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



THESIS

THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST EXTORTION

by

Ralph William Connelly

March 1976

Thesis Advisor: Russel H. Stolfi

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

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Third Party Involvement in International Terrorist Extortion

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

from the

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ABSTRACT

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The thesis contains a methodology for collecting information about extortionary terrorist events in a format suitable for aggregate data analysis. This methodology was used for recording data on all international terrorist extortionary events which could be found for the period 1968-1975. Bivariate analysis was used in an effort to reveal the determinants of terrorist success in kidnappings, hijackings, and barricade incidents. It was found that the variables which contribute to terrorist success are so interrelated that no single determinant of terrroist success could be isolated. Tests of the hypothesis were unable to produce conclusive results. Whether or not terrorist success encourages further terrorist extortionary activity could not be proven in this study.

TABLES OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE PROBLEM

In recent years, the world has seen the development of a new and modern political weapon, international terrorism. This is not meant to imply that terrorists have never before operated outside the limits of territorial borders. However, there are several factors which indicate that international terrorism is indeed a modern phenomenon. Modern modes of transportation, particularly the jet airliner, have made it easy for terrorists to rapidly export their violence to other countries and even other continents. The availability of modern explosives and sophisticated weaponry has allowed terrorists to strike with greater accuracy and concentrated destructive force. Since terrorists often seek to disrupt the normal order of things, increased political and economic interaction between nations has offered new targets for terrorist attack both at home and abroad. Finally, the dramatic increase in the frequency of incidents of international terrorism as well as its use by numerous groups of political extremists in all parts of the world, indicate that it is a modern problem which confronts all nations as it never has before.

International terrorism is a phenomenon which is easy to recognize, but at the same time difficult to define. The type of terrorism which is the subject of this study can be defined as violence, the threat or use of which is politically motivated. It is not an end in itself, but a means of achieving specific goals. Terrorism is violence which is personal in nature and conducted outside the generally accepted rules of warfare. Normally in war there are categories of civilians who are considered immune to violence because they are not actively engaged in the struggle.

Examples include women, children, and representatives of international agencies. The terrorist, however, does not recognize this immunity. Additionally, although the specific and immediate objectives of terrorism, as well as the methods employed, may vary widely, the violence is always designed to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm.[1]

International terrorism can be defined as terrorism which deliberately involves or victimizes governments, organizations, diplomats, or foreign nationals who are not participants in the struggle between the terrorist and his opponent. When the victim of the violence is a diplomat or other internationally protected person, when international modes of commerce and travel are involved, or when the violence is exported to other nations, the terrorist activity can be considered international.[2]

One of the most common and apparently most successful types of international terrorist activity is the act of extortion. In recent years governments, corporations, and individuals have paid exorbitant ransoms to secure the freedom of hostages seized by terrorists. Governments have been pressured into relinquishing some measure of their sovereignty by releasing prisoners, failing to prosecute apprehended terrorists, or even allowing them to perpetrate their crime and depart under official protection. The random nature of international terrorism, and the terrorists ability to strike out anywhere and at any time, makes every nation in the world susceptible to terrorist attack. Neither geographical location,

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[1]Rand Corporation, P-5217, Terrorism Works - Sometimes, by Brian M. Jenkins, p. 2-3, April 1974.

[2]Rand Corporation, P-5261, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, by Brian M. Jenkins, p. 2, June 1974.

ideological position, nor political system can exempt a country from the possibility of being targeted or exploited by international terrorists. Some governments have chosen to give in to terrorist demands on the grounds that not to do so only encourages terrorist revenge. On the other hand, the hope of deterring future terrorist extortion by not allowing terrorists to profit from their activities has promted other governments staunchly to refuse to pay terrorist blackmail. It is the purpose of this study to observe the various ways in which international terrorists exploit third party governments, to examine the different reactions which governments have made to terrorist extortion, and to evaluate both the immediate and subsequent effects of those reactions.

B. HYPOTHESIS

When international terrorists involve a third party government in an extortionary event, the actions of that government ultimately determine its liability and susceptibility to future involvement in similar terrorortionary activity. It can be further hypothesized that the third party government which consistently capitulates to terrorist demands will be viewed by the terrorists as an easy target which can be successfully exploited in the future. Conversely, the government which consistently resists and opposes the terrorists will reduce its liability to future involvement. In other words, future terrorist activity is encouraged by terrorist success and discouraged by failure.

In order to test the hypothesis, it was determined that quantitative as well as qualitative analysis would prove useful. The first step in the research involved the development of a methodology for recording in coded form the essential elements of a terrorist extortion. Data was then

collected in this format on international terrorist extortionary events from 1968 to 1975. All events which could be identified and about which information was available were included. Evaluation and analysis concluded the research.

C. SOME DEFINITIONS

Before proceeding further, it will prove helpful to explain some of the terms which will be used throughout this study. The terms terrorism and international terrorism have already been described. A terrorist extortion can best be considered within the context of a simple kidnapping. A hostage is seized and threatened with death or physical harm unless the kidnappers' demands are met. The hostage is normally a person, but could also be an aircraft, ship, embassy, government building, etc. The hostage is the victim in an extortionary event. The target of the event is the person, government, or organization upon whom the demands are made. The host is the country in which the event takes place. The opposition government is the one with which the terrorist organization is in conflict or opposes. The opposition government is the recognized enemy of the terrorist organization. A third party government is one which is not a participant in the struggle between the terrorist and his opponent. The country of which the hostage is a citizen is referred to as the hostage government.

Some of the above listed terms apply to the actors in an international terrorist extortion while others relate to the possible roles in which those actors might be cast. The matrix contained in Figure 1 is designed to show the difference between actors and roles. Two actors who do not appear in the matrix are the terrorist and his victim. The terrorist always assumes the role of extortioner in an event, and the victim is his hostage.

AN INTERNATIONAL EXTORTIONARY EVENT: THE ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES		
THEIR ROLES	THE ACTORS	
	Opposition Government	Third Party Government
Hostage Government (citizenship of hostage)		
Host Government (location of event)		
Target Government (target of demands)		

Figure 1. An International Extortionary Event: The Actors and Their Roles

The Figure 1 matrix shows the ways in which opposition and third party governments can be involved in an international terrorist extortion. A third party government must be cast in at least one of the three roles for the event to be an international one. The opposition government may or may not be a participant. This basic matrix can become considerably larger and contain numerous different possibilities for those events which invlove multiple third party governments in the various combinations of roles.

The final term which might require explanation is Bangkok Solution. The term originated as the result of the 1972 seizure of the Israeli embassy in Bangkok. It refers to the compromise in which the terrorists drop their demands and release their hostages in return for safe passage out of the country to one in which they will be granted sanctuary.

II. METHODOLOGY FOR RECORDING TERRORIST EXTORTIONARY EVENTS

A. VARIABLE SELECTION AND CODING PROCEDURES

In developing a methodology for recording international terrorist extortionary events the steps included primarily identifying those variables of which an event is comprised and then developing categories, codes and scales suitable for the accurate measuring and recording of the variables identified. An initial variable list, and coding procedures were drawn up. This initial list emphasized identification of actors, their actions relative to the event, extortion demands and payoffs, types and numbers of hostages, fates of both hostages and terrorists, the impact of publicity, and the event's relationship to previous or subsequent events. These variables were chosen as being essential to the testing of the hypothesis.

After discussion and interviews with administrators at the State Department, Justice Department, and Central Intelligence Agency, who are involved in policy on terrorism, it became apparent that the initial variable list and coding procedures required modification and expansion. The variables and coding procedures used in the ITERATE Project[3] were extremely valuable to the revision. In some cases, variables were taken directly from the ITERATE codebook. In other cases, ITERATE variables were modified or expanded before being incorporated. Finally, parts of the ITERATE codebook were also used for modifying and expanding previously selected variables. The second generation variable list and codebook, which

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[3]Mickolus, Edward F., ITERATE: International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, a project done for the Office of Political Research of the Central Intelligence Agency, August 1975.

can be found in Appendix A, was used for the collection of all data.

B. DATA COLLECTION

1. What Events Were Included

The first step in the data collection phase related to choosing the events to be included. It was decided that all international terrorist extortionary events from 1968 to 1975 would be examined. The following criteria were initially established to determine which events would qualify for use in the study:

a. The event would have to involve a third party government.

b. The event would have to be extortionary in nature. It would need to contain an action, a hostage, and a demand which has to be met to secure release of the hostage. Events which involved only extortionary threats were not included.

c. The event would have to be carried out by a politically motivated organization.

d. The event would have to allow for a decision or action by the third party government who was involved.

Almost as soon as the data collection phase began, it became apparent that the above criteria would have to be expanded. Because international terrorism is characterized by its penchant for operating outside the normally accepted rules of political action, warfare, and international law, it is difficult to establish strict rules or criteria for evaluating terrorist events. Consequently, the above decision rules for choosing the events to include in the study were expanded as follows:

(1) The third party actor need not be a government. Many events have been targeted against multi-national corporations rather than

governments. This is particularly evident in Argentina where the kidnapping of corporate executives has proved to be a lucrative business. In these events, the kidnap victim may be valuable because of his position with the corporation rather than because of his citizenship. The criteria was expanded to include those events involving citizens or corporations from third party countries even though that country's government was not a direct participant in the event.

(2) The requirement that an event be extortionary in nature was changed only slightly to allow for the fact that sometimes the extortionary demands might not be made known or might not be clear. Once a hostage has been seized, the event qualifies for inclusion in the study. This allows for the fact that sometimes events do not proceed as the terrorists would like, and an event can end prior to the demands being issued. Unsuccessful attempts to seize a hostage and extortionary threats when no hostage has been physically seized are not included.

(3) A substantial number of incidents have been perpetrated by terrorists who were not thoughtful enough to report the organization with which they were affiliated. There have also been a number of events which were carried out by individuals rather than organization. Consequently, the requirement that events must be the work of politically motivated organizations was dropped.

(4) In many terrorist events, the third party actor or government is never given the opportunity to act or make a decision relative to meeting the demands. Normally, one can assume that the third party actor can, at the minimum, exert pressure on the host government or actor upon whom demands have been made. Unfortunately, we cannot always determine

what role if any the third party actor played in determining the outcome of an event. Therefore, this criterion also was eliminated.

The requirements, then, for deciding which events to include in the study and which to reject were reduced because the original criteria were somewhat unrealistic and entirely too restrictive. Simply stated, the event had to involve a third party government, citizens, or corporations from third party countries; be of an extortionary nature, even though the demands might not be clear or made known; and be an event which develops sufficiently to allow for a decision by government officials regarding the management of the event. Unsuccessful attempts, and events in which the intended victim avoids capture or escapes during the initial seizure are excluded.

The above criteria adequately describe which events are of interest in this study, if those events are kidnapping or barricade and hostage incidents. Another type of event which is of interest is the aircraft hijacking. In many hijackings the only decision maker is the pilot, and we assume that the policy which he follows is one of personal survival. In other events, the only third party involved is the country to which the aircraft is hijacked, and because the event ends upon arrival, that country's involvement or actions really do not affect the hostages. The event is over when the hijacker reaches his destination and releases his hostages. Certainly a country's policy toward hijackers encourages or discourages other hijackings, but this research is primarily interested in decisions made when hostage lives are in the balance.

The criteria, then, for including hijacking events are that a third party government be involved as hostage, host, or target of demands; that

demands are made, exclusive of those directed at the aircraft crew; and that a decision be made regarding the management of the event while the hostages are in custody of the hijackers.

2. Coding an Event

The rules for coding events are contained in Appendix A. This section, then will not explain the procedure for coding, but rather will discuss some of the problems, solutions, assumptions, and shortcomings encountered in coding the events.

Whenever possible, the events were coded from press reports contained in the New York Times. The Rand Corporation Report, "International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974," by Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, and unclassified chronologies provided by the Office of Political Research of the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the New York Times Index were used to identify those events to be coded. In twenty-three cases, the events were coded from the chronologies because no articles in the New York Times could be found. These events are identified as those which received zero publicity points.

The duration of an event is that period of time between the seizure of the hostage and the determination that there no longer exists a threat to him. Normally an event ends with the release or demise of the hostage. However, in some cases where kidnap victims have been killed, their fate is not known for some time. In these cases, because observers of the event are unaware that it has ended, the event is not considered ended until the fate of the hostage is made known.

Most of the information about an event is generally reported by the news media while the event is in progress, although reporting may continue for a brief period of time after the event has ended. Because of this reporting style, much of the information which is of a follow-up nature is never reported. Many questions were raised during the data collection phase of this research for which answers could not be found. The items for which information was most often lacking are those which deal with the fate of a captured terrorist.

The methodology calls for the coding of government and/or non-government actor responses. The categories of potential response range from complete capitulation to terrorist demands to armed confrontation or shoot-out with the terrorists. The response step in the research is one of the most important because this information forms the basis for testing the hypothesis that government reaction determines future susceptibility to terrorist extortion. For the majority of cases, it was not difficult to code this variable. However, in several cases, government response changed during the course of the event. Most often the change is from a position of total rejection of terrorist demands to one of compromise or capitulation. In the well known event which occurred during the Munich Olympics in 1972, however, the West German government's response shifted in the other direction. Initially the West Germans negotiated with the BSO terrorists, but the event ended in a shootout. Since the coding procedure only allows for one response to be recorded, naturally the final one is the one which is coded.

3. Measuring Publicity

One of the primary purposes of terrorism is the generation of publicity. Terrorist activity captures headlines. The drama of such events is brought into the homes of millions through television news coverage complete with live, on-the-scene reports whenever possible. News media coverage not only dramatizes the event, but also focuses world attention on the cause which the terrorist represents. In many cases it would be difficult to determine whether gaining publicity is one of the terrorist's primary purposes, ot whether it is simply an additional benefit which he receives. In other cases, events appear to be staged to gain maximum news coverage. One such case was the seizure of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. The world wide news coverage which the games were receiving assured the Black September Organization (BSO) terrorists who perpetrated the incident a world wide audience to view the event.

Because publicity is considered to be among the primary purposes of terrorism, a scale for measuring publicity was developed. Using this scale, a publicity score was derived for each of the events considered in this study. Measuring the amount of publicity which a terrorist event generates could best be accomplished by aggregating the total coverage given the event by all forms of news media. Unfortunately, because of limited resources available to the research, a single source was chosen. It was decided that the New York Times, from which all of the events were being coded, would be used for the measurement of publicity. The assumption, upon which the decision to measure publicity from a single source is based, is that the New York Times accurately reflects the other forms of news

media in its coverage of an event. A nation-wide television newscast probably gives more time and attention to the story of national interest which the New York Times places on page one than it gives to the story on page seventeen. The scores derived for publicity, then, reflect the attention given events by the New York Times, but they are also considered to be representative of total news coverage which events receive in the United States.

Measuring publicity from a newspaper presents certain problems which should be discussed.[4] The time at which a story is received by a newspaper may determine where it is positioned and how much space is allocated for it. A story of front page importance received too late for today's edition may be superceded by events of more immediate concern and not receive a front page position in tomorrows edition. Pictures catch the reader's eye and contribute to the publicity value of a story. However, pictures are not always available or may not be used because of space limitations. The actual size of a story may determine whether it is placed at the top of the page, above an advertisement, or down the side of the page. Finally, the importance of a story in today's news must be evaluated relative to the other stories in today's news. A given terrorist event might receive more or less publicity because of the absence or presence of other newsworthy events of greater importance.

The problems discussed above indicate that the measurement of terrorist publicity as attempted in this research must be approached with caution.

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[4]The recognition of several of the problems in measuring publicity from a newspaper are the result of an interview with Mr. Albert Cross, the Managing Editor of the Monterey Peninsula Herald.

Certainly there are considerations beyond the impact of the event itself which determine the amount of publicity which an event receives. Nevertheless, some events do receive front page coverage while others are buried in the back of the paper. There are differences in the amount of publicity which different terrorist events receive and those differences can be measured.

The scale which was derived for measuring publicity can be found under Variable 70 in the codebook which is contained in Appendix A. In developing this scale, a story's location in the newspaper was considered to be the most important element of publicity. Consequently, story location is the primary determinant of an event's publicity score. Other elements which also contribute to an event's score are story length and the presence of a picture, map, or other graphic display. Because of the assumptions and problems involved in measuring publicity, a minor difference between two scores may not accurately reflect a minor variance in the actual publicity which two events received. But minor differences are of little value to the analysis. It is the major differences which are significant, and they can be confidently evaluated with the scale which has been developed in this study.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

A. DATA AGGREGATION

The first step toward the analysis of the data collected during this research consists of aggregation, i.e., the data are grouped on the basis of similarities. It must be pointed out, however, that there are many differences between international terrorist extortionary events, and

these differences are not always apparent. Every event is different in various particulars from every other event. This is not meant to imply that dissimilarities between events reduce the validity of analysis based on aggregation of associated iters. The author is acutely aware of the fact that every terrorist event is unique; nevertheless, the events also possess categorical similarities which can be validly aggregated and analyzed.

B. TYPES OF EVENTS AND THEIR FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE

For the period 1968-1975, there were 166 international terrorist extortionary events identified and included in this study. A listing of these events can be found in Appendix B. Although they represent only a small portion of the total terrorist activity which has occurred during the eight years examined, the listed events do contain all those which were found and judged appropriate to the study according to the definitional criteria previously discussed.

International terrorist extortionary events can be sorted into three basic types. There are kidnappings, barricade incidents, and aircraft hijackings. In a kidnapping, the victim is seized and carried off to some unknown location. The kidnappers can communicate their demands indirectly and need not expose themselves. In a barricade incident, the victims are captured but not carried off. Rather, the terrorists hold their hostages where captured and fortify the location against the police. In these events, the terrorist's exposure is maximized, and direct communication between the terrorists and authorities is enhanced. The third type of event is the aircraft hijack. These events are characterized by the fact

that they take place aboard an aircraft. They could easily be thought of as airborne barricade incidents, but the common characteristic that they take place aboard aircraft justifies grouping them separately. The annual frequency of all three types of events is tabulated below in Table I.

Table I.

Annual Frequency of Events by Type

YEAR	TYPE EVENT			TOTAL
	Kidnap	Barricade	Hijack	
1968	0	0	1	1
1969	2	0	8	10
1970	16	1	12	29
1971	7	1	5	13
1972	10	3	11	24
1973	28	6	8	42
1974	11	7	3	21
1975	15	10	1	26
TOTAL	89	28	49	166

As Table I indicates, kidnapping is certainly the most popular method of extortion employed by international terrorists and accounts for over half of the total number of events. Kidnappings and barricade incidents both show an upward trend. Hijackings, however, have declined over the last

three years. Even with this decline in the hijackings, the overall trend in total number of events continues to rise.

C. KIDNAPPINGS

1. The Corporate Case

Of the 89 total kidnapping incidents examined, 38 can be classified as corporate cases. These events are distinguished from the others in that the victim is a corporate official, employee, or relative of a corporate official, and the demands are made solely on the corporation or its officials. In three of these events, the nature of the demands are unknown. In the 35 other cases the sole demand issued was for payment of a ransom. An annual tabulation of the corporate case kidnappings is contained in Table II.

Table II. Annual Tabulation of Corporate Case Kidnappings

Year	# of Events	# of Events Ransom Disclosed	Total Ransoms Paid
1968	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0
1970	0	0	0
1971	3	3	$ 97,000
1972	6	5	2,300,000
1973	22	14	26,918,000
1974	4	0	?
1975	3	0	?
TOTAL	38	22	$29,315,000

Note: Total ransoms paid includes only those events for which the ransom was disclosed.

During the peak year, 1973, over $41 million was demanded, and the total ransom payments exceeded $26 million. There were also eight cases in 1973 for which the amount of the ransom paid is unknown, and two events in which no ransom was paid. During that year, a single event in which an EXXON official was kidnapped netted a ransom payment of $14.2 million. That event not only accounts for the highest single ransom payment about which we know, but also marks the last event for which the amount of payment was disclosed. The reluctance to disclose ransom amounts is evidence of the belief that such disclosure encourages future kidnappings.

Table III lists the countries in which corporate case kidnappings have occurred. South American countries account for 89.5 percent of the events, and the overwhelming majority, 73.7 percent took place in Argentina alone.

Table III.

Geographical Breakdown of Corporate Case Kidnappings

Country	# of Events
Argentina	28
Bolivia	2
Burma	1
Colombia	2
Ethiopia	2
Guatemala	1
Northern Ireland	1
Paraguay	1
TOTAL	38

Table IV lists the terrorist groups who have claimed responsibility for corporate case kidnappings. It is interesting to note not only the

organizations which have financed themselves through this type of extortion, but also the number of events where the organization to which the kidnappers belonged was not disclosed. In 23 of the 38 events, the terrorist group which conducted the kidnapping was unknown. One can only speculate as to how many of these were carried out by individuals who were not affiliated with any politically motivated organization. Kidnapping corporate executives has proved to be a lucrative business, and there is no reason to assume that common criminals as well as politically motivated groups have not benefited from this type of extortionary event.

Table IV. Corporate Case Kidnappers

Organization	Country	# of Events
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	Argentina	8
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)	Argentina	1
Montoneros	Argentina	1
Kachin Independence Army	Burma	1
National Liberation Army (ELN)	Colombia	1
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)	Ethiopia	2
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)	Guatemala	1
Unknown (UNK)		23

In one instance, the kidnappers, in their ransom demand, claimed to be members of the ERP: the organization, however, publically disavowed any role in the kidnapping. There are several possible reasons why a terrorist organization might disavow its participation in an event or simply refuse to identify itself. Certainly, the less information available to the

authorities, the greater is the problem presented to police trying to solve the case. Accurate assessments of the activity levels as well as the revenues of specific terrorist groups are impossible to make if the authorities cannot determine who is responsible for which event. A final reason might stem from fear of disillusioning the public. An organization which seeks public support might not want the public to see how rich it has become through terrorist extortion.

Corporate case kidnappings rank as the most successful type of terrorist extortionary event. In 29 of the 38 cases examined, the kidnappers succeeded in extorting ransom for hostages. One case was evaluated as being indifferent to success. In other words, terrorist gains and losses cancelled each other out. Only two events were judged to be total failures for the terrorists. An evaluation of terrorist success could not be made in the remaining six instances because of insufficient information.

The cross impact matrix contained in Figure 2 shows the relationship between ransom payment and the fate of the hostages for corporate case kidnappings. The most striking point is that there are no events in which it is known that the hostage was killed. The two events in which it is known that no ransom was paid both involved executives who had been previously kidnapped and ransomed. In one, the hostage was rescued, and in the other the hostage was released after convincing his captors that his company would not ransom him a second time.

		Hostage Fate		
Ransom Paid		Killed	Released	Unknown
	Yes	0	29 (a)	0
	No	0	2 (a)	0
	Unknown	0	4	3
(a) Includes one case of hostage rescue.				

Figure 2. Corporate Case Kidnappings: Ransom Payment vs. Hostage Fate

One of the twice kidnapped executives, Charles Lockwood, reported after his first experience that his captors had said that kidnapping executives was the best way to raise money. They had tried robbing banks, but found out that kidnapping an important corporate official was easier, less dangerous, and more profitable. The data collected in this study certainly indicates that Mr. Lockwood's abductors were correct in their assessment of corporate case kidnappings.

2. Miscellaneous Kidnappings

If the 38 corporate cases are removed from the total of 89 kidnappings, 51 events remain to be analyzed. These events can be classified as political and miscellaneous. The political kidnappings are those in which diplomats, military personnel, other government representatives, or relatives, are taken hostage, or the demands are targeted against governments. The miscellaneous category is provided for those cases which cannot appropriately be called either political or corporate cases. There were

only four miscellaneous cases discovered during the research. The one element that links these four events is that the kidnappers were apparently more interested in the individual kidnapped than in extorting something from someone else.

The first miscellaneous kidnapping involved the abduction of Hector Minoni, the manager of United Press International in Uruguay by members of OPR-33. No demands were issued by the terrorists, and Mr. Minoni was released the next day.

The second case was somewhat more complicated. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) asked Tenneco Corporation to send a helicopter to pick up an ELF member who would negotiate the release of five Tenneco employees being held by the ELF. When the helicopter arrived both it and the pilot, Thomas Wyatt, were seized. The helicopter, piloted by Mr. Wyatt, was then used to kidnap an American nurse, the victim in the following case. Mr. Wyatt was released ten days later.

In the third case, Mrs. Dortzback, an American nurse, was kidnapped from a rural Ethiopian hospital. Although a ransome demand for medical supplies was issued, she was taken primarily to treat wounded ELF guerrillas. The ransom demands were rejected, and she was released after 26 days.

The final miscellaneous kidnapping was the abduction of Clyde Huddleson in Beruit, Lebanon by unknown terrorists. His kidnappers believed he was a CIA operative. After three days of interrogation he was released.

As has been seen, in the four miscellaneous kidnappings, the terrorists were primarily interested in the victim himself on the services he could provide. No ransoms were paid in any of the cases, and the victims were all released unharmed after their captors were finished with them.

3. Political Kidnappings

a. An Overview

The category of political kidnapping includes all kidnapping events which directly involve governments, either because of the type of victim held hostage or the nature of the demands issued by the abductors. There are 47 events in this category. Table V lists the annual frequency of political kidnappings.

Table V. Annual Frequency of Political Kidnappings

Year	Number of Events
1968	0
1969	2
1970	16
1971	4
1972	3
1973	6
1974	5
1975	11
TOTAL	47

The average number of political kidnappings was 5.875 per year. Linear regression based on the number of events per year over the eight year time span reveals an overall rising trend. The regression equation predicts nine events of this type for 1976. However, the correlation coefficient, r , is very low. r = .32. Consequently, little confidence can be placed in the regression equation to accurately predict the number of events

which will occur in the future. Figure 3 graphically displays the number of political kidnappings per year with the regression trend line superimposed.



Regression Equation: $\hat{y} = 2.32 + .76\ (x)$
$r = .32$

Figure 3. Political Kidnappings per Year with Regression Trend Line

b. The Hostage

The overwhelming majority of the political kidnappings have involved government personnel. High government officials have been the victim in 48.9 percent of the cases. Low government officials and government employees added another 17 percent for a total of 65.9 percent. Military personnel, corporate personnel, and private parties, e.g. tourists, missionaries, students, etc., were victims of political kidnappers in five events each, or a total of 31.9 percent of the cases. Relatives of high government officials were kidnapped in three events. The number of events in which each hostage type was taken is displayed in Table VI.

The total number of political kidnappings was 47. Table VI shows a total of 49 because two events involved hostages of two different types.

Table VI. Political Kidnap Hostages

Type Hostage	Number of Events
1. High Government Officials	23
2. Low Government Officials/Employees	8
3. Military Officers	2
4. Military Enlisted	3
5. Corporate Officials	2
6. Corporate Employees	3
7. Prominent Opinion Leaders	0
8. Private Parties; e.g., tourists, missionaries, students, etc.	5
9. Other (a)	3
TOTAL	49 (b)

NOTE: (a) The three events of Type 9, "Other," were kidnappings of family members of high government officials.

(b) The total number of events is 49 vice 47 because two events involved two different hostage types.

The large number of events in which high government officials were kidnapped most probably reflects their value as hostages for the terrorists. We might expect, then, that the importance which the terrorists place on their demands is indicated by the importance of hostages they seize. An examination of terrorist demands and the relationship between hostage types and demands issued will be helpful in evaluating the value of the various types of hostages.

c. Terrorist Demands

Of the 47 political kidnapping events, the terrorists' demands are unknown in seven cases. In the remaining 40 cases, 58 separate demands were issued. The demand most frequently made was for prisoner release. This demand was issued in over half of the events. Prisoner release was demanded in 24 separate events. Ransom demands rank second in frequency of occurrance with 12 events. The third most frequently issued demand was for the publication or broadcast of a statement by the terrorists. This demand was made in eight events. Amnesty or safe passage for the terrorists was demanded in four events. Other demands made by terrorists include armaments (1 event), specific political changes (2 events), change of sentence for prisoners (1 event), suspension of search for hostages and kidnappers (3 events), the closing of the Jewish emigre center at Schoenau Castle (1 event), and for prisoners to be shown on television to prove they were in good health (1 event). No demands were made in four events. The far right hand column of Figure 4 gives the total number of times specific demands were issued.

The cross-impact matrix contained in Figure 4 shows the relationship between hostage types and terrorist demands. Twenty-four events contained demands for prisoner release. In 62.5 percent of these events, high government officials were kidnapped. Low government officials and government employees were victims in another 12.5 percent of these cases. Government officials and employees were the victims in 75 percent of all the political kidnappings in which prisoner release was demanded. It is apparent that terrorists consider government personnel, especially high officials, as appropriate hostages when they want to have prisoners released.

Terrorist Demands	HOSTAGE TYPE*									Total # of Times Demands Issued
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Ransom (Money or Monitary Equivalent)	4	1	1	1	2			2	2	12(a)
Armaments								1		1
Prisoner Release - Own Group	15	3	1		2	2		1		24
Prisoner Release - Not Own Group	1									1
Specific Political Changes				1		1				2
Amnesty or Safe Passage	1	1						1	1	4
Publish or Broadcast a Statement by the Terrorists	6			1				1		8
Change of Sentence of Prisoners (but still inprison)	1									1
Suspension of Search for Kidnappers and hostage	3									3
Close Schoenau Castle, Jewish Emigre Transit Camp		1						1		1(a)
Show Prisoners on Television	1									1
No Demands Made	2	1		1						4
Demands Unknown	3	2						2		7
									TOTAL	69

* See Table VI for hostage types.

(a) Demand issued during one event involving two hostage types.

Figure 4. Political Kidnappings: Hostage Type Versus Terrorist Demands

Ransom demands were made in 12 cases. In these events, the victims were government personnel only five times. It appears that terrorists consider other categories besides government employees to be suitable hostages for ransom demands. The value of corporate executives to terrorists seeking high ransoms has already been demonstrated.

d. Terrorist Success

In this study, five categories of terrorist success were established. The terrorist success rating for an event is determined only within the context of that event and its outcome. Success is measured irrespective of the value of publicity generated by the event. The five categories are: high success, moderate success, indifference, moderate failure, and total failure. High success describes those events in which the terrorists are overwhelmingly successful in having their demands met and suffer no losses. Moderate success describes those events in which some terrorist demands are met and/or the terrorist gains outweigh their losses. The category indifference is used for situations in which the terrorists neither gain nor lose, or the gains and losses cancel each other. Moderate failure describes events in which terrorist losses exceed their gains. Total failure means the terrorists suffered losses and achieved none of their demands during the event.

Figure 5 shows the relationship between terrorist success and hostage type for political kidnappings. Terrorist success is unknown for eight events. The terrorists were successful in over one-half of the remaining cases. If events within the indifference category are considered as terrorist failures because the terrorists did not succeed in achieving their demands, then the totals become 22 successes and 19 failures. The most

		Hostage Type									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Terrorist Success	1. High Success	8	2	2		1	1		3	3	20
	2. Moderate Success	2									2
	3. Indifference	8	1		2	1			1		13
	4. Moderate Failure										0
	5. Total Failure	2	2		1		1				6
	6. Unknown	3(a)	3				1(a)		1		8
	TOTAL	23	8	2	3	2	3		5	3	49(b)

(a) Includes one event still in progress when the data was collected.

(b) The total number of events is 49 because two events contained two different Hostage Types.

Figure 5. Political Kidnappings: Hostage Type vs. Terrorist Success

interesting fact revealed in the Figure 6 matrix is that the events involving high government officials, the apparently most valuable hostage type, afforded the terrorists successes in only 10 cases, 50 percent of the 20 events for which terrorist success was able to be measured. Little confidence can be placed in statistical evaluation of the relationship between other hostage types and terrorist success because of the small numbers of events in which other hostage types were taken. However, it does appear that in most of the cases, the hostage type does not significantly effect terrorist success.

It was thought that terrorist success might be correlated with the type of demand issued. Unfortunately, the data does not allow an analysis of this relationship, because terrorist success is measured by event rather than by demand. Consequently, in events in which multiple demands were issued the success of specific demands might not be known. What did become apparent, however, is that when terrorists issue multiple demands, they increase their chances of gaining at least a partial success.

The two most popular demands were for prisoner release and ransom. The numbers of events during which these demands were made and met were recorded. Prisoner release was demanded in 24 events. Figure 6 gives a breakdown of events in which prisoner release was demanded. The prisoners were released in 9 cases (37.5 percent). They were not released in 14 cases (58.3 percent). It is unknown whether or not the demand was met in the remaining case (04.2 percent). High government officials were the most frequently seized hostage where prisoner release was demanded. When compared with all other hostage types, high government officials proved to be the optimum hostage for terrorists seeking the release of prisoners. High government officials were held hostage in seven of the nine events in which prisoners were released (77.7 percent). However, it must also be noted that eight of the fourteen cases (57.1 percent) in which prisoners were not released also involved hostages who were high government officials. Simply stated, the terrorists who kidnapped high government officials were more successful in securing the release of prisoners than were terrorists who kidnapped other types of hostages; however, prisoner release was granted less than 50 percent of the time regardless of the hostage type.

Prisoner Release Demanded	Hostage Type: High Govt. Official	Hostage Type: All Others	Total
Prisoners Released	7	2	9
Prisoners Not Released	8	6	14
Unknown	0	1	1
Total	15	9	24

Figure 6. Political Kidnappings: Hostage Type vs. Prisoner Release

Terrorists were slightly more successful with demands for ransom than with demands for prisoner release. In six of twelve events (50 percent) which included ransome demands, the ransom was paid. The ransom was not paid in five events (41.7 percent). Whether or not the ransom was paid is unknown for one event (8.3 percent). Of particular interest are the four events in which high government officials were held hostage. In these events, the terrorists succeeded in extorting a ransom in only one case. High government officials proved to be the optimum hostages for events in which prisoner release was demanded, but poor hostages for events in which money as demanded. Figure 7 shows the relationship between high government officials and all other hostage types for events containing ransom demands.

		Hostage Types		
		High Govt. Official	All Others	Total
RANSOM	Paid	1	5	6
	Not Paid	3	2	5
	Unknown	0	1	1
Total		4	8	12

Figure 7. Political Kidnappings: Hostage Type vs. Ransom Payment

e. Third Party Government Involvement

A third party government is one which is not a direct participant in the struggle between the terrorist group and the government which it opposes. In the vast majority of political kidnappings, the hostage taken was a citizen of a third party country. Of the 47 political kidnappings, 37 were carried out by known terrorist organizations. One event was perpetuated by an individual rather than a group. Nine events were carried out by unknown terrorists, but a determination of third party involvement was able to be made. Of the 46 events in which the third party relationship was determined, 45 events included victims from third party countries. Forty-two events took place within the opposition country, and only four took place in third party countries. The opposition government was the target of the extortion in 29 cases, and third parties were targeted only eight times. Nine events contained either no extortion demands, unknown demands, or unknown targets. Figure 8 shows the number of

events in which opposition and third party governments have served as host, hostage, or target of demands in political kidnappings.

	Host	Hostage	Target
Oppisition Government	42	1	29
Third Party Government	4	45	8
Total	46	46	37 (a)

(a) Nine events contained no or unknown targets.

Figure 8. Political Kidnappings: Opposition and Third Party Government Involvement

D. BARRICADE EVENTS

1. The Rising Trend

The first barricade incident took place in 1970. Since that first event, the number of barricade incidents per year has grown slowly but steadily. Whereas with political kidnappings, the number of events per year jumped from two the first year, 1969, to sixteen the second, 1970; the number of barricade incidents remained at one during the first two years, 1970-1971, and began to increase slightly in the third year, 1972. The number of barricade events per year is listed in Table VII and displayed with the trend line derived from linear regression analysis in Figure 9.

Linear regression analysis of the number of barricade incidents per year predicts that 10 events of this type will take place during 1976. The correlation coefficient, r , is very high, indicating a close association between time and the number of events. $r = .95$. Because the correlation



Figure 9. Barricade Incidents per Year with Regression Trend Line.

Table VII. Annual Frequency of Barricade Events

Year	Number of Events
1968	0
1969	0
1970	1
1971	1
1972	3
1973	6
1974	7
1975	10

coefficient is so high, considerable confidence can be placed in the regression equation to accurately forecast the number of events which will occur in the future. Between six and fourteen barricade events can be predicted for 1976 with 95 percent confidence.

2. Terrorist Demands

The most frequently issued demand during barricade events was for amnesty or safe passage for the terrorists conducting the event. This is, of course, expected, because the terrorists would need safe passage in order to insure their own safety upon conclusion of the event. The demand was actually made in 16 events, and in three events safe passage was the sole demand issued.

Prisoner release was the primary demand issued in 15 barricade incidents. The majority of these demands, 53.3 percent, were made on the hostage government rather than the host government. With political kidnappings, on the other hand, demands for prisoner release were targeted at the host government in 91.6 percent of the cases. In two of the barricade incidents, demands for prisoner release were targeted against a government which was neither the host nor hostage government. Figure 10 shows the targets and outcome of events in which prisoner release was demanded.

	Target of Prisoner Release Demanded			
	Host Govt.	Hostage Govt.	Other Govt.	Total
Prisoners Released	2	2	2	6
Prisoners Not Released	3	6	0	9
Total	5	8	2	15

Figure 10. Barricade Events: Targets versus Outcomes where Prisoner Release Demanded

3. Terrorist Success

From Figure 10 it can be determined that barricade events were successful for extorting prisoner release 40 percent of the time. This is remarkably close to the percentage of successful political kidnappings in which prisoner release was demanded. Political kidnappers were successful in 37.5 percent of those events. For barricade events in which prisoner release was demanded, the hostage government was not only the most frequently targeted, but also afforded terrorists the fewest successes. Hostage governments refused to release prisoners in six events and released them in only two events.

In general, barricade events had an overall success rate of 42.8 percent. In 46.4 percent of these events the terrorists were captured and/or killed. Three events, the remaining 10.8 percent, ended in a Bangkok Solution. These three events were evaluated as indifferent to success because the terrorists dropped their initial demands in exchange for safe passage out of the country.

Six countries have been the target of terrorist demands in more than one barricade event. They are listed below in Table VIII along with the event outcome. This list excludes those cases in which safe passage demands were issued to host governments unless that was the sole demand made during the event.

Table VIII. Barricade Events: Targets of Demands and Terrorist Success

Target Government	Terrorist Success	Bangkok Solution	Terrorist Failure	Total Events
Israel	0	1	3	4
Jordan	2	0	1	3
Federal Republic of Germany	0	0	3	3
France	2	0	0	2
Netherlands	0	0	2	2
U. S. A.	0	0	2	2

Israel has been targeted more than any other country, and has never capitulated. Other countries who have rejected terrorist demands and been targeted in subsequent barricade events are Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, and the U.S.A. Only two coutries, Jordan and France, have capitulated and been targeted during subsequent barricade events. It does not appear that previous success significantly influences the selection of extortion targets in barricade incidents.

There was a total of 24 host governments for barricade events. Only three countries hosted more than one event. Sweden hosted two, both of which were failures. France also hosted two events, both of these were

successes; however, the second event developed after an unsuccessful attack on an Israeli aircraft at Orly Airport, and the only demand was for safe passage. This event was probably unplanned. The Netherlands hosted three events, one success and two failures. It appears that previous successes or failures do not influence the selection of location for barricade incidents. In fact, the large number of host governments may very well indicate that terrorists prefer to strike in countr without previous experience in managing a barricade incident. The large number of host governments also points out the terrorist's advantage in being able to choose the time and place of his attack.

E. AIRCRAFT HIJACKING

1. A Problem Solved

There have been over 250 aircraft hijackings worldwide since 1968. The overwhelming majority of these events were not included in this study, because third party governments were not required to make decisions which would affect the fate of the hostages. Only 49 hijackings were found which met that requirement. Although data was not collected on the excluded events, they were examined during the research and some general conclusions were formulated. Most of the events were conducted by individuals rather than politically motivated organizations. Usually the hijacker asked for nothing other than to be taken to his desired destination. However, after B.D. Cooper parachuted to freedom with $200,000 extorted from Northwest Airlines in 1971, there followed a rash of hijackings in which money and parachutes were demanded. Cooper's success certainly prompted others to attempt similar hijackings.

The peak years for aircraft hijackings were 1969-1970. Over 130 incidents took place during those two years alone, and most were entirely successful, i.e., the hijacker got where he wanted to go. The reception he received, however, was often not as expected. Years after the Cuban government began imprisoning hijackers, individuals were still commandeering aircraft to Cuba.

Since the peak years for hijackings, the number of events per year has been reduced steadily to only a few. Government policy, such as Cuba's toward hijackers was not the most important cause in the reduction. The major cause was improved security. Sky marshals and security agents were placed on aircraft, and they succeeded in foiling several hijack attempts. The best deterrent, however, proved to be the metal detection device. Air piracy stopped when the potential hijacker could no longer board the airplane with concealed weapons.

2. Hijackings for Extortionary Purposes

When airport security and boarding procedures succeeded in stopping hijackings, they also solved the problem of hijackings by international terrorists for extortionary purposes. Only one event of this sort could be found for 1975. Even though the hijacking problem appears to be solved, and future hijackings should be rare and isolated incidents, an examination of the 49 events isolated in this research should prove useful in further testing the hypothesis that terrorist success encourages further terrorist activity.

In 20 events, hijacked aircraft were required to stop for fuel enroute to the hijacker's destination. Four events ended during enroute stops when local officials captured the hijackers or convinced them to

surrender. Uruguay, Argentina, Uganda, and Cuba ended hijacking events in this manner.

Prisoner release was demanded in 21 hijackings. Terrorists were more successful in achieving the release of prisoners with hijackings (47.6 percent) than with political kidnappings (37.5 percent) or barricade events (40 percent). An examination of the success of hijackers in extorting prisoner release over time reveals a dramatic shift from capitulation by target governments to rejection of the demand. Table IX lists the number of hijackings per year in which prisoner release was demanded and achieved.

Table IX. Hijackings: Prisoner Release Demanded and Achieved

Year	Prisoner Release Demanded	Prisoner Release Achieved
1968	1	1
1969	1	1
1970	5	5
1971	1	0
1972	6	2
1973	5	0
1974	1	1
1975	1	0
TOTAL	21	10

The first seven times that prisoner release was demanded, the terrorists achieved it. However, they were successful in only three of the remaining 14 events. The reason for the shift in the terrorist success rate is difficult to isolate, but terrorist perserverance as

well as superior event planning and execution contributed to five of the first seven initial successes. The Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine (PFLP) conducted five successful hijackings for prisoner release between 1968 and 1970. They were successful in wresting prisoner release from Israel in the first two events, but only after holding Israeli hostages for 40 and 68 days respectively. In 1970, the PFLP won the release of prisoners held in Switzerland, West Germany, and England in a single well coordinated espisode which began with the simultaneous hijacking of four aircraft on September 6. After a fifth airplane was hijacked on September 9, the PFLP held over 300 hostages at "Revolution Airport" in the Jordanian desert. Only three of the five hijackings became extortionary events for prisoner release and they were coded separately because of the definitional criteria established for data collection in this study. However, intuitive judgement prefers to consider this episode as a single event involving three aircraft rather than three separate events. If the three events are reduced to one, then the number of successful "prisoner release" events for 1970 is reduced from five to three, and the 1968-1970 record for successful "prisoner release" events is reduced from seven to five.

Perhaps the reason for the dramatic shift in terrorist success between the 1968-1970 period and the 1971-1975 period is simply that several governments who refused to capitulate in the second period had not been targeted during the first period. Turkey (2 events); India, Venezuela, Colombia, Cypress, and Iraq (1 event each) were targeted only during the 1971-1975 period and refused to release prisoners. Only two governments, Israel and Greece, who had capitulated to prisoner release demands during the first

period, rejected those demands in all events in which they were targeted during the second period.

Terrorists demanding prisoner release after 1970 did not exhibit the same levels of resolve as did the PFLP in their early events. In three of the post-1970 events, the terrorists accepted asylum from the host government after their prisoner release demands had been rejected by the target government. In three events they flew to a friendly country for asylum. Terrorists accepted a monetary ransom in lieu of prisoner release in one event, and they surrendered to the host government in another. Three events ended with terrorists being killed or captured by the host government.

Demands for prisoner release were issued to the host governments in only five events. Normally, the terrorists hijacked the airplane to a country other than the target of the prisoner release demands. Only one of the four events targeted against host governments was successful in achieving prisoner release. In two events the terrorists simply departed after the target government rejected their demands. In the other two events, the targeted host government killed or captured the terrorists.

Palestineans and their sympathizers conducted the majority of the hijackings for prisoner release and also achieved the highest rate of success. Figure 11 compares the results of Palestinean related events and all others. Eighty percent of the successful hijackings for prisoner release worldwide were conducted by Palestineans and their sympathizers. Palestinean related events were successful twice as many times as not. Events which were not Palestinean related were successful only 22 percent of the time. The Chi-square test shows with 97 percent confidence that there is a positive relationship between event outcomes and whether or not the event was Palestinean related.

	Palestinean Related	All Others	Total
Prisoners Released	8	2	10
Prisoners Not Released	4	7	11
TOTAL	12	9	21

Figure 11. Hijackings for Prisoner Release: Palestinean Related versus All Others

Palestinean hijackers not only succeeded in achieving the specific objectives of their operations, but they also succeeded in focusing world attention on their cause. Because publicity for the terrorist is perhaps the most important result of terrorism, it too shall be examined.

F. TERRORIST PUBLICITY

The problems and assumptions inherent in the measurement of terrorist publicity as undertaken in this research have already been discussed. During the analysis of the publicity data, it was discovered that time is a very important factor in determining the amount of publicity which an event can receive. The maximum publicity points which can be awarded an event for any single day's news coverage is 45. A front page story over 20 column inches long with a picture receives the 45 point maximum score. Because interest in an event usually subsides quickly after it ends, the longer an event is in progress, the greater is its ability to receive a high publicity score. The effect of time points out the difference between the amount of publicity

an event receives and the impact of that publicity. The event with the largest publicity score is not necessarily the most memorable.

Perhaps the most memorable event of the 166 examined in this study is the BSO's seizure of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. This event received 185 publicity points. The multiple hijacking event of September 6, 1970 received 580 points, the maximum publicity score of any event. If a control for the effect of time is applied by dividing the publicity score by the number of days the event was in progress, an indication of the impact of publicity is generated. Applying this procedure to the September 6, 1970 event (23 days) and the Olympics event (1 day), shows that the multiple hijacking event has an impact score of only 25.2, while the impact score for the Olympics event remains at 185. Unfortunately, the algorithm (publicity score : length of event in days = impact score) favors events of shorter duration and does not give a true indication of the impact of the longer events. Accurate measurement of the impact of terrorist publicity would require methods of data collection and manipulation beyond the scope of this study.

The terrorist groups which have generated the greatest amounts of publicity are listed in Table X. It must be noted that many non-extortionary events have also been conducted by these organizations and the publicity from those events is not reflected in this study.

Palestineans and the Japanese Red Army, which has acted primarily in concert with Palestineans, rank among the top four groups in total publicity generated. Their activities not only shocked their world-wide audience, but also served to focus its attention on the issue of forgotten Palestine. Terrorist publicity which centered world attention on the Palestine issue

Table X. Terrorist Groups with Higest Publicity Scores

Terrorist Group	# of Events	Total Publicity Score	Average Publicity Per Event
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	8	1332 (a)	166.5
Japanese Red Army	5	1154 (a)	230.8
Tupamaros (Uruguay)	5	768	153.6
Black September Organization (Palestinean)	5	566	113.2
People's Revolutionary Army (Argentina)	10	447	44.7
Action for National Liberation (Brazil)	3	377 (a)	125.6
Turkish People's Liberation Army	5	371	74.2
Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine	3	361	120.3
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (Brazil)	3	317 (a)	105.7
South Moluccan Terrorists (Netherlands)	2	315	157.5
Eritrean Liberation Front (Ethiopia)	8	219	27.4
Revolutionary Armed Forces (Guatemala)	3	179	59.2

(a) Publicity scores for events conducted by two groups have been awarded to both.

during the early 1970's eventually led to the PLO's leader, Yassir Arafat, being welcomed at the United Nations with honors suitable to a head of state.

G. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis that third party governments encourage or discourage future terrorist extortionary activity by their reactions during current events can best be tested by examining those events in which a third party government was the primary target of the terrorist demands. Exclusive of demands for safe passage, aircraft fuel, and non-interference with the departure of a hijacked aircraft, third party governments have been targeted by terrorists 41 times. This figure may not be accurate, however, because when the demand is for ransom, the terrorists are usually more interested in the money itself than in who pays the ransom. Consequently, an analysis of third party targets may not produce accurate results.

An examination of the third party governments most frequently involved by terrorists in extortionary events and terrorist success might help to test the hypothesis. Table XI shows the most frequently involved third party governments for those events in which prisoner release and/or ransom was demanded.

With the exception of France and Great Britain, the third party government involved does not appear to significantly affect the outcome of events in which prisoner release and/or ransom were demanded. Of the five events in which France was involved, she was the target of demands in three events, the hostage government in one event, and the host government in one event. France's reactions during the events in which she was not targeted are unknown. During the three events in which she was targeted, France capitulated. If the hypothesis that terrorist success encourages further

Table XI. Third Party Countries Most Frequently Involved in Events in Which Prisoner Release and/or Ransom was Demanded

Third Party Country	Extortion Successful	Extortion Unsuccessful	Total
United States	8	8	16
West Germany	6	4	10
Great Britain	1	4	5
Netherlands	2	3	5
France	5	0	5

terrorist extortion, France would be expected to have been targeted more than three times.

The United States has a firm and well publicized policy of not releasing prisoners or paying terrorist blackmail. This policy does not stop other governments from meeting terrorist demands in events in which citizens of the United States are taken hostage. However, the citizenship of the hostage probably had little effect on decisions by target governments to meet or reject terrorist demands. Nevertheless, even though the United States has a firm policy against meeting terrorist demands, she continues to be involved and targeted by international terrorists. Of course, it is also impossible to know how many times terrorists have been deterred from involving the United States because of its policy of rejection.

The variables which contribute to the success or failure of an extortionary event are so closely related that simple bi-variate analysis cannot adequately expose the determinents of terrorist success. On the

other hand, the patterns of extortionary events and the number of different governments who have been cast in the varied roles within the events, makes multi-variate analysis impractical because of the small number of cases in which variables can be held constant.

The data collected in this research and its analysis neither prove nor disprove the hypothesis that terrorist success encourages further terrorist extortionary activity. The same variables and patterns of variables which produce successful events also produce unsuccessful events. Furthermore, it appears that terrorists who conduct extortionary events are influenced more by the present objectives to be gained from an event than by the past record of successes and failures.

IV. CONCLUSION

The methodology employed for event coding and data collection offers an effective means of recording information on terrorist extortion in a form suitable for data analysis. However, terrorist events often contain subtleties which are not reflected in the coded data. For example, the data would not reflect the difference between a shootout initiated by police and one initiated by the terrorists. The coding procedure is an effective instrument for collecting data of a general nature but cannot accomodate all of the details which are also often important. The best record of an event would contain a narative as well as the coded information.

The overall trend in international terrorist extortionary events is an upward one. Third party governments which have been involved by terrorists in extortionary events have been unable to protect themselves from further involvement and exploitation by terrorists. The number of organizations which practice international terrorist extortion is growing, as is the number of third party governments which become involved by the terrorists. Although the practice is widespread, the terrorists have not enjoyed overwhelming success in their extortions. If the rate of success from past events is used to project a probability of success, then terrorists have only a 53 percent chance of succeeding in an extortion.

It must be remembered that terrorist organizations are locked in a struggle with their opposition government, not with third party governments. Consequently, extortionary demands are usually directed at the opposition government and third party governments are used by the terrorists for the purpose of bringing additional pressure on the opposition government. This

pattern has proven successful, and will undoubtedly continue to be employed by terrorists seeking concessions from their opponents.

The hypothesis that terrorist success encourages further terrorist extortionary activity has been examined in this research and the results are inconclusive. Previous successes or failures may have very little influence on future terrorist activity. However, there are some indications that the hypothesis is true. The large number of successful corporate case kidnappings certainly indicates that success encourages similar extortions. A possible indicator of the deterrent value of rejecting terrorist demands is found in examining events involving Turkey. In six events the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA) targeted their opposition government, Turkey. The Turkish response was always total rejection of the demands, regardless of the third party involved. Turkey's hard line policy against her own internal terrorists may well have influenced other terrorist organizations to reject Turkey when selecting third party governments to exploit in an extortionary event. Not a single event was found in which Turkey was the third party government.

Third party governments which imprison terrorists definitely increase their susceptability to being targeted in an extortionary event. Some of the most spectacular and daring events have been targeted at third party governments holding captured terrorists. Perhaps because of this, some governments have shown a reluctance to capture terrorists. The third party government which is forced to host an event normally wants to end the event quickly and save the hostages. Since capturing the terrorists would make the host susceptable to being targeted in a future event, as well as endanger the hostages, the Bangkok Solution appears to be a suitable compromise between host and terrorist. The safety of the hostages

is secured, the host government does not need to worry about a future attack for prisoner release, and the terrorists go free. Such a solution is pragmatic and gives the host what he desires above all else, a quick and simple conclusion to the event.

Terrorist publicity is among the most important benefits terrorists receive from an extortionary event. The longer they protract the event, the more publicity the terrorists receive. The impact of publicity is not as easy to determine. The Munich Olympics event offers a good example of the publicity which terrorists can generate and the impact of that publicity. The whole world watched through live television coverage as the drama unfolded, and the world remembers, not that the event ended in total disaster for the terrorists who were trying to flee the country, but the resolve, determination, and patriotic daring of the BSO commandos.

The actual outcome of an event is often not as important as the event itself in politically oriented acts of extortion. The first five barricade events to secure prisoner release were unsuccessful in achieving that objective. The Munich event was among these early failures. The number of barricade events has, nevertheless, increased each year since then. It would appear that terrorist publicity influences future terrorist activity more than terrorist success.

APPENDIX A

Codebook for Recording International Terrorist Extortionary Events

Variable Number	Variable Coding Rules
1.	Event Code: Month/Day/Year//Country (Code from WEIS)//Sequential Number for events beginning same date and country.
2.	Date of Start: month/day/year
3.	Place of Event: city, country (Country Code from WEIS); for enroute Skyjacking, code city, country of origination of flight
4.	Type of Event: 1. Kidnapping 2. Seizure - barricade and hostage 3. Seizure - barricade without hostage 4. Skyjack 5. Ship takeover 6. Other transportation means takeover 7. Extortionate threat with no subsequent action 8. Kidnapping ending in barricade 9. Skyjack ending in barricade 10. Assassination or murder 11. Armed Attack 12. Other
5.	Environment of Event: 1. Urban 2. Rural 3. In Transit

6. Terrorist Group - as reported on scene: (3 digit code from List of Terrorist Groups). Up to 4 groups. List in priority of participation.

7. Opposition Government: (Code from WEIS)
The political opponent of the Terrorist Group. This will normally be the legitimate and recognized "in-power" government. It could also be an "out-of-power" political organization.

8. Variable 6 Leadership Statement:
   1. Accept Responsibility
   2. Deny Responsibility
   3. No Statement

9. Other (Than Variable 6) Organization Claiming Responsibility: (Code from List of Terrorist Groups)

10. Other (Than Variable 6) Organization Denying Responsibility: (Code from List of Terrorist Groups)

11. Number of Terrorist Groups Participating:

12. Nationality or Home Government of Terrorists: (Code from WEIS)

13. Number of Terrorist Nationalities:

14. Number of Individual Terrorists Involved:

15. Number of Male Terrorists:

16. Number of Female Terrorists:

17. Hostage Government / Response Code:
Response Codes
   1. No concessions
   2. Compromise
   3. Capitulate

4. No pressure on Host Government

5. No response, response inappropriate, no opportunity to respond

18. Hostages - By Country//Type-Number//Total:

Hostage Types

1. High Government Officials
2. Low Government officials, Government Employees
3. Military Officers
4. Military Enlisted Personnel
5. Corporate Officials
6. Corporate Employees
7. Prominent Opinion Leaders
8. Private Parties, e.g., tourists, missionaries, students
9. Other

19. Total Number of Hostages This Event:

20. Total Number of Hostage Governments:

21. Number of Governments Demands Made Upon:

22. Number of Non-Government Actors Demands Made Upon:

23. Target of Demands - Government and Non-Government Actors Demands Made Upon (Code from WEIS or List of Non-Government Actors)/Response Code:

Response Codes

1. Capitulate
2. Compromise
3. Bangkok Solution
4. No Compromise, no shoot-out; Reject demands

5. Shoot-out

6. Total cooperation with terrorists

7. Arrest with no shoot-out

24. Host Government/Response:

Response Codes as in Item 23

25. Initial Demands: Government or Non-Government Actor//Type Demand:

Type Demands

1. Ransom of Money or Monetary Equivalent
2. Armaments
3. Prisoner Release - Own Group
4. Prisoner Release - Not Own Group
5. Independence; Self Rule
6. Specific Political Changes
7. Amnesty or Safe Passage, may include Transportation
8. Publish or broad a statement by the terrorists
9. Charge of sentence of (but still imprison) prisoners
10. Demands not made known - Terrorists unable to make demands known
11. No demands made
12. Aircraft fuel
13. Red Cross inspection of Palestineans in Israeli prisons
14. Allow departure of hijacked aircraft
15. Suspension of search for kidnapper and victim
16. Protection of Palestinean Refugee Camps
17. Release of all Arabs detained in Israel

18. Closing of Schoenau Castle, transit camp for Jewish emigres

19. Parachutes

20. Other

26. Terrorist Negotiation Behavior:

1. Terrorists lessened demands during negotiations
2. Terrorists increased demands during negotiations
3. Terrorists did not change demands
4. Terrorists substituted demands during negotiations. (Unable to state whether the change was an increase or decrease)
5. Up-the-ante doublecross, e.g., more demands were made after other side fulfilled their part of the bargain
6. Other side agreed to comply, terrorists broke contact
7. No contact for negotiations was even established

27. Subsequent Terrorist Demands:

Code as in Initial Demands

28. Primary Target Upon Whom Demands Were Made:

1. Host Government
2. Victim's Government
3. Other Foreign Government
4. Corporate Officials
5. International Organizations
6. Individuals
7. Other non-State Actors

8. Aircraft - pilot and crew

9. Other

10. Combination of Targets

29. Type of Negotiator:

1. Police

2. High ranking Host Government official

3. Low ranking Host Government official

4. High ranking Victim Government official

5. Low ranking Victim Government official

6. High ranking foreign government official

7. Low ranking foreign government official

8. Corporate official

9. Private parties, family

10. Prominent opinion leaders

11. International Red Cross officials

12. Other

30. Number of Prisoners whose release was demanded:

31. Type of Ransom Demanded:

1. Robin Hood (for benefit of needy persons vice the terrorist group itself)

2. Organizational Coffers

3. Both

4. No Ransom Demanded

32. Amount of Ransom Demanded: (in thousands of dollars)

33. Was ransom demanded monetary equivalent vice money?

1. Yes

2. No

34. Number of Prisoners Released:

35. Amount of Robin Hood Ransom Paid: (in thousands of dollars)

36. Amount of Organizational Coffers Ransom Paid:
(in thousands of dollars)

37. Source of Ransom Payment:

1. Target Government
2. Corporate
3. Family
4. Host Government
5. Other
6. No Ransom Paid

38. Fate of Hostages:

1. No damage nor casualties, hostages released, no capitulation by targets
2. No damage nor casualties, hostages released, capitulation or compromise by targets
3. Victims killed, no capitulation by targets
4. Victims killed, capitulation by targets
5. Damaged material, no capitulation by targets
6. Damaged material, capitulation by targets
7. Victim killed when attempting escape, had been captured
8. Victim successfully escaped/rescued, had been captured
9. Victim killed attempting to avoid capture
10. Victim successfully avoided capture
11. Hostages killed in shoot-out (some/all hostages)

12. Hostages killed, no provocation, during negotiations (some/all hostages)

13. Hostages killed during negotiations terrorist imposed deadline had expired (some/all hostages)

14. No damage or casualties, no decision or action by targets

15 Victim rescued during kidnap attempt

39. Number of hostages killed:

NOTE: # 40 - # 48 applicable to terrorists conducting event and/or prisoners released during event.

40. Number of nations publically denying that safe haven would be granted if request were made:

41. Number of nations denying safe haven after request was made:

42. Identity of nations spontaneously denying safe haven:

43. Identity of nations denying safe haven request:

44. Number of nations spontaneously granting safe haven:

45. Number of nations granting safe haven on request:

46. Identity of nations spontaneously granting safe haven:

47. Identity of nations granting safe haven upon request:

48. Ultimate destination of group: (where the event ends)

49. Group view toward own death:

1. Suicidal

2. Willing to die, prefer not to

3. Elaborate getaway plans & execution of plans

4. Dropping of demands, safe passage, Bangkok Solution

5. Group view not tested. (Terrorists never exposed to capture, i.e., kidnap and hide)

50. Number of terrorists dead at scene of shootout:

51. Number of terrorists dead, blew selves up/suicide:

52. Number of terrorists dead via death penalty:

53. Number of terrorists captured:

54. Number of terrorists given long jail term:

55. Number of terrorists given long jail term, becoming subject of demand in subsequent event:

56. Number of terrorists given long jail term, released due to subsequent event:

57. Number of terrorists given short jail term (i.e., less than 5 years):

58. Number of terrorists given short jail term, becoming subject of demand in subsequent event: (includes terrorists in custody, not yet tried and/or sentenced)

59. Number of terrorists given short jail term, released due to subsequent event: (includes terrorists in custody, not yet tried and/or sentenced)

60. Number of terrorists freed by court verdict:

61. Number of terrorists escaped after capture or imprisonment:

62. Number of terrorists arrested, not brought to trial, freed by other than court verdict, "surrendered" to friendly government:

63. Number of terrorists never captured, remained at large:

64. Number of terrorists allowed to go free in Bangkok Solution:

65. Was extradition request made:

    1. Yes

    2. No

66. Nation Requesting Extradition:

67. Was Extradition Request Granted:

1. Yes
2. No

68. Nation Receiving Extradition Request:

69. Was Publicity offered by negotiator as part of compromise:

1. Yes
2. No

70. Terrorist Publicity: (Total of New York Times news coverage) Code from table below. Assign points only for the first page in the newspaper upon which a story about the event is located. Do not assign points for subsequent stories on the same day. Bonus points for pictures and story length also apply only to the first page on which the story appears. Score publicity for all days during which the event is in progress and for as long after its conclusion as it receives significant news coverage, e.g., receives a score of 10 or better.

Location of Story		Score for story	Score for story
Section I	Other Section	Without a picture	with a picture
Page 1		25	35
2-3	Page 1	15	25
4-5	2-3	10	15
6-7	4-5	7	10
8-9	6-7	5	7
10-11	8-9	4	5
12-13	10-11	3	4
13-20	12-13	2	3
20-end	13-end	1	2

Bonus points for story length:

Story between 10 and 20 column inches = + 5

Story over 20 column inches = + 10

71. Dollar Value of Property Losses During Event (in thousands):

72. Related Previous Events - Extortionary

List: Who - Terrorist Organization

Type Event (code as in Item #4)

Event Code (Item #1 of previous event)

73. Related Previous Events - Non-extortionary: Code as in Item #72

74. Related Subsequent Events - Extortionary: Code as in Item #72

75. Related Subsequent Events - Non-extortionary: Code as in Item #72

76. Date of Ending of Event: (month/day/year)

77. Duration of Event: (Days)

78. Number Wounded - Terrorists:

79. Number Wounded - Police/Military:

80. Number Wounded - Bystanders:

81. Number Wounded - Hostages:

82. Number Killed - Police/Military:

83. Number Killed - Bystanders:

84. Terrorist Success:

1. High Success: Terrorists and/or Terrorist Organization much better off, no terrorist losses, total success, gains far outweight losses.
2. Minor Success: Terrorists and/or Terrorist Organization somewhat better off, gains outweight losses.
3. Indifference: Terrorists and/or Terrorist Organization neither better nor worse off, gains and losses cancel each other out.
4. Minor Losses: Terrorist losses outweight gains, probably would not want a repeat of the event.
5. Significant Losses: Terrorist losses far outweight any possible gains, definitely would not want a repeat of the event.

LIST OF TERRORIST GROUPS

Code Number	Terrorist Group
001	Individuals, not a terrorist group
861	12th of January Liberation Movement - Dominican Republic
862	Movimiento Popular Dominacano - Dominican Republic
863	23rd of September Communist League - Mexico
864	Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine
865	Kachin Independence Army - Burma
866	Holger Meins Comando - West Germany
867	Organization of Sons of Occupied Territory - Middle East
868	Al Fatah
869	Punto Cero - Venezuela
870	Eagles of National Unity - South Yemen
871	Martyr Abou Mahmoud Squad - Middle East
872	Sandanist National Liberation Front - Nicauragua
873	IRA - Irish Republican Army - Northern Ireland
874	South Moluccan Terrorists - Netherlands
875	Mohammed Boudia Guerilla Squad - Middle East
876	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
877	Somali Coast Liberation Front
878	Peoples Revolutionary Party - Zaire
879	Rebel Shan Tribesmen - Burma
950	ELN - National Liberation Army - Colombia
951	Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola
952	PFLP - Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine - Middle East
953	ELF - Eritrean Liberation Front - Ethiopia
954	BP - Black Panthers - United States
955	MIR - Leftist Revolutionary Movement - Chile
956	URA - Japanese Red Army - Japan
957	MR-8 - Revolutionary Movement of the Eight - Brazil
958	ALN - Action for National Liberation - Brazil
959	Palestine Popular Struggle Front - Middle East
960	FSLN - Sandinist Front of National Liberation - Nicaragua
961	VPR - Popular Revolutionary Vanguard - Brazil
962	FAR - Revolutionary Armed Forces - Guatemala
963	United Anti Reelection Command - Dominican Republic
964	FAL - Argentine Liberation Front - Argentina
965	MANO - Argentine National Organization Movement - Argentina
966	National Liberation Front - India
967	ELN - National Liberation Army - Bolivia
968	Tupamaros - National Liberation Movement - Uruguay
969	JDL - Jewish Defense League
970	FLQ - Quebec Liberation Front - Canada
971	ETA - Basque Nation and Liberty - Spain
972	TPLA - Turkish People's Liberation Army - Turkey
973	ERP - People's Revolutionary Army - Argentina
974	OPR-33 - Organization of the Popular Revolution-33 - Uruguay

975 BSO - (Palestinean) Black September Organization
976 Croatians (general) - Yugoslavia
977 Montoneros - Argentina
978 Coalition of National Brigades - Haiti
979 Armed Revolutionary Forces of the People - Mexico
980 23rd of September Communist League - Mexico
981 Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization
982 Bandera Roja - Venezuela
983 FAR - Revolutionary Armed Forces - Argentina
984 Punishment Squad - Middle East
985 PLO - Palestine Liberation Organization - Middle East
986 Moslem International Guerrillas
987 FROLINAT - National Liberation Front of Chad
988 Iberian Liberation Movement - Spain
989 Republic of New Africa - United States

List of Non-Government Actors

901 Liegib's Meat Company
902 International Mining Company - U.S. Owned
903 Bank of America
904 Swissair
905 Amoco Argentina
906 The Exxon Corporation
907 McKee-Tesca Company
908 Safrar-Peugeot
909 Pepsi-Cola
910 Mercedes Benz Motor Company
911 Northwest Airlines
912 Braniff International
913 Hughes Airwest
914 Mohawk Airlines
915 United Air Lines
916 Pacific Southwest Airlines
917 Continental Airlines
918 Delta Airlines
919 Varig Airlines (Brazil)
922 American Airlines
923 Banco Popular (San Juan, Puerto Rico)
924 Southern Airways
925 Sears, Roebuck and Company
930 Unknown Corporations
931 TWA - United States
932 Western Airlines
933 Fiat of Argentina (Italian)
934 Banco di Napoli (Italian)
935 Swift & Co. (meat packing company) (Argentina)
936 Volcan Metallurgy - Bolivia

937	Phillips of the Netherlands
938	Vesty Corporation - British owned
939	Standard Electric of Argentina - U.S. owned
940	Eastern Airlines
941	First National Bank of Boston
942	Eastman Kodak
943	Nobleza Tobacco Company
944	Italo-Argentina Electric Company
945	Coca-Cola of Cordoba
946	Ford Motor Company
947	Firestone Tire & Rubber Company
948	Bank of Rio de la Plata - Italian owned
949	First National City Bank of New York

List of Additional Actors and Locations

003	Puerto Rico
025	Bahama Islands
045	Cayman Islands
111	French Guiana
195	Netherlands Antilles
204	Northern Ireland
410	Angola
555	Zaire
685	French Territory of Afars & Issas
691	Bahrain
697	Palestineans

APPENDIX B

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST'S EXTORTIONARY EVENTS

1968

July 23, 1968 - El Al Israel Airlines Boeing 707 hijacked to Algeria.

1969

January 19, 1969 - Ecuadorian airliner hijacked to Cuba.

August 29, 1969 - TWA Boeing 707 hijacked to Syria.

September 4, 1969 - C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador, kidnapped in Brazil.

September 6, 1969 - Two Ecuadorian Air Force planes hijacked to Cuba.

October 6, 1969 - Son and Secretary of Enrique S. Traessle, Swiss Consul, kidnapped in Colombia.

October 31, 1969 - TWA airliner hijacked to Italy

November 4, 1969 - Two Lanica Airlines (Nicaraguan) air-liners hijacked to Cuba.

November 8, 1969 - Austral Airlines (Argentina) airliner hijacked to Uruguay.

November 12, 1969 - Brazilian airliner hijacked to Cuba.

November 29, 1969 - Varig Airlines (Brazilian) airliner hijacked to Cuba.

1970

January 1, 1970 - Cruzeiro Do Sul Airlines (Brazilian) airliner hijacked to Cuba.

January 9, 1970 - TWA airliner hijacked to Lebanon.

March 6, 1970 - Sean Holly, U.S. Labor Attache, kidnapped in Guatemala.

March 11, 1970 - Nobrio Okuchi, Japan's Consul General, kidnapped in Brazil.

March 24, 1970	-	Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Crowley, U.S. Air Attache, kidnapped in Dominican Republic.
March 24, 1970	-	Joaquin Waldemar Sanchez, Paraguayan Consul, kidnapped in Argentina.
March 29, 1970	-	Yuri Pivovarov, Soviet Assistant Commercial Attache, kidnapped in Argentina.
March 31, 1970	-	Count Karl von Spreti, West German Ambassador, kidnapped in Guatemala.
March 31, 1970	-	Japan Air Lines plane hijacked to North Korea.
April 1970 (date unknown)	-	Jack Fry, Peace Corps official, kidnapped in Ethiopia.
May 1, 1970	-	Jamaican airliner hijacked to Cuba.
June 7, 1970	-	Morris Draper, U.S. Political Secretary, kidnapped in Jordan.
June 9, 1970	-	Sixty foreigners held hostage in two hotels in Amman, Jordan.
June 11, 1970	-	Ehrenfried von Holleben, West German Ambassador, kidnapped in Brazil.
July 4, 1970	-	Brazilian airliner hijacked to Cuba.
July 21, 1970	-	Two West German technicians kidnapped in Bolivia.
July 22, 1970	-	Olympic Airways (Greece) airliner hijacked to Cairo.
July 31, 1970	-	Daniel A. Mitrione, U.S. Public Safety Adviser, kidnapped in Uruguay.
July 31, 1970	-	Aloisio Mares Dias Gomide, Brazilian Consul, kidnapped in Uruguay.
August 7, 1970	-	Claude Fly, U.S. agricultural Adviser, kidnapped in Uruguay.
September 6, 1970	-	Pan American World Airways 747 hijacked to Cairo.
September 6, 1970	-	Swissair DC-8 (Switzerland) airliner hijacked to Jordan.
September 6, 1970	-	TWA 707 hijacked to Jordan.

September 9, 1970 - BOAC VC-10 (Great Britain) airliner hijacked to Jordan.

October 5, 1970 - James R. Cross, British Trade Commissioner, kidnapped in Canada.

October 22, 1970 - Costa Rican airliner hijacked to Cuba.

November 2, 1970 - United Airlines 727 plane hijacked to Cuba.

December 1, 1970 - Eugene Beihl, Honorary West German Consul, kidnapped in Spain.

December 7, 1970 - Giovanni Enrico Bucher, Swiss Ambassador, kidnapped in Brazil.

1971

January 8, 1971 - Geoffrey M. S. Jackson, British Ambassador, kidnapped in Uruguay.

January 22, 1971 - Ethiopian airliner hijacked to Libya.

January 30, 1971 - Indian Airlines plane hijacked to Pakistan.

February 10, 1971 - Two Croatian emigrés seize Yugoslavian Consulate in Sweden.

February 15, 1971 - James Finlay, U.S. Air Force Security Policeman, kidnapped in Turkey.

March 4, 1971 - Four U.S. servicemen kidnapped in Turkey.

March 30, 1971 - Philippine Air Lines plane hijacked to China.

May 12, 1971 - Manager of U.S. owned gold mine kidnapped in Bolivia.

May 17, 1971 - Ephraim Elrom, Israeli Consul General, kidnapped in Turkey.

May 23, 1971 - Stanley Sylvester, executive of Swift & Company and honorary British Consul, kidnapped in Argentina.

June 7, 1971 - Alfred Kuser, Swiss industrialist, kidnapped in Bolivia.

July 2, 1971 - Braniff Airlines plane hijacked to Argentina.

November 13, 1971 - Air Canada airliner hijacked to Canada via United States.

1972

February 22, 1972 - Lufthansa German Airlines plane hijacked to South Yemen.

March 21, 1972 - Oberdan Sallustro, President of Fiat of Argentina, kidnapped in Argentina.

March 27, 1972 - Three NATO civilian radar technicians kidnapped in Turkey.

May 3, 1972 - Turkish airliner hijacked to Bulgaria.

May 8, 1972 - Sabena Belgian World Airlines plane hijacked to Israel.

May 26, 1972 - South African Airways plane hijacked to Malawi.

June 30, 1972 - Ernanno Barca, President of Banco di Napoli, kidnapped in Argentina.

July 28, 1972 - Hector Menoni, manager of United Press International, kidnapped in Uruguay.

August 18, 1972 - United Air Lines plane hijacked to Canada.

August 22, 1972 - Al Yemda (South Yemeni) airliner hijacked to Libya.

August 30, 1972 - The son of the Jordanian Ambassador kidnapped in France.

September 5, 1972 - Jan J. Van de Panne, Dutch executive of Philips Argentina electronics firm, kidnapped in Argentina.

September 5, 1972 - Israeli athletes taken hostage at Munich Olympic games.

September 15, 1972 - Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) airliner hijacked to Spain.

October 6, 1972 - West German Consul kidnapped in Algeria.

October 22, 1972 - Turkish airliner hijacked to Bulgaria.

October 29, 1972 - Lufthansa German Airlines plane hijacked to Libya.

November 7, 1972 - Enrico Barrella, Italian industrialist, kidnapped in Argentina.

November 10, 1972 - Southern Airways airliner hijacked to Cuba.

November 24, 1972 - Air Canada airliner seized in West Germany.

December 6, 1972 - Felix Azpiazu, Spanish industrialist, kidnapped in Argentina.

December 10, 1972 - Donald Crove, Managing Director of the British Vestey Industrial Group, kidnapped in Argentina.

December 27, 1972 - Vicente Russo, Italian executive working for ITT Corporation, kidnapped in Argentina.

December 28, 1972 - Israeli Embassy seized in Bangkok, Thailand.

1973

January 23, 1973 - Two Italian businessmen kidnapped in Ethiopia.

January 23, 1973 - Clinton E. Knox, U.S. Ambassador, kidnapped in Haiti.

February 3, 1973 - Norman Lee, Argentine executive of a Coco-Cola bottling company, kidnapped in Argentina.

February 20, 1973 - Indian High Commission seized in London.

March 1, 1973 - Saudi Arabian Embassy seized in Khartoun, Sudan.

March 28, 1973 - Gerardo Sealmazzi, Manager of First National Bank of Boston (Rosario Branch), kidnapped in Argentina.

April 2, 1973 - Anthony R. Da Cruz, Technical Operations Manager of Eastman Kodak Company, kidnapped in Argentina.

April 8, 1973 - Francis Victor Brimicombe, President of Nobleza Tabacos, kidnapped in Argentina.

May 1, 1973 - The son of the chairman of Italo-Argentine Electric Company (Swiss citizen), kidnapped in Argentina.

May 4, 1973 - Two Soviet doctors kidnapped in Burma.

May 4, 1973 - Terrance G. Leonhardy, U.S. Consul General, kidnapped in Mexico.

May 18, 1973 - Venezuelan airliner (AVENSA) hijacked to Cuba.

May 21, 1973 - Oscar Castel, Manager of Coco-Cola bottling plant, kidnapped in Argentina.

May 30, 1973 - Colombian airliner hijacked to Paraguay.

June 6, 1973 - Charles Lockwood, British executive of Acrow Steel, kidnapped in Argentina.

June 18, 1973 - Hans Kurt Gebhardt, West Germ lothing manufacturer, kidnapped in Argentina.

June 18, 1973 - Roberto Galvez, general manager of an American firm, kidnapped in Guatemala.

June 19, 1973 - John R. Thompson, President of Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, kidnapped in Argentina.

June 25, 1973 - Mario Baratella, Vice-President of Italian owned Bank of Rio de la Plata, kidnapped in Argentina.

July 2, 1973 - Raul Bornancini, Assistant Manager of First National City Bank of New York, kidnapped in Argentina.

July 4, 1973 - Aerolineas Argentinas (Argentinean) airliner hijacked to Cuba.

July 19, 1973 - An attempt to seize the El Al Israel Airlines Office in Athens, Greece failed. Consequently terrorists seized hostages in a nearby hotel.

July 20, 1973 - Japan Air Lines plane hijacked to Libya.

August 25, 1973 - Yemen Airlines plane hijacked to Kuwait.

August 27, 1973 - Ian Martin, British Citizen and manager of Liebig's Meat Company, kidnapped in Paraguay.

September 5, 1973 - Saudi Arabian Embassy seized in Paris.

September 23, 1973 - David George Heywood, executive of Nobleza Tabacos, kidnapped in Argentina.

September 28, 1973 - Three Jewish emigres and an Austrian customs official seized on train in Austria.

September 28, 1973 - Son of Francisco Garcia, the Mexican Ambassador, kidnapped in Dominican Republic.

October 4, 1973 - Two U.S. citizens employed by Frontino Goldmines, kidnapped in Colombia.

October 10, 1973 - Anthony Williams, British Consul, kidnapped in Mexico.

October 18, 1973 - Bank of America office seized in Beirut, Lebanon.

October 20, 1973 - Argentine Airlines plane hijacked to Cuba.

October 22, 1973 - Kurt Schmid, Swissair executive, kidnapped in Argentina.

October 25, 1973 - David Wilkie, Jr., President of Amoco Argentina, kidnapped in Argentina.

November 20, 1973 - Kurt Nagel, Honorary West German Consul, kidnapped in Venezuela.

November 25, 1973 - KLM Royal Dutch Airlines plane hijacked to Dubai, Saudi Arabia.

December 6, 1973 - Victor Samuelson, American executive of Exxon Company, kidnapped in Argentina.

December 17, 1973 - Lufthansa West German Airlines plane hijacked to Kuwait.

December 21, 1973 - Charles Robert Hayes, American engineer for McKee-Tesca Company, kidnapped in Argentina.

December 27, 1973 - Thomas Niedermayer, West German industrialist, kidnapped in Ireland.

December 29, 1973 - Yves Boisset, Director of Safrar-Peugeot, kidnapped in Argentina.

1974

January 3, 1974 - Douglas G. Roberts, Argentine Director of Pepsi-Cola Company, kidnapped in Argentina.

January 31, 1974 - Eight hostages seized aboard a ferryboat in Singapore.

February 2, 1974 - Greek freighter (VORI) seized in Pakistan.

February 6, 1974 - Japanese Embassy seized in Kuwait.

March 3, 1974 - British Airways VC-10 hijacked to Netherlands.

March 20, 1974 - East African Airways plane hijacked to Uganda.

March 22, 1974 - John Patterson, U. S. Vice Consul, kidnapped in Mexico.

March 26, 1974 - Employees of Tenneco Company, Inc., kidnapped in Ethiopia.

April 12, 1974 - Alfred Laun, head of the U.S. Information Service in Cordoba, kidnapped in Argentina.

April 21, 1974 - Dr. Christoph Staewen, Swiss citizen, kidnapped in Chad.

April 23, 1974 - Two nurses, one from the Netherlands and one from New Zealand, kidnapped in Thailand.

May 3, 1974 - Paris banker kidnapped in France.

May 27, 1974 - Mr. Wyatt, Canadian pilot for Tenneco, kidnapped in Ethiopia.

May 27, 1974 - Mrs. Dortzbach, U. S. nurse, kidnapped in Ethiopia.

June 14, 1974 - Herbert Pilz, West German official of Mercedes-Benz, kidnapped in Argentina.

July 23, 1974 - Erich Breuss, Austrian official of Acindar steel firm, kidnapped in Argentina.

September 13, 1974 - French Embassy seized in the Hague, Netherlands.

September 27, 1974 - Barbara Hutchison, U.S. Government official, kidnapped in Dominican Republic. Venezuelan Consulate also seized.

November 21, 1974 - British Airways VC-10 hijacked to Tunisia.

December 5, 1974 - Three French diplomats kidnapped in Mexico.

December 27, 1974 - Guests at party seized in Nicaragua.

1975

January 20, 1975 - Hostages seized at Orly Airport (France) after unsuccessful rocket attack on Israeli aircraft.

January 31, 1975 - Mr. Leuipan, Dutch Consul, kidnapped in Colombia.

February 26, 1975 - Mr. Egan, U.S. Honary Consular, kidnapped in Argentina.

March 1, 1975 - Iraqi Airways 737 hijacked to Iran.

March 4, 1975 - West German mining technician kidnapped in Burma.

March 23, 1975 - Guerry, French Ambassador, kidnapped in Somalia.

April 24, 1975 - West German Embassy in Stockholm seized.

April 29, 1975 - Israeli Embassy in Johannesburg seized.

May 19, 1975 - Four students (three U.S. citizens and one from the Netherlands), kidnapped in Tanzania.

June 29, 1975 - Morgan, U.S. military officer, kidnapped in Lebanon.

July 14, 1975 - Cambell and Harrel, U.S. corporate employees, kidnapped in Ethiopia.

July 31, 1975 - Charles Lockwood, British corporate official, kidnapped second time in Argentina.

August 4, 1975 - United States Embassy seized in Malaysia.

August 5, 1975 - Donald E. Cooper, U.S. corporate official of Sears, Roebuck & Company, kidnapped in Colombia.

September 12, 1975 - Two U.S. servicemen kidnapped in Ethiopia.

September 15, 1975 - Egyptian Embassy seized in Madrid.

September 1975 (date unknown) - Donald Lutes, Canadian missionary, kidnapped in Angola.

October 3, 1975 - Herrema, Dutch citizen, corporate employee, kidnapped in Ireland.

October 8, 1975 - U.N. High Commission seized in Argentina.

October 22, 1975 - Gallagher and Dykes, U.S. Government officials, kidnapped in Lebanon.

October 23, 1975 - Basil Burnwood-Taylor, British Government Official, kidnapped in Ethiopia.

October 30, 1975 - Clyde Huddleston, U.S. corporate employee, kidnapped in Beruit, Lebanon.

November 10, 1975 - Belgian Embassy seized in Tunisia.

December 3, 1975 - Dutch train seized in Netherlands.

December 4, 1975 - Indonesia Consulate seized in Netherlands.

December 21, 1975 - OPEC Headquarters seized in Austria.

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