


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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

RESEARCH STUDY



AIR UNIVERSITY

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

A COMPENDIUM OF EUROPEAN THEATER TERRORIST GROUPS

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism has become increasingly prevalent over the past few years, particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East. This study identifies and discusses, country by country, the significant terrorist groups operating in the European Theater. For the purposes of this study, we have defined significant terrorist groups as those groups that have targeted U.S. personnel, military or civilian, or groups that may target U.S. personnel in the future. The origins, political orientation, size, organizational structure, personalities, modus operandi, weapons, and significant operations of each group are examined. The final chapter briefly discusses the transnational aspects of terrorism.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The consequences of international terrorism may go far beyond anything yet accomplished or contemplated by the terrorists themselves, militarily or politically. The developments that have made international terrorism feasible could in the future have a profound effect on the world. (4:164)

Objectives of the Study

The purpose of this report is to present an encyclopedic reference of significant terrorist groups operating in the European theater, which includes the European continent, the United Kingdom, and the Middle East. The study illustrates the nature of the growing terrorist threat in today's world and presents a realistic picture of the groups committing terrorist acts. It is presented in unclassified format to insure wide distribution to United States military personnel assigned to or contemplating an assignment to the European theater.

Limitations of the Study

Research for this report was limited primarily to source material in the public media. All data presented is unclassified. An appendix lists certain classified or restricted sources which future researchers may find beneficial. Most current

information of an unclassified nature is found in newspapers and periodicals.

Definitions

Terrorism is defined in various ways by various authors. A medical author (1:7) defines terrorism as ". . . the use of violence when its most important result is not the physical and mental damage of the direct victims but the psychological effect produced on someone else." A group of Ph.D.s meeting at the behest of the State Department could not arrive at an agreed upon definition. However, the group did generally agree terrorism referred to civil violence for political goals and committed ". . . by an establishment or opposition groups." (6:1) An Australian Army officer has written there is no universally accepted definition; however, he, and the present authors, define terrorism as "' . . . a term used to describe the method, or the theory behind the method, whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through systematic use of violence.'" (2:44)

As there are different definitions of terrorism, there are numerous ways to classify terrorist groups. However, in the interest of brevity, the classification system presented by Crozier to the U. S. Congress will be described as that which the present authors prescribe. While admitting his system to be arbitrary, Crozier advised it was adoptable worldwide and he listed six categories (7:182).

1. Ethnic, religious, or nationalist groups. Examples are the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army and the Palestinian group Al Fatah.

2. Marxist-Leninist groups. The Red Brigade in Italy or the Basque separatist Sixth Assembly in Spain are examples.

3. Anarchist groups. Again, a Spanish group, the Iberian Liberation Movement, is illustrative.

4. Pathological groups or individuals. Moving away from Europe, Crozier lists the well known Weathermen and Symbionese Liberation Army of the United States as examples.

5. Neo-Fascist and extreme right-wing groups. The Ordine Nero and Mussolini Action Squads in Italy are typical.

6. Ideological mercenaries. The Japanese members of the United Red Army who carried out the Lod Airport massacre in Israel are of this ilk.

It is important to make the distinction between international and transnational terrorism. Many writers use the term 'international' terrorism; however, this appears a misnomer. The present authors prefer the less connotative term 'transnational' to describe the current world terrorist threat. The term 'international' implies a worldwide, centrally controlled terrorist conspiracy, both right- and left-wing. While many groups and individuals offer succor, material or manpower assistance to other groups, and cross international borders and time zones to do this,

there does not appear to be the centrally organized plot. However, as the opening quote implies, the future is less certain. That terrorism is currently transnational by nature is seen in Crozier's Congressional testimony.

Relatively few terrorist movements are entirely home-grown and self-sufficient, although it is equally true to say that unless a group has roots in its home territory, it is unlikely to flourish, regardless of foreign support. The point, however, is that foreign support does enable such groups in many cases to increase their effectiveness and pursue their efforts until final victory. (7:184)

Lastly, it is desirable to define the authors' term 'significant' as used to qualify a group for this study. Some countries boast as many as 35 subversive or terrorist groups operating within their borders. Spain is an example. Not all of these are significant, either in terms of activity, threat to the established government, or to U. S. assets. By significant, the authors imply the group is currently or was recently active in carrying out periodic acts of terrorism, and represents a potential threat to the stability of the government, the security and welfare of its peaceable citizens, and to U. S. assets.

The Study Format

This study is arranged alphabetically by country and alphabetically by terrorist group within each country. The only exception will be the Middle East which is listed as an entity rather than by separate countries. Each chapter will have its own

bibliography for easy reference. The country chapters will begin with a short discussion of the current terrorist climate or other pertinent data for background information. Each group will be described by name; origins and political orientation; size; personalities; modus operandi and weapons; significant operations and operations directed against U. S. assets; and evidence of cooperation between groups, both intra- and inter-territorial. Some chapters also contain a list of insignificant groups about which there is little information, but may be of reader interest.

This study is cross-sectional and not longitudinal in nature; therefore, more current data may be available at the time of reading. The transitory nature of terrorist groups renders it impossible to insure that all groups contained herein will remain viable forces, that their names will be the same, or their political orientations will remain constant.

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CHAPTER II

CYPRUS

Terrorism has played a significant role in the brief history of Cyprus. In 1955, during Cyprus' struggle for independence from British rule, a retired Greek colonel named George Grivas, at the request of Archbishop Makarios, went to Cyprus to lend his experience to the Cypriote cause. He developed an organization, the National Organization for the Cyprus Struggle (EOKA), which operated as a guerrilla force (28:1). In addition, EOKA made excellent use of terrorist tactics and, in 1960, Cyprus gained its independence.

It is significant that during the period 1955 to 1959, Makarios and Grivas were working together against the British although their ultimate objective was different. Makarios wanted a free and independent Cyprus while Grivas wanted union with Greece or 'enosis.' In 1960, Makarios was made President of the new commonwealth republic and Grivas felt betrayed. He refused to acknowledge the independence agreements which were guaranteed by Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey (17:30).

Another significant and complicating factor is the binational character of the Cypriote population. Approximately eighty percent

of the population is of Greek descent and twenty percent is of Turkish descent (12:10). As a result of this, the Government of Cyprus was proportioned to reflect these binational interests and functioned relatively well for the first three years. During this period, there was still a strong sentiment among a segment of the Greek Cypriote population for 'enosis.' This created a great amount of concern in the Turkish Cypriote community and, coupled with a growing fear that the Turkish community did not have sufficient voice in governmental decisions and processes to protect its interests, caused a high degree of tension between the Greek and Turkish populations. In 1963, this tension erupted in intercommunal fighting with atrocities committed by both sides. This continued throughout the year and precipitated direct air intervention in December of 1963 by the Government of Turkey. In March 1964, as a result of an emergency session of the United Nations, a peace-keeping force was sent to Cyprus to help halt the fighting on the island.

One result of the intercommunal strife was an even stronger push by the Greek Cypriotes for 'enosis' and an equally strong stand by the Turkish Cypriotes for a federated government. In 1964, General Grivas returned to Cyprus from Greece and led the fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriotes. His presence was counter to the desires of Makarios who realized that a strong stand for 'enosis' and continued intercommunal fighting increased

the risk of direct Turkish intervention and the probability of Cyprus becoming annexed to Turkey. Grivas was recalled to Greece in 1967.

From 1967 until 1971 relative peace returned to Cyprus although the Greek and Turkish communities were by no means close to settling their differences. There were also occasional clashes between the two communities in various parts of the island. In 1971, General Grivas clandestinely reentered Cyprus and organized a carbon copy of the EOKA. It had as its objective the achievement of 'enosis' and was in direct conflict with the Makarios government (28:7). The result was that the new organization, the EOKA-B, began terrorist activities against the Greek Cypriote Government of Makarios.

A noteworthy fact about terrorist activity in Cyprus is the role of the communist party. It is noteworthy because its role and objectives in Cyprus are in opposition to the aims and objectives of the primary terrorist organization in Cyprus. The Reconstruction Party of the Working People (AKEL) is, based on an estimated 12,000 to 14,000 members, the second largest communist party relative to population of the non-ruling communist parties in the world (2:119). The AKEL backs independence for Cyprus rather than 'enosis' because it believes that if 'enosis' were accomplished, the party would probably be declared illegal and Cyprus would become a part of NATO (2:121). The AKEL opposition

to the objectives of the terrorist organization is unique to Cyprus in the European Theater.

With the above background, the remainder of this chapter will examine in detail the EOKA-B as the most significant terrorist organization operating in Cyprus. The Cypriote Liberation Army and the Turkish Cypriote Liberation Army will be discussed briefly.

National Organization for the Cyprus Struggle (EOKA-B)

Name. National Organization for the Cyprus Struggle (17:30). It is also known as the National Organization of Cypriote Fighters (12:10).

Origins and Political Orientation. The EOKA-B is a carbon copy of the EOKA which was formed by General George Grivas in 1955 to fight for the independence of Cyprus with an ultimate objective of 'enosis' - union with Greece (28:1). The nature of the EOKA was that of a wartime resistance organization. It led the fight against the British and gained independence for Cyprus; but, Grivas was disappointed that 'enosis' was not achieved (12:10). The EOKA used terrorist tactics in its successful struggle against the British (37:12). In September of 1971, General Grivas clandestinely entered Cyprus and reformed the remnants of the EOKA into the EOKA-B whose objective was the overthrow of the Cypriote Government of Archbishop Makarios and to then effect union with Greece (22:5) (18:8). A number of Greek Cypriote reserve officers joined the

EOKA-B or strongly supported it and denounced the government's policy of reconciliation and unity with the Turkish Cypriotes (19:5). A primary strategy to achieve 'enosis' was to create violence to assure no progress was made in the talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriotes (36:13).

Size. The exact size of the EOKA-B is unknown but estimates range from 100 to 200 armed guerrillas with approximately 2,000 armed supporters (24:13) to 500 to 700 active followers (17:30). One estimate goes as high as 3,000 to 4,000 (28:1). While there is a rather wide range of estimates on the size of the EOKA-B, the fact remains that it has been of sufficient strength to create a serious problem for the Government of Cyprus.

Organizational Structure. The EOKA-B is apparently organized into armed underground cells located in various parts of the island (28:1). Based upon General Grivas' background, it can be assumed that the organization probably has a chain of command similar to a military organization. The effectiveness also indicates that a fair amount of control and coordination is exercised by the leadership.

Personalities. General George Grivas was the founder and leader of the EOKA and the EOKA-B until his death in 1974 (22:5). George Karousos was designated by Grivas to succeed him and, prior to Grivas' death, served for two years as his deputy (24:13). Stavros Stavrou headed the military arm of the EOKA-B until his

arrest on 9 Aug 1973 (9:5). Andonis Kalogirou is considered the head of the EOKA-B in Paphos, Cyprus (39:3). George Vasiliades served as chairman of the organization's political unit (20:10).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The EOKA-B has used the tactics of both a terrorist organization and a guerrilla organization. While some tactics are common to both type organizations, the one unique to a guerrilla type group is the actual armed confrontation with government forces. There is evidence that the EOKA-B contemplated this on at least one occasion (14:5). Generally though the modus operandi (MO) of the EOKA-B has been primarily that of a terrorist group. This has included bombings of police stations, police officials' homes, and random bombings of commercial establishments (17:30) (21:4) (39:3). The EOKA-B has also used tactics such as hit and run machine gun fire from a moving car, kidnapping and political assassination (17:30). One type of MO used by the predecessor of the EOKA-B, the EOKA, is use of women and children as couriers and to transport weapons. In the period 1955 to 1956, a terrorist would take a child with him so that he could place his gun in the child's schoolbag after a shooting (37:12). Because the EOKA-B is composed of former members of the EOKA and because it has the same leader, it is reasonable to assume that this tactic is or could be used now.

The weapons used by the EOKA-B range from hand guns to automatic weapons and generally are obtained through raids on the

government's security forces. Dynamite has been used for the bombs (10:8) (21:4).

Significant Operations.

March 1970: An assassination attempt was made on Archbishop Makarios which was attributed to the EOKA. As Makarios was leaving, via helicopter, rifle and machine gun fire was directed at the helicopter from the roof of a nearby high school. The bullets missed him but hit and seriously wounded his pilot. The pilot was able to land the helicopter and Makarios was not injured (4:4).

7 Feb 1973: An EOKA-B coordinated attack was made on 20 police stations (21:4).

25 March 1973: Cypriote officials uncovered a plot by the EOKA-B to overthrow the government by seizing the presidential palace, arresting Makarios and declaring immediate union with Greece (10:8).

28 July 1973: Cyprus Minister of Justice Christos Vakis was kidnapped by two men in uniform. They abducted him from his home and told him their leader wished to see him and he would be released in two hours (33:9). Vakis was later released unharmed and the EOKA-B was accused of the kidnapping.

16 June 1974: The EOKA-B killed the district secretary of a right wing farmer's union that supported Makarios. A companion was wounded in this killing (26:6).

30 August 1974: Gunmen tried to assassinate Dr. Vassos Lyssarides who was the personal physician of Makarios and the chairman of the United Democratic Union of the Center, a socialist party. The attack was accomplished through an ambush of Dr. Lyssarides' car. One person was killed and three persons in addition to Dr. Lyssarides were wounded (25:7).

Cooperation with Other Groups. In March of 1970, the EOKA apparently cooperated with the right wing National Front organization in an attempt to assassinate Archbishop Makarios (13:12). In July 1974, Makarios accused the Cypriote National Guard, under the command of Greek officers, of being a supplier to the EOKA-B although he offered no proof of this (29:2). There is an indication that some members of the EOKA-B have joined a new group, the Cypriote Liberation Army, in an attempt to regain that portion of Cyprus now occupied by Turkish forces (20:10). These are the only indications of any outside cooperation with other groups although there have been continuing rumors and allegations that the EOKA-B received at least the sympathy if not the support of the Greek Government.

Cypriote Liberation Army (CLA)

Name. Cypriote Liberation Army (20:10).

Origins and Political Orientation. The CLA was formed subsequent to the Turkish occupation of a large part of Cyprus. Its leaders are of various political leanings and include some

EOKA-B members. The group is planning guerrilla warfare against the Turkish occupation forces if no peaceful solution to the Cyprus situation can be found. The objective is to cause the withdrawal of Turkish forces. (20:10)

Size. The exact size is unknown but the plans call for a force of approximately 500 men. According to reports, the organization had recruited about 300 men by the end of August 1974. (20:10)

Personalities. Major Andreas Papapetrou, a Cypriote National Guard officer with ties to the EOKA-B is said to be the commander of the group. Alkins Stavropopolous is a spokesman for the group. Others reported to be involved are Major Pantelis Pantazis, Andre Seimenis, Marios Thristodoulides, and George Vasiliades, former Chief Justice of Cyprus. Thristodoulides and Vasiliades are connected with the EOKA-B. (20:10)

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The stated MO of the group is to conduct guerrilla warfare behind Turkish lines (20:10). Based upon the personnel involved with the group, it is reasonable to assume that terrorist tactics will also be used when and if the group starts operations. It also can be assumed that the weapons available to the group will be at least as good as the EOKA-B has and perhaps better if it draws support from Greece.

Significant Operations. None.

Cooperation with Other Groups. The CLA is drawing manpower support from the EOKA-B. It is reported that 18 members of the force went to Lebanon for tactical training by some Palestinian guerrilla groups. It is also reported that the group is receiving financial assistance (\$1 million) from Greece and Greek Americans. (20:10)

Turkish Cypriote Liberation Army (TCLA)

Very little is known about the TCLA other than it was apparently founded in October 1973 and is "hostile to the 'fascist' character of the Turkish Cypriote leadership." (1:13) The leadership, strength and actual objectives are unknown. It appears to be more "anti-Turkey than anti-Greece" (1:12). The group bears watching as it could have the potential for future terrorist activities.

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CHAPTER III

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

German terrorist groups had their genesis in the revolutionary student movement of the late sixties. These student activists were labeled the "New Left" and were primarily anti-establishment and protest in character. The hard core groups developed around the Universities in Berlin and Frankfurt well before their activities came into the public spotlight (44:2).

One issue that drew a great deal of attention in Germany during the last half of the 1960s was the Vietnam War. Numerous demonstrations were held in Berlin and other University cities against American involvement in the war. Rudi Dutschke was the one individual in particular who was instrumental in fermenting much of the discord among West German students. He was often referred to as "the chief ideologist of the student rebellion." (72:116) Dutschke, who considered himself a Marxist, had left East Berlin just before the wall was built (72:118).

The radical students who formed the core of the student movement were a mixture of Marxist, Trotskyists, Maoists, Anarchists, and varying degrees in between (72:115). Many of them belonged to the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), the League of

Socialist German Students. Their stated intent was to overthrow the established order in Germany (72:116).

From the student demonstrations and protest movement of the late sixties emerged the terrorist or anarchist groups in Germany during the 1970s, particularly the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the "Movement 2 June."

The German activists have generally followed the revolutionary example of the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Like many other Urban Guerilla groups the German terrorists have used Carlos Magighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla for guidance (43:6). The philosophy expressed by Marighella is to provoke the government to resort to repression or to make government impossible without repressive measures (1:242).

There are a number of groups in West Germany that have caused concern to the authorities. These groups range from political groups of the right and left to the two above-mentioned anarchist groups: the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the "Movement 2 June." This chapter will deal in detail with these two groups.

Baader-Meinhof Gang

Name. The Baader-Meinhof Gang derived its name from the two principal organizers of the group: Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. The group took the name Red Army Faction (RAF) (Rote Armee Fraction). A letter, probably written by Ulrike Meinhof, dated 17 November 1971 and sent to the Workers' Party of North

Korea, explained the choice of the name: "The group did not split off from a previously unified movement but was forced to work illegally because of reigning repression--it is not itself a party, but it is organizationally, practically, conceptionally a necessary component of a Communist party worthy of the name." (43:6) The group is also referred to in Germany as the Meinhof/Baader Gruppe (53:27).

Origins and Political Orientation: Andreas Baader in 1968 was a member of Rudi Dutschke's SDS. In that same year he was arrested and convicted for throwing fire bombs into two Frankfurt department stores (20:37). Baader was sentenced to three years in prison and while there was interviewed by Ulrike Meinhof, who at that time was a columnist for a left wing publication Konkret (50:77).

On 14 May 1970 Baader was taken to the Social Affairs Institute in Berlin to do research on a book that he was writing. Shortly after his arrival four terrorists, two of them women, shot their way into the institute and freed Baader (66:14). One of the group was subsequently identified as Ulrike Meinhof (80:17).

Following Baader's escape, the group travelled to the Middle East for military training in a camp used by Palestine guerrillas (43:6). In June 1970 the group published their goals and intentions. The stated plans were to set up a guerrilla organization to overthrow the parliamentary system in Germany. Meinhof, in a

tape recording from which Der Spiegel, a West German news magazine, printed excerpts declared: "We must learn from revolutionary movement of the world--the Vietcong, the Palestine Liberation Front, the Tupamaros, the Black Panthers" (80:17). The Baader-Meinhof stated ideology is derived from Marxism-Leninism modified by the teachings of Mao (44:16).

Size. From a hard core group of about 17 members, the Baader-Meinhof Gang expanded to at least 60 members (43:4). In November 1974, 30 Baader-Meinhof members were in jail awaiting trial (88:8).

Organizational Structure. It is extremely difficult to determine any organizational structure of the Baader-Meinhof Gang.

With few exceptions, gang members remain silent when arrested and reveal very little about their activities or other members (43:4). However, it appears that the group is fairly well organized. Members of the gang who, after arrest, were placed in a dozen German jails managed to communicate with each other. Baader wrote, while in jail, detailed instructions on how to escape. These instructions were distributed regularly to gang members both inside and outside of jail. They were also able to coordinate hunger strikes among jailed comrades and to pressure ones who were prone to backslide (50:80).

Personalities. Andreas Baader was born on 6 May 1943 in Munich. He attended several high schools but did not receive a diploma. His father was a historian who died during World War II (43:13).

In a letter dated 24 January 1972, Baader wrote: "Successful announcements concerning us can only be: arrested or dead" (43:13). His escape from prison in May 1970 was supposed to have been an "exemplary action of the urban guerrilla" (100:97). Baader was recaptured in Frankfurt on 1 June 1972 (8:6).

Ulrike Meinhof was born on 7 October 1934 in Oldenburg, Germany. Her father was an art historian who died young. She was raised by a historian, professor Renate Riemeck. She was married to publisher Klaus-Rainer Roehl from 1961 to 1968 (43:13). Both Ulrike and Roehl were members of the German Communist Party (KPD) and their magazine Konkret was financed by secret communist funds obtained by Roehl and Ulrike in East Berlin and filtered through Prague (50:75). Meinhof studied philosophy, education, sociology, and German at Universities at Marburg, Hamburg, Freiburg, and Munich (43:13). She has been considered the leading ideologist of the Baader-Meinhof Gang. She committed suicide in May 1976 while jailed in Stammheim Prison in Stuttgart (21:33).

Horst Mahler, the son of a dentist, was born in Hanau, Upper Silesia, on 23 January 1946. Since 1964 Mahler has been a practicing lawyer and has defended leading members of the student protest movement (43:13). He left the Baader-Meinhof Gang in the Summer of 1974 and joined the German Communist Party (KPD). Mahler accused the Baader-Meinhof Gang of being elite-like (100:101). He was sentenced to 14 years in prison for his part

in Baader's jail break on 14 May 1970. In 1975 he refused to join other terrorists who were released in return for Peter Lorenz, a mayoral candidate in West Berlin who was kidnapped by the "Movement 2 June" (38:A25).

Holger Meins was born on 26 October 1941 in Hamburg, Germany, the son of a business manager (43:13). Meins was considered a member of the Baader-Meinhof Gang inner group and was captured along with Baader in Frankfurt on 1 June 1970 (100:99). Meins died as a result of a hunger strike in November 1974 (41:65).

Gudrun Ensslin, a minister's daughter, was born on 15 August 1940 at Bartholomae, Swabian Alb (43:13). She was a girlfriend of Baader's and was arrested for participating, with him, in the fire bombings of the Frankfurt department stores (71:38).

Joerg Lang, also known as "Jogi," was reported as 35 years old in September 1975. He has been living underground since 1974 and police believe that he is planning a "spectacular kidnapping." Lang is considered to be the new leader of the Red Army Faction (RAF), (Baader-Meinhof Gang) since Baader and Meinhof have been in jail. He is reported to have said to a restaurant owner in Tuebingen, Germany, "nuclear material in the Bodensee, (Lake Constance) these are the terror attacks of the future" (87:70-71). Der Spiegel reported in September 1975 that Lang was last seen in Holland (87:70).

Siegfried Haag was reported to be 30 years old in 1975. He is a Baader lawyer and has gone underground. German police reported traces of him in Southern France and in Scandinavia. He is one of the planners, with Lang, of a new phase of trying to integrate smaller groups into the RAF, thereby broadening the base of the organization (87:78).

Astrid Proll also known as "Rosi" is another former girlfriend of Baader's. She has been staying with members of the Italian "Rote Brigaden" on an estate in Northern Italy. She travels incognito between North Italy and cities in West Germany. She is said to be extremely arrogant and moody and is unable to get along with others on the estate (87:70).

Jan-Carl Stefan Raspe was thirty years old in the Fall of 1975. He is considered to be one of the inner group members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and was arrested with Baader in 1972 (58:33).

Gerhard Mueller and Irmgard Moller were sentenced by a German court in March 1976 to ten and four years in prison, respectively, after having been convicted of complicity in murder, illegal possession of firearms, and forgery in connection with their Baader-Meinhof activities (84:20).

Members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang have come largely from middle class families normally associated with the professions. The majority of the group are or were students. Most of their

sympathizers and people who gave assistance were also members of the professions (43:4).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. Members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang travel incognito and assume new names and identities (87:71). They rent cars under false names and on occasion they have broken into government offices and stolen identification papers, automobile registration forms, and tax stamps (87:75).

Baader-Meinhof operations have been financed by bank robberies and kidnapping. In February 1971, a seven-year-old boy was kidnapped near Bonn, Germany, and a demand for a \$54,000 ransom was made and subsequently paid (89:17). German officials charge that the RAF robbed six or more banks, stealing more than a half million Marks (10:2). The gang has operated with an arsenal of weapons and fast automobiles, preferably BMWs (20:37).

A mushroom cellar near the Dutch border was occasionally used as a weapon depot. In the Summer of 1975, the police found there three wooden crates of revolvers, cartridges, handgranade firing charges, a radio, automobile license plates, and RAF literature (87:74).

On 11 May 1972 a new type of offensive operation was begun by the RAF with the bombing of the U.S. Army V Corps headquarters in Frankfurt. This was followed by a series of bombings against German police stations. Bombs went off in Munich, Augsburg, Karlsruhe, and Hamburg (9:3). Another bombing target was

the newspaper and magazine publishing house of Axel Springer (83:7).

German Police stated that all of the bombs used by the gang had been made from pieces of heavy steel pipe stuffed with explosives (63:39). The bombs at a Springer building in Hamburg were placed in the building while bombs that exploded at the U.S. Army European Command Headquarters in Heidelberg were left in parked cars (12:3).

The RAF has consistently used handguns in their operations. A small caliber pistol, the Landmann-Preetz, became the favorite handgun of the Baader-Meinhof Gang (50:76). Baader's escape from jail in 1970 was accomplished with the use of handguns, and when Baader was captured in June 1972 he was using a .45 caliber pistol and was in possession of automatic rifles (90:3). Police authorities in Germany in 1972 counted four deaths resulting from activities of the RAF, including two policemen who were shot down (10:2).

Significant Operations. Two events in the history of the RAF stand out as far as United States' interests are concerned. They are the bombing of the U.S. Army Officers Club in Frankfurt and the U.S. Army European Command Headquarters in Heidelberg. Both of these bombings took place in May 1972.

11 May 1972: A series of bombs exploded at the U.S. Army V Corps headquarters. The Officers Club which is directly behind the main building was heavily damaged. A U.S. Army Lieutenant

Colonel was killed and thirteen people were injured. The blasts occurred after normal duty hours and most people who work at the headquarters had gone for the day (17:1).

22 May 1972: Less than two weeks after the bombing in Frankfurt, bombs exploded during the night in two cars parked inside the compound of the U.S. Army European Command Headquarters. These bombs killed three American servicemen and injured five others. The two bombs went off within 10 to 15 seconds of each other and were spaced 150 yards apart (12:3).

19 May 1972: Two bombs exploded at the headquarters of the Axel Springer Publishing Company in Hamburg. In these blasts, fifteen employees were injured. The bombs had been placed in lavatories on the third and sixth floors of the building. A search by police revealed five additional homemade bombs that had failed to explode (27:3).

On the next day police found two more bombs at the Springer headquarters. One of these bombs was found on "the executive floor," the twelfth story of the thirteen-story structure (83:7).

May 1975: Two explosives went off in a nuclear power station being built in France just over the border from Germany. Credit was claimed by an anonymous caller for the "Meinhof-Puig Antich group." Puig Antich was an anarchist executed by the Spanish government (16:A1). No other reference has been found for this group. It is probably a splinter of the RAF.

22 December 1971: Baader-Meinhof activity in bank robbery has been discussed above. However, one noteworthy robbery occurred in Kaiserslautern. In this incident the gang robbed the Bayerische Hypotheken - und Wechselbank of 133,986 Deutsche Marks (approximately \$58,250). They blocked the entrance and exit of the driveway of a nearby police station to retard police response to the robbery taking place in the bank. During the robbery, a policeman noticed the gang's improperly parked getaway car outside the bank and was killed when he went to investigate (57:55-56).

September 1970: In Berlin the gang robbed three separate banks in a ten-minute time period. The total take from the three banks was 217,469 Deutsche Marks (approximately \$94,550) (45:38).

Cooperation with Other Groups. When Baader was broken out of jail in May 1970, he, Meinhof, and others went to the Middle East for weapons training from Palestinian guerrillas (8:6). When Black September commandos seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, the Sudan in 1973, one of their demands was the release of members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang from German jails "because they had supported the Palestinian Cause" (75:2).

The Swiss Attorney General reported in July 1972 that a band of youthful Swiss anarchists had established contacts with the Baader-Meinhof Gang (74:3).

Cooperation with Italian group Rote Brigaden has been discussed above.

Further international connections of the RAF came to light as a result of the "Carlos" affair in France (see Chapter XIV). French police searched a hideout in Paris that "Carlos" had hastily vacated after killing two French policemen and a Lebanese terrorist named Michel Moukarbel. In the apartment, police found what was described as an arsenal of weapons, including American grenades marked U.S. 26. The same type grenade (M26) had been stolen from the U.S. Forces in Miesau, West Germany, allegedly by the Baader-Meinhof Gang (48:3).

In addition to the international connections established by the Baader-Meinhof Gang, cooperation has also been established with other anarchist and leftist groups within West Germany. The Movement 2 June participated with the RAF in a number of the group's bank robberies (47:3). Other smaller groups with connections with the RAF include the "Information Centre of the Red People's University" (IZRU) and the Heidelberger Patienten Kollektiv (SPK) (43:11).

Movement 2 June

Name. Movement 2 June sometimes is referred to as 2 June or second of June Movement. The German name is "Bewegung 2 Juni." The movement is named after the day of the death in 1967 of Benno

Ohnesorg who was killed by the police (14:32). Ironically, Ohnesorg was not a member of the student radical groups in Berlin where he was a student (72:116).

Origins and Political Orientation. The origin of "2 June" goes back to 1970 when it participated in the bank robberies with the Baader-Meinhof Gang. It is believed that "2 June" has attracted many members of the RAF who left that group after the capture of Baader and Meinhof in 1972. In March 1975, "2 June" was considered to be the most dangerous and active group then operating in Berlin (47:3). Initially, they had the aim to work with more brainpower than their actionistic partisans of the RAF. But just as with the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the trend to attack and violence developed faster than their political maturity (14:32-33). However, in 1975 the New York Times reported that "2 June" seemed entirely devoted to revolution through violence (47:3).

Size. The size of "2 June" is not known, but West German police in March 1975 estimated the total hard core left wing radicals in Germany to be fewer than one hundred (47:3).

Organizational Structure. "2 June" is organized in image of the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Activity revolves around a core group with support groups who can be used to accomplish specific tasks. Support group members are used in such a way that allows core members to remain almost anonymous (1:195).

Personalities. Ralf Reinders was reported by Der Spiegel to be twenty-seven years old in September 1975. He is of Dutch descent and is an off-set printer by trade. He is considered to be the central figure in the organization. In September 1975, he was arrested in Berlin (14:32).

Inge Vielt was arrested with Reinders in September 1975. At the time of her arrest she was thirty-one. Vielt was Reinders' girlfriend and reportedly shared the leadership in "2 June" with him (14:32).

Angela Luther was thirty-five when she drove the getaway car in February 1975 during the kidnapping of West Berlin mayoral candidate Lorenz. She was one of the early members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang and in January 1976 was considered to be one of Germany's most wanted terrorists (64:27). In June 1974, her apartment in West Berlin, which she had rented under a false name, caught fire and a bomb factory was discovered (47:3).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. "2 June" like the RAF resorts to criminal activities to provide for their needs. As stated above, they participated with the RAF in bank robberies. Other activities by "2 June" included thefts of automobiles, arms, explosives, and false documents (61:1). They have engaged in shooting attacks on political leaders, kidnapping, and the murder of one of their own members for informing to the police (47:3). The New York Times stated in 1975 that "2 June's" terrorist activities fall

somewhere in the center of the spectrum of the methods used by terrorist groups. The article says: "The range is from fanatic and random slaughter to carefully targeted assassinations" (7:IV,2).

Significant Operations.

November 1974: The first operation conducted by "2 June" under its own name that received attention outside of West Germany was the murder of Judge Guenter von Drenkmann. The murder followed the death of RAF member Holger Meins and most probably was in retaliation of his death (88:8). German Police have accused Rolf Reinders of the murder (87:70).

27 February 1975: Three days before elections in West Berlin, "2 June" kidnapped one of the leading candidates for mayor of the city, Peter Lorenz. Lorenz's chauffeur-driven car was cut off by a truck and rammed in the rear by another automobile. The chauffeur got out of the Lorenz car to discuss the accident and was knocked down by a bearded man who jumped from yet another automobile (52:51). Lorenz was then overpowered in his car and given several drug injections in his arms and legs. He was tied and gagged, put into a chest, and carried into a cell in the basement of a house in West Berlin (5:16). Lorenz subsequently identified two of the kidnappers as Rolf Reinders and Angela Luther (82:8). In return for Herr Lorenz's release, "2 June" demanded the release of six convicted members of the Baader-Meinhof

Gang, a Boeing 707, and an additional hostage, former Berlin Mayor Heinrich Albertz. The six prisoners whose freedom was demanded were: Gabriele Kroeher-Tiedemann, Horst Mahler, Verena Becker, Ingrid (Hedwig) Siepmann, Rolf Heissler, and Rolf Pohle. An interesting sidelight on the demands for release of prisoners was the absence of any mention of either Baader or Meinhof, or other more prominent members of the RAF (54:21-22). Mahler, in his refusal to join the kidnappers, said that he had "parted ideologically with those who advocate violence" (38:A25). Tiedemann initially refused to participate in the release but changed her mind and was flown with the other four to South Yemen (94:3). Tiedemann is mentioned in Chapter XIV, Transnational Links, and Chapter VIII, Middle East. The abductors of Lorenz did not join the five released RAF members on the flight out of West Berlin. The Police Commissioner said that there were indications that the kidnappers were still in Berlin. Lorenz was released after he had been held for five and a half days (5:16).

24 April 1975: A fire group calling itself the "Holger Meins Commando" launched an attack on the West German Embassy in Stockholm Sweden. A fire group is a common device used by urban guerrillas. The group is often recruited for specific missions. It is not clear to which organization the "Holger Mein Commando" belonged. Some early press reports indicated that "2 June" was responsible, others indicated that it was a Baader-Meinhof

operation, and yet others indicated involvement of the "Socialist Patients Collective" (SPK). The truth probably lies somewhere in between and elements of all three groups shared in this event. Also, a number of people are members of all three groups (29:27261). Just before midday, six individuals armed with sub-machine guns entered the embassy and took twelve people, including the West German ambassador, hostage. The terrorists ordered the police to leave the building or one of the hostages would be shot. The police did not leave and the military attache was shot. In mid-afternoon the attackers identified themselves as the Holger-Meins Commando and demanded the release of 26 people from jails in West Germany. Among those whose release was demanded were: Baader, Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe. At 11:20 that night, the economic attache was murdered because the demand for the release of the 26 had not been met. Just before midnight an explosion was accidentally detonated by the commandos, killing one of them and setting the embassy on fire. When the other five members ran from the embassy, they were captured by the police (29:27261).

Cooperation with Other Groups. "2 June," as mentioned above, has not only cooperated with but has participated in operations with other groups like the RAF. Most, if not all, of the New Left Group in Germany emerged from the student demonstrations of the 1960s. This fact was personified by the photograph that appeared

in Der Spiegel of Rudi Dutschke standing over the grave of Holger Meins, his fist raised, saying, "Holger, der Kampf geht weiter" - the struggle continues.

Other German Groups

<u>Name</u>	<u>Political Orientation</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Red Help (Rote Hilfe)	Marxist	Red Help provides financial support for jailed members of Baader-Meinhof and other New Left groups.
International Marxists' Group (Gruppe Internationaler Marxisten)	Trotskyist	German section of the Fourth International with about 450 members. It has provided support for the RAF.

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CHAPTER IV

FRANCE

Since the end of the Algerian War, the French terrorist scene has been relatively quiet, by European standards. During the Algerian trouble, the Secret Army Organization (OAS) was a significant terrorist force in France. With the loss of Algeria and the dying influence of the OAS, the French governmental system was stable, but volatile. The level of terrorism remained at a fairly low level.

A strong left-wing political structure in France negated the need for severe communist inspired terrorism, with one exception. The French Communist Party, the Parti Communiste Francais (PCF), has been able to insure about 20 percent of the electoral vote and has apparently been able to coordinate most left-wing opposition with their aims (2:137). This is not to say the PCF does not have the potential for destruction. In 1974, the PCF, working with Trotskyists, organized street demonstrations involving up to 30,000 people (1:14).

The right-wing has remained comparatively quiet also, but has supported some terrorist activity. A small separatist movement

has been among the most active in France. However, its activities have been restricted to one locale--Brittany.

Politically-based and separatist terrorist organizations do not appear to represent the major threat in France. In the summer of 1975, the French government was embarrassed because Paris was "suddenly exposed . . . as a nerve center of terrorism in Western Europe." (3:45) Newsweek reported the killing of three French counterespionage agents and an informant by a man identified as 'Carlos'; allegedly the same man who masterminded the raid on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries headquarters in Vienna in late 1975. The article reported information implicating Carlos with major terrorist European groups, after his hasty departure from Paris. He was tied to terrorist attacks and to terrorist groups in at least six countries. The groups included Basque separatists, the Turkish Popular Liberation Front, and the German Baader-Meinhof group, and possibly the Breton separatists in France. Carlos will be discussed more fully in the concluding chapter on transnational links between terrorist groups.

Another Newsweek article (3:23) reported that French police had broken a terrorist network based in Paris which had links "all over the world . . ." According to Newsweek, Paris has been a main terrorist "clearinghouse" in Europe. Allegedly, the Libyan Embassy in Paris furnishes guns and money to these groups; however, "western intelligence sources doubt that anything like a centralized

international terrorist command exists." These sources reportedly believe close connections between terrorist groups are maintained in France. French authorities have raised the specter of communist intelligence agency involvement in these activities, including possibly the Russian Committee for State Security, the KGB (3:24).

Additional evidence of French involvement in the world terrorist scene is found in Congressional testimony (15:195). Brian Crozier from the Institute for the Study of Conflict in London alluded to Fidel Castro's use of his embassy in Paris as a "headquarters of subversive efforts . . ." until he was able to use Chilean facilities under the Allende government. Also it has been stated that France is a safehaven for Spanish Basque separatists (6).

Thus, while France does not currently have major terrorist groups committing their acts against totally French targets, this does not mean France is out of the terrorist picture in Europe. Conversely, France may be more important to the future scheme of terrorists than those countries which boast a large, active terrorist population.

The three French groups outlined below, while not necessarily significant by this report's standards, do represent those which are or were recently active in the country.

Front de Liberation de La Bretagne (FLB)

Name. Front for the Liberation of Brittany.

Origins and Political Orientation. The FLB is said to have been linked with the former Breton Nationalist Party which was founded in 1931 and banned at the start of World War II (13). The FLB is a separatist or minority nationalist organization composed of ethnic Celtic militants (22:198) (23:65).

Size. The size of the FLB is unknown; however, the group is large enough to have some influence in four of the five departments (counties) into which Brittany is divided (13).

Organizational Structure. A report in 1969 reflected the FLB had a military wing called the "Breton Republic Army" which was allegedly commanded by a general staff. No further details were reflected (13).

Personalities. Unknown.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. In 1969, French authorities uncovered a large cache of explosives, weighing in excess of 1,000 pounds, which were allegedly stolen from a local warehouse in Brittany (12) (13). The FLB has claimed responsibility for several government and police building bombings in Brittany (23:65).

Significant Operations. Unknown.

Cooperation with Other Groups. The FLB announced on 8 January 1974 that it was working on the international scene with elements of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Spanish separatists, the ETA (23:65).

Ligue Communiste (LC)

Name. Communist League.

Origins and Political Orientation. The LC was formerly known as the Revolutionary Communist Youth Movement (21) and began as the French branch of the Trotskyist Fourth International (1:14). The LC brought together former members of the Internationalist Communist Party and the militants from the Revolutionary Communist Youth, both banned by the government in June 1968 (2:44). The LC's leader (see below) said in May 1972 the aim of the LC was revolutionary action through the workers, strikes, demonstrations, and circulating political pamphlets (14). The LC, Trotskyist from the beginning, was banned by the French government on 28 June 1973 (1:159) (2:134) (21).

Size. Estimates range from 4,000 to 5,000 members (2:144) (21).

Organizational Structure. Allegedly, the LC had a number of auxiliary organizations. They included the Indochina Solidarity Front, the National Federation of Struggle Committees, the High School Front of Red Centers, and the Front of Revolutionary Soldiers, Airmen, and Sailors (2:144).

Personalities. The founder of the LC was 33-year-old (as of June 1973) Alain Krivine (1:14) (21).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. In June 1973, French police raided LC headquarters in Paris and found two rifles, gasoline bombs and portable radio equipment (21).

Significant Operations. The LC's major operations are few in number and not as spectacular as those noted in other countries. In June 1973 the LC organized a left-wing demonstration against the right wing Ordre Nouveau (see below) (8). This clash resulted in both groups being banned by the government. Of a minor nature, the LC claimed responsibility for throwing red paint on General Jacques Massu, the former French Commander-in Chief in Algiers (15).

Cooperation with Other Groups. There has been a report of cooperation between the LC and the French Communist Party (PCF) in March 1973 street demonstrations involving 30,000 people (1:14).

Ordre Nouveau (ON)

Name. New Order. Formerly known as Occident (21).

Origins and Political Orientation. The ON draws its roots as far back as the Vichy era and the OAS at the time of the Algerian War, and is an outgrowth of an extreme right-wing movement banned by the government in 1968 (18) (21). The group was banned in June 1973 because of the clash with the LC (21).

Size. Less than 4,000 members (18) (21).

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. The Secretary General and founder was a 27-year-old (as of January 1969) law student, Alain Robert. National direction of the group was provided by Francois Brigneau, the editor-in-chief of the ultra-rightist weekly Minute (1:13) (10).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The ON allegedly limited itself to political activity, and poster publication denouncing African worker immigration into France (18). However, in 1972 when French police raided ON headquarters they found iron bars, pick handles, crash helmets, wooden shields, metal staves, and a shotgun--all to be used in Paris street fighting (7).

Significant Operations. None known.

Cooperation with Other Groups. None known.

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CHAPTER V

GREECE

In discussing terrorism in Greece, it is important to recognize that there are currently no known terrorist groups operating in Greece. This is not to say that there have been no incidents which could be classified as acts similar to those normally associated with terrorist organizations elsewhere in Europe and the Middle East. The 24 December 1975 assassination of Athens CIA Station Chief Richard S. Welch was definitely the act of a terrorist. However, the perpetrators and their organization have not been identified and it is possible that they belong to a group outside Greece (51:26). The point is that there is no group in Greece that can be classified as a terrorist group even though there are numerous groups in Greece that have on occasion used various terrorist acts to attempt to achieve their objectives.

Before identifying these groups, a brief discussion of the Communist Party of Greece is important. Kommounistikon Komma Hellados (KKE) was outlawed in 1947 due to the guerrilla campaign it conducted following World War II. Currently it is split into several factions with two major groups. The major groups are the Soviet sponsored KKE and the KKE (Interior) which is more moderate.

Two lesser factions are the KKE (Marxist-Leninist) group with Maoist leanings and the Nea Aristerce (New Left) which represents the more moderate Greek left. The estimated size of the KKE is 100,000 sympathizers, 27,000 card carrying members in Greece, and 15,000 members abroad (1:170).

The KKE has, in its 17th Plenum of the Central Committee which met in Eastern Europe in December 1972, called for a "Popular Front" against the Papadopoulos government. In this regard it attempted, in the February 1973 student demonstrations, to get the students under its control with little success (1:171). In November 1973, the KKE (Marxist-Leninist) appeared to have exerted some influence over student demonstrators although how much influence is unknown (1:170). All factions of the KKE place a great deal of importance on pro-communist publications and it is interesting to note that, in 1973, one of the publications was Carlos Mariguella's For the Liberation of Brazil which provides instruction on how to conduct guerrilla warfare (1:175). The KKE does have some influence in various groups in Greece which have used terrorist tactics. It is reasonable to assume that, given the opportunity, they will attempt to exert even greater influence.

At best it is difficult to identify organizations in Greece which use terrorist tactics as one means of achieving their objectives. The reason for this is that after various incidents, either by telephone or letter, a group will notify the newspapers or a

government agency that it was responsible for the incident. There have been occasions where more than one group claims credit for a single incident. Many times a group is only identified once and is never heard from again. Because this paper is concerned mainly with the most significant groups and those which appear to pose a more serious threat to U.S. personnel, only four groups are dealt with in detail. The reader should not assume that there are no other groups. Several groups such as the Greek Democratic Movement, the October 29th Movement, and the Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement, have claimed responsibility for several incidents of bombings. They have not, however, been significant within the definition used for this paper. One other point to keep in mind is that with the new government in Greece, the organizations identified below may not have reason to continue their activities. Most were primarily against the military backed government and with its removal, it is possible that they no longer have reason to exist. This does not, however, mean that other groups with pro-communist leanings will not emerge with similar tactics and objectives.

Free Greeks

Name. Free Greeks.

Origins and Political Orientation. The "Free Greeks" organization was formed by Greek military officers most of whom had retired (32:9). The basic objective of the organization was to

restore King Constantine to the throne of Greece. Its political orientation has been described as both royalist (42:9) and center left (44:4).

Size. Unknown.

Personalities. On 28 May 1969, more than 10 retired Greek generals were arrested and identified as being members of the Free Greek organization. Eight of these were identified as follows:

Lt. General Ioannis Gennimatos, Army Chief of Staff, 1964-65

Lt. General George Tsihlis

Lt. General Christos Papadatos

Brig. General Constantine Papageorgiou

Brig. General Demetrios Papadopoulos

Brig. General Nikolaos Demestihis

Navy Captain George Psalidas

Col Pierakos (42:9).

Former Premier Constantine Karamanlis, in close cooperation with Costas Coliyannis, leader of the Greek Communist Party, was also reported to be closely connected with the Free Greek organization (32:9).

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. Other than being suspected of several bombing incidents in downtown Athens, not enough information is available to establish any specific MO or to identify what kind of, if any, weapons the Free Greek organization has available.

The Free Greek organization did threaten to make life uncomfortable for Americans in Greece if the Nixon Administration did not stop support of the Greek regime. It also warned tourists not to come to Athens because it did not want to harm them. (13:4). The use of bombs was implied in their communiques.

Significant Operations. 14 May 1971: The only significant act that can reasonably be linked to the Free Greek organization occurred. It is strongly suspected of planting a bomb at the Truman Statue in Athens. The bomb exploded killing one policeman. The Free Greeks were also suspected of several other bombing incidents during the first five months of 1971. These were directed against American targets such as the Esso-Pappas office, the American BX, and several U.S. owned automobiles. (13:4)

Cooperation with Other Groups. One report indicated that the Free Greek organization may have received financial support from the German Social Democratic Party (32:9).

Democratic Defense

Name. Democratic Defense

Origin and Political Orientation. This organization was formed with the objective of overthrowing the military-backed Greek Government (28:3). Its political orientation is described as left of center to conservative.

Size. Unknown.

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. One report has identified the following as being members of the Democratic Defense. It is interesting that several are Americans.

George-Alexander Mangakis, Greek law professor

Jules Dassin, American film producer

Alan Malcolm Wenger, American

General George Iordanides, former Greek representative to NATO

Elias P. Demetracopoulos

Dionyssios Karayorgas, economics professor (28:3)

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The major MO of this organization was the use of bombs to create the climate for an overthrow of the government. Some of the bombs were apparently smuggled into Greece. (28:3)

Significant Operations. The Democratic Defense is accused of planting 19 bombs in the Athens area. These bombs resulted in injuries to 20 persons. The Democratic Defense organization is not suspected of any major operations. (28:3)

Cooperation with Other Groups. While there is no indication of cooperation with other groups, it is interesting that the organization apparently had considerable cooperation from several non-Greeks. Mr. Dassin, supra, is accused of providing U.S. Army manuals on how to manufacture bombs and booby traps to the organization. Also, Bengt Holmquist, a Swedish art critic, is suspected of having smuggled bombs into Greece and giving them to Professor Mangakis. (28:3)

Resistance, Liberation, Independence

Name. Resistance, Liberation, Independence. It is also called AAA which are the initials of the Greek words standing for resistance, liberation, and independence (21:2).

Origins and Political Orientation. The AAA was first mentioned in March of 1971 when it claimed credit for a bomb explosion in downtown Athens (29:7). Its political orientation was essentially anti-regime and it targeted Americans and other allied nations' vehicles because of their government's support of the regime in Athens.

Size. Unknown.

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. The group was allegedly formed by a retired Greek Lt. Colonel, Anastasios Minis, and Dr. Stefanos Pendelakis, a pediatrician (21:2).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The basic MO of the group was to place bombs in the hub caps of U.S. and allied nation-owned vehicles. The total results were minor damage and it appears that there was no intent to injure people but rather to create unrest. (21:2)

Significant Operations. The AAA claimed responsibility for a bomb explosion in downtown Athens on 23 March 1971 which blew out display windows of a large department store. The organization stated the explosion was to punish one of the owners, Constantine

Papayiannis, and a special advisor to the Prime Minister. (29:7)
The AAA also claimed responsibility for two bomb explosions which did minor damage to American-owned automobiles (31:8). The AAA is not known nor suspected of having committed any significant operations.

Cooperation with Other Groups. Unknown.

Greek Anti-dictatorial Youth Movement

Name. Greek Anti-dictatorial Youth Movement (40:5)

Origins and Political Orientation. The origins of this organization are unknown but its apparent political orientation was royalist and its objective was to return King Constantine to Greece (40:5).

Size. Unknown.

Organizational Structure. While the exact organizational makeup is unknown, one report indicated that it had a militant arm called the "Greek Liberation Army" (40:5).

Personalities. The alleged leader was identified as Ippokratis Savouras, a 42-year-old veterinary surgeon. A 43-year-old accountant, Ioannis Roubos, was also identified as a member and was charged with planting and exploding bombs in Athens. The alleged deputy leader of the Greek Liberation Army was identified as a retired police official, Kyriakos Spyriounis. (40:5)

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The organization planned to use bombs to destroy public utilities and the cars of foreign diplomats.

The organization also planned to execute government personalities according to one report. (40:5) The latter tactic was apparently never used.

Significant Operations. The Greek Anti-dictatorial Youth Movement did not conduct any significant operations although it claimed responsibility for exploding 16 bombs under American cars as a protest against U.S. Government support of the Greek regime (36:7).

Cooperation with Other Groups. One report indicates that the Greek Anti-dictatorial Youth Movement had ties with the Free Greek organization (40:5).

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CHAPTER VI

IRAN

Iran is a relatively stable government in a region of perpetual turmoil. However, since approximately 1963, the most significant form of political opposition has been violent, illegal actions or plots against the government by small, covert groups of alienated individuals (10:iii). The argument has often been made that the Government of Iran does not allow for legitimate release of pent-up political frustrations; consequently, the turn to terrorism and radicalism. This is nothing new to Iran as terror techniques have been used by political and religious minorities in Iran for centuries. The term "assassin" originated in Iran in the Eleventh Century.

In addition to the political and religious reasons for terrorism in Iran, there are cultural factors which have contributed to the existence of terrorist groups. Most are derived from the predominant religious sect in Iran, the Shi'ia Muslims. While Shi'ia Islam is predominant in Iran, it is a minority group within Islam as a whole. Shi'ia Islam has usually regarded its own figures as the proper leaders of society and views temporal government as a necessary evil at best (10:2).

Due to its long history as a persecuted minority sect, Shi'ite tradition places great emphasis on martyrdom and self-sacrifice. As has often been the case with the United Red Army, the willingness of a few totally committed individuals to risk all for the good of the whole community lends itself well to the self-perception of those who choose to engage in terrorist activity.

Unlike some of the transnational terrorist groups operating within and around the Middle East, the terrorist groups in Iran seem to concentrate their actions against the Iranian government, both military and civilian, United States military personnel, and U.S. government employees. Since 31 May 1972, three U.S. military officers have been assassinated, one has been seriously wounded, and one Iranian employee of the U.S. embassy was assassinated because he bore marked resemblance to a U.S. embassy civilian. They were all the result of Iranian terrorist activity.

To say specifically what group is responsible for an act of terrorism is both difficult and often misleading. Terrorist groups in Iran have repeatedly changed their names, and it is virtually impossible to pinpoint the responsible group. Organizations are constantly changing, new alliances are formed and factions break off from parent groups. This chapter will address but one terrorist group, the Iranian People's Strugglers (IPS), who appear to be the most active terrorist group in Iran and who pose the greatest security threat to U.S. personnel in Iran.

Iranian People's Strugglers

Name. Iranian People's Strugglers.

Origin and Political Orientation. The IPS can be traced as far back as 1960 under the Iranian Freedom Movement Association (IFMA) name. The IPS was one of the first Iranian covert terrorist organizations and has undergone a series of changes in both names and tactics since 1961 (10:29). When it was called the IFMA, it became part of the illegal National Front which still has remnants operating covertly in Iran. The IFMA was later referred to as the Iran Liberation Organization and changed to its present name, IPS, in 1971. The Iran Liberation Organization and the IFMA were earlier names; however, they still occasionally appear in print for minor acts of terrorism and seem to be actually used on occasion.

The IPS is an extremist group which advocates an ideology synthesized from Marxism and Islam (4:1). It was founded by Muhandis Mahdi Bazargan, a Muslim. The IPS attempts to recruit from the fringes of the country's timid opposition, which primarily expresses itself through student protests. The main source for determining the political orientation of members of the IPS is from those IPS members who have been captured by Iranian Security Forces. The results of the interrogations regarding ideology and political orientation have been less than startling. The captured terrorists advocate opposition to the present government of Iran,

they view the Shah as a "lackey" for the West, and they believe terrorist acts against U.S. personnel will greatly embarrass the Shah of Iran.

Size. There are few indicators of the size of the IPS or of the overall terrorist movement in Iran. The Shah of Iran has merely been quoted as saying, "We have a terrorism problem" (8:2).

Organizational Structure. The IPS appears to consist of small, covert, compartmented terrorist cells. The IPS bears a resemblance to some Middle East terrorist groups when it comes to internal security. There appears to be some chain of command structure but rarely does one cell know what the other cells are doing. They appear to have their respective duties with each cell given a task for the overall accomplishment of the terrorist act. They appear to have centralized control and decentralized execution of their terror missions.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The main thing that can be said for the method of operation of the IPS is they are reasonably professional and seem skilled in sophisticated surveillance techniques. There is reason to believe surveillance of some of the assassination victims preceded their attacks (4:1). Thorough planning and casing of the planned attack location has been accomplished by the terrorists. The use of women for surveillance and for cover has been in evidence. Detection of patterns of living and travel, the type of transportation used to and from work,

number of persons in the car pool, rank and position of the car pool members all assist the terrorists in deciding who would make appealing targets. Deviation from set patterns of living have a negative reaction on the part of the terrorists, just as a high rank and high visibility give a positive reaction to the terrorists. The Iranian terrorists place great importance on a successful attack and a successful escape.

Price was attacked by a bomb detonated as he passed a pre-selected location. Hawkins, Shaeffer, and Turner were killed with handguns. Farsiou, Taheri, and Hosnan were also killed with handguns. Bombings against U.S. facilities have been accomplished. After the Shaeffer and Turner shootings, their briefcases were removed and a similar briefcase was substituted. The substituted briefcase contained a motion-activated explosive.

The terrorists have shown a high degree of sophistication in their attacks. We know handguns and explosive devices are in the hands of the terrorists, but it must be assumed that all types of weapons are available to them should different weapons be necessary to serve their purpose.

Significant Operations.

7 April 1971: Iranian General Ziaddin Farsiou, Chief of Military Courts, Tehran, was shot to death as he left his home. General Farsiou's career had been built around combatting covert

opposition movements in Iran. He had successfully prosecuted those accused of plotting the Shah's assassination in 1965 (10:8).

31 May 1972: U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Harold L. Price, Chief, Air Force Section, ARMISH/MAAG, Tehran, was seriously wounded when his car drove over an explosive device as the device was detonated. General Price suffered lacerations, had both legs broken, and an Iranian woman and her child walking in the street were killed (2:1). General Price was on his way to work and was traveling along the normal route, which he took every day. During this same period of time, President Nixon was making a brief stopover in Iran. President Nixon's short visit was marked by a wave of bombings, including at least nine in or near Tehran. In addition to the bombing of General Price's staff car, several other bombings were directed at U.S. targets. The bombings were intended to embarrass the Shah during the visit of President Nixon (2:1).

13 August 1972: Iranian Major General Said Taheri, Iranian National Police Official in a key counterterrorist role, was assassinated by members of the IPS (10:29).

2 June 1973: U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins, ARMISH/MAAG, Tehran, was shot to death as he walked from his quarters to meet with his car pool. The terrorists shot Hawkins two or three times at close range and escaped from the area on a motorcycle (3:1). Hawkins lived on a dead-end street and it was

his normal practice to meet his car pool at the end of the street at approximately the same time each morning. The terrorists were familiar with his normal pattern of activity.

The Hawkins' assassination was intended as a clear rebuff to a statement by the Shah which minimized the terrorists in Iran, as a protest against U.S. military personnel in Iran, and as an act of revenge for the execution of convicted terrorists (60) between January 1972 and June 1973 (1:62-63).

21 May 1975: Colonel Paul R. Shaeffer, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel Jack M. Turner, both USAF officers assigned to the ARMISH/MAAG, Tehran, were assassinated by members of the IPS. Some reports attributed the assassinations to the Iranian People's Fighter Organization (4:1). Shaeffer and Turner were being driven to work in the northern section of Tehran when the ambush took place. A car blocked the path of their vehicle while another vehicle rammed the Shaeffer/Turner vehicle from the rear. When the Shaeffer/Turner vehicle came to a stop, three gunmen approached their vehicle and shouted at the Iranian driver of the American car to lie down. The terrorists opened fire at Shaeffer and Turner at point blank range. The Iranian driver was not harmed (4:1).

3 July 1975: Hassan Hossnan, an Iranian employee of the U.S. embassy was assassinated. Hossnan, another employee, and a driver left the U.S. Embassy on a scheduled route shortly after noon.

A car swerved in front of their U.S. embassy vehicle in downtown Tehran. Two men got out and one, reportedly wearing a police uniform, opened fire killing Hossnan. The driver and the other employee were unhurt. The driver and the other U.S. embassy employee reported a young woman in the terrorist's car but she did not participate in the shooting. Unfortunately for Hossnan, he bore a marked resemblance to a U.S. government employee on the embassy staff who normally made that particular embassy run. Obviously, the target of the assassins was the U.S. government employee and not Hossnan (5:20).

29 July 1975: Iranian security agents captured two terrorists involved in the Shaeffer and Turner killings. They were arrested after a gunfight and documents were seized outlining plans to assassinate other Iranian and foreign officials (6:10).

11 August 1975: Iranian authorities arrested four more terrorists, completing the roundup of the group thought to have assassinated Shaeffer and Turner (7:8).

20 September 1975: Well placed Western European and U.S. informants reported that some U.S. officials have been under surveillance in recent months by persons believed to be Iranian terrorists, who have vowed to attack Americans. American vigilance and U.S. counterterrorist operations have also turned up evidence of hostile surveillances (8:2).

Terror Against the United States. In addition to those terrorist acts committed against Price, Hawkins, Shaeffer, and Turner, there have been other less significant terrorist actions against the U.S. community in Iran.

20 May 1970: The United States Information Service building was attacked by Iranian students.

5 May 1971: The Iranian-American Society was bombed causing minor damage.

30 November 1971: A U.S. Air Force station wagon was bombed. There were no personal injuries, although the vehicle was totally destroyed.

17 January 1972: Minor bombs were exploded at the U.S. Embassy, the Iranian-American Society, and the Peace Corps building.

31 May 1972: Iranian terrorists bombed the U.S. Information Service offices in Tehran, killing one person and injuring two. No U.S. personnel were killed or injured (9:33).

24 January 1973: A bomb detonated at the Pan American building.

Cooperation with Other Groups. Iranian and non-Iranian informants have reported that occasional collaboration has come to light between the IPS and the left wing People's Sacrifice Guerrillas. Between them, they are thought to have been mainly responsible for most of the recent terrorist incidents (8:2) (11:2). Unclassified sources fail to discern any noticeable differences

between the two organizations. There are also indications that the terrorist movement in Iran has received some training in the Peoples Republic of China; however, there are no indicators to suspect the IPS is on the same transnational level as some groups in the Middle East.

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CHAPTER VII

ITALY

Since the end of World War II, Italy has had one of the most unstable governments in the world--something in excess of 35 changes of government since 1945. One author, John Earle, has attributed this, in part, to the Italian character (11:8). He points out a number of peculiarities of the Italian character to illustrate his point. The Italians have little sense of state; since they have been united as a country for only a century, the Italian owes his allegiance to his family or locality rather than the country. The Italian has a mistrust of all governments, which as Earle says "have been mostly bad and oppressive." A consequent self-reliance and resourcefulness is a third trait and is coupled with a dislike of regimentation and discipline. Finally, the Italian has a basic suspicion of 'strong' leaders who historically have brought disaster to office, e.g., Mussolini. These Italian traits, if valid, would explain the wide-ranging nature of terrorist organizations in the country.

The entire political spectrum is represented in Italian terrorists. Many of the groups are attached, overtly or covertly, to the various recognized political parties which dominate the

Italian political arena. For example, when speaking of right-wing groups, Earle said:

In the wake of the Neo-Fascists a number of rowdy extreme right wing groups exist, mainly of young people. It is difficult to assess their strength. Some have a mere handful of adherents and are nothing more than rallying points for any one who wants a rough house. Others claim a substantial following Whatever their real strengths, they are able to stage demonstrations, take on the police, and to engage in running battles with the left-wing groups. (134:9)

The Communists, on the other hand, have tended to refrain from revolutionary methods and have relied on the ballot box to obtain their goals. The Communists have been able to make substantial inroads on the legitimate political scene and, therefore, have forsaken most of the traditional terrorist stock-in-trade. Of course, not all left-wing groups are of this nature. The Maoist Red Brigade is an example of a violent left-wing terrorist group.

At this writing, Italy remains an active terrorist camp; the future foresees little change. This contention is supported by Earle who writes of three alternatives for Italy. His most likely alternative is that the present confused governmental situation will continue. Another possibility is that center-left parties will gain increased political recognition. Finally, he notes that younger Italians favor radical reforms (134:13). Their use of terrorist tactics to obtain their ends is not uncommon. These statements lead one to believe in the continuation of the Italian terrorist threat.

Anarchial Individualists (AI)

Name. Same.

Origins and Political Orientation. This anarchist group was founded in 1969 (63).

Size. Unknown.

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. The founder of AI was Gianfranco Bertoli whose criminal record included murder (1:18).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The AI used explosives in its one significant operation (63).

Significant Operations. The AI bombed a Milan police headquarters in 1973; one person was killed and 40 were wounded. Bertoli was arrested at that time (63).

Cooperation with Other Groups. When Bertoli was arrested for the Milan bombing, he said he arrived in Milan from Haifa, Israel, two days before the incident. Two other people were arrested in the case, one of which was an Arab from Yemen named Muhammad Mansor Said who reportedly received an overseas telephone call the day before the explosion. He then traveled to Milan and was subsequently arrested. The origin of the telephone call is unknown; however, it does indicate foreign involvement in the incident.

Bertoli was alleged to have participated in 1970 strike-breaking activities which were organized by the Ordine Nero (see below) (63).

Brigate Rossi (BR)

Name. Red Brigade. Possibly also known as the "Armed Proletarian Unit" (32).

Origins and Political Orientation. Formed in 1970, the BR is a Maoist group (15, 64), and thought to be a nationwide organization (23).

Size. Unknown.

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. The leader of the BR, as of June 1975, was Renato Curcio (24).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The BR has used most of the common terrorist weapons. The group kidnapped an assistant state prosecutor who was critical of ultraleftist activities (15) (32). The purpose of the kidnapping was to force the release of some prisoners held in prison. The group also kidnapped a vermouth manufacturer for ransom in June 1975 (24).

A May 1975 article (13) reported the BR shot and killed a Christian Democrat party official, and alleged the group claimed responsibility for other similar acts. The article went on to say the BR claimed responsibility for fires set at the Pirelli Tire plant and at the Turin Fiat plant.

A police raid on a BR hideout in Milan disclosed armaments, bombs, and forged identity documents (23). Another report claimed BR prison inmates in Southern Italy kept in touch with members on the outside with two-way radios (32).

Significant Operations. The kidnapping of the court officer and wine manufacturer must be considered significant. In addition, the BR kidnapped a high court judge to bring pressure for the return of BR prisoners held in northern Italian prisons to prisons in the south (32).

Cooperation with Other Groups. The BR has been linked with Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, the Italian multimillionaire leftist publisher of Dr. Zhivago. Feltrinelli was killed in a bomb blast on 14 March 1972 when he was apparently attempting to blow up a power pylon (18, 23). In the article reflecting the release of the state prosecutor (55), it was reported the prisoners the BR sought to have released were members of the October 22 Group (see below). This indicates a connection or the possibility the two groups are one in the same.

National Vanguard (NV)

Name. Same.

Origins and Political Orientation. This fascist organization was banned in November 1973 (1:17) and could have been a youth movement of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) (see below) (20).

Size. One report said the NV had 600 members (1:17).

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. Prince Borghese, an Italian nobleman, was reported to be the leader of the NV (see New Order below) (58).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The NV allegedly used dynamite to destroy Socialist Party headquarters in Brescia on 4 February 1973 (1:17). An NV member used a submachine gun in a shootout with police in May 1974 (12). Police found an NV training camp 50 miles northwest of Rome in May 1974. At least 100 pounds of explosives were found there (39).

Significant Operations. With the exception of the Brescia dynamiting, the NV has not been reported responsible for major terrorist operations.

Cooperation with Other Groups. The NV has been linked with the New Order in political violence (1:17).

New Order (NO)

Name. Same.

Origins and Political Orientation. The date of founding of this right-wing organization is unknown; however, it is apparently made up of dissidents from mainstream neo-Fascists (20, 26). The group was banned by Italy in November 1973 (1:16).

Size. Estimates range from 600 to several thousand members (1:16, 20).

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. One leader of the NO was allegedly Elio Massagrande who lived in Greece and was the link between the former Greek dictatorship and the NO (25). An Italian prince,

Junio Valerio Borghese, known as the 'Black Prince,' has been linked with the group (19).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. Unknown.

Significant Operations. The NO was responsible for drawing up a 'death list' of 1,617 Italians marked for assassination in 1973 (26). Prince Borghese was the mastermind behind this plot (19) and, interestingly, the list included the name of Giorgio Almirante, leader of the neo-Fascist MSI.

Cooperation with Other Groups. The NO has been linked with the MSI, the Mussolini Action Squads, and the National Vanguard, all right-wing, neo-Fascist organizations (1:17). The NO allegedly joined the MSI in June 1971 (20). A New York Times article (25) said the NO was the Italian affiliate of the New European Order (NEO), a multinational European group whose goal is a federation of authoritarian states. The NEO purportedly met in Lyons, France, on 27-29 September 1974. Countries represented were France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, and Denmark. Exiles from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia also attended.

Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)

Name. Italian Social Movement.

Origins and Political Orientation. The MSI was formed at a 1948 Naples convention (1:17, 20). The group is neo-Fascist, anti-Arab, and anti-communist (1:17, 20), and is a recognized political party.

In 1971, the MSI had 24 deputies in the 630 member Chamber and 13 senators in the 322 seat Senate (20).

Size. The MSI claimed 400,000 members in 1971 (20).

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. The founder of the MSI is Giorgio Almirante and the party youth organizer is Massimo Anderson (1:17). Until his resignation, the president of the party was Admiral Gino Birindelli. He resigned on 25 June 1974 after a dispute with Almirante, the party secretary. Birindelli had been on active duty with the Italian Navy until he entered politics in 1972 (30). As of 4 September 1974, Alfredo Covelli was president of the MSI (51).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The MSI has been either directly involved or associated with several terrorist acts. The MSI was connected with a synagogue fire in April 1973 (21). A member used a hand grenade to kill a policeman and wound 30 people on 12 April 1973 in Milan (1:17). The group's alleged use of firebombs has been reported (20).

MSI implication in political chicanery was reported in 1974 (51). An employee of Rome University told police he had been paid \$1600 and promised an additional \$16,000 to tell police that leftists were planning to bomb a train. They said he had been paid by Aldo Basile, an associate of Almirante. Basile had the unlisted telephone numbers of Almirante and other neo-Fascists in his possession when arrested.

Significant Operations. None other than outlined above.

Cooperation with Other Groups. The MSI has been connected with the Mussolini Action Squads, National Vanguard, and New Order (1:17, 20). There is some evidence to link the MSI with the Ordine Nero (see below) in a Brescia bombing in May 1974 (9). Foreign connections have been alleged in two reports (20, 29). The first report opined the MSI was receiving money from Greece and Spain. The second stated that a Greek student member of the MSI was killed on 28 February 1975 in Italy. The student's father was General Nilos Mandakos, an opponent of the Greek authoritarian military regime.

Mussolini Action Squads (MAS)

Name. Same.

Origins and Political Orientation. Origins are unknown; the MAS is an extreme right-wing group (35).

Size. One report said the MAS had less than 5,000 members (20).

Organizational Structure. The MAS may be a youth organization of the MSI (20).

Personalities. Unknown.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The main weapon used by the MAS has been the bomb. Allegedly, the MAS bombed a leftist publisher's office in Milan in 1973 (47). One report stated the MAS had set off 25 bombs in Milan between 1969 and May 1973 (49).

Significant Operations. In addition to those operations mentioned above, in June 1974, police found evidence the group was planning to turn May 1974 into a bloodbath by bombings in Brescia. They planned to machinegun a labor demonstration in Milan; occupy a carabinieri (para-military police) barracks; blow up roads, bridges, and railroads; and assassinate prominent politicians (38). The idea of the operation was to force a military takeover and allegedly a number of fascist organizations (not further identified) were involved. Police found an MAS camp near Rome which contained weapons and explosives, forged identity cards, and \$650,000. The plot was to start on 10 May and to be carried out by the "Revolutionary Action Movement." The arrest on 9 May of a well-known fascist, Kim Borromeo, spoiled the plot.

Cooperation with Other Groups. The MAS has been tied to the New Order, the MSI, and the National Vanguard (1:17, 20).

Ordine Nero (ON)

Name. Black Order.

Origins and Political Orientation. The ON was first noted in March 1974 (53) and is allegedly an offshoot of the New Order (25). One report said the ON began in 1948 as the Black Legion. The name changed to New Order in 1954, to Political Movement of New Order in April 1974, and then to its present name (7). The group is neo-Fascist (64).

Size. One report stated the ON had less than 500 members as of June 1974 (53).

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. Unknown.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The group used TNT in a time bomb set off at an Anti-Fascist rally in Brescia in May 1974 (61).

Significant Operations. The Brescia rally explosion killed six and wounded 94 (9, 61). The ON was held responsible for 13 bombings between March and June 1974 (53); ON claimed responsibility for bombing the Rome-Munich express train on 5 August 1974 in which 12 were killed and 48 wounded (50). Earlier, the ON had attempted to blow up the Turin-to-Rome train in April 1973 (49).

Cooperation with Other Groups. The ON has been tied to the MAS at the Brescia rally bombing (9). One report linked the ON with the former ruling Greek Junta which allegedly furnished money and training to the ON prior to 1972 (57).

Other Italian Groups

<u>Name</u>	<u>Political Orientation</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Federazione Anarchista	Anarchist	
Italiana Lotta Continua (Permanent Struggle)	Maoist	The groups' newspaper publisher was jailed for two years in 1973.

Name	Political Orientation	Remarks
October 22 Group	Maoist	The groups' leader, Mario Rossi, was jailed for life in April 1973. Remnants may have joined the Red Brigade. Was possibly involved in the Feltrinelli affair. The group killed a bank messenger in a holdup in September 1971.
Partio Comunista Revoluzionario	Trotskyist	Publishes the Bandiera Rossa (Red Flag).
Rosa Dei Venti	New-Fascist	

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convinced, and this was clearly stated by Arafat in his U.N. speech, that violence and terror against Israelis everywhere in the world are the sole alternative to disfranchisement (3:5). Unfortunately, this terrorism has included much more than just terrorist acts against the Israelis. Palestinian Arab terrorism has taken on global dimensions. A number of terrorist groups have come into existence operating against targets in Israel and against Israeli citizens, Jews, and any nation or people who, even remotely, have any connection with Israel. Countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, and Syria provide terrorist groups with arms and training bases. Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states are said to provide various terrorist groups with some financial support (18:8).

Unless the international community provides a solution to the plight of the Palestinian refugees, then the international community must be able to live with a cycle of terrorism and counterterror. Efforts of the Black September Organization (BSO) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) will continue to be remarkably successful in causing the world community to focus its attention on the plight of the Palestinians. There is no sign that terrorism by Palestinian terrorist groups is going to stop or even slow down in the immediate future. Israel will remain their main target; however, the United States also

makes an attractive target, particularly, those Americans assigned to U.S. government posts overseas.

Again, some of the confusion that existed in Iran over what terrorist group is responsible for a particular act of terror also exists in the Middle East. It is generally accepted that the BS0 and the PFLP are the main terrorist threat in the Middle East; however, this also depends on one's definition of terrorism. For the purposes of this chapter, military or commando raids against villages and military bases inside Israel and Israeli occupied territory by Palestinian groups are being excluded. Hence, much guerrilla action and some groups will be omitted. To have some appreciation for the groups, a brief characterization of the omitted groups is necessary.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) acts as a parliament for the terrorist (fedayeen) group. The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) is the military arm of the PLO and the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF) is the commando wing of the PLA. Generally, the PLF confines its activities to targets within Israel and Israeli occupied territories (18:8).

Under the PLO are Al Fatah, Al Saiqa, Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), PFLP, PFLP-General Command and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) (18:8).

Al Fatah, like the PLF, has generally limited its attacks to targets inside Israel and Israeli occupied territories. It is believed to be the parent of the BSO (18:8-9).

Al Saiqa is connected to and financed by the Syrian Baath Party. It represents the unofficial view of the Syrian regime within the PLO and is opposed to Al Fatah (1:65).

The PFLP-General Command split with the PFLP in 1968 because of doctrinal reasons. It has been involved in mailing letter-bombs to Jewish leaders (18:9).

The ALF conducts its activities primarily within Israel and Israeli occupied territories. Reportedly, the ALF was formed by the Iraqi government in 1968 to counter the influence of other pro-Egyptian and pro-Syrian groups (18:9).

When dealing with any Arab terrorist group, it must be remembered that their stated ideologies, objectives, and organizational names can all change rapidly as new affiliations develop and factions break off. The following constitute the major known or reported organizations that are active at the time of this paper.

Black September Organization

Name. Black September Organization.

Origins and Political Orientation. The BSO surfaced in Cairo, Egypt, on 28 November 1971 (8:42) when four men killed Jordan's Prime Minister on the steps of the Cairo Sheraton Hotel. The BSO

took credit for the killing and reported that its name was taken from the dark September in 1970 when King Hussein of Jordan turned his army on Al Fatah. BSO is an extremist clandestine faction of Al Fatah which emerged from the Al Fatah intelligence organization "Fehaz al Rasd," which recruits among the more radical members of the PLO (1:65).

Mohammed Mustafa Syein, a deputy of Al Fatah's Chief, Yasir Arafat, was the movement's first leader. Mohammed Yusuf Najjar, alias Abu Yusuf, who was once a top intelligence officer of Al Fatah, is believed to be the BSO current leader (3:8). Speculation about the identity of the Septembrist high command centers on Al Fatah, and particularly on a handful of leaders of Fatah's elite field intelligence unit.

The quality and dedication of the BSO exceeds that of the average terrorist group. They are willing to die, if necessary, for their "cause" (3:8). BSO is a Palestinian nationalist group and is considered, along with the PFLP, as the most extreme of all Arab terrorist groups (5:23). Its stated goal is the destruction of Israel and they have seldom hesitated to kill in the service of what they call their "cause" (6:19).

Organizational Structure and Size. BSO is a very secret and clandestine organization. It has no known headquarters and no membership lists are maintained. It maintains an unknown number of 5-10 man cells throughout the Arab world and Western Europe.

Membership has been estimated at about 400 - 600 members by European and Israeli intelligence sources, about 100 - 200 by U.S. sources (3:8) and 60 - 100 by other sources. The BSO is so secure that no government intelligence network seems to have been able to infiltrate its ranks (4:42). The BSO supposedly consists of four main operating units that are variously responsible for Europe, Middle East, Africa, and the Americas.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The BSO has been described as the "elite" among terrorist organizations. Prior to the attack at the Olympic games, the BSO already had some members in Germany attending universities. The BSO planning and training for the assault was carried out in Syria. A week before the Olympic games, several BSO members set out for Munich, traveling separately and by various means of transport. They brought an arsenal of weapons including Russian built Kalashnikov submachine guns, pistols, and hand grenades. They surveyed the Olympic village, and some even got jobs among the 30,000 workers in the village (5:23). The planning and precision associated with the attack at the Olympics was alarmingly sophisticated.

There are conflicting reports on the BSO's ties to the main commando group, Al Fatah, but the BSO is a small, discreet, highly motivated body of men and women with a cause. They have access to a wide variety of weapons and have engaged in most

of the methods of operation normally restricted to experienced, well-trained intelligence services.

Significant Operations.

28 November 1971: The BSO was responsible for the murder of Jordan's Prime Minister, Wasfi Tal, on the steps of the Cairo Sheraton Hotel.

15 December 1971: BSO terrorists attempted to assassinate Zaid Rifai, the Jordanian ambassador to London (18:30).

8 May 1972: The BSO hijacked a Belgian airliner en route to Tel Aviv. Upon landing, the BSO demanded the release of Palestinian Arabs held in Israeli jails in return for the safety of the passengers. Israeli troops stormed the plane and killed two hijackers. A passenger was also fatally wounded (7:17).

5 September 1972: Eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team and four Arab terrorists were killed in an incident that began with an invasion of the Olympic village by the BSO. The incident ended with a shootout at a military airport some 15 miles away as the BSO terrorists were preparing to leave for Cairo with their Israeli hostages. BSO members, armed with automatic rifles, broke into the quarters of the Israeli team and seized nine hostages, after killing two Israelis. The hostages were killed in the airport shootout between the BSO and German policemen and soldiers. The incident was televised by the American Broadcasting Corporation giving added publicity to the BSO and the Palestinian cause (8:1).

19 September 1972: An Israeli diplomat was killed by a letter bomb mailed to the Israeli Embassy in London. In the next few days approximately 50 letter bombs addressed to officials in Israel and Israeli Embassies were intercepted throughout the world. The BS0 claimed responsibility (18:35).

29 October 1972: Two BS0 hijackers took over a Lufthansa German airlines plane and ordered it flown to Munich. The hijackers ordered the release of the three BS0 terrorists captured in the Munich Olympic games attack. The West Germans complied, and the hijacked plane was kept aloft while the three terrorists were released (18:35).

20 December 1972: Two rockets hit the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The BS0 was suspected of the attack (18:37).

28 December 1972: Four BS0 terrorists took over the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok, and held six hostages for 19 hours. They demanded release of Arab guerrillas imprisoned in Israel, including the two surviving hijackers of the Belgian airline (8 May 1972) and the lone survivor of the 31 May 1972 Lod Airport massacre (see 31 May 1972, PFLP). The terrorists threatened to blow up the embassy if Thai security forces attempted an assault. After considerable deliberation, the terrorists were flown to Cairo (18:37).

9 February 1973: Seventeen BS0 terrorists were arrested in Amman, Jordan. The terrorists were on a mission to attack the U.S. Embassy along with attacking Jordanian government officials (18:39).

1 March 1973: BSO terrorists executed three diplomats at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. Executed were the arriving and departing U.S. Ambassadors and the Belgian charge d'affaires (9:25). The BSO terrorists drove Land Rovers to the front gate of the four-story embassy villa. Seven men leaped out of the Rovers and fired their automatic weapons at random (10:22). The BSO terrorists then held a mock court in the compound in which the captives were judged according to their country's attitude toward the Palestinians. The U.S. diplomats, along with the Belgian, were then shot.

4 August 1973: Arab terrorists killed five and wounded 55 New York bound TWA passengers at the Athens, Greece, airport. The terrorists mistook the passengers as tourists for Israel. Again, automatic weapons were used. BSO subsequently took credit for the act; however, there is still question as to what organization was, in fact, responsible (9:25).

4 March 1973: BSO terrorists sunk a Greek charter ship carrying 250 U.S. tourists bound for Haifa, Israel. There were no casualties (18:39).

6 and 7 March 1973: Bombs were found in abandoned rental cars outside the El Al Israel airlines air terminal at Kennedy Airport and outside Israeli banks in New York (18:40).

30 April 1973: Four BSO terrorists were arrested as they approached the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Beirut police reported

that five other armed BSO terrorists were rounded up in connection with the abortive attack (18:43).

Terror Against the United States. Seven incidents involving U.S. citizens and U.S. government employees have just been detailed. These incidents signify how U.S. citizens and U.S. facilities might get caught up in terrorist acts by the BSO either as innocent bystanders or as specific targets. As long as U.S. foreign policy supports Israel, the BSO and other Arab terrorist groups will consider the U.S. as detrimental to their objectives. Israel will remain the BSO number one target but further terror against the U.S., its citizens, and its facilities must be expected.

Cooperation with Other Groups. Transnational terrorism has never been more evident than in the case of the BSO and their acts of terror. Evidence of this collaboration emerges from events such as the Lydda airport massacre in May 1972 and the Olympic games attack when BSO terrorists demanded release of the leaders of a group of German criminals (Baader-Meinhof Gang) responsible for numerous acts of terrorism in Germany. The 28 December 1972 seizure of the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok further highlighted the transnational collaboration between the BSO and other terrorist groups.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Name. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

Origin and Political Orientation. The PFLP was founded in January 1968. It is a pro-communist (Marxist-Leninist) organization; however, it is ideologically inconsistent. The PFLP is considered the most militant, along with the BSO, of the Arab terrorist groups. The PFLP has sworn never to negotiate with Israel. The PFLP receives support from Libya, Iraq, and in the past, the Peoples Republic of China, and the Soviet Union (1:65) (11:21).

The PFLP professes a Marxist-Leninist ideology; however, as previously noted, they are ideologically inconsistent. The PFLP has collaborated and requested services from terrorist organizations who profess to be more Maoist than Marxist-Leninist. The PFLP, when convenient, professes a "world revolution" doctrine and at other times the PFLP takes a very strong nationalistic (Palestinianism) stance. The PFLP is dedicated to the destruction of Israel and has attempted to focus the eyes of the world on the plight of the Palestinians. For this last measure, the PFLP has been successful, even though the focus of the eyes of the world has not always been in a sympathetic vein.

The current leader of the PFLP is Dr. George Habash, who emerged as a significant world revolutionist in 1970 after delivering a key address on revolutionary strategy to an assembled group in Pyongyang, North Korea. Habash's operational chief of the PFLP is Dr. Wadi Haddad, who along with Habash, ostensibly

planned the OPEC Ministers' Conference attack in December 1975 (12:76) (13:24).

Organizational Structure and Size. Little has been written of an unclassified nature about the organizational structure of the PFLP. However, an analysis of their actions strongly suggests that the PFLP maintains strict security and is compartmented along the lines of the BSO. There is evidence that the PFLP utilizes other terrorist groups to accomplish their objectives more often than the other Arab terrorist groups. The PFLP has about 500 members and it has been behind most international hijackings and attacks on embassies (12:76). The PFLP has engaged in mass instruction on guerrilla methods, but there is no reason to believe they have in any way compromised their internal security or hampered any planned acts of terrorism by holding these guerrilla schools. Based on the inability of various government intelligence services to predict or even stop the actions of the PFLP, it is logical to assume that, like with the BSO, the intelligence services have had little success in infiltrating the ranks of the PFLP.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. Terrorists have been provided with new targets and new capabilities as a result of contemporary technology. Jet travel gives them unprecedented mobility that allows them the freedom to strike anywhere in the world. At the same time, new weapons coupled with their immediate availability

increase their capability for violence. The PFLP is not just an ordinary terrorist group. They are well trained in the use of weapons and explosives, and they recognize the vital need for well planned and executed attacks. They adapt their methods to the job at hand and use precision in its execution. The PFLP has generally stayed away from purely suicide attacks. The PFLP is an organization dedicated to the fall of Israel, and they are willing to use any means to attain their objectives.

Significant Operations.

13 February 1969: Four PFLP terrorists machine-gunned an El Al Israel Airlines jet preparing to take off from Zurich for Tel Aviv. One PFLP terrorist was killed, four Israeli crew members, and three passengers were wounded (18:14).

18 July 1969: Two London department stores known to have links with Israel were fire-bombed by the PFLP. The PFLP warned that there would be more bomb attacks on Jewish-owned establishments in London and in the United States. PFLP leader Habash said, "We shall expand our operations everywhere, in all parts of the world. The enemy camp includes not only Israel but also the Zionist movement, world imperialism led by the U.S., and reactionary powers bound to imperialism" (18:15-16).

29 August 1969: A TWA 707 en route between Paris and Athens was hijacked by two members of the PFLP. They ordered the plane

flown to Syria, where the plane was blown up after removal of the passengers (18:16).

10 February 1970: An Israeli citizen was killed and 11 other Israeli citizens were wounded by three PFLP terrorists in a grenade attack on a bus at the Munich airport (18:18).

21 February 1970: Forty-seven persons were killed, fifteen of whom were Israelis, when a sabotaged Swiss Air plane crashed on takeoff en route to Tel Aviv. The PFLP claimed responsibility (18:18).

7 June 1970: Morris Draper, U.S. political secretary in Amman, was kidnapped by members of the PFLP as he drove to a dinner party. He was released unharmed on 8 June (14:16).

10 June 1970: Major Paul P. Perry, U.S. Military Attache, was killed at his home in Amman by PFLP terrorists (15:1).

6 September 1970: Three airliners bound for New York from Europe were hijacked by members of the PFLP. The airliners, one U.S., one British, and one Swiss, were diverted to a landing strip in the Jordanian desert. The passengers and flight crews were held captive for three days. A fourth hijacking of an El Al Israel airlines plane en route from Amsterdam to London was foiled by a security guard on board the plane. The PFLP said the hijackings were in retaliation for U.S. support of Israel and the U.S. peace initiatives in the Middle East (3:5-8) (18:24) (7:17).

9 September 1970: A BOAC VC-10 was hijacked by the PFLP who also had it flown to the landing strip in the Jordanian desert, bringing the total number of hostages held in the desert to 300. On 12 September, the hostages were evacuated and the planes were blown up. Most of the passengers were subsequently released, but the PFLP held 58 hostages to exert pressure on the European governments. The hostages were released on 25, 26, and 29 September. The Swiss government announced that the British, Swiss, and West German governments would free seven Arab terrorist when the last six hostages, who were U.S. citizens, had left Jordan. The seven prisoners were released and flown to Cairo on 30 September (18:24).

22 February 1972: The PFLP hijacked a Lufthansa German Airlines jet en route from New Delhi to Athens and forced it to land at Aden, South Yemen. On 25 February, the West German government disclosed that it had paid \$5 million in ransom. The hijackers were set free (7:17) (18:31).

30 May 1972: Three young Japanese men killed 25 and wounded 78 persons at Tel Aviv's Lod International Airport. The three Japanese headed for the luggage conveyor belt and removed their jackets. When their luggage arrived, they opened a suitcase and pulled out Czech-made, VZ 58, lightweight submachine guns and half a dozen grenades. They began firing into the crowd of deplaning passengers and bystanders. When they emptied their submachine guns, they lobbed grenades at groups of tourists and

airport attendants. They then reversed the magazines in their guns and started firing again.

All three Japanese were members of the United (Japanese) Red Army, a small extremist group of university students who had hijacked a Japan Air Lines flight and its passengers to North Korea in 1970. The three URA members had been recruited in Japan by a representative of the PFLP, which claimed responsibility for the massacre. The Japanese had been recruited because they could enter Israel more easily than Arabs, especially, since Israel decided to waive visas for visiting Japanese. The URA men were looking for new ways to carry out their organizational goal of "global revolution."

Dr. Habash was the organizer of the massacre. The Japanese had been trained for the attack in guerrilla camps in Lebanon and North Korea. They collected their passports in Frankfurt and their weapons in Rome, in each case by arrangement with local terrorist groups (2:109) 16:23) (17:59) (18:32).

3 November 1972: A female member of the PFLP was killed in Amman while handling a bomb. Police reported she had intended to place the bomb in the U.S. Embassy in Amman (18:35-36).

31 January 1974: Two members of the URA and two PFLP terrorists attempted to blow up a Shell Oil Company refinery in Singapore. The terrorists tried to blow up three oil storage tanks but only succeeded in setting one on fire. They then seized

eight hostages aboard a ferryboat and threatened to kill themselves and the hostages unless they were given safe passage to an Arab country. Five of the eight hostages were allowed to jump overboard but the other three were forced to stay with the terrorists (18:53).

6 February 1974: Five PFLP terrorists took over the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait, holding 12 persons hostage, including the Ambassador. They demanded the Japanese government supply an airliner to bring their comrades from Singapore to Kuwait. A Japan Air Lines plane carrying the four terrorists from Singapore landed in Kuwait. After picking up the other five terrorists, the plane went on to Aden, South Yemen. The terrorists were freed by South Yemen authorities (18:53).

December 1975: "Carlos" and five accomplices entered Austria utilizing false papers. On 21 December 1975, they entered the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) building, located at the Dr. Karl Lueger Ring in Vienna. They all carried Adidas sports bags and when they approached the floor where the OPEC ministers' conference was being held, they removed their weapons from the sports bags and started shooting. During the next four minutes, three persons were killed, two by the girl terrorist, Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann, a member of the Baader-Meinhof Gang. After about a twenty-minute gun battle, the 6 terrorists held 70 hostages, including 11 of the most powerful men in the world (11:21).

The captive ministers and senior members of the delegations put in writing their wishes that Chancellor Kreisky of Austria comply with the terrorists' demands. The terrorists were then furnished a flight from Vienna to Algiers on an Austrian airplane. The flight to Algiers was the end of the journey for most of the hostages, but for the terrorists and two other hostages, the journey continued to Libya.

Carlos had indicated earlier he worked for Libya and the terrorists were last seen in a police car leaving Algiers airport; a week later they were reported to be back in Libya where one of them was receiving medical treatment.

A few days later, a disaffected member of the Libyan government told The Observer's Africa correspondent that "President Qadhafi had organized the whole business."

Reportedly, Carlos' boss is Dr. Habash whose only real ally is Qadhafi. Some western diplomats say Qadhafi was furious that the raid took place, especially since a Libyan delegate was killed. The same sources say the raid was the idea of Dr. Haddad, the operational chief of the PFLP (13:24).

Terror Against the United States. Significant operations by the PFLP have indicated the importance and priority they place on attacking U.S. targets. U.S. airline flights have been hijacked and their planes blown up. U.S. government employees have been assassinated and kidnapped. Sabotage has been directed

against U.S. commercial interests overseas and U.S. citizens traveling abroad have received "preferential" treatment by the PFLP, as indicated in the 9 September 1970 hijacking of a BOAC plane.

The mobility and accessibility of U.S. personnel, property, and facilities make the U.S. prime targets for PFLP terrorists.

Cooperation with Other Groups. Five years ago Haddad began to make extensive contacts with revolutionary groups abroad like the URA and the Baader-Meinhof Gang. In 1971, he invited young people from all of Europe to a guerrilla seminar at a PFLP camp in Southern Lebanon. Carlos attended that seminar. The results of transnational collaboration between the PFLP and other terrorist groups is very much in evidence (13:21).

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CHAPTER IX

THE NETHERLANDS

In comparison with other countries in which this study has examined terrorist groups, the Netherlands is rather quiet. Other than the militant South Moluccans, who are discussed in detail below, there are no known terrorist organizations of any significance currently operating within the Netherlands.

Terrorist groups from outside occasionally have launched operations within the Netherlands. One example of this was the seizure of the French Ambassador in the Hague by members of the Japanese Red Army in 1974 (14:1) (see Chapter XIV).

Members of the West German Baader-Meinhof Gang and Movement 2 June have used the Netherlands on occasion as a safe-haven. The German terrorists have also received some logistical support from individuals within the Netherlands. However, this activity appears to be on a rather small scale (20:78).

This chapter will deal with the terrorist activities of the South Moluccans living in the Netherlands.

South Moluccan Militants

Name. Militant South Moluccans living in the Netherlands use

the names Free South Moluccan Organization (FSMO) and South Moluccan Youth Movement (SMYM).

Origin and Political Orientation. In 1949 the South Molucca Islands were incorporated into Indonesia. Starting in 1952, 12,000 Moluccans came to live in the Netherlands and the number has grown to 35,000 (16:25). The Dutch government promised the Moluccans at the time of their arrival that they would eventually be returned to their islands (14:1).

The Moluccans want to establish an independent Republic of the South Moluccans and have expressed desires to join a leftist revolutionary group, Fretilin, on the island of Timor (17:32).

Size. The proportion of the 35,000 Moluccans living in the Netherlands who belong to the militant group is unknown although the militant leader claims to represent a majority (7:27537). The Times of London says that the non-militant Moluccans led by Dr. Jan Manusame represent the Moluccan majority (14:1).

Organizational Structure. The militants of the FSMO model themselves after the Palestine Liberation Organization (17:32).

Personalities. The leader of the FSMO is Etti Aponno.

Dr. Manusama is considered to be the leader of the Moluccan Community in the Netherlands and is referred to as the President of the South Moluccan republic in exile (8:1).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The FSMO has engaged in arson, attempted kidnapping, and the seizure and occupations of consulates,

residences, and a train. These incidents will be discussed in more detail below. The weapons used by the FSMO include sub-machine guns, pistols, and a hunting rifle (16:25).

Significant Operations.

26-27 July 1966: The Indonesian Embassy in the Hague was set fire after the arrival in the Netherlands of the widow of a representative of the Indonesian government (7:27537).

31 August 1970: The residence of the Indonesian Ambassador in the Hague was seized and occupied by over 30 young South Moluccan militants who also killed a policeman (7:27537).

April 1974: An attempt was made to kidnap the Indonesian consul-general in Amsterdam and an Indonesian airways office was set fire (7:27537).

1 April 1975: The Dutch government announced that the South Moluccans had planned to occupy the Royal Palace at Soestdyk and kidnap the Dutch Queen, Juliana. Forty-two Moluccans were arrested (7:27537).

2 December 1975: Six members of the FSMO boarded a four-car electric train about ten miles from the town of Beilen. They stopped the train, killed the engineer and a passenger, and threw the bodies out onto the tracks. On the third day, after negotiations failed, another passenger was brought to the door of the train, shot in the neck, and thrown onto the railroad bed (16:25). The Moluccans demanded to be flown to East Timor in order that they

might join the Fretilin. Other demands included the release of all South Moluccans in Dutch prisons and independence talks for the South Molucca Islands arranged by the Dutch government under U.N. auspices (7:27538). On 5 December an explosion in one of the cars of the train injured one of the Moluccan gunmen and two of the hostages (5:1). During the seizure, several hostages such as elderly people and children were released and eighteen others managed to escape (12:1). After 12 days of holding the train, the Moluccans released the remaining 23 hostages and surrendered to the Dutch authorities without having gained any concessions from the government (13:1 and 14).

4 December 1975: Another group of six South Moluccan gunmen seized the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam, taking 32 hostages including 17 school children (10:1). Demands made by the gunmen at the consulate paralleled those on the train. Violence was not as severe at the consulate. One of the hostages was made to stand in his shirt sleeves on a balcony for more than an hour in the rain. The man was subsequently hospitalized for pneumonia (8:1). One consulate employee died and three were hospitalized after jumping from upper floor windows (8:1). The consulate seige ended on 19 December after the gunmen destroyed all of their weapons and surrendered (7:27538).

Cooperation with Other Groups. Although, as pointed out above, the FSMO models itself after the Palestine Liberation

Organization, there is no known involvement or cooperation with any other group.

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CHAPTER X

PORTUGAL

The problems confronting Portugal today are not problems of terrorism but internal political strife. Until the Moderates finally took charge in December 1975, political discord and occasional violence were very much in evidence in Portugal. The Moderates will not end all that, but they will lend a feeling of stability to the country.

The main cause of trouble for Portugal comes from the extreme left, which consists of eight, small dedicated fragmented parties and other organizations (2:36). The groups range from the Portuguese Democratic Movement, which is regarded as a front for the communists, to the Maoist Movement for the Reorganization of the Proletariat. The ideologies of the far left groups show tremendous disparity; however, they are united in at least one goal: to overthrow the present moderate government.

The Moderates have not been inactive during the political upheaval attempts by the left. When the Moderates took charge of the country, more than 100 Army officers and soldiers were arrested. Other radical officers and civilians fled the country, as did many youthful revolutionaries from other nations in Western

Europe, who had gone to Lisbon to help "the cause." President Francisco da Costa Gomes warned all organizations in Portugal not to start demonstrations when he stated: "We will not be intimidated" (3:26).

Portugal's immediate crisis is past but they can expect serious problems in the future if the current government flounders for a moment or if they do not establish the stability so necessary to the future of Portugal.

There are some Portuguese extremist movements which do not pose an immediate political threat to the Moderates but are waiting in the wings, so to speak. Those extremist movements, which also include some recognized political parties, pose both a political and insurgent threat should the future of Portugal deter from its current course. A brief characterization of the extremist parties and movements is in order.

Name. Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (MES).

Political Orientation. The MES is to the extreme left of the socialists and many of its members became orthodox communists. The MES is considered a political party that advocates the absolute dictatorship of the proletariat, abolition of all private ownership and a system of people's communes. The MES states that Moscow has become perverted by bourgeois ideas (4:34).

Name. Frente Socialista Popular (FSP).

Political Orientation. The FSP was set up under communist instigation in an attempt to split the socialists. The FSP is a communist party in all but their name (4:34).

Name. Movimento Democratico Portugues (MDP).

Political Orientation. The MDP is the catch-all party of the far left but they do not wish to use the communist name (4:34).

Name. Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP).

Political Orientation. The MRPP is a Maoist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement opposed to the policies of the Soviet Union and the U.S. The MRPP is a big movement which has acquired a large quantity of arms from the old Portuguese Legion. They have been involved in some violent demonstrations in the past but do not appear as a terrorist threat today (4:34). They could pose a political threat to the Moderates.

Name. Liga de Uniao e Accao Revolucionaria (LUAR).

Political Orientation. The LUAR has grouped the anarchists and Maoists. They are well armed and could put 3,000 - 4,000 men in the street (4:34). The movement was founded in 1966 and dropped out of sight in the late 1960s, but reappeared in 1973. Again, the LUAR poses more of a "coup" threat to the Moderates than a terrorist threat (1:52).

Name. Accao Revolucionaria Armada (ARA).

Political Orientation. The ARA is the revolutionary wing of the communist party. It is well armed with Russian and Czech weapons (4:34), but it suspended violent actions in 1973 (1:52).

Name. Uniao Democratico Popular (UDP).

Political Orientation. The UDP is a recognized political party expressing a Maoist ideology.

Name. Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat (RPP).

Political Orientation. The RPP, popularly called the Revolutionary Brigades, poses the greatest threat to the Portuguese Moderates or any other form of government simply because the RPP believes that armed action is justified to overthrow the government. The RPP has many of the 30,000 weapons stolen from the Army, and it has the allegiance of many low-ranking soldiers and sailors. The RPP has been involved in violence against various Portuguese governments for the past four years. The RPP somewhat offsets the communist threat as the Brigade's members make no secret of their contempt for communists (2:36). There has not been sufficient time to evaluate the RPP reaction to the Moderates. The RPP could pose a formidable threat in the future.

By now it should be readily apparent that the problems within Portugal arise from the internal political instability of their political process. However, for now an almost "holiday

atmosphere" (5:1) has started to prevail in Lisbon. In December when the Moderates took over, the streets were filled with Christmas shoppers instead of mobs screaming for the overthrow of the government. The political parties were using this period of quiet for reflection and consolidation. The infiltrations and subversions practiced in military units throughout the country have been halted and crushed (5:34). Future periods of tranquility depend on the job done by the Moderates. If they are not successful, the door might then be opened for political upheavals, insurgency, and even terrorism. For now, everything is quiet.

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CHAPTER XI

SPAIN

Spain is in a state of flux, uncertainty, and testing. The death of Franco left Spain with an untried, newly appointed monarch. Juan Carlos, while prepared by Franco for some time, is an untested entity in a country noted for authoritarian measures and intolerance of anti-government activity. Early in 1976, Spanish workers began striking. Debate centered on whether these strikes were politically motivated or caused by purely economic needs. The possibility of subversive, political/revolutionary support for the strikes is hard to deny.

The threat from the extreme left - which many outside observers have tended to shrug off in the past as a bogey invoked by the right as a pretext to silence moderate opposition - must now be taken seriously . . . the communists have had some success in forging a tactical alliance with non-Marxist opposition groups . . .
(40:1)

Separatist movements have always been amongst the most active terrorist elements in Spain. These movements, some of which draw historical roots from past centuries, have caused Spanish military and police forces their most trying times. Some of the most widely publicized kidnappings, bombings, and bank robberies in Europe have been caused by Spanish separatists.

Moss (40:35) lists three options for Spain following Franco's death. These include some form of revolution, some form of counter-revolution, or thirdly, a smooth transition from Franco to Juan Carlos. Moss eliminates from possible scenarios a democratic outcome, or a constitutional monarchy under Juan Carlos' father, Don Juan.

Moss discounts the possibility of a revolution in Spain due to the Communist forces having little support from the army. However, he points out that Spanish support for the "armed struggle" drew encouragement from the assassination of Premier Carrero Blanco in December 1973 (40:36).

Moss also tends to discount the possibility of a counter-revolution, intervention by the military, in governmental affairs. This is due to Franco's ability to render the military apolitical following the Civil War. Moss does say that given inept government performance accompanied by efforts of liberalization by the government, the military might be tempted to step in (35:36).

According to Moss, a successful transition from Franco to Juan Carlos is the most likely outcome for Spain's future, at least on the short term.

Countering this opinion is the fact that Spain has one of the most active terrorist lineups in Europe. Moss himself lists more than 35 such groups (40:35-40). The most active group, Basque separatists, are not likely to relinquish their long-cherished

desires for a separate Basque nation. The Catalan separatists while less effective than the Basques also wish the same for their 'people.' An increase in political agitation by the left, counter moves by the right, and some anarchial elements threaten the Juan Carlos regime.

Continued active terrorist and political unrest is in the offing for Spain. The Franco-era terrorists are still there, and the new government is untried. The potential hangs on the ability of Juan Carlos to solve difficult and possibly insoluble problems.

Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA)

Name. Freedom for The Basque Homeland.

Origins and Political Orientation. An article has described the ETA as small and fragmented--one splinter allied with Trotskyite communists, another with regular communists, and the third with "calibrated" terrorism (16). This same article reported that Spanish officials fear the ETA has developed a large infrastructure in the Catholic Church, among lawyers, and among liberal Basque bankers and industrialists.

A separatist organization, the ETA is actually several groups which originally split from the Basque Nationalist Party (1:23). The ETA was founded in the late 1950s (15) and began terrorist activity in 1959 (57). A split in 1969 led to the forming of two groups, the ETA (V Assembly) and the ETA (VI Assembly). They resemble

the two wings of the Irish Republican Army (IRA); the V Assembly, like the Provisionals of the IRA with no coherent ideology apart from ultranationalism, are dedicated to violence. The V Assembly is responsible for most ETA-sponsored violence. The VI Assembly, like the official IRA, has leaned toward a Marxist ideology and is more restrained in its use of violence (40:22).

The VI Assembly itself split into two groups, a "Majority" and a "Minority" faction. The Majority uses limited violence and relies on union organization. In December 1973, the Minority merged with the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR), the Spanish branch of the Trotskyite Fourth International (40:39-40).

In addition to the fractionalism outlined, Moss (40:40) stated the Movimienta Comunista de Espana (MCE) broke away from the V Assembly. MCE activities were originally limited to labor agitation in northern Spain; however, the group has been attempting to become a national Marxist-Leninist movement.

Size. Little data on the ETA's size could be located; however, two articles (1:160, 15:48) described the ETA as having 200 members; the V Assembly has a few dozen personnel at best.

Organizational Structure. The Basque government in exile is headquartered in Paris (39); however, the connection between this organization and the ETA is unknown. As noted above, the ETA is fragmented and little could be found to support a discussion of the group's organizational structure.

Personalities. As with organizational structure, little could be found concerning significant personalities of the ETA.

One article identified the leader of the exiled Basque nation as 77-year-old (as of April 1974) Jesus Maria de Leizaola (4). Active ETA terrorists are much younger. For example, a kidnapping organizer, Thomas Perez Revilla, was 35 as of April 1973 (38). A man described as a "leader" of the ETA, Juan Jose Echave, was 33 as of March 1970 and resides in France (36). The Chief of the ETA living in France is Telesforo de Monzon (23).

Many ETA leaders and organizers have been killed or captured by Spanish authorities in recent years. These include Pedro Ignacio Beotequi, also known as "Wilson," listed as the chief political officer of the Basque Province of Vizcaya and was probably the leader of the ETA group which assassinated Premier Blanco (see Significant Operations) (55). All members of the group were under 27 years old in 1973. Leaders recently neutralized include the organization's political leader Jose Luis Arteche Orejon, 25 in 1972, captured in October 1972 (25); military front leader Eustaquio Mendizabal, killed in April 1973 (34); military leader Jose Mugica Arregui, age 30 in 1975, caught in September 1975 (37). The founder of the ETA, Benito Del Valle, left the organization in 1967 (18). His current activities or location are unknown.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The ETA has used most terrorist weapons with the exception of airplane hijackings. Some funds have

come from kidnappings of Spanish industrialists who pay handsomely to be released (1:24, 13, 23). The ETA also use bank robberies for their funding (13, 14, 45). Explosives were used with great effectiveness in the Blanco assassination (see Significant Operations) (32).

Raids by Spanish authorities have found submachine guns, pistols, and shotguns in ETA arsenals (1:25, 48). ETA weapons are captured items from Spanish authorities who are killed and also from Sweden and Czechoslovakia (15). Support for this later contention could not be found in other articles.

The Modus Operandi used in the Blanco assassination provides a clue to ETA expertise. The five members of the team tunneled under the street where the 99 pounds of explosives were set. The charge was set on top of a heavy metal sheet to insure the force of the explosion would go up toward the street surface. A lookout down the street gave the signal when Blanco's car was in the right position and the charge was detonated (32).

Significant Operations. The most significant ETA operation was the assassination of Premier Carrero Blanco in December 1973. The team, which included a woman, rented an apartment in the name of a sculptor to provide a cover for the digging noises. Carrero attended the same church service each day and traveled the same route to and from church. The timing of the explosion was exact and Carrero's car was blown five stories high (31, 32).

Interestingly, the ETA missed killing Secretary of State Henry Kissinger by one day; the ETA did not know of his presence in Spain and postponed the attempt one day, when Blanco was alone. In a book claiming responsibility for the assassination, the ETA stated they would have killed Kissinger given the chance, "'out of solidarity with the Palestinians'" (31).

Other significant operations, in chronological order, include:

- The ETA blew up a Spanish radio-telephone facility in San Sebastian, northern Spain, in April 1972 (52).
- In April 1972, the ETA robbed a bank in San Sebastian of £78,000 (14).
- The ETA may have bombed the French Consulate in Saragossa on 2 November 1972. There is some doubt the ETA carried out this operation as later reports attributed it to left-wing students at the University of Saragossa (29).
- In well organized raids on 6 December 1972, the ETA carried out four simultaneous attacks in different Spanish towns in northern Spain. The groups raided headquarters of state-controlled trade unions to protest the appointment of a non-Basque to head the unions in the area and to make a show of strength following a series of arrests of ETA members (56).
- In January 1973, the ETA kidnapped well-known Spanish industrialist Felipe Huarte near Pamplona. A large ransom was paid for his release (10).

- The ETA was suspected of a Bilbao bank robbery in May 1973 in which between £15,000 and £40,000 was stolen (45).

Cooperation with Other Groups. There have been several published accounts of collaboration between the ETA and other terrorist groups. The US Air Force reported the ETA had connections with several French anarchist groups, especially the Group of International Revolutionary Action (GARI) (58). GARI is allegedly composed of French nationals and Basques; the report states the ETA and GARI collaborated in an attempt to blow up trains running between France and Spain in the 1973-1974 period. Other joint activities have included arms smuggling and some terrorist attacks against such targets as the Paris manager of the Spanish Bank of Bilbao, Iberia Airlines office in Brussels, and the Palace of Justice in Paris. These attacks were carried out in behalf of the ETA.

Other reports have connected the ETA with other Marxist-Leninist groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Palestinian groups, the Kurds, and French Basques (16). One author, Moss (40:23), feels the upswing of terror in 1972 demonstrated the ETA's awareness of terrorist activities outside Spain. He alleges there have been meetings between the IRA and the ETA in Dublin; apparently these two groups have cooperated in arms deals from East Germany. An intelligence report in 1973 stated a shipment from East Germany was to stop on the Basque coast before proceeding

to Ireland. The "Claudia," a ship previously used for IRA gun running, was the carrier. Moss also reports ETA connections with the Al Fatah in Lebanon and separatist groups in France. Additionally, the ETA receives moral support from the Front for the Liberation of Brittany (see Chapter III, France).

Moss draws a parallel between the modus operandi of the Blanco assassination and similar methods used by IRA and Latin American groups. FRAP (see below), a Maoist organization, supposedly has ties with the ETA (11).

In January 1971, Carlist royalists who support the return of Prince Xavier of Bourbon-Parma to the Spanish throne, attempted to sabotage a TV transmission station near Burgos. Franco was speaking at the time, discussing commuting death sentences of ETA terrorists. The Carlists attempted to interject a message from the condemned terrorists at the same time as the broadcast (22). While not directly indicating a connection between the two groups, Carlist support for the ETA is indicated.

Frente Revolucionario Antifascista Patriotica (FRAP)

Name. Anti-Fascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front.

Origins and Political Orientation. This Maoist-Leninist group (1:160, 4:210-214) was first organized in 1971 as a result of a split with the Spanish Communist Party, the Partido Comunista de Espana (PCE), over the Sino-Soviet problem (81:20). As result of

this original split, the PCE - Marxista-Leninista, a Maoist faction, was formed. The PCE(M-L) held a congress in 1971 and laid down some principles, one of which was to "set up a National Revolutionary Front [NRF] to coordinate these different forces." FRAP, as NRF, first appeared as a loosely organized collection of local coalitions of Maoist and revolutionary groups; then as a central coordinating committee; and finally in January 1974 as a formally constituted national movement. FRAP is an umbrella-like organization for like-minded groups.

Size. Unknown.

Organizational Structure. FRAP subgroups include the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Spain (PCE(M-L)), the Unionized Workers Opposition, the Popular Peasant Union, the Popular Union of Women, the Marxist-Leninist Communist Youth of Spain, and the Federation of High School Students (2:210). Further structural breakdowns could not be located.

Personalities. Unknown.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. FRAP knifed a Madrid policeman in May 1973 (1:24).

Significant Operations. The killing of the policeman reported above cannot be considered significant by standards of this report; however, one report (58) opines that FRAP does occasionally target American forces stationed in Spain:

American military forces in Spain, while not significantly affected by the increased incidence of terrorism, have been the objects of sporadic harassments and attacks. In most instances these anti-U.S. military actions have been conducted by Spain's left-wing terrorists, mainly the FRAP.

Cooperation with Other Groups. FRAP's association with the PCE(M-L) has already been outlined and there is evidence to link the two groups in May Day 1973 activity which resulted in the Madrid policeman being killed (2:214). Allegedly, the FRAP killed another policeman in Bilbao, an ETA area of operation. There are suspected close ties between the FRAP and ETA (11).

Front d'Alliberament Catala (FAC)

Name. Front for the Liberation of Catalonia.

Origins and Political Orientation. This separatist movement was set up in 1968 to fight for an independent Catalanian state, to include the Spanish Province of Valencia and the French Province of Roussillon. The group would like to include the Balearic Isles in its 'nation.' (1:23, 1:160, 40:25, 60:68) The FAC was weakened considerably in September 1972 by the arrest of two of its leaders (not further identified) (40:40).

Size: Unknown.

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. Unknown.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. Targets for FAC bombing attacks have included radio and TV stations, a Barcelona newspaper, police

posts, and Spanish Civil War monuments (40:25). FAC has claimed responsibility for numerous bombing and sabotage attacks on railroads, public buildings, and Spanish government offices (60:68).

Significant Operations. Unknown.

Cooperation with Other Groups. Unknown.

Guerrilleros De Cristo Rey (GCR)

Name. Warriors of Christ the King.

Origins and Political Orientation. While the specific origins of GCR are unknown, the group apparently has at least tacit government approval for some of its ultra-right activities (43:46).

The GCR is neo-Fascist (24) and is composed of extreme rightists, Falangist Civil War veterans, unemployed thugs, and off-duty policemen (11, 43:46). The group combines fanatical Catholicism with a self-appointed mission to continue the Nationalist crusade (40:38).

Size. Unknown.

Organizational Structure. Little information was located about the internal workings of the GCR except a group called "Anti-Marxist Commandos" (AMC) split from the GCR in early 1971 (24).

Personalities. The leader of the splinter AMC is a 38-year-old (as of August 1975) office worker, Angel Sierra (24). The leader of the GCR is reportedly Mariano Sanchez Couisa (57).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The GCR has used iron bars, revolvers, and truncheons to attack members of the clergy who were

active in worker's movements (1:25). The group is blamed for using acid to ruin a Picasso exhibition in Madrid in November 1971 (24, 40:38). The GCR has specialized in attacking separatists, especially the ETA. ETA offices and shops have been attacked with machineguns (49) and property of suspected ETA members has been bombed (49).

One article (43) states the GCR attacks liberal elements when official action might cause the government embarrassment. The GCR is well known in Madrid and Barcelona for attempts to intimidate leftists by attacks on bookshops and art galleries. Leftist lawyers and priests are not immune and, allegedly, the GCR has carried out assassinations, similar to the Brazilian Death Squads, against Basques in Spain and France.

The GCR was blamed for the bombing of the Paris offices of the Committee for Information and Solidarity with Spain, an anti-Franco group (57). In all, the GCR has been blamed for 80 attacks against separatist movements up to October 1975 (26).

Significant Operations. With the exception of those listed above, the group has not been identified as conducting significant terrorist acts.

Cooperation with Other Groups. Unknown.

Movimiento Iberico de Liberatorio (MIL)

Name. Iberian Liberation Movement.

Origins and Political Orientation. Little information was found concerning the origins of the MIL except it is active in the Barcelona area and is anarchist by nature (1:160, 3, 40:25, 59).

Size. Unknown.

Organizational Structure. The guerrilla arm of the MIL is known as the L'Unita Armada (3). No other organizational data could be found.

Personalities. A leader of the MIL, Salvado Puig Antich, 26 years old as of January 1974, was executed for the murder of a policeman in Barcelona (51).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The MIL has been known to use guns on occasion (1:25) and in April 1974, police seized an MIL arms cache which included antitank mines, dynamite, and other explosives (3). The group apparently planned to blow up a police station, a Barcelona television station, and the city's electric power plant. The MIL may use a monastery at Prades, southern France, as a refuge and base area (40:40).

Significant Operations. Probably the only MIL operation of significance was the killing of a policeman and a bank robbery in 1973 in Barcelona (51).

Cooperation with Other Groups. The only evidence of a connection between the MIL and other groups was a report (40:25) that Spanish security forces found links between the MIL and a group known as Organitzacio de Llunita Armada (OLA), the Organization

for Armed Struggle. Due to the similarity in names, this group may be the same as the guerrilla arm of the MIL; however, this second report has stated the political strategy of the OLA was to use industrial armed combat groups (not further identified) (40:25).

Other Spanish Groups

Name	Political Orientation	Remarks
Ala Izquierda del PCE	Communist	Semi-autonomous group out of sympathy with the PCE.
Asociacion Para La Defensa del Pensamiento Iberico, AKA: "Cruz Iberica"	Nationalist	Goal is "integral nationalism."
Bandera Roja	Trotskyite	Student group active in pamphleteering.
Colectivo Hoz y Martillo	Maoist or Marxist-Leninist	Tiny group active in Zaragoza. Possibly supported by the ETA (V Assembly).
Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo	Anarchist	In eastern provinces of Valencia and Alicante. Largely confines activity to underground literature.
Federacion Anarquista Iberica	Anarchist	Largely inactive.
Frente de Estudiantes Sindicalistas (FES)	Extreme right wing	Set up in 1964, active on campus; allegedly will collaborate with Communist student groups to obtain common goals.

Name	Political Orientation	Remarks
Frente Sindicalista Revolucionario	Extreme right wing	Broke from FES in 1969.
Front Nacional Catala	Catalan separatist	Activities described as "folkloric," or inconsequential.
Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR)	Trotskyite	Spanish branch of Fourth International; merged with ETA (VI) in December 1973.
Lucha de Clases	Maoist	Linked with Maoist labor organizations.
Movimiento pro autodeterminacion e independencia del archipielago canario	Anarchist	Reportedly headquartered in Algeria.
Movimiento Social Espanol	Right-wing	Active in Valencia. May join with PENS.
Movimiento Socialista de Catalunya	Catalan separatist	Another "folkloric" (inconsequential) group.
Organizacion de Marxistas-leninistas Espanoles	Marxist-Leninist	Splinter group from PCE(M-L); in Madrid.
Oposicion Sindical Obrera	Maoist	Trade union wing of FRAP
Partido Comunista de Espana (PCE)	Communist	Orthodox communist party
PCE (Claudinsta)	Catalan Communist	Broke from PCE in 1965. Almost inactive.
PCE (Garcia-Gomez)	Pro-Soviet Communist	Formed in 1973.

Name	Political Orientation	Remarks
PCE(M-L)	Maoist	Broke with PCE after Sino-Soviet rift. Has been infiltrated by police. Driving force behind FRAP.
Partido Comunista Obrero Espanol (PCOE)	Pro-Moscow	Broke from PCE (Garcia-Gomez).
Partido Comunista Proletario	Trotskyite	Advocate of armed struggle. Broken up by police.
Partido Comunista Revolucionario	Castroite	Would-be guerrilla group. Broken up by police.
Partido Espanol Nacional Socialista (PENS)	Neo-Nazi	Active in Barcelona; wants to join with MSE; has bombed bookstores selling Marxist literature.
Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista (POUM)	Trotskyite	Largely inactive.
Partit Socialist d'Alliberament Nacional	Catalan separatist	
Union do Pobo Gallego	Separatist	Goal is to win autonomy for Galicia
Union Socilista de Cataluna	Catalan separatist	"Folkloric"

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CHAPTER XII

TURKEY

Terrorism in Turkey grew out of student unrest and riots which developed in the late 1960s. There were numerous clashes between right and left wing students between 1969 and 1971 which created an atmosphere of violence on the university campuses. Between 1969 and 1971, 21 persons were killed as a result of these clashes (28:IV,4). The leftist students exhibited and espoused anti-Americanism and became increasingly violent in their actions. The first real actions directed against Americans began in January of 1969 with the burning of the automobile of United States Ambassador to Turkey, Robert W. Komer, while he was visiting the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara (22:9). Twelve days later leftist students threw a bomb at the US military headquarters in Ankara breaking glass in the building (58:61). Then in February of 1969, there was a student-led protest in Istanbul against the visit of the U. S. Sixth Fleet (23:6). Two students were killed in clashes between left and right wing students during the Sixth Fleet's visit (35:1). In December of 1969, 13 Americans were injured in Izmir as militant students protested the visit of five ships from the Sixth Fleet to Izmir (40:11).

During this time a leftist organization emerged among the students called Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth Federation) which became the dominant force in the growing anti-American actions of the leftist students. During 1970, Dev Genc was responsible for numerous bombs planted and exploded at various U.S. buildings, primarily in Ankara. Initially, due to the type bomb used and the times of the explosions, it appeared that these actions were designed to damage facilities rather than to injure people. This rapidly changed with one bomb being concealed as a package which was taken by a child into his apartment. The child's mother noticed it smoking and barely got herself and her children out of the apartment before the bomb exploded doing extensive damage to the apartment. Another example of this change was the placing of five bombs around the USAF Officers' Club in Ankara during the lunch hour. The only reason there were no injuries was that the bombs were of poor quality (several did not go off) and luck. This activity continued and the Turkish People's Liberation Army emerged, formed from old cadre of Dev Genc. The anti-American activities intensified with kidnappings and culminated in March of 1972 with the kidnapping and subsequent killing of three NATO civilian technicians (28:IV,4).

During the past two years there has been virtually no terrorist activity in Turkey. This is due to extensive arrests of leaders and supporters of the TPLA. It appears that the TPLA, as an

organization, no longer exists. It is very probable that the nucleus for either reforming the TPLA or organizing a similar organization is currently present in Turkey. The General Amnesty Law of 1974 (May) released many political prisoners from which any new organization could draw recruits. The potential for a return to the terrorist activities of 1971-1972 is still present in Turkey. It is interesting, and perhaps significant, that there have been clashes between right and left wing students similar to those of the late 1960s. Whether this will manifest itself into formation of radical terrorist organizations similar to Dev Genc and the TPLA is uncertain.

Although several splinter groups grew out of the TPLA, only Dev Genc and the TPLA will be discussed in detail. This is not meant to imply that other groups could not develop into significant threats to U.S. military personnel in Turkey, but rather limits the discussion to those groups which have proven to be serious threats. A basic assumption is that any new organizations developed will employ essentially the same modus operandi and also have similar objectives and targets.

Dev Genc

Name. Revolutionary Youth Federation (Dev Genc) (RYF) (25:5).

Origins and Political Orientation. Dev Genc grew out of the leftist student movements in the late 1960s. Its founders were members of the "Socialist Ideas Club" at METU (25:6). During the

late 1960s, revolutionary literature was allowed in Turkey and the leftist students were able for the first time to read Marx, Lenin, and also Carlos Mariguella's book on urban guerrillas (28:IV,4). As the students spent more and more time on politics and less time on studies, Dev Genc was formed from the leftist students. The organization had a Marxist and, to some degree, a Maoist orientation. It was also pro-Arab and anti-American. (25:5)

Size. The exact size is unknown. The number of active members was relatively small although it is fair to say that it probably had several thousand supporters.

Organizational Structure. Unknown.

Personalities. The two major personalities in the Dev Genc organization were Deniz Gezmis and Mahir Cayan (50:9) (6:4). Both broke away from Dev Genc and formed the TPLA.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. Dev Genc activities consisted primarily of planting and exploding bombs at various U.S. facilities. This was most prevalent in Ankara although there were incidents in Izmir and Istanbul also. The organization may have started to finance its operations through bank robberies (5:7), but the timing makes it difficult to be sure whether the bank robberies were committed by Dev Genc or the TPLA which broke away from Dev Genc sometime prior to February 1971. One report indicates that the TPLA was founded in January 1971 (1:26). If that is accurate, then Dev Genc did in fact use bank robberies as

a means of financing their operations. The bombs used by Dev Genc were generally poor quality, particularly the fuses. Initially, the bombs appeared targeted against facilities rather than people based upon the times they went off. This changed in late 1970.

Significant Operations. The main thrust of Dev Genc operations was setting off bombs at various U.S. facilities. As far as U.S. targeting is concerned, the two most significant operations based on potential personal injury involved five bombs placed around the U.S. Officers' Club at approximately noon on a weekday and the placing of a bomb disguised as a package by the apartment door of an American military family. The previously discussed incidents did not result in any injuries. The disguised bomb would have seriously injured or killed the mother and children if the mother had not acted as quickly as she did. Dev Genc allegedly assisted in the kidnapping and subsequent assassination of Israeli Consul-General Ephraim Elrom in May of 1971 (18:1).

Cooperation with Other Groups. One of the founders of Dev Genc, after he was arrested by Turkish authorities, stated that he had undergone training with the Palestinian organization "Al Fatah" in 1965 (50:9). There was good evidence to indicate that the Palestinians provided training to other members before Gezmis' admission. Dev Genc also allegedly cooperated with the TPLA in that three Dev Genc members were involved in the kidnapping and

assassination of Ephraim Elrom, the Israeli Consul-General in Istanbul in May 1971 (7:3). One report indicates that the Soviets provided some guidance and financial support (28:IV,4). The relationship with the TPLA is natural inasmuch as the founders of the TPLA were also founders of Dev Genc.

Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Ordusu (THKO)

Name. Turkish Peoples' Liberation Army (TPLA) (25:5) (2:230).

Origins and Political Orientation. The TPLA had its origins in the Dev Genc organization. The TPLA broke off from Dev Genc and was founded in January 1971 according to one report (1:26). However, it was not identified until March 1971 when it claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of U.S. airmen stationed in Ankara. The TPLA activities were more violent than those of Dev Genc (25:6). Its political orientation is a combination of Marxist and Maoist ideologies (25:5) (55:5) (38:39).

Size. The exact size of the TPLA is unknown but estimates run from less than 100 active guerrillas to as high as 800 (28:IV,4). The one estimate of less than 100 active guerrillas with 300 to 400 active sympathizers and a few thousand passive supporters appears to be the most realistic (37:33).

Organizational Structure. According to a captured member, the TPLA had no central leader nor did it have a definite central committee. It apparently was organized into cells of about six people (25:6).

Personalities. Mahir Cayan is generally credited with being the founder of the TPLA (1:26). Deniz Gezmis was one of the more significant members of the organization (50:9). The other individuals identified below were all involved in the most significant operations conducted by the TPLA.

Avni Gokoglu was captured attempting to cross into Syria (1:27). Mete Ertekin (45:53), Huseyin Inan, and Yusuf Aslan were all involved in the kidnapping of four U.S. airmen (54:2). Cihaz Sari, Husseyin Karsli, Ertugrul Yesilova, Necmi Demir, Ilkay Alptekin Demir, Necat Sagir, and Irfan Ucar were all involved in the kidnapping and assassination of the Israeli Consul-General in May of 1971 (39:6) (11:4). Omer Ayna, Cihan Alptekin, Ulas Bardakci, and Ziya Yilmaz all escaped from prison with Mahir Cayan (15:7). Most of the leaders have been killed or captured and their successors have gone underground.

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The TPLA has used almost all of the tactics available to terrorist organizations. It has used kidnapping, hijacking of aircraft as a means to secure the release of arrested comrades, bank robberies for funds, wholesale theft, and political terrorism and assassination (25:6) (17:3). The TPLA has also exploded bombs at foreign legations, businesses, and homes in Ankara (45:53). Additionally, according to Deniz Gezmis, they rented some 36 apartments in Ankara to hide kidnap victims and themselves (50:9). The kidnappings demonstrated that

they used surveillance to determine the best time to accomplish their mission.

Relative to weapons, it appears that they had a plentiful supply. In April 1973, in six different raids, the Turkish authorities claimed they confiscated 4,457 pistols and 4,646,220 rounds of sten gun ammunition. There are reports that the TPLA also had 3.5 inch rockets and handgrenades. (1:27) There are indications that the Czechs helped provide weapons (25:6). Of the weapons confiscated by Turkish authorities, the majority of them were of Chinese and Russian origin (1:27).

Significant Operations.

15 Feb 1971: The TPLA first surfaced in early 1971 and its first activity was the kidnapping of a USAF sergeant, Jimmy Finley. Finley, a security policeman, was kidnapped while he was making building checks on the USAF Balgat Air Station on the outskirts of Ankara. He was held for approximately 16 hours, given money for a taxi, and then released (59:6).

4 Mar 1971: The second significant operation of the TPLA was the kidnapping of four USAF airmen. This was done in the early morning hours as the four were coming off the 3 to 11 shift at a radar installation about 20 kilometers outside Ankara. Four or five armed persons stopped the USAF vehicle the four airmen were in and took them away in an automobile. The TPLA demanded \$400,000 for the release of the airmen or they would be executed. (13:1)

The U.S. airmen were released although it is questionable whether the TPLA released them or rather were scared away due to the presence of Turkish police in the vicinity thus allowing the airmen to escape.

17 May 1971: The TPLA kidnapped the Israeli Consul-General, Ephraim Elrom. They entered an apartment just below Elrom's and waited until he returned home for lunch. They way-layed 12 people while waiting for Elrom to arrive. This indicates that they had done thorough planning before the incident and were waiting for Elrom. The TPLA killed Elrom several days after his kidnapping. (18:1)

30 May 1971: Again in Istanbul, members of the TPLA kidnapped the daughter of a Turkish major. Turkish authorities forced their way into the apartment where the girl was being held and rescued her. They apprehended one of the perpetrators and killed the other. In contrast to the Elrom kidnapping, this one was more a matter of necessity as the kidnappers were asked for identification and apparently became frightened with the result that the girl was kidnapped as a matter of protection. (27:1) (29:1)

26 Mar 1972: The TPLA kidnapped three NATO civilian technicians from a NATO site near the Black Sea. The TPLA members subsequently executed the three during a battle with Turkish authorities. Ten TPLA members were killed during the battle with the Turkish authorities. (46:3)

3 May 1972: Four apparent TPLA members hijacked a Turkish Airlines passenger plane and forced it to land in Sofia, Bulgaria. The hijackers demanded the release of three guerrillas in Turkey or they would blow the plane up with its passengers. The Turkish Government did not accept the terms and the four hijackers released their hostages and surrendered to the Bulgarian authorities. (12:2)

Cooperation with Other Groups. There is considerable evidence to indicate that the TPLA had relatively close links with Palestinian guerrilla organizations. When he was captured, one of the more significant members, Deniz Gezmis, stated that he had received training from "Al Fatah" (50:9). Another member was apprehended as she attempted to cross the Turkish border into Syria where, according to reports, TPLA members received training from "Al Fatah" (1:27). There was also the arrest of 10 Turks in Paris in December 1973. The Turks were arrested with two Arabs and one Algerian. During the raid, the French authorities confiscated guns, grenades, letter bombs, booby trapped books, and plastic explosives. While these Turks were apparently members of the Turkish People's Liberation Front, that organization is either a front or else very closely connected to the TPLA (31:11) (16:1) (36:5). As the TPLA evolved from Dev Genc, there is also a close cooperation between these two organizations. This is best illustrated by the apparent participation of three Dev Genc members in

the TPLA kidnapping and assassination of the Israeli Consul-General in May of 1971 (18:1). There were also rumors that the Soviets provided guidance and financial assistance (28:IV,4).

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CHAPTER XIII

UNITED KINGDOM

In looking at terrorists groups in the United Kingdom, the Irish Republican Army comes immediately to mind along with the years of violence in Northern Ireland. The first question that needs to be answered is: what is the reason for protest and violence in Northern Ireland? The key to this question lies in the Irish people themselves. The Irish have always regarded themselves as a people under alien colonial rule. This feeling prevails in the Catholic community in Northern Ireland (2:49). The conflict between the Irish and the British has continued for centuries. In 1920 the Government of Ireland Act was passed, after years of guerrilla war against Britain. It established an independent Parliament at Stormont in Belfast for the six counties of Ulster. The British government retained responsibilities for defense, public and social services, and the collection of taxes (51:1). A predominately Catholic civil rights movement in 1968 turned into communal riots and the movement came under the control of the Marxist Irish Republican Army (51:2). Following these events, violence became a way of life in Northern Ireland.

Other than people killed by the Irish Republican Army, not one person was killed in England, Scotland, and Wales in political demonstrations for a period of over fifty years (1919 to 1973) (2:3).

It is worth mentioning that there are and have been strong nationalistic groups in Scotland and Wales who also would like to become independent from Great Britain. It appears at this writing that these groups do not constitute a significant terrorist threat and certainly there is no threat to United States interest, except possibly through their support of terrorist groups in Ulster.

This chapter will deal with the groups both Protestant and Catholic that operate within the United Kingdom as a result of the strife in Northern Ireland. The term United Kingdom refers to England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (Ulster). The term Great Britain refers to England, Scotland, and Wales.

One should keep in mind that the term Irish Republican Army actually refers to two distinct and separate organizations. These are the Official and Provisional wings of the I.R.A. Each has its political branch called Sinn Fein. In May 1973, The London Times reported that the Belfast Provisional I.R.A. virtually controlled the entire I.R.A. movement throughout Ireland (32:1). From the standpoint of terrorism, the Official I.R.A. poses a relatively low threat to the United States or to United States personnel. The Official I.R.A. has committed acts of violence since the founding of the "Provisionals" (Provos) in 1969. However, the

Officials have bitterly criticized the violence of the Provos and, consequently, have had to moderate their own position (10:285). In 1974 the official wing was split again and from it the Irish Republican Socialists Party was formed. All three factions will be dealt with in more detail, but since the Provos are and have been the most active and are the greatest potential threat, this chapter will deal more heavily with them.

On the opposite side of the situation in Ulster are the Protestant or Loyalist groups. These groups will also be examined.

Irish Republican Army (Provisionals)

Name. Irish Republican Army Provisionals (Provos). Often now referred to as I.R.A. without distinction from Officials. The South Armagh Republican Action Force is a Provo unit (26:40).

Origins and Political Orientation. The I.R.A. held a convention in Dublin in December 1969. At this convention a substantial majority of the delegates opted for de facto recognition of the governments of both the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland. Recognition extended also to the British government which maintained overriding authority over Belfast. Those delegates who found themselves in disagreement with the majority withdrew to form what was then called the Provisional Army Council. They criticized the failure to uphold the basic military role of the I.R.A. and especially the lack of a best possible defense for the

people of Belfast. They called for support from the Irish people, both in exile and in Ireland. The goals were set to defend the North and eventually achieve full social, economic, and cultural freedom in Ireland. Special envoys rapidly spread the appeal to Irish exiles living in the United States. The vast majority rallied to the cause of the Provisionals (9:230).

Shortly after the split at the Dublin convention, the political wing of the I.R.A., Sinn Fein, also separated into two groups. Billy McKee became the first Chief of Staff of the Provisionals in Belfast, with Francis Cord in charge of propaganda and Leo Martin in operations. Three other members of the Brigade Staff were Seamus Twomey, Sean McKee, and Billy Kelly. Traditionalism was the cement binding the group. One observer stated, "The Officials go to Mass once a year; the Provos once a week" (8:194). When the I.R.A. split came, the entire Army's strength in Belfast was approximately 150. Of this group, possibly eighty were activists and no more than thirty of them joined the Provisionals (9:196).

Support for the Provisionals was slow in coming. The main source of funds and equipment seems to have come from the Irish community in the United States. Since Officials took a more aggressive Marxist line, they ensured further support for the Provos from the American-Irish (9:231). The ultimate aim of the Provos is to oust the British and to unite Northern Ireland with

the overwhelmingly Catholic Irish Republic (57:4). A senior member of the Belfast Provisionals in a confidential interview with a New York Times writer stated that the Provos wanted to overthrow the government of the Irish Republic because it is too conservative. The man, called Dan, remarked: "I am a hell of a sight more anti-conservative than anti-communist. What I dislike is being a satellite state" (28:16). It would be safe to state that the basic driving force of the Provos is Irish nationalism. The group was founded partially in opposition to the Marxism of the Officials. However, this does not mean that the Provos are totally uninfluenced by the Marxists. A former Belfast Brigade Commander was identified by friends as a Trotskyite. In March 1973, a bombing mission to London was led by Dolours Price, a Marxist intellectual. This raid was the first Provo operation in which working class Provos were commanded by a Marxist (2:159).

Organizational Structure. The Provisional I.R.A. is a paramilitary organization with an Army Council in the Republic of Ireland. In Belfast, Northern Ireland, the Provos have a brigade headquarters and three battalions. In the city of Londonderry, the organization is not as well organized and is made up mostly of area groups which refer to themselves as battalions. The Provos' political wing, the Provisional Sinn Fein, is located on Kevin Street, Dublin (51:22).

Size. In October 1975, The New York Times reported the strength of the Provisional I.R.A. to be at 1,500, including three battalions of 400 men each in Belfast (101:5). In February 1976, The New York Times again reported the strength of the Provos at 1,500 (94:2).

Personalities. Seamus Twomey is officially the commander of the Provos Belfast Brigade. Authorities believe him also to be the chief of staff. He is considered to be the I.R.A.'s leading hawk. Following World War II he reorganized the Belfast branch of the I.R.A. and eventually began the urban bombings that killed large numbers of civilians. Twomey is credited with developing the terror device of a car loaded with explosives set with a timer. He escaped from Dublin's Mountjoy Prison in late 1973 and was still at large in April 1976. He was born in 1920 and is a former clerk, married, with six children (48:28).

Margaret McKearney is believed by British authorities to have played a crucial role in the I.R.A. terror campaign in the English midlands. She has been linked with the murder of a London policeman and the shooting of another five. She was arrested in September 1975 in Dublin and was released for lack of evidence (92:1). In September 1975, Scotland Yard said that the 21-year-old McKearney was "probably the most dangerous and active woman terrorist operating over here" (49:3).

David O'Connell, considered to be the leader of the Provisional I.R.A., was arrested in Dublin in July 1975. Later that month, he was convicted by a Dublin court for being a member of the illegal I.R.A. and sentenced to a year in prison. He was thirty-seven years old at the time of his conviction and had been in "the republican movement for twenty years" (71:8). O'Connell has been the Provos' top strategist (45:6) and leading political thinker (32:1).

Ruari O'Bradaigh is known by several variations of his name. Among these are Rory O'Brady, Ruari Bradaigh, and Rory Brady (8:12). He is the president of the Provisional Sinn Fein. He is a former high school teacher but now works full time running the Provos political machinery. He helped to form the Provos in opposition to the growing Marxist influence in the republican movement (41:39).

Sean Macstiofain in 1972 was the Provos' chief of staff. He is a fervent nationalist and is very anti-British. In 1953 while in prison he developed contacts with Greek Cypriot guerrillas who, he said, had "proved that successful guerrilla warfare is possible in a small country" (41:39). He was in jail from November 1972 until April 1975, where he engaged in a hunger strike for eight weeks. Macstiofain has fallen from grace among the Provisional leadership (74:1).

Joe Cahill is the former commander of the I.R.A.'s Belfast Brigade. He served seven years in prison for murder. He was instrumental in ousting the I.R.A. officials from control of the Belfast Brigade. Cahill attempted a speaking tour of the U.S. in 1972 but was denied entry to the U.S. He is a staunch nationalist with some socialistic leanings (41:39). Cahill was again arrested in May 1972 (82:9).

Gerry Adams is also a former commander of the Belfast Brigade. Adams was arrested by the Security Forces on 19 June 1973 along with 15 other members of the Provos (51:7). He is a former law student and was in his twenties at the time of his arrest. Friends of his say that he is politically adept and is a Trotskyite. During his tenure it was reported that contact was made with the official I.R.A. concerning a separate command without control of the men in Dublin (104:3).

There are a number of problems with identifying and tracking I.R.A. personalities. First of all, the I.R.A. is a secret organization that is reticent about identifying its leaders (79:3). The I.R.A. is an illegal organization both in Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic. On 9 August 1971 the Stormont and British governments instituted their internment policy whereby suspected terrorists could be jailed without trial (2:59). The policy of the I.R.A. is that leaders when imprisoned automatically lose their positions. The leadership positions can only be restored by

decision of the I.R.A. council (74:1). From time to time, the British government released a number of people jailed under the internment policy. In February 1975 the government announced that 80 of the 490 people interned without trial would be released (22:5). Finally, on 6 December 1975, the government ended internment. During the four year period, 1,981 people were detained, most of whom were republicans (90:1).

Modus Operandi (MO) and Weapons. The MO of the Provos is as varied as the people who make up the organization. Operations change frequently as personnel changes are made. Also, the MO changes from time to time in response to governmental policy or variations in tactics by the security forces.

On 8 March 1973 Dolours Price and her team launched a bombing attack in England that was the beginning of a series of bombings that during the following 18 months killed over 30 people. This is more than twice as many people killed by bombs in the previous 50 years in Great Britain--except for World War II (25:15). The bomb in several forms has become a favorite weapon of the Provisionals. Often bombs are planted in retaliation for the arrest or death of an I.R.A. member. One such bomb, which was hidden in a milk can, killed four soldiers in July 1975 in Ulster (36:28).

A variation on this is to put gelignite into a milk churn. The churn is then left by the roadside among dozens of other containers that farmers have put out for collection. When an Army

patrol passes, the terrorists detonate the bombs by remote control (24:26).

Another bomb technique is the "proxy bomb." A car is stopped and loaded with a bomb and the driver threatened and forced to drive to a specific target (51:9).

The bomb and the automobile is a deadly combination used by the Provos. They often park a stolen car loaded with explosives on a street with a timing device for the detonation. This was used on numerous occasions in Belfast. In April 1973 the police tied a rope around the ankle of a Provo member and forced him to remove a bomb from the trunk of a car (31:1).

Another technique combining bombs and cars is that of placing a bomb beneath a car, often belonging to someone the Provos wish to assassinate. One well known example of this is the incident involving Caroline Kennedy in London in October 1975. The bomb, intended for Mr. Hugh Fraser, was placed under his car (63:1). Neither Ms. Kennedy or Fraser was injured in the blast. Fraser is a member of Parliament who has spoken out for stronger anti-I.R.A. measures in Northern Ireland (75:36).

It is extremely difficult to grasp the scope of bombing that has taken place in the United Kingdom, mostly by the Provos. For example, on Friday, 21 July 1972, in Belfast, twenty-two blasts were set off in approximately one hour and twenty minutes. A spokesman for the British Army said that it was calculated that

more than 1,000 pounds of explosives had been used. In these bombings, at least thirteen people were killed and 130 people were wounded (57:1).

At the outset the bombings displayed good technical expertise in the handling of explosives. Speculation was that the I.R.A. was receiving training in the Irish Republic either from quarrymen or from former Irish soldiers. Later this expertise declined considerably, probably for several reasons: most of the experienced men were arrested, a breakdown in the I.R.A. organization (2:111), and a high death rate from premature explosions which killed more than sixty people (51:10). After the Summer of 1973 enthusiasm for large and often unstable large bombs decreased. In their place, the Provos adopted small incendiary devices which could fit into flip-top cigarette boxes. These bombs burn fiercely and were used effectively against clothing or furniture shops (51:9). In mid-1975 the large bomb was revived and used especially against large London hotels and restaurants. These bombings will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section.

The mail bomb is another explosive device used by the Provos. Two letter bombs were mailed in Dublin in September 1975. Both exploded when they were opened in London. The device was placed in a hollowed-out paper book and detonated when it was opened (80:2).

In 1973 the Provisionals brought out another new tactic--that of hijacking and blowing up trains. In one such incident, five armed men hijacked a train and left it abandoned for some time in an area where British soldiers had been frequently ambushed. The train later blew up when time bombs aboard detonated (34:2). A similar operation took place in January 1976 when Provos from the South Armagh Battalion blew up a Dublin to Belfast freight just after it crossed into Northern Ireland (24:26).

During 1975 at least one new type bombing tactic was used by the Provos. On two occasions in November 1975, bombs containing ball bearings were thrown through the windows of restaurants in London (98:14).

Shopping-bag bombs are relatively easy to plant and have been used by the Provos. In this case, the bomb is carried into a busy place in a shopping bag and left to explode. One such bomb was smuggled into the Tower of London on 17 July 1974. The explosion killed one person and injured 41, mostly children (25:19).

Two other type bombs used by the Provos are worth mentioning--the suitcase bomb and the nail bomb. Suitcase bombs are usually, but not always, used in airplanes, buses, and other public conveyances and in airports, terminals, stations, etc. On 23 July 1974 one such bomb failed to explode in an aircraft bound from Belfast to London (25:19). Earlier in 1972 a suitcase bomb exploded in a crowded restaurant in Belfast, killing two people.

A nail bomb is a device made up of a stick of gelignite with six-inch nails bound to it. It has a short length of safety fuse which is lit by a match and thrown (2:121).

Although the bomb is terrifying and dramatic, the gun is used with equal aplomb and frequency by the Provos. The gunman has become synonymous with the I.R.A. and the Provos have lived up to that tradition. From 1970 on the British press, on almost a daily basis, reports some shooting incident involving the Provisionals. Often I.R.A. gunmen murder their victims out of revenge. Ross McWhiter, co-editor of the Guinness Book of World Records, was gunned down after he had offered \$100,000 for information on bombers (72:B4).

Before the Provisionals even developed into an organization, they had engaged in gunplay, with a Sterling submachine gun stolen from the British Army (9:197). Since that time, in 1969, the Provos have used firearms in an unending barrage of bullets directed toward the police, the British Army, Protestants, the Official I.R.A., and the public in general.

The first shooting by the Provisionals directed at the British Army in Ireland came on 6 February 1971. Up until that time, the assaults on the Army were made by youths throwing rocks and molotov cocktails (10:246). Following the introduction of internment in August 1971, gun battles erupted between the I.R.A. and the Army.

After 15 terrorists were killed in the open confrontation, tactics were altered. Murder squads went out to shoot soldiers (38:19).

In July 1972 the Provos ended a truce when Seamus Twomey engineered an artificial confrontation with the Army and resumed the violence. Eleven soldiers were killed and forty-three wounded between 12 and 18 July. The British Army claimed to have hit over 100 I.R.A. gunmen. In this action, the Provos fired over 1,000 rounds including armor-piercing shots from rocket launchers (2:140).

One often used tactic by the Provo gunman is the ambush. On 26 July 1975 a policeman in Londonderry was killed by automatic weapons fired from several directions as he got out of his car (86:4). This kind of action has been repeated numerous times by the Provos.

Intimidation is a tactic used by both I.R.A. wings and Protestant groups. The I.R.A. gunman's methods have included the shooting off of kneecaps and front teeth being shot out sideways. One of the I.R.A. members preferred to wrench off the index finger of victims (87:16). Another tactic of both I.R.A. wings has been to visit homes of jury members and warn them not to convict I.R.A. members. If the threats were not heeded, jurors found their homes and businesses bombed (87:16).

Kidnapping is another tactic employed by the Provos. In October 1975, two Provos, Eddie Gallagher and Marian Coyle ("Mad Marian"), kidnapped Dutch industrialist Tiede Herrema in

Limerick, Ireland. The Provos demanded the release of three convicted Irish terrorists (75:36). Dr. Herrema was released unharmed after thirty-six days (61:2). In January 1975 London newspapers reported plans by the Provos to kidnap Prince Charles--heir to the British throne. The idea was finally vetoed by David O'Connell (53:5).

The basic operational doctrine of the Provos can be found in the philosophy of Carlos Marighella in a book Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, and in that of General Grivas in Cyprus (2:156). The Grivas philosophy as applied by the Provisionals would work in a way that would sicken the British of the Irish situation and cause them to withdraw (2:156). Marighella suggests that the urban guerrilla provoke the government into repressive measures to the point that the lives of the people become "unbearable" and the government is overthrown (2:156).

On St. Patrick's Day 1975, the Provisional gunmen failed in an attempt to free more than 100 I.R.A. prisoners in the Irish Republic. Provo gunmen outside the jail engaged soldiers and policemen for several hours. This attempt was credited as being probably the largest operation that the Provisionals had attempted (47:40).

Perhaps the most brutal gunplay by the Provos came on 5 January 1976. On that night, ten Protestant textile workers were murdered after armed men stopped their vehicle and ordered

buy arms comes from the U.S. (64:21). Former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson estimated that the supply of guns, ammunition, and money to the I.R.A. that comes from America amounts to 85 percent. The Prime Minister stated that the figures for this support had been verified at upwards of \$1 million (106).

On 19 October 1971, arms, ammunition, and grenades which had been shipped from the United States were discovered on the ship Queen Elizabeth II. At London airport on 1 June 1972, two colt .45 revolvers, a rifle with a telescopic sight, and ammunition were discovered on board a plane on a flight from San Francisco to Shannon, Ireland (87:18). In November 1975 British authorities stated that they had evidence that the Queen Elizabeth II had been used for smuggling guns and explosives to the I.R.A. from New York (68:86). Weapons used by the I.R.A. are mostly of World War II vintage including .303s and Thompson submachine guns. Russian-made RPG7 rocket launchers, the M1 carbine, Garand rifles, and the Armalite are among the Provos' more modern weapons (51:22).

Provos' recruits normally undergo a week's training in small arms and demolition. Advanced courses include such things as making bombs and the handling of machine guns and rocket launchers. Instructors are usually Provos who live in the Irish Republic. Training takes place in camps with less than thirty members training at one time (51:22).

Significant Operations. Several significant operations conducted by the Provisionals have been discussed above. However, a look at some of them from a different perspective will be helpful in understanding the length to which the Provos sometimes go in order to accomplish their objective. Although some of the more spectacular operations caused revulsion even among republicans in Ulster, the effect in the rest of the United Kingdom is somewhat different especially since the bombing was carried to England in March 1973. Newsweek reported in January 1976 that an opinion poll showed that 64 percent of the British people favored a complete withdrawal from Northern Ireland. After all, the stated aim of the Provos is to get the British out of Ulster. Significant Provisional operations involving Americans increased in late 1975. In October a bomb exploded in a restaurant in London about two hundred yards from the American Embassy. No damage was done to the embassy but four of the eighteen people who were injured were American (16:2). There does not, however, appear to be any significance to the location near the embassy or to the fact that Americans were injured.

5 September 1975: A bomb blast in the lobby of the London Hilton killed two people and injured 63. Among the injured was Brigadier General Joseph J. Capucci, USAF (Ret.) (95:1). General Capucci is a former director of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The hotel is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Trans

World Airlines (TWA) and many of the 750 guests were American (95:4).

21 July 1972: The more significant operations of the Provos did not involve Americans. If one event were to be chosen as the Provos' most significant operation, it would have to be the events which have come to be known as Bloody Friday. This series of bombings are significant for two reasons, other than the number of killed or wounded. First, it demonstrated the capability of the Provos, and secondly, it caused a revulsion in Ulster and the Republic of Ireland against the Provisional I.R.A. (2:14). In Central Belfast between 2:10 and 3:15 p.m., the Provos set off nineteen bombs killing nine and wounding 130 people. The first bomb exploded at the Smithfield bus station which was crowded with mothers and young children. Two more bombs exploded in railway stations, one in a ferry terminal, one in another bus station, and the sixth in a shopping center. It was obvious from the target selection that the intent was to kill and maim the largest possible number of ordinary people. It was the heaviest bomb attack on Belfast since the airwar in 1941 (2:140-141). The condemnation of the Provos from various opinion groups in Ireland was expressed. The Dublin Irish Independent reported: "I have never seen scenes so horrible in this city, and one felt a deep feeling of anger and shame that such deeds were planned and carried out by fellow-Irishmen. All Ireland has been shamed by the events of this terrible July afternoon in Belfast" (2:141).

Cooperation with Other Groups. Little evidence has been found that would support Provos being trained by other groups (51:23). However, as was pointed out above, the Provos receive considerable support from the United States. In fact, an organization exists in the Bronx section of New York City expressly to aid the I.R.A. The organization, the Northern Irish Aid Committee (NORAIID), reportedly raised approximately \$250,000 in 1975 for humanitarian relief of the I.R.A. Mathew Higgins, a former I.R.A. soldier and NORAIID spokesman, doubted that any of the money was used for weapons. However, three Philadelphia men have been indicted for shipping arms to the I.R.A. over a five-year period, and two of the men are members of NORAIID (107).

There is some evidence that the I.R.A. has had contact with a Spanish group. An article in a British periodical Survival reported in the Summer of 1975 that the I.R.A. has developed close relations with members of the Basque Homeland and Liberty movement (ETA)--a Basque separatist group in Spain (52:161).

Support from the left for the Provos has been generally in the form of lip service. However, links with British Trotskyist groups, such as the Irish Solidarity Campaign and the International Marxist Group, have been confirmed. In 1971 Peter Graham, who had been smuggling guns to the Provos for European Trotskyists, was murdered (51:23).

In the early 1970s, Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez, who is known as "Carlos" and referred to as "the world's most wanted terrorist," was dispatched by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to coordinate activities in Europe. "Carlos" is believed, by counterterrorist experts, to be a central link among various groups including the Baader-Meinhof group, the Japanese Red Army, the I.R.A., and the Tupamaros of South America (56:45). "Carlos" was remembered in London as being seen constantly on the London diplomatic cocktail circuit (58:27). For a more complete discussion on Carlos, see Chapter XIV on Transnational Links.

In the case of the Provos, perhaps more important than collaboration with other groups is conflict with one other group, namely the Official I.R.A. In early 1976 the president of the Official Sinn Fein, Tomas MacGiolla, said that the Provos "are equating republicanism in the minds of the Irish people and indeed of the people of Britain and throughout the world with mindless violence and terror" (91:1). During October 1975, Provos gunmen carried out attacks against Official I.R.A. members. On the night of 29 October 1975, there were thirty such attacks in which one man was killed and 16 others wounded. On the following night, four teenage members of the Officials were shot in the legs (67:1).

Irish Republican Army (Officials)

Name. Irish Republican Army Official Wing

Origin and Orientation. The I.R.A. was originally founded in 1916 to drive the British from Ireland. In 1962 the group became Marxists with the aim of overthrowing the entire capitalist structure in Ireland and replacing it with a totalitarian Marxist republic with the capital in Dublin. This is still the Officials' objective (2:60).

The Official I.R.A. emerged in its present form in early 1970 after the split with the Provisional wing (51:23). The Officials take a somewhat different approach to violence from that of the Provos. The policy of the Officials is to avoid any violent acts that injure members of the working people in Northern Ireland, both Protestant and Catholic. The Officials have carried out indiscriminate bombings in England on one hand and on the other have condemned similar attacks by the Provos in Belfast (2:61).

The Official I.R.A. is an illegal organization in Northern Ireland. Republican Clubs were organized in Ulster as a legal front organization for the political arm of the official Sinn Fein (87:14).

Size. Figures on the size of the Official I.R.A. are not clear. In 1974 their strength was estimated at about one thousand (51:23). The New York Times in October 1975 reported Official I.R.A. strength at several hundred (101:5). However, between the time that these two estimates were made another split occurred in the Official I.R.A., and the Irish Republican Socialist

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Party (IRSP) emerged, further reducing the size of the Officials (101:5).

Organizational Structure. The Official I.R.A. is a paramilitary organization. It has an army council in the Irish Republic and its political wing, Official Sinn Fein, is located on Gardiner Place in Dublin. The organization has a small brigade headquarters located in Belfast with two battalions. In other areas in Ulster, Official I.R.A. structure is loosely coordinated and is based only on geography (51:23).

Personalities. The principal leader and chief of staff of the Official I.R.A. is Cathal Goulding (51:23). He was involved in an I.R.A. arms raid at the age of fifteen and has spent a total of fifteen years in jail (8:23). Other military leaders are Sean Garland, Seamus Costello, and Siam Macmillan (51:23). Costello has become active in the IRSP and apparently has split with the Officials (101:5).

On the political side, the Official Sinn Fein is led by Tomas MacGiolla. Roy Johnston is the Marxist "political commissar" of the Official I.R.A. (2:63). Malachy McGurran was the organizer of the Republican Clubs in Ulster (51:23).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The Officials follow a more Trotskyite approach to violence. They believe that by killing a few, you can influence many. Murder, therefore, is a political act and assassination becomes more respectable than premeditated

murder (87:14). They did not hesitate to accept the blame for the murder of a Northern Irish Senator in 1971 and the attempted murder of a Stormont minister in 1972 (2:60).

Another murder charged to the Officials in 1972 was that of Sean Russell, a Catholic part-time member of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Russell was watching television with five of his six children when the gunmen knocked on the door. One of the children opened the door and the gunmen shot Russell and wounded the oldest child in the leg (2:115). Another example of Official I.R.A. murders was the torture and murder of a British soldier on leave from Germany. The soldier was seized by the I.R.A., tried by a kangaroo court, beaten up, hooded, and shot (2:139).

Another tactic of the Officials is the use of tar and feathers. This has been used in disciplinary action against their own people. On 10 May 1972 a fifteen-year-old girl was tarred and feathered in public (2:137).

Weapons of the Official I.R.A. have been similar to those of the Provos. However, in May 1972 the Officials declared a ceasefire and have generally adhered to it and, consequently, it has not been possible to identify any new equipment (51:23). The Officials carry out training in a similar fashion as the Provos (50:23).

Significant Operations. The Officials are regarded as less violent than the Provos and as pointed out above have, except for

a number of murders, largely adhered to a cease-fire since May 1972 (87:14). No operations against U.S. personnel have been discovered. It has been established that the Official and Provisional I.R.A. have received considerable financial aid from organizations within the United States. I.R.A. reluctance to target U.S. personnel and interest probably is out of fear of alienating this American support.

February 1972: The last significant bombing known to have been done by the Officials was against the British Army in Aldershot, England. The bomb was in retaliation for thirteen Northern Irish Catholics killed by British Paratroopers in Londonderry on the day that has become known as "Bloody Sunday" (59:47). A 280-pound gelignite bomb was set outside the officers' mess at the headquarters of the Sixteenth Parachute Brigade. The bomb did not kill any paratroopers but killed seven civilians. The dead were five women kitchen workers, a gardener, and a Roman Catholic chaplain (59:47). The significance of the Aldershot bomb was not in the operation itself, but in the resulting severe criticism of the act and the I.R.A. Bernadette Devlin, who at the time was a member of Parliament and had said that she "would not shed a single tear" for British soldiers killed in revenge, stated that the act of retaliation had gone "horrifically wrong" (60:29).

Cooperation with Other Groups. In July 1974 Sinn Fein of the Official I.R.A. sponsored an "Anti-Imperialist Festival" in Dublin and Belfast. Among the groups to whom invitations were sent were Palestinians, Separatists Movements, and European Trotskyites. The meeting had no significance on the conflict of Ulster (51:23). The Official Sinn Fein also has joined with the Communist Party of Ireland in establishing ties with the International Communist Movement (51:23).

Irish Republican Socialist Party

Name. Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP). This group should not be confused with the Irish Socialist Republican Party founded by James Connolly in Dublin in 1896 (9:137). The IRSP has a military wing called the People's Liberation Army (101:5).

Origin and Orientation. The exact date of the establishment of the IRSP is not known, although it was probably sometime in late 1974. The group emerged in early 1975.

The IRSP is believed to include extreme left defectors from the Official I.R.A. and disaffected Provos. The intention is to resume full scale hostilities in Ulster (101:5). The IRSP is considered to be Trotskyite (14:31).

Size. In October 1975 The New York Times reported the strength of the IRSP at about 700 members in Ireland and Ulster (101:5). Another source reported the IRSP size at approximately 200 in November 1975 (13:11).

Organizational Structure. The IRSP is probably organized in a similar fashion as the I.R.A.; however, very little is known about the structure of the IRSP. They do have a military wing known as the People's Liberation Army (100:16).

Personalities. Only two personalities have emerged from the IRSP thus far. They are Bernadette Devlin McAlisky and Seamus Costello.

McAlisky joined the IRSP in December 1974. She refers to herself as a Marxist and is said to be at war with the Official Wing of the I.R.A. (14:31).

Costello was one of the military leaders of the Official I.R.A. (86:14). An Irish journalist described him as "capable, intelligent, magnetic and violent" (101:5).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. Since the IRSP and its military Wing--the People's Liberation Army--is relatively new, there are very few actual incidents for which they have been held responsible. However, a feud between the IRSP and the Official I.R.A. has developed. The feud has been bloody with a series of violent incidents (50:4). In addition, a number of bombing and shooting incidents have possible links with the IRSP and the feud with the Officials (18:12).

Since the IRSP is a splinter group of the Official I.R.A., with some Provos membership, it is probably safe to assume that tactics used by the group will be similar to those of the I.R.A.

Some sources of weapons will probably be the same for the IRSP as for the I.R.A. In speculation on the possible future tactics and weapons of the IRSP, three factors should be kept in mind: First, the stated intention of the group is to resume full scale hostilities. Second, the leadership of Seamus Costello, former Official I.R.A. military leader, and Bernadette Devlin McAlisky is an indicator of militancy. Third, the Trotskyite leanings of the group and the violent environment of Ulster are signs of probable future terrorism by the IRSP.

Significant Operations. The IRSP has been blamed for a number of murders and possibly one bombing of a bar in Belfast (100:16). There is no known action by the IRSP against U.S. personnel.

Cooperation with Other Groups. This factor has not been established; however, it is safe to assume that ties with other left extremist groups will be formed.

Ulster Protestant or Loyalist Groups

Names. The Ulster Loyalist Army Council. This is an umbrella group of Protestant groups in Northern Ireland. Included in the Council is the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), and the Red Hand, as well as smaller, less active and less significant groups. These groups will be generally treated as one for two reasons. First, there is dual and triple memberships among many of the members, and second is the absence of any clear-cut political philosophy (35:1).

Origin and Political Orientation. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) emerged in Belfast in 1966. Relatively little reliable information is available on the UVF because of the high standard of security. The UVF is dedicated to preservation of Ulster constitution (51:24). The UVF is considered the most militant Protestant group (78:9). The largest of the Protestant groups is the Ulster Defense Association (UDA). It was founded in 1971 from street gangs and vigilante groups (94:2). The UDA's aims are to retain the status of Ulster within the United Kingdom and to preserve the Loyalists' majority status (51:24).

The Red Hand Commandos is a small gang of around thirty members and like the similar apolitical Ulster Freedom Fighters emerged in the Spring of 1973 (35:1).

Size. The Ulster Loyalist Army Council claimed in early 1976 that it was able to muster about 20,000 men, some of whom were ex-British soldiers trained in conventional warfare (94:2). An independent estimate of the UDA in 1974 estimated its membership at 4,000 to 6,000 with 10,000 to 15,000 supporters who would turn out for marches (51:24). Security officials, however, confirmed that the UDA could mobilize 20,000 armed men (100:16).

Organizational Structure. The Loyalist groups were built on neighborhood units. There is a hierarchy of officers, NCOs, and men. Streets are broken down into platoons of about fifty men with an NCO in charge. Company or unit commanders hold the rank of major (99:3).

Personalities. Andy Tyrie is a 35-year-old former machine setter. He is the head of both the Army Council and the UDA (94:2). The secretary of the UDA is John Orchin who sometimes acts as a spokesman for the UDA (100:16). The leading personality in the UVF is Kenneth Gibson. Augustus (Gusty) Spence acted as a spokesman for the UVF in an interview with a London newspaper in 1972 (51:24).

Modus Operandi and Weapons. The Protestant groups have a large stockpile of weapons dating back to World War II and some to World War I. The weapons are varied and include pistols, rifles, sten guns, and M1 Carbines. The weapons were acquired over a 50-year period from the police, militias, and from the 100,000 licensed gun owners in Ulster (94:2). Canadian sympathizers are a key source of weapons for the Protestants. Another primary source is Scotland (94:2).

A large part of the smuggling to the Ulster Protestants is gelignite and other explosives. The gelignite is sometimes mailed in packages to Belfast or smuggled in ships from Canada and Scotland (94:2).

Another way of acquiring arms is by theft especially from security forces. In one incident, twelve members of the UVF broke into a headquarters of an Ulster Defense Regiment and stole five .38 pistols, four self-loading rifles, two submachine guns, and over two hundred rounds of ammunition (34:2).

The chief tactic of the Protestant groups in Northern Ireland is sectarian murder. The most active of the groups in this type of murder is the UVF (100:16). An example of this occurred in July 1975 when three musicians from Dublin were murdered in Northern Ireland. The musicians had been playing in Ulster and were driving back to Dublin when they were stopped South of Belfast and shot. Speculation was that the ambush was a retaliation for the murder of three Protestants a month earlier (78:9). John Orchin said about the sectarian murders: "If a fellow comes home and learns that his brother has been shot dead, how can we stop him from retaliating?" (100:16)

Bombing is another tactic of the Protestant paramilitary groups. They have used car bombs on a number of occasions. On one day in late 1973, car bombs exploded in Belfast, destroying five Roman Catholic public houses (bars), and damaging the former headquarters of the Roman Catholic political party. The bombs contained a total 1,000 pounds of explosives and went off over a five-hour period. These bombs were believed to be the work of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (35:1). In fact, the Protestant groups mirror the style of the I.R.A. (99:3).

Training is done secretly in local halls. Physical training courses in unarmed combat and assault courses are run outside the city (99:3).

Significant Operations. The Protestant groups have shown little interest in United States personnel and property, or in targets outside of Ireland. However, since the Protestant groups often operate for revenge and their chief rivals--the I.R.A.--receive much of their financial support and arms from the U.S., action against U.S. interests is feasible. There is no ideological conflict apparent between the Protestant groups and the United States such as exists between the Marxists Official I.R.A. and American ideology. This is a possible explanation for the absence of any operations against U.S. interests.

Protestant groups, specifically the UDA, have carried out at least one significant operation outside of Ulster. This was a bombing at the Dublin Airport in November 1975. Two bombs of about five pounds each exploded forty-seven minutes apart in the men's rest room in the terminal building, killing an airline worker and injuring six people (27:12).

Cooperation with Other Groups. The Loyalist groups have contact with similar groups in Scotland. In January 1976 the commander of a militant Protestant group in Glasgow was sentenced to ten years in prison for mailing explosives to Ulster. There are also UDA branches in England and Canada which support Loyalist units in Northern Ireland (94:2).

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CHAPTER XIV

TRANSNATIONAL LINKS

In almost every chapter of this study, evidence has been presented that demonstrates transnational linkages between various terrorist organizations. These links exist not only throughout Europe and the Middle East but extend into North and South America and into Asia.

One incident with international involvement occurred in July 1972 when two Latin Americans with Peruvian passports participated with the Japanese Red Army (JRA) in the hijacking of a Japan Airlines plane over the Netherlands (8:29). In 1972 The New York Times reported that Western Intelligence services including the C.I.A. traced numerous connections between terrorist groups among whom were the Irish Republican Army, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and a group of Swiss revolutionaries (12:3).

Probably the best example of transnational terrorism is the story of "Carlos," the man The Observer referred to as "the world's most wanted terrorist" (11:20). "Carlos" first gained worldwide attention in December 1975 when he led the raid on the OPEC ministers conference in Vienna. He was accompanied by Gabriele Kroeher-Tiedemann, a Baader-Meinhof Gang member who was released

from a West Berlin jail as the result of the Lorenz kidnapping (5:24) (see Chapter III). However, there remains a question as to whether or not "Carlos" actually led the raid. Time reported in January 1976 that French intelligence believed that the attack was led by someone else and that "Carlos" was dead. Israeli agents speculated on the possibility that instead of one "Carlos," there were four (3:45). The world press, including The Times and The Observer in London, The New York Times, and various American and British news agencies reported that "Carlos" did, in fact, lead the OPEC raid. For two and one half years before the OPEC raid in Vienna, the "Carlos Affair" had been revealing an intricate pattern of transnational terrorist links.

"Carlos" is Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, born in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1949. His father is a Marxist lawyer who has two other sons: Lenin born in 1951, and Vladimir born in 1958. In 1966 Ilich went with his mother and brothers to live in London. In 1968 Ilich and Lenin enrolled in Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. In 1970 Ilich was expelled from the University and he left the Soviet Union (5:21 and 24).

According to The Times, Bassam Abu Sherif of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) described "Carlos" as "the most brilliant agent and our chief international operative" (4:5). In 1970 "Carlos" joined the PFLP after being recruited by Michel Moukharbel, the PFLP's chief European agent. Following his

recruitment, "Carlos" went to Jordan to a training and indoctrination camp (4:5).

The Times reported that the PFLP claimed that "Carlos" was one of a large group of guerrillas who formed a "terror bank" and that he had recruited the terrorists for at least six major PFLP operations in Europe from mid-1974 until late 1975 (4:5).

The Observer stated that "Carlos" led the Commando Boudia, the PFLP's European cell, for almost two years, and that the cell operated between Paris and London. He had contacts with other terrorist groups including the German Baader-Meinhof Gang who gave him some stolen U.S. M26 hand grenades. "Carlos" had stored some of the grenades and other weapons in a villa, outside Paris, which was rented by the Turkish Liberation Army (10:20). In addition to these connections, and possibly without the knowledge of other cell members, "Carlos" held meetings with three Cuban diplomats in Paris (4:5). In July 1975 the French expelled the three Cubans because of their connection with him. The French Interior ministry reported that the Cubans had been "constant visitors" to "Carlos's" Paris hideout (7:1).

Reuters news agency reported in July 1975 that "sources close to the PFLP" said that "Carlos" was part of a network that not only included Baader-Meinhof but South American guerrillas and the JRA (7:4). This point is born out by the various Latin American travel documents found in caches vacated by "Carlos."

"Carlos" and Moukharbel reportedly did reconnaissance on the French Embassy in The Hague in September 1974 in preparation for a JRA raid that began on 13 September when the JRA seized the embassy (10:20). French authorities also reported that "Carlos" was directly involved with the siege (7:4).

While the raid on the embassy was in progress in The Hague, an M26 grenade was thrown into Le Drugstore on St Germain des-Pres in Paris, killing two people and injuring 34. A telephone call to two news agencies indicated that the attack on Le Drugstore was in support of the JRA's operation in The Hague. The Observer reported that the police are convinced that the grenade was thrown by "Carlos" (10:20).

In early 1975 the Commando went underground and "Carlos" travelled around Europe with Moukharbel. "Carlos's" itinerary included frequent trips to London, Zurich, and the Federal Republic of Germany where he talked with members of Baader-Meinhof or Movement 2 June (10:20).

Moukharbel returned to Paris on 13 June 1975 after a trip to the Middle East. He had been picked up by the Lebanese security service, questioned for a day and a night, and according to The Observer "roughed up a bit" (10:20). Moukharbel left Paris for London in a possible attempt to lead the French counterintelligence force, Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), away from "Carlos." However, Scotland Yard had been contacted by the DST

and, consequently, the English sent Moukharbel back to Paris to be arrested by the DST on 23 June 1975 (10:20).

Moukharbel apparently told the DST where they could find "Carlos." On 3 July 1975 a DST Commissaire and two other DST agents were led by Moukharbel to "Carlos's" apartment in the Latin Quarter of Paris (2:1 and 3). "Carlos" opened the door with a bottle in his hand and invited the four men into the room. Two girls in the apartment went into another room. When the agents requested that "Carlos" accompany them, he said that first he had to go to the bathroom. When he came out of the bathroom, he was carrying a Russian automatic pistol and shot the four men, killing three of them and wounding the senior DST agent in the throat (10:20).

Following the murders and "Carlos's" escape, the DST found an apartment that he had used as a hideout. In the apartment were found two American passports, a Venezuelan passport, and one from Peru. Each either had the same picture of "Carlos" or a description which fit him. Also found was what was described as an arsenal of weapons including the U.S. M26 grenades (2:3).

A French Interior spokesman, Mr. Mousset, said that the "Carlos Affair" was one of the most important incidents of terrorism on an international scale to come to the attention of Western authorities in recent years. He further stated: "It provides categorical proof of the unity of action of the terrorist groups operating in

Europe and elsewhere, as well as of the close links between the terrorist networks and certain foreign intelligence services" (7:4). However, the conclusion of this study is that although transnational terrorist links are extensive, there is no evidence to support the belief that a central organization of international terrorism from the Soviet Union or elsewhere exists. Neither is there any evidence to support a belief that International Terrorism is under any worldwide or European direction. Probably an important issue that surfaces is the constant ad hocery of the terrorist groups. The bond that ties these groups may be ideological, financial, criminal comradery, or common social alienation.

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