


VIOLENT SCHOOLS — SAFE SCHOOLS

The Safe School Study Report to the Congress

Volume I



45988

The National
Institute of
Education
U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare
Washington, D.C. 20208





VIOLENT SCHOOLS - SAFE SCHOOLS

VOLUME I

ERRATA

- p. iii The last sentence on the page should read, "The incidence of interracial violence is not significantly greater than would be expected by chance alone".
- p.ix Figure 1-5 should read, "... Month and Percentage Reported Police".
Figure 1-7 should read, "Percentage of Schools Experiencing..."
- p. 2 Between second and third paragraphs in column 2 add subhead: "Risks in School and Elsewhere". Between Fourth and Fifth paragraphs in column 2 add subhead: "Principals' Assessments".
- p. 40 Table 1-4. Delete "Y total = 117.7x + 39.1 r = .996 p < .005".
- p. 44 Title of Figure 1-5 should read, "... Month and Percentage Reported to Police".
- pp. 58-59 Student Interview Victimization Rates. An incorrect editing procedure, described in Volume 2, p. 73, paragraph 1, lines 11-15, led to slight underestimates of the percentage of students victimized. With the editing procedure corrected, theft remains unchanged, the percentage of students robbed increases from .5% to .6%, the percentage of students attacked from 1.3% to 1.4%.
- p. 61 Column 2, first full paragraph, lines 1-3: Statement indicates that interview estimates of victimization do not differ significantly (p. < .05) by location. One exception to this statement is a significant difference between the rates for physical attacks in smaller cities and suburban areas. The suburban estimates are the higher of the two. See Volume IV.

Line 3 of the last paragraph in column 2, and footnote 26: change "Appendix E" to "Volume IV".
- p. 104 Table 3-8: Delete asterisk between columns 2 ("Middle Schools") and 3 ("Junior High Schools"). At top of column 4 change "Senior High Schools" to "Comprehensive High Schools".

p. 113

Column 1, second bullet from bottom, lines 2 and 3:
delete "or middle schools".

Column 2, last bullet, line 2: delete "in junior high
schools", insert "young adolescents".

VIOLENT SCHOOLS — SAFE SCHOOLS
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January 1978

NCJRS


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ACQUISITIONS

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary
Mary F. Berry, Assistant Secretary for Education

National Institute of Education
Patricia Albjerg Graham, Director



ABSTRACT

The Safe School Study was undertaken by the National Institute of Education in response to Congress' request that HEW determine the number of schools affected by crime or violence, the type and seriousness of those crimes, and how school crime can be prevented. The study is based on a mail survey of over 4,000 schools and on an on-site survey of 642 schools, and case studies of 10 schools. Principals, teachers, and students contributed to the study.

Risks of Crime at School

Although school violence and vandalism increased during the 1960's, they have leveled off since the early 1970's, and there are some hints of a decline. Still, about 8% of the nation's schools (6,700) have a serious problem with crime. Secondary schools are more likely to have a serious problem than elementary schools.

The risks of crime directed against schools are higher in the Northeast and West than in the North Central and Southern States, and tend to be spread throughout urban and suburban areas. The risks of personal violence are higher in junior high schools than in senior highs, and are higher in larger communities.

Extent of the Problem: Personal Violence

About 2.4 million secondary school students (11%) have something stolen from them in a typical month. About 1.3% of the students (282,000) report being attacked in a month. Relatively few are injured seriously enough to need medical attention.

Among secondary school teachers, about 12% (130,000) have something stolen at school in a month's time. Some 5,200 are physically attacked, about 1,000 of whom are seriously enough injured to require medical attention. Around 6,000 have something taken from them by force, weapons, or threats.

Young teenagers in cities run a greater risk of violence in school than elsewhere, except in high crime neighborhoods. There, schools are safer than the surrounding communities.

Extent of the Problem: Vandalism

Over 25% of all schools are subject to vandalism in a given month. The average cost of an act of vandalism is \$81. Ten percent of schools are burglarized, at an average cost per burglary of \$183. The annual cost of school crime is estimated to be around \$200 million.

Other Factors in School Violence

Most offenses are committed by current students. Victims and offenders are generally of the same age and sex (usually male). In a majority of cases, victims and offenders are also of the same race. The chances of interracial violence are highest in schools where students of one race outnumber those of another.

Court-ordered desegregation is a factor in increased school violence only at first. Later, schools return to their former patterns.

Means of Prevention

Security devices, such as specially designed locks, safes, and window and door alarms are considered generally effective in reducing school crime, though they can be unreliable. Security personnel are also considered effective in reducing crime, though more emphasis on training is needed.

In the case studies, the single most important difference between safe schools and violent schools was found to be a strong, dedicated principal who served as a role model for both students and teachers, and who instituted a firm, fair, and consistent system of discipline.

PREFACE

In any large study such as this one, a great many individuals and organizations contribute to the final product. Reviews by the Committee on Education Information Systems of the Council of Chief State School Officers, as well as the Safe School Study Practitioners' Panel and the Safe School Study Technical Panel were most valuable. A Research Triangle Institute team, headed by David Bayless, conducted the data collection and many other essential tasks. Computer work was conducted by Sheldon Laube of C.M. Leinwand Associates.

The authors and coauthors of the Overview, Introduction, and Chapters 1 through 7 are: David Boesel (NIE), Robert Crain (Rand Corporation), George Dunteman (Research Triangle Institute), Francis Ianni (Columbia University), Marla Martinolich (NIE), Oliver Moles (NIE), Harriet Spivak, Charles Stalford (NIE), and Ivor Wayne (NIE).

The authors of the Case Studies are: Ann Borders-Patterson (University of North Carolina), James Broschart (Virginia Polytechnic Institute), James Deslonde (Stanford University), Francis Ianni (Columbia University), Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni (Institute for Social Analysis), and George Noblit (Memphis State University). Appendix A (Multivariate Analysis) was written by Shi-Chang Wu (NIE), Appendix B (NCES Survey) by Roy Nehrt and Jeffrey Williams (NCES).

This edition includes several changes and corrections made since the publication of a limited edition in December 1977. The report was edited by Martha R. Asner of Biospherics, Inc. and James Broschart. We would also like to acknowledge the support of the many other individuals who contributed to this study.

David Boesel
Director
NIE Safe School Study




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
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
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Overview

Student misbehavior, lack of interest or attention, disrespect for teachers or rules, and other difficulties of classroom management have long been problems in American education. In the last decade, however, public concern over evidence of more serious problems—those of crime and violence in schools—has heightened. In the early 1970's, the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, chaired by Senator Bayh, noted mounting evidence of school violence and vandalism. Increasingly, newspapers and other media have presented stories of violent encounters in schools—robberies, gang fights, even murders—and of massive property destruction. Parents, teachers, and school administrators have voiced serious concern about the problem, both to Congress and through the media. Yet systematic data have not been available to assess the magnitude of the problem or to describe the nature, extent, and cost of school crime for the nation as a whole. To provide such information, the "Safe School Study Act" was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressmen Bingham of New York and Bell of California. Following similar initiatives in the Senate by Senator Cranston, the Ninety-third Congress, as part of the Education Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-380), mandated that the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) conduct a study to determine the incidence and seriousness of school crime; the number and location of schools affected; the costs; the means of prevention in use, and the effectiveness of those means.

In response to this legislation, the National Institute of Education (NIE) designed a three-part study. In Phase I, a mail survey, principals in a representative national sample of more than 4,000 public elementary and secondary schools were asked to report in detail on the incidence of illegal or disruptive activities for selected 1-month periods between February 1976 and January 1977, and to provide other information about their schools. The nine 1-month reporting periods (summer months not included) were assigned to participating schools on a random basis.

In Phase II, a nationally representative sample of 642 public junior and senior high schools was surveyed. The Phase II data collection was conducted on site by field representatives rather than by mail. Once again, principals were asked

to keep a record of incidents during the reporting month and to supply additional information about their schools. Students and teachers were also surveyed and asked to report any experiences they have had as victims of violence or theft in the reporting month. They also provided information about themselves, their schools, and their communities, which was later used in statistical analyses to sort out some of the factors that seemed to affect school crime rates. The Phase I and Phase II samples were selected to be representative of schools in large cities, smaller cities, suburban areas, and rural areas.

In Phase III, 10 schools were selected for more intensive, qualitative study. Most of the Phase III schools had had serious problems with crime and violence in the past and had changed rather dramatically for the better in a short period of time. A few continued to have serious problems. Each Phase III report is a small case study that focuses concretely on the ways in which schools coped or failed to cope with incidents of crime and disruption, and with what consequences.

This report is based primarily on the NIE study, but it also includes information from a companion survey conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) in 1975, and from other studies as well. The organization of topics in this summary corresponds roughly to the organization of chapters in the report and addresses the following broad questions:

- How serious is the problem of crime and disruption in schools?
- How many schools, students, and teachers are affected, in what ways, and to what extent?
- When and where are the risks of crime and violence highest?
- Who are the victims and offenders?
- What are the attitudes and experiences of the victims?
- What factors are associated with violence and vandalism in schools?

- What measures are schools using to reduce or prevent crime?
- What measures do principals, teachers, and students recommend?
- What are the implications of this research for policy?

HOW SERIOUS IS THE PROBLEM OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS?

This question can be approached in several different ways. One is to compare the extent of the problem in different time periods. Another is to compare the risks of violence in school with the risks in other places. A third method is to ask knowledgeable people in schools whether they think their schools have a crime problem, and if so, to what extent. Yet a fourth is to use some arbitrary but reasonable criterion of seriousness. All four methods were used in the study.

Time Trends

Are crime and violence in schools more prevalent today than in the past? The evidence from a number of studies and official sources indicates that while acts of violence and property destruction in schools increased from the early sixties to the seventies, both increases leveled off after the early 1970's. Safe School Study data are consistent with these findings. Principals' assessments of the seriousness of violence and vandalism in their schools for the years 1971-1976 showed no overall change and some improvement in urban areas. For the offenses usually summed up in the terms "violence" and "vandalism," then, the data from these studies do not indicate that the situation is growing worse, and there are some hints that it may be getting better.

In attempting to explain the increased amount of school violence and vandalism in the late sixties and early seventies, respondents in the case studies often observed that these were times of protest and discontent, particularly among young people. The protest against the war in Vietnam, together with racial conflict and a growing youth movement, were said to have been associated with a general rebellion against school authority which sometimes entailed conflict and property destruction in schools.

Underlying much of the discontent among young people in this period may have been an important demographic change. As "baby boom" children became adolescents in the 1960's, the amount of disruption in schools increased. As the crest of the wave passed in the 1970's, the amount of disruption leveled off and may be showing

modest signs of decline. The size of this age group relative to the rest of the population and to schools may have been a factor in the growth of disruption in schools. The growth of the youth cohort relative to the general population seems to have been accompanied by an increasing sense of group consciousness—youth versus adults—and by an increasing sense of the power or potential of youth, which schools, as adult-controlled institutions, were sometimes seen as inhibiting.

We do not know to what extent the growth and decline of the adolescent age cohort has in fact affected the amount of disruption in schools. But to the extent that it has, we would expect the leveling off which began in the early 1970's to turn into a definite decline. Whether or not a definite decline occurs is a question for the future, however. The problem today is as serious as it has ever been.

The second way to assess seriousness is to compare risks at school with those elsewhere. An analysis of data from 26 cities in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's National Crime Survey provides substantial evidence that the risk of violence to teenage youngsters is greater in school than elsewhere, when the amount of time spent at school is taken into account. (Data from another nationwide study support this finding.) Although teenage youth (ages 12 to 19) may spend, at most, 25% of their waking hours in school, data show that 40% of the robberies and 36% of the assaults upon teenagers occur in schools. Most of this discrepancy is accounted for by young adolescents, aged 12 to 15. A remarkable 68% of the robberies and 50% of the assaults on youngsters of this age occur at school. No doubt there are certain places where the risks are higher; other evidence from the Safe School Study indicates that schools in high crime areas are safer than their surroundings. But in general, young urban adolescents face higher risks at school than elsewhere.

This situation is probably not new and should not be surprising, considering that young teenagers are more likely than people in other age brackets to commit violent acts and that attendance at school greatly increases the amount of contact among them.

In the third approach to gauging the seriousness of school crime, we relied on the assessments of elementary and secondary school principals. Some 8% of them, representing about 6,700 schools, reported having a serious problem. The proportion reporting a serious problem ranged from 6% in rural areas to 15% in large cities; secondary schools were more likely to have problems than elementary schools. While the

largest proportion of seriously affected schools is in the cities, the largest number is in suburban and rural areas (where four out of five schools altogether are located); seriously affected suburban and rural schools outnumber seriously affected urban schools two to one. About the same results were obtained using the fourth approach, in which schools reporting five or more incidents in a month were classified as having a serious problem.

In sum, the problem is as serious as it has ever been, the risks of violence for young adolescents in cities are greater at school than elsewhere, and around 6,700 schools are seriously affected by crime. While the problem is most pronounced in urban areas, it cannot be seen as strictly urban. Now let us look more closely at measures of crime and disruption in schools.

HOW MANY PEOPLE AND SCHOOLS ARE AFFECTED?

Our survey data enable us to assess the risks of offenses against persons and against schools, and also to say something about the prevalence of "victimless offenses," particularly drug and alcohol use. For the personal offenses we have calculated estimates of the risks of personal theft, attacks, and robbery from students' and teachers' reports of their own experiences. The figures presented here are estimates from a sample. Such estimates inevitably contain some degree of error, and estimates of crime are especially difficult to make with confidence. In the case of data from teachers and students, a careful examination of the methods used and the results obtained suggests that the estimates are probably somewhat high. Nevertheless, they give us some idea of the dimensions of the problem.

The Reports of Students

Theft is clearly the most widespread of the offenses measured. Eleven percent of students have something worth more than \$1 stolen from them in a month. This represents about 2.4 million of the nation's 21 million secondary students. Most of the reported thefts involved items such as small amounts of money, sweaters, books, notebooks, and other property commonly found in lockers. Only one-fifth of the thefts involved losses of more than \$10. No significant differences were apparent between school levels, and differences among locations were not pronounced. Petty theft appears to be commonplace throughout secondary schools.

An estimated 1.3% of secondary school students report that they are attacked at school in a typical 1-month period, representing some

282,000 students. More than two-fifths of the attacks (42%) involved some injury, although most of the injuries were minor. Only 4% of the attacks involved injuries serious enough to require medical attention. The proportion of junior high school students reporting attacks was about twice as great as that of senior high students (2.1% vs. 1%). While the risk of minor attacks is about the same, regardless of location, the risk of serious attack is greater in urban areas than elsewhere.

An estimated one-half of 1% of all secondary students have something taken from them by force, weapons, or threats in a typical month, representing some 112,000 students. (This description includes robberies and petty extortion, or shakedowns.) Eighty-nine percent of the robberies involved no injury to the victim; 11% involved some injury, but only 2% were serious enough to require a doctor's attention. The risks are again greater in junior than in senior highs, and greater in urban areas than elsewhere. While attacks, robberies, and shakedowns affect a large number of students each month, most are minor offenses. Still, their consequences in terms of personal fear and disruption of the educational process can be considerable.

The Reports of Teachers

The proportions of public secondary school teachers victimized by theft, attack, and robbery are roughly similar to those of students. In a typical month, an estimated 12% of the nation's 1.1 million secondary teachers (around 130,000) have something stolen from them worth more than a dollar. As with students, about one-fifth of these thefts involve the loss of things worth \$10 or more. The risks to teachers in junior and senior highs are the same, but unlike students, teachers have higher risks of theft in larger communities.

An estimated one-half of 1% of the teachers are physically attacked at school in a month's time. Although this proportion is small, it represents some 5,200 teachers. Most of the attacks reported by teachers did not result in serious injury; about one-fifth (19%) required treatment by doctors. However, this is a much higher percentage than for students (4%), indicating that attacks on teachers are almost five times as likely as those on students to result in serious injury. The proportion of teachers attacked declines as we move from large cities to rural areas, and junior high schools show higher percentages than senior highs.

A little more than one-half of 1% of all secondary school teachers are estimated to have had something taken by force, weapons, or threats at school in a month. This represents about 6,000 teachers. Once again, large cities show the

highest percentages and rural areas the lowest. The differences between school levels are significant only in large cities, where junior high school teachers are more vulnerable than those in senior high schools. The estimate of the proportion of teachers raped in a month is very low (4/100ths of 1%) and is not very reliable, except in terms of orders of magnitude.

Offenses Against the School

Estimates of offenses against schools, rather than persons, come from the principals' reports and are no doubt conservative, because some time and effort were necessary to fill out each incident sheet. Most widespread are the property offenses—trespassing, breaking and entering, theft of school property, and deliberate property destruction, sometimes called vandalism. Of these, property destruction is the most prevalent. Some 24,000 of the nation's 84,000 public elementary and secondary schools report some vandalism in a month. The risks are greater than one out of four, and the average cost of an act of vandalism is \$81. In addition, around 8,000 schools (1 out of 10) are broken into in a month, the average cost of a school burglary being \$183. The rate of burglary for schools is about five times as high as that for commercial establishments such as stores, which have the highest burglary rates reported in the National Crime Survey.

In contrast to property crimes, disruptive/damaging offenses—fires, false alarms, bomb threats, and disruptive behavior—primarily affect the school routine. While fires are usually regarded as property offenses, our data show that the costs typically associated with these acts are negligible. Most of them are probably wastebasket or trash fires. (This is not to minimize the amount of property loss due to serious arson. Other data indicate that arson is a major contributor to the cost of school crime. But the number of such cases is too small to estimate from this survey.) While school property offenses, such as vandalism and burglary, affect between 1 in 4 and 1 in 10 schools (respectively) in a typical month, any one of the disruptive/damaging offenses affects fewer than 1 in 40 schools.

Estimates of the annual cost of school crime run from \$50 million to \$600 million, with most clustering in the \$100-\$200 million range. Our best estimate, based on NCES data, is around \$200 million in yearly replacement and repair costs due to crime.

There is a consistent tendency for the risks of antischool offenses to be higher in the

Northeast and West than in the North Central and Southern regions. While there is some tendency for urban schools to have more property offenses, the risks of these and disruptive/damaging acts do not differ much throughout metropolitan areas (cities and suburbs) and are about the same in junior and senior high schools. The per-capita cost of school crime is higher in the suburbs than in the cities. Moreover, according to secondary school students, beer, wine, and marijuana are also widely available throughout metropolitan areas, especially in senior high schools.

As a rule, then, the risks of personal violence are greater in junior highs and large communities; the risks of antischool offenses are about the same for both junior and senior highs throughout metropolitan areas; the availability of alcohol and marijuana is greatest in senior highs but does not differ from cities to suburbs. Elementary and rural schools tend to have the fewest problems with these various offenses, though there are some minor exceptions. Clearly, though, the problems of school crime and disruption are not specifically urban phenomena.

Reporting of Offenses to Police

Only a small portion of violent offenses are reported to the police by the school. One-sixth of the attacks and robberies recorded by principals for the survey were reported. Even where serious violence is involved, as with attacks requiring medical treatment, only a minority—about one-third—of the offenses are reported to police. On the other hand, the majority of certain offenses against the school—especially burglaries—are reported to police. School principals are not unique in the tendency to avoid involving the police. Other studies have shown that people in general are reluctant to call in police unless the offense is serious.

Nevertheless, the nonreporting of violent offenses in schools is a finding that deserves consideration by school districts. The schools and police have traditionally had an arm's-length relationship, and much can be said for schools' handling of their problems internally, if they are not too serious. But districts in which violence is a serious problem may find it useful to assess and enforce reporting requirements and, in planning efforts, to rethink the respective roles of the police and the schools, especially with regard to the question of when the police should become involved and when not.

Other Signs of Trouble in Schools

In addition to the actual costs in human and dollar terms which crime and disruption create

wherever they occur, they have added significance when they take place in the schools. Teachers who must attempt to carry out their responsibilities under fear for their personal safety find such conditions detrimental to effective teaching, to say the least, and students who spend their days at school afraid are not likely to learn much. We found that:

- 22% of all secondary students reported avoiding some restrooms at school because of fear.
- 16% reported avoiding three or more places at school for the same reason.
- 20% of the students said they are afraid of being hurt or bothered at school at least sometimes.
- 3% reported that they are afraid most of the time, representing around 600,000 secondary students.
- 4%, or around 800,000, stayed home from school in the previous month because they were afraid.
- 12% of the secondary school teachers, representing some 120,000, said they were threatened with injury by students at school.
- 12% of the teachers said they hesitated to confront misbehaving students because of fear.
- Almost half (48%) of the teachers reported that some students had insulted them or made obscene gestures at them in the last month.

With few exceptions, these attitudes and experiences are most prevalent in junior high schools in urban areas and least so in senior high schools in rural areas. At both the individual and the school level there is an association between these indications of trouble and actual violence.

The statistics on incidence, frequency, and seriousness of the problem are sufficiently compelling to make clear the dimensions of the problem and the need for concerted action to remedy it.

TIME AND PLACE OF INCIDENTS

The analysis of school crime data by time and place illustrates how "risk profiles," which may be of considerable use to school systems and schools in planning the allocation of preventive measures, can be developed. The analysis of

national-level data should not be used for local planning purposes, however. It can only clarify broad patterns and illustrate approaches that school districts may want to employ in assessing and planning ways to reduce school crime.

The risks of personal violence, personal theft, and disruptive/damaging acts against the school are highest during regular school hours and tend to occur more frequently during midweek. Four-fifths of all personal violence at school takes place during the schoolday.

The risks of breaking and entering, on the other hand, are highest on weekends and secondarily during other nonschool hours. The importance of the absence of witnesses to such acts is highlighted by the fact that two-thirds of all school property offenses other than break-ins (theft of school property, vandalism, and trespassing) also occur on weekends and during other nonschool hours. Thus, the occurrence of school property offenses and personal violence tends to be complementary throughout the week, the former taking place more often on weekends and abating during the week, the latter starting low on Mondays, rising to a peak at midweek, and declining toward the end of the week.

Personal violence and school property offenses also tend to be complementary across months of the school year, one being high when the other is low. During the spring semester, school property offenses stay at or below the average for the year, with one exception. However, in the fall semester these offenses rise from a low in September to a high in December. Perhaps because of Christmas vacation, the risks of property offenses in December are much higher than in any other school month.

In a pattern the opposite of that for school property offenses, the relative monthly frequency of violent incidents begins high in February and drops systematically thereafter, reaching its low point in December. There is some evidence, then, that the incidence of both types of offenses is cyclical. Just as school property offenses occur in a mirror image of offenses against persons over the days of the week, they also do over months of the year.

For students, the classrooms are the safest places in school, considering the amount of time spent there. The risks are highest during the between-class crush in the hallways and stairs. Other places that pose substantial risks are the restrooms, cafeterias, locker rooms, and gyms. In the Phase III Case Studies, we found that the locus of much violence and disruption—the stairways, hallways, and cafeterias—were areas of crowding. One frequently heard comment from school

personnel was that control of students, once they were in the classroom, was easier, and a relief from the chaos and disorder of the halls and stairs during change of classes.

WHO ARE THE VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS IN SCHOOL CRIME AND DISRUPTION?

A knowledge of who the victims and offenders are can be useful for policy purposes. For example, if most of the offenders are nonstudent outsiders, then measures to keep them out of school should be stressed. If most of the offenses involve older students preying on younger ones, then perhaps a separation of older and younger students is needed. If interracial violence is prevalent, then measures to reduce racial conflict would be appropriate.

Student Status of Offenders

The data provide clear answers to these and related questions. First, with the exception of trespassing and breaking and entering, the great majority of all reported offenses in schools were committed by current students at the school. All respondents agree on this. In most attacks and robberies at school, the offender is recognized by the victim; in most attacks the victim knows the offender by name (75%), but in most robberies he does not (43%). Since current students are responsible for most offenses, the schools' primary emphasis should be on internal problems.

Age and Grade Level of Victims and Offenders

The data are equally clear on the relative ages of victims and offenders. In three-fourths of all attacks and robberies of students, the victims and offenders were roughly the same age. In the other cases there was a slight tendency for older students to pick on younger ones, but not nearly enough to regard the separation of older and younger students as a viable means of reducing school violence.

With minor exceptions, the risks of being a victim of either attack or robbery in secondary school decline steadily as grade level increases. It is 7th graders who are most likely to be attacked or robbed and 12th graders who are least so. Since grade level is closely associated with age, the risks of violence also decline as the student's age increases. The lower the age and the lower the grade level, the greater the risk of being the victim of either attack or robbery. One striking exception, however, is the evidence that students 19 years old and above have a much higher probability of being victimized than students a year or two younger. The probable explanation is that these older students have failed a year or

more at school, may have greater difficulty getting along with their younger classmates, and may be targets (and perhaps initiators) of aggressive behavior because of their marginal status.

Why are the risks of violence at school greater for the younger secondary students in the lower grades? There are a number of possible explanations. The higher risks may be due to: (1) biological and related emotional changes which some believe make early adolescence a volatile age; (2) socialization—as children grow older, society increasingly teaches them acceptable forms of behavior; it also becomes less tolerant of violent behavior; (3) adaptation to secondary school—the younger students have to learn the ropes in a new environment; (4) the separation of younger, more volatile students (in junior high schools) from the moderating influence of older students; and (5) the dropping out of problem students as they grow older than the mandatory schooling age.

Disentangling (1) biological and (2) socialization effects is beyond the scope of this study. The data do show that (3) the longer a student attends a given school, the lower the risks of violence, which suggests that learning the ropes may be a factor. More interesting, we find that (4) the isolation of young adolescents in junior high or middle schools may be a factor: 7th and 9th graders in comprehensive high schools (grades 7-12) have lower risks than those in junior high and middle schools, even taking location into account. The dropout argument (5) is not supported by the data: after other factors are taken into account, the proportion of dropouts reported by schools is not related to the levels of violence they experience; neither is the number of students identified by teachers as behavior problems. This suggests that removing problem youngsters from regular schools is not necessary to reduce violence.

Racial/Ethnic Characteristics and School Violence

Three assumptions are generally made about the relation between racial/ethnic status and violence in schools: (1) that the risks of violence are greater in minority (nonwhite) than in white schools; (2) that court-ordered desegregation contributes to school violence; and (3) that most violence in schools is interracial. What support do these assumptions receive from the data?

First, except for attacks in general, the risks of violence are greater in schools that are less than 40% (non-Hispanic) white. The risks are higher for all robberies of students and teachers,

attacks on teachers, and serious robberies and attacks on students.

Does this mean that a school's racial composition itself contributes to (or reduces) violence? Statistical analysis shows that when other factors are taken into account, the proportion of minority students in a school cannot be seen as a cause of the general level of student violence (attacks and robberies combined). The important factor seems to be the amount of crime in the attendance area of the school. A minority school in a low-crime area has a little less violence than a white school (more than 70% white) in a low-crime area. Whether the same results hold for serious violence against students and for violence against teachers is a question for further research.

Second, court-ordered desegregation is associated with slightly higher levels of violence in schools, but there is no relation between the numbers of students bused for desegregation purposes and school violence, and there is suggestive evidence linking violence to the recency of initial desegregation efforts. Taken together, the data suggest that while the beginning of the desegregation process is associated with some increase in violence, things quiet down as time goes on and the process continues.

Third, the majority of violent incidents against students are not interracial, but a substantial proportion (42% of the attacks and 46% of the robberies) are interracial. However, this is not more than would be expected to occur by chance alone. It seems that the smaller the racial or ethnic minority in the school, the greater the chances that an attack on a member of that minority will be by someone of another racial or ethnic group. For example, more than two-thirds of the attacks on white students were committed by whites, while more than two-thirds of the attacks on Hispanic students were committed by members of other racial/ethnic groups.

Contrary to some research findings, our data indicate that the chances of violence are not greatest in substantially integrated schools (40%-69% white), but at least as great in schools in which either whites or racial/ethnic minority students are numerically predominant; there is some suggestion that risks may be highest for minority students in white schools and white students in minority schools. Numerical predominance by one group in a school appears to increase the risks for others.

Experiences and Attitudes of Student Victims

When students victimized by attack or

robbery are compared with other students, they are more likely to report having low grades and having failed at school. They are also more likely to be in trouble at school. Half again as many victims as other students report having been suspended, and twice as many were expelled from other schools. These findings and others suggest that the victims of attack and robbery are also more likely than most students to be offenders. They tend to be youngsters who are in trouble, and part of the trouble may well be that they get into fights and other situations in which their chances of being victimized increase.

Compared to other students, victims of attack or robbery in schools are more likely to live in high crime neighborhoods and are much more apt to say that they are afraid on the way to school and at school. They are also more likely to avoid places at school because of fear, to stay home out of fear of being hurt, and to be absent for whatever reason.

Within the school, they tend to have fewer close friends and are more likely to turn to counselors and teachers for advice on personal problems than do other students. Those victimized by attack or robbery tend to say that they do not like their school, the students, the principal, or the classes. They also tend to see the rules of the school as unfair, inconsistent, and arbitrary, and to report corporal punishment and demeaning treatment of students. More than twice as high a proportion of victims as others say their schools are "not nearly as good" as other schools in the area.

These assessments should not be regarded simply as reflections of more negative attitudes on the part of student victims. They may also be realistic appraisals of schools which are badly run and in which a good deal of violence and illegal behavior occurs.

Characteristics of Victimized Teachers

Many of the demographic variables associated with student victims do not apply to teachers. Male students are twice as likely to be attacked as females, but for male and female teachers the risks are the same. Young (secondary) students are much more likely to be attacked than older students, but age is not consistently related to a teacher's risk of attack. In general, a teacher's attitudes and actions may have more to do with his or her risks than any demographic characteristics.

Class size does seem to be related to teacher victimization, for the higher the average number of students in the classes they teach, the higher the risk of being attacked and robbed.

Teachers with high proportions of (1) low-ability students, (2) underachievers, (3) behavior problems, and (4) minority youngsters are also more likely to be victims than others.

The picture of the school and its surroundings drawn by the victimized teachers is similar to that of their student counterparts. More than other teachers, they report that crime is a problem in the neighborhood around the school. Like the students, their assessment of their schools tends to be much more negative than that of other teachers. Their view of students is also negative. Like the victimized students, they are probably describing accurately school and neighborhood environments in which violence is fairly common, and in which efforts to reduce violence are generally ineffective.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM

Statistical analysis has shown that 22 factors are consistently associated with school violence and property loss, even after each factor is weighed against others. The 10 factors associated with violence are:

1. The crime rate and the presence or absence of fighting gangs in the schools' attendance area. It seems that the more crime and violence students are exposed to outside of school, the greater the violence in the school.
2. The proportion of students who are male. Since males commit more violent offenses than females, schools with higher proportions of males have more violence.
3. The grade level in secondary school and the age of the students. The lower the grade level and the younger the students, the more violence in the school. Possible reasons for this have already been discussed.
4. The size of the school. The larger the school, the greater the risk of violence, though the association is not strong.
5. The principal's firmness in enforcing rules and the amount of control in the classroom. The more firmly a school is run, the lower the incidence of violence.
6. Fairness in the enforcement of rules. The absence of fairness, as perceived by students, seems to provoke violence.
7. The size of classes and the number of different students taught by a teacher in a week. Apparently the implication is not only that teachers have better control over smaller classes, but that more continuous contact with the same students helps reduce violence.
8. The relevance of academic courses. Schools where students say that teachers are not "teaching me what I want to learn" have more violence. Students "turned off" by school seem to cause trouble.
9. The importance of grades to students. Schools where students strive to get good grades have less violence.
10. The students' feelings of control over their lives. Schools in which students feel they have little control over what happens to them have more violence.

In addition, there are 12 factors consistently associated with property losses due to crime in schools:

1. The crime rate in the attendance area.
2. Residential concentration around the school. The school's proximity to students' homes may make it a convenient target for vandalism.
3. The presence of nonstudent youth around school, cited by principals as a problem. Evidently, they increase the school's risk of property loss.
4. Family intactness and family discipline. Schools having higher proportions of students from families in which both parents are present, and in which discipline is firm, suffer less property loss due to vandalism and other offenses.
5. School size. In larger schools, where there is more to steal or destroy, property losses will be higher.
6. Rule enforcement, classroom control, and nonclassroom supervision. These again indicate that the more firmly a school is run, the fewer offenses it has.
7. Coordination between faculty and administration. This is another measure of how well the school is run.
8. Hostile and authoritarian attitudes on the part of teachers toward students. As a response to such attitudes, students apparently take it out on the school.

9. Students' valuing their teachers' opinions of them. Schools in which students identify with their teachers have less vandalism.
10. The manipulation of grades as a disciplinary measure. This practice may be seen by students as arbitrary and unfair, with the result that the school again is the victim.
11. The importance of grades to students. Schools where students strive to get good grades have more vandalism.
12. The importance of leadership status to students. Schools where there is intense competition for leadership have greater property losses.

In considering these 22 factors, certain themes emerge. The first is that while community and other background factors have a substantial influence on the amount of violence and property loss, schools are by no means the helpless victims of their circumstances. Many school factors seem to influence the amount of crime that schools experience. A sense of helplessness about the situation may even contribute to the problem by undercutting the positive steps that could be taken.

Second, systematic discipline and strong coordination between faculty and administration, both important factors in school governance, can have a substantial effect in reducing a school's problems.

Third, fairness in the administration of discipline and respect for students is a key element in effective governance. The absence of this characteristic in a school can lead to frustration and aggressive behavior by students.

Fourth, while size and impersonality are associated with school vandalism and violence, impersonality seems to be the more important of the two. Evidently, the closer and more continuous the personal bonds between teachers and students, the lower the risks of violence. In the Phase III Case Studies, respondents frequently mentioned the importance of personal contact. Not only does it increase a teacher's influence with students, but if students are known and can be identified, they are less likely to commit violent offenses. Further, close personal ties between teachers and students may increase the students' commitment to and involvement with the school.

Fifth, the perceived relevance of academic courses is a factor in the amount of violence a school experiences. Sixth, the discovery that

striving for good grades at school seems to reduce violence while increasing vandalism does not mean that violent schools are faced with the difficult choice of trading violence for vandalism. There seem to be two syndromes—one for violence and another for vandalism—involving different kinds of students. In particularly violent schools, students are likely to be apathetic about grades, to have given up on school, and to feel that they have little control over their lives. Emphasizing academic achievement in such schools, as seen in the Phase III case studies, is part of the process of building school pride and student commitment, both of which are ingredients in turning violent schools into orderly ones. Many "turned off" students can be turned on again.

The vandalism syndrome, on the other hand, seems more likely to involve students who care about school, but who are losing out in the competition for grades and leadership positions, or who perceive grades as being unfairly manipulated for disciplinary purposes. Denied what they consider fair and adequate rewards by the school, they take aggressive action against it.

If a school is large and impersonal, discipline lax and inconsistent, the rules ambiguous and arbitrarily or unfairly enforced, the courses irrelevant and the reward system unfair, the school lacks a rational structure of order and the basic elements necessary to maintain social bonds, both among students and between students and school. In the absence of these, acts of violence and vandalism, whether for immediate gratification or rebellion, are likely to be common.

DEVICES, PERSONNEL, AND PROCEDURES TO PREVENT CRIME AND DISRUPTION IN SCHOOLS

Schools have responded to crime and disruption with a wide array of devices, personnel, and procedures. These measures tend to be most heavily concentrated in urban secondary schools, and while in general the problems are more pronounced there than elsewhere, some discrepancies exist between the allocation of these measures and the relative need in various areas. Security devices, such as specially designed locks, safes, and window and door alarms, highly ranked by principals who have used them, are most heavily concentrated in urban schools. Yet principals' reports indicate that the risks of some property crimes are as great in suburban schools as in the cities, and the risk of others, not much less. In terms of relative risks, suburban schools seem less well protected than urban schools. While principals consider such devices generally effective, undependability ratings for some of the more complicated

electronic systems are relatively high. Respondents in the case studies also mentioned that their electronic systems were unreliable. Schools interested in investing in crime prevention "hardware" should investigate carefully the merits of the various systems available.

Unlike the security devices which are used primarily at night and on weekends, professional security personnel are employed during both school hours and nonschool hours. When school is not in session, they serve primarily to guard property; during the schoolday, however, they also help maintain safety and order in school. The skills required for the latter are greater than those needed for guarding property; hence school districts should recruit and train security personnel with particular care if they are to be used during the schoolday. The Case Studies also note the need for such training.

Principals who have employed security personnel, such as school security officers and police, rank them fairly high in reducing school crime; they also tend to rate them as more dependable (or less undependable) than the electronic security systems. Very few schools (1%) have regular police stationed in them, but the proportion is much higher in big city secondary schools (15%). School security officers are more widely used and are present during the day in half of all large city junior high schools and two-thirds of the senior highs in these cities. Even though junior high schools have higher rates of violence than senior highs, daytime security professionals are concentrated more in senior high schools. In terms of relative risks, junior highs seem to be getting a smaller share of these resources than they need.

Among the disciplinary procedures, suspension and paddling are the most widely used. No less than 36% of all secondary schools reported reliance on this form of physical punishment in a typical month. The practice is more prevalent in junior than in senior high schools and, unlike any of the other procedures, devices, or personnel, is most prevalent in rural areas; 61% of all rural junior high schools reported paddling students in a month's time.

Urban schools tend to have higher crime rates than those in other areas, and with few exceptions, security devices, security personnel, and disciplinary procedures are most heavily concentrated in urban schools, especially those in the largest cities. Yet the principals in these schools are much more likely than those in other areas to report that they receive little or no support from their school boards and central administrations in the handling of discipline

problems. These findings suggest a reliance on technical measures not adequately supported by political leadership. In the absence of effective school governance, which such leadership can help to provide, reliance on technical measures can result in a continuing battle between disaffected students and beleaguered security forces, each trying to outwit the other.

PRINCIPALS', TEACHERS', AND STUDENTS' RECOMMENDATIONS

In the Safe School Study, students and teachers in secondary schools and principals at both levels were asked to recommend ways for schools to respond to vandalism, personal attacks, and theft. In addition, principals at all levels were asked to describe specific programs or measures which they had employed and found to be successful in reducing these problems.

Among all groups of respondents, discipline was rated as being of prime importance. Indeed, with the exception of the successful practices reported by elementary school principals, discipline was ranked first by all groups of respondents.

When we consider the practices listed as successful by all principals--elementary as well as secondary--the use of security devices ranked first, although these devices tended to receive middle-level recommendations from principals, teachers, and students together. The use of security personnel was among the top three (out of eight) categories of successful practices listed by principals and received middle-level rankings from the principals, teachers, and students who were asked to make general recommendations. Among the recommendations of these groups in large city schools, security personnel were ranked high. This is important because security personnel are most widely used in these schools. Respondents in the Phase III Case Studies expressed a preference for "more people than things" as an approach to security. In all schools training and organizational change, parental involvement, and improvement of the school climate were strategies also frequently mentioned, as they were in the Case Studies.

While school design was not often mentioned as a strategy recommended in this portion of the study, it was observed to be important in Phase III. Security personnel and other school staff frequently commented on the problem of difficult-to-reach or difficult-to-monitor spaces such as stairwells, alcoves, or numerous exit and entrance doors. They also frequently commented that open spaces, such as long corridors which could be kept under

surveillance, were easier to secure. It was observed in Phase III that the safer schools were cleaner and better maintained, although not necessarily newer, than those schools which were still experiencing some disruption.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE

Within all schools there is a process of governance which serves as a means of organizing behavior and achieving the ends of a school. Governance provides a rational structure of order, with positive incentives and negative sanctions, within which students, teachers, and others know what to expect and can conduct their behavior accordingly.

In the school, governance is expressed through the rules and regulations, with their negative sanctions, but it is also expressed through the system of incentives, such as grades and honors. Both of these structures help schools achieve the goals of educating and socializing youngsters.

It is a central conclusion of this study that strong and effective school governance, particularly by the principal, can help greatly in reducing school crime and misbehavior. The exercise of discipline, through the clear enunciation of rules and their even-handed enforcement, is an important part of this strategy. Also important are the rewards which schools offer, both through the incentive structure and in terms of academic substance. In the absence of efforts to increase student commitment to the school, efforts to reduce violence may be undercut.

In Phase III, the principal's leadership and his or her initiation of a structure of order described as "firm, fair, and most of all consistent" seemed to differentiate safe schools from those having trouble and to be the starting point for turning unsafe schools into safe ones. The leadership role of the principal appears to be a critical factor in itself. Visibility and availability to students and staff are characteristic of the principals in Phase III schools which have made a dramatic turnaround from periods of violence. Conversely, in those schools which remained in difficulty or which were headed toward increasing difficulty, we found that it was the principals who were most frequently cited as the major problem. Often they were described as "unavailable and ineffective." Most of the successful principals in Phase III studies took over their schools from ineffective principals during

the low point in the school's experience with disruption. It is important to emphasize that strong leadership in this sense means a commitment to educational leadership as well as control over the school. In each case where principals were described as dynamically moving the school forward, their educational leadership and the new educational programs they installed were frequently cited by students and community residents as well as by school staff.

Successful principals were educational leaders and behavioral role models. The principal's leading the school by his or her own example, putting in long hours, and not arbitrarily siding with teachers or with students, were characteristics felt to be important. The principal's responsiveness to teacher and student input in terms of school policies were also considered important. In some cases, this meant a willingness to include students and teachers in decisionmaking; in others, it represented a willingness to make known how decisions would be made and a policy of following these procedures with openness and honesty.

In these formerly troubled schools, the successful principals were people of unusual strength of character, leadership abilities, and dedication to their schools and students. Such individuals are rare in any line of work, but we suspect that they exist in sufficient numbers in the ranks of principals, assistant principals, teachers, and other educators to supply the most troubled schools with new leadership. The problem for school districts is to identify people with such potential, recruit and train them, attract them to the schools that need them most, and keep them there, at least until they can be replaced by equally talented people.

There are also a number of characteristics of teachers which seem to have been important in Phase III schools where a successful governance program was established. High self-esteem, job satisfaction, and general agreement with the principal's educational and procedural styles are important dimensions of morale in successful schools. Teachers in such schools also reported that they were there because they wanted to be in those particular schools. Cohesiveness among teachers and a sense of identification with students was another characteristic frequently mentioned. Generally, high faculty morale seemed to be associated with a strong sense of the school spirit visible among students.

While the focus of school governance is the school itself, the active support of the central administration, backed by the school board, can greatly strengthen a school's governance program

by providing both material and moral support. In the case of the schools with the worst problems, the initiative for change would ordinarily come from the administration.

Implications for Action

This study was designed to aid Congress in its deliberations on crime and violence in schools, not to formulate a Federal program as such. Hence we confine ourselves to pointing out measures that can usefully be undertaken by local school districts and schools. Some of these can be implemented by local communities themselves, without further assistance; others would require additional resources. The implications for action are organized around major themes of the report.

I. We found that while past increases in crime and violence have leveled off, there is abundant evidence of a problem requiring concerted action. In many respects school crime and violence stem from sources outside the school; but there are steps which schools and school districts can take to reduce such problems.

1. Crime and disruption in schools should be recognized as a significant problem, and the problem should receive the open attention and public concern it deserves. In the course of the study, a tendency to understate or minimize the extent of the problem was sometimes evident. Progress toward solving a problem cannot be made until the problem itself is recognized.
2. If a school district has reason to think that its schools may have a serious problem the dimensions of which are unclear, an assessment of the problem is in order. Some of the methods and instruments developed in the course of this study are suitable for such an assessment, though they should be used with an awareness of their limitations. This approach can also provide detailed information valuable for planning purposes (Chapter 2).
3. If crime and disruption are serious problems in a school or school district, the priority given to the issue must be a primary one. This may require some hard decisions about the relative value of other desirable goals and programs, although it is clear that educational goals cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of violence and disorder. Assigning a high priority to the issue also means that the district administration, backed by the board of education, should provide prominent, active support for efforts to deal with these problems (Chapter 6).

4. School districts and their communities should recognize that schools can do a great deal to reduce crime and disruption. If the feeling that nothing can be done pervades a school, nothing is expected or demanded of students, faculty, or administrators. Yet we found that many schools have managed to control and reduce the incidence of crime and disruption through locally developed and initiated programs (Chapter 5, Case Studies).
5. While schools can and should do a great deal to reduce crime and disruption, an adequate program to deal with the problem requires the consensus, cooperation, and resources which can come only through local planning and coordination supplemented by financial and technical assistance. Social policy is dependent on a measure of consensus among those groups that are affected by and have an effect on social problems. Such consensus begins with the identification of goals to be sought and the means of attaining them. In order to develop an effective program to make schools safe, it is necessary that interested parties in the communities—including parents, social agencies, the police, the courts, and others—join together to plan and implement such programs. Other financial resources and expertise should be available as a supplement to, but not a substitute for, local policymaking and planning.
 - II. A system of governance providing an equitable structure of order characterizes schools which are working and seems to differentiate safe schools from those which are having problems. Student commitment to the school is an important factor in the safety of schools.
6. Seriously affected schools should give particular attention to the establishment of legitimate and effective governance programs. Such programs involve at least two things: (1) firm, fair, and consistent discipline; and (2) a structure of incentives (such as grades and honors) which adequately rewards students for their efforts and achievements (Chapter 5, Case Studies). Attention should be given to rewarding diverse kinds of accomplishments (including individual improvement) and to broadening the availability of rewards.
7. Schools and their communities should recognize that the role of the principal is important to the success of any school, but that it is the key in schools which are seriously affected by crime and disruption (Chapter 5, Case Studies). Seriously affected

schools require principals who have strong leadership and administrative abilities. Recruitment and selection of such principals is essential. Attention should be given to the career ladder for assistant principals and to their movement into principalships. Specialized training of principals is also needed both in graduate schools and afterwards. Apprenticeships with principals who have demonstrated success in leadership of difficult schools is one method of training. Given the unusual qualities required for this job, incentives should be available to keep talented principals in the schools that need them most.

8. Communities and their school districts should provide the resources necessary to enable principals in seriously affected schools to exercise a leadership role vis-a-vis students as well as teachers. In practical terms, this might mean providing the principal with the assistance necessary to take care of some of the routine business of school administration, leaving the principal free to spend more time with students and teachers. The importance of the principal as a role model for students was evident in the study. Leading by example, putting in long hours, and being visible and available were essential activities. To maintain this posture requires that principals not delegate the functions of educational leadership and maintenance of discipline to others in order to carry out the routine administrative tasks which are part of the job.
9. Teachers and other school personnel require pre- and in-service training for making schools safe. While the principal seems to be a key element in establishing and maintaining a governance system which produces a safe school, the teachers, their relations with the administration, and their abilities in classroom management are also of considerable importance (Chapter 5). Many teachers report that "we weren't prepared for this" when they relate the problems they encounter in schools which have serious problems with crime and disruption. For teachers in seriously affected schools, intensive training in classroom management, perhaps provided in the summer, can be an important means of increasing their skills.
10. Communities and their school districts should increase the number of teachers in schools which are having serious problems with crime and disruption. Classrooms are the safest places in school, and smaller classes are associated with decreased incidence of crime

and disruption (Chapters 2, 3, and 5). One response for a school which is having problems is to increase the number of teachers per pupil.


11. Consideration should be given to ways of increasing the "personalization" of secondary schools. School size, student anonymity, and alienation seem to be factors in school crime (Chapter 5, Case Studies). The principal's accessibility and lower student-teacher ratios should help "personalize" larger schools. Increasing the amount of continuous class time that a teacher spends with a given group of students would: (1) increase personal contact with students; (2) in junior highs, ease the transition from elementary schools; and (3) reduce traffic in the halls.
 12. Seriously affected schools should provide more relevant courses to students, especially those who are alienated and "turned off" by school. The perceived lack of relevance is associated with apathy and violence in schools (Chapter 5). This is an old problem, but not an intractable one. Voluntary alternative schools and programs, many of which have a good track record with such students, should be considered as one approach.
 13. Relationships between the administration and teachers, among teachers, and between the school and the school system are important in producing safe schools and should be supportive in dealing with the problem. "Down the line support" from the board of education and central administration to the classroom was a frequently mentioned necessity for school safety. The support of communities and parents can also help. Within the school, supportive attitudes toward students can help to contribute to a school climate which makes positive identification with the school, or "school spirit," more likely to develop (Chapters 6 and 7 and Case Studies).
- III. Security measures and procedures can be helpful in reducing violence and property loss in schools, provided they are not used as a substitute for effective governance. In the absence of adequate leadership and student commitment to the school, security measures can become just another challenge to youngsters bent on attacking the school or other students.
14. School systems with serious problems of violence and vandalism can benefit from the hiring of additional security personnel. The recruitment and training of such personnel should emphasize interpersonal skills as well

as security functions. Security personnel can be effective in reducing crime and disruption in schools. Since they often function as peacekeepers and sometimes counselors, they should be recruited and trained to be able to fulfill these roles properly (Chapters 6 and 7 and Case Studies).

15. Schools experiencing serious problems should give special attention to surveillance and traffic control in areas such as hallways, stairwells, and cafeterias, where violence and disruption are most likely to start. Hallways especially may be strategic locations in troubled schools (Chapter 2, Case Studies). The better a principal is able to control them, the better the chances of restoring order to the school. The more adult hall monitors available, the better the chances of controlling the halls.
16. Schools and school systems should move to improve recordkeeping and reporting of serious problems to the police and other appropriate agencies. Many systems have requirements for the reporting of incidents, but they are often not followed (Chapter 1). School districts facing serious problems of vandalism and violence should review these requirements and, having done so, enforce them. It may be helpful to consult police in formulating guidelines for when they should and should not be called. The establishment

and maintenance of recordkeeping systems and the development of reporting guidelines should be undertaken by school systems to ensure uniformity of recording and reporting.

17. Schools and school systems in which crime is a problem should coordinate their efforts with those of local courts. While local courts are central to the administration of juvenile justice, the schools express very little confidence in them (Chapter 6). The schools and courts should work together to plan and coordinate their activities with regard to juvenile (and school-age adult) offenders.
18. Schools and school systems should select security devices with care and with reference to their special needs. There are a great number of such devices available, and they vary in utility and reliability. Principals' responses indicate that security devices in general can be effective, but schools seeking such devices and systems should also seek advice on which ones to acquire and how they may best be used (Chapters 6, 7). Advice from school districts which have used them can be helpful (many large city districts have), and information on their testing and certification is available from various sources cited in Chapter 6.







Introduction

In recent years the press and other media have carried an increasing number of reports about crime and violence in the nation's schools. Vivid descriptions are presented of assaults, robberies, and sometimes murders in our schools. We hear of fighting gangs establishing and warring over "turf," nonstudents entering schools to prey upon pupils, classrooms and even whole schools being destroyed.¹ One Los Angeles high school principal described the situation by saying that "for teachers and students alike the issue is no longer learning, but survival."² Moreover, the problem is pictured not only as bad, but getting worse.

Estimates of the cost of school crime for the nation as a whole are in the hundreds of millions and are reflected in the high cost and limited availability of insurance for schools.³ The estimates include replacement/repair costs and the costs of preventive measures. Not included are substantial costs of a less tangible nature: it is argued that (1) where violence levels are high, teaching and learning are negatively affected by a school climate that is dominated by fear,⁴ and (2) even if this were not the case, the millions of dollars spent each year to employ security personnel or to repair broken windows could better be spent on improving instruction.

The question is not whether serious assaults, robberies, cases of arson, and other crimes occur in schools. Obviously they do. But the more relevant questions are, how often do such incidents occur? How many schools are affected and to what extent? How many people are victimized? In general, how serious is the problem, and is the situation improving or deteriorating?

To date we have had relatively little information available to answer such questions or to guide us in the development of policies to help schools in their efforts to deal with the problem. Some fragmentary data have been available, but not the kind of systematic data that would permit us to describe the nature, extent, and cost of school crime for the nation as a whole. Lacking too have been the kinds of data that would enable us to assess the relative importance of different factors in explaining why the risks of school crime and violence are greater in some schools than in others. With information of this sort, we would be in a position to suggest what kinds of measures are likely to be effective in preventing (or at least reducing) school crime, violence, and disruption. Without such data, it would be difficult to attack the problem systematically and arrive at workable solutions.

In response to this need and to growing concern about incidents of crime, violence, and disruption in the Nation's schools, the Safe School Study was mandated by Congress in 1974 in Public Law 93-380 (Section 825). The legislation called upon the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to determine:

1. The frequency, seriousness, and incidence of crime in elementary and secondary schools in the United States;
2. The number and location of schools affected by crime;
3. The per-pupil average incidence of crimes in elementary and secondary schools in urban, suburban, and rural schools located in all regions of the United States;

¹For instance, see: California State Department of Education, A Report on Conflict and Violence in California's High Schools (Sacramento: California State Department of Education, 1973); Frank Thistle, "It's time we discussed the violence in America's schools," PTA Magazine, October 15-17, 1974; and Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Our Nation's Schools—A Report Card: "A" in School Violence and Vandalism (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

²California School Boards Association, Conflict and Violence in California Schools, 1974.

³Bernard Greenberg, School Vandalism: A National Dilemma (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1969).

⁴For instance, see Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Our Nation's Schools, op. cit.

4. The cost of replacement and repair of facilities, books, supplies, equipment, and other tangible objects seriously damaged or destroyed as the result of crime in such schools; and
5. The means by which attempts are made to prevent crimes in such schools and the means by which crime may more effectively be prevented in such schools.

Enactment of this legislation followed hearings and earlier attempts in the Congress to pass laws that would help local education agencies in their efforts to cope with crime and disruption. The "Safe Schools Study Act" was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressmen Jonathan B. Bingham of New York and Alphonzo Bell of California. The Senate, at the initiative of Senator Alan Cranston of California, adopted essentially similar provisions. These bills formed the basis for the present law.

To provide the information requested in the legislation, two different surveys were undertaken by agencies of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—one by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), the other by the National Institute of Education (NIE). The two were intended to complement one another.

The NCES Survey was designed to provide information on points 1 through 4 in the legislation and do so within a stringent reporting requirement set by the legislation. Consequently, in surveying its national sample of schools and districts, NCES relied on the collection of data by mail and limited its requests to information that could be found in school records or supplied from memory—i.e., (1) data on the incidence of specified kinds of criminal activities reported by school authorities to the police; and (2) information about the costs of replacing or repairing school property lost or damaged as a result of unlawful activity.

The NIE was not faced with so early a reporting deadline and therefore had a freer hand in designing its study. This made it possible to use a range of survey and other data collection methods and to take a more comprehensive and interpretive look at the incidence and causes of school crime.

What this meant in terms of the study carried out was that the NIE was able to use a number of approaches and to address several kinds of questions that NCES could not:

1. Examination of a broad range of offenses: those reported to the police, those not reported to the police, and activities that

may be violent or disruptive but that violate no criminal statutes;

2. Collection of detailed information about offenses: how many are being committed, who is doing what to whom (or, in the case of property damage, to what), and when and where are these offenses being committed;
3. Use of several types of information sources: numbers of offenses committed and reports from principals describing incidents in some detail; descriptions of attacks, thefts, and robberies from students and teachers recently victimized; detailed case studies of schools that have had serious problems with vandalism and violence in the past and that over time have (in most cases) changed for the better; and
4. Analysis of factors accounting for school-to-school differences in incidence rates: rates of incidence and concomitant school and community variables that seem to explain why the risks are greater in some schools than in others.

This report deals primarily with the NIE Study—the questions asked, the research approaches used, the data gathered, their meaning and possible implications, and the kinds of policy recommendations suggested by the data. We will use NCES data to answer certain questions in Chapter 1. However, we have not attempted to describe the NCES Survey or data fully. The results of that survey were released in December 1976 and are reproduced in Appendix B.

In the remainder of this Introduction, we will describe the thinking that guided the NIE staff in the design and analysis of our survey and consider briefly the procedures and instruments used.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The NIE Study was designed to provide some guidance for the development of policy and program initiatives to assist schools in reducing crime and disruption. Some insight into the problem can be derived from descriptive data about the nature and extent of crime in the nation's schools and what schools are doing to prevent it. Knowledge of incidence rates and their variation may be necessary to understand the full extent of the problem: however, this alone is not sufficient as a guide for the design of strategies to prevent (or at least reduce) school crime and violence. In addition, we need to know why some schools experience more crime and violence than others, and we must try to explain

this variation in terms of factors amenable to policy action. Once we know what circumstances and conditions seem to accompany the varying degrees of crime in the schools, we will be in a better position to determine the potential efficacy of various crime prevention strategies that might be adopted.

These information requirements suggested the need to collect data for two kinds of purposes: (1) to provide the descriptive information requested on the incidence of various categories of crime in schools; and (2) to shed some light on the causes of school crime, by examining factors known or expected to be highly related to levels of school crime. The following pages discuss some of the concepts that guided the initial formulation of questions asked in the survey.

Measures of School Crime and Misbehavior

To provide basic information for both descriptive and analytic purposes, data were collected on incidence of a number of offenses occurring in schools. The categories used in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports were followed, but behavioral rather than legal descriptions of events were used. We distinguished offenses against schools (trespass, break-in, theft, bombing, arson, false fire alarms, and other vandalism) from offenses against persons (assault, robbery, rape, and homicide). We also included a number of other offenses, such as drug and alcohol abuse, weapons possession, and disorderly conduct.

While the behavioral descriptions of incidents reflect legal categories, it cannot be assumed that all the incidents reported would ordinarily be regarded as crimes by most people or indeed by the police. Theft is a crime, but are we to assume that the filching of a pencil or notebook is a criminal act, as ordinarily understood? Assault is a crime, but how are we to classify one student's punching another's arm as they pass in the cafeteria? No doubt some responses to our questions refer to such behavior. To distinguish the more serious incidents from the less serious ones, we have included questions about the extent of injury, if any, the presence of weapons, dollar loss and the like, and these data are presented. But in our discussions it should be kept in mind that many of the incidents recorded would probably not result in arrest or prosecution if known to the police. For this reason, we often add a second, qualifying term to the word "crime," such as "misbehavior," "disruption," or "violence," and invite the reader's attention to the data on

the seriousness of incidents in Chapter 1.

Along with statistics on number of incidents of each type, then, we collected detailed information about each offense committed. These data allow us to answer questions such as:

- What kinds of offenses occur in schools?
- How serious are these offenses?
- How much actual physical harm do students and teachers experience?
- To what extent are weapons involved?
- What proportion of offenses are reported to police by the school?
- When are crimes committed at school (when during the day, the week, and the year)?
- Where at school are they committed?
- What kinds of property are stolen or damaged?
- To what extent is the threat of crime a problem?

Correlates of School Crime and Misbehavior

In order to help explain why some schools have high crime rates and others low rates, data were collected on two basic sets of factors that may affect the level of crime in schools:

1. The community in which the school is located—the argument is often made that differences in crime rates among schools are a reflection, in part, of conditions within the community served by the school; and
2. The school itself—one argument common in the delinquency literature is that much of the delinquent behavior in schools is in part a function of the social and structural characteristics of this institution.⁵

Thus, it is argued that differences in school crime rates will be (in part) a function of community conditions, regardless of the nature of the schools themselves, and a function (in part) of social and structural variation among schools, regardless of conditions in the communities they serve.

⁵ Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Rebellion in a High School (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964); Travis Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Martin Gold, Status Forces in Delinquent Boys (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1963); and Kenneth Polk and Walter E. Schafer, Schools and Delinquency (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972).

Two types of community factors were expected to affect the incidence of crime in schools—community characteristics and school-community relations. Community characteristics affect the opportunity and motivation to commit crimes against schools. Deserving of primary consideration among these characteristics are, of course, the size of the community and the amount of crime in it. Both are expected to be related to the amount of crime in schools. Other relevant factors may be the economic, social, and racial/ethnic composition of the area, family stability, and population concentration around the school, as it is frequently argued that poverty, minority status, family instability, and crowded conditions increase the risks of crime.

Community-school relations may also be a factor in the incidence of school crime and misbehavior. It is arguable that schools having good relations with the surrounding community will tend to have less of a problem: the more support a school gets from parents, community agencies, police, the board of education, and other sources, the lower the school crime rate will tend to be. Indices of the kinds and quality of these relations were therefore included in the survey questionnaires.

In addition to these community factors, we focus on several school factors that may be potentially important in explaining variation in school crime rates. Substantial attention is paid to school factors, for they are probably more amenable to policy control than most community factors. Furthermore, there is much in the literature to suggest that schools can and do affect the levels of delinquency that occur.⁶

Four broad categories of school factors are considered: physical structure, social structure, school functions, and school climate.

The school's physical structure is of obvious relevance to the incidence of crime in the school. In the survey we posed a series of questions relating to the vulnerability of the physical structure—the presence of security hardware,

such as special locks, intrusion alarms, monitoring devices, and the like. Questions about the actual design of schools proved difficult to construct for survey purposes because of the great number of possible variations in school design. For some information on the relation of design to school crime, we have relied on case study data.

The school's social structure is likely to be a very important factor in accounting for the incidence of crime. We include here two aspects of social structure: the social composition of the school (number and characteristics of its students and staff) and social relations.

Among the compositional variables expected to influence school crime rates significantly are the numbers of students and staff and the socioeconomic characteristics of students and staff. Studies of colleges and universities have indicated that large institutions are more likely than small ones to have high rates of disruption.⁷ Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the same will hold for public schools, especially at the secondary level. Characteristics of the students—age, sex, economic status, and race or minority status—may all be contributing factors, as records indicate that young people, males, the poor, and minorities all have higher arrest rates than others. In addition, studies of public secondary schools suggest that the closer a school's racial composition approximates a 50%-50% black/white distribution, the greater the likelihood of interracial violence.⁸ Further, teachers often argue that high student/teacher ratios and large classes contribute to the amount of violence and disruption in schools.

Social-relations variables expected to have a bearing on school crime rates include the level of intergroup tension among students and the power relations between students and administration. Three major types of social relations are considered:

1. Power relations (the relative power of administrators, teachers, and students, especially as this applies to decisionmaking):

⁶ *Ibid.*; also William Spady, "Authority System of the School and Student Unrest: A Theoretical Exploration," in Uses of the Sociology of Education, National Society for the Study of Education, 73rd Yearbook (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); and Vincent Tinto, "Antisocial Patterning of Deviant Behavior in School," unpublished manuscript, Syracuse University.

⁷ Joseph W. Scott and Mohamed El-Assal, "Multiversity, University Size, University Quality, and Student Protest: An Empirical Study," American Sociological Review, 34 (October 1969); and Bayer and Astin, Campus Disruption During 1968-1969 (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, Research Report #4, 1969).

⁸ Robert Havighurst, A Profile of the Large City High School (Washington, D.C.: NAASP, 1970); Stephen K. Bailey, Disruption in Urban Public Secondary Schools (Syracuse: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1969).

How much power does each have to affect decisions regarding curriculum, grading, school rules, and the like? Does it reside primarily with the principal, or is it more widely distributed? What institutionalized means are available for the redress of grievances?

2. Authority relations: Who is recognized as having the right to make various kinds of school decisions? Where is the focus of authority in the school, if anywhere? If the principal decides on most matters large and small, do the teachers and/or the students regard these decisions as legitimate?
3. Affinity relations: How well do the groups in school get along with each other—students with teachers, teachers with administrators, and subgroups of students with each other? Are contacts between individual students, teachers, and administrators frequent and personal or infrequent and impersonal?

The importance of examining power and authority relations within the school, especially between students and the administration is fairly evident. In the traditional view, running the school is primarily the principal's responsibility, and the stronger his leadership, the less violence the school will have. On the other hand, in the 1960's and early 1970's, the minimal extent of student participation in school decisionmaking was found to be a major grievance, one significantly related to the amount of disruption in schools.⁹ Whether it remains so today, when the emphasis on participatory democracy has diminished, is a question to be investigated.

One set of theories of crime and delinquency suggests that school disorders may be the result of strains due to the absence in schools of adequate channels for the expression and redress of grievances.¹⁰ If students do not have access to such channels, various kinds of disruptions may result. If this is correct, then we would expect higher levels of disruption in schools lacking adequate channels for the expression or redress of grievances.

As regards affinity relations, the connection between intergroup tension and violence is pretty

straightforward, and it may be expected that effective methods of reducing such tension will also reduce school violence. Other apparent sources of violence in schools are the alienation and impersonality that often are related to school size: the less personal the environment and the less personal influence that teachers and the administrators have on students, the greater the extent of violence in the school.

School function variables are derived by and large from Spady's work¹¹ on the functions schools perform and their effects on students. Spady argues that schools fulfill five basic functions: instruction, socialization, custody-control, evaluation-certification, and selection. Under each of these five functions, we include such variables as:

1. Instruction: amount of time spent in instruction, perceived quality of instruction and perceived relevance of courses.
2. Socialization: student involvement in school organizations and activities, provisions for staff/student interaction on nonacademic matters, and counseling services (guidance, personal problems).
3. Custody-control: nature, extent and clarity of school rules, degree of rule enforcement, perceived fairness of rules and their enforcement, disciplinary measures (suspensions, expulsions, corporal punishment), and programs for discipline problems (special classes, alternative schools).
4. Evaluation-certification: emphasis placed on grades, use or misuse of grades, teacher expectations of students, and promotion policies.
5. Selection: extent and characteristics of tracking, criteria for recruitment to school (personal preference, geographical assignments, etc.), and special classes (for gifted, retarded, etc.).

Information was collected for all of these categories of variables in order to examine the variability among schools in the way they fulfill their functions.

⁹Scott and El-Assal, *op. cit.*; Mark Chesler and Jan Franklin, Survey of Student and Teacher Views of Disrupted Schools, (1969); Edward McDill and Leo Rigby, Structure and Process in Secondary Schools: The Academic Impact of Educational Climates (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

¹⁰The basis for these theories is: Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1957).

¹¹Spady, *op. cit.*

- (1) If instruction is bad, if courses are considered irrelevant, or if little emphasis is placed on academic performance, students may have little attachment to the school. Their school experience may be a frustrating one which leads them to take out their aggression on other students or on the school itself.
- (2) If a school does not provide the basics of socialization, such as clear standards and expectations for behavior, it may have more vandalism and violence than another school which provides these basics.
- (3) If schools have indefinite rules, if they fail to enforce the rules, or if they enforce them unfairly, they may experience high levels of crime and disruption.
- (4) Likewise, if a school's emphasis on grades is heavy and low grades are regarded as stigmatizing, or if grades are awarded unfairly, students receiving low grades or grades which they see as unfair may be antagonistic toward the school and other students. The same may be true of students who have failed a year or more at school.
- (5) If schools have rigid tracking systems so that students in the lower tracks see no opportunity to get better teachers and courses and hence no future for themselves in the schools, their commitment to school is likely to be minimal and the trouble they cause, considerable.

Finally, as the fourth major category of school variables, we are concerned with those aspects of school climate—attitudes, beliefs, and values—that are most likely to affect the rate of crime and misbehavior in schools. The relation between school climate variables and school crime rates—particularly as regards violence and vandalism—is expected to be fairly direct. If students do not like their school or their teachers or each other, the potential for violence and vandalism is probably enhanced. If students hold ethical values that are contrary to the law or the accepted rules of the game, a climate that tolerates violence and vandalism may exist. If teachers and administrators have little regard for students and treat them in demeaning ways, student unrest is likely to be high.

Let us review what we have said about the measures suggested by our conceptual framework. To provide the descriptive information called for in the legislation, we needed measures of the incidence of various kinds of crimes occurring in schools. To shed some light on the question of why some schools experience more crime and

violence than others, we collected data on a number of factors known or expected to be highly related to levels of school crime: both community variables and school variables.

The community variables considered were basic community characteristics (size, crime level, socioeconomic composition, and the like) and school-community relations.

Four sets of school variables were examined: the school's physical structure, its social structure, school functions, and school climate. Particular attention has been given to the last three variables as they relate to patterns of governance in the school. We expected these factors to be important in explaining levels of violence and disruption, and we believed they were factors that might be particularly amenable to policy impact.

In the course of our analysis, many of the hypotheses were not supported by the data. A significant number were, however, and they provide some understanding of the roots of the problem and hence some insight into the likely efficacy of various kinds of preventive strategies that might be adopted. Are school crime rates merely reflections of the communities in which they are located and the students they serve? Or are they also a function of school characteristics, which can be changed by policy action? If school characteristics seem to make a difference, which ones do? Are they diverse and essentially unrelated? Or do they fit together in a pattern? These are among the questions to be addressed by the statistical analysis in the study.

SURVEY METHODS

The NIE survey had to consider at least three important factors in determining what data to collect and how to proceed: the general phenomenon of under-reporting of crime; the recognition that information on crime is sensitive material requiring stringent measures to assure the anonymity of respondents, schools, and school systems; and the absence of a detailed and widely adopted system of recordkeeping for school crimes.

In addition, the NIE survey was designed to take into account one other factor as well—the recognition that while survey research using questionnaire responses to obtain data can provide broad indications of the extent of crime and some of its correlates, it may not provide detailed insights into the dynamics of the school processes that are involved and that may prove important for policy formulation. This factor suggested the advisability of using a multiphase approach in

collecting data—that is, different types of quantitative and qualitative information.

The NIE data were gathered in three related substudies, each with distinctive purposes and characteristics:

- Phase I survey: In Phase I, data were gathered from a large national sample of schools. These data provide the basis for many of our estimates of the extent of crime in schools nationally.

- Phase II survey: A smaller subsample of schools was used to gather detailed data about not only the incidence of school crime, violence, and disruption, but also about community and school factors that might help to explain why incidence rates are greater in some schools than in others. The Phase II survey was designed to permit statistical analyses of the relationships between incidence rates and these expected correlates of school crime. In addition, the Phase II survey was designed to take into account the known phenomenon of authorities under-reporting crime: this survey included administration of questionnaires and (in the case of students) interviews to victims of school crime and violence, as well as gathering data from principals reporting for their schools.

- Phase III Studies: The final phase of the investigation was intended to explore the dynamics of school crime and crime prevention through observation and in-depth case studies of a small number of schools that at one time had serious crime problems and have since had various degrees of success in crime prevention. These case studies permit us to explore potentially causal relationships in explaining levels of crime and different degrees of success in turning around a bad situation.

Data collection and processing, together with the calculation of estimates for the NIE study and management of Phase III activities, were carried out by the Research Triangle Institute. Appendix C provides a detailed discussion of the methodology of the study—sample design, selection, and weighting procedures; data collection instruments and procedures; data preparation and analysis; estimates of sampling and nonsampling error; and case study procedures. Copies of all instruments used in the survey are included in this appendix.

Phase I Survey

A representative sample of 5,578 public schools in the United States was selected for Phase I. In a mail survey, principals in participating schools were asked to report in detail on the incidence of illegal or disruptive activities for selected 1-month periods between February 1976 and January 1977 and to provide some background information on their schools. The nine 1-month reporting periods (summer months not included) were assigned to participating schools on a random basis. Completed forms were returned by 4,014 schools, giving a 72% response rate. (In analysis of the data, responses were weighted to take nonresponse into account.)

Public schools in the United States are organized in many combinations of grades and groups of grade levels. For this study we have stipulated a uniform set of grade-level combinations. A senior high school is defined as one in which grades 10, 11, and 12 constitute half or more of all grades in the school. A junior high is a school other than a senior high in which grades 7, 8, and 9 are half or more of all grades in that school. Schools with a majority of lower grades are classified as elementary schools.^{1 2}

Schools in the survey also were randomly selected to represent schools in four different types of communities: (1) large cities: central cities of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) having populations in excess of 500,000; (2) smaller cities: central cities of an SMSA having populations of 50,000 to 500,000; (3) suburban areas, which are the noncentral city sections of an SMSA; and (4) small town and rural areas outside any SMSA. (Although portions of noncentral city SMSAs can contain rural sections, and although towns as large as 50,000 can be found outside SMSAs, the areas defined are predominantly suburban or rural.) The average size of the large cities in this study is around 1,200,000; smaller cities, 125,000; suburban communities, 13,000; and rural communities, 2,500.

Two data collection instruments were used in Phase I, the Principal's Report Sheet (PRS) and the Phase I Principal's Questionnaire (PQ).

Report sheets were used by the principals or their designees to record basic data on disruptive or illegal incidents as they occurred or as shortly

¹² Junior high schools as defined here include those middle schools in which grades 5 and/or 6 comprise a minority of all grades. There is some grade overlap between junior and senior high schools, especially in the case of grade 9.

thereafter as possible. One form was to be used for each incident occurring in the school's reporting month.

To provide uniformity, offenses listed on the forms are defined in behavioral rather than legal terms. Thus, instead of "robbery," the description used is to "take something from someone by force, weapons, or threats." The form also calls for information on the level of seriousness of the incident, its time and location, the characteristics of the victims and offenders, and to whom (if anyone) the incident was reported. Of the 4,014 schools participating in the Phase I survey, 3,612 (90%) returned 11,525 report sheets; 1,362 of these report sheets indicated no incidents.

The Phase I Principal's Questionnaire is a short (25-question) instrument that seeks information on means of prevention used, and those recommended, by the schools in the sample. It also seeks basic information on the school, such as number of students, teachers, and classrooms. Phase I Questionnaires were returned by 3,910 principals (97%).

Phase II Survey

For Phase II, a nationally representative cluster sample of 851 junior and senior high schools was selected; of these, 642 participated in this phase of the study, giving a 76% response rate. (In both Phases I and II, responses were weighted to take nonresponse into account.) As in Phase I, the sample was drawn from the four types of locations (large city, smaller city, suburban, and rural), and each school in the sample had a randomly assigned reporting month. In contrast to Phase I, the Phase II data collection was conducted on-site by field representatives, rather than by mail.

One purpose of Phase II was to conduct victimization surveys of teachers and students, in which respondents were asked to provide information about their own experiences as victims of personal offenses in school. Another was to gather data from principals, teachers, and students about themselves, the school, and the surrounding community.

In Phase II five instruments were used. A Principal's Report Sheet identical to that used in Phase I was employed. Of the 642 schools participating in Phase II, 582 (91%) returned 2,888 report sheets; 139 of the report sheets indicated no incidents.

The Phase II Principal's Questionnaire is an expanded version of the Phase I Principal's Questionnaire, seeking additional information on school factors that might be expected to contribute to (or reduce) crime and disruption in schools; 623 principals returned these questionnaires (97%).

The Teacher's Questionnaire (TQ) was given to all teachers present in each sample school during the 2 to 3 days when field representatives were gathering data. In all, 23,895 teachers completed these instruments, which were self-administered and anonymous. This represented a 76% response rate. Teachers were asked to provide information on themselves, their schools, their own experiences, if any, as victims of robbery, personal attacks, theft, and rape during the previous month. (Called the "Target Month," this is the same month for which the principal filled out Principals' Report Sheets [PRSS]. Teachers were also asked to provide victimization data for the month before the target month (called the "Pretarget Month"). Except for necessary minor changes, the same behavioral definitions of offenses as on the Principals' Report Sheets were used.

The Student Questionnaire (SQ) is in many ways similar in scope and content to the Teacher's Questionnaire. A random sample of about 50 students in each school provided background information on themselves, their schools, their experiences, if any, as victims of robbery, personal attacks, and personal theft in the previous month (Target Month). The questionnaires were administered to students in groups, each student filling out his or her own. Altogether, 31,373 students returned questionnaires, an 81% response rate. As with the teachers, all student data were anonymous.¹³

Student Interviews (SIs) were held with a randomly selected subsample of approximately 10 of the 50 students in each school who filled out the Questionnaires. The Student Interviews were undertaken after a pilot study showed that victimization questions on the Student Questionnaires yielded extraordinarily high rates. Each interviewed student was asked whether he or she had experienced a given offense in the Target or Pretarget Month; if so, the student was asked to provide detailed information about the incident, very similar to the detailed information requested in the Principals' Report Sheets. As with the Report Sheets, the purposes of obtaining this information were to provide descriptive data about the seriousness of offenses and to help

¹³ Unlike the Teacher Questionnaires, the Student Questionnaires did not include a question about rape, which was considered too sensitive for a national survey of students administered in schools.

ensure that the incident actually occurred when and where the respondent initially said it did. In all, 6,283 students were interviewed, an 83% response rate.

Phase III Studies

A small purposive sample of 10 schools was selected for more intensive, qualitative study. Most of the Phase III schools have had serious problems with crime and violence in the past and have changed dramatically for the better in a short period of time. A few continue to have serious problems. Each Phase III report is a small case study that focuses concretely on the ways in which schools have coped or failed to cope with incidents of crime and disruption and with what consequences.

Estimates and Error Margins

An understanding of the estimates in this report requires a discussion of survey error. While this discussion is fairly technical, it is important to show at the beginning of the report that survey estimates are only approximations of reality rather than "facts" about it.

Two kinds of errors are possible in any estimate based on a sample survey—sampling and nonsampling errors.

Sampling errors occur because data are gathered only from a sample, not the entire population. However, the amount of sampling error can be expressed by the standard error of estimate. The standard error is a measure of the reliability of an estimate made from a sample. If a given survey were repeated many times, so all possible samples of the same size and design were used, the average estimate derived from all these surveys would be the same as the real number in the population, if there were no nonsampling error. The chances are about two out of three that the average estimate from all possible samples would fall within the range of ± 1 standard error of the initial estimate. Thus, if our survey were to yield an estimated 1,000 offenses of a certain kind, and the standard error were 100, we could say that in all possible samples for the same survey, the chances would be about 2 out of 3 that the average estimate would fall between 900 and 1,100.

The range encompassed by ± 1 standard error is called the 67% confidence interval. As the range is increased, it becomes more likely that the average estimate would fall within the expanded range. Thus, the chances are about 9 out of 10 that the average estimate would fall within ± 1.6 standard errors (the 90% confidence interval) and 19 out of 20 that it would fall within

± 2 standard errors (the 95% confidence interval).

For the population estimates of crime in this report, the 95% confidence intervals are provided.

Nonsampling errors in surveys derive from many sources, among them the instruments, such as questionnaires, and the survey methods. These are discussed briefly below. (Other types of nonsampling error and special data quality studies conducted for this survey are discussed in Appendix C.)

(a) The Principal's Report Sheet: One of the strengths of this method is that information is collected when incidents occur, rather than later. If a respondent is asked to look back over a period of time and indicate the number of incidents that took place during the period, memory loss is likely to produce inaccurate results. The further back the incident, the less likely it will be remembered; on the other hand, the longer the recall period, the more difficulty the respondent will have specifying whether past incidents occurred within or outside of a given period. To the extent that they occurred outside the time period, the effect would be to inflate the estimates.

Another advantage of the incident-reporting method is that it calls on the respondents to provide detailed information about the incident, including time and place, thus helping to assure both that the incident actually occurred and that it occurred where and when the respondent says it did.

The reporting method employed here also has limitations. Some principals might have been reluctant to report incidents for fear that their schools would "look bad" when compared with others. Further, in many cases, a principal simply might not have been aware of incidents occurring in the school. This seems especially true of personal offenses in secondary schools, where principals recorded far fewer incidents than teachers and students, and tended to record the more serious ones (Chapter 1). Offenses against school property seem to have been reported more fully both because they are more easily documented and because principals usually have to account for dollar losses incurred by the school.

A special study in Indiana elementary schools provided an opportunity to check incidents reported by principals against those reported by teachers using the same method. The teachers filled out report sheets on offenses experienced by their students at school and on property damage or loss in their classrooms. For comparable offenses, there were no significant differences between the rates derived from the teachers' reports and those of the principals, except for

personal theft (teachers reported more of it). The special study thus gives added confidence to the elementary principals' reports.

Another possible limitation of this method is that it takes time to fill out the sheets, which might have discouraged full reporting. To see whether a shorter reporting period, placing less of a burden on respondents, would increase the number of incidents recorded per unit of time, a special data quality study was conducted in December 1976 and January 1977. A sample of principals was asked to fill out reporting sheets for 1 week only, rather than 1 month. There was no significant difference between the monthly rates derived from the shorter and longer reporting periods. Evidently, decreasing the respondent burden does not significantly affect reporting.

Insofar as we have been able to assess the incident reporting method, it seems that elementary principals' reports are reasonably accurate, that secondary principals' reports are more accurate for offenses against school property than for those against persons, and that differential respondent burden does not seriously affect the results. It is very likely that most of the report sheets represent real incidents that occurred in the month in question. It is also likely that some incidents known to principals were not reported. The Principal Report Sheet estimates should therefore be regarded as conservative.

(b) Teacher's Questionnaire: The chief strength of the Teacher's Questionnaire method is that information was obtained directly from persons who might have been victimized, rather than from secondhand sources. Further, to reduce any reluctance to report incidents that occurred, a pledge of anonymity was provided. Finally, the recall period for the Teacher's Questionnaire is brief--1 or 2 months--and hence memory loss is likely to be minimal. Most other victimization and self-reported offender studies have much longer recall periods.¹⁴

¹⁴For example, the National Crime Survey, conducted annually by the Bureau of the Census for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), has a 6-month recall period; and a self-reported offender survey conducted by Martin Gold at The University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research had a 3-year recall period.

¹⁵Telescoping was a major issue in the development of the National Crime Survey. To guard against this tendency, a method called "bounding" was developed. By this method, the respondent is initially asked to report retrospectively on victimization experiences occurring in a certain period of time. Later, the same respondent is revisited and asked to report incidents occurring since the previous interview. Incidents that appear to be duplicates are then brought to the respondent's attention to see whether they are in fact two separate incidents, one occurring within the more recent period and the other in the previous period. If the two reported incidents turn out to be one, it is placed in the earlier period.

The time and expense required to bound interviews would have been prohibitive for the Safe School Study, and the need to know the respondent's identity for a return interview would have required parental permission in the case of students. Further, it would have made a pledge of anonymity impossible.

On the other hand, a self-administered questionnaire is more liable to misinterpretation than an interview, and the need for economy in posing questions works against collecting the more detailed information that would help verify incidents. In addition, one cannot be sure that the incidents reported by a teacher as taking place at school in a given month actually occurred there and then. A tendency of respondents to report incidents occurring outside the specified time period, called "telescoping," has been noted in other studies. To mitigate this problem, the teachers were asked to provide victimization data not only for a Target Month (e.g., March 1976), but also for the Pretarget Month (February), on the assumption that, given the opportunity to report distant experiences in the earlier month, the respondent would be less likely to telescope them into the Target Month.¹⁵

To assess the magnitude of the time-telescoping problem, another data quality study was conducted in December 1976 and January 1977. A subsample of teachers was interviewed by telephone, and special checks were employed to prevent telescoping. For attacks and serious thefts there were no significant differences between estimates from the special survey and those from the regular one, although estimates for the smaller thefts did differ. (There were too few robberies to test the two methods.) Time-telescoping, then, while still a problem, might not be a major one. On the other hand, we have no way of knowing whether incidents reported as occurring at school actually took place there rather than someplace else. The possibility of such "spatial-telescoping" is, as far as we know, unique to this study, and it is a subject calling for more research.

(c) Student Questionnaire: The same strengths and limitations apply to this method as to the Teacher's Questionnaire. In addition, the students in many cases probably had more difficulty reading and understanding the questions. (One of the reasons for conducting direct inter-

views with the subsample of students was to be reasonably sure that they understood the questions.) Reading ability was undoubtedly a biasing factor but might not have been too serious. In Chapters 3 and 4 we see that the Student Questionnaire data behave in very consistent and predictable ways.

In contrast to the Teacher's Questionnaire, no victimization information was requested from students for a Pretarget Month due to the need for simplicity. Consequently, time-telescoping is likely to be more of a problem than with the Teacher's Questionnaire, and spatial-telescoping may also be a problem.

As noted earlier, the number of offenses reported via the Student Questionnaire in the Pilot Study seemed unusually high. This finding prompted the development of the Student Interview as a more carefully controlled method of data collection.

(d) Student Interviews: The interviews appear to be the best source of victimization data available in the study. They have most of the advantages of the Teacher and Student Questionnaires and few of the disadvantages. The data collection method was fairly well controlled; the recall period was short; a Pretarget Month was used to mitigate the bounding problem; and students were asked to answer a series of detail questions designed to confirm that the incident occurred as initially stated. Still, time and spatial telescoping may have occurred.

To determine whether Student Questionnaire or Student Interview estimates were more accurate, another data quality study was conducted from October through December 1977. Participants in the study were students who responded on both the questionnaires and the interviews. Students who reported different numbers of incidents in the interviews than on the questionnaires were asked to explain the differences and to indicate the actual number of incidents that occurred, if any.

The estimates derived from this postinterview check were not significantly different from those of the Student Interview, except for thefts of less than \$1; but they were significantly different from the Student Questionnaire estimates. The results indicate that, for purposes of estimation, the Student Interviews were better.

Because the sample of interviewed students is too small to permit a multivariate analysis of victimization with these data, victimization responses from the Student Questionnaire are used for this purpose. Comparisons of the two data sets show that while the levels of victimization

derived from the questionnaire are much higher than those from the interviews, the two data sets correspond more closely in terms of variations among students and among schools. For example, both data sets show that students in junior high schools are more likely to be attacked than those in senior high schools and that boys are more likely than girls to be attacked.

It seems, then, that minimum estimates of offenses against school property can be obtained from the Principals' Report Sheets, but that data from these forms on offenses against persons greatly underestimate the extent of the problem, and are useful primarily as indicators of variations across schools. The report sheets also provide valuable information on the detailed characteristics of the incidents recorded.

While the teachers' data quality study indicates that the Teachers' Questionnaires provide reasonably good estimates of attacks and serious thefts, it also shows that minor thefts are overestimated and it provides no check on the robbery estimates. As time-telescoping has been shown to be a problem in other surveys, and spatial-telescoping may be a problem unique to this survey, the safest assumption is that the estimates derived from the teachers data are somewhat high, although we do not know how much.

The Student Questionnaire provides a wealth of information about the experiences of secondary students at school. The data are also useful as indications of differences in victimization among students and schools, but not as the basis for estimates of the extent of victimization.

The Student Interview data are much better for estimates of victimization, and they also provide valuable descriptive information on offenses. Nevertheless, as with the teachers' data, we must assume that some time- and space-telescoping has occurred and that the estimates derived from the Student Interview data are also high.

Some Comments on Procedure

In general, the percentage of respondents reporting any offense of a given type seems to be a more stable and reliable measure than the number of such offenses per 1,000 (students, teachers, schools). Therefore, in presenting estimates, we will rely primarily on the percent of students, teachers, and principals who say that any offense of a certain type occurred, rather than on rates per 1,000. (Rates per 1,000 students are presented in Appendix E.)

The statistics in this report have been weighted to reflect each respondent's chances of

falling into the sample. Thus, if 1 teacher had 1 chance in 50 of being selected, while another had 1 chance in 200, the responses of the second teacher would "weigh" 4 times as much as those of the first in any calculations. In a highly stratified sample such as this, weighting is essential to produce data that reflect real situations, but it creates some awkwardness in discussing results. This occurs because the weighted data are estimates of what the various responses would have been had all principals, teachers, and students been surveyed, rather than statements about what those in the sample actually said. The difficulty in discussing weighted estimates is particularly evident in the case of opinion questions. A literal discussion of the opinion responses would require saying, for example, that "an estimated X% of all students would have said 'The school rules are fair' had they been asked." To avoid such tangled prose, statements of this sort in the report will be reduced to "X% of the students said. . . ."

Sometimes differences between estimates from a sample do not reflect real differences in the population from which the sample is drawn. They occur merely by chance. The probability of such chance differences, however, can be specified. By using tests of statistical significance we can tell, for example, whether a chance difference between two estimates is likely to occur less than 5 times out of 100. If so, we can say that the difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. In this report, the .05 level is the minimum criterion for statistical significance; any difference likely to occur by chance more than 5 times out of 100 is regarded as not statistically significant.

A Perspective on the Findings

The Safe School Study represents the first effort to collect extensive data on crime and misbehavior in schools on a nationwide basis. As such it breaks new ground and provides much valuable information. At the same time it has limitations that should be recognized. Many of these have already been discussed, but two should be emphasized.


First, crime statistics do not have anything like the accuracy of economic statistics. Behaviors are much more difficult to define and count than dollars; record-keeping systems for crimes are much less highly developed than those for money and financial transactions; and people are less willing to provide information about crime than they are about finances. Estimates of the amount of crime vary greatly according to the

sources of information and methods used for data collection. Estimates made from police records, for example, differ greatly from those derived from victimization surveys. In the case of the NIE surveys, estimates of personal offenses from two of the data sets (the Teacher's Questionnaires and the Student Interviews) correspond rather closely; while those from two other sets (the Student Questionnaire and the Principals' Report Sheets) diverge greatly, being in one case much higher and in the other much lower. After careful assessment of the data sources and methods, we have presented what we consider to be the best available estimates, and have noted the limitations of these, as well. Generally the data are better as indicators of differences among groups of individuals and schools than as estimates of the amount of crime. For the reader who is interested in examining the data sets in more detail, extensive computer printouts of school crime estimates are available in Appendix E.


Second, in trying to understand why some schools have more crime than others, it is important not to equate statistical associations with cause and effect. In looking at the statistical relationships among different measures, we can say that certain variables seem to go together--for instance, that high levels of school crime seem to be found in schools that have certain characteristics. However, data collected at a single point in time cannot tell us that one set of factors causes another--in this case, that a school factor such as student composition is the cause of varying levels of crime. One cannot be certain which of two factors that appear together caused the other, or whether both were caused by one or more other factors. Evidence about factors that simply appear together can be considered only suggestive of causes at best, and causal interpretation beyond this is a matter of educated guesswork and plausible inference.

A Brief Roadmap of the Report

Throughout our presentation we will be focusing on the risks of crime, violence, and disruption in schools--assessing how serious they are in different schools (Chapter 1); where in school (and when) the risks are greatest (Chapter 2); who is most at risk of being victimized (Chapter 3); what seem to be some of the school climate concomitants of these risks (Chapter 4); what kinds of factors seem to explain why the risks are greater or less serious in different schools (Chapter 5); the means of prevention currently in use (Chapter 6), and those that students, teachers, and principals recommend for use (Chapter 7) to reduce the risks of crime.







Extent and Patterns of Crime and Misbehavior in Schools

1

How serious a problem is crime, violence, and disruption in American schools? Answering this question is by no means an easy matter, since it depends on what we mean by serious. If a little over 1% of the secondary school students in the country are attacked in a month, is that a serious problem? Some people will argue that any instance of violence is serious, especially in a school. Others will want to know how serious the attacks themselves are—how many result in injuries, how many of the injuries result in medical treatment, and so forth. But even if we have this information, we are still left with the question of whether any given statistic or set of statistics represents a serious problem.

Since there are no objective criteria in terms of which a given level of crime and misbehavior can be measured as serious or not, we must approach the question in other ways. One is to compare the risks of violence in school with those risks in other places. Are students, for example, more at risk in school than elsewhere? Another method is to compare the extent of the problem in schools in different periods of time. Is the problem more serious today than it was in the past, and is it currently getting better or worse? A third way of measuring seriousness is to ask knowledgeable people in schools whether they think there is a problem, and if so, to what extent? Yet a fourth way is to use some arbitrary criterion which seems reasonable, but the "validity" of which is simply a matter of opinion.

In this chapter we will use all of these methods in an effort to characterize the seriousness of crime and disruption in schools. Then we will go on to other questions posed by the Safe School legislation: The frequency and incidence of crime in elementary and secondary schools in urban, suburban, and rural areas; the number of schools affected; the proportions of students (and teachers) affected; the risks of school crime in different regions of the country; and the estimated annual costs of school crime.¹ In addressing these questions we will rely primarily on data from the National Institute of Education (NIE) Safe School Study but we will also employ data from the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES), the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), and other sources.

THE RISKS OF VIOLENCE AT SCHOOL AND ELSEWHERE

Using information from a recent study based on National Crime Survey data from 26 cities, it is possible to assess the risks of violence to urban secondary students in and out of school.² The data show that 36% of all assaults and 40% of all robberies reported by people aged -19 occurred in school.³ This is a sizable portion of all assaults and robberies, but its magnitude is best understood by taking into account the relative amount of time spent in school by students. Most school systems require students to attend school about 180 days a year, a little less than half the year. Leaving aside absenteeism (one of many factors which will tend to make our estimates of the risks at school conservative), let us say that a secondary school student spends about half of his days at school. Of course the student does not spend all of his or her waking hours there. Let us assume that the risks to a student are very low in the morning before school; that he or she is at school from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and is out of school and active from 3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.; and that for most students the risks are very low after 9:00 p.m. By this reasoning we could figure that a student spends about half of his/her active waking hours at school. (Many students are at school after 3 p.m., but then many students are also out and around after 9 p.m.)



If a student attends school half the days of the year, and on the average spends half of his/her waking hours at school, then about 25% of the student's active time is spent at school. Yet during this time at school 36% of the assaults and 40% of the robberies of people aged 12-19 occur. Clearly the risks are greater at school than elsewhere. Moreover, the data and procedures used here probably yield conservative estimates of the relative risks of victimization at school, for a number of reasons: (1) more detailed analysis would probably show that students spend less than 25% of their active hours at school; (2) more important, by age 19 (the oldest category considered) most people have graduated from school, and many in the 16-, 17-, and 18-year-old category have dropped out; and (3) the question posed in the victimization survey asked whether the offense took place inside the school building, not simply at school.

Most of the discrepancy between the risks in and out of school is accounted for by the younger people in the survey, those in the 12-15 age range. For youngsters in this age group reporting victimization, fully 50% of all assaults (48% of the aggravated assaults and 51% of the simple assaults) occurred at school, as did a remarkable 68% of all robberies. For those in the older group, only 26% of the assaults and a mere 6% of the robberies occur at school. For this older age group, the scene of robberies clearly shifts to the streets, where 67% of the total occur. For older adolescents, then, the risk of assault at school is about the same as, or somewhat higher than the risks elsewhere (given the conservative elements in the at-school calculations); and the risks of robbery at school are considerably lower. But for the younger students, the risks at school are dramatically higher than those elsewhere. Even considering that many people aged 16-19 are not in school and hence that the risks of at-school violence for these students are probably higher than they appear, there still is a substantial discrepancy between the in-school/out-of-school risk ratios for younger and older students. The younger adolescent's risk of violence increases greatly when he goes to school, while the older student's risk of assault increases only slightly and his risk of robbery decreases.

This does not mean, of course, that schools are the most dangerous of all places for young adolescents; the comparison is only between schools and other places in general. For 12-15 year olds, the second highest proportion of assaults (19%) and of robberies (17%) occurred on the streets (excluding areas "near home"). We do not know what proportion of their waking hours youngsters in this age range spend on the streets away from home, but it is probably less than 17%-19%. Whether this means that the streets pose greater risks than schools for these youngsters cannot be determined from available data.

For people aged 16-19, the streets clearly present greatest risks of robberies. About the same proportion of assaults (25%) occur in schools, on the streets, and at vacation homes. Again, it is difficult to estimate relative risks at places away from school, because we do not know how much time, on the average, is spent in each place, and because we do not know how many of those assaulted are students. However, the risk of assault seems to be higher in streets than at school, and the risk at vacation places is almost certainly higher.

The tendency for junior high schools to pose relatively high risks of violence, compared to other places, is probably not new, and is probably due in part to the concentration in one place of large numbers of youth who tend, statistically, to commit more violent acts than people in other age categories. Yet it is clear that more than age is involved here.

Something happens to produce a greater increase in the risk of violence at school (relative to risk in the community) for younger teenagers than for older ones. This suggests, for one thing, that there may be something about the schools they attend that affects younger students differently from older ones, and in so doing, increases their risks. Stronger evidence for this contention is found in the multivariate analysis of factors contributing to school violence (Appendix A, Part 1), where we find that school factors seem to weigh more heavily in explaining violence in junior highs than in senior highs.

¹Data on the extent of crime in each of the States are found in the NCES Report in Appendix B. Since the sample of schools in each State was small, the sampling errors associated with the state estimates are relatively large, and the state data should be used only as order-of-magnitude estimates.

²Michael J. Hindelang and M. Joan McDermott, Criminal Victimization in Urban Schools, Criminal Justice Research Center, Albany, N.Y. 1977, Tables 2B, 2C, 2D.

³A special analysis of offender data collected by Martin Gold of the University of Michigan also indicates that 36% of all assault offenders say they attacked someone at school. Gold's data are based on a national, not simply an urban sample.

TIME TRENDS IN SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM

The second approach to the question of seriousness involves comparing different time periods to each other. Is there more violence and vandalism in schools now than in the past? What have been the trends over time? To answer this question we rely on data from a number of different sources, not all of which are consistent with each other. But taken together they give us a rough picture of trends over the last 10 to 20 years.

NEA Teacher Surveys

Survey information about victimization of teachers has been gathered by the National Education Association on a consistent basis over a number of years.⁴ In 1956, 1.6% of responding teachers reported that an "act of physical violence" had been committed against them in school, by a student or students. By 1972, 2.2% of teachers reported similar experiences during the school year. In 1974 and 1976, 3.0% and 2.9% of teachers reported being attacked. Translated into actual numbers of teachers attacked, the 1976 percentage approximates 61,000 teachers in the total public elementary and secondary teaching force of 2.1 million. Comparable figures in 1956 would have been approximately 18,000 teachers attacked out of 1.6 million. (These are rough estimates.) In general, therefore, the risk of a teacher's being attacked has almost doubled since 1956, but it has not changed much since 1974. With regard to property destruction, in 1974, 11.4% of the teachers reported having personal property "maliciously damaged by a student." In 1976, 8.9% reported similar experiences.

These NEA estimates are useful in giving us a "feel" for the increase in school crime and misbehavior. It must be noted, however, that these estimates are restricted to incidents directed against teachers. Even then, relatively little information is available about the nature of the incidents.

⁴"Teacher Opinion Poll on Pupil Behavior," NEA Research Bulletin, April 1956; "Teacher Opinion Poll," Today's Education, January 1973; "Teacher Opinion Poll," Today's Education, September-October 1974; "Teacher Opinion Poll," Today's Education, September-October 1976.

⁵Bernard Greenberg, School Vandalism: A National Dilemma (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1969)

⁶Annual Report of Vandalism in Selected Great Cities and Maryland Counties, compiled by the Center for Planning, Research and Evaluation, Baltimore City Schools for years 1970-71 and 1974. Also responses to a separate survey conducted in March 1975 showed 40% of districts reported an increase in costs of vandalism, 43% remained the same and the rest presumably experienced a decline in the preceding year. See National School Public Relations Association, Violence and Vandalism: Current Trends in School Policies and Programs, 1975.

Vandalism: The Stanford Research Institute and Baltimore Great City Schools Studies

In a 1969 study of vandalism, Bernard Greenberg of the Stanford Research Institute concluded:

"Vandalism has always been a problem in the community and particularly in the schools. But, in recent years, with the increase in racial tensions and violence and student activism throughout the nation, the rate of incidents in the schools has reached alarming proportions."⁵

Greenberg estimated, for example, that the total losses of 120 California school districts due to vandalism rose from \$1.7 million in 1965-66 to \$3.0 million in 1967-68. In addition to the quantitative increases in vandalism, qualitative shifts were noted as well. In particular, more arson occurred, in extreme cases destroying entire schools. Breaking and entering into schools was increasingly done for the purpose of stealing supplies and equipment. Burglary may have become a bigger problem, in part due to the more expensive and sophisticated equipment in newer and larger schools. Schools also were obliged to pay increasing amounts for security measures. (It was at this time that school security forces were beginning to be formally organized.)

The available evidence suggests that vandalism, including burglary and arson as well as more casual property damage, continues to be a serious problem; but it seems to be leveling off. Data collected through 1974 by the Research Division of Baltimore City Schools, for example, show that in 31 large cities for which comparable figures were available in 1971 and 1974, 18 districts experienced increases in the costs of property loss due to crime while 13 either experienced no change or lower costs. Further, an increase in the overall costs from \$10.3 million in 1970 to \$11.1 million in 1974 is more than offset by a 30% rise in the Consumer Price Index in that period. More recent evidence supports the conclusion that property losses are leveling off.⁶

Urban School Crime: The Bernard Watson-Temple University Study

In a study of school crime between 1970 and 1975 in 15 cities selected especially to represent urban situations where problems would presumably be among the most serious, Bernard Watson of Temple University concluded:

"Because of differing classifications and changes in classification of criminal incidents, it is difficult to trace trends within or across cities. Weapons violations, however, appear to be on the increase in most cities with the single exception of Oakland, where they have been decreasing over the years. . . Drug violations (including alcohol abuse) also appear to be generally increasing. Again, Oakland is an exception. . ."

"A rather surprising finding for these cities is that although there are fluctuations in the incidence of vandalism, the overall trend in the six cities for which long-term data are available is down. . ."⁷

Vandalism and Violence in Schools in the 1970's: Report of the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency

As part of a broader investigation of the problems of violence and vandalism in schools, the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, chaired by Senator Birch Bayh, conducted a mail survey of school districts having over 10,000 students in an effort to discern trends in school crime between 1970 and 1973. The survey showed increases of 37% for robberies, 85% for assaults on students, 77% for assaults on teachers, and 12% for burglaries in that period. The retrospective nature of the survey and the handling of nonresponses (counted as zeroes) may have yielded overestimates of the percentage increases in this period.⁸

The Martin Gold-University of Michigan Survey

Gold conducted two carefully controlled surveys of adolescent youth—one in 1967 and one in 1972—to discover what proportion of the responding youngsters had committed certain delinquent offenses in 3-year recall periods. Special tabulations prepared for NIE showed that the proportions of youngsters who reported having committed assaults, threats of injury, thefts, and

acts of property damage at school, as well as those involved in gang fights, declined from 1967 to 1972. However, drug and alcohol use increased in this period. The results of this survey tend to conflict with those of the others, except in the case of drug and alcohol use.

Reviews of these five sets of studies provide valuable trend information. The first (from a series of teacher polls) dealt with teacher victimization and showed a significant increase between 1956 and 1974, but no increase thereafter. It also showed no increase in reported destruction of teachers' property between 1974 and 1976. The second combined a review of school experiences with vandalism in the mid-1960's (Greenberg) with a review of similar experiences in the 1970's (Baltimore studies). The former showed sharply rising costs of vandalism; the latter pointed to a leveling off of any increase. The third study (Watson) looked at school crime in troubled urban areas; Watson reported difficulty in finding discrete trends for most offenses between 1970 and 1975 (a rise in drug use and weapons offenses being an exception). For vandalism, however, Watson's study, like the Baltimore data and the NEA data on property destruction, showed no increase in the early to mid-1970's. The fourth study (the Senate Subcommittee's survey) showed sizable increases in robberies and in assaults on teachers and students, but a lesser increase in burglaries between 1970 and 1973. The Subcommittee's reported rise in teachers' assaults (77%) is higher than that detected by the NEA survey between 1972 and 1974 (from 2.2% to 3.0%, an increase of 36%) but in the same direction. Further, the Subcommittee's finding of a slight increase in burglaries (12%) is not inconsistent with the findings of the Baltimore study, the NEA data on property destruction, and Watson's data. That is, no significant increase in vandalism occurred in the early to mid-70's. (Biases in response patterns and memory loss by respondents could easily account for a 12% shift.)

The fifth study (Gold) showed a decline between 1967 and 1972 in proportions of youngsters reporting having committed various offenses in schools, except for drug and alcohol use. While it might be possible to reconcile the findings of the Gold study with those of the others—given differing time spans and the

⁷ Presented by Dr. Bernard Watson in Oversight Hearing on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, U.S. Government Printing Office. Conclusions on trends were based on data available in about half the 15 cities.

⁸ Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Our Nation's Schools—A Report Card: "A" in School Violence and Vandalism, 1973.

possibility of rapid fluctuations in the level of delinquent offenses—it would nevertheless be difficult. We have no ready explanation for this apparent inconsistency.


Except for the Gold study, then, the data are fairly consistent. They indicate an increase in assaults on teachers from 1956 to 1974, but a leveling off thereafter; an increase in robberies and assaults in the early seventies; and an increase in vandalism in the mid-sixties which leveled off around 1970 or 1971. For the offenses usually summed up in the terms violence and vandalism, the data from these studies do not give evidence that the situation is currently growing worse.

Trends in the NIE Data

Data from the NIE survey lend additional credence to this conclusion. Principals in the survey were asked to indicate how serious a problem vandalism, personal attacks, and theft had been at their schools in each of the last school years, 1971-1976. As can be seen in Figure 1-1,

the proportion of respondents saying the problem was fairly serious or very serious (out of five categories) remains constant at around 8% or 9% for each of the 5 years. When we look at these seriously affected schools broken down by school level and location, a more interesting picture emerges (see Figure 1-2). Suburban and rural schools, which by the sheer weight of numbers dominate the national statistics (four of five schools are in these areas), show little change over the 5 years and little difference between elementary and secondary schools. Among urban schools, there are substantial differences between the elementary and secondary levels and, more interesting, a general trend toward improvement is apparent, with two minor exceptions: large city senior highs (1975-1976) and smaller city elementary schools.

Of course these are only subjective assessments, and retrospective ones at that. Further it can be argued that they have been made by respondents who have an interest in showing that improvement has taken place. Finally, it should be noted that these are national averages which



SOURCE: PQ

FIGURE 1 - 1

PERCENTAGE OF PRINCIPALS
SAYING THEIR SCHOOLS HAD A SERIOUS PROBLEM
WITH VANDALISM, PERSONAL ATTACKS, AND THEFT




FIGURE 1-2

PERCENT OF PRINCIPALS SAYING VANDALISM, PERSONAL ATTACKS, AND THEFT HAVE BEEN FAIRLY SERIOUS OR VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THEIR SCHOOLS, 1971-1976

Source: P Q

do not necessarily reflect the trends over time in any particular district. In some systems the situation may be getting worse; but according to the principals, the cases of improvement outnumber the cases of deterioration. Allowing for all the reservations, it seems safest to say that in terms of the overall trend these assessments, like the other studies cited, indicate that the situation has not changed much in recent years. The apparent improvement in urban areas can be regarded as interesting and suggestive, but hardly conclusive. It can be taken as one of several signs that things may be improving--the other two being Watson's finding that urban vandalism seems to have decreased in six cities between 1971 and 1975 and the finding from the Baltimore data for 31 cities that school property losses from 1971 to 1974 did not keep pace with the cost of living.

All things considered, it can be concluded that the evidence does not indicate the situation is growing worse, and there are a few hints of improvement.

Various explanations can be offered for the increased amount of school violence and vandalism in the middle-to-late sixties and early seventies. In general, these were times of protest and discontent, particularly among young people. The protest against the war in Vietnam, together with black militancy, ghetto riots, and a growing youth movement were all prominent features of the time. Protest and discontent, of course, are not the same as violence and vandalism. The more politically conscious protesters in these movements were generally not violent in their actions, although their rhetoric sometimes was violent. But the deliberate and politically conscious elements of a social movement often reflect less self-conscious discontent among larger numbers of people, discontent which sometimes takes the form of violence and property destruction. This appears to have happened in the ghetto riots in the mid-sixties (although these were attacks on property, not persons)⁹ and may also help to explain the rise in violence and vandalism in schools, particularly to the extent that these were directed against teachers and school property.

Underlying much of the discontent among young people in this period may have been an important demographic change. The trends in school crime and disruption suggest that there may be some relation between these problems and the size of the youth cohort in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. As "baby boom" children became adolescents in the late 1950's and especially the 1960's, the amount of disruption in schools

increased, both in absolute and relative terms. As the crest of the wave passed and the size of the cohort decreased in the 1970's, the amount of disruption leveled off and may be showing modest signs of decline. According to this line of thought, both the greater number of students in the 1960's, and the size of this cohort relative to the rest of the population and to schools, may have been factors in the growth of disruption in schools. The growth of the youth cohort, relative to the general population, seems to have been accompanied by an increasing sense of group consciousness.

We do not know to what extent the growth and decline of the adolescent age cohort has in fact affected the amount of disruption in schools. But to the extent that it has, we would expect the leveling off which began in the early 1970's to turn into a clear decline.

That is a question for the future, however. The question that we began with was, how serious a problem are crime and disruption in American schools? One answer is, considerably more serious than it was 15 years ago, and about the same as it was 5 years ago.

CURRENT SERIOUSNESS AS PERCEIVED AND REPORTED BY PRINCIPALS

The principals' assessments can also be used to characterize the current situation in schools, and data from the Principals' Report Sheets (PRSs) can be used to validate these assessments. (Principals were asked to fill out one sheet for each incident occurring in their schools during a randomly selected 1-month period.) Table 1-1

TABLE 1-1
 PRINCIPALS' ASSESSMENT: HOW SERIOUS A PROBLEM WERE VANDALISM, PERSONAL ATTACKS, AND THEFT IN 1975-76

Percent of principals saying:

No problem	25
A small problem	50
Moderate problem	17
Fairly serious problem	6
Very serious problem	<u>2</u>
	100%

Source: Principals' Questionnaire (PQ I, Question 19; PQ II, Question 26)

n = 4442

⁹David Boesel, "The Ghetto Riots." — 1964-1968. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1972.

summarizes the principals' ratings of how serious a problem vandalism, personal attack, and thefts were in their schools in the latest academic year, 1975-1976. Using these ratings we can say that in three-quarters of the schools in this country, principals rate crime as a small problem or none at all. That reassuring figure needs to be underscored. However, another statistic also requires emphasis—8% of the schools are rated as having a fairly or very serious problem. That 8% figure represents approximately 6,700 of the nation's more than 84,000 public elementary and secondary schools.¹⁰

As might have been expected, the larger communities have the higher proportions of seriously affected schools. The data are presented in Table 1-2. As shown here, 15% of the schools in large cities are faced with vandalism, attacks or thefts to an extent considered serious by school authorities; this compares to 11% of the schools in small cities, 8% of the schools in suburbs, and 6% of the schools in rural areas. According to these assessments, the problem is particularly acute among large city secondary schools: for 1975-76

principals in 18% of the junior high schools and 26% of the senior highs characterized the problem as fairly or very serious (see Figure 1-2).

Two important points are illustrated by these data. First, the great majority of schools (85%-94%) in each type of community are rated as not seriously affected by crime. And second, while urban schools have a higher probability of serious crime problems, most of the seriously affected schools in the nation (68%) are located in suburban and rural areas. Since nearly four out of five of the nation's schools are located in suburban and rural areas and only one out of five in urban areas, the 8% figure for suburban schools with serious problems represents some 2,444 schools; the 6% figure for rural areas represents some 2,110 schools; the combined total for seriously affected large city and small city schools is only 2,159; i.e., only 32% of all seriously affected schools. We are not, then, talking about a necessarily urban problem: school crime, violence, and disruption is a problem that affects large numbers of schools in every type of location.

TABLE 1-2

LEVEL OF SERIOUSNESS BY LOCATION: ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE AND NUMBER OF SCHOOLS*

	Serious**		Nonserious***		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Large cities	15%	899	85%	4,949	100%	5,848
Small cities	11%	1,260	89%	10,238	100%	11,498
Suburban areas	8%	2,444	92%	30,043	100%	32,487
Rural areas	6%	<u>2,110</u>	94%	<u>32,537</u>	100%	<u>34,647</u>
All areas		6,713		77,767		84,480

Source: Principals' Questionnaire

* Percentages and numbers are subject to sampling errors.

** "Serious" here combines the categories "fairly" and "very" serious problems.

*** "Nonserious" combines the categories "no problem," "small problem," and "moderate problem."

¹⁰ These averages from the study sample are subject to sampling error. Given the large size of our sample, the 95% confidence interval around each percentage is narrow. For instance, for the combined fairly and very serious category, $p = 7.9\% \pm .8\%$, which represents for the nation as a whole $6,700 \pm 675$ schools.

As might also have been expected, a higher percentage of secondary schools than elementary schools are rated as having problems with crime (see Table 1-3). Note that 32% of the secondary schools are rated as having a moderate (24%) or serious (8%) problem compared to 21% of the elementary schools. Nearly a third of all elementary schools are rated as having no crime problems; this is almost twice the percentage of secondary schools with no crime problems. When one examines the figures for schools in the combined (fairly or very) serious category, it appears that the same percentage, 8%, of both elementary and secondary schools are placed in this category. Does this mean that for the schools with the most severe problem, we are talking about approximately the same percentage of elementary and secondary schools? Actually this is not so. We shall return to these data shortly.

Seriousness As Measured by Number of Incidents

What evidence is there that the perceptions of these principals are accurate? Strong support for the validity of the principals' ratings is provided by comparing these ratings to the

number of incidents reported for each school on the PRS.¹¹

As shown in Table 1-4 and Figure 1-3, there is a very strong and significant relationship between the mean number of incidents reported and the principals' ratings of seriousness ($r=.996$). Note that the association holds for every category of offenses: Table 1-4 shows that for every type of offense, the mean number of incidents reported per 100 schools increases as principals' assessments of seriousness increase. The relationship holds for the total number of offenses, for all categories of offenses, and for both elementary and secondary schools (Table 1-5).

However, there is one particularly intriguing finding in these data analyzed by school level: evidently elementary and secondary schools have different standards for assessing seriousness. Note that elementary schools rated as seriously affected report on the average only 240 incidents per 100 schools; among secondary schools, 278 incidents per 100 schools is the mean for schools rated as having only a "small" crime problem.

TABLE 1-3

PRINCIPALS' RATINGS OF SERIOUSNESS OF CRIME PROBLEMS IN THEIR SCHOOLS
DURING THE YEAR 1975-76, BY SCHOOL LEVEL
(in percentages)

	<u>No Problem</u>	<u>Small</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Serious*</u>	n
Elementary	32	47	13	8	3057
Secondary	17	50	24	8	1393

Source: Principals' Questionnaire

*"Serious" here combines the categories "fairly" and "very" serious problems.

¹¹The comparisons shown in Table 1-4 and Figure 1-3 are of (1) principals' ratings of the seriousness of the crime problem in their schools for academic year 1975-76 (the school year immediately preceding our survey), and (2) mean number of incidents reported by principals per month for the Spring of 1976 (and not for the full 1975-76 school year). This was necessary because we had no PRS data for the Fall of 1975: our survey had not yet begun in the Fall of 1975, and retrospective data would not have been acceptable for the kinds of information we wanted. (Such retrospective data probably would have been highly inaccurate and lacking in a substantial amount of the detail we needed about each incident.)

PRS data for the Fall of 1976 would apply to the 1976-1977 year and therefore did not seem to be appropriate for comparisons with ratings for 1975-76. To determine whether or not we were reasonable in using only the Spring 1976 data, we correlated the 1975-76 seriousness ratings with the month-by-month mean number of vandalism incidents in the PRS data. The correlation was positive for the Spring months ($r = .4$), negative for the Fall ($r = -.75$). We therefore, felt justified in using only the Spring 1976 data for the comparisons.

Secondary schools rated as having "serious" problems report in an average month as many as 706 incidents per 100 schools. This was not a surprising finding. One's judgment of

"seriousness" is bound to be related to expectations: in elementary schools, where criminal offenses are generally unexpected, almost any significant amount of violence or

TABLE 1-4

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS PER 100 SCHOOLS, BY SERIOUSNESS OF CRIME PROBLEM
(AS REPORTED BY PRINCIPALS FOR A TYPICAL SPRING MONTH, 1976)

Type of Offense*	Seriousness of crime			
	No Problem	Small	Moderate	Fairly and Very Serious
School Property	24	67	120	177
Disruptive/damaging	1	11	24	28
Personal violence	12	29	81	110
Personal theft	8	24	50	82
Victimless offenses	4	6	11	18
Total	49	137	286	415

Sources: Principal's Questionnaire; Principal's Report Sheet

* This categorization and the offenses in each category are discussed later in this chapter.


$$Y \text{ total} = 117.7x + 39.1 \quad r = .996 \quad p < .005$$

TABLE 1-5


MEAN NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED BY 100 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS DURING ONE SPRING MONTH (FEBRUARY-MAY 1976), BY SERIOUSNESS OF CRIME RATING FOR SCHOOL YEAR 1975-76

	Seriousness			
	No Problem	Small	Moderate	Fairly and Very Serious
Elementary	30	92	143	240
Secondary	115	278	454	706

Sources: Principal's Questionnaire; Principal's Report Sheet



MEDIAN COST OF INCIDENTS, BY LEVEL OF SERIOUSNESS REPORTED BY PRINCIPAL



PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS REPORTING DIFFERENT TYPES OF INCIDENTS, BY LEVEL OF SERIOUSNESS AS REPORTED BY PRINCIPAL

SOURCE: PQ and PRS

FIGURE 1 - 3
SERIOUSNESS OF PROBLEM OF VANDALISM,
PERSONAL ATTACK, AND THEFT IN SCHOOLS

unlawful activity is likely to be judged as "serious"; in secondary schools, where a certain amount of this kind of activity is expected, a considerably larger number of incidents are required before the crime problem is rated as serious.

Is there some less subjective measure we might use, that can be applied uniformly across both the elementary and secondary school data to estimate the relative seriousness of the problem across school levels? We can get some idea of the difference between elementary and secondary schools in seriousness of the problem by using the arbitrary criterion that a school must report five or more incidents a month before it is rated as having a serious crime problem. Using this standard, we can see that only 3% of elementary schools fall into this category compared to 20% of secondary schools, and that although less than a third of all schools in the nation are secondary schools, nearly three-quarters of all seriously affected schools are among them (see Figure 1-4).

Figure 1-4 also shows that, by this arbitrary criterion, 8% of the nation's schools are seriously affected by crime (the same proportion as in the principals' assessment) and that locational differences among these seriously affected schools are very similar to those among schools judged as serious by the principals, ranging from 15% in the large cities to 4% in the rural areas.

There is a general pattern, then, that runs through almost all of these data—higher proportions of secondary than elementary schools seriously affected by crime, and increased likelihood of a crime problem with increase in community size.

We have asked how serious a problem crime and disruption are in American schools. We have found that for urban youngsters of secondary school age, especially young adolescents, the risks of violence are greater in school than elsewhere; that violence and vandalism are a more serious problem today than, say, 15 years ago, but about the same as 5 years ago; and that around 8% of all schools—roughly 6,700 of them—are seriously affected by crime, ranging from 15% of those in large cities to 4%–6% of those in rural areas, with secondary schools having more of a problem than elementary schools. At this point we need to fill in the picture with information about the number of offenses occurring in schools, the proportion of schools affected by crime, the cost of crime to schools, and other related matters.

NUMBER OF OFFENSES: TOTAL AND AS REPORTED TO POLICE

If you ask how many offenses occur in American public schools, the first answer must be that it depends on whom you ask and how you ask them.

	0%	10%	20%	30%
SCHOOL LEVEL	EL <u>3%</u> (1843 ± 46)			
	JH _____	19%		(2063 ± 108)
	SH _____	20%		(2989 ± 142)
LOCATION	Large _____	15%		(867 ± 76)
	Small _____	11%		(1298 ± 180)
	Suburban _____	10%		(3328 ± 215)
	Rural <u>4%</u> (1402 ± 108)			
% of all schools 8% (6896 ± 156)				

SOURCE: PRS

FIGURE 1-4
PERCENT OF SCHOOLS AT EACH LEVEL AND LOCATION
REPORTING FIVE OR MORE INCIDENTS IN A MONTH

If you were to ask the police, you would get one answer, indicating a relatively small number of crimes in schools. If you were to ask the principals (as we did), you would get another answer, indicating a larger number of offenses, some reported to the police and some not. If you were to ask students and teachers about their own experiences (which we also did), you would get a third answer, indicating a very much larger number of incidents. And regardless of whom you ask about school crime, the way in which you get the information—roughly, the survey method—is going to affect the responses and the estimates that are derived from those responses. All of this is not to say that no reasonable estimates can be made, but it is to emphasize: (1) that they are estimates from a sample survey, not counts of the population, and as such are subject to both sampling and nonsampling errors; (2) that assessing estimates of this sort is a difficult matter, requiring much attention to the sources and quality of the data; and (3) that the estimates should not be regarded as Scientific Truth but as the best estimates that can be arrived at, given the various strengths and limitations of the sampling procedures and data collection methods. (Some of these are discussed in the Introduction.) The problems involved in trying to make accurate estimates of the amount of crime in the country are familiar to anyone who has dealt extensively with crime statistics. It should be noted, too, that we are on firmer ground when comparing differences in crime rates among schools (e.g. urban, suburban, rural) or among teachers or students than when trying to estimate the level of crime.

With these reservations in mind, let us turn to the estimated number of offenses in schools. These come from the Principals' Report Sheets and are probably conservative.

Figure 1-5 shows the number of offenses at school estimated from the PRS data for a typical month, together with the proportion of the total that were reported to police by the school. Accompanying each estimate in parentheses () is the 95% confidence interval, which can be regarded as the margin of error due to sampling.

According to these estimates, there are some 157,000 illegal acts committed at school in a typical month. It is immediately apparent that going to police records would not give us the full picture: of the 157,000 incidents, only about 51,000, or one-third, were reported to police. Data from NCES, which used a different survey method to obtain information from principals, show an average of about 56,000 police-reported offenses per month. While there are differences

in the estimates for the various categories of crime in each study (the NCES Survey had fewer crime categories with relatively more offenses in each category), these two sources provide a rough estimate of around 50,000 school-related offenses reported to police in a typical month. On a per-school basis, that would be a little more than one offense reported to police by a school every 2 months; two or three other offenses known to the principal would go unreported in the same period.

The data in Figure 1-5 suggest the extent and patterns of underreporting to the police:

- (1) The extent of underreporting varies with the type of offense.
- (2) Four types of offenses against the school are more likely than not to be reported: 7 out of 10 break-ins, 6 out of 10 bomb incidents, and at least half the cases of trespass or theft of school property are reported. For most other offenses against the school, the proportion reported varies from a little more than one out of five to approximately one out of three.
- (3) Most offenses against persons are not reported: police receive reports of approximately 1 out of 3 robberies, 1 out of 4 personal thefts, 1 out of 6 attacks, and only 1 out of 20 fights. Only group conflicts are well reported: nearly 7 out of 10 are reported by school authorities to the police, but the number of such conflicts turned up in the survey was very small, and the estimates derived from the sample are not very reliable.
- (4) So called victimless offenses tend to be more highly reported than most offenses against persons: 55% of the drug incidents and 35% of the cases of alcohol abuse are reported to the police.

The principal, of course, tends to report the more serious incidents to the police, as evidenced by the finding that:

- (1) The costs of offenses against the school which are reported to the police tend to be substantially higher than those not reported (see Table 1-6), from more than two times higher (in mean costs) for break-ins to better than 12 times greater for personal thefts. The only exception is in the case of bomb incidents. Not only were those reported to the police less costly than the others, but among those not reported the median cost is higher than the mean, suggesting that some particularly costly bombings went unreported.




FIGURE 1-5
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF OFFENSES IN A TYPICAL MONTH, BASED ON PRINCIPALS' REPORT SHEETS (95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL IN PARENTHESES)

Source: PRS

(2) Of the various offenses against persons, robberies and fights reported to the police fit the pattern and tend to be more serious than those not reported. As shown in Table 1-7, 9% of the robberies reported to the police involved weapons, compared to only 2% of those not reported; 12% of the fights reported to the police involved weapons, compared to 3% of those not reported; likewise, the robberies and fights reported to the police were more likely to

involve injuries. The one category of offenses against persons that does not show this pattern is physical attacks, where there is no significant difference between the seriousness of reported and unreported incidents.

With the exception of bomb incidents and attacks, then, principals are more likely to report the more serious incidents to the police.

TABLE 1-6
COST (in dollars) OF OFFENSES RECORDED
BY PRINCIPALS

	<u>Total</u>		<u>Reported to Police</u>		<u>Not Reported to Police</u>	
	<u>Mean*</u>	<u>Median**</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Median</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Median</u>
Theft of School Property	150	40	229	90	69	15
Breaking and Entering	183	40	219	70	98	8
Property Destruction	81	20	193	69	39	15
Fire Setting	85	0.39	273	2	31	0.31
Bomb Offenses	16	1	11	1	24	31
Personal Theft	101	14	327	50	26	10
Robbery	6	0.35	13	1	3	0.31

Source: Costs estimated by principals in the PRS.



* The mean is the average cost per incident.

** The median represents the cost figure that half the cases fall below and half above.



TABLE 1-7
PERCENT OF OFFENSES INVOLVING
WEAPONS OR INJURY

	<u>% Involving</u>		<u>% of Those Reported to Police Involving</u>		<u>% of Offenses Not Reported to Police Involving</u>	
	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Injury</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Injury</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Injury</u>
Robberies (165)	4	15	9	29	2	8
Attacks (1,814)	12	45	11	43	9	45
Fights (2,156)	4	26	12	37	3	25

Source: Principals' Report Sheet



PERCENTAGE OF ATTACKS WITH WEAPONS OR INJURY REPORTED TO POLICE BY SCHOOL



PERCENTAGE OF FIGHTS WITH WEAPONS OR INJURY REPORTED TO POLICE BY SCHOOL

SOURCE: PRS

FIGURE 1 - 6
REPORTING OF MORE SERIOUS OFFENSES TO POLICE

Even when we look at only the more serious violent offenses, we still find a substantial amount of underreporting. This can be seen from data on attacks, and fights. Figure 1-6 shows the percentages of the more serious violent offenses—those involving weapons or injury—reported and not reported to the police. These data indicate clearly that most serious attacks and fights went unreported. Five out of six attacks with weapons, attacks with injury, and fights with weapons were not reported by the school. Of the fights with injury, 94%—almost all—were not reported. (A majority of robberies involving injuries or weapons were reported to police, but the small number of serious robberies recorded in the survey makes these estimates unreliable.)

Even if we raise the level of seriousness and include only those offenses involving injury at least serious enough to be treated by a doctor, the picture changes only in emphasis. Of the attacks requiring medical treatment, 70% were not reported to police; of the fights, 90% were not reported.¹² According to these data, the great majority of serious violent offenses at school are not reported to police by the school. We do not know to what extent others report them, but it is still striking that 7 out of 10 burglaries are reported to police while 7 out of 10 attacks requiring medical treatment are not. The fact that principals usually have to account to the central administration for property losses, but not for personal injury, may be a factor in this disparity. Moreover, the situations that lead to personal violence are often very complex. A principal may not be able to assess blame for the incident; the people involved may be friends and willing to let the incident drop; there may be further complications because of adverse parental involvement, and so on. Further, school principals are not unique in the tendency to avoid involving the police. Other studies have shown that people in general are reluctant to call in police unless the offense is serious.

Nevertheless, the nonreporting of violent offenses in schools is a finding that deserves consideration by school districts. The schools and police have traditionally had an arms-length relationship, and much can be said for schools' handling of their problems internally, if they are not too serious. But districts in which violence is a serious problem may find it useful to assess and enforce reporting requirements and, in planning efforts, to rethink the respective roles of the police and the schools, especially with regard to the question of when the police should become involved and when not.

Just as police records would give a very inadequate picture of the extent of school crime and disruption known to the principal, so the principals' records (the PRSS) are very inadequate reflections of certain kinds of offenses occurring in their schools—those directed against people rather than against the school. This is made dramatically clear by a comparison of the number of violent incidents occurring in schools as reported by principals on the one hand, and by students on the other. If all the violent incidents recorded by principals are combined, the estimated number is about 35,000; of these, about 24,000 occur in secondary schools in a typical month. Yet according to data from students who were interviewed, around 525,000 attacks, shakedowns, and robberies occur in public secondary schools in a month, almost 22 times as many as were recorded by principals. It is understandable that the great majority of these incidents never come to the principal's attention: two-thirds of them involve no injury and only 3% require medical treatment. Most of them probably would not be regarded as crimes in our everyday understanding of the term: as offenses worthy of arrest and adjudication. This does not mean that they are irrelevant, for in many ways they are an important part of the texture and fabric of the lives of students in many schools—casual hitting and shoving, threats spoken or implied which force you to hand something over ("Hey kid, loan me a quarter!"), small things taken forcibly in the course of an argument, and the like. Society in general tends to tolerate this sort of behavior more among young people than among adults, and some schools are more tolerant of it than others. What the interviews seem to be picking up here is a great number of relatively minor incidents that are so much a part of every day life in some secondary schools that they are not really noticed and remembered—except by the victims. Yet they have a great deal to do with the overall tone and climate of a school, and it is likely that a school climate characterized by hundreds of minor incidents is also one in which major offenses are more likely to occur.

Part of the discrepancy between the estimates derived from the principals' reports and those from the students' is also probably due to biases in the two sets of data. In addition to not being aware of these incidents, the principal might: (1) regard as too trivial to record an incident which a student would report in an interview; (2) be unable or unwilling to take the time to fill out a report sheet; or (3) be unwilling to record an incident in order to keep his or her school from "looking bad." The effect of all these

¹²There were 228 attacks and 121 fights requiring medical attention. There were, however, only eight reported robberies that required medical attention, and this number is too small to permit generalization.

possible biases would be to produce underestimates of the number of offenses known to the principals.

Turning to the students, on the other hand, we do not know whether an incident reported by a student actually took place when and where the student said it did. If it were reported as happening in the last month and actually took place 3 months ago, or if it were reported as happening at school and actually occurred somewhere else, the effect would be to contribute to an overestimate of the number of violent incidents occurring at school in a month's time.

All things considered, it is clear that PRS data grossly underestimate the number of personal offenses occurring in schools. We will use PRS data to discuss offenses against the school, but in discussing offenses against persons, we will rely on victimization data from the Student Interviews (SIs) and the Teacher Questionnaires (TQs). (This approach was intended in the initial design of the study.)¹³ In the discussions that follow we will focus primarily on the number and proportion of schools, students, and teachers affected by different types of offenses in a typical month. By focusing on schools and people, rather than on incidents, as the primary units of analysis, we can: (1) reduce the amount of potential error in the estimates presented; and (2) discuss school crime and disruption in terms of risks to schools and the people in them.

We have classified all offenses into three broad categories depending on the target of each offense. Therefore, we discuss offenses against the school, offenses against persons (students and teachers), and victimless offenses (drug and alcohol abuse).

OFFENSES AGAINST THE SCHOOL

While this section focuses on the number and proportion of schools affected by crime in a typical month, information on frequency, incidence, and seriousness is also supplied, where relevant, for each type of offense.

The PRS data provide us with information about eight categories of offenses against the school. Four of these are offenses directed at

school property: breaking and entering, trespassing, theft of school property, and willful destruction of school property. Four others are offenses aimed primarily at disrupting the school's routines, but as an incidental side effect these acts may also cause some damage to school property. Included in this category of disruptive/damaging offenses are: setting of fires, false alarms, and bomb incidents (both actual and threatened). We also include here a general category of disruption of school activities.

Figure 1-7 and Table 1-8 indicate the proportion and number of schools affected by these eight different types of offenses in a typical month. (The 95% confidence intervals, indicating the margin of error due to sampling, are represented by the short bars at the end of the longer ones.) The discussion also refers back to the numbers of offenses presented earlier in Figure 1-5. Let us consider that offenses one by one, keeping in mind that these estimates are conservative.

Trespassing


In a typical month's time, one out of every nine schools has at least one case of trespassing. Our estimates suggest that nearly 14,000 cases of trespass occur in more than 9,000 (or nearly 11%) of the nation's more than 84,000 public elementary and secondary schools. For those schools that encounter trespassing, the frequency of this offense is, on the average, nearly 1.6 cases a month, or more than three cases in 2 month's time.

Breaking and Entering

A typical schools' risk of break-ins is considerable: 1 out of every 10 schools is broken into within a month's time. In a typical month, we estimate that more than 11,000 break-ins occur in more than 8,000 (or nearly 10%) of the nation's schools. Breaking and entering seems to occur much more frequently in schools than elsewhere. The estimated annual rate for school break-ins is about five times as high as that for burglaries of commercial establishments, which represent the highest rate category reported by the National Crime Survey.¹⁴ The fact that schools as a rule

¹³Williams, Moles, and Boesel, D. Safe School Study: Concepts and Design, 1974.

¹⁴This comparison derives from the following: According to NIE data, there are an estimated 11,034 cases of breaking and entering in a typical month. Since data were gathered in nine different months, a 9-month rate can be calculated ($11,034 \times 9 = 99,306$). If we assume that break-ins occur at the same rate during the three summer months, the annual estimate would be 132,408. This divided by 84,834 = 1.56, or 156 break-ins per 100 schools. National Crime Survey data for 1975 (the latest published to date) show an annual rate for retail stores of 32 per 100. $156 \div 32 = 4.87$.



SOURCE: PRS

FIGURE 1 - 7
 PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS EXPERIENCING ONE OR MORE
 OF THE LISTED OFFENSES IN A TYPICAL MONTH

TABLE 1-8
 NUMBER OF SCHOOLS EXPERIENCING ONE OR MORE
 OF THE LISTED OFFENSES IN
 A TYPICAL MONTH

<u>Offenses Against School:</u>	Estimated Number of Schools (out of 84,834)	95% Confidence Interval (2 Standard Errors)
<u>School Property Offenses</u>		
Trespassing	9,210	+ 1,252
Breaking and entering	8,067	- 1,308
Theft of school property	10,352	+ 1,484
Property destruction	24,155	- 2,184
<u>Disruptive/Damaging Offenses</u>		
Fire setting	1,738	+ 416
False alarms	2,159	+ 614
Bomb offenses	926	+ 500
Disruptive behavior	2,918	- 536

Source: Principals' Report Sheet

are relatively unprotected and are thoroughly familiar to many people may help explain their high burglary risks. Nor are the costs of these incidents trivial: the average cost of a school burglary is about \$183. (For costs see Table 1-6.)

More than 90% of all schools will have no break-ins in this time period. But those schools that are burglarized are likely to have, on the average, 1.4 break-ins a month, nearly three in 2 month's time. For some of these schools, the incidence rates are higher; for others, lower. In Chapter 5 we will consider some factors that seem to account for the differences in property losses among schools.

Theft of School Property

School thefts affect an even greater number of schools than either break-ins or trespassing. Our data suggest that in a typical month more than 13,000 thefts of school equipment, supplies, and other school property take place in more than 10,000 schools, i.e., more than 12% of the nation's schools. The risk, then, is that one out of every eight schools will have something stolen in a month's time. Nearly 88% of all schools are likely to experience no school thefts at all in this period. However, the 10,000 or so schools that do encounter thefts will have, on the average, 1.3 incidents per month. Moreover, the average cost of a school theft is substantial—around \$150.

Property Destruction (Vandalism)

Incidents of vandalism are more frequent and more widespread than nearly all other offenses against the school combined. They occur more than three times as often as cases of trespass or school theft, and nearly four times as often as break-ins. An estimated 42,000 cases of property destruction occur in school in a typical month, affecting more than 28%, i.e., more than 24,000, of the nation's schools. A typical school's chances of being vandalized in a month are greater than one in four, and the average cost of an act of school vandalism is \$81. (By way of contrast, false alarms, fires, and bomb offenses affect fewer than one school out of 40 within the same period and involve median smaller costs.) While nearly three out of four schools do not experience vandalism in a month's time, those that do are likely to have, on the average, 1.75 incidents a month, seven incidents over a 4-month period.

The disruptive/damaging offenses against schools, to which we now turn, have substantially lower incidence rates than the property offenses considered above.

Fire Setting

According to our estimate, more than 2,000 fires are set in schools in a typical month. Only 2% of the schools in the nation (around 1,700 schools) appear to experience this problem. The risk to a typical school is 1 chance out of 49 in a month's time. Those relatively few schools that have an arson problem appear to have, on the average, slightly more than one fire a month. Most of these fires, however, appear to be of little consequence. While the average (mean) cost of the fires reported in the PRS data was \$85 the median cost was only 39¢—that is, half of the fires did less than 39¢ worth of damage. These figures indicate that the cost of most fires in school is trivial; many of them are probably wastebasket and trash fires intended to disrupt the school routine rather than to destroy property. This is not to say that enormously expensive cases of arson do not occur; but they are sufficiently rare that none was encountered in this survey. The most expensive case involved \$7,000 worth of damage.

False Alarms


False alarms are more frequent than fires, affecting a slightly larger number of schools. Nearly 3,000 false alarms are set in schools in a typical month in approximately 2,200, i.e., around 2.5%, of the schools. False alarms are a problem, then, for only 1 out of every 40 schools. This figure represents a very small minority of schools. The 2,200 or so schools that have this as a problem experience an average of 1.3 false alarms a month, or four false alarms over a 3-month period.

Bomb Offenses

Of all offenses against the school, bomb incidents (threatened or actual) are the least frequent. An estimated 1,100 or so of these incidents occur in a typical month in fewer than 1,000 schools, a little more than 1% of all schools. Only 1 out of every 100 schools, then, experiences any bomb incidents in this period. On the average, slightly more than one incident a month occurs in those relatively few schools that report any bomb incidents. Most bomb offenses are threats rather than actual bombings; half of the bomb offenses resulted in less than a dollar's worth of damage. The intent of most of these incidents, then, would seem to be, as in the case of arson, to disrupt the school routine rather than to cause damage or injury.

Disruptive Behavior

More than 5,000 incidents of such behavior are estimated to occur in schools in a typical



SOURCE: PRS

FIGURE 1 - 8

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS EXPERIENCING ONE OR MORE OF THE LISTED OFFENSES IN A TYPICAL MONTH, BY SCHOOL LEVEL

month, with nearly 3,000 (3.4%) of the schools in the Nation reporting such incidents. This is a catchall category. Though the term is widely used, perceptions of what is disruptive may, and probably do, differ by region, type of community, level of schooling, and in many other ways. The data should be regarded as principals' perceptions of student behavior which they find very troublesome. If these estimates are accurate,

then, on the average, 1.6 of these incidents occur per month in the 3,000 or so schools affected by this kind of behavior, more than three such incidents over a 2-month period.

INCIDENCE RATES BY LEVEL, LOCATION, AND REGION

In discussing the various offenses against the





FIGURE 1 - 9

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS EXPERIENCING ONE OR MORE OF THE LISTED OFFENSES IN A TYPICAL MONTH, BY LOCATION

school, we noted what the risks are for schools in general—1 out of 4 that a school will be vandalized in a given month, 1 out of 10 that it will be broken into, 1 out of 8 that something will be stolen from the school, 1 out of 100 that it will have a bomb incident, and so on.

Clearly, some schools are more at risk than others. In part, this is likely to reflect

differences in school-related factors. But also, we would expect to find differences among groups of schools, varying by school level and location, following the same patterns noted earlier for the distribution of schools seriously affected crime, violence, and disruption. In fact, when we examine the data on individual categories of offenses, we find that the pattern holds, but with some significant modification. As shown in Figure



SOURCE: PRS

FIGURE 1 - 9

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS EXPERIENCING ONE OR MORE OF THE LISTED OFFENSES IN A TYPICAL MONTH, BY LOCATION
(continued)

1-8, the expected differences can be seen between elementary and secondary schools: in all cases except bomb offenses, significantly higher proportions of secondary than of elementary schools experience offenses against the school in the span of a month.¹⁵ (Because of the small number of bomb offenses reported, differences would have to be relatively large to be detected.) However, the differences by school location are not as great as might have been expected (see Figure 1-9).¹⁶

For property offenses, the risks are probably greater for schools in large cities, but the differences by location are not great. The risk of break-ins or theft of school property is not significantly greater ($p < .05$) in cities than in suburbs, although for breaking and entering the difference between large cities and suburbs approaches significance. The fact that breaking and entering, trespassing, and theft of school property all show higher mean (%) risks in the large cities suggests that there may be a locational pattern here. Further support for this pattern can be seen in the rates per 100 schools for these offenses (see Appendix E): there we see a definite tendency for the rates to be higher in the large cities.

For disruptive/damaging acts and vandalism the pattern is somewhat different. These aggressive acts against the school appear to affect schools almost equally across a wider range of locations. There are no significant differences by location in the percentage of schools likely to be affected by vandalism or bomb offenses; only in the case of fires and false alarms do we find any significant differences—in this case, lower risks in rural areas.

The NCES data provide additional confirmation that school property loss is not necessarily a large city or even an urban phenomenon. NCES provided estimates of total and per-pupil costs for repairing and/or replacing school property lost as a result of crime; separate estimates were provided for cities, suburbs, and rural areas¹⁷ (see NCES Report, Appendix B). These data show that suburban schools account for 57% of the total national costs (despite the fact that suburban schools represent only 38% of all schools) and that the per-pupil cost is greater in suburbs than in other areas, even urban areas.

¹⁵ For table of significant differences, see Table B-1.1.

¹⁶ For table of significant differences, see Table B-1.2.

¹⁷ NCES uses the phrases "Metropolitan, Central" (what we are referring to as "urban"), "Metropolitan, Other" (what we are calling "suburbs"), and "Nonmetropolitan" (our "rural areas").

¹⁸ Table of significant differences for regional differences is provided in Table B-1.3.

The point need not be elaborated further. In all the data on offenses against the school, the differences across locations tend to be relatively slight. This suggests as one possibility that such acts may be more a function of school characteristics than of community size. Indeed we find in the multivariate analysis (Appendix A) that school factors seem to weigh more heavily.

In requesting information about school crime incidence rates, the Safe School legislation referred to "all regions of the country." Therefore we have examined these data by region to see if the risks are significantly greater in some regions than in others. The data are examined separately for each of the four main regions defined by the Bureau of the Census—Northeast, North Central, South, and West (Figure 1-10).


The Principals' Report Sheets (PRS) data show a distinct regional pattern for the school property offenses. Schools in the Northeast and West generally are more at risk than those in the North Central and Southern regions.¹⁸ The one clear exception to this pattern is breaking and entering in the South, where schools are as much at risk as in the West.


While a school in the Northeast or West has about one chance in three of experiencing some vandalism in a month, a school in the North Central or Southern region has about one chance in four or five. A school's chances of having something stolen in a month are about 1 in 7 in the Northeast and West; in the North Central and Southern regions risk is about 1 in 10.

For the disruptive/damaging offenses the numbers of incidents recorded are often small, and the regional differences in several cases are not significant. But the tendency, if any, is for schools in the Northeast to have a greater risk of false alarms, fires, bomb threats, and disruptive behavior than schools in the other regions.

COSTS

The Safe School legislation requested information about the costs of replacing or repairing school property lost or damaged as a result of crime in the schools. Estimates in the literature generally run from \$50 million to \$600





SOURCE: PRS

FIGURE 1 - 10
 PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS EXPERIENCING
 AT LEAST ONE OF THE LISTED OFFENSES
 IN A TYPICAL MONTH, BY REGION




FIGURE 1 - 10

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS EXPERIENCING
 AT LEAST ONE OF THE LISTED OFFENSES
 IN A TYPICAL MONTH, BY REGION
 (continued)

million, most of them clustering in the \$100 million-\$200 million range. The higher figures include not only repair and replacement costs but also the costs of employing security guards and other preventive measures against school crime, violence, and disruption. Those security costs may amount to as much as half the total of each estimate.¹⁹

NCES specifically gathered data on repair and replacement costs.²⁰ The NIE survey, while not specifically designed to address this question, gathered additional information on the costs of each property-related incident in the Principals' Report Sheets, and we can use some of these data to arrive at estimates to compare to the NCES figures.

The NCES data provide estimates of the cost of replacing or repairing supplies (including books), equipment, and the school's physical plant lost or damaged as a result of unlawful activity over the 5-month study period (September 1974-January 1975). They estimate a total cost of nearly \$90 million in that period (see Appendix B, NCES Report). Of that total, approximately 66% went to repair/replacement costs for the physical plant, 24% for equipment, and 9% for supplies, including books. The average per-pupil cost comes to \$2.05.

If we assume that the costs are likely to be approximately equal throughout the year, then we can extrapolate the 5-month \$90 million figure over a full year to give us an estimate of approximately \$216 million a year. If we assume further that most of the significantly higher estimates in the literature include security costs which make up half or more of the total, then the NCES data can be considered reasonably consistent with these other estimates.

Additional information about costs is provided by the NIE survey. According to these data, the cost of offenses against schools in a typical month is about \$7.8 million. On an annual basis, making the same assumptions as above, we arrive at a figure of around \$94 million.

It appears, then, that the NIE cost data suggest estimates that are somewhat less than half the figure estimated by NCES. We cannot be certain why this is so, but there are a number of possible explanations. One is that NCES cost data did not come from the sample schools themselves; rather district-wide costs were used as a basis for generating estimates. This approach may have made it more difficult to distinguish costs due to crime from those due to other causes, thereby artificially inflating the estimates of school crime costs. The incident-by-incident approach used by NIE does not have this disadvantage. On the other hand, the NCES district-level approach provided coverage of a much larger number of schools than the NIE survey and therefore was better suited to "picking up" rare but costly events, especially major cases of arson. Other studies, such as the Baltimore vandalism survey cited earlier, list arson as a primary factor in school crime costs.

As noted before, the NIE survey did not uncover any major cases of arson, the largest costing around \$7,000. The NCES survey, on the other hand, turned up several cases of major arson, running into the hundreds of thousands and even millions of dollars. Dollar figures of this magnitude in a sample, when weighted to reflect the whole population of schools, can have a great impact on the final estimate, and it seems likely that these large fires account for much or most of the discrepancy between the NIE and NCES figures. Hence it seems reasonable to accept the NCES figures as more reliable, if perhaps a little high, and to conclude that the annual cost of school crime is somewhere around \$200 million.

OFFENSES AGAINST PERSONS

Victimization of Students

The Student Interviews (SIs) and Student Questionnaires (SQs) asked secondary school students about their experiences, if any as victims of personal theft, attack, or robbery. As discussed earlier, the SI data are more reliable as a basis for estimating incidence levels, but the estimates are probably somewhat high.²¹

¹⁹ Robert J. Rubel, The Unruly School: Disorders, Disruptions, and Crimes (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1977), p. 77. Educational Research Service, "Losses Due to Vandalism, Arson, and Theft in Public School Systems, 1972-73," ERS Research Memo, July 1974.

²⁰ The NCES data are based on information supplied by the approximately 4,200 school districts in which their approximately 8,000 or so sample schools were located. For details about the NCES sample and procedures, see Appendix B.

²¹ As discussed in the Introduction, the SI data come from a sample of approximately 10 students in each of 642 secondary schools participating in the Phase II survey--6,283 students in all. The interviews asked about their experiences in the preceding 2 months. For estimation purposes, only the data from the more recent month are used.


Based on the SIs, estimates of the percentage of secondary school students victimized in a typical month are provided in Figure 1-11. We turn now to the data on each of these offenses.

Personal Theft

Based on the SI data, we estimate that more than 11% of secondary school students have something worth more than \$1 stolen from them in a month's time. (Thefts under \$1 are excluded as trivial.) This represents some 2,400,000 students.²² Personal theft is very widespread: in

78% of the Phase II schools surveyed, at least 1 out of 10 students interviewed in each school reported having had something stolen in a month's time.


How serious were these personal thefts in terms of losses incurred? We have two different sets of data on this question: one from the SIs, the other from the PRS (see Figure 1-12). According to interviewed students, four-fifths of these thefts involved losses of money or possessions worth between \$1 and \$10; the other fifth involved thefts of items valued at \$10 or more. Principals, however, present a different



SOURCE: SI

FIGURE 1 - 11

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS VICTIMIZED IN A TYPICAL MONTH



SOURCES: SI and PQ

FIGURE 1 - 12

COST OF SECONDARY SCHOOL THEFTS, AS REPORTED BY STUDENTS, PRINCIPALS (PERCENT OF THEFTS)

²²The more precise figures are 11.3% ± 1.2%, or 2,400,000 ± 273,000 students.

picture, for they tend to record only the more serious losses: the PRS data from secondary school principals suggest that almost two-thirds of these thefts (rather than only the one-fifth reported by students) involved losses greater than \$10. The average dollar loss for personal theft recorded by principals was quite high—\$101, and the median figure for the PRS thefts indicates that half of the cases recorded involved losses greater than \$14. The students are clearly reporting a larger number of relatively minor incidents: the theft (or loss or disappearance) of small amounts of money, books, notebooks, sweaters, gym shoes, and other things commonly kept in lockers, or carried to class.


Physical Attacks

An estimated 1.3% of secondary school students are attacked at school in a month, a proportion representing more than 280,000 students.²³ Data on the seriousness of these attacks are presented in Figure 1-13. According to interviewed students, more than two-fifths of the attacks (42%) involved some injury to the students. The presence of some injury may be used as a basic criterion of seriousness. While an

attack that results in no injury may be frightening or disconcerting to a student, in most cases such an incident would not ordinarily be regarded as a crime. The proportion of attacks resulting in some injury is substantial, but in most of these attacks—38% out of the 42%—the injuries were minor. Only 4% of all attacks involved injuries serious enough to require medical treatment. Again, as noted in our discussion of personal thefts, principals' reports present a somewhat skewed picture of the seriousness of personal attacks. The data show a tendency for principals to report more serious incidents, though it is less marked here than in the case of personal thefts. Higher proportions of the incidents they report involve injuries (53%, compared to 42% of the attacks reported by students), but the difference between the two data sets is most marked in the proportions of attacks requiring medical treatment, as reported by the two sources. The proportion reported by principals (12%) is three times as high as that reported by students (4%).

Robbery

An estimated one-half of 1% of all secondary school students have something taken from them by force, weapons, or threats in a



SOURCES: SI and PQ

*Since these are reports of secondary school principals only, the injury figures are not the same as in Table 1-7, which includes reports from both elementary and secondary principals.

FIGURE 1 - 13
SERIOUSNESS OF SECONDARY SCHOOL ATTACKS,
AS REPORTED BY STUDENTS, PRINCIPALS
(PERCENT OF ATTACKS)


²³The more precise figures are 1.3% ± .4%, or 281,649 ± 76,045 students.

typical month, representing more than 112,000 students altogether.²⁴ Seventy-six percent of the robberies involved losses of less than \$1. Figure 1-14 illustrates that most of them involved no injury to the victim (89%); 9% involved minor injury; only 2% entailed injuries serious enough to require a doctor's attention. Once again a tendency exists for principals to record the more serious incidents. While 11% of the student-reported robberies involved injury, twice as large a proportion of those reported by principals (23%) involved injuries. The median cost of robberies as recorded by the principals was still only 35¢.

While not minimizing the seriousness of these events, it is clear that most of them are not robberies in the usual sense of the term. They are not stickups or muggings for the most part, but instances of petty extortion—shakedowns—which for some student victims become an almost routine part of the schoolday. For such students the situation is often more like paying tribute to minor territorial chieftains than like being robbed at gunpoint in the streets.

STUDENT VICTIMIZATION BY LEVEL AND LOCATION

Analysis of the SI victimization data by school level is shown in Figure 1-15. As illustrated, a student's risk of being attacked or robbed in junior highs is significantly greater than in senior highs. The proportion of junior high school students reporting attacks (2%) was about twice as great as that of senior high students (1%): therefore, a typical junior high student has around 1 chance in 50 of being attacked at school in a month's time, a senior high student around 1 in 100. The proportion of students robbed in junior high schools is larger than that in senior high schools: 1% compared to .3%, a statistically significant difference. By these estimates, a junior high student stands around 1 chance in 100 of having something taken from him by force or threat of force in a month; a senior high student less than 1 in 300. For personal theft, the risk is about the same in junior and senior highs: in both, a typical student has about one chance in nine of



SOURCES: SQ and PQ

*Since these are reports of secondary school principals only, the injury figures are not the same as in Table 1-7, which includes reports from both elementary and secondary principals.

FIGURE 1 - 14
SERIOUSNESS OF SECONDARY SCHOOL ROBBERIES,
AS REPORTED BY STUDENTS, PRINCIPALS
(PERCENT OF ROBBERIES)

²⁴The more precise figures are .6% ± .2%, or 112,236 ± 50,721 students. Given the relatively small number of incidents reported in the SI data (n=99), the sampling error here is very large: the chances are 95 out of 100 that the average estimate from all possible samples would fall between 61,505 and 162,967.


having something worth more than \$1 stolen from him or her in a month.²⁵

But is the risk of the more serious forms of these offenses greater in senior highs? To answer this question, we considered not only the SI data but the SQ data as well, since the larger sample size of the SQ made it more likely that school-level differences among the very small proportion of seriously injured students would be detected. Using both sets of data to compare the risks of the more and less serious forms of personal theft, attacks, and robbery in junior and senior high schools, we found that the patterns were very similar in the SQ and SI data indicating higher risks in junior high schools. However, the differences between junior and senior highs for the more serious offenses are statistically significant only in the SQ data. (See Appendix B-1.5.) Given the small number of serious thefts, attacks, and robberies reported in the interviews, the lack of statistical significance is not surprising. The similarity in pattern of both data sets, though, strongly suggests that for all offense categories except theft, the mean percentages of victimized students are greater in junior highs regardless of seriousness. Only for thefts involving losses of more than \$10 are the risks greater in senior highs, and even then the

differential is not large. The observed difference may be due to senior high school students bringing more valuable things to school.

The number of students interviewed was too small to enable us to detect significant differences by location. However, some differences by location are suggested by the SQ data, from a much larger sample. These data show significant differences across locations for robberies and serious attacks, but not for thefts or other attacks. Where significant differences do exist, urban areas, especially large cities, stand apart from other locations as having the highest proportions of victimized students.²⁶

Further confirmation of these differences by location is evident in the PRS data on violent offenses per 1,000 students (Appendix E). In these data, the incidence of personal violence in schools is directly related to community size, and the pattern is strong and consistent. Even in cases where relatively few schools report any aggressive personal offenses (robbery, group conflict, and weapons possession), the differences are statistically significant at the .05 level. There would seem, then, to be a greater likelihood of violence against students in urban areas than elsewhere.



SOURCE: SQ

FIGURE 1 - 15

PERCENTAGE OF SECONDARY STUDENTS VICTIMIZED IN A TYPICAL MONTH, BY SCHOOL LEVEL

²⁵For table of significant differences, see Table B-1.4.

²⁶See Appendix E, SQ percentages of students victimized.

MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION OF STUDENTS


Students who are victimized once at school are much more likely than others to be victimized again. (Appendix B, Table B-1.10.) Being attacked once in a 2-month period increases a student's chances of also being robbed about five times; likewise, being robbed at school increases the risk of also being attacked five times. Some youngsters, of course, tend to get picked on, regardless of where they attend school. But part of this multiple victimization is also probably explained by differences among schools: schools with higher levels of violence are more likely to have students who are victimized repeatedly. The worst situation must be that of a particularly vulnerable youngster in a particularly violent school.

Students' Fear and Avoidance

A problem that is more widespread among students than victimization at school is the fear and avoidance of places which it engenders. A serious violent act at school, like that of a stone

thrown into a pond, has a ripple effect. From the point of impact the effect ripples outward, gradually diminishing with distance and time. To be sure, schools are not ponds and education does not take place in perfect calm; at its best education requires vigorous interaction among teachers and students. But it also requires a civil order, which, like the surface of the pond, is disrupted by a serious violent act. Included in these ripple effects are fear and avoidance of places at school, and, more broadly, a reduction in the ability of teachers to teach and students to learn. In some schools the occurrence of violence is not occasional, but almost continual, and the outward reverberations from many violent acts impinge on each other, creating a general turbulence in which little or no education takes place and in which students and teachers look to themselves for protection.

We asked students to indicate, on a list of places at school, whether they stayed away from various locations because someone might hurt or bother them there. (Admittedly, interpretation of the question is made difficult by the phrase "or




SOURCE: SQ


FIGURE 1 - 16

PERCENT OF STUDENTS AVOIDING THREE OR MORE PLACES AT SCHOOL, BY LEVEL AND LOCATION

Percent of Students Afraid of Being Hurt or Bothered at School Most of the Time, by Level and Location



Percent of Students Staying at Home Out of Fear, in a Typical Month, by Level and Location



SOURCE: SQ

FIGURE 1 - 17
MEASURES OF STUDENT FEAR

bother," which was intended to measure such things as harassment by other students, but which could also refer to many other sources of worry. Nevertheless the main emphasis of the question is on avoidance and harm.) As Figure 1-16 illustrates, 16% of all students said they avoided three or more places for these reasons. (Restrooms were mentioned most frequently: 22% of the students said they avoided one or more.)

The figure also shows that junior high students are much more likely than senior high students to avoid three or more places and that urban students are more likely to do so than are students in other locations.

We also asked students how often they were afraid of being hurt or bothered at school. One-fifth of the students said that they were afraid at school at least sometimes. Three percent said that they were afraid most of the time; for these students, as Figure 1-17 illustrates, differences across locations are slight for all secondary schools, but are greater for junior high schools. Seven percent of the junior high students in large cities are afraid most of the time, 4% in suburban and rural junior highs. More marked than the differences across locations, however, are those between junior and senior high schools. Five percent of the junior high students, as compared to 2% of those in senior high, reported being afraid most of the time they are at school.

Four percent of the students reported staying at home in the last month because someone might hurt or bother them at school (see Figure 1-17). The tendency for big cities to have the highest proportion is once again evident, and differences among other locations are slight, as are differences between school levels.

Even the small percentages of students reporting such fear and avoidance represent large numbers of students in the population. The 3% of the students saying they are afraid at school most of the time represent better than half a million secondary school youngsters ($574,709 \pm 61,742$).

There is a strong and clear relation between these measures of fear and avoidance on the one hand and student victimization on the other, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. Students who are victimized are more likely than others to express

fear, to stay away from places at school, and to avoid school altogether. What is true of individuals in this case is also true of schools: at both levels and in all locations there is a significant positive correlation between school violence on the one hand and student fear and avoidance on the other (Appendix B, Table B-1.6). Understandably, violent schools also tend to be schools where students are afraid.

VICTIMIZATION OF TEACHERS

Like the students, secondary school teachers were asked about their experiences, if any, as victims of personal theft, attack, or robbery in the month prior to their participation in our survey.²⁷ In general, the percentages of teachers reporting personal theft, attacks, or robbery also resemble those of the students, as can be seen from Figure 1-18.

Personal Theft

A teacher's risk of being victimized by theft appears to be about the same as a student's: 12% of the teachers reported having something worth more than \$1 stolen from them in a typical month. This represents some 128,000 secondary school teachers. A typical teacher's chance of having something stolen in a month is about one in eight.²⁸ More than one-fifth of these thefts involved losses of more than \$10 (see Figure 1-19).


Physical Attacks on Teachers

An estimated one-half of 1% of the teachers are physically attacked at school in a month's time. Although this proportion is small, it represents some 5,200 of the nation's 1 million secondary school teachers.²⁹ According to these data, a teacher's risk of attack at school is less than half that of a student—1 chance out of 200 as compared to 1 out of 80. However, attacks on teachers are much more likely to result in serious injury. While only 4% of the attacks on students required treatment by a doctor, 19% of the attacks on teachers required medical treatment. A teacher's chances of getting seriously hurt, if attacked, are almost five times as great as a student's (see Figure 1-19).

²⁷The TQ data come from the responses of 23,895 teachers in a sample of 642 secondary schools. The estimates derive from teachers reporting their experiences for the month before the survey was conducted at their schools. Eight different school months were randomly assigned to the 642 participating schools.

²⁸The more precise figures for personal thefts are $12.1\% \pm .9\%$, or $128,000 \pm 10,000$ secondary school teachers.


²⁹The more precise figures for attacks are $.5\% \pm .1\%$, or $5,200 \pm 1,274$ secondary school teachers.




SOURCE: TQ

FIGURE 1 - 18


PERCENTAGE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS VICTIMIZED IN A TYPICAL MONTH



19a Theft of teacher's property, by dollar loss (percent of thefts greater than \$1)



19b Percent of physical attacks of teachers treated by doctors



19c Robberies of teachers by dollar loss (percent of robberies)

SOURCE: TQ

FIGURE 1 - 19

THEFTS, ATTACKS, AND ROBBERIES OF TEACHERS



CONTINUED

1 OF 5

Robberies

As with students, a little more than half of 1% of all secondary teachers are estimated to have had something taken by force, weapons, or threats at school in a month, representing some 6,000 teachers in the Nation. A teacher's chances of being robbed at school in a month are around 1 in 170.³⁰ Approximately one-quarter of the robberies reported by teachers involved losses of more than \$10 (see Figure 1-19).

Rape

The estimate of the proportion of teachers raped in a month is very low and is presumed to be very unreliable, both because small numbers of responses in a sample yield unreliable estimates, and because rape victims may be very reluctant to report the experience. Based on our data, it is estimated that 4/100ths of 1% of the female teachers are raped at school in a month's time. This represents around 400 teachers, but the sampling error alone is so large that the real number could be anywhere between 0 and 800, making the unlikely assumption that there are no other sources of error than sampling. About all that can be said is that based on these estimates, the risk to teachers of being raped at school is very small.

Multiple Victimization of Teachers

Like their student counterparts, teachers who are victimized in one way are also much more likely to be victimized in other ways (see Table B-1.9). For example, a teacher who is attacked once in 2 months is more than twice as likely to have something stolen as a teacher who is not attacked (63% as compared to 24%), and 16 times as likely to be robbed (13% as compared to .8%). These figures deserve some emphasis since they suggest that while teachers in general are not in much danger of being attacked or robbed at school, the risk of further victimization faced by teachers who have been victimized once increases tremendously. While teachers in general have about 1 chance in 125 (.8%) of being robbed in a 2-month period, the risks faced by those also attacked in the same period rise to 1 in 8 (13%), a 12-fold increase in risks. We may recall that the risk for a student, being victimized once in a similar period increases the risk of further victimization about five times. The reasons for this discrepancy in risk increase between teachers and students is not immediately apparent.

³⁰The more precise figures for robbery are $.6\% \pm .1\%$, or 6,000 \pm 1,500 secondary school teachers.

³¹Given the large sampling errors associated with the rape estimates, these figures should be regarded only as representing orders of magnitude.

³²For table of significant differences, see Table B-1.7.

³³The more precise figures for attacks are $.8\% \pm .2\%$ in junior highs compared to $.4\% \pm .1\%$ in senior highs.

More striking than the increased risks of attack and robbery are those associated with rape. As noted earlier, 4/100ths of 1% of the nation's female secondary teachers are raped in a month. In 2 months, the rate is about 8/100ths of 1%—still less than 1/10 of a percent. Yet, speaking in terms of probabilities, if a female teacher is attacked once in a 2-month period, the chances of also being raped in that period shoot up from less than 1 in 1,000 to almost 1 in 10 (9.5%), more than a 100-fold increase in risk. If the teacher has been robbed in that period, the risks are somewhat higher—almost 1 in 8 (11.8%): being robbed at school increases the risks of being raped almost 150 times.³¹

Again, we do not know how much of the increased risk for once-victimized teachers is a function of individual characteristics and how much a function of school characteristics. Some teachers may be attacked repeatedly because of the way they treat students, or because they seem personally vulnerable, or for some other reason related to the teacher as an individual. Others may be victimized repeatedly because they teach in schools in which the level of violence is high. Teachers for whom both of these are factors, e.g., personally vulnerable teachers in violent schools, are no doubt often in serious trouble.

INCIDENCE PATTERNS BY LEVEL AND LOCATION

Analysis of the TQ victimization data by school level are shown in Figure 1-20. As shown here, a teacher's risk of being attacked at school is twice as great in a junior high as in a senior high³² (.8% as compared to .4% of teachers reported attacks at these two levels).³³ For robberies, the differences between school levels are significant only in large cities, where junior high school teachers are more vulnerable than those in senior highs. For personal thefts, the pattern is even less pronounced. The mean percentages of teachers victimized by theft are slightly higher in junior high schools, but the differences between the two are not statistically significant.

It is sometimes argued that while a teacher's risk of being attacked is in general greater in

junior than senior high schools, the risk of encountering serious offenses is greater in senior highs. Our data lend some support to this contention in cases of robbery and theft but not attacks. (See Appendix B, Table B-1.7.) The risks of robbery and theft in general are the same in junior and senior highs, but the chances of encountering robberies or thefts which result in losses of more than \$10 are significantly greater in senior high schools. Further, a teacher's risk of being attacked in junior high school is about twice as great as in senior high; but the chances of being hurt badly enough to require a doctor's treatment are about the same at both levels. There is, then, a tendency for the risks of more serious offenses against teachers to be greater in senior high schools but the tendency is not very great.


The familiar pattern of incidence rates increasing with community size is repeated in the data on teacher victimization (Figure 1-21).³⁴ Urban areas showed the highest percentages of thefts, though there was no significant difference between large cities and small cities (Appendix B-1.8).³⁵ The rates were lower in suburban areas and lower still in rural areas. The proportions of teachers reporting attacks decline markedly as we move from large cities to smaller cities to suburbs to rural areas. A typical teacher in an urban high school stands 1 chance in 55 of being attacked

within a month's time, while a teacher in a rural senior high school has 1 chance in 500. For robberies, large cities once again show the highest percentages and the rural areas the lowest. The typical teacher in an urban junior high school has 1 chance in 77 of being robbed while his or her counterpart in a rural junior high has only 1 chance in 500.

The data for teachers, then, resemble the data for students in showing greater risks in urban areas and in junior high schools. Of course there are also great differences among schools in a given type of location, and a teacher's risk will depend on the particular school in which he or she teaches. Teachers in some urban junior high schools, for example, will have much lower risks than those in others. There are likely to be some school factors at work here, a point we shall return to in Chapter 5.

Teachers' Encounters with Student Hostility

The data on teacher victimization reveal only part of the problem experienced by teachers: our data suggest that teaching in secondary schools, especially in urban areas, is often made difficult and unpleasant by hostile encounters with students.






SOURCE: TQ

FIGURE 1 - 20

PERCENTAGE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS VICTIMIZED IN A TYPICAL MONTH, BY GRADE LEVEL

³⁴For table of significant differences, see Table B-1.8.

³⁵For table of significant differences, see Table B-1.8.



SOURCE: TQ


FIGURE 1 - 21
 PERCENTAGE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS
 VICTIMIZED IN A TYPICAL MONTH, BY LOCATION

In addition to asking questions about teachers' experiences of attack, robbery, and personal theft, the TQ included questions about forms of student hostility that teachers might have experienced: having students swear or make obscene gestures at them or being threatened with harm. To judge from the data presented in Figure 1-22, being sworn at by students, at least occasionally, comes with the job of teaching in secondary schools. Almost half of the teachers surveyed said that students had sworn at them or made obscene gestures in the last month, among them two-thirds of those in large cities and two-fifths in rural areas. Of course, we do not know the circumstances under which the remarks or gestures were made. Many cases may have involved disputes between teachers and students, with the students, feeling unfairly treated, retaliating in one of the few ways available to them. In some cases the teachers may have insulted the students. Other instances may have entailed casual, offhand, or humorous remarks

never intended seriously. Still the percentages here are rather striking, and they seem to say a good deal about the day-to-day problems of teaching in secondary schools.

More serious are threats against teachers (Figure 1-23). Asked whether any students threatened to hurt them in the last month, 12% of the teachers reported that this had happened to them at least once or twice.


In both the data on instances of swearing or making obscene gestures and the data on threats against teachers, we find that junior high schools show higher proportions of such hostile encounters than senior highs, and the percentage of teachers affected increases with community size: relatively smaller numbers of teachers experienced these forms of hostility in rural areas; substantially larger percentages




SOURCE: TQ

FIGURE 1 - 22
 PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS SAYING STUDENT(S)
 SWORE AT OR MADE OBSCENE GESTURES AT THEM
 IN THE LAST MONTH

Percent of Teachers Saying Students Threatened to Hurt Them in the Last Month



Percent of Teachers Saying They Hesitated to Confront Misbehaving Students for Fear of Their Own Safety in the Last Month



Legend:

- - - All Secondary Schools
 | % At Each Location

SOURCE: TQ

FIGURE 1 - 23
MEASURES OF TROUBLE FOR TEACHERS

encountered abuse in large cities. The differences between school levels are relatively large in urban areas and small or negligible in suburban or rural areas. The problems are most serious in urban junior highs where, for instance, over a typical span of a month or so, better than one-third of the teachers (36%) reported being threatened with harm.

Some insight into the effect of these hostile encounters is provided by data on a related question in the TQ about teacher responses to student misbehavior. The teachers were asked how many times in the last months they hesitated to confront misbehaving students for fear of their own safety: 12% of the teachers indicated that this had happened at least once or twice (see Figure 1-23). The percentage is the same as for teachers who reported having been threatened with harm, although they are not necessarily the same teachers.

Clearly, many teachers who have been threatened fear for their safety and this affects their interactions with their students. One can imagine how much more of an effect victimization experiences can have on teachers in relating to students. The combined effect of hostile encounters and victimization must be serious indeed for teachers unfortunate enough to be the targets of student aggression.

A higher percentage of teachers in urban areas hesitate to confront misbehaving students than elsewhere. However, there are no significant differences between junior and senior highs here: senior high school teachers are just as likely as those in junior highs to hesitate in confronting misbehaving students. Given the higher incidence of verbal abuse and threats in junior high schools, why are there not more junior high school teachers avoiding confrontations? Available data do not provide answers to the question, but a reasonable guess would be that the greater age and size of the senior high school students increases the likelihood of hesitation on the teachers' part. As shown in Chapter 4, insults and threats against teachers are associated with substantially increased risks of victimization. Both are symptomatic of hostility and conflict which are not limited simply to verbal exchanges.

In seriously affected schools, they are likely to be part of a general turbulence in which violent acts are common. As with student fear and avoidance, the association between violence, threats, and insults is characteristic of schools as well of individuals. Schools in which insults and threats are common are also schools in which violence is common. (See Table B-1.6.)

It appears, then, that the incidence of teacher victimization and encounters with student hostility tends to follow very much the same pattern as student victimization: for both students and teachers, personal theft seems, on the whole, to be equally risky in junior and senior highs and in all locations; violent offenses, on the other hand, are far more likely in junior highs than in senior highs, especially in urban areas. Moreover it seems that extensive personal violence in a school is likely to be just one part of a negatively charged social environment in which many things go wrong.


VICTIMLESS OFFENSES

Drug and alcohol use among teenagers increased dramatically in the late sixties and by the early seventies had become commonplace among older adolescents. In 1972, around 75% of all senior high school students had consumed some alcohol and around 40% had tried marijuana. Among junior high students, approximately 50% had tried alcohol, while 16% had tried marijuana. In addition, smaller proportions of students had tried inhalants (e.g., glue), hallucinogens (e.g., LSD), stimulants, depressants, and opiates (e.g., heroin).³⁶

We do not have good estimates of the actual use of drugs or alcohol at school. Principals' reports, whether in the NIE or NCES Surveys, almost certainly understate the amount of usage among students. Further, since these are victimless offenses, the victimization approach would not work, and a survey of self-reported offenders was deemed impractical in public school settings. Hence, we have relied on the opinions of students about the availability of alcohol and drugs at school to give us some idea of the patterns in different types of schools.

³⁶ See Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective, Second Report of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse. U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1973. These figures represent a synthesis of some 200 surveys completed until 1972. The findings might still be regarded by some as conservative. A 1976 survey showed 53% of high school seniors had tried marijuana. See Lloyd Johnston and Jerald Bechman, Monitoring the Future: Continuing Study of Life Styles and Values of Youth, University of Michigan. In the Gold Study the reported use of marijuana and other drugs increased ninefold between 1967 and 1972. The spectacular percentage increase is due in large part to the almost negligible proportion of youth reporting such behavior in 1967. See Gold, "Changing Patterns of Delinquent Behavior," *op. cit.*

Beer or Wine



Marijuana




FIGURE 1 - 24

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS SAYING
 IT'S VERY EASY OR FAIRLY EASY
 TO OBTAIN THESE SUBSTANCES AT SCHOOL

Secondary students in the Safe School Study report that beer or wine and marijuana are widely available in their schools. Almost half of the students (47%) said that marijuana was fairly easy or very easy to get at school, and 37% said the same of alcohol. (Figure 1-24.) Senior high students are about twice as likely as those in junior high to report ready availability of these substances at school, but differences across locations are minor. While students in rural schools are somewhat less likely to report the availability of marijuana (40%), it seems clear that, according to student perceptions, the availability of these substances at school is not particularly an urban problem, or even a metropolitan one; it substantially affects schools in all areas.

Student reports of the availability of heroin, on the other hand, indicate that it is much harder to get at school than marijuana or alcohol, as would be expected, that availability is about the same in junior and senior high schools, and that schools in smaller communities have less of a problem with it than those in large ones.

However, the difference between the reports of large city students (14%) and those of rural students (8%) is small, given what we know about major cities as centers of heroin distribution.

The slightness of this difference underscores that we are dealing here with student's judgments rather than more objective data, and that the responses are no doubt affected by their perceptions, opinions, and circle of contacts: what is considered easy for one student to obtain may be considered hard for another. Still, these reports are suggestive of the extent, school level, and location of the problem.

NCES data (Appendix B) further emphasize that drug and alcohol use are not particularly an urban problem. Indeed, suburban schools show higher rates than urban ones. The NIE data from principals (Appendix E) agree that alcohol use is as widespread in the suburbs as in the cities, though they do show higher drug rates for cities. The NIE principals' data, like the students', also show senior high schools having higher rates of drug and alcohol use than junior highs.




FIGURE 1 - 24
 PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS SAYING
 IT'S VERY EASY OR FAIRLY EASY
 TO OBTAIN THESE SUBSTANCES AT SCHOOL
 (continued)

All the relevant sources examined agree that drugs and alcohol are more prevalent among senior high than among junior high youth. With one minor exception, the Safe School Study data (both NIE and NCES) indicate that alcohol and drugs in school are not specifically urban problems—they are prevalent throughout metropolitan areas and are found in rural areas as well.

SUMMARY

We have focused in this chapter on the incidence and seriousness of school crime, violence, and disruption. We have used several approaches in an effort to determine the overall seriousness of the problem: comparing risks in school to those out of school; comparing the extent of crime at present with its extent in the past; considering principals' assessments of the problem in their own schools; and applying a reasonable but arbitrary objective measure of seriousness. We have also considered numbers of offenses; numbers and proportions of schools, teachers, and students affected; extent of injury and loss caused by various offenses; and annual costs of school crime. In presenting these data, we have indicated where the risks of crime are highest by education level, location, and region.

Our most salient findings can be summarized as follows:

- Risks of assault and robbery to urban youngsters aged 12-19 are greater in school than out. Most of this disparity is accounted for by 12- to 15-year-olds, whose risks at school are much higher than elsewhere.
 - Crime in schools is a more serious problem today than 15 years ago, and about as serious as 5 years ago. Increases in the sixties and early seventies have leveled off, and there are some hints of a decline.
 - 8% of the schools in the nation, about 6,700 of them, are seriously affected by crime, violence, and disruption.
 - Higher proportions of secondary than of elementary schools have a serious problem with crime.
 - The percentage of schools seriously affected increases with community size, from 4%—6% in rural areas to 15% in large cities.
 - While the likelihood of a school's having a serious crime problem is greater in urban areas, the majority of schools with serious crime problems are found in suburban and rural areas. Only 32% of the seriously affected schools are located in urban areas.
- At a minimum, 157,000 cases of crime and disruption occur in American public schools in a typical month.
 - 50,000 offenses a month are reported to police by schools.
 - Two-thirds of the assaults requiring medical treatment are not reported to police by schools.
 - Our best estimates of incidence rates for each category of offenses in a typical month are:

Trespassing: 9,000 incidents affecting 1 out of 9 schools.

Breaking and Entering: 11,000 incidents affecting 1 out of 10 schools. A school's risk of burglary is five times as high as a store's; the average cost of a school burglary is \$183.

Theft of School Property: 13,000 incidents affecting 1 out of 8 schools; the average cost is \$150.

Property Destruction (Vandalism): 42,000 incidents affecting 1 out of 4 schools, clearly the most frequent of all offenses committed against schools; average cost, \$81.

Fire Setting: 2,000 fires, affecting 1 out of every 49 schools, mostly trivial trash and wastebasket fires.

False Alarms: 3,000 cases, affecting 1 out of every 40 schools.

Bomb Offenses: 1,100 incidents, affecting 1 out of 100 schools.

Disruptive Behavior: 5,000 incidents, affecting 1 out of 30 schools.

Personal Theft: the most widespread of offenses against persons, affecting 1 out of 9 secondary school students (2,400,000 a month) and 1 out of 8 secondary school teachers (128,000 a month); in 78% of the Phase II schools, at least 1 out of the 10 students interviewed in each school reported something stolen in a month. Most thefts are minor.

Attacks: they affect 1 out of 75 secondary school students (280,000 students a month) and 1 out of 200 secondary school teachers (5,200 teachers a month). For students, most attacks are not serious, 4% requiring a doctor's attention; for teachers, they are more serious, 19% requiring a doctor's treatment.

Robberies: they affect 1 out of every 200 secondary school students (112,000 students a month) and 1 out of 170 secondary school teachers (6,000 teachers a month). The amounts of money involved are usually small; injury is rare. Many robberies are probably instances of petty extortion.

- Students and teachers who are victimized in one way are also much more likely to be victimized in other ways.


Lesser but more pervasive symptoms of hostility and disorder abound. According to our estimates:


- About 3 million secondary school students (16%) avoid at least three places at school because they are afraid.
- About half a million secondary students (3%) are afraid at school most of the time.
- Approximately 125,000 secondary teachers (12%) are threatened with physical harm in a month; about the same number hesitate to confront misbehaving students for fear of harm.
- Verbal abuse of teachers is commonplace in secondary schools; half the teachers reported this happening to them in a month.
- Offenses against the school are significantly more of a problem in secondary than in elementary schools. Property offenses

appear to be more of a problem in urban areas, but the differences across locations are not pronounced.

- Vandalism, disruptive/damaging offenses, and alcohol and drug use affect schools almost equally throughout metropolitan areas, and affect rural schools only a little less.
- Considering the distribution of offenses in different areas and different types of schools, we find that the risks of school offenses are higher in the Northeast and Western States than in the North Central and Southern States.
- Personal theft seems to be equally distributed across school levels and locations.
- Personal violence is distinctly different, posing the highest risks in junior high schools, especially in urban areas.
- The annual cost of replacing and repairing school property lost or damaged as a result of school crime is around \$200 million. Suburban schools seem to account for a disproportionately large share of the total.

Are school crime and disruption serious enough to warrant policymakers' attention? We think so. Despite hints that the trend in school crime may be turning downward, the problem at present is as serious as it has ever been, and the statistics cited above are sufficiently compelling to make it clear that the educational policymakers should not take a wait-and-see position. Further, while the risks of particular offenses are higher in some locations and regions than in others, school crime is not specifically an urban problem or a Northeastern problem; it is nationwide in scope.





Time and Place of Offenses at Schools

Common sense tells us that crime is not randomly distributed across time and place. We hear of "high crime areas" where the risks of being victimized are disproportionately great, and "high crime hours" when police patrols are beefed up in an effort to reduce the expected high risks. By analyzing where and when the risks are greatest, police departments have tried to increase the efficiency of their efforts to prevent crime and apprehend offenders.

Since school crime tends to have much in common with that in the surrounding community, it seemed reasonable to look for the same kinds of risk patterns in the data on school crime, violence, and disruption. (The sources of data used in this chapter are presented in Table B-2.1, Appendix B.)¹

The search proved well worth the effort. Several significant patterns were uncovered and are described in this chapter. Three broad categories of offenses are discussed—offenses against the school (both property offenses and disruptive/damaging ones), violent offenses against persons, and theft of personal property. For each offense, the timing of incidents is discussed: time of day, day of the week, and (later in the chapter) time of the year. In cases of personal violence and personal theft, we note the places at school where these offenses were committed, and take special note of those places where the risks are highest. Finally, cyclical patterns of incidence over the school year are discussed. The findings are summarized and some of their possible policy implications explored. The focus throughout the discussion is on risks—when and where the risks for particular types of offenses are greatest—and on the types of policy options that should be considered to reduce those risks.

OFFENSES AGAINST THE SCHOOL: TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In thinking about offenses against the school, it seemed useful to categorize them into

¹Data on offenses against the school came from the Principals' Report Sheets; data on offenses against persons came from the Principals' Report Sheets, Student Interviews, Student Questionnaires, and Teachers' Questionnaires.

two broad groupings. (We previously introduced this category scheme in Chapter 1.) One set of behaviors involves acts directed against school property, whether rooted in feelings of aggression, or desire for gain, or both. Included here are break-ins, thefts of school property, trespassing, and deliberate property destruction (vandalism). A second set of behaviors, which we have called "disruptive/damaging" acts, is directed primarily against the school's routine and may also involve property damage as a secondary effect. These offenses include the setting of fires, false fire alarms, bomb threats, and some actual bombings.

It seemed reasonable to expect that offenses against school property, such as break-ins and vandalism, would occur most often in the absence of witnesses. Therefore, we expected to find most of these offenses committed on weekends, before or after school, and during vacation periods. It seemed even more evident that acts directed against school routines (disruptive/damaging acts) would require the presence of an audience and therefore should be expected to occur most often during the schoolday.

Analysis of incidents reported by principals shows precisely the expected pattern (see Figure 2-1). Only 2% of all reported break-ins and only 26%-28% of all other school property offenses




occurred during the regular schoolday; the remaining 98% of the break-ins and 72%-74% of all other school property offenses occurred when witnesses were least likely to be present--on weekends, before or after school, and during vacations. The pattern for disruptive/damaging acts was also as anticipated: unlike the property offenses, most of them (62%-73%) occurred during the schoolday.

If school authorities are to plan preventive measures efficiently, they will need to know more than the simple distribution of incidents over different broad time periods. More useful is an understanding of the differential timing of risks for these two categories of offenses. Understanding the risks per unit time is especially helpful for planning the allocation of preventive measures whose costs are time-related, as in the employment of watchmen or other security personnel. Throughout our discussion of risks and the differential allocation of preventive measures, it should be kept in mind that this technical planning approach may not be adequate to the needs of schools unless it is part of a more comprehensive school governance policy which emphasizes administrative leadership and student commitment to the school. This subject is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

In order to ascertain risks, a number of calculations were made based on the data presented in Figure 2-1. Since the term "nonschool hours" is frequently used, it should be clarified. "Nonschool hours", as used here, include only two time periods: (1) weekends, and (2) weekday periods when school is not in session (before or after school). Vacations are excluded from our discussion. The exclusion seemed warranted since relatively small numbers of offenses were committed during these times.

To illustrate how the risks were calculated, let us consider the data on break-ins. As shown in Figure 2-1, only 2% of the break-ins occurred during school hours, while 93% took place during nonschool hours (other than vacations); we can say, then, that 46 times as many break-ins occurred during nonschool hours. To determine what these figures mean in terms of relative risks during the two time periods, the percentage of break-ins likely to occur per hour in each period is calculated; the relation between the rates in the two periods is expressed as a ratio.² Using this procedure, we determined that the risk (per hour) for break-ins during nonschool hours was 10 times greater than during school hours.³ (The small



*Percentage figures may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding.

SOURCE: PRS

FIGURE 2-1

FOUR TYPES OF OFFENSES BY TIME OF OCCURRENCE
(PERCENT OF EACH OCCURRING AT VARIOUS TIMES)*

² Our calculations assumed that there are approximately 30 school hours per week (approximately 6 hours per day for 5 days) and 138 hours per week of nonschool hours.

³ With 2% of the break-ins in a 30-hour period, we calculated that 0.067% of the break-ins occurred per hour during school hours. With 93% of the break-ins taking place over a 138-hour period, it was calculated that there are 0.67% of the break-ins per hour during nonschool hours. The relative risk ratio for non-school: school hours, then, is 0.67:0.067, or 10:1.

TABLE 2-1

RELATIVE RISKS FOR VARIOUS OFFENSES AGAINST THE SCHOOL,
BY TIME PERIODS

Offense	School Hours (S) vs. Nonschool Hours (NS)				Nonschool Hours: Weekend (WE) vs. Weekdays (WD)			
	% During School Hours	% During Nonschool Hours	Ratio NS:S	Relative Risks S:NS	% Weekend	% Weekday Nonschool Hours	Ratio WE:WD	Relative Risks WE:WD
<u>School Property Offenses</u>								
Break-ins	2	93	46.5:1	0.1:1	51	42	1.2:1	2.3:1
School Theft	26	69	2.7:1	1.7:1	38	31	1.2:1	2.3:1
Trespassing	27	70	2.6:1	1.8:1	44	26	1.7:1	3.7:1
Property Destruction	28	69	2.5:1	1.9:1	38	31	1.2:1	2.3:1
<u>Disruptive/Damaging Acts</u>								
Bomb Incidents	73	27	2.7:1	12:1	1	26	26:1	13.8:1
Fires	69	30	1.3:1	10.5:1	13	17	1.3:1	0.7:1
False Alarms	62	36	1.7:1	8:1	12	24	2:1	1.1:1

Source: Principals' Report Sheets

number of school-hour break-ins may have involved such things as forceful entry into supply and equipment rooms, into seldom used annexes, etc.)

It seems obvious that security resources for preventing break-ins should be allocated to nonschool hours. But which nonschool hours? Again, referring to the information in Figure 2-1, 51% of the break-ins occurred on weekends and 42% during the week in the periods before and after school. What are the relative risks for the weekend compared to the weekday nonschool hours? There are only 1.2 times as many breaking and entering incidents on the weekend; however, taking time into account,⁴ the risk (per hour) of a break-in over the weekend is more than 2½ times the risk in nonschool hours during the week.⁵ Hence, in schools which reflect the national pattern, maximum efficiency can be achieved by giving weekends a higher priority than weekdays when it comes to the deployment of measures designed to prevent burglaries. This is especially the case where personnel costs are involved, since wage and salary expenditures are proportional to the amount of time worked.

Comparable calculations for all other offenses against the school (as well as for break-ins) are summarized in Table 2-1. The left half of the table is useful for understanding the relative

⁴In this case, the figures we are using are 48 hours per weekend and 90 hours during the week before and after school.

⁵With 51% of the break-ins occurring over the 48-hour weekend period, 1.06% of the break-ins occurred per hour over the weekend. With 42% of the break-ins occurring over the 90-hour weekday nonschool-hour period, 0.47% of the break-ins occurred per hour during this period. The relative risk ratio for weekends relative to weekday nonschool hours, then, is 1.06:0.47, or 2.25:1.

risks for school and nonschool hours, the right half for understanding the relative risks for weekend and weekday nonschool hours.

Let us examine the left side first (school vs. nonschool hours). Note the risk ratios for break-ins and for disruptive/damaging offenses. As expected: (1) for break-ins, the nonschool period is considerably more risky than school hours (the risk is 10 times as high); (2) for disruptive/damaging acts, the risks are higher during school hours (12 times higher for bomb offenses, 10.5 times higher for fires, 8 times higher for false alarms).

More surprising are the risk ratios for school property offenses other than break-ins (school theft, trespassing, and vandalism). While 2½ times as many of these offenses are committed during nonschool hours as when school is in session, the risks during school hours turn out to be higher because of the shorter time period during school hours: the risk of school thefts is 1.7 times greater (per hour); the risk of trespass, 1.8 times greater; the risk of vandalism, 1.9 times greater.

The presentation on the right side of Table 2-1 underscores the higher risk to school property

on weekends relative to the weekday periods before and after school. The weekend risks are more than twice as high for break-ins and all other school property offenses. The weekend risk is also higher for fires, while false alarms present roughly equal risks in the two time periods. Only for bomb incidents are weekday nonschool hours riskier than weekends, and here the risk is considerably higher (13.8 times greater).

For schools which reflect the national pattern (an important qualification), several sorts of inferences might be drawn from this set of risk profiles:

1. Weekends should be given first priority in the allocation of security measures to prevent burglaries (some of these are discussed in Chapter 6). Weekday nonschool hours should be given second priority.
2. To reduce disruptive/damaging acts (fires, false alarms, bomb offenses), first priority should be given to efforts during regular school hours, second priority to weekday nonschool hours.
3. The timing of school property offenses other than break-ins (trespassing, theft, vandalism) is somewhat harder to deal with. On the one hand, the most efficient per-hour allocation of manpower to reduce these offenses would be during regular school hours. On the other hand, 2/3 of the offenses occur during nonschool hours when the risks are greatest on weekends. This suggests a strategy which would combine measures to reduce break-ins and other

property offenses during nonschool hours, giving first priority to weekends and second priority to weekday periods before and after school.

Let us consider further the idea of a risk profile and its possible utility. School systems wanting most efficiently to allocate security resources (whether personnel or equipment) would want to know when and where the risks of various offenses are greatest. The analysis discussed above can give us a general idea of the risks associated with different times, but the picture provided is not equally valid for all schools. For example, when the time-of-incidence data were analyzed separately by school level (elementary/junior high/senior high) and community type (large city/small city/suburban/rural), some interesting differences were detected. Table 2-2 shows that for all schools combined, 51% of break-ins occurred on weekends; however, junior high schools have a disproportionately high share of their break-ins on weekends (59%) and high schools have a disproportionately low share (43%); smaller cities and suburbs have a disproportionately high share of school break-ins on weekends (69% and 64% respectively), and rural areas have a disproportionately low share (32%). In senior high schools and in rural areas, apparently, an unusually high proportion of the break-ins occurred during the week in nonschool hours. Clearly, then, the risk profile varies for each set of schools. The analysis of national-level data, even when broken down by location and school level is not suitable for local planning; it can only show broad patterns and illustrate an analytic approach that school systems may find useful.

TABLE 2-2
PROPORTION (%) OF BREAK-INS THAT OCCURRED OVER THE WEEKEND

Level	Metropolitan				
	Large Cities	Smaller Cities	Suburban	Rural Areas	All Areas
Elementary	59	69	67	29	51
Junior High School	53	72	60	50	59
Senior High School	46	58	58	29	43
All Levels	57	69	64	32	51

Source: Principals' Report Sheets


As a second illustration of this kind of variability, data on vandalism, trespass, and theft of school property were broken down by school level and location. For all schools taken together, only 27% of these offenses occurred during the regular schoolday. However, as shown in Table 2-3, secondary schools (especially senior highs)

experienced a much higher proportion of property offenses during school hours than did elementary schools, and larger communities experienced a higher proportion than smaller communities. In general the higher the level of the school and the larger the community, the greater the need for precautions against school property offenses

TABLE 2-3
 PROPORTION (%) OF OFFENSES AGAINST INSTALLATION
 (VANDALISM, TRESPASS, SCHOOL PROPERTY THEFT)
 THAT OCCURRED DURING REGULAR SCHOOL HOURS

Level	Metropolitan				
	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban	Rural Areas	All Areas
Elementary	22	10	10	11	12
Junior High School	50	40	42	31	40
Senior High School	65	59	50	37	49
All Levels	37	27	29	22	27

Source: Principals' Report Sheets



SOURCE: PRS : 33 weeks

FIGURE 2-2
 OFFENSES AGAINST SCHOOL PROPERTY AND AGAINST
 PERSONS, BY DAY OF THE SCHOOL WEEK

during the regular schoolday.

Again, then, we have found risk profiles varying for different sets of schools. If planning of preventive strategies is to be based on this approach, it may be advisable to have risk profiles for each school in a given district. The development of such profiles might use the kinds of incident analysis procedures we have been illustrating.

There is one additional body of information that can be uncovered through another kind of incident analysis. Some particularly interesting findings appeared when we analyzed rates for these various offenses by days of the week. Figure 2-2 shows the percentage of incidents in each offense category committed on each day of the school week. Note that both break-ins and other school property offenses peak on Mondays. Evidently the attractiveness of weekends for these acts extends to the first day of the school week: 28% of weekday break-ins and 25% of the weekday incidents of other anti-installation offenses occurred on Mondays.

Disruptive/damaging acts show a rather different pattern: the proportions occurring Monday through Friday are 19%, 33%, 12%, 14%, and 17%. For some reason these offenses show an unusually high peak on Tuesdays (33%), with much lower percentages on all other days. This is due mostly to the seeming preference for Tuesday by those who make bomb threats and start fires (41% of the reported bomb threats and 34% of the reported fires occurred on Tuesdays).

To summarize the overall pattern for offenses against the school: break-ins and other school property offenses occur most often on weekends and on Mondays before or after school; disruptive/damaging acts occur mostly on school days with a particularly high peak on Tuesdays.

VIOLENT OFFENSES AGAINST PERSONS: TIME AND PLACE

Four types of violence against persons are reported by school authorities. These are acts in which force, threat, or a weapon is used, and they include: robbery, assault, fighting between individuals, and group conflict. We have additional data on robbery and assault from student and teacher victims.

The timing of personal violence appears to follow a pattern the reverse of that noted earlier for school property offenses. According to principals' reports:

- (1) Most personal violence at school (80%) occurred during the regular schoolday. Most

school property offenses occurred before or after school or on weekends.

- (2) The day-by-day incidence rates for personal violence start low on Monday, rise toward the midweek, and return to a low point again by Friday. In Figure 2-2, note the symmetrical shape of the line representing incidence of violent acts against persons. Note, too, that the line representing school property offenses follows the opposite pattern, from a high on Mondays, to a midweek low, then rising again by Friday. The two distributions are almost exactly complementary. Excluding weekend and vacation episodes, then, this would mean that for those schools having about the same number of school property incidents and acts of violence against persons, the day-to-day total does not change much during the school week: the sharp decrease from Monday in trespass, school thefts, and vandalism is accompanied by an equal rise in violence against persons until midweek when the trends proceed in the reverse manner towards Friday. The relatively constant number of offenses, however, should not be taken to mean that the same set of preventive measures can be employed with equal effectiveness every day of the school week. Rather, it would seem wiser to design preventive strategies around this kind of more detailed information about the regularly rising and falling incidence rates of these different kinds of offenses.

The reported figure that 86% of the violent incidents at school occurred during school hours is an average for all schools. How much variability in this figure is to be expected among schools analyzed by level and community type? As shown in Table 2-4, the proportion of violent offenses against persons occurring during school hours increases with school level in every type of community, from 65% in rural elementary schools to 93% in large city senior high schools. Among secondary schools, large cities have the highest proportion of violent offenses during the schoolday. Schools in rural areas report the lowest proportions of violent acts against persons during the schoolday. The data on means of prevention used by school authorities indicate that most such efforts are concentrated in regular school hours. What these personal violence data suggest, however, is that additional efforts during nonschool hours may be useful, particularly in elementary and rural schools that have a problem with violence.

The data we have discussed so far indicate that for violence the incidence pattern by day of the week starts low on Monday, rises on Tuesday

and Wednesday, and then decreases on Thursday and Friday, only to recur again the following Monday. Information of this kind could be of some help in considering how to allocate preventive measures, but even more useful would be details about when during the day and where at school the risks of personal violence are greatest. Some data on these questions are available from the interviews with students who were the victims of personal violence.⁶

According to these interviews, the student is safest when he is in class, and the classroom is the safest place in the school. Table 2-5 indicates that when the schoolday is divided into three time segments—during class, between periods, and during lunch—the smallest percentage of assaults and robberies (22%) occur during class. These data alone tend to understate the relative safety of the time students spend in class: taking time into account, the risk profile is even more striking. Assuming that the time for lunch and the total time between classes are about equal (30 to 35 minutes), we can use the statistics in Table 2-5 to show that more than half of all personal violence (58%) took place in about an hour's time. The 22% of all personal violence that occurred

during class, in sharp contrast, is spread out over a period of perhaps five or more hours. In senior high schools, the contrast is particularly striking: here, only 20% of all personal violence occurred during class, compared to 65% in the 1 hour of nonclass time. In senior highs, there is an especially high proportion (40%) of personal violence in the brief period between classes.

In terms of relative risks (per hour), we can say that in general the secondary school student's risk of experiencing personal violence is 13 times greater during lunch and between periods than in class.⁷ The risk is highest between periods, when the student has 14 times as great a chance of encountering personal violence as in class.⁸ For the high school student, the risk between periods is 20 times greater than the risk during class; for the junior high school student, the risk between periods is nearly 11 times greater.⁹

The data on when during the schoolday the student is most likely to experience personal violence also suggest where in the school the risks are greatest. This suggestive evidence is confirmed by data from both the student interviews and principals' reports. Our findings

TABLE 2-4
PROPORTION (%) OF PERSONAL VIOLENCE TAKING PLACE DURING SCHOOLDAY

Level	Metropolitan				
	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban	Rural Areas	All Areas
Elementary	72	77	76	65	73
Junior High School	86	82	80	73	80
Senior High School	93	90	86	79	86
All Levels	82	83	73	73	80

Source: Principals' Report Sheets

⁶These data (as reported in Tables 2-5, 2-6, and 2-7) were derived from Student Interviews, which were conducted in secondary schools only.

⁷If 58% of the incidents occurred in 1 hour per day, and therefore 5 hours per week, then the average rate for the nonclass time is 11.6% occurring per hour. If 22% of all incidents occurred over the 5 hours per day (25 hours per week) spent in class, then 0.88% of the incidents occurred per hour of class time. The nonclass:class time ratio is 11.6:0.88, giving a risk ratio of 13:1.

⁸If 32% of the incidents occurred over a total of a half hour between periods per day, or 2.5 hours between periods per week, then 12.8% of the incidents happen per hour of the between-periods time. If 22% occurred over the 5 hours per day of class time, or 25 hours per week, then 0.88% of the incidents occurred per hour of class time. The between periods:class time ratio is 12.8:0.88, giving a risk ratio of 14.5:1.

are summarized in Table 2-6 (both junior and senior highs considered together) and Table 2-7 (senior high schools alone). In secondary schools, the largest proportion of violent incidents occurred in hallways and on stairs, the places of greatest activity in the time between periods (which, as we saw, was the highest risk time segment during the schoolday). Senior high students report an even greater proportion of violent incidents occurring here (43%) than do principals (35%). Again we see that, considering the amount of time spent there, the risk in the classroom is relatively small. According to students in senior high school 13% of violent incidents occurred in classrooms, in all secondary schools, 18%.

According to high school principals, the proportion of incidents occurring in classrooms was higher—25%. This discrepancy, however, is not too important; the main point is that both students and principals agree that a relatively small proportion of incidents occur in classrooms given the amount of time spent there. It should be noted that the classroom is a riskier place for teachers than for students, in part because teachers often remain in classes after students have left. Classrooms during class accounted for 24% of the violent offenses against teachers; an additional 14% took place in empty classrooms.

TABLE 2-6
PLACES WITHIN SCHOOL WHERE ASSAULTS
AND ROBBERIES OCCUR
(JUNIOR AND SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS)
(By Percent)

Place	Percent*
Hallways and stairs	31
Classrooms	18
Restrooms	11
Cafeteria	11
Locker room/gym	14
Athletic field	9
Other	8

Source: Student Interviews

*Number of incidents reported by students = 330. Total percent in table is greater than 100% due to rounding.

TABLE 2-5
TIME OF OCCURRENCE OF ASSAULTS AND ROBBERIES
IN JUNIOR AND SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS
(By Percent)

Time	Junior High School	Senior High School	All Secondary*
During Class	24	20	22
Between Periods	26	40	32
During Lunch	26	25	26
Total During Schoolday	76	85	80

Source: Student Interviews

*Number of incidents reported by students = 365.

⁹In high schools: if 40% of the incidents occurred over a total of a half hour between periods per day, or 2.5 hours between periods per week, then 16% of these incidents occurred per hour of between-periods time. If 20% occurred over the 5 hours per day of class time, or 25 hours per week, then 0.80% of these incidents occurred per hour of class time. The between periods:class time ratio for high schools, then, is 16:0.8, giving a risk ratio of 20:1.

In junior high schools: if 26% of the incidents occurred over a total of a half hour between periods per day, or 2.5 hours between periods a week, then 10.4% of the incidents occurred per hour of between-periods time. If 24% occurred over the 5 hours per day of class time, or 25 hours per week, then 0.96% of these incidents occurred per hour of class time. The between periods:class time ratio for junior high schools, then, is 10.4:0.96, giving a risk ratio of 10.8:1 or nearly 11:1.

When one compares students' and principals' reports of where violence occurs (Table 2-7), the most striking discrepancy is between the relatively high frequency of violent encounters reported by high school students in restrooms and the rather low proportion of such incidents reported by principals. To students, restrooms outrank classrooms in terms of the proportions of attacks and robberies occurring there, even though much more time is spent in classrooms. Principals, however, report fewer incidents of personal violence in restrooms than in any other location in the school. Evidently information about violent incidents in restrooms often does not reach the principals. Since nearly one-sixth of all violence encountered by high school students occurs in restrooms, many students consciously avoid them, as we saw in Chapter 1. For some reason, the use of restrooms for attack or robbery is less of a problem in junior high schools, according to the reports of students, although fear of using restrooms is also evident among junior high youngsters.

Hallways and stairs are clearly the places of highest risk in secondary schools. Considering the amount of time spent there, other places that would seem to pose substantial risks are the restrooms, cafeteria, locker rooms, and gym.

As we might expect, the pattern for violence is somewhat different in elementary

schools. (Of course violence in elementary schools is generally less serious than in secondary schools.) According to principals' reports, as illustrated in Figure 2-3, hallways and stairs were the sites of considerably less violence in these schools (only 10% of all such incidents occurred here). This is quite reasonable since elementary school students spend relatively little time in the hallways and on the stairs: most elementary schools are organized around self-contained classrooms where students remain most of the day, taught for most or all of the time by a single teacher. The largest proportion of violent encounters for elementary school students was in the playground or on the school athletic fields. This is clearly the area where elementary school students are exposed to the greatest risk; 40% of all such incidents in elementary schools occurred in these outdoor play areas despite the fact that the children spend relatively little time there. In contrast, a smaller percentage (36%) of violent incidents took place in classrooms where students spend an average of five out of every 6 hours of the schoolday. The risk profile in elementary schools seems reasonably manageable: typically, the first step to be considered should be to provide more supervision for the school's outdoor play areas.

Secondary schools in which violence is a serious problem, especially in the rush between classes, may be able to learn something from

TABLE 2-7
PLACES WHERE INCIDENTS OF PERSONAL VIOLENCE
OCCUR IN SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

	<u>Student Interviews</u>		<u>Principals' Report Sheets</u>	
	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Percent*</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Hallways and stairs	43	1	35	1
Restrooms	16	2	4	7
Classrooms	13	3	25	2
Cafeteria	9	4	11	4
Locker room/gym	9	5	8	5
Parking lot and other	6	6	13	3
Athletic field	4	7	8	6

*Total percentage exceeds 100% due to rounding and multiple answers.


elementary schools. One way to reduce violence in the halls is to reduce traffic in the halls. There are a variety of ways in which this could be done. For example, it is not necessary for every student to change classrooms for each different subject. For core subjects which all students take, teachers could move from room to room in close sequence, the the teacher in one class remaining there until the next teacher arrived. Some junior high schools are using core teacher systems, in which a single teacher teaches several basic subjects, such as English, history, and social studies, to a single class of students in the morning, while students move to electives in the

afternoon. But whether the emphasis is on reducing traffic in the hallways or controlling it, it is evident that the halls pose a problem for many schools.

Having discussed the time and place of personal violence in schools, let us turn to personal theft.

PERSONAL THEFT: WHEN AND WHERE

Of all the offenses against persons occurring in schools, the most frequent is theft of personal property without use of force or threat.¹⁰ These



Note: Percentages do not total to 100% because only incidents occurring in three main locations in each type of school are included.

SOURCE: PRS

FIGURE 2-3

PLACES AT SCHOOL WHERE MOST VIOLENT INCIDENTS OCCURRED, BY LEVEL OF SCHOOL

offenses are generally less serious in nature than incidents of personal violence, and less costly than theft or vandalism of school property. Still, given their high incidence, they are a problem, and knowing when and where thefts occur may be helpful in planning measures to reduce them. The timing of personal thefts appears to be quite similar to the pattern for personal violence that we described earlier:

- (1) Most cases of personal theft occurred during the regular schoolday. According to principals' reports, 85% occurred during school hours; according to students interviewed, the figure is 79%. Even if we use the figure from the student data, it is clear that at least four times as many personal thefts occurred during regular school hours as during other times at school. On a per-hour basis, it turns out that the risk of having something stolen during school hours is 20 times greater than that of having something stolen at school at other times.¹¹
- (2) The day-by-day incidence rates for personal theft tend to follow the same pattern described earlier for personal violence: the relative number of thefts rises from Monday towards Wednesday and then decreases sharply towards Friday.

The student interview data provide additional details about the timing and location of personal thefts at school. More than half of them (54%) occurred during classes. Only around one-sixth (18%) took place between classes, and there was relatively little theft (7%) during the lunch period.

Does this suggest a risk pattern for personal thefts that is different from the pattern for personal violence? The difference is one of degree. When time is taken into account, the periods between classes still present the highest risks; the time during classes are still the safest. The (per hour) risk between periods is more than

three times greater than the risk during classes;¹² even the lunch period is slightly (1.3 times) riskier than class time.¹³

For personal thefts and personal violence, the timing of risks appears to be somewhat similar. The pattern also appears to be consistent for place. As might be expected, the hallways and locker rooms, the usual locations of student lockers, were the prime targets of personal thefts, accounting for nearly 60% of all these incidents reported by students. Note again (as for personal violence) the prominence of hallways as a high-risk location. Classrooms, where students spend most of their time in school, were of only secondary importance: 32% of the reported thefts were of students' belongings kept in or under desks or in other locations inside the classroom. (For teachers, however, the classroom was the highest risk location for personal thefts: nearly four out of every five thefts of teachers' belongings took place in classrooms [44% during class and 35% in empty classrooms].)

The similarity in incidence patterns for personal violence and personal theft can simplify the planning of preventive strategies. In terms of relative risks, the hallways are obviously key locations and the periods between classes, critical times. In a particularly troubled school, gaining control of the hallways may be the first step toward regaining control of the school. Reasonable measures to reduce the traffic in hallways are likely to reduce incidents of both personal violence and personal theft. When students are in the halls, extra supervision by administrators and faculty would seem advisable. And, during class periods, regular monitoring of the halls may both help reduce locker thefts and minimize the chances of classes being disturbed by students who are not in class.

A TIME/TREND ANALYSIS: DO OFFENSES OCCUR IN ANNUAL CYCLES?

The day-by-day incidence rates of all offenses plotted in Figure 2-2 suggest a


¹⁰ See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the estimated incidence of personal theft.

¹¹ If 79% of the at-school thefts take place during 30 school hours, the percentage per hour would be 2.63%. For the remaining 21% occurring in the 138 nonschool hours, the per-hour percentage is .13%. The ratio $2.63\% : 0.13\% = 20:1$.

¹² If 54% of these incidents occurred during the 25 hours per week of class, then 2.16% of these incidents occurred per hour of class time. If 18% occurred during the 2.5 hours per week between periods, then 7.2% of these incidents occurred per hour between periods. The class:between periods incidents per hour ratio, then, is $7.2:2.16$, giving a risk ratio of 3.3:1.

¹³ If 7% of the thefts occurred during the 2.5 hours per week of lunch, then 2.8% of these incidents occurred per hour of lunch time, compared to 2.16% per hour of class. The lunch period:class period incidents per hour ratio is $2.8:2.16$, giving us a risk ratio of 1.3:1.


Standard deviations
from average month



SOURCE: PRS

FIGURE 2-4
SCHOOL PROPERTY OFFENSES, BY MONTH (1976)

Standard
deviations from
the average month



SOURCES: PRS, TQ and SQ

FIGURE 2-5
PERSONAL VIOLENCE, BY MONTH


periodicity in the data, in this case recurring weekly cycles. For break-ins, a high incidence begins on Saturdays, lasts with a slight abatement through Monday, remains low during the week, and then returns to a high again on the weekend. Other recurring cycles are also apparent for the other offenses we have considered.

Given this weekly periodicity, it seemed reasonable to look for longer cycles in the data as well. Two significant patterns were uncovered and are presented graphically in Figures 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6.

These graphs are based on average incidence rates in each offense category for each of the months for which data were available.¹⁴ Data are

presented here in standardized form; i.e., as deviations from the average month, with the standard deviation of the distribution of the 8 months as the unit of the vertical axis. Standardization permits the combining of distributions, e.g., those originating from different respondents and instruments, giving each component distribution the same weight. This was particularly important here since the incidence rates reported came from Principals' Report Sheets, Student Questionnaires, and Teacher Questionnaires. Personal violence, then, as depicted in Figures 2-5 and 2-6, should be understood to include violence directed at both teachers and students.

As shown in Figure 2-4, break-ins and other school property offenses follow roughly similar



SOURCES: PRS, TQ and SQ

FIGURE 2-6

THE EXPERIENCE OF TWO SEMESTERS

¹⁴ Data were collected for the months of January to May and September to December. January data, however, were not included in the month-by-month analysis. The reason for this was that although some data were collected from principals during January 1977, the number of observations was small and the sampling error large.

The May data were handled in a particular manner that warrants some explanation. The reporting period in May 1976 was curtailed in agreement with school officials, thus covering only the first 3 weeks of the month (to May 21st). In order to make this month comparable to the others as a unit of analysis, the mean number of school days was calculated (from responses to the Principals' Questionnaire) for May for those that reported any incidents. The frequencies were then multiplied by the ratio of mean school days to reporting days; by assuming that for any reporting school the last week in May would be the same in experience as the average of the preceding three, we have corrected for under-reporting and made May a full comparable month. The multiplier, incidentally, did not quite reach 4:3, since some schools reported fewer than 20 school days for May, probably in anticipation of Memorial Day, falling on the last Monday.

patterns. During the spring semester, offenses stay at or below the mean. (The one unexplainable exception here is the unusually high rate for school property offenses in March, a rate way out of line given the rest of the pattern.) In the fall semester, the incidence rates for break-ins and other school property offenses proceed almost in a straight line from a low in September to a high in December. Thus, most instances of school property offenses--breaking and entering, vandalism, trespass, and theft of school property--are concentrated in the last 2 months of the calendar year.

Figure 2-5 gives us equally useful information about the annual pattern for violence directed against persons. From a very high level in February, the relative monthly frequency of personal violence drops systematically (only April is somewhat out of line) toward the decrease in fall months, reaching its low point in December.¹⁵

Figure 2-6 combines the data from Figures 2-4 and 2-5¹⁶ and reveals the following pattern of incidence: for five of the 8 months shown, the two types of offenses occur in a complementary fashion. For example, in February the number of violent incidents was much above average, running the line for violence up past the +1.5 mark; the line for school property offenses for the same month descends almost to -.9, indicating that the monthly frequency was way below average. There are 5 months in which the deviations run in opposite directions and are roughly of the same magnitude--February, May, October, November, and December.

Figures 2-4 through 2-6, then, support the assumption that the incidence of both school property offenses and personal violence are cyclical in character. The relative monthly frequencies of personal violence descend regularly from February on (with one unexplainable reversal) and thus seem to be governed by a single yearly cycle. Offenses against school property are distributed in a pattern that shows two cycles per academic year, with the break between the cycles coming during the summer vacation.

Information of this kind can be of considerable help to school authorities in planning the allocation of security resources. Measures designed to prevent personal violence would seem to be needed in particularly heavy concentrations early in the calendar year, with lesser and lesser amounts in successive months, with the smallest efforts of all in the last 2 months of the calendar year. Preventive measures against school property offenses appear to be needed in particularly heavy doses during November and December, precisely the same months when the lowest allocations are needed for protection against personal violence. If a given school has available to it a limited quantity of a given kind of security resource--for instance, a specific number of days per year that municipal police will patrol the school grounds or that parent volunteers or resident custodians will stay inside the school at night--then this sort of information can guide decisions about when best to use these limited resources. Incident analysis by school systems, whether by time of day, day of the week, month of the year, or location in the school, can be a useful tool for planning measures to protect the school, its students, and staff against school crime, violence, and disruption.

SUMMARY

We have attempted throughout this chapter to illustrate the utility of incident analysis as a guide for planning the allocation of preventive measures--when various kinds of measures are most needed, and where. The distribution of various categories of offenses over different time periods and locations in the school was considered. Several calculations were made of relative risks to suggest when and where security resources can be used most efficiently. These analyses have shown that:

- The risks of personal violence, personal theft, and disruptive/damaging acts against the school are highest during regular school hours in the middle of the school week.

¹⁵ A methodological note about the underlying data is in order. Three sources were used: the Principals' Report Sheets with the combined frequencies of attacks, robberies, fights, and physical participation in group conflicts per month standardized to obtain one set of monthly z-scores; teachers' reports of assaults and robberies standardized separately, and means of the two z-distributions used to represent the month-by-month experience of the teachers; and the same procedure used with the victimization reports derived from Student Questionnaires. The three z-distributions were added and divided by three, thus giving each set of informants equal weight. For six out of eight months, the respective z-scores in the three component distributions closely agreed.


¹⁶ The measures shown in Figure 2-6 for offenses against the installation were derived from the respective z-distributions in Figure 2-5 weighting the "other" vis-a-vis breaking and entering by a 6:1 ratio to compensate for the difference in actually observed frequencies of the two categories.


- The risks of breaking and entering are highest on the weekends and secondarily during other nonschool hours.
 - More than 2/3 of the school property offenses other than break-ins (theft of school property, vandalism, and trespassing) also occur on weekends and during other nonschool hours, even though the per-hour risk of these offenses is greatest during regular school hours.
 - Violence against persons rises from Monday to Wednesday and then drops toward Friday; the pattern for personal theft is similar.
 - School property offenses present the mirror image of offenses against persons, occurring with particular frequency on weekends and Mondays. Thus, the two types of incidents are complementary over the days of the week.
 - For some unexplainable reason, fires and bomb threats are most likely to occur on Tuesdays.
 - The proportions of school property and violent personal offenses occurring during school hours vary with school level and location. Urban senior high schools encounter larger proportions of their property and violent offenses during the schoolday than do other schools. (This is not to say that the risk of these offenses is greater in urban senior highs; the statement concerns the distribution over time of whatever incidents a particular kind of school has.)
 - For students the risk of violent encounter is greatest during the time between classes, especially in senior high schools.
 - Hallways and stairs show the highest proportion of assaults and robberies, and measures to reduce or control traffic in the halls should be considered.
 - Taking into account the amount of time spent there, classrooms are the safest places in school.
 - According to students who have been the victims of personal violence, in high schools the restrooms are high risk places for personal violence. Hence, students tend to avoid them.
 - In elementary schools, the outdoor play areas present the greatest risk of personal harm.
 - More than half of all thefts occur during class. However, when time is taken into account, the time during classes appears to be less risky for personal theft than either the time between periods or during lunch.
 - Lockers and classrooms are the sites of most thefts.
 - Break-ins and other school property offenses show similar cyclical patterns over the year: incidents tend to occur with particular frequency toward the end of each semester, especially in November and December.
 - Personal violence tends to occur in a single cycle, dropping from the highest level in February toward the low of December in an almost orderly curve.
 - The trend lines for school property offenses and personal violence tend to be complementary through the school year, the one rising when the other is falling.
- If school authorities were to use this kind of information in their planning, it might be possible to increase the efficiency as well as the effectiveness of available preventive measures. Preventive strategies can be designed around the high-risk concept which permits the heaviest concentrations of available resources when and where they are needed most; low-risk locations and time periods could be given less attention. This approach can be used for different types of offenses, requiring different preventive measures. Planning along these lines would have the advantages of:
- (1) Increasing the efficiency of security operations (gaining the maximum amount of prevention for each dollar or hour of prevention resources allocated)
 - (2) Increasing their likely effectiveness (through use of focused strategies designed around what we know about the incidence of each particular type of offense)
- As discussed in Chapter 6, this essentially technical planning approach should be part of a broader school governance program which emphasizes the development of administrative leadership and student commitment to the school. In seriously affected schools, the problems of crime and violence cannot adequately be handled by technically-oriented security programs alone. If the leadership of a school is inadequate, the teachers unhappy, the students turn off and discontented, then the efficient allocation of

security resources by itself merely becomes a more efficient way of carrying on battles with students (who, as noted in Chapter 3, are responsible for most offenses at school). There is considerable evidence that students bent on causing trouble for the school can find ways to outwit their opponents. Without a change in the school climate, greater efficiency on one side may merely beget greater efficiency on the other.

However, given adequate governance and student commitment, the selective allocation of prevention measures to high-risk times and places can be useful. For local planning purposes, of

course, national-level data are not adequate. School systems wanting to utilize this approach should begin with the collection of incident data from schools, perhaps using the Principals' Report Sheet method employed in the Safe School Survey, and then conduct risk analyses similar to those in this chapter. The first question to be answered is which schools have the highest risks of various kinds of incidents? Thereafter the analysis would focus on the differential risks of various times and locations at school, as above. The collection and analysis of risk data, then, may be of considerable use to school districts in which school crime and disruption are a substantial problem.







Victims and Offenders'

In planning preventive measures, decisions about who (or what) is to be protected, and how, are likely to reflect assumptions about the characteristics of offenders, or victims, or both. To illustrate, let us consider the implications of the assumption that offenses are generally committed by outsiders—"intruders" as they are often called. School authorities who hold to this view are likely to allocate substantial resources for the protection of the school's perimeter. During school hours as well as nonschool hours, gates are likely to be locked, all exits but one bolted and patrolled, and all entrances through the one open door closely scrutinized. Anyone who has visited public schools in high crime areas will recognize this pattern. In many cases, even students are screened when they enter the school or move about inside and are required to carry and show plasticized ID cards to school authorities on demand.

If crime and violence in school are traceable primarily to the unlawful activities of outsiders, then such measures—as unpleasant as they may be—may be necessary. But what if most such crime is being committed not by outsiders intruding, but by students already inside the school? Then the heavy allocation of resources to such perimeter-guarding measures might no longer be regarded as either necessary or desirable.

While looking for evidence to test the validity of the "intruder" hypothesis, we considered several other assumptions that have been made about the sources of school crime and violence:

1. That a substantial portion of violent offenses in schools are committed by groups, such as gangs, rather than by individuals.²
2. That robberies and attacks generally involve older students preying on younger ones.
3. That school violence is often interracial in nature.

Our evidence suggests that most of these various assumptions are mistaken and do not provide a valid picture of victimization patterns inside our nation's schools. If preventive strategies are to be effective, they must be based on information about victims and offenders that

has been documented rather than merely assumed. Of course, as was emphasized in the last chapter, national averages cannot be used directly for planning purposes by local school districts. But such data can provide some idea of what the results of local surveys might show; and the questions asked and analytic methods employed here may be useful to districts collecting data for planning ways to reduce crime in schools.

In this chapter we explore the question: who is being victimized by whom? Our focus will be primarily on personal violence, although some information about those who commit offenses against the school is also available. We will consider data that bear on all four assumptions mentioned above: that school violence is traceable to outsiders, to groups of youngsters, to older children preying on younger ones, and to interracial conflict. The survey also produced a good deal of information on the characteristics of the students and teachers who were victimized, and these findings will also be presented. Finally, the most salient points will be summarized and their implications for the design of effective preventive strategies considered.

Before we proceed, a few notes on method are in order. The data presented in this chapter came from several sources. We relied most



heavily on information that came directly from students and teachers who had been victimized. Thus, most of the information to be discussed came from the Student Interviews (SIs), the Student Questionnaires (SQs), and the Teacher Questionnaires (TQs). Additional information was also derived from the Principals' Report Sheets (PRSs).

In considering the data on student victimization, we have two sources to rely on, the questionnaires and the interviews. As noted in the Introduction, it was evident in the pilot study conducted for the survey that the victimization rates from the SQ data were much higher than those from the SIs. Among other things, students answering the questionnaire may have reported incidents that occurred some time ago or in places other than school. This was less possible in the SIs, since interviewers asked a series of questions designed to establish the time, location, and circumstances of the incidents.

A special Data Quality Study was conducted to determine the validity of these two data sets. (For a description of this Data Quality Study, see the Methodology Report in Appendix C.) The results indicate that for estimating levels of victimization, the SI data are more accurate.

Still, despite the high levels of incidents reported, the SQ data have a decided advantage over those from the interviews: the large number of questionnaires administered (over 30,000 of them) makes them more reliable for measuring variations among schools and individuals. Data from the smaller sample of SIs have larger sampling errors and therefore tend to be more erratic measures of these variations.³ Given the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two data sets, we have tried to compare data from both where possible. In the figures particularly the reader can see that the questionnaire data display a good deal of consistency and regularity, and show patterns that tend to be supported by the interview data. Data from these sources as well as from the PRSs and TQs are presented in tables

and figures that appear in the text of this chapter and in Appendix B.

Data about the characteristics of victims, on the one hand, and offenders, on the other, had to be analyzed in somewhat different forms. We have a great deal of information from students and teachers who had been victimized. Consequently, we can try to describe what the whole population of "victims" looks like—what proportion of them have this characteristic or that one, how many of them think this way or that way, and how victimized students and teachers compare in these respects to other students and teachers who have not been victimized. We are not in such a strong position on offenders. Less information is available about them, and whatever information is available was reported by others—either the principal reporting for the school or the teacher and student victims.

Since the information about offenders is provided by second parties rather than by the offenders themselves, the unit of analysis is the incident rather than the offender as a person. We have no way of knowing whether the offender reported by a student victim in a certain school, for example, is the same as the one reported by another student or by a teacher in the same school. Therefore, we are unable to describe the population of offenders—how many have which characteristics; we can simply indicate what proportion of incidents were committed by offenders with particular characteristics.

Two other notes are in order: first, while students and principals were asked to give information about offenders on all incidents reported, teachers were asked to provide this information on the last or only incident. Consequently, we have a good deal more information about offenders in instances of student victimization than teacher victimization. Second, to maximize the number of incidents available for analysis from the SIs and the TQs, (thereby reducing sampling error), we have used their reports for 2 months (the "target" and

¹For indications of statistical significance of differences not supplied in this chapter, see tables in Appendix B. All tests of statistical significance for this chapter were t tests for proportions and were performed using the actual weighted percentages and the unweighted sample size of individuals responding to the item in question. For the convenience of the reader, however, we have rounded the percentages and displayed averaged sample sizes in all tables in the text.

²For instance, see Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, The Nature, Extent, and Cost of Violence and Vandalism in our Nation's Schools: Hearings, April 16 and June 17, 1975. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 93, 136-137, 143, 149-153, 162-163.

³This is especially true of reported robbery victimization, which is responsible for most of the rank-order discrepancies between the SQ and SI data.

"pretarget" months) rather than for the last month alone. Therefore, the victimization percentages will be higher than those in Chapter 1, which were based on data from the last month only.

CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENT VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS

Student Status of Offenders

Preventive strategies designed to keep "intruders" from entering the school assume that offenses in the school are usually committed by outsiders; relative safety is believed to require keeping students inside the school and others who

do not belong there outside.

Our data, however, suggest that rather than locking most offenders out, these strategies seem to lock the offenders in with their potential victims. Except for trespassing and break-ins, the great majority (74%-98% in the PRS data) of all reported offenses for which information about offenders is available were committed by current students at the school in question (see Tables 3-1 and 3-2). Even in the case of breaking and entering, slightly more than half (56%) of these offenses were committed by current students. This pattern holds regardless of whether the data examined are based on the PRSs, SIs, or TQs (no information about offenders is available in the SQs).

TABLE 3-1
PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE OF OFFENSE,
BY TYPE OF OFFENDER

<u>Offenses Against the School</u>	<u>Sample n*</u>	<u>Current Student</u>	<u>Non-student</u>
Trespassing	785	17	83
Breaking and entering	87	56	44
Theft of school property	255	74	26
Property destruction	666	83	17
False alarm	84	90	10
Fire setting	67	90	10
Bomb offenses	69	83	17
Disruptive behavior	586	83	17
<u>Offenses Against Persons</u>			
Personal theft	646	85	15
Fights	2,118	98	2
Attacks	1,746	91	9
Robbery	161	82	18
Weapons possession	192	92	8
Group conflict	64	87	13
<u>Victimless</u>			
Drug sale, use	651	95	5
Alcohol use	245	92	8

Source: PRS

* Includes only those offenses for which information about offenders was available.

Recognition of Offenders

If most violent offenses in school were committed by outsiders, the victims would generally not know the offenders. Yet in most attacks and robberies of students at school, the offenders are recognized by the victims and are often known by name (see Table 3-3). This pattern is even more usual for attacks than for robberies: in most attacks, the victim knows the offender by name; in most robberies, the victim does not. Evidently, the people you know are more likely to attack you than to rob you; robberies are more likely to be committed by strangers.

TABLE 3-2

PERCENTAGE OF OFFENSES OF EACH TYPE COMMITTED BY CURRENT STUDENTS

	<u>% of Attacks</u>	<u>% of Robberies</u>
PRS	91 (1,746)	82 (161)
SI	92 (224)	94 (109)
TQ	88 (108)	* (9)

() Sample numbers

* Number of offenses reported too small to permit calculation of percentage estimates.

TABLE 3-3

PERCENTAGE OF OFFENSES OF EACH TYPE, BY RECOGNITION AND NAME ACQUAINTANCES

	<u>% of Attacks</u>	<u>% of Robberies</u>
SI: Offender seen before (n=228)	86	(n=131) 62
SI: Offender known by name	75	47

Number of Offenders

If there were any question that individuals rather than groups of youngsters are responsible for most violent offenses in schools, the data clear up the matter. The majority of reported attacks and robberies in school involved only one offender (see Table 3-4). The individual-offender pattern was even more characteristic of robberies than attacks and was especially likely to be the case in attacks of teachers. Multiple offenders were more likely to be involved in attacks of students (40%) than in robberies (30%). Only a small proportion of attacks on teachers (20%) involved more than one offender. As was to be

TABLE 3-4

PERCENTAGE OF OFFENSES OF EACH TYPE, BY INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS

	<u>% of Attacks</u>	<u>% of Robberies</u>
SI	60 (227)	70 (125)
TQ	80 (116)	* (11)

*Number of offenses reported too small to permit calculation of percentage estimates.

TABLE 3-5

PERCENTAGE OF OFFENSES OF EACH TYPE, BY SEX OF BOTH VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS

	<u>Attacks (n=224)</u>	<u>Robberies (n=125)</u>
Males victimizing males	66	72
Females victimizing females	22	13
Males victimizing females	9	14
Females victimizing males	3	1
	100%	100%

Source: SI

expected, multiple-offender attacks on students were considerably more likely to result in injury to the victims (51%) than those committed by individual offenders (25%).

Sex

Most violent offenses (attacks and robberies) against students involve victims and offenders of the same sex--usually males victimizing males (see Table 3-5). This was true in 88% of the attacks and 85% of the robberies.⁴ In the small number of cases where victims and offenders are of different sexes, the offenders are usually male and the victims usually female; only 3% of all attacks and 1% of all robberies involved the victimization of boys by girls.

All the data sources show that a much higher proportion of attacks are committed by males than females (Table 3-6). In terms of risks, boys are more than twice as likely as girls to be attacked or robbed at school (Figure 3-1 and Appendix B, Table B-3.1). The ratio is about the same as that reported for males and females in the general population by the National Crime Survey.⁵ Rather interestingly, attacks by males and robberies by males were not much more likely to involve injuries than those by females. (See Appendix B, Table B-3.2).

Age and Grade Level

If it is true, as some have assumed, that student victimization generally involves older students preying on younger ones, then we would expect our data to show two patterns: (1) that the risk of victimization is greater for students who are younger and in lower grades, and (2) that offenders are likely to be older than their student victims. We find, however, that only the first of these patterns is evident in our data.

Both the SQ and SI data indicate that, with minor exceptions, the risks of victimization by either attack or robbery tend to decline as age and grade level increase. The data are presented in Figures 3-2 and 3-3 and Appendix B. (See Tables B-3.3 and B-3.4.) In both figures the patterns are more clearly evident in the SQ data than the SI results. This is as we would expect: the more erratic results from the interview data are no doubt a consequence of their much smaller sample numbers. The pattern is particularly clear in the grade level data (Figure 3-2): 7th graders are most likely to be attacked or robbed, 12th graders least so. The age data (Figure 3-3) are generally consistent with this finding.^{6,7}

TABLE 3-6

PERCENTAGE OF OFFENSES OF EACH TYPE,
BY SEX OF OFFENDER

	% of <u>Attacks</u>	% of <u>Robberies</u>
PRS:		
Male	79	87
Female	21	13
	(2,570)	(325)
SI:		
Male	75	86
Female	25	14
	(226)	(127)
TQ:		
Male	78	*
Female	22	*
	(109)	(7)


*Number of offenses reported too small to permit calculation of percentage estimates.

⁴The TQ is the only data set that is not consistent with the general pattern that a higher proportion of robberies than of attacks involve male offenders. But the N here is extremely small (N=7).

⁵Criminal Victimization in the United States, U.S. Department of Justice, No. SC-NCP-N-3, May 1976, pp. 17-18.

⁶Note that the SI data correspond closely to the SQ pattern for robberies, but the correspondence for attacks is very rough. The SI data on attacks show an apparent rise between ages 12 and 15 which is not evident in the SQ data; however, the apparent rise is not statistically significant. In describing our findings in the text, we will generally be discussing the SQ data unless some particularly intriguing patterns in the SI data seem to warrant comment.

⁷Our data on robbery victimization appear to be generally consistent with the National Crime Survey data: in their data, the robbery victimization rates for youngsters aged 12-15 were higher than for youngsters aged 16-19. Our data are not, however, consistent with their data on assaults: they found youngsters aged 12-15 to have a lower rate of assault victimization than the 16-19 age group; our data showed the reverse. Whether this discrepancy is due to differences in the two surveys or to differences between students at school and young people in general is unclear. For the National Crime Survey data, see Criminal Victimization in the United States, p. 16.




For statistically significant differences and sample sizes, see Appendix B, Table B-3.1.

SOURCES: SQ and SI

FIGURE 3-1
STUDENT VICTIMIZATION BY SEX OF STUDENT

It is interesting that students 19 years old and above have a much higher probability of being victimized than students a year or two younger.⁸ The apparent explanation is that these older students have failed a year or more at school, many of them are probably in trouble with the school, have difficulty getting along with their younger classmates, may at times themselves be the aggressors, and may at other times be the targets of aggressive behavior in response to their provocations or by virtue of their marginal status at school.

Younger students, then, are more likely to be victimized, but does this mean that they are being preyed on by older youngsters? Not according to our data. Interviewed students were asked to estimate the ages of the offenders they encountered. If their estimates are accurate, then contrary to the assumption that student victimization involves older students preying on younger ones, these data indicate that violent offenses tend to involve victims and offenders similar in age (see Table 3-7). This was true in three-quarters of both the attacks and robberies.



SOURCES: SQ and SI

FIGURE 3-2

STUDENT VICTIMIZATION BY GRADE OF VICTIM

⁸ Only the interview responses for attacks fail to show this, again probably because of the small sample number.


TABLE 3-7

PERCENTAGE OF OFFENSES OF EACH TYPE, BY RELATIVE AGES OF VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS

	Attacks (n=230)	Robberies (n=122)
Victims and offenders of same age*	76	75
Offenders older than victims	16	19
Offenders younger than victims	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>
	100%	100%

Source: SI

*Age categories are ≤ 12, 12-14, 15-17, 18-20, 21+.



SOURCES SQ and SI

FIGURE 3-3


STUDENT VICTIMIZATION BY AGE OF VICTIM

(In those cases where victims and offenders were not close in age, the tendency was for older students to pick on younger ones; however, this occurred in only 16%-19% of the cases. The reverse pattern of younger students attacking or robbing older ones characterized only 6%-8% of the incidents.)

Why are the younger students in the lower secondary grades most likely to be involved in violence both as victims and offenders? There are a number of possible explanations. Some experts believe that early adolescence is a volatile age for biological reasons, and that as youngsters become biologically mature they become less prone to violent behavior. Others stress the socialization process. As youngsters grow older, society increasingly teaches them how to behave in socially acceptable ways. Moreover, the definition of what is acceptable changes with age; for example, fighting is tolerated among children but, as a rule, not among adults.

A third explanation focuses specifically on socialization in schools and stresses the difficulties faced by youngsters of junior high age in making the transition from the more homogeneous and homelike environment of elementary schools to the more heterogeneous and broadly societal environment of secondary schools, where they have to cope with other youngsters from different neighborhoods and social backgrounds. As time goes on they learn how to get along, or at least to avoid trouble, according to this line of thought.

A fourth possible explanation is that junior high schools, by separating younger students from the moderating influence of older, more mature students, may compound the potential for violence. In this view, junior high schools are seen as narrowly age-based institutions which segregate and confine young people during a period of life in which aggressive behavior is commonplace.



SOURCES: SQ and SI

FIGURE 3 - 4

STUDENT VICTIMIZATION BY TIME ATTENDED PRESENT SCHOOL

Yet a fifth explanation is that many problem students in junior high school drop out of school as time goes on, leaving the senior highs less troubled by their presence.

It is not possible, given our data, to test each of these hypotheses. Trying to sort out the effects of biological and social maturation on school violence is beyond the scope of this study. However, we do have some data that bear on the last three explanations. The data indicate, for example, that with one interesting exception, the longer a student attends a particular secondary school, the smaller are his or her risks of being a victim of violence at school (Figure 3-4 and Appendix B, Table B-3.5). This suggests that learning the ropes in a school may reduce the risks a student faces. (The increase in victimization

risks for students in the 5+ category will be discussed shortly.)

More interesting are data which bear on the fourth hypothesis—that junior high schools, by segregating younger students from older ones, also remove them from the moderating and socializing influences that the older students could have. We examined the risks of violence to 7th, 8th, and 9th graders attending schools which were comprised of different grade combinations. The risks to 7th and 9th graders in comprehensive high schools (grades 7-12) were significantly lower than to 7th and 9th graders in junior high schools (Table 3-8).⁹ This difference persisted even when location was taken into account. These findings, together with the evidence that most violence occurs among victims and offenders of the same age, suggests that the question of grade combinations

TABLE 3-8
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS ATTACKED/ROBBED
IN THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF SCHOOLS,
BY GRADE LEVEL

Grade	Middle Schools	Junior High Schools	Senior High Schools
7	14.1 (2,781)	15.4 (3,724)	* 11.0 (345)
8	11.1 (2,494)	11.9 (3,964)	11.1 (371)
9	13.7 (92)	* 9.4 (2598)	* 7.5 (2437)
10	**	**	4.9 (4,151)
11	**	**	4.6 (3,806)
12	**	**	2.8 (3,135)

Source: SQ

*Difference significant at $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

**Sample numbers less than 20.

() Sample numbers

⁹We wondered if this might be explained by community type: perhaps most comprehensive high schools including grades 7-12 were located in rural areas and it was the rural location rather than the grade organization of the school that accounted for students' greater safety. However, additional analyses have shown that this pattern continues to hold even when community type is controlled.

and their relation to school violence is a line of investigation well worth pursuing, although the results are not conclusive enough to serve as a basis for policy recommendations.

Statistical analysis seems to cast doubt on the "dropout" argument: after accounting for other relevant factors, the number of students who drop out of school has no relation to the level of violence in schools (Appendix A, Part 1). This finding receives further support from another: after taking into account other factors such as how well the school is run, the proportion of students identified as "behavior problems" by teachers bears little relation to the amount of violence in school. This finding is discussed further in Chapter 5.

Race and Ethnic Background

It is often assumed that most of the violent incidents in school are interracial. The Student Interview data, however, indicate that a slight majority of the violent incidents actually involve victims and offenders of the same race. Table 3-9 shows that 58% of the reported attacks and 54% of the robberies involved victims and offenders of the same race, while the remaining 42% of the attacks and 46% of the robberies were interracial. Considering that an estimated 27% of all secondary students are members of racial minorities, it seems at first sight that there are more interracial incidents than would be expected by chance—that is, more than would be expected if every student in a given school had an equal probability of being attacked by (or an attacker of) every other student, regardless of race. It is interesting to find, then, that the proportions of attacks and robberies that are interracial are not significantly greater than expected by chance

alone.¹⁰ This is an important point. On the one hand, the everyday perception that there is "a lot" of violence involving youngsters of different races is supported by the finding that close to half of these violent incidents are interracial. On the other hand, the data do not support the assumption that these attacks or robberies are in general racially motivated, since about the same proportions would be expected by chance. This is not to say that racially motivated incidents don't occur; obviously they do. Some schools have more than the expected (by chance) proportion of interracial incidents while other schools (in which there are a disproportionate number of intra-racial incidents) have less.

The likelihood of an attack being interracial changes markedly with the ethnic background of the victim (see Table 3-10). It appears that the smaller a given ethnic group, the greater the chances of being attacked by someone of another group. According to these data, most attacks on Hispanic youngsters are by non-Hispanics, while most attacks on white youngsters are by other white youngsters. One possible explanation for this tendency for members of small groups to be attacked by members of larger groups can be found in the notion of "turf control." According to this hypothesis, the numerically and socially dominant group in a school may be able to pick on members of smaller groups with relative impunity.

TABLE 3-9
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENSES OF EACH TYPE, BY RACIAL SIMILARITIES OF
VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS

	% Attacks (n=230)	% Robberies (n=126)
Victim and offender of same race	58	54
Victim and offender of different races	42	46
	100%	100%

Source: SI

¹⁰ Paper presenting calculation of probabilities is available from NIE.

This notion will be further explored later in the chapter.

It should be pointed out, though, that the explanation may also reside merely in statistical probabilities. Theoretically, if every person had an equal chance of being an offender, we would expect Hispanic youngsters, whose numbers are small, to be attacked most often by non-Hispanics, whose numbers are very large. We would also expect white youngsters, other than Hispanics, to be attacked most often by other white youngsters, since, on a chance basis, there would be so many potential white offenders around. In any case, a substantial majority (69%) of the attacks against white youngsters are committed by other white youngsters. Therefore, the notion that attacks on white students usually involve assailants of a different race is not supported by the data.

For robberies, however, the evidence is less clear. Of the robberies reported by white students (n=79), about half (51%) involved an offender of the same race, and about half (49%) involved an offender of a different race. It was noted above that robberies seemed more likely than attacks to be interracial. This appears to be especially so when the victims are white. (The numbers of robberies reported by black and Hispanic victims were too small to permit generalization.)

Still, when one examines the data by victim's race or ethnic background, it becomes clear

that white students do not fare poorly compared to others. As shown in Figure 3-5, there are no significant differences between black, white, and Hispanic students in their risk of being attacked or robbed at school. With the exception of American Indian students, there are no significant differences among ethnic groups in their risk of being attacked at school. With regard to robbery, Indian students again face the highest risks, and white students the lowest. (See Figure 3-5 and Appendix B, Table B-3.6.) Data from both the SQs and SIs indicate that the risks of attack and robbery faced by American Indians are significantly higher (p .05) than for any other group. Sample numbers of Asian-Americans were too small to permit meaningful comparisons.

Controlling for the level of seriousness of incidents—either the amount of money lost in a robbery or the degree of injury suffered in an attack—white students are generally in a better position than others. Whites have less of a risk than any other group except Asian-Americans of being robbed of more than \$10; the risk for black students is three times greater; for Hispanics, more than 2½ times greater; for American Indians, nearly 3½ times greater (see Table 3-11). In cases of attacks, white students are less likely than students of other groups (except Asian-Americans) to require medical treatment.

It is interesting to compare our data on the victimization of black and white students to the findings reported by the National Crime Survey.¹¹

TABLE 3-10
PERCENTAGE OF INTRA- AND INTERRACIAL ATTACKS,
BY ETHNIC BACKGROUND OF VICTIM

Ethnic background of victim:	% Attacks by Offenders of the Same Race	% Attacks by Offenders of a Different Race	Total
Hispanic (n=40)	29	71	= 100%
Black (n=27)	58	42	= 100%
White (n=131)	69	31	= 100%

Source: SI


¹¹ Criminal Victimization in the United States, p. 14.

Our data on attacks are consistent with theirs: according to the National Crime Survey, the victimization rates for assault in general are not higher for blacks than for whites, although the rates for aggravated assaults are higher. However, our findings on in-school robberies differ from theirs on robberies in general. The National Crime Survey found that blacks generally have much higher rates of victimization by robbery than whites. Apparently being at school evens out the risks of being robbed for the two groups, either by lowering the risk for blacks, increasing it for whites, or both. The other possibility is that the apparent difference between

robbery risks at school and in the general population are due to different characteristics of the two surveys.

Evidently a student's risk of being victimized is related to his or her racial/ethnic background. Even more important, it would seem, is the student's race/ethnicity in relation to the racial composition of the school.

Table 3-12 presents the SQ data¹² on student attacks and robberies analyzed separately for schools with different racial compositions—predominantly nonwhite (less than 40% white), in-



SOURCES: SQ and SI

FIGURE 3-5

STUDENT VICTIMIZATION BY RACE OF VICTIM

¹²The SI data generally show the same patterns but reveal fewer significant differences, probably because of the smaller sample size (and even smaller sizes when the data are analyzed separately by racial composition of the school) and relatively large sampling errors.

tegrated (40%-70% white) and predominantly white (more than 70% white). We find that when the data are considered for all students together, the racial composition of the school has some relation to the incidence of robberies (which tend to be less likely in predominantly white schools), but none to the incidence of attacks. When the

data are analyzed separately for white and nonwhite students in these schools, a decided racial association is evident: white students are significantly more likely to be attacked in minority schools (Table 3-13). Minority students are more likely to be attacked if they attend predominantly white or integrated schools (Table 3-

TABLE 3-11

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS ATTACKED/REQUIRING MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ROBBED OF MORE THAN \$10,
BY RACIAL/ETHNIC BACKGROUND*

	Sample n	% Attacked/Doctor	% Robbed > \$10
Indian	(1,058)	1.8 _{ab}	2.0 _x
Asian	(579)	1.8 _{ac}	0.2 _y
Hispanic	(2,121)	2.1 _a	1.6 _x
Black	(5,139)	2.3 _a	1.8 _x
White	(20,835)	0.9 _c	0.6 _y

Source: SQ. Percentage estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

TABLE 3-12

PERCENTAGE OF ALL SECONDARY STUDENTS ATTACKED OR ROBBED,
BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SCHOOL*

% White Students in School	Sample n**	% Attacked	% Robbed
<40	(4,753)	4.7 _a	6.4 _x
40-70	(6,588)	4.5 _a	5.7 _x
>70	(19,156)	4.2 _a	4.1 _y

Source: SQ. Percentage estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

**Averaged sample number. In no case was difference between n's greater than 40.

14). Apparently, regardless of one's own racial/ethnic background, the risk of being victimized tends to increase if you are not part of the dominant racial/ethnic group in the school's population. The notion of "turf dominance" suggested earlier

receives support from the data. On the other hand, the assumption held by some that conflict is greatest in integrated settings, especially when they reach the 50-50 tipping point, is not supported by our data.¹³

TABLE 3-13

PERCENTAGE OF ALL WHITE SECONDARY STUDENTS ATTACKED OR ROBBED, BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SCHOOL*

<u>% White Students in School</u>	<u>Sample n**</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
<40	(696)	7.0 _a	7.8 _x
40-70	(3,700)	4.2 _b	5.7 _x
>70	(16,052)	3.9 _b	3.6 _y

Source: SQ. Percentage estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

**Averaged sample number. In no case does difference between n's exceed 21.

TABLE 3-14

PERCENTAGE OF ALL NONWHITE STUDENTS ATTACKED OR ROBBED, BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SCHOOL*

<u>% White Students in School</u>	<u>Sample n**</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
<40	(3,965)	4.1 _a	6.0 _x
40-70	(2,758)	4.7 _{ab}	5.7 _x
>70	(2,531)	5.9 _b	7.0 _x

Source: SQ. Percentage estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

**Averaged sample number. In no case was difference between n's greater than 26.

¹³The only instance in which higher victimization rates seemed to occur in integrated schools was in the SI data on attacks of white students. However, since all other evidence runs contrary to this finding, we assume that the finding in this one instance is a fluke in the SI data.

It was noted earlier that while the risks of attack in general were about the same for white and minority students (other than Indians), the risks of serious attack were greater for minority students (except Asian-Americans). Is the same true of serious offenses in white and minority schools? Table 3-15 indicates that it is.

The risks of serious attack and robbery are more than twice as high in predominantly minority schools (less than 40% white) than in predominantly white schools (more than 70% white). Taken together, these findings suggest that while minor violence is not substantially associated with racial or ethnic status, more serious violence is. Further research on this subject is required.

Almost all of our discussion so far has focused on the student as the victim of attacks and robberies in school. We now turn to a second group in schools that has been the target of personal violence, the teachers. Are some teachers more likely to be victimized than others? Let us consider the data on teacher victims.

CHARACTERISTICS OF TEACHER VICTIMS

While student demographic characteristics are often strongly related to the risks of being

victimized at school, this does not seem to be the case with teachers. Differences in victimization probabilities among the various demographic groups are generally not significant; where significant differences exist, they tend to be weak or inconsistent. It may be simply that the teacher's status as teacher—which entails certain authority relations, for example—is a more important factor influencing the probability of victimization than any demographic characteristic. (Teacher demographic data are presented in Appendix B, Tables B-3.7 through B-3.10 and Table B-3.15.)

Males are no more likely than females to be attacked or robbed at school. Younger teachers are no more likely than older ones to be attacked, and while for robberies there are a few significant differences by age, there is no consistent pattern. Length of time teaching in the present school is not related to the probability of being attacked, and the few significant differences for robbery again appear to be haphazard. In fact, the only demographic variable consistently related to a teacher's risk of victimization is grade level taught, and then only for attacks: teachers in grades 7, 8, and 9 are more likely to be attacked at school than those in grades 10, 11, and 12. As we have already seen (Chapter 1), junior high

TABLE 3-15

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS ATTACKED/REQUIRING MEDICAL TREATMENT
AND ROBBED OF MORE THAN \$10, BY PERCENTAGE OF WHITE
STUDENTS IN SCHOOL*

<u>% White Students in School</u>	<u>Sample n</u>	<u>% Attacked/ Doctor</u>	<u>% Robbed >\$10</u>
<40%	(4,975)	2.2 _a	1.8 _x
40-70	(6,826)	1.7 _a	1.1 _y
>70%	(19,572)	1.0 _b	.7 _z

Source: SQ. Percentage estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the p<.05 level (multiple t tests).

school teachers are more likely to be attacked than those in senior high schools.

Several characteristics of the classes and students taught by teachers, and the schools in which they teach, do seem to be associated with their risk of victimization. The probability of teacher victimization is greater if the teacher has: large classes (over 30 students); relatively large numbers of low-ability students, under-achievers, and behavior-problem students; and a relatively high percentage of minority students, regardless of the minority (see Appendix B, Tables B-3.11 through B-3.14). The risk of a teacher ever having been attacked or robbed is also greater in schools with higher proportions of minority students. As shown in Table 3-16, the percentages of teachers attacked and robbed are smallest in predominantly white schools, significantly higher in integrated schools (40%-60% white), and significantly higher again in predominantly nonwhite schools. The risk of robbery is three times greater in minority schools than in predominantly white schools; the risk of attacks on teachers is nearly six times greater.

Racial or ethnic background of teachers did not initially appear to make any difference in a teacher's probability of being victimized (see Appendix B, Table B-3.15). When we examined

the data for the teacher sample as a whole, the risks of attack or robbery did not appear to be significantly different among racial/ethnic groups.¹⁴

However, these data take on a different cast when examined in relation to the racial composition of the schools in which these teachers worked. As shown in Tables 3-17 and 3-18, white teachers confront substantially higher risks than others when they are teaching in predominantly nonwhite schools. A white teacher, for example, is seven times more likely to have been attacked in a minority school than in a predominantly white school; and in a minority school the risk that a white teacher will have been attacked is more than twice as great as the risk for a minority teacher. Clearly, then, the racial or ethnic background of a teacher relative to the racial/ethnic composition of the student body is a factor of some consequence in affecting his or her risk of being attacked or robbed. Since 89% of the teachers are white, the teachers at risk do tend to be white teachers working in minority schools.

One policy implication of these findings might be that more minority teachers be assigned to predominantly minority schools. This is obviously one of those areas in which other desired

TABLE 3-16

PERCENTAGE OF ALL SECONDARY TEACHERS ATTACKED OR ROBBED,
BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SCHOOL*

<u>% White Students in School</u>	<u>Sample n**</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
<40	(3,268)	2.8 _a	2.1 _x
40-70	(4,262)	1.2 _b	1.1 _y
>70	(11,788)	0.5 _c	0.7 _z

Source: TQ.

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

**Averaged sample number. In no case is difference between n's greater than 25.

¹⁴There were no significant differences between whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans. Only Indian teachers appeared to have a significantly different (lower) risk of being robbed; however, the number of Indian teachers participating in the survey was so small ($n=76$) that the data are likely to be highly unreliable.

TABLE 3-17

PERCENTAGE OF ALL WHITE SECONDARY TEACHERS ATTACKED OR
ROBBED, BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SCHOOL*

<u>% White Students in School</u>	<u>Sample n**</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
<40	(2,048)	3.5 _a	2.3 _x
40-70	(3,426)	1.3 _b	1.1 _y
>70	(11,063)	0.5 _c	0.7 _z

Source: TQ.

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

**Averaged sample number. In no case is the difference between n's greater than 20.

TABLE 3-18

PERCENTAGE OF ALL NONWHITE SECONDARY TEACHERS ATTACKED OR
ROBBED, BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SCHOOL*

<u>% White Students in School</u>	<u>Sample n**</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
<40	(1,143)	1.5 _a	1.9 _x
40-70	(775)	0.8 _b	0.8 _y
>70	(598)	0.8 _b	0.6 _y

Source: TQ

*Column figures sharing a common subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

**Average sample number. In no case was difference between n's greater than 10.

social ends—among them the racial integration of teachers—may conflict with a measure that might reduce some of the violence in schools. Coordinated desegregation of both students and faculty would, in the long run, also be consistent with these findings (see Chapter 5).

SUMMARY

We have considered in this chapter the evidence on several key characteristics of offenders and their student and teacher victims in incidents of attack and robbery occurring in schools. Our most salient findings can be summarized as follows:

- Except for trespassing and break-ins, the great majority of all reported offenses were committed by current students at the school in question. Clearly, then, most school violence is not committed by outsiders intruding into the school.
- In most attacks and robberies, the offender is recognized by the victim and known to him or her by sight, or by name, or both. This, too, seems to run counter to the assumption that school violence is committed by outsiders.
- Most reported attacks and robberies committed in school involved only one offender.
- Most violent offenses involve victims and offenders of the same sex—generally males victimizing other males.
- In general, the risk of victimization is greater for secondary school students who are younger (11-13), and in lower grades (grades 7-8); the risk tends to decline as age and grade level increase. However, contrary to the assumption that attacks and robberies in school involve older students preying on younger ones, most violent offenses involve victims and offenders similar in age.
- The longer a student has attended a school, the less his/her risks of violence there.
- 7th and 9th graders are safer in comprehensive high schools than in junior highs or middle schools.
- A majority of violent offenses involve victims and offenders of the same race. While the proportion of offenses that are

interracial at first seems high (42% of the attacks and 46% of the robberies), these percentages are not significantly greater than would be expected by chance.

- For attacks and robberies in general, the risks faced by white students are not significantly different from those faced by minority students. For serious attacks and robberies, however, minority students have higher risks.
- For attacks in general, the risks in minority schools are not significantly greater than in white schools, though the risks of robbery are. For serious attacks and robberies the risks in minority schools are also higher.
- White students are more likely to be attacked or robbed if they attend schools that are predominantly nonwhite; minority students are more likely to be attacked if they attend predominantly white schools.
- Teachers are more likely to be victimized if they teach in junior high schools; teach large classes with relatively large numbers of low-ability students, underachievers, and behavior-problem students; have a relatively high percentage of minority students; and teach in predominantly nonwhite schools. White teachers face greater risks than minority teachers in predominantly nonwhite schools. Race and ethnic background, then, when considered in conjunction with racial composition of the school, are factors in accounting for differential risks of teachers being attacked or robbed in school.

What does all this suggest about the kinds of preventive strategies that are and are not needed? Those measures designed to keep intruders out of the school during the regular schoolday are clearly likely to have little if any effect on the incidence of attacks and robberies occurring in schools, at least in terms of national averages. Such measures may still be necessary for some schools in some communities. Almost equally ineffective, it would seem, will be those strategies designed to keep older and younger students apart. Indeed, if anything, the data suggest that there may be some advantages to including 7th, 8th, and 9th graders in comprehensive high schools, although the evidence is sketchy and further research is required. Measures designed to reduce interracial conflict would be helpful.





Victims' Attitudes and Experiences

Having discussed some of the objective characteristics of the victims of violence in schools, let us turn to the more subjective dimensions. What are the attitudes, perceptions, and experiences of students and teachers who report being attacked or robbed at school? How do they think, and what do they feel? Are they, as we would expect, more afraid than others? How do they view the environment around their schools? What do they think of the schools themselves and the people in them? For the students, how well are they doing in school? More broadly, what can be said about the way they view themselves, their lives, and their futures?

The Safe School Study provides data from the Student and Teacher Questionnaires with which to answer these and related questions. This analysis requires comparing the responses of student and teacher victims with those of nonvictims.¹ For such comparative purposes, the SQs are preferable to the SIs because their larger numbers appear to make them a more reliable measure of relative differences. Nevertheless, the interview data lend some support to the questionnaire findings, and the degree of correspondence between the two data sets will be indicated in the tables. Data on both attacks and robberies are presented. With few exceptions, differences between attack victims and nonvictims resemble those between robbery victims and nonvictims. For the sake of convenience only the attack statistics are cited in the text. As in the last chapter, the period for which attacks and robberies are reported is 1 month for the SQs and 2 months for the TQs, and SIs. Since the tables are longer and more complex than those in other chapters, some will be placed in Appendix B rather than interspersed with the text.

In response to many of the questions, such as those about fear at school, suspensions, and academic failure, only a relatively small proportion of either victims or other students reported such experiences. But we are interested in relative tendencies: are students who are victimized more likely than others to be fearful at

school, to have been suspended, or to have failed academically?

One final note. Repeated use of the term "victim" tends to create the impression that the experience of victimization somehow defines a student (or teachers) once and for all as primarily a victim and secondarily a person with other characteristics. Obviously this is not the case. Those called victims here are first of all young people—boys and girls, students—who, according to their reports, were attacked physically or robbed at school. Or they are teachers, men and women of various ages and backgrounds, with families or without, and so on. The term victim is used because it is the variable of interest in this analysis, but it should not be understood as the essential characteristic of the people involved. Now let us focus on the experiences and attitudes of the victims of violence in schools.



¹All tests of statistical significance presented in this chapter were t tests for proportions and were performed using the actual weighted percentages and the unweighted sample size of individuals responding to the item in question. For the convenience of the reader, however, we have rounded the percentages and included the total number of attack and robbery victims and nonvictims in all tables in the text. (The number of victims and nonvictims varied only slightly depending upon item nonresponse.)

STUDENTS' REPORTS OF CRIME IN THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS

We would expect to find that student victims of attack and robbery at school are more likely than others to live in high-crime neighborhoods, on the assumption that their schools are also more likely to be located in these areas (see Chapter 5). The data support this expectation (see Table 4-1). Substantially larger proportions of victims reported parents having been robbed on the streets of their neighborhoods and their homes having been broken into the last year. Larger proportions also reported the presence of fighting gangs in their neighborhoods. In all probability, the victims of violence at school are more likely to be victims of violence in their neighborhoods as well.

Fear and Avoidance

It is not surprising, then, that the victimized students tend to be afraid on the way to school (see Table 4-2); 23% of those having been attacked reported being afraid at least once or twice a month as opposed to only 5% of the other students. The victims are also more likely to be fearful at school: 18% of the attack victims reported being afraid there most of the time, compared to only 2% of the other students. Overall, 56% of the assault victims reported being afraid at school at least sometimes.

Fear engenders avoidance: students victimized by assault and robbery tend to avoid places at school more than others (see Appendix B, Table B-4.1). Two or three times as many victims as nonvictims reported staying away from specific

places because of fear. At least 44% of the victims reported avoiding restrooms at school, as opposed to 21% of the other students. Compared to others, the student victims of assault and robbery are also more likely to carry some sort of weapon ("bring something to school to protect yourself"). Of the attack victims, 29% reported doing so at least sometimes, while 9% of the others reported this.

Since they were attacked or robbed at school in the previous month and are often afraid there, it is understandable that a higher proportion of victims should report staying home sometime in that month for fear of being hurt or bothered at school. Fifteen percent of the attack victims reported doing so, but only 4% of the other students stayed home. In general, whether out of fear or for other reasons, the victims miss school more often than the other students.

Social Ties

Both neighborhood and school, then, must appear to many of these student victims as rather alien and hostile places. This impression is reinforced by the finding that student victims have fewer external sources of social support than most students (see Table 4-3). Those who report having been attacked or robbed at school tend to have fewer friends: 19% of the attack victims said they either had no friends at school or only one or two, 12% of the other students so reported. Consequently, those victimized by assault or robbery are less likely to turn to friends for help, and more likely to turn to a formal source of support, such as a counselor, or to a teacher.

TABLE 4-1

STUDENTS' REPORTS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	% of Attack Victims (n=1,629)	% of Attack Nonvictims (n=28,882)	% of Robbery Victims (n=1,770)	% of Robbery Nonvictims (n=28,685)
In the last year has either of your parents been robbed on the streets of your neighborhood?				
Yes	10	*† 5	13	*† 5
In the last year has anyone broken into your home?				
Yes	16	*† 8	19	*† 8
Are there fighting gangs in your neighborhood?				
Yes	39	*† 20	36	*† 20

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE 4-2
STUDENTS' FEAR, APPREHENSION, AND ABSENTEEISM

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
	(n=1,629)		(n=28,882)		(n=1,770)		(n=28,685)
How often do you feel afraid that someone will hurt or bother you on the way to school?							
At least once or twice a month	23	*†	5		21	*†	5
How often are you afraid that someone will hurt or bother you at school?						*	
At least sometimes	56	*	18		51	*†	18
How often do you bring something to school to protect yourself?							
At least sometimes	29	*†	9		28	*†	8
Did you stay at home any time [last month] because someone might hurt you or bother you at school?							
Yes	15	*	4		13	*	4
In the last four weeks, how many days of school did you miss?							
More than 10 days	5	*	2		12	*	2

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE 4-3
INDICATIONS OF STUDENTS' SOCIAL SUPPORT, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
	(n=1,629)		(n=28,882)		(n=1,770)		(n=28,685)
How many close friends do you have at this school?							
0-2	19	*†	12		15	*	12
Who would you go to first if you needed help with a personal problem?							
A school counselor	11	*	7		14	*	7
A teacher	5	*	3		6	*	3
A friend	25	*	29		21	*†	30
If you got into serious trouble at school with the teachers, how often would your parents do the following?							
Listen to your side							
Almost Never	19	*†	11		20	*†	11
Come to school to take your side							
Almost Never	36	*	30		37	*	30
Punish you							
Almost Always	39	*	31		39	*†	30

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

Should they get into trouble at school, the student victims are also less likely than others to think that their parents would listen to their side of the argument or come to school to support them, and more likely to think that their parents would punish them. In terms of tendencies, then, the gradually emerging picture is one of the victim as a youngster who perceives his life as harder than most: he or she is more likely to live in a tough neighborhood, to be afraid much of the time, to have few friends, and, perhaps, to come from a more punitive home environment. Moreover, other experiences at school do little to relieve the situation.

Academic Performance and Behavior at School

While students who have been victimized are more likely than others to say that there is a lot of competition for grades in their schools (see Table 4-4), they are also more likely to say that their own grades are low or below average (for attack victims, 14% as compared to 7%), more likely to rate themselves as well below average in reading ability (7% to 4%), and more likely to have failed a grade or more (19% to 12%).

Not only do the victimized students tend to be doing poorly academically but they are also more likely to be in trouble with the school (see Table 4-5). Twenty percent of the attack victims reported being suspended from their present schools, as compared to 11% of the other students; 2% of attack victims reported having

been expelled from another school, as compared to 1% of those not victimized. (Four percent of robbery victims report having been expelled.)

These findings and several others, such as the possession of weapons at school, suggest that the victims of attack and robbery are also more likely to be offenders. They tend to be youngsters in trouble, and part of the problem may be that they get into fights and other situations in which the chances of being victimized increase.

Attitudes Toward the School

Under the circumstances, we would not expect the student victims of violence to be as happy with their schools as other youngsters, and they are not. Compared to others, students victimized by attack or robbery tend to say that they do not like their school, the students, the principal, or the classes (see Table 4-6). Proportionately, three times as many victims said their schools were "not nearly as good" as other schools in the area. Their assessments of the teachers and principals are consistently more negative than those of other students. They are less likely to say, for example, that the principal is doing a good job, is fair, or is friendly. They are also less likely to say that the teachers are teaching them what they want to learn, or that the teachers are fair or interested in the students (see Appendix B, Tables B-4.2 through B-4.4).

TABLE 4-4

STUDENTS' ACADEMIC STATUS, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	% of Attack Victims	% of Attack Nonvictims	% of Robbery Victims	% of Robbery Nonvictims
Is there a lot of competition for grades in this school?	(n=1,629)	(n=28,882)	(n=1,770)	(n=28,685)
Yes	56 *	52	59 *	52
At the end of the last semester, were your course grades mostly:				
Below average (mostly D's) or Low (mostly E's or F's)	15 †	7	14 *	7
How would you rate yourself in reading ability?				
Well below average	7 *	4	9 *	4
Have you ever had to repeat a year in school because you failed?				
Yes	19 *	12	18 *	12

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE 4-5

STUDENTS' REPORTS OF SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	% of Attack Victims (n=1,629)	% of Attack Nonvictims (n=28,882)	% of Robbery Victims (n=1,770)	% of Robbery Nonvictims (n=28,685)
Have you ever been suspended from this school?				
Yes	20	*† 11	17	* 11
Why do you go to this school and not some other school?				
I was expelled from another school	2	* 1	4	* 1

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE 4-6

STUDENTS' DISSATISFACTION, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	% of Attack Victims (n=1,629)	% of Attack Nonvictims (n=28,882)	% of Robbery Victims (n=1,770)	% of Robbery Nonvictims (n=28,685)
How well do you like the following: Don't like				
This school	17	*† 9	17	* 9
The students	11	*† 3	11	* 3
The principal	24	* 17	26	* 16
The classes you are taking	16	* 10	19	* 10

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

The victims are more likely to see the rules as unfair, inconsistent, and arbitrary, and to report paddling and demeaning treatment of students in their schools (see Appendix B, Table B-4.5). If these perceptions are accurate, students who are victimized tend to live in more punitive environments--at school, as well as at home--than other students. Their school environment is also more likely to be characterized by conflict.

Measures of Conflict at School

A larger proportion of student victims than of others report racial, ethnic, and class conflicts in their schools, and say that racial minorities are not treated fairly at school (see Table 4-7). (Both

the victims and other students agree, however, that minority groups are treated more fairly at school than in the country as a whole.)

These assessments should not be regarded simply as reflections of more negative attitudes on the part of the student victims. They may also be quite realistic appraisals of schools which are badly run and in which a good deal of violence and illegal behavior occurs. For example, student victims are about twice as likely as others to say that heroin and stolen articles are very easy to get at their schools (see Appendix B, Table B-4.6). Victims who think the cards are stacked against them may not always be incorrect in their assumptions.

Ethics and Outlook

The victims of assault and robbery tend to express ethical values contrary to the law or the accepted rules of the game—another indication that victims in some circumstances may be offenders in others (see Table 4-8). For example, they are more likely to say that if they could get away with it they would take money from other students, cheat on a test, spray paint on school walls, and skip school. They are also more likely

to endorse statements such as "If you want to get ahead, you can't always be honest," "Taking things from others doesn't hurt anyone," and ironically, "People who get beat up usually asked for it." (See Appendix B, Table B-4.7.)

In broader terms, the victims of assault and robbery at school tend to see themselves as victims of life. In a small way, this is evident in their inclination to feel that no one listens to them in class (see Table 4-9). But the sense of

TABLE 4-7

STUDENTS' REPORTS OF HOSTILITY AMONG GROUPS AT SCHOOL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

		% of Attack		% of Robbery	
		Victims	Nonvictims	Victims	Nonvictims
		(n=1,629)	(n=28,882)	(n=1,770)	(n=28,685)
How well do the following people get along at your school?					
Students of different races	Not Well	18	*† 8	19	* 8
Students of different nationalities	Not Well	10	*† 4	11	* 4
Students without much money and students with money	Not Well	20	*† 11	20	*† 11
How much do you agree with each of the following Statements?					
Racial minority groups (Blacks, Spanish-Americans, etc.) are treated fairly in this school	Disagree	12	* 7	12	* 7
Racial minority groups (Blacks, Spanish-Americans, etc.) are treated fairly in this country	Disagree	33	* 29	31	* 29

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE 4-8

STUDENTS' REPORTED WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT CRIMES OR RULE INFRACTIONS, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

		% of Attack		% of Robbery	
		Victims	Nonvictims	Victims	Nonvictims
		(n=1,629)	(n=28,882)	(n=1,770)	(n=28,685)
Would you do any of the following things if you knew you could get away with it?					
Yes response to:					
Cheat on a test	Yes	23	* 19	25	* 19
Spray paint on school walls	Yes	10	* 4	11	* 4
Take money from other students	Yes	9	* 4	9	* 4
Skip school	Yes	28	* 24	27	* 24

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

inability to control their own destiny is dramatically evident in the response of the victims to the statement, "Every time I try to get ahead, someone or something stops me." Forty-one percent of the attack victims agreed with that statement, as compared to 25% of the other students. Victimized students were also more likely to disagree that "If I study hard I will get good grades," and "If I plan things right, they will come out OK."

It is perhaps consistent with this sense of powerlessness that a higher (though still small) proportion of victimized students said they planned to join the armed forces after leaving high school. And, asked how much school was helping them get ready for what they wanted to

do later, the victims were more likely to reply "not at all" (see Appendix B, Table B-4.8). In many ways the experiences and attitudes of teachers victimized at school resemble those of the student victims, probably, in part, because they are in the same schools.

TEACHERS' EXPERIENCES WITH CRIME AND MISBEHAVIOR

Teachers who have been attacked or robbed at school are more likely to report vandalism, personal attacks, and theft in the neighborhood around the school. Indeed, 56% of the attack victims reported that these were fairly or very much a problem, as compared to 20% of the other teachers (see Table 4-10). Teachers who have

TABLE 4-9

STUDENTS' SENSE OF INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

		<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
		(n=1,529)		(n=28,882)		(n=1,770)		(n=28,865)
How easy would it be to do the following things if you wanted to?								
Have your ideas listened to in class	Not Easy	31	*†	19		32	*†	19
How do you feel about each of the following ideas?								
Every time I try to get ahead, something or someone stops me	Agree	41	*†	25		46	*†	24
If I study hard, I will get good grades	Disagree	13	*	9		14	*	9
If I plan things right, they will come out O.K.	Disagree	12	*	10		14	*	10

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE 4-10

TEACHERS' REPORTS OF HIGH CRIME IN SCHOOL NEIGHBORHOOD, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
	(n=273)		(n=19,051)		(n=211)		(n=19,157)
In your opinion, how much of a problem are vandalism, personal attacks, and theft in the neighborhood surrounding your school?							
Fairly much or very much	56	*	20		53	*	20

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

been victimized are two to five times as likely to regard places at school as unsafe (see Appendix B, Table B-4.9).

More than others, teachers who are victims of violence at school also tend to have frequent hostile encounters with students (Table 4-11). No less than 90% of the teachers who reported being attacked also reported being sworn at by students in the previous month; 48% of the other teachers reported this. Of those victimized by attack, 60%

were also threatened with harm at least once in the previous month; only 11% of the other teachers so reported. Understandably, those victimized are also more likely than other teachers to hesitate in confronting misbehaving students for fear of their own safety.

Perceptions of the School

Teachers who are victims of assault and robbery further resemble student victims in their

TABLE 4-11
TEACHERS' REPORTS OF VERBAL ABUSE, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	% of Attack Victims (n=273)	% of Attack Nonvictims (n=19,051)	% of Robbery Victims (n=211)	% of Robbery Nonvictims (n=19,157)
In (the target or pretarget month), did any students swear at you or make obscene remarks or gestures to you?				
At least once or twice	90	48	74	48
In (the target or pretarget month), how many times did any students threaten to hurt you?				
At least once or twice	60	11	37	11
In (the target or pretarget month), how many times did you hesitate to confront misbehaving students for fear of your own safety?				
At least once or twice	45	12	33	12

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

TABLE 4-12
TEACHERS' REPORTS OF HOSTILITY AMONG GROUPS AT SCHOOL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

		% of Attack Victims (n=273)	% of Attack Nonvictims (n=19,051)	% of Robbery Victims (n=211)	% of Robbery Nonvictims (n=19,157)
How much does each of the following statements describe your school?					
All students are treated equally	Not At All	15	6	14	6
In your opinion, how well do the following groups get along at your school?					
Students of different races	Not Well	14	5	13	5
Students of different nationality backgrounds	Not Well	7	2	8	2
Students of different socio-economic groups	Not Well	10	4	10	5
Teachers and students	Not Well	6	1	10	1
Teachers and administrators	Not Well	22	9	27	9
Parents and teachers	Not well	7	2	11	2

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)

assessments of their schools (see Appendix B, Table B-4.10). In general, they do not like them. They are much less likely than other teachers to say that the principal is friendly or fair, or that he/she shares decisionmaking. They also tend to feel that all students are not treated equally at school, and, like the student victims, they are much more likely to note conflict in the school--not only racial, ethnic, and class conflict, but conflict between teachers and students, administrators and parents (see Table 4-12).

As with the students, these differences between the perceptions of teacher victims and

nonvictims probably reflect real differences in the schools in which they teach. It is no surprise, then, that victimized teachers tend more than others to say that teachers in their school are unable to maintain control in class (see Appendix B, Table B-4.11).

Attitudes Toward Students

The teachers were asked a series of 10 questions from the "Pupil Control Ideology Scale" designed by Willower (Table 4-13). Each of the statements to which the teachers responded reflects a negative attitude toward students--

TABLE 4-13
TEACHERS' REPORTS OF AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDES,¹
BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

		% of Attack Victims (n=273)	% of Attack Nonvictims (n=19,051)	% of Robbery Victims (n=211)	% of Robbery Nonvictims (n=19,157)
Following are 10 statements about schools, teachers, and pupils. Please indicate your personal opinion about each statement by circling the appropriate number at the right of each statement.					
Pupils are usually not capable of solving their problems through logical reasoning	Strongly Agree	5 *	2	10 *	2
Beginning teachers are not likely to maintain strict enough control over their pupils	Strongly Agree	7	5	10 *	5
The best principal gives unquestioning support to teachers in disciplining pupils	Strongly Agree	23	18	25 *	18
It is justifiable to have pupils learn many facts about subjects even if they have no immediate application	Strongly Agree	21 *	8	9	9
Being friendly with pupils often leads them to become too familiar	Strongly Agree	5	4	11 *	4
Student governments are a good "safety valve" but should not have much influence on school policy	Strongly Agree	4	2	2	2
If a pupil uses obscene or profane language in school, it must be considered a moral offense	Strongly Agree	16 *	6	15 *	6
A few pupils are just young hoodlums and should be treated accordingly	Strongly Agree	19 *	8	22 *	8
A pupil who destroys school material or property should be severely punished	Strongly Agree	26 *	18	32 *	18
Pupils often misbehave in order to make the teacher look bad	Strongly Agree	7 *	3	8 *	3

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*p<.05 (t test)

¹From Willower's Pupil Control Ideology Scale.

generally harsh, authoritarian, and demeaning. On every item a higher proportion of victimized teachers than of others endorsed the statements. Harshly authoritarian teachers may provoke violence by students. On the other hand, teaching in violent schools may engender authoritarian attitudes in teachers.

Understandably, victimized teachers are more likely than others to say that they do not want to keep teaching the kind of students they have now, and indicated they would rather move than continue teaching at their present schools (see Table 4-14).

SUMMARY OF VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS

Student victims are more likely than others to come from high-crime neighborhoods, to be afraid at school, to avoid places there, and to miss school. They have fewer friends and less social support at home than others, and are more likely to turn to school counselors and teachers for help. They tend to be youngsters in trouble, apart from their victimization experiences. They are more

likely than others to have been suspended from their present school or expelled from others, to have trouble academically, and to hold to ethical values not sanctioned by society in general. More than others, they tend not to like much of anything about their schools. In general, they tend to see themselves as pawns in a game over which they have no control.

The picture of the school and its surroundings drawn by the victimized teachers is similar to that of their student counterparts. More than other teachers, they report that crime is a problem in the neighborhood around the school and there is a lack of safety at school. Like the students, their assessment of their schools tends to be much more negative than that of other teachers. Their view of students is also more negative. Like the victimized students, they are probably accurately describing school and neighborhood environments in which violence is fairly common, and in which efforts to reduce violence are generally ineffective. Therefore many want to move to other schools and to teach other students.


TABLE 4-14

TEACHERS' DISSATISFACTION WITH THEIR STUDENTS AND SCHOOL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS


How much do you disagree or agree with each of the following statements?	% of Attack Victims	% of Attack Nonvictims	% of Robbery Victims	% of Robbery Nonvictims
	(n=273)	(n=19,051)	(n=211)	(n=19,157)
Disagree/Strongly Disagree				
I want to keep on teaching the kind of students I have now	38	* 16	39	* 16
I want to continue teaching at this school rather than move	22	* 8	19	* 9

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*p<.01 (t test)







The Schools' Role in Reducing Crime and Misbehavior

5

This chapter summarizes the results of a statistical analysis of data from the schools in the Safe Schools Study. The preceding chapters examined the association between personal characteristics of teachers and students and their experiences as victims of robberies and attacks at school. Now we shift the spotlight from the individual and focus on the role of the school. Since the school is an environment where school crime occurs, any policy initiatives which alter that environment presumably affect the amount of crime that occurs.

The statistical analysis is presented in Appendix A. The technique uses multiple regression equations to locate those school characteristics which are most consistently and strongly associated with the amount of crime occurring in a school. In the course of constructing these equations, literally hundreds of variables were considered and most rejected. The questionnaires were written in order to test a variety of theories about factors that cause school crime. The reader who is interested in fully understanding this analysis should examine the appendixes in detail.

THE RESEARCH METHOD

Although this chapter is intended as a non-technical summary of the main findings of our analysis, it is still necessary to begin with a brief reference to some of the technical issues. One such issue involves measuring each school's crime rate, given the inconsistencies in the rates obtained by different methods in the survey. The reader by this point is well aware that students in face-to-face interviews were considerably less likely to report being victimized than they were on written questionnaires, and that we have some reason to believe that the Student Interviews (SIs) are more accurate, and the Student Questionnaire (SQ) responses inflated. Nevertheless, we have to use the questionnaire data for the analysis of this chapter because its larger number of responses gives more reliable estimates of the differences between schools.

The statistical study analyzes the impact on one factor while holding constant the effects of a number of others--in technical terms, this is a multivariate analysis. A multivariate analysis is a useful method of study, providing that we keep in

mind the way it differs from an analysis that looks at only one possible cause of crime, and also that we keep in mind the limitations of the method.

Multivariate analysis identifies factors which are characteristic of high-crime schools and shows which of these factors are and are not related to school crime when schools are matched on the basis of other characteristics. When this occurs, interpretation of the statistics is sometimes difficult. As an example, 22 school characteristics were identified as being related to school crime in our multivariate analysis. One factor which we might expect to find in such a list, but which is not there, is the number of "problem students" dealt with in the school. Each teacher was asked for a count of problem students in his or her class and, not surprisingly, we find that schools which have more problem students also have more crime. However, the importance of this count of problem students becomes irrelevant when other school factors are considered simultaneously. What exactly does that mean? First, it does not mean that "problem students" do not cause difficulty or that high-crime schools do not have more problem students. What it does imply is that it cannot be true that school crime is mainly caused by an easily recognized cadre of serious offenders whose behavior is intractable. If this were the case, there would be nothing the school could do if it had a large number of such students, and the relationship between the number of problem



students and the level of crime would persist no matter what other school factors were considered. Apparently the number of students in a school who are chronic troublemakers, or are believed to be by the teachers, is not a fixed or uncontrollable characteristic of the school. For example, if most of the students say the school rules are fair or that rules are strictly enforced, the teachers will say that there are fewer problem students in their classes. Whether this is because potential troublemakers are less likely to "act out" if the rules are strict and fair or whether teachers are less likely to define students as troublemakers when school rules are firmly and fairly enforced, we do not know. But whatever the case, we can conclude that the school is not the impotent victim of the number of chronic offenders in its student body.

The policy implications of this finding are ambiguous. On the one hand it is still probably true that a school could reduce its crime rate by simply expelling those students causing the most trouble. Although our data cannot say how effective such a policy would be, our data do indicate that there seems to be a large number of schools in the United States that have reduced their crime rate without resorting to the expulsion of problem students.

The major problem with a statistical analysis such as this is that it cannot guarantee that the factors identified as characteristic of low-crime schools are in fact "causes" of the low crime rate. To consider another example: The data show that schools whose teachers have intensive association with fewer students in the course of a week have less violence than schools in similar neighborhoods, with similar ethnic compositions and student attitudes, whose teachers have extensive contact with a larger number of students each week. For one thing, it is possible that the data are mistaken; we may have somehow miscalculated the amount of teacher-student association. In addition, it may be that had we identified some other school factor and taken that into account, we would have found the relationship between extensiveness of association and school crime disappearing. Finally, there is always the possibility that the relationship between extensiveness of teacher-student association and school crime exists because a high crime rate causes a school to alter its staffing pattern so that teachers are brought into association with more students. This last explanation seems highly unlikely, but it is a possibility to be considered.

For all these reasons, the statistical analysis cannot guarantee that an administrator who reduces the number of students per teacher will find a corresponding reduction in crime. In this

particular example, we think it is at least rather likely that the school crime rate would go down if this step were taken. But this conclusion is based on more than simply the results of the statistical analysis. It represents a culling of other information about schools, a knowledge of the views held by professional educators and educational policymakers, and a reading of the general literature on juvenile delinquency. The analysis is as much influenced by the writings of social scientists and educators as it is by the statistical data presented here.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SCHOOL SECURITY PROCEDURES: A RESEARCH PROBLEM

This particular analysis does not address the question "How effective are security procedures (such as hiring security officers or installing burglar alarms) in reducing school crime?" The question is not addressed because it is impossible to answer with these data. We have already noted the problems in analyzing data and interpreting the results in terms of factors influencing school crime. The analysis of the effect of any school characteristic is difficult and complex, but analysis of the effects of procedures explicitly intended to reduce crime is, for all practical purposes, not possible. It is ironic that the more closely related a school characteristic is to school crime, the more difficult the analysis becomes. But this is exactly the case. The problem is that if we consider schools that have security personnel and compare them to those that do not, we will find that schools with security officers have higher crime rates than others. Does this mean that security guards cause crime? Of course not. Even if we carried out a multivariate analysis like the one done in this report, we would still find that schools with guards appear to have more crime.

The problem is that we cannot statistically match a school with security guards to one without guards. Even though we can find two schools of identical ethnicity, similar student attitudes, and similar community crime rates, one with and one without security guards, the one with the guards is likely to have a higher crime rate. The school with guards may have introduced them because in the recent past it had a serious crime problem. Even if the guards were successful in reducing the problem, we should not expect them to have reduced it to a level below that of a similar school which did not have the problem. In other words, security personnel do not cause crime, but crime causes schools to hire security personnel, and our multivariate analysis cannot distinguish between these two explanations.

No matter what we do, the data will always make it appear that the apparent "effect" of

security guards is to increase the amount of crime. There has been a great deal of debate among educational statisticians about this particular type of problem. Many believe that there is no solution in a single survey such as this one, and recommend that repeated data collections over several years be used. Others have pointed out that even with a longitudinal data collection plan, serious problems still continue to surround such questions. Some researchers believe that new, sophisticated statistical techniques can be used to solve the problem. The scientific community does agree, however, that the most effective way to deal with the problem is to carry on an experiment. In this case that would mean assigning security personnel to schools not on a basis of normal assessment of need but in a purely random fashion. These kinds of experiments are routinely used in medicine and the biological sciences and are becoming more common in educational research. However, time and resources did not permit such an experiment for this study. As an alternative, we have relied on principals' assessments of the effectiveness of security measures (see Chapter 6) and on their descriptions of the successful programs implemented in their schools (see Chapter 7).

The Phase III Case Studies have also been used to gain an understanding of the value of school security personnel and devices. But the statistical analyses of the school crime rates do not aid us here. For this reason, we will concentrate in this chapter on analyzing more general school characteristics which might be related to school crime. While the problems of interpretation remain evident, they are less serious when

we analyze a school characteristic which is not explicitly intended solely to reduce school crime.

To return to our earlier example, we have no reason to believe that schools which have high student/teacher ratios (or large classes) have them because of local crime waves. It seems more reasonable to say that large classes are a cause of crime rather than that crime causes large classes. In this case, there are technical problems in the analysis, but at least there is not an insurmountable barrier to interpretation.

THE RESULTS

The role of schools was studied using 12 separate analyses. First, two categories of school crime were defined: student violence, defined as the proportion of students in a school who reported being attacked or robbed; and school property loss, defined as the value of property lost through theft, burglary, vandalism, or arson. For each of these two types of crime, six separate analyses were done—one each for junior high schools and senior high schools in metropolitan central cities, suburban metropolitan schools, and nonmetropolitan schools. (For brevity, we refer to these as urban, suburban, and rural, although these terms are not precisely correct.)

A large number of variables representing a number of different kinds of hypotheses were tested, and only those variables were used which had a consistent effect. In the end, 10 variables were located which were consistently related to student violence, and 12 variables which were consistently related to school property loss (see Tables 5-1 and 5-2). The two lists have some variables in common, and despite the fact that the

TABLE 5-1

CHARACTERISTICS OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS WITH LOW RATES OF STUDENT VIOLENCE

Student violence is lower in:

1. Schools whose attendance areas have low crime rates and few or no fighting gangs.
2. Schools that have a smaller percentage of male students.
3. Schools that are composed of higher grades.
4. Small schools.
5. Schools where students rate classrooms as well disciplined, where rules are strictly enforced, and where the principal is considered strict.
6. Schools where students consider school discipline as being fairly administered.
7. Schools where there are fewer students in each class and where teachers teach fewer different students each week.
8. Schools where students say that classes teach them what they want to learn.
9. Schools whose students consider grades important and plan to go on to college.
10. Schools whose students believe they can influence what happens in their lives by their efforts, rather than feeling that things happen to them which they cannot control.

others are different, they can all be organized according to certain common themes.

Looking at the factors identified in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 does not permit us to write a simple recipe for reducing school crime; but taken together, the factors present a conception of school crime which we think is valuable in understanding its origins and in designing effective preventive strategies.

Effects of Neighborhood and Student Body Characteristics

One factor which influences the amount of crime in a school is the character of the student body and the community from which the student body is drawn. Seven of the 18 findings in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 point to student or community factors as a cause of crime:

1. Violence is higher in schools where the attendance area has a high crime rate and youth gang activities.

2. School property loss is greater for schools in attendance areas with high crime rates.
3. School property loss is greater when a large number of students live near the school.
4. School property loss is greater if the school has a problem with nonstudents loitering around the school.
5. Student violence is greater if the school has more male than female students.
6. Student violence is greater if the school serves lower secondary grades.
7. School property loss is greater if students' families do not support school discipline.

All seven of these results are easily understood. We expect crime to spill over from the neighborhood into the school to some extent because the same youngsters may be involved in both; growing up in a violent neighborhood may

TABLE 5-2

CHARACTERISTICS OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS WITH LOW PROPERTY LOSS (Through Burglary, Theft, Vandalism, or Arson)

Property loss is lower in:

1. Schools whose attendance areas have low crime rates.
2. Schools where fewer students live close to the school.
3. Schools which do not have many nonstudents on the campus during the day.
4. Schools where families support school disciplinary policies.
5. Small schools.
6. Schools whose students say that classrooms are well controlled, rules are strictly enforced, and where teachers say they spend more time in nonclassroom supervision.
7. Schools where teachers say that the principal works cooperatively with them and is fair and informal in dealing with staff.
8. Schools in which teachers do not express hostile and authoritarian attitudes toward students.
9. Schools whose students value their teachers' opinions of them.
10. Schools where teachers do not lower students' grades for disciplinary reasons.
11. Schools whose students do not consider grades important and do not plan to go on to college.
12. Schools whose students do not consider being school leaders important personal goals.

make violent behavior seem normal and acceptable. If the school is located in a densely populated area, the school becomes a convenient target for vandalism or burglary. If the school is a hangout for nonstudent youths, we can expect some damage to occur to the building. As boys commit a disproportionate share of all violent crime, a disproportionate ratio of boys to girls means more sources of trouble. As young adolescents commit more violent crimes than older students, the younger the secondary school's student body, the more crime can be expected. Finally, if parental discipline is lax, the school can be expected to suffer. These results indicate clearly that a substantial factor in school crime is the kind of community the school serves. In this sense a portion of the school's crime rate is outside of its control. But it is important not to overstate this. The relative influence of the community on the school is not as strong as we anticipated, or as most educational policymakers previously assumed.

Community size has been shown in Chapter 1 to be related to the risks of certain kinds of offenses in schools, but only weakly, if at all, to others. Hence, it is an overstatement to say that school crime is an urban problem. The risk to schools of offenses such as vandalism and arson is about as great in suburbs as in cities. In the present analysis we find that property loss due to crime is about the same for urban and suburban junior high schools, while in senior high schools suburban rates are about three-fourths as high as urban rates. Rural junior high schools have a relatively low amount of property loss, less than half that of suburban and urban schools; the rural high schools, however, have a loss rate only slightly less than that of suburban high schools.

Student attacks and robberies are about three-fourths as likely to occur in suburban and rural junior high schools as in urban junior highs; the urban high school rates are only about 10% higher than those in the other areas. However, when we consider the more serious violent offenses against students (such as attacks requiring medical treatment) and offenses against teachers, the relation to community size is more marked (Chapter 1).

While schools in high crime areas tend to have more violence and property loss than schools in other areas, the association between community crime and school crime is not as strong as we expected it to be. In our search for factors affecting property loss for all six categories of schools (junior and senior high schools in the three types of communities), at least one school characteristic was more strongly related to the amount of property loss than the overall crime rate of the schools' attendance area. For student

violence, we see a similar pattern: the crime rate of the community is an important but by no means overwhelming factor. For every three students victimized in a school in a high-crime neighborhood, two students in a low crime area are victims.

For the types of crime covered in this analysis, property loss and violence against students, the rates in minority schools are not a great deal higher than those in schools serving mostly white students. Black adults are much more likely than white adults to be both the victims and offenders in violent crimes, as are adults in several other racial/ethnic minority groups. Therefore, one might also expect minority schools to have unusually high rates of crime. This is true for assaults upon teachers, which as we saw in Chapter 3 are more than five times as likely to occur in predominantly minority schools as in mostly white schools. However, the differences in rates are much smaller for property losses and violence against students. The risk of attack is not much higher in minority than in white schools, while the risk of robbery is 56% higher. Although this is a substantial difference, it is much smaller than one would expect, considering the adult community crime rates. Schools seem to even out widely disparate community crime rates, perhaps because schools in general are more like one another than their surrounding communities are.

This evidence that minority schools in general are not as plagued by crime as is often assumed will come as a surprise to many readers. This is partly because we have assumed that ethnic differences in adult crime rates will be reflected in the schools. In addition, because attacks on teachers receive much more attention in the media and in ordinary conversation than do attacks on students, the high rate of this kind of violence in minority schools has led us to expect the same pattern among students.

In the statistical analysis we see that when schools are matched on the level of crime in the community, predominantly white schools have about the same rates of violence and property loss as do nonwhite schools. Once the level of crime in the community is taken into account, there is essentially no relationship between the racial composition of schools and the amount of violence or property loss experienced in the schools. A mostly white school in a low-crime neighborhood typically has a slightly higher rate of student violence than a minority school in an equally low-crime neighborhood. Put differently, a white school is, on the average, not as safe as the area around it, while the minority school is safer.

The same pattern appears if we consider the

income of the students' parents. Low-income areas in general have high crime rates, but the crime rate in schools serving those areas is not as high as their neighborhoods would lead us to expect. Like racial composition, parental income has no relation to the amount of violence or property loss in schools once other factors are taken into account.

Desegregation and Violence

The attention given by the media to instances of violence accompanying the desegregation process has given the impression that desegregation is a major cause of school violence. Our data do not support this impression. The statistical analysis shows that a school's being under court order to desegregate is associated with only a slight increase in the amount of student violence when other factors are taken into account. It shows further that there is no consistent association between the number of students bussed and school violence, controlling for other factors. Finally, there is a weak association between student violence and the recentness of initial desegregation efforts at a school. Together these findings suggest that some violence may be due to the initiation of mandatory desegregation, but that as time goes on and larger numbers of students are bussed to achieve racial balance, the desegregation process ceases to be a factor. Programs to ease tensions in the first stages of desegregation already exist, and further research and development in this area is being conducted. Our data suggest that, in general, a heavier concentration of resources on schools which are desegregating would not be an appropriate strategy, unless the goal is to make them safer than other schools.

Another finding from our analysis that seems to run counter to common belief is that violence rates are much lower in senior high schools than they are in junior high schools. We have already seen that student victimization declines as students grow older. In general, student victimization rates in high schools are about one-half that of the rates in junior high school, regardless of the seriousness of the incidents. Property loss through vandalism and burglary in senior high schools is twice as great as in junior high schools. However, when we consider that senior high schools are much larger, have more expensive property on the premises, and are more visible in the community, the fact that their property loss rate is higher does not necessarily suggest that they have a more serious problem.

The data relating student background and community characteristics to the school's crime rate indicate a great variation in crime rates among schools with similar student and

community characteristics. Schools in low-income areas frequently have low crime rates, while schools in seemingly "better" areas sometimes have very high crime rates. This is very encouraging information for policymakers, as it suggests that there may be much a school can do to influence the degree to which it is beset with problems. The major task of the remainder of this analysis is to describe school practices that seem to be successful in reducing school crime.

WHAT SCHOOLS CAN DO TO CONTROL CRIME

Fifteen school factors are related to the extent of crime. These 15 factors taken together do not constitute a simple recipe for controlling violence; they do, however, point to a way of viewing what a school should do. The factors represent six closely related themes that mesh closely with social science theories of crime and juvenile delinquency. Taken together, they suggest a set of overall process goals that schools should work to achieve. The 15 school factors represent characteristics of schools that have low crime rates. The meaning of these facts must be a matter of scientific and human judgment. It is possible that we have misread the significance of these 15 factors, and the reader must judge that for himself. However, to us, the facts fit together and agree with social science theory in a persuasive way.

Theme One: Size and Impersonality

It is often suggested that size of student enrollment is a cause of the problems in schools. Large schools represent impersonal environments where many strangers are thrown together and lost in a Manhattan-like shuffle. Three findings in our analysis address this issue.

- Large schools have greater property loss through burglary, theft, and vandalism; they also have slightly more violence.
- The more students each teacher teaches, the greater the amount of school violence.
- The less students value teachers' opinions of them the greater the property loss.

The argument that large schools have more difficulty than small schools simply because they are large seems overstated in the light of these data. It is true that large schools have more property loss, but we should bear in mind that the larger buildings with more expensive equipment and more students provide more opportunity for loss. Actually, the per-capita property loss from large schools is not higher than in small schools.

However, the proportion of students victimized is slightly higher in large schools, and violence is consistently higher in schools where teachers have larger classes and where teachers teach more students in the course of a week. The impact of class size on student violence is interesting, in part because previous research has not found class size to be an important predictor of such things as school achievement. It may well be that students learn as well in a large classroom as in a small one, but large classes apparently do cause problems for student control. We suspect it is simply that teachers are not able to establish personal relationships with students in large classes. The policy implications of this--reducing class size--are obvious but expensive.

A second factor has to do with the number of different students each teacher sees in a week. In general, when other school characteristics are controlled, the more different students a teacher comes in contact with, the greater the school violence. Again, we suspect this has to do with the inability of the teacher to establish personal relationships with large numbers of students. As teachers have contact with more students, and students deal with more teachers, the student's sense of being a cipher becomes stronger.

Impersonality is also related to the third factor. In an impersonal school where teachers have little continuous contact with students and little personal influence over them, students are less likely to be affected by teachers' opinions of them. This lack of a sense of adult guidance and expectations is associated with high property losses in schools.

There are two ways to reduce the number of different students that teachers have in their classes. One is by having each teacher assigned to fewer classes, thereby freeing them for more supervisory duties in nonclassroom parts of the schools and for engaging in other activities with students that may have a positive effect on school safety. However, this approach would also be expensive and would not provide closer and more continuous contact between a teacher and his or her students. The second method is to have fewer, but longer classes. One approach to this is the "core" system of teaching, in which a single teacher teaches English, history, and social studies to one class for half the day, used by many middle schools and junior high schools to help younger students deal with the transition from elementary to secondary school. This is a potentially promising strategy, particularly when we bear in mind that seventh grade is the most difficult grade level in terms of school crime. As was noted in Chapter 2, such an approach would also be helpful in reducing traffic in the hallways. However, the core system has been criticized as

demanding too much expertise from teachers in diverse subject areas, and it should not be regarded as a sure-fire way to reduce school violence and vandalism. It is presented as an illustration of the ways in which secondary schools can increase continuing personal contact between teachers and students, as an approach worthy of consideration by school districts, and as one requiring further research.

A related approach to establishing personal relationships between teachers and students is the use of what might be called cohort teaching, in which a teacher is assigned to a group of students and moves with them through the school career--teaching the higher grade each year as the students themselves are promoted. This system is used in some European schools, but is uncommon in the United States.

Theme Two: Systematic School Discipline

One of the most powerful predictors of the school crime rate is the character of the schools' disciplinary policies. This is suggested in three findings from our study:

- Student reports of strict enforcement of school rules and strict control of classroom behavior are associated with lower levels of school property loss.
- Student perceptions of tight classroom control, strictly enforced rules, and principal's firmness are associated with low levels of student violence.
- Reports by the teachers of strong coordination between faculty and administration are associated with a lower level of property loss.

As these three relationships are strong in the data, it is very important to understand what they mean. Analysis was done in an attempt to determine whether these findings are simply an indication that schools with unruly students are unable to control them, or whether a school with an efficient disciplinary system is able to reduce student crime. Analysis of the data suggests that both arguments are partly correct. Weak rule enforcement is characteristic of a difficult student body--rule enforcement is more lax in high-crime neighborhoods, where many students come from broken homes or where students report ineffective discipline at home. It is understandable that a school with this type of student body may have more difficulty controlling student behavior. But this is only part of the story. Certain types of schools have stricter control,

regardless of the kind of students they have. These are schools in which teachers praise their principal, stress the degree of coordination in the school, and tend not to complain about the central administration of the school district (for example, they are less likely to say that they have difficulty obtaining the materials they need for teaching). In these schools, teachers are also more likely to say that they play a strong role in supervising halls and other areas of the school outside the classroom.

It is interesting to observe that many writers on education would have predicted an opposite relationship--that crime would be high in firmly disciplined schools because students would react to the confining nature of strict rules. This may once have been true about American secondary schools, but it is apparently true that there are more schools that err on the side of laxness in rule enforcement than there are schools that have difficulty because they are too rigid. However, the unfair or inconsistent enforcement of rules today, as always, can lead to revolt, as we shall see shortly.

We also considered the possibility that school crime is a form of student rebellion against an institution that does not permit students to participate in the establishment of school rules. We asked several questions about opportunities for student participation but found no evidence that a more democratic form of government helps to reduce school crime. It is unclear what this means, and certainly it cannot be read as a condemnation of student participation. Indeed, we have noted that schools in which students feel they have no control over their circumstances are schools which tend to have more violence. Whether student participation in decisionmaking would help reduce this sense of fatalism is not immediately apparent from the data, but the subject is worth exploring further.

Detailed analysis indicates that coordination between principal and teachers and among teachers is most important in larger schools. In small schools, it may be possible for informal communication among school staff to take the place of efficient administration, but large schools seem to require a direct administrative strategy for establishing a school-wide disciplinary policy and seeing to it that the policy is enforced. We suspect that firm rule enforcement is the result of the behavior of the principal. An efficient principal who commands the respect of his staff and who plans the school disciplinary program carefully can help teachers learn disciplinary techniques, help coordinate their efforts, and provide support when they need it. It also seems likely that one reason why

schools in high-crime areas have poor rule enforcement is that teachers and administrators alike have low expectations in these schools. One of the unfortunate effects of the common view that school crime is a function of the community is the strong temptation for administrators and teachers to give up, expecting students in poverty areas to be unruly and causing their expectations to become "self-fulfilling prophecies." As a result, they do little to prevent it. All this is not to suggest that the control of school discipline in such areas is an easy task; however, the data indicate that large numbers of school principals have succeeded in establishing a firm and clear set of disciplinary rules and in seeing to it that they are uniformly enforced.

Theme Three: Arbitrariness and Student Frustration

The data also suggest that student crime results when students are frustrated by rules that they see as arbitrary and enforced by a school staff that is unnecessarily punitive. Two findings suggest this:

- Schools where students complain that discipline is unfairly administered have higher rates of violence.
- Schools where teachers express authoritarian and punitive attitudes about students have greater amounts of property loss.

Schools where the above situations exist are usually characterized by weak school disciplinary policies. This helps us understand the significance of these two findings. We suspect that it is probably true that a school with a lax disciplinary policy is perceived by the students as administering its discipline unfairly. If rules are not enforced consistently, the student who is disciplined is likely to feel unfairly singled out. It is also likely that teachers will tend to discipline some students more harshly than others and, in that sense, "take on" certain students. Moreover, it seems that if the school disciplinary policy is lax, teachers will become upset at the unruliness of the students and develop unfavorable attitudes toward them. Students in poorly disciplined schools are more likely to say that they are treated "like kids," that minorities are treated unfairly, and that teachers do not listen to their views. Again, we suspect that these perceptions may be largely accurate. This sort of situation increases the frustration level of the student body, and many students will express this frustration in aggressive acts--either in attacks on other students or in attacks on the school as an institution.

Theme Four: The Importance of the School's Reward Structure

Four factors related to school violence and property loss stem directly from the schools' structure of incentives:

- Schools where students express a strong desire to succeed by getting good grades have less violence.
- Schools where students express a strong desire to succeed by getting good grades have more property loss.
- Schools where students have a strong desire to be school leaders have greater property losses.
- Schools where teachers say they lower students' grades as a disciplinary measure have greater property losses.

The most striking thing about this list is that an emphasis on getting good grades seems to reduce violence but to increase vandalism. Does this mean that a school which tries to reduce its violence level by emphasizing grades and academic aspirations will increase its risk of vandalism? That may be the case, but we suspect not. Instead, we believe that there are two syndromes related to the schools reward structure—the violence syndrome and the vandalism syndrome.

It is not surprising that a student's desire to succeed academically is associated with reduced violence. Two other student attitude variables are also consistently associated with school violence—the perceived relevance of the courses and the student's sense of control over his or her own destiny. Each of these three related factors makes its own particular contribution to school violence: a lack of concern about grades, a sense of the irrelevance of courses, and a sense of having no control over what happens to you.

The syndrome suggested here is that of the alienated, turned-off student who is beyond caring about grades because he or she has given up. The courses seem irrelevant, and the student feels that nothing he or she does at school is going to make any difference. The school seems to constitute a set of impersonal circumstances to be endured, or avoided, until he or she can get out. Resigned to these circumstances because he or she cannot affect them or improve his or her own chances in them, the student turns to personal

violence either in frustration or in an effort to have at least some impact on somebody.

In schools where this syndrome is apparent, the effect of emphasizing academic success and of providing meaningful rewards to turned-off students—such as incentives for individual improvement—would be to bring students above the level of fatalistic indifference and to foster a situation in which students care about the school and see it as offering them a chance. The Phase III Case Studies support this interpretation: an emphasis on academic success was an important factor in building school pride and in drastically reducing violence.

Vandalism seems to be related to the reward structure in a different way. The three factors that increase property losses are desire for academic success, desire for success in school leadership roles, and teachers' manipulation of grades for disciplinary purposes. All three assume that the school's rewards are very important, and the third suggests that the way these rewards are allocated makes a considerable difference. In this syndrome we seem to be dealing with a situation in which the competition for rewards is intense, the availability of rewards is limited, and the unfair distribution of rewards is prevalent. Many of those who lose out in the competition (as the majority do) still care about what the school can give them. They are more likely to be frustrated at being denied rewards which the school says, and they believe, are important. And they are likely to be angry when the rewards are passed out unfairly, as with the use of grades for discipline. Since they care about the rewards, but see themselves as denied them by the school, they vent their aggression on the apparent source of their problem—they attack the school.

Interestingly, while an emphasis on academic success seems to work in opposite directions for violence and vandalism, the findings in both cases suggest the same thing about the relation of the school's reward structure to school crime. As McDill and McPartland have pointed out, despite an elaborate incentive system, many students do not receive much in the way of rewards at school. Some care and are disappointed or frustrated; others have ceased to care. It should be possible to provide a wider distribution of incentives without compromising performance standards. One way of doing this would be to reward individual improvement as handsomely as achievement relative to others is rewarded. And whatever the standards and processes of distribution, the reward system should be administered in a fair and evenhanded manner.

Theme Five: Relevance

Many critics of the school have argued that secondary school education is irrelevant to the needs of many youths. One finding in the analysis is consistent with this:

- Student violence is higher in schools where more students say that the teachers are not teaching what they want to learn.

Arthur Stinchcombe argues that we can understand student rebellious behavior by thinking of the relationship between the school and the student as a form of contract. The school requires that the student surrender a great deal of freedom, to act like a child in giving unquestioning obedience to the adults of the school; in exchange for this, the school promises to reward the student with a high school diploma that will be of value in his adulthood. The contract seems fair and reasonable to many students—particularly those who are looking forward to college and a professional career. But for other students the contract may appear decidedly one-sided. For example, the student who wants to go to college but cannot make good enough grades may feel that the school is not fulfilling its part of the bargain. The student who is not planning to go to college may feel that little of what he is learning will be of use to him. Stinchcombe argues that, when students feel that the contract is invalid, they will respond by refusing to accept the status of remaining a child—insisting on such adult privileges as the right to marriage, automobiles, etc. Denied these, they become rebellious.

We should point out that the data do not indicate that career education is the only solution to this problem. Indeed, a question asking students whether they feel that they are being adequately prepared for adult jobs does not correlate with school crime. We suspect that students do not view the school in strictly instrumental terms. We also believe that they are willing to accept the school's definition of reality—that basic skills and a general liberal education are necessary. But a general liberal education can be presented in such a way as to seem relevant to the needs of students. At least these data indicate that some schools are able to do this, and when they do they have less student violence.

Theme Six: Alienation

Most of the findings presented thus far can be brought together under a single general theme of alienation. Alienation is a complex concept that has been used in research on delinquency and crime. Alienation means simply the breakdown of

the social bond that ties each individual into the society. Melvin Seeman has pointed out that this breakdown may occur in several different ways. It may come from a sense of normlessness: a sense of not knowing what the social rules are or should be. This is particularly critical in a time when the social values are changing rapidly, as they have been in the United States. We think one of the problems confronting schools with a lax or ineffective disciplinary policy is that such a policy teaches students that there are no rules—or that rules are ambiguous and not necessarily intended to be obeyed. The student who learns this lesson in connection with such petty offenses as truancy may generalize it to apply to more serious kinds of crime. The same argument applies to rules seen as unfair or capricious. If teachers are "picking on" students, they are themselves not following the norm of fair and equal treatment.

The second way in which the social bond breaks down is if students are unable to cope with the society which makes them feel powerless. Certainly, the student who is unable to obtain good grades and sees no chance of being rewarded by the school, may come to believe that he or she is destined for failure, no matter what he or she tries to do.

Finally, alienation can derive from a sense of meaninglessness in life. This is the way the word is used by existentialist philosophers. School is the student's first major experience in dealing with society beyond the family. If the school does not make sense—if its rules seem strange, indefensible, and arbitrary, or if the point of learning an assignment is obscure—the student may develop a view that the whole experience, and indeed life in general is meaningless. There is one major finding in the study that seems to touch on this concept quite directly.

- Student violence is higher in schools where more students say that they cannot influence what will happen to them—that their future is dependent upon the actions of others or on luck, rather than on their own efforts.

Over the past 15 years social researchers have investigated this concept, under the name of "internal vs. external" control of the environment. A person is said to have a sense of internalized as opposed to externalized control if he believes that he can influence his future, rather than believing that his future is controlled entirely by other persons or by fate. For example, externalized control means answering "yes" to the statement "Everytime I try to get ahead, something or someone stops me," or "No" to the statement, "If I plan things right, they will come out ok." In the

Coleman report, a series of questions about this attitude was used and found to be strongly related to academic achievement. Other researchers have used variations of this scale of questions and have found similar results. Adults who have a strong sense of internalized control of their future are more likely to plan for it and more likely to take steps to achieve their goals, while those who believe that the future is mainly controlled by luck do not. Writers on juvenile delinquency and crime have argued that crime is a response to this sense of meaninglessness. If the future is out of one's control, then following the rules will not guarantee a reward and disobeying the rules will not guarantee a punishment. If this happens, the rules make no sense and there is no point to obeying them. If the future is out of one's control, there is no point in being concerned with it; one might as well embark on a course of simple hedonism. Why try to stay out of trouble if there is no rationality in the allocation of rewards and punishments? Why bother to study, if it is not going to affect your future? Why not take what you want now, if it has no bearing on what will happen to you later? The students who feel this way will be understandably angry about their inability to control their lives and will see no reason to "play by the rules." This seems to explain why student violence is considerably higher when students do not believe that they control what happens to them.

Schools where the parents are poorly educated have more students who feel unable to control their future. Partly this may reflect the home's lack of cognitive training in thinking about the future; more likely it reflects the hopelessness of growing up in poverty. The data also suggest that the school itself can influence students' attitudes. The school is after all a major portion of the student's environment, his major experience in dealing with the society outside of his own family. Presumably, the school that gives rewards and punishments systematically will teach students that the rewards do follow on the heels of effort. For example, consider a school that has a practice of assigning no grade above "C" to students in the lower tracks or that gives low grades automatically to students who are performing below their grade levels. In such a school, a student who works very hard and indeed improves his skills will not be rewarded. Alternately, consider a school that has rules against truancy but does not enforce them very carefully; the student in effect learns that no punishments are attached to his actions and life becomes more meaningless. The schools where students express a stronger sense of internalized control are also schools where students believe they are being prepared for the future, where they believe they are not "treated like kids," where they believe they have a say in what happens in

school. These are also schools where teachers do not express hostile and authoritarian attitudes and where the principal is well liked by the students. Perhaps most significant, however, the schools where students have a high sense of control over their environment are schools where the students say they know what the rules are regarding school behavior. In these schools the teachers also say that the rules are clear and that there is good coordination among teachers and between principal and teachers regarding the rules. This suggests that the schools that have worked most conscientiously to ensure that both rewards and punishments follow consistently on the heels of positive and negative behavior on the part of students do indeed teach students that their future is within their control. Such schools are less likely to have students acting out in interpersonal robberies and attacks.


SUMMARY


What then have we learned from this analysis of the characteristics of schools with high crime rates? As we noted at the beginning, we have not produced a simple cookbook recipe that a school can follow. But we have produced something at least as valuable by discovering the general characteristics that underlie the operation of schools with low crime rates. Throughout this analysis, the data point to the principal and the school administration as the key element. An effective principal who has developed a systematic policy of discipline helps each individual teacher to maintain discipline by providing a reliable system of support, appropriate in-service training for teachers, and opportunities for teachers to coordinate their actions. This means that the teachers themselves are in a more secure position and are more likely to take effective disciplinary actions to control their own classrooms. Teachers are also more likely to recognize that they have a responsibility in establishing school-wide discipline. Students will respond favorably when this occurs; they will see the system as fair, will understand better what the rules are, and will be less likely to feel that the school is capricious and despotic. The effective school also finds ways to provide positive incentives to all students. The honors of the school go to many students, regardless of social class or academic ability. The school is sufficiently comprehensive to offer something of value to all of its students.

As the case studies of successful schools indicate, there are many ways that a school can achieve these goals. No doubt the means depend upon the age of the students, their social class, whether the community is urban or rural. But


whatever the details of the administrative plan are, the effect is the same: Regardless of the type of community or the type of the student, the safe schools in this study are characterized by clear norms, students' belief that the school is providing something of value to them, and a sense

that the school as a social system is not a meaningless environment. The safe schools are characterized by a rational structure of order, with consistent positive incentives and negative sanctions, maintained by effective administrative leadership. They are well-governed schools.





RELATIONS D



Schools' Responses to Crime and Misbehavior

6

Many schools today have a substantial problem with crime and misbehavior. One school in 4 experiences some vandalism in a month's time; 1 in 8 has school property stolen; and 1 in 10 is burglarized. For young teenagers the risk of encountering personal violence is greater in school than out. How have schools responded to violence and property crimes? Are a significant number of them becoming fortresses? How widespread is the use of automatic surveillance systems, police and other security personnel, or other means of monitoring and social control? To what extent do schools still rely on traditional means of discipline?

We do not have the information necessary to characterize the response of schools in all dimensions and details. What we can do, however, is focus on the use of measures that are directly related to school crime and disruption. In general, schools are responding to the problems of crime and disruption with a wide array of devices, personnel, and procedures. Some of the approaches are traditional; others are of more recent origin. The devices include security locks, intrusion alarms, and electronic monitoring systems; the personnel include security officers, police, parents, and students; the procedures, everything from paddling to mental health referrals.

In general, too, the schools are responding most strongly where the problem is most pronounced—in urban secondary schools, especially in the large cities. Suburban and rural school systems have tended to rely less on these various measures. Despite a general tendency for the response of schools to be commensurate with risks in relative terms (i.e., there being more preventive measures when the risks are greater), some significant discrepancies between risks and responses are apparent in different locations and at different school levels.

Let us examine separately some of the devices, personnel, and procedures that schools are currently using in coping with the problems of crime and disruption.

SECURITY DEVICES

Most of the security devices employed by schools are intended to guard against the damage,

destruction, or theft of school property. As pointed out in Chapter 2, most incidents of this kind occur after school hours during the week and on weekends when potential witnesses are few. The measures considered here are intended either to physically prevent intrusion, theft, or damage; or to detect people illegally entering the building when school is not in session.

As Table 6-1 shows, devices such as security locks and safes are rather widely used. There is a slight tendency for urban schools, more than others, to employ these devices. (Tables in this chapter show differences by location only. For simultaneous breakdown by location and school level, together with sample numbers, see Appendix B, Table B-6.1.)

On the other hand, while only one-fifth of the schools (21%) in the survey reported using security screens to protect their windows, more than three-fifths (64%) of the schools in the largest cities (over 500,000 population) use them. Big city schools are also more likely to use unbreakable glass or hardened plastics in windows and doors; while 42% of all schools use these materials to some extent, they are used by 69% of schools located in large cities. Likewise, the use of intrusion alarms on doors and windows is most prevalent in big cities and least so in rural areas.



Electronic intrusion detection devices, variously triggered by sound, heat, or motion, are installed in one-fifth of all schools, one-fourth of the suburban schools and almost half of the large city schools. Most of the detection systems in the cities also have automatic communication links with a central monitoring station or with the police. And while rarely used in general, portable emergency signaling devices and TV monitors also tend to be employed more in cities than elsewhere.

A majority of the schools in large cities, then, are equipped with security locks, security screens, and unbreakable glass; a near majority use electronic detection systems; in addition intrusion alarms, special signaling devices, and TV monitors are more often used in urban schools than in schools in suburban and rural areas.

This does not mean, however, that most large city schools have been turned into fortresses. In many cases schools make selective use of these devices. For example, unbreakable glass, if used, is ordinarily installed only in particularly vulnerable windows or doors, often to

protect against accidental breakage. While 42% of all schools used this material in at least some windows, only 3% used it in all windows. Electronic intrusion detection devices often are used only to protect rooms in which valuable equipment is stored, rather than in the whole school, and as a rule these devices are only turned on when the building is closed. While devices designed to protect the perimeter of the building from intrusion—special locks and door and window alarms—may be used on all doors and ground-level windows, such devices are generally unobtrusive and are employed by only a minority of urban schools.¹ Security screens, on the other hand, are highly visible, and a fairly large proportion of big city schools (29%) use them on all ground-level windows. Even taking the screens into account, it would be an exaggeration to say that a large proportion of big city schools have become fortress-like.

Although the security devices discussed above are not statistically associated with reduced crime costs in schools, we have other measures of their effectiveness from the principals responding in the survey. Asked which,

TABLE 6-1
PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS USING VARIOUS SECURITY
DEVICES AND PROCEDURES, BY LOCATION

	<u>Large Cities</u>	<u>Small Cities</u>	<u>Suburban Areas</u>	<u>Rural Areas</u>
1. Security locks on <u>any</u> outside doors	51	50	44	40
2. Security vault or safe	45	50	48	44
3. Security screens on <u>any</u> ground-level windows	64	29	16	15
4. Unbreakable glass or plastic in <u>any</u> outside window	69	53	44	31
5. Intrusion alarms on <u>any</u> outside doors	20	17	10	7
6. Intrusion alarms on <u>any</u> ground-level windows	12	9	6	3
7. Electronic intrusion detection system(s)	46	35	27	7
8. Automatic communication link with police	40	36	23	5
9. Portable emergency signaling devices	3	3	2	2
10. Closed-circuit TV monitors	1	1	1	1

Source: PQs

¹Forty-four percent of all schools make some use of security locks; 21% use them on all doors. Ten percent of all schools make some use of intrusion alarms on doors; 5% use them on all doors. Five percent of all schools use these alarms on at least some windows; 2% use them on all windows.

if any, of the devices had not proved dependable, only a minority of principals indicated that any was undependable (see Table 6-2). Least reliable, according to these assessments, were the portable emergency signaling devices, such as wrist or pocket alarms. These are intended to be carried by teachers or security personnel and used in case of trouble to signal a central office for help. Twenty-four percent of the principals whose schools used these devices rated them undependable. Second least reliable, according to principals whose schools employed them, were the electronic intrusion detection systems, rated not dependable by 17% of the respondents. Thirteen percent called the attendant automatic communication links with police undependable, as did a similar percentage, security screens. Less than 10% of the principals having other devices

rated any of them undependable. The most reliable (or least undependable) were intrusion alarms on ground-level windows and doors.

The impression that most of these devices can be effective if properly used is buttressed by the principals' reports of measures that have been successful in reducing school crime (Chapter 7). Among the successful measures reported, security devices ranked first for all schools, second (to discipline) for junior and senior high schools.

On the whole, then, principals tend to regard security devices such as these as effective means of reducing school property crime. However, the relatively high ratings of undependability for the more complicated of these systems, such as electronic intrusion detection systems, suggest that any decisions to invest in them be weighed carefully. The potential investment can be considerable, and their complexity and automatic character sometimes make them prone to false alarms and other "bugs." Sound-sensitive systems can be set off by heavy traffic or airplane noises as well as by burglars. A motion detection system can be set off after the system has been activated by a janitor returning to school to pick up a forgotten sweater. School districts should check the certification of particular systems or devices before investing. Security "hardware" is rated by Underwriters Laboratories, the State Insurance Fire Rating Bureau, the Factory Mutual Engineering and Factory Insurance Association.² Districts should also check with other school systems which have had experience with them. As noted above, school systems in cities over 5000,000 population are most likely to have had such experience.

It is interesting that while secondary schools are only slightly more likely to employ security devices than elementary schools (see Appendix B, Table B-6.1), the PRS data show that secondary schools have a substantially greater risk of experiencing property offenses. A much more detailed analysis than is possible here would be required to quantify this disparity, but the data suggest that, given the distribution of school property offenses, secondary schools may be getting a smaller share of these resources than their risk-situation warrants. What is true for the nation as a whole, of course, may not be true of schools in a particular district. As suggested in Chapter 2, school districts may find it useful to construct their own risk profiles to help in making decisions about the allocation of security resources such as these.

TABLE 6-2
PERCENTAGE OF PRINCIPALS REPORTING
DEVICES NOT DEPENDABLE *

	<u>Percent</u>
1. Security locks on <u>any</u> outside doors	9
2. Security vault or safe	7
3. Security screens on <u>any</u> ground-level windows	13
4. Unbreakable glass or plastic in <u>any</u> outside window	8
5. Intrusion alarms on <u>any</u> outside doors	6
6. Intrusion alarms on <u>any</u> ground-level windows	2
7. Electronic intrusion detection system(s)	17
8. Automatic communication link with police	13
9. Portable emergency signaling devices	24
10. Closed circuit TV monitors	00

Source: PQs

* Sample includes only schools which have a particular device.

²"Vandalism and Violence: Innovative Strategies Reduce Costs to Schools," National School Police Relations Association, 1975.

A similar disparity is evident when we consider location. As we have just seen, urban schools, especially those in large cities, are much more likely than those in suburbs to be equipped with security devices. Yet the PRS data indicate that where school property offenses are concerned, the risk for suburban schools is not much less than for urban schools, and NCES data show higher dollar losses due to crime in suburban schools. In terms of the relative risk, then, as well as in proportional terms, suburban schools are investing less in security devices than are urban schools. The extent of the urban schools' investment in security equipment is one indication of the emergence of a district security function in many of these districts. Another is the increasing use of security personnel.

SECURITY PERSONNEL

Unlike the devices discussed above, security personnel are employed both during the school day and after school hours, both at night and on weekends. As we have seen in Chapter 2, violence, disruption, and personal theft are the offenses most likely to occur during school hours. This means that the problems typically addressed by daytime security personnel are not burglaries and related offenses, and their function is not

primarily that of guarding school property, but more of maintaining safety and order in schools. It means further that their job requires higher levels of skill than guarding and involves the ability to work effectively in complex interpersonal situations. It means finally that the recruitment and training of professional daytime security personnel, where their presence is deemed advisable, are matters of considerable importance. Personnel quickly recruited or inadequately trained may cause more problems than they solve.

In this section, the discussion will focus primarily on the use of personnel during the schoolday. (Information on non-schoolday use of security personnel is in Appendix B, Tables B-6.2 and B-6.3.) Under the heading of security personnel are included not only police and security professionals, but others such as administrators, students, and parents when employed in security roles. Table 6-3 and Appendix B, Table B-6.4 show the proportion of schools using various types of personnel.

We read much these days about police in schools, often in relation to articles about conflict accompanying desegregation. How widespread is the practice of having regular police stationed in

TABLE 6-3

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS EMPLOYING VARIOUS DAYTIME SECURITY PERSONNEL
IN MONTH PRIOR TO SURVEY, BY LOCATION

	<u>Large Cities</u>	<u>Small Cities</u>	<u>Suburban Areas</u>	<u>Rural Areas</u>
1. Police stationed in school	5	2	1	0
2. Police on regular patrol outside school	11	8	10	8
3. Security guard employed by school	35	14	7	1
4. Administrators specifically responsible for security and discipline	85	76	76	75
5. Janitor(s) as watchmen	21	30	25	23
6. Students from school as monitors	26	16	11	7
7. Parents as monitors or security guards	10	4	3	0

Source: PQs

school? Safe School Study results indicate this is a very rare situation. Only 1 out of 100 schools in the survey had police stationed on the premises in the month before the survey. However, the picture varies markedly according to location. Suburban and rural schools, which make up the great majority of all schools, seldom if ever have police stationed in them, and police are rarely stationed in elementary schools. But among urban secondary schools, the picture is different. One out of 10 senior high schools in the smaller cities reported police stationed inside; 1 out of 5 senior high schools in the largest cities reported the presence of police. Big city senior high schools are almost 20 times as likely as all schools together to have police in them.

More common is the practice of having police on a regular patrol outside the school, which was reported by 9% of the respondents. Again secondary schools were more likely to report this than were elementary schools. Among secondary schools the practice is most pronounced in the large cities and least common in the rural areas, but the differences between level and location in the case of police patrols are not as great as in the case of police stationed inside.

The establishment of school security divisions and employment of security officers have increased markedly in the last decade. Ten years ago only a few school systems had such divisions, and it was rare indeed to find regular security personnel in school. Today, while only 7% of all schools, including elementary, report having security officers stationed in them, among secondary schools, the figure is 13%. More than one-third of all big city schools employ trained security personnel; more than half of the big city junior high schools have them, as do two-thirds of all big city senior high schools. In suburban areas the proportion is much lower (7%), and in rural schools their use is negligible (1%). As with police, the use of professional security personnel is heavily concentrated in secondary schools in the cities.

Turning to more traditional means, most schools (76%) have administrators, such as assistant principals, specifically responsible for security and discipline. The proportion is somewhat higher in the large cities (85%) and in senior high schools (80%), but the practice is general regardless of education level or location. Janitors are also sometimes assigned as watchmen; one-fourth of the schools reported this practice, elementary schools somewhat more than others.

These data suggest that the security function has become organizationally more distinct and specialized in urban schools than

elsewhere. It is here that we are most likely to find the security devices and to find security professionals. The more traditional and less specialized use of administrators and janitors for discipline and monitoring does not vary markedly across locations. Among urban schools, secondary schools in the largest cities, especially senior high schools, are most likely to use professional personnel for security purposes. Elementary and junior high schools are somewhat more likely to use students and parents for this function.

It seems, then, that a prominent response to school crime among urban schools, particularly at the secondary level, has been to define security as a distinct function and to employ professionals to perform that function.

In terms of dependability, security personnel received better ratings from the principals than did the security devices, although the meaning of dependability changes when applied to people rather than things (see Table 6-4). Only 3% of the principals said that the security officers in their schools were not dependable, and only 2% said so of police stationed in school. (By comparison, 24% of the principals whose schools had emergency signaling devices and 17% of those having electronic detection systems called these methods undependable.) Least likely of all to be rated undependable were the student and parent monitors whose ratings on this score were close to zero.

As with the devices, the security personnel, while not showing any statistical association with reduced violence in schools, were frequently cited by principals as successful in reducing crime rates (Chapter 7), and investigations in the Phase III Case Study also lead to the conclusion that they can be effectively deployed. As noted earlier, the fact that they must often work in complex interpersonal situations suggests that if security personnel are to be employed, a good deal of attention should be paid to recruitment standards and to training.

The fact that senior high schools are more likely than junior highs to have daytime security professionals is of some interest, because both teachers and students are more likely to encounter violence in junior high schools. Urban junior high and elementary schools make the most use of students and parents as monitors, perhaps because younger children may be more responsive to delegated authority and because it seems more appropriate to handle problems "within the family" (school) where younger children are concerned. It may be, however, that in the assignment of security officers, there is some misallocation of resources between senior and junior high schools, and school systems having a

TABLE 6-4

PERCENTAGE OF PRINCIPALS REPORTING DAYTIME
SECURITY PERSONNEL
NOT DEPENDABLE*

	<u>Percent</u>
1. Police stationed in school	2
2. Police on regular patrol outside school	6
3. Security guard employed by school	3
4. Administrators specifically responsible for security and discipline	1
5. Janitor(s) as watchman	2
6. Students from school as monitors	0 [†]
7. Parents as monitors or security guards	0 [†]

Source: PQs

* Sample includes only schools which have the indicated security personnel.

[†] Less than 0.5%.

serious problem with violence in junior high schools may want to consider whether this is the case. Again, the risk profiles discussed in Chapter 2 may be useful for this purpose.

Rule Enforcement and Discipline

One characteristic response of schools to problems of violence and disruption has been to tighten enforcement of rules and discipline and to place troublesome youngsters in special classes or schools. Do urban secondary schools lead the way in implementing these measures, as they do with security devices and personnel? Tables 6-5 and Appendix B, Table B-6.5 illustrate that for those types of regulations governing access to and movement around the school, strict enforcement is most prevalent in big city secondary schools and least so in elementary and rural schools.

While 3% of all schools have a strictly enforced rule that requires students to carry and

show ID cards to authorized personnel, 34% of the senior high schools in large cities enforce such a rule. Elementary schools rarely do. Twenty-one percent of all schools enforce a regulation that requires students to carry hall passes when out of class during class hours, a procedure practiced in 73% of the large city junior high schools but only 7% of rural elementary schools. Large city junior high schools are also toughest about enforcing the almost universal regulation that visitors check in at the central office on arriving at school. About half of the schools nationwide (47%) enforce this rule strictly, the proportions ranging from 82% in large city junior high schools to 33% in rural elementary schools.

In two of the three cases above, the strict enforcement of rules is most prevalent where the risks of violence are greatest—in junior high schools, especially those in big cities.

Among the more traditional disciplinary measures schools rely on are suspension, expulsion, and paddling. The use of suspensions is widespread: about one-third of all schools reported suspending students in a month's time. As with many other measures, suspension is most prevalent in the large cities, least so in rural areas, and greater in secondary than in elementary schools. Interestingly, though, there is not much difference between urban and suburban secondary schools in this respect; it is the greater tendency of urban elementary schools to suspend that distinguishes urban from other areas. Thirty-nine percent of all big city elementary schools and 20% of those in smaller cities reported suspensions in a 1-month period, as compared to 13% of those in the suburbs and 11% in rural areas.

Expulsion occurs less frequently today than in the past, in part because of court rulings that school systems have an obligation to provide education for youngsters of school age even when it is difficult to do so. Only 4% of the schools in the survey reported any expulsions in a month's time. Urban secondary schools again led the list, with 15% so reporting. Senior high schools in general were more likely to report expulsions than junior highs, probably because more senior high students are beyond the mandatory schooling age, making it easier for students in this age range to be expelled without legal complications.

Corporal punishment, unlike expulsion, continues to be practiced in secondary schools to a remarkable extent. More than one-third of all secondary schools (36%) reported paddling students in a month's time. (Data on elementary schools are not available.) This practice is more widespread among junior than senior high schools, reflecting a societal assumption that physical

punishment, if used at all, is more appropriate for younger than for older children. Unlike the other means of discipline employed by schools, paddling is least prevalent in the large cities and most widespread in the more traditional rural areas. Indeed, 61% of all rural junior high schools reported paddling youngsters in a given month.

Schools also attempt to handle problems of violence and disruption by removing troublesome youngsters either to special classes or to other schools. As Table 6-5 illustrates, only a small proportion of all schools—from 4% to 8%—relied on these means in a month's time. Eight percent of all secondary schools transferred "problem students" to other regular schools. This procedure, sometimes called a "social transfer," often results in schools trading problem students in the hope that a change of environment will cause

some of them to become less troublesome. The practice is strongly concentrated in urban areas: in large cities around one-third of all secondary schools (35%) conducted such transfers in a month; in smaller cities 19% transferred troublesome students, while in rural areas, only 3% did so. Distance and factors associated with it no doubt make such transfers unfeasible in rural areas.

The assignment of problem students to special schools is also strongly concentrated in urban secondary schools. While only 4% of all schools reported doing so in a month's time, one-fourth of all big city secondary schools (26%) did so.

There are relatively few special schools for disciplinary problem youngsters in suburban and

TABLE 6-5
PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS USING VARIOUS DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL PROCEDURES, BY LOCATION

	<u>Large Cities</u>	<u>Small Cities</u>	<u>Suburban Areas</u>	<u>Rural Areas</u>
1. Students must show ID card to authorized personnel when requested	6	3	3	2
2. Students must carry hall passes if out of class	41	23	20	18
3. Visitors must check in at office	67	56	49	39
4. Suspension	47	36	33	27
5. Expulsion	6	3	4	4
6. Paddling	17	34	33	42
7. Assignment to special day-long class for disruptive students	10	7	7	5
8. Transfer to another regular school (social transfer)	35	19	7	3
9. Transfer to special school for disruptive students	10	7	4	2
10. Referral to community mental health agency as disruptive student	40	29	20	17

Source: PQs

rural areas. It is easier for these smaller school systems to set up special classes within the school to separate problem students from others. This may explain why there is less disparity between urban and nonurban areas in this practice.

As a general approach to handling problems of crime and misbehavior in schools, discipline is strongly recommended by principals, teachers, and students alike (see Chapter 7). The statistical analyses indicate that firmness in enforcement of the rules can have a positive effect. The Phase III Case Studies make it clear that firm, fair, and consistent discipline is sine qua non for restoring order to chaotic and conflict-ridden schools.

At the same time, both the statistical analyses and the case studies indicate that discipline should be exercised within a broader context of governance that is perceived as legitimate and fair by the students. Harsh, unfair, or demeaning measures are more likely than not to add fuel to the fire.

With only the conspicuous exception of paddling, the use of various disciplinary measures is more pronounced among urban secondary schools than elsewhere. However, despite the greater risks of violence in junior high schools, there is no uniform tendency for them to rely on these measures more than senior highs. A larger proportion of junior highs enforce visitor check-in and hall-pass regulations, assign students to special classes, and use corporal punishment (the latter two not characteristically in urban areas). On the other hand, senior high schools are more likely to require ID cards, to assign disruptive students to special schools, and to expel students.³ Suspensions and social transfers are practiced by junior and senior high schools about equally. Does this suggest that more attention should be given to discipline in junior high schools? If we regard these various procedures not as specific measures to be implemented but more as general indications of the relative emphasis placed on discipline by schools, then the answer is probably yes. There is no evidence in this study that increasing the number of suspensions or expulsions will reduce the amount of crime in schools. As noted above, however, there is considerable evidence that an active policy of firm, fair, and consistent discipline can reduce it. In this sense the amount of emphasis on discipline in junior high schools may not be commensurate with the extent of the problem.

Sources of Support Outside the School

Urban schools, and especially those in the large cities, operate in communities where the risks of crime in general are higher than in suburban and rural locations. Urban schools specifically experience greater risks of burglary, theft of school property, and violence than other schools. In response to this situation, urban, and especially big city schools, have invested more heavily in security devices, have developed a specialized and professionalized security function, and have placed more emphasis on discipline and the enforcement of rules. What help do they get from their communities in the handling of discipline problems? How much support do the parents, police, courts, schoolboard, and school administration provide?

The parents are generally helpful, according to the principals who answered this question and reported having discipline problems (see Table 6-6 and Appendix B, Table B-6.6). Fifty-one percent of the respondents said that the parents provided them with "very much" support in handling discipline problems. Those in large cities and rural areas were least likely to say that parents were very supportive. The principals were less positive about the police in this respect: 41% said that the police provided very much support, and those in large city schools registered the lowest proportion of positive "votes" (29%).

When it comes to the local courts, the principals vote is "no confidence." Only 16% said that the courts provided very much support. Conversely, 45% of the principals said that they received little or no support from the courts. Principals in big city schools have the least confidence of all in them: only 8% said that the courts helped very much, and two-thirds said that they provided little or no support. Parents, police, and courts, then, get good, fair, and poor ratings respectively from the principals. Principals in big city schools tend to feel that they get less support from these sources than do other principals.

What about the most natural sources of support—the schoolboard and the central administration? The principals rate them even higher than they do the parents: 58% said the schoolboard provided very much support, and 64% said this of the school administration. But there

³Technically the schools usually recommend expulsion; the decision to expel is made at a higher level.

are great differences between locations in the principals' responses. In suburban and rural areas, the proportions of principals responding positively are above the national average. But in urban schools, and especially in large city schools, the proportion is far below the average. Only one-quarter (24%) of the principals in big city schools said that they received very much support from the schoolboard; only one-third (31%) said this of the central administration. Conversely, 45% said they received little or no support from the board; 33% said they received little or none from the administration. Hence principals in schools that need it most are least likely to feel that they get adequate support from these community sources.

The disparity between urban and other schools is especially pronounced in the case of support from the schoolboard and administration. Though large city schools are the most likely to have security devices and personnel and to report suspension, expulsions, and other disciplinary measures, their principals clearly feel more isolated in their efforts to deal with discipline problems than principals in smaller communities.

In urban areas, where the problems of school crime are generally most pronounced, we have seen on the one hand the emergence of an organizationally distinct security function, as well as a proliferation of devices, personnel, and procedures. We have also seen, on the other hand, a substantial lack of support from the schoolboard and administration in the handling of discipline problems, at least as perceived by principals. Together these tendencies suggest a reliance on

technical measures not adequately supported by political leadership. Technical measures are necessary, but they should be part of a more comprehensive policy on student conduct which is backed by strong and visible leadership at the top--from the principal in the school and at the district level from the superintendent, supported by the schoolboard.

The development of such a policy would proceed first from an assessment of the extent of crime and misbehavior in district schools (Chapter 2 suggests how this might be done), followed by an assignment of priorities. If the priority is high, it should be recognized that other desirable educational goals may have to be given less support.

The assignment of priorities would be followed by policy and planning formulation. At this stage, especially in its planning phase, it would be advisable to include representatives of parents, students, and a number of important agencies and institutions in the community. Particular attention should be given to mutual planning efforts involving the schools, the police, and the courts, including the juvenile courts. In systems with serious problems, establishing firm guidelines for when police should and should not be involved in school incidents would be helpful. Equally important, the schools and the courts should undertake to establish a more active and cooperative relationship. With appropriate planning, coordination, and leadership, technical measures are likely to be more effective, and perhaps less necessary.

TABLE 6-6

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS RECEIVING "VERY MUCH" SUPPORT FROM VARIOUS COMMUNITY SOURCES IN THE HANDLING OF DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS, BY LOCATION


	<u>Large Cities</u>	<u>Small Cities</u>	<u>Suburban Areas</u>	<u>Rural Areas</u>
1. Parents	47	57	57	43
2. Local police	29	41	47	39
3. Local courts	8	15	16	18
4. Schoolboard	24	47	61	64
5. School system central office	31	55	66	71

Source: PQs



CONTINUED

2 OF 5



Recommendations of Principals, Teachers, and Students

7

INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter we examined the use schools are making of security devices, security personnel, and discipline in their efforts to reduce school crime and disruption. These measures figure prominently among the practices reported as successful by principals and among the recommendations made by students, teachers, and principals in the Safe School Study Survey. Principals in both elementary and secondary schools were asked: (1) to describe measures which they had tried and found successful in reducing vandalism, personal attacks, and theft; and (2) to make general recommendations for measures to reduce these offenses, whether they had tried them or not. Secondary school students and teachers were also asked to make such recommendations. The questions were posed in open-ended fashion to all three groups. The number of students, teachers, and principals who made general recommendations is presented in Appendix B, Table B-7.1.)

From these responses a standard list of recommendation categories was developed which is applicable to all three groups. (The list of the 56 recommendation categories is presented in Appendix B, Table B-7.2.) Since the number of recommendation categories is large and the frequency of recommendations in many categories relatively small, an attempt was made to cluster the categories on the basis of similarities important to the description and understanding of school crime. This yielded eight major clusters. Since many of the categories defining a cluster had relatively few responses, most clusters could be adequately characterized by one, two, or three primary categories that contained most of the recommendations. The clusters and their primary categories are defined in Table 7-1. These clusters also defined the recommendations made by principals concerning the specific instances of successful programs leading to a reduction of vandalism, personal attacks, and thefts.

The results reported in this chapter are discussed separately by educational level, type of community, and crime index. The three educational levels are elementary, junior high, and senior high. There are four types of communities: (1) cities over 500,000 (big cities), (2) cities between 50,000 and 500,000 (smaller cities),

(3) suburban areas, and (4) rural areas. The crime index for the recommendations by principals is based upon the reported frequency of incidents of crime and misbehavior throughout a school. They are: (1) none, (2) 1 to 9 (moderate), and (3) greater than 9 (severe). Similarly, the crime index for the student recommendations is defined as three levels of the student victimization frequency: (1) none, (2) 1 to 3 (moderate), and (3) greater than 3 (severe). The crime index for the teacher recommendations is defined as three levels of the teacher victimization frequency: (1) none, (2) 1 (moderate), and (3) greater than 1 (severe). (The severe category for each of the indexes is based upon a weighted percentage of school principals who claimed they had a very serious problem in regard to vandalism, personal attack, and theft.) The general approach to be followed in this chapter is to present the profiles for various subgroups of students, teachers, and principals. Each profile will show what proportion of recommendations fall into each of the different recommendation categories.

For ease of presentation, the results are depicted with various graphs. The data are also presented in a more precise tabular form in Appendix B, Tables B-7.3 and B-7.4 for those readers interested in specific subsets of data. Both graphs and tables are based upon weighted population estimates.



SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES REPORTED BY PRINCIPALS

An overall profile for successful practices as reported by principals is presented in Figure 7-1. The proportion of recommendations falling into each of the eight clusters varies considerably. The largest proportion is for Security Devices (Cluster I) and the lowest is for Physical Plant Improvement (Cluster VI). Discipline (III) ranks a close second in importance and Security Personnel (II) third. Following these, Training and Organizational Change (V), Parental Involvement and Community Relations (VII), and Improving School Climate (VIII) also contain significant proportions of recommendations.

A better understanding of these practices may be obtained by comparing groups of principals on the basis of school level, location, and crime level.

The profiles for the three school levels are presented in Figure 7-2. This figure suggests that the junior and senior high school profiles are quite similar. For secondary school principals, the most frequently mentioned successful practice was discipline (III). The elementary school profile diverges from these two primarily because elementary school principals are much less likely to report that discipline has successfully reduced vandalism, personal attacks, and theft. Apparently, these principals feel that discipline is

not the major solution for elementary school problems. Elementary principals were more likely to recommend security devices, and were almost as likely to recommend security personnel (II), training and organizational change (V), parental involvement and community relations (VII), and improved school climate (VIII).

Senior high school principals, relative to those in elementary and junior high schools, felt that improving parental involvement and community relations (VIII) was less successful. One reasonable explanation for this is that as youngsters grow older, and become more independent, their parents have less influence over their behavior. One advantage of parental involvement in schools is that it enables the schools to work through the parents to affect the behavior of children. It seems that this approach is likely to be more successful with younger children.

When the profiles are presented separately for each type of community, a different picture emerges. As shown in Figure 7-3, the profiles are all quite different from one another. Although the shapes are somewhat similar, there are substantial differences in levels. The big city principals had the highest level of recommendations, while the rural principals had the lowest. The smaller city and suburban school principals fall between.


Big city school principals most frequently cited discipline (III) and security devices (I);

TABLE 7-1

RECOMMENDATION CLUSTERS


<u>Cluster</u>	<u>Major Defining Categories</u>
	<u>Code</u>
I. Security devices	011 - detection systems, alarms, etc. (1.61, 1.37, 3.11)* 014 - locks (1.56, 3.73, 4.54)
II. Security personnel	015 - police (1.74, 2.61, 8.11) 017 - school security officers (2.51, 8.05, 9.52)
III. Discipline and supervision	021 - enforcement of rules, suspension, etc. (6.37, 23.93, 17.73) 026 - monitoring, watching, reporting troublemakers (2.72, 10.26, 9.93) 053 - strict enforcement of law by courts, police, etc. (4.81, 8.09, 2.90)
IV. Curriculum and counseling	032 - better curriculum, better teaching, better courses (2.18, 3.00, .30) 024 - individual attention (counseling, social work, etc.) (1.08, 2.84, 2.00)
V. Training and organizational change	044 - citizenship program, student socialization, rights, responsibilities, etc. (1.78, 2.48, .24) 045 - awareness campaigns against school crime (4.50, 3.11, 2.54)
VI. Physical improvement	046 - keep school shipshape (.59, .77, .72) 057 - make schools and classrooms smaller (.93, 2.18, .11)
VII. Parental involvement and community relations	051 - parental involvement, support for school (5.00, 6.72, .26) 052 - good relations with community, community involvement (4.53, 2.70, .05) 055 - support from schoolboard, principal, public agencies (1.65, 4.60, .26)
VIII. Improved school climate	041 - good relations, understanding, mutual respect etc. (2.88, 4.99, 3.64) 042 - student pride, school spirit (6.87, 4.19, .57) 043 - student participation in decisionmaking (2.81, 3.42, .62)

*Weighted proportion of recommendations from students, teachers, and principals, respectively.



SOURCE: PQ

FIGURE 7-1
PRINCIPALS' SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES



SOURCE: PQ


FIGURE 7-2
PRINCIPALS' SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES BY SCHOOL LEVEL

curriculum and counseling (IV) and physical plant improvement (VI) were least frequently cited. The same general pattern holds for the smaller city and suburban principals. The rural school principals, however, had very low recommendation rates for all but security devices (I), security personnel (II), and discipline (III). Since big city schools generally have the highest recorded crime rates and rural schools the lowest, with the other types of communities falling in between, it seems that the overall pattern of successful recommendations may be related to the level of crime in schools.

Schools with levels of crime and disruption had the highest overall level of successful practices to counter them, while schools with a minimum incidence had the lowest overall level of successful practices, as can be seen in Figure 7-4. The levels and to a lesser extent, the patterns, are different. The schools with high incidence levels were forced to attempt many solutions, and it seems that they perceived themselves as being most successful by using discipline (III), security devices (I), security personnel (II); training and organizational change (V), and improved school climate (VIII) were also important clusters. The principals in schools with no incidents most frequently recommend measures falling under

security devices (I). The profile for moderate-problem schools resembled the pattern of the severe-problem schools. The three types showed extreme differences in recommending discipline. They also differed considerably on recommending security devices (I), security personnel (II), training and organizational change (V), and improved school climate (VIII).

There are wider differences among profiles when they are compared by incidence frequency than when they were classified by school level or type of community. Some of these differences may be due to the small size of the high incidence group. However, it appears that a principal's perceptions of success in dealing with school crime and disruption is substantially influenced by the level of crime in that school. This suggests that different strategies with different probabilities of success are attempted in schools with varying crime levels. In general, a larger proportion of successful strategies was cited by big city schools with a high frequency of incidents. Apparently those with the most experience of the problem try more measures to reduce crime and disruption; this increases the probability that successful measures will be reported.



SOURCE: PQ

FIGURE 7-3

PRINCIPALS' SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY

COMPARISON OF GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FROM STUDENTS, TEACHERS, AND PRINCIPALS


The general recommendations from students and teachers in secondary schools, and from principals in both elementary and secondary schools, reflect varying perceptions of how to deal with school crime. These are recommendations, not necessarily successful practices, although there are some similarities between the two. The cluster profiles for the general recommendations are presented in Figure 7-5.

While students, teachers, and principals all recommended disciplinary measures more frequently than any other, students and teachers placed much more emphasis on them. Part of this difference is no doubt due to the tendency of elementary school principals to place less emphasis on discipline than those in secondary schools. But other factors may be involved, too. Teachers interact with students continuously throughout the schoolday and students, of course, are continuously observing other students' behavior. Principals, on the other hand, in general have more limited contact with students and quite a different perspective and role in these

interactions. Teachers and students can more readily observe the individual behavior of problem students and may perceive that this behavior can be altered by disciplinary measures. That is, they may more readily feel that problem behavior can be altered by firmer rules, regulations, and other measures of a disciplinary nature.

Students are more likely than either teachers or principals to recommend security devices (I) and security personnel (II). Students tend to see the problem as one of security and discipline and place little emphasis on recommendations falling into the remaining five clusters. They seem to have a more restricted perception of the problem than principals and teachers. Principals and teachers alike, on the other hand, place considerably more emphasis on parental involvement and community relations (VIII) and on improving school climate (VIII).

Overall, students offer more direct solutions to the school crime problem and view it in terms of direct intervention such as by discipline and security; teachers and principals tend to regard solutions as less direct and more complex, involving such measures as training and organizational change, parental involvement and



SOURCE: PQ

FIGURE 7-4

PRINCIPALS' SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES BY FREQUENCY OF INCIDENTS

community relations, and school climate. Teachers and principals perceive the problem in terms of several broad influences both within and outside the school. The remainder of this chapter will take a closer look at the student, teacher, and principal recommendations.


General Recommendations from Students

Student recommendations are presented separately by school level, type of community, and student victimization incidence. The student victimization level is simply the number of times an individual student was a victim of assault, robbery, or theft. (Thefts constitute the great majority of reported victimization experiences.) Most students were not victimized; they constitute the lowest of the three victimization levels. The second level is composed of students who reported being victimized from one to three

times. The third level is composed of those who were victimized four or more times. The cut point between the second and third level was based primarily upon the frequency distribution of student victimizations and the convenience of relying on three levels to present the data visually.


Cluster profiles for junior and senior high schools presented in Figure 7-6 are similar. The only significant differences concern security personnel (II) and discipline (III), but for both groups, discipline is of primary importance and security personnel of secondary importance. The two profiles follow the overall student pattern previously presented in Figure 7-5.

Profiles for student recommendations depicted on the basis of community type shown in Figure 7-7 indicate that the recommendations



SOURCE: PQ, TQ and SO


FIGURE 7-5
GENERAL RECOMMENDATION BY STUDENTS,
TEACHERS, AND PRINCIPALS



SOURCE: SQ

FIGURE 7-6

STUDENT RECOMMENDATIONS BY SCHOOL LEVEL



SOURCE: SQ

FIGURE 7-7

STUDENT RECOMMENDATIONS BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY

from big city students differ greatly from those in the other three locations. All of the latter resemble the overall student profile, with discipline being the major recommendation by a large margin and security personnel being of secondary importance. For big cities, however, the pattern is clearly different: security personnel increases in importance and discipline decreases, such that each was about equally endorsed. Many of the large city schools have security personnel, which perhaps explains why this is one of the first recommendations that comes to mind. Rural students, on the other hand, have the lowest rate of such recommendations; security personnel are also absent in the majority of rural school settings. It is significant that students with experience of security personnel in their schools are most likely to recommend them.


The profiles for the three levels of victimization presented in Figure 7-8 are very similar. Surprisingly, the experience of being victimized has no important impact on the probability of making a particular recommendation. Victims and nonvictims both have similar perceptions of the factors involved in school crime and disruption. If anything, highly victimized students were slightly less likely to recommend security personnel or discipline.

With the exception of big city students, then, the recommendation profiles for the various student groups followed the overall student pattern.

General Recommendations From Teachers

Except for the parental involvement and community relations cluster (VII), junior and senior high school teachers had essentially identical profiles. (see Appendix B, Figure B-7.5). Junior high school teachers were somewhat more likely to emphasize such involvement. This may reflect a feeling among teachers that parental involvement has more impact on younger students' behavior.

The four community profiles indicate a few differences between recommendations of the big city teachers and those of teachers in other locations (see Appendix B, Figure B-7.6). The levels of recommendation for both security devices and security personnel were higher in the cities, as was the case with the students, perhaps for the same reason—greater familiarity with them. Rural school teachers had the lowest levels of recommendations for security measures.



SOURCE: SQ

FIGURE 7-8

STUDENT RECOMMENDATIONS BY VICTIMIZATION

Teacher victimization was defined for three levels: none, once, and two or more times. Victimization levels seemed to be somewhat more related to teacher recommendations than they were to student recommendations (see Appendix B, Figure B-7.7). Teachers who were not victimized were generally less likely to make recommendations. Victimized teachers were significantly more likely to recommend disciplinary measures.


General Recommendations from Principals

While the three school level profiles were similar in general pattern and level (see Figure 7-9), there were some significant differences. Junior high principals urged disciplinary measures the most; this choice was least attractive to elementary principals. Improving school climate was more frequently recommended by junior high principals, and parental involvement and community relations were least frequently recommended by senior high principals. In general, these findings parallel those depicting the principals' successful practices. It would be expected that the two sets of findings would parallel each other, since those principals who experienced a success with a preventive measure would most probably recommend it in general.

Considered by type of community, the big city principals made the most recommendations (see Figure 7-10). They placed considerably more emphasis upon security devices, security personnel, discipline, and training and organizational change than those in other locations. Rural principals had the lowest overall level of recommendations. The high number of recommendations from big city principals could be a reflection of their concern with the incidence rates in their schools, a suggestion supported by Figure 7-11.

General recommendations from principals also vary according to incidence levels of school crime. Incidence was defined on the basis of the total number of incidents occurring in the principal's school during the reporting month. Three incidence levels were selected: none, 1-4, and 5 or more incidents. The cutting point between the middle and the high incidence category was chosen such that about 8% of the principals would represent high incidence schools, the same percent that indicated that their school had a fairly or very serious problem.

Figure 7-11 clearly indicates that principals from high incidence schools had a significantly



SOURCE: PQ

FIGURE 7-9

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF PRINCIPALS BY SCHOOL LEVEL




FIGURE 7-10
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF PRINCIPALS
BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY




FIGURE 7-11
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF PRINCIPALS
BY "CRIME" INCIDENCE LEVEL

higher rate of recommendations. Furthermore, they were much more likely to recommend training and organizational change as a means of reducing problems. They also focused upon security, discipline, and improving school climate. Overall, the emphasis on training and organizational change, parental involvement and community relations, and improving school climate seemed to be somewhat stronger than the emphasis on security and discipline.

The uniqueness of the big city and junior high school recommendation profiles can probably be explained in part by the higher incidence rates in these types of schools.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Principals at all three levels of schooling reported successful practices for reducing school crime and disruption. In addition, general recommendations for preventing school crime were made by secondary students and teachers as well as by principals in both elementary and secondary schools. The results were as follows:

1. Except for elementary principals, all groups of respondents agreed on one point: as both a general recommendation and a successful strategy, the administration of discipline ranks first. Security devices and personnel received high ratings, and training and organizational change, parental involvement and community relations, and improvement of school climate were also frequently mentioned.
2. Big city schools reported the highest overall levels of successful practices, while rural schools had the lowest. In addition to high rates of success in the areas of security and discipline, the big city schools also experienced success with training and organizational change.
3. Principals in schools with the highest crime incidence rates had the highest level of successful practices, and principals in low incidence schools the lowest. Evidently those with more experience of the problem make more recommendations.
4. Strategies used by low and high incidence schools were quite different. Low incidence schools placed more emphasis on security than on discipline; high incidence schools reversed this pattern, placing more emphasis on discipline than security.

5. General recommendations of students, teachers, and principals were compared. While all three groups recommended discipline most frequently, students tended to place much more emphasis on it as the primary course of action. Teachers and principals viewed the problem as more complex, requiring both discipline and a variety of other approaches.
6. Students in big city schools were considerably more likely than students elsewhere to recommend security personnel and less likely to recommend discipline. Students who were victimized had essentially the same perceptions of the school crime problem as students who were not victimized and tend to make essentially the same recommendations.
7. Big city teachers were more likely to recommend security devices and personnel. Victimized teachers as compared to nonvictimized teachers were more likely to recommend discipline.
8. Junior high principals placed the most emphasis on discipline and elementary principals the least. Big city principals placed more emphasis on security, discipline, and training and organizational change, as did those in high-crime schools.

Crime and disruption in school is seen primarily as a problem in discipline by students, teachers, and principals alike, but teachers and principals have a more complex understanding of the process than students do, as inferred from the recommendation profiles. This general finding holds true even when the recommendations of all three groups are broken down by school levels, by types of community, levels of crime, or victimization. However, the big city recommendation profiles are decidedly different when comparing students, teachers, or principals with their non-big city counterparts. The big city school situation with its accompanying high incidence rates brings out a different solution profile within each of the three groups: students, teachers, and principals in big city schools are more likely to recommend security devices and personnel.

Recommendations from the principals seem to be more affected by school level and type of community than do those from teachers and students. In other words, principals in different situations are more likely to have different solutions to recommend than do either students or teachers.





Phase III Case Studies

INTRODUCTION

In Phase III of the Safe School Study, 10 schools were purposely selected for more intensive, on-site study. The qualitative data from this portion of the study is intended to complement, supplement, and add a descriptive richness to the statistical findings from Phases I and II. Since it was a field study permitting extensive observation and intensive interviewing in the schools, Phase III provided access to school sources who had not been included in the earlier phases of the study such as counselors, security personnel, school aides, and, in some cases, school board members. It also involved a community component by allowing for discussions with parents and representatives of various agencies in the community. The observation and interviewing provided an opportunity to focus concretely on the perceptions of school and community respondents of the nature and causes of school vandalism and violence, how they are coping or failing to cope with the problems, and their evaluations of the relative success or failure of their attempts.

The selection of the 10 field sites was based on various characteristics of the schools and the communities in which they were located. Schools were chosen to represent various regions of the country, sizes of community, and rural-urban dimensions, and to include examples of elementary, junior, and senior high school grades. Most of the schools have had serious problems with vandalism and violence in the past and have changed for the better over a period of time. A few of them continue to have serious problems today.

The study design provided for approximately two and one-half weeks of intensive field observation and interviewing in each of the schools and their surrounding communities by one of six professional field researchers, each of whom had previous experience in conducting and reporting field studies of schools. Prior to visiting any of the sites, the study team, consisting of six field researchers, the Project Monitor, the Project Director, and a technical advisory committee met and designed a protocol or general guide to observation and interviewing to ensure comparability across sites.¹

In addition, it was agreed that exploratory observation and discussions would involve, in each case, a wide range of potential respondents, including school administrators, teachers, students, security personnel and other school staff, parents and juvenile authorities. Since the field researchers did not use a highly structured interviewing format and were not constrained by a rigid quota of interviews, they were able to follow observations and discussions wherever they led in the school and out into the community.

The same study team met again at the conclusion of the first round of five field studies to compare on-site experiences and to set tentative guidelines for the analysis of the data. Each field researcher reported in depth on his or her school. Based on draft reports, individual school profiles were developed. By comparing the findings in each report, some beginning ideas about similarities and differences in the experiences with, and treatments of, vandalism and violence among the five schools began to emerge. The team met again at the conclusion of the second round of five new field studies and continued the analytic procedures begun at the mid-study meeting. As a result of this process, collectively developed findings and conclusions emerged from the comparative analysis of all 10 schools.



The 10 school profiles and the summary findings and conclusions which were derived from them should be examined in the perspective of the method through which they were gathered and analyzed. The schools and the people we interviewed were assured anonymity and every attempt, including the use of pseudonyms, has been made to guarantee that assurance while maintaining accuracy in reporting. Field research as a technique is descriptive and holistic in looking at specific sites and situations under study. It gives an in depth picture of what a trained observer can see, and a skilled interviewer can learn about what people involved in the particular school believe to be the causes and consequences of vandalism and violence in their school and community. Field research also allows the researcher to ask the people in the school and its community about their opinions of how the programs they have developed to control vandalism and violence have succeeded and where and how they have failed. Since the field researcher has observed the day-to-day life of the school and how it relates to its community, he is able to add his own insights and evaluations to those of the people he has observed and interviewed, always making certain that he does not confuse his views with those of the people he is studying either in his analyses or in his reporting.

Generalizing beyond these 10 schools is not a valid procedure. The small number of schools included in Phase III did not constitute a probability sample and could not represent all geographical regions, or the variety of student body and school staff compositions extending across the country, or reflect the full range of differential exposure of schools to vandalism and violence. These and other characteristics which produce differences in schools and their communities could not be adequately represented in a study of this size. However, important insights can be gained through an exploratory study of this type. It is possible to learn what is common in the experience of the 10 schools and how experiences differ. Such comparisons allow us to begin to identify some of the important variables in school vandalism and violence and to isolate those techniques for control which seem to be working from those which do not.

¹The six field researchers were: Anne Borders Patterson, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina; James R. Broschart, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Roanoke, Virginia; James L. Deslonde, Stanford University, Stanford, California; George W. Noblit, Memphis State University, Memphis, Tennessee; Elizabeth Ruess-Ianni, Institute for Social Analysis, Newfoundland, New Jersey; and Francis A. J. Ianni, Director, Horace Mann Lincoln Institute, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, New York, who served as Senior Member and wrote the Phase III Summary and Conclusions. Other members of the study team were David Bayless, RTI Project Director, and David Boesel, NIE Project Monitor. A technical advisory committee comprises W.C. Eckerman, Oliver Moles, William Pink, Jack Shirey, and J. Williams.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

While each of the schools studied in Phase III is unique in terms of its community and its experience with vandalism and violence and their control, there are a number of similarities in the experience of some of the schools and some which seem to be shared by all 10 schools in the study. These similarities emerged during the meetings of the field researchers as we compared our findings and analyzed what we had seen, heard, and been told by school staff and community members. Again, while it is not possible to generalize beyond these 10 schools, the findings reported below should be considered both in relation to the major findings in Phases I and II and in the perspective of the 10 school profiles from which they emerged. Our analyses began with what the people we interviewed had told us about the causes and control of school vandalism and violence, but also included what we had observed and read in school records as well. From these analyses, we identified a number of factors which seemed to be common enough in the experience of all or most of the schools studied that they required identification and comment. As we examined these factors, we found that they could conveniently be described under five major headings:

- (1) Community effects on vandalism and violence
- (2) School size and design as factors in vandalism and violence
- (3) Composition of student body, student and staff identification with the school, and the quality of student life as aspects of school climate
- (4) Leadership, staff relationships, authority relations, discipline, and rule structures
- (5) Making schools safe and maintaining the quality of education.

COMMUNITY EFFECTS ON VANDALISM AND VIOLENCE

Throughout the schools we studied, there seems to be some confusion in defining and describing the wide range of problems which are disruptive to schools and which are often collectively called "school crime." To some extent, this resulted from an unwillingness or inability to distinguish between what is school-specific about violence and vandalism in schools and what is simply reflective of what is happening in the streets of the community. As a result, we found that in most of the schools there was a strong reluctance to use the term "school crime" as generic for vandalism, violence, and disruption of activity in the school. While a number of reasons were cited to explain this reluctance, the most common concerned the legal-societal parameters which define crimes, because there are disruptions within the school which can have as much or more consequence for the school even though such disruptions are not defined as being crimes.

Activities ranging from school riots to disrespect for teachers and administrators were frequently cited as causing more disruption to the ongoing life of the school than individual thefts or even minor incidents of violence. At the same time there was agreement among a number of the respondents that minor crimes committed in the school were frequently not reported to the police and were handled within the disciplinary procedures of the school. As a result, we found that the use of the term "school crime" could not be applied with any specificity to the variety of acts of vandalism and violence which were reported to us in individual schools which tended to use more locally generated definitions. Vandalism and violence, however, were commonly used terms in all of the schools with "vandalism" referring to the theft, defacing, or destruction of school property and "violence" commonly used to describe any activity against persons, including the theft of personal, as contrasted to school, property. These definitions which emerged in the field studies included acts which would be legally classified as crimes by the community but would also fall within the more traditional violations of good order and discipline within the school.

A number of community related factors were described as having an important influence on both the incidence and the character of vandalism and violence in schools. Many of the respondents reported that changes in the composition of the community population, and particularly in community stability, were reflected in changes in both the extent and the nature of vandalism and violence in the school. In

two schools in two different regions of the country, for example, it was reported that decreases in the population of the attendance districts of the school resulting from wide-scale burning out of available living quarters produced significant decreases in the size of the school population. The result was less crowding and consequently less violence. In these same cases, the respondents added that the destruction of existing dilapidated housing eventually resulted in the building of new, low income housing projects, which provided more adequate living conditions, consequently decreased population mobility, and led to more stable patterns of family living. Family stability in turn was said to have led to better attendance and improved student performance, as well as greater parent involvement in the school.

There were also reports of communities where the transition was from middle class to lower socioeconomic status population patterns, which led to an increase in the community violence and property crimes, more truancy, and greater vandalism against the schools. This latter point may help to explain an interesting difference in vandalism which we noted when comparing rural-suburban schools with schools in depressed urban areas. While we did not have a sufficient number of schools to provide any conclusive comparisons among rural-suburban and urban schools, we did find that vandalism in rural and suburban areas tended to aim at the destruction or defacement of the school and so might be viewed as an act against the school as an institution. The urban, inner city schools, while suffering some destruction and defacement, more frequently were the victims of thefts of school property, sometimes on a massive scale. The ultimate goal of offenders in these cases was presumably the resale of the stolen property.

While there was general agreement among respondents from all of the schools that the economic, cultural, and social level of the community provides an important context for the incidence and character of vandalism and violence in schools, there was also frequent mention of the fact that schools are not simply reflective of crime rates in those communities. In a number of schools in urban areas where there has been a decline in the incidence of school violence and vandalism, this has taken place during a period of time in which crime rates have soared in the immediate communities. In some of these schools, parents reported that they felt their children were safer while they were within the school than they were in their own communities. When we spoke with parents in these communities, they most frequently cited both the greater security provided by the school and the more

pervasive control, order, and accountability to which their children were exposed in the school. Teachers and administrators in these schools also indicated that they felt safer in the schools than in traveling through the surrounding communities. In a number of cases, they also reported that parents actually turned over responsibility for disciplining their children to the school.

The influence of the community on the school was most apparent in the strong emphasis placed upon the school-community relationship by parents and school people in those cases where there had been a change for the better, especially in schools which were once considered unsafe or out of control. The teachers and administrators in these schools report that bettering community relationships not only leads to a more supportive atmosphere for the school in the community, but can effect dramatic change in the level of disruption within the school. When the community relates positively to the school, this seems to be accompanied by a decrease in vandalism against the school and in violence in the school attributable to outsiders. At the same time, when a school loses its reputation as being unsafe and begins to be known in the community as a safe school, there is a higher probability that parents seeking better education and greater safety for their children will send their children there as opposed to elsewhere. This in turn reduces the problem of the loss of better students to schools outside the community, a factor often cited in explaining the disproportionate number of academic and behavioral "problem children" in the public schools in some communities.

At the same time that a strong emphasis was noted on the importance of community factors, there was also frequent mention of the importance of societal forces in general as influencing vandalism and violence in the schools. In all of the schools we examined where there has been a period of upsurge and decline or of continuing escalation of disruption and disorder, the period of the late sixties and early seventies seems to have marked a turning point. In a number of the schools, problems associated with desegregation and resegregation in terms of racial balance were frequently cited as important and sometimes critical benchmarks in school violence. In these same schools, however, as well as in others, it was also pointed out that this time frame included both a more general student rebellion against the authority of schools and the period of student unrest associated with the war in Southeast Asia. A number of respondents also pointed to the effects of budget cuts resulting

from financial crises. Respondents pointed to the reduction of teachers and other school personnel, of instructional materials, and of facilities in many school districts as examples of how changes in society can lead to increased problems with school disruption.

SCHOOL SIZE AND DESIGN AS FACTORS IN VANDALISM AND VIOLENCE

In discussing school safety, respondents frequently mentioned the physical characteristics of schools and the methods used to make them secure. In addition, our observations in each school paid particular attention to the physical plant and the security measures related to it. The existing research on school size as a variable affecting student behavior indicates that large schools and small schools differ in a number of ways.²

When we compared the smaller with the larger schools in our set--some of which had over 4,000 students--we found smaller schools to be safer than larger schools. Both interviews and observations suggested some reasons to explain this difference.

One reason mentioned by a number of school personnel was that students can be anonymous in large schools but are individually identifiable in small schools. The importance of student visibility was frequently reported. A number of administrators, teachers, counselors, and school guards maintained that in a small school the staff can identify each student so that "there is no place to hide." In large schools, on the other hand, not only do school personnel not know each student; but, in the absence of some form of identification, it is impossible to identify outsiders. One frequently mentioned problem concerned schools that had to go into split sessions because of crowding. In such schools, school personnel can never be certain who is and who is not supposed to be in the building at a given time.

Many of the schools used some form of identification such as program cards or student identification cards. In one school, all students wore name tags. The problem of identification also became apparent in instances where students who were victimized by other students were unable to identify their assailants. Many respondents said that the visibility of students in smaller schools served a preventive function. Students in smaller schools knew they could be identified.

²See, for example, Barker, Roger G., and Paul V. Gump. Big School, Small School: High School Size and Student Behavior (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964).

Some respondents said that small schools and the greater visibility of individual students in such schools also made for better integration of students with the faculty and with each other. In some of the smaller schools, for example, the principal knew each student and could relate not only to the student but often to his or her family as well. These same respondents added that the student's feeling of self-worth and responsibility were often enhanced by the fact that he was known personally by the faculty. It is interesting to note that in the large schools studied which had annexes or alternative schools as subunits, these smaller units were found to be safer than the main buildings.

While sheer size was found to be an important factor, the size of the school population in relation to school capacity seems to be even more important. This "crowding factor" was mentioned frequently and in a number of different contexts. In several of the schools which had experienced major disruption in the late sixties and early seventies, teachers remembered that the schools were over-crowded and had many more students than they were designed to serve. In these same schools, reduction in school population was found in some cases to be significantly below the designed school capacity and was accompanied by a reduction in violence and disruption, according to many teachers and parents.

Another frequently reported and often observed aspect of the crowding factor was the locus of much violence and disruption in crowded hallways, cafeterias, and stairwells. One frequently heard comment was that control of students, once they were in the classroom and could be identified as individuals, was a relief from the chaos and disorder of the halls and stairs during change of classes. Of particular significance in both interviews and observations is the problem of cafeterias. Even in the smaller schools studied, the cafeteria seemed to be a focal point for potential violence and disorder. In the larger schools, the problem of attempting to feed 4,000 students in a short period of time has led these schools to partition off the cafeteria into smaller areas or to shorten and stagger lunch periods for students. In all cases school personnel are specifically assigned to monitor lunch periods. Bathrooms, on the other hand, while frequently believed to be potential danger spots in schools, were reported and observed to be relatively safe in most of the schools studied. This safety factor, however, results in some cases from the fact that all bathrooms except one were locked and usually monitored, with a pass required for admission.

School design and maintenance were other factors frequently mentioned or observed to be

important in relation to school safety. Security personnel and other school staff commented on the problem of difficult to reach or difficult to monitor spaces such as stairwells, alcoves, or numerous exit and entrance doors. Interviewees frequently commented that open spaces, such as long corridors, which could be kept under surveillance were easier to secure. It was also frequently reported and consistently observed that the safer schools were cleaner and better maintained, although not necessarily newer, than those schools which were still experiencing some degree of disruption.

The area immediately outside of the school also presented difficulties in terms of grounds and security maintenance in those cases where the school was responsible for large playing fields or parking lots. This was particularly true after school hours and on weekends when, according to school personnel, community members and other "outsiders" used the facilities and often defaced or even destroyed them.

Throughout all of our schools, there was a strong preference for "more people than things" to increase the security of schools. Many of the schools had electronic security devices; but in most cases, they were either inoperative or were believed to be ineffective. In two of the schools, burglar alarms were said to be effective deterrents, particularly for making small areas such as supply rooms or areas where refreshments and school supplies were sold, secure. Walkie-talkies were considered not only valuable but essential to adequate communication and rapid response time in the larger schools; in some of the smaller schools, they were considered unnecessary.

COMPOSITION OF STUDENT BODY AND SCHOOL IDENTIFICATION

Another set of factors which seemed to differentiate safe schools from those experiencing difficulty was the composition of the student body and how students identified with the school. Many schools had a variety of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic status characteristics of both students and staff. In the 10 schools studied, no particular pattern of racial mixture seems to have differentiated safe schools from schools experiencing difficulties with vandalism and violence. While a number of the schools experienced difficulties and an increase in disruption during periods of changing racial balance or desegregation, we also found examples of schools which did not experience these problems. Evidence from the study suggests that younger children in the secondary schools tend to be more frequently victimized than older students; however, no significant evidence

supports any attribution of more or less vandalism or violence in any particular grade or grade structure. One of the schools examined was a 7th grade center which had the effect of isolating the 7th grade from the rest of the school structure. The school was working well academically and was considered safe by its staff who believed that such centers are a viable alternative to the traditional school grade structure.

There was general agreement among respondents in many of the schools that a small percentage of students--the figure 10% was frequently cited--form a hard core of disruptive students who are responsible for most of the vandalism and violence in schools. While this troublesome group did not seem to be identifiable in terms of any specific racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic status background, school staff commonly described them as students who were also having difficulty academically, were frequently in trouble in the community, and tended to come from troubled homes. These students were easily identifiable and generally seemed to be known both to staff and other students because of the frequency with which they were in trouble. These same respondents indicated that in their experience this group of troublesome students could find allies among the other students when specific issues, situations, or problems arose. Violence and disruptive behavior is thus described as interactive with a small group of students frequently causing problems and at times setting off a chain reaction among other student groups.

Another problem associated with the group of troublesome students is the inability of the schools to find viable alternatives for dealing with them. The most frequent treatment is suspension, but very few respondents seemed to feel suspensions were effective either as deterrents or as treatments. The problem seems greatest at the junior high school level where, because of the mandatory school leaving age, students in some school districts may not be expelled and suspension is the only alternative. A number of schools are further hampered by regulations limiting the number of suspensions each year. There were also frequent complaints about the inadequacy and lack of availability of counseling or psychiatric help. In one school system studied, it was reported that it took 3 months to obtain even emergency psychiatric referral. One remedy which seems to be used by some schools for dealing with troublesome students is to transfer them to other schools, often without identifying them as troublesome, as a result of restrictions on communicating student disciplinary records. However, some counselors indicated that when troublesome students are transferred, the school "informally" notifies the receiving school of the

behavior problem involved. They added that this may have the effect of labeling the student and thereby create a situation in which he has to "live up" to his previous reputation. While examples were found of specific programs aimed at early identification and treatment of such troublesome students, there were frequent suggestions by school staff that such students require special training and socialization experiences.

One characteristic of students which did seem to differentiate safe schools from problem schools was the sense of identification which students felt with the school and its program. This characteristic, which we came to call "school spirit," was manifest in each of the safe and successful schools studied, and was just as obviously absent in those schools which were experiencing problems. The dimensions of school spirit were also fairly uniform in those schools where we found it. One important feature was that students expressed a sense of pride in their school. The source of the pride could be very different. In one case, the long tradition of excellence was described by students and faculty alike, while in another school the fact that the school had recently developed a series of special honors programs which brought superior students to the school was cited. Staff relationships with students seem also to be a measure of both the responsiveness of the school and the students' ability to identify with it. Here again, the nature of the relationship could be quite different from school to school. In one case, the faculty relationship centered on creating a student centered school with the principal openly describing himself as an advocate for students. In another school, where student identification with the school was just as high, the faculty role was one of close supervision and monitoring of student efforts. In both schools, however, students reported that they felt part of the school community because "the teachers cared."

Another feature which seems to be related to the students' ability to identify positively with the school is parent and community attitudes towards the school and its programs. Community involvement and interest in school programs were high in each of the schools we identified as having school spirit. Here again, however, the nature of parental involvement varied from a large number of parents actively involved as school aides and paraprofessionals, to the more traditional model of parental involvement in PTA or other school centered organizations.

An emphasis on the importance of academic excellence seems to be associated with those schools which produce a high sense of identification among students. It is interesting that in two of the schools, the staff indicated that

efforts on the part of the school to attract bright and able students had the effect not only of lowering the problems with vandalism and violence because those students were less troublesome, but it also seemed to have an effect on low-achieving students who were now proud of the higher standards established at their school. Finally, wherever a school was identified which had been in trouble but which had "turned around" and seemed to be headed for greater safety, one of the measures associated with the turnaround seems to have been improving the academic program and stressing the importance of academic excellence.

LEADERSHIP, VIOLENCE, AND VANDALISM

When the data were analyzed from the first five schools we studied, the importance of the principal's style of leadership and his initiation of a structure of order seemed to differentiate safe schools from those having problems. This same characteristic was found to be equally important in the second group of 5 schools; and by looking at all 10 schools, some factors which contribute to this sense of order were identified. First, the role of the principal appears to be a critical factor in itself. Visibility and availability to students and staff mark the principal in those schools which seem to have made a dramatic turnaround from periods of violence. In all of these schools, we heard that the principal was frequently seen by students and staff throughout the school, even in the larger schools which had made a turnaround. In addition, faculty and students had easy access to him. This was also true, in most cases, of parents and community people who could "get to the principal" whenever they had concerns or problems with the school.

Conversely, it was found that those schools which remained in difficulty or seemed to be headed downward towards more trouble had principals who were often described as "unavailable and ineffective." In most cases such principals were described as keeping to their offices and seldom being seen in the hallways. In other cases, the perception was that they spent inordinant amounts of time outside the building in the community or at central administrative offices. It is also significant that most of the successful principals took over their schools from ineffective principals during the low point in the

school's safety. Another factor among successful principals seems to be strong commitment to educational leadership as well as control over the school. In each case where principals were described as being dynamic and moving the school forward, respondents credited their educational leadership and the new programs initiated as important factors.

While the principal's personal leadership style is important, we found that his ability to initiate a structure of order in the school was equally important. Again, in every successful school we found that the structure of order was described as "firm, fair, and most of all consistent." It is interesting that this finding complements a number of recent research findings which indicate that a consistent structure of order is an important determinant of success in many areas of education, ranging from the teaching of reading to the establishment of a school climate conducive to learning.³

The importance of "firmness, fairness, and consistency" was mentioned not only by teachers but by students and other school personnel as well. What they were describing was a situation in which discipline and punishment, as well as rewards, were handed out in an even-handed fashion. A related aspect was that students and faculty were aware of the consequences of certain acts, and that they were also aware that exceptions were rarely, if ever, made. In one school students added that they knew that "troublemakers" would be dealt with harshly and swiftly, but that the certainty of punishment was tempered by the fact that it was not arbitrarily or unfairly applied.

Finally, the importance of the principal as a role model for teachers, students, and the community was frequently mentioned. Some successful principals delegated considerable responsibility and authority to assistant principals; others did not. The principal leading the school by his own example, putting in long hours, and not arbitrarily siding with teachers or other adults in confrontations with students, were characteristics felt to be important. Attendance at student activities, both in the school and in the community, was also mentioned. Of particular importance was the principal's responsiveness to teacher and student input in terms of school policy. In some cases, this meant a willingness to

³See, for example, the U.S. Office of Education Office of Planning, Budgeting, and Evaluation Executive Summary Impact of Educational Innovation on Student Performance (November 1976), which reports findings of Project Longstep conducted by the American Institute for Research, and A Study of Compensatory Reading Programs (October 1976), which reports the results of a large-scale study of Title I Compensatory Reading Programs. This study was conducted by the Educational Testing Service and RMC Research Corporation.

include students and teachers in decisionmaking, while in others it represented a willingness to make known how decisions would be made and a policy of following these procedures with openness and honesty.

While the principal is a key element in establishing and maintaining order and safety in schools, the teachers and their relationships with the administration and with students were also important. We found that in a few schools dynamic leadership on the part of the principal did not lead to any change or movement towards success because "he did not have his faculty with him." There are a number of characteristics of the faculty which seem to be important in those schools which have been successful. Faculty stability in terms of length of time in the school and minimum turnover in personnel was frequently reported to be an important factor by respondents. While generally such stability had a positive effect, there were a few examples of entrenched faculty resistance to new policies on the part of the principal, producing barriers to successful change. Another factor is high faculty morale which seemed to be associated with the school spirit variable among students. High self-esteem, job satisfaction, and general agreement with the principal's educational and procedural styles are important dimensions of morale in successful turnaround schools. Teachers in such schools also reported that they are there because they want to be in those particular schools, and they frequently expressed a sense of renewal and even excitement in helping to bring about change in the school. Cohesiveness among teachers and a sense of identification with students was another characteristic frequently mentioned. Conversely, factionalism and antagonism and even open hostility towards students were found in schools which were in difficulty.

The structure of order and authority in the school comes from a variety of sources including the principal, the faculty, and the community; but eventually it is communicated through rules. How these rules are established and enunciated also seems to differentiate successful schools from those which continue to have major problems with vandalism and violence. Again, most frequently heard was that consistency and certainty of application made rules work for the successful schools. Frequently, contrasts were made between earlier periods of disruption and the present movement towards a successful school in terms of changes in the pattern of rule enforcement. Formerly, rules seemed to be developed on an as needed basis during the time of troubles, and their application and enforcement were described as equally arbitrary. Carefully and openly developed and clearly announced rules applicable to everyone and firmly enforced were

characteristic of these same schools after their turnaround. In addition, successful schools were found to include the academic program within the rule structure more frequently than was true among those schools in difficulty. In the successful schools, attendance, completion of necessary academic requirements, and maintenance of acceptable levels of achievement were stressed and enforced with the same firmness and consistency as rules regulating discipline. In unsuccessful schools, rule enforcement in the academic areas tended to be highly arbitrary and seemed to serve disciplinary rather than educational ends.

SAFE SCHOOLS AND THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION

Throughout the study, we heard and saw convincing evidence that school crime, vandalism, and violence can pose serious problems in schools just as they do in society. They present unique problems, however, when they take place in schools. For one thing, the fact that they do take place in schools means that in addition to their human and property costs, they disrupt learning processes in schools. At the same time, since the schools also socialize youth, the effects of school crime and violence have a lasting effect on youth which can eventually spread outward from schools into communities. There are also serious effects of crime and violence and the potential for it on the teaching function. Many teachers described their concern for personal safety and how the fear of outsiders coming into the school with violent and criminal intent either was or had in past periods been detrimental to effective teaching. Students and parents as well described the necessity of a safe school as a basis for effective learning. It is important to point out, however, that we found that the price for such security can frequently deplete resources or create conditions detrimental to making schools effective learning organizations and environments for providing socialization and cultural competence to young people.

In a number of the schools we studied, including those described as moving successfully towards providing a safe school environment, the need to make the school secure seemed to have some negative effects on the quality of the educational program. While students and school personnel frequently pointed out the importance of a personal and collective sense of safety and security for teaching and learning, they also pointed to a number of problems resulting from the increased emphasis on security. A major problem is the resources of the school which must be directed toward security. Principals, teachers, and school district or school board personnel constantly complained that the financial burden

represented by school security programs was increasing, and that in a period of low school budgets, this meant that security costs must compete with educational costs. While such financial resources present difficulties, there are other school resources which also suffer.

In many schools, teachers are required to perform security duty, ranging from one school in which all teachers were expected to patrol the halls, to the common practice of having teachers assume monitoring duties in the cafeteria during lunch hour. Principals and other administrative staff also find significant amounts of their time increasingly devoted to attempts to control school crime and violence. Many custodians and maintenance personnel described dramatic increases in the costs of replacing broken windows and torn out toilet fixtures, removing graffiti, and what they described as significant increases in mischievous arson.

In addition to these human and property costs, there is also the problem of the effect of strict security measures on the environment of the school. Many of the schools visited had been built during a period of time when the school was considered open to the community and thus had many entrances. Now these entrance doors are frequently kept locked and sometimes guarded. Many schools have closed off most student toilet facilities, both because of the difficulty of maintaining security, and because they are a frequent target of vandalism. A number of schools have done away with student lockers, because they were frequently broken into and were targets of arson. The chaotic conditions found in many cafeterias have necessitated not only deployment of school personnel but careful regimentation of access to the space and student interaction while eating. Finally, many schools are no longer open to the community, and afterschool activities and evening programs have been greatly reduced in the service of keeping the school secure.

The most obvious result of school and community concern with crime and violence in the schools is the presence of security personnel. Security personnel represent attempts by the schools to maintain security by creating a new role within schools. Schools have traditionally been reluctant to call in the police for all except the most serious situations. The police, on the other hand, are frequently reluctant to enter schools because of the juvenile status of students and because they view school problems as falling within disciplinary rather than criminal definitions of behavior. At the same time, the deployment of teacher and administrative time to increase security measures has meant conflict with teacher unions, diminishing of educational offerings, and

in addition, has generally been found to be insufficient to the needs.

The creation of this new role has presented a number of difficulties in some of the schools studied. The role of the security person seems to be an emergent one with problems of definition. Throughout our interviews, we heard frequent suggestions from some security personnel themselves as well as from teachers, students, and administrators, that security personnel in school settings require specialized training. There was general agreement that such training should be oriented towards increasing the educating function of school security personnel. This was often described as "keeping the security function unobtrusive." We found a number of the successful schools moving in this direction. One of the most interesting ideas here was the use of "hall counselors," trained security personnel whose function was to prevent disorder by intervening with students before an event or problem could cause disruption.

It was also suggested that special training in security procedures should be established to improve the effectiveness of security personnel. Most respondents felt that security personnel had become a permanent feature in the nation's schools, and that defining the role in educational terms and establishing standards for recruitment, training, and performance should be undertaken by the educational rather than the law enforcement system.

Throughout the interviews and observations, we found that emphasis on preventive discipline as a means of forestalling violence and vandalism was the preferred means for making schools safe. The "nip-in-the-bud" approach as well as early detection and identification and adequate socialization to discipline for students from early in their school careers were important aspects of the preventive style. The ability of the schools to successfully organize and implement preventive programs, however, was felt to be greatly reduced as a result of budget cuts and consequent personnel reductions. Many principals and teachers felt that it was important to increase the number of teachers at least as backup to the number needed to return to the student-teacher ratios which existed prior to the current fiscal crisis. We were also told by administrators, teachers, and students that drastic cuts in support personnel such as counselors and school aides had made preventive discipline virtually impossible. A number of respondents emphasized that adequate socialization to discipline required constant attention and that once a school had made the turnaround to becoming a safe school, it was necessary to work just as hard to keep it there or the school would begin to slip back into trouble.

NOTE: All names of communities, schools, and people in the Case Studies are pseudonyms.



BAYSIDE JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

The Bayside neighborhood is a pleasant, blue collar, suburban area in the extreme north end of an American metropolis. This end of the city has a fair share of industries concentrated just south of the freeway; i.e., data processing firms, a cookie and cracker plant, a brewery, and various other light industries. Approximately two miles east of this industrial area is the Bayside neighborhood, which surrounds the junior high school.

The immediate school neighborhood is a curious mixture of low-income family apartments, adult apartments, newly constructed working class townhouses, single family homes, and commercial businesses located along the nearby heavily traveled boulevard. Approximately two miles north of the junior high school is one of the large campuses of the state college system.

The most common structure throughout the neighborhood is the single family home. Many were built by developers in the late 1940's and were purchased by returning veterans eager to rear their families in suburbia. However, many residents of the city describe the area as a "white flight" area where blue collar families escaped from the growing ethnic populations in the central city. Here, the lots are larger than one would expect; many homes have 20-30 foot spacious lawns and driveways. Directly across from Bayside School is a home with stables, horses, sheep, and other animals. The typical home is between three and four bedrooms, most are well cared for, few "For Sale" signs are seen, and not many younger children are seen playing on the walkways and lawns. In fact, school personnel say that there is a steady decrease in school-age children in the attendance area of Bayside Junior High School and its feeder elementary schools.

Toward the university are larger, more expensive homes. The opening and expansion of the university has attracted "a lot of middle-class families into our attendance area." A few miles to the south of the school, within clear view, are the "homes in the hills with swimming pools, tennis courts, and horses--some of these homes used to fall within our attendance area" according to one school employee. However, within the more immediate area, the general impression of the school staff is that the neighborhood is not as

nice as it once was because more apartments are being constructed. Thus, the attendance area draws upon a varied mixture of socioeconomic groups. One faculty member said that within recent years new schools have opened and these tend to siphon off the middle-class children. They seem to imply that the school should be more middle-class, and these newer schools should not take away the better students.

Composition

The ethnic mixture of the neighborhood is representative of "every ethnic group one could find in the United States." Blacks have always been present in the neighborhood. However, in recent years, more blacks have migrated to this section along with Chicanos, although whites are by far the largest group in the schools. Bayside Junior High School is still basically a "white" school with a small percentage of nonwhite students.

PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

One's first impression of Bayside Junior High School is that of bigness and fences. The campus is located on a 28 acre rectangular lot enclosed by a chainlink fence around the perimeter of the plot. Inside the school grounds are more chainlink fences sectioning off various other parts of the school campus. Numerous gates are chained and padlocked except for one entrance, thus the school personnel can seemingly maintain a closed campus situation.

The next most visible feature of the campus is its interconnection of covered walkways. There are 15 cottage-like classroom buildings connected to each other by covered, cemented walkways. Each cottage is painted a pastel pink color with several doors and many windows. The campus is comprised of 70 classrooms, a gymnasium, a large auditorium, a multipurpose room, two student lunch areas (covered and uncovered), two faculty cafeterias, library, student store, principal's offices, custodial storehouse and offices, a home economics cottage, two faculty lounges, an agricultural center, and several large athletic playing fields.

The physical plant, built in 1952, is in excellent condition. The campus is interspersed with plantings of trees, shrubbery, lawn, and

plants, all neatly maintained with a professional appearance. To achieve this, there is a staff of eight full-time custodians; three of these are "daytime," that is, their hours closely coincide with the students' schedules. The other five are the night crew--their day begins after the student day. Thus, the campus has five custodians on the grounds until almost midnight each night.

No evidence of vandalism to property is seen, such as broken glass, windows, doors, or student lockers. The teachers' parking area is relatively isolated from the school, and neither security guards nor locked gates are used in this area. No armed or uniformed security personnel patrol the campus. Visitors are greeted by students with smiles and friendly directions. When it is time to change classes, the crowds seem orderly; there is no excessive policing and monitoring by teachers. Bayside, on first sight, comes across as a genteel, polite, ultrapleasant school.

There are 1,650 students on this campus. The educational staff at Bayside includes 68 teachers, 3 counselors, 1 administrative dean, 2 assistant principals, 2 secretaries, 1 principal. The organization begins with Mrs. Ellen Smith, the principal. Mrs. Smith appears to be low-key, unabrasive, nonauthoritarian, and one who delegates much authority and responsibility to her staff.

As one wanders around the offices, one may conclude that Bayside is not the place for discipline. Although a few such cases wander in, the bulk of the activity here seems to be managerial. According to the assistant principals, the discipline is effectively maintained by the counselors, one for each grade. On the other hand, a brief visit to the counselors' suite of offices illustrates where the discipline logjam is located. Waiting students are constantly lined up in the reception area. Student offenses range from cutting class to fighting, extortion, insolence, theft, or minor vandalism. The contrast in the two office areas is striking. The administrators see only the most severe cases. This process, says the assistant principal, allows them to function as "instructional leaders to the rest of the faculty." A counselor assigned to each grade then handles discipline as well as regular counseling duties. In line with the counselors is the Administrative Dean. Although Bayside Junior High School does not qualify for district salary support of this position, Mrs. Smith has managed to relieve a teacher of five periods of teaching to handle this position.

The next administrative layer is composed of department chairpersons. Bayside's curriculum offerings seem quite conventional: foreign

language, mathematics, music, science, English, art, industrial art, physical education, social studies, homemaking, and special education. Each of these 12 "departments" has a chairperson who handles personnel and instructional matters at the departmental level. Next in line are the 68 teachers, median age of 35-44, average of 12 years' teaching experience, approximately half male and half female, and 20% are nonwhite. Beneath the teachers are several noontime aides, all of whom are college students from the nearby university, and, finally, the cafeteria workers and custodial staff. This administrative structure is also very conventional, thus assuring that Bayside is an ultratraditional, "typical" suburban junior high school.

The administrative staff agree (1) that the problems of violence and vandalism are getting worse at Bayside, and that there is only a handful of students (estimates range from 1% to 5%) involved in such acts; (2) that most break-ins occur on the weekends; and (3) that there are three main types of violence and vandalism. Mr. Caldwell, the school custodian described them as follows:

Vandalism is the number one problem here. ...it creates a lot of overtime for my crew. It is expensive. The worst problem is graffiti. The next would be window breakage--mostly from B.B. guns and rock-throwing. And our very worst problem right now is the breaking of fire alarm boxes. Sometimes six or seven fire alarm boxes a day are broken. As fast as I fix one, another is broken. Then there are trash can fires. The kids are constantly setting fires to the trash cans. When the trees drop leaves, they burn the leaves; they even burn the shrubbery around the landscape. And then there are the lockers. Broken lockers are a problem; they pass the lockers, kick off the lock and steal the contents.

During the school day, all restrooms except one are kept closed. Otherwise, sinks are torn from the wall, paper towel dispensers are ripped down, mirrors are broken, the partitions between the toilets are torn from the wall, paper towels are torn from the dispensers, piled on the floor, and set afire, and finally the rolls of toilet tissue are stuffed into the toilets which are flushed thereby flooding the restroom. One of the vice-principals said that all of this incredible destruction can occur within a 1-hour time span when a restroom is left unattended. The one restroom left open during lunchtime is watched by two university students hired just to watch the restrooms. There is constant reference to the destructive acts focused on the restrooms, and now the school has decided not to replace mirrors and paper dispensers.

At Bayside, the first major type of violence/vandalism is willful destruction to the school and personal property. Anything that can be broken is broken. A rash of locker fires was started by students repeatedly dropping lighted matches through the vent slots until the contents were ignited. The school spent several hundreds of dollars to put metal plates over the vent slots to prevent locker fires. Following this preventive action, the students now squirt a permabond substance on the locks which dries to a permanent hardness, and the custodian has to cut the lock with a bolt cutter. The administrators agree that the ultimate solution probably is to discontinue locker use, as they have discontinued availability of restrooms. Bike theft and vandalism are also problems which have become so rampant that there is now a fenced area where all bikes are kept, and the area is monitored by a watchman throughout the day.

The second type of school violence/vandalism is assaults and fights which are daily occurrences. Larger students extort money from smaller students, as well as pick and encourage other fights. Insolence toward adults is on the increase with many of the students threatening to beat up teachers. Bayside's first student assault on a teacher was during the period of this study. Interracial hostility is also a constant source of conflict at Bayside.

A third type of violence and vandalism described by the administrators are break-ins. The break-ins are either caused and carried out by adults or by the students. The student break-ins are usually accompanied by extreme destruction--destroying files, defecating on the floors and smearing feces about, splashing paint, and breaking any object in sight. The adults simply break in, take whatever can be converted to cash, and leave. Usually, the only damage in these cases are the broken windows. Such break-ins occur about twice a year. The latest break-in resulted in the loss of almost all of the multimedia equipment: T.V. cameras, 35 mm. cameras, developing equipment, lens, etc. In the past, entire rooms of furniture have been stolen and thrown over the fence. The most notorious of these break-ins was in the home economics cottage and the library. Bayside's library facilities are the second largest for junior high schools in the district. Three years ago it was 80% destroyed by two vandals who were students in the school. The home economics cottage had all its furniture, glassware, and other portable equipment stolen. It was recovered in the neighborhood a few weeks later.

Elaborate precautions have been implemented at Bayside to deter break-ins. The student store is equipped with a burglar alarm. A

detector system costing several thousand dollars has been ordered for the library, and the multimedia room has been burglar-proofed with iron grids at some windows and boarded spaces where there were once windows.

When students are apprehended in any of these acts, they are sent to the vice-principal's office after processing by the counselor. An automatic 3-day suspension is issued. The student returns with the parents and a formal hearing is held. Acts of a very serious nature (including all narcotics incidents) involve the security agent and, when arrest is required, the metropolitan police. The hearing with the parents results in either a severe reprimand and threats of more punitive action if the incident occurs again, or the hearing will result in arrest, booking, court hearing, and opportunity transfer. Rarely are expulsions ordered. Repeated offenders may go on a rather long waiting list to be permanently assigned to a special school for these kinds of children.

All of the administrators think that the opportunity transfer is undesirable, but it is their only tool for dealing with the deviant child. They imply that teachers could do more to help out, and they are satisfied that the appropriate district divisions and the security division are supportive and respond quickly to the school's requests. The school's response to these infractions are guided by a handbook published by the district. The 100-page handbook lists procedures to follow for every violation from murder to insolence. Violence and/or vandalism is a serious endeavor on the part of the students, and the school's intent to deter it is just as systematic and determined. This pitched battle between the school and Bayside students has all the resemblance of armed warfare.

When asked about causes and remedies, the administrators and teachers characteristically respond with suggestions of "things"--more burglar alarms, guard dogs, night watchmen, more locked, patrolled areas, a resident agent, etc. Conspicuously absent are any thoughts about preventive aspects or instructional classroom-oriented techniques. The administrators see the causes of violence and vandalism as emanating from "others," i.e., changing family values, violence glorification on television, single parent families, the changing social structure of the neighborhood, drugs, or a general loss of respect for traditional values. In the face of these causes, the administrators imply that they are helpless to intervene in these powerful social processes; the school is completely victimized by the will of the deviant student vandalizer, thief, or fighter.

VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM AT BAYSIDE

It is impossible to evaluate the violence and vandalism at Bayside, however, without viewing these acts within the context of the problem in the school district within which the school is located. A recent report by the district on the "monetary loss attributed to crimes against district property and criminal acts committed against district personnel and pupils" gives some idea of the problem.

The net total in loss for the 1975-76 year was \$3,821,664. Each security person interviewed in this study agrees that under-reporting is a conscious, common practice, especially in areas of high incidents. Compensating for under-reporting, the net total would exceed \$4 million. The variety of crimes on school campuses are a testimony to the conjecture that schools are not immune to the ills of society, or worse, schools are a reflection of society—a microcosm. The schools are hit by robbery, assault and battery, sex offenses, burglary, theft, malicious vandalism, arson, and narcotics activities.

Whereas firearms (handguns, shotguns, etc.) on campuses were down 33%, knives and other weapons on campus were up by 21%. These weapons were used in a total of 10,460 criminal offenses in the schools. The report further states that 6,699 suspects were handled through administrative processes and/or arrests. Some areas of the district report incidents of burglary, theft, and vandalism occurring daily; on weekends, the rates doubled.

The crime statistics are staggering: 222 11-year olds arrested or processed for criminal acts; 779 adults over 18 arrested and processed; 792 assault and batteries; 5,075 burglaries; 422 knives and other weapons confiscated from lockers or from persons threatening bodily harm. In addition, thousands of hours of instructional time have been lost.

Against this backdrop, Bayside Junior High School may seem without problems. The report further states that Bayside reported a total of only 13 cases to the security division (4 burglary cases and 9 cases of theft). Bishop Junior High, on the other hand, reported 10 assaults, 6 robberies, 34 burglaries, 17 thefts, 4 vandalisms, 18 narcotics incidents, and 16 trespassings. Compared to Bayside, this leads one to suspect that two different worlds exist in these two schools. However, the surface illusion may be misleading. This case study reveals that Bayside is struggling against very real, serious problems of violence and vandalism. Given the neighborhood setting and the past history of the school, Bayside is indeed in serious trouble. The Security Chief

characterizes this as a school with "no problems." His assessment is influenced by Bayside's relative standing throughout the district. Yet, the Bayside people interviewed for this study are not similarly impressed; they see Bayside as a troubled school. Spirits are not particularly high; optimism seems on the decline as they describe the problem. Thus, although Bayside may appear to be a bright spot in the total, somber picture of the total district, the interviewees convey a sense of gloom, frustration, and anger at not being able to solve its problems with violence and vandalism.

This report is 50% accurate, says Howard Nelson, the District Chief of Security. "Many of our schools under-report because they don't want to be seen as a bad school. Our best reporting is from campuses where there are resident agents. Grammar schools and junior highs don't report accurately.

He goes on to state that "in one junior high school, the kids actually walk down the hall smoking pot. Extortion, robbery, assaults, are daily occurrences—that's why our primary aim is protecting people." The Chief explains further that the psychological as well as physical well-being of students and staff is a far more valuable resource than the building itself. His division tries to create a school that is safe for students and staff.

SECURITY PERSONNEL

The security division of this district contains 300 security agents trained and sworn in as peace officers. This police force is the third largest in this metropolitan county. The total security division consists of 4 communications operators, 16 watchmen, 50 special officers for adult schools, 41 security agents and assistants for night patrol, 221 day patrol agents, and 8 security agents for investigations. A force of 37 persons administer, supervise, and render supportive services for the security division.

From the perspective of agents, more training, role expansion, and redefining of professional relationships, rather than more manpower, are the desirable responses to the increasing violence. Each agent encountered during the study was very impressive—well dressed, in shirt and tie, neatly trimmed haircuts, cordial, no weapons exposed. They looked much like businessmen on a brief visit to campus. In the interviews, respondents verify that the agents are well known on the school campus, well liked, and respected. They seem to stand out in the school because of their contrast to the teachers' extremely casual mode of dress—jeans, open shirts.

Chief Nelson wants teachers and students to see the security division as providing this atmosphere.

We have a goodly number of assaults on teachers, students, and security agents. In one school, an intruder made the teacher disrobe in front of her class. He said he only wanted to take her money when we caught him. He took her keys--so we had to stake out her house until we caught him. Assaults such as this result in a loss of class time, it instills fear in the teachers, creates undue anxiety, and in the end it diminishes the teacher's capacity to teach. Valuable instructional time is lost and in the long run the students suffer. That is why people protection has to be our priority.

The district is beginning to experiment with more creative uses of the agents. The local metropolitan police also started a new program of having policemen as teachers in high incident schools. The security division recently broke up a large narcotics circle in one of the high schools through an undercover agent posing as a high school student. The Chief regrets that the bulk of the division's time must be spent in protection; "we haven't been able to do anything long-range to help with the problem."

In the grammar schools, the kids still respond to authority; it's between grammar school and junior high school that the transition occurs. Something makes the kids participate in drugs and vandalism. It's the grammar schoolage youngster that has to be the target of any long-range programs. We have a traffic education program in the grammar schools. All of the reports tell how receptive they are at this age.

Now the vandalism problem is mostly a problem for the 9- to 14-year olds. Burglary starts between 14 and 18; this is also the age for arson and assaults. So it would seem that any antivandalism efforts would start before the age of 9.

We have found that when kids are tired of everything else, they will turn to arson. We have had more than \$100,000 lost in fires after vandalism. With most of the arsonists, it is usually not their first break-in. Arson is a pretty big problem for us. We are losing at least one classroom per week to arson! Arson is back! At one time, the arsons didn't start until 3 months before summer. It used to be that arson started just before summer. Now it has picked up in intensity. It is all the way up to November now. So far this year we have had a \$750,000 loss in arson. And Spring just started! This is a conservative estimate because we don't get reports of the small damage that can be cleaned up by the custodial staff.

Although Chief Nelson is very proud of the job the staff is doing, he mentions the need for updating and expanding their training. He believes training in the areas of adolescent psychology, crisis intervention, juvenile law, community dynamics, and human relations would be especially helpful. With an impending desegregation suit, the Chief believes training in the human relations area would be essential--many others throughout the district expect conflict and violence to follow the desegregation implementation. Chief Nelson thinks the agents can be utilized more in the classroom instructional programs, and they could become involved with more interventions before the child commits an act of violence or vandalism. However, such an expanded role of the security agent requires additional training. He implied strongly that unless such training and role redefinition takes place, his division could not function in a preventive capacity, but rather would continue to respond to symptoms.

THE TEACHING STAFF AT BAYSIDE

The teachers at Bayside are well experienced. Many of them have taught at Bayside Junior High School almost from the time the school was built in 1952. Several have been there for 20 years; one has been there for 22 years. The teachers who have been at Bayside the longest feel the strongest about the "loss of respect for property." These teachers often comment that the physical facilities are still among the best in the city and the students do not realize how well-off they are.

All of the teachers complain that they do not have students as good as those of 10 years ago:

It was much better 10 years ago and even better 18 years ago when I first came here. We used to have very fine students. Although we still have some fine students now, the overall academic level is down--whether the IQ has gone down, I couldn't say, but the overall academic level is down from what it used to be. Years ago, we used to have more high-ability kids, today we're more on the lower spectrum. We used to have--when I was social studies chairman, way back then, I used to set up for 19 sections--in 8th grade we'd have three high, three low, and the rest would be average. Now it's skewed to the bottom. You're lucky if you get one high-ability section in the 8th or 9th grade. The academic level has really come down.

In addition, all of the teachers complain about having to discipline the students continually for minor infractions. They describe their day as leaning more toward policing than teaching.

Several of them have had their classrooms broken into and vandalized, with the latest being the multimedia room and the band room. Most of the equipment stolen from these burglaries has not been recovered and will be difficult to replace. During visits to the classrooms, the teachers pointed out how desks are broken in half, books destroyed, and acoustical tiles ripped and hanging from the ceiling (the students poke the ceiling with the window poles).

Emphatically, all teachers tell us that the situation is getting worse--more student insolence and even a student assault on a teacher. They blame "changing values, lack of respect for property rights, and violence on TV" as primary causes. Most of them also say that the present system of dealing with the student violator is not effective in deterring the violence; they think more diligence on the part of the administrative staff would be more effective. Several teachers accused the principal and vice-principal of not being effective and too lenient with student violators. One teacher went so far as to say that the school is literally being run by the students--they have no guidance or adult authority figures to set limits for them.

There is uniform agreement that the counselors should not be involved with discipline matters:

I think it's a lousy system! The counselors are supposed to be friendly with the child. The counselor is like a psychiatrist. The counselor tries to work quietly with the child and help him solve his problems. All of a sudden the counselor is the same person the kid goes to when he gets in trouble. So you've got the priest and the policeman in the same body--it just won't work, at least not at this school. One of our counselors wants to leave because he's not cut out to be a policeman; he wants to counsel, not punish. I think the vice-principals should be in charge of discipline. Now the way it is, the kids who really want counseling can't get in to see the counselor because the discipline cases take all of his time.

A girl in one of my 7th grade classes was a very bright girl. She had gotten all A's in elementary school. In this same class was a boy who was a neighbor of the girl, he also had gotten all A's in elementary school. By the time they both got to 8th grade, she was trying to become the worst behaved girl in school so she could look big in the eyes of her peers. She was constantly in and out of school on suspensions; she stopped getting good grades. The boy told us she did this to be accepted by her peers--now the boy went on and continued making good grades--he is a model student. . .

They are skillful at finding ways of doing vandalizing acts. They think of many angles to destroy, damage. They think it is fun.

The loss of corporal punishment has caused much disruptive behavior here. The kids know we can't swat them--so they do as they damn well please. They tell us "don't put your hands on me--don't touch me!"

We are too remote from our students; with 30 to 40 students, they become anonymous. We lose sight of the disruptive student. The other, the well-behaved student will not come forward and let the teacher know that they are annoyed. Very often the students have the attitude that I can get away with it and as long as I can then I'll do it.

Bayside teachers are not happy. School enthusiasm is low. No special praise was given for any aspect of the school's academic program or special extra-curricular programs. As though embarrassed by their lack of positive contribution, some teachers half-heartedly stated that there were some good students at Bayside, even though there is total agreement that only a very few students cause all of the violence and vandalism problems. The teachers see the problem as urgent, requiring immediate, harsh action.

If I were to redesign this school today, I'd take out every window. I would have security agents armed and on campus all day, every day. I'd have TV monitors in every nook and cranny, and I'd have one or two security agents and guard dogs roam around the grounds at night and during weekends.

THE VIEWS OF BAYSIDE STUDENTS

The students of Bayside Junior High are lively, friendly, and seem to enjoy an easy-going ambiance on the campus. Initially, it is difficult to detect the social groups among them. The style of dress is fairly uniform; there seem to be no particular territories guarded by certain groups.

The ethnic groups are easy to distinguish. Mexican students tend to cluster together, as do the black students. Although there are 200 based-in black students, many blacks can be seen walking home after classes. They are sometimes paired off with white or Chicano friends.

During nutrition break and lunchtime, all 1,600 students are crowded into one section of the campus housing the student store (candy, popcorn, and other sweets), the sandwich windows, and the steam table lunches. Large metal picnic tables

are provided outdoors. The eating area has long metal railings leading to the windows which have a small slit for passing through the money and food.

Students sit on the asphalt or at tables in groups of two, three, and four to eat lunch. As many sit on top of the tables as those who sit properly with legs under the table. After lunch when everyone has returned to class, the empty eating area is a shocking sight. There is litter up to one's ankles--spilled milk, half-eaten sandwiches, fruit peels, squashed cups, candy, paper, etc. The filth is overwhelming. The trash cans, spaced strategically around the area, are empty.

After school, the buses are lined up to take the black students back to the central city area. The bus ride is long since Bayside is at least 30 to 35 minutes from the central city. One of the bused students said that they must be at the bus stop at 6:30 a.m. in order to get to school for the 8:00 a.m. first period. The library and a few other facilities are open before classes; however, the library is usually filled with its quota by the time the bus students arrive.

How can one distinguish a bus student from a neighborhood black? It appears as though the few interracial friendships to be seen are indulged in by neighborhood black youngsters; the bused-in black youngsters cling tenaciously to each other. They have a strong sense of group identity and operate strong negative sanctions against any form of interracial friendship. The behavior of this special group of youngsters is another indication something is wrong at Bayside.

"Will you girls get out of this classroom area!" shouts Ms. Green, the assistant principal. Students are allowed only in restricted areas during lunchtime. Students are confined to the small lunch-library area during nutrition and breaktime. Almost every restroom on campus is locked. Locked restrooms, restricted areas, and numerous rules make student life easy to manage by the adults in the school.

A school day in the life of a Bayside student should be predictable: school arrival about 8:00 a.m., closed campus/fenced-in campus, group hassles at 10:00 a.m. nutrition break, classes, group hassles at noon, classes, dismissal (2:45), and then the skillful manipulation of one's way home. If you ride the bus, your group affiliation is decided for you--you need only worry about rocks or other missiles being thrown at the bus by the white students.

The school's rigid tracking system only exacerbates the highly structured peer group

situation. The upper division student sees himself above the student who lights fires in the lockers, extorts money, and vandalizes. They snobbishly refer to "them, those, and those other students" as the violators. They still find themselves amused at the acts of the other students:

Rickey: Some kids, especially the big ones, look for fights. They walk around picking on the little kids. One time we were walking to class and we heard this banging on the locker. Well, we opened the locker and this little kid was stuffed in the locker! (Laughter) He could have been hurt. Or burned to death!

Marilyn: We have lots of fires. They have burned the bushes over by the gym. Students were standing around watching this bush burn and enjoying it--they thought it was funny!

Unidentified Student: Yeah, those are the pyros!

Marilyn: We have at least three fires a week--mostly burning trash in the trash can.

Unidentified Student: And the kids all run over and clap and cheer at the fire.

Susie: They have put metal plates on all the lockers so they can't start fires in the lockers anymore. We used to have fires in the lockers every day before they put the metal plates on.

Kevin: At lunchtime, the big kids beat up on the little kids.

Jean: In the gym they throw shoes around the dressing room, they throw empty cans of deodorant--that's dangerous, kids could get hurt with those. They burned the towels in the gym last week--just put a match to them and burned this pile of towels.

Howie: There have been three break-ins since I've been here; the band room was broken into last and many of the instruments were stolen.

Unidentified Student: There is a break-in every 2 or 3 months.

Larry: There is no respect for school property. There was a break-in to the library and our video equipment was stolen—they took the video camera—it was an inside job, maybe.

Mark: Some of the teachers are afraid and when they find a teacher who is afraid, they really put them on—just for the fun of it. They like to see the teacher get afraid of them.

Larry: The teacher could easily take the kid to the office—but they don't want to go through all that trouble, you know. The teachers aren't dedicated.

Allan: I know a lot of teachers who start out being very nice. They are concerned about us, then they get turned off and they don't care.

The students say that the troublemakers are low-achievers, they are to be found in the "dummy class," and the educationally handicapped (E.H.) classes. The troublemakers are just as troubled at home; they indulge in vandalism to vent their frustrations from home. They beat up other kids and generally make a nuisance of themselves because they want to look big in the eyes of their friends. "There is a lot of peer pressure in this school," says one of the upper division students.

The peer groups can be vividly described by each Bayside student: the cheerleaders, their boyfriends, the ESL group, the Chicano and black groups, the nerds, the geeks, the smokers, etc. Each group develops its own identity norms and assigns severe sanctions if anyone strays from the group. Whereas the students do not particularly demean these groups (they are all members of one or more), they do think that some kids may be "imprisoned" in the peer group and can't get out:

Vince: Yes, they start fires just to get attention. I think some come to school just to start fires.

Unidentified Student: Those are the pyros.

Mark: They do that for attention and enjoyment; they stand around and clap and cheer. The teacher—now the teachers don't even worry or try to put the trash fires out.

Vangie: When there is a fight, all the kids run to the fight yelling "Fight, fight, fight!" Yeah, they really enjoy seeing people fight each other.

Barbara: Another thing that happens to these kids is that they might mess up in elementary school and try to straighten up when they get here. . .but the teachers look up their records and see that they messed up in elementary school and then they won't help them. Then they get further behind in class. You can imagine how it feels to be in class where you don't understand not one thing going down. When you don't know what's going on, you mess with people, pick on them, and start a fight.

Unidentified Student: Yeah, that's right, they put you in those dummy classes.

Unidentified Student: Who wants to teach kids with smart mouths? Always smart mouthing. I'd have nothing to do with them.

Unidentified Student: They set themselves up. They are crying out for something.

Unidentified Student: Everybody has to look big in front of somebody, everybody has their own ego.

Unidentified Student: They fight to show their friends how big they are.

Unidentified Student: We used to punch in windows just to see who could do it without getting hurt (fist balled, jabbing in the air).

The "dummy group" admits openly to fanning the heat of racial antagonism at Bayside. They admitted that they can start a race riot any time they pleased. The black students confirm this behavior and further state that racial slurs and other forms of racial hate are expressed every day. The black students explained last year's race riot at Bayside as a culmination of a long history of racial antagonism which was left unattended by the school.

The black students see Bayside as a racist school with teachers who do not care. They felt hurt that when they were surrounded by hostile white students (and 20 policemen), only one teacher was there to comfort them and talk to them. The racial lines are sharp and distinct at Bayside.

Within this context, Bayside must be considered a school in serious difficulty. Plagued with every form of violence, vandalism, narcotics activity, assaults and racial hate, it is a school "on its way down" toward even greater problems of violence and vandalism.

CARVER JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

Carver Junior High School, serving grades 7, 8, and 9, is located in a residential section of a medium-sized city, in which most of the residents are black, except in areas comprising enclaves of whites and other ethnic groups. A great range of economic and social classes exists in this city and its surrounding suburbs, with significantly large groups of the very wealthy and of the extremely poor. Within the black population, important distinctions are made among individuals, groups, and living areas based on income and social position. The city government and its agencies are in the hands of the black majority, as is the school system which serves a predominantly black student population.

Carver Junior High School is a school in transition. Nearly all of its students, faculty, and staff now regard it as a "safe" place to be. Up until 3 years ago, however, it had just as emphatically been viewed as "a school out of control," a school on its way down. What went on before, what has changed, and what is the situation at Carver today?

The school is situated near the intersection of two major cross-city avenues where three neighborhoods come together. Its district includes large portions of all three living areas. The residents of the wealthy black neighborhood, which begins just to the south of the school, are successful in sending their children either to private schools or to the junior high school on the south side of the city, even though this necessitates individual petition to the central school administration for permission to transfer. This transfer pattern has been established for some time now; and the reason for it, according to many of the faculty at Carver, is the deterioration of Carver under the prior administration. Even though such transfers require privately arranged transportation for their children, well-to-do blacks prefer South Junior High School. It provides better academic and social opportunities, and the wealthy black parents of junior high school-aged children assert that they want, and can afford, a better education for their children than the neighborhood school can provide.

In a similar fashion, families in a large middle-class black neighborhood, located to the west of Carver, tend to send many of their children to a junior high school on the western edge of its section. Again the arrangements for transfer have to be made individually, but the city bus system provides, in this instance, a ready means of transport. The feeling among many middle-class black families is that West Junior High represents a more distinctly suburban school experience with values closer to theirs. These families, as well, have avoided Carver for over 10 years.

Carver Junior High thus is regarded as an unattractive choice by both wealthy and middle-income blacks; it has had a reputation in the past for violence and for gang fights. At present, this reputation is somewhat diminished, but those who avoid the school still regard Carver as the type of inner-city school that interferes with social and academic success. Consequently, the children who do attend Carver, with few exceptions, are from the lower class black neighborhoods to the north and east of this school or from adjacent streets to the west, where some parents feel that the school is just too convenient not to use.

During the past 3 years, under a new principal, Carver has succeeded in losing much of its former reputation for violence and today is generally regarded as "safe" by school authorities in the central administration. However, the attendance pattern established over the last decade persists, along with the central administration's willingness to permit transfer apparently on the basis of social position. Few of the middle and upper class children are in Carver today, despite strong promotional efforts on the part of the school's current principal.

Carver was constructed in 1930 and, except for the construction of additions in the 1950's, is essentially unchanged. Located on an elevation higher than the surrounding blocks, the handsome Georgian brick facade of this four story building makes an imposing structure. Immediately adjacent to one side of the school grounds is about two acres of public park; along the other side of the school block, across the street from its playing field, is another field that is divided into garden plots for neighborhood use. The school thus has an open, uncrowded appearance. It is in a

section of duplex-style, two-family houses and with one block of attached single-family dwellings. No high-rise or apartment complexes are nearby, and both the streets and the housing in this neighborhood are attractive and appear well-kept, although to the north and east of the school, within a few blocks, the housing deteriorates to three- and four-story tenement-style apartments and less well-kept row houses.

A block behind the school is a major thoroughfare and shopping avenue, with several fast-food franchises and a number of more traditional "candy store" establishments. School children frequent this avenue extensively during the day, as well as after school. The entire area is predominately black, although some of the merchants are white and a few elderly whites are seen shopping in the area. Between the school and the avenue, one block away, is the district headquarters for the metropolitan police force; and the entire area has a great many white and black policemen, both on and off duty, moving through at all times.

Carver has an enrollment of 920 students, down from 1,150 several years before. Almost 400 of these are 9th graders, with nearly 250 in each of the other grades. More 9th graders attend Carver because two of the five feeder elementary schools go through grade 8, and these pass children into Carver for a single year before they go on to high school. It is anticipated that next year's enrollment will be only 800, due to elementary population decline; and this will divide with 200 in 7th, 200 in 8th, and 400 in 9th. The faculty numbers 42 teachers, 3 counselors, and 2 special education teachers. The principal is assisted by three assistant principals and a dean of students. Five persons are on the office staff, and two men are in charge of buildings and grounds; four people, three men and a woman, are on the in-building security staff. In addition, one officer from the metropolitan police force is assigned to the school and its immediate neighborhood, and he spends approximately half of his time inside the building.

HISTORY AND SOCIAL CLIMATE

For nearly 12 years prior to 1974, Carver was administered by the same principal, a black male in his fifties at the beginning of his tenure, who retired out of the job. While he was principal, during the latter half of the 1960's, Carver experienced the same social and political upheavals as did many other schools. Here such upheavals apparently went uncontrolled with little attempt to enforce discipline or to supervise conduct. The outcome of that era, according to the teachers and staff who worked at Carver then,

was a school that became controlled by the students themselves.

Most of the present faculty worked at Carver during some part of the previous administration. They described techniques used for maintaining some semblance of schooling. Each individual teacher, in effect, was on his or her own, and the extent to which the teachers were able to control their own classrooms determined not only their own success but also their own safety. Teachers would lock themselves and their classes into their rooms, opening the doors only for class changes and to eject unruly students. Students who were put out of class were supposed to report to the principal's office but in fact roamed the halls at will. The school's corridors, the gym, the playground, and the bathrooms were essentially under the control of the students. The principal and his assistants, who were also elderly, remained in the administrative offices throughout the day and responded only when problems actually were brought to them by the teachers. Their response usually took the form of 1-, 3-, or 7- day suspensions, which essentially set these students free to run the streets. Most of the suspended students hung around the school where their friends were and where their influence was greatest.

At that time, and through the early 1970's, the school had an acknowledged drug problem. Teachers, parents, and staff readily admitted that the school had been a center for various kinds of drug activity, but no one would describe the extent of the problem. All possible sources of information queried simply stated that it was "typical" and that "all the city schools had drugs in the sixties and early seventies."

The police officer assigned to the school during the term of the previous principal had also retired; and when interviewed, he confirmed that the school was out of hand. "But you should have been here," was his comment. "It was so bad on the avenue and on the streets that the school was small potatoes compared to that." His reputation in the school, among those who remembered him, was based on his willingness to look the other way. He apparently spent most of his time, when in the building, in the custodian's office.

Just before the present principal and his assistants were appointed 3 years ago, the school was in effect totally disorganized. Teachers kept themselves locked in their rooms, and students spent most of the day on the streets. This was partly due to the fact that the school, with 1,150 students, had a schedule with three lunch periods (the first began around 11:00 a.m. and the last ended at 1:00 p.m.); and for this major part of the school day, most of the students stayed out of

class. Since the only attendance check occurred at the start of school, many students simply left at the first lunch period.

A small group of students formed the controlling gang in the school and in the neighborhood. These were from Jamaican families and tended to be a year or two older than most of the other students because of early grade failures in elementary school. They would enter Carver already identified as a group, as different, and as troublemakers. They clung to their own backgrounds and were especially intent on keeping their own form of the English language intact in dialect and in accent. This set them apart quite noticeably. According to the head of student counseling, they were proud of the fact that they were resisting assimilation, and they saw the school as an American "weapon" used to wipe out the cultural heritage of blacks from other ethnic experiences. Consequently, most of their rage was directed at the school and its staff, as well as at the American students whose attitudes and dress and language they saw as insulting.

Other youngsters were also identified as troublemakers. These were usually 9th grade boys or girls who tended to act as individuals rather than in groups or gangs. The boys were known, collectively, as "dudes," and they were affiliated with older boys at the nearby high school, which Carver fed. In anticipation of going to this high school the following year, both boys and girls would spend a lot of time on the street acting out in ways designed to attract the attention of the high school boys who would drive by during the lunch periods and through the afternoon. The boys from the high school saw Carver as a source for finding girls and for recruiting followers. Carver was also apparently supplied with much of its drugs by high school students.

Both interpersonal violence and property damage had long been facts of life at Carver. Within the building during the day, the Jamaicans in particular engaged in petty thefts of personal property and set fires in lockers. Any of the students who were roaming the halls would, as a matter of course, set off the fire alarm. Eventually it was disconnected except for a master alarm in the principal's office. Most younger students were afraid to enter any of the bathrooms except for the ones regarded as "safe" just outside the main office. The other bathrooms were apparently centers for drug dealing, and different ones were identified as hangouts for "hall bandits" or for Jamaicans.

Outside the building, the dudes would throw rocks through windows with the intent of interrupting classes. This took a great deal of skill since the windows were, and still are,

covered with very heavy gauge and tightly meshed grating. This particular activity became ritualized, so that after a rock broke through a window, that teacher would call the principal on the intercom, who in turn would phone the police, who would radio the school officer to investigate. He would drive his patrol car to the side of the building where the incident had been reported and park, while the dudes scattered to the other sides. They would usually avoid harassing the policeman because they knew that the next step would be his call to the district headquarters for assistance and that would bring a vanload of police.

In regard to interpersonal violence, the major problem was spontaneous knife fights among individuals, caused by real or imagined insults. Such fights would end with one of the protagonists getting cut and going home. Since knife fighting usually occurred outside the building on the grounds or in the streets, the school staff did not interfere. Even when the provocation occurred within the building, those kids who were involved, along with their friends, would go outside for the fight in order to avoid having the police called. Within the school, younger children were frequently victimized by older kids. Shoving, scuffling, and punching were regarded as the norm by students and staff alike and represented the threshold of violent behavior in the school. Apparently little official notice of such activity was taken, except that children who became violent in the classroom were put out of the room and "sent to the office." Violence at this level in the corridors was largely ignored, unless blood was spilled inside the school. At this point, "official" intervention consisted in providing first aid treatment for the injured and suspending the perpetrator.

CHANGE OCCURS

Today the school is in the 3d year of a new administration, and a decided change from the previous conditions is evident. The new principal, Mr. Size, is an energetic black man in his early forties who lived in the neighborhood and whose children attended Carver. This man had developed professionally as a teacher and then as an administrator in one of the nearby elementary schools. He came to Carver 3 years ago determined to recreate a stable and safe school. Just before he arrived, the entire school administration had been "retired out," and one man and two women had been appointed, from outside, as assistant principals. A professional administrator from the district school headquarters had been sent to Carver to function as acting principal until a replacement could be found. The new principal had volunteered for the vacancy, and he states that he did so because of the challenge the school represented to him

personally as a resident in the neighborhood and professionally as an educator who felt compelled to "turn the school around."

Mr. Size feels that, after 3 years, he has succeeded. He points out that it takes that long to get students who will have moved through Carver's three grades without contamination from the previous system. Mr. Size is quite vehement in pointing to the previous administration, particularly the old principal, as the reason for the condition of the school when he took over.

The new principal made some changes in the format of the school. He feels these changes had an immediate effect on regaining control. One of the three lunch periods was eliminated, and the student body was divided in half so that each half took its lunch break between 11:35 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. With this, he required classroom teachers to take attendance in the classes immediately after each lunch period. Even more significant, he feels, was the inauguration of dismissal attendance, where each student was required to go to his homeroom for an attendance check in the 10 minutes before school was dismissed at 3:30 p.m. If a student was absent at any of the attendance checks, the parents were immediately phoned and asked to come to the school with the student the same day. The outcome of this approach has been, it is felt, to get all of the enrolled students back into the school.

The Jamaican gang was a difficult situation. Mr. Size immediately established recognition of their cultural uniqueness through such devices as holding an all-school Jamaican Day and through the appointment of one teacher to support these students with ethnic heritage studies and a variety of assimilation activities. The administration felt it was able to cool out the gangs during the 1st year; then it simply waited for most of the original gang members to be promoted out of the school at the end of that year. Since then, the dean of students and the counseling staff have been explicitly instructed to mix these students into the general school population through carefully controlled enrollment procedures, homeroom assignments, and lunch room assignments.

The dudes presented what was perhaps the new principal's most difficult situation, since it involved activities outside the school building. Mr. Size viewed it as a community problem and went to the police to present it that way. On the basis of the situation and as an acknowledgement of his new administration, he convinced police officials to assign a new, young police officer trained in juvenile affairs to the school and also persuaded the officials to have the exterior of the building and the surrounding streets patrolled

frequently by regular two-man police cruisers. The new policeman, Officer Strong, is a black resident of the neighborhood who had come through the local schools recently enough to be familiar with the local gangs. The high visibility outside the building of the regular police patrols, who made it a point to give citations for every conceivable automobile and loitering infraction, made the area around the school very unattractive to the boys from the nearby high school.

Along with these steps, Mr. Size hired three local young men as a security patrol for the school. One has since been replaced by a woman, so that areas of the school, including bathrooms, can be covered. These are tough-looking young people in their late twenties who dress in typical street clothes and use a walkie-talkie radio system for communication as they patrol the halls.

In respect to dress, Mr. Size has told his staff and faculty that no pro forma dress code is necessary as long as the students are fully clothed. The principal himself wears leisure suits, sport shirts, and he encourages his faculty to dress in sportswear. According to one of the assistant principals, this policy has resulted in a student view of the administration as vigorous and contemporary, with an interest in young people.

Among the new policies initiated by this administration are concentrated efforts to remedy school/neighborhood relations. A Community School program, directed by one of the assistant principals who is a long-time local resident, has been established. This staff member has scheduled courses and workshops in self-improvement, home care and repair, and basic competency subjects for the adults of the district. This community program is available four evenings a week during the school year at fees designed simply to cover the costs of supplies. The Community School is clearly used almost exclusively by the lower income residents of the area; and several hundred adults, many parents of Carver students, have participated.

Mr. Size has made a personal effort to recruit new students from among the middle and upper income residents. Whenever he is notified, as he must be, that parents of a Carver-eligible child are petitioning the central school administration for transfer privileges to one of the other junior high schools, he will call on these families in person in an attempt to convince them that Carver has changed, is safe, and is convenient. So far he has had little real success in this endeavor, but he is convinced that within the next 2 or 3 years, as the school demonstrates that the old problems are under control, he will see a return of the wealthier blacks. His

assistants and the counseling staff support his view, but most of the teachers are not yet convinced.

THE SCHOOL TODAY

No windows have been broken in the past 3 years, according to Mr. Size. Vandalism is at a minimum; and the few break-ins which occur are at night, with the major losses amounting to a tape recorder or a projector now and then. One reason for such low-scale losses, however, is that very little is left in the school to steal; today it is essentially a barebones institution.

The assistant principal, responsible for the 9th grade and for boys' disciplinary matters, emphasized that the school had experienced "a complete turnaround" under the new principal. The young police officer who is assigned to the school remarked that Carver has become one of the quietest schools in the district.

The bell rings for a class change; and Mr. Size, his three assistant principals, and the counselors leave their offices to go into the hallways on the first floor. Each has an agreed location, and altogether the entire floor is strategically covered. All make a point of greeting as many students as possible by name and hold frequent short conversations with various students as they approach with questions or problems. If the problem requires a more lengthy discussion, appointments are made for resolution later that day.

On the upper floors, all teachers have similarly been instructed to stay just outside their classrooms during the class changes and to make themselves available to students. However, few actually undertake to do this unless they are aware they are being observed; one teacher commented that the few minutes of class change was little enough time to get the board erased and the materials out for the next class.

The security people move quickly through the halls of the upper floors, mingling with groups which might have formed spontaneously around a drinking fountain or at a corner. These security officers never overtly break the groups up, but their presence tends to remind the students to move along. In groups that fail to disperse, the technique is to draw one student out at a time quietly, send him on his way, and then take out another until the group is minimized and finally disperses. In instances where scuffling, shouting, or fighting occurs, the security person uses the radio to get assistance. While one security person intervenes with the actual protagonists, the other continues the previous tactic of breaking down the

crowd. The security people feel that most young people will stop "horsing around" if they lose their audience and do not have to prove anything in front of anyone. Occasionally the regular police officer will be asked to show himself; and this is usually enough, since everyone knows that the next step is the office, an assistant principal, and at the very least, afternoon detention. More serious incidents result in judicial-style hearings, with parents required to be present and the offering of testimony and evidence. These occur on a next-day basis. The outcomes of these, for the guilty, range from suspension to juvenile court; and Mr. Size does not hesitate to go to the civil authorities when the situation requires it.

As the corridors clear out and the second class change bell is sounded, the stragglers are urged along by the principal and his assistants. The teachers who were in the halls have entered their rooms with the first of the arriving students, and room doors are closed--but not locked--at the second bell. Any student who arrives at a classroom after the door is shut is required to return to his previous teacher to get a note accounting for his tardiness. Students without tardy slips are sent to the responsible assistant principal, escorted by one of the security people. This process is intentionally designed to inconvenience the student as much as possible, and the result is a minimum of tardiness. Lateness without excuse is punished with detention after school in increments of 10 minutes up to 40 minutes. More serious detentions, such as truancy for an entire class period or wandering the halls, result in a telephone call to the parents and a scheduled interview with parents and student. The bathrooms are not open during class changes, and students must individually obtain bathroom passes during class periods from teachers. Bathroom permissions and the number of students in a bathroom at a single time are closely monitored by the security people.

According to the security staff, whose area of responsibility is limited to the interior of the building, the most serious problems seem to center around theft. Particularly, girls' handbags are frequently stolen; these purses usually reappear the same day, minus any valuables or attractive objects. The majority of purse thefts are committed by girls, and few, if any, boys are suspected of this. Students are not permitted to go to lockers except at the start and the end of the school day, but everyone including the staff regards this as somewhat unreasonable, since this means that students have to carry an entire day's books and supplies along with them. Nevertheless, most students stop by their lockers, located in the corridors, during class changes; since this is a necessarily rushed activity lockers are frequently

left unlocked in the haste of going to class. Here thefts occur regularly, as well as in the cafeteria and in the gym.

Violence among boys appears to be limited to acting out in the gym or, more usually, outside on the school grounds. This is most often horseplay, which turns into push-and-shove until someone gets hurt; or it is a fight that results from a dispute in an athletic event. The physical education teacher for the boys is very large and husky, and he is evidently quite effective in controlling schoolyard activity. Knife fighting, once the big problem, has been severely repressed, with juvenile court automatically in store for anyone who pulls a knife. Most of the kids who were interviewed indicate that knife fighting at school has almost disappeared since the school has "gotten itself together." They implied that knife fights do persist "in the streets" away from the school's domain.

CONCLUSION

Carver Junior High School is not the school that it was 3 years ago. The change has been dramatic, relatively quick, and recognized by residents, neighbors, parents, faculty, staff, and students. The word has gone out in the school system that Carver "has gotten its act together."

Without exception, everyone also recognizes that the agent of change has been Mr. Size, the principal. He is clearly in charge and the rules are explicit; the penalties, known. No student at Carver has any doubt about what happens when he gets out of line. For the most part, the students

also feel that the administration is basically "on their side" and working in their interest. The result, according to various students, is a sense of knowing "what we are supposed to be at school for."

At the present time, the school has stabilized and made itself a safe place for its institutional undertaking as a place for children to be kept throughout the day. As an academic setting, however, it appears to be little more than a holding pen. Most of the faculty are old and tired, and they have never quite recovered from the despair generated during the previous administration. Newer faculty are few, and they seem cynical about their teaching mission. The lack of funds in this school system keeps academic endeavors at a bare level.

Mr. Size is aware of the academic problems, and he is determined to improve the school in that regard. He insists that the first priority was obviously to make the school safe, and he sees his next job as academic leadership. In the meantime, he has substituted a strong emphasis on pride and "school spirit." This is the message he urges on teachers, students, and parents. His personal zeal is apparent.

It is not clear yet whether Carver can take the next step toward academic achievement. Mr. Size may not be suited to that role. It can be said, however, that this principal has halted the deterioration of this school. Working with the same teachers, the same building, and many of the same students in a neighborhood that is essentially unchanged, he has been able to recreate a schooling situation.

THE DAWSON SCHOOL

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

The Dawson School is located in the center city of one of our large metropolitan areas. Its neighborhood is predominantly black, as it has been since a period of transition following World War II. The school itself serves kindergarten-through 8th-grade children from the neighborhood district; today all of the children in the school are black. The students in a parochial elementary school, which is three blocks away and was originally the focus of the previous, largely Italian-American community, are also predominantly black but include the few Hispanic Americans in this area. Within five to eight blocks of Dawson School, adjacent elementary districts begin in which children also attend almost exclusively black schools.

The Dawson School structure is relatively new; it was built in 1962 during a period when school policy favored construction based on discrete neighborhood elementary schools within relatively small and self-contained service districts. This school was originally designed for approximately 1,200 children in grades K-8 and, in fact, served that many until about 5 years ago when minor redistricting and reallocation of pupils, along with a nationally experienced drop in lower grade populations, reduced these numbers to about 500 pupils. The present school population of 526 is expected to remain at that figure, more or less. All of these children walk to school; none travels further than eight blocks, and most walk less than five blocks.

Both blacks and Caucasians make up the 27-member faculty, with women outnumbering men by over 2:1. Support staff ranges from clerical-secretarial and custodial to aides and professionals, such as the principal and the special education and categorical program personnel; paid staff members number 37. There is one night watchman and a daytime security staff of two, who alternate their shifts. In addition, a number of local parents volunteer as aides. Although both faculty and staff are hired through a central, citywide administration that both assigns and transfers personnel among all the metropolitan schools, few of the teachers and almost none of the staff of this school live far from the district itself. The majority of teachers here--both white and black--grew up in, were schooled in, and

consider themselves part of the larger "neighborhood" which this geographical area of the city represents.

The principal is a black man who is a native of the city but from another section; this is his first year in Dawson after having served in a "silk stocking" school in another area. The previous principal was a black woman from the immediate neighborhood who regarded this school as "hers" and is viewed by the present school staff and by the parents and other residents of this neighborhood as the single most important influence or force having created the present school. The body of this school's practices and policies is a result of her administration, and there is a wait-and-see attitude toward the new principal. All of the nonteaching staff are locals; the aides, both employed and voluntary, and the other support staff such as the lunchroom workers are from the immediate neighborhood and are parents whose children are or have been in this school.

The Neighborhood

The neighborhood is clearly down but not out. It represents a pocket in the city around which events in the past two decades have moved, leaving behind a relative stability and a momentary halt in the rate of change. This area was the scene of intense and explosive urban rioting 10 years before, with large nearby sections burned out and abandoned. What remains is an area around the school of two- and three-story single-family detached dwellings, each with a small yard and porch fronting on a residential street. Within a few blocks in any direction is a dividing line: a major, limited-access arterial highway on one side; a railroad embankment on another; and, completing the rectangle, parallel boulevards of deteriorating shops, corner bars, and gas stations and many commercial structures that are either closed and boarded or which suffered extensive damage a decade before and remain as burnt-out shells and facades. Along these boulevards, several blocks away from the school and its neighborhood, are destruction and decay. Demolition of obviously dangerous sites is proceeding at a minimal pace throughout this section of the city, usually as a private undertaking. Those areas that have been cleared remain as rubble-strewn vacant lots. No new building is evident.

The people of the school district are faced with a very high rate of unemployment. The commercial streets are filled throughout the day and night with black men of all ages who are apparently out of work. Few women are seen on the commercial streets except for those shopping, usually in groups of two or more, during the middle part of the day. The men congregate around the bars and the gas stations or ~~on~~ and in the cars along the curbs. The rate of chronic, maintenance-level alcoholism appears to be high. The younger men are into drugs and dope.

The more immediate residential neighborhood around the school presents a significantly different picture. Here the houses are relatively well kept. Although many exhibit a need for major capital improvement and the structures show the results of deterioration over time, what remains is being looked after, even though most of the people who live in these houses are renting them from absentee landlords. Windows are curtained; new paint shows here and there; and much porch step, and sidewalk sweeping is going on. During mild weather, the residents use these steps and sidewalks as their living rooms. There is extensive street play by the younger children and visiting up and down the streets by the adults. The dominant figures in these neighborhood streets appear to be the mature women, who move the family members about, initiate and control conversations, and settle disputes. Children and young people are boys and girls up to the age of 12 or 13 who attend the school. Older children are represented on these residential streets in diminishing numbers; for the most part, young females are evident. Boys over, say, 15 are rarely seen; and it is presumed that they have made a transition to the activities on the boulevards further away.

The community, both in the neighborhood and on the boulevards, is a tightly knit one that is exclusively black except for a very few whites who move through in delivery trucks and service vehicles. Strangers are immediately apparent, and all activity and talk stops as the outsider moves through on foot. Even driving, the outsider, if white, senses exclusion. The exception to this pattern, interestingly enough, is the police. Police patrols drive through the neighborhood frequently—every half hour or so, and more often along the boulevards. Typically both a black and a white officer are assigned to the patrol cars in this area. Although conversation and the groupings do not "shut off" along the boulevards, some changes in stance and in language signal the presence of the police patrol; in the neighborhood, the car moves slowly through the street play and in spite of a clear air of reserve, there are occasional half-nods from the residents. In the residential streets,

acceptance of the visible signs of law and order seems to be present.

The police, in informal conversation, acknowledge this acceptance and point with some pride at the "fact" that on a citywide basis the crime rate has been dropping in the black neighborhoods compared with the "uptown" increases in crimes. One officer suggested, however, that the decrease was only in visible crime and that what was actually true was that reported crimes were increasing in other sections of the city. One outcome of this perceived trend is that police are being slowly withdrawn from the black districts to be reassigned uptown. Within the black neighborhoods and precincts, over half of the police in uniform are black, although very few detectives are nonwhites.

THE SCHOOL

The school building is a two-story, L-shaped structure on a corner lot. It is surrounded by residential dwellings, although in the rear its nearly half-acre macadamized play area is subtended by a high railroad embankment. The school is the only "modern" building in the area; and its flat roof, brick construction, and use of large areas of window set it apart in a distinctive way from the peaked roofs of the pre-World War II-style frame housing. From the outside, the school has a shabby look, with rusted waist-high chain-link fencing, scuffed and scarred exterior, broken glass, and the dingy appearance of its present plexiglass windows and doors. The early attempts at landscaping have been minimally maintained, and the streets and sidewalks around the school corner are filled with light trash and a winter-long accumulation of dirt and debris. Part of the name of the school beside the front entrance has been broken off, and the only positive evidence that it is a public building is the American flag on the pole beside the main door. Although doors are on every side of the building, they are kept locked from the outside except when the children arrive in the morning. The front doorway is the only access during the schoolday.

The schoolday begins at 9:00 and lasts until 2:30, although approximately 110 of the 526 youngsters in the school arrive at 8:30 a.m. for a hot breakfast. Other early arrivals play outside in spontaneous groups. Mothers from the neighborhood volunteer as hallway and cafeteria helpers to facilitate the breakfast service and the movement of children through the building. Other children converge on the school from throughout the neighborhood, walking; and by 9:00 a.m. the schoolyard and the sidewalks around the school are filled with youngsters ranging in age from 5 to

13 or 14. The children play actively, but there is little indication of bullying or other acting out. In fact, one morning two of the older boys found an umbrella on the sidewalk in front of the school and brought it into the front office to turn it in.

The main hazards in the playground are glass from broken bottles and the hard surface itself. The school windows had been broken out long ago and replaced by plexiglass; now, nearly every morning reveals an overnight accumulation of bottles heaved at or near the school by older boys from the boulevard. Most school personnel, including the principal and the security officer, agree that these incidents are the work of nonenrolled adolescents, either dropouts or older (beyond grade 8) young people. The glass smashing does not appear to school officials to be directed "at" the school so much as it represents a convenient open area for disposing of bottles late at night.

On one morning a boy of about 8 or 9 cut his foot through his sneaker on some broken glass. He was helped into the school by several older boys and led into the "nursing" room adjacent to the main office while one of the school secretaries telephoned his home. Meanwhile the athletic director, a middle-aged black man, was called on the intercom system. He has responsibility for all emergency first aid treatment in the school; several other teachers and staff have had first aid training, and a full- or part-time health professional is not needed at the school due to an extremely low incidence of injuries among the students.

The boy's mother arrived within 6 or 8 minutes of the call; she had walked from her home after leaving the boy's younger siblings with a neighbor. By then he had received first aid, which consisted of washing the wound, checking for glass bits, and placing a tight sterile bandage over the wound. The sock had been bloodsoaked, so the athletic director got a clean one from some large boxes of worn but clean and usable clothing kept at the school; the clothing had been gathered for just such uses by the Parents Club the previous year. The mother was greeted by the school secretary and by some teachers in a way which indicated she was known to them; she was relaxed and appeared unconcerned that she was dealing with school personnel. They discussed the need for a tetanus shot, and the mother said she would return the borrowed sock after she had cleaned it. Then she took the boy home. This incident represented, for all staff and parents interviewed, a typical example of the level of personal danger to be expected by any child in this school.

The school operates on a closed campus system, which was introduced a little over 5 years

before. This was one of the first schools in this section of the city to adopt this plan, and accepting it had required that parents as well as teachers and staff vote in favor of the scheme on a nearly unanimous basis. Quite simply, the plan means that when the children enter the school building at 9 in the morning, they remain there throughout the day. All time is structured, and every child eats lunch in the cafeteria. No child may leave the school unless withdrawn by a parent or dismissed by the principal. This system, with its several supporting mechanisms, is the result of the personal plans and approaches of the former principal.

This plan had several attractions when it was introduced. First, and perhaps most significant, the school enrollment before the closed campus was approximately 1,200 children in the K-8 span. With open lunch periods many of the children roamed the neighborhood at will, and many never returned to school after lunch. Rivalries with another nearby K-8 school were intense; and gang fights, knife incidents, and escalating violence throughout the neighborhood were fairly common. In addition many older kids would go to the boulevard at lunchtime and bring back drugs. Many strangers--children from other schools, dropouts, and adults--entered the school freely. During class hours, the 1,200 enrolled students meant crowded classrooms, an inadequate faculty-to-student ratio, and problems--often serious--in the halls and especially in the bathrooms.

When the neighborhood and the school staff were presented with the option of going to a closed campus system in early 1970-71, nearly everyone seized on it as a possible solution to what had become a seriously troubled school. This option was offered to all elementary-secondary districts by the central school administration, provided that these districts were eligible for those Federal funds and programs, such as hot lunch, that could make such a scheme possible. This school was among the few to adopt the plan in an initial, "model" phase. Subsequently, other K-8 schools have gone over to this program in this section of the city; in fact of the five feeder schools to the area high school, the other four K-8 schools adopted this school's version of the closed-campus model with slight modifications.

Several basic ideas were combined in formulating the approach in this school. First, the school population was halved, to 500 children, by redrawing district boundaries. Only parents residing in the district may send children to the school, and no out-of-district transfers are permitted. Since this neighborhood represents an essentially static population, this meant that most of the children who entered the school at the

kindergarten or early grade levels could be expected to remain in the school through grade 8, along with their brothers and sisters. This is what, in fact, has happened. Since the closed campus was adopted, children who at that time were third and fourth graders and below have remained in the school.

This led to a second basic idea, which was to recognize a principle of overt socialization and institutional control of the children from the beginning of their school experience. This, of course, required a significant level of active parent involvement with the school situation, and most parents attribute the success of this involvement to the forceful character of the former principal. She had always functioned as the "proprietor" of the school; when local gangs and other outsiders would approach and enter the school she would personally, and successfully, drive them out of the building. After the closed campus was instituted, and before other nearby schools had adopted it, she would frequently corral intruders, individuals or groups, and phone the principals of the schools they were from to come and get them out of "her" school. Consequently, she was recognized throughout the area, well beyond this school's district, as a strong and effectively protective figure in charge of a stable and safe school.

One version of overt control is to vest in all adults within the school responsibility for conduct and discipline and to make all students aware of this. Acting out is strictly forbidden. An example of the "nip-in-the-bud" approach to discipline, as practiced and developed over the years, occurred when a child around age 7 threw a piece of orange at another child in the cafeteria. The initial response was from the volunteer aide, a neighborhood mother, who removed him from the room and scolded him severely. Next the lunchroom supervisor, a staff member employed by the school but also from the neighborhood, took him to the main office and spent about 10 minutes explaining to him how potentially serious this offense had been. Following this, the school secretary phoned his home and explained the situation to his mother, asking her to come in an hour to pick him up. The boy did not return to class but spent the hour sitting in the outer office. When the mother arrived, she also scolded the boy at length, while several of the office staff reiterated the incident to the boy and to his mother. The boy was sent home and appeared to be thoroughly ashamed and embarrassed. The school secretary, in remarking on the incident, indicated that "making such a fuss" was their standard approach whenever any child "got out of line." "You'd be amazed," one teacher said, "how soon they get their heads straight if you catch

them young enough." All teachers who were asked about the approach supported it, citing that it gave primary control of discipline back to them and to the parents, rather than setting up the front office as the sole source of discipline.

The front office, however, is the terrain on which disciplinary problems are ultimately resolved. In past years the previous principal would have conferred with the summoned parents over the child's behavior; more recently, due perhaps to the regular absence of the present principal for long periods every day at meetings uptown at the central school administration, the chief school figure in front-office disciplinary activities is the school secretary. This is obviously a strong woman, acknowledged by school staff and pupils, as well as by parents who enter the school, to be "in charge." Just as obviously her power is not formally derived but is a function of her representation of the policies and practices of the prior administration. In many ways, her role appears to be that of the "inside person," managing the internal workings of the school on a day-to-day basis, while the new principal seems to function as the "outside person," serving as the go-between in the school's relationship to the central administration. Anecdotal information from long-time members of the staff and faculty supports this division of labor and also reveals that the former principal spent nearly all of her time in the school personally handling the internal workings, particularly the outcomes of the disciplinary system that was initiated, under her guidance, at the classroom level.

The incident in the lunchroom seems to represent a fairly typical example of the degree of violence that exists within this school. Aside from occasional scuffles in the hall during class changes, which appear to originate as horseplay and, if escalated, are immediately "nipped," there are no reported serious incidents among any of the age groups in the school. No one can recall any incident involving a student striking out at a teacher, for example.

No children move around the school alone. Aides in every classroom and in the major corridors observe any individual movements, say, to the restrooms and retrieve children who "disappear." Whenever groups of students move from class to class or to the gym, lunch, or elsewhere, they are moved in double-file lines by a teacher and an aide. The children are taught to respond to the direction of any adult in the building, since only grownups with legitimate reason for access are permitted inside.

Strangers in the building wear passes, and they are frequently approached and greeted by students of all ages. If someone looks lost,

students will speak and ask if they can be of any help. Responsibility for gatekeeping rests with the security officer, a young black man from the neighborhood who is employed with CETA funds. He is a single parent with children and also younger brothers in the school; his investment in the institution is obviously high. He sits in the main hallway, inside the main doors at an intersection of corridors where he can observe two of the three other entry doors which are kept locked from the outside. (These doors can be opened without hindrance from the inside, and people who exit the building from any of them were observed pushing them shut firmly and carefully so that they would relock.) Aside from frequent periodic strolls through the hallways on both floors to check doors and the condition of the building, the security officer remained at his station and referred any outsider to the office to "check in" and receive a pass to be in the building. His manner was consistently polite, helpful, but firm to those entering the building. Although he wore no uniform or any visible badges of authority, his bearing and his size elicited compliance with his request to "step into the office, please." Here the school secretary would quietly evaluate reasons offered for being in the building, and she and the security officer, acting together, would issue passes. Frequently, the security man would conduct the outsider to the area of the building where that person had a reason to be; while he was gone from his station, it would be staffed by volunteer aides, as it was during his breaks and lunch periods.

The school is roughly divided into three areas, with the youngest children on the first floor near the main office, and the middle and upper school groups separated into different wings on the second floor. These three groupings eat at separate times during supervised lunch periods, of 20 minutes each. No free play is allowed after lunch, and all groups return to their classrooms following the lunch break. Recreational activities are conducted in the gym for upper school children (grade levels 6, 7, and 8) while younger children have supervised access both to the gym and to the playground at different times. There is an upper school interscholastic sports program, and this school has won a number of trophies for basketball and for cheerleading over the past few months. These are exhibited prominently at an unattended table in the main lobby of the school. Each corridor is also lined with glass display windows where the academic and artistic work of the students is exhibited.

Of the 526 children in the school, about 110 are in Title I programs. Since Title I mandates parental involvement, many parents are socialized into an active interest in and involvement with their children's schooling experience. Parents are

thus in the school on a daily basis for various participatory reasons. One staff person is a black woman who functions as the school's community relations representative; she is from the neighborhood and oversees any Federal program involvements with the school. She has been at this school, initially as an aide, for over 10 years; and although she has no professional credentials, she is highly regarded by the school staff as well as by the neighborhood. She indicated that before the riots of a decade ago, immense problems resulted from gangs forming around dwelling sites, such as the large apartment complexes and in public housing. Since much of this was destroyed at that time, these gangs have dissipated. Her view was that much of the success of the present school-neighborhood relationship was due to parental involvement. The Parents Club includes some teachers but is primarily a "social" club that works for the school as part of their socializing. To that extent the school acts as a neighborhood social focus, although the facilities themselves are rarely open to nonschool uses. Many families and teachers in the school belong to the same large, nearby Methodist-Episcopal Church, and that site is the location of most organized neighborhood social activity.

The school is closed and locked after 3:00 p.m. every day; and a single security guard, employed by the central administration, patrols the premises inside through the night until school opens the next day. His role is exclusively to prevent break-ins, and he is not responsible for going outside to guard the grounds. The opening of any entrance door sends an alarm signal to the nearby police precinct.

The chief engineer and custodian, a white man, has been at the school for a little over a year. He is, in effect, in the city civil service and was transferred to this location recently after about 8 years in "the projects"—a school in the middle of a public housing project. There, he indicated, the almost totally black population represented a constant threat to the school he was charged with safeguarding. By comparison, he thinks that this school is "ideal" in the way it is designed and administered and hopes that his seniority will allow him to stay. During his time at this school, vandalism has not been significant, and he does not know any of the police assigned to the area of the school. His main problem currently is the broken bottles heaved onto the playground; however, he expects that when warm weather comes, loitering and nighttime incidents will increase. He thinks that "flat roofs on a two-story school should never have been invented," since they represent an attractive nuisance for kids. He is quite apprehensive that, should the city go forward with a proposed austerity

program, he will be forced to go on leave for 2 months in the summer and during that time the school will be vandalized. He speaks a great deal about "these people," meaning the black residents of the neighborhood, and how amazed he is at the level of investment and pride they have for this school.

The teachers take lunch in a schoolroom adjacent to the cafeteria. Here the table talk centers on personal matters and, when it is about the students, appears to be concerned with academic topics and issues. The relationship among the teachers and the aides is easy and free, and they all eat together. The few white faculty have all been at the school since the closed campus was initiated; and, since transfer within the citywide system is a function of seniority expressing preference, they have all requested to remain at the school. One male black teacher who grew up in the neighborhood decided, after an early period of delinquency, to become a teacher because of the rioting and the toll it had taken of the area. He spends a great deal of his own time after school interacting with parents and students, and he sees his role in the community as a political one. He pointed out that three out of four of the upper school teachers are from the neighborhood itself, and he is convinced that the school is the main element of stability within this particular part of the city--he cites several similar neighborhoods that he feels would also have "gone bad" if it had not been for the schools and, in particular, the adoption of the closed-campus model in other sites. His personal view is that the situation is precarious at best and that eventually court-ordered desegregation will ruin the whole undertaking. Others in the school, as well as some parents, individually offered the same view. Many of them indicated that they would like to "send that message back to Washington."

Students are active in the life of the school in many ways through their organizations and athletic teams. One organization of special interest to this study is the selection of a group for the school safety patrol. A dozen of the oldest boys from grade 8 are chosen each year, partly because they might otherwise "get into trouble." The boys are recruited and selected by the physical education instructor, a black man, and by the upper level social science instructor, a white man. Ostensibly chosen to act as crossing guards, these boys are also charged with a responsibility for overseeing the safety of the children as they congregate around the school building before school and as they leave the building at the end of the day. Their presence is apparently instrumental in keeping scuffling, fighting, and the potential for serious trouble at a

minimum. They appear to take their role seriously and do not view it as a sellout to be placed in the position of reporting troublemakers. They have been directed not to involve themselves but to get help from the school staff as soon as a situation arises. They do, however, intervene verbally at the level of "Stop that or I'll turn you in."

The boys wear Sam Browne belts and appear to take great pride in their group. They are compensated from their participation by getting one period a week of released time from class, when they go to the gym and have it all to themselves for supervised play. Boys who are in the safety patrol say they have got "a good thing going." The upper school teachers who devised the approach are convinced it has not only prevented a lot of trouble but also given these boys pride in themselves.

CONCLUSION

This is a "safe" school. It is obvious that the school staff, parents, children, and residents of the neighborhood regard it as a safe environment. No one hesitates to send his children here. In fact, since this is a closed system, with no provision for transfer into this school from outside of its own district, there have been instances of parents who do live outside finding surrogate families or even false addresses within this school district so that their children could be eligible to attend. This practice is recognized and largely ignored by the school's administration; the principal commented that it did not amount to that many additional students, particularly since other surrounding K-8 schools have adopted this school's closed-campus system. He took pride in the fact that people wanted to get into the school.

The closed-campus system is identified by all groups as the "reason" that this school has turned around from a recently violent past and is now relatively calm. Most people view it as a total and coherent system and no longer distinguish between those aspects that were originally made available by the central school administration--the closed building, the completely scheduled day, and the smaller school population--and those features that were added to this system largely through the efforts of the former principal--overt socialization, teacher-initiated discipline, and the involvement of the neighborhood in the aides program.

In fact, to the extent that so many of the faculty, staff, and the volunteers in the school are from the neighborhood, the school can be seen as an extension of the neighborhood. Furthermore, since so many of the volunteers in the school are mothers of the present students and since the

neighborhood is self-contained enough so that mothers of children who do get into trouble can respond almost immediately, the school might be seen as an extension of the home itself.

The former principal is viewed by the parents and by the school staff as a strong and dominant woman who "made the school work." Parents and other residents of the neighborhood deferred to her, and it was clearly her own strength of character that persuaded the parents to give the school such a large measure of the responsibility for initiating discipline of their children. Presently some suspicion of the new principal is evident: an outsider and as a slightly built, somewhat dapper man, he has a "hard act to follow." In addition, much of his time is spent at the central school administration, and his visibility in the school is low. The day-to-day management of the school, particularly in matters

of the disciplinary program, has been assumed by the school secretary. She was secretary under the former principal, and she has the support of the aides and the parents.

The school is viewed by parents and students alike as something of a "refuge" from the harsher reality of the life on the boulevards. Children are constantly and actively encouraged by their teachers and by the school staff in general to aspire to better themselves. Students who have gone on to become successful are brought back to encourage the older students to follow them into such routes to mobility as enlisting in the army, becoming medical technicians or teachers, or going into other human service occupations. It might, in fact, be argued that the school, if it continues to be successful, will contribute to the decline of the neighborhood as more and more children grow up with aspirations of leaving it.



DORSEY HIGH SCHOOL

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

Dorsey High School serves its nearly 4,000 students in grades 9 through 12 in three entirely separate buildings. Dorsey has always served the poor of the large city in which it is located; and the school and its surrounding neighborhood are, and have been, delicately intertwined. About 15 years ago the neighborhood began its transition from a largely white to a predominantly black and Hispanic population, and the school followed the pattern. Then, in 1965, a new high school was built nearby as the school population at Dorsey soared to over 5,000. The new school was zoned in such a way that it drew off most of the remaining white students at Dorsey, so that today it has a student body which is almost exclusively black and Hispanic, while its teaching staff remains predominantly white.

The physical deterioration of the neighborhood is evident. Several persons likened the area to Berlin after the bombing of World War II. On the west, east, and north sides of the main building, the two- and three-story dwellings are mere shells left as the aftermath of what one interviewee called "self-destructive arson." Interspersed with these shells on the west side of the main building are new, low-income apartment complexes. While of handsome construction, it was reported that these serve as the base of operations for "hit-and-run" theft and assault, as well as drug dealing and occasional prostitution. South of the main building, the two- and three-story apartment buildings and single-family dwellings are more-or-less intact. The flowers, shrubbery, and fresh paint attest to the occupants' pride in their homes, even though age and inadequate repair have taken their toll on the buildings.

Some six blocks south of the main building, these dwellings end at a major boulevard. Across this boulevard are the other two sites of Dorsey High School, the Annex, and the Alternative School, which serve approximately 1,200 and 150 students, respectively. These sites were also developed to relieve the overcrowded Dorsey High School. The Annex was established some 5 years ago, and the Alternative School moved to its present location 3 years ago, after being in the basement of the main building for 4 years. The two schools are four blocks apart and are parallel

to the boulevard that signals the end of the small buildings and single-family dwellings.

The Annex opens directly onto the sidewalk on three sides, either from the larger building or from the 8-foot chain-link fence that establishes the perimeter of the remainder of the grounds and the buildings, and is bordered by rapidly deteriorating two-story dwellings on the fourth side. Across the street, on the south side of the school, is a large park that has a history of being a battleground for juvenile gangs, whose members at one time lived in the nearby, high-rise, low-income apartment complexes. The Alternative School is housed in a former synagogue. In its block are mostly low-income apartment complexes and small, multifamily dwellings.

Each of the three sites has distinct attributes and character, and even distinct problems of violence and vandalism. The main building is considered a physically dangerous place to be by students and staff alike. One white teacher, who was a student at Dorsey some 25 years ago, commented concerning the main building that he "always was afraid of this school." However, the situation is believed to have worsened in recent years with the promise of continued deterioration in the future. It is largely the incidents that have occurred at the main building that have earned Dorsey the reputation of being a center of violent incidents, including some 19 teacher assaults this year alone. The Annex is a much safer place, even though just a few years ago it was populated by gang members who fought with knives and guns in the neighboring park. The gangs reportedly would storm the fences of the school on occasion, either to destroy school property or to avenge an act against a gang member by a teacher or another student in the Annex. Today, however, students and staff alike feel that it is a good, safe place to be. The Alternative School is also considered safer than the main building. When the Alternative School was housed in the basement of the main building, however, the situation was different. It was reported that the Alternative School students were often assaulted by the other students in the main building, and that equipment and materials were frequently stolen. Now fights are rare, even between the students, but thefts continue to be a problem. All of the typewriters, projectors, and duplicators were taken during a burglary at the Alternative School this past year.

Drug and alcohol use is common to all three sites of Dorsey High School. However, marijuana seems to be a more common problem at the Annex and Alternative School, with alcohol usage being most prevalent at the main building. Students and teachers alike report that few other drugs are used. Usually this is said to be the result of the extreme poverty of the students; thus, they cannot afford "expensive highs." Seemingly in contradiction to this are the dice games that occur at all three sites, though with much less frequency at the Annex. Students report that at the beginning and end of the week the games are large, having a couple of hundred dollars in the pots at one time. The remainder of the week, however, is spent gambling for "chump change."

THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF DORSEY HIGH SCHOOL

Each of the three sites of Dorsey High School is unique structurally. The main building has five stories and covers almost a full city block. As one faces the main entrance, the two visible sides (north and south) have 12-foot chain-link fences that encompass the concrete covered grounds on each of these sides. The south side is used as a parking lot for the teachers at the main building. The north side, which is not used for any purpose, is a vast open area of concrete. The east (main entrance) and west sides have no grounds as the building itself borders the sidewalks. The street and the school are in direct juxtaposition with no buffer zone. The student either is in school or on the street.

The 51-year old building is in good structural condition, yet the signs of neglect are everywhere. The entrance hall is impressive with glass display cases and beamed and filigreed ceilings, yet the paint on the beams is chipped and beginning to fall away. The remainder of the halls and classrooms are in similar condition, except that as one moves from the lower to higher levels, the floors darken. Lighting units are either missing or not functioning.

The classrooms are arranged in a "U" formation around a huge auditorium that takes up the center of the building for four stories, with the student cafeteria occupying most of the fifth floor. The auditorium is clean and impressive, but it is no longer used since, it is argued, it cannot be adequately secured. The teachers lock their classrooms when they are teaching in the classroom or have left it for any period of time. The seven entrances can all be opened at any time from the inside, which is a source of consternation to the deans and security officers who would like the custodian to violate fire regulations and lock them.

The Annex is composed of four buildings. One is a converted supermarket, and on what was the supermarket's parking lot are three one-story, corrugated aluminum buildings of equal size. In the two-story building, the first floor is divided along one hall into the cafeteria-multi-purpose room, the office of the assistant principal in charge of the Annex, restrooms, a library, and the typing room. The second floor is not used because of security problems. The building has three sets of doors—two that open onto the sidewalks and one that opens into an asphalt courtyard upon which the three aluminum buildings sit. The outlying three buildings contain between six and eight classrooms. The halls in each building run lengthwise with one side hall to the main entrance/exit of each building. Given the door locks, these buildings can only be entered with inside assistance from the main entrance in the middle of each building.

The Alternative School has a brick exterior with stained glass from its days as a synagogue covering most of the sides of the building. The building covers almost all of the small lot except for about a 50 foot by 50 foot back yard. The main entrance and a front basement entrance are kept locked. The main floor is an open room with dividers of storage cabinets and tables setting off the four corners which are used for the regular classes. In the middle of the room are scattered tables and chair-desks. The basement is a large open room with chair-desks scattered about. To the one side are a series of smaller rooms containing a small cafeteria and two classrooms. Towards the front of the building and in the basement hall leading to the stairwell is one room that serves as the office for the 5 teachers who serve the 125 students enrolled in the program. The students move freely about, even though bells signal break times of 10 to 15 minutes duration between the hourly classes.

THE STAFF AND STUDENTS

The three sites of Dorsey High School serve 4,000 enrolled students—125 at the Alternative School, 1,200 at the Annex, and 2,700 at the main building. Rarely, however, does the daily attendance approximate these figures. The reported daily attendance rates for the Main Building, Alternative School, and the Annex are 60%, 65% to 70%, and 70% to 75%, respectively. The students are exclusively from poverty areas (everyone is on the free lunch program) and exclusively minority. Approximately 60% are identified as blacks, 30% Hispanic, and 10% black "islanders" from the Carribean, and the distributions appear similar across the three school sites. The main building houses the honors program, college discovery program, and the remedial programs. It is the "middle-range"

student who is usually served by the other two sites. The Annex takes students from all four grades but selects only those with "middle level" reading scores. The Alternative School usually will not take a student with a very low reading level. They argue that their individualized learning program that focuses upon "developing personal responsibility" and "career education" requires some ability to read. Further, they will not accept 9th grade students, nor will they usually take seniors. Attitude, however, seems to be the most important criterion. If the staff feels that the student "wants to succeed and will take the responsibility for it," then he/she is probably eligible. Thus the Annex and Alternative School serve the "middle-range" student at Dorsey High School, given that 87% of the students are below grade level in reading. The main building serves the "dregs" and the "higher ability" students, to use the students' phrases.

In sharp contrast to the students, the faculty at Dorsey High is 92% white, even though the principal and one of her three assistant principals are black. While this percentage seems relatively constant across the three sites, there are some differences. Budget cutbacks a few years ago not only virtually eliminated the minority staff, but also drastically reduced the number of younger instructors. Further, the older teachers could refuse reassignment to the Annex, which in its early years had considerable violence and vandalism. As a result, the Annex has a much younger staff than the main building. The Alternative School also has younger staff. This is partly due to the selectivity the Alternative School is allowed to exercise in choosing staff and the discretion of the main building in offering potential staff. The main building can most easily offer the younger staff (the tenured, senior teacher can refuse reassignment) and tends to offer those who seem not to "fit well" in the main building. Thus, like the students it serves, the Alternative School has a staff with some potential, but who "have difficulty performing" in the regular school program.

There are 98 teachers at the main building. Also, there are 7 security officers, 5 deans, 1 police officer, 2 guidance counselors, 17 aides, 2 assistant principals, the principal, and clerical and support staff. At the Annex, there are 39 teachers, 3 security officers, 4 deans, 2 guidance counselors, 11 aides, 1 teacher in charge of security, the assistant principal in charge, and 2 secretaries. At the Alternative School, there currently are five teachers (one additional teacher is on leave) and one aide. Notably, there are no security officers or administrators at the Alternative School, although one of the teachers is designated as the "teacher in charge."

In general, the staff is white and middle-aged, and came to teach at Dorsey High School when it had a city-wide reputation for high academic achievement. They now feel that the present student body does not have the same commitment to achievement as did the white students in "The Old Days." Even though the different situations at the Annex and Alternative School lead to less contrast, the same feelings exist there producing a source of faculty-student conflict that is a growing concern in the school.

SCHOOL CLIMATE, VIOLENCE, AND VANDALISM

The three sites of Dorsey High School each have their own climate and, to a certain extent, their own problems with violence and vandalism. All three draw from the same neighborhood—a neighborhood in which it is rumored, "everybody... either has a knife or a gun." They all have a minority student population and an essentially white faculty, albeit teacher "age" and outlook vary by site. Yet the characteristics of the student bodies vary because of reading level requirements at the Annex and Alternative School, and the Alternative School's reluctance to take 9th graders. Further, while all three are under the principal, who is housed at the main building, the autonomy of the branch sites is evident. The three sites also differ in their perception of the problem of violence and vandalism. In the Annex and the Alternative School, the problems of violence and vandalism "have gotten better" over the past few years, and the current levels are considered as good as the school participants believe they can ever be. The teachers are shocked by the situation and bemoan it, but "given the neighborhood," they argue, little better can be expected. At the main building, however, the situation is believed to have worsened over the past few years. Teachers are fearful for their safety while the students are, by and large, not fearful but knowing or cautious.

Everyone at Dorsey says that the main building is "no safe place to be." In years past, however, this was not so. A former student reported that even as late as 5 years ago, the main building was considerably more "relaxed" in tone, and was considered a fairly quiet environment. However, violent youth gangs have come and gone in the interim, and left as their residue a neighborhood that the teachers regard as "exceedingly violent." The students acknowledge the presence of the potential for violence but regard it somewhat less fearfully than do the teachers. Over the past 5 years, however, the neighborhood has declined and today is even more poverty stricken than in the recent past. One respondent characterized the effect of more poverty on the

organization of the gangs. He noted that gangs always rely upon theft and extortion as vehicles to make money. However, he argued that the gangs waned about 2 years ago in part because it was evident there was no money left to be extorted from students. A series of homicide arrests which put most of the gang leaders in prison also was a major factor.

Nevertheless, most people at the main building argue that violence and vandalism are getting worse, and most teachers are afraid to be there. Last year, the main building had 19 reported teacher assaults. Teachers report that they have had to learn to live with threats and now do not even report them. Robbery, particularly of cash or items easily converted into cash via resale, is also usual, and many are not reported by the teachers or the students to the administration. Teachers lock themselves inside their classrooms, and many ride only the elevator to change floors. They regard the stairwells as unsafe and avoid using them. Teachers have been sexually assaulted in the school, although no actual rapes have been reported. It was even said that it was not safe for a teacher to attempt to chase students from the restrooms to get them to class. As a result, teachers avoid rule enforcement in most cases and will not even come to the "rescue" of another teacher. Characteristically, one female honor student reported that she uses only the gymnasium bathrooms in order to avoid the hall restrooms. The use of alcohol, wine particularly, and marijuana is extensive. A group of students reported that 60% to 65% of the students at "Main" use marijuana regularly, and two-thirds of the percentage use it during school. They also believe that all of the students at Dorsey have tried it at least on occasion.

There is a "rule" in the school about victimization that a number of persons confirmed. The rule is that you will never be victimized by someone you know but you should be wary of "strangers." In a school of 2,700 students with sporadic attendance, it is of course easy for a student not to be recognized. It is this anonymity of students which is believed to be responsible for much of the violent behavior. A recent example illustrates the nature of the violence facilitated by anonymity. An older man was substitute teaching in the school one day. In the afternoon, he was approached by some students who were trying to extort some money from him. When he refused to comply, he was beaten, robbed, and thrown down a stairwell. No one has yet been identified as one of his assailants. Students in such a mass as at the main building, and with such "fluid" attendance, seemingly can engage in disruption and violence with virtual impunity from detection and punishment.

Faculty and students alike report that fights are usually between students. A fight between students in the cafeteria during lunch, for example, is a common occurrence. The students argue, however, that when teachers are assaulted, it is usually the teacher who "incites" the incident. In many cases, they say, the teacher creates a situation where a student has to lose face, or "punk out", in order to comply with teacher demands, and, the students argue, "no one in this neighborhood is going to punk out." Former teachers at Dorsey independently reported that teachers at main building often do provoke fights. These teachers argue that this is the result of the social distance between the white, middle-class teachers and the poor, minority students which results in a lack of respect for the students' way of doing things.

It is also this distance that is believed to produce a situation where many teachers are allowed to instruct only with the "leave" of their students. Few teachers were reported by the students as being able to actually run their class, and by and large teacher control of a class was allowed because the course and teacher were interesting to the students. Everyone else, they reported, had to surrender control to the students.

The school response to the increased level of violence and vandalism in recent years seems to have been one of increasing the emphasis on security. As a result, the main building now has one police officer assigned full time, 5 deans and assistant deans who deal with security matters, 7 security officers, and 15 aides directly involved in patrolling and securing the building. Total security is not possible, however, argue the security personnel, given the seven exit doors to the building and the physical characteristics of the building itself which offer many "blind" spots. Most of the security personnel carry walkie-talkies to facilitate quick response; but even so, there are complaints of incidents which are never responded to by the security personnel. In one observed incident, a phone call reporting a classroom disorder went without response for a period of 7 minutes before someone was dispatched from the security office. Security aides and security officers both are reported by students to tend to "look the other way" except in actual cases of violence or where they have been specifically assigned to respond to an incident. Also, say the students, the security officers, who are all males and tend to be young, are interested in the female students and tend to be selective and arbitrary in referring students for disciplinary action. Once on report, they continue, the deans who hold disciplinary hearings are more likely to make a judgment based on the student's past reputation than on the facts. The student

response to all of this seems to be one of accepting disciplinary action as a matter of "fate." That is to say, there is no way of avoiding it and if you happen to be reported, there is little hope of justice in the proceedings. It is, they say, one of the prices paid for being a student.

It should be noted that the deans are essentially all powerful in disciplinary cases. The decisions upon suspensions, the usual disciplinary response, are made by them and confirmed by the principal. The principal seems to regard security as essential, and therefore wishes to strengthen it. Thus in essence, she has delegated her disciplinary authority to the deans who accept it readily. In fact, her role in the school is almost exclusively administrative, which requires that she spend most of her time in the office. Also, because of her statements in the media about the negative aspects of Dorsey High School, students and faculty are critical of her ability to lead the school. It may be, however, that the lack of faith in her is part of general lack of faith in the school system itself. Budget cuts have disgruntled staff, and what they consider the unresponsiveness of "The System" dismays them. It should also be noted that the main building faculty are disgruntled with the principal because she is starting to blame the teachers for the school problems. The teachers see the kids as the problem and may be angry at some moves toward accountability in a system that otherwise has none.

The staff believe that the children who grow up in the neighborhood are destined to produce trouble in any school they attend. They note that three of the five worst intermediate schools in the city are feeding students to Dorsey with the result that disorder is endemic in the school. One argued that the name should be changed to Dorsey Mental Institution since the kids are "nuts." He argued that you cannot treat them as rational beings. Generally, however, it seems that most teachers believe that about 200 students are the chronic troublemakers who can mobilize a vast number of other students for the "right" incident.

The students, however, do not see it the same way. While they know they are "in control" of the school, and that there is a "bad crowd" of students, they see the teachers as just "collecting a pay check," and some were even characterized as being "antisocial." They report little substantive teaching in the classroom. They want more activities (which were cancelled for security reasons), the building repaired and cleaned, more job-related courses, more electives, and, since the building is understaffed, more teachers.

Fights are still not unusual at the Annex. However, they are usually between students, and

rarely involve weapons on the grounds. Fights are sometimes incited in the school and move across the street to the park. Teachers seem to feel safe, and if they lock their classroom doors while class is in session, it is to reduce disruption from a student opening the door to say hello to the teacher or another student.

Even theft is of a different character here. While anything convertible to cash will be stolen, particularly if it belongs to another student, it is more difficult than at the main building since most everyone is known to the staff and students. For example, one teacher had her wallet rifled and cash stolen. She quickly reported it to the deans along with the names of students that were possible suspects. The deans immediately questioned the suspects who admitted their guilt and returned the money. This never would have occurred at the main building.

Alcohol and marijuana use is common in the Annex, as it is in the main building; vandalism is not a problem. In fact, student murals (even three dimensional murals) are not defaced, and the flower beds that are student designed and maintained are never trampled. However, bathrooms, are, on occasion, destroyed.

The reasons for the change in the level of violence and vandalism and the difference between the main building and the Annex, according to the Annex staff and students, are not based on the notion of security. The assistant principal in charge of the Annex described security personnel as important only to keep fighting from getting "out of hand." Further, in regards to the police, he noted: "This is not a neighborhood in which you call the police for everything. . .nor can they respond to everything." Thus, he has concentrated on other devices.

He argues that three factors are responsible for the lower level of violence and vandalism in the Annex: 1) the beautification of the school via the student murals and flower beds; 2) the tone of the dean's office which is as much a refuge as it is a discipline office (there are students who just "hang out" in the dean's office); and 3) his visibility, mobility, and attitude (he smiles at and talks to the students as he travels about the school). The teachers and the students concur that the assistant principal is responsible for much of the atmosphere, but also noted that size has some effect also. The classes are smaller, and one teacher reported that she knows three-fourths of the students by name. Teachers also think the middle-range literacy of the students, the "team-like" attitude of the staff, and the "defusing" style of the dean's office (compared to the "confrontation" style of the main building's deans) are significant. All in all, it appears that change is

due to the more personal and responsive style of the Annex school, to the waning of gangs, and the establishment of a full 4-year school. When there is trouble, everybody that can, will respond. Generally, the students regard the place as congenial. The assistant principal to them is benevolent—a belief which is the result of a policy whereby the assistant principal is brought into a disciplinary hearing after the deans have indicated how severe the response (suspension is the usual punishment) is to be. At that point, the assistant principal will often grant a reprieve with the provision that any further incidents will receive the maximum punishment allowable—by which he abides.

All in all, the teachers and the students who attend regularly are committed to the Annex school and do not wish to transfer elsewhere. The teachers are shocked by the violence but see it more as a general characteristic of the neighborhood—not of their students.

Things seem to have been better for the Alternative School since they left the main building some two and a half years ago. When the Alternative School was in the basement of the main building, Alternative Students were victimized and vandalized by the "Main" students. Today there are virtually no fights or teacher assaults in the Alternative School, and the vandalism occurs mostly through after-hours burglaries—the most recent of which netted all the typewriters, projectors, and other equipment. Marijuana smoking is quite common, and the staff simply accepts it as usual, taking no disciplinary action because of it.

In general, the Alternative School is relatively placid. When informed of the purpose of the study, the teacher in charge quipped, "You're going to have an awfully dull time here." The students also agreed. It seems that this is due to the unique character of this school. The students come here by choice, and only one has ever been asked to leave the program.

It was argued that four factors can explain the low level of violence and vandalism in the Alternative School: 1) the students have an identity with the school; 2) there is no bureaucratic framework so incidents are dealt with on a personal basis (the teachers avoid the use of the main building's procedures and referral capabilities in part for this reason); 3) there are no rules so "no one gets frustrated by the school"; and 4) it is simply small in size. There are no security personnel assigned to the Alternative School.

The students seem genuinely to enjoy going to this school. They are enthusiastic about its flexibility (multiple-day field trips occur regularly) and spontaneity. The staff, while seemingly beleaguered by student demands, are

proud of their accomplishments and their ability to avoid contact with the main building, and thus survive. Further, the staff has on at least two occasions teamed up to deal with problems of criminal activity. Once, it was to work with the police to solve the major burglary, and the second was to catch a student reported to be selling hard drugs at the school. They support each other and students respect them, and it is maintained the students would come to the staff's defense if violence was threatened.

In summary, the three sites of Dorsey High School point to some factors that can explain the variation in level of violence and vandalism. The participants at all sites seem to point to three major factors: size and anonymity, administrative capability, and commitment.

It is significant that violence seems to increase as size increases. Yet the staff and students of Dorsey High School are quick to isolate the meaning of size—anonymity. It is not that a site is impossible to secure because of its size, but that students can escape recognition. The probability of detection is lower and probability of misbehavior is higher.

Commitment intertwines the factors of size and anonymity and administrative capability. It is evident that the 98 teachers who struggle at the main building are simply inundated and demoralized. They view the students derogatorily and in effect destroy the commitment of students. The student who loses his/her commitment to the school then is free to act out, and this destroys staff commitment even more, to the point where teachers will not even give assistance to each other. It must also be remembered that the main building has the most uncommitted students to begin with, since the middle-range student is siphoned off to the Annex and the Alternative School. The Annex and Alternative School have younger, more committed staff and students with some motivation. Further, both promote the students' identification with the site and treat them seemingly with more respect. The response of the students may best be understood when looking at the pattern of student disruption. Thursday is the most disruptive day at the main building, since many students take a "4-day weekend." Friday is the most disruptive day at the Annex—only 2-day weekends. The Alternative School reports little systematic patterning. In short, while students act up before days off, they characteristically take more days off at the main building.

Violence and vandalism at Dorsey High School is in part the result of the neighborhood in which it functions. Yet the variations by site seem to indicate that the school climate and leadership style do have consequences for crime within the school.

GRANT HIGH SCHOOL

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

Grant High School, located in a moderately large urban area, is one of the oldest high schools west of the Mississippi River. To understand Grant, one has to understand its historical background.

As an institution ages it often develops traditions and status. Grant High School is rich in both areas. For many years it was the only high school serving this city and the surrounding rural area. Those who know the school well boast of its famous alumni—a former state governor, senators, a nationally syndicated columnist, wealthy corporation board presidents, all-American athletes, judges, and the children of many high status, wealthy, well known public figures. The trophy cases of Grant are a testimony to its excellence. The awards are overwhelming. The centennial edition of the school paper is rich in memorabilia of Grant's illustrious past. The lasting impression is that Grant is truly an institution of noteworthy distinction.

However, about 15 years ago, the school began to change demographically and subsequently the community began to reassess Grant's unchallenged position in the hierarchy of schools. Beginning in the early 1960's an influx of lower income, darker-skinned families began to buy and rent in the area. Middle and upper middle income families gradually shifted to the developing suburban areas. By 1965 the city had grown so rapidly that its sprawl created a typical ring of white suburbs around Grant High School's attendance area.

Almost overnight, Grant was transformed into an inner city, ghetto school. In 1968 its white population tipped the balance—Grant's white population became, at that time, 49%. What happened the next few years is a familiar story—a gradual decline in middle income white students; a gradual increase in low income whites, blacks, Mexican, and Asian-American students.

However, the tradition of Grant remained unchanged in the minds of many loyal supporters and teachers. Not only did the tradition remain unchanged, the faculty remained basically all white, and the school offerings remained the same. Among the archival materials which line

the hallways are the photographs of the past principals of Grant High School—all white males except for a brief 3-month stint of one black male appointed in 1970 and the present black male principal Mr. Haines, who was appointed in 1970. Mr. Morris, the last white principal, witnessed the shift in population and decline in status. According to teachers who were there, Mr. Morris admitted in his resignation speech that he could no longer cope with the changes. He stated that some of the teachers should also resign for the same reasons. It seems significant that only one left with him.

The replacement for Morris was the school's first black principal. Many informants noted that only the ethnicity of the principal changed in 1970; the style, content, and essence of Grant was just as much in tact in 1970 as it was in 1870. Only the complexion of the student body was different.

The year 1970 was tumultuous for Grant High School. Its black, Asian, and Mexican American population totaled close to 60%; its faculty was all white except for one teacher. Many urban centers around the United States were experiencing racial tensions; so was the neighborhood around Grant High School. For the first time in the history of the school, the State accreditation team would only issue accreditation on a 1-year basis rather than the usual 4 years. The temporary accreditation was blamed primarily on faculty disunity, overall low school morale, and several areas of weaknesses in the curricular offerings. Tensions increased as teachers argued with board members and students; accreditation seemed clearly in jeopardy.

That year the school experienced its first "race riot." The pictures and news stories were grim. Students with bloody heads, angry crowds, threats from community groups, police on campus, billy clubs flying—Grant High School, the alma mater of former governors and supreme court judges was at its lowest. The damage has left a hard-to-measure blotch on the record of Grant. The older faculty members refer to the 1970 riots as "the war days":

... During the war, very little learning took place. Teachers came on a day-to-day basis. You didn't know what to expect--there was so much fear and calamity on the campus.

Mr. Haines, the present principal, was sent to the school in the middle of the turmoil. As a Human Relations Specialist, he was sent to help the newly appointed principal "straighten out the mess." Mr. Haines' vivid account of his first days at Grant is wrought with distress:

The first day I returned home from Grant I was covered with blood all over my clothes! I promptly told the Superintendent that no talking could take place until order was restored to the campus.

The school was closed for several days and reopened with Mr. Haines appointed as the new principal, the youngest in the history of that city's schools.

THE TURNAROUND PROCESS

Mr. Haines' appointment as Grant's principal was as dramatic as the racial events were disheartening. A press conference was arranged; Haines was in one part of the school fielding questions, flashbulbs popping, T.V. cameras whizzing; the faculty was in a separate part of the school being informed of the new appointment by the Superintendent. It was late Tuesday evening.

On Friday, my first full day as principal, 40 Chicano students ran through the hallway shoulder-to-shoulder and broke out every window in sight and every piece of glass in the trophy cases. One of them slashed his wrist so badly that blood was gushing out all over the hall. I stopped him, applied a tourniquet, and got him into an ambulance.

The following Wednesday I decided it was time for me to take charge of the situation. I called another press conference that morning as well as a full school assembly. Of course many of the teachers warned me that I was looking for trouble--to put all those students together in one auditorium would invite chaos.

The assembly had just the opposite effect. Haines later learned that that was the first full school assembly convened in more than a year. When the students walked into the auditorium, there stood Mr. Haines--an imposing figure, well dressed, articulate, and projecting confidence. In addition, there were news reporters, photographers, T.V. cameras, and microphones. The students of Grant High School were experiencing visible, strong, leadership for the first time in several years.

Haines' talk to the students played heavily upon Grant's tradition of excellence.

I told them that that part of Grant was no different--we had even more to be proud of than any other student body in the history of the school. I asked them if they wanted to be number one, the best. The 'right-ons' let me know I had struck a responsive chord. I then laid out my plans for them.

Haines informed the students he was a "strictly-business" man. All thugs, drifters, nonstudents, and troublemakers would have to deal with him, and he wanted them off the campus immediately. He told the students that no loitering in halls would be tolerated--learning was going to be restored, and everyone was going back to class. Haines' "get tough" speech was well received by everyone. Excerpts of the speech were picked up on the AP wire service and carried nationally. The local newspapers and T.V. stations carried the first bit of positive news about Grant in months. Haines received hundreds of letters from all over the country. The leadership vacuum at Grant High School was soon to be filled.

I had to comb the streets around the school to break up crap games and get those kids back on the campus into the classrooms. I had to go in and out of alleys to find students. Nobody cared about them--they were all over the place doing everything but going to class.

Haines relates how tough it was to gain credibility among the students and the teachers:

The other principals in the city ignored me. The word got back to me that I was entirely too young - I'd never make it. A segment of the community was still supporting Mr. Morris, whom they claimed was unjustly treated by the district.

Charges and countercharges were all around. I immediately set about talking to community groups. I hired community people to monitor the halls--those who knew the kids, could relate to them; one of them had a child in the student body. I cleared the campus of police; I made it my business to be visible on the campus and around the neighborhoods.

Haines knew that the events could not turn around unless the teachers, the students, and the community offered support.

I held a series of small faculty group meetings to begin a needs assessment process. I asked them to lay it on the table -- to verbalize everything that was bothering them.

At the same time, the minority students told me they didn't want to go to class because the teachers were racist. I told them I would not accept those accusations unless they were in class

and could offer me documented proof of incompetence and racism.

Within a few days, Mr. Haines was presented a list of 35 teacher names by the students with proof of their incompetency and racist behavior. Haines' response to them was that the list would be kept in his office and over the next few days he and his assistant would visit classrooms, confer with teachers, and "check out the student grievances."

Our classroom visits convinced us that we had to concentrate on improving the academics at the school. I convened another series of faculty meetings and discussed my findings concerning the needs assessment and the academic program of the school. I began to stress academic excellence as well.

As Haines went about the task of turning the school around, he was often challenged by news reporters and his staff to make his views clearer. He found it necessary to issue a formal statement of his philosophy which the newspapers printed in its entirety; he was praised by community and administration for a clear, concise, workable philosophy. The teachers began to feel secure under Haines' leadership. One teacher stated that he began to encourage teachers to transfer if they did not agree with his emphasis and direction:

He gradually created a framework for us to work within. He was firm with policies, yet he was open to change any school rule. All one had to do was present sufficient argument why a rule should be changed, show proof of support, and he would change the rule. For the first time in years, our students felt as though they had an actual voice in the affairs of the school.

Mr. Haines began a campaign to get positive press coverage. He made informal agreements with the local black newspaper to give positive coverage to Grant. "Eventually the white papers felt challenged, and they too began to give us more positive coverage." During those days Grant was a fishbowl school; a sneeze was enough for news reporters to do a story. Graffiti was removed from walls and the plant became spotless. Faculty replacements slowly produced a staff reflective of the student body ethnic makeup. "I required each teacher to submit a course of study to me with their year's work plan, their philosophy, and how the students' performance would be evaluated." One teacher described Haines' initial year as open with an emphasis on excellence.

The past years at Grant were rigid. The students had little to say about the operation of the school. If they stepped out of line, they were

zapped. With Haines, the rigidity of the past was replaced with much more flexibility--the other side of the story was heard; he (Haines) was willing to gamble on new approaches; he developed an excellent atmosphere for learning and that's what it's all about.

Haines worked hard with the Grant High faculty to develop understanding, compassion, and high expectations for the students. He modeled a relational style that he expected many of them to emulate. He stopped students in the hall, called them by name, made pleasant small talk, commented on their dress--always positive and with smiles. Strong punitive language and actions were reserved for special occasions. Open relationships replaced suspicion. Grant High was becoming student centered.

THE STUDENTS

The transition of Grant High School from an upper status, elitist high school to an "inner city, ghetto school" began nearly 20 years ago. At that time, the neighborhood of small, wood frame, single family homes was being sold and rented; the occupants were heading for suburbia. The new occupants, mostly black Americans and Mexican Americans, rented from absentee landlords. At the same time, apartments being built in the area quickly turned over from white to nonwhite in occupancy. By 1966 the story was all too familiar; decline in city services, high unemployment, overcrowded housing conditions, etc. Grant's student population had changed considerably--54% white, 12% Asian, 17% black, and 16% Mexican American.

The Mexican American student enrollment continued to increase gradually until 20% was reached in 1970 where it remains today. The Asian student population declined until it reached 9%, and it remains the same today. The black population has continuously increased until it peaked at 28%; today this student group is holding steady at 25%. In addition, the school has attracted American Indian students (2%), and a trickle of several other nonwhite ethnic groups. The hallways are a testimony to the ethnic mixture; every possible American physical type can be seen at Grant. This multiethnic mixture which triggered the violent eruption in 1970 is now perhaps the school's greatest asset. Several white students reported that they wanted an integrated school experience so they chose to attend Grant.

The faculty and administration often boast of the good, healthy relationship and how hard they work at not letting divisive processes get started in the school. Ethnic and racial hostility is quickly squelched by students as well as adults.

Ethnic murals can be found in several parts of the 21-acre campus. Most extracurricular and curricular activities attract a healthy cross section of students. When they do not, there is concerted effort to find out why and to attract a more representative group. The faculty and administration are very proud of the exemplary intergroup relations at Grant High School. "This is something one cannot be lax about, you must work constantly, everyday, at nurturing good student relationships. A little neglect can set the school back 10 years."

Pride in Grant High School exudes from most of the students. Many of them wear their slogan buttons "We're Number One." They are proud of their athletic power, their winning debate team, and their fashion and dance ensemble. The students even mention that Grant had higher test scores than any of the other high schools. They often express pride in their diverse student body.

You see, we're not like those other high schools. We have a good mixture of students here. Some come from well-to-do families, others, from working class homes, and we have all the races here. We don't have that 'rich kid' syndrome. Our school is like the real world!

If there is a problem at Grant, the students feel as though they have a workable mechanism for having their voice heard and having something done about the problem. Quite often Mr. Haines and other teachers can be heard telling the students about speaking up for their rights, not to let anyone dictate unquestioning rules and commands on them. It is well understood by most students how to go about having a protest registered.

The informal teaching that takes place outside the classroom is prevalent and powerful. There is no sign of strong negative or punitive sanctions being employed and most importantly, no moralizing. "Many of our teachers are more like friends. If we have a problem, we can always find a teacher to talk to." Today at Grant, there is an underlying norm of "talking things out instead of fighting. We can solve our problems like adults. We don't have to fight." When asked about troublemakers, the uniform responses were: "We don't have any troublemakers here; Mr. Haines gets rid of them or they don't come to this school. Everybody here wants to get an education and that's why we are here at this school."

Parents are also responding to the challenge. The students talk about the respect the neighborhood has for the school and how they want to take care of it. Several students reported

that their parents are now concerned about what is taught in the schools and they want the students to have a good schooling experience. "Our parents tell us to keep up the pride in the buildings and the teachers."

When asked about burglary, vandalism, and damage to the physical plant, the students again refer to their pride in Grant High School. The number one school cannot have this kind of problem; they imply how inconceivable that would be!

The students here realize that busting out a window doesn't help--in the long run it hurts them. I know of schools in much nicer neighborhoods that get torn up.

Over at Wilson High School, they tear up the building all the time, in fact the other week they turned a car over in the parking lot. There are cops on their campus. We don't want that to happen here.

Grant uses people from the neighborhood as "staff assistants." While their primary job is to monitor the halls and keep the students from "bitching," they also provide on-the-spot, informal counseling. Most of the students seem to respect these community people and have a relaxed relationship with them.

Grant High School is distinctly student centered, and life at the school revolves around student life. Mr. Haines guards that revolution with all of his managerial skills--he challenges the teachers to challenge the students.

The scene below is indicative of Mr. Haines' "style." One day he was perturbed with one of the coaches. It seems as though she was negligent about getting one of the star track team members to the qualifying events for the Regional Championship meet. The student was expected to make it to the State Finals, which would automatically gain her a college scholarship.

Come here Helen, said Haines, Tell me what happened with Georgia; why didn't she make it to the meet?

Well, you see, I gave the teacher all of the particulars such as when to meet, who was riding with whom, and she just didn't show up. I didn't know where she was. Her brother was looking for her also. We just couldn't wait any longer. It was her fault because I made it very clear...

At this point the coach is interrupted by an obviously agitated principal. He is livid with anger.

Her fault? What do you mean, her fault? That's your responsibility to see that she gets there!

No, it's not my responsibility--I tell them what time, when to meet me and...

(Haines even more upset and shouting:)

I said it is your responsibility! Just think what could have happened if she had been scratched from the competition? She would have lost her chance for a college scholarship. The kid would have been permanently injured because of your negligence...

Now just a minute said the coach, you don't need to yell at me and I still say it was her responsibility; we can't treat these students like babies...

Yes, we will treat them like babies if it means injuring their chances to a future, to a 4-year college scholarship!

The coach tries to interrupt and Haines yells at her to listen. Tempers are flaring and the coach is on the verge of tears. The principal continues yelling:

If I say it's your fault, it's your fault. And I don't want this to happen again--it's that kind of attitude that makes our kids think we don't give a damn about them. If it would have taken getting Georgia to sleep at your house under lock and key to get her to the meet, then, damn it, that's what you have to do--that's what your responsibility is--do you understand that?

No answer, tears, more yelling about what damage could have been done to the child:

We are lucky that she wasn't scratched and that she'll still get a chance at the State meet.

A lull--the coach says:

Are you finished?

No! Because we've got to settle this matter--but go on back to your tennis class.

What is interesting about this scene is the informality of the setting. A formal notice requesting a conference at an appointed time in the seclusion of the office was discarded in lieu of the on-the-spot problem solving. It is also interesting that students, or anyone else within proximity, is privy to seeing teachers catching the principal's wrath. The underlying philosophy of Mr. Haines in these interactions is that the "students come first and you break your back for them; if you don't, then you have me to reckon with." This style has caused problems for Haines with the teachers' union, but he has presented his philosophy and his point of view on the issues and has not yet lost a case.

Haines is everywhere on the campus. He leans into Mrs. Little's class, passes a few words, and he is gone. He constantly stops students, calling most of them by name--always ending with a smile or laugh and asking them about their classes. In most cases, he can share something personal with the students. Later in the day he doubles back to the tennis court to "pull the coach together, because I was pretty rough on her." He calls the coach over again. In a much calmer mood, she agrees that he was correct. There had been 10 minutes of talking in which Haines changed his role from professional peer to counselor to principal, and finally to teacher. At the end of the 10 minutes, the coach, with tears streaming down her cheeks, was embracing Haines and promising to give the matter more serious thought, and would not let it happen again. Later still Haines relates what an excellent teacher the coach is; he has known her for 10 years, and personally recruited her.

Each Monday, Mr. Haines has a quasi open administrative meeting. This meeting is meant to handle all policy-related issues and procedures. Any adult or any student may request an agenda item during this meeting. The procedure is simple and the grievances are dealt with quickly. At Grant High the air of well constructed freedom is deeply honored by the students. The principal and his staff seem to have created that magical environment that gives the students "freedom but not license."

THE TEACHING STAFF

There are 93 certified staff members at Grant High of whom 79 are involved in the regular instructional program of the school. The faculty

is almost as diverse as the student body—15% are blacks, 5% Asian, and 13% Mexican American and Spanish surnames. More than half of them have earned M.A. degrees in their specialty areas. Many of the teachers were personally recruited or "hand-picked" by Mr. Haines except for those who preceded his appointment to the school. However, the bulk of these are there by choice. Of the nearly all white group in the school when Mr. Haines became principal, less than half remain—the others have transferred or retired. Mr. Haines often spoke of his efforts to get teachers to leave when he felt they could not relate to the new challenges of the school. Like the students, one often hears teachers say "I am here teaching at Grant because I want to, I have had many opportunities to leave but I stayed. I wouldn't teach at any other school!"

The older teachers often talk about the transition of the school. They describe the "old" Grant as steeped in the authoritarian mode of dealing with the students. When nonwhite students began enrolling, few aspects of the school reflected their needs or their differences. Several of these teachers very explicitly stated that some of the teachers were, at that time, outright racists. "They made matters worse; in fact, they may have precipitated the war."

When these teachers describe the differences in Grant High School at the time of the "war" and now, several interesting contrasts are agreed upon: a series of ineffective principals preceded the breakdown as contrasted to the present strong, firm leadership.

The instructional program was geared mostly for high-achieving, college bound students as contrasted to the highly diverse course offerings of today. The tracking system was rigid as compared to virtually no tracking today. The faculty was all white versus an integrated staff. Morale was low among faculty, and now high morale is characteristic. Few or no opportunities existed for the students to participate in the operation of the school; today, students constantly cite their opportunity to voice displeasure over school affairs as a distinguishing feature of Grant. A lack of community input into school affairs also characterized the prewar years; today, the lines between the community and the school are slowly blurring; in addition to being student-centered, Grant is developing into a community-based school.

There is uniform agreement among teachers that Mr. Haines was the key in turning around the school.

The rigidity of the past was replaced with more flexibility, the other side of the story was heard. Haines was willing to try new approaches, he gambled...he developed a framework within which all of us could work...Anyone can voice their displeasure; if there is sufficient factual back-up, we can change any aspect of the school.

The "framework" was difficult to develop. Haines needed consensus for many of his ideas. He needed a staff that supported his gambling and flexibility; the teachers often had to discard their old and tried ways for new risk-taking ones. It took several years and half of the teachers leaving to develop the faculty cohesiveness which many teachers cite as their strongest point. They are here because they want to be here. Several of the teachers described their teaching as "exciting, challenging, a constant learning experience." Another common characteristic of Grant High teachers is that they have a well defined philosophical perspective on education and society.

The "involvement" of the teachers is often cited as what makes the faculty and school unique. Teachers often work throughout the summer without pay to get a particular school activity ready for the fall. Many of the teachers will work until 5:00 p.m. each day if it means improving instruction or if it is in response to a student's needs. An example of such dedication was described:

This teacher took a group of the drama students to the Annual Shakespeare Festival and camped out with them for the entire 3 days. That's the kind of things we do for the kids--it develops a camaraderie with the students. Now, of course, this isn't all of the teachers--some of them would never do such a thing. However, a large number of us will do these things.

The teachers, like the students, are constantly confronted by the stigma of "the bad school image" which lingers!

When I am at cocktail parties or other affairs, I find myself defending Grant. The stereotyping is awful--people still think this is a jungle. They even imply that the teachers at this school are less prepared than other high schools; they even think that some of us don't have a degree. I understand what our students must face.

I constantly invite them to come see for themselves, and in very emphatic terms I let them know I am teaching at Grant because I want to and it's the best high school in the district.

Confidence, self-assurance, high satisfaction, and professionalism best describe Grant faculty. When asked to identify the characteristics most influential in the turnaround process, the teachers consistently agree on the following points:

- a. The necessity for open communication
- b. An undergirding of a humanist approach to the education of youngsters (especially the enhancement of self dignity and human respect)
- c. Strong, firm, and fair leadership

d. The instillment of pride and an emphasis on the positive parts of the schooling experience

e. Elimination of weak, ineffective teachers

Few of these characteristics would have developed at Grant if the faculty, schoolboard, and community had not felt some urgency about the situation. Years of complacency preceded the violent outbreaks of assaults and property damage at the school. Mr. Haines' first efforts were to restore calm to Grant High School, to get students back in class, and to start classroom teaching and learning again. The turnaround came slowly, and once it occurred, it required as much diligence to maintain as to initiate. The best testimony of the direction the school is moving is expressed by a Grant High School student:

This school is unique--it has a free atmosphere; here we have the freedom to develop as an individual.



HARRISON B. KIRK HIGH SCHOOL

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

Straddling the border between two districts of a major metropolitan center, Harrison B. Kirk High School sits midway between two very different communities. To the north, the school is surrounded by a blue-collar, working-class, white neighborhood that is predominately German, Italian, and Irish in origin. The homes in this area are small but well kept with flower gardens and neatly trimmed lawns. Although the area is socially and politically well organized, its conservative politics and social attitudes have not had much impact on the management of the city. In fact, political representatives from this section have always been considered ultraconservative and outsiders by their more liberal colleagues in the city council. Traditionally, this area has always been considered "a safe place to live"; but over the past decade, complain the neighbors, crime has moved out from the center city. Today, a number of youth gangs can still be found in the area, and their number and visibility seem to be increasing.

One of the city's major black and Hispanic ghettos, with overcrowded tenements as well as deteriorating two-family row houses, lies to the south of the school. Prior to World War II, this area had been occupied by middle-class Jewish families; but in the late forties and early fifties, increasing numbers of blacks and then Hispanics moved in as the Jewish families left. From the 1960's on, this community was one of the centers of black militancy, particularly in regard to community control of education. It is also an area characterized by high levels of crime and violence and poverty-level subsistence for the largely unskilled labor and welfare recipients who live there.

Kirk has been the high school for this area since the mid-1920's when it was a four-story structure with 50 classrooms for 1,800 students. In the 1930's, as the population in the area grew, a new building planned as the "largest high school in the world" was constructed, occupying a site encompassing four city blocks. From the outset the student body, while predominately white, had a small number of black students.

As the area to the south became increasingly black, the changing racial

composition had its effect on Kirk. As early as 1951, newspaper accounts described interracial confrontations in the school. The same newspapers, however, pointed out that such confrontations were infrequent and that even though blacks were only 20% of the school's population, they were frequently elected to the presidency of the student body. By 1964 the school population had grown to over 4,000, and in that year the percentage of black students increased to over 40%. This was also a period of mounting racial conflict within the school as well as in the surrounding community. The school became a battleground for black and white gangs who fought openly in and around the school. A teacher who remembers that period says, "The fighting then was really between kids and didn't involve any outside adults egging them on or encouraging them." Police sources confirm that this was a time of increased gang activity in other high schools in the city but that Kirk was a center for conflict between black and white gangs. After 1964, racial strife in the school continued to grow as the black students became over 40% of the student population, which soared to over 5,000. This increased population forced the school to move to two split sessions each day. As Hispanics began to move into the south, the percentage of white students from the north dropped even more dramatically so that by 1967 they were 40% of the school population, just 10 years after having been 80% of the population. While the increase in the number of black students was attributable to the growth of the black population in ghetto areas to the south of Kirk, it seems also to have been the result of a "conscious" decision on the part of the central Board of Education to make Kirk the "safety valve" school in that area. Over a period of years, the school's attendance district was changed so that only a small portion of the white middle-class areas to the north remained, while more and more areas to the south were added.

By 1968 Kirk had become a school in serious trouble. Not only racial strife but frequent violence on the part of students towards each other and increasingly towards teachers began to attract community concern and news media interest to the school. A long-time community resident remembers, "I was afraid to go near the school because you could never tell what was going to happen with the kids from the school."

The fear was also shared by teachers who complained that the maintenance of order and control was affecting the school's educational program. For many students, both black and white, the school became almost a source of terror, and teachers report having to escort some youngsters home after school. Vandalism was rampant in the school and extended out to the community. Within the school the vandalism was aimed at random destruction rather than theft. The immediate community fell victim to the same vandalism, as marauding gangs of students committed property crimes daily. Then, towards the end of 1968, events in the city intervened to create an atmosphere that everyone agrees pushed Kirk over the brink and out of control.

The beginning of the 1968-69 school year was marked by a massive strike on the part of teachers in the city. The strike was not over money but over who would control the schools. A confrontation between the overwhelmingly white teachers' union and both the Board of Education and black civil rights groups occurred as a result of an incident that took place in the black ghetto area served by Kirk High School. The black community-appointed administrator of the local school district had terminated employment of 19 white teachers from the local schools. The union went out on strike and demanded the reinstatement of the teachers and brought pressure for greater teacher involvement in educational decisionmaking. Throughout the city, schools remained closed for over a month; and, as the strike continued, the racial overtones of the strike widened the split between black students and the overwhelmingly white teaching and administrative staff at Kirk. Teachers describe this period as one in which the school virtually lost its boundaries with the community as well-known black militants entered the school roaming the hallways "holding their fists up in the black-power salute for the students to emulate." Parents in the black community saw other factors as important to the chaos at Kirk in those days. Students were beginning to become involved in the antiwar sentiment concerning American involvement in Vietnam; and some black community leaders described this involvement as well as bias against blacks at the school as a major cause of alienation. The police, while seeing racial conflict as the major source of violence in the schools, also describe antiwar sentiment as an important factor. In addition, the police report that while gang activity had decreased in the school as it had elsewhere in the city, drugs were becoming an increasing problem and that hard-core drug users among the students were robbing and assaulting other students. The disruption in the school reached a peak in late November when a band of 150 black youths invaded the school and assaulted teachers and

administrators. The school was closed, and the students sent home for the remainder of the day.

One of the frequent complaints made by teachers who recall that period was the reluctance on the part of the school administration to bring in the police. A number of factors resulting from the relationship between the police precinct and the schools became apparent during this period of time. The reluctance of the principal to call the police was described by a number of teachers and by policemen as characteristic of school administrators. Because of the traditional isolation of schools from the community, calling in the police represents a serious step rather than a routine procedure. For the principal it represents an admission that he has lost control over some activity or individual within his building. For the police it represents a problem of jurisdiction, since matters of school discipline (as contrasted to actual violations of the law), particularly where they concern juveniles, are considered school rather than police matters. In the case of Kirk, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that the school was situated midway between two police precincts (the precinct boundaries like the district boundaries literally divided the school in half) resulting in confusion as to which precinct was responsible.

By early 1970, the chaos at the school had reached the point where violence and property crime were daily occurrences. Teachers describe incidents in which one male teacher was set afire and a female teacher was attacked in front of her students. Property damage became extensive with chairs thrown through windows, students lockers set afire, toilet fixtures torn from the walls, and slogans painted on walls inside and outside the building. Kirk became notorious throughout the city as a "jungle," a term which was used even outside the city as the setting afire of the teacher made national headlines. Finally, the teachers protested the principal's decision not to call in the police; and when he still refused, they sent letters to parents saying that the school was unsafe and demanding police protection for themselves and for the students. In addition, they wanted the school to transfer some students to reduce the student population to below 5,000 and to return to single sessions. Truancy had become endemic with some students classified as "ghosts" because they were registered but never actually came to school and others as "dropins" who came to school but did not attend classes, choosing instead to "forage through the halls looking for trouble." The reduction in school population and the return to a single session were accomplished in part by setting up an annex where hundreds of the more difficult and truant youngsters were transferred. Meanwhile security guards were

brought into the school to patrol the halls and the cafeteria. None of these measures seems to have been very successful, and the turmoil continued causing controversy even among the teachers with constant letters of accusation and protest circulated daily in the school and in the press.

In 1971 the teachers' union chapter at Kirk joined with the parents from the white communities to the north in filing a suit in Federal court maintaining that Kirk had been deliberately zoned to produce a predominately black and Hispanic school. By this time the racial balance in the school had shifted to the point where 85% of the population was black or Hispanic. The court case continued until 1974 when the court agreed with the plaintiffs and mandated a redistricting of the school to redress the racial imbalance. As a result, sections in the ghetto to the south were dropped and white areas to the north added to the school's attendance area. The court order also directed that the school not admit a freshman class for the year 1975-76 as a means of both reducing the student population and correcting the racial imbalance, a move which also resulted in the cropping of almost half the teachers. In addition to the rezoning, the judge required that a new educational program be designed adding additional options and programs as new students came in.

Still the controversy raged, as parents' demonstrations and political protests centering on busing in students attracted wide media coverage. By now the school image was such that consideration was given both to closing the school completely or to changing its name in the hopes that the old image would disappear. The name was kept, however; and in 1976 the school was "rededicated" at a formal ceremony with a new principal, some new hope, and a good deal of media coverage describing it as "reborn as virtually a new institution."

THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

What is most striking about Harrison B. Kirk High School is its sheer size. In a city with a number of very large schools, Kirk stands out as the largest. Its architecture is modeled after a university campus, leading one teacher to remark, "It's a pity to waste this beautiful plant on high school students; it should really become a community college." When it was built in the 1930's at a cost of close to \$4 million as part of a depression-era Works Progress Administration program, its exterior facades and internal fittings could only be described as "ornate and elaborate." The plant comprises a full-size swimming pool, several gyms, a huge library with intricately carved oak doors and shelves, a theatre-sized

auditorium, and an athletic field that includes eight outdoor tennis courts. The toll of time and the disruptions of the school show in these facilities. The library has had to have some of the doors replaced with more modern and more secure doors, and its gigantic size is accentuated by the absence of any large number of students using this facility. The playing fields, as well as the school itself, are completely enclosed by chain-link fencing, which is cut in a number of places both by students wishing to get out and by local community residents who want access to the facilities on the weekends. Adults and youths openly clipping away sections of the fence are visible any weekend, when no school security force is on duty, as are large numbers of local residents using the facilities or just generally strolling through the athletic fields.

The school is set well back into an area that consists mostly of a cemetery so that it stands out from the surrounding neighborhood. On one side are blocks of small, neatly kept, row houses; and in front, separated by the mammoth athletic field, is a major commercial street running under an elevated railway. Along this street are a number of pizza parlors and delicatessens as well as other small stores that serve as student hangouts.

The outside of the five-story building shows the results of the turmoil as well. Iron gratings, some of which have been twisted off, cover windows, a number of which are broken. Graffiti are almost continuous around the lower level of the school building and along the walls in the tennis courts and playing fields. Around the rear entrances to the playing fields, one can find occasional empty beer cans and bottles, as well as the paper used for rolling marijuana cigarettes. These entrances are also frequently used as urinals, and the overpowering urine odor is frequently commented on by students and teachers alike. Some comment that neighborhood youths and even adults who use the area clandestinely on weekends are responsible, whereas others maintain that it is the result of the closing of most of the toilet facilities in the building during the schoolday.

Size and spaciousness are also the dominating feature of the interior of the school. The long hallways, which are one-fourth of a mile around on each floor, can only be swept every other day as a result of cuts in the custodial staff. Graffiti are also visible within the building, and attempts to remove them are obvious in that some seem to have been virtually washed off, while others are just as obviously recent. The stairwells that run from floor to floor in each corner of the building are enclosed by wire fencing and glass as a protection against thrown objects but offer

numerous "blind spots" where individuals cannot be observed. The school elevator is used only by the staff and handicapped students.

The school cafeteria, located in the basement, completes the picture of spaciousness with a seating capacity for over 2,000 students at any given time during the three scheduled lunch periods or during the morning free breakfast program. In fact, the cafeteria is so huge that during the time of the school disruptions, it was necessary to set up wall-length dividers to separate the one large room into three smaller sections as a means of crowd control during riots. The three sections still remain. Students are not permitted to leave the building during lunch periods although they need not eat lunch and are permitted to use the playing fields or other school facilities by permission during that period. Two serving lines, one for a hot lunch and one for cold food, are available for students. Teachers have separate dining facilities on the fifth floor of the building. During lunch periods two student bathrooms, one male and one female, are opened in the cafeteria.

Forty-eight sets of doors lead into the school. All doors are kept locked prior to and after the school day. The side entrance is opened at 7:50 a.m. to allow students in for the free breakfast program and closed again at 8:15. When the school day begins at 8:30 a.m., one door on the side of the school is opened for late students or visitors. A security guard is posted at this door at all times, and all students and visitors entering must sign in and are issued a pass to enter the building. After 9:20 a.m., no student is permitted to enter the building unless a parent has called the administrative office and the security guard has been informed that this student is allowed into the building.

COMPOSITION AND SCHOOL CLIMATE

As a result of the judicial order, no freshman class entered Kirk in the school year 1975-76. While the ostensible reason was to give the school "a breather" in designing its new educational program, the effect of the order has been to structure the school so that at this time the junior and senior classes are overwhelmingly black and Hispanic while the freshman and sophomore classes are predominately white. Today, Kirk has a student population of 3,448, including 878 Hispanics, 1,150 blacks, 1,349 whites, and 36 Orientals (Table 1). When these figures are examined by grades, the upper class and lower class difference becomes obvious.

TABLE 1

COMPOSITION OF STUDENT BODY, BY GRADE AND ETHNIC ORIGIN

Grade	Hispanic	Black	White	Oriental	Total
9	492	486	825	14	1817
10	195	245	232	6	678
11	87	191	166	7	451
12	104	228	126	9	467

The teaching staff consists of 121 teachers, most of whom are white and have been at Kirk from the time of the disruptions in the late 1960's and early 1970's. In addition to the teachers, the staff includes 13 assistant principals, most of whom are actually department heads but some are in charge of guidance, administration, and general organization. A former teacher is administrative assistant to the principal in charge of security. The 12 security guards, 11 males and 1 female, are predominately black or Hispanic and young. A number of paraprofessionals and educational aides work in areas such as health, tutoring, and liaison with families. Finally, a custodial and maintenance staff is responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the building.

The principal, who came to the school last September and who was responsible for the redevelopment of Kirk, has been attempting to revitalize the school as an educational institution. He points to the effects of heightened security measures on educational programing:

We've worked very hard to bring the school to a point where it is safe enough for students and teachers, but I'm not very happy with the effect that has had on the educational program. Throughout the time of the disturbances it was really impossible to run educational programs, and the people who moved to positions as department chairmen were chosen because they were strong administrators who could control. Now we need to improve the educational program and that's my highest priority. But the people who were able to bring things under control are not necessarily the best people to help in redesigning the educational program.

Many teachers agree with the principal and feel that the price of security may well be a decreased expenditure for educational resources. They feel that so much of their time is spent in maintaining order and actually patrolling the

school that they cannot give the time and effort they should to teaching and preparation. The principal is aware of this attitude on the part of teachers and reports that many of his best teachers are less than enthusiastic about attempting to rebuild the self-image of the school. He sees this morale problem among the teachers as one of the most serious still facing the school. Interestingly, those teachers who survived the troubled period seem to have been drawn together by the experience and share a sense of comradeship.

Everyone agrees that the school certainly has made a turnaround in the last year, although not everyone agrees on how permanent that turnaround is. The principal feels that the school is not in danger of returning to the previous chaos so long as the tight control now in existence continues. Again, he is concerned with taking what is now a relatively secure school and making it a learning environment for students and a professionally rewarding experience for the teachers.

The problems of morale among teachers are also apparent in some of their expressed concerns. Many fear that increasing the school population will force a return to double sessions. One department head remarked: "I remember what it was like with double sessions. People were coming and going constantly and there was no way of knowing who was supposed to be in the school and who was invading. The halls were in constant chaos and no one felt certain about what was supposed to happen." A security guard expressed similar feelings: "Right now we pretty much know who is supposed to be where, when, and who isn't. If they go to double sessions we're in trouble because there is no way of controlling who comes and who goes."

While the school is now in control and seems almost placid when one hears tales of what it used to be like, violence and vandalism continue to be problems. In one recent month, for example, the police were called into the building on 10 separate occasions as a result of incidents involving students. These ranged from assaulting security guards to stealing individual property as well as selling and using of drugs and destroying school property. That same month 30 students were suspended for violation of school rules including verbal abuse; harassment; drug use; and acts of aggression against students, teachers, and security staff. The police agree that Kirk is a much safer and quieter school than it used to be, but that problems continue with the students and cite drug use and sale and some gang activity as major problems. Some areas within the school, particularly certain stairwells, are known as drug

hangouts and places where drugs can be purchased as well as used. The administration of the school is aware of this problem but find it impossible to patrol and control the vast area of the school; students know those times of the day such as the lunch hour when teachers and security personnel must be deployed in parts of the school allowing some sections to go unsupervised. The principal attempts to patrol these areas on an irregular schedule; but again, because of the sheer size of the school, it is impossible to maintain the degree of vigilance required to halt all drug use. Students describe marijuana use in and around the school as "open," maintaining that many students smoke and that they sometimes are disruptive in classes because they are "stoned" or "on the way."

Theft and vandalism also continue to present problems at Kirk. When the student turmoil in the late 1960's led to frequent fires started by students' dropping matches into other students' lockers, all the lockers, with the exception of those in the gyms, were closed and remain so. As a result, students must carry lunches and other belongings, and these are sometimes stolen when they are left out. Vandalism, while not nearly as dramatic or widespread as it was during the time of the disruptions, still presents problems. The cost to the school in 1976 for repainting or cleaning off graffiti was approximately \$5,000. The principal explains that graffiti and the breaking of windows are a constant problem both because of the size of the school and the reduction in the custodial staff: "The maintenance people really try to keep the plant up, but there is too much school and not enough of them. We also don't have sufficient funds to replace all the broken windows or to get the graffiti off as quickly as we would like." The cost of replacing broken glass in 1976 was approximately \$5,640. An additional problem arises because the school also operates adult education courses at night; and since there is no security staff at night, access to the building is fairly easy. Recently a day student came into the building at night and covered the inside of the building with graffiti. He was soon apprehended as a result of the ease of identifying the author of the graffiti and was arrested; he was brought into the school and put to work removing the graffiti. After a few days of removing the graffiti, he dropped out of school and has not been heard of since. False fire alarms also continue to present problems despite attempts on the part of the school to reduce them by placing a distinctive red dye on the fire boxes to ease the identification of the student setting the alarm. Once again, the comparison of the school with its earlier period of disorder makes the level of violence and vandalism seem low. As one security aide observed, "When you compare what happens in schools in this city with suburban areas or even other cities, every school looks like a hell hole and

Kirk is no different, but we have a better record here now than most other schools in the city, and if you could have been here during the troubles, you would think that this place is like a convent now."

Racial segregation and tension seem to have diminished considerably since the days of the confrontations. Because of the peculiar grade structure with the upper grades being predominately black and Hispanic and the lower grades white, there is little in-class contact; but even in the hallways no sense of racial tension is felt, and students move freely about. In the cafeteria students sort themselves out by race on a voluntary basis, and seating patterns are very obviously based upon race even more than sex. During a discussion with a group of white students, one volunteered: "We don't sit separate from each other because we are different colors or because we don't get along but because we come from different neighborhoods and have different things we are interested in." The cafeteria remains one of the most difficult areas to control. Even though teachers and security guards are assigned to it during all meal periods, there are too few to adequately supervise the area. The potential for violence is always high, and the principal feels that this is an area requiring further attention.

Although students are not permitted to leave the cafeteria once they enter it, any number do. Students report that the security guards show favoritism, but there is little agreement on the bases for the favoritism. White students report that the black guards give special consideration to black students, while black students report "good looking white girls can get away with murder." The biggest problem is the sheer time and effort required to keep the building secure and in control. Almost every adult in the school, regardless of his or her job classification, spends inordinate amounts of time patrolling the vast area inside the school building. One paraprofessional complained that although he was brought to the school to work on remedial education problems, he finds himself regularly assigned to guard duty throughout the three lunch periods.

Kirk is just beginning to redefine its self-image, and much of the old reputation as a center of violence and vandalism remains. Security guards and administrative officers report that there is still constant trouble with outsiders who come to the school for a variety of reasons. Some come to visit boy friends and girl friends; others seem bent on illegal or mischievous behavior, and others come almost as tourists because of the school's old reputation as a place where things were happening. Although all doors are kept

locked except those that are guarded, the doors can be opened from the inside as is required by fire regulation. As a result, students will open the doors to admit outsiders or students who are outside the school during unauthorized periods. Yet that "Blackboard Jungle" image is beginning to change. Recently the school held its first fire drill after years of being unable to allow students to leave the building, since most of them, it was felt, would simply not have returned. Prior to the fire drill, the principal announced over the public address system that attendance would be taken by all teachers upon return to the classrooms and that any student absent would be automatically suspended. He also called local student hangouts and asked that the owners report any students who made their way to those establishments. Although the day of the fire drill the weather was warm and clear, all students returned, and the principal received a number of calls from local community residents commending the school and the students on the orderly manner in which the fire drill was carried out.

MEASURES FOR CONTROLLING VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM

What factors seem to have been responsible for the turnaround at Kirk High School? Much of the public acclaim for what has been called the "Miracle at Kirk High School" is given to the new principal and the policies he has instituted. He is quite frank to acknowledge his role but adds that a number of other factors seem to be responsible as well. His presence is felt throughout the school, and teachers and students alike describe his policy as one of firm control but always with a sense of even-handed control and judgment. One teacher who lived through the period of disruptions compared the role of the present principal with that of his predecessor: "With this principal you always know he is there to back you up but also to chew you out if you are in the wrong. The previous principal never came out of his office and never wanted to make decisions and might just as well not have been there." Not all the teachers agree with the present principal's policies. One new teacher, for example, remarked, "I don't agree with a lot of his decisions, but I have to admit that at least he makes them right away and once they are made he stands by them."

In the community, the principal receives good marks from the white, black, and Hispanic communities. He feels that good community relations are critical for the success of the school, since his view of education is that it requires the efforts of parents as well as students and teachers, and that parents will send good students to a school that has a positive image and a record of safety. Student reaction to the principal is

mixed. Many students seem indifferent to his policies but report that he "seems to be everywhere at once and there aren't too many places to hide anymore." Some students feel that the principal was willing to deal directly with disorder and would "come down hard and even call in the police if necessary if anyone is out of line." The principal has also developed a wide range of contingency plans intended to cover any eventuality within the school. If, for example, a riot should break out, a code sentence requesting all members of a nonexistent committee to report to the auditorium is designed to bring all school personnel with patrol duty assignments to their designated areas immediately.

Another feature of the school's attempt to bring order is the obvious presence of security guards. Although they are not uniformed and are relatively young, they are easily distinguished by the walkie-talkies they carry. The principal, who also has a walkie-talkie, explains that with over a mile of corridors to patrol plus the four city blocks of area included in the school property, it is essential to maintain constant communications. Students often mimic the security guards with their walkie-talkies but seem not to be put off by their use. Relationships between the security guards and the students are sometimes tentative. Students frequently complain that the security guards not only play favorites but also become romantically involved with female students. The guards, on the other hand, feel that there is strong antagonism towards them on the part of some of the more troublesome students, and some report that they have been verbally threatened and even physically attacked not only in the school but in the communities where they live. The principal is aware of these problems but on balance feels that the security guards are essential to maintain order at Kirk and would prefer to have more guards to increase that security. Police presence at Kirk has varied over the years, but today one foot patrolman who can be called in immediately if trouble begins is assigned to the area of the school. The problem of the split jurisdiction between two precincts has been resolved by making one precinct responsible inside the building and the other outside the building.

In addition to the walkie-talkies, other physical means of providing security are used. Areas of the building such as stairwells and bathrooms that are potentially dangerous are heavily patrolled and monitored or closed off. A burglar alarm, although it is not connected to the police precinct, produces a local alarm. The alarm has been inoperable recently, and school officials feel that it is of little use and no one seems anxious to have it repaired. The custodian believes that

physical devices can do little to protect against vandalism and that "more staff after school is closed and on weekends" is the only way to keep the building secure: "The grates on the outside the windows are useless when you realize that most of the windows are broken by kids throwing chairs or other objects into them from inside the building."

While firm administrative control, security guards, and some physical security devices are obvious as means to maintain order in the school, other educational means seem equally important. The principal has made a number of changes in the school curriculum that are aimed at making the school more responsive to the student. Mini-courses or modules of 10-week duration have been introduced as a means of both keeping student attention and allowing for shorter marking periods and consequently less prolonged periods of difficulty for those students who are not doing well in a particular class. Some teachers have resisted the modular approach, but the principal feels that they will adjust to the new program over time and that the shorter courses will increase student enthusiasm and serve to keep students in school and in the classrooms. Another innovation has been the establishment of "career institutes" that group courses from various departments into career-oriented programs. At present, institutes have been proposed in science and the humanities, the performing arts, public service, business, and technology. One concern expressed by some black parents and recognized by the principal is that the institutes will provide a new means of tracking students racially. The science and humanities program, for example, is really a college preparatory program, and some of the department chairmen seem determined to keep it that way.

What seems to bring together the various factors that have led to the turn around is the developing sense of Kirk as a school and the beginnings of the development of a "school spirit." Certainly the traditional notion of school spirit with strong adherence on the part of students and faculty and commonality of purpose does not yet characterize Kirk. However, the fact that recently an entire week was set aside with a variety of activities, such as one day on which everyone was requested to wear the school colors as part of their clothing (and most teachers and students did), bake sales, athletic events, and performances by the students and faculty, and one day on which students and teachers went on a variety of educational and recreational field trips throughout the city and into the countryside (and returned) seems to mark an important beginning.

CONCLUSION

The students and teachers at Kirk, even those who were not present during the period of disruption, by and large believe that the school has turned around and is on its way to renewal. While agreement among the students and teachers is not complete, most see the role of the principal as pivotal in producing this change. Secondly, many feel that the "breather" provided by not taking in a freshman class in 1975 was instrumental in allowing the school to develop the energy necessary for the renewal. Everyone agreed that the reduction in the size of the school population and the end of the split sessions had been of great importance in bringing the school under control. The director of security said: "When you've got a crowded school and it is as big as ours, there is absolutely nothing you can do if the students decide to take it over. The best you can hope for is that they don't know how easily they could do it."

Many teachers and community residents feel that the great publicity focused on the school had both negative and positive results. One teacher compared Kirk to "a fishbowl or the shark tank at the aquarium" with everybody looking in and expecting the worst. Others, however, pointed out that the publicity served to bring issues to a head fairly quickly so that indecision and recalcitrance were extremely difficult. During the time of the disorders, rumors presented a special problem at Kirk. Incidents at the school, no matter how minor, were quick to spread throughout the two communities and would escalate with each telling. There were rumors in the black community that black students were being beaten and jailed at the same time that rumors spread through the white communities that white students and teachers had been killed. The publicity given to the school in the media made rumor mongering even more immediate and widespread. To some extent, this interest in what goes on in the school has continued. The school has come up with an interesting and, seemingly,

successful means of dealing with the problem. A Rumor Control Network has been set up including all of the feeder schools, community organizations, churches, synagogues, and parents. Notices have been sent out giving the names of a number of school personnel and parents and community members in each of the communities in the attendance area who can be called when questions or concerns about the school arise. When an incident does occur at the school, a member of the administrative staff prepares a resume of the incident and, if rumors have already begun, describes the allegations made in the rumor as well. This "Rumor Control Relay" is then sent to each of the members of the school staff, parents, or community leaders identified as a member of the Rumor Control Network.

The principal also feels that the judicial mandate provided a sense of urgency as well as an aura of power to bring about the necessary changes. This power related both to the community and the central Board of Education and provided a rationale for cutting red tape and seeking resources and decisions with some immediacy. The reestablishment of the school was overseen by a "blue ribbon" advisory panel of civic leaders and distinguished educators. The school is gradually phasing out the advisory panel because the administration feels that the school should plan and carry out its own future.

All of these factors seem important in the change at Kirk High School. While the school still continues to experience difficulties in the maintenance of order, the administration and faculty are aware of the problems and do not find them hopeless. Indeed, many teachers describe themselves "as veterans of the school wars" and capable of dealing with any problem that might arise. The more serious problem is the question of the price paid in the teaching and learning process for the control and order established in the school. Teachers and administrators are quick to point out that the cost of misbehavior and violence are great enough to warrant any price.

ELVIN ROGERS JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

Elvin Rogers Junior High School is located in the middle of an inner-city ghetto neighborhood which has one of the highest crime rates in this Eastern metropolis. The crime rate and the population of the neighborhood have diminished in recent years because of a complex of social and economic forces which have resulted in the systematic burning out and gutting of entire blocks of tenements and dilapidated business establishments.

These buildings once housed working, middle-class families who later moved to the suburbs in the late 1940's. They were replaced by new waves of impoverished black and Hispanic migrants. By the late 1950's and early 1960's, the neighborhood began to show the effects of overcrowding and neglect. As the sixties drew to a close, a new phenomenon developed and threatened to complete the destruction of the area.

As the neighborhood deteriorated, the buildings were passed from one landlord to another; property values declined, and many buildings became tenement dwellings for welfare recipients. Then individual buildings and eventually whole blocks began to be struck by fires. Some fires resulted from the age and lack of proper maintenance of the buildings; others, say local police and fire officials, resulted from buildings being put to the torch by unscrupulous landlords seeking to recoup investments through insurance or from individual apartments being set ablaze by occupants in order to collect the sizable relocation allowance provided to fire victims by the city's welfare agency. Whatever the causes, the results were always the same--rampant deterioration and rapid depopulation as burned-out apartments and buildings were vandalized and the looting spread to adjacent apartments and buildings. The buildings that were left became havens for squatters who moved in despite the absence of heat, water, and other utilities; "shooting galleries" where heroin addicts gathered to escape police surveillance; and hang-outs for roving youth gangs who terrorized the remaining inhabitants, many of whom were too old or too ill to leave.

Today, the neighborhood is once again in transition as a result of high-rise, low-income projects being built by the city in the last decade. The new projects provide stable living accommodations for families moving back into the neighborhood, and businesses are reopening. But the scars of the urban blight which all but destroyed the neighborhood remain, and old buildings continue to be burned. New projects seem almost to rise out of the ashes of the surrounding blocks. Police officers assigned to the local precinct aptly picture the area as resembling post-war European cities which struggled to rebuild in the aftermath of massively destructive bombing attacks.

While the out-movement of large portions of the neighborhood population has somewhat reduced the crime rate in the area over the last few years, police statistics indicate that it still remains one of the highest crime areas in the city. Violent street crimes and homicides as well as drug-related incidents give the area a reputation for being unsafe for inhabitants and highly dangerous for outsiders. Organized crime activities, such as the policy or numbers racket and other forms of illegal gambling, the sale and use of narcotics, loan-sharking and the sale of stolen goods, are carried out openly on the streets. According to police estimates, 8 out of 10 youths in the area carry knives or other weapons including, in a small number of cases, guns.

Elvin Rogers Junior High School has been an integral part of this community since the 1930's. It first opened as a junior high school for boys, but in the late 1950's a new building was constructed across the street from the original site and opened as a coeducational junior high, grades 7 through 9, with a maximum capacity of 1,200 students.

PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

Rogers is the only junior high school in the local community school district, but there are six other intermediate or grades 6 through 8 schools. The building occupies an entire city block but shares part of that block with an outdoor play area which at first appears to be the school playground but actually is a city park open to the public and therefore not under the control of the school. Older youths and adults use the handball

and basketball courts, walk young children, or sit on the benches and socialize. Externally, the building is square and angular with fireproof walls covered by a pale yellow cement finish. One striking difference is that unlike most schools and other public buildings in the neighborhood and in the city, the walls at Elvin Rogers are not covered with graffiti.

There are five sets of exterior doors all of which are made of steel with additional metal plates protecting the lock mechanism against jimmying. All doors are kept locked from the outside at all times with the exception of the main entrance which is locked during the lunch hour and after the school closing at 3 p.m. The only ground level windows run along one wall of the school, and these are recessed into 3-foot-deep concrete excavations protected by an iron railing. On all other sides of the building, windows are raised to the second floor level and, with the exception of those on the third floor, are covered with metal grating. In the back of the school is a low roof area which adjoins the playground; a 6-foot "bear fence" of metal spikes curved outward at the top runs the entire length of this roof to discourage scaling.

Inside the building are three floors of classrooms and offices with a large auditorium and a well-equipped gymnasium. The classrooms and offices are laid out along one major corridor which runs the entire length of the school with only one small side corridor leading off from it to the main entrance of the school. The basement of the building contains the school cafeteria where breakfast and lunch are served, separate lunchroom for teachers and staff, a music room, separate locker facilities for girls and boys, and the boiler room and other maintenance facilities including a vault room in which all valuable equipment is placed during holiday periods. Stairwells are constructed to provide a minimum of "hiding" space, have separate up and down stairs, and internal metal grates on all windows in the stairwell.

No graffiti is seen inside the school. There are numerous and attractive exhibits and bulletin boards with art work provided by school authorities; students; or, in a few cases, community groups. Despite recent budget cuts which have significantly reduced the number of maintenance personnel, classroom and office space are cleaned daily and hallways four times a day; the school always appears to be well kept throughout the day.

All of the contrasting features which make up the neighborhood can be found in the immediate vicinity of the school. On two sides of the school are a number of large high-rise housing

projects which are well maintained and which have their own internal policing. Across the street from the east side of the school is an area which is being rebuilt for small retail businesses, fast-food services, and a parking lot. In the back of the school on the other side of the street from the playground is an area still composed of many burned-out buildings where new fires occur frequently.

SCHOOL COMPOSITION

The demographic history of the school is also a function of the population dynamics of the surrounding community. The old Elvin Rogers was an all-white school with white teachers, many of whom lived in the immediate vicinity. As the population characteristics of the neighborhood changed in the early 1960's, the student population of the school also changed. Each entering class contained fewer white students and more black and Hispanic students. By the late 1960's, the school's student population was predominately black and, to a lesser extent, Hispanic. Almost all teachers and administrators were white and increasingly were from outside the community.

Thomas Gallagher, the principal during the late 1960's, is now the principal of one of the 18 elementary schools in this district and remembers that period as one of overcrowding, chaos, and continuous disorder and disruption. "Most of that time," he recalls, "we were as high as 150% of utilization with close to 1,800 kids in a school designed to hold 1,200." The violence and criminal activity that characterized the neighborhood spilled over into the school as well. "The playground was the first place where they began selling drugs. Soon they moved into the school, and when they did we found they were selling marijuana in the bathrooms and there were a lot of fights frequently with knives all over the school." Narcotics and youth gangs came into the school from the surrounding community. "There were any number of youth gangs hanging out around the school and there was even one lesbian gang that used the school as a headquarters. Probably the biggest of the gangs was the "Caballeros" among the Hispanics and the "Shades" among the blacks and there was constant warfare between them over turf, girls and drugs."

Gallagher left the school towards the end of the sixties and was replaced for a short period of time by an acting principal during whose tenure the school "fell apart" in the opinion of teachers and parents who remember that period. Gang fights increased, often taking place inside the school. The school was so crowded that just walking down the hall led to jostling which often led to retaliation not only against students, but also against teachers who got in the way. Early in

1971 when the school had gained a reputation as one of the most violent in the area, the acting principal suffered a coronary attack at the school and shortly thereafter was replaced by Roberto Martinez, who is still principal today.

After 1970, changes in the community again brought about changes in the school. The depopulation caused by the burnings and the massive out-migration, coupled with active fear on the part of some parents to send their children to the school, brought about a noticeable decline in enrollment. Then, between 1972 and 1974, four new intermediate schools were built in the district, again drawing students away from Rogers. The school changed not only in size but in the characteristics of its student population as the relative proportion of blacks and Hispanics increased in favor of the Hispanics as was now

true in the surrounding community. Table 2 indicates the number and racial and ethnic identification of students between 1970 and October 1976. There are 818 students of whom 450 or 55% are Puerto Rican and 340 or 41% are black. Of the remaining 29 students, 20 are classed as "other Spanish surname," and 9 as "white." There are currently 44 teachers of whom 32 are male and 12 are female. Among the male teachers, 27 are white, 3 are Hispanic, and 2 are black. Five of the 12 female teachers are Hispanic, 5 are white, and the remaining 2 are black. The principal is Hispanic, and the two male assistant principals are white; there is one black female guidance counselor, and one male Hispanic drug coordinator. There are 15 service workers, including custodial staff, lunchroom workers and so on, of whom 8 are black females; 3, white males; 2, Hispanic males; 1, a black male; and 1, a white female.

TABLE 2
NUMBER, RACE, AND ETHNICITY OF STUDENT BODY AT ROGERS BY YEAR

<u>School Year</u> ^a	<u>Black</u>	<u>Oriental</u>	<u>Puerto Rican</u>	<u>Hispanic</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Total</u>
1970	616	4	808	7	25	1460
1971	631	5	828	8	29	1501
1972	600	4	741	5	14	1364
1973	572	3	740	6	9	1330
1974	335	3	549	4	8	889
1975	294	1	430	12	6	743
1976	340		450	20	9	819

^aFigures represent school enrollment as of October 31 of that year.

VIOLENCE, VANDALISM, AND THE SCHOOL'S RESPONSE

When Martinez took over the school in 1971, he immediately instituted a number of changes to quell the rampant chaos and violence that surrounded the school. The teaching staff at Rogers had been a stable one with little teacher turnover. This meant, however, that a number of ineffective or "problem" teachers as well as seasoned, experienced teachers were on the staff. Between March of 1971 when he took over as principal and June, the end of the school year, Martinez dismissed 10 of the teachers who were there when he arrived. Most of the remaining

teachers have stayed on, and the average period of service among teachers today is 7 years, including that of one teacher who has been at Rogers for 29 years.

Within the school Martinez soon discovered that much of the violence took place in hall ways as students moved from room to room in groups or individually. The bathrooms, which had been a favorite place for drug sales and use, were also places where fights started. Martinez closed off all bathrooms except one girls' and one boys' room on the first floor, which were kept locked; students were required to get the key from a school aide, who also guarded the door and kept a

record of how many students were in the bathroom at any one time. During lunch hours the student bathrooms adjoining the cafeteria area were unlocked but still monitored by school personnel.

While much of the traffic in the halls was the result of the normal movement among classes, Martinez noted that there were other reasons for excessive or unnecessary activity in the halls. Teachers were using students as messengers to carry papers, notes, or verbal messages to other teachers. Drop-outs and other youth from the community often roamed the halls, and most of the time students could roam freely without permission. By closing off all doors except the main door, stationing two paraprofessional aides at the main door at all times, and requiring all visitors to sign in with these aides, the problem of outsiders entering the school and wandering the halls dropped dramatically. Since the externally locked doors can all be opened from the inside, he also stationed monitors at each of these doors, but the personnel cuts which have resulted from the budget crises of recent years now make this impossible. Teachers were asked not to use students as messengers, and all students were required to have a pass or note signed by a teacher in order to be in the halls at any time other than the changing of classes.

There is one lunch period each day and students are permitted to go home for lunch. For those who stay, the schedule calls for separate mealtimes for boys and girls. When the lunch period begins, the girls go to the auditorium where they wait until the boys have finished eating. The boys line up in the corridor outside the cafeteria by assigned numbers. The lunchroom teacher then sends the lines in one at a time with the order alternating each day. When they have finished lunch, the boys go either outside in clement weather or to assigned programs within the school during inclement weather. Brian Abernathy, the lunchroom teacher, explained that since girls are less likely to be disruptive, the boys eat first. The separation of sexes during lunch, he says, is because young people at that age are more disruptive when in mixed groups.

Not all of Martinez' actions were aimed at bringing about change regulating and regularizing student activities. It had been customary for recalcitrant students to be taken to an area of the basement known as the "dungeon" for corporal punishment, often with the approval and sometimes at the request of their parents. Martinez moved to halt this practice, and today there is no evidence of any physical punishment of students. He also moved to better the school's relationships in the community. One of his first steps was to arrange a "sit down" with the

Caballeros and the Shades. Martinez was criticized by some teachers for agreeing to meet with the gangs; however, the meeting resulted in an agreement that the school was off limits to both gangs and that those members who were students at Rogers would either not wear their distinctive gang jackets or "colors" to school or, if they did, they would wear them inside-out to conceal the gang name.

Since that time the school has been relatively free from gang activities and recruitment, especially when compared to other schools in the area. Some members of the community believe that the reduction of gang activity in and around Rogers is also due to pressure from organized crime figures in the community who warned the gangs against attracting too much police "heat" into the neighborhood. Others feel that gang membership comes and goes as a fad in 10- to 15-year periods, and that gangs will inevitably return.

Another problem at Rogers had been the school dances which usually resulted in violence in the school when older male youths would "crash" the school function. The trouble spilled over into the neighborhood when youths leaving the dance high on beer or drugs would vandalize the neighborhood; walking from car roof to car roof along the parked cars was not uncommon. All dances with the exception of the annual prom were discontinued and the prom is now held off school property.

There were also new security measures put into effect in the school. The local police precinct assigned one officer full-time to the school. Once again, however, budgetary cuts leading to a reduction in available police manpower have resulted in change and Officer Thomas, who was assigned to the school in 1972, now patrols a foot post which includes the school area but is not restricted to the school. In addition to Officer Thomas, Paul Rodriguez, a Hispanic security guard, is assigned full-time to the school by the Central Board of Education.

Martinez' attempts to bring order to the school were not always met with enthusiasm. Shortly after he arrived, he ordered that all graffiti inside or outside the school be removed as soon as it appeared. Shortly thereafter an ominous message appeared on one of the outside walls of the school: "Martinez will be gone by the 10th of June." When the custodian went to remove the graffiti, Martinez told him to leave it up, and for 2 weeks that was the only graffiti visible around the school. On the 10th of June Martinez spent the whole day in front of the sign and when school closed at 3 p.m. and the last students had passed on their way home, he had the

graffiti removed and as he says, "I've been here ever since."

While violence was the major concern at the school during the late 60's and early 70's, vandalism and thefts from the school were also continuing problems. Despite the fact that all windows except those on the third floor are covered with metal gratings, the school still averages 17 broken windows each month. Most breakage comes from stones or other projectiles which are thrown at the windows from outside the school and manage to penetrate the gratings or to reach up to the third floor windows. In an effort to reduce breakage, the school had begun to replace glass panes with more expensive but more durable Lexon plexiglass. Vandalism at Rogers, however, is usually not an act of malicious mischief by youngsters, but rather an active process of theft both for personal use and for resale usually in the immediate community. The pattern seemed always to be the same. Entry would be gained by breaking a window and entering either from the out-of-view-of-the-street windows leading off the low roof area or through basement windows. In fact, since 1970, all cases of illegal entry have been through windows with the exception of one case where a door was left unlocked and once when the school's radio and TV antenna was stolen from the roof (see Table 3). Some of the security devices put into effect during this period were soon dropped because as the principal reports, "they made the place seem more like a jail than a school." An expensive "walkie-talkie" system of radios and beepers was given to the school and used for a short time but was soon put away in the school

vault because, said David Cohen, who has taught at Rogers for 12 years, "we're teachers, not cops, and it creates the wrong image." Similarly, when a massive metal door with a combination lock in the middle of the door was installed on the language lab to protect the equipment inside, the students "felt they were being put into a cage," and Martinez had the new door removed.

In 1971, after repeated requests by the principal, an intrusion alarm system sensitive to both sound and movement was installed. When first installed, the alarm consisted of a bell and a flashing red light on the outside wall of the building, a system which was dependent upon neighbors calling the police when the alarm sounded or its being heard or viewed by police on routine patrol. In 1973, again after repeated written requests, the alarm system was converted to allow for direct telephone signal to an alarm company which then notifies both the custodian and the local police precinct. While those measures have been somewhat effective, Jack Costello, the building custodial engineer who is also responsible for building security, and the principal both feel that only a night watchman will make the building totally secure. The alarm system, for example, can easily be circumvented. Since it is sound sensitive, it had to be adjusted so that very loud sounds like low-flying planes or police sirens would not set it off. Consequently, it can be made inoperative by simply placing a loudly tuned transistor radio in front of its outside receiver-speaker.

Costello indicated that a few years ago a Federal grant was proposed as a means of hiring night watchmen for schools. The idea "died out,"

TABLE 3
INCIDENTS OF ILLEGAL ENTRY AND VANDALISM AT ROGERS

Year	Total No. of Incidents	School Open	School Closed	Value of Labor and Materials (in dollars)	Value of Property Stolen (in dollars)	Means of Illegal Entry	
						Window	Door
1970	9	3	6	\$2,226.45	\$2,537.85	6	
1971	11	0	11	2,600.00	6,302.00	11	
1972	17	1	16	3,700.00	3,681.00	17	
1973	10	0	10	1,545.00	2,742.00	9	1
1974	1	0	1	45.00	300.00	1	
1975	1	0	1	50.00	85.00	roof	
1976	0	0	0	00	00	00	

however, because "the union was afraid the money would be used to hire minority people at below union wage scale." He also feels that some of the new security measures mandated by the central board of education are unrealistic in terms of what actually happens at Rogers. Thus, despite the fact that illegal entry through a door has taken place only once since 1970, and even then as a result of a door's being left unlocked, the Central Board is spending "millions of dollars" to have dead-bolt locks installed on all school doors to discourage vandalism.

After the sharp decline in student enrollment between 1973 and 1974, Martinez decided to actively recruit the best students he could find both to improve the school's image and to avoid the continuing decline in enrollment which could result in closing the school. Rogers had been designated as a "Special Progress" or "SP" school, which meant that gifted students from the district's elementary schools could be admitted under a program in which they would have an enriched 7th grade, skip the 8th grade, and go directly to the 9th grade. Actually, not many students in the district had chosen to come to Rogers under this program, although it was the only such school in the district, because of its reputation for trouble. Martinez put a great deal of effort into recruitment to these classes, and today over one-fifth of the student body are SP students coming from all over the district; in effect, all 18 elementary schools feed Rogers. Martinez also built up the school's "Special Enrichment" or "SE" classes, which provide advanced preparation for students, particularly in math, at all three grade levels. Another one-fifth of all students are in this program and again, they come from throughout the district rather than only from the immediate neighborhood elementary schools designated to feed Rogers; thus, 10 out of the 25 classes in the school are doing special or advanced work for their grade. There are a few other specially funded programs such as remediation classes in math and reading and language laboratories.

By emphasizing these special programs, the school managed to keep its enrollment at between 800 and 900 and, more importantly, to change significantly the type of student in attendance in comparison to the other intermediate schools in the district. Now over two-fifths of all the students are in special enriched programs; they help to create an atmosphere and environment where learning is respected and disruption is discouraged. "When I first came here I didn't even go into the girls' bathroom for the first 5 months because it had been such a dangerous place in my old school," commented one 9th grade female SP student, "but here at Rogers the tough kids don't pick on the SP kids." Martinez reinforces this

atmosphere by adherence to a process of consistently rewarding good scholarship with special field trips, movies, and assemblies which are not open to students who are not doing well or who are troublemakers.

While the school is not permitted to keep records on the number of students whose families are on welfare, they estimate that almost 50% of the students are from welfare families. Some estimate of the socioeconomic level of the student body is also apparent in the fact that about 600, or approximately three-fourths of the students, are eligible for the free lunch and breakfast program provided at the school.

Although the principal establishes both the policy and the tone of discipline in the school, the day-to-day control is in the hands of Robert Burk, the Dean of Students. Until 1974, there were deans responsible for each of the three grades and three guidance counselors as well. Budgetary restrictions have reduced the number so that Burk is responsible for all students, as is the one remaining guidance counselor. Another budget casualty was the reduction in the number of attendance teachers (teachers assigned at the district level to perform the tasks which used to be the classical role of the "truant officer"); only one remains of the five originally operating in the district.

Like the principal, the dean believes that providing firm, fair, and consistent discipline is essential both to good order in the school and in creating a positive learning environment. "Most of the kids who come to the school are here to learn and really are not much trouble," says Burk in describing the school. "There are just a few cliques of kids--and the girls are usually worse than the boys--who seem to get into trouble over and over again." When the school was fully staffed, class size was kept down to a point where troublesome groups could be broken up by reassignment to new classes. "Now," reports Burk, "we don't have enough teachers to start new classes and keep class size down."

Since all students in the school are legally within the age of compulsory attendance, suspension rather than expulsion is the most serious disciplinary step that can be taken. The process for disciplinary action is graduated in four levels, ranging from a warning to suspension. In the first level, if a student is troublesome in class or presents a consistent behavior problem, a letter signed by the dean is mailed to the student's parents asking them to come in and meet with the dean to discuss their child's problem. "Our biggest problem is to get the parents to understand the importance of their child's education and attendance at school," noted the dean. In the

second level, a presuspension step, the principal writes to the parents indicating the serious nature of the behavior problem, invites the parents in to discuss the problem, and indicates the possibility of a suspension. The third level is a suspension hearing which parents are asked to attend and, as a result of a recent court ruling, are permitted to bring legal counsel. The fourth or suspension letter requires that the student be suspended for up to 5 days at the end of which time the student's parents must accompany him to the school in order for him to be readmitted. In the last 5 years, the number of suspensions has been gradually decreasing, but today the number of suspensions per year includes about 5% of the total student body or about 40 students. Truancy also has decreased. At the present time, there are "about 8 to 10" cases of truancy, which is defined as missing 25 days out of each 50-day marking period during the school year.

There are, however, less formal ways of dealing with difficult or disruptive students. Since it is not legally possible to expel students considered disruptive, it is customary at Rogers, as in other schools, to transfer students to other schools. By board regulation, the school is not permitted to inform the receiving school of the reason for the transfer or to provide any disciplinary records. "This can present some real problems," the dean says of the confidentiality requirement: "We had a kid last year who slashed another kid's throat with a razor blade and we finally had to transfer him to one of the intermediate schools, but we couldn't tell them officially what he had done or even that they should keep an eye on him because he was potentially violent." The dean added that frequently a teacher or administrator will "informally or unofficially" pass some information on the student to the new school. The Director of Pupil Personnel Services at the district level, Estelle Karsh, is aware of the transfer process and adds that sometimes it is also necessary to transfer a student to another school in the district because he or she has earned a reputation as a troublemaker in his present school, and "the student feels he has to live up to that reputation and so he continues getting in trouble." She also reports a growing problem with the lack of availability of psychiatric services, particularly in view of the drastic reduction in the number of counselors assigned to each school. "The most important thing," says Ms. Karsh, "is being able to identify potentially violent or disruptive students in advance and getting them out of the classroom where they influence or disrupt the other students and giving them specialized psychiatric help." Now, she reports, there is a usual 6-month delay in referrals, and emergency cases still require a 2- to 3-month wait.

Suspensions are usually the result of some disruptive behavior rather than for improper language or eccentricities of clothing or hairstyle. Fighting is the most frequent cause for suspension, and any threat against a teacher results in an automatic 5-day suspension. The school has managed to reduce incidents of fighting as indicated by the fact that fights which involved injury to a student or teacher dropped from 16 such reported incidents in 1966 to 2 in the 1976 school year, and there have been none reported to date in 1977.

The school has assigned to it for 4 days per week a Community Neighborhood Worker or "addiction teacher," Mr. Pedro Garcia, who works with students experiencing drug or alcohol problems. Garcia is a product of both the neighborhood and Rogers, which he attended approximately 15 years ago. While his official role is to deal with drugs and alcohol, he actually serves as an advisor to many students who see his experiences as more related to their life style than other teachers or school personnel. An incident last year involved one student (whose father is a well-known gambler living in the community) who stole money from his father in order to pay protection money to a group of male students in the school who were threatening him. Eventually the student paid out over \$800. Another student came to see Garcia and told him of the extortion. Garcia and the dean brought the extortionists into their office for questioning. Eventually they admitted their guilt and returned as much of the money as they could. "The kids really trust and respect Garcia because he comes from the same place they do and has kept in touch with what is going on out there," commented one teacher. "It's important to have someone like him around."

Garcia believes that many of the students smoke or have smoked marijuana, but that while heroin is once again a growing problem in the neighborhood, its use has declined among students at Rogers. During the turbulent 1960's at Rogers, drugs were sold and used openly in or around the school. The student bathrooms were the focal point of both sales and use, since marijuana smoking is usually a social, rather than an individual, act. Since the school's new policy on bathroom use restricts the number of students using the bathrooms at any one time--there are seldom more than two students allowed in the bathroom at once--marijuana use in the school is unusual. Consistently applied school rules resulting in immediate 5-day suspension for a student found to be using or selling drugs in the school have also contributed to the infrequent use of drugs in the building.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite its history and reputation for violence and vandalism, today Elvin Rogers is, in the unanimous opinion of teachers, students, administrators, the police, and community residents, a model of a safe school in a community where crime and violence are the norm. What has brought about this dramatic turnaround in 5 short years? Most respondents agreed on a few major causes, and some have added additional insights. The forceful but fair administration brought by the principal to the school has been a major factor in the improvement of the school's security and learning atmosphere. "Martinez is tough but he is consistent as well as fair," remarked one teacher who has been at the school for 9 years. "I think that he sets a tone for the students and the teachers that gives us a 'no-nonsense' school where you come to do your job and you are expected to do it well, and you are rewarded for doing it well." One parent of three children who have attended Rogers over the last 10 years said, "He is really interested in seeing to it that the kids learn and he spends a lot of time in the hallways not just looking for trouble but looking at what is going on and meeting with and talking to kids. He is the only principal I can remember who knows most of the kids by name."

There is also unanimous agreement that the decrease in school size—800 students in a building designed for 1,200—has been an important influence in reducing the violence and chaos in the school. John Malatesta, the foreman of the custodial staff at Rogers who was at the old school as well as the new one, said, as we were walking through the almost empty hallways during a class period, "It used to be like a circus with thousands of kids pushing and shoving each other trying to get from one room to another and there was no way the teachers could recognize who was a student and who wasn't or who belonged where." Mrs. Jones, the guidance counselor, added, "With 800 students it's possible to know them all, but what is more important is that they all know that you know who they are and so they are a little more careful about cutting up or bringing attention to themselves because of improper behavior."

A third major factor, again mentioned by everyone with whom we spoke, is the effect of the enrichment program in bringing a new mix of students into the school. Tom Gallagher, the former principal, commented, "The school is really different now because it is like a magnet and attracts the best kids from all over the district and what is more, when you have good students you attract and hold on to a better staff." Even the students are aware of the importance of the enrichment program: "Coming

to Rogers is very important to me not only because it's a good school and safe, but because you can go to good high schools from here. Last year about 30 kids went from our 9th grade to one of the three special high schools where only the best kids from all over the city are admitted, and I think there were at least 4 kids who were picked for special programs which send them to private boarding schools."

These three factors, then, seem in everyone's opinion to explain how and why Rogers became a safe school. There are, however, a few other reasons which, while not voiced by everyone, deserve some mention as part of what is obviously a complex set of factors related to the school's turnaround. A number of respondents mentioned the importance of the many housing projects in the neighborhood. The projects not only provide more adequate housing and a relatively safer environment since they are maintained and patrolled by their own security system, but also seem to offer a stability to family life which affects the children as well. At the same time the parents seem to have not only a greater interest in their children's behavior in the school, but a vested interest in keeping the neighborhood as safe as possible. Merchants in the area also report that the projects have stabilized the community to the point where they feel safe in remaining in the area. One other comment offered by a teacher relates to changing characteristics in the neighborhood: "Now that the welfare laws require that the school certify in writing that children of welfare recipients are actually in school, a lot of welfare parents are more interested in making sure that their kids come to school."

Finally, many respondents commented on the importance of the stability of the teaching staff in terms of their long tenure and on the general sense of commitment which they seem to share. One parent said: "I have always thought that white teachers come into our schools and can't wait to get across the bridge to their homes in the suburbs after school, but that's not true of the teachers at Rogers."

There were also comments and suggestions made about how the school might be made even safer and how violence and vandalism might be prevented. One frequent suggestion was that staff personnel cuts have threatened to reduce the effectiveness of the school's ability to prevent disruptions. More guidance counselors, more teachers, more attendance teachers, night watchmen, and a full-time police officer were all mentioned by one or more respondents. The police believe that the presence of Officer Thomas, even now that his patrol area has been expanded beyond the school, has been an

important factor in keeping out trouble. Another suggestion was to light up the exterior of the school which presently has only one spotlight as a means of discouraging vandals, but very few of the suggestions involved adding new or even improved security devices. Most individuals

suggested improving the already good relationships among teachers, students, and the surrounding community. One 7th grader summed it up best: "I feel safer at Rogers than I do in the streets and the closer I get to the school, the safer I feel."



ROOSEVELT HIGH SCHOOL

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

Roosevelt High School (grades 9 through 12) is located in one of the larger cities of the United States. Like most inner-city schools, it serves a distinct minority population, in this case, black students. Roosevelt first opened its doors as an all black school in the 1930's. Although its student population and immediate community have remained black throughout the years, the size and structure of the school have undergone various changes.

Initially, the school was built as a comprehensive school covering grades 1 through 12 to accommodate about 1,700 students, but it changed to a high school in the late forties. By the mid-forties the school was already overcrowded. The war years were violent years for society in general, and the school in many ways was a reflection of that society. Some of the teachers saw this period as a time when school violence and vandalism first appeared. Many parents in the community worked several shifts in defense plants and were therefore away from home. As students were dismissed from school—in three or four shifts—many of them would tarry around the school grounds. The streets surrounding the school became the center of frequent fights between students from the school and between students and nonstudents as well. Some of the fights, especially those with knives, brought media coverage and publicity to the school. One alumnus recalled that the first policeman was assigned to the school during this period. In addition to fights, he mentioned the increase in broken windows and graffiti on the interior and exterior walls.

Located in what is probably the largest predominantly black area in the city, Roosevelt is the only high school in the district; no white students attend any of the schools in the district. Today, the areas that make up the school district are characterized by a high rate of unemployment, income below the poverty level, crime, and delinquency. However, in the earlier years of the school while the community was predominantly low income, the mixture of income levels was greater. In the community immediately surrounding the high school, a large number of buildings have been abandoned and are awaiting demolition. Many of the homes are

multifamily dwellings, and a large proportion are in need of extensive repairs.

Deteriorating property, such as abandoned buildings and vacant lots, in an already depressed area is viewed by a community leader as "creating hazards in the community and breeding them." He stressed that this kind of environment seems to cause a negative attitude among young people. For one thing, he said, drifters are drawn to these kinds of areas, and they engage in all kinds of undesirable activities, e.g., drinking, littering, drugs, and gambling. Continued contact with such conditions and activities brings about disrespect among some young people, he added. Too often the disrespect gets acted out at school. In addition to being an eyesore and creating negative attitudes, he contended that deteriorating physical surroundings seem to attract other more serious criminal activities.

The fifties and sixties were reported to be marked by a great deal of gang activity. Members of different gangs attended the high school, creating a climate of tension and fear among the student body. Students who were not members of a gang were often the targets of harassment and fights on the school premises, whereas, for the most part, fights among gangs took place away from school. The public housing complexes across the street from Roosevelt were frequently mentioned as the center of much of the gang warfare; and, as violence increased there, it became associated with the school. The tendency to connect what happened in the community in general, and in the housing units in particular, with the school was mentioned a number of times. Several parents, community representatives, and students and teachers cited this association as a major factor contributing to the reputation of the school. Discussing the association of the school and the community, a member of the school's local advisory council remarked that generally more arrests and court referrals occur in low-income areas. As the director of a community agency whose purpose is to help prevent juvenile delinquency, he cited several instances where students who were truants or dropouts got involved with police. He said if arrests were made and publicity given the cases, the school attended by the students was always mentioned. Therefore, it was suggested again and again that at least some of the high school's reputation is

based in part on its location in a black, low-income, high-crime community.

Little doubt exists, however, that the presence of gangs in the school and in the community and the tensions they created contributed greatly to the school's reputation. We were told that gangs are no longer a problem in the high school. The main reasons given for their disappearance were (1) they have become big business, more sophisticated--perhaps associated with drugs, it was suggested; and (2) most members have grown up and have little interest in students, especially juniors and seniors. Acknowledging that gangs probably still exist in the city, several administrators said they are more aware of them during "recruiting season," which is the first month or so of school. By about 1970, they reported, the high school had fewer problems with gangs.

Referred to as the worst period of violence and vandalism in the history of the school, the 1960's were said to have clearly contributed to the reputation of the high school. Beginning with the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the period lasted until about 1971. Some of the incidents mentioned as occurring frequently were students harassing and assaulting teachers; more outsiders coming into the high school, disrupting classes, and instigating altercations with teachers and students; and students creating havoc in the lunchrooms by throwing dishes and milk cartons. Various persons reported that members of the Black Panthers and other militant organizations often came to the school during this time. Frequently, they joined groups of students in walkouts and in presenting demands to teachers and administrators. However, those administrators and teachers with whom we spoke said that although they were not especially afraid during this time, they were extremely cautious. They said they were aware of tensions in the community and in the schools. Therefore, they tried to avoid any situation that would cause a reaction or disruption. A counselor, who was a teacher in the school in the sixties, noted that, on the contrary, several teachers were indeed afraid and too slack. He said their avoidance of situations often exacerbated problems. The most common example cited was teachers on hall duty who would not ask any group of students for a hall pass or admonish them to move on.

In 1969 the security staff at this school was increased significantly. Along with the permanent, full-time policeman assigned to the school since the forties, a full-time security guard was hired. In addition, a new position of assistant principal was added to coordinate all security matters. Twenty-one paraprofessionals were hired as security staff to serve as hall and door

monitors and help control traffic during the changing of classes. Eight off-duty policemen were hired on a part-time basis. Identification badges were issued to all school personnel and students. The principal said these kinds of security measures became essential during the height of the student activism period for a number of reasons but primarily because of the overcrowded situation in the school. Classes were held as early as 7 o'clock in the morning and as late as 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Another problem was more and more intruders coming into the school. The most serious problem, however, was the actual physical structure of the school with three floors and 22 exit doors. In addition to posting monitors on certain doors, it became necessary to lock other doors in order to keep intruders out of the school building. However, because of fire regulations, the school was unable to lock its doors from the inside.

PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

Overcrowded conditions plagued Roosevelt from the forties through the sixties. Fights and considerable afterschool vandalism occurred during this period. In the mid-1950's the building was enlarged to accommodate about 3,000 students. Prior to this expansion, the core building was essentially a square design with three floors, located on half of a city block. An extra wing was included on the southwest corner of the building for the physical education program. This wing housed two gymnasiums and the swimming pool. A courtyard was placed in the center of the core building with classrooms surrounding it. Today the courtyard is a kind of life science laboratory for the biology classes. When the building was expanded, classrooms and a third gymnasium were added on the southeast end. The present structure is a three-story rectangle extending one city block north and south and one-half block east and west. The principal and other administrators are located on the first floor of the original building; the library is on the second floor. The school has always had two student cafeterias, one on the first floor and one on the second floor. The dining area for staff members adjoins the second-floor cafeteria. With the exception of additional corridors, the addition to the building is similar to the original structure where classrooms and lockers are interspersed along the corridors. The principal views the structure of the school as a major security problem requiring extensive security personnel to help prevent intrusion from nonstudents. The problem is aggravated further, he said, because the school has no public address communication system.

The students complain that the high school does not have an athletic field or any grounds

where they can participate in outdoor activities. They imply that the lack of such facilities brings about undue loitering in the school building and on the streets outside the school. From all indications, the only recreational facility available to the community and to the school (with the exception of the three school gymnasiums and the indoor swimming pool) is a large public park located some distance from the school. In fact, since there is no athletic field at the school, football and track take place in the park. However, some of the elementary schools in this district have playgrounds and playground equipment for young children.

COMPOSITION AND SCHOOL CLIMATE

Roosevelt is characterized by the high-rise public housing units, built in the 1960's, which stretch for several miles on its south side extending east and west. This characterization became apparent when persons in the school (students, administrators, teachers, and custodians) and in the community were asked what proportion of students in the high school live in the housing complexes. The reply always fell in the 90% to 98% range, when, in fact, about 68% of the students registered at the high school live in these housing units. Today approximately 20,000 of the residents are minors, and more than 50% of the residents receive public assistance. Over the years, the percentage of students who live in the housing complexes and attend this particular high school was reported to have ranged from just above 68% to as low as 34%.

Enlarging the school building did not ease the crowded conditions in the 1950's. Toward the end of 1950, close to 4,000 students were enrolled. Relief in enrollment came when nonblack schools in the city began admitting black students. Reportedly, as enrollment in other schools became more open in general, many students in the district who scored high on standardized tests chose to attend vocational and technical schools. Today about 2,800 students are enrolled in the high school. It is felt that the enrollment has leveled off and will remain at around 3,000 students in the future. However, as several persons point out, the school now has the reputation of being overcrowded.

While the entire student body of the high school is black, the school staff is 35% white and 65% black. The principal is a white male who has been at the school since 1968 and has been a principal in this district for 15 years. Tenure in the school in terms of years of service among the black administrators, including the dean of men and dean of women, ranged from 10 to 23 years. A similar trend of long years of service was noted among the teachers, both black and white, and

among males and females. The most noted break in this trend was reported to have come about within the past few years because the city has been transferring teachers to acquire racial balance. However, the school was reported to have had a 15% to 20% white staff since it opened. Of the 138 members of the administrative and teaching staff (including the librarian, nurses, and social worker), 81 are female and 57 are male.

Most security measures started in the school in the late sixties are still in operation today. The only change noted was that the Board of Education hired only four part-time off-duty policemen in the fall of 1976. Budgetary constraints were given as the reason for this change.

It is interesting to note that the off-duty policemen working in the school work in the school district on their regular policing assignments and, therefore, are known to the students. The policemen said the students come to them for advice regarding a variety of matters. They said they feel the relationship they have with the students is extremely important with regard to school security; in some cases it is a major deterrent to vandalism. At least two police officers described this relationship as concerned, friendly, helpful, yet firm and consistent when it comes to law enforcement. One officer said, for example, a known vandalizer is apt to be reported to police. The full-time police officer presently at the school has been there since 1963.

It is the policy at Roosevelt that all incidents that take place on school premises be reported, regardless of how minor or how serious they might be. Teachers are expected to report students for disorderly conduct in the classrooms, the halls, the lunchrooms, or washrooms and for insubordination as well as more serious incidents. Discipline records are kept in the security office. Similarly, it is a policy that any incident that is a police matter is handled as such, e.g., smoking marijuana, assault, harassing or threatening a teacher or other school employee, and trespassing. Arrest reports are filed, and students are taken to the district police headquarters. Other incidents requiring disciplinary action are handled by the dean of men or dean of women, usually in consultation with parents.

The director of safety described the school's policies as a legalistic approach to law enforcement. He said some schools in the system have chosen to follow other methods. Some follow what is called the watchman approach where a great deal of discretion is exercised in handling a particular incident and the political ramifications are considered. Others follow a

service approach where the student breaking the law is taken to his parents. With the latter two approaches, an alternative to arrest is sought.

Nevertheless, the feeling in the high school is strong that the existing security measures have been successful and that they are necessary in order to maintain control and order in the school. It appears that the security system seems to be a positive connection between past events and what is happening in the school today. Similarly, the practice of strictly enforcing school policies probably also has a positive influence on student behavior in and around the school.

One spinoff of the overall security system, noted by the principal, was that he and other administrators were freed from a preoccupation with security and discipline and could devote more time and energy to educational programs. Curriculum reform was the first byproduct of the spinoff. In 1973, Roosevelt began operating on a new schedule known as the 45-15 Plan. Under this plan, school was open the year round. Students and teachers were divided into four groups. While teachers had the option of teaching all year in intervals of 45 days, students attended school for 45 days and were out for 15 days. All teaching units were revised to fit the 45-day span, and credit was given for work completed during this time frame. Certain minicourses were offered during the 15-day periods allowing students who needed the opportunity to do makeup work. Concurrently with the new plan, the school began developing and packaging new units of instruction with stated performance objectives based on the concept of "teaching by objectives." The principal expressed strong disappointment that only two instructional units (algebra and Greek mythology) were completed before financial constraints brought this activity to a halt and forced the school to return to the traditional school year. He asserted that in addition to bringing about changes in the curriculum, attendance and achievement went up under the 45-15 Plan. The decrease in the dropout rate, he contended, was a reversal of what was happening in the city and in the nation between 1973 and 1975.

The main criticism of the plan, other than expenses, was that it would hamper students in finding jobs. From all reports this was not the case. An ingenious group of students initiated a work project contacting potential employers (such as Sears, Montgomery Ward, and Burger King) and guaranteed them that jobs given to the students would be covered throughout the year by different students on alternate school schedules. This project was successfully implemented. Students, administrators, and teachers said they preferred the 45-15 Plan and were disappointed when it was dropped.

A unique feature of Roosevelt is the location of the entire administrative staff of the district in one section of the school building. In particular, a number of persons suggested that the presence of the district superintendent, who is an alumnus of the school, has had an obvious impact on the students. Stressing self-respect and respect for others, the dress code drawn up by the district office, for example, appears to be judiciously adhered to by the students.

Speaking about some of the depressed, deteriorating conditions in the neighborhood around the school, a parent representative stressed that a "watchful eye" is most essential in preventing violence and vandalism. He described a "watchful eye" as concerned persons keeping an eye on children and youth in the community. He saw a strong relationship between the community and the school as the key for bringing about this kind of watchful situation; the involvement of citizens living and working in the community with school activities and with students brings about this relationship. For example, having ministers, parents, and agency or business representatives serve on the local school advisory council, speak, and/or do volunteer work in the school greatly facilitates this relationship. He also mentioned that a visit by a group of concerned parents to the homes of students who cause problems in school is often a deterrent to further troubles, even when the parents are not really welcomed into the home. Within the school, he noted that a good relationship between students and teachers and other school personnel is the key. He emphasized that such a relationship must be underscored with respect and that among teachers and administrators there must be strong leadership.

Both the director of safety and the supervising engineer for the city school system expressed strong opinions regarding the physical environment of a school as a deterrent to violence and vandalism. For example, the safety director commented that broken school windows that are not repaired or replaced over an extended period of time help create an undesirable atmosphere in and around the school. If these environmental conditions could be remedied immediately, he continued, then one could expect respect for the environment and for property. Furthermore, he said one could exert greater authority in demanding respect. Repairing broken windows and removing graffiti from walls and doors were mentioned by the engineer as ways of "staying ahead" of violence and vandalism. According to him, in recent years this method of staying ahead has been practiced at the school.

Interestingly, a group of senior students also mentioned the sight of graffiti, broken plumbing

in the washrooms, broken water fountains, and broken windows as undesirable for their school environment. In spite of the students' comments, at the time of this study no graffiti were found on the walls in the halls or on the bathroom walls. The doors left in the bathrooms, however, showed a history of graffiti as they had all been cut on. Few, if any, broken windows were in evidence about the school. In an attempt to stay ahead of vandalism, the school system began to use Lexan, a tempered plastic in windows. A couple of water fountains were broken as was some plumbing in at least one male washroom. The engineer acknowledged that the plumbing was in need of repairs. He pointed out, however, that because of the expense involved in repairing plumbing, repairs were put off until plans to rehabilitate the entire building were settled. Although talk about rehabilitation began 4 years ago, the rehabilitation program is expected to start in April 1977.

CURRENT PROBLEMS AT ROOSEVELT

The picture with regard to violence and vandalism at this school seems to have changed over the past several years. At present, the most serious problem is truancy with freshmen and sophomores. Freshmen and sophomore students were also considered to be involved in most disruptions that take place in the school such as fights or altercations with teachers. When asked why this seems to be the case, most teachers and students tended to agree that "freshies" usually have to assert themselves. They are viewed as less serious about school, so they cut classes and roam around the halls. It was emphasized, however, that disruptions in classes and in the halls and truancy involve a few students who tend to be repeaters. Many of the students involved are regarded as poor readers, and many were involved in school disruptions before coming to the high school. Some of those who have a history of involvement in school disruptions are also said to have parents who lost control of them in the early elementary grades and tend to drop out of school when they reach 16.

A look at the dropout rate at this high school is quite revealing, especially when the number of 9th graders enrolling is compared with the number of seniors. Over the past 3 years, approximately 1,000 freshmen registered in the school each year. By grade 11, about half of these students have dropped out. Only 350 seniors were in the graduating class of 1977. However, it was suggested that students who move out of public housing and out of this highly concentrated community of low-income people account for some drop in enrollment in the upper grades.

Keeping nonstudents out of the school was the second major problem mentioned. Most nonstudents were described as dropouts or male students between the ages of 18 and 23. Although this situation appeared to be under control, it was considered to demand constant security attention. The problem of intrusion by nonstudents reportedly becomes more acute during games and other special events. During these special events, the increase in locker theft is also marked. To help prevent theft, portions of the school building are locked off with metal gates after school, and more areas are locked whenever a special event takes place. As discussed earlier, to help keep intruders out during school hours, the security staff is extensive, and all school staff and students are required to wear a name tag at all times with his or her picture on it.

Locker theft is listed as the third most serious problem at Roosevelt today. It is a problem because the thief is seldom apprehended, according to the assistant principal in charge of security. "Hot items" such as wallets, purses, rings, watches, and leather jackets are usually taken from the lockers. Yet it is not really unusual, she noted, for coats or books to be taken as well. Locker theft is handled as a police matter by the school, and a student is expelled for a period of time.

Although truancy, intruders, and locker theft were reported as the most serious problems the high school has to deal with today, most respondents tended to agree with a student who said, "We have our share of typical school problems." They also agreed with the principal and others who said, "We have incidents here." Fights, for example, were regarded as typical, and they were reported to occur on a fairly regular basis. As long as no weapons are involved, fights are handled by the dean of men or dean of women, usually in consultation with parents. Disciplinary actions resulting from fights range from suspensions to transfers, and parents must always accompany the student when he or she returns to class. If any weapon is involved in a fight or a quarrel (e.g., chains, hammers, steel pipes, rubber hoses, scissors, knives), whether used or not, the incident is handled as a police matter.

A few weeks prior to our visit to this school, a female sophomore cut a male sophomore in the face with a kitchen knife. Another girl who was standing by tried to stop the fight and was cut on the arm. It was reported that the argument between the girl and boy started during the weekend at a party. According to all reports, this was the first "cutting" incident in the school in more than 4 years.

Almost everyone interviewed prefaced their remarks with, "In spite of the reputation the

school seems to have or had had," as they insisted that today the problem with violence and vandalism is not serious. This was the impression given while moving around the school observing and talking with various persons. Although the building exterior shows its age, the interior is clean and well maintained, attractive in terms of bulletin boards and the variety of pastel paints used on the walls. The halls are fairly bright, not withstanding the out-of-date lighting that was pointed out by the custodial engineer as he talked about the upcoming rehabilitation. Given the crowds of students in the halls during the changing of classes, the halls were remarkably clear about 10 minutes after classes started. The teachers and administrators on hall duty seemed to take their task seriously as they moved about inquiring why a student was in the hall and where he or she was going. When we did hall duty with one of the deans, the washrooms on every floor were visited and cleared of the two or three students there.

During any given period of the school day, a large number of students stood along the street in front of the school, sat along the outside steps, or congregated in small groups in the two parking lots located on the sides of the school. The principal gave three primary reasons for these gatherings: first, students come to school in shifts either the first, second, third, or fourth periods; second, they are dismissed in shifts; and third, the city has a policy that permits students to go home for lunch and return to school for the remaining classes. There are four lunch periods during the school-day, and some students go outside during the lunch break. It should be noted that throughout our visits the students who were outside the school, for whatever reasons, were orderly and quiet. Several persons reported that students smoke marijuana and drink wine and beer, particularly outside of the building. Inside the school, they said some evidence of these activities can be found in the washrooms, especially during the winter.

CONCLUSION

Unanimously, respondents commented that violence and vandalism are not as bad today as was the case in the late sixties and early seventies, and that the school is not as bad as its past reputation would have one believe. One of the counselors put it this way: "This school is no worse than any other school in this system and lots better off than many." He said hard drugs have never been a problem (adding that the students simply cannot afford them), and there has never been an arson. Most of the students are responsive to anyone who takes a genuine interest in them, but teachers and other school staff must take control of situations early and establish

themselves, he said. Agreeing with comments made by several teachers, he said some students will always take advantage of teachers who do not have control although they are responsive and "toe the line" in other teachers' classes and in other situations. Most teachers and administrators remarked that, for the most part, teachers who have difficulties are those who have not established themselves, who have not taken a firm stand. "Or," as the counselor quipped, "they have made the wrong response at the wrong time with the wrong people." Some teachers and administrators said they had been involved in incidents with students but felt they helped to bring about the situations by a negative or inappropriate action. For example, the principal cited an incident he was involved in last fall during a fire drill. He approached a male student who was fairly new to the school and directed him to go down a particular set of stairs. He came up behind the young man and grabbed him by the arm. The young man turned and hit the principal in the eye, breaking his glasses and bruising his face around the eye. One of the teachers who has taught in this school for 10 years best summarized the way the principal talked about this incident in retrospect. She said, "Many of the students in our school are streetwise; therefore, it is almost a common law around here that you don't put your hands on the students. (If you do) invariably this brings about a negative response."

It was agreed that Roosevelt has the reputation for having a high degree of violence and vandalism that goes back to the 1940's. Many feel that this reputation is unwarranted, that it is the result of extensive front-page coverage which a local paper gave to a few incidents that occurred intermittently during the school's first 10 years. It was also pointed out that there seemed to be more violence in the school when society at large was also experiencing a crisis, such as the Civil Rights Movement of the sixties.

Two other factors appear to be associated with the school's reputation. First is its location in a black community. As the community changed over the years, becoming the lowest income area in the city, it also became the highest crime area. In addition, there was a great deal of gang warfare. With the increase in violence in the public housing complexes built across from the school, more and more violence seemed to be associated with the school.

The second factor is the way incidents are handled at Roosevelt and in the surrounding community, that is, the legalistic approach. Apparently, many incidents that result in suspensions are also police matters and arrests are made. Students and other school personnel are urged to press charges. Whether handled by the

police or not, all incidents become a matter of school record.

Agreement was unanimous that the sixties, in particular, was a most troublesome period at the high school. One of the main problems cited was nonstudents coming to the school. They were said to instigate incidents as well as to be involved frequently. There were assaults against teachers, and much of the time of administrators and teachers was spent settling disruptions or trying to maintain control.

The school also has a history of being overcrowded. Although the building is quite large, it has many cross corridors and exit doors. Therefore, with the combination of crowded

conditions, the physical structure, and intruders coming into the school, security problems have been serious. Today enrollment is down to building capacity (about 2,800 students). It is felt, however, that the security staff (i.e., policemen, security guards, and aides) are needed to monitor doors and halls and to help maintain a relatively safe school. Changes from a rather disruptive environment where many incidents occurred daily to a rather stable situation are attributed first to the presence of an extensive security staff and second to the fact that the school has firm policies regarding student conduct that are strictly enforced. The principal said fewer problems exist in the school today in spite of crime and violence in the local community.



SOUTHWESTERN HIGH SCHOOL

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

Southwestern High School is surrounded by a predominantly black neighborhood that developed during the 1960's as a result of white "flight" from the inner city. At one time, the neighborhood was more diverse with the blocks east of the high school being characteristically white, upper-middle class. Today these large homes are occupied almost exclusively by black families. There is one white neighborhood that traditionally was, and currently is, served by the school. The remainder of the white students are bused to achieve racial balance in the school.

The school, while not having an open campus (due to what is argued to be "supervision problems") makes its grounds (basketball and tennis courts, practice fields, and track) available to the community, and reportedly the neighborhood does avail itself of the opportunity. Previously, the school was said to have problems with outsiders coming into the school during the day, but this problem is now significantly reduced. Nevertheless, the neighborhood is believed to have a high level of theft and, to some extent, violence.

The city has approximately 200,000 inhabitants, and has a tradition of supporting its public schools. A local newspaper supported voluntary desegregation efforts by the district, even though opposition by some citizens and political figures resulted in its receiving national media coverage of resistance to school desegregation. All in all, however, desegregation was seen by business leaders and others as pragmatic, and the school system was "positive" in its dealing with desegregation efforts.

In general, the city is considered progressive in tone and has elected school board members who responded to desegregation orders with the tone of "let's make this the best school year possible for our students." While there is considerable housing segregation by race in the city, recently wealthy whites have begun to buy and restore the larger older homes in the inner city. Blacks and whites attribute this to a progressive stance of the community towards race relations.

THE TRANSITION OF ADMINISTRATION

Most of the faculty at Southwestern report that the school was in difficulty prior to the arrival of the present principal and the establishment of new programs. While few of the teachers would contend that the school was out of control or had a crime problem, they describe the last few years under the former principal as chaotic with increasing evidence of potential for violence and vandalism in the school. The principal was heavily involved in community activities and was frequently out of the building. The school itself was no longer the "clean and tidy" building it once was. Teacher morale was low, and student behavior had deteriorated to where discipline problems were becoming common, as was infiltration of the school by nonstudents. As a result, said one former teacher, "it had reached the point that many people were afraid to send their children there" and many teachers feared for their safety. While it must be noted that this former teacher is a close friend of the current principal, she explained that a lack of strong leadership by the previous principal was responsible, and that the current principal does provide strong leadership. Most teachers concur with this reasoning.

The transition to the new administration began with the death of the previous principal in the spring of 1973. The Director of Secondary Education for the district served as the interim principal for the remainder of that year. During that time, the district asked the faculty what they would like to do in the school. The faculty recommended that a Referral for Counseling (RFC) Center be established to "defuse" classroom problems while quickly getting the students back into the classroom. Secondly, they recommended that campus supervisors be employed, but insisted that the supervisors should be able to relate well with students and not be "police types."

At about the same time, a fatal shooting in one of the local junior high schools resulted in a public education program by the district to "let the public know that the schools couldn't operate without community support." The district printed a rights and responsibilities brochure for students and undertook a training program aimed at reconvincing teachers of their capabilities in working with students. They also encouraged

school pride programs which "caught on" at Southwestern High School. The district promoted a "team concept" that they argued resulted in teachers taking increasing responsibility for discipline. Further, the district became more concerned about student participation in decision-making, and today the presidents of the student councils in the three district high schools have the right to sit in the school board meetings with full discussion privileges, but without voting power. Finally, the district and the local police began to cooperate more in the handling of criminal cases. Now a Police Crime Prevention Department is responsible for school crime problems. The principal calls that department directly, and the officer responsible for that school will come to the school or arrange for a substitute. In this way, the school seems to retain its authority while enabling the police to have knowledge of the incident in order to reduce concern and to back up school officials, as necessary. Also, victims are encouraged by the school to prosecute offenders, and this is believed to have led to a reduction in violence and vandalism.

THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

Southwestern High School is an imposing structure, shaped as half a decagon with the center side being twice in the length of the other four sides. From the front of the building, it appears to have three levels with stairways that lead to the main entrance on the second story. In actuality, the building has four additional levels: one above the third floor and three below the first floor. Located behind the main building which faces east are the library and the gymnasium, each of which are separate structures and were built some years later than the original building, which is now 50 years old.

The remainder of the school grounds behind the library and gymnasium are situated in two tiers. The first tier has outdoor courts for tennis and basketball, baseball and football practice fields, and a track. The second tier is the stadium, a large structure with seating formed from concrete. The walls vary from about 10 feet in height at the side nearest the practice fields to 40 feet on the street that demarks the western edge of the school grounds. In all, the grounds cover what otherwise would have been two city blocks.

The school doors are kept locked when school is not in session. Both before and after school, only one entrance is unlocked. The gymnasium remains locked throughout the day. Entrance and exit doors are unlocked only between classes, and the locker rooms are unlocked only for student dressing and undressing.

During the class periods, the locker rooms are locked.

SCHOOL COMPOSITION AND CLIMATE

Southwestern High School today seems to have an open and pleasant climate. The students move easily about the buildings, and smiles on student faces are frequent. Blacks and whites of the student body, who comprise 51% and 49%, respectively, mix freely in the halls, singly, or in pairs. The students, in fact, are proud of their school and their principal, who they believe is responsible for ensuring the pleasant climate and the comfortable "racial tone" of the school. They feel the school provides a quality education for its 2,100 students. In fact, the editor of the student newspaper reports that she must struggle to find issues for her weekly editorial. She argues that the students are "not oppressed" at Southwestern High School, and thus there is little to fight for that is not unreasonable or absurd. She seems to accept the boundaries placed upon the student role as "reasonable," and therefore not oppressive. Further, students tend to feel that Southwestern is "their" school, regardless of the various group identifications. They argue that the school, despite its size, provides opportunities to which most students can relate. There is the band, the Reserve Officers Training Corps, athletics, the half-day vocational school programs, the various cooperative education programs, and many other activities. Importantly, the students believe that the school fosters commitment to its rules and procedures. This commitment seems to be well articulated and, when asked, teachers and students were unable to identify "factions" of student opinion, behavior, and action other than in terms of the school-promoted organizations mentioned above.

The teachers seem similarly content, and some even enthusiastic, about working at Southwestern. They have a strong teacher organization and a professionally negotiated contract. They are obviously proud of the success Southwestern has had in implementing desegregation. Talk of the efforts and the positive working of the students, staff, and community permeated many of the interviews, even with the constant reminder that the study was about school violence and vandalism.

The faculty, like the students, have high regard for their principal. Most of them have been at the school for a number of years, and teacher turnover is quite low. The faculty believe the principal brought order to a school headed for serious trouble. He is deemed responsible for the

improved "harmony between the races," and the safe, pleasant atmosphere of the school. Some also attribute to him an improved academic program, pointing out that white parents are no longer as reluctant to enroll their children in the school as they were when the school was first desegregated. They also report that there are no dissenting "factions" among the teachers of whom 77 are white and 47 black. Interestingly, the manner in which faculty meetings are conducted may also mitigate against the development of factions among the faculty. Faculty meetings are held during the day and during each period, so that teachers can attend the meetings during their "free" or preparation period. Therefore, the faculty meets in six separate shifts, which obviously makes informal faculty organization around an issue difficult.

Also, the teachers are more or less content about the level of funding of the school (per-pupil expenditure is \$949.39) and the size of classrooms (the professional staff-pupil ratio is 1:22).

THE ADMINISTRATION

The administrative staff consists of one principal who is black, four vice-principals of whom three are white and one is black, two campus supervisors, one registrar, one nurse, three counselors, one social worker, and custodial, cafeteria, and clerical support staff. The principal believes the administration is "adequately" staffed at this level.

The principal has established an administrative climate that is characteristically thought to be "firm and fair." Discipline is a major issue in school and it is "expected" to be maintained. It was argued that "preventive discipline" is practiced whereby incidents are quelled before they come to the surface. As one teacher rather dramatically put it: "if a student looks crosseyed at a teacher or another student, the incident will be responded to immediately by the staff."

Three of the four vice-principals are the contact points through which discipline is meted out to students. Each of these vice-principals is assigned to one of the three grades in the high school and is responsible for that class throughout their years at Southwestern. Since corporal punishment is not administered, discipline consists mainly of parent, student, teacher and administrator conferences, and suspensions (70 students were suspended in the fall semester 1976). The fourth vice-principal is assigned to "system maintenance" and thus has a minimal role in discipline. All vice-principals are expected to monitor the halls between classes and during lunch periods. Like the campus supervisors who

continuously patrol the grounds, parking lots, and buildings, each vice-principal carries a walkie-talkie that enables continuous communication with the others and with the principal, who has the base system in his office.

The two male campus supervisors (one black and one white) are responsible for the security of grounds and buildings. Primarily, their assigned tasks are to see that students are not in the halls without a pass during class periods, to prompt students with passes to proceed to their destinations, to keep unauthorized visitors out of the school, and to stop loitering in the parking lots. They are not, by design, supposed to be perceived as policemen or security personnel. They do not wear uniforms or carry any "weapons" (other than walkie-talkies). The campus supervisors were selected for their ability to relate well with the students while enforcing the rules, both of which they do observably well.

The counselors at the school are responsible for personal, academic, and career counseling, and play a supportive role in discipline. By policy, they are not to administer discipline. The social worker, however, has a more direct role in discipline. Aside from enabling referrals to community social service agencies and providing individual counseling upon request of the student, the social worker is a key component in enforcing the attendance policy. The policy is that nonattendance of 15 or more days in any semester, excused or unexcused, will result in the student being dropped from the rolls for that semester. The principal sends a letter to the parents explaining the attendance policy and asks the parent to contact the school by telephone or in person after a student has missed 5 days of school. Upon the accumulation of 10 days of absence, the school social worker delivers a letter to the parents from the principal and requests a parent-student-principal conference. At this time, the social worker will also make his services available to the family. Finally, after 15 days of nonattendance, the student is dropped from the rolls for the semester.

The social worker is also responsible for the Referral for Counseling (RFC) room, which he and an aide staff. This is the room where a student is referred by a teacher for minor disciplinary and academic problems. The student is sent there for counseling, remediation, and for "time-out," a "cooling off" period which was said to be needed for both student and teacher. The student is returned to the class the next day, although the RFC room can develop a program for him outside of class periods.

Generally, the parents, black and white, are avid supporters of the school. However, the

Parent-Teacher-Student-Association (PTSA) seems to involve only about 10% of parents, and assessments of its relative "activity" vary. Yet the Student Council reports that for specific tasks, such as needs for transportation, the PTSA can be counted on to deliver. Parental support is uneven, however, across racial and economic lines. The poor and black parents, whose children comprise approximately 45% of the school population, are usually involved with the school only when their children are "in trouble" behaviorally or academically. The school social worker reports that the attitude of these parents who have troublesome children is "not cooperative." He reports that they believe "that school is supposed to take the child and the child's mind, and mold it to fit into society." They believe, he says, that it is the school's job to do this and if the school is unsuccessful, the parents should not be called upon for support. H. describes their approach as: "Do what you want with him, I've done all I can." Generally, however, he says the reception by parents is "pretty good."

Parents also report that the academic program at Southwestern is tops and still improving. Approximately 50% of the students go on to college, mostly to within-State liberal arts colleges and universities, and "stay in pretty well." The Director of the Counseling Department reported that her own informal follow-up showed that both black and white Southwestern graduates were successfully negotiating college.

Factions along racial or other lines at the school do not seem to exist. One teacher noted that parents are likely to cooperate with the school when they feel their child is being treated fairly, and that student access to the principal seems to connote such fair treatment. Further, the school's Discipline Committee is composed of influential white and black parents. Thus, resistance by the influential is lessened by involving those parents in policymaking.

VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM

Today, violence and vandalism are not serious problems at Southwestern High School. The major vandalism, theft, and violence incidents that have occurred are attributed not to students but to nonstudents who have entered the school either with mischievous intent or as a "spillover" from events occurring in the community. This "spillover" either takes the form of continuing the outside incident or of outsiders seeking retaliation against a student during the school days.

Most informants felt that the problem of violence and vandalism was worse in the past.

They implied that this was due to the newness of desegregation and was a product of the times. Now, however, "these kids have grown up together." Even the principal believes that the school has no control over the major factors in a violence/vandalism problem. This belief persists among the faculty also, though they attribute the turnaround in the general school situation to the principal. Thus it seems that they believe the best the school can do is to manage the problem of violence and vandalism by: (1) responding to incidents quickly and rather severely, (2) extensively supervising the entire grounds of the school, and (3) fostering the commitment of the students via participation in decisionmaking.

This program, however, has not completely eliminated the problems of violence or vandalism. Serious incidents still occur. Students, on occasion, bring weapons to school, which may or may not result in a fight. Recently, one of the "piss-cutters" (most troublesome students) used a "box-cutter" in a fight in the student parking lot. He was suspended, as is automatic for anyone carrying or using a weapon, and the victim was encouraged to prosecute. There are other fights, of course, but usually they end after a brief exchange of punches or hair-pulling. These incidents often are dealt with by assigning the students to "early study hall" and by convening a parent conference.

The usual theft reportedly involves unattended, small items that are readily sold for cash. For example, an unattended purse was recently stolen from one female student. The "insides" of the purse, including credit cards, were later found in one of the restrooms. However, the money and the purse itself were taken. Locker theft was more usual when books had to be privately purchased, and when key padlocks were used on the locker doors. Now with state-owned books and combination locks in the locker doors, locker theft has decreased significantly. Recently, however, one of the school's books of locker combinations was stolen. One of the offenders was quickly caught with some of the pages of the locker combinations while breaking into a locker. He was suspended for a few days, and the locker occupant was encouraged to prosecute him. All in all, however, theft appears amateur in character with some "fencing" of C.B. radios and tape decks reported. Respondents maintained, however, that a shirt or similar item could be left out almost indefinitely without being taken.

Vandalism seldom occurs at Southwestern. This is usually attributed to the good repair and upkeep of the school. The principal is of the opinion that an unclean building invites disrespect. Therefore, the custodial staff constantly clean the

halls, teachers and administrators pick up paper from the floor, and the Student Council has been actively promoting the School Cleanliness Contest which Southwestern has won 3 out of the last 4 months. Vandalism does occur in restrooms, however, and some of it is potentially serious. Aside from graffiti, one of the campus supervisors reports that in the men's restrooms the "favorite habits" are setting the wastepaper cans on fire and urinating on toilet rolls (sometimes followed with attempts to burn them). Even with these potentially dangerous incidents of arson, the campus supervisors interpret the major problems to be "philosophical," which lead a student to question the right of a school official to enforce compliance with the rules or administer discipline.

Alcohol and drug use are continuing problems at Southwestern. Alcohol is most commonly used, with marijuana in second place. Other drugs seem available, but it is felt that their usage is minimal when compared with alcohol and marijuana. Intriguingly, the administrative staff are of the opinion that alcohol usage may lead to disruptive behavior, but that marijuana usage does not. They maintain that a student can "turn-off" the marijuana effects when necessary, but cannot do so with alcohol.

THE CHARACTER OF ADMINISTRATION

The organization and character of the school, especially in disciplinary matters, is a direct reflection of the authority of the principal, although many of the programs were instituted at the suggestion of teachers or as a result of the City School District initiatives. The principal is uniformly strict in rule enforcement; he will call anyone "on the carpet." Upon arrival at the school, he began enforcing the hours negotiated in the teachers' contract. Those who left early or arrived late received, in his words, "nasty notes" about their leaving early or arriving late.

Students are also subject to strict rule enforcement. Disciplinary violations result in referral to the RFC room or the appropriate vice-principal, depending on the type of the offense. While students are referred to the RFC room for minor infractions within the classroom, attitude problems as well as developing conduct problems will result in referral to the RFC room. Major infractions (insubordination, fighting, truancy, drinking, possession of weapons, gambling, theft, drugs, threatening or striking another person, extortion, forgery, vandalism, threatening and disruptive profanity, and molesting and overt disruption of the classroom) result in a "referral" to the vice-principal. Students of one race occasionally accuse students of another race of

"being out to get them." But it is the practice of the administration not to permit such racial attributions. If a student attributes an offense to "the blacks" when in conference with a vice-principal, it was reported that he/she would be "jumped on." That is, the student would be informed of the inappropriateness of the racial attribution, and would be pressed to identify more precisely the offender(s) by name(s) and/or description(s). Here again, the victim is encouraged to prosecute the offender.

Even with his strict discipline, the principal has been charged by some teachers with being overly student oriented and "on their side." This results from a combination of practices. First, he actively seeks student participation in decision-making. As a result, students are represented on all school committees except the "Building Committee" which is the professional teacher organization committee. The Student Council officers also make up the "Principal's Cabinet" with whom he meets weekly to discuss school occurrences, policies, and procedures. Second, his access to students seemingly overrides all other business of the school. He maintains that if a student wished to talk with him in his office, he would interrupt an ongoing conference to talk with him. Student access to him is facilitated by his rarely leaving the grounds, and by his being in the halls as much as possible. Third, in the case of major infractions and, particularly with criminal violations, he insists on proof of the offense before suspending a student. While he might call for a parent conference, he will not suspend a student without evidence or witnesses beyond the testimony of the person referring the student for action for a major infraction.

In short, the principal is characterized by one administrator to be "extremely fair and extremely firm." One vice-principal indicated that they keep "idiot rules" to a minimum, but enforce existing rules relentlessly. Even this is tempered, however, by an advisory policy review mechanism, the Discipline Committee, which meets monthly to review the handling of discipline cases and suggests new, or modifications in old, policy. In any case, Southwestern High School "entertains democracy," as one teacher put it, and engages in "preventive discipline" by responding quickly and "perhaps severely" to potential as well as actual infractions. The net of participation and the net of enforcement are both quite wide.

By and large, students, teachers, and parents all seem to believe that the level of school violence and vandalism at Southwestern and that other forces besides the school must be involved to explain the current problems elsewhere. They do believe, however, that the school itself is responsible for controlling potential discipline

problems. First and foremost, the current principal's "extremely firm but extremely fair" orientation by which the various constituents are represented in rule-making and through which the rules are enforced firmly for all school participants is believed to be responsible for the reduction of previous problems. Second, it appears that the participants believe that his increased access to everyone, particularly students, enables problems to be quickly identified and handled." Third, it is believed that a clean, well-kept plant not only discourages vandalism, but sets a better "tone" for the school. Fourth, it is believed that a balance has been achieved whereby "supervision but not surveillance" has reduced incidents. Even the students see the walkie-talkies as humorous or as a game to beat. Fifth, the RFC room is believed to have "defused" many potential problems before they worsened. The school district was so impressed by Southwestern's

success with the RFC program that RFC rooms have been placed in all high schools. Sixth, the teachers' enthusiastic cooperation in all these attempts, and particularly in enforcing discipline within the classroom, is considered to be a central component in reducing the potential for violence and vandalism. Seventh, good cooperative relations with the courts and police is believed to have done a lot to deter potential offenders. Many teachers and administrators believed that students today are more tolerant of each other, and when given a role in decision-making will behave responsibly. One vice-principal noted: "Schools are not going to the dogs, they're just changing" and "Schools are much better now than 5 years ago because people recognize things are changing." They believe that as experience with desegregation increases, racial tension will ease and school environment will improve. Optimism pervades the school.

WAYNE SEVENTH GRADE CENTER

COMMUNITY SETTING AND HISTORY

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of this rather large, sprawling, urban, school system is busing. Busing to achieve racial balance seems to have permeated every aspect of school life in this system. It is so pervasive that as persons interviewed talked about the schools, they used busing as a historical marker, describing occurrences or conditions as "before busing" and "after busing." The population figure reflected in the schools at faculty and student levels is 70% white and 30% black.

Seventh-grade centers, that is, a single school building housing only a 7th-grade student body, were established by this school system under a court-order desegregation plan in 1972. These centers, for the most part, are located in black communities in what were formerly black junior and senior high schools, and white students are bused to the centers to achieve racial balance. Unless a student fails the year and must repeat, he or she would normally spend only 1 year at Wayne. The Wayne Seventh Grade Center is located in a school that first opened in January 1952 as a black senior high school. In the fall of that same year, the school reopened as a junior high and remained a junior high until 1972 when it was desegregated and made a 7th grade center.

For 16 of the years Wayne served as a junior high (7th through 9th grades), it had one principal. During those years, it had a good reputation and ranked among the better schools in the system. It was said that other black students envied those who attended this school. Much of the school's strong reputation at that time was attributed to its principal, Mr. Horn. He was remembered as a dynamic, innovative leader who believed in exposing students to a variety of programmatic experiences in classes, assemblies, clubs, and other afterschool activities. For example, orchestra classes were added to the music program as an elective. He was referred to repeatedly as "a well-respected scholar and educator who did things his way." "He commanded the respect of students and teachers," was a frequently heard phrase. Several persons related how he had the ability to get good work from teachers who had been considered not so good. Due to retire in 1970, this principal was

granted a request to remain head of the school during its first year of faculty desegregation (1970-71) and the following year when the student body was desegregated. Both transitions were reported to have been "extremely smooth."

Violence or vandalism problems appear not to have been serious through the school's history, including these transitional years. This fact stands in stark contrast to what was happening in many other schools in the system, especially during the first several years of desegregation. Two teachers, who have been on the faculty since the school opened, remarked that the students had occasional fights. However, more often than not, if there were any fights, they took place after school hours in the community. Respondents also remembered at least two different periods of time when the school had a "rough group of boys" who were involved in whatever disturbances there were and who bullied other students. "Mr. Horn stayed right on top of these boys," said one teacher. "He worked closely with their parents until the boys left the school."

In contrast to the school, the neighborhood surrounding it has remained black. The economic status of the residents, however, has been changing gradually over the past decade. For example, when the school was built the neighborhood was well established; most of its residents were professional persons living in small single family homes. Many of these persons are now retired. Some still live in the neighborhood while others have left, and their homes have become rental property. Younger professionals, on the other hand, began moving into other areas throughout the county, usually to larger homes. Today the neighborhood is viewed as transitory although some older retired residents have remained. Other changes noted were:

- More and more younger people are moving in, and only a few are professionals.
- Professional families tend to move out of the neighborhood within 2 or 3 years.
- Generally, a great deal more moving into and away from the community is occurring than was customary in the past.

Despite these changes, the small homes and lots appear to be well kept. The most noticeable physical change was the sprinkling of two- and four-family units built on small lots on some streets.

Adjacent neighborhoods appeared to be more or less similar, i.e., to have a mixture of low and moderate income groups. A couple of them, although somewhat distant from the school, were obviously low-income. No public housing units are located anywhere near the school.

The two outlying attendance areas from which the center draws its student body are predominantly low-income white communities. Along with the admixture of types of housing (e.g., small framed homes, duplexes, and small apartments), at least one relatively large public housing complex can be found in each area. In addition, a fair number of students in the school live on military bases. Therefore, students are bused into Wayne from as much as 15 to 20 miles away. Only black students who live in the immediate neighborhood walk to school. It was indicated that because of the extensive busing plan at all grade levels, in this school system by the time a student reaches 7th grade he is attending his third or fourth school.

PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

The basic structure of the school is a two-story elongated building consisting of 39 classrooms. Two long corridors run the length of the building. Exits are located in the center of the building at two sides. The principal's office and a conference room are on the first floor to the left of the entrance foyer. Offices for the assistant principal (who is also the dean of boys) and the dean of women (with a first aid center) are located to the right of the foyer diagonally across from each other. There are three sets of stairs: one in the middle of the building leading off the foyer and one at each end.

In the back of the first floor area, breezeways lead to the cafeteria and library, the industrial arts area, and the music suites. The gymnasium is located to the right of the main building and connected by a breezeway. Attractive shrubbery adorns all sides of the fairly modern building. Overall, the school is bright, colorful, and extremely well kept inside as well as outside.

In addition to racial mixing, a number of physical changes were noted as having come about in the school along with desegregation. As examples, breezeways leading to the gymnasium, cafeteria, and music buildings were paved; the

lighting system was completely overhauled and large fluorescent lights installed; an additional water fountain was placed on each floor; gates were added to both ends of the street that runs between the school buildings and the athletic field that belongs to a 2-year college in the neighborhood. The field is used by the center until 4:40 p.m. daily in exchange for the college's use of the gymnasium. The gates are locked by the night custodian and reopened each morning in time for school buses to enter.

SCHOOL COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION, AND CLIMATE

An average of 1,300 students a year were enrolled in the junior high school prior to desegregation. Total student enrollment for Wayne has remained just above 1,000. During 1976-77, approximately 1,047 students are enrolled, of whom 550 are boys.

The professional staff consists of 56 persons: 5 administrators (1 white); specialists who deal with students on a one-to-one or small-group basis—2 guidance counselors (1 white), 3 special-education teachers (all white), and a media specialist and an In-school Suspension (ISS) teacher (both black); and 44 teachers. The racial breakdown among teachers and students is 70% white and 30% black. Teacher/pupil ratio is reported to be about 1 to 25. The current principal, Mr. Paylor, like his four predecessors, is a black male.

In a self-study report being submitted towards accreditation, the school characterized the majority of its students as coming from low-socioeconomic conditions. The report also revealed that there is a great deal of transiency in the school attendance areas. It attributed this to the influence of military families in the community and to family circumstances as divorce or separation and frequent moves in search of jobs.

Further, the report noted the large proportion of students (about 45%) who fall below grade level in basic academic skills. Since this point was mentioned frequently by the teachers we interviewed, we asked the principal if the school had any programs that dealt with the problem. He proudly described the language arts program in which student assignment is based on reading levels. Including the advanced level for students reading at 10th grade and above, the five levels are: basic communication skills (for those reading below 3d grade level), remedial (3d and 4th grades), basic standard (5th - 7th grades), and high standard (8th - 9th grades). In addition, the school employs two reading teachers full time,

and students reading below 7th grade level are enrolled in reading class. He also talked about the "one on one" tutorial program using parent and community volunteers.

Discussing economic and social conditions in the various communities sending students to Wayne, a number of persons commented about the potential such conditions could have for encouraging vandalism and juvenile delinquency. For instance, a community representative, who also works for Neighborhood Improvement Operations (a Housing and Urban Development agency), said this potential becomes especially alarming when it is considered in light of increased drug traffic that is moving into some neighborhoods and given the high unemployment rate in this county in general. A youth education worker made the same point but added that high dropout rate among younger students as a third alarming situation. Both men asserted that these situations pose a serious threat to students because too often they involve people whom students know and sometimes with whom they identify. The school, therefore, has a special responsibility—along with parents, they contended—to make students keenly aware of the consequences of such situations.

Perhaps also aware of this potential, the principal talked about the importance of "involvement and participation" as a major deterrent to violence and vandalism in a school. He said, "Keeping students involved in regular academics, in clubs and other programs during school and in extracurricular programs after school becomes a constructive channel for student interest and energy." Although this is his 1st year as principal of this center, he gave us examples of how he put this belief into practice this year.

First, he changed the lunch-study period to a regular class period which runs 90 minutes. Each teacher is assigned a group number. Group I teachers are required to escort their classes to the cafeteria between 11:39 and 12:13; group II teachers, between 12:09 and 12:37; and group III teachers, between 12:43 and 1:10. Approximately 30 minutes are allowed for lunch as well as travel to and from the cafeteria. Immediately following lunch, students and teachers return to class for the remainder of the long period, except in the case of group III. Apparently this change made a significant difference in terms of controlling student movement and reducing the number of referrals to the deans for such infractions as cutting study period, disturbing other classes in session, and roaming the halls. Several teachers mentioned these as "more common" among the deplorable things students once did during the lunch break. They commended the change as a way of minimizing idle time.

Second, the principal instituted a rotating schedule for classes. For students, school starts at 8:00 a.m. and ends at 2:00 p.m.; lunch is always held between 11:39 and 1:10. Within this time frame, each day of the week is given a number from one through six at the beginning of the semester. This number indicates which class period that day will begin with. The schedule for the day is posted each morning. Consequently, each first period class will be different. For example, the sixth period class will sometimes meet at 8:00 a.m. or the fourth period class will sometimes meet just after lunch at 1:14. Although the lunch period never rotates, what changes is the teacher who escorts a given class, and the block of time the classes go to the cafeteria.

According to the principal, this kind of schedule keeps students (and teachers) "on their toes. . . it keeps them thinking and planning ahead." But more importantly, he said students seem to like the schedule tremendously. "It adds a little spice to their school day."

Mr. Paylor also reduced to 4 minutes the amount of time allowed students between classes. This was again an attempt to cut down on their idle time. Furthermore, he required teachers to stop whatever they may be doing to stand in the doorway of their classrooms to monitor the halls during the changing of classes. Breezeways and bathrooms are to be checked by administrators. Almost everyone we talked with in the school viewed this monitoring system as extremely important as a deterrent to misbehavior in the halls, locker theft, and other undesirable activities. This has not eliminated all running in the halls or running up or down the stairs; however, it was felt that it curtailed running and controlled traffic flow considerably.

The assistant principal said periodically a test of the 4 minutes is allowed between classes. Teachers are asked to lock their doors promptly when the bell rings signaling the beginning of the period. The test was conducted during our visit; only 4 students were late for class and had to get a tardy slip.

It is the principal's opinion that each of these changes makes students more accountable for their time. In addition to the regular school program, some teachers sponsor special clubs. They may schedule a meeting during their free-period (no more than twice a month). Sponsors are responsible for notifying the faculty the day before the meeting is to be held, and in turn a student must get a written permission slip from the homeroom teacher requesting that he/she be excused from class. However, it is the classroom teacher who decides whether a student's work is



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well enough up to par that he/she can afford to miss class. The aim is to encourage involvement and participation. Mr. Paylor noted, as well as to create an incentive plan that gives priority to academics and regular school work. From all indications, having in-school club meetings works quite well, although a few complaints were heard about a couple of teachers who seldom excused students for the meetings.

Finally, involving the community in the school was cited by the principal as another way of deterring violence and vandalism (especially after school). He said citizens in the community, teenagers and young people in particular, must be "climatized" to what is expected. Therefore, he is an ardent supporter of the community-school program, a vehicle for citizen involvement in schools. The community-school operates between 3:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. The school is open for meetings of various organizations, night classes, teas or other special functions, and recreation. Interestingly, the trophy display case in front of the school and the bulletin board in the yard display as much about community activities as about the center itself. The principal explained that such publicity is one small indication of his endorsement of community involvement. Furthermore, he said, it gives the community a sense of belonging to and pride in the school.

The coordinator of the community-school program briefly summarized its purpose:

- (1) To make more effective use of the school facility as a public investment
- (2) To utilize community resources in seeking solutions to local social problems, such as delinquency or dropouts
- (3) To complement existing school activities especially in terms of developing good habits and attitudes regarding desirable citizenship
- (4) To provide creative and stimulating activities for people of all ages

A member of the local school advisory council, a council composed of community representatives, agreed with the principal with regard to the important role this program plays in providing constructive activities after school for young people living in the community. This program, it seems, takes on some functions (among many others) of a neighborhood school during early afterschool hours. For example, many of the 7th graders with whom we spoke remarked that they participate in sports and other activities sponsored in their "home-communities." Similar comments were made by the coordinator

of the community-school at Wayne. He observed that while schools are desegregated during regular hours, they revert to serving one race or ethnic group in the community school program. We were reminded by an advocate of this program, a former state legislator, that much of the success of such a program depends on the school principal.

VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM

It is evident from some of the changes the new principal made this year that problems existed in the school. As one teacher put it, although it was never a critically violent school, it had some serious problems during the two school years, 1974-76. The most overt problem was reported to be student behavior or lack of discipline. Students skipped classes and roamed the halls screaming, cursing, and slamming doors; they disrupted classes, and many of those cutting classes would hide behind the gymnasium and other out buildings. However, agreement throughout the school was almost complete that problems with students were secondary. Discord among teachers and between teachers and the principal were reported to be the most serious problem.

It all began when the principal of 16 years retired and the assistant principal replaced him. Factions developed between some teachers who had been in the school several years (mostly black) and some of the newer teachers (black and white). The principal was said to cater to certain "older" teachers and to give them special privileges. "They ran the school," was the statement made by several teachers as they discussed the situation of a few years ago. Some of them said this was their own point of view while others said they used the statement in an effort to relate what was generally considered to be the crux of the problem. All respondents, however, emphasized that race was not the issue. The principal's presence was not felt sufficiently throughout the school; he was neither a strong administrator nor an innovator.

Friction continued to build in the faculty; and according to one of the coaches, by the 3d year "things were really out of control." "Complete apathy" and "no cooperation" were words used repeatedly to describe the situation. One of the administrators said a principal needs the cooperation of his faculty to maintain order and get things done in a school. "Around here cooperation was the exception rather than the rule," he said. "Teachers taught their classes but did almost nothing beyond that," said the teachers we interviewed, although a few exceptions were noted.

The coach argued that discord among the teachers had to be blamed for the behavior students manifested. He said it seemed to be common for several teachers to send students into the hall when they were displeased with their behavior in class. He added, "This act is not tolerated today and it was unthinkable under Mr. Horn." It should be remembered that the vast majority of students attending this school stay only 1 year. Therefore, misbehavior or encroachments against rules cannot be attributed easily to a carry-over effect among the student body.

As might be expected, during the 3-year period, the increase in the number of reported fights and in vandalism as reported by the custodians was appreciable. Several persons recalled that the school grounds were littered more frequently, the number of students suspended reached an all time high, and a window was occasionally broken. Nevertheless, teachers and administrators maintain that violence and vandalism never became a serious problem. They said most fights stemmed from pushing, pinching, talking about a boy or girl friend, or name calling. Fights today, although few, are usually related to similar incidents. Students at Wayne do not carry weapons of any description, and no attacks against any teachers have been made. One custodian commented that students today are different from the students of previous years. He stated that nowadays they are more boisterous, more destructive in terms of small yet costly items around the school (such as breaking toilet seats, pulling paper-towel dispensers off bathroom walls, pushing screens out of the windows in the cafeteria), and that, worst of all, they are less respectful of teachers and other adults. But teachers have changed also, he continued; some of them pass students in the hall who may be throwing paper airplanes, running and screaming, or even fighting. "They see, but they don't see."

The 1976-77 school year is Mr. Paylor's first as principal at Wayne. He has been in the system for over 30 years and a principal for about 20. Since 1973, when the schools were desegregated, he has been principal of several junior highs that have had problems; and, according to him, he has been able to "turn them around."

Asked what the secret is to his success, he replied, "It should be no secret to school people that the first essential ingredient is RESPECT!" He said all persons in the school must be able to demand respect and to give respect. This includes, teachers, custodians, administrators, aides, bus drivers, and students. He made this point in an open letter to "Co-workers" stressing that all adults—regardless of their positions—are role models for students. Further, he stated that

the first meetings with students should begin with "fairness, firmness, and friendliness." If this behavior is consistent and persists throughout the year, his letter continued, it should be a positive deterrent to undesirable situations. Caring and friendliness shown to students in all deliberations were the second point on his list. Nevertheless, he said one must not be afraid to show anger or disapproval in certain situations. The third ingredient listed was "Involvement and participation of students in constructive activities and of the community in the hopes and dreams of the school."

The principal also admitted that poor relationships among some teachers still linger in his school, and his goal is to develop cohesion and a spirit of cooperation in the faculty. Based on conversations with teachers, improvements along these lines this year were marked. Teachers said the principal's style is to involve them in decision-making and to request volunteers for things that must be done. They view him as one who gets things done; he has made positive changes in Wayne already, and they expect more positive changes in the future. Interestingly, many of the teachers compare Mr. Paylor favorably with Mr. Horn. Except for a few complaints that the lunch break is too short and students have no real time during school to "let off steam," almost everyone expressed satisfaction with the school year. It also seemed to be true that this year students have not been affected directly by poor rapport between teachers and the administration. On the whole, indications were that disciplinary matters are handled according to policy. Students complained about having to ride overcrowded buses and about the running that takes place in the halls during the changing of classes. In a class of approximately 25 students, more than three-fourths of them raised their hands acknowledging that they usually run "at least down the steps."

It can only be reiterated that everyone we talked with considered this a relatively safe school. Theft, skipping classes, and smoking cigarettes were listed as the most serious offenses by students. Smoking of marijuana was considered a very rare occurrence. While smoking seemed to be under control, some administrators said finding an effective way to curtail class skipping and to combat truancy were topics of discussion in many faculty meetings. Conferences with parents help but have not significantly reduced the outstanding number of referrals for these offenses, remarked the assistant principal. Breaking into lockers was listed as another "aggravating" problem. Seventy-five percent of all locker break-ins take place in the gymnasium where from three to six students share a locker (three if a small locker, six if a large one). The coach said the situation of insufficient lockers is compounded further by the

lockers being in extremely poor condition. Having ordered new, noncombination lockers for the gym and for general student use, the principal said he hopes to eliminate this problem. Stealing purses and other personal items from classrooms was cited by students and teachers as a problem.

Fighting, perhaps surprisingly, was not considered to be a major problem among the 7th graders in this center. Administrators said often they hear of a likely fight, and they intervene before it actually takes place. Their technique of following up arguments reported to them by students and teachers has been an effective way of curtailing fights as well as controlling hostile situations. In the opinion of the administrative assistant who is charged with "trouble-shooting" in discipline problems, the students get along remarkably well; racial animosity is not evident, and there are very few incidents of deliberate attempts to harm another individual. The administrative assistant is the closest this school comes to having a security person. He investigates reported incidents and can be seen frequently walking about the school. As a teacher who has been in this school since 1971, the administrative assistant operates like a personal counselor to students. No police or security aides are placed in the center, although there are some in many other schools in the system.

For several years the number of students suspended from school annually has been increasing in this system. In response, the school board instituted a new program in the fall of 1976 known as In-School Suspension (ISS). If a student gets three referrals to the assistant principal or dean's office, he is eligible for suspension. Offenses such as fighting, stealing, cheating, or carrying a weapon on the school grounds or school bus could result in immediate suspension. Depending on the nature of other offenses, the deans may assign a student to ISS, but no more than three times. Parents are notified regarding the assignment and are asked to come in for a conference. At Wayne teachers are asked to prepare regular assignments for the student, and the ISS teacher monitors the student's work. In addition, the ISS teacher holds discussions with the student about his/her behavior, attitude, and general feelings. Frequently, the student also meets regularly with one of the counselors.

ISS amounts to complete isolation of the student from 4 to 15 days. Since this is the program's first year in operation, comments about its success were extremely mixed. However, the consensus was that the ISS teacher had to be a rather special type if the program is to be meaningful.

Responding to concerns in the community as well as by the school board, the local Urban League instituted a new program for students suspended from school. Through its School Retention Program, the League provides special counseling and tutoring for students who have been suspended. The counselor for the program said League members work with students who have been suspended repeatedly. Their purpose is to help students understand their own behavior. "We point out that whatever the written referral says is the issue, regardless of the reasons," the counselor emphasized. "And we try to demonstrate how a record develops from this." In addition to working with students during school hours for the duration of a suspension, she stressed that their counselors do follow-up work in the home, the school, the court, or wherever necessary. About a half-dozen students from Wayne are involved in the Urban League's program. These students were referred there by the school.

The silent alarm system, installed in the school 2 years ago, was credited for reducing the small number of burglaries that occur in the school. Incident reports for 1976-77 showed four cases of breaking and entering. Reportedly, one of the four took place during an evening basketball game, when the building was open and the alarm was therefore shut off. According to several reports, four or five intruders have actually been caught in the school since the installation of the alarm system.

The counselor, the principal, and the administrative assistant talked at length about 7th grade as a critical period for an adolescent. They stressed that it is during this time that young people are changing rapidly in terms of growth and development, their ideas, their identity, and their priorities. Therefore, they require special understanding and care. They are energetic and still playful, but they also are questioning--including authority. Unfortunately, the adolescents are not understood, especially by their parents; and consequences of the confusion and frustration they experience during this age (12 to 14 years) can have far-reaching effects. "We try to keep these points in mind," the principal said, "in all our actions involving students, from developing educational programs to disciplinary actions."

CONCLUSION

A school serving one grade level only is itself rather noteworthy. As the principal, other administrators, and most of the teachers pointed out, 7th grade is a special time in the life of adolescents. The respondents remarked convincingly that a 7th-grade center provides

young adolescents a unique opportunity to get involved in the total school program. A chance for teenage boys and girls to be on equal footing with other students in the school was considered one of the greatest advantages of a 7th grade center. Students do not have to contend with being on "the low end of the totem pole," so to speak, as they enter the critical age between childhood and adulthood. Another advantage, noted by the principal, is that he can impress upon his faculty the importance of understanding the developmental and emotional changes a 7th grader may experience.

Having an entirely new student body to work with—who came to the school the same time as the new principal—probably accounts for the fact that he received a good response to the program changes he made. At the beginning of the school year, students were given a handbook that explained what was expected of them. The handbook also outlined disciplinary procedures. It appeared that students were cooperative and, for the most part, enjoyed their school day.

Although Wayne never had serious problems with violence and vandalism, its problems began mounting 3 years ago. More than anything else, the administrative styles of its principals seem to be the major influence in the amount of trouble in the school. For example, Mr. Horn, who served as principal for 16 years, was said to have complete control of the school. He was well respected by teachers, students, and the community. A sense of school pride was evident at Wayne, and teachers were committed to maintaining a good reputation. Under his leadership the transition to desegregation was smooth. When Mr. Horn

retired, his assistant principal took over. Contrary to his predecessor, the new principal did not have the cooperation of his faculty, and discontentment grew. Although the student body changed annually, each year during his 3-year tenure saw more and more problems with students acting out and disrupting classes. The principal was not a strong force in the school.

Firmness and strong leadership seemed to return to Wayne. This past year (1976-77) Mr. Paylor, the new principal, instituted a number of new programs and procedures. He is a strong advocate of involving teachers and students in school activities, and he has gotten positive results. Teachers are involved in running the school. They responded to the expectation that they must show an interest in students inside and outside the classroom. Similarly, students no longer roam the halls or hide behind buildings on the school grounds as some did in the past few years. Overall, the school seems to operate smoothly. This year was considered to be another success for Mr. Paylor, who has a reputation for taking hold and making improvements in tough school situations.

Through the community-school program, a concerted effort is made at Wayne to involve members of the community in the school. Mr. Paylor considers this involvement an important effort in deterring afterschool vandalism.

This leadership from the principal, commitment from the teachers, and involvement of the people in the community have made the environment at Wayne "safe" and conducive to learning.



APPENDIX A

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF FACTORS IN SCHOOL VIOLENCE

In this Appendix we examine factors related to violence and property loss due to crime in American secondary schools. In the conceptual paper for the Safe School Study (Williams, Moles, and Boesel, 1975), it was hypothesized that crime and misbehavior in schools are affected by five categories of factors: the community context, the physical structure of the schools, school social structure, school functions, and school climate. Within each of the five categories, numerous hypotheses were developed, and data were collected from principals, teachers, and students to test these hypotheses. In short the Safe School Study data files contain information about several hundred variables which were considered potential contributors to the level of crime in schools. Given the large number of the potential factors, in the earlier stages of analysis our efforts were directed toward sorting out the more promising explanations from the less promising ones by examining the relationship between each variable and school crime levels. As a result of these preliminary analyses, several factors that appear likely to have general explanatory value with respect to school crimes were selected for further discussion and examination.

PART 1

In this section we will examine various factors that may affect violence in the Nation's public high schools. By violence we mean robbery and attacks that involve the actual use of physical force or the threat of using physical force, as in the case of robbery. Our attention will be directed primarily to assault and robbery against students, which constitute the large majority of all assault and robbery incidents that take place in secondary schools. The main purpose here is to explain why some schools have higher levels of violence than others, using attacks and robbery against students as indicators.

The discussion in this chapter will be divided in the following way. We will first present a theoretical framework in which we consider some basic factors most likely to have effect or violence at school. Following discussion of the theoretical rationale, the data and the measurement of those factors will be presented, and the analytical results with respect to the

relationship between those factors and violent behavior will be reported. After the discussion of findings on the basic factors, we will then consider various additional factors and issues.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE BASIC FACTORS IN VIOLENCE AT SCHOOL

It has been determined that violent acts in schools are largely committed by students against their fellow students, rather than by outsiders. This finding serves as the foundation on which the theoretical rationale in this chapter is developed. The basic factors that explain why some schools have more violent behavior than others can be differentiated into two categories: background factors and school factors. These two categories of factors will be discussed in turn.

Background Factors

In general, we consider that violent acts at school are affected by the background characteristics of the students. These characteristics will be referred to hereafter as background factors. Here we consider four background factors most likely to have some impact on school violence.

The first background factor that we consider is the age of the student population. One might argue that violence requires certain physical strength and therefore that schools with older students are more likely to have violence. However, we believe that the level of violence is better explained by socialization, a process that gradually inhibits individuals from violent behavior.

We believe that, through socialization, as the students grow older they learn and acquire more alternative skills and develop resources to resolve interpersonal conflict or interpersonal problems. Consequently, we believe that older students are less likely to engage in violence or physical aggression. Younger students have fewer social skills and resources to cope with interpersonal conflict through nonviolent means; moreover, their violent behavior is seemingly more tolerated by society. To the extent that the violent behavior of younger students is more

tolerated by the society in general and by the school in particular, we may further expect that violence is more likely to take place among younger students. Therefore, those schools with an older student population may be expected to have less violent behavior than those with a younger student population.

The second background factor that we consider likely to affect school violence is the composition of the school in terms of the sex of the students. Generally speaking, schools with a larger proportion of male students may be expected to have more violence than schools with a smaller proportion of males. Again, we consider male students more likely to be violent, not because of their greater physical strength, but because of social norms that appear to tolerate and accept violent behavior by males more than by females. In addition, it seems that males are encouraged to be masculine in their role-learning process. To the extent this is true we may also expect male students to be more likely to engage in violence than female students. As this is a school-level analysis, the effects of the sex and age of students are considered here in terms of school composition. That is, we believe that schools with a younger, predominantly male, student population are more likely to have relatively high levels of violence.

The third background factor that we consider important is the community crime level. By "community crime level" we are not referring to the possibility that a school in a high-crime community may be directly affected by the crimes in the community in the sense that individuals in the school are also the target of those crimes. Rather, we consider that the violence and crime in the community that students are subjected to or come in contact with are likely to affect their attitudes toward violence and, ultimately, their behavior at school. In a high-crime community, where violence is commonplace, we can expect violence to be more socially acceptable than in other areas. Thus, we may expect that students who come from high-crime areas have fewer psychological barriers against committing violence than those who come from areas where violence and deviant behavior are less frequent and less acceptable. Indeed, more frequent contact by students with delinquent subcultures in high-crime areas may offer positive reinforcement to violence or other deviant behavior. Consequently, we may expect that the schools that are located in high crime communities and draw more students from these areas are likely to have more violence.

The fourth background factor that we consider likely to have an impact on violence at school is the students' general sense of internal

control; that is, their feeling that the outcome of events is largely controlled by themselves or largely determined by their own actions, rather than by other external forces. Numerous reports have considered violence as a result of frustration, with violence being directed toward the objects of frustration (including people). With respect to school settings, we may project that schools whose students believe that events are largely controlled by themselves (internally controlled) are likely to have less violence because the students are less likely to blame others for their frustration and, therefore, less likely to engage in or commit acts of violence against others.

School Factors

Data collected for the Safe School Study point to four school factors that are considered most likely to have some impact on the extent of violence at schools. The first factor is the degree to which school personnel devote their efforts to governing students and enforcing school rules and regulations. In general, we expect that a school in which personnel make deliberate efforts to govern students and enforce rules and regulations strictly and consistently will have less violence than a school in which such efforts are lacking for the most part. There are two reasons why we expect this. First, when governance and rule-enforcement are strict and consistent, students can expect with a high degree of certainty that deviant behavior, including violent acts, will be punished. This may discourage some potential violence from taking place. Second, governance and rule-enforcement may in fact reduce interpersonal hostilities at school. As long as rules are strictly enforced and sufficient efforts are made to govern students, they are able to see clearly the relationship between individual actions and the responsibilities and consequences that follow. In an environment in which clear and certain consequences are attached to individual actions, individuals are likely to behave more responsibly, and mutual trust and respect are more likely to develop. As a result, we can expect that schools that enforce rules strictly and that make a sufficient effort to govern students are likely to have fewer interpersonal hostilities and consequently fewer violent acts.

We believe that, in addition to student governance and rule-enforcement, the occurrence of violence at school is likely also to be affected by the degree of fairness in school rules and in the administration of the rules. Students will be more likely to settle interpersonal conflicts by themselves in a school where rules are considered

unfair and the administration of rules unjust than in one where the rules are considered fair and their administration just. We would expect these differences to be related to the amount of violence in these two schools, even though the attention and the effort devoted to student governance and rule-enforcement in the two schools are comparable. In short, fairness in rules and in the administration of rules may be expected to have some additional effect in reducing violence, aside from the effect of student governance and rule-enforcement. Unfair rules or the unfair application of rules may not only increase the chances of students taking matters into their own hands, but also further increase the probability of violence in that unfair treatment of students in itself may be a source of interpersonal conflict or hostilities.

The third school factor that we consider important is the teacher-student interaction ratio. By this we mean the amount of attention that a student receives in the school from teachers. In a school where students in general receive a greater amount of teachers' attention, we expect there to be less violence, not only because the students are less likely to be alienated from the school, but also because the personal influence of teachers on the students is greater and more likely to reduce the potential for deviant behavior. With respect to the teacher-student interaction ratio, we consider important both the average class size and the average number of different students taught. In a school where the average class is relatively small, students on the average may receive a larger share of the teacher's attention in class. Hence that teacher may have a greater personal influence on his or her students. In addition, small class size may also develop better mutual understanding and therefore better interpersonal accommodation among the students. This may further reduce the possibility of physical aggression among them. Besides average class size, the average number of different students in all classes taught by a teacher is considered important. Although the average class size is related to the number of different students taught by a teacher, we would expect the teachers' influence to decrease if the number of different students they teach increases after taking average class size into account. As teachers are required to teach more different students in different classes, not only does their attention to the students in general become increasingly diffused, but their sense of responsibility for any particular student's behavior or performance in the school is also likely to decrease. This would occur because such responsibility is shared by a larger number of teachers. Besides the diffusion of teachers'

attention and the decrease of their sense of responsibility for individual students, we may also expect a student to have greater difficulty identifying with a particular teacher as the number of his teachers increases, with the class size held constant. Consequently, the personal influence of the teacher is likely to decrease. We may further note that the average class size and the average number of different students taught may be related to the teacher's ability to control students through the enforcement of rules, as discussed earlier. We also believe that class size and the number of different students taught will have an additional effect on the level of violence because of personal attention and interpersonal interaction, independent of rule-enforcement.

Finally, the level of violence in a school is likely to be affected also by the extent to which the subject matter taught is perceived as relevant to the interests and the needs of the students. If students consider the courses offered by the school largely irrelevant to their needs and interests, they are likely not only to decrease their efforts in learning, but also to be indifferent to the school and not to regard it as an important, meaningful, and worthwhile environment. Consequently we would expect the students to care less about their behavior at school. In such a school we would expect to find more violence or other deviant behavior than we would in a school where the courses are generally considered relevant and as serving the interests and the needs of the students.

This concludes our discussion of the four school factors that we consider most likely to have an impact on the violent crimes that take place in schools. We think these four school factors are likely to have some effect of their own, independent of the four background factors. We also believe that the extent of violence at school is a product of more than external conditions, or other factors over which the school has little control. By increasing its efforts at student governance and rule-enforcement, by being fair to its students, by increasing subject-matter relevance, and by reducing class size and the number of different students that a teacher is required to teach, a school is likely to decrease the chances of violent behavior. Whether each of these factors in fact has an effect is an empirical question. The empirical evidence and findings with respect to the relationship between each of the school and background factors and violence will be discussed later. In the following section, we first discuss the data and the measurement of these factors.

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

The analyses here will be based on the data collected in Phase II of the Safe School Study. In Phase II, 641 public secondary schools in the Nation were surveyed. Of the 641 schools, 604 provided information on the extent of victimization experienced by students, together with information on factors that may affect the extent of such victimization. These 604 schools will be the actual units of analysis as our primary interest is to investigate why some schools have more violence than others.

The extent of violence in a school is measured by 1) the percent of its students who reported that they were robbed at least once at school during the past month and 2) by the percent of the students who reported that they were physically attacked at least once at school, again in the past month. These two indicators are linearly combined and equally weighted into a scale. The score for a school on the scale thus reflects the relative level of the two kinds of violent acts in that school as compared to other schools. This score is regarded as measuring the level of violence in the school and is the dependent variable in the analyses in this chapter.

As to the independent variables, or the factors that we consider most likely to affect the level of violence in schools, the amount of violence and crime in the community to which students are exposed is measured by the following four indicators:

1. The percent of students in a school who reported fighting gangs in their neighborhoods.
2. The percent of students who reported that their parents were robbed on the streets of their neighborhoods during the past year.
3. The percent of students who reported that their homes were broken into in the past year.
4. The percent of teachers who considered vandalism, personal attacks, and theft as fairly much or very much a problem in the neighborhood surrounding their school.

These four indicators are linearly combined with weights derived from the principal components analysis, which maximizes the common variance shared by the four indicators.

The percent of male students in a school is measured by the percent of male student respondents who answered student questionnaires. The age of the student population is measured by the mean grade of all student respondents who answered the student questionnaires.

The sense of internal control that students in a school have is measured by an internal control scale with three indicators:

1. The percent of the students who disagree with the statement that "Everytime I try to get ahead, something or someone stops me."
2. The percent of the students who agree with the statement that "If I study hard, I will get good grades."
3. The percent of the students who agree with the statement that "If I plan things right, they will come out O.K."

These three indicators are linearly combined to maximize their common variance with weights generated through the principal components analysis.

To measure the efforts of school personnel in governing students in enforcing school rules, a governance and rule-enforcement scale is constructed with four indicators:

1. The percent of the students who reported that the school rules were almost never strictly enforced;
2. The percent of the students who reported that the teachers at their school almost never kept order in the class;

3. The percent of the teachers who reported that the teachers always maintained order in class; and
4. The percent of the students who disagreed that their principal ran the school with a firm hand.

With the exception of the third indicator, the other three are considered negative indicators that reflect the relative lack of efforts on the part of school personnel to govern students and to enforce the rules. The four indicators again are linearly combined to maximize their common variance with weights generated through the principal analysis.

To measure fairness of the school environment, or more specifically the fairness in rules and administration of the rules, a fairness scale is constructed. The fairness scale uses the following five indicators:

1. The percent of the students who believed that the school rules were almost never fair.
2. The percent of the students who believed that it was almost never true that in their school, the punishment for breaking the school rules was the same no matter who you were.
3. The percent of students who believed that the teachers in their school were almost never fair.
4. The percent of the students who disagreed with the statement that "the principal is fair."
5. The percent of teachers who believed that the statement "all students are treated equally" very much described their school.

With the exception of the last indicator, the other four measure the fairness in school in the negative direction. The five indicators again are combined with the weights derived through the principal analysis.

Student-teacher interaction ratio is measured here by combining (1) the mean of the number of different students taught during a week, as reported by all the teachers in a school; and (2) the mean of the average number of students in class reported by all teachers. These two variables are equally weighted. As to the perceived relevance of the subject matter taught at school, the measure here is the percent of the students who thought that the teachers at their school almost always taught them what they wanted to learn.

Earlier we indicated that a total of 604 public secondary schools in the Phase II study provided the information used for the analyses here. This includes 104 urban junior high schools, 103 urban senior high schools, 121 suburban junior high schools, 118 suburban senior high schools, 76 rural junior high schools, and 82 rural senior high schools. Methodologically, we think that these six subsets of schools may be characteristically quite different from one another. Thus, in the analyses to be conducted, we will only compare the schools within each subset. Following this rationale, the scales as discussed above are constructed for each of the six subsets of the schools separately, so that the score of a school on a scale is indicative of the position or the state of the school on that scale relative to the other schools in the same subset, but not to the other subsets. In other words, the six subsets of schools will be analyzed separately and simultaneously. The means and the standard deviations for all the eight independent variables and the dependent variable are reported in Table A-1 for the six subsets of schools. Intercorrelation matrices for the eight independent variables in each subset are presented in Tables A-1a through A-1f.

TABLE A-1

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL
AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS FOR THE SIX SUBSETS OF SCHOOLS

	Urban Junior High			Urban Senior High			Suburban Junior High		
	Factor Weight	Mean	S.D.	Factor Weight	Mean	S.D.	Factor Weight	Mean	S.D.
School violent crime level		.000	1.000		-.000	1.000		.000	1.000
% Students robbed/last month	.56205	9.452	5.962	.57209	3.920	3.834	.59676	7.463	3.982
% Students assaulted/last month	.56205	8.218	4.795	.57209	3.955	3.169	.59676	7.232	3.997
Community crime and violence level		.000	1.000		.000	1.000		.000	1.000
% Students reported the presence of fighting gangs in their neighborhood	.36862	33.636	15.305	.36604	28.019	15.296	.32234	23.458	12.301
% Students reported their parents were robbed on the neighborhood streets/last year	.38666	8.965	5.267	.41696	7.164	4.995	.38814	6.401	4.432
% Students reported their homes broken into /last year	.24829	12.528	5.482	.16366	10.282	5.289	.38145	9.393	4.831
% Teachers considered vandalism, personal attacks, and theft as fairly much to very much a problem around their school neighborhood	.39603	43.889	27.383	.40519	38.057	25.827	.40949	15.679	15.810
% Male students		50.084	8.342		48.094	18.191		50.105	7.791
Mean of student grade		7.834	.368		10.545	.452		7.713	.310
Internal control		.000	1.000		.000	1.000		.000	1.000
% Students disagreed with "Everytime i try to get ahead, something or someone stops me"	.41368	31.777	7.805	.20652	39.353	8.107	.43754	30.855	8.088
% Students agreed with "If I study hard, I will get good grades"	.49531	77.465	7.752	.59477	76.172	8.005	.46374	73.975	7.045
% Students agreed with "If I plan things right they will come out O.K."	.43881	56.144	8.069	.56106	57.877	8.189	.50531	53.347	7.731
Student governance and rule enforcement		-.001	1.007		-.011	1.010		-.000	1.000
% Students reported the school rules as almost never been strictly enforced	-.36689	11.848	6.691	-.39525	10.679	7.141	-.38423	8.938	4.801
% Students reported the teachers as almost never kept order in class	-.37760	9.541	5.472	-.35996	7.837	5.126	-.46801	5.637	3.944
% Teachers reported that the teachers always maintained order in class	.25976	6.986	5.879	.33111	9.172	8.507	.27263	10.889	10.513
% Students disagreed that their principal ran the school with a firm hand	-.39253	15.828	8.823	-.37638	15.751	9.047	-.41800	11.505	6.881
Fairness		.003	1.004		-.017	1.003		.005	1.000
% Students said the school rules as almost never fair	-.41513	13.193	8.237	-.38156	10.618	6.987	-.31053	10.537	6.968
% Students believed as almost never true that punishment for breaking school rules was the same no matter who you were	-.24630	13.397	6.048	-.30578	14.786	8.146	-.31053	12.983	5.815
% Students said the teachers as almost never fair	-.33214	13.663	5.334	-.25554	9.052	4.758	-.25899	12.086	5.749
% Students disagreed with "the principal is fair"	-.37493	15.090	8.866	-.30133	12.241	7.973	-.28949	13.037	8.536
% Teachers considered "all students are treated equally" as very much describing their school	.14466	29.791	13.678	.29592	31.322	16.384	.15139	34.310	16.495
Student-teacher interaction ratio		.000	1.000		.000	1.000		.000	1.000
Mean of the number of different students taught by a teacher per week, as reported by all teachers	-.62932	157.410	32.779	-.56802	129.691	27.877	-.60097	155.900	27.382
Mean of average class size reported by all teachers	-.62932	29.739	5.246	-.56802	28.095	6.214	-.60097	28.887	4.743
Subject matter relevance, i.e., % students reported that the teachers almost always taught them what they wanted to learn		28.915	9.643		28.964	10.185		23.069	8.105

TABLE A-1 (Continued)

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL
AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS FOR THE SIX SUBSETS OF SCHOOLS

	Suburban Senior High			Rural Junior High			Rural Senior High		
	Factor Weight	Mean	S.D.	Factor Weight	Mean	S.D.	Factor Weight	Mean	S.D.
School violent crime level		.000	1.000		-.000	1.000		.000	1.000
% Students robbed/last month	.60588	2.423	2.641	.59163	7.067	4.645	.58743	3.466	2.902
% Students assaulted/last month	.60588	2.987	2.712	.59163	6.171	4.288	.58743	3.425	2.844
Community crime and violence level		.000	1.000		-.000	1.000		.000	1.000
% Students reported the presence of fighting gangs in their neighborhood	.39846	19.261	12.291	.23432	19.863	9.455	.08787	14.232	7.528
% Students reported their parents were robbed on the neighborhood streets/last year	.40243	5.031	4.192	.51641	4.631	3.650	.56213	3.486	2.755
% Students reported their homes broken into/last year	.14212	8.392	4.729	.47417	7.734	4.446	.58041	6.805	4.306
% Teachers considered vandalism, personal attacks, and theft as fairly much to very much a problem around their school neighborhood	.42655	18.014	16.255	.36111	13.998	14.853	.16542	11.276	11.783
% Male students		52.148	12.301		50.296	7.980		50.039	9.378
Mean of student grade		10.442	.527		7.703	.449		10.136	.715
Internal control		.000	1.000		-.000	1.000		-.000	1.000
% Students disagreed with "Everytime I try to get ahead, something or someone stops me"	.45328	38.194	8.694	.42061	28.656	6.945	.44528	35.797	8.066
% Students agreed with "If I study hard, I will get good grades"	.42200	71.940	7.439	.45471	76.479	8.227	.53288	74.943	7.777
% Students agreed with "If I plan things right they will come out O.K."	.50461	54.775	8.111	.44071	54.116	8.454	.50612	54.777	7.662
Student governance and rule enforcement		-.000	1.000		.000	1.000		.000	1.000
% Students reported the school rules as almost never been strictly enforced	-.44658	8.101	6.495	-.48538	9.397	5.863	-.46894	8.334	5.617
% Students reported the teachers as almost never kept order in class	-.45841	5.693	4.565	-.28342	6.365	3.670	-.41841	4.868	3.723
% Teachers reported that the teachers always maintained order in class	.21656	9.963	8.530	.25913	12.771	10.601	.22263	12.372	12.015
% Students disagreed that their principal ran the school with a firm hand	-.40704	14.073	7.821	-.44736	12.091	8.787	-.36654	14.002	9.630
Fairness		.000	1.000		-.000	1.000		-.000	1.000
% Students said the school rules as almost never fair	-.33342	9.571	6.598	-.30615	9.977	6.617	-.30369	9.322	5.783
% Students believed as almost never true that punishment for breaking school rules was the same no matter who you were	-.27891	15.535	7.658	-.29714	12.635	6.150	-.28536	17.842	8.770
% Students said the teachers as almost never fair	-.29668	7.657	4.391	-.30117	11.641	5.676	-.29403	9.231	4.989
% Students disagreed with "the principal is fair"	-.33848	13.456	11.006	-.32815	13.703	8.902	-.33003	16.957	11.779
% Teachers considered "all students are treated equally" as very much describing their school	.15569	26.296	14.802	.16463	35.604	17.831	.10086	28.781	17.714
Student-teacher interaction ratio		-.000	1.000		.000	1.000		-.000	1.000
Mean of the number of different students taught by a teacher per week, as reported by all teachers	-.55648	125.860	29.185	-.58477	154.984	39.318	-.55043	128.252	38.425
Mean of average class size reported by all teachers	-.55648	26.853	4.463	-.58477	28.548	5.276	-.55043	25.406	4.683
Subject matter relevance, i.e., % students reported that the teachers almost always taught them what they wanted to learn		24.548	10.971		25.816	10.268		27.431	10.345

TABLE A-1a

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS, URBAN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

	<u>Community Crime and Violence Level</u>	<u>Percent Male Students</u>	<u>Mean of Student Grade Level</u>	<u>Internal Control</u>	<u>Student Governance and Rule-Enforcement</u>	<u>Fairness</u>	<u>Student-Teacher Interaction</u>
Community crime and violence level							
Percent male students	.058						
Mean of student grades	.038	.132					
Internal control	.071	.024	.123				
Student governance and rule-enforcement	-.632	-.129	.010	.047			
Fairness	-.419	-.178	.036	.241	.627		
Student-teacher inter- action ratio	-.085	.078	.219	-.154	.053	.038	
Subject-matter relevance	.435	-.016	.152	.279	-.149	.044	-.049

TABLE A-1b

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS, URBAN SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

	<u>Community Crime and Violence Level</u>	<u>Percent Male Students</u>	<u>Mean of Student Grade Level</u>	<u>Internal Control</u>	<u>Student Governance and Rule-Enforcement</u>	<u>Fairness</u>	<u>Student-Teacher Interaction</u>
Community crime and violence level							
Percent male students	.147						
Mean of student grades	-.330	-.116					
Internal control	.153	-.106	-.003				
Student governance and rule-enforcement	-.534	-.037	.288	-.064			
Fairness	-.205	-.030	.128	.081	.489		
Student-teacher inter- action ratio	-.230	-.072	.247	-.014	.336	.023	
Subject-matter relevance	.116	-.036	.129	.068	.268	.241	.313

TABLE A-1c

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS, SUBURBAN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

	<u>Community Crime and Violence Level</u>	<u>Percent Male Students</u>	<u>Mean of Student Grade Level</u>	<u>Internal Control</u>	<u>Student Governance and Rule-Enforcement</u>	<u>Fairness</u>	<u>Student-Teacher Interaction</u>
Community crime and violence level							
Percent male students	.101						
Mean of student grades	.217	-.058					
Internal control	-.187	-.048	-.123				
Student governance and rule-enforcement	-.431	.100	-.044	.240			
Fairness	-.423	-.112	-.143	.423	.604		
Student-teacher inter- action ratio	-.122	-.093	.092	.072	.153	.099	
Subject-matter relevance	-.128	-.137	.083	.269	.073	.240	.105

TABLE A-1d
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS, SUBURBAN SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

	<u>Community Crime and Violence Level</u>	<u>Percent Male Students</u>	<u>Mean of Student Grade Level</u>	<u>Internal Control</u>	<u>Student Governance and Rule-Enforcement</u>	<u>Fairness</u>	<u>Student-Teacher Interaction</u>
Community crime and violence level							
Percent male students	.067						
Mean of student grades	.019	.093					
Internal control	.103	.012	.070				
Student governance and rule-enforcement	-.272	.004	.145	.058			
Fairness	-.055	-.089	.208	.328	.368		
Student-teacher interaction ratio	-.142	-.041	.250	-.233	-.009	-.077	
Subject-matter relevance	.012	.230	.271	-.012	.339	.328	.276

TABLE A-1e
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS, RURAL JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

	<u>Community Crime and Violence Level</u>	<u>Percent Male Students</u>	<u>Mean of Student Grade Level</u>	<u>Internal Control</u>	<u>Student Governance and Rule-Enforcement</u>	<u>Fairness</u>	<u>Student-Teacher Interaction</u>
Community crime and violence level							
Percent male students	-.188						
Mean of student grades	-.193	.310					
Internal control	.138	-.133	-.102				
Student governance and rule-enforcement	-.066	-.070	-.109	.256			
Fairness	-.001	-.191	-.103	.455	.501		
Student-teacher interaction ratio	-.043	-.106	.061	-.005	-.071	.005	
Subject-matter relevance	.212	-.068	-.236	.420	.163	.486	.119

TABLE A-1f
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS, RURAL SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

	<u>Community Crime and Violence Level</u>	<u>Percent Male Students</u>	<u>Mean of Student Grade Level</u>	<u>Internal Control</u>	<u>Student Governance and Rule-Enforcement</u>	<u>Fairness</u>	<u>Student-Teacher Interaction</u>
Community crime and violence level							
Percent male students	.070						
Mean of student grades	-.056	.085					
Internal control	.155	.016	.036				
Student governance and rule-enforcement	-.171	.030	.233	.255			
Fairness	-.116	.066	.176	.405	.527		
Student-teacher interaction ratio	-.253	.145	.405	-.138	.100	-.109	
Subject-matter relevance	.113	.166	.349	.409	.470	.468	.205

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BASIC FACTORS AND VIOLENCE IN SCHOOL

To see the relationship between each of the eight basic factors and violence at school, the zero-order Pearson correlation coefficients between these factors and the school violence scale are reported in Table A-2 for the six subsets of schools separately. These zero-order correlations indicate, with only a few exceptions, the four background factors and the four school factors are generally related to the violence level in the direction we have previously discussed. Specifically, we observe a positive correlation between the community crime level and the level of violence in school. This is consistent in the analyses of all six subsets of the schools. This generally supports our hypothesis that schools whose students are more subject to crime and violence in the community are in fact more likely to be the scene of violence themselves.

The percent of male students is positively correlated with the violence scale in five subsets of schools; rural junior high schools are an exception. This indicates that male students do in

fact more frequently engage in violence than female students; consequently schools with a higher proportion of female students can expect to have less violence. The mean grade of the students is consistently related to the violence scale in all six subsets of schools, suggesting that, as the students gradually mature and move to the upper grades, they are less likely to engage in violence or physical aggression.

The level of internal control among students in a school is found to be related to the violence level negatively and consistently, for all six subsets of schools. This supports the idea that the more students believe they have some control over events or the satisfaction/frustration associated with the outcome of events, the less likely they will be to blame things on others and commit violent acts against others at school.

With respect to the four school factors, we observe a consistent and negative correlation between student governance and rule-enforcement on the one hand, and violent crime level in all the subsets of schools. Similar results are also observed for the degree of fairness and the level of violence. This indicates that the schools in

TABLE A-2
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AND THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL (PEARSON R'S)

	Urban Junior	Urban Senior	Suburban Junior	Suburban Senior	Rural Junior	Rural Senior
Community crime	.263	.381	.294	.069	.196	.304
Percent male	.169	.264	.158	.191	-.119	.079
Mean grade	-.122	-.311	-.165	-.356	-.160	-.383
Internal	-.230	-.010	-.215	-.209	-.255	-.136
Governance	-.333	-.267	-.338	-.203	-.309	-.329
Fairness	-.319	-.122	-.348	-.193	-.418	-.329
Relevance	-.045	.134	-.215	-.103	-.302	-.248
S-T interaction	-.155	-.161	-.265	-.082	-.137	-.129

which personnel make greater efforts to govern students and to enforce the rules and in which a greater degree of fairness is perceived by students and teachers do indeed have fewer violent crimes. We may further note that the correlation between the degree of fairness and violence appears to be generally higher for junior high schools than for senior high schools. It may be that fairness is considered more important by the younger students than by the older.

The relevance of courses taught at school is found to be negatively correlated to the level of violence, with the exception of urban senior high schools, for which a positive correlation is observed. This again is generally consistent with our hypothesis that the relevance of courses as perceived by the students is likely to decrease violent behavior in the school.

The student-teacher interaction ratio also is found to be consistently correlated with the violence level in all the six subsets of schools. As shown in Table A-2, all the zero-order Pearson correlation coefficients between the student-teacher interaction ratio and school violence level are negative. This indicates that the schools that have smaller classes and in which each teacher instructs a smaller number of different students in fact have less violence.

To summarize, the correlation coefficients as reported in Table A-2 suggest that our earlier discussion of the four background factors and the four school factors likely to affect school violence is supported by the empirical evidence. However, these factors may be interrelated, and thus the relationship between one factor and school

violence needs to be evaluated with all the other seven factors being controlled. To do so, multiple regression analyses are conducted, with the school violence scale as the dependent variable and all the eight factors as the independent variables.

In the analyses here, a crucial question that we need to answer is whether the school factors have any additional effect apart from the background factors, or whether they merely reflect the effect of the background factors. For this reason, the multiple regression analyses are carried out in two steps. In the first step, we include only the background variables as the independent variables; the four school factors are entered as additional independent variables later, in the second step. The least-squares solution is used here, and the results of the two-step multiple regression analyses are reported in Tables A-3 and A-4.

The results of the multiple regression analyses using only the four background factors as the independent variables indicate that the community crime and violence level, percent of male students, mean grade, and sense of internal control among students in a school continue to have some impact on the extent of violence in schools when controlled for the effect of one another (See Table A-3). The multiple R^2 's indicate that these four background factors explain 17.2, 22.3, 18.6, 21.8, 14.7, and 26.2 percent of the total variance in school violence for urban junior high schools, urban senior high schools, suburban junior high schools, suburban senior high schools, rural junior high schools, and rural senior high schools, respectively.

TABLE A-3
STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME
LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE FOUR BASIC
BACKGROUND VARIABLES AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior	Urban Senior	Suburban Junior	Suburban Senior	Rural Junior	Rural Senior
Community crime	.274	.294	.303	.081	.198	.304
Percent male	.176	.195	.104	.222	-.083	.082
Mean grade	-.126	-.192	-.247	-.364	-.128	-.367
Internal	-.239	-.035	-.184	-.194	-.307	-.172
R^2	.172	.223	.186	.218	.147	.262
F	5.040	6.762	6.615	7.888	3.068	6.850

As we regress the school violence scale on the four background and school factors, the results show that student governance and rule-enforcement continue to have a negative effect on school violence in all the six subsets of the schools. This is indicated by the consistent negative standardized partial regression coefficients (see Table A-4). Besides student governance and rule-enforcement, the degree of fairness also continues to be negatively related to school violence in five subsets of the schools with the exception of the suburban senior high schools. The degree of subject matter relevance continues to show some negative effect on violence in five subsets of schools, with the exception of the urban senior high schools. The student-teacher interaction ratio still remains negatively related to violence in all of the schools, with the exception of the rural senior high schools.

In summary, the results of the multiple regression analyses as presented in Table A-4 indicate that the four school factors appear to have some additional impact on the school violence level, when we control for the effect of the four background factors as well as the effect of the school factors on one another. The four school factors together explain an additional 5.8,

3.9, 9.6, 1.7, 17.9, and 4.7 percent of the total variance in school violence for the urban junior high schools, urban senior high schools, suburban junior high schools, suburban senior high schools, rural junior high schools, and rural senior high schools, respectively. This additional variance explained by the four school factors can be seen by comparing the changes in the multiple R^2 's from Table A-3 to Table A-4.

We emphasize that this is additional variance explained by the four school factors after the amount of the total variance in the school violence level explained by the four background factors is taken out. Since a part of the total variance explained by the background factors may also be explained by the school factors, it would be interesting to know how much of the variance is explained by the four school factors when they are considered alone. The results as reported in Table A-4a indicate that when the four school factors are considered alone, they together explain 15.6%, 13.3%, 21.0%, 6.7%, 22.1%, and 16.0% of the total variance in school violent crime level for urban junior high schools, urban senior high schools, suburban junior high schools, suburban senior high schools, rural junior high schools, and rural senior high schools respectively.

TABLE A-4

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior	Urban Senior	Suburban Junior	Suburban Senior	Rural Junior	Rural Senior
Community crime	.159	.176	.161	.043	.174	.277
Percent male	.155	.208	.095	.228	-.126	.092
Mean grade	-.071	-.198	-.224	-.338	-.178	-.331
Internal	-.222	-.035	-.070	-.196	-.079	-.057
Governance	-.171	-.115	-.158	-.131	-.156	-.100
Fairness	-.052	-.046	-.131	.018	-.251	-.135
Relevance	-.070	.215	-.121	-.022	-.195	-.058
S-T interaction	-.164	-.079	-.161	-.021	-.119	.062
R^2	.230	.262	.282	.235	.326	.309
F	3.470	3.987	5.502	4.177	4.053	4.083

The results reported in Tables A-3, A-4, and A-4a could further be summarized in Table A-4b, in which the percent of the total variance in violence explained uniquely by the four school factors is at least as great as that explained uniquely by the four background factors for all the junior high schools. As for the senior high schools, the total variance in the school violence crime level explained uniquely by the four background factors appears to be much greater than that

explained by the four school factors uniquely. This seems to suggest that as the students mature gradually, their behavior becomes increasingly independent of school conditions. Nevertheless, the school factors also have unique explanatory power of their own among the senior high schools.

In summary, based on this evidence, we conclude that schools are likely to reduce their level of violence by: (1) increasing efforts in

TABLE A-4a

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE FOUR SCHOOL FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Governance	-.236	-.253	-.186	-.157	-.159	-.178
Fairness	-.162	-.059	-.183	-.153	-.277	-.237
S-T Interaction	-.140	-.144	-.204	-.103	-.132	-.132
Relevance	-.080	.260	-.136	.029	-.126	-.026
R ²	.156	.133	.210	.067	.221	.160
F	4.472	3.591	7.707	2.018	5.037	3.666

TABLE A-4b

DISCOMPOSITION OF THE TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY THE FOUR BACKGROUND FACTORS AND THE FOUR SCHOOL FACTORS (IN PERCENT)

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Variance explained by:						
4 background factors uniquely	7.4	12.9	7.2	16.8	10.5	14.9
4 school factors uniquely	5.8	3.9	9.6	1.7	17.9	4.7
4 background factors and 4 school factors commonly	9.8	9.4	11.4	6.0	4.2	11.3
Total variance explained	23.0	26.2	28.2	23.5	32.6	30.9

student governance and rule-enforcement; (2) treating students fairly and equally; (3) improving the relevance of subject matter to suit student interests and needs; and (4) having smaller classes, with teachers instructing a smaller number of different students. We may further note that both class size and the number of different students taught have effects of their own. This is shown in Table A-5, in which we use these two variables

as two separate predictors in the multiple regression analysis.

This concludes our discussion of the effects of the eight factors that we consider most likely to affect the extent of the violence in schools. In the next section, we will investigate the effect of other factors that have been considered as possible explanations of violence at schools.

TABLE A-5

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND WITH AVERAGE CLASS SIZE, AVERAGE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT STUDENTS TAUGHT BY A TEACHER, AND SEVEN OTHER BASIC FACTORS AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.160	.179	.179	.039	.169	.279
Percent male	.157	.207	.094	.223	-.128	.096
Mean grade	-.055	-.200	-.227	-.343	-.183	-.347
Internal	-.219	-.035	-.057	-.205	-.080	-.047
Governance	-.177	-.111	-.167	-.133	-.156	-.102
Fairness	-.045	-.047	-.148	.017	-.249	-.142
Relevance	-.072	.214	-.081	-.035	-.205	-.074
Mean number different students	.162	.037	.234	-.033	.036	-.109
Mean class size	.048	.050	-.040	.054	.102	.030
R ²	.234	.261	.303	.236	.327	.312
F	3.125	3.498	5.356	3.699	3.565	3.625
r Between mean number dif- ferent students and violent crime level	.175	.148	.285	.115	.137	.175
r Between mean class size and violent crime level	.070	.135	.157	.032	.097	.059

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

In this section, we will examine the possible effects of some other factors not included in the eight that we have discussed above. The additional ones include various racial factors, poverty, family discipline, problem students at school, school size, and others.

Minority Status, Poverty, and Violence at School

Racial minorities and students that are economically deprived often are reported to be disproportionately represented as both victims and offenders of violent crime. Here we examine whether school violence is related to its composition in terms of the racial/ethnic and economic characteristics of students. If race were a determining factor in school violence we would expect

schools with a larger proportion of racial minority students to have more violence and schools with a larger proportion of white students to have less. To ascertain if this is the case, we will examine whether the percent of white students is in fact correlated with school violence; we will also examine whether the percent of white students has any effect when we control for the effect of the eight basic factors. The zero-order Pearson correlation coefficients between the percent of white students and the school violence level, together with the results of regressing the school violence level on the percent of white students and the eight basic factors, are reported in Table A-6.

As shown in Table A-6, the percent of white students is negatively correlated with the school violence level only in the urban schools and in the suburban senior high schools, not in the other

TABLE A-6

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND WITH PERCENT WHITE STUDENTS AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.156	.115	.194	.061	.201	.274
Percent male	.155	.211	.101	.231	-.105	.094
Mean grade	-.070	-.204	-.232	-.339	-.184	-.333
Internal	-.224	-.060	-.075	-.196	-.056	-.058
Governance	-.167	-.081	-.183	-.129	-.204	-.100
Fairness	-.051	-.065	-.108	.020	-.253	-.135
S-T interaction	-.166	-.100	-.169	-.021	-.121	.065
Relevance	-.074	.203	-.087	-.021	-.127	-.064
Percent white students	-.010	-.109	.115	.026	.152	-.019
R ²	.230	.267	.292	.235	.340	.309
F	3.052	3.594	5.098	3.687	3.778	3.584
r Between % white students and violent crime level	-.125	-.275	.018	-.047	.136	.037

subsets of the schools. As we control for the eight basic factors, the effect of the percent of white students is again inconsistent. In fact, after the eight basic factors are controlled, the results show that in three subsets of schools, the higher proportion of white students is actually associated with more school violence. Based on these results, we can hardly conclude that racial minorities are generally more likely to commit violence at schools than are other students, when other important factors are taken into account.

It has been suggested that as the racial majority and the minority approach an equal proportion in schools, interracial violence is likely to increase and consequently increase the total violence in the school. The possibility of the equal proportion effect will be examined here.

The extent to which a school is characterized by equal proportions of white and minority students is measured by the minus of the absolute value of the difference between 50 and the percent of white students ($-|50-\%white|$). The relationship between the equal race proportion and the school violence is represented in Table A-7. The Pearson's r 's indicate that equal proportions of whites and minorities appear to be largely unrelated to the violence level; the correlations are weakly positive in three subsets of schools, and weakly negative in the other three subsets. Controlling for the eight background factors, we find that as the proportion of majority and minority students approaches the 50-to-50 break, there is actually slightly less violence in five subsets of schools, with the exception of urban junior high schools. This is indicated by the

TABLE A-7

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND WITH EQUAL PROPORTION OF THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY RACES, AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.149	.170	.193	.056	.198	.282
Percent male	.143	.209	.102	.235	-.123	.090
Mean grade	-.080	-.197	-.231	-.340	-.180	-.330
Internal	-.207	-.048	-.074	-.197	-.057	-.055
Governance	-.191	-.111	-.187	-.128	-.199	-.099
Fairness	-.047	-.046	-.112	.020	-.266	-.136
S-T interaction	-.166	-.084	-.174	-.022	-.127	.059
Relevance	-.059	.212	-.079	-.023	-.140	-.055
Equal proportion of race majority and minority	.077	-.059	-.125	-.036	-.136	-.023
R ²	.235	.265	.294	.236	.338	.310
F	3.139	3.563	5.138	3.702	3.750	3.587
r Between equal proportion of race majority and minority and violent crime level	.095	-.102	-.019	.034	-.065	.037

negative partial regression coefficients for the proportion in Table A-7.

The next possibility that we consider, with respect to the potential effect of race, is the disproportionality of white teachers in relation to the minority student population. Similar to the measure used in the analyses of school property crimes, we again define the disproportionality of white teachers by the following two criteria: (1) for a school with more than 80% minority students, it is disproportionate if the percent of white teachers is greater than or equal to 50% of the total faculty; (2) for a school with between 20% and 95% white students, it is disproportionate if the ratio of the percent of minority teachers to the percent of the minority students is less than .5. Any school that meets either criterion will be

assigned a value of 1, otherwise 0. Using this measurement, the relationship between the disproportionality of white teachers and school violence is reported in Table A-8.

The results in Table A-8 indicate that in four of the six subsets of schools, the disproportionality of white teachers is in fact negatively correlated with school violence. Similar results are observed as we control for the effect of the eight basic factors. If anything, having a relatively high proportion of white teachers in minority schools decreases the amount of student victimization.

Two additional race-related factors will also be examined here—court-ordered desegregation and bussing. If a school is under court order to

TABLE A-8

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND DISPROPORTIONALITY OF WHITE TEACHERS AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.161	.173	.166	.064	.194	.284
Percent male	.158	.207	.100	.252	-.152	.100
Mean grade	-.072	-.199	-.248	-.368	-.171	-.329
Internal	-.220	-.034	-.080	-.211	-.092	-.060
Governance	-.168	-.114	-.139	-.114	-.211	-.099
Fairness	-.050	-.047	-.111	.030	-.201	-.137
S-T interaction	-.162	-.080	-.164	-.011	-.146	.060
Relevance	-.070	.216	-.148	-.012	-.184	-.074
Disproportionality of white teachers and violent crime level	-.035	.007	-.133	-.121	.223	-.051
R ²	.231	.262	-.298	.247	.371	.311
F	3.072	3.505	5.229	3.940	4.322	3.617
Between dispropo- rtonality of white teachers and violent crime level	-.072	.153	-.105	-.002	.175	.083

desegregate, one might expect interracial hostilities to be heightened, and interracial violence to increase. If a court order to desegregate does provoke violence at school, we would expect the schools that are not ordered to desegregate to have lower violence levels. However, it is also possible that a court order to desegregate may provoke some interracial violence in the earlier stages of desegregation, but such violence may gradually diminish as a school is increasingly desegregated. Thus, we also examine the relationship between the percent of students bussed to achieve racial balance and school violence. The relationships between court desegregation orders, the percent of students bussed, and the school violence level are reported in Tables A-9 and A-10 respectively. From Table A-9, we notice that schools that are currently under court order to desegregate in fact appear to

have slightly more violence than the schools that are not. This is observed in five subsets of the analyses, with the exception of the urban senior high schools. This holds true in both the simple correlations and the partial regression coefficients, with the eight basic factors controlled. With respect to the percent of students bussed, on the other hand, our results indicate that this percentage is actually associated with less violence in four subsets of the analyses. By considering the two findings together, we therefore conclude that although desegregation may at the beginning provoke some interracial violence, in the longer term the desegregation process cannot be considered an important determining factor in school violence. In summary, our analyses show that race is not a major factor. Next we discuss the possible effect of poverty.

TABLE A-9

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND COURT ORDER TO DESEGREGATE AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior	Urban Senior	Suburban Junior	Suburban Senior	Rural Junior	Rural Senior
Community crime	.154	.178	.161	.018	.177	.281
Percent male	.165	.209	.103	.219	-.126	.100
Mean grade	-.082	-.198	-.226	-.346	-.177	-.335
Internal	-.220	-.035	-.073	-.191	-.082	-.054
Governance	-.184	-.119	-.162	-.118	-.151	-.103
Fairness	-.018	-.042	-.139	.032	-.251	-.130
S-T interaction	-.171	-.078	-.165	.004	-.115	.091
Relevance	-.081	.216	-.110	-.028	-.200	-.094
Not under court order to de- segregate	-.103	-.019	.060	-.106	-.025	-.106
R ²	.239	.262	.285	.244	.327	.319
F	3.217	3.432	4.839	3.797	3.557	3.691
r Between no court order to de- segregate and violent crime level	-.124	.047	-.028	-.164	-.006	-.025

If poverty has an effect on the school violence, we would expect the schools with a generally poor student population to have more violence than schools with more affluent students. To determine whether school violence is in fact affected by the poverty of the students, we construct a family-economic-status scale to measure the relative degree of poverty in the student population by combining and weighting equally the following two indicators: (1) the percent of parents on welfare or unemployed, as reported by the principal; and (2) the percent of students who reported getting free lunch at school in the questionnaires. The relationship between the score of low economic status and the school violence level is presented in Table A-11. The results indicate that the percent of poor students is positively correlated with school violence only in the urban schools and the suburban senior high

schools. Among the suburban junior high schools and the rural schools, violence is actually lower in those schools with a larger proportion of poor students. These inconsistent results are again observed when we control for the eight basic factors. The empirical evidence thus suggests that in general, poverty cannot be considered as an explanation of school violent crimes, but may be considered so in urban areas.

Underachievement, Low Ability, and Behavior Problem Students

Besides race and poverty, another conventional belief has been that crimes at school are largely committed by students who are academically underachieving or have low ability or who have behavior problems. Can violent crimes at school be largely explained by the presence of

TABLE A-10

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, PERCENT STUDENTS BUSSED, AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior	Urban Senior	Suburban Junior	Suburban Senior	Rural Junior	Rural Senior
Community crime	.084	.0167	.151	.035	.205	.327
Percent male	.163	.218	.096	.224	-.136	.155
Mean grade	-.014	-.210	-.214	-.324	-.180	-.321
Internal	.208	-.030	-.061	-.201	-.075	-.074
Governance	-.203	-.110	-.169	-.126	-.147	-.075
Fairness	-.049	-.048	-.116	.019	-.256	-.147
S-T interaction	-.186	-.078	-.160	-.040	-.111	.078
Relevance	-.006	.210	-.124	-.030	-.182	-.030
Percent students bused	.246	-.087	.099	-.099	-.099	-.167
R ²	.282	.269	.291	.244	.334	.327
F	3.961	3.598	5.027	3.798	3.679	3.784
r Between percent students bused and violent crime level	.284	-.077	.168	-.134	-.077	-.082

these students? The relationships between school violence and the percent of low-ability students, the average number of underachieving students, and the average number of students with behavior problems as reported by teachers for their classes, are presented in Tables A-12, A-13, and A-14, respectively. From these three tables we notice that the percent of low-ability students, the average number of underachievers, and the average number of students with behavior

problems as reported by teachers are positively correlated with the school violence level, with only one exception; in rural junior high schools we observe instead a negative correlation between the percent of low-ability students and violence. However, as we control for the effects of the eight basic factors, we find that the positive relationships between these three factors and school violence are largely reduced. To be more specific, when we control for the eight basic

TABLE A-11

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND LOW FAMILY ECONOMIC STATUS AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.112	.130	.185	.020	.204	.321
Percent male	.163	.213	.088	.230	-.114	.101
Mean grade	-.035	-.190	-.234	-.343	-.153	-.325
Internal	-.263	-.062	-.089	-.187	-.073	-.082
Governance	-.112	-.053	-.162	-.136	-.176	-.074
Fairness	-.012	-.080	-.140	.019	-.253	-.131
S-T interaction	-.201	-.117	-.162	-.024	-.118	.061
Relevance	-.149	.203	-.075	-.022	-.107	-.015
Low family economic status	.225	.144	-.099	.051	-.150	-.159
R ²	.253	.274	.289	.237	.339	.329
F	3.271	3.311	4.653	3.341	3.594	3.543
r Between low family economic status and violent crime level	.230	.267	-.006	.037	-.226	-.160

TABLE A-12

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND PERCENT STUDENTS WITH LOW ABILITY AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.179	.204	.179	.041	.177	.272
Percent male	.158	.210	.095	.228	-.143	.094
Mean grade	-.072	-.198	-.233	-.337	-.179	-.328
Internal	-.222	-.034	-.079	-.195	-.061	-.052
Governance	-.174	-.154	-.163	-.131	-.174	-.102
Fairness	-.055	-.045	-.138	.018	-.262	-.135
S-T interaction	-.161	-.086	-.160	-.021	-.096	.061
Relevance	-.062	.237	-.103	-.022	-.177	-.062
Percent students with low ability	-.045	-.087	-.054	.004	-.080	.018
R ²	.231	.265	.284	.235	.330	.309
F	3.072	3.572	4.895	3.680	3.619	3.584
r Between percent students with low ability and school violent crime level	.132	.250	.119	.093	-.061	.090

TABLE A-13

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND MEAN NUMBER OF UNDERACHIEVERS AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.112	.189	.158	.125	.167	.258
Percent male	.140	.203	.094	.245	-.122	.103
Mean grade	-.057	-.200	-.223	-.363	-.179	-.312
Internal	-.229	-.035	-.069	-.220	-.080	-.070
Governance	-.156	-.127	-.158	-.130	-.156	-.084
Fairness	-.049	-.047	-.128	.023	-.239	-.119
S-T interaction	-.122	-.102	-.154	-.093	-.097	.158
Relevance	-.093	.219	-.124	-.052	-.200	-.030
Mean number underachievers	.136	-.046	.017	-.199	.056	.187
R ²	.240	.262	.282	.257	.329	.327
F	3.231	3.518	4.852	4.159	3.588	3.890
r Between mean number under- achievers and violent crime level	.272	.245	.219	.042	.184	.311

TABLE A-14

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND MEAN NUMBER OF STUDENTS WITH BEHAVIOR PROBLEM AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.084	.177	.189	.072	.165	.273
Percent male	.160	.207	.090	.242	-.119	.086
Mean grade	-.055	-.200	-.228	-.357	-.183	-.331
Internal	-.218	-.034	-.065	-.201	-.080	-.050
Governance	-.141	-.117	-.162	-.139	-.151	-.094
Fairness	-.027	-.048	-.157	.030	-.249	-.134
S-T interaction	-.081	-.084	-.204	-.050	-.098	.103
Relevance	-.077	.217	-.121	-.032	-.198	-.051
Mean number of students with behavior problem	.256	-.012	-.110	-.094	.045	.071
R ²	.273	.262	.290	.240	.328	.312
F	3.845	3.506	5.034	3.796	3.573	3.627
r Between mean number of students with behavior problem and violent crime level	.373	.205	.190	.102	.157	.213

factors we find that the percent of low-ability students is actually negatively related to school violence in four of the six subsets of schools. With respect to the number of underachievers and students with behavior problems we in fact observe a negative partial regression coefficient in two and three subsets of schools respectively. Over all, then, these three factors have no consistent relationship with school violence when other factors are taken into account.

On the basis of these results, we can hardly conclude that the presence of low-ability, underachieving, and behavior-problem students is a major factor in school violence.

School Size, Family Discipline, Nonstudent Problem, and Other Factors

Some of the factors that we discuss later in the analyses of school property offenses may also affect the amount of violence in school. Here we will examine the potential effect of the following six factors: (1) school size, (2) nonstudent youth

problem around school, (3) family discipline, (4) faculty-administration coordination, (5) teacher authoritarianism, and (6) academic aspiration. The effect of each factor will be briefly discussed in turn. The measurements of these factors are equivalent to what we have used in the analysis of the school property offenses with the exception of faculty-administration coordination, in which five additional indicators are added here in the construction of the scale. The relationships between these six factors and the school violence are reported separately in Tables A-15 through A-20, one for each factor.

From Table A-15 we notice that school size as measured by the size of student enrollment is rather consistently and positively correlated with the school violence level, although all the correlation coefficients appear weak. This holds true with the exception of the suburban senior high schools. As we control for the effects of the eight basic factors, the weak positive association between school violence and school size still

TABLE A-15

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND SCHOOL SIZE AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.142	.155	.157	.069	.172	.272
Percent male	.158	.211	.097	.223	-.118	.084
Mean grade	-.077	-.200	-.226	-.319	-.193	-.347
Internal	-.231	-.026	-.071	-.167	-.083	-.046
Governance	-.181	-.117	-.161	-.122	-.158	-.091
Fairness	-.051	-.050	-.129	-.044	-.269	-.147
S-T interaction	-.146	-.053	-.151	-.098	-.084	.106
Relevance	-.066	.227	-.119	-.041	-.191	-.055
School size	.049	.075	.024	-.171	.099	.074
R ²	.232	.266	.282	.253	.334	.313
F	3.082	3.542	4.814	4.057	3.679	3.587
r between school size and the school violent crime level	.055	.163	.143	-.165	.038	.086

TABLE A-16

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND NONSTUDENT YOUTH PROBLEM AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.189	.167	.175	.040	.179	.280
Percent male	.156	.210	.088	.230	-.124	.099
Mean grade	-.071	-.202	-.209	-.339	-.167	-.315
Internal	-.181	-.038	-.062	-.196	-.079	-.045
Governance	-.208	-.107	-.162	-.128	-.155	-.113
Fairness	-.048	-.047	-.136	.017	-.255	-.161
S-T interaction	-.162	-.075	-.165	-.019	-.121	.048
Relevance	-.048	.212	-.120	-.022	-.181	-.047
Nonstudent youth problem	-.151	.044	-.055	.011	-.029	-.079
R ²	.246	.263	.284	.234	.327	.314
F	3.186	3.377	4.726	3.647	3.342	3.616
r between non- student youth problem around school and the school violent crime level	-.051	.140	.007	.008	-.135	.001

TABLE A-17

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND LACK OF FAMILY DISCIPLINE AND THE
EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.159	.203	.160	.024	.182	.280
Percent male	.143	.203	.090	.220	-.126	.088
Mean grade	-.061	-.181	-.223	-.359	-.182	-.323
Internal	-.234	-.032	-.069	-.185	-.077	-.057
Governance	-.150	-.153	-.161	-.095	-.165	-.106
Fairness	-.021	-.041	-.145	.002	-.255	-.133
S-T interaction	-.162	-.063	-.162	-.031	-.115	.058
Relevance	-.067	.192	-.123	-.011	-.196	-.059
Lack of family discipline	.124	-.147	-.041	.108	-.046	-.030
R ²	.242	.280	.284	.244	.328	.310
F	3.275	3.853	4.881	3.873	3.579	3.593
r between the lack of family discipline and the school vio- lent crime level	.247	-.079	.086	.104	.091	-.039

TABLE A-18

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND FACULTY-ADMINISTRATION COORDINATION AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.161	.168	.166	.034	.171	.278
Percent male	.157	.208	.092	.222	-.123	.095
Mean grade	-.072	-.201	-.227	-.336	-.178	-.332
Internal	-.225	-.036	-.071	-.180	-.073	-.057
Governance	-.169	-.106	-.153	-.141	-.173	-.099
Fairness	-.045	-.036	-.142	.002	-.260	-.141
S-T interaction	-.163	-.073	-.163	-.014	-.129	.060
Relevance	-.072	.213	-.123	-.025	-.194	-.060
Faculty-Administration Coordination	-.017	-.043	.027	.080	.072	.014
R ²	.230	.262	.283	.240	.331	.309
F	3.055	3.529	4.861	3.798	3.625	3.582
r between Faculty Administration coordination and the school violent crime level	-.101	-.199	-.151	.079	-.043	-.189

TABLE A-19

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND TEACHER AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE
EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.164	.190	.163	.044	.176	.291
Percent male	.157	.224	.094	.229	-.130	.106
Mean grade	-.067	-.207	-.220	-.339	-.165	-.338
Internal	-.224	-.033	-.071	-.197	-.079	-.049
Governance	-.173	-.131	-.156	-.131	-.148	-.098
Fairness	-.050	-.060	-.136	.018	-.237	-.171
S-T interaction	-.166	-.095	-.163	-.020	-.117	.039
Relevance	-.070	.216	-.120	-.022	-.205	-.009
Teacher authori- tarianism	-.018	-.090	-.015	-.004	.059	-.162
R ²	.230	.267	.282	.235	.329	.332
F	3.056	3.606	4.851	3.680	3.598	3.980
r between teacher authoritarianism and the school violent crime level	.096	.175	.062	.174	.159	-.090

TABLE A-20

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE SCHOOL VIOLENT CRIME LEVEL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE LEVEL OF ACADEMIC ASPIRATION AND THE EIGHT BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Community crime	.137	.198	.166	.043	.174	.286
Percent male	.155	.201	.101	.224	-.124	.087
Mean grade	-.100	-.202	-.211	-.336	-.180	-.343
Internal	-.191	.005	-.089	-.185	-.076	-.023
Governance	-.151	-.059	-.166	-.127	-.155	-.090
Fairness	-.032	-.038	-.147	.027	-.246	-.070
S-T interaction	-.177	-.101	-.161	-.025	-.118	.016
Relevance	-.069	.213	-.116	-.028	-.196	-.047
Academic aspiration	-.121	-.122	.072	-.029	-.013	-.170
R ²	.239	.272	.286	.235	.326	.326
F	3.222	3.701	4.934	3.689	3.550	3.861
r between academic aspiration and the school violent crime level	-.250	-.130	-.112	-.193	-.244	-.212

persists. This suggests that violent acts in fact take place more frequently in the larger schools.

The results reported in Table A-16 indicate that essentially there is no relationship between the nonstudent youth problem around school campuses and the occurrence of violence at school. In fact when we control for the eight basic factors, in four of the six subsets of the analyses, the seriousness of the nonstudent youth problem as evaluated by the principals is actually negatively associated with the violence level. This, however, does not imply that the environment surrounding the school is not important. We have found that the community violence and crime level is indeed an important factor in the school violent crimes. The lack of relationship between the nonstudent youth problem and school violence simply indicates that the violence in school is produced by the student's contact with or exposure to crime and violence in the larger community rather than by the mere presence of nonstudent problem youth near the school. The results in Table A-16 further suggest that the amount of violence at school cannot be satisfactorily explained by outsiders' attacks on the students.

With respect to family discipline, the results as reported in Table A-17 indicate that there is consistent positive zero-order correlation between the lack of family discipline and the school violence level among the junior high schools. However, as we control for the effects of the eight basic factors, we find in four of the six subsets of the schools that the lack of family discipline is actually associated negatively with the school violence level. This indicates that the violence at school cannot be explained by the lack of parental or family discipline. The finding that school discipline (i.e., student governance and rule-enforcement) does reduce the school violent crimes, while family discipline does not, and the fact that family discipline affects the school property offenses but not school violence, suggest that violence at school may be more spur-of-the-moment than school property offenses. Therefore, the more immediate discipline and control by the school may reduce violence, while the parental discipline appears to be not effective.

In the analysis of the school property offenses, we found that the schools with better coordination between the faculty and the school administration were likely to have less property loss. With respect to school violence we do find a rather consistent negative correlation between faculty-administration coordination and the violence level. However as we control for the eight basic factors we find that this coordination does not appear to have additional explanatory power (see Table A-18). Somewhat similar results are observed concerning the relationship between teacher authoritarianism and school violence. Although there is a fairly consistent positive zero-order correlation between the degree of teacher authoritarianism and the school violence, this relation disappears as we control for the eight basic factors (see Table A-19). In fact with the basic factors controlled, the schools with higher teacher authoritarianism scores appear to have slightly less violence in five of the six subsets of schools. So while authoritarianism is related to school property loss, it does not cause any increase in violence at school.

We now turn to the relationship between the academic aspiration and the school violence. We may recall that academic frustration was found to be an important factor in the school property offenses: we observed a positive association between students' level of academic aspiration or competitiveness and school property losses. Does the level of academic aspiration have a similar effect on school violence? The results reported in Table A-20 indicate that, on the contrary, schools with students having high academic aspirations in fact have a lower level of violence. We observe a consistent negative correlation between academic aspiration and the school violence crime level in all six subsets of schools. After we control for the effect of the eight basic factors, academic aspiration again is still consistently associated with the low violence levels in all subsets of schools, except suburban junior high schools. Unlike the school property offenses, school violence cannot be explained by high academic aspiration, nor can it be explained by the frustration resulting from academic competition. This finding, together with other empirical evidence, as noted above, clearly suggests that violence and vandalism broadly defined are different in nature and thus should be considered separately.

PART 2

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF FACTORS IN SCHOOL PROPERTY CRIMES

This section discusses the factors that may affect the extent to which schools suffer from crimes against school-owned property. Our concern here is directed exclusively to school property losses due to destruction, theft, vandalism, fire-setting, bombing, and so forth, which for convenience will be referred to as school property crimes. Schools vary in the extent to which they suffer from school property crimes. The main purpose of this appendix is to examine the effects of various factors on the degree of property losses among schools. By doing so we hope to shed some light on the nature of such crimes.

A set of factors are presented which are most likely to have some effect on the incidence of school property crimes. The theoretical rationale for this formulation will be discussed, followed by a presentation of the empirical findings with respect to the factors. Additional issues will then be considered as possible contributors to school property crimes.

THE BASIC THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this section we will introduce and describe the theoretical rationale of factors which we believe to be the most important in affecting the variation in school property crimes. The factors that we will consider can be separated into two categories, background factors and school factors.

Background Factors

The first factor we consider important is the population of the school. We recognize school size as an important factor in the following sense: If all schools have an equal probability that a property crime will be committed by some standard unit of student population, then the sheer volume of property losses or property crime would simply be a function of the size of the school. Thus it is important to control for school size or population when we consider the volume of school property crimes.

The second background factor considered important is the level of crime in the community in which the school is located. Schools are neither physically nor socially isolated from the rest of their communities. Thus we expect the crime

condition in the community at large to affect the degree of property crimes at school. Other things being equal, it is reasonable to expect that in the communities where crime levels are high the schools are likely to have higher levels of school property crimes than are schools which are located in relatively low crime areas or communities.

A third factor we consider important is the extent of any nonstudent youth problem in the area directly adjacent to schools. There have been suggestions that acts of vandalism and property damage are largely committed by youth. If this is true, we expect that the extent of school property crimes is further affected by the degree of seriousness of youth problems not involving students directly in the proximity of schools, given the general level of crimes in the community. In other words, although the nonstudent youth problem may be closely related to a community level of crime, it is also expected to have an additional relationship to school property crimes.

The geographical concentration of student population around a school is also likely to affect the extent of school property crimes. The reason for this is because the larger the proportion of student population living within a short distance of the school, the more likely the school will be visited by its students, especially during off-school time. With more students likely to come around school, the probability of school property crimes will be greater. To be more precise, if a student wants to vandalize school property, the effort required to do so is lower if he lives nearby.

A fifth background factor important to this basic theoretical framework is parental discipline of students. We expect that schools will suffer less from property crimes committed by students where the students come from families in which discipline is maintained. We also expect that schools will be better off in respect to property crimes if the parents do not offset the discipline instituted at school.

School size, community crime levels, problem youth who are nonstudents near the school, a concentration of student population within a short distance from school, and the extent of discipline parents maintain are five factors that we consider

to be fundamental background conditions which determine the extent of school property crimes. These factors are in a sense externally imposed. Besides these external factors, there are factors internal to the schools that may also affect the extent of school property crimes.

School Factors

Various factors including structural, functional, and climatic aspects of a school have been suggested as potentially relevant to school crimes in general by Messrs. Williams, Moles, and Boesel in a conceptual paper for the Safe School Study. However, with respect to school property crimes, here we consider the following internal factors to be particularly important.

The extent to which school personnel pay attention to student governance is a basic factor in any evaluation of the rates of school property crimes. Of course, every school governs its students; however, the particular efforts devoted to student management may vary from one school to another. Although one may conceive the possibility that extreme governance or overcontrol of the students may cause students to rebel, in this discussion we are interested in how the school's governance efforts might reduce school property offenses.

The nature of the authority that a school exercises toward its students is likely to be important. If school property offenses are shown to be at least partially an expression of student resentment of unreasonable school authority, then it would be plausible to hypothesize that in schools where conflicting responsibilities for authority are exercised the problem of school property crimes will be greater than in schools where responsibilities for authority are relatively less conflicting. The most common conflicts are likely to be those between teachers and the administration, especially if there is lack of coordination between the two. Therefore, here we consider that schools with good working relationships or coordination between teachers and the administration will have less of a problem with school property crimes than schools where such relationships or coordination is somewhat lacking.

Another factor we consider important is related to teachers' attitudes. We expect that in general the extent to which teachers are extremely authoritarian is likely to be associated with high school property loss. Earlier we stated that excessive governance or overcontrol may cause students to rebel. Schools whose teachers are highly authoritarian are likely to institute controls that students consider unreasonable or demeaning. In addition, authoritarian attitudes

among teachers toward their students could result in student antagonism, thus lessening sociopsychological barriers to committing antischool offenses such as vandalism or other forms of property destruction.

School property offenses committed by students may also be related simply to frustration associated with school activities. If school-related frustration is a cause of school property crime, then we expect that schools with highly motivated and academically competitive students are likely to suffer more school property crimes than schools with less motivated and less competitive students. Academic frustration, in fact, may be one of the most important of the school-related frustrations. We are not saying that high academic aspiration is a direct cause of school property crimes; but rather, on the aggregate, schools with highly competitive students are also likely to be the schools whose students are likely to have more academically related frustrations. It is the academic frustration that we consider an important factor in school property crimes, not academic aspiration itself. We must also note that here the key concept is academic frustration rather than academic failure in its usual sense. Academic failure would not be a source of frustration unless the students are academically competitive. One school factor we consider significant is related to a specific disciplinary practice. This is the practice by some teachers of lowering students' grades as a sanctioning measure for bad behavior, and it is considered important because it seems to have implications not commonly shared with other disciplinary practices. It may affect the credibility of the academic grading system since the grades become not only an outcome of academic performance but also an outcome of behavior. Besides the possible effect on the integrity of the grading system as a whole, the use of grades as a disciplinary measure makes any pursuit of academic achievement more difficult to the extent that behavior must also be in conformity to certain expectations. Thus students are more likely to become academically frustrated, and this may be translated into anti-school property offenses.

This concludes our discussion of factors (both inside and outside of the school) that we consider to be potentially important in determining the extent to which a school may actually suffer from school property offenses. To see whether in fact each of those factors has had an effect on school property crimes, we will subject each to a multiple regression analysis. We will also attempt to establish the relative importance of the factors in explaining the extent of these crimes. The next section discusses the data to be

used in the measurement and the analysis of each of these factors.

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

The data used here come from the Phase II sample of the Safe School Study, which provides matching information concerning the 10 basic factors or independent variables together with the dependent variable which is the extent of property crime at each school. The analytical units here will be the schools. Each factor is measured in particular ways.

To measure the extent of crimes in the community in which a school is located, a community crime level scale is constructed by using the following indicators: (1) the percentage of teachers who consider the surrounding neighborhood to exhibit problems of vandalism, personal attack, and theft by reporting responses ranging from "some" to "fairly much" to "very much", and (2) the percentage of students who reported that in the preceding year either their homes were broken into or their parents were robbed on the street. The scale is the weighted linear combination that maximizes the common variance shared by these indicators through principal component analysis. Thus, a high score on the scale indicated a relatively high crime level in the community.

Concentration of student population around a school is measured by the geographical concentration scale, which takes into consideration the size of an attendance area and the extent to which students reside near their school campus. The size of the attendance area is measured by the principal's reported "farthest point" in his school's attendance area; the proportion of students residing near a school is measured by the percent of students who mainly walk to school. The geographical concentration scale is a combination of these two variables with both equally weighted. A high score on the scale reflects a high degree of student concentration around the school.

School size is measured by the total enrollment of the school as reported by the principal for 1976. Further, each principal was asked to indicate how much the presence of youthful nonstudents is a problem around the school. The responses range from "no problem at all" to "very serious problem." The principal's answer to this question is taken here to indicate the extent of any nonstudent youth problem in the areas proximate to the school. A high value for this variable indicates serious problems with nonstudent youth.

To measure the extent to which a school's students are disciplined by their parents, a family discipline scale is constructed by using information on the following three variables: (1) the percentage of students who live with their fathers, (2) the percentage of students who reported that their parents would almost always agree with them when they got into serious trouble with teachers at school, and (3) the percentage of students who reported that their parents would almost never punish them under the circumstances that would have led to trouble at school. The last two variables are considered to be indicators of lack of parental discipline. The family discipline scale is the weighted combination of these three variables that maximizes the common variance shared, with weights taken from the first principal component as generated in the principal component analysis. The high end of this scale is considered to be indicative of a student body that, in the aggregate, is subjected to a high degree of parental discipline compared to other student bodies included in this study.

Among the school variables, the extent to which a school is actively governing its students is measured by a student governance scale. The student governance scale is constructed with four component variables. They are: (1) the percentage of students who stated that their teachers almost never keep order in the class, (2) the percentage of students who stated that students at their school almost never need permission to do anything, (3) the percentage of teachers who stated that teachers at their school always maintain order in class, and (4) the average number of hours that the teachers of a school spent in supervision. The first two variables are considered as negative indicators while the last two are positive indicators of active school governance of students. The values of these variables for each school are translated into standardized z-scores, with the value on the student governance scale for a school expressed as the sum of the four z-scores for that school. In other words, the student governance scale is a simple combination of the four variables, with each equally weighted.

The degree of coordination between the teachers and the school administration is measured by a faculty-administration coordination scale. Five indicators are used: (1) the percentage of teachers who consider that teachers and administrators get along very well, (2) the percentage of teachers who believe that the principal can be described as sharing decisionmaking "very well" with the faculty, (3) the percentage of teachers who consider the principal as "not friendly at all," (4) the percentage of teachers who describe the principal

as "not fair at all," and (5) the percentage of teachers who describe the principal as "not informal at all." The first two are positive indicators while the last three are considered to be negative indicators; that is, indicative of lack of coordination between teachers and the administration. The faculty administration coordination scale is constructed by linearly combining the five indicators by maximizing the commonly shared variance among the five with weights generated through principal component analysis. A high score for a school on the scale is considered to indicate a relatively high degree of coordination between teachers and the school administration as compared to other schools.

To measure the academic aspiration and competitiveness among the students at a school, we consider the following three indicators: (1) the percentage of students who expect that they will actually go to college after graduation, (2) the percentage of students who affirm that most of their friends think getting good grades is important, and (3) the percentage of students who indicate that the grades they receive at school are not important. The last variable apparently is a negative indicator of academic aspiration. These three indicators are scaled into a single index of academic aspiration, again through a weighted linear combination that maximizes the common variance shared by the three separate indicators.

Teacher authoritarianism at the school aggregate level is measured by: (1) the percentage of teachers who agree that "a few pupils are just young hoodlums and should be treated accordingly" and (2) the percentage of teachers who agree that "a pupil who destroys school material or property should be severely punished." These two indicators are equally weighted and built into a single scale.

Finally, the extent to which a school utilizes the lowering of grades as a discipline measure is straightforwardly measured by the percentage of teachers who state that they "often" or "very often" lower grades in response to repeated misbehavior.

To this point we have described the way in which each of the 10 independent variables is measured. For the dependent variable, the extent to which a school suffers property crimes, some researchers might consider using the number of school property crime incidents as the indicator. However, here we believe the better indicator is the total amount in dollar values for property losses in school-related crimes. These include property destruction, arson, bombing, break-in, burglary, and others. The main reason for this is to permit some degree of comparability among

incidents. Total school property losses refers to the dollar amount aggregated from incident report sheets furnished by each school for a 1-month period. Thus, the total amount is a "per month school property loss." In the analyses in this chapter, we include only those schools that reported a loss of at least one dollar. This is necessary because it cannot be determined whether a large proportion of schools that did not return any report of crime incidents in fact experienced no crime incidents or simply failed to report.

The essence of the analysis here is to examine why some schools suffer more property losses while others suffer less. Altogether, 222 schools in the Phase II sample reported some property losses; this group of schools is the basis for our analyses in this chapter. Speaking in terms of location and educational level, the group includes 37 urban junior high schools, 35 urban senior high schools, 45 suburban junior high schools, 52 suburban senior high schools, 24 nonmetropolitan or rural junior high schools, and 29 rural senior high schools. Because these six subsets of schools can be characteristically quite different from one another, in the following analyses we will compare schools only within each subset. Following this rationale, the scales and the measurements of independent variables as mentioned earlier are constructed separately for each subset of schools. The mean and standard deviation of each variable in the basic model are presented in Table A-21; the weight associated with each scaling item is also noted on the table for each subset of schools. The Pearson zero-order correlation coefficients among the 10 independent variables are presented in Tables A-21 through A-27.

This concludes our discussion of the data and the measurements of the variables. In the following section we will discuss the results of analyses for the basic model as described throughout the last two sections.

RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES ON THE BASIC MODEL

To see if each of the factors outlined in the basic model is in fact related to the level of school property crimes, the Pearson zero-order correlation coefficients between each of the 10 independent variables and the total amount of school property losses are presented in Table A-28. The relationship between each of the independent variables and school property losses is generally as expected, with some exceptions. Community crime level is positively correlated with school property losses in five subsets of schools; the exception is rural junior high schools,




TABLE A-21

MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF
MODEL VARIABLES

	Urban Junior <u>High</u>	Urban Senior <u>High</u>	Suburban Junior <u>High</u>
Independent Variables:			
Background variables			
Community crime level	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)
Geographical concentration	-.027 (.987)	.021 (1.009)	-.006 (1.005)
School size	997.541 (380.667)	1685.314 (701.845)	904.659 (273.020)
Nonstudent problem	2.471 (.861)	3.029 (.969)	1.955 (.680)
Family Discipline	.155 (.933)	.020 (1.010)	.000 (1.000)
School variables			
Governing	.000 (2.035)	.000 (2.532)	.000 (2.396)
Faculty/administration coordination	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)
Academic aspiration	.000 (1.000)	.000 (.992)	.000 (1.000)
Authoritarianism	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)
Grade as discipline	14.722 (13.143)	14.315 (11.990)	7.928 (8.984)
Dependent Variable:			
Total amount of school property losses (\$/month)	140.351 (201.205)	268.028 (238.300)	136.689 (141.532)

TABLE A-21

MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
OF MODEL VARIABLES (Continued)

	Suburban Senior <u>High</u>	Rural Junior <u>High</u>	Rural Senior <u>High</u>
Independent Variables:			
Background variables			
Community crime level	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.009)	.000 (1.000)
Geographical concentration	.005 (1.115)	.008 (.860)	.000 (1.000)
School size	1403.692 (688.006)	685.042 (288.038)	848.379 (482.459)
Nonstudent problem	2.269 (.689)	1.952 (.974)	2.214 (1.134)
Family discipline	.017 (1.008)	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.002)
School variables			
Governing	.000 (1.911)	.000 (2.544)	.000 (2.437)
Faculty/administration coordination	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.166)
Academic aspiration	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)
Authoritarianism	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)	.000 (1.000)
Grade as discipline	8.421 (6.902)	2.595 (3.340)	.000 (5.856)
Dependent Variable:			
Total amount of school property losses (\$/month)	197.077 (209.958)	66.500 (123.079)	154.172 (194.402)

TABLE A-22

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE TEN BASIC FACTORS, URBAN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

Background variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) Community crime level									
(2) Geographical concentration	.387								
(3) School size	.339	.022							
(4) Nonstudent problem	.291	.490	.153						
(5) Family discipline	-.093	-.191	.083	-.103					
School variables									
(6) Governing	-.478	-.229	-.059	-.324	-.069				
(7) Faculty/administration coordination	-.110	-.103	-.383	-.283	.128	.254			
(8) Academic aspiration	-.262	.121	-.011	.020	-.038	-.049	-.069		
(9) Authoritarianism	.113	.424	.313	.383	-.283	-.303	-.394	.127	
(10) Grade as discipline	.215	-.050	.174	.027	-.013	-.315	-.122	-.174	.261

TABLE A-23

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE TEN BASIC FACTORS, URBAN SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

Background variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) Community crime level									
(2) Geographical concentration	.369								
(3) School size	-.060	.228							
(4) Nonstudent problem	.393	.614	.340						
(5) Family discipline	-.598	-.410	.104	-.416					
School variables									
(6) Governing	-.215	.083	.292	-.161	.356				
(7) Faculty/administration coordination	-.056	-.255	-.285	-.121	.246	-.117			
(8) Academic aspiration	.081	.208	-.132	.233	-.104	-.090	-.188		
(9) Authoritarianism	.019	.009	.436	.232	-.088	-.092	.020	-.200	
(10) Grade as discipline	.022	-.039	-.008	-.008	-.460	-.489	-.158	-.006	.250

TABLE A-24

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE TEN BASIC FACTORS, SUBURBAN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

Background variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) Community crime level									
(2) Geographical concentration	.170								
(3) School size	.087	-.071							
(4) Nonstudent problem	.223	.378	.078						
(5) Family discipline	-.197	-.011	.187	-.150					
School variables									
(6) Governing	-.220	-.109	-.092	-.150	.322				
(7) Faculty/administration coordination	-.310	-.067	.009	-.055	.231	-.149			
(8) Academic aspiration	-.301	.049	.263	-.310	.365	.053	.371		
(9) Authoritarianism	.127	.144	-.117	.429	-.029	-.085	-.134	-.426	
(10) Grade as discipline	.149	-.098	-.128	.063	-.189	-.341	-.110	-.136	.236

TABLE A-25

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE TEN BASIC FACTORS: SUBURBAN SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

Background Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) Community crime level									
(2) Geographical concentration	.241								
(3) School size	.371	.243							
(4) Nonstudent problem	.259	.323	.109						
(5) Family discipline	-.362	-.397	.075	.101					
School variables									
(6) Governing	-.175	-.264	-.185	-.147	.321				
(7) Faculty/administration coordination	.083	-.096	.005	-.041	-.179	-.129			
(8) Academic aspiration	-.060	.184	.397	-.042	.229	-.057	-.197		
(9) Authoritarianism	.157	.113	.251	.193	.116	.208	-.153	.031	
(10) Grade as discipline	.045	.148	.068	.223	.157	.010	.168	.090	-.013

TABLE A-26

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE TEN BASIC FACTORS: RURAL JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

Background variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) Community crime level									
(2) Geographical concentration	-.153								
(3) School size	.023	-.216							
(4) Nonstudent problem	.297	-.190	.077						
(5) Family discipline	-.266	-.197	-.223	.383					
School variables									
(6) Governing	-.040	.115	-.198	.069	.402				
(7) Faculty/administration coordination	.084	.031	.201	.308	.064	.097			
(8) Academic aspiration	.057	.668	.175	.071	-.305	-.006	.162		
(9) Authoritarianism	.047	.178	.139	.184	.038	.273	-.006	.202	
(10) Grade as discipline	-.248	-.078	.409	-.342	-.180	-.086	.272	.200	-.145

TABLE A-27


CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE TEN BASIC FACTORS: RURAL SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

Background variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) Community crime level									
(2) Geographical concentration	.186								
(3) School size	.080	-.055							
(4) Nonstudent problem	-.010	-.392	-.091						
(5) Family discipline	-.341	-.289	.118	-.157					
School variables									
(6) Governing	-.446	.007	-.121	-.259	.242				
(7) Faculty/administration coordination	.038	.138	-.056	-.223	-.085	.207			
(8) Academic aspiration	.021	.054	.120	-.320	.291	.416	-.097		
(9) Authoritarianism	.173	-.024	.155	.009	.090	-.319	-.295	-.010	
(10) Grade as discipline	-.289	-.308	.048	.034	.350	-.049	-.184	.024	.172

TABLE A-28

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE TEN BASIC FACTORS
AND THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.281	.209	.145	.096	-.023	.276
Geographical concentration	.062	.290	-.024	.212	.166	.337
School size	.242	.216	.313	.214	.253	.101
Nonstudent problem	.203	.273	.143	.136	-.045	-.310
Family discipline	-.261	-.104	-.203	.065	-.532	-.006
School variables						
Governing	-.341	-.007	-.229	.018	-.570	-.183
Faculty/administration coordination	-.263	-.391	-.040	-.063	-.135	-.084
Academic aspiration	.365	.211	-.075	.281	.360	.238
Authoritarianism	.282	.085	.035	.090	.163	.338
Grade as discipline	.209	.039	.160	.228	-.013	-.250



in which we observe very small negative correlation. This indicates that schools in high crime communities do suffer more school property losses. A high concentration of student population around a school in fact is associated with high property losses. This is true for all subsets of schools except suburban junior high schools. In respect to size, the larger schools appear to have suffered more property losses than the smaller schools; this holds true for all subsets of schools. Nonstudent youth problems around schools are associated with school property losses in urban and suburban schools, but not in the rural schools. In rural schools nonstudent youth problems do not appear to be a factor that affects school property losses; in fact, in rural settings those schools that indicated more serious problems with nonstudents appeared to suffer less school property losses than those that reported less serious problems with nonstudents.

The scores on the family discipline scale tend to be associated negatively with the amount of school property losses, with the slight exception of suburban senior high schools. This suggests that in fact parental discipline does reduce the extent of school property crimes, particularly with junior high schools in all locations. The association or relationship between family or parental discipline and school property losses is generally stronger for junior high schools than for senior high schools.

For the school-related factors, school management of its students is rather consistently correlated with low school property losses, in a manner highly similar to the factor of parental discipline. Again we observe higher correlations for junior high schools than for senior high schools. The degree of faculty-administration coordination and the degree of teacher authoritarianism are both consistently correlated with school property losses. The schools with relatively better coordination between teachers and administration generally have less school property losses, and the schools showing relatively greater authoritarian characteristics among their teachers tend to suffer more property losses.

With respect to frustration related to academic aspirations, the schools with students comparatively higher in their degree of academic aspiration are likely to have larger school property losses than schools where students are less academically inspired or competitive. A consistent positive correlation between student academic aspiration and total school property losses is observed in five subsets of schools; the exception is suburban junior high schools.

The practice of lowering grades as a disciplinary measure is positively correlated to the

total amount of school property losses among schools in urban and suburban communities, as suggested in the earlier discussions. However, in rural schools it is found to be negatively correlated with school property losses. This latter finding might imply that students in rural communities are less resentful of grade lowering as a disciplinary measure, or that they might be more tolerant of school discipline in general as compared to their urban or suburban counterparts. Another possibility is that rural students might be as resentful as urban and suburban students of the grade lowering practice, but the resentment is translated into other forms of behavior rather than property offenses against the school.

The outcome of the analysis thus far is that the zero-order correlation coefficients presented in Table A-28 are generally consistent with the theoretical conceptualization presented in the first section. However, because the 10 factors might be interrelated (cf. Tables A-22 through A-27), it will be important to examine the relationship between each factor and school property losses while holding the other 9 factors constant. To do so, multiple regression analyses using the least squares solution will be performed with school property losses as the dependent variable and the 10 factors as the predictors.

One of the key questions we are facing here is whether school property offenses are determined largely by external conditions such as the five background variables which are imposed upon the schools. If this is the case, events within the school might be the sheer reflection of external factors rather than having an impact of their own on school property crimes. In other words, the correlation coefficients observed between the five internal school factors and property losses could well be explained by relationships between the external background factors and the school property losses. To check whether this is in fact the case, rather than directly using all 10 factors as the predictors, the analyses will be performed in two steps: first, we regress only the five background variables on the school property losses; second, we will then include the five school factors as additional predictors. The results obtained will allow us to examine whether school factors in themselves reveal significant information with respect to school property losses.

The results of the two-step multiple regression analyses are reported in Tables A-29 and A-30 for the six subsets of schools. From Table A-29 we notice that with the five background variables, the factors of community crime levels, school size, and problems with nonstudent youth are consistently related to school property losses generally, as shown by the standardized partial

TABLE A-29

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES
(DOLLARS) AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE FIVE BACKGROUND FACTORS
AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Background variables	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural- Junior High	Rural Senior High
Community crime level	.210	.174	.056	.047	-.294	.263
Geographical concentration	-.155	.178	-.043	.228	.063	.255
School size	.172	.148	.344	.127	.093	.063
Nonstudent problem	-.164	.083	.083	.020	.314	-.183
Family discipline	-.269	.092	-.244	.160	-.698	.121
R ²	.195	.133	.178	.093	.398	.221
F	1.014	.584	1.302	.781	1.587	1.138

TABLE A-30

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES AS
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND THE TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.353	.263	.045	.049	-.281	.006
Geographical concentration	-.299	.136	.016	.122	-.199	.184
School size	.058	.015	.396	.074	.042	-.017
Nonstudent problem	.113	.121	.027	.053	.045	-.218
Family discipline	-.233	.325	-.220	.012	-.397	.081
School variables						
Governing	-.112	-.046	-.023	.081	-.469	-.282
Faculty/administration coordination	-.058	-.374	.161	-.025	-.052	-.035
Academic aspiration	.483	.110	-.122	.215	.385	.261
Authoritarianism	.092	.076	-.014	.013	.227	.290
Grade as discipline	.120	.089	.159	.173	-.242	-.288
R ²	.459	.277	.224	.159	.647	.416
F	1.359	.535	.723	.622	1.282	1.068
Additional % of variance explained by the five school factors	26.4	14.4	4.6	6.6	24.9	19.5

regression coefficients. We also notice that junior and senior high schools are clearly different with respect to the factors concerned with the concentration of students around schools and the extent of family discipline. For senior high schools the relative degree of concentration of students residing around school in fact increases the extent of school property losses. But for junior high schools the geographical concentration of students does not, in itself, appear to increase the chances of school property damage. This can be explained in part by the likelihood that senior high school students have greater freedom to frequent their schools than junior high school students. The partial regression coefficients do show that geographical concentrations of students around senior high schools is a relatively important factor compared to other background variables.

The effect of family discipline is just the opposite to that of geographical concentration. Family discipline appears to be an important factor that affects property losses for junior high schools but not senior high schools. It might be the most important factor, or at least one of the most important background factors, among the five we consider here for junior high schools.

The multiple R^2 shown in Table A-29 indicates the percent of the variance in school property losses that is explained by the five background variables. The variance is 19.5% for urban junior, 13.3% for urban senior, 17.8% for suburban junior, 9.3% for suburban senior, 39.8% for rural junior, and 22.1% for rural senior high schools. Thus, the background variables appear to explain school property crimes better for rural and urban schools than for suburban schools.

Turning to Table A-30 with both the school and background factors as predictors, we can examine the five background factors held constant and the five school factors controlled for one another. The relative degree of active school management of students appears to be negatively related to school property losses, with the relationship being stronger in rural schools. The coordination between faculty and the school administration appears to be very weakly related to school property losses, with the exception of urban senior high schools where we find a relatively strong negative partial regression coefficient. Both student academic aspiration and teacher authoritarianism continue to have positive effects in school property losses. And the practice of lowering students' grades as a disciplinary measure continues to have some positive effects on property loss for urban and suburban schools while it continues to show a negative effect for rural schools.

By comparing the results as depicted in Tables A-29 and A-30 we can conclude that school factors do have some additional effects on school property offenses. The correlations between school factors and school property losses as shown in Table A-28 are not simply the reflection of the effect of the background factors that are external to the schools. The changes in multiple R^2 from Table A-29 to Table A-30 indicate that school factors explain a substantial amount of the additional variance in the school property losses. The additional variances explained by the five internal school factors are, for urban junior high schools, 26.4%; for urban senior, 14.4%; for suburban junior, 4.6%; for suburban senior, 6.6%; for rural junior, 24.5%; and for rural senior high schools, 19.5%.

This concludes our discussion of the 10 factors considered to be fundamental in explaining school property crimes. However, certain other factors are also of interest and have not been included in the discussion. These additional factors will be examined in the next section.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

Various factors other than those included in the basic model can affect, in general, the extent of disruption and crime in schools. Some of these factors will be examined in this section to see whether they have a particular effect on school property crimes. The discussion here will, in effect, be a continuation of the earlier analyses and will focus on consideration of the additional factors of race, poverty, underachievement, low ability, behavior problems, academic relevance, teaching qualifications, pursuit of social recognition, and identification with teachers.

Consideration of Race and Poverty as Potential Factors in School Property Crimes.—It has been frequently reported in criminological research that race and poverty are two important factors in various crimes. The general finding has been that racial minorities and persons with a lower economic status in general are disproportionately represented both as offenders and as victims in crimes of various types. The question we ask here is whether school property crimes are poverty or race related.

If race is a determining factor, among others, in school property crimes, we would expect that the racial composition of school populations must be associated with the amount of school property losses. More specifically: if we posit that school property crimes are mainly caused by the minority students, then schools with larger proportions of white students would be better off, and those with larger proportions of

minority students would be worse off insofar as school property losses are concerned. Therefore, we will examine whether the percentage of white students in a total school population is in fact related to low property losses. Because the possibility also exists that school property crimes could be an expression of the resentment of minority students toward the authority of white teachers, the proportion of white teachers in schools in relation to the proportion of minority students must also be examined. If this suggested relationship holds, then we would expect that the schools with highly disproportionate numbers of white teachers will have more school property losses.

We will examine the relationship between the proportion of white students, or white teachers, and school property losses, while holding the background factors and school factors constant. Again, multiple regression techniques are used. The results are represented in Tables A-31 and A-32. A disproportionate percentage of white teachers is defined according to the following criteria: (1) for a school with more than 80% minority students, it is disproportionate if the percent of white teachers is greater than or equal to 50% of the total faculty; (2) for a school with between 20% and 95% white students, it is disproportionate if the ratio of the percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of minority students is less than 0.5. These two criteria essentially separate predominantly minority schools from integrated schools. Any school that meets either criterion will be assigned a value of 1 for this variable; a school that does not will be assigned a value of 0.

The results reported in Tables A-31 and A-32 are largely inconsistent from one set of schools to another. When holding the five background variables constant (Table A-31), the percentage of white students appears to be positively related to school property losses in four of the six subsets of schools that have been analyzed. Schools with disproportionately greater numbers of white teachers actually have less school property losses in four of the subsets. On the basis of these results, it is reasonable to conclude that antischool property crimes are hardly minority related.

We will now turn to poverty as a potential factor in school property crimes. If school property offenses are poverty-related or if they are committed more by economically deprived students than by the relatively affluent, then we would expect the family economic status of students to be related to the school's property losses. In particular, we would expect that schools with a larger proportion of parents on welfare or unemployed will suffer more property

losses. Here the principal's report on the percentage of students in his school whose parents are on welfare or unemployed will permit us to examine these variables while holding the five background factors and the five school factors constant. The results are presented in Tables A-33 and A-34.

As shown in Table A-33 the results indicate that there is essentially no relationship between the extent of school property losses and the percentage of poor students whose parents are on welfare or unemployed. We find that where the percentage of parents on welfare or unemployed is relatively larger, those schools actually have suffered less property losses compared to schools with a relatively smaller proportion of parents in these categories. This has been fairly consistently observed in the six subsets of schools. So the results just discussed suggest rather strongly that school property crimes are not related to poverty.

Underachieving, Low Ability, and Students With Behavior Problems.—Earlier we indicated the frustrations associated with high academic aspiration and competition as one important factor in explaining school property crimes. We found that schools with relatively high academic aspirations among their students generally suffer more property losses than schools where such aspiration is relatively low. However, an alternative interpretation is possible with respect to this particular finding: the relationship between high academic aspirations and the level of school property losses might be more indicative of the frustration of underachieving students in highly academically oriented schools. In other words, the positive relationship between academic aspiration and school property losses could be an ecological fallacy; the real factor could be underachievers or those who fail in their academic work, instead. The essence of this alternative interpretation is based on the possibility that school property crimes might be attributable to a small proportion of students who are academically underachieving or who have low ability to compete academically.

If underachieving students or students with low ability are responsible for school property crimes, we would expect schools with a relatively larger proportion of these students to have more property losses. To examine the hypothesis, we will use the mean of all teachers' reports on the percent of low-ability students and the number of underachievers among all the students they teach. This relationship is depicted in Tables A-35 and A-36.

The results indicate that, by holding constant the 10 factors in the basic model, the

TABLE A-31

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES (DOLLARS) AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND PERCENT WHITE STUDENTS, DISPROPORTIONALITY OF WHITE TEACHERS, AND THE FIVE BACKGROUND VARIABLES AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.252	.282	.130	.048	-.318	.330
Geographical concentration	-.100	.178	-.014	.211	.147	.334
School size	.168	.091	.286	.115	.130	.077
Nonstudent problem	.190	.152	.042	.009	.238	-.040
Family discipline	-.281	-.063	-.236	.176	-.491	.162
Percent white students	.168	.340	.110	-.039	-.140	.210
Disproportionality of white teachers	.239	-.046	-.178	.126	-.226	-.300
R ²	.254	.182	.209	.114	.440	.318
F	1.070	.761	1.317	.755	1.460	1.333
r between % white students and total property losses	-.230	.011	.046	-.158	-.426	.172
r between disproportionality of white teachers and the total property losses	.316	.000	-.230	.171	-.288	-.197

TABLE A-32

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES (DOLLARS) AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND PERCENT WHITE STUDENTS, DISPROPORTIONALITY OF WHITE TEACHERS, AND THE TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.405	.312	.168	.050	-.296	.088
Geographical concentration	-.204	.180	.049	.109	-.132	.262
School size	.063	.028	.325	.073	.075	.010
Nonstudent problem	.254	.089	-.071	.059	.007	-.001
Family discipline	-.331	.222	-.234	.021	-.237	.080
School variables						
Governing	-.137	-.078	-.040	.103	-.389	-.269
Faculty/administration coordination	-.096	-.353	.176	-.016	-.138	.106
Academic aspiration	.469	.151	-.119	.226	.358	.403
Authoritarianism	.049	.031	-.003	-.007	.264	.227
Grade as discipline	.150	.082	.204	.146	-.175	-.226
Percent white students	.314	.237	.234	-.015	-.172	.264
Disproportionality of white teachers	.036	.117	-.157	.137	-.166	-.278
R ²	.482	.303	.267	.178	.665	.483
F	1.317	.690	.910	.648	1.325	1.167

TABLE A-33

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND PERCENT PARENTS ON WELFARE OR UNEMPLOYED AND THE FIVE BACKGROUND FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.218	.215	.067	.054	-.261	.264
Geographical concentration	-.151	.210	-.052	.230	.079	.255
School size	.171	-.018	.340	.125	.053	.063
Nonstudent problem	.174	.251	.082	.019	.506	-.183
Family discipline	-.287	.008	-.251	.167	-.726	.122
Percent parents on welfare or unemployed	-.043	-.374	-.032	-.030	-.272	.001
R ²	.196	.194	.179	.094	.434	.221
F	.892	.921	1.164	.657	1.787	.995
r between percent parents on welfare or unemployed and total school property losses	.187	-.065	.029	.008	-.138	.019

TABLE A-34

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES (DOLLARS) AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, THE PERCENT OF PARENTS ON WELFARE OR UNEMPLOYED AND THE TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.356	.318	.061	.058	-.246	.007
Geographical concentration	-.281	.216	.002	.124	-.140	.192
School size	.062	-.250	.395	.071	.019	-.024
Nonstudent problem	.132	.318	.018	.051	.263	-.205
Family discipline	-.283	.271	-.225	.021	-.445	.064
School variables						
Governing	-.135	-.080	-.022	.074	-.437	-.288
Faculty/administration coordination	-.074	-.407	.145	-.027	-.119	-.032
Academic aspiration	.481	.053	-.148	.214	.334	.280
Authoritarianism	.070	.180	-.022	.012	.225	.286
Grade as discipline	.119	.090	.182	.179	-.199	-.287
Percent of parents on welfare or unemployed	-.101	-.452	-.083	-.040	-.234	-.045
R ²	.465	.352	.228	.160	.669	.417
F	1.343	.890	.726	.572	1.657	1.041

TABLE A-35

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES (DOLLARS)
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND PERCENT OF LOW-ABILITY STUDENTS AND THE
TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.389	.725	-.046	.039	-.318	.025
Geographical concentration	-.238	-.012	.070	.122	-.247	.180
School size	.053	-.261	.462	.080	.022	-.017
Nonstudent problem	.195	.325	.076	.059	.061	-.223
Family discipline	-.411	.183	-.280	.001	-.359	.075
School variables						
Governing	-.220	-.034	.027	.088	-.528	-.274
Faculty/administration coordination	-.179	-.383	.219	-.026	-.070	-.028
Academic aspiration	.402	-.049	-.051	.222	.449	.274
Authoritarianism	.047	.310	-.037	.008	.177	.274
Grade as discipline	.036	.083	.144	.176	-.332	-.289
Percent of low-ability students, mean of all teachers' reports	-.380	-.866	.283	.033	-.246	-.053
R ²	.501	.550	.271	.160	.691	.418
F	1.646	2.223	1.046	0.638	1.828	1.043
r between percent low-ability students and the total of school property losses	.113	-.254	.138	-.049	-.103	-.022

TABLE A-36

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE NUMBER OF UNDERACHIEVERS AND THE TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.318	.418	.019	.040	-.234	.094
Geographical concentration	-.180	.173	.050	.175	-.135	.210
School size	.148	.090	.428	.128	.050	.010
Nonstudent problem	.231	.155	.009	.040	.069	-.196
Family discipline	-.323	.275	-.240	.053	-.368	.091
School variables						
Governing	-.222	-.126	-.016	.054	-.506	-.288
Faculty/administration coordination	-.171	-.317	.198	-.024	-.065	-.063
Academic aspiration	.417	.115	-.102	.160	.320	.229
Authoritarianism	.050	.119	.014	.090	.266	.262
Grade as discipline	.160	.097	.175	.178	-.180	-.251
Number of underachievers, mean of all teachers' reports	-.453	-.355	.113	-.207	-.080	-.173
R ²	.555	.328	.233	.188	.649	.436
F	2.040	0.886	0.855	0.777	1.511	1.124
r between the number of under- achievers and the total of school property losses	.024	.016	-.006	-.069	-.027	-.080

percent of low-ability students present at school and the number of underachievers among all students actually are negatively related to the total amount of school property losses, with the exception of suburban junior high schools. Thus, the idea that school property crimes are due to the frustration of those who fail academically is not supported by the empirical evidence.

Let us now turn to another related factor. We have found that school property crimes can be attributable neither to the underachievers nor to the students with low ability. We may further ask whether they can be explained by the number of students who have behavior problems. The relationship between school property losses and the number of students with behavior problems is reported in Table A-37. Notice that the number of students with behavior problems for a school is measured by the mean of the numbers reported by all teachers of that school; thus it does not indicate the actual number of students with behavior problems. Instead, it is an indication of the relative number of behavior problem students for the school, as it is compared to other schools.

As shown in Table A-37, we notice that the average number of behavior problems reported by teachers is actually negatively associated with the total amount of school property losses when holding constant the 10 factors in the basic model. This finding holds true in five of the school subsets. Therefore, we conclude that the extent of school property crimes cannot be attributed to the small proportion of students exhibiting behavior problems.

Academic Relevance and Teachers' Educational Qualifications.--We may further ask whether the relevance of the subjects taught in schools, as well as the professional competence of the teachers, has any impact on school property crimes. Theoretically, it is conceivable that if the subjects taught at school are considered irrelevant by the students or if the teachers are not considered to be qualified professionally, students may react against these circumstances, and this may increase the probability of damage to the school. These relationships are reported in Tables A-38 and A-39. The relevance of the subjects taught at school as perceived by students is measured by the percentage of students who consider that their teachers are "almost always" teaching what they want to learn. Teachers' educational qualifications are measured by the percentage of the teachers who have some graduate training.

As shown in Table A-38, there is no clear indication that schools where a larger proportion of students consider the subjects as almost always relevant are any safer with respect to school

property losses. This is indicated by both the simple Pearson correlation coefficients and the partial regression coefficients with the 10 factors in the basic model held constant.

With respect to teachers' educational qualifications, we find that schools with highly educated teachers do not appear to have less property losses. Suburban schools appear to be an exception, where we find that both junior and senior high schools with better educated teachers do have less school property losses. In general, however, the results as reported in Tables A-38 and A-39 indicate that teachers' educational qualifications or the relevance of the subject matter taught at school are not the major sources of school property crimes.

Pursuit of Social Recognition and School Property Crimes.--School-related frustration is by no means limited to academic matters. Students have been frequently described as highly motivated at school by the achievement of social recognition as well as academic pursuits. The next question we will ask is whether student frustration resulting from the pursuit of social recognition may play a role in determining the extent of school property crimes. Undoubtedly social recognition, similar to recognition for academic achievement, is a limited resource or reward that is distributed in the school environment. Thus it is reasonable to expect that in a school where a large proportion of students are motivated to seek social recognition, frustrations associated with this pursuit are also likely to be high. If these frustrations are factors that lead to school property crimes, then we would expect that the school with a larger proportion of its students motivated to achieve social recognition is likely to have more school property crimes. To see whether this is true, we consider the percentage of students who attach no importance to leadership in school activities; this will be a negative indicator of the significance of competition for social recognition. The relationship between this indicator and the total amount of school property loss is reported in Table A-40.

We find that schools with more students who aspire to achieve high levels of social recognition do appear to suffer more school property losses. This holds true for five subsets of schools in the total of the six analyzed. This finding, together with our previous finding on academic aspiration, suggests that schools which provide an environment that either promotes the setting of realistic and reachable goals among their students or increase the opportunities for achieving academic or social recognition are likely to reduce their school property crimes.



TABLE A-37

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES (DOLLARS)
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS WITH BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS
AND THE TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.424	.320	.078	.054	-.223	-.0002
Geographical concentration	-.294	.206	-.018	.182	-.103	.175
School size	.111	.011	.393	.107	.044	-.021
Nonstudent problem	.243	.081	.079	.061	.210	-.222
Family discipline	-.324	.319	-.199	.055	-.409	.078
School variables						
Governing	-.122	-.122	-.063	.070	-.510	-.284
Faculty/administration coordination	-.168	-.377	.092	-.003	-.156	-.032
Academic aspiration	.407	.072	-.133	.198	.262	.261
Authoritarianism	.124	.096	-.008	.037	.261	.290
Grade as discipline	.234	.103	.164	.170	-.078	-.293
Number of students with behavior problem, mean of all teachers' reports	-.468	-.252	-.162	-.148	-.229	.020
R ²	.556	.323	.238	.173	.677	.416
F	2.045	0.869	0.880	0.705	1.714	1.037
r between the number of students with behavior problem and the total of school property losses	.053	-.120	.017	.032	-.086	.155

TABLE A-38

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES (DOLLARS)
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE SUBJECT-MATTER RELEVANCE AND THE
TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.347	.304	.039	.052	-.319	-.026
Geographical concentration	-.305	.136	.017	.154	-.183	.119
School size	.062	-.050	.392	.094	.116	-.023
Nonstudent problem	.105	.195	.029	.052	-.059	-.252
Family discipline	-.235	.286	-.229	.019	-.314	.054
School variables						
Governing	-.111	.051	-.028	.083	-.511	-.273
Faculty/administration coordination	-.059	-.351	.163	-.034	-.005	-.008
Academic aspiration	.485	.097	-.107	.238	.306	.284
Authoritarianism	.092	.075	-.018	.052	.274	.322
Grade as discipline	.121	.099	.165	.138	-.260	-.315
Subject-matter relevance	.024	-.163	-.046	.160	.184	-.088
R ²	.460	.288	.226	.179	.657	.418
F	1.392	0.735	0.823	0.732	1.569	1.045
r between subject-matter relevance and the total of school property losses	.077	-.030	-.019	-.006	.164	-.048

TABLE A-39

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES (DOLLARS)
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND TEACHERS' EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION AND
THE TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.346	.265	.067	.006	-.258	-.011
Geographical concentration	-.300	.133	.021	.159	-.168	.176
School size	.063	.004	.454	.107	.064	-.023
Nonstudent problem	.115	.137	.013	.053	.057	-.224
Family discipline	-.238	.335	-.314	-.008	-.383	.061
School variables						
Governing	-.117	-.043	.007	.029	-.471	-.282
Faculty/administration coordination	-.056	-.375	.176	-.056	-.061	-.013
Academic aspiration	.482	.111	-.055	.256	.351	.280
Authoritarianism	.082	.069	-.005	.028	.216	.308
Grade as discipline	.116	.089	.221	.195	-.206	-.293
Percent of teachers with some graduate training or above	.019	.041	-.211	-.213	-.050	.048
R ²	.460	.278	.255	.191	.648	.417
F	1.391	0.700	0.963	0.794	1.505	1.041
r between percent of teachers with some graduate training or above and the total of school property losses	.133	.026	.034	-.018	-.221	-.054

Identification with Teachers and School Property Crimes.—Throughout this analysis the important role that teachers play with respect to school property crime gradually emerges. This is implicit in the discussions of the management of students, academic aspiration, authoritarianism, and the use of grades as a disciplinary measure. On the basis of these indirect indications, it seems highly probable that strong identification with teachers by students may reduce the chance that students will commit property crimes against their schools. Here we will examine whether this is, in fact, the case. To do so, we consider the percentage of students who report that what their teachers think about them is very important; this is indicative of the degree to which a school's students strongly identify with the teachers and

accept the teachers as significant people. Using this indicator, the results of analyses regarding the relationship between strong identification with teachers and school property losses are reported in Table A-41.

The results as presented in Table A-41 indicate that schools where a larger proportion of students strongly identify with their teachers in fact experience less property loss, when controlling for the 10 basic factors. This holds true for all six subsets of schools analyzed. We may further note that the identification with teachers appears to be more important for the senior high schools than for junior high schools. This is reflected by the generally higher partial regression coefficients for the senior high schools.

TABLE A-40

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND STUDENT LEADERSHIP ASPIRATION AND THE TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.368	.206	.041	.022	-.277	-.071
Geographical concentration	-.339	.141	.005	.118	-.206	.133
School size	.037	.059	.453	.091	.040	.015
Nonstudent problem	-.068	.103	.032	.057	.045	-.304
Family discipline	-.180	.369	-.284	-.008	-.399	.158
School variables						
Governing	-.050	-.053	-.026	.072	-.464	-.314
Faculty/administration coordination	-.110	-.373	.125	-.016	-.052	-.107
Academic aspiration	.494	.084	-.194	.184	.403	.097
Authoritarianism	.227	.056	-.059	.012	.220	.270
Grade as discipline	.077	.131	.164	.198	-.249	-.341
Percent of students attaching no importance to being a leader at school	-.287	-.147	-.221	-.142	.030	-.234
R ²	0.450	.286	.257	.177	.647	.657
F	1.635	0.728	.973	0.722	1.503	1.104
r between percent students attaching no importance to leadership role and the total of school property losses	-.237	-.177	.012	-.159	-.042	-.193





TABLE A-41

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, WITH THE TOTAL OF SCHOOL PROPERTY LOSSES (DOLLARS)
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND STUDENT IDENTIFICATION WITH TEACHERS AND THE
TEN BASIC FACTORS AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Urban Junior High	Urban Senior High	Suburban Junior High	Suburban Senior High	Rural Junior High	Rural Senior High
Background variables						
Community crime level	.307	.198	.045	.026	-.260	.136
Geographical concentration	-.286	.142	.019	.090	-.244	.080
School size	.078	-.034	.393	.044	.060	-.056
Nonstudent problem	.124	.138	.030	.050	.026	-.293
Family discipline	-.251	.251	-.223	.021	-.389	-.018
School variables						
Governing	-.158	-.063	-.014	.123	-.428	-.210
Faculty/administration coordination	-.036	-.393	.171	.021	-.051	-.040
Academic aspiration	.482	.132	-.118	.301	.466	.454
Authoritarianism	.032	.088	-.016	.031	.201	.285
Grade as discipline	.119	.006	.156	.177	-.261	-.195
Percent of students considering very important how teachers think about them	-.096	-.168	-.028	-.303	-.103	-.332
R ²	.456	.296	.225	.238	.653	.451
F	1.424	0.764	0.818	1.05	1.537	1.195
r between percent of students consid- ering teachers very important and the total of school property losses	.147	-.119	-.109	-.232	-.111	-.019



APPENDIX B

NCES SURVEY REPORT

DESIGN OF THE SURVEY

The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) conducted a mail survey on crimes reported to police by school authorities to provide state-by-state data in time to meet an early deadline in the legislation. Data collection was based on a sample of approximately 8,000 public and private schools in the 50 States and the District of Columbia. The sample was structured to be representative of each State, level of education, and type of location. Two levels of education are distinguished: elementary and secondary. An elementary school was defined as having no grade higher than 8 and at least one grade between 1 and 6, inclusive; a secondary school has no grade lower than 7 nor higher than 12 and could have any single grade or combination of grades therein.

The three types of location distinguished in the NCES survey are (a) within the central city of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA); (b) within the SMSA but outside the central city area; and (c) outside the SMSA.

Principals in the 8,000 schools were asked to provide the number of criminal offenses in 11 categories reported to the police in a 5-month period between September 1, 1974, and January 31, 1975. Information on the value of property damage and destruction was collected from a sample of approximately 4,200 public school districts in which schools for the school-level sample were located.

The school district sample data were used to generate estimates in dollars of property loss due to illegal activity on school sites and on school-district owned property. The time period covered was the same as that for the survey of offenses in schools, i.e., September 1, 1974, to January 31, 1975.

DISCLAIMERS AND DATA LIMITATIONS

The Center disclaims responsibility for the accuracy of the data reported by respondents. The Center made a substantial effort to insure accuracy and has corrected many detectable errors that were reported. The Center employed standard, acceptable statistical methods in the process of generating estimates.

It is important to note that the period of coverage did not include the summer vacation period when many schools are closed. The rate of offenses against persons is expected to be lower during this period; and the rate of property losses, higher. The estimates, however, cannot reflect these variations in rates, since no data are available upon which adjustments could be based. The summer period could not be covered since Section 825 provided that state educational agencies must report these data "within seven months of enactment."

It is also important to note that the survey asked for data on only those offenses committed on school premises that had been reported to police. It is believed, therefore, that the estimates tend to underestimate the seriousness of the problem. Three factors support this premise.

First, data from victimization studies when compared to sources such as the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR) show that victims perceive substantially higher crime rates against persons than are reflected in UCR.

State and school district policies with regard to what must be reported to police and what may be handled within internal disciplinary procedures were found to vary greatly. Generally, serious offenses must be reported to police. Less serious offenses, particularly if the offender has committed an offense for the first time and no complaint is filed by the victim or his or her parents, are usually processed under terms of local disciplinary policies.

Finally, Section 825 provided no immunity against disclosure of data reported by respondents. Fear of disclosure with possible adverse public reaction is considered as a possible cause of underreporting. The magnitude of such underreporting, if any, cannot be measured or estimated.

The survey was retrospective in nature. No uniform recordkeeping system has been adopted by the schools. Some of the reports are known to be memory-based while others were record-based. The proportion, however, is not known. It must be assumed that, since offenses reported to police were to be reported, the effects of memory-based reporting on accuracy would be minimal.

SAMPLING ERROR

All of the estimates are subject to sampling error. A canvass of the estimated 115,000 schools and 16,000 school districts was not conducted because of the enormous cost to respondents and to the Government. There is a range about each estimate in which the true value would be found, had a canvass been conducted. This range is often called sampling error and is usually described as a confidence interval within which sample statistics would fall in 19 out of 20 (95% confidence level) repeated drawings of similar random samples from the population. Thus, the U.S. estimate for offenses reported by all schools of 280,703 could

vary from 252,633 to 308,773 or by about 10%, while for the elementary school estimate the range extends to about 15%. This illustrates that the smaller the sample from which the estimate is derived, the larger, proportionately, its sampling error. Or, the more detailed the data, the more they are apt to be affected by sampling error. On the whole the national estimates have reasonably small sampling errors, whereas those for the state estimates are considerably larger. Hence, state estimates, and certainly all those further refined (e.g., by level or location), should be considered indicators of orders of magnitude rather than measurements.

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED IN TABLES 1 THROUGH 7

1. Offenses Against Persons

- a. Rape—carnal knowledge through the use of force or threat of force, including attempted rape
- b. Robbery—theft, including attempted theft, directly from a person, of property or cash by force or threat of force, with or without a weapon
- c. Assault—unlawful physical attack by one person upon another, whether or not with a weapon, and whether or not the attack results in injury, including attempts to assault
- d. Theft/larceny—theft, without contact between victim and offender, of personal property or cash belonging to individuals, excluding auto theft.

2. Offenses Against Property

- a. Burglary—unlawful or forcible entry of a district-owned facility, usually, but not necessarily, attended by theft of supplies or equipment
- b. Arson—willful or malicious burning or attempt to burn property
- c. Bomb—use of, or threat to use, an incendiary or explosive device

- d. Disorderly conduct—unlawful assembly, riot, public demonstration, or other peace disturbance

3. Other Offenses

- a. Drug abuse—violations of State and local laws regarding the possession, sale, or use of narcotic drugs
- b. Alcohol abuse—violations of state and local laws regarding the possession, sale, or use of alcoholic beverages
- c. Weapons—unlawful possession of deadly weapons

4. Location: These classifications (called SMSAs) are based on a system developed by the Office of Management and Budget. Generally these comprise cities having a population of 50,000 or more and any surrounding counties that are economically dependent on the city.

- a. Metropolitan, central—within the city limits of the central city of an SMSA
- b. Metropolitan, other—areas within an SMSA but outside of the city limits of the central city of an SMSA
- c. Nonmetropolitan—all areas not included within the boundaries of any SMSA

TABLE 1

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF SCHOOLS REPORTING SPECIFIED TYPES OF OFFENSES TO POLICE BY LOCATION AND LEVEL: U.S. SUMMARY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1974 - JANUARY 31, 1975

Offense	All Schools			Elementary			Secondary					
	Total	Metro-politan, Central	Metro-politan, Other	Nonmetro-politan	Total	Metro-politan, Central	Metro-politan, Other	Nonmetro-politan	Total	Metro-politan, Central	Metro-politan, Other	Nonmetro-politan
RAPE.....	219	50	100	68	110	10	69	30	109	40	30	38
ROBBERY.....	3,067	1,350	1,137	579	1,306	708	367	230	1,761	641	770	349
ASSAULT.....	7,528	3,150	2,936	1,441	2,858	1,542	934	381	4,670	1,607	2,002	1,060
PERSONAL THEFT.....	14,064	3,888	5,881	4,295	6,719	2,140	2,771	1,807	7,345	1,747	3,109	2,488
BURGLARY.....	32,215	8,360	13,017	10,837	21,958	6,058	8,735	7,164	10,257	2,301	4,282	3,673
ARSON.....	3,518	1,297	1,514	705	1,445	709	477	258	2,072	588	1,037	447
BOMB.....	6,320	1,848	2,717	1,753	2,826	1,028	1,060	737	3,493	820	1,656	1,016
DISORDERLY CONDUCT...	7,888	2,320	3,168	2,399	3,703	1,335	1,366	1,001	4,184	984	1,801	1,397
DRUG ABUSE.....	9,938	1,918	5,095	2,924	2,453	307	1,523	622	7,485	1,611	3,572	2,301
ALCOHOL ABUSE.....	4,961	879	2,285	1,795	1,212	259	652	300	3,748	620	1,632	1,495
WEAPONS.....	4,193	1,715	1,753	724	1,585	721	653	210	2,608	993	1,100	513
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS REPORTING ONE OR MORE OFFENSES.....	46,349	11,422	19,156	15,770	30,245	8,137	12,541	9,566	16,104	3,284	6,615	6,204
PERCENT OF SCHOOLS REPORTING ONE OR MORE OFFENSES.....	49	61	50	42	41	56	41	34	72	82	81	61

TABLE 2

PERCENT OF SCHOOLS REPORTING SPECIFIED OFFENSES TO POLICE BY LOCATION AND LEVEL: U.S. SUMMARY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1974 - JANUARY 31, 1975

Offense	All Schools			Elementary			Secondary					
	Total	Metro-politan, Central	Metro-politan, Other	Nonmetro-politan	Total	Metro-politan, Central	Metro-politan, Other	Nonmetro-politan	Total	Metro-politan, Central	Metro-politan, Other	Nonmetro-politan
RAPE.....	.23	.27	.26	.18	.15	.07	.23	.11	.49	1.02	.38	.38
ROBBERY.....	3.25	7.30	2.97	1.55	1.81	4.87	1.22	.84	7.95	16.18	9.51	3.46
ASSAULT.....	7.98	17.03	7.67	3.84	3.96	10.61	3.09	1.39	21.07	40.54	24.72	10.50
PERSONAL THEFT.....	14.91	21.02	15.36	11.44	9.31	14.73	9.18	6.59	33.14	44.05	38.39	24.64
BURGLARY.....	34.15	42.20	33.99	28.87	30.43	41.69	28.92	26.11	46.28	58.04	52.87	36.37
ARSON.....	3.73	7.02	3.95	1.88	2.00	4.88	1.58	.94	9.35	14.84	12.80	4.43
BOMB.....	6.70	9.99	7.10	4.67	3.92	7.08	3.51	2.69	15.76	20.68	20.46	10.06
DISORDERLY CONDUCT....	8.36	12.55	8.27	6.39	5.13	9.19	4.53	3.65	18.88	24.83	22.25	13.84
DRUG ABUSE.....	10.54	10.37	13.30	7.79	3.40	2.11	5.04	2.27	33.77	40.63	44.10	22.79
ALCOHOL ABUSE.....	5.26	4.76	5.97	4.78	1.68	1.78	2.16	1.09	16.91	15.65	20.16	14.81
WEAPONS.....	4.45	9.27	4.58	1.93	2.20	4.97	2.16	.77	11.77	25.06	13.59	5.09

TABLE 3

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED TO POLICE BY LOCATION AND LEVEL:
U.S. SUMMARY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1974 - JANUARY 31, 1975

Offense	All Schools				Elementary				Secondary			
	Total	Metro- politan, Central	Metro- politan, Other	Nonmetro- politan	Total	Metro- politan, Central	Metro- politan, Other	Nonmetro- politan	Total	Metro- politan, Central	Metro- politan, Other	Nonmetro- politan
RAPE.....	262	70	113	80	121	21	70	30	141	49	43	49
ROBBERY.....	8,962	4,883	2,921	1,158	2,468	1,545	568	355	6,494	3,338	2,353	803
ASSAULT.....	26,710	13,071	10,722	2,816	7,952	4,668	2,611	673	18,657	8,403	8,112	2,143
PERSONAL THEFT.....	64,371	20,087	30,255	14,029	14,907	5,376	6,077	3,454	49,463	14,711	24,177	10,575
BURGLARY.....	78,897	22,844	33,143	22,910	48,291	14,907	19,200	14,184	30,606	7,937	13,943	8,726
ARSON.....	5,623	2,140	2,615	867	1,828	1,021	549	258	3,794	1,119	2,066	609
BOMB.....	12,886	3,642	5,856	3,337	3,996	1,369	1,562	1,065	8,889	2,273	4,294	2,322
DISORDERLY CONDUCT..	25,847	9,505	10,442	5,889	8,701	3,567	3,356	1,778	17,136	5,938	7,087	4,110
DRUG ABUSE.....	33,070	7,545	18,246	7,280	4,233	593	2,420	1,221	28,837	6,952	15,826	6,058
ALCOHOL ABUSE.....	14,707	2,465	7,699	4,543	2,004	449	995	560	12,703	2,017	6,704	3,983
WEAPONS.....	9,370	5,000	3,087	1,283	3,532	2,358	834	341	5,837	2,643	2,252	942
TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED	1/280,703	91,254	125,097	64,392	98,034	35,873	38,241	23,920	182,558	55,381	86,856	40,321

1/ Columns may not add exactly to totals because of rounding.

TABLE 4

ESTIMATED OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000 PUPILS IN MEMBERSHIP BY LOCATION, LEVEL,
AND TYPE OFFENSE: U.S. SUMMARY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1974 - JANUARY 31, 1975

Offense	All Schools				Elementary				Secondary			
	Total	Metro- politan, Central	Metro- politan, Other	Nonmetro- politan	Total	Metro- politan, Central	Metro- politan, Other	Nonmetro- politan	Total	Metro- politan, Central	Metro- politan, Other	Nonmetro- politan
RAPE.....	.006	.006	.005	.006	.004	.003	.005	.004	.008	.011	.005	.010
ROBBERY.....	.191	.414	.135	.086	.084	.209	.042	.042	.373	.762	.295	.159
ASSAULT.....	.570	1.109	.496	.209	.270	.631	.192	.080	1.071	1.917	1.015	.424
PERSONAL THEFT.....	1.374	1.704	1.401	1.041	.507	.726	.446	.410	2.838	3.356	3.026	2.091
BURGLARY.....	1.684	1.938	1.534	1.701	1.641	2.014	1.410	1.686	1.756	1.811	1.745	1.724
ARSON.....	.120	.182	.121	.064	.062	.138	.040	.031	.218	.255	.259	.120
BOMB.....	.275	.309	.271	.251	.136	.185	.115	.127	.510	.519	.537	.459
DISORDERLY CONDUCT.....	.552	.807	.483	.437	.296	.482	.247	.211	.983	1.355	.887	.813
DRUG ABUSE.....	.706	.640	.845	.540	.144	.080	.178	.145	1.655	1.586	1.981	1.198
ALCOHOL ABUSE.....	.314	.209	.356	.337	.068	.061	.073	.067	.729	.460	.839	.788
WEAPONS.....	.200	.424	.143	.095	.120	.319	.061	.041	.335	.514	.282	.186
U.S. RATE 1/.....	5.990	7.743	5.791	4.769	3.331	4.846	2.809	2.843	10.474	12.545	10.871	7.965

1/ Columns may not add exactly to totals because of rounding.

TABLE 5

ESTIMATED COST OF REPAIRING AND/OR REPLACING PROPERTY LOST AS A RESULT OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY BY LOCATION, LEVEL, AND TYPE OF PROPERTY: U.S. SUMMARY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1974 - JANUARY 31, 1975

Type of Property	Total	Metropolitan, Central	Metropolitan, Other	Nonmetropolitan
Supplies, including books..	\$ 7,926,164	2,925,796	3,338,306	1,662,062
Equipment.....	22,308,691	3,949,833	13,696,726	4,662,132
Physical Plant.....	59,487,517	15,517,911	34,351,531	9,618,075
Total.....	89,722,372	22,393,540	51,386,563	15,942,269
Cost per pupil in membership				
Supplies.....	\$.18	.30	.16	.12
Equipment.....	.51	.47	.66	.35
Plant.....	1.36	1.61	1.67	.72
Total.....	\$2.05	2.32	2.49	1.19

TABLE 6

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED TO POLICE BY STATE AND LEVEL
SEPTEMBER 1, 1974 - JANUARY 31, 1975

	All Schools	Elementary	Secondary		All Schools	Elementary	Secondary
U.S. Totals							
Alabama.....	3,005	1,081	1,924	Montana.....	1,732	247	1,485
Alaska.....	888	128	760	Nebraska.....	NA ^{1/}	NA	NA
Arizona.....	3,064	1,254	1,810	Nevada.....	2,135	435	1,700
Arkansas.....	2,069	816	1,253	New Hampshire.....	748	303	445
California.....	46,130	14,360	31,770	New Jersey.....	8,040	2,913	4,127
Colorado.....	3,352	789	2,563	New Mexico.....	3,656	837	2,819
Connecticut.....	4,624	1,904	2,720	New York.....	15,157	5,953	9,204
Delaware.....	1,526	637	889	North Carolina.....	6,776	3,423	3,353
Florida.....	15,085	5,747	9,338	North Dakota.....	518	147	371
Georgia.....	4,377	2,419	1,958	Ohio.....	14,843	6,065	8,778
Hawaii.....	3,781	729	3,052	Oklahoma.....	4,222	1,027	3,195
Idaho.....	819	177	642	Oregon.....	4,465	1,875	2,590
Illinois.....	16,368	5,383	10,985	Pennsylvania.....	9,681	2,692	6,989
Indiana.....	3,982	1,325	2,657	Rhode Island.....	1,148	410	738
Iowa.....	2,857	629	2,228	South Carolina.....	4,094	1,647	2,247
Kansas.....	2,804	604	2,200	South Dakota.....	1,413	524	889
Kentucky.....	3,103	1,411	1,692	Tennessee.....	4,954	1,859	3,095
Louisiana.....	3,635	1,690	1,945	Texas.....	11,906	5,528	6,378
Maine.....	1,203	433	770	Utah.....	1,749	430	1,319
Maryland.....	7,778	1,915	5,863	Vermont.....	365	107	258
Massachusetts.....	5,882	1,895	3,987	Virginia.....	4,507	2,341	2,166
Michigan.....	13,947	2,940	11,007	Washington.....	5,994	1,651	4,343
Minnesota.....	4,446	850	3,596	West Virginia.....	1,283	578	705
Mississippi.....	1,171	589	582	Wisconsin.....	6,217	2,160	4,057
Missouri.....	6,628	3,225	3,402	Wyoming.....	375	86	290
				U.S. Totals	280,703	98,035	182,668

^{1/} Data not available.

TABLE 7

ESTIMATED OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000 STUDENTS BY STATE AND LEVEL,
SEPTEMBER 1, 1974 - JANUARY 31, 1975

	<u>All Schools</u>	<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Second^{ary}</u>
U.S. Rate	5.99	3.33	10.48
Alabama.....	4.77	2.75	8.12
Alaska.....	11.31	2.66	24.94
Arizona.....	7.27	4.44	13.03
Arkansas.....	4.14	2.99	5.52
California.....	10.14	4.97	19.17
Colorado.....	5.50	2.26	9.85
Connecticut.....	6.91	4.40	11.52
Delaware.....	10.64	7.06	16.68
Florida.....	9.66	5.53	17.93
Georgia.....	4.50	4.00	5.32
Hawaii.....	21.17	6.37	47.56
Idaho.....	4.55	1.68	8.62
Illinois.....	6.39	3.06	13.72
Indiana.....	3.47	1.85	6.17
Iowa.....	3.21	1.12	6.83
Kansas.....	5.62	2.04	10.85
Kentucky.....	4.16	2.96	6.31
Louisiana.....	4.66	3.30	7.27
Maine.....	4.98	2.63	9.98
Maryland.....	8.65	3.66	15.63
Massachusetts.....	4.53	2.14	9.66
Michigan.....	6.20	2.12	12.76
Minnesota.....	4.50	1.59	7.91
Mississippi.....	3.36	2.82	4.18
Missouri.....	5.94	4.72	7.88
Montana.....	6.49	1.94	10.62
Nebraska.....	NA ^{1/}	NA	NA
Nevada.....	11.53	5.80	15.44
New Hampshire.....	4.39	2.65	6.75
New Jersey.....	5.10	3.80	7.54
New Mexico.....	12.97	5.15	23.59
New York.....	4.26	2.54	7.56
North Carolina.....	6.32	5.17	8.19
North Dakota.....	4.07	1.95	7.18
Ohio.....	5.67	3.72	8.88
Oklahoma.....	6.89	2.95	12.07
Oregon.....	9.56	6.54	14.38
Pennsylvania.....	3.39	1.51	6.51
Rhode Island.....	6.94	3.81	12.73
South Carolina.....	6.51	4.52	10.19
South Dakota.....	6.89	5.70	7.87
Tennessee.....	6.07	3.60	10.29
Texas.....	4.38	3.17	6.54
Utah.....	5.78	2.61	9.58
Vermont.....	4.09	1.69	9.99
Virginia.....	4.26	3.39	5.89
Washington.....	7.68	3.74	12.81
West Virginia.....	3.25	2.55	4.18
Wisconsin.....	5.70	3.14	10.05
Wyoming.....	4.20	1.61	7.97

^{1/} Data not available.

SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTERS 1 THROUGH 7

TABLE B-1.1

SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LEVELS
(PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS HAVING ONE OR MORE OFFENSES)

		<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Junior High</u>	<u>Senior High</u>
Trespassing	Elementary	--	--	--
	Junior High	*	--	--
	Senior High	*	ns	--
		<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Junior High</u>	<u>Senior High</u>
Breaking and entering	Elementary	--	--	--
	Junior High	*	--	--
	Senior High	*	ns	--
		<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Junior High</u>	<u>Senior High</u>
Theft of school property	Elementary	--	--	--
	Junior High	*	--	--
	Senior High	*	ns	--
		<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Junior High</u>	<u>Senior High</u>
Property destruction	Elementary	--	--	--
	Junior High	*	--	--
	Senior High	*	ns	--
		<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Junior High</u>	<u>Senior High</u>
Fire setting	Elementary	--	--	--
	Junior High	*	--	--
	Senior High	*	ns	--
		<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Junior High</u>	<u>Senior High</u>
False alarms	Elementary	--	--	--
	Junior High	*	--	--
	Senior High	*	ns	--
		<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Junior High</u>	<u>Senior High</u>
Bomb offenses	Elementary	--	--	--
	Junior High	ns	--	--
	Senior High	ns	ns	--
		<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Junior High</u>	<u>Senior High</u>
Disruptive behavior	Elementary	--	--	--
	Junior High	*	--	--
	Senior High	*	ns	--

Source: PRS

* Difference significant at $p < .05$ level (t test); ns indicates difference not significant.

TABLE B-1.2

SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES ACROSS LOCATIONS
(PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS HAVING ONE OR MORE OFFENSES)


		<u>Large City</u>	<u>Small City</u>	<u>Suburban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Trespassing	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	*	--	--	--
	Suburban	*	ns	--	--
	Rural	*	*	ns	--
Breaking and entering	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	ns	--	--	--
	Suburban	ns	ns	--	--
	Rural	*	ns	ns	--
Theft of school property	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	ns	--	--	--
	Suburban	ns	ns	--	--
	Rural	ns	ns	ns	--
Property destruction	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	ns	--	--	--
	Suburban	ns	ns	--	--
	Rural	ns	ns	ns	--
Fire setting	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	ns	--	--	--
	Suburban	ns	ns	--	--
	Rural	*	ns	ns	--

TABLE B-1.2
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES ACROSS LOCATIONS
(PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS HAVING ONE OR MORE OFFENSES) (Continued)

		<u>Large City</u>	<u>Small City</u>	<u>Suburban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
False alarm	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	ns	--	--	--
	Suburban	ns	ns	--	--
	Rural	*	ns	*	--
Bomb offense		<u>Large City</u>	<u>Small City</u>	<u>Suburban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	ns	--	--	--
	Suburban	ns	ns	--	--
	Rural	ns	ns	ns	--
Disruptive behavior		<u>Large City</u>	<u>Small City</u>	<u>Suburban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	*	--	--	--
	Suburban	*	ns	--	--
	Rural	*	*	*	--

Source: PRS

* Difference significant at $p < .05$ level; (t test) ns indicates difference not significant.



CONTINUED

4 OF 5

TABLE B-1.3

SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES ACROSS REGIONS
(PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS HAVING ONE OR MORE OFFENSES)

		<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>West</u>
Trespassing	Northeast	--	--	--	--
	North Central	*	--	--	--
	South	ns	ns	--	--
	West	ns	*	*	--
		<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>West</u>
Breaking and entering	Northeast	--	--	--	--
	North Central	*	--	--	--
	South	ns	*	--	--
	West	ns	*	ns	--
		<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>West</u>
School theft	Northeast	--	--	--	--
	North Central	ns	--	--	--
	South	ns	ns	--	--
	West	ns	*	ns	--
		<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>West</u>
Property destruction	Northeast	--	--	--	--
	North Central	*	--	--	--
	South	*	ns	--	--
	West	ns	ns	*	--
		<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>West</u>
False alarm	Northeast	--	--	--	--
	North Central	*	--	--	--
	South	*	ns	--	--
	West	ns	*	*	--

TABLE B-1.3

SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES ACROSS REGIONS
(PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS HAVING ONE OR MORE OFFENSES) (Continued)

		<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>West</u>
Fire setting	Northeast	--	--	--	--
	North Central	ns	--	--	--
	South	*	ns	--	--
	West	*	ns	*	--
Bomb offense		<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>West</u>
	Northeast	--	--	--	--
	North Central	ns	--	--	--
	South	ns	ns	--	--
West	ns	ns	ns	--	
Disruptive behavior		<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>West</u>
	Northeast	--	--	--	--
	North Central	*	--	--	--
	South	ns	ns	--	--
West	ns	ns	ns	--	

Source: PRS

*Difference significant at $p < .05$ level (t test); ns indicates difference not significant.




TABLE B-1.4

SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SCHOOL LEVELS
(PERCENTAGE OF SECONDARY STUDENTS VICTIMIZED)

		<u>Junior High</u>
Personal theft	Senior High	ns
		<u>Junior High</u>
Attack	Senior High	*
		<u>Junior High</u>
Robbery	Senior High	*

Source: Student Interview

*Difference significant at $p < .05$ level (t test);
ns indicates difference not significant.

TABLE B-1.5

PERCENTAGE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS VICTIMIZED
IN A MONTH

	<u>Junior High</u>		<u>Senior High</u>
SQ:			
Theft > \$1	16.03	ns	15.30
Theft > \$10	3.80	*	4.92
All attacks	6.94	*	3.01
Attacks/doctor	2.04	*	.95
All robbery	7.79	*	3.03
Robbery > \$10	1.49	*	.67
SI:			
Theft > \$1	12.44	ns	10.77
Theft > \$10	2.06	ns	2.74
All attacks	2.08	*	.97
Attacks/injury	.83	ns	.48
Attacks/doctor	.11	ns	.05
All robbery	.99	*	.31
Robbery > \$10	.04	ns	.00
Robbery/injury	.07	ns	.07

Sources: SQ, SI

* $p < .05$ (t test); ns indicates difference not significant

TABLE B-1.6

SCHOOL-LEVEL CORRELATIONS (PEARSON'S r 's) BETWEEN VIOLENCE (ASSAULT/ROBBERY) SCALE AND SEVEN SCHOOL CLIMATE VARIABLES, BY LEVEL AND LOCATION

	<u>Urban Junior</u>	<u>Urban Senior</u>	<u>Suburban Junior</u>	<u>Suburban Senior</u>	<u>Rural Junior</u>	<u>Rural Senior</u>
Students afraid at school (at least sometimes)	.399	.360	.303	.451	.300	.315
Students "carry something to protect themselves" (at least sometimes)	.431	.350	.216	.267	.123	.220
Students avoid hallways out of fear	.164	.315	.200	.197	.219	.395
Students avoid restrooms out of fear	.287	.238	.168	.031	.302	.305
Teachers sworn at (many times)	.244	.382	.172	.051	.048	.058
Teachers threatened (many times)	.125	.375	.019	.108	.214	-.032
Teachers hesitate to confront students (often)	.206	.262	.022	-.034	.322	.246

Sources: SQ, TQ




TABLE B-1.7
 PERCENT OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED IN A TYPICAL MONTH,
 BY SCHOOL LEVEL

	<u>Junior High</u>		<u>Senior High</u>
All robbery	.56	ns	.55
Robbery > \$10	.12	*	.31
Theft > \$1	11.74	ns	12.26
Theft > \$10	3.13	*	4.18
All attack	.77	*	.35
Attack/doctor	.16	ns	.11

* T=p<.05; ns indicates difference not significant

Source: TQ

TABLE B-1.8
 SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LOCATIONS AND LEVELS
 (PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED)

I. BY LOCATION

		<u>Large City</u>	<u>Small City</u>	<u>Suburban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Personal theft	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	ns	--	--	--
	Suburban	ns	*	--	--
	Rural	*	*	*	--
Physical attacks	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	*	--	--	--
	Suburban	*	--	--	--
	Rural	*	*	*	--
Robberies	Large city	--	--	--	--
	Small city	*	--	--	--
	Suburban	*	ns	--	--
	Rural	*	ns	ns	--

TABLE B-1.8
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LOCATIONS AND LEVELS
(PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED)
(Continued)

II. BY SCHOOL LEVEL

		<u>Junior High</u>
Personal theft	Senior High	ns
		<u>Junior High</u>
Physical attacks	Senior High	*
		<u>Junior High</u>
Robbery	Senior High	ns

Source: TQ

*Difference significant at $p < .05$ level (t test); ns indicates difference not significant.

TABLE B-1-9

MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION OF TEACHERS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
	(n = 273)		(n = 19,051)		(n = 211)		(n = 19,157)
Did anyone take things directly from you by force, weapons, or threats at school in (the target or pretarget month)?							
YES	13	*	0.8		100		0
Did anyone steal things of yours from your desk, coat closet, or other place at school in (the target or pretarget month)?							
YES	63	*	24		69	*	24
Were you a victim of rape or attempted rape at school in (the target or pretarget month)?							
YES	4	*	0**		6	*	0**
Did anyone physically attack and hurt you (not including rape or rape attempts) at school?							
YES	100		0		12	*	0.8

Source: TQ for 2 months

* $p < .001$

** Proportion less than .05%

TABLE B-1.10
 MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION OF STUDENTS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u> (n=160)		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u> (n=6,123)		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u> (n=93)		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u> (n=6,190)
Attacked	100		0		9.9	*	2.1
Robbed	4.8	*	1.0		100		0

Source: SI for 2 months

*p<.05 (t test)

TABLE B-2.1
 SOURCES OF DATA: SAMPLE SIZE AND POPULATION

<u>Source</u>	<u>Sample</u> n	<u>Population</u> N (in 000)
Student Questionnaire	31,373	21,265
Student Interview	6,283	21,176
Teacher Questionnaire	23,895	1,087
Schools that submitted PRSs	3,612	84.8
PRS received (monthly average)	1,675	157.1

TABLE B-3.1

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY SEX OF STUDENT*

Sex of Student	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
	(Source: Student Questionnaire**)	(Source: Student Questionnaire**)	(Source: Student Interview)	(Source: Student Interview)
Male	6.2 _a (n=15,106)	6.3 _f (n=15,043)	3.0 _m (n=3,103)	1.4 _x (n=3,103)
Female	2.4 _b (n=15,236)	2.7 _g (n=15,173)	1.3 _n (n=3,143)	.7 _y (n=3,143)

Sources: Student Questionnaire and Student Interview

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the p<.05 level (t test). The subscripts for attack and robbery and for the Student Questionnaire and Student Interview are independent.

**Student Questionnaire estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

TABLE B-3.2

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS INJURED, BY SEX OF OFFENDER*

Sex of Offender	<u>% of Victims Attacked and Injured</u>	<u>% of Victims Robbed and Injured</u>
Male	37 _a (n=174)	8 _x (n=108)
Female	34 _a (n=52)	21 _x (n=18)

Source: Student Interview

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the p<.05 level (t test). The subscripts for attack and robbery are independent.

TABLE B-3.3

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY GRADE LEVEL OF STUDENT*

What grade are you in?	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
	(Source: Student Questionnaire**)		(Source: Student Interview)	
7th	8.1 _a (n=6,935)	3.7 _g (n=6,903)	3.8 _m (n=1,426)	1.8 _{wx} (n=1,426)
8th	6.8 _b (n=6,918)	6.7 _h (n=6,886)	3.0 _{mn} (n=1,413)	2.4 _w (n=1,413)
9th	4.5 _c (n=5,179)	5.1 _i (n=5,149)	2.9 _{mn} (n=1,040)	1.2 _{xy} (n=1,040)
10th	3.1 _d (n=4,230)	2.4 _j (n=4,215)	1.8 _{no} (n=850)	.7 _{yz} (n=850)
11th	2.4 _d (n=3,847)	2.9 _j (n=3,842)	1.1 _{op} (n=833)	.2 _z (n=833)
12th	1.5 _e (n=3,173)	1.7 _k (n=3,169)	.7 _p (n=677)	.3 _z (n=677)

Sources: Student Questionnaire and Student Interview

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests)
The subscripts for attack and robbery and for the Student Questionnaire and Student Interview are independent.

**Student Questionnaire estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

TABLE B-3.4

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY AGE OF STUDENT*

How old are you?	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
	(Source: Student Questionnaire**)		(Source: Student Interview)	
≤11 years	9.8 ^{ab} (n=149)	13.7 ^g (n=148)	5.6 ^{noq} (n=39)	2.0 ^{vwxz} (n=39)
12 years	7.5 ^a (n=3,985)	6.9 ^h (n=3,962)	2.5 ^{np} (n=829)	2.1 ^{vw} (n=829)
13 years	6.8 ^a (n=6,500)	7.9 ^h (n=6,485)	2.8 ⁿ (n=1,318)	2.7 ^v (n=1,313)
14 years	5.5 ^b (n=5,715)	5.4 ⁱ (n=5,675)	2.9 ⁿ (n=1,166)	1.2 ^{wx} (n=1,166)
15 years	3.8 ^c (n=4,872)	3.8 ^j (n=4,851)	3.4 ⁿ (n=968)	.8 ^x (n=968)
16 years	3.0 ^d (n=4,136)	2.9 ^k (n=4,133)	1.0 ^o (n=814)	.1 ^{yz} (n=884)
17 years	2.1 ^e (n=3,566)	2.6 ^k (n=3,555)	1.2 ^{op} (n=749)	.6 ^{xy} (n=749)
18 years	1.6 ^e (n=1,277)	1.7 ^l (n=1,266)	.8 ^{oq} (n=275)	.0 ^z (n=275)
19 years +	7.2 ^{abc} (n=179)	8.0 ^{ghi} (n=176)	.0 ^q (n=38)	4.5 ^{vxz} (n=38)

Sources: Student Questionnaire and Student Interview

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the p<.05 level (multiple t test)
The subscripts for attack and robbery and for the Student Questionnaire and Student Interview are independent.

**Student Questionnaire estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

TABLE B-3.5

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY TIME ATTENDED PRESENT SCHOOL*

How long have you gone to this school?	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
	(Source: Student Questionnaire**)		(Source: Student Interview)	
≤ 1 month	7.1 _a (n=608)	3.1 _f (n=605)	4.7 _{mn} (n=120)	1.2 _x (n=120)
< 1 year	5.1 _{ab} (n=8,280)	4.9 _g (n=8,246)	2.9 _m (n=1,722)	1.3 _x (n=1,722)
1 or 2 years	4.5 _{bc} (n=10,929)	4.6 _g (n=10,854)	2.0 _{mn} (n=2,286)	1.2 _x (n=2,286)
3 or 4 years	3.2 _d (n=6,604)	3.5 _h (n=6,595)	1.6 _n (n=1,374)	.7 _x (n=1,374)
≥ 5 years	3.8 _{cd} (n=3,923)	4.5 _g (n=3,919)	1.6 _n (n=759)	.7 _x (n=759)

Sources: Student Questionnaire and Student Interview

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the p<.05 level (multiple t test)
The subscripts for attack and robbery and for the Student Questionnaire and Student Interview are independent.

**Student Questionnaire estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

TABLE B-3.6

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY RACE/ETHNICITY OF STUDENT*

How do you describe yourself?	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
	(Source: Student Questionnaire**)		(Source: Student Interview)	
American Indian or Alaskan Native	7.7 ^a (n=1,004)	7.6 ^f (n=1,008)	5.4 ^m (n=199)	1.9 ^{wx} (n=199)
Black or Afro-American or Negro (other than Hispanic)	4.4 ^b (n=4,933)	5.1 ^g (n=4,894)	2.1 ⁿ (n=1,034)	.7 ^{xy} (n=1,034)
White (other than Hispanic)	4.0 ^b (n=20,449)	4.0 ^h (n=20,411)	1.7 ⁿ (n=4,129)	.9 ^{wy} (n=4,129)
Hispanic (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or other Latin American)	4.2 ^b (n=2,015)	5.8 ^{fg} (n=1,975)	5.6 ^m (n=439)	2.3 ^w (n=439)
Asian-American or Pacific Islander (Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiian, etc.)	5.0 ^b (n=547)	5.4 ^{fgh} (n=541)	2.8 ^{mn} (n=127)	.0 ^z (n=127)

Sources: Student Questionnaire and Student Interview

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the p<.05 level (multiple t tests). The subscripts for attack and robbery and for the Student Questionnaire and Student Interview are independent.

**Student Questionnaire estimates high; to be used for comparative purposes only.

TABLE B-3.7

PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY SEX OF TEACHER*

Sex of Teacher	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
Male	1.0 _a (n=9,856)	.9 _x (n=9,906)
Female	.8 _a (n=9,250)	1.1 _x (n=9,240)

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the p<.05 level (t test). The subscripts for attack and robbery are independent.

TABLE B-3.8

PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY YEAR OF BIRTH*

When were you born?	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
Before 1920	.6 _a (n=1,175)	.7 _{xy} (n=1,172)
1920-1929	1.1 _a (n=3,103)	1.0 _{xyz} (n=3,101)
1930-1939	.8 _a (n=4,185)	1.1 _{xz} (n=4,193)
1940-1949	.9 _a (n=8,019)	.7 _y (n=8,037)
1950 or later	1.0 _a (n=2,695)	1.5 _z (n=2,710)

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the p<.05 level (multiple t tests). The subscripts for attack and robbery are independent.




TABLE B-3.9

PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY TEACHING EXPERIENCE IN CURRENT SCHOOL*

How many years have you been teaching in this school?	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
Less than 1 year	1.2 _a (n=2,077)	1.4 _{xy} (n=2,092)
1 to 4 years	.9 _a (n=5,792)	.8 _z (n=5,793)
5 to 9 years	.9 _a (n=6,115)	.9 _{xz} (n=6,132)
10 to 14 years	.8 _a (n=2,938)	1.4 _y (n=2,940)
15 or more years	.7 _a (n=2,232)	.7 _z (n=2,236)

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests). The subscripts for attack and robbery are independent.

TABLE B-3.10

PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY GRADE TAUGHT*

At what grade level(s) do you currently teach?	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
Grade 7	1.2 _a (n=5,825)	1.1 _x (n=5,830)
Grade 8	1.1 _a (n=6,327)	1.0 _x (n=6,347)
Grade 9	1.1 _a (n=7,829)	1.0 _x (n=7,859)
Grade 10	.7 _b (n=9,024)	.9 _x (n=9,066)
Grade 11	.7 _b (n=9,402)	1.0 _x (n=9,442)
Grade 12	.7 _b (n=9,095)	1.0 _x (n=9,147)

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests). The subscripts for attack and robbery are independent.




TABLE B-3.11

PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE BY CLASS SIZE*

	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
What is the average number of students in the classes you teach?		
≤20	.7 _a (3,815)	.8 _x (3,839)
21-25	.7 _a (4,310)	.7 _x (4,304)
26-30	.8 _a (6,283)	1.0 _{xy} (6,293)
31+	1.4 _b (4,228)	1.3 _y (4,234)

Source: TQs

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

TABLE B-3.12

PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE,
BY PERCENTAGE OF LOW-ABILITY STUDENTS TAUGHT*

	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
Of the students you teach, what percentage would you say are low ability?		
0%-33%	.5 _a (12,164)	.8 _x (12,187)
34%-67%	1.5 _b (3,962)	1.0 _x (3,961)
68%-100%	2.4 _c (1,880)	1.7 _y (1,886)

Source: TQs

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

TABLE B-3.13

PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY ACADEMIC AND
BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENTS TAUGHT*

		<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
Of the students you teach how many are:			
Underachievers	0-18	.5 _a (n=5,476)	.9 _x (n=5,490)
	19-37	.6 _a (n=5,612)	.5 _y (n=5,628)
	38+	1.6 _b (n=6,213)	1.3 _z (n=6,213)
Behavior problems	0-4	.3 _a (n=4,225)	.5 _x (n=4,246)
	5-10	.6 _b (n=6,989)	.8 _y (n=6,996)
	11+	1.8 _c (n=6,213)	1.4 _z (n=6,213)
Genuinely interested in school	0-29	1.3 _a (n=5,009)	1.1 _x (n=5,017)
	30-65	.7 _b (n=6,400)	.7 _y (n=6,402)
	66+	.8 _b (n=5,972)	1.0 _{xy} (n=5,991)

Source: TQs

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

TABLE B-3.14

PERCENT OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY RACE OF STUDENTS TAUGHT*

		<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
Of the students you teach, about what percent are:			
American Indian or Alaskan Native	0%	.8 _a (n=7,648)	.8 _a (n=7,666)
	1%-100%	1.0 _a (n=7,544)	1.0 _x (n=3,900)
Asian-American or Pacific Islander (Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiian, etc.)	0%	.8 _a (n=5,642)	.8 _x (n=5,653)
	1%-100%	1.2 _b (n=6,598)	1.1 _x (n=6,616)
Spanish-American (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or other Latin American)	0%	.6 _a (n=3,885)	.8 _x (n=3,889)
	1%-100%	1.2 _b (n=9,752)	.9 _x (n=9,781)
Black or Negro (other than Spanish-American)	0%-33%	.7 _a (n=11,703)	.8 _x (n=11,734)
	34%-67%	2.1 _b (n=2,332)	1.5 _y (n=2,332)
	68%-100%	2.4 _b (n=1,838)	1.8 _y (n=1,839)
White (other than Spanish-American)	0%-33%	2.4 _a (n=2,281)	1.0 _{xy} (n=2,287)
	34%-67%	1.5 _b (n=2,955)	1.5 _x (n=2,960)
	68%-100%	.5 _c (n=12,145)	.8 _y (n=12,171)

Source: TQs

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests).

TABLE B-3.15

PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS VICTIMIZED AT LEAST ONCE, BY RACE/ETHNICITY OF TEACHER*

How do you describe yourself?	<u>% Attacked</u>	<u>% Robbed</u>
American Indian or Alaskan Native	3.3 ^a (n=75)	.0 ^x (n=76)
Asian-American or Pacific Islander (Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiian, etc.)	1.2 ^a (n=114)	1.6 ^{xy} (n=114)
Hispanic (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or other Latin American)	.5 ^a (n=312)	1.1 ^y (n=314)
Black or Afro-American or Negro (other than Hispanic)	1.1 ^a (n=1,869)	1.2 ^y (n=1,883)
White (other than Hispanic)	.9 ^a (n=16,556)	.9 ^{xy} (n=16,574)

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*Column figures sharing a common letter subscript do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level (multiple t tests). The subscripts for attack and robbery are independent.

TABLE B-4.1

STUDENTS' AVOIDANCE BEHAVIOR, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
	(n=1,629)		(n=28,882)		(n=1,770)		(n=28,685)
Do you <u>stay away</u> from any of the following places because someone might hurt or bother you there?							
YES							
The shortest route to school	16	*†	8		19	*†	8
Any entrances into the school	20	*†	9		24	*†	9
Any hallways or stairs in the school	24	*†	8		25	*†	8
Parts of the school cafeteria	24	*†	9		26	*†	9
Any school restrooms	44	*†	21		42	*†	21
Other places inside school building	34	*†	12		32	*†	12
School parking lot	25	*†	11		25	*†	11
Other places on school grounds	42	*†	16		37	*†	16

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.001 (t test)

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE B-4.2

STUDENTS' PERCEIVED QUALITY OF SCHOOL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>	<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>	<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>	<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
	(n=1,629)	(n=28,882)	(n=1,770)	(n=28,635)
In other ways, how good is your school compared to other schools in this area?				
Not nearly as good	9 *†	3	8 *†	3

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.001

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE B-4.3

STUDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF PRINCIPALS, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>	<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>	<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>	<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
	(n=1,629)	(n=28,882)	(n=1,770)	(n=28,685)
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?				
DISAGREE				
The principal is doing a good job	19 *†	14	23 *†	13
The teachers are friendly	19 *†	11	20 *	11
The principal runs the school with a firm hand	21 *	14	23 *	14
The teachers are doing a good job	19 *	12	20 *	12
The principal gets out of his office and talks with the students	28 *†	24	30 *	24
The principal is fair	19 *	14	23 *	13
The principal is friendly	18 *†	12	22 *†	12

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.001

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).




TABLE B-4.4

STUDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHERS, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
In general, how often are teachers at your school like this?	(n=1,629)		(n=28,882)		(n=1,770)		(n=28,685)
ALMOST NEVER							
Teachers expect a lot of work from students	6	*	4		6	*	4
They are teaching me what I want to learn	26	*	16		26	*	16
They keep order in the class	15	*	5		12	*	5
The teachers are fair	19	*	9		20	*†	9
They are interested in the students	22	*	13		25	*	13
Teachers let students learn from each other in class	45	*	35		47	*	35
ALMOST ALWAYS							
They let everyone know who gets high and low grades	26	*	18		26	*	18

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.001

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE B-4.5

STUDENTS' REPORTS CONCERNING THE ENFORCEMENT OF SCHOOL RULES, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
How often are the following things true of your school?	(n=1,629)		(n=28,882)		(n=1,770)		(n=28,685)
ALMOST NEVER							
Everyone knows what the school rules are	16	*	7		14	*†	7
The school rules are fair	15	*	10		18	*	9
The punishment for breaking school rules is the same no matter who you are	23	*	15		23	*	15
The school rules are strictly enforced	16	*	9		15	*	9
If a school rule is broken, students know what kind of punishment will follow	24	*	14		24	*†	14
How often is your school like this?							
ALMOST ALWAYS							
Students need permission to do anything around here	56	*†	52		57	*	52
Students are paddled for serious rule-breaking	25	*†	17		27	*†	17
Students are treated like children here	26	*	16		26	*	16

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).



TABLE B-4.6

STUDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE AVAILABILITY OF HEROIN
AND STOLEN GOODS AT SCHOOL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>	
How easy or hard is it for students to get the following things at your school?	(n=1,629)		(n=28,882)		(n=1,770)		(n=28,685)	
VERY EASY								
Heroin	13	*	7		15	*	7	
Stolen things for sale	36	*†	21		34	*†	21	

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.001

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE B-4.7

STUDENTS' STATEMENTS REGARDING THEIR ETHICAL VALUES, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>	
How do you feel about each of the following ideas?	(n=1,629)		(n=28,882)		(n=1,770)		(n=28,685)	
AGREE								
People who leave things around deserve it if their things get taken	36	*	32		37	*	32	
Taking things from stores doesn't hurt anyone	9	*	5		11	*†	5	
People who get beat up usually asked for it	21	*	17		24	*	17	
If you want to get ahead, you can't always be honest	33	*	26		38	*†	26	

How much do you agree or disagree with
each of the following statements?

AGREE

If students are in a fist fight, let them settle it by themselves	31	*	25		34	*	25	
--	----	---	----	--	----	---	----	--

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.001

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE B-4.8

STUDENTS' PLANS FOLLOWING HIGH SCHOOL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
	(n=1,629)		(n=28,882)		(n=1,770)		(n=28,685)
What do you <u>want to do most</u> in the year after you <u>leave high school</u> ?							
Go to college	43		45		42	*	46
Go to business or trade school	8		9		8		9
Join the armed forces	11	*†	6		9	*	6
Get a job	21		22		25	*	22
Get married	4		4		5		4
Something else	5		4		4		3
I don't know	8	*	10		7	*	10
How much is school helping you get ready for what you want to do after high school?							
Not at all	14	*	8		14	*	8

Source: Student Questionnaire

*p<.01

†Indicates that Student Interview data also show a significant difference (p<.05).

TABLE B-4.9

TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY OF SCHOOL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

	<u>% of Attack Victims</u>		<u>% of Attack Nonvictims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Victims</u>		<u>% of Robbery Nonvictims</u>
	(n=273)		(n=19,051)		(n=211)		(n=19,157)
At your school during school hours how safe from vandalism, personal attacks and theft is each of the following places?							
VERY UNSAFE OR FAIRLY UNSAFE							
Your classroom while teaching	28	*	4		19	*	5
Empty classrooms	37	*	14		43	*	13
Hallways and stairs	50	*	13		35	*	13
The cafeteria	33	*	10		32	*	10
Restrooms used by students	60	*	28		53	*	28
Lounges or restrooms used by teachers	12	*	4		10	*	4
Locker room or gym	46	*	21		46	*	21
Parking lot	45	*	19		39	*	19
Elsewhere outside on school grounds	51	*	15		38	*	15

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*p<.001

TABLE B-4.10

TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS OF PRINCIPAL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

How well do each of the following characteristics describe the principal of your building?	% of Attack Victims (n=273)		% of Attack Nonvictims (n=19,051)		% of Robbery Victims (n=211)		% of Robbery Nonvictims (n=19,157)	
	NOT AT ALL							
Friendly	6	*	2		7	*	2	
Fair	11	*	4		14	*	4	
Shares decision-making	28	*	13		24	*	13	

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*p<.05

TABLE B-4.11

TEACHERS' MAINTENANCE OF CLASSROOM CONTROL, BY VICTIMIZATION STATUS

How often does each of the following occur at your school?	% of Attack Victims (n=273)		% of Attack Nonvictims (n=19,051)		% of Robbery Victims (n=211)		% of Robbery Nonvictims (n=19,157)	
	NEVER, OCCASIONALLY, OR ABOUT HALF THE TIME							
Teachers maintain control in class	25	*	11		25	*	11	
Which one of the following does your principal emphasize <u>most</u> ?								
Keeping control in class	6	*	2		2		2	
Which one of the following do you emphasize <u>most</u> ?								
Keeping control in class	27	*	18		23		18	

Source: Teacher Questionnaire

*p<.05




TABLE B-6.1

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS USING VARIOUS SECURITY DEVICES AND PROCEDURES, BY LEVEL AND LOCATION*

	Elementary				Junior High				Senior High				All Schools
	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	All Areas
1. Security locks on <u>any</u> outside doors	49 (277)	50 (261)	43 (538)	38 (333)	64 (288)	56 (280)	47 (583)	40 (375)	50 (298)	47 (251)	45 (593)	45 (345)	44 (4,422)
2. Security vault or safe	32 (276)	39 (264)	36 (546)	33 (335)	78 (289)	72 (279)	67 (586)	55 (374)	85 (300)	83 (256)	80 (592)	71 (347)	46 (4,444)
3. Security screens on <u>any</u> ground-level windows	64 (279)	30 (266)	17 (547)	16 (334)	69 (289)	32 (277)	14 (579)	19 (374)	58 (295)	24 (249)	15 (591)	11 (343)	21 (4,423)
4. Unbreakable glass or plastic in <u>any</u> outside window	71 (284)	53 (269)	44 (548)	33 (333)	67 (293)	56 (280)	47 (585)	30 (376)	61 (302)	50 (253)	42 (597)	25 (348)	42 (4,468)
5. Intrusion alarms on <u>any</u> outside doors	19 (273)	16 (269)	13 (550)	3 (334)	24 (288)	20 (270)	15 (585)	4 (375)	21 (298)	22 (254)	18 (595)	3 (346)	10 (4,443)
6. Intrusion alarms on <u>any</u> ground-level windows	13 (271)	9 (265)	6 (546)	3 (332)	12 (287)	7 (275)	4 (577)	2 (375)	10 (290)	15 (253)	9 (592)	2 (348)	5 (4,417)
7. Electronic intrusion detection system(s)	44 (279)	34 (267)	26 (553)	6 (334)	58 (291)	42 (279)	33 (589)	8 (375)	44 (303)	35 (253)	30 (594)	10 (348)	21 (4,465)
8. Automatic communication link with police	38 (282)	35 (273)	21 (548)	4 (336)	47 (283)	41 (282)	27 (588)	7 (374)	42 (294)	36 (252)	25 (590)	5 (344)	18 (4,446)
9. Portable emergency signaling devices	1 (275)	1 (261)	2 (537)	2 (334)	8 (276)	4 (274)	2 (577)	0 (373)	13 (290)	9 (251)	3 (583)	2 (347)	2 (4,378)
10. Closed-circuit TV monitors	1 (277)	0 (263)	1 (540)	2 (334)	1 (280)	1 (275)	0 (576)	0 (372)	0 (292)	4 (250)	0 (583)	0 (345)	1 (4,387)

Source: PQs

*Figures in parentheses indicate sample size upon which percentage is based.

TABLE B-6.2

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS EMPLOYING VARIOUS NIGHTTIME SECURITY PERSONNEL IN MONTH PRIOR TO STUDY, BY LEVEL AND LOCATION*

	Elementary				Junior High				Senior High				All Schools
	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	All Areas
1. Police on regular patrol outside school	8 (290)	14 (274)	23 (559)	18 (338)	12 (260)	15 (272)	18 (567)	22 (361)	10 (255)	13 (237)	18 (563)	20 (341)	18 (4320)
2. Security guard employed by school	13	19	11	3	13	21	10	6	20	28	12	7	10
3. Administrators specifically responsible for security and discipline	10	11	17	8	8	13	13	12	13	21	11	13	13
4. Janitor(s) as watchmen	15	32	36	17	22	34	35	26	23	26	33	36	28

Source: PQs

*Figures in parentheses indicate sample size upon which percentage is based. Sample sizes for items two through four are the same as those shown for item one.

TABLE B-6.3

PERCENT OF PHASE II SCHOOLS USING VARIOUS KINDS OF PERSONS FOR SECURITY PURPOSES ON WEEKENDS OR HOLIDAYS*

	JUNIOR HIGH				SENIOR HIGH				All Schools
	Cities Over 500,000	Cities of 50-500,000	Suburbs of Cities	Towns & Rural Areas	Cities Over 500,000	Cities of 50-500,000	Suburbs of Cities	Towns & Rural Areas	
a. Administrators and/or faculty members specifically responsible for security and discipline	13 (56)	10 (49)	6 (123)	12 (75)	15 (58)	19 (47)	10 (121)	16 (82)	12 (611)
b. Security guard(s) employed by school or school district	16 (52)	24 (48)	11 (110)	7 (67)	19 (56)	35 (45)	17 (116)	4 (76)	12 (570)
c. Police on a regular patrol outside the school	18 (51)	18 (47)	24 (110)	35 (67)	20 (53)	21 (43)	24 (113)	24 (70)	25 (554)
d. Janitors as watchmen	11 (52)	11 (48)	16 (108)	25 (69)	18 (52)	23 (41)	22 (112)	28 (75)	22 (557)

* Numbers of schools in the samples from which the percentages were derived are noted in parentheses.

TABLE B-6.4

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS EMPLOYING VARIOUS DAYTIME SECURITY PERSONNEL IN MONTH PRIOR TO STUDY,
BY LEVEL AND LOCATION*

	Elementary				Junior High				Senior High				All Schools
	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	All Locations
1. Police stationed in schools	3 (290)	0 (274)	0 (559)	0 (338)	9 (260)	7 (272)	1 (567)	1 (361)	19 (225)	10 (237)	3 (563)	1 (344)	1 (4320)
2. Police on regular patrol outside school	7	6	0	8	20	12	9	8	31	13	10	8	9
3. Security guard employed by school	29	10	4	1	55	17	6	1	66	38	17	3	7
4. Administrators specifically responsible for security and discipline	84	74	74	74	84	79	74	77	90	84	83	77	76
5. Janitor(s) as watchmen	23	33	26	23	14	21	23	23	11	23	20	25	24
6. Students from school as monitors	28	18	12	7	20	11	10	10	15	7	8	3	11
7. Parents as monitors	11	4	3	1	10	3	4	1	4	3	1	0	2

Source: PQs

*Figures in parentheses indicate sample size upon which percentage is based. Sample sizes for items two through seven are the same as those shown for item one.

TABLE B-6.5

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS USING VARIOUS DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL PROCEDURES,
BY LEVEL AND LOCATION*

	Elementary				Junior High				Senior High				All Schools
	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	All Locations
1. Students must show ID cards to authorized personnel when requested	1 (287)	0 (271)	1 (550)	0 (337)	8 (290)	6 (282)	2 (587)	3 (372)	34 (300)	19 (259)	5 (599)	11 (347)	3 (4481)
2. Students must carry hall passes if out of class	32 (286)	10 (273)	9 (555)	7 (337)	73 (294)	63 (283)	54 (590)	45 (377)	55 (303)	49 (258)	36 (600)	37 (352)	21 (4508)
3. Visitors must check in at office	64 (290)	51 (274)	45 (555)	33 (336)	82 (295)	73 (285)	62 (587)	58 (378)	76 (299)	63 (259)	54 (601)	50 (351)	47 (4510)
4. Suspensions	39 (290)	20 (274)	13 (559)	11 (338)	80 (260)	80 (272)	76 (567)	63 (361)	71 (255)	83 (237)	80 (563)	56 (344)	32 (4320)
5. Expulsion	4 (290)	0 (274)	1 (559)	1 (338)	13 (260)	9 (272)	7 (567)	9 (361)	15 (255)	17 (237)	13 (563)	10 (344)	4 (4320)
6. Paddling	--	--	--	--	16 (56)	43 (51)	52 (126)	61 (77)	18 (59)	25 (47)	16 (124)	33 (83)	36 (623)
7. Assignment to special day-long class for disruptive students	9 (290)	4 (274)	3 (559)	2 (338)	19 (260)	19 (272)	17 (567)	2 (361)	7 (255)	11 (237)	15 (563)	10 (344)	6 (4320)
8. Transfer to another regular school (social transfer)	--	--	--	--	38 (56)	21 (51)	5 (126)	2 (77)	32 (59)	16 (47)	8 (124)	3 (83)	8 (623)
9. Transfer to special school for disruptive students	6 (290)	2 (274)	1 (559)	1 (338)	25 (260)	16 (272)	8 (567)	5 (361)	26 (255)	22 (237)	10 (563)	3 (344)	4 (4320)
10. Referral to community mental health agency as disruptive student	--	--	--	--	46 (56)	31 (51)	25 (126)	16 (77)	32 (59)	36 (47)	16 (124)	18 (83)	26 (623)

Source: PQs

*Figures in parentheses indicate sample size on which percentages are based.

TABLE B-6.6

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS RECEIVING "VERY MUCH" SUPPORT FROM VARIOUS COMMUNITY SOURCES IN THE HANDLING OF DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS, BY LEVEL AND LOCATION

	Elementary				Junior High				Senior High				All Schools
	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	Large Cities	Small Cities	Suburban Areas	Rural Areas	All Locations
1. Parents	49 (275)	60 (247)	60 (464)	47 (287)	43 (289)	53 (278)	54 (577)	43 (360)	40 (297)	45 (251)	50 (583)	34 (336)	51 (4244)
2. Local Police	24 (257)	37 (215)	44 (395)	35 (259)	38 (290)	49 (271)	48 (544)	43 (360)	43 (299)	53 (247)	56 (583)	43 (330)	41 (4041)
3. Local Courts	7 (230)	16 (194)	19 (352)	18 (234)	7 (278)	10 (266)	12 (528)	20 (345)	10 (289)	17 (247)	12 (570)	16 (318)	16 (3851)
4. Schoolboard	22 (245)	44 (213)	60 (404)	61 (202)	27 (283)	55 (266)	62 (553)	69 (351)	30 (285)	53 (245)	66 (577)	70 (329)	53 (4013)
5. School system central office	29 (256)	53 (229)	65 (418)	69 (270)	34 (283)	63 (273)	65 (563)	75 (357)	37 (298)	59 (247)	69 (579)	74 (328)	64 (4101)

Source: PQs

*Figures in parentheses indicate sample size upon which percentages are based.

TABLE B-7.1

NUMBERS OF STUDENTS, TEACHERS, AND PRINCIPALS MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS

	Sample <u>N</u>	Weighted <u>N</u>
Students:		
Junior	16,551	6,900,389
Senior	14,822	14,365,037
Teachers:		
Junior	9,485	357,978
Senior	14,410	728,191
Principals:		
Elementary	1,461	58,798
Junior	1,555	11,173
Senior	1,517	15,680

TABLE B-7.2

WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES OF PRINCIPAL, SECONDARY TEACHER, AND SECONDARY STUDENT RECOMMENDATIONS
BY THE EIGHT CLUSTERS AND "OPEN-ENDED" CATEGORIES WITHIN THE CLUSTERS

Cluster and Category Codes	Description of Clusters and "Open- ended" Categories Within Clusters	Weighted Percentages			
		Principal Successful Recommendation PQ (Item 22&72)	Principal General Recommendation PQ (Item 25&75)	Secondary Teacher Recommendation TQ (Item 40)	Secondary Student Recommendation SQ (Item 68)
I	<u>Security Devices</u>	13.37*	4.91	5.91	8.50
011	detection systems, alarms, etc.	4.32	1.61	1.37	3.11
012	lighting	2.99	2.06	.87	.35
013	fences, gates, window screens, etc.	1.44	.98	.66	.53
014	locks	5.93	1.56	3.73	4.54
018	guard dogs	.07	.22	.39	.32
010	protection of valuables	.10	.03	.00	.67
II	<u>Security Personnel</u>	6.73	4.62	10.30	17.11
015	police	2.50	1.74	2.61	8.11
016	custodians	1.07	.86	.24	.09
017	school security officers	3.80	2.51	8.05	9.52
III	<u>Discipline and Supervision</u>	11.85	15.27	42.14	33.95
021	enforcement of rules, suspension, etc.	4.36	6.37	23.93	17.73
023	restitution, payment	1.78	2.41	6.66	.30
025	special classes, expulsion	.67	2.22	6.96	4.48
029	other	.22	.14	1.12	.45
026	monitoring, watching	5.12	2.72	10.26	9.93
027	controlling movement, student ID, etc.	.90	.66	2.99	1.17
028	let principal handle it	.20	.00	.20	1.19
053	strict enforcement of law by courts, police, etc.	2.66	4.91	8.09	2.90
054	cooperation from criminal justice system	1.09	2.14	1.49	.16
066	other court action	.00	.02	.36	.00

*Each cluster percentage is based on the rule that, if the principal, teacher, or student mentioned at least one of the categories within the cluster, the analysis unit was recorded as "having the cluster."

TABLE B-7.2

WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES OF PRINCIPAL, SECONDARY TEACHER, AND SECONDARY STUDENT RECOMMENDATIONS
BY THE EIGHT CLUSTERS AND "OPEN-ENDED" CATEGORIES WITHIN THE CLUSTERS (Continued)

Cluster and Category Codes	Description of Clusters and "Open- ended" Categories Within Clusters	Weighted Percentages			
		Principal Successful Recommendation PQ (Item 22&72)	Principal General Recommendation PQ (Item 25&75)	Secondary Teacher Recommendation TQ (Item 40)	Secondary Student Recommendation SQ (Item 68)
IV	<u>Curriculum and Counseling</u>	<u>1.83</u>	<u>3.31</u>	<u>6.16</u>	<u>2.29</u>
031	good vocational, educational, work study courses	.06	.61	.91	.03
032	better curriculum, better teaching, better courses	.58	2.18	3.00	.30
024	individual attention (counseling, social work, etc.)	1.51	1.08	2.84	2.00
V	<u>Training and Organization Change</u>	<u>6.50</u>	<u>8.04</u>	<u>9.45</u>	<u>3.44</u>
033	organizational change	.25	.19	.74	.07
034	change in school personnel	.27	.87	1.88	.50
035	in-service training on discipline, students' rights	.41	.72	.82	.04
039	other relating to curriculum and organization	.17	.37	1.04	.09
044	citizenship program, student rights, respon- sibilities, etc.	1.45	1.78	2.48	.24
045	awareness campaigns against school crime	4.63	4.50	3.11	2.54
VI	<u>Physical Plant Improvement</u>	<u>.81</u>	<u>1.55</u>	<u>2.93</u>	<u>.37</u>
046	keep school shipshape	.48	.59	.77	.22
047	allowing smoking area	.01	.05	.05	.04
057	make schools and classrooms smaller	.18	.93	2.18	.11
070	enrollments and crowding	.03	.01	.00	.00

TABLE B-7.2

WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES OF PRINCIPAL, SECONDARY TEACHER, AND SECONDARY STUDENT RECOMMENDATIONS
BY THE EIGHT CLUSTERS AND "OPEN-ENDED" CATEGORIES WITHIN THE CLUSTERS (Continued)

Cluster and Category Codes	Description of Clusters and "Open- ended" Categories Within Clusters	Weighted Percentages			
		Principal Successful Recommendation PQ (Item 22&72)	Principal General Recommendation PQ (Item 25&75)	Secondary Teacher Recommendation TQ (Item 40)	Secondary Student Recommendation SQ (Item 68)
<u>VII</u>	<u>Parental Involvement and Community Relations</u>	<u>5.84</u>	<u>12.25</u>	<u>16.28</u>	<u>1.21</u>
022	parental conferences	1.35	1.38	.96	.54
050	parental responsibilities for rearing their children	.16	1.47	3.76	.13
051	parental involvement, support for school	2.55	5.00	6.72	.26
052	parental relations with community, community involvement	1.42	4.53	2.70	.05
055	support from schoolboard principal, public agencies	1.11	1.65	4.60	.26
059	other related to community and society	.02	.21	.91	.04
<u>VIII</u>	<u>Improve School Climate</u>	<u>6.18</u>	<u>10.55</u>	<u>11.29</u>	<u>4.78</u>
041	good relations, understanding, mutual respect, etc.	1.92	2.88	4.99	3.64
042	student pride, school spirit	4.14	6.87	4.19	.54
043	student participation in decisionmaking	2.01	2.81	3.42	.62
049	other relating to interaction in school	.08	.27	.33	.06
058	interracial or interethnic problems	.01	.00	.03	.05
067	negative student attitudes, turned off, etc.	.00	.05	.21	.01
068	antisocial groups, gangs, troublemakers	.00	.03	.00	.00

TABLE B-7.3

WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES USED FOR FIGURES OF RECOMMENDATIONS CHAPTER

Figure Number	Reporting Groups	Sample Size n	Security Devices I	Security Personnel II	Discipline and Supervision III	Curriculum and Counseling IV	Training and Organization Change V	Physical Plant Improvement VI	Parental Involvement and Community Relations VII	School Climate VIII	
1	U.S.	4533	13.37	6.73	11.85	1.83	6.50	.81	5.84	6.18	
Principal Successful Recommendations											
2	Principal	Elem. School	1461	13.73	6.21	8.18	1.38	6.52	0.89	6.23	5.11
	Successful	Jr. High School	1555	14.56	6.84	20.82	3.97	6.74	0.74	7.10	9.84
	Recommendations	Sr. High School	1517	11.14	8.60	19.23	2.00	6.24	0.58	3.48	7.61
3	Principal	> 500k	892	20.85	12.91	21.20	2.59	14.78	0.76	11.27	10.90
	Successful	50k-500k	818	16.40	8.32	13.32	3.11	8.59	0.63	8.88	10.35
	Recommendations	Remaining SMSA	1755	13.76	6.68	12.58	2.17	8.18	0.62	6.66	7.16
		Non-SMSA	1068	10.75	5.24	9.12	0.97	2.86	1.06	3.18	3.13
4	Principal	0 Incidents	1293	11.59	5.48	6.40	0.91	5.31	0.75	4.68	4.32
	Successful	1-9 Incidents	2019	15.92	8.61	18.50	3.03	7.31	1.10	7.03	8.49
	Recommendations	10 or more Incd.	430	29.54	16.18	35.84	6.63	18.82	1.32	8.92	15.55
5	Principal	4533	4.91	4.62	15.27	3.31	8.04	1.55	12.25	10.55	
	General	Teacher	23,895	5.91	10.30	42.14	6.16	9.45	2.93	16.28	11.29
	Recommendations	Student	31,373	8.50	17.11	33.95	2.29	3.44	0.37	1.21	4.78
6	Student	Jr. High School	16,551	10.00	13.83	29.74	2.37	2.52	0.33	1.68	4.23
	Recommendations	Sr. High School	14,822	7.78	18.68	35.97	2.25	3.88	0.39	0.98	5.04
7	Student	> 500k	5626	6.15	24.59	24.55	1.71	2.81	0.27	1.81	4.32
	Recommendations	50k-500k	4775	8.10	17.86	30.35	2.02	2.78	0.53	0.83	4.45
		Remaining SMSA	12672	8.40	17.04	34.67	2.38	3.51	0.44	1.24	4.88
		Non-SMSA	8300	9.42	14.89	37.14	2.45	3.81	0.25	1.17	4.92

TABLE B-7.3
WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES USED FOR FIGURES OF RECOMMENDATIONS CHAPTER (Continued)

Figure Number	Reporting Groups	Sample Size n	Security Devices I	Security Personnel II	Discipline and Supervision III	Curriculum and Counseling IV	Training and Organization Change V	Physical Plant Improvement VI	Parental Involvement and Community Relations VII	School Climate VIII
8										
Student Recommendations	None	19,889	7.97	17.51	34.04	2.40	3.60	0.34	1.28	4.71
	1-3 Incidents	7368	10.23	17.25	36.24	2.30	3.37	0.37	0.98	5.32
	4 or more Incd.	2979	8.87	15.05	31.21	1.73	3.09	0.71	1.32	4.74
9										
Teacher Recommendations	Jr. High School	9485	6.28	10.14	42.67	6.08	9.29	3.53	17.68	10.80
	Sr. High School	14410	5.73	10.38	41.87	6.20	9.52	2.64	15.60	11.53
10										
Teacher Recommendations	>500k	5410	8.53	18.13	42.50	6.52	10.59	3.72	17.55	9.09
	50k-500k	4368	5.67	12.07	45.54	5.84	8.59	2.46	16.98	10.53
	Remaining SMSA	9709	5.88	9.93	43.32	5.80	9.24	3.48	16.44	10.86
	Non-SMSA	4408	5.41	8.05	39.12	6.65	9.80	2.29	15.47	12.69
11										
Teacher Recommendations	None	18103	5.57	9.99	41.02	6.05	9.25	2.84	15.82	11.18
	One Incident	2087	7.89	11.35	46.21	6.17	11.83	3.22	17.80	11.49
	2 or more Incd.	2733	6.75	11.70	48.45	6.98	9.69	3.21	19.24	11.11
12										
Principal General Recommendations	Elem. School	1461	5.23	4.96	13.56	3.07	8.60	1.57	13.34	10.53
	Jr. High School	1555	4.89	4.47	21.06	4.97	7.79	1.93	12.57	14.45
	Sr. High School	1517	3.73	3.44	17.57	3.02	6.12	1.22	7.94	7.85
13										
Principal General Recommendations	> 500k	892	9.38	9.69	20.00	2.33	14.23	1.28	15.38	12.47
	50k-500k	818	4.01	3.94	16.69	3.09	7.79	0.75	14.78	15.52
	Remaining SMSA	1755	3.93	4.80	15.31	3.92	8.77	1.54	12.37	10.68
	Non-SMSA	1068	5.38	3.83	13.99	2.97	6.40	1.87	10.79	8.48
14										
Principal General Recommendations	None	1293	4.77	4.61	14.64	3.38	8.88	1.33	12.22	9.63
	1-9 Incidents	2019	4.75	4.83	16.60	2.93	6.42	1.84	11.14	11.19
	10 or more Incd.	430	10.48	9.11	22.25	4.42	20.76	1.53	14.49	16.10

TABLE B-7.4


SAMPLING ERRORS OF WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES OF RECOMMENDATIONS CHAPTER

Figure Number	Reporting Groups	Sample Size n	Security Devices I	Security Personnel II	Discipline and Supervision III	Curriculum and Counseling IV	Training and Organization Change V	Physical Plant Improvement VI	Parental Involvement and Community Relations VII	School Climate VIII
1	U.S.	4533	.83	.52	.63	.24	.50	.30	.51	.44
Principal Successful Recommendations										
2	Elem. School	1461	1.16	0.70	0.81	0.32	0.69	0.43	0.72	0.54
	Jr. High School	1555	1.06	0.71	1.21	0.52	0.68	0.21	0.79	0.91
	Sr. High School	1517	1.01	0.96	1.38	0.37	0.79	0.16	0.58	1.08
3	> 500k	892	2.32	1.86	2.14	0.56	1.80	0.29	1.68	1.72
	50k-500k	818	1.98	1.36	1.47	0.67	1.35	0.33	1.52	1.46
	Remaining SMSA	1755	1.20	0.73	1.03	0.51	0.96	0.23	0.92	0.76
	Non-SMSA	1068	1.48	0.91	1.03	0.23	0.64	0.67	0.70	0.57
4	0 Incidents	1293	1.32	0.70	0.76	0.27	0.74	0.50	0.81	0.64
	1-9 Incidents	2019	1.38	1.06	1.39	0.56	0.84	0.57	0.89	0.87
	10 or more Incd.	430	5.90	2.49	3.87	1.56	6.31	0.50	2.01	2.49
5	Principal	4533	0.58	0.54	0.85	0.42	0.68	0.35	0.83	0.76
	Teacher	23,895	0.25	0.35	0.73	0.26	0.26	0.20	0.44	0.38
	Student	31,373	0.32	0.52	0.77	0.12	0.14	0.05	0.08	0.20
6	Jr. High School	16,551	0.44	0.58	0.70	0.21	0.17	0.06	0.18	0.23
	Sr. High School	14,822	0.43	0.61	0.92	0.13	0.21	0.07	0.11	0.28
7	< 500k	5626	0.56	1.22	0.96	0.21	0.33	0.07	0.33	0.36
	50k-500k	4775	0.55	1.72	1.58	0.28	0.32	0.17	0.12	0.44
	Remaining SMSA	12672	0.46	0.84	1.42	0.19	0.18	0.11	0.14	0.34
	Non-SMSA	8300	0.69	0.67	1.05	0.23	0.31	0.06	0.13	0.31

TABLE B-7.4


SAMPLING ERRORS OF WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES OF RECOMMENDATIONS CHAPTER (Continued)

Figure Number	Reporting Groups	Sample Size n	Security Devices I	Security Personnel II	Discipline and Supervision III	Curriculum and Counseling IV	Training and Organization Change V	Physical Plant Improvement VI	Parental Involvement and Community Relations VII	School Climate VIII
8										
Student Recommendations	None	19,889	0.37	0.58	0.91	0.16	0.20	0.07	0.10	0.25
	1-3 Incidents	7368	0.46	0.74	0.96	0.22	0.26	0.10	0.13	0.34
	4 or more Incd.	2979	0.69	0.85	1.11	0.37	0.38	0.22	0.29	0.58
9										
Teacher Recommendations	Jr. High School	9485	0.43	0.66	0.88	0.34	0.37	0.31	0.65	0.56
	Sr. High School	14410	0.26	0.62	0.94	0.36	0.35	0.21	0.46	0.43
10										
Teacher Recommendations	>500k	4510	0.54	1.11	1.58	0.46	0.61	0.43	0.84	0.58
	50k-500k	4368	0.58	0.94	2.00	0.62	0.64	0.34	0.94	0.55
	Remaining SMSA	9709	0.37	0.85	1.08	0.30	0.36	0.36	0.53	0.56
	Non-SMSA	4408	0.46	0.87	1.28	0.58	0.51	0.26	0.98	0.76
11										
Teacher Recommendations	None	18103	0.25	0.54	0.78	0.32	0.34	0.23	0.50	0.37
	One incident	2087	0.79	0.92	1.53	0.67	0.92	0.43	0.86	1.07
	2 or more Incd.	2733	0.60	0.91	1.30	0.65	0.66	0.37	1.00	0.82
12										
Principal General Recommendations	Elem. School	1461	0.82	0.76	1.14	0.58	0.96	0.50	1.16	1.05
	Jr. High School	1555	0.61	0.63	1.23	0.68	0.78	0.39	1.10	1.17
	Sr. High School	1517	0.61	0.57	1.47	0.68	0.83	0.28	1.17	0.99
13										
Principal General Recommendations	>500k	892	1.81	1.57	2.11	0.51	1.78	0.42	1.86	1.71
	50-500k	818	1.02	0.98	1.87	0.95	1.23	0.34	2.18	2.22
	Remaining SMSA	1755	0.68	0.87	1.26	0.59	1.08	0.46	1.14	1.07
	Non-SMSA	1068	1.17	0.95	1.53	0.81	1.22	0.73	1.52	1.32
14										
Principal General Recommendations	None	1293	0.96	1.02	1.54	0.81	1.27	0.45	1.41	1.25
	1-9 Incidents	2019	0.79	0.67	1.27	0.51	0.70	0.61	1.14	1.17
	10 or more Incd.	430	2.30	1.94	3.08	1.18	6.19	0.63	2.47	2.77




SOURCE: TQ

FIGURE B-7.5
TEACHER RECOMMENDATIONS BY SCHOOL LEVEL



SOURCE: TQ


FIGURE B-7.6
TEACHER RECOMMENDATIONS BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY



SOURCE: TQ

FIGURE B-7.7

TEACHER RECOMMENDATIONS BY VICTIMIZATION LEVEL



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
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Participants in Safe School Study Workshops

Edward Allen	Carlton Irish
Donald Anneser	Darlene Jackson
Troy Arbogast	Maurice A. Jackson
Robert Armacost	Anthony D. Jones
Ernesto Ballesteros	Michael Kean
Jerry T. Barton	James King
Delores Bates	Linda Land
Cynthia Bell	William L. Lucas
Patricia L. Benavidez	Ricardo Martinez
Milton Bins	Joseph Mayo
Frank Burtnett	Cindy McClung
Les Burton	Patrick J. McDonough
Lucius Burton	Mary Jane Mikuriya
Rev. Caby Byrne	Patricia Evans Miner
John Carusone	Margaret Montgomery
Bob Collins	Marshall Moore
Ann Covill	Flora O'Neill
Gloria Cox	Wallace Orr
Stephen Daeschner	Lewis Perullo
Douglas Dopp	Robert Pipkin
Norman Fruchter	Sharon Plon
Antoine Garibaldi	Anthony Polemeni
Anthony Gibbs	Doris Randolph
Henry Givens	John Rencher
Claire Greene	Carolyn Rotkin
Ron Greene	Dan Turner
Edythe Hall	John Wick
Richard H. Hinds	Sylvester Williams
Morris Holmes	Lee R. Wolfe
Wilma A. Hopper	L. Everett Yarbrough

Safe School Study Panel of Social Scientists

Robert Crain	Charles Kinderman
Robert Emrich	Elliot Liebow
Martin Gold	Robert Rubel
Bernard Greenberg	Walter Shafer

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