan area. These criteria would be geared to reducing the opportunity for crime, inhibiting offenders' freedom of movement, and facilitating territorial control by residents.

Conclusion
There is no question but that crime and fear of crime are problems of major proportions in American cities; indeed they are among the most frequently cited reasons for the exodus to the suburbs. If our cities are to continue to be the setting for viable residential communities, then some means must be found to restore the security that was once provided by the stable, close social networks of earlier urban neighborhoods. The increasing mobility of large segments of the population and the economic deprivation of other segments are among the factors that have led to the breakdown of these stable social structures and consequently the breakdown of security. One of the responses to this situation has been to build "fortresses" and to rely on elaborate and expensive security hardware and personnel; this approach is often ineffective and can, moreover, have alienating effects on both the "fortress" residents and the surrounding community.

Secure residential neighborhoods can exist where the population is mobile and not disposed toward intense neighborhood social interaction, however, without turning neighborhoods into armed fortresses. Some city neighborhoods are now relatively free from crime, even when surrounded by high-crime areas with the same kind of population. Research and demonstration efforts have begun to document the ways in which the configuration of the physical environment influences both the degree of opportunity for crime in an area and the potential for effective collective territorial control by residents.

The potential implications of these initial findings are sweeping: the more we learn about the crime/environment link the greater will be our ability to build and restore neighborhood environments that minimize crime opportunities and maximize the potential for territorial control. These findings have implications for every actor in the complex process of weaving the urban fabric—Federal, State and local agencies as well as private enterprise. It is hoped that future work will refine this incipient body of knowledge so that it is readily applicable and informs all of the decisions that affect the quality of the urban environment. At the very least, our growing understanding of these relationships can stimulate those now involved in shaping urban environments to consider security as one of their criteria for environmental design.

Mr. Gardiner is President of Gardiner Associates, Inc., a Land Planning and Urban Design Consulting firm located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is currently writing a book on crime prevention through environmental design to be published in 1976. Gardiner Associates, Inc., is also currently involved in a number of projects dealing with neighborhood crime prevention through environmental design.

2. Proposed Territorial Land Use
Over the past two years, the readers of HUD Challenge have probably noticed a continuous concern on the part of HUD's Office of Housing Management with the problems of security. This is no accident, since the residents themselves have defined this as their own major concern. For the older person, this has even more truth, since he is an easy target for the criminal, a target who seldom fights back, a target whose very sense of being is threatened by physical and personal violence. Perhaps it is time now to summarize the few lessons we have learned in these two years, since this more intensive security effort began.

The Office of Housing Management has issued a handbook entitled Security Planning for HUD-Assisted Multifamily Housing (HM 7460.4). Chapter 8 is devoted to the older resident, with major discussions of the virtues of separate buildings for the elderly within a housing project; control of access; grounds security; resident participation; and finally, security off the premises. The handbook was aimed at housing authority central staff who have to conceptualize such planning on a large scale. Only indirectly is it aimed at the project manager, although it can be useful here, too.

More directly pertinent to the housing manager's security planning for elderly needs is a particularly good chapter, entitled "The Manager and Security," printed in the On-Site Manager's Resource Book: Housing for the Elderly, by the National Center for Housing Management at the end of 1974. An excellent set of tenant and crime assessment tools is assembled here for the direct use of the manager in diagnosing where, when, under what circumstances, and what kinds of crimes are committed by whom. A good check list of target hardening techniques is also included, as are a manpower evaluation checklist and a funding source list.

Training in Security
During the fall and winter of 1973-74, the HUD office of Housing Management arranged for training its newly-designated security specialists throughout the country by Temple University's Center for Social Policy and Community Development. At the same time, Seymour Rosenthal, Director of the Center, agreed to train 13 community security organizers for the Pittsburgh Housing Authority, applying his theory of "Turf Reclamation." Here, the assumption is that the resident must participate in the process of taking back public space as his own, but with a fair trade for other recreation and activity areas for the young person involved.

Preliminary indications are that this theory and training are paying off, since crime dropped sharply (by official police figures) in the four projects involved. Since then the Pittsburgh Housing Authority has decided to expand the program Authority-wide.

Dade County (Fla.) Experiment
A significant experiment that may have real promise in this area was undertaken through the Management Improvement Program. The Dade County Housing Authority, contracting with William Brill Associates, conducted some basic research that created measurement and planning tools. A Vulnerability Index was developed that can pinpoint the exact location and nature of a crime, strongly suggesting physical (and in some instances, social) measures that can be taken to counter that type of crime. In addition, a Behavior Change Index was developed that measures the actions and attitudes of residents who were victimized by a criminal act, particularly aiming at changes in resident behavior.

The Dade County study also resulted in the creation of resident groups of 80-120 families that participated in the redesign of the areas around their own homes. This study, still in early stages, may serve as an important test of some of the territorial as well as the conceptual ideas of defensible space. More important, it may help to examine the role of residents in planning their own destinies by working more closely together as a community.

The past year has also seen the development of door and window standards, based on security considerations, by the National Bureau of Standards. These standards still await a local test to determine their adequacy and validity.

Philadelphia Experiment
Perhaps what was recently done in Philadelphia can serve as still another guide for community and housing action. There, a major mixed elderly and family high rise was a source of continuing trouble and crime, with the elderly residents victimized by the younger residents, particularly teenagers. It was decided to convert the building entirely to elderly use. Southwark still has three buildings (with some surrounding low-rise), but families occupy two and the elderly the third, and victimization has eased off considerably since the separation. (See HUD Challenge, March 1975.)

Of the nearly $430 million to be committed for modernization during this fiscal period, a large part will go for security and protective measures, as well as corrective action for the massive vandalism that has taken place in these projects over the past few years. It is hoped that as reconstruction of public housing continues under HUD's Target Projects Programs and through HUD-assisted modernization the needs of the elderly are considered, and that planning to meet their needs for security goes hand in hand with physical reconstruction. This means area and building planning, social planning with and for the residents, and security planning that is at once creative and imaginative.

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An Alternative to Juvenile Crime

by Wm. R. Williams and Kaleb Nelson

When he came to Bell Gardens in Orange County 6 years ago to organize this Southern California community’s police department, Chief Ferice B. Childers was given a wooden replica of a medieval mace by the city council and told, “You’re going to need it.”

But unlike some of the ancient kings, whose spike-encrusted maces were employed to keep unruly subjects in line, Chief Childers’ has never been off its nail on his wall. As far as he was concerned there was a better way to handle lawbreakers—particularly juveniles—in this city of 30,000, and he went after it.

“Sure, Bell Gardens is a low economic base community with attendant levels of crime,” says the chief, “but we felt that was no reason for law enforcement to remain trapped in tradition and to simply deal as we always had with crime and criminals.” “Nationally,” says the chief, “literally billions of dollars had been going down the rathe of a failing system. We wanted to get our hands on a million bucks to try something new.”

Bang hard—and repeatedly—on every door he could darken between Sacramento and Washington, the persistent chief’s bulldog tenacity paid off—finally. “It took us 3 years to get our money (beginning with $303,000 the first year) through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in Washington and the Office of Criminal Justice Planning in Sacramento, but we launched the program in May of 1972—our Youth Services Bureau.”

Rebuffed by many who reminded him over and over that “only the very biggest cities, like New York and Los Angeles, get the kind of money you’re talking about,” the chief stressed that Bell Gardens was a natural laboratory “to show that problems of juvenile crime are decidedly not separate from problems in education, employment, housing and every other social concern. We wanted to be viewed seriously as a national pilot project encompassing the entire community to resolve our juvenile crime problems.”

Did the Bell Gardens Youth Services Bureau pay off? “At a time when juvenile crime is rising nationally at a rate between 18 and 50 percent,” says the chief, “we experienced an 11 percent reduction last year.”

Additionally, the program was credited on Bell Gardens’ campuses recently with reducing annual vandalism costs from $90,000 to a more realistic and manageable $9,000—a figure which, has not grown.

Program’s Approach

“The uniqueness of our approach,” says Childers, “is that here the police offer personal counseling and participation in community projects to potential offenders, which creates a positive alternative to crime—and it really works.”

A variety of vehicles are utilized for police contact which officially reached 40 percent “of the kids in the community who were between 10 and 18 the first year,” Childers says. “We conduct high school counseling programs, work with local youth organizations, and have direct contact with previous offenders. Certainly not all those we reached the first year, and whom we continue to reach, are offenders, but when you realize that we’d had a recidivism rate approaching 75 percent, and that that meant three out of four kids caught up in the juvenile justice system seemed fated not to get out of it, then you know it was absolutely imperative for us to try something that provided better odds.”

Childers’ Youth Services Bureau is run by a 16-member commission made up both of youths and adults. “We have a population of 71 percent Caucasian, and 23 percent Spanish-surnamed people in Bell Gardens, and we try to reflect that in our program,” he says. “The commission knows, and works from the standpoint that we focus on the kids by focusing on those aspects of their environment that work on their heads. This means working on the relationship of a given youngster to the community, and of the community to him. I guess what it comes down to is simply personalizing the responsibility of the one to the other.”

Chief Childers is convinced “that we now have in Bell Gardens an operational model that could work anywhere, and we want to make it available to other cities. We see in all this a marriage between our home-grown software programs, and the hardware-oriented programs of the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA).”

More specifically, the chief’s own scenario calls for the Youth Services Bureau to organize Bell Gardens juveniles into work teams, led by skilled professional tradesmen. Under their leadership the work teams would undertake clean-up, maintenance, and light carpentry in conjunction with various HCDA community hardware improvement programs. A residential rehabilitation program now in the planning stages is a prime possibility for implementing the youth work-team innovation.

Chief Childers did not quite get a million dollars over 3 years, but he did get $817,000. “We went in wanting to scale down eventually to a level where the community could support the program fully in the fourth year. However, if we had not had the massive initial outside funding, this would never have been an attainable goal,” he says.

Childers points out that there is a “real question” in law enforcement circles today “over whether a fully-uniformed, fully-equipped officer in a
patrol car is as effective as something like this Youth Services Bureau.” He may be right, because his own department of 66 would, he said, “probably have to be double that right now” had it not been for the Youth Services Bureau’s highly-successful record over the past 3 years.

“Two statewide associations—the California Association of Diversion and Youth Services Counselors, and the Association of School Resource Officers, have sprung from our experiment here in Bell Gardens,” says the chief. “Not only that, but lately we’ve been studied by teams from many nations—Canada, Japan, England’s Scotland Yard—as well as from around the country. So we must be doing something that is paying off.” It is hard to disagree.

Williams heads his own Berkeley-based citizen participation and community relations consulting firm. Kaleb Nelson is the community development consultant and vice-pres. of the Anaheim-based firm, Envista, Inc.
Practice v. Theory

Public Housing Security and the Elderly
by David P. Van Buren

The following article deals with the second facet of the study outlined by Professor Edmund Sherman in HUD Challenge, June 1976. It reviews the security practices of the three public housing sites previously discussed, and examines the relationship between elderly residents' fears of crime and the practice of security in their respective projects.

For the purpose of analyzing security policy, it may be useful to view the public housing project as a socio-technical system, an organic unit characterized by the interaction of its social and physical environments. In such a system, one might reasonably expect deterioration in one environment to bring about deterioration in the other. Ashby, for example, in his model of self-regulation and requisite variety, tells us that, for an organic system to survive, it must be able not only to maintain and regulate itself internally but also to adapt to its external environment.1 One may ask what all of this has to do with public housing security and the elderly. It is the thesis here that elements of our traditional approach to security have not prevented and, indeed, may have contributed to our perception of public housing projects as "fearful environments."

As Professor Sherman has already pointed out, our study examined the incidence and fears of criminal victimization among the elderly in three different types of public housing projects. When respondents were asked how safe they felt in their buildings, there was a marked difference in the opinions of those living in age-segregated buildings and those in age-integrated sites. In both the age-segregated and mixed projects, two percent of the elderly tenants were afraid in their buildings during the day and 15 percent at night. In the totally age-integrated project, however, 31 percent of the respondents were fearful during the day, and 72 percent were afraid of being criminally victimized at night. Since merely asking people how safe they feel at different places and at different times may not provide an accurate indication of the impact of such fears, a more rigorous indicator of dissatisfaction was employed. When asked if they felt there was so much crime in their project that they wished they could move, no respondents in the age-segregated and mixed settings expressed a desire to move. In contrast, 42 percent of the elderly tenants in age-integrated buildings wished to move. Many, in fact, had already made arrangements to do so at the time of our interviews. In light of this, the question before us is twofold. In what way are the social environments of the three projects related to their respective security practices, and what impact do formal security organizations have upon residents' fears?

Traditional Approaches to Safety

Traditionally, many security organizations serving public housing have employed what might be termed "the armed fortress" approach. Guards and locks are often viewed as the prime mechanisms of crime prevention, and the need for more guards and better locks seems to accompany feelings of insecurity. Patrol is the game, and deterrence is often its name. Just as there are financial costs to such an approach, there are social costs. If security is viewed as a balance between freedom and control, then locks and guards may offer certain unanticipated consequences. To the extent that it effectively prevents undesirable outsiders from entering buildings and apartments, "the armed fortress" approach may simultaneously discourage insiders from venturing out. At best, however, this is mere speculation. The more serious consequence of such an approach appears to be the deterrent effect it often has on the willingness of residents to participate, even minimally, in bearing the burden of their mutual security. Fortunately, a new model for security and crime prevention in public housing has evolved in recent years—Oscar Newman's concept of "defensible space."

In what is rapidly becoming a classic in its field, Newman's approach integrates elements of mechanical prevention with an architectural model of corrective prevention. As he defines it, defensible space uses physical design to attack the attitudes and structure of motivations which allow the criminal event to occur. He states, "Defensible space is a model for residential environments which inhibit crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric that defends itself."2 By altering the physical environment to create perceived zones of influence under tenant control, by maximizing the capacity and utility of natural surveillance, and by changing the image and milieu of public housing projects, Newman proposes the creation of what we have called a self-regulating, socio-technical system. His approach is socio-technical because he uses physical design to create a social environment. It is self-regulating because its objective is to

restore those mechanisms of informal social control which have often been attributed, perhaps nostalgically, to a more rural society.

It is interesting to speculate whether Oscar Newman's evolution of the concept of defensible space was consciously guided by any single theory of crime. In his book, for example, he writes, "Ghetto leaders and social scientists have challenged us in our belief that crime, born of a poverty of means, opportunity, education, and representation, could be prevented architecturally." While he cloaks the argument of ghetto leaders and social scientists within the idiom of what has been termed "strain theory," Newman's approach does not address itself to the "causes" of crime in any conventional sense. His perspective is not so much what "causes" crime as it is what "prevents" the criminal event from occurring. Thus, there is a shift from a problem, phrased in terms of causal analysis, to a mode of intervention based on policy alternatives. It is the latter, however, and not causal analysis that seems frequently to guide the operations of security.

In the light of Newman's work, it is our contention that age-segregated housing for the elderly is an embodiment of defensible space. Whether located in high-rise or low-rise buildings, age-segregated public housing offers, by design, a social environment in which residents share information about one another. In so doing, they often come to define their territorial boundaries, are able to identify outsiders, and participate in the basic regulation of their own security. In terms of the level of patrol activity and the structural formality of security organizations, three different patterns of security emerged in the projects which we studied. The age-integrated project was characterized by the active patrol of a formally organized, paid security staff. On any given evening, between seven and nine guards would actively patrol the buildings and grounds. In the age-segregated building located in the mixed setting, only one member of a formally organized, paid security staff served the building. On duty each evening between 4 p.m. and midnight, the guard generally employed a passive style, monitoring the door by sitting at a front desk. The security operations of the totally age-segregated site were at the other extreme. No formal security organization of any type existed there. Tenants informally carried out the passive door-monitoring function.

The evolution of informal social groups with the capacity to perform a natural surveillance function appeared to be one of the great assets of the age-segregated buildings. The development of the ability of tenants to identify each other, to perceive outsiders as such, and to question strangers as to their purpose were primary elements in the informal security structure of both the age-segregated and mixed projects. At no time during the course of our study, for example, were any interviewers questioned as to their purpose while entering the age-integrated buildings. This pattern was a reversal of our experiences at the age-segregated and mixed sites where groups of people often gathered socially in front lobbies.

Our interviews also indicated an apparently higher degree of social isolation and anonymity among elderly residents in the age-integrated setting. When respondents were asked how many persons in their building they knew well enough to visit with, nearly 20 percent of those in the age-integrated buildings said they knew fewer than four. This is significant when one notes that fully 38 percent said they did not know anyone at all sufficiently well to visit with him. In contrast, over 54 percent of those in the age-segregated building said they knew four or more persons that well. Interestingly, the two projects were extremely similar in terms of the length of time respondents had lived there. Sixty-four percent of those in the age-integrated buildings had lived there for more than 3 years, as compared to 65 percent in the fully age-segregated project. Thus, differences in length of residence did not account for the marked differences in the number of people residents knew in their buildings. Since the age-segregated building in the mixed project was less than one year old, it has been excluded from our comparison.

It is clear from our analysis that the level of patrol activity and the structural formality of security organization are not in themselves major factors in reducing the fears of victimization of elderly tenants. Although the pattern emerges that residents' fears of crime in their building increase as the level of patrol activity and formality of organization increase, one should be cautious about confusing cause with effect. As the level of criminal activity and fear of victimization increased at the age-integrated site, for example, it appears that the activity and formality of security organization were purposely increased as a reaction to this. The important question, however, is whether public housing security for the elderly will be reactive in approach or proactive by design. More guards and better locks, while important considerations, tend to respond reactively to the problems of crime and fears generated by it. On the other hand, age-segregated public housing seems proactively to anticipate the problem by constructing a social environment which reduces the probability of the criminal event. Not only does it appear to offer a more secure environment for the elderly but it seems simultaneously to reduce some of the social isolation and anonymity often associated with the public housing way of life. This is the essence of defensible space.

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There can be a thin line between turf reclamation and interfering with the civil liberties of others. There are, however, obvious distinctions, and I suggest we identify them."

I think that it is necessary to talk about security in a way which does not permit us to develop a competitive attitude between physical and social issues. I think it is dysfunctional to attempt to draw a clearly defined line between a "hardware" and a "software" approach. Mechanistic hardware, has little or no meaning for housing project tenants unless they are involved in understanding the nature of a hardware program. A dead-bolt lock could have no meaning unless tenants know how to lock the door, or to twist that bolt, or to utilize and put into action those hardware items. In any kind of situation in which there is instrumentation of new ideas in hardware, the concern for how it is utilized by the tenant population is important, and that can become a software portion of the security system.

Securing the Neighborhood

Let's assume that in fact we secure a multi-story building by employing physical technology. How do we then secure the neighborhood of which that building is a part? People have to go to and from the building in order to survive. There is a distinction between feeling secure from criminal intrusion and not feeling secure to leave your place. What happens when you leave your secure facility? In the long run, this is more important an issue than is protecting the material goods of one's household.

In this regard I want to develop a notion about neighborhood security. Not a new notion. If we put it in hardware terms for a moment, I think it becomes easily translatable to social terms. It is what I call "turf reclamation." The notion of turf reclamation is very simple if we can accept an assumption that many of us who live in neighborhoods (and most of the people who live in public housing), walk on turf which in a sense we don't control. It's reminiscent of the conditions in Vietnam where one faction controlled a village during the daytime and another faction controlled at night.

The issue of turf control is current in our communities. It is a condition that exists not only in public housing and it may not be just a nocturnal turf exchange. Control of turf may change each afternoon when high school kids get out of school. It can happen on a particular night when some folks come inside and the night people go outside. When control of turf changes, that's when the hardware becomes more important to us. When we've given over control of our turf we rely more heavily on the mechanistic means of providing security. It has reduced our ability to move out.

We cannot develop a sense of community if people are loath to enter into discourse with one another on the stoop, on the street, on the corner, on the porch for fear of being attacked in some way. Now the fear of attack in one's house is different from the fear of attack on the street. Locks will presumably prevent that from happening in one's house. If
that doesn't exist there's got to be
terrible tension in the human being's
mind.

Establishing Community Values:
Challenging Destructive Values

As for turf reclamation, how
might that happen? Let us say
something about some possibilities. I
believe that it is critical to move toward
developing a sense of community,
and I believe in the long-run this will
be the hard core resolution to the
issue of security.

Underlining the concept of turf
reclamation is the establishment of
neighborhood values. Whose values
permeate a neighborhood? The major-
ity? The minority? The activist? The
non-activist? The law-abiding citizen,
or the non-law-abiding citizen? That's
a kind of software question, I admit.
Ten teenagers standing on a corner
night after night create a condition to
which a community must adjust.
That's a value standard which begins
to become a part of the fabric of a
community unless there is a counter
value. The counter to that value must
come from a better organized group
of citizens in that neighborhood or
else the values of those ten people on
that corner at that particular time
become the condition against which
all others must respond. A very few
people can determine what is accept-
able or not acceptable in a neigh-
borhood.

Why is it this happens? I suggest
that it occurs for a number of rea-
sons; one of which is fear. There is a
whole lot of fright out in neighbor-
hoods when there is a series of dis-
ruptive activities against which there
are no counter activities. The longer
these activities are unchallenged in a
neighborhood, the more pervasive and
accepted that value becomes, and the
more difficult it is to change the
behavior.

How many of us live in a neigh-
borhood where as a part of a daily
nonprofessional experience, we feel
fear? That's a different kind of fear
than the one which you have on a
job which you must leave before it
gets dark. Some businesses in North
Philadelphia have adjusted their work
hours to make possible the exit of
their workers before it gets dark. The
feeling of fear is very real in North
Philly after dark for an outsider, but
it's not like having to come home to
that condition which cannot be
manipulated by adjusting work hours.
That's a real problem. Now let's put
that in the context of what we were
saying before about the ten kids in
the neighborhood. When you come
home what are you going to do if
you see those kids doing something
destructive? You do nothing, usually.
It's not just the people living in
North Philadelphia; it is all of us who
live in those neighborhoods where we
are insecure. My wife and I walked in
my neighborhood one night at 11:30
when we saw five kids rip off an
automobile right in front of my
house. And you know what I did?
Nothing! I felt sick when it was over
because I didn't say anything to
those kids. I knew those kids and I
knew their parents, and I didn't say
anything. No. It wasn't my car, but
the next time, it could be.

Too often value standards of
behavior in neighborhoods are being
set by the adults through their silence
and inactivity. The reason is fear; we
don't want to see the kids retaliate
against us by breaking our windows
or messing with our children. We
don't want the friendships we have in
the neighborhood to be upset by the
fact that we are informing on their
kids. We don't dare violate the un-
written code of ethics, "You don't go
against your own kind." This fear of
taking action can be reduced or elimi-
nated if one is not acting in isolation
from neighbors and friends. The pro-
cess of turf reclamation begins with
sharing our concern with neighbors
who, more often than not, hold the
same feelings but have been reluctant
to express them.

Setting Community Standards

The next step in the process is
more difficult: agreeing to take action
and setting standards for the neigh-
borhood. People should be pushed
and cajoled into determining what
they deem acceptable behavior. The
major question is whose values are
going to be imposed on the commu-
nity. This is a tough issue. It's a class
issue—working class versus middle
class. It's also a race issue—are white
folks going to tell blacks how to act;
are black folks going to tell white
folks how to act? With these con-
straints in operation, nobody is say-
ing anything about what the stand-
ards ought to be. Nobody talks about
it. We just have values erupt accord-
ing to who has the energy to either
articulate them or act them out. I
suggest that we ought to talk with
neighbors about what kind of values
they hold and how to respond when
certain conditions occur. That's a
beginning, and I have no illusions
that there are no difficulties with

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that. There can be a thin line between turf reclamation and interfering with the civil liberties of others. There are, however, obvious distinctions and I suggest we identify them. For example, it is unacceptable to stone senior citizens because we resent their life style; it's unacceptable to fling epithets because of racial difference; it's wrong to break beer bottles on the street after drinking till 2 o'clock in the morning. On that we can agree. It is none of our business if people remain quiet and don't litter the streets with broken glass. You have to find out what you can say or do with regard to value setting. In any event, a basic question in terms of turf reclamation is—if you are going to take back the turf what are the conditions for reclaiming it?

Developing Community Alternatives

Another problem in turf reclamation is that you just can't take something without giving something. There should be an implied kind of contract even with people who are anti-social or who have a potential for such behavior. The problem is we have so few alternatives to offer people. If I want to move those kids from in front of my house I have got to use either force or I have got to find an alternative to force.

We do care about where they go because some of them are our kids in the neighborhood and we don't want the problems just shifted down the street, and we do want their view of us as community people to be one that isn't opposed to their surviving in the neighborhood. We've got to give something. So we try to find jobs. We've developed career development programs because the kids today don't seem to know where they can go, or what their potential is. With just a little bit of help they could make it. What about the school system? What about recreation? What about all those things that you know about? It seems to me that those are things we almost divorced from our concept of security. We tend to think about these as separate issues and not related to security problems. Every-

thing that goes into a neighborhood a housing project has got to be conceptualized as building a secure community, including ash and trash removal. The more dilapidated a project looks, the more we invite disrespect for people and disregard for property.

The way in which management deals with tenants is determined by whether or not there is a common purpose in their approach to their project. It depends on which values are predominant. It seems to me that there is no aspect of life in public housing projects that prevents community building.

Resolving Security Problems

If there is going to be security in public housing, it needs to be a product of internal resolve. There needs to be the sense that the people in those projects are dependent upon each other, and that they can set standards internally and deal with issues. When there is a problem with security, the tenant calls the manager; he calls the police. Problem solving comes from the outside. Such a response is not preventive.

Another important requisite for developing a mechanism for internal resolution of problems is neighborhood satisfaction. To be satisfied living where you are, it is important to achieve some type of security. Otherwise, your energy is spent in getting out of where you are. You don't have much left for working toward a better neighborhood. One way to use that energy could be in looking carefully at your community. The notion of the tenant patrol is a community defined activity whose purpose is to reduce crime. An alternative to the patrol is something I would call a community promenade.

This is not going out looking for trouble, but being out walking the turf, looking for friends, knocking on doors, talking to people. This is not a spying operation, but a first step toward making it possible to walk the streets again and being able to identify with neighbors. This involves greeting the senior citizens and youth, asking about their needs and enlisting their participation in turf reclamation.

In brief, two important elements are required for a successful grip on community safety and security. One is personnel who have the training and/or the experience in organizing communities, especially someone who understands the intricacies of community conflict and has the skill of an organizer. The other element is an organized community.

A community does not become organized because it's a nice thing to do. It's almost more natural these days for a community to be disorganized. If we want organized communities because we see them as a necessary component of security, then we've got to help organize them. And that system can work, that it's people will be protected, that they will be rewarded. That things will happen as expected. This requires manpower and resources to help communities become organized.

The key to the security problem lies in its definition. We think it is not really nice to talk about social services in public housing, but it is all right to talk about security. I don't know how to get security into public housing or anywhere else for that matter by talking about social services, without talking about human relatedness. If we believe that total security is provided by the dead-bolt lock, we needn't concern ourselves with social services. But if we really care about security, I don't know how it's going to happen without some sense of humanity humanity tied into a sense of community, and community tied in with a sense of service. What is security if it is not some of these things?

Mr. Rosenthal is Director of the Center for Social Policy and Community Development and associate professor in the School of Social Administration, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa. This article grew out of a speech he delivered at the National Conference on Security which HUD sponsored in September 1973.

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Turf Reclamation Revisited
by Seymour J. Rosenthal and Archibald Allen, III

A few weeks ago an elderly woman, blind since youth, left her home in Allequippa Terrace, a public housing project in central Pittsburgh, to take a walk with her seeing-eye dog. It is often dangerous for women—including blind women with dogs—to walk alone in such neighborhoods, and so it proved this time. A group of roving teenagers thought it might be fun to tease and harass her, and to try to entice her dog to lead her over the brink of the steep hill that plunges down from the project toward downtown Pittsburgh and the Allegheny River.

When she returned to the project she reported the episode to the office of the Community Security Organizers, a small, new department of the Public Housing Authority in Pittsburgh, and that was the last time she was bothered. The next time she walked, the woman was accompanied by other young people, who differed little in appearance and in background from those who had molested her, but who were organized into a “Youth Security Patrol” (YSP) whose function was to ensure that the neighborhood delinquents did not, through terrorist tactics, set the standards by which residents of Allequippa had to live.

Members of the Youth Security Patrol were controlling their own territory, which had fallen to a group whose standards were not theirs. In short, they were reclaiming their turf! The members of the Youth Security Patrol are residents and official representatives of Allequippa Terrace and the Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh. They are not a counterforce of tough kids, but a part of an expanding program of neighborhood security that is based on one of the oldest, loveliest, and yet least often realized hopes of American urban life—community. The old blind woman and the rest of the residents in the project, rather than the roving teenagers, make up the community. The Y.S.P. was organized to work with them, to assure that the neighborhood is pleasant and safe to live in. This concept must still seem as radical to the residents as it does to many city officials around the Nation.

This concept of Turf Reclamation was first articulated by one of the authors, Seymour J. Rosenthal, at the HUD National Conference on Security in Multi-Family Housing in September 1973 (see HUD Challenge, March 1974). Mr. Rosenthal’s point of view was that Turf Reclamation was a practical approach whose time had come. The methods that rely solely on force and hardware have failed. The centers of our cities have become almost unlivable, and the great majority of those who live or work in them are ready to take action to clean them up. So far the concept of Turf Reclamation has only been applied in public housing projects, but the same principles could be used in any residential neighborhood.
Many of us walk, and live, on turf over which we have no control, or control only at certain times of day. Many city neighborhoods resemble villages in Vietnam which belong to one side during the day, and to the other at night. Defensible space in such a neighborhood may shrink to one's own apartment; and even that cannot be assured, since robberies are frequent. People lock their doors, throw the bolts, and by and large stay off the streets and out of the halls till morning.

When strange or threatening noises are heard, and no action is taken, control is surrendered. The reassertion of this control is only temporary and once this pattern is established it becomes harder and harder to dislodge. Through fear, resignation and "not wanting to get involved" we let important segments of our lives be governed by the wishes of a minority—sometimes a vicious minority.

Turf control may change several times during the day, week or season: when the high school lets out, for instance, and the men of the neighborhood are still at work; over the weekend or during the summer; during celebrations or holidays. Ten teenagers standing on a corner night after night may create a situation to which the whole neighborhood may have to adjust; making the women and children take roundabout routes on errands; making the neighborhood merchants apprehensive so that they close early; creating a general atmosphere of malaise. The teenagers may actually do nothing; their presence, and its implications, are enough.

How many people, even in polite suburban neighborhoods, have surrendered to implied threats, and done nothing about them? How many have seen automobiles or bicycles "ripped off" in the streets—or heard intruders in the next apartment—and done nothing, not even taking the safe step of calling the police?

People feel alone, helpless, afraid of retaliation. "Why can't the police do something?" But it is obvious that with neighborhoods as with people the only real control comes from within. Even if reliance is placed primarily on force and hardware, the police can do little unless they are called and trusted; the locks won't work unless they are installed, and used properly. There will never be enough locks and policemen, and, finally who wants to live in a fortress? No policeman can know as well as the residents who does or doesn't belong in that hall or playground, which tenants are troublemakers and which corners and rooms are dangerous.

Whose values will dominate the neighborhood, and determine the quality of life; those of the law-abiding majority or those of the law-breaking minority? If the responsible community does nothing, then the minority will set the values, and these will become part of the fabric of the neighborhood.

Establishing Community Bond

Working with one's neighbors to agree on common values and rules, and to enforce them is the first step. Sharing concerns means that one is no longer isolated, that fear, both of retaliation and of "acting against one's own kind," are diminished. Almost invariably the neighbors, who had thought that they were alone, will be in agreement.

Recognition, by management and residents, that security is a total program, involving all aspects of operation and living arrangement is an important consideration. This means that the apartments must be attractive and well maintained and the halls clean. It means that neighborliness must be encouraged, with the residents walking to visit one another, "patrolling the turf," taking an active interest in what is happening. Through meetings and committees the residents can actively control their environments. Rules should be posted and enforced, and notices and pronouncements displayed to remind residents, for instance, that garbage must be wrapped. If an individual becomes a menace to the values that the majority has established, other residents must be prepared to confront him or to report him to the housing authority, or the police, rather than see community control of the turf threatened. Youth must be given realistic alternatives to delinquent behavior—jobs, clubs, friends, or help with their problems; their recreational and social needs must be met.

Maintenance becomes more important than locks as a means of preserving order. Broken windows lead to other broken windows, as well as to kids who enjoy breaking them. This can be stopped by prompt repair, which gives residents a taste of what homes with no broken windows are like, so that they have a stake in seeing that no more are broken. Fresh paint is more than paint; it represents concern, evidence of belief in common goals, and a bright antidote to discouragement. There is little incentive for people to take care of a dilapidated building, but one that is well maintained will encourage residents to look after it.

The residents must come to believe that it is really their turf, that it is worth reclaiming, and that it can be reclaimed. They must believe that the administrators who are competent and fair are as dedicated to this goal as they are; otherwise, it won't work.

Turf Reclamation in Pittsburgh

In Pittsburgh Turf Reclamation has worked, dramatically, in a relatively few months. The heart of this approach is not the guard force but the Community Security Organizers, or CSO's. There are 17 of them for eight projects with some 30,000 residents. They do not carry guns or clubs, and thus cannot replace the 200 guards which the projects did not get (they finally did get 50). In direct hardware terms they are almost helpless in coping with the problem—they can guard no entrances, and cannot make arrests. This is not their
function. The CSO is there to serve as a focal point, guide, and spark plug for the efforts of the tenants to provide their own security. They are exactly what the name says: Community Security Organizers.

They are, in the words of Coordinator Art Mitchell, "somewhere between organizers, cops, social workers and Dear Abby." Their offices—one in each project—are nerve centers to which complaints and reports of suspicious occurrences come, and from which investigations, exhortations, information and organization go. They organize the Hall Captains, who are in charge of security on each floor, supervise the Youth Patrol, recreation and tenant meetings. They relay and act on complaints. They constantly "walk the turf," make themselves visible and accessible, visit tenants and urge the tenants to do the same. They have reintroduced the tenants to the police, and made the latter socially acceptable.

"I asked them," says Art Mitchell, "who else are you going to call on if you need help? Used to be, a patrol car would come in the neighborhood; it would get hit with rocks. Had to have tape crossed on the windshield to stop flying glass. That's all gone now." The police are enthusiastic about the success of the CSO's work.

Henry Miller, the CSO at Allequippa, relates an incident which demonstrates the change of attitude of residents towards security. "Shortly after I started work, I answered a call for help and went and pounded on the wrong door. The woman looked out at me, and she knew I didn't live in that project. We can't live in the project where we work. Anyway, she suddenly jumped out, waving a stick. 'What do you want here, man?' I had to explain real quick who I was. In the old days she would have thrown her locks and never mind what went on in the hall."

The CSO insists that the tenants be involved. A complaint by phone is not enough; it must be formally reported, and the police called immediately if the occasion warrants. "I tell them," says Mitchell, "that if they don't report it, it didn't happen."

When all are committed to the same goals, old distinctions and antagonisms (management versus tenants, liberals versus conservatives) tend to become blurred. When interviews for the CSO jobs were being held, representatives of tenant organizations and authorities rated the applicants—and found themselves in agreement on the great majority of cases, even the ones that eventually turned out to be mistakes. They wanted the same kinds of people. In the leases there is a category of "social eviction" designed to eliminate deviant behavior and tenants considered a menace to others or to the general welfare of the project.

In earlier days most tenants and liberals might have been very cautious about anything that seemed to suggest social control. But under Turf Reclamation, majority standards must be formulated and enforced. Art Mitchell gives an example. "A woman and her boyfriend would turn up her stereo at one or two in the morning and 'pop pills.' Well, the other people on that floor are working people. They need their sleep and they wanted it stopped. We talked to the couple about it and gave them warnings before we did anything else." Usually bringing contending parties into a single room will enable a problem to be solved without eviction taking place.

Long Range Effects Seen

Since Turf Reclamation involves all aspects of maintenance and administration, its benefits are far-reaching, affecting areas not usually associated with security. The vacancy rate in family apartments is the lowest in 10 years, according to Dan Blackwell, Director of Services for the Authority. Savings in maintenance costs have resulted from keeping painters and janitors busy 6 days a week. Cases of vandalism have dropped and, most important, in the 9 months the CSO's have been functioning, crime has gone down about 75 percent.

These statistics apply only to specific crimes in selected communities. Data is presently being gathered for a more comprehensive statistical report.

To the people involved in the Pittsburgh story, statistics are meaningful, but they tend to be cold. Each has an anecdote that has particular meaning for him. Jay Goggins, Executive Director of the Authority, recently received a call about a break-in that might seem routine to an outsider, but which delighted him. "St. Clair Village used to have a lot of rip-offs. This woman called the police to report a break-in to the maintenance store room. Think of that! Reporting a robbery of authority property!"

To Art Mitchell and Henry Miller it seems significant that the "Dear Abby" portion of the job seems to be growing. Recently Mitchell and another organizer helped the victim of an assault, an elderly woman, move to another apartment where she felt more safe. But it was Saturday, the apartment was dingy, and painters were not available; "So we spent that weekend painting her place. Made her feel better," Says Art Mitchell, "Well you know, people call up to complain, or something, and they talk about this thing or that thing. But sometimes it turns out that they have no real complaint. They're lonely, and they want to talk, and they know we'll listen. Well, that's part of our job too."

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Residents of Honolulu’s two largest public housing projects, Kuhio Park Terrace and Kalihi Valley Homes, can look forward to a safer, more secure environment as a result of a unique security program underway within the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA). HHA’s experimental program, now completing its second year, provides a security guard force controlled and staffed by the residents themselves through their own non-profit corporation. As a result of residents’ enthusiastic support of the program, the tenant security guard force has been effective in controlling crime and vandalism at the two projects over the last 2 years.

The tenant security guard force was initiated in the Fall of 1973 as part of the HHA’s Housing Management Improvement Program (HMIP). The HMIP, a HUD-sponsored program, was set up to develop innovative approaches for solving the tough problems in managing public housing.* Under the HMIP, HHA identified security as one of these problems and developed the tenant security guard demonstration as a possible solution.

*See HUD Challenge June 1974 for a complete description of the HMIP effort.
respond to their calls. As a result of unsatisfactory performance, HHA discontinued commercial security services until the present tenant security guard program was initiated.

The experiment with a tenant-manned security guard force has paid off for HHA. A comparison of “before” and “after” data shows that the average number of selected criminal offenses decreased by 15 percent at one project after the start of the guard service, and, at the second project, there was only a marginal increase of 8 percent. These results compare favorably with a 43 percent increase at a similar HHA project without security services, and with a 26 percent increase in Hawaii’s overall crime rate and a national increase of 16 percent during the same period.

The number of fire calls decreased by 60 percent at the first project and increased only slightly by 3 percent at the second, while the comparison project showed a 29 percent increase. The savings to the City and County of Honolulu as a result of these decreases are an estimated $4,360 per year.

In addition, there has been a significant change in the responsiveness and willingness of the Police and Fire Departments to answer calls from the two projects. The tenant guards, acting as a liaison between tenants and officers and providing security for their equipment, enable minimum forces of both Police and Fire Department personnel to respond quickly.

The guard service, incorporated as Tenant Security, Inc. (TSI), is directly controlled by an elected Board of Directors made up of the tenants from the two projects that receive the guard service. This is one of the most important features of the service, since tenant input contributes greatly to its success. As residents, board members are familiar with the problems of the project, understand the ethnic and cultural differences of project residents, and are thus better equipped to provide decisions on security needs. They are also vitally concerned with the security of their own homes and, as a result, are more committed to improving the level of security services in their projects.

Presently, there are 11 tenants on the board representing the two projects, with membership based on the number of apartments in each project. Any legally registered tenant over 18 years of age at both housing projects can become a member of the corporation by simply signing a membership list.

TSI operates under contract with HHA at a cost of approximately $150,000 a year. The guard service itself is managed by a licensed principal guard who is the only outside professional employee hired by the corporation. In addition, the guard force employs a bookkeeper, a lieutenant, four sergeant-dispatchers and 13 patrol guards, most of whom are public housing tenants or former tenants. Although preference in hiring is given to tenants, occasionally it has been necessary to hire outsiders to meet recruitment needs. Every effort is made to secure a racial and ethnic balance on the guard force, representative of the tenant population itself.

To insure that the guards have the proper skills for their jobs, a 20-hour training program is provided for all guard personnel, covering such subjects as community relations, laws of arrest, self-defense, first-aid, report writing, and HHA’s occupancy rules and regulations.

The security guard patrol is on duty from 7:00 p.m. until 5:00 a.m. the next day, 7 days a week including holidays. A couple of two-man foot patrols and a sergeant dispatcher are on duty at one project of 750 units, while one two-man patrol, with an electric four-wheel scooter, and another sergeant dispatcher are assigned to cover the smaller 400-unit project.

Although the guard force was initially outfitted in aloha-print shirts to maintain their low key, non-authoritative image, problems frequently arose in identifying the guards from other tenants. As a result, the guards now wear conventional uniforms to permit easy recognition, especially by the new tenants and visitors. The guards are unarmed, carrying only heavy duty five-and six-cell flashlights and walkie-talkies to maintain contact with the dispatcher. The dispatcher monitors a police radio to receive timely information on police calls to the project so that the guards can assist police if necessary.

With residents themselves patrolling, the guards, like the board members, have an advantage in knowing both the people and the problem areas within their projects. They are thus more effective in controlling project problems.

Overall, the tenants’ commitment to the safety of their own living environment makes the tenant security guard force a viable method for providing an effective security system for public housing. HHA’s experience indicates that this approach can provide public housing with professional guard services, and foster resident support and cooperation in solving security problems.

Ms. Ostrowski is Demonstration Program Director, Hawaii Housing Authority.
To provide information and training to our more than six million members aged 55 and older, the National Retired Teachers Association and American Association of Retired Persons (NRTA-AARP) initiated in 1972 a crime prevention program conducted as a community public service project. The concept of crime prevention espoused throughout the program is defined by Dr. John Klotter of the University of Louisville, who believes effective crime prevention involves the anticipation, the recognition and the appraisal of a crime risk, and action to reduce or remove that risk.

Program Responsive to Elderly

The NTRA-AARP crime prevention program consists of four two-hour sessions on the subjects of street crime, residential burglary, criminal fraud and community-police relations. A script is provided for each program coordinator to use in conducting the four sessions, and an informative film is included in each presentation.

During the developmental phase of this program, our associations undertook extensive research into the aspects of crime which most affect older persons and an examination of existing crime prevention activities. Using the data that was collected, we were able to design a program especially suited to the needs of the older population.

Our primary concern in structuring the program was to provide information about those crimes that are likely to be committed against the older person or which he fears most. Hitchhiking and other behavior associated with youth are not covered. The course does, however, cover mugging, armed robbery, purse snatching and other crimes that victimize older persons.

Although many older persons have long expressed fear of murder or rape, national statistics indicate that
the elderly have a very low probability of becoming a victim of these crimes. An examination of crime statistics from several major cities demonstrated further that the vulnerability of persons over 60 to murders or rapes committed on a stranger-to-stranger basis is even lower. We found that most of the crimes in these categories could have been avoided through use of simple crime prevention techniques which are incorporated in the NRTA-AARP program.

In another instance—burglary— despite statistical evidence that this is the most frequently committed crime, an analysis conducted in one major city disclosed that more than 35 percent of the residential burglaries were committed by persons entering through unsecured exterior openings. Here again, a discussion of simple locks and other devices for protecting residences can be a positive deterrent to crime and at the same time allay unnecessary concerns of older persons.

Criminal fraud, we found, is a crime about which older persons seem to be largely unaware, but it should be one of their major concerns. It is the one crime which affects the older population out of proportion to its numbers.

Armed robbery is considered by the elderly as a great threat, but most often it deprives the victim of a very small amount of money. Swindles, however, can be much more devastating if the victim loses a "nest egg" which provides both tangible financial support and significant psychological satisfaction in later years.

But how can we effectively educate the older persons in methods to deter these "white collar" crimes?

Preventive Measures Taught
In the NRTA-AARP Crime Prevention program, we try first to convince the participant that anyone—at any age—of any intelligence—can be swindled. A recounting of case histories of swindles involving highly intelligent and knowledgeable persons is a significant educational tool in this respect.

As a second step, the program identifies the variety of bunco games which prey upon the uninformed and provides a list of key words or phrases to warn potential victims that a proposition is not entirely on the up-and-up.

Many times in speaking to this subject, I have been asked to describe the new bunco schemes, and indeed they are many. My reply, however, must be that our primary concern should be about the old ones since they are still working so well in updated versions. The old "snakeoil salesman" may appear as the peddler of quack food supplements or treatments for cancer, but the scheme remains the same.

The final segment of the NRTA-AARP program on community police relations was added to encourage individuals to work with existing law enforcement agencies to reduce the incidence of crime in their communities. Through the use of resource persons from law enforcement agencies at our crime prevention meetings, many persons have been informed of ways to support law enforcement efforts and to utilize more effectively the services of their local police or sheriff's department.

There have been significant spinoffs from this portion of the NRTA-AARP program. Once people began thinking in terms of preventing crime rather than resigning themselves to a feeling that nothing could be done, many innovative programs have been developed.

In one highrise public housing project in a major city, tenants were subjected to criminal attacks on their way to the bus stop—often while returning from the bank with Social Security money. Working in cooperation with the local transit authorities, the tenants and the project director were successful in having the bus stop moved to within view of the director's office door. A tenant-manned volunteer watch program was initiated so that the police department could be informed instantly if a crime situation developed. As a result of these actions, the crime problem for these tenants was to a great extent solved—without a great expenditure of funds.

In another instance, the burglary problem which had plagued tenants in an elderly housing unit was relieved by a change to inexpensive but more effective locks on apartment doors.

These crime prevention activities have demonstrated that there are many possibilities for reducing criminal victimization through immediate and often simple actions. Unfortunately the solutions to social and economic problems in our society which contribute to or actually cause criminal activity have not yet been found. But too often a concentration on these major issues leads us to overlook the immediate crime prevention measures which can help those most affected by crime.

Some day we may develop an "anti-crime pill" or find other methods of diverting criminally inclined persons into socially constructive activities.

In the meantime, however, we hope through our NRTA-AARP crime prevention program to provide the older population with a means of coping with the problems of crime today.

Mr. Sunderland is coordinator of the crime prevention program of the American Association of Retired Persons-National Retired Teachers Association.
It has been stated that the fear of strangers is impoverishing the lives of many Americans. Residents of public housing are no different. People stay behind locked doors of their homes rather than walk in the projects at night. Tenant council meetings are poorly attended because of these conditions. Sociable tenants are afraid to talk to those they do not know.

When people stay at home they are not enjoying pleasurable and cultural opportunities in their communities; they are not visiting their friends as frequently as they might. The general level of sociability is diminished, their earning opportunities restricted, and community participation minimal.

The elderly are further isolated from resources of the community. As social interaction is reduced the fear of crime becomes the fear of the stranger. It is to this problem, the Personal Self-Defense Program addresses itself.

Adaline B., 75 (a fictitious name and age for the composite members of the group) until 3 months ago, was afraid for her own safety when she left the protective walls of Millvue Acres, a 130-unit family-type housing project managed by the Allegheny County (Pa.) Housing Authority. She and 14 other senior citizens who have been meeting for the past 3 months at Millvue Acres in Clairton, Pa., now are a hundred times less fearful because of their mastery of self-defense skills taught by the South Campus of the Community College of Allegheny County in cooperation with the Allegheny County Housing Authority.

"Each of the 15 people who participated regained lost self-esteem, became more agile, and, as a result, less fearful of the real world," said Thomas Wilson, physical education director at the South Campus. "But that is only a part of what the program accomplished," he added.

Adaline and the other people involved—14 women and one man—had lost their self-esteem through self-imposed isolation from the general population. They became more fearful of the outside world from the necessarily imposed security measures required to make living conditions safe for them. Their isolated living made them less physically active and, in time, less capable of moving about on their feet as in the past.

"The purpose of the program isn't to supplant any security measures which have been implemented to make living conditions safe," Mr. Wilson said; "it is to supplement these measures by making the aging feel that they have a part in the management and enjoyment of their lives."

Doing away with the fear of crime against their persons was a major goal of the program. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to teach skills to minimize the physical and psychological impact of crimes against the person and property of the aging as well as deal with fear itself.

David W. Craig, at the recent ceremonies at South Campus for the first graduates of the program, pointed out, "The crime statistics at Millvue Acres are no higher than the crime incidence in the surrounding community. The fear of crime is two to three times greater than the incidence of crime. This is generally true in all communities." Mr. Craig, an attorney, is Pittsburgh's former Director of Public Safety.

Most meaningful of all is the response of the new graduates who received certificates for their work. All of them have a surer step; their eyes are brighter, they are newly enthusiastic about life.

"Old people have to have something to do or they just melt away," one of the class members candidly said.

"That's certainly a lively group at Millvue Acres," declared JoAnn Stoops, home economist, working in an outreach program for the South Campus. Three months ago, Mrs. Stoops wouldn't have made that statement. Then, some class members had difficulty maintaining balance for the simple physical movements employed at the beginning of the physical phase of the program. Week by week, however, their abilities increased and their enjoyment in participating took wing.

Measurement of their improvement must be by relative standards. A 70-year-old woman who suffered a stroke 6 years ago can't run a mile or jump a 2-foot hurdle. But she is far from being as dependent on a cane as she was 3 months ago.

How Program Began
The pilot program resulted from talks between George L. Adams, Human Services Director of the Allegheny County Housing Authority, and Lois J. Delahan, Assistant Director of Community Services for the South Campus of the Community College. Both Mr. Adams and Mrs. Delahan were searching for a method to engage the aging in helping themselves. They conceived the program and called upon Mr. Wilson to help design and teach it.

The program teaches the aging three skills:
- how to recognize potentially dangerous situations and how to avoid them;
• how to manage potentially dangerous situations when they cannot be avoided;
• how to execute simple defensive moves within the physical capabilities of the aging if the first two skills are ineffective

Responding to Danger
An example of a response to a threat of forced entry into an apartment could take two measures, either of which would be effective: The occupant should turn the radio up loud or blow a whistle. Learning to respond to these signals is an integral part of the training.

While the women enjoy the physical part of the program most, it is hoped they have learned skills which will keep them from having to use such physical techniques.

Wilson makes the point that a woman should never carry a purse dangling from an arm—she could suffer a broken arm if confronted by an assailant. Instead, the purse should be clasped in her arms. If an attacker wants the purse badly enough to try to take it—give it to him!

Mr. Wilson stressed that “not fighting, not resisting, takes as much psychological preparation as learning when to resist.”

Often, a potential assailant is as frightened as his victim, and, if one displays a lack of fear, that alone may scare him off. Some of the physical self-defense tactics taught include jabbing a key in the mugger’s eye, kicking him in the shins, or hitting him in the groin with an elbow.

Several Teaching Approaches
Several approaches are utilized in teaching the course in personal self-defense and security training. One is psychological preparation in the form of role playing—assuming the roles of potential victims and assailants. There is practice in simple defensive and offensive moves and combinations of moves. Film and slide presentations were made to stimulate discussion of the various methods by which given situations or environments could be handled. Experiences in elevators, narrow sidewalks with recessed doorways, an open door when returning home and others were discussed. Each session concentrated on one aspect of the program, but each one also contained reinforcement of the basic skills. This assured that each session included a brief period of physical activity and a reminder of the individual’s responsibility for more than himself. The motto, “I am my brother’s keeper,” applies.

At the close of the course Wilson conducted a demonstration attended by local officials and HUD Area Office personnel, which emphasized that a good security program requires a combination of both hardware and software elements.

Security Reinforced
Through the modernization program many of the units in the Allegheny County Housing Authority projects have been improved by the addition of new windows, doors and lighting features which have enhanced security. However, no amount of locks, bolts and other hardware can give individuals a feeling of security when they leave their units for shopping, church attendance, or a simple walk in the neighborhood.

“The program developed for the residents of Millvue Acres has complemented the physical improvements of the modernization program. Without Mr. Wilson’s help these elderly residents could be prisoners in physically secure dwellings. Through his assistance they now have the freedom to live their lives more humanly,” said Paul C. Steimer, HUD Area Office Director of Housing Management.

Security training and programming have assumed special priority under the direction of H.R. Crawford, HUD’s Assistant Secretary for Housing Management. Under his administration, security, both physical and personal, is seen as an integral tool for the effective management of projects for low-income residents.

Techniques Transferable
James W. Knox, Executive Director of The Allegheny County Housing Authority, believes this program to be one which can be assimilated into the programs of other housing authorities and communities housing low-income elderly and families. Senior citizens, teen-agers, and young adults can take part in the program. Training sessions can be fun as well as productive, he says. “The program is a way of reaching out, of getting residents interested in their surroundings, their neighbors, their community.”

Mr. Knox feels that the pilot self-defense program developed through the cooperation of HUD officials, Allegheny County Housing Authority staff members, South Campus of the Community College of Allegheny County personnel, and residents shows what can be done to improve the living conditions of public housing residents when people with a common objective become involved. “I think everyone, from top to bottom, can take pride in what we have done at Millvue Acres,” Mr. Knox said.

Mrs. Bernice Jones, a resident of Millvue Acres and an adviser for the self-defense program, summed it up best when she said: “This is the kind of program public housing residents need most. It brings together people with a variety of backgrounds, and focuses attention on a problem that concerns every American today. It’s a great feeling to be involved and to work with people in fostering a sense of security, pride and good will.”

--Community College of Allegheny County
Allegheny County Housing Authority

HUD CHALLENGE / January 1975
New York City’s Housing Police Department is often called “the last of the neighborhood police forces” because, though it is a modern police operation in every respect, the Housing Police place their main reliance on the foot patrolman and employ a system of “vertical patrol” whereby the officers survey each floor of project buildings. This makes the Housing Police perhaps the last of the large urban police forces where people actually know the cop on their beat.

Though hard pressed by layoffs forced by the city’s fiscal crisis which have brought operating strength down from an authorized 1,933 officers and men to an actual 1,545, the Housing Police are the seventh largest police force in New York State and the 19th largest in the country. They receive the same training, are paid the same salaries and benefits, and have the same legal powers as members of the New York City Police Department.

Inaugurated in 1952 with 47 men, the department has become a vital part of the city’s law enforcement apparatus. It has a fully equipped communications center and uses 80 cars, 75 scooters and 750 walkie-talkies. Although the vast majority of its men and women are employed on patrol duty, the department has a detective division and community relations unit. Although the services involved in policing the city’s 242 public housing developments, with their over 160,000 families, is of the simple human service kind not ordinarily associated with police work, the department has over the years made some notable arrests, most recently that of the alleged murderer of an elderly woman at West Brighton Houses on Staten Island.

The entire fabric of public housing in New York City is kept intact in large part by this strong, well-trained and community-oriented police operation. The crime rate in all public housing developments in New York City consistently runs well below one-third that of the city as a whole. Without exception, crime in Housing Authority Police Department-patrolled projects is substantially lower than in its surrounding neighborhoods. This is true in the most economically depressed high crime neighborhoods, as well as in other more fortunate communities. New York’s public housing population encompasses a major portion of the city’s lower-income working families. Their continued safety and ability to lead peaceful and productive lives is vital to the social and economic health of our city.

—Richard E. Zatorski, Chief Tenant Organization Division New York City Housing Authority

A friendly police officer is surrounded by young residents. 

Housing police receive the same training as members of the New York City Police Department.
The Drama of Southwark Plaza
By Powell Lawton
In the wake of heightened public recognition of the fear and effects of crime on older people has come a concerted effort to reduce this major threat to their peace of mind. Naturally, law enforcement officials are at work on this problem, but the diversity of people involved in the effort includes social workers, planners, government officials, architects, engineers, research workers, and older people themselves.

The risk of crime is greatest in poor urban areas, and because of the high concentrations of people in one location, the crime problem in federally-assisted low-rent housing has attracted particular attention. The Pruitt-Igoe project in St. Louis failed in part because of its inability to control crime in its buildings and on its grounds. The demolition of this monumental social disaster epitomizes one solution to the problem. It is important to point out, however, that the image of the housing project as a breeder of crime is overdrawn. In fact, Simeon Golar, former chairman of the New York City Housing Authority, has reported one study indicating that the crime rate in a number of New York projects was consistently lower than that of the surrounding neighborhood. However, while the image of public housing as a center for crime has been overdrawn, we are still left with a problem of critical dimensions.

Thus, the story begins on a most negative note. How hard do we have to strain to find anything positive to point the way to the future? Oscar Newman, an architect, did strain, and in his book Defensible Space as well as in the pages of HUD Challenge came up with some heartening ideas about choosing housing locations, situating the housing on its site, and designing buildings so as to be able to minimize crime. Tenants in many locations have organized patrols to complement the protection offered by municipal and housing authority police. Advances have been made by engineers in developing portable electronic signal systems to allow an elderly tenant to sound an alarm in a security office from wherever he happens to be located. Carl Cunningham, a social scientist from the Midwest Research Institute, has developed educational guides to assist the older person to minimize his exposure to crime. A particularly rich mine of this kind of information was found by Mr. Cunningham in known criminals' willingness to share the secrets of their trade.

**One Case Study**

I would like to give an outsider's view of another modestly positive outcome: a case history of change in a particular housing environment, Southwark Plaza, 900-unit project of the Philadelphia Housing Authority. The drama of Southwark Plaza is particularly interesting because it had so many actors who, despite their normal human reactions to threat and criticism, were able to work out conflicts and achieve a workable solution. In many ways, the change at Southwark Plaza may be more instructive than some of the examples mentioned above because the change was achieved at relatively small cost.

Southwark Plaza was planned by a housing authority dedicated to equal opportunity long before this became a nationally accepted goal. The planners viewed this in the broadest of terms, implying not only racial integration but the free mixing of many diverse groups, including children, young adults, and the aged. This goal was reflected in the construction of a number of low-rise structures for families, two high-rise buildings for families, and one high-rise for a combination of families and older people. This latter building mandated an unusual degree of age integration: every floor consisted of six units specially designed for and limited to occupancy by older people, plus four larger apartment units with enough bedroom space for larger families.

The architects succeeded in the task of designing an esthetically pleasing high-rise structure that conveyed a sense of status in its superiority of form to even the most luxurious apartment buildings. Again, Pruitt-Igoe affords the prime example of apparently creative ideas being proven dead wrong:

- Wide expanses of landscaped grounds thought to give a sense of space and freedom turned out to be no-man's land for which no individual felt responsible for what occurred, and crime therefore thrived.
- Wide "galleries" on each floor meant to be the indoor small-group "playgrounds" for the children who lived on the floor became the turf of gangs.
- Skip-stop elevators took many people into stairwells to get from one floor to another. The stairs were the unsafe part of the building.

**Design of Southwark**

At the time Southwark Plaza was designed there had been almost no interaction between research workers in social science and architects.

In the beginning came the planners' decision to provide intergenerational living. This step was taken before the sociological study of Irving Rosow had demonstrated the many advantages that were associated with older people having age peers as close neighbors. More importantly, it was far less true then than now that age integration among low-income tenants was in reality what I have called "a lethal mix of problem young people and vulnerable elderly." Research on this subject done at the Philadelphia Geriatric Center and elsewhere has documented how the proximity of these two groups results in the older person's being both victimized physically and subjected to an even higher level of psychological stress.

The design decision most difficult to understand was the total abolition of the entrance lobby. Access to the elevators was from the sidewalk through a completely open breezeway. Anyone could wait on the sidewalk for a senior citizen to open his mailbox on Social Security check day—it was done all the time. Similarly, anyone could get on an elevator and ride to the upper floors.
without ever being challenged. Oscar Newman’s research showed that one of the most potent deterrents to crime is the tenant’s ability to know who has legitimate business in a building and who does not. In a building the size of Southwark Plaza it is impossible to recognize everyone. The added frequency of outside visitors to family units makes the problem even greater.

Most buildings have an enclosed lobby through which people must walk to get to the elevators. At the very least, some tenants might sit in the lobby and be able to monitor the entrance. Many lobbies have in addition, a reception desk or a staff office with a view of the entrance, affording a relatively good degree of control, at least during the time the staff member is on duty. Southwark had no such capability. The underhang-entrance was cold psychologically and physically: no one would be likely to remain there long by choice. There was no way this entrance could be observed from any other space in the building. Furthermore, management offices were located in a separate building. Offices for other staff existed on the ground floor of the project building, but they were occupied by part-time personnel who were physically and visually distant from the entranceway.

In short, the economy of the lobbyless building may have been appealing for the construction, but it has been a disaster in allowing free access to the building by both impulsive and deliberate criminals.

Another more understandable design error was the cross-sectional layout of the living floors. Part of Southwark Plaza’s exterior appeal is derived from the fact that all four sides have attractive balconies and windows. Apartments range around all four sides of the building, with an elevator and service core running down the center of the building, and the hall wrapped between this core and the apartments. Every corner turned by the hallway afforded cover for anyone with a predatory idea. The economy of this scheme was increased by building excessively narrow corridors with cinderblock walls, and by using dim lights. Both from the point of view of safety and esthetics it was a grim route to travel.

The elevators were another hazardous place to be, given their availability to people from within and without the project. They were frequently made inoperative or stopped by children.

One design feature was provided with the needs of older people in mind. A quiet courtyard with benches and plantings opened out from the senior center area with three boundaries formed by the buildings of the project and the other enclosed by a fence with access only from the center. While it was not possible to watch much activity from the courtyard, at least its occupancy was limited to older people. However, the children in the building quickly learned the pleasures of throwing water, refuse, and missiles onto the people sitting in the court, and it was totally unused.

The Philadelphia Geriatric Center’s research on housing for the elderly documented fully the unfortunate effect these conditions had on the psychological well-being of the elderly tenants. The younger families whom we interviewed there shared fully the conviction that it was a bad place for an older person. We dutifully shared our information with local people with whom we came into contact, spoke of the “case” of Southwark Plaza at professional meetings, and published articles with pictures showing how the lack of communication among planners, architects, administrators, and gerontologists could result in an inhuman quality of life. We failed to use our information in the way that would have been most meaningful, however, by going directly to the major potential decision-makers: the housing authority’s executive director, the board, action-oriented citizens groups, or the news media. Thus, where this study began by placing blame on the planners and the architects, the researchers’ names are now added to the list.

Action Taken
The turn for the better in the story of Southwark Plaza began early in 1973. It is difficult to say exactly where it began, because there happened to be a number of people and groups whose concerns surfaced around the same time. A relatively new self-advocacy group, the Action Alliance for Senior Citizens, had formed a Safety Committee whose concern was for the physical safety of all older people whether living in scattered homes in the community or in age-concentrated housing. The Alliance was headed by capable, activist, retired union official, Frank Bradley.

A new executive director, Thomas J. Kelly, had just been appointed to the Philadelphia Housing Authority. A group worker from the city Department of Health, Mrs. Virginia Bird, had an intimate picture of tenants’ problems through her work at the senior center located at Southwark.

The Alliance Safety Committee held a meeting where Mrs. Bird played a video-tape-recorded discussion of Southwark’s safety problems led by a student from the University of Pennsylvania. Stimulated by testimony such as that from a man who had been mugged four times in seven days, the Safety Committee decided to hold a public hearing at Southwark Plaza. This meeting was given good newspaper and television coverage, and featured a closeup interview with a woman whose face was noticeably bruised from a recent mugging. Mrs. Bird’s encouragement gave tenants confidence in preparing themselves to talk about their experiences.

Mr. Kelly was quick to add momentum to the effort. A Housing Authority meeting was scheduled to be held at the Southwark Plaza senior center and was well attended by Housing Authority personnel, Southwark tenants, and Action Alliance members led by the persuasive voice of Mr. Bradley. A log was kept of specific incidents, includ-
ing what action was taken by Housing Authority guards and other personnel when an incident was reported. The Housing Authority had no doubt that ameliorative action should be taken, and Mr. Kelly made himself personally available to deal with security issues as they were raised by tenants and the Action Alliance. Mr. Kelly attended several more meetings on this issue, some held at other projects located in similarly problematic areas of Philadelphia.

One Year Later
The move toward change began immediately, and within 6 months, an impressive record of accomplishment had been made. A program for radical changes has now been established for five separate projects, and others will undergo one or more security-inducing changes.

At Southwark the problems of age mixing led to the decision to phase out the younger families in the building housing older people. Eviction of these families was ruled out as unfair to those who would have to move, but as vacancies develop elderly families move in or the units are left vacant. The very large apartments, unsuited for occupancy by a single person or couple, though, also remain vacant. Plans for remodeling these to accommodate two or more units for elderly people are in process. It is hoped that these plans will avoid the cramped space and minimal attractiveness of the original efficiency units.

Immediate steps were also taken to enclose the entrances described above. This was a simple matter of building a permanent window wall with an entry through a regular door. Thus, casual passersby no longer have easy access to mailboxes, tenants, and elevators. This change also doubled the traffic using the north entrance, which in itself provides greater protection.

A necessary complement to the structural change at the entrance was the upgrading of coverage by security police. A new Housing Authority Director of Security, Eugene F. O'Neill, was appointed, who fully shared his organization's goals. Earlier, there were just a few guards for the entire high-rise and low-rise project, who had to make rounds in order to give minimal coverage. The building for the elderly was assigned 24-hour coverage, with two guards covering each shift. One guard remains in the enclosed entrance to see to it that each building entrant has legitimate business before allowing him to go to the elevator. When in doubt, he telephones the occupant to confirm his willingness to allow a visitor to come up. The occupant, in turn, knows that a guard is always available on the ground floor. The other guard is free to move through the building and the grounds and is able to escort tenants to their apartments, if needed.

Equally important as the above changes was the Philadelphia Department of Health's provision of a small bus for the transportation of tenants and senior center participants to local resources. The neighborhood in which Southwark Plaza is located is not the worst in Philadelphia. In fact, it is near the borders of Queen Village, a historic part of Colonial Philadelphia now experiencing a renaissance, and also near an Italian neighborhood that has staunchly resisted the usual neighborhood blight of the inner city. But the immediate environs include a considerable amount of dilapidated or condemned housing, industrial and non-retail commercial occupants, and the crime rate is high. Although a major supermarket and a cluster of small retail stores are within a few blocks of the housing project, the pedestrian routes to these resources are fraught with danger. Some observers have the impression that the interior security improvements have moved crime from the building to the nearby streets. Thus, a transportation link to the local resources is a logical extension of the security program.

The minibus makes neighborhood pickups of senior center participants. The director of the center, Mrs. Bird, combs the tenant population to determine needs for transportation away from Southwark Plaza. Thus, regular trips are made to the supermarket, the bank, and a nearby hospital. Individual trips are also made for specific tenant needs. The driver is an essential member of the service team, showing great skill in assisting tenants and in his supportive personal manner.

For other tenants, or for occasions where the transportation is not available, the center organizes group walking trips to the supermarket.

Today, with the above improvements made, life at Southwark Plaza is much easier than it once was. The conversion to exclusive senior-citizen occupancy is not complete, and there will be a potential within-building security problem until the time when only the elderly live there. Two guards are not always able to be scheduled for duty simultaneously. The interested parties on the scene feel the need for upgrading the status of the guards, who are paid less than city patrolmen. Slips do occur in allowing access to the building. When this happens, the risks inherent in the high-rise elevator and stairwell, and in the living-floor hallway design, demonstrate security at a less than complete level. There are many who do not wish to use the center's transportation facilities; in the absence of foot patrolmen on the routes to the two shopping areas, there is still risk. However, the accomplishments have been major, and are well-reorganized locally.

This example may be characterized as a modest success, rather than a transformation. Certain hard realities of neighborhood location, building design, and operating budget will prevent Southwark Plaza from ever being ideal housing. However, the gain to the older tenant has been major and its cost low. This case has been a model for other similar improvements in Philadelphia and it can be for other locations, too.

Dr. Powell Lawton is Research Psychologist at the Philadelphia Geriatric Center.
New York’s Experiment in Tenant Safety

By Samuel Granville

Tenant patrol operations cover wide range of activities.
The incidence of major crime within New York City's public housing projects is only about a third of that for the city as a whole. Nevertheless, it is a cause of intense concern to the Housing Authority and our residents. We have studied many proposals for improving security in our developments and have adopted those which give the best promise of increased security at manageable cost. Some are in the experimental operating phase, while still others are in the planning and design stage.

Citizens of New York, like their counterparts the world over, depend upon their municipal police force for their basic security. Public housing tenants also rely upon the municipal police force for their basic security, but the New York City Housing Authority also provides a supplemental police force of some 1900 men. This force operates exclusively to provide additional police protection for the more than 600,000 residents in public housing.

These limitations in New York's as well as other tenant patrol programs are outweighed, by far, by the advantages—one of which is noted by Luther Williams of 120 Kingsboro St. Walk in Brooklyn. "Because of the tenant patrol, Kingsboro has now become one large family with everyone showing love and respect for each other."

**Tenant Patrols**

From a search for economically feasible ways of meeting the pressing demand for greater security there emerged the tenant patrol idea. We explored the possibility that our tenants might be willing—in view of the depth of their concern—to make some contribution to their own security. If tenants could contribute in a way which would substantially increase the effectiveness of our current police forces, and at the same time gain a greater understanding of the problem of providing adequate security, everyone might benefit.

At this point, some five years after the tenant patrol program began, we feel it has succeeded far beyond our expectations. There are now more than 12,000 tenant volunteers involved in approximately 120 patrols operating in every borough in the city. In many cases, the impact of these patrols on criminal activity and interior vandalism has been dramatic. In every case, the presence of the patrols has furnished some measure of reassurance to the residents.

As important as these direct gains have been, we have been equally gratified by an important by-product of the patrols—a greatly enhanced participation and responsibility among large numbers of tenants.

In terms of effectiveness, interest and involvement of tenants, the tenant patrol program represents the most successful of the many approaches to the security problem beyond uniformed patrolmen and improved hardware.

Tenant reaction offers the best gauge of the success of tenant patrol in the city's projects:

"Our patrol has made our building a safer and cleaner place to live," says Mrs. Elease Witherspoon, commenting on changes in her Amsterdam Avenue complex since tenant patrol was instituted there.

"Tenant patrol is doing a marvelous job in 1010 East 178th Street and New York City as a whole," says Mrs. Violet DeGenspe.

Mrs. Maude Askins is satisfied with how tenant patrol has changed the Queensbridge community by "bringing the tenants closer together."

"Tenant patrol means security, but it also means people of all races and nationalities relating to each other," said Rudy Frank of 2861 Exterior Street in The Bronx. "And, after all," he added, "what's more important than people communicating with one another."

**Plan Built on Voluntarism**

With the exception of a few projects in which it was possible to hire young men with Youth Corps funds, the plan relies on tenant volunteers. The program has, in fact, been uniquely successful in enlisting low-income tenants in a program of self-help and, in the process, creating better management-tenant cooperation.

Although the tenant patrol program operates largely on a decentralized basis, with the housing manager giving guidance to an essentially autonomous patrol, assisted by a locally hired part-time patrol supervisor, we have found a central unit most helpful; there is just no substitute for the drive, enthusiasm and expertise that a small staff of dedicated employees, assigned full time to this novel program, brings to bear on the numerous details and problems involved. The tenant patrol unit currently includes an assistant housing manager, a housing assistant and three part-time consultants, who aid in the formation and maintenance of patrols in the various developments. The duties of the assistant manager and housing assistant reflect the central supervision we provide. They:

- supervise three part-time consultants;
- maintain liaison with project managers who call frequently for advice concerning initiation or operating problems of tenant patrols, purchase of equipment, etc.;
- review weekly reports from patrol supervisors and follow up on special problems with the managers. Inevitably, they get many requests for information directly from tenant patrol supervisors, although it is our policy to refer them to the manager, if at all possible;
- review requisitions for equipment;
- attend meetings at projects about once a week;
- prepare a monthly report;
- prepare the tenant patrol newsletter;
- conduct a monthly meeting with the tenant patrol supervisors at Central Office; and
- establish a training program for tenant patrol members and supervisors.

It would be unfair, however, to expect volunteers to carry the whole burden at the local level. A patrol might number 100 or even more members, giving a few hours a week on various shifts in different buildings. Recruiting, scheduling even minimal supervision of members of the patrol, and filing reports necessary for insurance purposes require more work than can reasonably be expected of a volunteer. We have therefore authorized projects to hire one or two tenants as tenant patrol supervisors, working 10 or 20 hours per week at $3.00 per hour.

The tenant patrol supervisor's job is not an easy one. Inevitably, some volunteers resent the fact that only one member of the group gets paid. This is particularly true among low-income persons who have generally been found difficult to organize for volunteer work and who often have a real need for supplementary income. However, this has proved to be much less a problem than we anticipated. Patrol supervisors, carefully selected by housing managers after consultation with members of the patrol, are often men or women respected as community leaders. Most of them voluntarily put in more hours than they are paid for. On the whole the position has worked out well.

The careful choice of local tenant patrol supervisors is essential to good rapport with existing tenant organizations whose active support and sponsorship of the program are highly desirable. Quite commonly, in fact, the first steps toward a new patrol are taken after a manager, discussing security problems with the project tenant organization, mentions how tenant patrols in other developments have helped to alleviate some of these problems. In other cases, unorganized tenants, petitioning the manager concerning security, supply the initial impetus. As a matter of fact, the patrol program successfully involves many men who are not organization-minded and have shown little previous civic interest. This is one of its most encouraging aspects.

**Some Problems to be Expected**

It would be misleading to assume that widespread tenant participation is generally easy to achieve or that it usually arises spontaneously. Sometimes there is outright opposition, even in projects that badly need a patrol. Tenants sometimes insist that it is their right to determine who enters the building, that their home is not a patrolled public area. It is their right to have a feel for the building, and that their right to have a feel for the building is not a patrolled public area. To this end, we provide a room for the patrol wherever possible. Unused carriage rooms located off building lobbies are ideal for this purpose since they permit members to socialize and at the same time keep an eye on the lobby. Often, however, two or three tenants simply sit in the lobby, using a table and chairs we provide, and control access to the building. Women, too, find a place in the patrol and their very presence serves to counteract a fear psychology that might have been prevalent before the patrol became active in a particular project.

**Social Benefits Weighed**

The social aspect of the tenant patrol is important in a number of ways beyond the indispensable function of helping to maintain interest. It helps to build up tenant pride and civic interest. In some cases the local patrol headquarters has become a gathering spot for off-duty members and for teenagers involved in constructive activity. Moreover, as patrols have developed in this manner, fears that they might turn into vigilantes have diminished.
Close cooperation with police, primarily the housing authority's own force, but also municipal police, likewise helps to curb any latent impulses toward the vigilante spirit. Such cooperation is basic to the entire tenant patrol concept. Members are told at the very beginning that they are not expected to be policemen. Their job is to act as a deterrent, and to call the housing police if trouble develops.

We make it easy for the patrols to call the housing police by providing them with phones and in some cases walkie-talkies. All housing patrolmen are equipped with walkie-talkies, so that quick communication is assured.

The housing authority has not reduced police coverage where active patrols exist. Rather than act as substitutes, the patrols have increased the effectiveness of housing police, acting as eyes and ears for the uniformed patrolmen and giving them the feeling that they are backed up by a group of responsible, interested tenants.

There can be no universal formula for the setting up of tenant patrols: The tenants are the first, and major, variable factor. Even where local conditions obviously require additional security measures, their willingness to volunteer determines whether a patrol can be established at all; they set the hours of operation and the program of patrolling—whether lobby attendant, escort service, outside patrol, building patrol, or a combination of these methods.

The tenants will probably be guided by the size and layout of the buildings in deciding upon the most suitable methods of patrol for their development. In New York City, high-rise buildings averaging about 130 apartments are common. Such buildings, with their large number of tenants and sizable lobbies, are well-adapted to a system of control by lobby attendants. We also have projects made up of low-rise buildings; in these, escort service (for the elderly, or for working women coming home from late shifts, etc.) from one or more central points has been found very useful.

Senior Citizens Play Role

One of the unforeseen aspects of the tenant patrol was the extent of participation by senior citizens. They sit in the lobbies of high-rises, teamed up with younger men, or help to man patrol headquarters. At the other end of the scale, youth patrols are better suited to escort service, or outside patrol. Thus, the kind of manpower available may influence the kind of patrol that is set up.

For those who have taken part in it, the growth of tenant patrols in New York City housing projects has been an exciting adventure. Wherever the patrols were given a fair try, they have contributed greatly to project security. Moreover, while the size and quality of the patrols vary greatly from place to place, they have all, to some degree, provided a meaningful additional avenue for tenant participation in project life. Many tenants are learning that working together with management they can indeed be effective in improving their environment. (This may be the most significant outcome of the program.)

New Security Measures Under Review

In another direction, the New York City Housing Authority has underway two experiments growing out of its relationship with Professor Oscar Newman of the Institute for Security Design. The first of these involves the application of his defensible space concepts to a row type garden apartment complex (Clason Point Houses) as part of a modernization program. It is too early to assess the impact of these changes on the total security of this development. Preliminary indications, however, suggest that significant changes have taken place in the incidence and profile of crime there.

The other experiment, at our Bronxdale housing development, involves installation of electronic surveillance and sensing equipment in selected buildings of a typical seven story, 28-building, elevator-equipped development. These devices are part of an overall space modification system using Professor Newman's defensible space concepts again. This experiment involves the installation of television cameras in modified building entrance lobbies and the elevators of selected buildings. The television receivers in the tenants' apartments may be tuned in on a special channel to receive the signals from these cameras. Thus the tenant may see a visitor on his TV set before operating the door buzzer to let him in. He may also follow the progress of his visitor into and out of the elevator. The tenant thus has not only aural but visual contact with any would-be visitor. Also, at strategic locations, other TV cameras are placed so as to "sweep" and "zoom" the various walks and building entrances. These cameras feed into a central console manned by a tenant patrol member. Other parts of this experiment involve devices which permit audio monitoring of an elevator from the various floors and monitoring corridors by devices installed on the apartment doors.

In the design stage is an experiment to test the effectiveness of a strategically located observation booth with a 360 degree revolving "zooming" TV camera mounted on its top. The booth and camera will be so located as to afford visual observation of a maximum number of building entrances. It will be equipped with a telephone for rapid contact with the police as well as the lobby patrols. It will probably be equipped also as a walkie-talkie base station.

The reader should not lose sight of the fact that these programs are based upon the installation of sound "hardware." A first line of defense in any building security program is a reasonably effective lock system and adequate lighting; and, finally, tenant patrols cannot substitute for basic uniformed police protection.

Mr. Granville is Deputy Director of Management in the New York City Housing Authority. He is indebted to Mr. Bernard Moses, Chief Manager, New York City Housing Authority, for his assistance in organizing material for this article.
For many residents of urban areas the advantages of city living have been blemished by the high incidence of crimes such as burglary and robbery. The fear of holdups, which threaten not only property but life itself, makes some citizens reluctant to leave the comparative safety of their homes and apartments. And even these homes and apartments are vulnerable to burglars who in the course of a few minutes take possessions acquired by families through a lifetime of labor and thrift. Boarded up store windows along many streets are mute evidence of the toll which crime losses have taken of the thriving neighborhood shops so essential to all communities. While crime is not unique to cities and, in fact, has spread to the suburbs as well, the city dweller is particularly exposed to crime.

Fortunately, city administrators are devoting greater attention to security. City police departments are emphasizing more effective use of manpower to apprehend criminals and, even more important, are stressing crime prevention activities. Police departments are helping citizens make their apartments, homes, and places of business less vulnerable to burglary. Of long-range importance, government is trying to identify and cope with some of the underlying causes of crime and social disorder.

HUD Authority

Recognizing this problem, Congress authorized HUD to make Federal crime insurance available on and after August 1, 1971, in those States where a critical problem of availability or affordability of crime insurance exists and where the States have taken no action to remedy the situation. The Federal program is administered in HUD by the Federal Insurance Administration and is now available in the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The Federal Insurance Administrator conducts a continuing nationwide review of the market availability and if he finds a critical problem in additional States which is not being resolved at the State level, he will designate such additional States as eligible for the purchase of Federal crime insurance.

This significant program, which requires applicants for crime insurance to meet certain basic protective device requirements, combines insurance protection with an upgrading of physical security designed to make insured premises less vulnerable to crime. For those who take all reasonable steps to protect their property, the Federal Crime Insurance Program enables residential and commercial victims of burglary and robbery crimes anywhere in an eligible State to recover some of their monetary losses through the purchase of Federal burglary and robbery insurance policies. Over 40,000 citizens have already purchased these policies, but such a small number scarcely reflects the dimension of the crime problem. Unfortunately, most people appear to be unaware of the existence of the Federal Crime Insurance Program.

Coverage and Purchase

Residential policies are available in amounts from $1,000 to $10,000 and in a single policy provide coverage against burglary and robbery losses. Commercial policies are available for businesses in amounts from $1,000 to $15,000 and provide coverage against burglary, safe burglary and/or robbery losses.

More specifically the policies cover:

- Burglary and larceny incident thereto, which means the stealing of property from within a premises which has been forcibly entered by means which leave physical marks of such forcible entry at the place of entry.
- Robbery, which means the stealing of personal property from the insured in his presence and with his knowledge both inside the premises and outside the premises. The term robbery includes observed theft.
- Damage to the premises committed during the course of a burglary or robbery, or attempted burglary or robbery.
- In the case of the residential insurance policy, the burglary of an enclosed locked storage compartment of an automobile, i.e., the trunk compartment.
- In the case of commercial insurance against burglary, the theft from a night depository and burglary of a safe, subject to a $5,000 limit on claims with respect to safes of less than insurance Class E quality.

The Federal crime insurance policies do not cover mere disappearance of property. In case of burglary there must be signs of an entry by force, evidenced by visible marks upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the premises at the place of such entry.

Federal crime insurance policies can be purchased through any licensed insurance agent or broker in the State in the same way as fire or automobile insurance policies, and commissions are payable to agents and brokers who sell the policies. To facilitate the operation of the program, the Federal Insurance Administration has selected a servicing company through competitive bidding. The servicing company furnishes information on the program and policies may also be purchased from its offices. The Federal Insurance Administration or the local office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development can furnish the names of the current servicing companies for each State.

Affordable Rates

Rates for Federal crime insurance are required by statute to be reasonable. Furthermore, they are establish-
Federal Crime Insurance Program

RESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE DEVICE REQUIREMENTS

(EXAMPLES OF ACCESSIBLE OPENINGS AND LOCKING DEVICES REFERRED TO IN THE PROTECTIVE DEVICE REQUIREMENTS)

- Windows to be protected
- Exterior doors and door leading into house from garage area to be protected
- Basement windows to be protected
- Exterior doors of apartments leading outdoors or into public hallway to be protected

- Dead bolt lock
- Mortised dead bolt lock
- Single cylinder dead bolt lock, operated by key outside and knob inside
- Self locking dead latch
- "Claw shell" lock
- Minimal type window locks

- Residential apartment house
- Windows to be protected because fire escape affords easy access
- Ground floor or basement windows to be protected
- Outside mortise dead bolt lock (Recessed into the edge of the door instead of the side)

The throw of the lock is illustrated by the distance which the bolt extends from the edge of the door when the lock is in a locked position. Minimum of 1" for residential.

HUD CHALLENGE / October 1974
Federal Crime Insurance Program

COMMERCIAL PROTECTIVE DEVICE REQUIREMENTS

(EXAMPLES OF ACCESSIBLE OPENINGS AND LOCKING DEVICES REFERRED TO IN THE PROTECTIVE DEVICE REQUIREMENTS)

- Air vents and windows within 18 feet from ground and exceeding 96 square inches in area and 6 inches in the smallest dimension are accessible openings and must be protected.

- Sidewalk doors to be protected by deadbolt locks or heavy duty padlocks.

- Skylight to be protected by bars or grillwork or by alarm system.

- Door or doorway to be protected including transom.

- Storefront plate glass display windows need not be protected by bars or grillwork.

- Example of bars and grillwork.

- Mortise dead bolt lock (recessed into the edge of the door instead of the side).

- Dead bolt lock utilizing interlocking vertical bolts and striker.

- Dead bolt lock for narrow frame doors.

- The throw of the lock is illustrated by the distance which the bolt extends from the edge of the door when the lock is in a locked position.

- Minimum of 1" for commercial.

- Case hardened steel shackle (should be minimum 3/8" thick).

- Heavy duty padlock (should be minimum 3/8" thick and case harden steel shackle). Five pin tumbler operation.

- The steel bar and staple of the hasp should be case hardened as is the padlock shackle. Reeded springs should be concealed when the hasp is closed.

- Case hardened steel shackle (should be minimum 3/8" thick).
ed on a metropolitan-wide basis so that residents and businesses in inner city areas will not be charged more than those in the suburbs. The annual rates in most metropolitan areas for residential policies are as follows:

- $1,000 of coverage = $30
- 3,000 of coverage = $40
- 5,000 of coverage = $50
- 7,000 of coverage = $60
- 10,000 of coverage = $70

Commercial rates vary depending upon the type of business, annual gross receipts, and options of insurance applied for. Only a half of the annual premium is payable with the application. Policy holders are billed every six months.

In most metropolitan areas, a grocery store or a drug store having gross receipts of under $100,000 would pay annual rates as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of coverage</th>
<th>Burglary and robbery in equal amounts (Option 1)</th>
<th>Robbery only (Option 2)</th>
<th>Burglary only (Option 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$60</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Option 4 (varied amounts of both coverages): Assuming a selection of $1,000 robbery and $5,000 burglary, the premium would be $60 plus $200 or $260.

The same store having gross receipts of between $100,000 and $299,999 would pay annual rates as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of coverage</th>
<th>Burglary and robbery in equal amounts (Option 1)</th>
<th>Robbery only (Option 2)</th>
<th>Burglary only (Option 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$90</td>
<td>$75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Option 4 (varied amounts of both coverages): Assuming a selection of $1,000 robbery and $10,000 burglary, the premium would be $90 plus $413 or $503.

Policies cannot be cancelled because of losses. Claims may be reported to the agent or broker from whom the policy was purchased or directly to the servicing company. All claims under the residential policy are subject to a deductible of $50 or 5 percent of the gross amount of the claim, whichever is greater. All personal property including jewelry is covered under the residential policy, but there is no coverage for loss of money in excess of $100. The commercial deductibles range from $50 to $200 or 5 percent of the gross amount of the claim, whichever is greater, depending upon the annual gross receipts of the insured.

Minimum Protection Standards

To help insureds reduce their vulnerability to crime, the program has minimum protective device standards which must be complied with as a condition of eligibility for insurance and payment of claims. The residential requirements printed on the residential application form are self-explanatory, but to help businessmen understand the more complex requirements in the commercial application, a new inspection procedure enables them to confirm that their stores meet the requirements. Commercial burglary requirements provide that doorways or doors and accessible openings meet the program's standards of protection during nonbusiness hours. An alarm system is required for some businesses exposed to a particularly high degree of risk. There are no protective device requirements in the case of commercial policies which insure against robbery losses only.

In order for a residential property to be eligible for Federal crime insurance, its exterior doors, other than sliding doors, must be equipped with either a dead bolt, or a self-locking dead latch. The self-locking dead latch should be used in conjunction with a dead bolt for if used alone it provides only minimal protection. Dead bolts or self-locking dead latches must have a throw of at least one-half inch or be equipped with interlocking bolts and striker. (The term "dead bolt" refers to the fact that the bolt cannot be made to retract except by turning a knob or key. The term "throw" refers to the distance which the bolt or latch protrudes from the body of the lock when the bolt or latch is in a locked position.)

All sliding doors and windows opening onto stairways, porches, platforms or other areas affording easy access to the residential premises must also be equipped with some type of locking device.

These are, of course, minimum requirements and are not intended to discourage the use of even more effective locks, such as a one inch throw bolt on doors (which is required under the protective device requirements pertaining to commercial premises) and a bolt-operated lock on windows. These security devices meet the Federal Crime Insurance protective device standards and we urge citizens to seek the advice now available from many police departments.

By participating in the Federal Crime Insurance Program, urban residents can help themselves reduce the threat of crime losses and thereby the knowledge that the insurance coverage means that they need not suffer the economic losses of crime single-handed. Through the combined efforts of citizens and government, both Federal and local, our cities can be made more secure and can maintain themselves as centers of dynamic life.

Mr. Rose is Assistant Administrator for Urban Property Insurance-Riot/Crime in the Federal Insurance Administration.
Citizen cooperation in helping to fight crime has had marked influence on burglaries and related crimes. Reductions in burglaries of 12 to 30 percent have been reported.

All over America, people are reacting to what has been described as the individual's greatest problem—the threat to his safety and property. Crime is no stranger to public housing where over 6 million Americans live under some form of subsidy and over 3 million people live in units under the direct control of public housing authorities.

America's sheriffs are increasingly concerned because burglary is the most frequent of all major offenses. Last year law enforcement agencies cleared or solved only 19 percent of the burglaries. During 1971-72, 71 percent of the burglary suspects arrested had been apprehended previously on similar charges. Burglary has been a relatively safe crime to commit.

Local needs dictate many methods of coping with this problem. In some areas metropolitan police provide police services. In other areas regular police patrols have been replaced by special housing police with limited jurisdiction, but are generally backed up by large departments in the area. In some localities, contract law enforcement has been effective through county sheriffs' departments or other law enforcement agencies.

Protection Extended to Public Housing

The many unique problems of protecting citizens in public housing cover a broad spectrum of concerns. Vertical patrol, large parking areas, elevators, etc., present many special problems. Planners are learning a great deal about better locks, more efficient methods of lighting, even techniques for breaking up the space into more controllable areas. But these are only parts of the formula for success—it is people who make it work. People lock or fail to lock doors and windows, see and report crimes. People are the victims and, unfortunately, the perpetrators of crimes.

Key recommendations in the National Advisory Commission's report on community crime prevention include recognition of the increasing need for citizen participation. The contribution of citizens to crime prevention—making their homes and businesses more secure by taking part in police-community programs—is helping to reduce significantly the number of crimes taking place.

To help reach this goal, the National Sheriffs' Association has been conducting a self-help educational program to alert citizens to the steps they can take to protect their property and the property of their neighbors from theft, and to encourage prompt reporting to, and cooperation with, law enforcement agencies.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the U.S.
Department of Justice has funded this program to make available materials designed to go directly into the home. Pamphlets and materials containing simple security hints provide the program with visibility and help to develop community awareness. This literature is being distributed efficiently through a network of participating sheriffs, local law enforcement agencies, and police.

Program Expansion Underway

The tremendous success of the National Neighborhood Watch Program has generated expansion into many areas where crime has previously gone unchecked. Reports from participating agencies indicate that areas in which effective police patrol has not been possible respond to Neighborhood Watch with very encouraging results. Police are now invited into these communities to talk to groups of citizens.

These successful techniques may provide some basis for improving security in our public housing complexes. Strategies for dealing with the crime problem in each complex may vary because of numerous differences—only people are common to the solution.

Recently, HUD brought together security experts from the fields of industry, public housing, and law enforcement to focus on many of the basic needs for improving tenant safety. Better locks, electronic surveillance, more active police and tenant patrols, etc., were all accepted as effective measures to provide security. Transferring the Neighborhood Watch concept to public housing could be the straw that breaks the back of crime.

An overwhelming response to the program has resulted in the shipment of over 12 million pieces of program material to participating agencies. A third printing has been ordered to meet the increasing demand.

Kits containing sample bumper stickers, window stickers, educational and crime prevention brochures, telephone stickers, and suggestions for program implementation were distributed to 2000 law enforcement agencies.

Results Confirmed

Recently announced studies have confirmed the effectiveness of citizen education programs in reducing burglaries and increasing non-victim reporting of crimes. The largest affected segments have been reducing non-force and minor-force intrusions, which account for the largest part of the almost 2.5 million reported burglaries in the United States.

Emphasis is placed on the people-to-people aspects of the program. In order to achieve the program's basic goal of reducing burglaries we can help make burglary unprofitable for the burglar. With active citizen participation we have a good start now, and we want to keep it moving.

Donald Santarelli, Administrator of LEAA, points out that, "LEAA believes that this is a beneficial program which is producing results. It is making the average citizen more aware of crime, and this in turn will bring crime down. It is for this reason LEAA is pleased to be involved in distributing this program to the sheriffs."

As long as supplies last, request from communities to join the growing National Neighborhood Watch Program will be considered. Inquiries regarding the program should be directed to Ferris E. Lucas, National Sheriffs’ Association, 1250 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Mr. Lucas is Executive Director of the National Sheriffs’ Association.
Residential Crime and the Elderly Victim

By Carl L. Cunningham

An elderly, infirm widow living alone in one of the older neighborhoods in Kansas City, Missouri, was confronted one evening not long ago by three young males who had broken through the back door of her small frame house. They ripped the telephone from the wall, ransacked the home, robbed and assaulted her. Their assault started a cycle that ended in her relinquishing her independent life to enter a nursing home.

This sort of crime, and thousands of similar ones are committed daily against Americans of all ages. There has been a marked social tendency to concentrate attention on criminal acts and the criminal, and to ignore the victim. Yet a full assessment of the social costs of crime can only be made from the victim’s perspective.

Of all persons who, in one way or another, become targets of a criminal act, the elderly usually suffer most. The reasons are very basic. Like many other Americans who are street crime victims, they are poor, both relatively and absolutely. However, unlike their younger counterparts, most elderly victims have little hope of recouping financial loss through later earnings. They usually have little physical and emotional resiliency; thus, physical abuse and mental anguish incurred through crime can leave a more lasting mark. Many live alone, and this aloneness is compounded by the fact that they have few persons to rely on for immediate aid, compassion or companionship. Some have none. They tend to be concentrated in areas of the city which may have high numbers of unemployed male youths. Thus, they are in juxtaposition with the element of society most likely to criminally victimize them.

Institute’s Findings
Older Americans live generally conservative and circumspect lives. A study by Midwest Research Institute of crimes committed against persons over age 60 in Kansas City, Missouri, confirms that they are less often victims of most forms of street crime, considering the population of the metropolitan area as a whole. However, that isn’t an informative comparison, because the elderly living in or near certain neighborhoods of the city can be ten times more vulnerable to serious crime than a younger resident of a relatively safe suburb who works and shops in areas with low crime rates. In short, the range of criminal offenses being committed against the aging American, and particularly the aging poor, covers the spectrum of violence and viciousness noted in the national crime pattern.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,831</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Offenses occurred in Kansas City, Missouri, over an approximate 18 month period (Sept. 72-Feb. 74).*

HUD CHALLENGE / April 1975
However, as important as any of these considerations is the fact that over 80 percent of these crimes were committed near the homes and immediate neighborhoods of their victims. This is due largely to the fact that burglary is the predominate crime against the elderly just as it is the most frequent criminal offense committed against Americans of all ages. Findings of the Institute also indicate that between 50 and 60 percent of all assaults, robberies, and larcenies were committed in or near the home of the victim.

Why focus on the site of the crime? The reason lies in the acceptance of the home as a "sanctuary." Criminal invasion of it, regardless of the outcome or loss, usually assumes larger dimensions in the victim's mind than a crime of equal or greater seriousness committed elsewhere.

While many elderly Americans are as vigorous in their approach to life as much younger persons, it has been shown that a violation of the "sanctity" of their homes can leave lasting feelings of being invaded, of threat to one's life, of aloneness and anonymity that irreparably demean their lives—particularly if several of these assaults are experienced repeatedly.

Contrary to popular belief that burglaries are most frequently committed against elderly apartment dwellers, and particularly residents of public housing, the study reveals that in Kansas City and, almost certainly, throughout middle America, the elderly victim of crime is most frequently living in a single family or duplex house.

Over 80 percent of residences of elderly persons burglarized over an 18 month period in Kansas City, were single family or duplex structures. Only 14 percent of the city's burglary victims over 60 years old live in structures consisting of more than four apartments. Many of the victims have owned their homes; and most have lived in their present neighborhood for more than 10 years. Some of this stability in residence stems from satisfaction and emotional attachment, but certainly not all. The study has included numerous cases of persons of advanced age who feel threatened by crime, to the extent that they would desire to relocate. But most who have this desire are without resources to move.

A Case Study
Consider a composite description of a residential burglary and its effect in the context of the aging victim's resources and condition. The target, a single story, somewhat rambling frame house, was built about 40 years ago. The security hardware is antiquated. Deadbolts, for example, are within easy reach of glass panes in the front door. The home has a fenced-in backyard, an overhang porch, and a basement that has an outside entrance. Houses nearby are of similar size and construction; but there are some multifamily units in the neighborhood, and many of these have fallen into disrepair. One or two are near the stage of abandonment. The neighborhood is racially mixed.

The offender is young—somewhere between 17 and 21. But his age will not be confirmed because he will not be apprehended. His selection of the house he intends to burglarize stems from his sense of risk to himself while he commits the crime and his estimate, based on experience, of the difficulty he will have in entering the structure. It is daytime and he sees no evidence of occupancy—an important factor. He knows the neighborhood. He probably lives in or near it. He pries open the locked front door and enters, making little noise. He is within full view of the street and at least the view of one neighbor, but if anyone notices him, no one calls the police.

Finding Solutions
Residential crime against elderly citizens is critical. But these victims are only that segment of society that is easiest hurt and in greatest need of help. The remainder of American society needs help as well.

The alertness of a single individual citizen is an important resource because it can pose a significant threat to the residential criminal. And even the most informal neighborhood organization formed for the purpose of maintaining a crime watch can create a synergistic force that can significantly reduce the residential crime rate in an area.

In addition, the elderly should be urged to organize in the interests of their own security, to create informal reliance networks of persons who have similar schedules, interests, and needs in order to decrease the physical aloneness of the elderly individual, and provide names of persons to be notified in cases of emergency. The involvement of exemplary young persons in high crime neighborhoods in accompanying and aiding the elderly who are alone is seldom attempted, but potentially beneficial.

Considering the very high probability that a person living in or near a high crime area of a city will become a multiple victim of burglary, organized citizen volunteers, trained and working under specific guidance of local police, should make home visits to the elderly, and offer advice on practical measures to reduce the chances they will become victims of crime.

As underlying support for all such efforts, information programs on personal and residential security in their neighborhoods must be developed for elderly citizens.

However, no programmatic approach will help much in suppressing residential crime unless there is active public commitment to the basic notion that a crime against one member of a community threatens the whole as well as its parts. Despite a constant national outcry against crime, that notion, curiously enough, is still rarely entertained at the grass roots of American society.

Mr. Cunningham is principal social scientist with the Midwest Research Institute, 425 Volker Blvd., Kansas City, Mo. 64110.
In June 1977, the Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver (DHA) began a program designed to provide housing residents with a greater feeling of security. The program was unique in that for the first time several city and Federal agencies cooperated to open the channels of communication between the Denver Police Department and the residents themselves.

The agencies involved were DHA, The Manpower Program of the Department of Labor, Denver Anti-Crime Council, and the Denver Police Department. Two housing projects were targeted for the program, South Lincoln Park Homes and Sun Valley Homes, which together comprise over 700 apartments. Through the Manpower Program, 20 staff positions, pursuant to Title VI of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, were allocated to the Denver Housing Authority and an intensive screening and hiring process was developed in conjunction with the Denver Police Academy. Appli-
Residents were interviewed by representatives of the Housing Authority with an instructor from the Police Academy present at the final screening.

As individuals were hired, they were assigned to either Sun Valley or South Lincoln Park Homes. Each development is staffed with a total of 10 employees, including day and night supervisors.

From the beginning of the program the intention was to develop rapport between the Housing Authority and the Police Department, between residents and the police, between residents and other residents and between the management of the Housing Authority and residents. There were many reasons for this need, but the overriding reason was fear. Police hesitated to get involved in civil disturbances; residents hesitated to call the police for fear of retaliation. Many crimes were, therefore, not reported to the police, but to the manager of the project. Occasionally the manager was not notified as he was often identified with the forces of authority.

The Community Representative Program, as it is now called, has been in operation for over 2 months. Already results can be seen. The channels of communications are improving, especially between residents and the Community Representatives and the management of the Housing Authority.

Training
One of the important aspects of the program was the training that each Community Representative received at the Denver Police Academy. Training consisted of such things as diffusing techniques, defensible space, personal safety, youth intervention, criminal codes, safety reviews, role playing, child abuse and neglect, alcohol abuse, interviewing, and how to make contact with the Police Department through dispatchers. Each Community Representative received 56 hours of instruction, which included video-taped sessions of role playing. Everyone had the opportunity to see himself in a crisis situation and to evaluate his strengths and weaknesses. Another part of their training included riding in the patrol car with police officers on duty. Community Representatives, it is hoped, will see the other side of the coin and be able to have an open mind in a situation involving conflict. Additionally, the channels of communication with patrolmen on the beat will be opened, and the police and Community Representative will get to know each other on a first-name basis. Staff of the Housing Authority have worked hard to create a positive link with the Police Department. Video taped interviews concerning the program were shown at police roll calls, and staff attended roll call to answer questions and clarify role ambiguities.

"When the program was initiated, we thought it was for security—to eliminate vandalism and burglaries and to recognize various crimes against persons," said Caroline Hall, a supervisor in the program. "After we received our training, however, we were very well equipped to deal with various non-violent crimes, and we soon realized that our job function was not as security guards or police officers, but as representatives of the community."

On a daily basis Community Representatives walk through their project talking to the people, finding out what is going on, and setting up many types of programs that are needed. Representatives wear blue windbreakers with the Denver Housing Authority patch for easy identification by residents and the police. The teams carry flashlights and walkie-talkies to keep communication lines open during the 24 hour, 7-day week that they are present.

Initial response from the developments varied: "Some residents felt threatened; they were confused about why we were here," said Loraine Murillo. "Were we police? narcotics agents? security guards? What exactly were we doing in their neighborhood?" Everyone knows the reason now.

"It's wonderful. The help given is really great for the people," said Josefita Gallegos from South Lincoln. "Especially all the things they do for the old people. When they take us shopping, it is really great, and I appreciate all the things they do."

"There is definitely less crime and I feel safer now," Mrs. Frazier of South Lincoln said. "Also, they help with problems we have when the manager can't take action on our part in dealing with other residents."

"There are fewer hassles and if there is a confrontation, Community Representatives can handle it. I feel safer," stated Martha Jane Johnson.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration will provide a statistical analysis of the program. Crime rates before and during the program will be compared as a measure of effectiveness. This will provide a reliable measure of the program, compiled by an outside and uninvolved party.

So the Community Representative Program is off to a good start. Statistics are being kept to determine its overall effectiveness, but it is obvious from the results thus far that the people of South Lincoln and Sun Valley are the real beneficiaries of the new relationship between the Manpower Program, DHA, the Denver Anti-Crime Council, and the Police Department.

—James G. Benway
Assistant Director
Operations Department
Denver Housing Authority
On November 10, 1975, the Holyoke Housing Authority was officially advised that it was the recipient of a grant of $63,000 from the Job Opportunities Program, Title X of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. The grant is awarded to housing authorities in areas of high unemployment, with the stipulation that the funds be immediately put to use on a worthwhile work program. Individuals who had exhausted unemployment benefits would receive top priority. Unemployed tenants of public housing, minorities, and persons ineligible for unemployment benefits were also to benefit from this program.

Security Guard Program
In view of increasing reports of crime and vandalism, the Holyoke Housing Authority staff recommended a security guard program to its board, which readily agreed that this type of service was needed. The staff proposed that several individuals be hired and trained as security guards to patrol all of its project areas with certain limited police powers.

Advertising for the positions began immediately with copies of the openings sent to all projects under the Housing Authority, the State Employment Office, and the Hampden County Manpower Consortium. Chief of Police Francis Sullivan agreed to help with the selection of the candidates, setting up work schedules for five different shifts, including enrollees in the Holyoke Police Academy's concentrated training program. The course was geared toward preparing these men for the routine problems they would encounter in the densely populated projects, and included training in family intervention problems, crowd control relations, and arrest and patrol procedures.

On January 3, 1976, seven men were sworn in as special police by the City Clerk, and on January 5, 1976, they were officially on patrol. Since the men were not to carry firearms, the Chief of the Holyoke Police Department had arranged for constant radio contact with the Department.

The immediate reaction from most of the tenants was one of pure relief. Since a number of the Authority's large family projects contained a considerable number of very small (one bedroom) apartments, elderly persons had occupied these units. This created problems of noise and other activity distracting to the elderly. The guards have proven themselves to be, among other things, masters of diplomacy and good judgment in handling the problem.

At the beginning of the program, the major portion of the guards' efforts were directed to one particular family project. This development had an unusually large number of vacancies and was quickly acquiring a very poor image. Vandalism in these vacant units was so bad that at one time, there were 22 broken panes in one large apartment alone. The hallways had become gathering places for the youngsters who used the walls for the latest graffiti, the floors and heating convectors were used for garbage disposal and generally annoyed all who attempted to pass. New entrance doors to each building had been installed in June of 1975. In January when the guards came on duty, all of the doors required some repair or replacement. Petty crime was rampant and tenant feuds were a daily occurrence.

The Authority began gathering statistics on work orders related to vandalism at this project from the time the Security Guard program began. In comparing the figures from the previous year, the staff found a saving of close to $15,000. Also, at the end of 1976 this project had only seven vacant units, as compared to 32 in January 1976. The Holyoke Police Department also attests to the fact that the number of calls from that project was reduced significantly.

During the course of the year, as the success of the program became apparent, staff began making inquiries as to the probability of future funding in order to continue this service. Although it was understood that the grant was a one time—one year donation, it was hoped that its success might engender future funds...
through the same agency.

After many fruitless attempts to get funding, an application was submitted to the City of Holyoke for possible Community Development funding. The request was filed in October 1976, and by December 31, 1976, a response had not been received. Since the Authority signed the closing documents for the acquisition of its Turnkey project on December 30, 1976, it was decided that even though the Title X funds for the guards had been exhausted, two of them would be kept on to cover the empty building until reasonable "rent-up" had been accomplished. It was also in the hope that funding would be forthcoming that the Chief Security Guard and one other guard were maintained.

The Citizens Advisory Committee for Community Development Funds turned down an initial request for $63,000 in late January. After careful scrutiny of operating budgets and conversations with HUD and DCA personnel, it was found that the Authority could provide about $23,000 to supplement possible Community Development monies, and the request was changed to a figure of $39,000. The Redevelopment Authority then voted to approve the allocation, which then awaited the Board of Aldermen review. After much questioning, discussion and tabling of the request, the Board of Aldermen and the Mayor unanimously approved the guard program on February 22.

The staff immediately contacted the men and kept their fingers crossed, hoping that none of them had found other employment!

Happily, security guards are again patrolling Holyoke Housing Authority properties.

Much thanks is due to the tenants who signed petitions, appeared at meetings and generally let their feelings be known regarding the success of the guards, as the program will go forward for one more year. It is hoped that other funding sources will be found for future years.

Rita Grenier Peloquin
Director of Management
Holyoke Housing Authority
Jersey City’s Experiment in Tenant Safety

By Neil S. Piro

The complete absence of any working relationship with tenant organizations was a primary issue that had to be faced squarely and honestly. Efforts to make physical improvements, stimulate fiscal solvency or deal with the rising crime rate and vandalism were viewed as futile in the absence of a meaningful tenant-management relationship. Besides a rather obvious lack of professional staff and massive internal reorganization that would be necessary, other factors had to be considered in developing effective tenant strategy. Existing tenant councils were considered inadequate bases from which to proceed, because they were loosely knit groups, unable to bring about improvements or to expand their base of support. Second, confronting project-wide problems was considered too large a task for a small group of tenants to handle when

Members of the A. Harry Moore project, tenant patrol monitor access to the building by having visitors and residents “sign-in” as they enter and leave.

There is an unmistakable gleam of pride today in eyes which once emanated despair as they gazed upon properties under jurisdiction of Jersey City’s Housing Authority.

In March 1973 the Authority was in default of its obligations to its tenants, its sponsors and itself; however, today there are activities which manifest hope and determination to improve the quality of life in the projects. In four high-rise buildings, formerly notorious as “tough, unmanageable projects,” newly-painted walls have remained without graffiti since September 1973. A year ago, in at least five of the nine JCHA housing projects, bitter anger and frustration of the residents was unmistakably etched on battered walls of bleak hallways. JCHA’s housing was in physical disrepair; its operating deficit was large and it maintained a negative if not antagonistic relationship with tenants. Such is no longer the case now as each evening groups of tenants voluntarily sit in their lobbies and monitor access to their buildings; an indication of a community spirit which has galvanized project tenants toward initiating plays, cake sales, Christmas programs, gospel sings and other activities including the placing of decorations in public corridors.

The Beginning of Improvements

The first step toward a revival of public housing in
gies were individually geared and/or administered, and social services, would be grossly insufficient. Such strategies were individually geared and/or administered, and could not deal with the existing gamut of problems. Finally, whatever approaches were considered would have to be comprehensive in both theory and practice; they would have to encompass tenant organization, policy participation, security, daily maintenance, large scale remedial maintenance and tenant screening.

After much theoretical and empirical investigation with the help of New York City Housing Authority, we decided to initiate a five phase program that would:

- Organize the residents of a building into a "tenant patrol" to monitor maintenance of and access to their own building;
- Refurbish the interior of buildings where tenant patrols are operating, in accordance with patrol priorities and engineering necessity;
- Install a tenant grievance and screening procedure through which patrol members can deal with disorderly tenants and with the Housing Authority and deny future access to disruptive tenants;
- Install a series of interior hardware devices which would assist patrol members in monitoring their building and enhancing the privacy of their residences;
- Improve the appearance of the housing site and maintain upkeep with tenant patrols.

We decided to concentrate initial efforts on the A. Harry Moore complex which consists of seven twelve-story buildings containing 664 units located on a 7.6 acre site. The project houses 2,080 persons—70 percent black, 10 percent Spanish-speaking, and 20 percent white. Vacancies were increasing monthly. The grounds and building interiors were rundown and the project was viewed by public officials as "unmanageable" and by tenants as "the toughest." However, it was believed that it might be turned around and become the project that would begin to dispel the notion that low-income high rises can't work.

We decided to begin organization of tenant patrols and interior refurbishing in only one building; this, we believed, would serve a number of key purposes. Organizationally, it allowed for a limited professional staff to concentrate on a smaller number of tenants, thereby allowing communication to be relatively easy and rapid. This coincided with our original intention to utilize the building as the unit for patrol organization. This lent a high self-interest plane of motivation (i.e., to improve our building) and maximized the potential for individual, rather than representative, participation in the definition and fulfilling of patrol program roles. Also, by executing interior refurbishing in only one building concomitant with patrol organization, the work would be within staff capacity and could be accomplished in a reasonable time.

Producing visible results quickly would be imperative to expanding and sustaining tenant confidence in the Authority and in themselves. As tenants within the building and in other buildings actually saw dramatic improvements accompanying the organization of a building patrol, the connection between the two would become self-evident.

Changes Implemented

Project leaders were contacted. They in turn solicited floor captains who solicited the support of two or three neighbors. Tenants and LHA officials met to determine repair priorities; an engineering survey was taken of the building, and refurbishing began, consisting of plastering and painting hallways in colors of the tenants' choice. Tiling, painting stairwells, replacing metal-plated "windows" with panes of lexan, and other improvements were made.

As refurbishing proceeded so did the organization of the building patrol. Tenants designed patrol buttons which were given to each member; lobby patrol duty schedules were compiled and a series of training sessions held to train patrol members in handling a variety of situations they might encounter. On September 4, 1973, the first organized tenant patrol began working in the first refurbished building in A. Harry Moore.

Security Patrol Fully Operational

Three to four tenants began to sit in the lobby of their building from 7:00 to 9:00 p.m. and a second group from 9:00 to 11:00 p.m., greeting fellow tenants, explaining the program to tenants in the building who were not yet participating, and asking non-residents to "sign-in" and indicate their destination. The tenants are not cops and not vigilantes; if an incident and/or crime develops it is reported to the Jersey City Police Department Headquarters radio room which dispatches either a police officer or guard from its Bureau of Housing Security. The patrol members are simply interested tenants committed to insuring that their building is a decent place to live and raise children.

The program caught on quickly; concerned and dissatisfied tenants from other buildings and other projects asked, "Why that building? What about us?" Our response was simple: "Those tenants organized into an effective building patrol and the Authority made repairs with the confidence that improvements will be maintained through the patrol's commitment." The message seemingly got...
across clearly. Numerous groups of other concerned tenants began the difficult process (with some LHA staff assistance) of organizing cohesive building organizations. To date there are eight high-rise buildings in various stages

of patrol organization, six of which are currently in various stages of interior refurbishing. The Authority has not spent one dollar on broken lightbulbs in organized buildings; none has been broken. Nor have we had to replace one hallway or stairwell window, despite an average of more than two children per unit. New front and back doors in each patrolled building are still on their hinges; they belong to the patrols and the tenants take personal responsibility for their maintenance.

It is important to note here, however, that although the program has far surpassed any of our expectations, as evidenced by both the present condition of the organized buildings and by the growing spirit of real community among the patrol members, it is neither devoid of problems nor a public housing panacea.

The Value of Organizing
The formation of building organizations has clearly surpassed our capacity to initiate concomitant refurbishing activities, so much so that we have directed our tenant organizers to curtail further contact with any building not already in the process of organizing. There is absolutely no point in encouraging the formation of additional building patrols until our maintenance task force can handle additional buildings. In fact to do this would in all probability have a negative effect, making future organizational efforts even more difficult. Our staff presently can refurbish only one building at a time, at an approximate cost of $20,000 a building—$6,000 in materials and $14,000 in labor. Average completion time is 1½ months. Tenant patrols are organizing themselves at twice the pace. We also have insufficient funds to properly approach the fourth and fifth phases of the program, i.e., interior security hardware and site improvements. Two projects will in all probability be ready and waiting for such activity by the summer of 1974.

Problems Scrutinized
Patrol leadership is not yet as problem-free as it might become. Building organizations are often too dependent upon a few key tenants; this creates problems for both the patrol and its leaders.

Nonetheless, despite difficulties and temporary weaknesses we find the patrol program a significant first step in making public housing work and are confident the program will persist and prevail. A number of public officials have observed the Jersey City program in operation and voiced their support and enthusiasm. Jersey City Mayor Paul Jordan has committed over two million dollars in police, sanitation, planning and social services to the LHA in support of the program. James Sweeney, HUD Newark Area Office Director and S. William Green, New York Regional Office Director, have given the LHA maximum flexibility in administering the program and have committed their offices to support of the program as best they can.

Finally, and most importantly, our greatest hope lies with the tenants, themselves, the consumers of public housing. Participation on their part has crossed age, race and family size barriers. There are two—parent and one—parent families who are active patrol members; there are welfare recipients and fully-employed families; blacks, Puerto Ricans and whites; senior citizens and teenagers—all exerting exemplary efforts to improve the quality of their residence. Their response to our initiatives has become literally overwhelming; we can foresee no reason to doubt its continuance.

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