SECOND YEAR EVALUATION OF THE SAN JOSE ROBBERY PREVENTION PROGRAM

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

A. OVERVIEW AND PERCEPTION OF PROGRAM INPUT

This report documents an independent evaluation of the second year of the San Jose Police Department Robbery Prevention Project (RPP). The evaluation was conducted by E. Fennessy Associates (EFA) under contract to the Santa Clara Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board. The San Jose RPP is funded by a grant from the U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) with matching funds from the State of California, the City of San Jose, and private industry. The grant supporting the RPP, and this evaluation, was awarded and administered by the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP) through the Santa Clara Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board. While this evaluation covers the second year of RPP operations (August 1, 1976 to July 31, 1977), it has also been necessary to reassess certain aspects of first year RPP operations (August 1, 1975 - July 31, 1976) due to some ambiguities encountered in reviewing project baseline data. This evaluation contract was awarded in May 1977 and completed in September 1977.

The stated goal of the Robbery Prevention Project is to reduce armed robberies in San Jose and to provide technical aids for law enforcement so that armed robbery suspects can be quickly identified, apprehended, and convicted in court. The RPP, which is described fully in Chapter II of this report, consists of two basic components: 1) the Surveillance Camera Program; and 2) the Secret Witness Program.

This report relies heavily on quantitative analysis of project results. It should be noted, however, that the manner in which a project is perceived by its host agency, the community, and other agencies is of substantial importance to its success or failure. Therefore, in addition to the quantitative analysis, EFA interviewed over 20 key officials in the public and private

sector who had knowledge of the RPP in order to assess their perception of project impact. More specifically, we interviewed the Chief of Police and various command and staff personnel of the San Jose Police Department, officials in San Jose City Government, the Santa Clara County District Attorney and members of his staff, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court, the Executive Editor and members of the staff of the San Jose Mercury-News, and representatives of the Northern California Grocer's Association. In general, the consensus of this group was that the San Jose Police Department's Robbery Prevention Project was a well-managed, innovative, and quite effective attack on armed robbery of commercial establishments in San Jose.

Some concern was expressed in these interviews that the program may reach a point of diminishing returns after several years of operation; but, as noted, the RPP enjoys strong criminal justice system and private sector support. We were particularly impressed by the willingness of the Northern California Grocer's Association to provide financial support - by assessing their member organizations - for reward money to operate the RPP's Secret Witness Program. We were also impressed by the considerable effort in time and money expended by the San Jose Mercury-News in both publishing Secret Witness Reports and acting as a receiver and conduit of information on armed robberies to the Robbery Prevention Project.

We believe that the high degree of acceptance enjoyed by the RPP - together with the substantial results it has achieved [that is documented in later sections of this report] qualify this program for designation as an "exemplary" or "promising" project under the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's guidelines. In brief, as evaluators, we regard this as an excellent project and one worthy of transfer and replication in other jurisdictions.

B. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION

This section contains a summary of the results of the detailed evaluation of the San Jose Robbery Prevention Project. A comprehensive discussion of the evaluation is presented in subsequent chapters of this report.

Overall Evaluation Results

The San Jose Police Department's Robbery Prevention Project (RPP) has met or exceeded all of its stated objectives. Some of the key findings of this evaluation include the following:

- In the 19 months of RPP operations evaluation, the project has been a major factor in the successful clearance of 150 armed robberies. (122 in San Jose and the remainder in surrounding jurisdictions).
- The RPP was a major factor in 41% of all SJPD armed robbery clearances in its first year of operation and in 28% of all such clearances during the first seven months of second year operations.
- The first year of RPP operations produced a 69% increase in armed robbery clearances compared to the baseline period and a 56% increase during the first seven months of the second year.
- Without these RPP contributions, SJPD robbery clearances would fall significantly below national averages.
- The RPP made major contributions to a net reduction of 87% in complaint rejections for armed robbery compared to the baseline period.
- There has been a significant increase in guilty pleas for RPP cases (14% the first year, 76% for the first seven months of the second year) compared to the baseline period.
- Armed robbery arrests have increased by 84% over the baseline during first year RPP operations and by 61% during the first seven months of second year operations.

In summary, from an overall perspective, EFA regards the RPP as an excellent police project and one that has made a significant contribution to enhancing SJPD effectiveness and productivity in dealing with the problem of armed robbery of commercial establishments. The remainder of this section - provides supporting detail for this conclusion and sets forth policy implications for SJPD management consideration.

Objectives and Scope

As a result of the first year evaluation, the six grant objectives were modified to permit a more realistic assessment of project performance. Five objectives were established for the second grant year;

1. Increase by 10% the total number of arrests for armed robbery.

2. Increase by 10% the clearance rate for armed robbery.

3. Decrease by 5% the projected rate of increase in the number of armed robberies reported.

4. Decrease by 5% the number of rejections for applications for armed robbery complaints.

5. Increase guilty pleas by 5% prior to Superior Court trials.

Although five components were implemented in the first year of the grant, only two components actually form the main thrust for the second year of the Robbery Prevention Project:

1. Surveillance cameras installed in selected stores.

2. Secret Witness Program based on rewards paid to anonymous respondents to newspaper publication of armed robbery and selected other violent incidents.

Project staff consists of a Project Manager (Detective Sergeant) handling the Secret Witness component; a Detective Sergeant entirely responsible for the surveillance camera installation and post-event investigations; a part-time contract assistant for camera installation and servicing; a full-time Steno II; and a dark room technician.

First year project funding was $258,823; second year, $207,405. The funding was for personnel, rewards and purchase of 150 cameras and supplies.

Evaluation Approach

In view of the limited period of surveillance camera (S.C.) and secret witness (S.W.) actual operation during the first year of the grant, the first year evaluation could essentially report on only eight months of activity. There was a three-month delay in getting the initial cameras in place and in setting up the procedures for the S.W. program. This second year evaluation, consequently, reviewed the entire operational period spanning 19 months, from November 1975 (data of camera initial installations and publication of S.W. incident synopses) through May 1977 (cut off date to permit analysis).

The project starting dates (grant year and actual operations) are out of phase with normal annual and quarterly statistical reporting periods that are based on a calendar year. As a result, it became necessary to assemble data on a monthly basis to enable comparative analyses of the statistical data.

Further complicating the analyses was the difficulty in attempting to determine whether Objective 1 (increase armed robbery arrests) was being met. Armed robbery arrests are aggregated with all robbery arrests in the published statistical reports as the BCS (Bureau of Criminal Statistics) and UCR (Uniform Crime Report). The result was the need to use an indirect method to develop the baseline and overall Department data.

In order to fully understand how the cases handled by the project were cleared, a case by case analysis was undertaken. Although the project maintained S.C. and S.W. logbooks, and incident case folders for those cases cleared as a result of the project interventions, information was incomplete particularly with regard to complaints, pleading and dispositions. Assistance was provided by SJPD Research and Development personnel to secure such information from CJIC. R & D personnel also provided monthly statistical data based on Department records and CAPER-generated statistics. Robbery prevention calculations were prepared also, similar to the prior first year regression analyses.

Because of the difficulty in developing a satisfactory baseline for the 12 months preceeding the project operational startup, a select sample of armed robbery cleared cases was drawn from the records storage facility to permit a case by case analysis for comparative analysis purposes. Support was provided by the SJPD Juvenile Division in determining dispositions of juvenile offender cases. But information on pleadings involving juveniles has not been satisfactorily resolved.

Interviews were conducted with project and department management personnel, prosecutor and District Attorney, Municipal Court Judge, newspaper editor and S.W. receiver, and a commercial association to determine opinions and views on the project. Periodically, the project manager and camera detective sergeant were briefed on findings, and questioned about certain cases that were difficult to understand with regard to the actual clearance processes and pleas. CJIC could not adequately provide the latter data. Finally, a draft of this report was reviewed by both RPP staff and Evaluation and Monitoring Personnel of the Santa Clara Regional Criminal Justice Planning Agency prior to final publication.

Robbery Perspective

In 1975, San Jose had a robbery rate that was 25% below the national average, and 42.5% below the average for the State of California. Relative to cities of similar size in California, San Jose recorded an exceptionally low number of robberies. Nonetheless, the trend over the past 15 years has been decidedly up, but with year-to-year, somewhat sharply fluctuating increases and decreases. For example, during a 12-month period (November through October) in 1962-63, 93 armed robberies were reported. By 1975-76, the number had risen to 599, but with a 3% decrease from the overall high occurring in 1974-75. The armed robbery "season" appears to peak between July and January, with about 66% of all armed robberies occurring in this period. Our analysis of the data indicates that the RPP has the potential to be effective in roughly 33-45% of all reported armed robberies.

While a 15-year history of clearances for San Jose had not been developed, a three-year seven-month period (November to May, comparable to the second year evaluation period) shows a fluctuating record: from 20% in 1974-75, 35% in 1975-76, to 26% in 1976-77 (seven months). These clearance rates are of more than casual interest when considered in context of the Robbery Prevention Program as will be shown in the discussion that follows.

Program Meeting Grant Objectives

The overall specified grant objectives are being met. From an evaluation perspective, EFA believes that Objective 3 -- Decrease the Rate of Increase of Armed Robberies -- is of questionable utility in view of the widely held opinion that the number of reported armed robberies fluctuates from year to year for reasons beyond law enforcement's ability to account for, much less influence, such variations. This observation is borne out in the 15-year period noted above, and particularly during the baseline and project years. Each of the five objectives is

briefly discussed below.

- Objective 1: Increase by 10% the total number of Arrests for Armed Robbery

The difficulty is separating out armed robbery from the aggregate of all robbery arrests was noted previously. By using a series of approximations, it was determined that 111 arrests for armed robberies occurred in the 1974-75 baseline period (November-May), 204 in 1975-76, and 179 in 1976-77. It is readily seen that the Department has overachieved this objective by a considerable margin -- 84% increase in armed robbery arrests for 1975-76 comparing the first project period to the baseline; and 61% for the second project period.

- Objective 2: Increase by 10% the Clearance Rate for Armed Robbery.

The Department has overachieved this objective both in the first and second project periods. The first year (12 months) showed a 69% increase in the rate of armed robbery clearances compared to the 1974-75 baseline year. The second project period (November 1976 through May 1977) of seven months, compared to the first seven months of the baseline year shows a 56% increase. However, when all three comparable seven-month periods are compared, the second project period reveals a 26% decrease in clearance rates compared to the first project period. This down trend is reflected in the productivity analyses undertaken on S.C. and S.W. operations discussed later.

- Objective 3: Decrease by 5% the Projected Rate of Increase in the Number of Armed Robberies Reported.

Of the five project objectives, this one proved to be the most troublesome, and possibly the most unrealistic measure of project performance. For reasons thoroughly explored in the body of the report, it is recommended that it be eliminated for the third year. In brief, because of widely fluctuating levels

of yearly reported armed robberies, a distorted result is obtained in projecting estimates on the basis of the statistical methodology employed. While there is no quarrel with the technique, the results projected do not reconcile with a broader perspective of trends and factors influencing crime rate fluctuations.

While the objective was apparently achieved in a technical sense, we do not believe that it is a valid or meaningful measure of program accomplishment.

- Objective 4: Decrease by 5% under the Baseline the Number of Rejections of Applications for Armed Robbery Complaints

Because there was no simple procedure available to secure case complaint data on all armed robberies in order to compare project interventions, namely by the S.C. photograph component, we restricted the comparative analysis to facilities in which the S.C. was involved. Consequently, we drew a 100% sample of cleared commercial armed robberies for the baseline year for facilities that closely resemble those in which cameras have been installed. This objective was overachieved in both projects period. A net reduction in complaint rejections of 87% was achieved in both project periods compared to the baseline year.

- Objective 5: Increase Guilty Pleas by 5% Over the Baseline Prior to Superior Court Trials.

Reconciling the guilty pleas based on project file records and those that we calculated based on case by case CJIC information proved to be perplexing. The first year evaluation report understated actual guilty pleas in the baseline year for reasons not clear. The disparity between the project tally and the evaluation count seems to be a result of multiple pleas entered (over and above the S.C. and S.W. cases for which the primary

arrest was made), and juvenile proceedings. Only through a case by case, defendant by defendant audit, together with assistance from RPP staff could we resolve the problem using the CJIC terminal.

There is no question that the project has overachieved this objective. The first year showed a 14% increase in guilty pleas (comparing the select sample of baseline year cleared cases), and 76% for the second project period (seven months). But the question of pleading measurement differences should be resolved. Also, the ability of CJIC to provide a customized tabulation of San Jose case pleadings should be explored.

Performance Measurement

Although the five grant objectives permit the assessment of impact on armed robbery incidents, their clearances and processing defendants at the prosecution level, they provide no insight into the dynamics of the operational process. Consequently, we undertook to compile selective operational information from project logs, case reports and developed time-related data on case clearances by arrest, camera deployment and robbery occurrence, newspaper incident publication and offender arrest.

- Surveillance Camera - Rate of Productivity

The results of calculations made are illustrated in a series of graphs contained in Figures V-1, V-2 and VI-1. The graphic display reveals on a month-by-month basis, the relationship between armed robbery incidents, cameras installed, secret witness synopsis publications, and cases cleared.

Beginning in February 1977, the installation of cameras (the 50 additional procured for the second year) occurred at a faster rate than that of robberies. But, also beginning in February, there is a perceptible divergence in the rate of clearances compared to the increase in reported robberies. By April 1977, a more pronounced slowing in the S.C./S.W. clearance rate is noticeable. This slowing of clearances roughly coincides with the earlier observation that the number of armed robberies occurring slackens yearly after January until July.

The Secret Witness Program is given to a more cyclical performance (clearance compared to number of incidents published) compared to the S.C. component. However, there is one noticeable difference. The S.W. component, following a high initial return in both 1975-76 and 1976-77, settles to a clearance rate between 10-12 percent yearly average.

- Clearance Rate Declining Faster Compared to Project

The fact that the return on the investment made (cameras installed and synopses published) compared to clearances, reveals a slowdown to the Spring of 1977, should not be construed as the beginning of a program washout. Rather, the information presented is calling attention to the need for possible operational strategy changes. In this context, an analysis was undertaken to compare project clearances on armed robberies to those clearances effected on non-project related cases.

In the baseline year, the overall Department clearance rate was 18.6%. During the first project year, the overall Department clearance rate was 30.1%. However, the project contributed 12.2 percentage points of this rate. In the second project period

(seven months), the overall clearance rate dropped to 25.7% with the project contributing 10.7 percentage points of this rate. This clearance drop comes in the second project period of armed robbery incident increase, which has risen 19% compared to the full 12-month first year. Despite the decreases in the rate of clearances for both project and non-projected related cases, the project has increased its relative proportion of clearances. The S.C./S.W. component has an impressive record of 71% clearances (35 out of 49 cases handled). On looking at the statistics another way, the Department, exclusive of the RPP contribution, has lost ground from its previous high.

- Pronounced Shift in Arrest Lag Times -- S.C. Cases

In the course of analysing the baseline sample of cleared cases, and comparing the elapsed times from report of robbery to arrest of the alleged offender(s) in the project period, we discovered a surprising result. In the baseline sample of 33 cases cleared by arrest, 28, or 80% were made within four hours by patrol. The remaining 20% were presumably made by investigators over a period of days. The median arrest period lag time was one hour and two days respectively.

On the other hand, during the project period, an almost complete reversal is revealed in arrest lag times. During this 19-month period, 28% of the S.C. cases (facilities in which a S.C. produced a photo) were cleared by arrest by patrol within three hours. The other 72% were cleared by both patrol and investigators over a period ranging from one day to over 100 days, the median time being 14 days. The obvious implication of this observation is that the S.C./S.W. program is able to provide investigative leads to a greater degree than has heretofore been possible by convential investigative practices. The explanation for the sharp drop off in on-scene/pursuit arrests is not clear. But it has been suggested that patrol response has been affected by changes in communication and dispatch procedures.

- S.C. Idle Times -- Possible Deterrence

From CAPER - generated data it was determined that during 1976 there were approximately 178 reported armed robberies of convenience and liquor stores, compared to 199 in 1975. The 60 cleared S.C./S.W. cases for these similar type establishments and others in 1976 were 71% greater compared to 1975. The possible deterrence effect may be revealed by our analyses of the median and mean elapsed times from dates of camera installation to first and last robberies, or none at all, to June 1, 1977.

Out of 150 cameras in place as of the end of May 1977, 30 camera-equipped stores had experienced one robbery; eight had more than one; two experienced five, and 14 S.C. store robberies occurred that were not cleared. Seven of these last cases involved S.C. stores that had been hit previously and the cases cleared.*

The mean (average) number of days from date of camera installation to the date of the first robbery is 155 days.* The median is approximately 40 days. The mean number of days from the last robbery in a given store to June 1, 1977 is 281 days. The mean number of days that 103 cameras have been in place without a robbery incident is 295 days. One can only conjecture whether these long periods of no hits, or long elapsed times from the last robbery reflect a deterrent effect.

- S.W. Case Clearance Elapsed Times

There were some 30 S.W. cases analyzed that fell into the median class range of 10-19 days for clearance by primary arrest. The median was approximately 11 days. These elapsed

*An internal RPP study conducted after review of a draft report of the evaluation came up with somewhat different findings. See the discussion related to Table V-13.

times are based on the first date of incident publication in the newspaper. It is interesting to note that 60 cleared cases resulting from publication of an event also fell into the 10-19 median class range. The median, however, was 19 days, some nine days more than the primary arrest clearance. This finding is similar to that of the S.C. component, that patrol officers and investigators are being provided with a reciprocal feedback mechanism to extend investigations to cases that for the most part might never have been solved.

Policy Implications for the Third Year Plan

- Pleadings

The difficulty in reconciling Project-logged complaints issued or rejected, and guilty pleas with the evaluation's approach points up the need to devise a validated procedure to routinely secure this information. The present project approach with the inherent difficulties in securing complaints and pleadings information from CJIC suggests the need for a consistent recording methodology and policy. The juvenile proceedings involving pleas are particularly difficult to audit under present procedures. The CJIC information on these two project data needs is not easily obtained.

- Project Case Logs

The procedure for serially recording S.C. and S.W. cleared cases is useful. But a cross reference should be established to quickly reveal the S.W. support to clearing a S.C. case. There was no master project log indicating those S.C. facilities hit that have not been cleared during the period of this evaluation.* The S.C. detective sergeant, however, maintains a photographic

*The data was subsequently complied by RPP staff after receipt of the draft report. Use the discussion with Table V-13 for further detail.

log on which certain annotations are recorded. So long as this procedure is known to an evaluator, there probably is no need to formalize the recording system.

- Program Planning and Strategy Reassessment

Given the recognizable cyclical (or seasonal) declines in S.W. responses leading to clearances, attention needs to be directed to publication procedures that may increase offfender I.D. The presumption is of course that the program can produce a higher or consistent yield ratio than the current 9 to 1, or initial 7 to 1 (number of published incidents compared to cases cleared). The decline is somewhat paradoxical when one considers the results of the newspaper readership poll conducted in 1976. This poll revealed a higher readership of the S.W. column compared to other featured columns on sports and senior citizens.

A project experiment revealed the success of photos published compared to a mere description of the crime scene and offenders. Given that some 600 events were published against 1100 reported robberies over the 19-month project period, a policy decision may be in order regarding whether the effort involved to publish at this rate is advisable, or whether a more effective screening procedure should be introduced.

The S.C. component, while also in a somewhat lower return rate compared to first year operations, appears to be more stable than the S.W. operation. The S.C. yield ratio (number of cameras installed compared to cases cleared) since December 1976, has been slowly climbing from 1.7 to 1 to 1.9 to 1 as of May 1977. This approximate 2:1 ratio has held since November 1976. Prior to this period, the ratio has fluctuated between 2.1 to 1 to 2.9 to 1 (excluding the first two operational months which are highly skewed).

Given the prior "idle time" averages for the large number of installed camera targets not having been hit, a policy question is raised regarding the need for reassessment of the deployment strategy. Countervailing arguments can be raised regarding alternative strategies. First, by examining the slopes of the graphs illustrating the deployment of cameras, and the cumulative rate of case clearances, it can be seen that at certain periods case clearances rose more rapidly than the static deployment number of cameras. The rising yield rate lags the camera installations by a variable period of time. The current (April-May 1977) decline may be just a pause before the clearance rates take off again. Thus, the first strategy is to closely monitor the "pulse" for a period of three to five months, from June through October to see if a turnaround occurs to coincide with the expected seasonal increase in robberies.

An analysis appears desirable of the impact of the third installation series of 20 additional cameras to ascertain the marginal return on arrests and clearances versus the incremental cost of installing more cameras.* Implicit in this analysis is the need to determine whether purchase of additional cameras will buy a greater return than increasing police response time, changing the beat structure and/or beat manning levels.

This first strategy is essentially a "sit tight" policy of not making any immediate changes. A second alternative strategy calls for a contingency plan to redeploy the existing "non-productive" cameras in the eventuality that a more unfavorable yield ratio (greater than 2:1) appears certain. Examination of the graph slopes for cameras installed shows a more rapid rise than the reported robbery rate at varying periods. Case clearances, while initially lagging at varying times appear to keep pace and exceed the rate of rise of robberies. The contingency strategy thus calls for an intensive pattern analysis leading to recommendations

*These 20 additional cameras were purchased with local funds and are not controlled by the RPP.

or re-siting cameras in target areas experiencing robberies. Such recommendations would be predicated on technical feasibility.

- Patrol Response to the S.C. Target

Of potential policy significance, is the need to determine why so pronounced a shift in arrest lag times occurred in the S.C. target facilities compared to the baseline sample analyzed. The as yet unexplained reasons for a sudden drop off in patrol on-scene or pursuit arrests in the project period for S.C. - equipped stores could have implications regarding patrol response priorities. The impressive clearance rate of the S.C. - S.W. support component speaks to the possibility reassessment of patrol response strategies when assurance of victim safety and availability of exposed film have been determined by dispatch. The overall drop off in Department robbery clearance needs to be examined in light of the evaluation findings.

A major consideration in the patrol response time analysis may be the indication of increasing resort to facial and headgear covering by perpetrators attempting to thwart I.D. (with perhaps knowledge of the hidden camera). In this situation, vehicle, clothing and other suspect descriptors quickly put out over the radio could be critical to their apprehension. This has not been a major factor up to now with 15.3% of the camera cases involving disguises in the first year and 16.6% in the second year to date. However, it should be closely monitored during third year RPP operations.

CHAPTER II
PROJECT DESCRIPTION

This chapter describes the background, objectives, current operations, and other relevant details relating to the San Jose Robbery Prevention Project. The chapter is based on examination of grant applications, project files, quarterly reports, first year external evaluation, final reports, and extensive interviews with project management and staff. This chapter is designed to provide a context for the reader to understand the detailed project evaluation presented later in this report.

Time Frame of the Project

The grant application from the San Jose Police Department to the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning was prepared in mid-1974. The application was successful and the project had an initial starting date of February 1, 1975 and a termination date of January 31, 1976. However, due to a variety of administrative problems between OCJP and the City of San Jose the Robbery Prevention Project was initiated on August 1, 1975. Due to this late start, the project staff requested a grant modification extending the project to July 31, 1976. Thus, for all practical purposes, the first full year of project operations was between August 1, 1975 to July 31, 1976.

A grant application for second year funding of the project was prepared and submitted on April 1, 1976. This application was subsequently approved by OCJP and provided funding for the period of August 1, 1976 to July 31, 1977. This evaluation is designed to focus on second year operations of the San Jose Robbery Prevention Project. As will be made clear later in this report, it was also necessary to redo certain aspects of the first year evaluation in order to develop a firm understanding of the project's accomplishments.

Project Justification

In describing the need for the Robbery Prevention Project, the San Jose Police Department's initial grant application stated that:

> The City of San Jose has been experiencing rapid urbanization and accelerating population growth. As a result, one of the major problems has been the rising rate intensity of crime, specifically, the increased number of reported robberies. The population of San Jose has swelled from 279,000 in 1963 to 524,000 in 1973. Robberies have increased from 125 in 1963 to 687 in 1973. As the population doubled, the robbery incident rate increased over five times. The robbery clearance rate has dropped from a 1963 high of 63% to a 1973 low of 34%.*

The grant application goes on to note that in 1972, over $240,000 was taken in robberies and that 10 citizens and four suspects were killed during the commission of robberies between 1969 and 1973.

Of specific relevance, the application states that the major problem in a robbery investigation is the identification of the robbery suspect and that:

> ...statistical data show an alarming increase in the failure of the victim to identify the suspect because they cannot or will not become involved.

As a result of witness and/or victim reluctance to come forward and due to the fact that a robbery scene usually produces little or no physical evidence - the San Jose Robbery Investigators encountered increasing difficulty in obtaining complaints from the District Attorney's Office.

*Current (1977) San Jose population is estimated at 575,000 persons according to the California Department of Finance.

In an effort to overcome these problems, investigators found that they were spending more and more time on court approved physical and photographic lineups in attempts to obtain positive identification of robbers by the victims and/or witnesses. The grant application also cited the fact that due to the identification problem more and more robbery arrestees were electing full-scale trials with their attendent costs in time and effort on the part of all involved parties.

In summarizing the need for a robbery specific project, the San Jose Police Department cited the following problems:

- High incidence of robbery in San Jose.
- Decreasing clearance rate
- Physical violence in relation to robbery
- Identification difficulties
- High cost of robbery cases tried in superior court.

Project Objectives

During its initial year of operation, the project specified that its overall goal was:

> ...to reduce robberies in the City of San Jose and also to provide aids for law enforcement and the citizens of our community so that robbery suspects can be quickly identified, apprehended and convicted in court.

In line with this goal, the first year grant application set forth the following specific objectives:

1. Increase by 4% in the first year, 6% in the second year, and 8% in the third year, the number of "in-progress" arrests for robbery.

2. Increase by 10% over the three year period of the grant the number of reasonable cause arrests for robberies.

3. Increase by 5% the number of arrest warrants executed.

4. Decrease by 5% the project rate of increase in the number of robberies reported.

5. Decrease by 15% the number of rejections of applications for robbery complaints.

6. Increase guilty pleas by 15% prior to Superior Court trials.

In its application for second year funding, project staff specified the following objectives:

1. Increase by 10% the total number of arrests for armed robbery.

2. Increase by 10% the clearance rate for armed robbery.

3. Decrease by 5% the projected rate of increase in the number of armed robberies reported.

4. Decrease by 5% the number of rejections for applications for armed robbery complaints.

5. Increase guilty pleas by 5% prior to Superior Court trials.

Early in the second year, project staff submitted a request for a grant award modification with respect to objectives. Specifically, the following changes were requested and approved:

- The word "armed" was added since the second year of the grant will only attack armed robberies. The strong-arm robbery program has been eliminated.

- Objective 2 was added to provide a clearer overview of project accomplishments in increasing armed robbery clearances.

- Objective 3 was modified to indicate that the project expects to achieve a 5% decrease during the second year of operation in the expected rate of increase in armed robberies.

It should be noted that these objectives were established during a period when "crime specific" programs were in vogue and in order to obtain funding, it was essential that quantitative "target" figures be included in all applications for OCJP/LEAA support. As evaluators, we have both practical and theoretical objections to some of these objectives which will be discussed later in this report.

Project Component Programs

During its first year of operation, the San Jose Robbery Prevention Project utilized five distinct components.

1. Improved robbery investigative techniques and robbery analysis.
2. Improved patrol procedures and techniques.
3. Surveillance cameras
4. Secret witness program
5. Confidential and investigative fund.

Each of these components will be described briefly below.

Improved Robbery Investigative Techniques and Robbery Analysis

The aim of this project component was to completely review all aspects of robbery investigation in the San Jose Police Department. More specifically, project staff assessed case assignment procedure, case preparation systems, use of field interview cards, analyzed patrol information, use of teletypes,

collation of robbery-related information from patrol, investigators, and informants, case filing systems, warrant serving process and liaison with robbery investigators, and paper work flow systems. During the first year of the grant, project staff produced a 200-page Robbery Investigation Manual for the Department specifying enhanced investigative procedures.

Improved Patrol Procedures and Techniques

The aim of this project component was to develop improved procedures for handling robberies on the part of the patrol force and assuring appropriate coordination between patrol and project efforts. Specific attention was paid to developing patrol procedures for surveillance camera protected locations and the implementation of patrol programs aimed specifically at the reduction of strong-armed robberies.

Surveillance Camera Component

Project staff were impressed by a surveillance camera project instituted by the Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department and decided to utilize a similar effort in San Jose. Thus, in the first year application, the San Jose Robbery Prevention Project proposed to purchase, install and maintain 100 surveillance cameras in selected locations as determined by an analysis of prior commercial robberies. These cameras are hidden in a disguised housing and are triggered electronically by a bait bill in a store's cash register. The camera itself is manufactured by Crim-Eye, Inc. and will take up to 12 35mm still pictures once activated. The camera does have certain technical limitations. For example, it has a top lens speed of F.2.8 which in combination with a "fast" film enables it to take pictures indoors without a tell-tale flash. However, as fast as this is, many retail businesses (e.g., bars, restaurants, etc.) are generally too dark for effective utilization of the surveillance camera. Also, the use of incandescent lighting - as opposed to fluorescent lighting - will render the camera ineffective.

Further, the camera is generally utilized in an indoor environment - to facilitate electrical connection to the cash register* - and to protect it from weather and theft. This generally precludes its use at service stations with their outdoor cash drawers located on the gas pump islands. The camera is also less than effective when the robber is disguised (e.g., ski mask, nylon stocking, etc.). Despite these limitations, there are still a large number of retail outlest in San Jose (e.g., Convenience stores, liquor stores, markets, etc.) that are likely robbery targets in which the surveillance camera can be utilized. Thus, once a robbery occurs and the film is successfully exposed, the film is retrieved and prints made and circulated to San Jose Police Field Forces for possible suspect identification. The photos are also circulated through an area-wide watch bulletin until an identification is made. If these approaches are unsuccessful - or if there is a particular urgency about the case - the photo is placed in the newspaper and the Secret Witness Program (described later) is used to solicit identification of the robbery suspect by the public. A total of 100 cameras was purchased and installed during the first year of the grant. During the second year of grant operations an additional 50 surveillance cameras were purchased and installed. Specific businesses initially identified for camera installation were selected on the basis of two robberies in a six month period.

Secret Witness Program

The Secret Witness Program is an attempt to solve robberies by offering monetary rewards to anonymous informants who provide suspect identification information that leads to an arrest. Reward money is provided by grant funds, the Northern California Grocers Association, and the San Jose Mercury-News. During the first year of grant operations, over $10,000 in Private Funds were pledged to the Secret Witness Program. This component of the

*RPP Staff is currently experimenting with a remote activation Device.

Robbery Prevention Project works as follows. The Project Manager reviews all robbery cases (and other heinous crimes) on a weekly basis and provides case summaries to the newspaper which publishes them on a weekly basis. During the first year of the grant, these cases were published twice a week. The newspaper invites anonymous informants to call in information to a designated telephone number where a newspaper employee assigns the informant a code number and name. This information is then relayed to the Robbery Prevention Project Manager who assigns it to an investigator for follow-up. The informant, at the time of the initial call, is instructed to call-back at a designated time so that any questions the investigator may have can be put to the informant by the newspaper telephone receiver. When, and if, the investigator identifies and arrests the suspect and is successful in obtaining the issuance of a robbery complaint by the District Attorney, the reward will be paid to the secret witness. Again, the newspaper receiver will handle the payment which ranges from a minimum of $300 to a maximum of $2,000.

Project Organization, Staffing and Finances

The San Jose Robbery Prevention Project is organizationally located in the San Jose Police Department's Bureau of Investigation - one of the four major bureaus of the Department. The project is specifically located in the Homicide/Robbery Section of the Criminal Investigation Division.

The Project Manager is a Detective Sergeant. This individual originally developed the Robbery Prevention Project concept, wrote the grant application, and has managed the project since its date of inception. Thus, there have been no managerial changes to disrupt project continuity. First-year project staffing included the following:

1	Detective Sergeant Project Manager	100% of time
3	Detective Sergeants	100% of time

1	Police Sergeant (records)	20% of time
1	Steno II	100% of time
1	Crime Analyst	50% of time
1	Dark Room Technician	50% of time

The second year project involved some major staffing revisions - the reasons for which will be described later. During the second year of the grant, the project was staffed as follows:

1	Detective Sergeant - Project Manager	100% of time
1	Detective Sergeant	100% of time
1	Steno II	100% of time
1	Dark Room Technician	100% of time

Project Funding

The first year funding for the Robbery Prevention Project totalled $258,283 of which $226,415 were federal funds; $12,579 was state buy-in money; and, $19,829 was local "hard" match funds.

The operating budget for the first year was as follows:

	Total	% of Total
Salaries	$125,137	48.5
Benefits	30,625	11.8
Travel	2,309	.9
Evaluation	7,500	2.9
Equipment	32,320	12.5
Supplies/Operating Expenses	60,392	23.3
TOTAL	$258,823	100.0

The second year project cost totalled $207,405 - of which Federal funds accounted for $186,665; state buy-in funds for $10,370; and local "hard" match funds: $10,370. The second year budget for the project was broken down as follows:

	TOTAL	% OF TOTAL
Salaries	$79,913	38.5
Benefits	21,780	10.5
Travel	6,396	3.1
Evaluation	10,000	4.8
Camera Installation, Equipment, Maintenance	39,288	18.9
Equipment	18,700	9.0
Supplies/Operating Expenses	31,328	15.2
TOTAL	$207,405	100.0

Significant Decisions Related to The Project

1. The Decision to Modify Project Components Between the First and Second Year of the Grant.

The reader will remember from our discussion of first year grant operations that the project had five major components. At the end of the first year, the Project Manager decided that project staff had accomplished all that they could in enhancing robbery-related patrol operations and in devising standardized robbery investigation procedures. Therefore, during the second year of the project, these components were eliminated and two of the Detective Sergeants assigned to the grant project were returned to normal line duties.

The second year grant concentrated its efforts on two of the original five components: 1) the Surveillance Camera Program; and, 2) the Secret Witness Program. The Confidential Investigative Fund (e.g., payment to informers) was also retained but the Project Manager decided not to utilize this component during the second grant year. Thus, for all practical purposes, the second year project is be evaluated here solely in terms of how well the Secret Witness and the Surveillance Camera Programs impacted the robbery problem in San Jose - both singly and in combination.

2. The Decision to Drop Strong-Arm Robberies from the Project

From a practical standpoint, the decision by project staff to drop strong-arm robberies as a primary project target was a wise one. Since the Surveillance Camera portion of the RPP was operative only inside commercial establishments, it was clear that this component would have no effect on strong-arm robberies which are essentially spur of the moment "street" crimes. The Secret Witness Program could conceivably impact strong-arm robberies but RPP management decided to concentrate primarily on only those "street" robberies that involved weapons or excessive violence. This eliminated the vast majority of typical mugging and purse snatch type strong-arm robberies from principal RPP emphasis.

The major result of this decision - while a good one from an operational perspective - was to seriously complicate this evaluation. The reason for this is that the crime of robbery is essentially a single statistical category for police data collection and compilation purposes. For example, all statewide BCS and National UCR statistics deal with robbery per se and make no distinction between armed and unarmed robbery. To be more precise, we were able to obtain good data from the San Jose Crime Analysis Unit describing the event of armed robbery but we ran into major problems in obtaining data on armed robbery

arrests and dispositions. This problem will be discussed in much more detail in later sections of this report.

Project Summary and Rationale

In summary, the San Jose Robbery Prevention Project, during its second year of operation, consisted of two major components: 1) the Surveillance Camera Program; and 2) the Secret Witness Program. The primary target of the RPP is the armed robbery of certain types of commercial establishments. Specifically, the RPP is concerned primarily - but not exclusively - with armed robbery of convenience stores, liquor stores, and other types of retail establishments that have been the target of armed robberies in the past and whose environmental conditions allow the effective placement of surveillance cameras.

In Chapter III that follows, we will present a brief overview of armed robbery in San Jose to provide the reader with a context in which to view RPP efforts.

CHAPTER III

AN OVERVIEW OF ROBBERY AND ARMED ROBBERY IN SAN JOSE

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of armed robbery in the City of San Jose to provide a context for the evaluation of the San Jose Robbery Prevention Project that will be presented in subsequent chapters.

The crime of robbery takes place in the presence of the victim and involves the taking of property or anything of value from a person by use of force or threat of force. In an operational sense, the police generally separate robbery into two classes: 1) armed robbery; and 2) strong arm robbery. The former category includes those cases involving any type of dangerous weapon (e.g., gun, knife, club, etc.). The latter category includes strong-arm robbery where no weapon is used and includes such crimes as "mugging", "yoking", etc. Some agencies routinely separate out "thefts from a person" to incorporate purse snatches, etc. However, for our purposes, the only categories used by the San Jose Police Department are armed and strong arm robbery.

Scholarly research finds significant differences between robbers and other types of criminals. Roebuck, for example, concluded that robbers are:

> ...frequently single, migratory, intelligent, and more emotionally maladjusted than other offenders.[1]

More specifically, armed robbers also differ in marked degrees from other offenders. Roebuck states that:

> ...armed robbers were less frequently addicted to drugs and alcohol than other offenders ... and at an earlier age, evidenced a greater tendency to use physical force, whether in the form of destruction of property,

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[1] Julian Roebuck: Criminal Typology (Springfield, Illinois Charles Thomas, Publisher, 1966), page 107.

> fighting with schoolmates or a periodic mugging or purse snatching... As a group, the armed robbers were highly self-centered and coldly unemotional.[2]

In brief, robbers - and particularly armed robbers - are fairly formidible criminals who often terrorize their victims to such an extent that they are quite reluctant to testify against such individuals once they are apprehended. This fact is one of the cornerstones of the San Jose Robbery Prevention Project's development of alternative means of identifying armed robbers through its Secret Witness and Surveillance Camera Programs. These programs will be discussed in detail later in this report. However, we feel that it is important to first provide some overall perspective on the severity of the armed robbery problem in San Jose.

National Robbery Trends

San Jose is categorized as a Group I City under the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) program of the FBI. There were 20 cities in this category that had populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000 persons. In 1975, these 20 cities reported a total of 71,257 robberies. Overall, these cities reported that 25.8% of these offenses were cleared by arrest or other means. On a national basis, robberies increased 33 percent between 1970 and 1975. The rate per 100,000 persons increased by 27% during this same period.

Table III-1 compares the rate of robbery per 100,000 people in the City of San Jose to national, pacific states, California and the San Jose Standard Metropolitan Statistical area.

[2]Ibid, p. 108

TABLE III-1

ROBBERIES PER 100,000

Area	1974	1975	% Change
National	209.3	218.2	+4.3
Pacific States	219.6	243.6	+10.9
California	252.7	282.4	+11.2
San Jose SMSA	125.7	136.2	+10.5
City of San Jose	152.8	162.9	+6.2

As this table indicates, San Jose in 1975 had a robbery rate that was 25% below the national average, 33.4% below the average for the Pacific States, and 42.5% below the average for the State of California. Further, while San Jose's robberies were increasing 19% faster than the national average, this rate of increase is 43% less than that of the Pacific States and 45% less than for the State of California as a whole.

In comparing the rate of robberies per 100,000 in San Jose to other SMSA's in the State of California, we find the following:

SMSA	Robberies per 100,000
San Jose SMSA	136.2
San Francisco-Oakland	396.5
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria	82.5
Los Angeles-Long Beach	421.2
San Diego SMSA	215.4
Modesto SMSA	111.2
Riverside-San Bernardino	190.1
Santa Cruz SMSA	133.0
Santa Rosa SMSA	85.0

While not the lowest, the San Jose SMSA compares very favorably to the vast majority of California SMSA's. The robbery rate in the San Francisco - Oakland SMSA, for example is over 191% higher than that in the San Jose SMSA. In terms of comparably sized cities, San Jose continues to demonstrate an exceptionally low number of robberies. We have selected the following sample to illustrate this point.

TABLE III-2
COMPARATIVE ROBBERY STATISTICS

City	#1975 Reported Robberies
San Jose	887
San Diego	2,199
Portland	1,843
Seattle	2,103
Long Beach	1,959
Kansas City	3,081
San Francisco	5,687
Oakland	3,185
Sacramento	1,128

Again, in terms of comparably-sized cities, San Jose has far and away the lowest number of reported robberies. We will now focus specifically on robbery in San Jose.

Armed and Strong Arm Robbery in San Jose

The table on the following page illustrates the frequency of robbery in San Jose between 1975 and 1976 by month.

TABLE III-3

MONTHLY ARMED AND STRONG ARMED ROBBERIES IN SAN JOSE

1975-76

Month	1975			1976		
	Armed Robbery	S. Armed Robbery	Total	Armed Robbery	S. Armed Robbery	Total
January	72	24	96	65	32	97
February	47	20	67	89	25	114
March	41	16	57	43	27	70
April	47	23	70	38	19	57
May	38	13	51	31	26	57
June	31	19	50	24	21	45
July	57	21	58	44	35	79
August	59	26	85	41	39	75
September	50	20	70	51	34	75
October	56	31	87	56	37	93
November	54	27	81	75	34	109
December	63	32	95	53	28	81
TOTAL	615	272	887	610	357	967

The data shows that armed robberies accounted for 69.3% of total robberies reported in 1975 and 63.1% in 1976. The armed robbery "season" appears to peak between July and January with 65.9% of all armed robberies occurring in this period. However, the peaks and valleys in the 1976 data are quite pronounced. Overall, armed robberies decreased slightly from 1975 compared to 1976. However, all robberies increased by nine percent during the same period.

Armed Robbery Trends

Over the past 16 years, armed robberies in San Jose increased 965%. Table III-4 shows the overall trend.

TABLE III-4

FIFTEEN YEARS OF SAN JOSE ARMED ROBBERIES

Nov - Oct	# of Armed Robberies	% Increase or Decrease
1961-62	58	-----
1962-63	93	+60.3
1963-64	89	- 4.3
1964-65	82	- 7.9
1965-66	104	+21.2
1966-67	158	+51.9
1967-68	161	+ 1.9
1968-69	277	+72.1
1969-70	329	+18.8
1970-71	325	- 1.2
1971-72	471	+44.9
1972-73	424	-10.0
1973-74	612	+44.3
1974-75	618	+ .2
1975-76	599	- 3.1

As the data shows, there is a considerable amount of year to year variation in the annual number of armed robberies. One way of looking at this data is to break it up into five year blocks. Thus, between 1961-1962 and 1965-1966, there was an average of 79.3 armed robberies per year. Between 1966-67 and 1970-71, there was an average of 250 armed robberies per year. By the 1971-72 to 1975-76 time period, armed robberies averaged 545 per year. One can speculate endlessly on the reasons for this increase, but obviously San Jose's surging population is likely the central factor in this increase. As noted, the year to year variation is striking. For example, in 1970-1971 there was a decrease of 1.2% compared to the prior year. In the next year (1971-72) armed robberies increased 45%. However, the next year (1972-73), armed robberies decreased by 10%. One other phenomenon of interest was uncovered in the course of this study. An internal San Jose Police Department report found that as caseloads per officer have increased, certain classes of crime (armed robbery, among them) have experienced decreasing percentages of reported cases that have been "unfounded".[3] More specifically, in the period from 1959 to 1968, an average of almost twenty-five percent of all reported robberies were unfounded upon police investigation. Unfounding simply means that the initial report of a crime (e.g., robbery) is, upon investigation, found not to be that crime. For example, either the reported crime never occurred or it was determined to be a different type of crime. Thus, in the 1959-1968 time period, roughly one out of every four robberies was unfounded. By way of contrast, in 1975 and 1976 only .7% of reported robberies - or less than one out of every 100 - was "unfounded". Obviously, this change results in more robberies being reported and seriously distorts any trend predictions. This change results from increasing caseloads and a concommitant inability to thoroughly investigate all reported offenses. Thus, some cases that would have been unfounded in the past are now being carried as actual offenses.

[3] Edmund Luksas: Long-Range Trends: Service Demand, Personnel Performance, Budgets, and Conflicts Between Them, San Jose Police Department, June 20, 1977.

	BASELINE PERIOD: 1974 - 1975												
	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	TOTAL
# Armed Robberies	67	53	72	47	41	47	38	31	57	59	50	56	618
# Cleared	25	7	13	4	8	2	13	8	12	8	4	11	115
% Cleared	37.3	13.2	18.1	8.5	19.0	4.2	34.2	25.8	21.1	13.6	8.0	19.6	18.6%

	FIRST YEAR OF PROJECT: 1975 - 1976												
	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	TOTAL
# Armed Robberies	54	63	65	89	43	38	31	24	44	51	41	56	599
# Cleared	11	32	13	36	15	8	18	6	8	7	12	14	180
% Cleared	20.3	50.1	20.0	40.4	34.9	21.0	58.1	25.0	18.2	13.7	29.3	25.0	30.1%

	SECOND YEAR OF PROJECT: 1976 - 1977 10 months of data												
	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J*	J*	A*	S	O	TOTAL
# Armed Robberies	75	53	61	69	56	75	66	54	39	41	--	--	589
# Cleared	29	16	9	8	21	14	20	10	12	9	--	--	148
% Cleared	38.6	30.2	14.8	11.6	38.2	18.6	30.3	18.5	30.8	21.9	--	--	25.5%

*Obtained after research cut-off date

TABLE III-5

ARMED ROBBERY FREQUENCY
AND CLEARANCES BY MONTH FOR THE
BASELINE, FIRST AND SECOND YEAR OF
THE ROBBERY PREVENTION
PROJECT

Armed Robbery Frequency and Clearances During the Baseline Period and Project Years

The purpose of this section is to present data on armed robbery during the period we have chosen for evaluation purposes. Table III-5 displays this data for the baseline year (November through October) 1974-75 as well as for the first year of Robbery Prevention Project operations (1975-76) and for second year project operations to date (1976-77).

As the data clearly show, the first year of the project resulted in a 3.1 percent decrease in armed robberies (618 to 599) and an increase in clearances from 18.6 percent to 30.1 percent. In short, clearances increased by almost 62 percent.

Since the second year of the project is still in progress, it may be useful to compare comparable periods (e.g., November - May) for all three years. The table below presents this comparison.

TABLE III-6
COMPARATIVE CLEARANCE RATES FOR ARMED ROBBERY

Year	#Armed Robberies	# Cleared	% Cleared
1974-75	365	72	19.7
1975-76	383	133	34.7
1976-77	455	117	25.7

The data shows a substantial increase in armed robberies during the second year compared to the baseline period (a 24.7% increase) Clearances are still higher in the second year (by 30.4%) than the baseline period but are down by 26% in comparison to the first year of project operations. This data will be discussed in some detail later in this report.

Clearances by Age Group

In the baseline year, 10.4% of armed robbery clearances involved juveniles under the age of 18 and 89.6% involved adults.

In the first year of project operations (1975-76), the percentage of clearances involving juveniles increased to 17.7% with adult clearances for armed robbery decreasing to 82.3%.

For the second year to date, roughly 15.3 percent of the clearances involve juveniles with adults accounting for the remaining 84.7%.

Arrests For Robbery

No readily retrievable data were available for armed robbery arrests so we utilized arrest data for all robberies (armed and strong arm) to provide a general picture.

The three tables on the following page illustrate the trend in robbery arrests in San Jose.

In the baseline year, adults accounted for 68.5% of robbery arrests. In the first project year, adults accounted for 63.1 percent of robbery arrests. Overall, there was a 21.2% increase in robbery arrests between the baseline year and the first project year.

Comparing the November through May period for all three years produces the results shown in Table III-6.

TABLE III-6

INCREASE IN JUVENILE ROBBERY ARRESTS

	# of Arrest	# of Juvenile Arrests	% of Juvenile Arrests
1974-75	192	56	29.2%
1975-76	240	73	30.4%
1976-77	224	103	46.0%

Arrests increased by 25% between the baseline year and the first project year. Second year arrests increased 18% over the baseline but declined by 7% compared to the first year. Juveniles are accounting for a growing portion of all robbery arrests - up 57.5% from the baseline year during the second year of the project.

Initial Disposition of Robbery Arrests

Again, we used data on all robbery arrest due to the lack of specific data on armed robbery arrests. Table III-7 below illustrates the initial disposition of robbery arrests for the baseline and first year of the project.

TABLE III-7

INITIAL DISPOSITION OF ROBBERY ARRESTS

Year	Total Adults Arrest For Robbery	Released By Police or Comp. Rejected	Turned Over to other Jurisd.	Misdemeanor Complaint Filed	Felony Complaint Filed
1974-75	233	55	4	15	144
1975-76	269	52	8	16	170

Year	Total Juveniles Arrested For Rob.	Handled Within Department	Turned Over To Other Jurisd.	Sent to Juvenile Hall
1974-75	102	8	1	93
1975-76	142	17	1	124

Targets of Robbery and Armed Robbery in San Jose

We used two sources of data that describe robbery targets in San Jose: 1) BCS data; and 2) CAPER data. Both sources provide a slightly different perspective that is worth comparison. The BCS data is shown in the specific format for all robberies that is reported to both the State and the FBI UCR Program. Table III-8 shows the BCS breakdown for the baseline year and for the first project year.

These figures indicate a decrease of roughly three percent in commercial robberies between the baseline year and the first full year of project operations. Particularly striking is the over 30 percent decrease in the chain stores. This was offset by an increase of over 57 percent in the robbery of service stations. It is instructive to compare the time period of November through April and the May through October period in both years. Table III-9 below presents these data for commercial robberies.

TABLE III-9
ROBBERY TARGETS

	1974-75 Robberies				1975-76 Robberies			
	1st Six Mth.	%	2nd Six Mth.	%	1st Six Mth.	%	2nd Six Mth.	%
Chain Store	96	52.1	88	47.9	93	72.6	35	27.4
Bank	12	75.0	4	25.0	5	38.4	8	61.6
Service Station	34	53.9	29	46.1	54	54.5	45	45.4
Commerical House	93	52.0	86	48.0	104	55.3	84	44.6
TOTAL	235	53.2	207	46.8	256	59.8	172	40.2

TABLE III-8
BCS BREAKDOWN OF ROBBERY TARGETS

		1974		1975											
		N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	TOTAL	
Commercial	Chain Store	17	13	28	17	9	12	8	8	15	21	13	23	184	
	Bank	5	1	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	1	0	16	
	Service Station	5	9	2	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	2	63	
	Comm. House	17	19	27	10	9	11	10	12	19	15	14	16	179	
	Subtotal	44	42	60	33	24	32	24	23	40	45	34	41	442	51.0
Other	Highway	22	11	24	24	23	23	18	23	24	29	23	31		
	Residence	7	7	2	4	3	12	6	3	6	7	9	4		
	Other	12	10	10	6	7	3	12	3	6	7	9	4		
	TOTAL	85	70	86	67	57	70	51	50	78	85	70	87	866	49.0

TABLE III-8

BCS BREAKDOWN OF ROBBERY TARGETS

(Continued)

		1975		1976											
		N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	TOTAL	
Commercial	Chain Store	12	12	17	29	14	9	3	7	5	5	9	6	126	
	Bank	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	4	13	
	Service Station	6	14	11	12	4	7	6	4	9	15	9	2	99	
	Comm. House	24	10	23	28	7	12	12	7	17	13	14	21	188	
	Subtotal	43	37	51	71	26	28	21	18	32	35	33	33	428	44.9
Other	Highway	28	35	35	22	32	20	23	18	34	34	31	49		
	Residence	8	15	6	10	5	4	7	5	6	10	5	6		
	Other	2	8	5	11	7	5	6	4	7	11	6	5		
	TOTAL	81	95	97	114	70	57	57	45	79	90	75	93	953	55.

We will not speculate on the meaning of these figures other than to note the substantial decrease in chain store robberies in the second half of the first project year compared to the baseline pattern.

Armed Robberies in San Jose According to CAPER Data

We obtained data on armed robberies in San Jose for the three-year period 1974-76 from the Crime Analysis Prevention Evaluation and Research (CAPER) Project. This is much better data than that available from BCS and provides a much finer breakdown of targets specifically for armed robbery. The data presented in Table III-10 were hand-tabulated from CAPER computer printouts for all armed robberies during this three year period.

While we are not completely confident in the accuracy of the data*, they provide some useful indications of the potential capability of the RPP to affect armed robbery clearances. More specifically, using 1976 as an example, we believe that the RPP could potentially impact armed robberies in the following categories:

Facility	Number
1. Convenience Store/ Super Markets	145
2. Liquor Stores	33
3. Hotels/Motels	15
4. Banks	17
5. Other Commercial Premises	36

Thus, we believe that the RPP - and particularly its Surveillance Camera Program - could have been utilized to affect arrests in 246 (33%) of 745 armed robberies.

*Due to different procedures in defining armed robberies.

TABLE III-10

CAPER ARMED ROBBERIES IN SAN JOSE TARGETS

TYPE OF TARGET	1974	1975	% + - 74-75	1976	% + - 75-76
Dwelling	50	72	+44	53	-26
Convenience Store/ Super Market	160	157	-2	145	-8
Gas Station	50	63	+26	97	+54
Liquor Store	37	22	-41	33	+50
Hotel/Motel	8	20	+150	15	-25
Bar	17	16	-6	6	-63
Restaurant	18	36	+50	16	-56
Drive-In/Take Out Restaurant	30	24	-20	21	-13
Vehicle	24	28	+17	38	+36
Bank	11	10	-9	17	+70
Other Commerical Premise	47	60	+28	36	-24
Street or Public Place	108	134	-24	120	-10
All other	23	7	-70	28	+300

This requires some explanation. Note that we are referring specifically to the Surveillance Camera Program here. Thus, (again using 1976 as an example) it is impractical to install cameras in dwelling places (53), streets/public places (120), bars (6) and vehicles (38). The technical problems involved in installing cameras in gas stations (97) and drive-in restaurants (21) have not been solved as yet and the category of "all other" (28) is meaningless. In short, in 499 of the reported armed robberies, the Surveillance Camera Program could not be used. Of course, the Secret Witness Program has general applicability, but - as will be shown later - its results indicate that it is only useful in certain situations. For example, if a lone robber sticks up a gas station wearing a disguise and keeps this fact to himself, it is unlikely or impossible for the Secret Witness Program to obtain a "hit" on this individual.

The point we are trying to make here is simply this: The San Jose RPP has genuine potential for clearing cases in somewhere between 33-45% of all actual armed robberies in San Jose. The remainder will have to be dealt with by traditional police means (e.g., informants, aggressive patrol, investigative follow-up, etc.). This program is not a panacea but it is one that has the potential to very significantly upgrade police apprehension capabilities in controlling certain types of armed robberies.

CHAPTER IV

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Evaluation Objectives

The Second Project Year Evaluation is concerned with collecting data to determine whether the Robbery Prevention Project is meeting the following grant objectives:

1. Increase by 10% over the base-line, the total number of arrests for armed robbery.

2. Increase by 10% over the base-line the clearance rate for armed robbery.

3. Decrease by 5% the projected rate of increase over the base-line in the number of armed robberies reported.

4. Decrease by 5% under the base-line the number of rejections of applications for armed robbery complaints.

5. Increase guilty pleas by 5% over the base-line prior to Superior Court trials.

The above grant objectives are basic to a quantitative assessment of project achievements. However, additional effectiveness measures were structured to permit a more dynamic evaluation of overall project performance over time.

Out of Phase Reporting and Project Periods

One of the troublesome problems arising early in the project evaluation was the difficulty in reconciling statistical data kept by the San Jose Police Department and the County CJIC system, on month, quarterly and yearly basis, with the project Grant Year beginning in July 1975. Although the grant program

started in July 1975, the surveillance cameras only began to be installed in November 1975, and the secret witness newspaper publication of incidents also started then. Further compounding the difficulty in reconciling the resultant partial yearly data, was the inability of the first year evaluation to compile one full year of project operational data. Only eight months of project data were evaluated. The same fragmented problem confronted the Second Year Evaluation, which began in May 1977, with the data cut-off date as of May 31, 1977.*

Review of Project Reports and Records

The initial project evaluation procedure was to review all published quarterly and yearly reports. Discussions were held with the Lieutenant in command of the Research and Development Unit, and the Project Manager and Detective Sergeant responsible for the surveillance camera aspect of the program. From this background, an understanding was acquired as to the procedures involved with the operation of the Secret Witness (S.W.) and Surveillance Camera (S.C.) as the interrelated in the total project methodology. In order to better understand the dynamics of the investigation procedures for both the S.C. and S.W. aspects of the project, a case by case analysis was undertaken of those incidents cleared. Project files and case reports were reviewed in addition to the case reports maintained by the General Crimes Unit. Early in the Project, Chief McNamara was interviewed to determine what information he required to evaluate project effectiveness. His concerns centered basically on increased use of facial coverings by perpetrators and a diminishing rate of productivity. (There is no conclusive proof that these concerns have materiallzed).

*The Robbery Prevention Project officially began second year operations on August 1, 1976. However, the evaluator was not hired until May 1977.

Although the Project maintains a file of S.C. and S.W. incident reports, it was found that they were incomplete compared to the General Crimes Unit files with regard to follow-up investigation reports, pleadings, and dispositions. Here also, disposition information was incomplete. The project had suffered from somewhat inadequate clerical support to maintain up-to-date records at the time the evaluation was initially undertaken.*

Analysis of Incident Case Reports

It was determined that the S.W. and S.C. case log books were sufficient for the Project Manager's needs in maintaining a record of armed robbery (and other incidents) clearances. However, for program effectiveness measurement purposes, it was necessary to develop a data collection form to facilitate abstracting specific incident information directly from the case reports. The data collected included: Times and dates of incident occurrence and reporting; times and dates of arrest, offender idnetifying number(s); number of offenders and whether photographs were obtained; I.D. by victims, witnesses and/or law enforcement personnel; dates of incidents published in newspapers; and dispositions, including complaints filed or rejected, quilty pleas, trial and conviction.

It is clearly evident that S.W. aspect of the program has been contributing to the clearing of S.C. photo cases whenever conventional investigative procedures failed to produce an I.D. of the offender(s). However, the project logs maintained for serially recording S.C. and S.W. cases cleared, did not provide for cross reference whenever a S.C. case photograph or description was published in the newspaper and a secret witness identified the alleged offender. It was only possible to link such mutually supporting program components by visually matching the offenders recorded in both logs.

*With the return from leave of the Project Secretary, the records are being upgraded.

Considerable time was involved in analyzing the incident reports related to the S.C./S.W. project to determine the often complex investigative procedures that led to offender I.D. In several instances, it became necessary to question the project personnel as to the precise investigative processes by which the offender's I.D. was made. Pleadings and case dispositions generally were not complete.

Crime Analysis Unit (C.A.U.), Juvenile Division and CAPER Support

As the incident report data abstraction was nearing completion, it became evident that Objectives 4 and 5 (complaint rejections and guilty pleas), could not be measured from information contained in project files and those records maintained in the Bureau of Investigation.

Assistance was provided by the C.A.U. staff to provide disposition information on project cases and on the 1974 sample cases drawn directly from CJIC terminals. Prior efforts to secure this information on project cases and on Department-wide 211 incidents (armed robbery penal code designation), were not successful. The first year evaluation also experienced this same problem. In order to isolate San Jose cases from the aggregate Santa Clara County cases requires that a special computer program be written and cost reimbursement be made to the County CJIC data processing unit. Sufficient processing lead time is also required.

The C.A.U. staff could only secure disposition information on a named-offender basis. Unfortunately, there were numerous cases in the CJIC memory that were incomplete with regard to pleadings and in not having some offenders listed in the CJIC system. Juvenile offenders' dispositions are not in CJIC. Dispositions on numerous juvenile offenders' cases were secured with assistance of the Juvenile Division.

The C.A.U. staff provided monthly statistical tabulations of reports of armed robberies and clearances. CAPER-generated geo-coded map locations of robberies as well as aggregate County-wide statistics by reporting jurisdiction were secured by the C.A.U. Lastly, the C.A.U. statistical analyst developed multiple regression analysis projections of rates of robbery through May 1977.

Baseline Data

In view of the difficulty experienced in attempting to secure complaint acceptance/rejection and plea data for the November 1974 through October 1975 baseline year, and for both the first and second project years, we began to question whether the expense and time consuming effort required of County personnel to develop such data on all armed robberies were necessary. Several discussions were held with the S.J.P.D Records Division and the C.A.U. District Attorney CJIC Unit, Court Records Division, CJIC Unit, and County CJIC data processing personnel. Each response revealed the same problem - time and cost. As a result, we undertook an alternative approach.

Given that the Surveillance Camera program operation is confined largely to small convenience and liquor stores, we drew an entire year (November 1974 - October 1975) of cleared cases of robberies committed in similar facilities. These cases were reviewed in the city records storage area. Since published robbery incidents in the Secret Witness program are investigated conventionally by detectives and patrol, when an informant provides a lead to the identity of the offenders, we saw no reason to broaden the base-line data to other types of premises for comparative purposes. The availability of surveillance camera photographs on the other hand, opened up a line of investigation not heretofore possible, except in bank holdups where cameras are in general use.

Analysis Procedures

Reduction was undertaken of the assembled data contained on the individual case abstract forms. Tabulation of cleared cases was undertaken for the S.C., S.W. and interrelated S.C./S.W. cases in addition to the base-line year cases to permit calculation of elapsed times from times of occurrence on an armed robbery to an arrest. Totals of the cleared cases (multiple clearances per arrest included), were then graphically plotted.

Dates of individual camera installation were recorded and the cumulative totals plotted on the same graph showing the cumulative case clearances. The elapsed times from camera installation to the first cleared robbery, and from the last robbery to June 1, 1977 were calculated. Means and median values were also calculated. From the project records, a tabulation was made of incidents published in the newspaper under the Secret Witness Program. A cumulative total by month was graphed alongside the graph of S.W. cases cleared. The monthly cumulative total of reported robberies was also graphed to enable visual interpretation of the program dynamics.

Utilizing the C.A.U. furnished data on robberies and clearances, tabulation of multiple year statistics was undertaken for San Jose and other County jurisdictions. Analysis of the above is discussed in the following section.

Following analysis of the data and discussion of findings with the project manager, interviews were conducted with the District Attorney and the Assistant D.A.; Mercury News journalist who is conducting the S.W. transactions, and the Executive Editor; supervising Judge of the Municipal Court; and a representative of the Northern California Grocers Association. The objective of these interviews was to determine impressions of the S.C./S.W. program and relative importance from each of the key respondent's perspective with regard to program continuance.

CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

Project Grant Objectives Met

The overall stated project grant objectives are being met. However, Objective 3 -- Decrease the rate of increase of armed robberies -- is a questionable goal in view of the widely held opinion that the level of reported crimes fluctuates from year to year for reasons beyond law enforcement's ability to account for, much less influence, the variations. This phenomenon has appeared during the 19-month period that the project has been operating. Each of the five broad objectives is discussed below.

Objective 1: Increase by 10% the Total Number of Arrests For Armed Robbery

Of all the objectives in this project, this one appears - on the surface - to be one that could easily be measured. However, this objective presented some major problems as will be explained below.

First, this objective applies to all arrests made by the San Jose Police Department for armed robbery and not simply to project-related arrests. Thus, we are supposed to measure something over which the Robbery Prevention Project exerts only marginal control. For example, as will be explained later in this report, there was a significant decrease this year in "on-scene" armed robbery arrests by the Patrol Division compared to prior years. The reasons for this situation are unclear. Possible reasons include: increased workload, changes in the deployment of patrol forces, changes in priorities, or any number of other reasons. As stated, the Robbery Prevention Project has no control over this variable.

Second, while "armed robbery has a legal meaning, it does not have a statistical meaning to the SJPD Bureau of Criminal Statistics or to the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR) in terms of

arrests. Armed robbery, as an event, is reported very well, but armed robbery arrests are not.

Various other sources of obtaining this data were examined. The Adult Arrest Register produced by CJIC, according to BCS is not consistent in defining armed robbery arrests. The Register will contain all robbery arrests but it may or may not indicate that the arrest is for armed robbery. We further explored this problem with staff personnel the SJPD Research and Development Division. We jointly concluded that there was no readily available means of obtaining this data.

The only possibility was from RIS II. However, the programming cost would be in excess of $1,000 and would involve a time delay fo at least one month to obtain the data with no real assurance that all armed robbery arrests would be included.

Another alternative would be in the case files of cleared armed robberies. However, it should be noted that the first year of this project aimed at robbery, in general, and not at armed robbery specifically. Thus, no baseline data is available without extensive trips to the warehouse to examine case files. Further, after reading all case files relating to RPP cases, we are not at all convinced that truly reliable data can even be obtained from the source documents. A problem here is that the SJPD does not have a consolidated arrest report and one has to read through the narrative of all follow-up reports to determine the specifics of an offense. This would entail the reading of over 1,500 case files.

Given all of these difficulties, we decided that the most productive approach to this objective would be to utilize estimattion techniques. The one good source of data that we do have is armed robbery clearances. We also have excellent data on all robbery arrests. Table V-1 displays this data for the baseline year (1974-75) and for the first two years of the project. Note that these claculations cover only the months of November through May in each year.

Table V-1

Armed Robbery Clearances and all Robbery Arrests

	Baseline	1975-76	1976-77
	Nov - May	Nov - May	Nov - May
Total Armed Robberies Cleared	72	133	117
Total Persons Arrested for Robbery	192	240	224

We have calculated - based on project data - that an average of 1.74 persons are involved per robbery. We also know that roughly 12% of armed robberies are cleared "exceptionally" based on available data reported by Greenberg.[1]

Therefore, we will first determine 12 percent of total armed robberies cleared in each year. This number is then subtracted from each year's total AR clearances and represents those armed robberies that were cleared exceptionally and in which nobody was actually arrested in San Jose. We then multiply the remaining armed robberies that were cleared by 1.74 (the average number of armed robbers arrested per case). This calculation should produce a result that approximates the number of individuals arrested. We make the reasonable assumption that these individuals were arrested for only one robbery. Our data indicates that multiple robbery charges are filed against very few of the total number of individuals apprehended. The results of these calculations are shown in Table V-2.

[1] B. Greenberg: Felony Investigation Decision Models, Stanford Research Institute, Palo Alto, California 1976.

TABLE V-2

ESTIMATED ARMED ROBBERY ARRESTS*

YEAR	Total Armed Robbery Clearances	Total Less 12% Exceptional Clearances	Col. 2 x 1.74 Persons Per AR	Increase or Decrease AR Arrests From Baseline
1974 - 1975	72	63	111	----
1975 - 1976	135	117	204	+83.7
1976 - 1977	117	103	179	+61.2

In brief, these calculations indicate that a total of 111 persons were arrested for armed robbery in the baseline year (1974-75). In the first year of the grant, we estimate that a total of 204 persons were arrested for armed robbery. This represents an increase of 83.7% over the baseline. In the second year of the grant, we estimate that 179 persons were arrested for armed robbery. While this figure is down 12% from the 1975-76 time period, it still represents a 61.2% increase over the baseline period.

In summary, while we have relied on estimation procedures to calculate the number of armed robbery arrests, we believe that this objective was achieved. However, we must note that this objective is directed at overall SJPD arrests for armed robbery and not just to RPP-related arrests. Clearly, the RPP cannot control the performance of the rest of the Police Department in this area and achievement of this objective should be judged in that light.

*For comparable seven month periods (November - May) during the baseline and first and second year of the RPP.

Objective 2: Increase by 10% the Clearance Rate for Armed Robbery

This is a fairly straightforward question that can easily be answered on the basis of existing San Jose Police Department data resources. The grant application is not clear on exactly what period of time in which this objective is to be achieved. Specifically, is this 10% increase to be achieved during the second year of grant operations in relating to the baseline year or to the first year of the grant? We will test both possibilities in the discussion that follow.

Table V-3 shows the actual (not the reported) number of armed robberies and clearances for the baseline period of November 1974 to October 1975; for the first year of full-scale grant operations; and for the second year to date.

This table shows that 18.6% of actual armed robberies were cleared by arrest or other means during the 1974-75 baseline period. During the first year of grant operations in 1975-76, the data shows a clearance rate of 31.5%. Thus, clearances rose by 12.9 percentage points in comparing the first year of the grant to the baseline period. However, in terms of overall percentage of increase, the change in clearances is an impressive 69.4%.

For the second year data was available for evaluation purposes only on the first seven months of grant operations. We will compare results to date to the same time periods (November-May) during the baseline and the first year of grant operations. This data is displayed in Table V-4.

Table V-3

Actual Armed Robberies and Clearances by Month: Baseline and Grant Operational Periods

	1974-75		1975-76		1976-77	
Month	Actual	Cleared	Actual	Cleared	Actual	Cleared
November	67	25	54	11	75	29
December	53	7	63	32	53	16
January	72	13	65	13	61	9
February	47	4	89	36	69	8
March	41	8	43	15	56	21
April	47	2	38	8	75	14
May	38	13	31	18	66	20
June	31	8	24	6	54 *	10 *
July	57	12	44	8	39 *	12 *
August	59	8	51	7	44 *	9 *
September	50	4	41	12	--	--
October	56	11	56	14	--	--
TOTAL	618	115	599	180	589 (10 Months)	148 (10 Months)

* These figures were obtained after the cutoff date for the Evaluation and are not used in the analysis.

TABLE V-4

Armed Robbery Clearances

	1974-1975 Nov - May	1975-1976 Nov - May	1976-1977 Nov - May
Armed Robberies	365	383	455
Number Cleared	60	133	117
Percentage of Robberies Cleared	16.4	34.7	25.7

In comparison to the baseline period, the Second Year of RPP operations still shows substantial gains. The clearance rate is 9.3 percentage points higher than the baseline period. This translates to an increase of 56.7% in terms of the overall clearance rate. There is a decline in the clearance rate for the second year when compared to the initial year of the grant. Specifically, the overall SJPD clearance rate declined from 34.7% (during the period of November to May 1975-76) to 25.7% (during the same period in 1976-1977). Stated differently, clearances are down 25.9% in the second year compared to the first year of the RPP.

In summary, when compared to the baseline period, the second year of the RPP results show a 56.7% increase in armed robbery clearances. This objective is clearly being achieved by a wide margin.

Objective 3: Decrease by 5% the Projected Rate of Increase in the Number of Armed Robberies Reported

This is a poorly stated, ambiguous, and altogether meaningless objective. This statement requires explanation. First, it assumes that the Robbery Prevention Program is designed to "prevent" armed robberies. In fact, the primary thrust of the

program is the apprehension of individuals who have committed armed robberies. Prevention is clearly a secondary objective. Second, the program is directed primarily at armed robberies committed in commercial establishments - particularly liquor stores and convenience markets. Third, and most important, there is no distinct trend in armed robberies in San Jose. It is true that they are much higher than they were 15 years ago but so is San Jose's population, the number of possible targets, and the number of young adults in the crime-prone years of 14-21. In fact, there are so many variables (e.g., unemployment, drug availability, etc.) that affect the overall rate of crime - most of which are not known with any degree of certainty - that predictions of one specific crime (e.g., armed robbery) are of extremely dubious validity.

More specifically, utilizing historical data to statistically predict a trend assumes stable behavior and predictable development of crime figures. Using this technique, a trend is statistically fitted to crime data of the years preceding a test period and then the actual crime data are compared with those predicted from the trend. The Crime Analysis Unit of the San Jose Police Department utilized regression and multiple time series methods to obtain the results shown in Table V-5. This table covers the months of November through May for a 15-year period.

Another way of looking at this data is in terms of the rate of increase or decrease in both the actual and predicted armed robberies on a year to year basis. This data is shown in Table V-6.

While the "fit" of the statistical projection looks fairly good when plotted, the actual year to year variation in armed robbery appears to follow no paricularly stable pattern. However, it may be useful to attempt to calculate whether or not this objective was achieved despite the fact that we doubt its validity.

Table V-5

Actual and Predicted Armed Robberies in San Jose

Nov - May	Actual Armed Robberies	Predicted Armed Robberies	Difference Between Actual & Predicted # of Armed Robberies
1961 - 1962	36	35.7	+.3
1962 - 1963	57	43.2	+13.8
1963 - 1964	51	52.2	- .8
1964 - 1965	52	63.0	-11.0
1965 - 1966	56	75.9	-19.9
1966 - 1967	97	91.3	+ 5.7
1967 - 1968	91	109.6	-18.6
1968 - 1969	162	131.5	+30.5
1969 - 1970	172	157.5	+14.5
1970 - 1971	189	188.4	+ .6
1971 - 1972	236	225.0	+11.0
1972 - 1973	284	268.3	+15.7
1973 - 1974	374	319.5	+54.5
1974 - 1975	365	379.9	-14.9
1975 - 1976	383	451.1	-68.1
1976 - 1977	455	534.8	-79.8

*Prepared by Crime Analysis Unit of the San Jose Police Department.

Table V-6

Rate of Change in Actual and Predicted Armed Robberies

	Percent Increase/ Decrease: Actual	Percent Increase/ Decrease: Predicted	Difference Between Actual & Predicted
1961 - 1962	--	--	--
1962 - 1963	+58.3%	+21.0%	+37.3%
1963 - 1964	-10.5%	+20.8%	-31.3%
1964 - 1965	+ 2.0%	+20.7%	-18.7%
1965 - 1966	+ 7.7%	+20.5%	-12.8%
1966 - 1967	+73.2%	+20.3%	+52.9%
1967 - 1968	- 6.2%	+20.0%	-26.2%
1968 - 1969	+78.0%	+20.0%	+58.0%
1969 - 1970	+ 6.2%	+19.8%	-13.6%
1970 - 1971	+ 9.9%	+19.6%	- 9.7%
1971 - 1972	+24.9%	+19.4%	+ 5.5%
1972 - 1973	+20.3%	+19.2%	+ 1.1%
1973 - 1974	+31.7%	+19.1%	+12.6%
1974 - 1975	- 2.4%	+18.9%	-21.3%
1975 - 1976	+ 4.9%	+18.7%	-13.8%
1976 - 1977	+18.9%	+18.6%	+ .3%

All calculations have been made in relation to our baseline actual figure of 365 armed robberies. The actual increase between the baseline period and the first year (1975-1976) of grant operations was 4.9%. The second year (1976-1977) total of 455 armed robberies represents an increase of 24.7% over the baseline and 18.8% over the first year (1975-1976) of grant operations.

The predicted number of armed robberies in 1976-77 is roughly 535. This figure represents an increase of 46.6% over the 1974-75 actual baseline armed robberies. The predicted increase (which is a statistically "smoothed" figure) averaged 18.7% per year between the baseline and the present. Since the grant objective is to "decrease the rate of increase by 5% per year", the question arises as to what figures (e.g., actual or predicted) do we use to compute the results attained. We first compared the actual baseline figure of 365 armed robberies to the predicted figure of 535 armed robberies in 1976-77. As noted, this figure represents a 46.6% increase. In this rate of increase is reduced by 10% (5% the first year and 5% the second year) we should expect a total of 499 armed robberies in 1976-77. In fact, only 455 armed robberies occurred. This produces a rate of 24.7% increase over the baseline. The difference between the predicted increase of 46.7% and the actual increase of 24.7% is 21.9%. Using this logic, we might conclude that 79 less armed robberies occurred than might have been expected over this two-year period.

Another way of looking at the question might simply be to take the "smoothed" predicted rate of increase - which was 18.7% the first year and 18.6% the second year - and apply it to the actual members. The actual increase in armed robberies for the first year of grant operations was only 4.9% compared to the expected 18.7% increase. Stated another way, a total

of 433 armed robberies was predicted the first year but only 383 actually occurred. This produces a difference of 50 armed robberies "saved". Applying the same logic to the first and second year of the grant produces a predicted total of 454 armed robberies and an actual total of 455 armed robberies. The difference between the predicted and actual figures is negligible here. In short, this calculation can be made in any number of ways and the results are not something in which one can place a great deal of confidence.

To further confuse the situation, we have calculated the number of armed robberies versus population in San Jose to see if this computation would shed any further light on the situation. These calculation are displayed in Table V-7. The population figures were obtained from the California Department of Finance.

Table V-7

Armed Robberies Versus Population

Year	Est. Population	# of Armed Robberies	Armed Robberies Per 1,000
1972-73	508,000	284	.56
1973-74	528,000	374	.71
1974-75	547,000	365	.67
1975-76	556,000	383	.69
1976-77	575,000	455	.79

In brief, this table states that there was an absolute 17.9% increase in armed robberies in 1976-77 compared to the robberies in 1974-75 baseline period relative to population increases. One other factor must also be considered in relation to this objective. This factor relates to the number of robberies that were "unfounded" (e.g., those events that were initially reported as robberies that turned out to be something else after police investigation). Table V-8 displays this pattern.

Table V-8

Percentage of Reported Robbery Cases That Were Unfounded

Year	Percent Robberies Unfounded
1959	27.6%
1960	28.4%
1961	30.2%
1962	26.8%
1963	23.8%
1964	24.1%
1965	24.2%
1966	15.9%
1967	12.7%
1968	12.6%
1969	8.7%
1970	3.0%
1971	6.9%
1972	4.3%
1974	4.1%
1975	0.7%
1976*	0.7%

*Source: E. Luksas: Long Range Trends: Service Demands, Personnel, Performance, Budgets, and the Conflicts Between Them, San Jose Police Department, 1977, p.6.

The variation in unfounded versus actual cases during this period is quite surprising. For example, in 1961 almost one out of every three reported robbery cases was unfounded. Obviously, this situation will seriously confuse any calculations based on prior history and any attempts to devise a valid prediction of robbery trends. The explanation offered for this phenomenon is as follows:

> Cases containing least promise of prosecution are lowest in the stack of cases given an investigator. Consequently, as cases increase faster than investigators, they increasingly tend to have insufficient time to work down to the bottom of the stack to cases that would most likely be unfounded. Result: Fewer unfounded cases. Therefore, as caseloads per investigator increases, the likelihood increases that a time will come when the "actual" cases reported to the FBI will become inflated due to the unfounded rate becoming significantly lower.

While these figures related to all robberies and not just armed robberies, we believe the same logic applies.

In conclusion, while this objective was apparently achieved in a technical sense, we do not believe that it is a valid or meaningful measure of program accomplishment. For this reason, we recommend the elimination of this objective as a measure of program accomplishment during the third year of grant operations.

Objective 4 - Decrease by 5% under the base-line, the number of rejections of applications for armed robbery complaints

Base Line (See Table V-9)

The Project Final Report for the First Year indicated that for the November 1974 through October 1975 base-line year there was a 40% rejection of complaints submitted (52 pre-court releases out of 131 filed). For the same period, the second year project evaluation staff drew a sample of all cleared robberies reported in convenience and liquor stores (the reason for drawing this select sample is that the surveillance camera has largely been installed in convenience and liquor stores). Consequently, a base-line comparison of like facilities appears logical. Of the 33 cases cleared by arrest for this category of premises, out of approximately 180 armed robberies reported by CAPER for the same types of stores, there were 57 arrests (51 adult and 6 juvenile).

There were 12 complaints rejected, and an additional 24 subject dispositions not accounted for through the CJIC system. Of the 57 arrests made for a total of 35 cases cleared, 47% (27 offenders) resulted in convictions. The remaining 53% (30 offenders released) included complaint rejections, case dismissals and others which were unaccounted for by CJIC or the Juvenile Justice records. In sum, both the Project First Year Final Report findings and the Second Year Evaluation on the Basis of Case Analysis reveal high alleged offender release rates for the 1974-75 base-line year -- 40% and 53% respectively.

First Year

For the first full project year (November 1975 through October 1976) the case by case analysis of cleared armed robberies in which the surveillance camera photographs alone and those S.C.

TABLE V-9

COMPLAINT REJECTIONS

	Baseline Year* (Nov. 1974-Oct. 1975)	First Project Year (Nov. 1975-Oct. 1976)	Percent Decrease Over Baseline	Second Project Year Nov. 1976 May 1977)	Percent Decrease Over Baseline
Number of Arrests	57	46		32	
Number of Rejections, Dismissals, and Unaccounted For	30**	4		4	
Percentage Rejected	53%	9%	87%	13%	87%***

*Select sample of all cleared convenience and liquor store robberies.

**CJIC on a case by case basis listed: 27 convictions, 12 rejections and the remaining 18 were dismissals or offenders unaccounted for.

***Only S.C./S.W. related cases considered. Also, the second year period of seven months was compared to a full 12 month baseline period.

photographs published in the newspaper under the Secret Witness Program played the central role, there was only one complaint rejection and three dismissals found through the CJIC system. There were 46 arrests counted. The Project First Year Final Report stated there were two rejections out of 46 arrests made in the 8-month period of the first year. The disparity in the numerical findings needs to be checked. But regardless, it is fully evident that the S.C./S.W. related program is over-achieving the reduction of complaint rejections by a wide margin -- 53% in baseline year down to 9% in first project year, or a numerical rate reduction of 87% (four first year rejections compared to 30 base-line year) for the select sample of stores equipped with surveillance cameras.

Second Year

The second year, seven months (November 1976 through May 1977) shows that there were two complaint rejections and two dismissals out of 32 arrests for the stores equipped with cameras, or 13%. Although the rate of complaint rejections is slightly higher than that of the first year, the net reduction of 87% is maintained and is impressive compared to the base-line year level of rejections (4/30).

The Secret Witness program publishing robbery incidents without S.C. photographs accounted for 13 arrests in the first full year, two complaint rejections, one dismissed and one alleged offender unaccounted for by CJIC. In the second year (seven months) there are five arrests and no rejections.

The S.W. program in the first year contributed to 10 I.D.'s leading to arrests based on the S.C. photographs that were published. In the second year (seven months), nine I.D.'s were provided. In effect, the S.W. program has provided I.D.'s leading to arrests at a rate of 21% of the First Year overall program arrests. In the second year (seven months), the S.W. rate is 30%, slightly higher compared to the first year.

Objective 5 - Increase guilty pleas by 5% over the base-line prior to Superior Court trials

Base-Line Year

The same select base-line sample of 33 cases cleared by arrest used to measure the achieving of Objective 4 is used to evaluate this objective. There were 21 guilty pleas entered out of 57 arrests made and assumed complaints requested for a ratio of 37%. Given CJIC informaton on disposition for the base-line year for specific cases analyzed, a count of 28 convictions was tallied. Considering that 21 guilty pleas were entered, and compared to convictions, the guilty plea number appears reasonable.

There is a significant disparity between the data reported here on pleadings based on CJIC output compared to the project and First Year Evaluator's final reports. The latter two First Year reports stated that five guilty pleas were entered for 66 complaints filed yielding a ratio of 7%. These data were stated to be derived from CJIC. Inasmuch as the primary source data could not be located for verification, and the fact that our analysis supported by R & D personnel checking CJIC on a case-by-case basis arrived at a greater number of guilty pleas, we view the pleading data as contained in the First Year Final Reports to be of questionable validity.

First Year

Considerable difficulty was experienced in attempting to reconcile the number of guilty pleas entered by comparing the data contained in the Quarterly and Final Reports to that we assembled on a case-by-case analysis basis. R & D staff assisted in querying CJIC to determine pleadings in those cases that we could not determine from reviewing case files.

Discussions were held with the Project sergeants to determine on a case-by-case basis the manner by which they arrived at the total of guilty pleas. It became evident that the higher totals tallied by the project compared to those we calculated were arrived at by considering the following: (1) juveniles arrested and turned over to juvenile authorities for adjudication were considered as having pled guilty; (2) multiple counts charged and presumably pled were added in; and (3) the category "dismissal in view of plea" was considered as a guilty plea entered. These three types of data cannot be verified by CJIC. Although we have some basic concerns regarding counting in pleas in those three categories noted, for the purposes of this Second Year Evaluation report, we generally accepted the Project rationale. However, it is recommended that an agreement be reached regarding the basis for considering a defendant as having in fact "voluntarily" entered a guilty plea as charged on the Project case arrested, or the final plea as negotiated be so stated.

As shown in Table V-10, 24 guilty pleas were entered in the First Year revealing a 14% increase over the baseline. The Project has overachieved the objective to increase guilty pleas by 5%.

It should be noted that the effort to determine the total number of guilty pleas for all armed robbery arrests made, exclusive of project cases, was thwarted by an inability to secure CJIC data. It is recommended in the following Chapter that a decision should be made whether the expense to write and run a special CJIC program to elicit these data is desirable.

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*Unless the investigating officer obtains pleading information at the time of a Juvenile Court hearing, records are not accessible for subsequent analysis.

TABLE V-10

GUILTY PLEAS

	Baseline Year (11/74-10/75)	Baseline Year (11/74-5/77)	Baseline Year (11/75-10/76)	Baseline Year (11/76-5/77)
Number of Arrests	57	43	46	30**
Number of Guilty Please	21	17	24	37**
Percent Increase over Baseline Year			14%	76%* 118%

*Compared to first seven months of baseline year.

** The number of guilty please counted are greater than the number of arrests shown. Thedisparity results from a carry over of cases pending adjudication from the First Year, and also reflects multiple counts that have been charged and guilty pleas entered.

Second Year

The difficulties noted in the First Year are also applicable here. However, as shown in Table V-10, the first seven months of the Second Year show that 37 guilty pleas were entered, revealing a 76% increase over the baseline year. Note that the number of guilty pleas exceed the number of arrests shown. The disparity arises from the First Year of cases pending. Also multiple counts are included. Based on the data it is evident that Objective 5 is overachieved by a considerable margin.

Overall Program Effectiveness

It is evident that the Surveillance Camera and Secret Witness Program operations are clearly achieving the five basic grant objectives. There are broader considerations, however, that must be taken into account. The Third Year operations must be structured to permit an evaluation by involved participants, planners and decision makers as to whether the program should be institutionalized under local funding sources when Federal funding ceases at the completion of the third year. To support the decision-making process, a straightforward dynamic analysis was performed to reveal a month-to-month pattern of both the S.W. and S.C. components operational results over a 19-month period.

Relationship of Deployed Cameras to Rate of Clearance

Figure V-1 illustrates a graphical comparison over a 19-month period of the number of cameras installed (about 150) with cases cleared. Also illustrated is the cumulative number of reported robberies for this same operational period - November 1976 through May 1977. Inspection of the graphs show that the number of case clearances has risen with the increasing number of cameras installed. The first four months of the program show a rapid

rise in the number of clearances corresponding with the initial rapid installation of cameras. The downturn in January 1976 of camera installation reflects the removal of two cameras that were reinstalled in a later month.

A perceptible flattening is noticeable in the clearance curve (Figure V-1) beginning in March 1976. This slowing down in the rate of clearances reveals a divergence from the rate of robberies occuring and also from the rate at which the cameras have been installed recently.

In September 1976, the rate of clearance rose again keeping pace with the rate of robberies occurring. The steady rise in clearances continues through a period of a marked slowdown in the deployment of cameras.

Beginning in February 1977, the installation of cameras occurred at a faster rate than that of robberies. However, also beginning in February 1977, there is a perceptible divergence in the rate of clearances, compared to the increase in reported robberies. The camera installation rate has kept pace with the robbery level. But we observe in the period beginning in April 1977, a slowing rate of return (clearances) on the investment in cameras and in secret witness expenditure of effort.

It should be noted that the S.C./S.W. clearance curve is derived from the number of identified and arrested offenders based on the use of the surveillance camera photograph. The photos are circulated among the law enforcement community and other institutions, such as schools, and correctional centers first. Failing in an I.D., the photograph is then published in the Mercury-News under the Secret Witness procedures.



Figure V-1 Dynamics of S.C./S.W. Program

Relationship of Secret Witness Publications to Clearances

Figure V-2 illustrates graphically the cumulative number of armed robbery synopses (and other particularly violent crimes) consisting of event and offender descriptions. Surveillance camera photographs that were published are also included. But the establishment where the robbery occurred is not identified for reasons of clandestine camera security. Nearly 600 incidents have been published over the 19-month period. The middle curve displays the cumulative total of robberies reported in the same period. The bottom curve shows the cumulative total month-by-month of clearances derived from anoymous informants responding to published incident descriptions and S.C. photographs.

The dynamics of the S.W. program can be readily discerned by inspecting the graphs in Figure V-2. It is apparent that the volume of published incidents has increased at a greater rate than has the number of S.W. clearances. There is also a cyclical effect relative to a peaking of cleared cases occurring in February 1976, July 1976, and in November 1976. These cyclical peaks can be seen more readily in Figure VI-1. The clearance rates for S.W. cases, comparing the first and second project years appear to settle down in the summer and fall months to a 10 to 12 percent yearly average. The cyclical effect is seen in the widening divergence of the published cases curve relative to the S.W./S.C. clearances curve shown in Figure V-2. The flattening of the clearance curve becomes most pronounced beginning in December 1976. In effect, the S.W. program appears to be more suspectible to seasonal factors compared to the S.C. program when their clearance curves are compared to the rate of increase in robberies.

Based on Project S.W. and S.C. log records, there were 11 S.W. and S.C. log numbers that intersected to reveal the I.D. of the offenders of armed robberies in camera-equipped stores. However, the arrest of the offenders led to clearances of some 19 cases.



Figure V-2 Dynamics of S.W./S.C. Program

The S.W. program, in addition to supporting the S.C. program was responsible for clearing an additional 42 cases (17 arrests) over the 19 months. Two complaints on S.W. cases were rejected. Nine known guilty pleas were filed (based on our case file and CJIC search) that were not associated with the S.C. program. There were 11 guilty pleas in which the S.C. photographs were handled through the S.W. program.

Relationship of Project Clearances to Overall Department Clearances - Table V-11

Based on R & D statistics there were 599 reported armed robberies in the Project's first year, 180 clearances for an overall clerance rate of 30.1%. During this first year, the combined S.C. and S.W. operations accounted for 73 clearances. By excluding these clearances from the overall Department total, the Department clearance rate drops to 17.9%. The Project thus contributed 12.2% to the overall Department clearance rate for the first year. In effect, the project accounted for nearly 41% of all clearances.

The second year (7 months) overall Department statistics are as follows: 456 reported armed robberies and 177 clearances, yielding a 25.7% clearance rate. By excluding the 49 S.C./S.W. clearances for the second period, the overall Department clearance rate drops to 15.0%. The project accounted for nearly 28% of all clearances during this period. This latter finding reveals a slipping in the overall Department clearance rate from the first year of project operations. The observed declining clearance rates for the Department in relation to related armed robberies, as well as for the Project efforts, comparing the first seven months of 1976 to the second year seven-month period, should be monitored closely during third year operations.

TABLE V-11

CLEARANCE RATES COMPARED
(Armed Robbery)

	Baseline Year (11/74 - 10/75)	1st Year- 7 mt. (11/75 - 5/76)	1st Year (11/75 - 10/76)	2nd Year (11/76 - 5/77)
Reported Robberies	618	383	599	456
Total Clearances	115	133	180	617
Total Percent Cleared	18.6%	34.7%	30.1%	25.7%
S.C./S.W. Cleared	--	33	73	49
Percent S.C./S.W. Cleared	--	8.6%	12.2%	10.7%
Percent other Department Clearances	--	26.1%	17.9%	15.0%
Percent Robbery Increase (Decrease) First Year - Seven Months and Second Year	--	--	--	19.0%
Percent Robbery Increase (Decrease) Baseline First 7 Months and Second Year	--	--	--	25.0%
Percent Overall Clearance Increase (Decrease) First Year - 7 Months and Second Year	--	--	--	(12.0%)

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

Contribution of Patrol Operations Relative to Project Involvement

One of the pluses in the management of the S.C./S.W. program is the obviously closer coordination of patrol and detective roles in apprehension of armed robbers than existed prior to the start of the Project. We frequently had difficulty in determining from case reports how patrol and investigators, other than Project detectives, were able, for unexplained reasons, to suddenly have an I.D. of an alleged offender. It became evident through discussions with Project sergeants that productive leads were furnished to patrol and from patrol. Many patrol officers in the Department and in neighboring jurisdictions recognized armed robbery offenders from S.C. photographs, based on S.C./S.W.-generated leads.

Median Times for S.C. Case Clearances (See Table V-12)

A rather significant finding was made by computing the elapsed time from the reporting of an armed robbery and the time when the alleged offender(s) was arrested. Such elapsed times were determined for the base-line year and the 19-month period that the S.C./S.W. program has been active.

For the select sample of 35 cleared cases (33 by arrest) drawn for the base-line year, 28 were cleared by arrest within 4 hours, presumably by patrol. This computes to 80% of arrests made in convenience and liquor store robberies. The remaining 20% of arrests were made presumably by detective involvement over a period of days.

It was found for the baseline year that the median time for those 28 arrests made within four hours was approximately one hour. The remaining cases were cleared in elapsed times greater than 8 hours to 49 days. The median elapsed time for these cases was slightly over two days.

TABLE V-12

ELAPSED APPREHENSION TIME - CASES CLEARED BY ARREST

HOURS	Baseline Year (Nov. 1974 - Oct. 1975)		Project Period (Nov. 1975 - May 1977)	
HOURS	Frequency	Cumulative	Frequency	Cumulative
0 - 1	13	13	11	11
1 - 2	6	19	1	12
2 - 3	5	24	3	15
3 - 4	3	27	-	-
4 - 5	1	28	-	-
TOTAL	28	-	15	
Median Clase	1-2 Hours		0-1 Hours	
Median	1 Hour			
DAYS				
8 Hr. - 1	2	2	5	5
1 - 9	3	5	16	21
10 - 19	1	6	4	25
20 - 29	-	-	6	31
30 - 39	-	-	1	32
40 - 49	1	7	3	35
50 - 59	-	-	-	-
60 - 69	-	-	-	-
70 - 79	-	-	-	-
80 - 89	-	-	1	36
90 - 99	-	-	-	-
100	-	-	3	39
TOTAL	7		39	
Median Class	1-9 days		10-19 days	
Median	2 days		14 days	
% cleared in less than one day	80%		28%	
% cleared in One or more days	20%		72%	

For the Project-logged cases cleared by arrest (54 were counted), involving the Surveillance Camera stores and Secret Witness-related cases, 15 of such cases were cleared by arrest within three hours (in other words, even though the S.C. store was hit, patrol made an arrest before the photo came into the investigation). The remaining 39 were cleared by arrest over a period ranging from one day to over 100 days; the median elapsed time, however, was approximately 14 days. Note that a signfiicant shift has occurred comparing the baseline year to the project period. Twenty-eight percent of the S.C. cases were cleared by patrol response within three hours of the time a robbery was reported. The remaining 72% that were cleared by arrest, were strung out over an extended period of time - a greater number of cases for a longer period of time than those for the baseline year. The obvious implication of this observation is that the S.C./S.W. program is able to provide investigative leads to a greater degree than has heretofore been possible by conventional investigative practices.

Possible Deterrence Value

CAPER generated data indicates that during 1976 there were approximately 178 robberies reported by convenience and liquor stores, compared to the 199 reported in 1975. The 60 cleared S.C./S.W. cases for these similar type of establishments in 1976 were some 71% greater compared to the 1975 clearances. Also, it is noted that there were some 21 fewer reported armed robberies during 1976. One can only conjecture whether the surveillance camera is functioning as a deterrent.

Some credence to this deterrence possibility may be found in another set of statistics with regard to the number of days cameras have been in place, with and without a robbery occurring (See Table V-13). As of May 31, 1977, there were approximately

TABLE V-13

SURVEILLANCE CAMERA ACTIVITY
(Nov. 1975 - May 1977)

Total Number of Cameras in Place	150
Maximum Possible Operation Days	567
Mean Number of Days to First Robbery	155
Median Number of Days to First Robbery	40
Mean Number of Days from Last Robbery	281
Mean Number of Days for Stores Having No Robberies	295
Number of Stores Having No Robbery	103
Number of Stores Having At Least One Robbery Cleared	30
Number of Stores Having More than 1-5 Robberies Cleared	10
Number of Stores Having Robberies (in addition to above) that have not been cleared	14

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* While our analysis will be based on these figures, it should be noted that our figures differ from those of the information developed by the RPP staff after the submission of the draft of this report. this retrospective study revealed that there were some 31 armed robberies in camera-equipped stores in which no photos were available for a variety of reasons (e.g., camera malfunction, clerk reluctance to pull activation bill, etc.). These 31 robberies are in addition to the project-logged and previously reported 40 robberies in which photographs were obtained leading to case clearances. In brief, the RPP's retrospective study showed that 78 of the 150 camera-equipped stores were robbed and 72 were not robbed. In view of this difference in Evaluator and Project data, an analysis should be undertaken in the third year to document these incidents and the procedures taken to remedy the problems encountered.

150 cameras installed in largely convenience markets and liquor stors. The maximum number of days that the installed cameras could be in place, beginning in November 1975 through May 1976, is 567 days. There are 103 camera-equipped stores that have not had any armed robberies.* This figure includes those facilities from which cameras were removed and/or the stores closed.

Table V-13 shows that as of the end of May 1977, 30 camera-equipped stores had one robbery. Eight had more than one. Two experienced five robberies. Note that all these cases were cleared. There were, however, 14 S.C. cases that were not cleared (seven cases involved stores previously hit and were cleared), primarily for technical reasons of poor photographs (offender was not facing the camera), or offender had covered his face, or simply not recognized despite investigative and secret witness publication efforts.

The mean (average) number of days from date of camera installation to the date that the first robbery occured is 155 days. The median number of days, however, is approximately 40 days. The mean number of days from the last robbery to May 31, 1977 is 281 days. The mean number of days that 103 cameras have been in place without a robbery incident is 295 days.

The significance of the "idle" cameras in terms of being a possible deterrent has yet to be explained. An interesting observation is that of multiple hits on a given premise, and one 211 offender who hit the same store twice knowing he had been previously photographed.

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*See the discussion with Table V-13.

Median Times for S.W. Clearances

Calculations were made to determine the median number of days elapsed from the date that an incident was published and its clearance by arrest. Arrest clearance cases were first considered to avoid a distortion by adding in prior occuring cases that were cleared incidental to the arrest resulting directly from a published S.W. incident (see calculations below). There were some 30 S.W. cases analyzed that fell into the median class range of 10-19 days for clearance by arrest. The median was approximately 11 days. The 30 cleared S.W. cases (including S.C.-related cases as well) were cleared in periods ranging from 10-19 days to 100 or more following publication in the newspaper.

For comparison, 60 totally cleared S.W. cases were analyzed, revealing a median class range of also 10-19 days for clearance from the date of incident occurrence. The clearance period for this classification of cases also ranged from 10-19 days to more than 100 days. The median, however, was approximately 19 days for case clearance, somewhat higher (9 more days) than for case clearance by arrest as shown above.

The interesting comparison of the S.W. Program to the baseline year is that conventional investigative practices based on our observed findings essentially do not demonstrate a marked degree of success in clearing cases compared to conventional patrol operations (noted earlier was the finding that in the baseline year sample of 33 cases cleared by arrest out of 35 cleared, 28 were cleared by patrol presumably, within four hours of their reporting). This finding is similar to that of the S.C. stores cases. Patrol officers and investigators are being provided a reciprocal feedback means to extend investigations to cases that for the most part might never have been solved.

CHAPTER VI
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Data Acquisition

A. Need for Internal Standardization of Disposition Statistics

Until the Justice Department can come up with an alternative to the UCR statistics for showing the period-to-period fluctuations in the level of reported crimes, most analysts and policy makers will continue to use them, despite the inherent faults. This evaluation and report also had to contend with the manner in which armed robbery clearances and disposition statistics are assembled and reported. Specifically, the Robbery Prevention Project staff has tallied pleading data on the basis of multiple counts for arrested offenders. But it is unclear whether juvenile offenders are included or excluded.

We had some ambivalent feeling regarding inclusion of multiple pleas. The emphasis on the Surveillance Camera component stems from the ability of the prosecution to confront the alleged armed rober with incontrovertible photographic evidence of his crime. We note that the accused frequently is also charged with additional robberies and crimes for which he may or may not be convicted. The verifying of clearances and pleadings resulted by the project is difficult based on a case-by-case analysis.

In other words, the majority of multiple charges and clearances attributed to an offernder came about after he was identified from an S.C. photograph. Since the S.C. photograph is the key factor in the I.D. process, one solution might be to log one plea to one or more defendant(s) and one or more conviction(s) per S.C. and S.W. cases. In this manner, the I.D., arrest and conviction is more closely related to the S.C. project.

B. Need to Establish Routine Procedure for Acquiring CJIC Disposition Statistics

It has been determined that the CJIC Data Processing Center can provide a disposition breakdown by crime category for San Jose cases processed by the District Attorney and Courts. A rough estimate was given of $250.00 to provide for writing of a computer program and running the computer. We doubt that this cost is accurate. But, if the Project Manager and other Department Planners and decision-makers feel that plea and disposition information routinely provided would be useful beyond the Robbery Prevention Project needs, then a better cost estimate should be made and steps taken to institute the program.

From the evaluator's perspective, the CJIC output as it now exists is not accurate and is difficult to interpret.

C. Juvenile Offender Data Handling

Once a juvenile has been either suspected of or arrested for a 211 offense, his case disposition is not easily determined. Although an informal cooperative arrangement had been made with the SJPD Juvenile Division and the Juvenile Center to indicate whether a juvenile had been processed for the crime arrested, no disposition was forthcoming, other than he (the offender) was booked. There were several blanks in the juvenile record system where no record was available of the alleged juvenile offender. CJIC, because of restrictions on processing juvenile offender data, also produced blank responses on cases queried.

From the evaluator's perspective, the 23 juvenile offenders involved in the S.C. (20) and S.W. (3) cases cleared, constitute a significant percentage. Therefore, juvenile offenders should be tracked for investigative and crime prevention purposes.

D. Project Record-Keeping

A significant amount of evaluation time was expended in auditing the separate S.C. and S.W. project logs. The entries should be cross-indexed so that appropriate credit can be easily assigned to the S.W. program for developing supsect I.D. from the published S.C. photographs.

It would be also helpful if incident synopses' dates of publication were entered in the S.W. clearance log to enable an assessment of response. It is presumed that inicident case numbers are somehow linked to the published synopses. This procedure would aid in an analysis of case publications to determine which types of events seem to be drawing the most attention from S.W. informants. Because of the apparent cyclical response to S.W. publications noted in the Second Year, such case log recorded data would be helpful to assess responses.

Program Milestone Assessment and Planning Strategy

A. Secret Witness Clearances Highly Cyclical

The Surveillance Camera and Secret Witness components of the Robbery Prevention Program have passed the mid-point in the planned three-year implementation and evaluation cycle. With the deployment of the first 150 cameras completed, plus an additional 20 scheduled for current installation, (non grant-cameras), the entire program appears to be at a point requiring an executive management appraisal of past performance, current trends and future plans. Although the S.C. program component in and by itself has been successful in meeting the grant

objectives, the contribution of the S.W. program to this success cannot be discounted. The S.W. program, apart from the S.C. component has also mande an independent important contribution to the Department's armed robbery clearance performance.

As discussed in Chapter V and illustrated in Figure V-1 and V-2, both program components experience downturn phases relative to the fluctuations of reported armed robberies. As can be seen in Figure VI-1, the return on the Secret Witness Program investment, relative to the effort involved in preparing synopses for publication, shows a cyclical effect with respect to the number of cases published. (The Secret Witness graph in Figure VI-1 has been constructed from monthly ratios of the number of cases cleared to number of cases published). Three periodic upturns are noticeable. But these sporadic upturns have been followed by cyclical declines in responses, i.e., clearances. The figures behind this graph are shown in Table VI-1.

By inverting the ratios used to construct the S.W. graph in Figure VI-1, it was found that the most favorable responses occur in the year end holiday season - approximately 6 to 7 published articles on the average produced one clearance. The project yearly average is about 9 publications to 1 clearance. The holiday season attracts more informants seeking reward money. Another reason may be that the original interest shown by the respondents to the S.W. program and the reward incentives offered has waned. The Mecury-News may have contributed to this decline by reducing the publication of the events submitted to once a week (Sunday only), starting in May 1976. Shortly thereafter, the synopses that were printed on the first page began to be published in the back sections of the newspaper with a lead reference only appearing on the front page.

FIGURE VI-1

PERCENTAGE OF SECRET WITNESS CLEARANCES TO INCIDENTS PUBLISHED



TABLE VI-I

SECRET WITNESS AND RELATED SURVEILLANCE CAMERA
CLEARANCE INDEX

DATE/ MONTH	Number of Cases Clear.	Cumulative Total	Incidents Published	Cumulative Total	Percent Cases Cleared to Incidents Published
First Year					
1975 Nov	2	2	37	37	2/37 = 5.4%
Dec	13	15	30	67	15/67 = 22.4%
1976 Jan	2	17	47	114	17/114 = 14.9%
Feb	10	27	59	173	27/173 = 15.6%
Mar	3	30	18	191	30/191 = 15.7%
Apr	0	30	17	208	30/208 = 14.4%
May	2	32	20	228	32/228 = 14.0%
Jun	1	33	15	243	33/243 = 13.6%
Jul	4	37	28	271	37/271 = 13.7%
Aug	0	37	49	320	37/320 = 11.6%
Sep	2	39	16	336	39/336 = 11.6%
Oct	1	40	36	372	40/372 = 10.8%
Second Year					
Nov	13	13	28	28	13/28 = 46.4%
Dec	0	13	20	48	13/48 = 27.1%
Jan	2	15	41	89	15/89 = 16.9%
Feb	2	17	38	127	17/127 = 13.4%
Mar	2	19	26	153	19/153 = 12.4%
Apr	4	23	29	182	23/182 = 12.6%
May	1	24	26	218	24/218 = 11.0%
Jun	2	26	18	236	26/236 = 11.0%
Jul	2	28	23	259	28/259 = 10.8%
Aug	2	30	18	277	30/277 = 10.8%

The newspaper management evidently felt that newsworthiness of the routine continuing series did not merit front page nor twice-weekly exposure. The Action Line newspaper journalist acting as a go-between (between Informant and Project Manager) indicated that he had manipulated the front page placement of the articles and compared the responses. No significant change in response level to this shifting on the front page was noted nor in moving the articles to the back pages.

An interesting outcome of a 1976 readership survey conducted for the newspaper revealed a higher rating achieved by the S.W. feature compared to other column readership polled. For example, 28% of the respondents polled indicated that they read the S.W. articles all or some of the times. The readership is equivalent to 190,000 persons. Two other features, such as a certain sports column and a senior sage column polled 20% and 16% respectively. The Executive Editor was quite surprised at this outcome, and is of the opinion that the paper should continue the series as a public service.

Because of the cyclical nature of S.W. clearance levels, we suggest that an analysis be undertaken to determine if the S.W. response can be stabilized at a higher level. One such technique has been tested by the sergeant operating the S.C./S.W. programs. Twice, descriptions only of two armed robbery offenders were publishied describing two events. Although two S.C. photographs were available, they were withheld. No responses to the two published synopses were made. After a couple of weeks had gone by, the photographs were then published. Almost immediately, S.W. calls were received that produced I.D.'s for both photographs. From these two test cases, it would appear obvious that photographs produce better responses. One possibility that RPP management mitht also consider would be to try to get pictures on no "hits" were recored in the newspaper on local TV news shows.

Our data show, on the other hand, that in the 11 instances that the S.W. program has supported the S.C. photograph publications, 27 cases were cleared. But in 19 S.W. cases (i.e., log numbers of cleared 211's maintained by the project), some 49 San Jose armed robbery cases were cleared. The S.C. program alone on the other hand, cleared 57 cases, compared to the 66 in which the S.W. program was key.

The basic policy issue at hand, consequently, appears to be the need to determine how to strengthen the S.W. program, because in our view, it is producing results.

B. Surveillance Camera Siting Reappraisal

1. Declining Department Clearance Rate in Second Year Offset by Project

The best sustained operating ratios (cases cleared divided by cameras deployed) keeping pace with the persistently increasing number of reported robberies over the past several years occurred during September through November 1976. Beginning in February 1977, there is a definite tapering off in an otherwise generally increasing level of clearances as measured against the number of cameras deployed. There is generally a lag between the period that cameras are installed, and results begin appearing in terms of photographing robberies in progress. But the spread between the number of robberies occurring and clearances achieved since December 1976, and continuing through this Second Year period, indicates the need for reappraisal of the camera deployment strategy. The necessity for this planning analysis is further underscored by the decline in the overall Department robbery

clearance rate (Table V-3), that began to become significant in the Second Project Year. It is interesting and probably significant, comparing the first seven months clearance rates for the First and Second Project years, that the Department at large clearance rate has dropped 43%. But for the same period, the Project clearance rate has increased 25%.

2. Large Number of Camara-Equipped Stores Not Hit*

Given that the project has narrowed the clearance rate difference, comparing its rates to the Department's rate, there is further justification of need to capitalize on the program's ability to enhance the apprehension and conviction of armed robbers. Considering the facts that (1) there is a considerable number of camera-equipped stores that have not experienced a robbery (Table V-5)*, and (2) robberies increased early in the Second Project year, a comparative armed robbery analysis appears warranted. The evaluation should be undertaken to target armed robberies occuring in areas and in facilities compatible with the technical feasibility to install the S.C. system. Table V-5 reveals the rather extensive "idle" time for those S.C. - equipped facilities, and for those other facilities not expereiencing a robbery since the last one reported. Trade-off and risk assessment analyses should be undertaken to ascertain whether some cameras should be relocated and/or the number increased. The latter alternative, however, will require additional funding for hardware.

*See the note on Table V-13. While there is a difference between our figures and the newly established RPP findings, the difference is not significant enough to substantially alter this policy implication.

3. Significant Reversal in Apprehension Times - Baseline and Project Years Compared

A somewhat subtle and no doubt controversial option in personnel reallocation arises from inspection of Table V-4. For the selected baseline year sample drawn of all cleared armed robberies for convenience markets and liquor stores, it was found that 28 cases were cleared within five hours. The median was one hour. The remaining seven cases were cleared within 49 days, with the median being 2 days. These data suggest that patrol in the baseline year had been the most successful component clearing the cases shortly after their report. Presumably, investigators took over after one day to clear the seven cases. The investigative performance by contrast was singularly unspectacular when it is noted that 180 reported robberies occurred in convenience markets and liquor stores during the baseline period.

Comparing the above to the 19-month project performance, an almost complete reversal in terms of delay time percentages cleared occurred. In the baseline year, 80% of the cases cleared were done so in a few hours, presumably without detective involvement. During the project operational period, only 28% of the cleared cases were accomplished in under three hours. The remaining 72% were surprisingly strung out over an extended period, the median being 14 days. The significance of this shift is that both patrol officers and investigators were sharing information and coordinating activities. While we did not keep a score card as to which force component was central to the post-event apprehension over the extended period of time, it was evident from the case analysis that both operations were reciprocal and vital.

The reason for this pronounced shift in apprehension delay times may not be obscure for B.F.O (Bureau of Field Operations) and BI (Bureau of Investigation) commanders, or the project sergeants. It has been suggested that changes in communication and dispatch procedures may have been a contributing factor. Consequently, patrol response may not have been so prompt or effective compared to the baseline year in apprehending suspects shortly after a 211 was reported by these facilities.

4. Patrol Priority Response Should be Analyzed

Further analyses should be pursued in the absence of a rational explanation for the elapsed apprehension time differences. But regardless of the possible outcome of such an inquiry, there remains the possibility to de-emphasize emergency-type patrol response if there is no immediate danger to the victims. Suspect descriptions can be put on the air by communications from information furnished over the phone. The exposed film can be retrieved by an assigned beat officer when freed from other "priority" service calls.

This initial finding of longer time post-event case clearances points up these significant facts - the quality of an alleged offender identification made possible by the unimpeachable evidence of crime in progress photographs will practically assure a 100% conviction rate. As was found in a major burglary investigation study undertaken in Alameda County, the time of response to a reported burglary was not so important as the time (less than one hour) that the burglary occurred.[1] The subtlety of this finding was that the latter time was highly correlated with witness providing suspect information and auto description data. So as with the S.C. photograph, both felony crimes have fairly incontrovertible evidentiary information.

5. Cost/Effectiveness of the Robbery Prevention Project

The current vogue is to assess programs in terms of their "cost effectiveness". Thus, in the first year of the RPP, estimates were provided that indicated that since a full-scale trial for robbery "costs" on the order of $10,000 (in terms of the costs of judges, bailiffs, district attorneys, etc.) and since "x" number of offenders plead guilty, thus avoiding trial costs and that "x" number of robberies were "prevented", then the project saved the criminal justice system "y" number of dollars.

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[1] B. Greenberg, et.al. "Enhancement of the Investigative Function," Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California 1971-1972.

We find these calculations interesting but not particularly valid in real terms. More specifically, in the pre-project period, we found that somewhere between 40-50% of offenders apprehended for armed robbery actually went to trial (with the remainder pleading guilty, plea bargaining, being acquitted, being convicted of a lesser offense, etc.). Thus, if the logic cited above prevailed, the appropriate calculation would be to compare the difference between the pleadings of the pre-project period to those of individuals apprehended as a result of RPP efforts. More precisely, one must compare only those robbers apprehended where a surveillance camera picture is available that would presumably influence the robber to plead guilty to the offense charged with a control group of armed robbers apprehended for similar offenses in which no surveillance camera picture is available. Further, because of the problems with armed robbery trend projections (e.g, the wide variation on a year to year basis) that we discussed earlier, we have both theoretical and practical objections to concluding that this or that many armed robberies were "prevented".

In any event, we believe that such calculations are exercises in futility. For example, implying that $10,000 is saved for every armed robber that pleads guilty is simply not factually correct. This amount of money is "saved" only if the judges, prosecutors, clerks, etc. are laid off because there is no work for them. That situation is not the case since these individuals simply devote their time to some other task. True, there is a definite saving of police time that can be utilized for some other purpose but that is not a cost saving that is a trade-off. More specifically, using figures derived from this study, we agree with RPP staff that there is a substantial savings of police officer time in those surveillance camera cases that plead guilty. The officer time without such photos - would have been tied up in three-five day court trials. In the case of this project, we estimate that between 80-100 days of police officer time is saved and is available for other line duties. Further, because the RPP did produce a significant increase in police productivity due to the quality of

the investigative leads provided, it did increase police effectiveness in achieving their crime control mission. In short, the RPP has made a definite contribution to enhanced SJPD police productivity.

On the other hand, whether the RPP achieved these results at less cost is strictly a moot point. To carry this logic to its extreme, if the police made no arrests for armed robbery, there would obviously be a "savings" in trial costs since no one would be available to go to trial. Further, by increasing the number of armed robbery apprehensions, guilty pleas, and the incarcerations, the actual dollar costs to taxpayers will be greater since putting more individuals in prison results in increased <u>real</u> costs for more prisons, more guards, care and feeding of the inmate, possible welfare costs if he has a family and so forth.

In summary, we suggest that RPP management simply accept the significance of the project in terms of the fact that the police, as a direct result of RPP efforts, are more effective and productive in apprehending armed robbers than they were without such a program. That, in and of itself, justifies the RPP as an excellent police project.

CHAPTER VII

THIRD YEAR PLAN

The preceding chapter, while lauding the relative success of the S.C. and S.W. components of the Robbery Prevention Grant Program no doubt due in large measure to its management and enthusiasm of participants, points up nonetheless, a weakening in results showing up in the Second Year seventh-month period. As a consequence of this finding, the third and final year of grant-supported activities should be geared to provide a solid basis for planners and decision-makers to determine whether either or both components should be continued under local funding provisions. Specific recommendations are as follows:

1. It is recommended that the same measures of effectiveness applied in the Second Year Evaluation be continued. They are simple to understand and reveal the dynamics of program operations.

2. An armed-robbery pattern analysis should be undertaken as quickly as possible with respect to current locations of cameras and other locations so that "idle" cameras may possibly be relocated to improve apprehensions. Implicit in this analysis will be a decided conflict that argues against moving the cameras because of their apparent deterrent effect.

3. A survey should be undertaken and documented regarding likely candidate facilities for installation of cameras consistent with technical feasibility.

4. Project S.W. and S.C. case logs should be set up to allow for ease in cross-correlating incidents supported by both components. The logs should also provide for a running list of pleadings and case dispositions.

5. A determination should be made to fund the CJIC Data Processing Center to provide for a periodic computer run of San Jose case pleadings and dispositions. This is a possible alternative to 4 (above), or can serve as a check on CJIC or Project accuracy.

6. A thorough analysis should be undertaken to determine corrective procedures for improving the Secret Witness Program response. A retrospective analysis appears necessary of publication of "newsworthy" references to the program, and the responses made to descriptions and/or photographs to gain some insight as to the persistent decline in numbers of responses.

7. A documented analysis should be instituted as quickly as possible to determine whether the desired "clandestine" nature of camera locations has been compromised by (1) avoidance by potential robbers, (2) use of facial covering to thwart I.D., and (3) knowledge by robbers of camera tripping mechanism.

8. Conduct an analysis to determine the reasons for the unusual apprehension delay times shift occurring in the project period compared to the base-line year.

9. A documented analysis should be undertaken of other jurisdictions pursuing similar S.C. and/or S.W. programs citing reasons for successes and/or failures to forestall similar problems occurring in the San Jose Police Department program. Specific attention should be addressed to the need for police management.

10. Information developed by the Project staff subsequent to the submission of a draft of this report revealed that there were some 31 robberies in camera-equipped stores in which no photos were available for a variety of reasons. The 31 robberies are in addition to the Project-logged and previously reported 40 robberies in which photographs were obtained leading to case clearances. In view of this finding, an analysis should be undertaken in the third year to document these incidents and procedures taken to remedy the problems encountered.

11. The Third Year Evaluation process should be involved in the above procedures to ensure adequacy and availability of data.

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