

A Design For Youth Development Policy

46452

**Center for Action
Research, Inc.
Boulder, Colorado
June 1976**

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ACQUISITIONS

A DESIGN FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

A Summary Report of Some Technical Products of the Office of
Youth Development's Youth Services System Program, 1973-1976:
Goals, Organization, and Guidance

Prepared by the
Youth Development Program
Center for Action Research, Inc.
Under Contract No. HEW-105-75-2107
with the
Office of Youth Development
Department of Health, Education and Welfare
June, 1976

DESIGN: An underlying scheme that governs functioning,
developing or unfolding

POLICY: A definite course or method of action selected
to guide and determine present and future
decisions

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary

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PREFACE

For the past six years, the Office of Youth Development, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, has sponsored a program of policy research--a search for information and ideas, a testing of youth development theories, organizational structures, and relationships. The purpose has been to determine how the federal government can best support state and local community efforts to plan for the use of local and federal tax dollars in administering coordinated programs for *youth development* and *delinquency prevention*. A promising approach to youth development, geared to the needs and practical possibilities of state and local general purpose governments--known by the phrase, "Capacity Building for Youth Development"--has emerged during the last eighteen months. The approach has four main elements:

A tested strategy for youth development

The strategy sets forth a set of theoretical propositions which have been verified and validated through field testing in more than twenty different communities and using a population of more than ten thousand youth. Based on this research, it is now possible to specify criteria, guidelines, objectives, and goals which communities may use in planning for the implementation and administration of their efforts in youth development and delinquency prevention.

A social institutional change perspective

This perspective shifts the decision-making focus from a sole concern with the treatment of young persons who are troubled (or about to be in trouble), to a balanced concern for *intentionally guiding and directing change in social institutions*--particularly the social and institutional contexts surrounding the world of work, traditional and alternative educational processes, and the justice system (police, court intake, adjudicatory procedures, probation) as they influence healthy development of *all* youth in the community.

A developing theory of coordination

The Office of Youth Development has begun testing a complete set of propositions which may be used to make a *systems perspective* practical and useful to locally elected government officials and their appointed administrators. At the present, the theory can be used to describe and examine the elements of a community youth services system (including elements which should be, but are not, included). When fully operationalized and tested, this set of propositions would provide methods and procedures for prescribing changes in agency-agency relations which would permit improved management of interorganizational activities and resources in pursuit of community youth development objectives.

A transferable applied technology

During the past two years a set of *community oriented research instruments and methods*, based on the verified theory contained in the Strategy for Youth Development, has been tested, modified, and

made available for use. This technology, when combined with the preceding three elements may be used by communities to begin a process of planning, implementation, and evaluation which will permit a guided experimental approach of planned improvement in community youth development programs.*

AUDIENCE

This publication was prepared with two particular groups of readers in mind. We believe that the four-element approach should be of specific interest to *practitioners* in the field of youth development and delinquency prevention. This is a broad audience in itself and includes educators, school and probation counselors, social workers, employers, therapeutic treatment professionals, and volunteers in public and private youth-serving agencies and organizations.

The approach has been designed to enhance the capability of local general purpose government--state, county, municipal, and school district--in managing community youth development resources. We believe that this publication will be of special interest to community *decision*

*This report has been designed for use in conjunction with other materials published for the Office of Youth Development. Prominent among these materials are those offered by the Behavioral Research and Evaluation Corporation, Boulder, Colorado: Research Handbook for Community Planning and Feedback Instruments (Revised), Volume 1, April, 1976; and Theory Validation and Aggregate National Data: Integration Report of OYD Research FY1975, Volume 12, September, 1975; both prepared for the Office of Youth Development, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, HEW-OS-74-308.

makers--elected officials such as governors and state legislators, county commissioners, mayors and city council members, and members of school boards.

In addition to those who serve general purpose government, agency administrators and technical personnel who plan, research, and evaluate youth programming should find the approach supportive of their interests. Members of appointed or elected advisory bodies may find a framework in the OYD approach to Capacity Building in Youth Development which makes their efforts more comprehensible, systematic, comprehensive, productive, and satisfying.

Finally, there may be parallels and analogies in the OYD approach which make it of interest and use to human service delivery agencies and organizations who serve other segments of the population.

A CAVEAT ABOUT COMPLEXITY

Our experience in providing technical assistance to disseminate the complex ideas which compose the OYD approach has shown us that there is a tendency for planners and program implementors alike to take only one or two of the elements and incorporate them in their ongoing efforts. When and where the OYD approach has been accepted or resisted through partial incorporation, we have found that the impact of programming on youth has failed to live up to the hope and promise implicit in the approach. We therefore caution our readers. We believe all four elements of the OYD approach must be incorporated if progress is to be achieved. Program efforts must be guided by the Strategy. New

relationships between public and private agencies must be established. The use of a planning technology without the theory and an ethic for a planned experimental approach will yield poor results. The goals and objectives of a sound youth development approach will be subverted, and the illusion of successful achievement will fade--leaving the problems as they were or worse.

While we do not offer simple solutions to complex problems, we can suggest that the methodical application of the knowledge and technology found in the four elements of the OYD approach make the approach viable. The problem of complexity yields not to simple reductionism, but to a systematic and carefully planned application of the whole approach.

It is to those readers, disappointed with quick and simple solutions which have failed in the past and are failing now, who are willing to entertain the idea of attempting a more complex but systematic approach to the problems of youth development and delinquency prevention, that this publication and our efforts are dedicated.

Center for Action Research, Inc.
Boulder, Colorado
June, 1976

INTRODUCTION

A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT

In the late spring of 1970, a small group of practitioners, administrators, and college teachers--all specialists in the problems of adolescence and youth--met in Scituate, Massachusetts, under the auspices of the DHEW Commissioner of Youth Development (then the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration). The stimulus for the meeting was the increasing recognition by the federal government that existing policies offered no satisfactory solutions to what the American public saw as a serious youth problem in the United States. The purpose was to frame a new policy statement which could offer communities new and more hopeful directions for the design and implementation of services for youth--services which could enhance youth development and prevent increases in the soaring rates of delinquency.

The product of six months' work was announced officially in January 1971 as the National Strategy for Youth Development.

The ideas proposed in the Strategy were different from the traditional treatment approaches offered by delinquency control and prevention professionals in the country. Because the ideas were not well understood at the time, nor for that matter have they been widely disseminated and understood since that time, we briefly summarize the crucial points of the Strategy in this introduction.

To begin with, the Scituate group suggested that policy makers had been asking and answering the wrong question. Instead of

the question--*Why do kids get into trouble?*--the appropriate question is *How do most youth become useful, productive, and contributing adults in their communities?* The answer came in four parts:

Access to roles

Most youth have, and perceive that they have, access to social roles which give them a stake in the life of their community, bond them to society, and generate commitment to generally conforming and acceptable behavior.

Negative labeling

There are processes at work in our communities through which most youth come to be seen and to see themselves as competent and worthwhile. Some youth, however, experience the application of negative labels by family, friends, teachers, and others--labels which derive from incorrect stereotypes or from premature judgments about a single experimental act of misbehavior interpreted as a pattern rather than as a single act. Young persons who are prematurely or otherwise inappropriately negatively labeled come to see themselves in negative terms and behave accordingly.

Alienation

Youth who perceive that they have access to socially gratifying and desirable roles *and* who develop positive self-identity, tend to develop into productive, contributing adults. Youth who are denied access to desirable community roles *and* who receive inappropriate

negative labels, experience alienation, frustration, and despair. This experience may lead to the performance of undesirable and occasionally illegal acts in the community.

Social institutional change

The structures and processes which provide access to socially desirable roles *and* which attach positive and negative labels to young persons are frequently beyond the control of the young persons themselves. Roles are part of the social institutional structures of the community and labels are applied by persons whose authority resides in those same institutions. Thus, from the perspective of the Strategy, healthy youth development is directed by the characteristics of community social institutions rather than by the personality characteristics of the youth influenced by those institutions.

It then follows that if change is required in order to improve community conditions for youth, the target for that change must be community social institutions rather than the behavior of individual youth which is determined and influenced by those institutions.

TESTING THE STRATEGY

All policies are deliberate choices of series of acts; whether we wish good or ill when we choose our acts, is of no importance. The only important thing is whether we know what the conditions are and what will be the effects of our acts. (William Graham Sumner, 1900)

The multivariable theory proposed in the Strategy statement was not a shot in the dark. The theories which were offered to explain what was happening to youth in the community, composed the best statement of

empirically based social science knowledge that could be made. The Office of Youth Development and its consultants recognized that there was far more to policy development than presenting a plausible explanation for existing conditions. Beginning in 1971, a course of policy research, program implementation, and evaluation was begun on a small scale to test the utility of the Strategy variables for community youth development. This programming was a necessary step before proposing the Strategy as a policy for guiding large expenditures. From 1971 to the present, the research has continued. While the research effort has always been purposeful and planned, a wide range of contingencies and constraints has influenced the research during the intervening period.

The conclusions offered in this publication are presented in a logical order which we believe makes sense of the effort of the past six years. The information did not develop in so logical a fashion.

Several thousand persons in more than a hundred communities have been involved in various phases of this policy research, thus there must exist a variety of viewpoints about what events have occurred and what they mean. It is from respect for persons with differing views who worked with youth programs as grantees, consultants, and service recipients that we offer our perspective on some of the events and constraints which influence our conclusions.

BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AFFECTING YOUTH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

1968 Passage of Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968.

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

Establishment of Office of Juvenile Delinquency Programs.

1969 Regionalization of national office transfers granting and monitoring responsibility to ten regional offices.

Creation of Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration in Social and Rehabilitation Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

1970

Appointment of Commissioner of Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration.

Study shows state comprehensive planning inadequate.

Decision to place funding priority on community-based prevention made by Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration Commissioner.

Scituate meeting held in late spring.

Appointment of task forces to oversee implementation of Strategy in urban, suburban, rural, and campus settings.

1971 Secretaries of Housing and Urban Development and Health, Education and Welfare agree to fund delinquency prevention projects cooperatively through Model Cities.

Official announcement of the Strategy

14 sites funded to implement the Strategy.

1971 Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Attorney General sign agreement that Law Enforcement Assistance Administration will emphasize program support for adjudicated youth; Health, Education and Welfare will work with pre-adjudicatory problem youth.

Theory task force supports emphasis on diversion programs through youth service bureaus.

Key decision-makers conferences disseminate Strategy nationwide.

1972 General Revenue Sharing Act passes.

Amendments to Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1968 pass. Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration extended for two years, youth services system as an experimental structure for coordination of youth services embodied in legislative language.

California Youth Authority funded by Office of Youth Development to assess impact of youth service bureaus.

National Council on Crime and Delinquency and the Office of Youth Development offer youth service bureau publications.

California Youth Authority survey casts doubt on youth service bureau concept as funded and administered.

Youth services systems concept set forth to pose as alternative to youth service bureaus.

Contract let to Behavioral Research and Evaluation Corporation to evaluate Office of Youth Development youth services systems diversion efforts in five cities. Behavioral Research and Evaluation Corporation develops impact instruments and applies flow analysis as part of evaluation.

1973 Office of Human Development established.

Twenty-five city survey indicates that direct service concerns of youth services systems are jeopardizing programs in same fashion as youth service bureaus.

1973 Youth Development and Delinquency
cont. Prevention Administration transferred
from Social and Rehabilitation Service
to Office of Human Development. Name
changed to Office of Youth Development.

Health, Education and Welfare forward
planning memorandum presents options
for new federal role--term, "capacity
building" introduced. Concept transfers
new authority to local general purpose
government. Federal role of research
and development, technology creation,
and transfer through technical
assistance proposed.

Behavioral Research and Evaluation Corporation
expands evaluation research, develops youth
needs survey, resource analysis, description of
coordination and systems building, continues
impact analysis and systems flow studies.
Instruments pilot tested in ten cities. First
data to validate Strategy collected.

Position paper on youth services system published
by Center for Action Research, Boulder, Colorado.

Performance Evaluation and Review Formats
(*Performats Manual*) introduced to Office of Youth
Development grantees, to improve quality of
management and planning of youth services system
projects. Management by objectives stresses
attention to systems building and Strategy
variables. Evaluative measures--impact analysis
and flow analysis incorporated.

Grantee suggests Eugene Litwak's "multifactor
theory of interorganizational linkages," may
hold promise for developing a theory of inter-
organizational coordination needed to support
continued development of youth services system.

1974

Behavioral Research and Evaluation Corporation
continues effort to refine community analysis
and feedback instruments, verification of the
Strategy for Youth Development.

Center for Action Research begins operational-
ization of Litwak multifactor theory of linkages
and pilot tests in Lane County, Oregon.

1974 September:
cont. Congress passes Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.
Transfers delinquency prevention responsi-
bility to Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration. Provides for two year
phase-out of Health, Education and
Welfare youth services system projects.

March:
Behavioral Research and Evaluation Corporation
reports Strategy variables verified by
first year's data.

1975 100 projects continue on transitional
phase-out funding.

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
funds American Public Welfare Association
for a research and demonstration program
based on youth development Strategy and
youth services system approach in five
cities.

Department of Labor funds Youth Work
Experience and Capacity Building Program
for Oakland, California based on Strategy.
State of Iowa CETA Prime Sponsor applies
Strategy and capacity building concepts.
States take on development of technical
assistance teams to support capacity
building for youth development in
Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Iowa.
California indicates intention to
implement delinquency prevention effort
based on capacity building concept.

Behavioral Research and Evaluation Corporation
publishes results of Strategy policy research.
Strategy solidly verified as scientifically
valid theory for basis of youth development
policy.

All instruments revised and published for use
of communities which wish to use technology
for local capacity building for youth develop-
ment.

Office of Youth Development funds technical
assistance to support continuing projects.

Office of Youth Development funds Capacity
Building for Youth Development (Center for
Action Research) to apply and test revised
approach for comprehensive coordinated planning
and programming for all community youth in ten
sites.

1976 June:
All Health, Education and Welfare
funds to youth services system projects
terminate.

Final conference on youth services systems.

POLICY RESEARCH AND DECISIONS

Between 1968 and 1974, as can be seen from the preceding, brief chronology of events and decisions, conditions changed several times for the Office of Youth Development. These changes in turn, resulted in decisions which led OYD in new directions. While many factors affected OYD, we view four factors as having been particularly influential.

HISTORICAL EXPECTATIONS

The first factor which had profound influence on OYD's efforts in establishing youth development policy was the existence of historical beliefs and expectations regarding young people in the community. Dating from at least the establishment of the U.S. Children's Bureau in 1912,* a serious concern for supporting and controlling the way in which youth grow up and behave had developed. As the size of the youth population increased (to peak in the mid-1970's), a cadre of professionals supported by concerned citizens began to advocate the development of treatment programs which could rehabilitate youth who were in trouble, and sought to change conditions that led to the trouble in the first place. There have been many different schools of thought about the causes of youthful "misbehavior," but irrespective of assumptions about the origins of delinquent activity--spiritual, biological, psychological or social--the basic approach to treating youth has been much the same. Identify the misbehaving youth, isolate him from his usual environment, and apply

*Persons interested in federal policy for youth development and delinquency prevention should refer to "Report to the Congress--How Federal Efforts to Coordinate Programs to Mitigate Juvenile Delinquency Proved Ineffective," by the Comptroller General of the United States (Washington, D.C.: mimeographed, April 21, 1975).

therapy or counseling to change his attitudes and behavior. The constituency of concerned citizens and professionals believed that they had the solution to the problem of youth deviance if they could just get the financial resources necessary to develop and support their own programs. This constituency, which included a variety of private national organizations as well as community public and private agencies, brought pressure on the federal establishment in general and OYD in particular to make funds available to develop and maintain their youth programs. But, by 1970, the executive branch of government was expressing considerable doubt about the ability of federal government to solve the entire range of the country's¹ social problems, including the problems of youth.

Congress, responsive to the constituency seeking federal funds, demanded that the Office of Youth Development seek the full appropriations for youth programming that Congress provided to support the mandate of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1968. Yet, the Office of Management and the Budget (which designs and approves budget requests by executive branch agencies) would permit OYD to request only as much funding as OYD could prove would effectively lead to a reduction in youth delinquency.

Most of the youth programming conducted prior to 1970, like most other social programs, had not been scientifically evaluated with respect to impact on a client population. The research that had been done, moreover, tended to prove that the programs had had no favorable long-term effect (and frequently no favorable short-term effect either). The Office of Youth Development thus faced conflicting demands and

requirements. Given (1) the absence of research findings which would support an increase in budget for traditional youth treatment programs; (2) considerable evidence that those programs did not have favorable effect; (3) the existence of another federal agency with a similar mandate for delinquency control which had substantial funds (LEAA); and (4) demands that OYD do something, the decision for a thrust in the area of community-based youth development and delinquency prevention with a sound research component was rational and logical.

FEDERAL REORGANIZATION AND FUNDING PATTERNS

The second factor or condition which influenced OYD policy development efforts was the reorganization of the executive branch, begun in 1968. In an effort to decentralize governmental authority and move decision making closer to local government, DHEW in 1969 began to regionalize its grant-awarding process to ten federal regional offices. By the time that the Commissioner of Youth Development had been appointed in 1970, Assistant Regional Directors of Youth Development were not only in place to make and monitor OYD grants, but in each regional office they had already made one or more rounds of grants to community youth service programs based on their own interpretation of the legislation. The grants were made for three year periods, renewable annually, thus committing the agency to a variety of project approaches for nearly the life of the legislation. Efforts to influence this granting process by changing guidelines for annual renewals in accordance with new directions were not greeted with enthusiasm at the regional level or by community grantees. The national office/regional structure made communication of national

policy decisions difficult, and the lack of enthusiastic support for decisions made at the national office (frequently interpreted as an usurpation of regional authority) was a continuing constraint on policy research efforts.

But decisions made by higher echelons of DHEW also had effects on research. For example, the decision by the Secretary's office that OYD should coordinate its funding with the Department of Housing and Urban Development Model Cities Program, made it virtually impossible for the Inner-City Task Force to test the implications of the Strategy in those settings. The fact that regional offices had to assist the model cities projects to prepare their proposals and approve them prior to national office approval, did not make the situation any easier. The millions of dollars spent in those ten cities did deliver services to many youth, but whether those services helped youth could not be determined.

CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE

In 1973, a series of new terms and phrases started to appear in DHEW policy discussions. Devolution, subfederal centralization, and capacity building for state and local general purpose government were added to the OYD vocabulary. These terms all represented an effort to change the relationship between federal government and local government by shifting the authority and responsibility for social programming from national and regional offices to states and communities. Funds should be given to local government through general and special revenue sharing, and they should design their own programs to meet local needs. In order

for this shift to occur, it was argued that the capability of local government to plan and administer complex programming would have to be enhanced. Thus, the federal role should change from running programs in the community, to building the capability among elected officials to gain control of administrative structures previously run by the federal government.

While this policy did not become official until the spring of 1974, the implications were extremely supportive of the direction that the Office of Youth Development had been following. The youth services system concept, introduced to overcome the structural inadequacies of youth service bureaus as they then existed, placed general purpose government at the head of the community effort. The development of a systems perspective and a planned experimental approach controlled by local general purpose government had already been recognized as essential in order to improve youth development opportunities in the community.

This change in federal policy put OYD in the mainstream of supporting the development of a new federal capacity-building role. Its policy research was several years ahead of that of other agencies, even though the results of the research could not be expected for another year.

TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY FOR DELINQUENCY PROGRAMMING TO JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

In September 1974, Congress transferred the mandate for delinquency prevention from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. One can only speculate about the crucial reasons for this transfer, but the failure of DHEW to request the full appropriations Congress had

allotted for transfer to the community in the form of grants surely figured in the decision-making process. The constituency mentioned as a factor influencing OYD policy research had not gone away. It is perhaps an irony that the Justice Department was instructed to implement the new legislation with existing funds. The appropriations offered by Congress have not yet been requested.

The two year transition period has permitted the solid scientific validation of the Strategy for Youth Development and the dissemination of findings to other agencies which have found the criteria and the technology created by OYD useful to their efforts. The Justice Department and the Department of Labor both have funded demonstration programs based on OYD policy research. A number of states have adopted the capacity-building approach for community youth development and are supporting the planned experimental approach with their own funds.

The Office of Youth Development continues to support the policy research and demonstration effort. However, Capacity Building for Youth Development is no longer limited to providing help for youth in trouble or in danger of becoming delinquent. The policy research concern is now directed toward finding the best arrangements for each community needed to design and implement effective programming for *all* youth in the community. While more research must be done, enough data have been accumulated to strongly suggest that only through locally developed and supported programs which engage *all* youth, will the problem for the few labeled *delinquent* be reduced.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Strategy for Youth Development
and Delinquency Prevention

THE STRATEGY FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

The ideas to be described in this volume were assembled as a means to implement the set of propositions referred to as a "Strategy for Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention." That set of propositions is both a value statement and an analysis of youth development needs and problems. The propositions guide action and provide criteria for evaluating action. In the complexities of implementation, the Strategy provides a reference point, a protection against substituting means for ends, and an assurance that the means are directed to worthwhile outcomes.

Theoretically and empirically, the Strategy is a strong base for examining youth needs and for planning, implementing, and evaluating youth programs. In critical ways the Strategy qualifies the approaches to treatment, rehabilitation, and control which have dominated youth programming to date.

INTRODUCTION

The Strategy examines how the arrangements in social institutions such as education, work, the family, and justice affect youth for good or for ill. These arrangements have changed considerably over the past three centuries. The present status of youth, which is examined in more detail later, should be seen in the context of such changes. Of particular significance to youth are the changes which have occurred in what it means to be a *member* of a community.

Characteristically, persons in earlier times lived and worked within small geographical areas. Membership was based on kinship and residence. Home, family, and work were closely tied in many ways. Families tended to teach children their manners, their values, and their work. Most needs were taken care of, and most lives were lived close to home. There were fewer occupations than there are at present.

The Industrial Revolution changed that. Where one lived and where one worked came to be distinctly separate places. Work skills and social skills came to be acquired separately. New roles, new skills, and new occupations emerged. Persons became more mobile, both socially and geographically. Where one lived was no longer the center of one's life.

Industrialization emphasized expansion, growth, and variety, and created specialized tasks and services reflecting the complexity of social needs. More and more, membership came to be granted on individual performance, rather than on kinship or residence. Persons increasingly became dependent on their own skills and ingenuities to make their way. Independence, individual identity, autonomy, and a dissatisfaction with position were by-products.

The industrial society became organized in such a way that people were allocated roles on the basis of merit and endowment *outside* the family, which placed great demands on industry to provide learning experiences to meet the demands for various work skills. In order to become a full-fledged member of society, one had to meet the demands for responsibility, maturity, and competition of the industrial framework by participating adequately in the learning experiences provided.

These membership demands affect youth. Not only has the time been divided between the work place and the home, but the time required to reach adulthood has been extended by almost a decade restricting youth participation in the valued activities of society. Not being highly integrated in the community is the same as not being a member of the community. Youth are defined in the community as marginal members, bound by their families and schools until they reach adulthood and full membership.

As society becomes more complex, the period of preparation for membership is extended and the requirements become more stringent. The most striking feature of membership is that it is a problem for *all* youth from different sectors of society.

American society has established criteria for attaining membership which are imbued with and supported by middle class values, having greatly to do with work. "Middle class standards of conduct are implicit in legal statutes" (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960, p. 47), to which all members are obliged to adhere. Subscription to these criteria results in common goals identifiable and prized by other members of the society.

The most prominent distributors of membership criteria are the family, the school, and the community. Because of the extended time period needed to become a member, most youth spend this time in school. The school becomes the reservoir for the requirements of membership, and the school relies on the family and the community for only peripheral support: "Education has become the principal avenue for upward mobility in most industrial nations." (Lipset and Bendix, 1959, p. 91) When the school fails to inculcate the standards for membership, we turn to other

institutions such as the juvenile justice system to take on the responsibility.

The theme to be seen in this historical progression is the steady erosion for youth of opportunities for membership. Full membership has been deferred for longer and longer periods, and the situations in which membership can be established or earned have become narrower and fewer. Youth's *stake* in society has diminished equally, with a variety of undesirable consequences. These changes are a significant part of the background against which the Strategy should be seen.

Several statements of the Strategy have been prepared in the years since its inception. We have borrowed from these, first to illustrate ways in which the Strategy is different from more familiar analyses, to elaborate problems with social membership for youth, and then to present the standard statement of the Strategy employed in programming and evaluation.

I. SORTING THE ANSWERS*

With or without help from a funded project, most youth develop passably well. If they did not, our system would collapse once every generation. It does not take a formal plan for most children to grow up to accept useful, productive places in the community. Uncoordinated common sense policies and practices in the worlds of family,

*Excerpted from Grant Johnson's, "A Strategy for Youth Development," 1974.

school, justice, work,¹ and other youth services turn a majority of adolescents into worthy adults. This haphazard process gets us by, but it contains some serious flaws. The same combination of practices which helps most youth develop actually blocks the social development of many others.² Our flawed youth development mechanisms regularly and predictably leave us with a substantial number of youth who do not turn out right.

¹The prevalent policies, practices, and beliefs in each of these "worlds" constitute a *social institution*. Every society has an institution of the family, as well as educational, economic, political, and religious institutions. Social institutions refer not to particular families, schools, or facilities, but to broad patterns of thought and behavior prevalent in each sphere of activity.

Each of these broad patterns consists of an array of shared expectations governing behavior of persons who occupy particular slots, or roles, in that sphere. A shared expectation for behavior is a norm. Knowing what the norms are means being aware of both negative and positive sanctions, which are likely to result from acting a particular way in a specific situation. Knowing ahead of time what will bring approval or disapproval from important others gives a person in a given role a basis for deciding how to behave: he or she can calculate probable consequences before acting. Because norms are shared, others can predict with fair success what that person will do under a wide range of conditions.

²An assumption of the *functional* orientation in social science is that anything in a society which is common or customary must be useful (functional) to a society, or it would not be standard practice. But what is functional for some parts or goals within a society may be *dysfunctional* for others; a particular set of practices can help and hinder simultaneously, depending on your frame of reference. Tracking in schools, for example, may be functional for the goal of maintaining a steady supply of labor for every level of job; it helps the economic sector by keeping a disproportionately high number of well-educated persons from flooding the market. At the same time, tracking is dysfunctional for the achievement of equal opportunity for all; it operates to limit chances for upward mobility of children from lower class backgrounds. From an individual standpoint, those in high tracks have a helpful advantage while others are excluded from socially desirable roles (see discussion below). Functional theory is described by Robert Merton in On Theoretical Sociology. New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 73-138.

Practices which produce these failures have become part of our way of life; even when proven harmful, some are held and defended as if they were sacred.³ Instead of working to eliminate obstacles to youth development, we usually choose to deal, over and over again, with every new batch of youth who run into the obstacles. We spend billions annually on arresting, rearresting, supporting, treating, and trying to patch up these spoiled batches.⁴ We spend next to nothing on correcting the recipes which repeatedly produce them.

Youth development means attending not to never-ending patchwork and rehabilitation of failures, but to correcting recurrent policies and practices which produce those failures.⁵ This follows from

³In every known society, practices acquire the force of tradition over time. They need not be religious in the usual sense to take on a sacred aura and to be enforced without question. Persons who see their own positions as dependent upon such practices are particularly resistant to change; they have vested interests in the status quo. This means only that change can be difficult, not that it is impossible. Ralph Nader's successes show that coercion can be effective in changing entrenched policies. Sometimes people are willing to change without being coerced, putting other considerations ahead of protecting their own status. For example, several Denver, Colorado, attorneys regularly conduct classes at a local free law school to take the mystery out of law so laymen can handle their own divorces and minor lawsuits.

⁴No matter who or what is to blame for their behavior, some youth need to be arrested or treated for protection of those around them. Fortunately, the young murderers, rapists, and other serious offenders who fall in this category are few in number. They represent but a minute fraction of all youth classified as "in trouble."

⁵Since these recurrent policies and practices are what define institutions (see footnote #1 above), this strategy suggests that the appropriate response is *institutional change*. Correcting practices which produce failures means altering norms--changing the patterns of approval and disapproval from important others. People will ignore good advice so long as listening to it only gets them into trouble.

the simple, yet largely overlooked, philosophy that a little spent on prevention is worth more than a lot spent on cure.

A. THE BEGINNING OF A STRATEGY

A would-be reformer who raises his hands to a crowd and says, "Come with me; I am going to correct things that are wrong," is not likely to attract many followers (and even if he does, his broad shotgun blast against social ills probably won't accomplish much).⁶ Before setting out to make the world a better place, it is a good idea to identify a few specific targets and decide where limited resources can do the most good for the greatest number. For OYD the initial task was to pinpoint a few crucial parts of the youth development process, to zero in where modest expenditure could have high beneficial impact on large numbers of youth.

People faced with problems often ask each other, "Where have we gone wrong?" This provides a chance for airing gripes and may postpone a trip to the divorce court, but it is not the most fruitful way

To bring about lasting changes in practices, we must attend to the environment which teachers, police and others in contact with youth have to work in, making it possible for them to do the right thing and at the same time have their actions approved (or at least tolerated) by others.

⁶It generally takes more than a leader's personal charm to incite people to action. Historically, leaders have attracted huge followings by focusing attention on a specific target--first by identifying particular problems, then by pinning the blame for all of them on some ethnic group, government body, or conspiratorial menace. (See Neil Smelser's discussion in Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: The Free Press, 1962.) OYD is handicapped in its ability to arouse passion by having no personified villains; instead, it has singled out as targets those policies and practices which are both crucial to youth development and amenable to change.

to reach agreement on a workable solution. "Accentuate the positive" may have acceptance as a folk saying, but you seldom hear of people lying awake nights pondering the question, "Where have we gone right?" It is this positive, seldom-asked question which led off OYD's initial task of strategy development, that of selecting a productive focus for program efforts.

Experts from several fields invited by the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare met in Scituate, Massachusetts in June, 1970, to seek a fresh approach to youth development. They asked not, "Why do youth become delinquent?" but "Why is it that most youth manage to grow from infancy through stormy adolescence to accept a useful, productive place in the life of their community?"

B. WHY MOST YOUNG PEOPLE TURN OUT OK

Ask people on the street about young people who make it, and you can count on hearing some of the following responses:

"Those kids are the ambitious ones; they aren't afraid of hard work."

"Those are the ones who have respect for the law."

"They have sense enough to do well in school."

"They are the good ones, the ones who mind their parents."

"They are mentally healthy; their heads are on straight."

All the replies have something in common: they explain behavior on the basis of *individual characteristics*.

Most of us learn early that our world contains good guys and bad guys, agreeable people and disagreeable people, interesting friends and dull ones. We like to make sense of what others do, and this becomes simple, once we know enough categories. If a stranger helps me without asking for thanks, there is no cause for bewilderment--he did it because he is a nice person. If another driver runs a red light and makes me swerve to keep from hitting him in as little time as it takes to slam on the brakes I can mutter an explanation for his behavior--"That stupid %&%!" By referring to individual characteristics we get quick and ready answers.

Trying to explain behavior in terms of outside forces which affect people and push them to act in certain ways is more difficult. We take the trouble to do this only on rare occasions, for example, when someone we admire surprises us by doing something unacceptable. If, as he speeds past me I recognize the bad driver as a close friend, I may forget about name-calling and wonder what has happened to good old Joe to get him so distracted. This shifts the blame from within the person to external forces.

This same kind of shift is called for when large numbers of people start having the same problem all at once. If one man in town is unemployed, it could be because he is just plain lazy. But when unemployment rates soar and thousands who worked last year now are out of jobs, it becomes farfetched to assume that all those people suddenly developed the same moral defect. We are more likely to solve the problem if we look at forces in the economy than if we blame it on an outbreak of mass laziness. When large numbers of youth across the country become truant from school,

that too can be dealt with more effectively if it is regarded as a social issue rather than an accumulation of individual defects.⁷

Personal traits and social forces are two of many ways to explain why people act as they do (diet and climate are a couple of others). Youth behave or misbehave *both* because of their individual characteristics and because of outside forces which they often cannot control.

The experts who met at Scituate made a point of talking about forces rather than characteristics.⁸ Ambition, respect, sense, mental health, and goodness may help a young person develop properly, but as thrusts for a national program they are not very practical. They are hard to define and harder to deliver. Even if we could agree on an effective way to hand out these admirable qualities, the cost of individually processing every youth who needed them could amount to several times the Gross National Product, and the task would have to be repeated for every new generation. So that it could lead to a practical program,

⁷The unemployment example comes from C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination. New York: Grove Press, 1959, p. 9. Mills distinguishes between *troubles*, which occur within the character of the individual, and *issues*, which "have to do with matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life." (For additional examples and discussion see pp. 3-13 of the Mills book.)

One consequence of mistaking issues for troubles is an emphasis on direct service delivery when institutional change would address the problem more effectively.

⁸Although there is substantial overlap in domains of the various social sciences, study of these external forces is the primary emphasis of sociology--how the forces affect people, how they interact. The perspective which is stressed here is a sociological one.

the question the experts posed became "How do policies and practices in the world around them permit most youth to grow up to accept useful, productive places in their community?"⁹

II. THE CASE FOR AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH*

The most common way to initiate a discussion of delinquency prevention is to search out those factors which are presumed to cause delinquency, then set forth programs which address the causes. We propose to start somewhat differently, asking, first, what is it that builds a stake in conformity (Toby, 1957) such that some youth are provided with a socially acceptable concept of self which "insulates" against delinquency (Reckless, Dinitz, and Murray, 1956). The analysis of conformity will begin with an examination of the character of adult, rather than adolescent, life since it is the denial of access to the type of institutional experiences which are the sources of conformity in adult life, that lies at the root of much adolescent alienation and rebellion.

One of the clearest facts known about delinquency, yet one often overlooked, is that it is a characteristically adolescent phenomenon. Law violation is virtually non-existent before the onset of the teenage years, rises sharply shortly after the onset of adolescence, hits

⁹The threefold answer which came out of Scituate was that *policies and practices operate so that most youth (1) have access to socially desirable roles, (2) are seen positively by friends, family, and teachers, and (3) feel substantial personal control over the direction of their own lives as integrated members of the community.*

*Adapted from Kenneth Polk, "Effective Programming for Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention: Proposed Guidelines" (draft paper, 1971).

highest peak around 16 or 17 years of age, and declines rapidly after that point, becoming exceedingly rare in middle or late adulthood.

What is it about adolescence that is so problematic? What is it that precipitates problems at this transitional point? As Friedenberg put it:

A great many young people are in very serious trouble throughout the technically developed and especially the Western world. Their trouble, moreover, follows certain familiar common patterns; they get into much the same kind of difficulty in very different societies. But it is nevertheless strange that they should. Human life is a continuous thread which each of us spins to his own pattern, rich and complex in meaning. There are no natural knots in it. Yet knots form, nearly always in adolescence (Friedenberg, 1965, p. 1).

The knots of adolescence can be understood most fruitfully when we contrast the adolescent with the adult experience. Our concern here is to identify those features of adult roles which are part of "legitimate" identity, which when fully developed provide insulating self-concepts. Out of the organized institutional features of adult community life, there appear to be four especially significant components of what we see as legitimate identity:

A sense of competence, especially in (but not limited to) one's work role. For most, work conveys the feeling that there is something not only that they can do, but that they do well. In the "mass society" such a sense of competence permits the person to feel that he is unique, that he somehow has something that allows him to stand apart from others.

A sense of usefulness. Work, family, and other roles do more than occupy time and produce money. They also are the grounds for social definitions of the self. One such definition is the feeling that the person has something to contribute, that what he does represents something which people value. Certainly, jobs and other activities vary in the way they contribute to this sense of usefulness. Contained in the service nature of welfare, medical, or educational work, for example, is a heightened feeling of meaningfulness. However, the "functional" character of most work, i.e., that it must be done if minimal stability of social conditions is to be maintained, results in at least some workers in what appear to be the most menial tasks justifying their work on the basis of its being socially necessary.

A sense of belongingness. Work, family, political, and other roles help, through their *active* commitment, to locate a person in the world, to convey a sense that he "belongs." The work setting and the family scene create settings and groups wherein the individual knows he has a place, where he knows that he "fits."

A sense of power or potency. One of the awesome features of contemporary existence is our collective vulnerability to feelings of powerlessness. The powerlessness problem transcends the limited boundaries of what we traditionally label "political." It has to do with our ability to exercise some control over those persons, organizations, or institutions in the world around us which control or attempt to control us.

Two factors stand out as providing a basis for feelings of power: social class and (closely related) work. Persons with high

status positions, who live in the "right" parts of town, feel with more than a little justification that such agencies as schools or police function in their interest, and they feel consequently some sense of control over agency policy.

In the present day world, however, it is necessary to include in this analysis the important ingredient of work. For large numbers of persons, it is their job which defines their economic position, and thus their power. Work provides money which by itself has control value. Put positively, money widens the choices a person can make--expands his power. The possession of money reduces dependency. Persons without a job, and without money, become dependent upon others for food, shelter, clothing, and money. Such dependence is not without its price: one cannot bite the hand that feeds. Dependency means loss of power. Access to work assures some degree of personal independence and power.

Above and beyond this, the way work is organized also has its effects on feelings of power. Seeman argues that there are two control elements in work life that relate to power: the presence of an organization that yields some control over work and occupational setting; and the individual's involvement in such an organization:

A person's feelings of self-reliance and power are tied up with whether he belongs to an organization that has some control over his occupational destiny. If he does belong to such an organization--union, business or professional association--his further feelings of mastery are directly tied up with how actively he works in it--whether he has some control over its destiny. (Seeman, May/June, 1966, p. 39)

As Seeman notes, it is not that unorganized workers are uninterested or apathetic, but that they feel helpless to channel their interests:

The unorganized were not totally withdrawn or apathetic; they were just as interested as the organized workers in personal and local affairs and in discussing their work. But the unorganized felt powerless to control their larger destinies--and politics and international affairs represented these larger destinies.

Men with little hope for success feel powerless, lose interest in, and have difficulty learning control-relevant information. (Seeman, May/June, 1966, p. 39)

With regard to these four particular features of legitimate identity in adult life, what is central to the present argument is their *institutional character*. The feelings of competence, meaningfulness, belongingness, and political potency derive from roles in the work world especially, but also from such institutional arenas as politics, the family, recreation, or cultural activities. These are not things which people generate by themselves. They come from the social world outside and from particular kinds of institutions in that world. Competence derives its meaning fundamentally from the context of work, and thus from the work organization which provides the work setting. In the contemporary world, it is a fact of life (whatever one thinks of that fact) that much of a person's usefulness or meaningfulness is assessed by his work role and how he performs it.

A sense of belongingness must be considered in a wider context, since one can feel attached in many ways to many things. However, in urban existence, the settings for attachment will be organizational and, in all probability, be dependent on the economic and power status that derive from the work role. Power, we argued above, derives both from status (most often established by the work role), and from the extent to which institutions allow individuals to exert influence, and then recruit members into such influence procedures.

Institutions are critical in providing the conditions which generate legitimate identity. When trouble occurs in what should be the orderly movement into legitimate life careers, we should look to problems in the institutional fabric. Are there problems in the way individuals *gain access* to institutional roles that might account for the emergence of illegal behavior and illegitimate identity? Adolescence is assumed to be a transitional state into adulthood. When we find systematic, recurring difficulties in this age period, it is only reasonable to ask if these are a consequence of the failure of institutions to provide access to experiences which would make for a smooth progression to adulthood. This perspective raises the question of to what extent does adolescent deviance lie not so much in "the head" of the adolescent, but in an outgrowth of institutional malfunction. Strategically, these two points of view call for quite different approaches to delinquency prevention and control.

If delinquency (or alienation, rebellion, and unrest) is a product of some individual's problem, then a form of individually centered clinic service is called for, such as counseling, therapy, treatment, or behavior modification. If, on the other hand, one looks to the nature of institutional experiences as the source of the problem, then it is probable that specific institutional practices be altered. What such an approach requires, however, is a thorough analysis of institutional contexts, coupled with concrete suggestions for institutional changes which link up with the causal analysis.

In the case of adolescence, it will be argued that much of what we call adolescent problems lies within the particular institutional practices used to move the adolescent through education into adult work roles. Movement into adulthood, as these practices are organized within the school context, contains features which create a particular sense of meaninglessness and powerlessness among vast numbers of young people, and delinquency among a few.

III. RECENT FORMULATIONS OF THE STRATEGY

The Behavioral Research and Evaluation Corporation (BREC), in the course of several assessment and evaluation projects employing the Strategy, has worked to refine our understanding of the Strategy. Issues of the theoretical validity of the Strategy have been discussed in reports on evaluative research undertaken by BREC. Central to these discussions are (1) the extent to which key variables are related in anticipated ways, and the extent to which these key variables are predictors of self-reported delinquency; and (2) the success with which programs have

modified the variables which have been found to have the most influence on involvement in delinquent activity. *The thrust of these evaluation findings is that there is, in fact, a theory which identifies salient causes of juvenile delinquency. This theory forms the core of a Strategy for Youth Development.* In a recent publication BREC described the Strategy as follows.

A. DESIRABLE SOCIAL ROLES--A STAKE IN CONFORMITY*

Successful, law-abiding youth do not pursue illegal activity because they have little to gain and much to lose. The gains of robbery, for example, are obvious, but there are losses. A youth who is loved at home, successful at school, comfortable among friends, and able to look forward to a worthwhile career puts all of these in jeopardy if he or she becomes involved in delinquent activity. Such a youth is not a very likely candidate for a delinquent career. Participation in meaningful, rewarding social roles insulates youth from involvement in delinquency by giving them a positive stake in conventional roles and behavior. These desirable aspects of a youth's life are aspects of positive social roles which are bestowed by a handful of institutions: the family, school, and work. In large measure, then, we look toward these institutions to ensure that youth are given sufficient opportunity to achieve these *desirable social roles* of "good son or daughter," "good pupil," "good friend," and "good worker."

In practice, most youth do find meaningful involvement and experience a favorable course in these institutional contexts,

*Excerpted from BREC, Research Handbook for Community Planning and Feedback Instruments, Vol. 1. 1975.

otherwise, these institutions would collapse and would have to be rebuilt for every generation. However, many youth do not have meaningful social roles in these contexts. Many are not loved and respected at home, are not successful at school, and do not hold much hope for rewarding work careers. These youth have no stake in conformity. They place little or nothing in jeopardy when they experiment with illegal forms of behavior. In fact, certain types of criminal activity may offer the *only* hope they see for financial and material rewards. Limited access to, or participation in, desirable social roles at home, school, and work is an obstacle to a favorable course of youth development and a "cause" of youth alienation and involvement in anti-social forms of behavior.

B. NEGATIVE LABELING

As human beings, we all have a tendency to define our world and then respond only to our definitions. This applies to our definitions of other persons as well as things. Once an individual is defined as a "troublemaker," a "truant," or a "delinquent," we tend to see him and treat him according to this label. When parents, teachers, and friends all begin to use such labels as a basis for their interaction with a person, the individual is under great pressure to define *himself* in a similar way, and to behave in a way which is consistent with this definition. At this point the person has *become* what we have labeled him, confirming our original definition of him. The fact that this was a self-fulfilling prophecy and that we participated in a labeling process which *contributed* to his becoming a troublemaker, truant, or delinquent, often goes unnoticed.

Of particular concern is the negative labeling which occurs at school and in our juvenile justice system. The negative labels employed in these institutional settings are particularly harmful because they are more visible and formal than those generated elsewhere, and they tend to have a greater effect on the individual's life. Being defined a troublemaker at school, for example, has an impact not only on the particular courses one takes (vocational as opposed to college-bound), but on one's participation in extracurricular activities, assignment to particular teachers, and even seating locations within the classroom (where one's actions can be closely observed). One's future educational opportunities are clearly affected by labels at school.

The same may be said of the application of the label "delinquent" to youth who get caught up in the processing of the juvenile justice system. The net effect of this processing is that youth are cut off from their contacts with conventional law-abiding youth, and thrust into contact with youth who are committed to delinquent roles; their future educational and occupational opportunities are diminished by their having an official record; and, perhaps most importantly, friends, parents, teachers, and other significant persons in their lives begin to view them as "different," responding to them selectively in terms of this label. This labeling process becomes complete when, as a result of this new definition and the resulting expectations of others, the youth comes to see himself as a delinquent person. The prophecy has been fulfilled.

The problem with institutional labeling, such as that in the school or the justice system, is that it is often premature, inappropriate, and dictated by system requirements rather than a careful

evaluation of the individual's abilities, values, and commitment to particular kinds of behavior. The danger of labeling, whether in the home, school, or juvenile justice system, lies in the very real possibility that the youth has *not* made any real commitment to the specific behavior which generated the label; the labeling process itself reinforces the very behavior which was seen as objectionable. This is particularly tragic when the label is applied simply as a result of system processing requirements. For example, it is often the case that runaway youth must be adjudicated delinquent and made wards of the court in order to receive care and shelter while resolving a temporary crisis at home. The application of the "delinquent" label is made primarily to satisfy system requirements of accountability, not as an official assessment of the character of the youth involved.

The same may be said of the educational system, which is based upon competitive processes. Winners and losers are the two logical social roles which must emerge from any competitive process; the very structure of our schools generates failure and requires some youth to play failure roles. These take the form of "vocational tracks," "slow learner classes," and "educationally handicapped classes." Assignment to one of these classes or tracks is a form of labeling which sets into motion the self-fulfilling process identified above.

What is significant about this labeling process in our schools is that the application of these labels is only *partially* a response to a youth's ability. With the competitive process underlying our educational institutions, even a school composed of youth with IQ's of 120 and above would produce academic failures. The fact is that the rate

of academic failure is constant in *all* schools, even though the student populations have quite different ability levels. From school to school, particular youth assigned to these failure roles vary tremendously with respect to actual ability. The competitive process results in some inappropriate negative labeling and assignment to failure roles which overlook and undermine the actual skills and abilities of youth, and unnecessarily limit their future life chances. Youth assigned to these roles learn the appropriate, expected behaviors and, in the process, actually become *less* capable as a result of their experience at school.

C. ALIENATION

Limited access to meaningful, responsible, and satisfying social roles, and negative labeling are primarily the results of child-rearing practices at home and institutional processing practices in school, work, and the juvenile justice system. Alienation represents a type of individual response to such experiences in these institutional settings. In response to difficulties at home, failure at school, and little hope for a rewarding work career, many youth feel defeated and rejected. They feel they have little or no stake in these institutions and no reasons to be committed to the rules of appropriate conduct in these settings. Alienation, in its most general sense, is a destruction of one's tie to the social order: a weakening of one's feeling of belonging to the family, the school, or the community; a weakening of feeling morally obligated to obey the rules; and a doubt that there are any positive rewards for striving to do what is right. In essence, it is a rejection

of one's rejectors, a psychological disengagement from these institutions and the general social order they support.

The significance of this response to labeling and limited access to desirable social roles is that it gives the youth permission to ignore or violate the rules. If one feels that he doesn't belong, has no possibility of any rewards from continued involvement, and, ultimately, has no moral obligation to those in authority in these institutions, then he is free to engage in any form of behavior which is *personally* gratifying. There is nothing to lose.

It is important to note that the Strategy for Youth Development has not assumed that all labeling of institutional failure necessarily leads to alienation and delinquency. Such a response is *most likely* to occur when the labeling has been premature or inappropriate, a result of institutional processing practices which are in some sense unfair or unjust to the individuals involved. Similarly, the experience of finding one's opportunities for desirable social roles blocked is most likely to produce alienation when the blockage results from institutional needs (the school's need for some failures irrespective of actual abilities), as opposed to individual abilities or needs. In general, the Strategy for Youth Development proposes that institutional failure and negative labeling limit access to desirable social roles, and that when this obstacle is recognized as an institutional blockage rather than as a personal inadequacy, it is less likely to produce alienation and deviant forms of behavior.

D. THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE


The Strategy for Youth Development asserts that a healthy course of youth development involves (1) participation in and access to meaningful, responsible social roles in each of the major socializing institutions--home, school, and work; (2) positive labels from parents and friends, and favorable self-images; and (3) acceptance and integration into conventional institutional settings. In contrast, the labeling of youth as "troublemakers," "slow-learners," "mentally retarded," and "delinquent," limits their opportunities to acquire meaningful, responsible, conventional roles. This, in turn, generates feelings of alienation and produces an increasing propensity toward problem behavior. Likewise, limited access to desirable conventional roles increases the vulnerability of these youth to the application of negative labels, to increased alienation, and to deviant forms of behavior.

Negative labeling and limited access to conventional social roles are viewed as mutually reinforcing processes which are tied directly to alienation, delinquency, and other forms of problem behavior, and constitute the major obstacles to a favorable course of youth development. The major variables in this theoretical scheme are diagrammed in Figure 1 on the following page.

The model in Figure 1 is a dynamic model; it assumes feedback which reinforces the direction of the basic process. Alienation feeds back upon failure and labeling, accentuating and compounding these negative experiences for the individual through time. On the deviant side of the model, the individual is caught in a process which leads to a deviant

Figure 1

Youth Development Model



+ = high access, positive labeling

- = low access, negative labeling

career or role--accelerating failure, negative labeling and alienation, and increasing dependence upon illegal or illegitimate opportunities for social rewards. At the individual level, the objective of delinquency prevention and youth development programs is to intervene in this process and reverse it, providing *increasing* access to desirable social roles, *decreasing* negative labeling and feelings of alienation, and thereby reinforcing conforming behavior patterns and involvement in conventional social roles. At the institutional level, the objective is to identify and change those aspects of institutional structure and processing which (1) limit access to desirable conventional roles, and (2) stigmatize youth through a negative labeling process.

IV. OPERATIONAL STATEMENTS

BREC translated their presentation of the Strategy into a research model with measures, which to date have been applied in more than fifteen sites to more than 8,000 youth. In one sense, the most concrete understanding of the Strategy may come from examining the measure of the Strategy variables. In the course of work to date, eleven measures of Strategy variables have been prepared and tested (BREC, Vol. 12, 1975). The measures are called Impact measures, and they ask about young persons' perceptions of the social situations in which they find themselves.

It should be noted that preparing and refining measures is a continuing business. No one is completely satisfied with all the measures; several kinds of difficulties and weaknesses have been noted by those who work with the measures, and these need to be addressed. However, enough research has been conducted with these measures to demonstrate that they do work; the evidence establishes that the variables measured must be taken into account in social programming for youth.

In reviewing the following descriptions of the measures,* the reader should ask, *"What is true about a given social situation which would cause young people to see it in a particular way, and which would cause them to respond to the questions in a particular way?"* Equally important is the question, *"What changes could be made in those situations to produce a favorable change in the way youth see those situations, and in the way youth respond to the question?"* At the end of the

*Paraphrased with permission from BREC Handbook, Chapter 7.

discussion of each measure, the fundamental questions associated with it will be posed.

A. MEASURES OF ACCESS TO DESIRABLE SOCIAL ROLES

There are four measures of access to desirable social roles, designed to find out whether youth feel "loved at home, successful at school, comfortable among friends, and able to look forward to worthwhile careers." The critical issues in access to desirable social roles are, what kinds of behavior are expected and encouraged in the school, home, work, and peer situations and how will important persons in these situations respond to a particular kind of behavior?

1. Access to Educational Roles

It has been difficult to isolate all the expected and rewarding behaviors in the school context. So far, this measure has settled for enquiring about youth's perceptions of their *future* prospects in education. The scale is designed to assess youth perceptions of access to personally desirable educational roles; it is intended as a direct measure of their perceived ability to achieve their educational goals. The scale has been demonstrated to have a powerfully predictive relation to delinquency. Youth are asked, "How far would you like to go in school?" to establish their personal aspirations, and then are asked such questions as, "What do you think your chances are for getting this much education?", and "What are the chances teachers will remember you as a good student?"

What characteristics of the school situation might cause young persons to have a low or high aspiration, or cause them to assess their chances favorably or unfavorably?

2. Access to Occupational Roles

This measure is also a future-oriented scale, intended to measure youth perceptions of their chances for achieving their occupational goals. It is concerned with the *anticipated* access to future adult work roles. In a fashion similar to the educational roles measure, youth are asked, "What kind of job would you like to have as an adult?", and then are asked, "What do you think your chances are of ever getting that kind of job?", or "What are the chances of a young person in this community getting a good paying, honest job?"

How would a young person learn his occupational aspirations, and why would a young person learn to aspire for a high-status job, or settle for a low-status job? Whatever the personal aspirations are, what experiences would cause a young person to estimate his occupational chances as low or high?

3. Parental Rejection

This measure is intended to measure a youth's perception of the extent to which his parents reject him. More specifically, the measure taps a youth's belief that his parents are not interested in him, do not see him as an important person, and would not want to help him if he were in need of help. Youth are asked to judge the likelihood that "Your parents would help you if you were to get in serious trouble," or "Your parents really care about you," or "Your parents find fault with you even when you don't deserve it."

On what kinds of family experience would young persons base such judgments? To take the weight off the parents for a moment,

what kinds of forces might be at work on parents which would cause them to behave in such a way as to cause their children to give negative judgments on such questions? How would one go about altering those forces for the better?

4. Normative Pressure from Peers

This is designed to measure the extent of pressure towards conforming or deviant behavior felt by a youth from his friendship group. Youth are asked to judge such statements as, "The kids in my group would think less of a person if he were to get in trouble with the law," and "Getting into trouble in my group is a way of gaining respect." In research to date, it appears that normative pressure is a kind of *intervening* variable between access to educational, occupational, and family roles on one hand, and delinquency on the other. It seems that friendship groups serve to interpret situations for their members, to interpret the rules, and to interpret what the appropriate behavior is.

What situations are most likely to support the formation of groups which support law-abiding behavior? Which support law-breaking behavior? What sequence of experiences might cause a youth to seek membership in one or the other of these groups, if both were available? Are both available to a given youngster at a given time, or is it the case that membership is produced by forces which work on all the group members alike?

B. MEASURES OF NEGATIVE LABELING

There are four measures of negative labeling. Three are concerned with how young persons think "important others" (teachers,

friends, parents) see them. In turn, youth are asked to think about their relationships with their teachers, friends, and parents, and then are asked to judge how their teachers, friends, and parents see them: as more troublesome or more cooperative; better or worse; more obedient or more disobedient; more as a law-breaker or more as a law-abider.

In a fourth measure--self esteem--youth are asked questions designed to assess the extent to which they value, accept, and respect themselves. Most specifically, the measure focuses on self-acceptance. Young people are asked to judge such statements as "You feel that you are a person of worth, at least equal to others," and "All in all, you are inclined to feel you are a failure," and "You feel satisfied with yourself."

The critical issues in negative labeling are: (1) how important others perceived specific youth in ways that would make them behave differently toward those youth, and (2) how the youth think others perceive them, and what that does to the youth's perceptions of themselves. *On what experiences would these "important others" base their judgments about specific young people? Do the judgments necessarily have anything specific to do with the particular young person's behavior, or might the judgment come from somewhere else? How would these important others communicate their judgment to the young people, how would the young people come to know that the judgment was positive or negative? To take the weight off those important others for a moment, what might happen to them that would cause them to make judgments about a specific youth? Even if they had a positive judgment, what in the situation might communicate a negative judgment to the young person?*

C. MEASURES OF ALIENATION

Alienation represents a type of individual *response* to experiences in the home, in the school, among friends, or at work (or non-work). In response to difficulties in these settings, many youth feel defeated and rejected.

There are three alienation measures. One is a measure of "normlessness," intended to assess the extent to which an individual believes that socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve given goals: "The end justifies the means; what a person gets is more important than how he gets it," "It is sometimes necessary to lie on a job application to get the job you want," or "One can make it in school without having to cheat on exams."

A second measure of alienation is of powerlessness; it is designed to measure a youth's sense of control over events in his life. Youth are asked such questions as, "Are you often blamed for things that just aren't your fault?", and "Do you feel that most of the time it doesn't pay to try hard because things never turn out right anyway?"

A third measure is of societal estrangement; it is designed to assess the extent to which a youth feels apart from the larger society, uncared for by that society. Youth are asked to judge statements such as, "It's hard to know who to trust these days," "I often feel lonely," and "Most teachers, principals, and counselors don't really care about kids."

The critical aspect of alienation is that it is an individual's *response to his situation*. Many current youth services try to make some direct impact on that response. Is that a reasonable approach? Can we expect to have much favorable effect if we do not change the

situation? The case for individual treatment would have to rest on the argument that young people do not perceive their situations accurately. Admitting that *some* may not perceive their situations accurately, do we really believe that so many young people are so unaware that we can justify our almost exclusive use of treatment for young people who are in trouble? *If we choose to change situations, what do we look for? What kinds of situations would we expect to produce feelings of estrangement, normlessness, or powerlessness?*

V. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGY

Testing the validity of a set of propositions such as the Strategy's is a complex, highly technical and continuing business. Testing the validity of those propositions is also a crucially important business. The more powerful the explanation of the forces which produce positive youth development or which produce delinquency, withdrawal, and despair, the more effective can be the actions intended to increase positive development and to reduce the problems. In this respect, good research and evaluation and good programming go hand in hand. No sustained, deliberate progress in youth development and delinquency prevention can be expected without maintaining this critical relation.

Research to date has provided strong evidence for the validity of the Strategy's propositions about youth development. The testing will continue; complementary tests and replications of the research are very much desired. The reader no doubt will want substantial evidence to satisfy himself of the strength of these claims. The main sources are BREC, Volume 12 (1975) and "An Impact Study of Two Diversion

Projects" (Elliott and Blanchard, 1975). The reader should find that they support the claim that *the Strategy propositions have sufficient support that they must be taken into account systematically and deliberately in social programming for youth.*

SUMMARY

From this chapter, we would like the reader to conclude that the way we have organized the affairs of our society produces many of the youth problems we perceive. In the past, perhaps largely as a result of a lack of means to examine and then to intervene in such situations, we have settled for often futile, repetitious attempts to patch-up the malfunctioning products of the system.

This Strategy is a valid analysis which points to the problems in the current arrangements, and is a useful guide to practical solutions, and it allows us to measure success. For those reasons, the Strategy merits serious study and serious efforts in application and research.

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CHAPTER TWO

Institutional Change

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

An essential feature of American ideology comes from defining success goals as being accessible to *all* members; however, through the actual experience in the institutional structures designated as providers of success-goal opportunities, a category of "failures" is systematically produced. We cannot continue to persuade youth to invest a large portion of their time and energy in acquiring knowledge and work place skills when the disparity between opportunity and guaranteed membership is so great. The solution of opening up membership to all youth, and perhaps reducing the disparity, lies in applying the philosophical and theoretical propositions of the Strategy for Youth Development.

The reasons and conditions identified in the Strategy as being responsible for producing solid citizens involve having access to satisfying and rewarding social roles; having parents, teachers, and friends view youth positively; and accepting and integrating youth into communities and families. Whenever these conditions are operating for youth, their future membership is assured. The Strategy is a combination of perspectives from sociology, psychology, and the field of juvenile delinquency; the propositions are aimed at an institutional rather than individual level. Promoting successful youth development involves an alteration of our institutional functions. Institutional intervention, although familiar to most youth services practitioners, remains the untried remedy in most instances because of lack of specific information, and because the task has seemed so overwhelming in the past.

The Strategy indicates a need for change in the key social institutions--education, family, work, and justice--which are the main arenas for positive, or negative, youth development. It has been difficult to specify the characteristics of those institutions which especially affect youth, but even more difficult to describe those characteristics in ways which give persons a concrete grasp of the situations and permit them to think of ways to change those situations.

In a review of ideas about institutions and institutional change, this chapter looks at some basic notions of society and institutions, examines some general images of change which have been proposed in the past, and then describes some specific current ideas about the determinants and processes of change, and about the role of the change agent. A later section presents a view of a rational, participative process of change concerned with education, work, and juvenile justice.

I. REVIEW OF IDEAS ABOUT INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

A. BASIC NOTIONS

While there is a considerable body of thought and experience about social change, making use of it to plan and carry out an attempt at change will require some tools. Institutional analysis may be an unfamiliar venture for many, an uncharacteristic and uncomfortable method. The purposes of this section are to present and review some of the basic notions which are the tools, or building blocks, for thinking about institutions, and to assist the reader to gain a practical feeling for what is "institutional," and what is institutional change.

To start, we need something that we can observe as the base for the analysis. The fundamental unit of institutional analysis is an act and a response in a situation. For example, we are in one of the rooms of a large brick building. The room is equipped with blackboards, with 30 chair-desks of one kind, and with one desk and chair of another kind. Several young persons have entered the room, a bell has rung, and an older person is entering the room. The younger persons, who have been laughing and talking, begin to quiet, to sit in the desk-chairs, and to arrange materials in front of them. One young person continues with talk which gets louder and harsher, accompanied by movements and gestures which become jerky and rigid, and by poking of persons on either side. The older person moves quickly down the aisle between desk-chairs and tells the loud young person to be quiet. The young person responds by shouting that the older person should "mind your own business." The older person insists, and the younger person quiets with a few parting remarks.

If we ask each of the persons in the room what has been happening in the last three minutes, we will get a story about it. This is not to say that we will get an "explanation" of what happened, but that each person will attach *meanings* to what he did, or to what others did. These are the basic elements for the analysis: a situation (a classroom); actors (students and a teacher); and acts and responses (shouting, sitting, instructing). The actors attach meanings to what goes on, they interpret those meanings, and thus there is a broader context for the situation in which the action takes place.

If we want to analyze the situation and make sense of it, perhaps to prevent tense confrontations in the future, how do we proceed?

We almost inevitably come to the question, "What *caused* the event?" Most frequently, this question leads to another question, "What is it about Charley--the loud young person--that caused the event?" The answers may range from "high spirits" to "retardation" to "maladjustment" to "lack of discipline" to "stress"--all intended to describe something about Charley at that point in time, something which comes out of the past.

Institutional analysis leads in a different direction, looking at characteristics of the *situation*, of the *acts and the meanings which are attached to them*, and of the *context*. To look at this situation "institutionally," it should be pointed out that the business of getting that class started on its work is not unique. With and without Charley's outburst, this business is taking place in many classrooms in many schools in many towns and cities. The acts in this event are repeated over and over, so they compose for us a pattern. In the same way, the meanings which are attached to the acts are repeated over and over. Over time, there builds up a set of shared meanings about what starting the class is like. There builds up a set of shared expectations about how persons will and should act in these situations, and how persons should respond to acts in these situations.

1. Some Terms

Shared expectations for acts in situations--norms--are the next building block in the institutional analysis. "Norm" is defined as a shared expectation about acts in situations, together with agreement about what sanction (response) is to be applied if the expectation is met

or not met. Norms encompass patterned acts, the responses to the acts, and some of the meanings which are attached to the acts and responses. It is expected that on the start of a class, persons will enter the right room, take the right place, do the right things with materials, and speak or not.

From norm we can construct the next building block, role. There are sets of related norms which apply to given positions in a situation. For example, there is a set of norms for teachers in classrooms, depending on what they are doing and with whom. There is the teacher-rule enforcer, the teacher-grader, the teacher-advisor, the teacher-lecturer, the teacher-conversationalist, the teacher-friend. There are expectations, norms, for each of these areas of teacher action in relation to students in the classroom. Taken all together, we recognize them as a pattern, the *role* of the classroom teacher.

The role applies not to the person, but to the position. Another person coming in as teacher will be subject to the same expectations. By the same logic, when the person who is the teacher goes home, different norms apply; while the person-teacher may be expected to correct students' speech in the classroom, and even be rewarded for that, one may suspect that the person-spouse would not be rewarded for correcting his spouse's speech at home.

By looking at a number of aspects of the classroom teacher's role and the classroom student's role, it is possible to identify an important characteristic of their relationship or *status*. Look at the teacher-student pairs: rule enforcer/rule follower, grader/graded,

advisor/advisee, lecturer/listener. The teacher is perceived as having more knowledge, more power, and more experience; the teacher has a different, higher status *in the classroom and in the school*. Together in line to buy movie tickets, the two persons who were teacher and student may have identical status, except that one or the other is ahead in the line.

Going one step further, we can construct the meaning for the term *group*. On the first day of class, there is a *collection* of persons who have in common being assigned to History 2, Section A. Further, these persons come with some shared expectations for the behavior of students and teachers in general, and for their behavior in classrooms in particular. As the class proceeds from the first day, a special set of very specific rules and expectations builds up which, perhaps only to a tiny extent, differentiate this collection from other collections of persons. These shared expectations may be about such subtle things as the tone of voice which distinguishes friendly, helpful analysis of work from disinterested criticism of work.

There emerges a class of very specific norms for the specific classroom, and the persons involved come to have the sense that they are members of a group distinguishable even from other sections of History 2. These norms also control behavior and come to define the specific ways in which the teacher and the students play their roles to each other.

Persons belong to a variety of groups. The "groupness"--the degree to which the norms of the *classroom* group control behavior--tends to depend on or be relative to the *other* groups of which each of the persons in the classroom is a member. The teacher, for example, is also a member of the group composed of teachers in the school. The expectations

which teachers share place limits on the range of acts permitted to the teacher in the classroom. In the same way, students are members of other classroom groups, or peer groups, or family groups, and the expectations shared by these other groups come with the students into the classroom and put limits on what can happen in the classroom. The classroom group interacts with the groups of which the persons in the classroom are members.

Out of these basic elements: (1) acts and responses in situations, (2) the meanings the actors attach to those acts and responses, (3) norms, (4) roles, (5) status, and (6) group, we can construct certain other ideas which may be encountered in materials on social change, institutional change, or organizational change.

One set of terms which will be encountered includes *structure*, *function*, and *process*. Structure refers to the norms, roles, status considerations, and groups in a recognizable pattern of actions. In building a house, walls and floors are joined in certain ways, and that is the structure of the house. In the same way, the structure of a group is defined by the norms of that group, the roles present in the group, and the status associated with the roles. This is the structure of the group, and it defines the relationships and joinings, or interactions, of the members.

Process refers to the *emergence of meanings* in social situations. The actors in the situation attach meanings to the acts and responses in the situation. Some meanings are personal to the actor, some are shared with other actors. Out of the interactions emerge new meanings, some of which define norms and roles and status. In the classroom questioning and answering is a process in which persons learn how to respond to

questions, learn what the acceptable (not necessarily correct) answers are, and learn how the managing of questions defines "good" students and "bad" students.

Function refers to the *purpose* which the activity serves. Function is very much like process. One can observe a process over time. At any *given time*, one can look at the meanings which have emerged through the process to date and say that the meaning is the function of that structure. The classroom group is a structure. One function of the classroom activity is "instruction": it is expected that persons will come out with information and skills that they didn't have when they went in. A second function is to preserve the order of the classroom. Another function is "sorting the bright from the dull," and the winners from the losers, which is another set of meanings entirely.

Another set of terms which will be encountered includes *institution* and *organization*. If social institution is defined as "an interrelated system of social roles and norms organized about the satisfaction of an important social need or function," the reader can find that definition understandable down to the most specific events or acts and responses in situations. Education is a social institution. The social need or function is to prepare the young to take their places in society as adults. The institution encompasses norms and roles in family groups, at work, and at public and private schools: in all the situations in which, in one way or another, the young learn how to play parts in society.

In the same way that persons have many roles and have membership in many groups, any norm or role or group could be recognized in the pattern of more than one institution. "Teacher" and "student" suggest

a set of roles which can be associated with "education." If the same persons are referred to as "employee" and "client," the roles and the group can be seen as part of the social institution "economy," together with stores and factories. The idea of institution draws a *boundary* around a complex pattern of acts, norms, roles, and groups which can be thought of in a definite relation to a major social need, such as education.

The term *organization* also draws such a boundary, but in a slightly different way. The difference might be illustrated by looking at *education* (a social institution) in relation to *school* (an organization). It might be better to use the term "formal organization" to refer to the school because, while "school" refers to many of the same norms and roles and groups as does "education," the word "school" calls to attention some of the structures and processes set in writing, or in other ways made *formal*. For example, some shared meanings surrounding the roles of a teacher are set down in a job description, in a contract, or in a manual of policies and regulations. "Role" becomes "office" and "status" becomes "rank." In the same way, many other aspects of the school activity become formal, e.g., how persons get selected to go to given classrooms. At the same time, some considerations under "education" are outside the boundary of "school." Activities in the family and at work are more or less outside the boundary.

We have seen some school activities and some work activities as part of the pattern of "education"; we now begin to talk about relations between school *organizations* and employer *organizations*. The utility of the idea of formal organization is that it draws a narrower boundary than institution, calls to our attention some special

characteristics of the activity which define its structure, and makes thinking about seeking institutional change more manageable.

Another set of terms which will be encountered includes "statute," "regulation," "policy," and "practice." These terms are more like "formal organization" than "institution." The terms call to mind the kinds of power and sources of power attached to norms. The shared expectation that, "It's good to be educated because it's necessary to learn how to play a part in society" can become a statute which requires all young persons up to a certain age to attend school. The power of the state enforces compliance with the norm.

At least in terms of meanings or rationalizations (if not in terms of acts), we expect to see some predictable relations among the statutes, regulations, policies, and practices. We expect to find that school system regulations will be described as "consistent" with the state statute on attendance. We expect to find a superintendent's policy on how to count attendance described as "consistent" with the school's regulations. We expect to find teacher practices in taking attendance to be described as "consistent" with the superintendent's policy. While a careful examination of the behavior at each of these levels may reveal apparent inconsistencies and unintended outcomes, we expect the acts at any given level (practice) to be *justified* in terms of those at higher levels (policy).

To summarize, out of the basic unit of analysis--acts and responses in situations together with the meanings attached to those acts--we can better understand norm, role, status, and group. With those terms we can deal with terms likely to be encountered in materials on change:

structure, function, process, statute, regulation, policy, practice, institution, and organization. *Most of the issues which will come up in practical attempts at institutional change can be analyzed by an application of these terms.* While schools and education have been used as the example, the set of terms could be applied as well to work, politics, juvenile justice, and other patterns of activity.

2. Applications of Terms

As was suggested, the usual analysis of a situation such as that in which we found Charley will lead to the question, "What is there about *Charley* that caused him to behave in that way?" There will be a search for that characteristic of Charley, and a treatment will be specified to change that characteristic. Counseling, tutoring, therapy, and other interventions of the same type will be based on the conclusion that something about Charley is wrong.

An institutional analysis wouldn't look just at Charley, but at a whole class of kids who behave as Charley did. In looking just at Charley, it's too easy to define Charley as a special or unusual case. It is too easy to ignore the fact that large numbers of youth, at one time or another, behave in the same way. In looking at many cases (not just cases of shouting at teachers, but at a range of behavior such as cheating on tests, failing tests, skipping school, or giving an incorrect answer to a question), however, it is apparent that many of these acts are normal for young people. It becomes difficult to define the acts as problems. The redefinition would require negotiating agreements about the range of appropriate acts by students and the appropriate responses by teachers and administrators.

If the acts are still defined as problems, allowing that there are *many* cases at least changes the picture. Any intervention or attempt at a solution must accommodate and respond to many cases. To illustrate, the following is a general institutional analysis for situations of this kind.

The range of acts in situations which are permitted to young people is rather narrow, compared with that permitted to adults. Many of the restricting *norms* are justified by statements that they protect the young people, are good for the young people, or protect others. Some of the restricting norms actually do serve these legitimate functions; other norms function mainly to prevent young people from playing *desirable roles*. Still other norms, especially those which forbid acts which are normal for young people, function mainly to attach *negative meanings (labels)* to young people who commit those acts. Those negative labels, in turn, further restrict the opportunities to play desirable roles.

The situations in which young people can perform acts which demonstrate competence, usefulness, or belonging are confined, to a very great extent, to the school. Families now serve fewer functions than they did in the past, especially as children attain adolescence and their work opportunities are few.

With fewer places to play desirable roles, youth have more at stake than adults in the opportunities which are available to them. To "lose" in a situation by not demonstrating competence, or by being labeled negatively, costs youth more than adults. Different youth have different ranges of opportunities. An honor roll/track star/band member student loses less in one situation than a student who has low grades,

doesn't go out for sports, and whose only achievement is playing in the band. There is less insulation against failure; a single failure counts for more.

Youth don't create their opportunities or their labels. The opportunities and labels are there, part of the *structure* and *processes* of the schools. In the classroom, for example (recalling that the classroom is not the only school situation), one can see the structure and the processes at work. It is the norm in classrooms that business is done by *speaking* and *writing*. One who has trouble speaking will have trouble demonstrating competence and usefulness, and will have difficulty in playing desirable roles in that situation. The person may draw well, shape clay well, hammer well, sing well, but will not be able to demonstrate competence. Out of a number of instances of this failure will emerge a meaning: that student is not competent. The meaning will probably be recorded in a grade.

It is a norm in schools that future opportunities are dependent on past performance. That is, one may need a certain grade average to get into an interesting activity, or have to complete one course before getting into another. Negative meanings (bad grades) from past situations control the new situation and further narrow the range of competent acts in situations which are possible for some young people. For youth affected this way, the options decrease and the negative labels increase. The young person's *stake* in the school diminishes, eroded by experiences in the school. A typical reaction of these young persons is to reject their rejectors, to reject the norms, and "trouble" can be the result.

At this point in the discussion, we should stop and dispose of "devils." There are no bad guys in an institutional analysis. No school boards, superintendents, principals, or teachers arranged the school deliberately to harm young people. Reasonable explanations can be given for both of the practices used previously as examples of failure. The business of the classroom is done by speaking and writing because the schools tend to deal with abstract information and ideas. Standard English is spoken because that is the language in the United States that permits the greatest number of people to understand each other. Grade point averages are prerequisites for entering into extracurricular activities because it is undesirable to distract a poor student's attention from studies. One course is made a prerequisite for another course because it is necessary to have mastered some skills before tackling more difficult materials.

Most policies or practices of the schools, or of any other organization for that matter, can be reasonably defended by pointing out that the policy or the practice has an intended consequence, a function, which can be justified in terms of some important principle or value. Our problem is not that persons intend to harm young people; it is that most policies and practices have more than one consequence. Some of the consequences are *negative*, and, by and large, they are *unintended*. The ideas of "devil" and "bad guy" are not very useful in sorting out the situations and finding solutions.

Most of the business in the school is done by speaking or writing, and a reason for that has been proposed. At the same time, it must be recognized that speaking and writing, compared to the range of

worthwhile human activity, are pretty narrow fields for demonstrating competence. If persons have difficulty in demonstrating the speaking/writing competence, they are likely to be defined as failures. They are seen as having little potential, and their options diminish. They tend to go away when the law permits, or sometimes before. We tend *not* to say that the field of opportunity is too narrow; we tend to explain it by saying that the children *failed*. In the United States, by the latter reasoning, a full quarter of fifth graders *fail* to finish high school. That's too large a number to allow us to hold onto the comforting explanation that they, as individuals, are failures. We should look at how we structure opportunity.

If we say that the range of opportunities to demonstrate competence in classrooms is too narrow, an immediate target for change is classroom norms and teacher practices--the shared expectations of teachers about what is good instruction, which are reflected in teacher performances in classes. We would be seeking a new set of norms which expect that competence can be demonstrated not only by speaking, reading, and writing, but also by drawing and shaping materials. We may find that the *classroom* as a form is too narrow, and seek new expectations for placing youth in a variety of situations outside the classroom as a way of learning a greater variety of useful skills and information.

In seeking these new norms, we may conclude that the desirable changes cannot be worked out solely at the level of classroom norms and teacher practices. We may find financial constraints, or we may find that the desired practices are difficult to justify in terms of existing policies and regulations and statutes, implying that secondary waves of change are needed to arrive at the desired state.

If we say that making past performance the prerequisite for future opportunities is a problem, we may be working at the level of school policy, school regulations, and school statutes. To begin to find new ways to create a logical path from skill to skill, ways which do not at the same time diminish opportunity, we may have to change policies so that the "permission" or the latitude to experiment is present. We may find that the desired changes are constrained by a set of expectations which is broadly shared throughout a community, which the schools comply with but did not invent. Grading policies and practices may have few desirable functions for learning and may have functions of negative labeling reducing opportunity, but will be supported by parents and universities who will argue that grades have desirable functions. Modification of grading policies and practices in schools may require simultaneous, or perhaps prior, modification of those broader expectations and demands.

To determine *what* should be changed, we must look for the *agreements*, the shared meanings and expectations, which control what goes on. We will find some of the outcomes of those controls desirable, some undesirable. *Our search is for new agreements, new expectations, new patterns of behavior which preserve desirable functions and eliminate undesirable ones.* In doing so, we should recall that changing the characteristics of one teacher is as limited in effect as changing the characteristics of one youth, from an institutional point of view. All youth, teachers, principals, administrators, parents, employers, would-be change agents, social workers, and priests are constrained, *though not equally constrained*, by the arrangements which have built up over time. To arrive

individually at new perceptions of those arrangements is desirable, but the work is not complete until those new perceptions are translated into new arrangements which hold a power equal to that of the old ones.

B. THEORIES OF CHANGE

We have argued that institutions form as the response of the group to the needs of the members. Time and usage legitimize the institution, and even when the need and response are no longer present, the behavior of the members of the group will conform to what has become the normal pattern. Although the original reason for the convention has been forgotten, each generation will continue to accept and follow the rules. Conformity and group solidarity provide a sense of security.

A society's institutions do not necessarily fulfill the needs of all its members. There will be dissatisfaction with the existing arrangements. The question of how to change them has been examined and answered in a variety of ways..

1. Causes of Change

Since change is such an integral part of the history of mankind, most writers have attempted to find some formula or pattern which would explain how change occurs. Early philosophers based their ideas on observations of known history and on imagination tempered by their particular outlook. Current writers demand empirical evidence and attempt to formulate step-by-step mechanisms to explain and program change. In organizational development situations, where it is possible to control or at least be aware of most variables, this approach appears to work. Often, nineteenth century and early twentieth century writers attempted to

discover a single basic reason for change and tried to explain the panorama of history in this context. Nevertheless, they did not agree in their views of why and how society changes, though in some cases the theories overlap.*

There is one view of history which sees society as evolving and progressing until it reaches perfection. Auguste Comte not only believed that "the progressive march of civilization follows a natural and unavoidable course," but also that "civilization has, under every aspect, made constant progress" (Etzioni, 1973, pp. 14-15). Herbert Spencer was another writer who believed the evolution of society was a process of growth. He used the metaphor of the process of organic evolution to describe change in the sense that over time societies become more and more internally differentiated with increasing specialization among parts. He envisioned a worldwide society in which wars were abolished and the protection of the rights of individuals was a priority (Etzioni, 1973).

Other writers rejected the idea of utopia being man's pre-ordained destiny, and saw in history a recurring cycle. Oswald Spengler believed that as a culture arose, flourished, and subsided, another would take its place, a cycle comparable to that of an organism--birth, childhood, maturity, old age, and death. He did not believe that society progressed, but merely that the cycle repeated itself (Etzioni, 1973).

Max Weber's view is somewhat more optimistic. According to Weber, as one culture is exhausted, another takes its place, a process

*The following quotations are taken from an excellent compilation of essays edited by Amatai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Social Change: Sources, Patterns and Consequences (New York: Basic Books, 2nd edition, 1973).

dependent upon the rise of a new leader ("charismatic-upheaval"). He also thought that a culture continued to develop; one society building upon and expanding the previous society's thought and culture (Etzioni, 1973).

Karl Marx combined both ideas in his view of history and the future. He saw society as progressing through a series of conflicts in which the subordinate class overthrows the ruling class, becomes the ruling class, and is eventually overthrown. He saw order and meaning in these conflicts since the last conflict would lead to the victory of the working class, and thus to a classless society. Marx felt that change always had to originate within the economic sector; Weber demurred, placing equal weight on ideas and other institutional sectors (Etzioni, 1973).

The field is too vast and complex for there to be one succinct, transferable model theory of change, and the classical theories have been discarded as blueprints for predicting social change. There are as many modern theories as there are modern theorists. The environment, technological advances, economics, and social conflict are all considered; even the psychological orientation of the members of a society is suggested as a basis for predicting that society's future. David McClelland writes persuasively about the "achieving society" in "Business Drive and National Achievement" (Etzioni, 1973). Conflict or stress in an institution or between the institution and its environment is seen as a precipitating factor in change. However stable or well-organized an institution is, because there are people with power, there are people without power. Intrinsic to such a situation is the possibility of conflict. Lewis Coser

sums it up by saying, "But if, within any social structure, there exists an excess of claimants over opportunities for adequate reward, there arises strain and conflict" (Etzioni, 1973, p. 118).

Strain does not always lead to revolution. Brinton, in his study of revolutions, does not believe they are brought about by totally crushed people, but by people on the way up whose way has been wholly or partially blocked (Etzioni, 1973). De Toqueville suggested a similar thought when he wrote, "Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from them is suggested" (Etzioni, 1973, p. 520). It would also seem that a successful revolution needs the banding together of groups who are basically dissimilar, but have a common goal in attacking the status quo. Some intellectuals and members of the aristocracy joined the revolutionary forces in both the French and the Russian revolutions. In the May 1968 uprising, one of the fears of the French government was that the workers would support the students.

Modern societies are learning not to invite revolutions, and most western governments have learned to acknowledge their responsibility to all their citizens and pay lip service to the idea of equal opportunity for all. James C. Davies points out that "the slow, grudging grant of reforms, which has been the history of England since at least the Industrial Revolution, may effectively and continuously prevent the degree of frustration that produces revolt" (Etzioni, 1973, p. 522). However, this process of attempting to keep a society stable or in equilibrium will produce as much change as more disruptive methods.

There is the view that conflict is necessary to preserve the vitality of a system. Lewis Coser subscribes to this: "A group or a system which no longer is challenged is no longer capable of a creative response" (Etzioni, 1973, p. 117). This is particularly true of bureaucracies which are overly concerned in keeping life predictable and the boat unrocked. Coser sees that conflict can be a force in technological innovation. The pressure by unions for higher wages caused industry to look for ways to increase production and capital investment, thus opening the door to technical improvements and innovation. Coser's arguments are beguiling and his conclusion valid: "A well-integrated society will tolerate and even welcome group conflict; only a weakly integrated one must fear it" (Etzioni, 1973, p. 122).

Kenneth Keniston, in his essay "A Second Look at the Uncommitted," subscribes to the view that conflict produces growth:

But there is much current evidence that individuals who attain high levels of complexity in feeling, thinking, and judging do so *as a result* of conflict, not in its absence. Students of cognitive development, like observers of personality development, find that disequilibrium, tension, and imbalance tend to produce growth. (Etzioni, 1973, p. 253)

Echoing Marx, he sees both human and social development as dialectic processes ". . . involving force, counterforce, and potential resolution: thesis, antithesis, and potential synthesis," but he believes that this is a continuing process with no final stage, pointing out "that groups Marx defined as progressive may have become reactionary in the century since his work" (Etzioni, 1973, pp. 253-54).

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Though most modern theorists disagree as much as their earlier counterparts, there does appear to be some consensus that planned social change is possible and even desirable, and social scientists have moved from observing and commenting on the phenomena of change to considering how to plan and bring about change.

There have been attempts at major change; an example is the restructuring of Russian society after the 1917 revolution. The Russians relied on brute terror and a massive bureaucracy. Americans tend to rely on money and a belief that goodwill can solve problems. Empirically based research does not appear to play a major part in planning in either system.

Numerous efforts at planned change have been undertaken. Everett Rogers reviewed over 500 studies in an attempt to provide a formula for the "Diffusion of Innovations" (Rogers, 1962). Jack Rothman studied social science research for a period of six years, using nearly 1,000 studies, in order to write Planning and Organizing for Social Change: Action Principles from Social Science Research (Rothman, 1974).

Everett Rogers noted that "Although scholars in several traditions of research have studied diffusion, there has been little diffusion among these traditions" (Rogers, 1960, p. 6), and that "every research area reaches the point where greater returns are available from a synthesis of the findings already available than from investing resources and efforts in additional research" (Rogers, 1962, p. 6). His book is aimed at discovering the common threads running through research studies on the diffusion of innovations.

Jack Rothman goes a step further and presents his "synthesis of the findings" as a guide to all workers engaged in social action

or planning. Both books and their findings are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

It is not only in the realm of the social sciences that the need is felt for taking control of change. The armed forces maintain research units to keep them abreast of new management policies. In business, as Frohman says, "whereas for fifty years the focus was on establishing stable internal structure and functioning of organizations, now the focus is shifting toward discovering ways to keep pace with outside innovations and facilitating changes of patterns of organizational functioning" (Frohman, 1970, p. 2).

2. Consequences of Change

Change does not occur only in situations where there is stress between different groups or between a group and the structure of the institution; it can occur as the institutions respond to technological development. Consequences of such change, whether planned or not, are often unanticipated.

The Industrial Revolution was the major change in the recent history of western civilization. Change in modern society is seen as too fast and almost impossible to keep pace with, but the leap from rural Georgian England to industrial Victorian England must have been breathtaking: it took three decades. Even though misery proliferated, for the majority it could be seen only as good. The price of goods and food fell, working hours were reduced, people lived longer. There was a great surge of energy throughout the country--no wonder that writers felt man was at

last in control of his destiny. Victorian England is a good example of McClelland's "achieving society."

The society attempted to maintain its equilibrium, mainly by insisting on a facade of genteel, but rigid, "ways to behave." However, changes which were occurring in the structure of the institutions could not fail to change the basic nature of the society. The momentum of the Industrial Revolution could not be sustained by cottage industry, and in a very short time factories were replacing the family-based cottage industries. The Industrial Revolution changed the family from a producing to a consuming unit, and the shift from the extended family to the nuclear family was set in motion.

Later, the decline in the death rate due to developing medical technology also affected the structure of the family. As the death rate fell, so did the birth rate. The lowering of the mortality rate meant large numbers of children survived. At the same time, the usefulness of children as labor was diminishing. Having a baby a year was no longer required of women; as women's role and status changed, so did the structure of the family.

Planned change can have unanticipated consequences also. The decision to provide education for all children was made with the highest of motives: America could ensure equality for all her citizens. Unfortunately, schools saw their primary mandate as training the future professional classes, and set about screening out children they felt had no potential. Tracking and labeling mechanisms often equate "poor" and "colored" with "stupid" and "pre-delinquent." The busing edicts were also

made with the idea that this was the answer to unequal opportunity. No judge foresaw that it would result in a resurgence of the prejudice and bigotry it was trying to erase.

Lowering the death rate in underdeveloped countries was a task deliberately undertaken with the view that it was to the benefit of the country. The mortality rates in industrialized countries were lowered gradually. The lowering of the death rate was caused by technological advances which were paralleled in other areas, and so the society adjusted over a period of time. However, in underdeveloped countries, the accumulated technology of the scientific world was brought to bear upon eradicating disease, and the death rate dropped three times as fast as in earlier industrialized societies. It was not possible to bring the same technological expertise to bear on the problem of lowering the birth rate, and the result was unprecedented population growth. This meant that any economic gains the country might make were swallowed up in maintaining the new population, and no advances in the level of the standard of living were possible. If any consequence was anticipated, it was certainly not this (Etzioni, 1973, pp. 183-190).

Everett Rogers describes a study in which missionaries, believing that it would help improve living conditions, persuaded a tribe of Australian aborigines to substitute steel axes for stone axes (Rogers, 1962, p.25). The missionaries overlooked the fact that the stone axes were not just tools, but a symbol of much meaning in the subtle status relationships within the tribe. The religious system and social structure of the Yir Yoront eventually broke down, due, in part, to the introduction of steel axes which had no atavistic value.

How change occurs, whether it can be guided, and its consequences--anticipated and unanticipated--have been the subject of considerable speculation. Throughout all of it runs a theme: the need for an ability to take into account the complexities of social systems.

C. SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE

1. The Roles of the Change Agent

A person who is considering the task of a change agent should look at the dynamics of the agent's involvement in the change process. Frohman describes a study in which the consultant to management can be viewed as the change agent (Frohman, 1970). The consultant conferred directly with top management, with the goal that top line management would facilitate change downwards. This echoes J. Daniel Lyons' point that the top echelons of an organization have to be involved for change to be effected in an organization (Lyons, 1966); if the management is involved, there is economy of time and money. Frohman's consultant functioned solely as an enabler: "He had no packaged program, rather as he observed top team functioning, he would react and intervene in what he felt were appropriate ways" (Frohman, 1970, p. 41). This is a luxurious way of effecting change, not usually available to self-appointed change agents.

The first decision a change agent has to make is to be a group. In the arena of social and institutional change there is plenty of room for individual brilliance and personal idiosyncracies. However, self-aggrandizement has to go, along with visions of being the fearless leader of the people, the staunch defender of the downtrodden, or the scourge of the bureaucracy. Etzioni, in his introduction to The Active Society, is

at great pains to emphasize that the social "self" is the group, and that social action depends upon collectivities (Etzioni, 1968). He says, "There is, of course, much individualistic and detached intellectual activity, but social change is chiefly propelled by social selves, by acting collectivities. Individuals participate, some even lead others, but the vehicle of social change is social grouping." Mark Frohman reinforces this. He calls the group "a powerful tool for change," and quotes Cartwright who

enumerates three ways in which the group can facilitate change: the group can serve as the agent of change, the medium through which change is introduced, and the target of change efforts. Correspondingly, by convening a group to study information about the group from its members in order to generate alterations in the group, the forces of the agent, medium and target are aligned with other forces moving toward change rather than in opposition to it (Frohman, 1970, pp. 32-33).

We agree with these ideas, and the term "change agent" in this paper denotes a collectivity. Riecken and Boruch support this attitude. Their view is that social experimentation is best engaged in by a collectivity of people or groups who have specific roles: the initiator, the sponsor, the design researcher, the treatment administrator, the program developer and the audience user. It is possible that these roles would overlap or that one group would have more than one function, but it is vital that each process is gone through in order to provide a systematic framework for social experimentation (Riechen and Boruch, 1974).

It will not be immediately clear exactly what role or roles the change agent will play, but consideration must be given to what they might be. This question should be approached from a "how-to-get-things-done" stance. The essence of a plan for institutional change is what it

hopes to accomplish for the target group. The task is the political one of getting power for the powerless, a job worthy of an amalgam of Robin Hood and Machiavelli's Prince. By taking careful thought and diagnosing the best possible role set for the situation, chances of success are increased. Spontaneity of reaction and ability to freewheel can be advantageous, but it is essential to see a specific role or roles as part of the plan.

There is a danger of restricting the field of operations by assuming one specific role. Jack Rothman uses a study which discovered three planning styles (Rothman, 1974). The "enabler" devoted a lot of time and effort to establishing and staffing committees. This approach did not produce many programmatic results. The "demonstrator" concentrated on implementing a single programmatic approach and was successful in short-range objectives, but did not achieve any innovative successes. The "stimulator-innovator" was involved in a lot of liaison work between agencies, cajoling and coercing them to do more for the client group, in this case old people. This latter style had more success in introducing innovation. Probably all three approaches would be needed at different stages of a program.

One important role of a change agent is that of linking formal and informal groups. Not only can the agent form a link between a client group and target agencies; he also can form a link between agencies with the idea that greater inter-agency coordination and cooperation has to be a benefit. There are already a number of professionals existing in the community, one function of whose is to be a link between their clients and their respective agencies: people such as public health

nurses, policemen, doctors, and clergymen. The change agent, through these people, gains access to the more formal levels of the agencies, and through local community leaders gains access to the client groups. The importance of this role will lessen as the client group learns to make its own contacts.

The danger in the linkage role is that the change agent, in responding to different groups' expectations, will have to cope with the problem of role conflict. Rothman describes such a situation:

Neighborhood coordinators in the Pittsburgh anti-poverty program were found to encounter competing expectations concerning the primary focus of their role from neighborhood citizens and the top executives of their organization. The executives expected coordinators to exhibit broker and expeditor roles, assisting welfare agencies to develop services for neighborhood groups. Neighborhood groups on the other hand expected the coordinators to work with and through them in advocate and activist roles, formulating demands for services from the agencies (Rothman, 1974, pp. 65-66).

It is not easy to present different faces to different groups. Apart from one's discomfort over apparent hypocrisy, there is the nagging feeling that one's associates will read the situation this way. The real danger in playing different roles with different groups is that one can start to lie or denigrate the other group in trying to gain an advantage. Both acts are counter-productive. On occasion it will be necessary to play dual roles, but the ambivalence can be minimized by discussing the role with one's associates or superiors, in terms of the tasks to be performed.

This is not to say that the change agent should be invisible. Rothman found that a practitioner can have a decisive impact on a community: "Success in community intervention varies directly with the sheer amount of practitioner activity or energy applied to role performance".

(Rothman, 1974, p. 71). He warns against undirected energy or energy applied with equal force to each area; consideration must be given to where energy can be most useful, "as time should be apportioned diagnostically." This energy can be used as assertiveness and, in certain cases, this can be effective. Change agents should not under-estimate the usefulness of being assertive.

Nor should change agents assume that the "opposition" is necessarily that opposed. It is possible that there is more support for the idea of change from the local establishment and bureaucracies than the change agent expects. He should attempt to gain a proper understanding of their attitudes. An assertive, positive approach could be welcomed: "In assessing the proper extent of directive role performance, practitioners should take into account the situational context, goals being sought, and attitudes of community participants" (Rothman, 1974, p. 75).

Part of the planning by the change agent has to deal with the problems of disengaging from the activity once it will stand on its own. Until the change agent relinquishes the role of facilitator, the program does not stand a chance of becoming part of the community or institutional structure. Rothman suggests three roles a practitioner should fill over time: (1) an actor-teacher; (2) a catalyst team member; and (3) an advocate-observer (Rothman, 1974, pp. 39-40). His example is drawn from the efforts of white workers in black communities in the South, but the major points are relevant to any change agent. The final step is the beginning of a new cycle as the change agent continues his work in another program and again becomes an actor-teacher.

One of the major problems a change agent encounters is assembling power. A number of studies have investigated successful programs emanating from low-power organizations. Rothman suggests that people in such a situation should:

emphasize consensus tactics, establish long-term continuing relationships with target agencies as a means of maximizing referent power, and obtain common membership in the target agency units (board, staff study group) as a way of directly influencing decision making in that agency (Rothman, 1974, p. 52).

He also suggests that the following are of importance to an agent with little power, but a stake in innovative social action:

A decentralized mode of administration that permits maximum autonomy to be exercised by program staff in carrying out tasks.

Assignment of staff to delimited ad hoc projects so that these can be taken over or disbanded easily. This requires staff members to be able to assume flexible, multiple roles.

Program co-sponsorship with the target or threshold agency, including development of that program in the milieu of that agency. Again, the notion of flexibility pertains, as well as the ability of the staff member to sustain conflicting expectations by two sponsoring agencies during the time that the program is being demonstrated.

In addition an agency could find it useful to supplement the regular staff with students and sub-professionals. This amalgam apparently reinforced the emergence of innovative practice roles (Rothman, 1974, p. 53).

These guidelines should be useful to a change agent mobilizing resources.

Youth appear to have less power and less hope of gaining power than those who intend to serve youth. However, by organizing, youth can gain enough recognition to start operating in the field of institutional change. Their first step is to become a group, not a radical anti-establishment group, but a group that will be credible to local authority

figures and capable of helping itself. Up to the time they become so involved, the young people have not, on the whole, received any benefits from the larger society. They have to buy the idea that institutional change is not only possible, but to their benefit.

Some of Etzioni's thoughts on mobilizing the larger society are relevant (Etzioni, 1968, p. 7): "The social units can be active participants in a society only to the degree that they transform into public energy some of the energy they and their associates generate in their private pursuits." He does not see assets (power) just as economic, but sees "such factors as loyalties, time and psychic energy" as equally important.

Some sources of power may be guided by competing or contrasting views, and the interaction may be interpreted as resistance. This resistance should be examined dispassionately. Often it is based on values supported by a large number of people, values which can be disagreed with but not discounted. Opposition to busing can be interpreted as bigotry and racism, but this opposition was first voiced by persons whose primary concern was for their children. The people concerned did not participate in the acknowledgment and research of the problem of unequal education, nor in its attempted solution.

The change agent has to operate in such a way that the outcome of the program is valid to the whole network. The problem is not one of overcoming resistance. The task is for the collective change agent to operate in a manner which produces an *organization of all* capable of attaining the outcomes which will be discovered to have been desired in the first place.

2. Determinants and Process of Change

A number of writers have attempted to devise a framework or set of criteria as a base for planning change. A number of useful ideas about change are contained in these frameworks, but they must be tempered by a view of what is to be changed. Institutional change consonant with the Strategy is a task different from other change tasks.

Kurt Lewin is often quoted, and his model for social change is as follows: (1) unfreezing present level of behavior or attitudes; (2) moving or learning new behaviors or attitudes; and (3) freezing or stabilizing the pattern (Lewin, 1952). The unfreezing stage covers all the change agent's activities up to the time its members start discussing objectives and ways to reach them. Mann and Neff (1961, p. 64) describe the unfreezing process when they say,

the first stage typically requires some shake-up in the old situation. Social habits and customs have to be jarred to break the tendency towards perseverance.

Once the change agent has progressed to the point of agreeing that something should be done, that the losses in preserving the status quo outweigh the risks of introducing change, it will move onto the stage which Lewin sees as the moving and learning stage. The participants look for and at new ideas, form new agreements, and experiment. "Searching" and "learning" are terms used to describe this process of moving.

If the search process is productive and new attitudes and methods of operation result, the refreezing stage is the institutionalizing of the process. The refrozen state is now the status quo.

Everett M. Rogers, in his study the "Diffusion of Innovations," presents a number of generalizations which could be of use. For example, he sees the process of adoption of an innovation or idea occurring in five stages: (1) awareness, (2) interest, (3) evaluation, (4) trial, and (5) adoption (Rogers, 1962, p. 17). Rogers also gives a number of leads to follow in approaching members of a community who should participate in the diffusion of the innovation of institutional change. It is not possible to discuss them all here, but the following should give some idea of his orientation.

Rogers' first generalization is that the innovativeness of individuals is related to their membership in groups with a "modern," rather than a "traditional" orientation, that is, groups in which new ideas are viewed more favorably and are adopted more rapidly. In schools, such a group might be an informal association of teachers who work together to study and apply new methods of schooling. The change agent might first include persons who, by virtue of such membership, are supported in an innovative outlook; by the same token, the change agent is a reference group which supports innovation.

If the media had carried some information about the efforts of the change agent, so that there was some awareness in the business leader's peer group, his willingness to spread the word at the evaluation stage would follow another of Rogers' generalizations. Impersonal sources of information are most important at the awareness stage, and personal sources are the most important at the evaluation stage in the adoption process. Rogers' book is concerned mainly with material innovations--hybrid corn or new weed sprays, antibiotic drugs or new

manufacturing techniques--but it is fascinating because it demonstrates the accumulation of small changes which have resulted in, for example, the transformation of the agricultural industry.

J. Daniel Lyons, of George Washington University, also has attempted to give a framework for accomplishing institutional change (Lyons, 1966). His area is very specific, that of organizational development as applied to the army. In a paper presented at the Symposium on Applied Research and Institutional Change at the Convention of the South-eastern Psychological Association in New Orleans, March 1966, he listed some of the characteristics of successfully implemented programs:

1. Timeliness--The product filled a recognized instructional gap. It was relevant to planned or on-going revision.
2. Command interest--There was a strong operational command interest, including that of a subordinate command. To put it another way, there was interest at both top management and the working level.
3. Product engineering--The end product was a plug-in item, specifically engineered for a given situation requiring little additional Army effort to adapt it to the operational setting, and requiring no doctrinal changes.
4. Concreteness--A material item, such as complete lesson plans or a training device with a user handbook, was provided.
5. Zeitgeist (for want of a better term)--Some other service foreign army, or civilian institution had accepted the product (or a similar one). It was not excessively novel.
6. Personal interest--An individual officer or officers associated with HumRRO became convinced of the worth of the product, and were willing to serve as forceful and dogged proponents.

His list of characteristics of an *unsuccessful* program is of equal interest:

1. Poor communication--Neither our briefings nor our reports effectively communicated the validity and operational value.
2. Lack of timeliness--The product did not meet a valid, contemporary requirement. It was too late, too early, or too tangential.
3. Too drastic--Too many changes in operating procedures were required; training was lengthened or shortened too much.
4. Lack of strong command support--"Somebody up there didn't like us" or our product in a particular instance.
5. Cost--Funds and personnel required had not been programmed and could not be obtained.
6. Lack of engineering capability--The Army experts required to translate the research findings into operational terms and content did not exist or were not available.
7. Policy problem--There was lack of doctrine under which to fit a new or improved training or operational capability.
8. Insufficient "salesmanship"--HumRRO did not devote enough additional time or money to "selling" the product, believing this was not the job of their research agency.
9. Sacred cow--The product was perceived to attack current practices, individual competence, sacred cows, tradition or long-accepted doctrine.

Organizational development is not totally relevant to community or social institutional change since there is the possibility of controlling many of the factors, which is not possible in broad social areas. However, J. Daniel Lyons' points do categorize the important areas of any change program.

George Fairweather sees social change as best proceeding from experimental innovation. His change agent is not a collective, but is a researcher (Fairweather, 1967). In recent years change has occurred as a response to a crisis. Fairweather mentions the enactment of civil rights legislation after the sit-ins, and the appointment of the McCone Commission after the Watts riots. The changes set in motion in this way are not the result of careful, documented research, they are a response to a manifestation of a problem, a response to a symptom rather than a cause. Fairweather sees this response as inadequate and temporary. His belief is that a solution to a social problem should be tested before being implemented; it has to be proven to be better than the current practice which is accepted and supported by the majority. In his system, the control group for the experiment is always the usual social practice. A social innovative experiment would go through the following eight states:

1. Definition--defining a significant social problem.
2. Naturalism--making naturalistic field observations to describe the social parameters of the problem in its actual community setting.
3. Innovation--creating different solutions in the form of innovated social subsystems.
4. Comparison--designing an experiment to compare the efficacy of the different subsystems in solving the social problem.
5. Context--implanting the innovated subsystems in the appropriate social settings so that they can be evaluated in their natural habitat.
6. Evaluation--continuing the operation of the subsystems for several months or even years to allow adequate outcome and process evaluations to be made.

7. Responsibility--assumption of responsibility by the researchers for the lives and welfare of participants in the subsystems.

8. Cross-disciplinary--using a multidisciplinary approach, with the social problem determining the subject matter (economic, political, sociological and the like) (Fairweather, 1967, p. 20).

Fairweather expands the process in step 1 by pointing out that practical questions have to be answered before the final definition of a problem: questions concerning the extent of commitments from the social institutions and research base involved, and the adequacy of the budget.

Fairweather's basic premise is that most social problems arise from the status of the people directly involved. He uses the term "marginal man," and says, "In our society, with the disappearance of the frontier, technological advances, urbanization and persistent prejudices, a status occupied by individuals who are marginal to this society has developed" (Fairweather, 1967, p. 6). It is possible that the marginal status has always been the lot of certain people in a society, but now it is seen as a problem rather than a fact. Marginal man has fewer rights, but also fewer responsibilities than other members of the society. Fairweather suggests that by providing the "appropriate external circumstances," a person can be helped to achieve higher status and thus become a part of the society. Even if a change agent is not in a position to set up experimental research, Fairweather's ideas have relevance to any implementation of social innovation.

Jack Rothman takes Everett Rogers' point that there are greater returns to be had from using findings already available than from embarking on additional research. His book (Rothman, 1974) draws together

findings from an extensive survey of research studies, and presents generalizations, discussions, and action guidelines for various aspects or stages of a change agent's job in effecting social change.

Rothman is at pains to demonstrate a method of using research findings so that at the point of transference to change agent, they have been tested and proven. There are six steps, and step VI is the use of the findings in broad practice. He believes that it would be possible for a creative change agent to take the action guidelines and implement them. However, he realizes that a major problem in the use of research findings is the lack of communication and understanding between researchers and change agents. This is understandable to some degree, as change often requires specific answers to specific questions, and the social scientists or researchers do not find it easy to be so dogmatic. Their findings, therefore, are judged to be "inconclusive generalities about broad theoretical matters" (Rothman, 1974, p. 548).

Having looked at other people's ideas of change, we now investigate how to use these ideas. This image of a rational participative process of change is directed towards the sphere of education. Later we will look at the spheres of juvenile justice and work.

II. A RATIONAL PARTICIPATIVE PROCESS OF CHANGE

The sequence of change to be presented avoids confrontation although it recognizes that there are occasions of conflict, and that certain kinds of power may have to be used. It does strive to avoid a stalemate in which "sides" have formed, and in which neither side can prevail

without applying substantial coercive power. A term for such a situation is "zero sum game." One wins as another loses, and in the long run the net gain is zero for both. Zero sum games produce high resistance to change. The object is to play a non-zero sum game. In this game there are no losers; all hold even or gain.

This sequence of change is seen as evolutionary, and any conflict is treated rationally. "Us" versus "them" reasoning is avoided. Allowing the situation to become polarized can lead to an incorrect analysis, to inadequately planned-for change, and to failure.

If the problem to be solved is traced to the organization of schools, the stance that "we" will change "them," must be avoided. The object is to create an organization of allies which will produce the changes needed, without producing, at the same time, a set of forces watching for the chance to undermine and subvert these changes. The ultimate goal is not just institutional change, but institutional maintenance--Lewin's refreezing. This perspective suggests a possible sequence for constructive change.

A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Some persons have come to the conclusion that there is a problem. There is evidence of the problem and its unhappy results. The problem is that of young people who leave school before completing their high school certificate. Some of these youth are troublesome in school and habitually truant. At some point, school personnel believe they have no further influence on these young people. In an attempt to impress, correct or coerce the youth, the personnel petition the juvenile court to

employ the punitive power of the state. Most of these young people leave school, some of them of their own volition; others are expelled by formal or informal means. There are a few programs to help them, but these are inadequate. These young people tend to end up unemployed, without other productive pursuits, and without prospects--marginal man in the making.

Some arrangements in the school system help to produce this result. The institution of education formed so that each child would grow up understanding and participating in the values of the adult society. However, the school system militates against a number of children, cutting them off from opportunities and achievement. The paradox is that the methods are working against the intended goals. The situation calls for change.

An immediate problem is one of scale. The problem is centered on the schools and courts: does this mean changing just one school, or the whole school system; one judge's opinions, or the legislature's? The choice is not between one or the other, but between sooner or later. The decision will depend on practical considerations such as the amount of energy required to talk to people involved, the number of contacts to be made, and the size of the original group of allies. Choose an alternative within the foreseeable means.

1. First Steps--Formation of the Change Agent

People begin to talk to people who are involved with the set of problems identified. The aim is to enlarge the group of allies. Most of the initial contacts will be on a one-to-one personal basis; some of the conversations will be more instrumental than others, because the community is organized into a variety of groups. The groups include

school board members, teachers, court personnel, school administrators, parents, and social service providers. The change agent needs to find authenticators for each of these groups. These authenticators are not necessarily in a visible position of power. A public health nurse could be listened to with respect both by people higher up in her agency and the people in the community. A teacher who has worked with children in trouble could be seen to speak with authority. Identifying such people and gaining their support would aid in organizing the community to consider the problem. While it is important that the community has an appreciation and understanding of what is happening and at least gives tacit support, the change agent must gain the support of certain people involved professionally to make a favorable outcome more likely.

Success demands committed support at each level of the education hierarchy: members of the school board, principals, counselors, department heads, teaching staff. Given a knowledge of the community, the sequence of who is approached first should be planned carefully. If it is known that the school superintendent is interested and eager to foster programs aimed at youth development, he or she would be the obvious choice for early contact. If, however, the superintendent equates new ideas with "trouble," members of the school board or a school principal should be contacted first.

Even though the target of the planning is change in the education sphere, key members of other agencies should be part of the nascent organization. The final program produced will need the support and help of professionals in the employment sector (staff involved in the CETA programs for example), and the juvenile justice system (staff from the court,

probation officers, chief of police, precinct captain). Some thought should be given to the key figures in the private sector also. Useful people could be the allocations director of United Way, members of the League of Women Voters, the Chamber of Commerce, or the local unions.

The activity is intended to produce ripples, ripples which will spread throughout the whole community. As people talk, more information about the situation becomes available, along with diverse perspectives and opinions. Judicious use of the media could help in spreading concern and interest. However, too much coverage in the early stages will produce expectations for quick results, and too little will make it appear of little concern to the majority.

As the ripples spread, an informal association of the concerned begins to form. *The association is the pattern of a more obvious, large, temporary organization which can produce change.* The formation of this association is the first major stage. The increased visibility of the issue and the forming of this association will bring about a rising agreement that a problem exists--a problem that can be solved.

The first stage, though carried out in an informal way, should be based on efficient organization. Trusting to spontaneous contacts and ad hoc meetings could cause a sudden high interest which could just as suddenly dissipate. The aim is a steady build-up of awareness. Each member of the initiating group should have definite tasks, and a time frame should be sketched in.

It might be useful to draw a chart of the salient groups in the community, pinpointing people in those groups who can be approached, and setting up a system of linkages. This would act as a check on the

possibility of an important group being left out because the first approach failed. Each contact or linkage mechanism should have a Plan B.

In talking and proselytizing, there are dangers. No one should build expectations for action faster than the capacity for action. Most of the people involved will have difficulty with ambiguities. There should be steady, clearly identifiable progress, and this might best be obtained by breaking down the chore into more frequent, more modest stages. People must not be put into the position of having to promise more than they can deliver; this is humiliating and frustrating. It will be necessary to decide whether shared agreements about problems must precede shared agreements about solutions; that is not always so. Some people do not have time to be directly involved but that does not mean they are not concerned. They should not be ignored, but given the opportunity to delegate.

In the early stages, there is the danger that the enthusiasm of a few will suggest the time is ripe for the next move. Take care that an early move doesn't injure the program; resources of time, influence, and ideas have to be sufficient for the chore. There is another danger inherent in the quick formation of a group of high-energy, totally committed people. In their enthusiasm they could make it "their" problem, and split the association into the manipulators and the manipulated.

2. Understanding That Stress Will Occur and Why

The planning and talking stages are Lewin's unfreezing stage, and this unfreezing is bound to produce some conflict. Reaching

agreements, forming associations, and gaining visibility also produce stress which, if incorporated positively, will further the attempt.

The stress will occur in all the constituents of the change agent. Persons are asked first to think and then to act. Students, ex-students, and families will feel stress as a rising expectation is generated that something could be done. This rising expectation asks for commitment and responsibilities from the young people and their families. Agencies serving youth will be affected also. They might see it as a chance to be seized, so that with school and community cooperation they could fulfill their task properly. Even people in total agreement with the ideas and aims of the association will feel some stress in being forced to grapple with defining the problem and planning its solution; anyone directly involved with the school or school system will be stressed further. They might agree also, but they have to accept their involvement, albeit tacit, in the creation of the problem. Even though in assessing the problem persons have been careful not to be judgmental and polarize the issue, other persons could react as if they had.

Managing the stress requires identifying some of its sources. Persons may have to accommodate suggestions that their well-intended actions have been ineffective or even harmful. Persons may have to reconcile familiar ideas with possibly unfamiliar ideas which are contradictory. Expectations rising faster than they can be met may produce stress for eventual beneficiaries; students, ex-students, families, and change agent members themselves. Loyalties to habitual associations and to the proposed changes may appear to clash. These sources of stress produce energy, which can move in several directions. If realistic

courses of action are available, the energy can be channeled to sustain creative change. In the absence of these apparent courses of action, the energy may move in negative directions: hostile conflict, disengagement, or a reactionary stance. While considerable delicacy may be required in negotiations with persons, long-term effectiveness requires structuring the situations so that a series of representatives can play the change game equally successfully over time.

3. The Larger Association Becomes Apparent in Action

The talking will build towards an occasion. A benchmark in the process has been reached if an association of appropriate breadth is taking shape, accompanied by increased visibility in the community, and increased energy and commitment to a soluble problem. When the stage is set for the next act, persons should pause again to consider,

The way in which Americans approach social problems has been recognized as patterned or habitual for many years. James Bossard has described the steps or stages through which society normally solves its problems as follows:

1. There will slowly develop a recognition that a problem exists which will be characterized by spreading discontent expressed by the statement, "Something ought to be done."
2. There will be discussions of various individuals and groups about the seriousness of the problem.
3. "Reforms," usually intuitively arrived at, often ill-advised, promoted by a "Well, let's do *something*" attitude will be attempted by the individuals and groups in disorganized fashion.
4. *This will lead to failure which will be followed by requests for careful studies and more information.*

5. Broad basic factors creating the problem will be established, and general discussion will lead to policies.

6. Policies will be handed to administrators who will interpret the policies and apply them to specific cases (Bossard, 1941, pp. 320-329).

The problem is how to get to stage 5 without going through stages 3 and 4.

The question as to what sort of organization will be most helpful and effective to study the problem, prepare the solutions, and put them into effect has various solutions:

1. The association can delegate the work to a smaller action group with a promise that progress and developments are reported back regularly.
2. The association can agree to shift attention to existing groups with leverage on the problem.
3. The association can agree to continue working as a group on several more occasions, delegating tasks to smaller groups.

In this organizing for action, the following points are of importance:

1. The breadth of interest and the level of energy, or at least the potential for energy, have to be sustained.
2. Simplistic solutions for hasty action should be viewed with a jaundiced eye. Most of the problems which will be addressed are not that simple and will not be solved quickly. Hasty action will raise expectations and then dash them.
3. The arena of action has to move into the organizations which are going to take the greatest burden of the changes.

4. Search For and Implementation of a Solution

The next stage is search for, and implementation of a solution. These stages of planning and action ought to receive the benefit of applied scientific method by persons who have technical skills. The sequence might be seen to include (1) assembling a base of assumptions or

propositions (a theory) from which to proceed; (2) assessing the current situation from the perspective of that theory; (3) setting goals and objectives for change; (4) designing the program (set of activities) which defines the changed situation and which will produce the change; (5) implementation; and (6) evaluation, which will be used to modify or expand the program and will demonstrate the extent of its success.

In the theory, assessment, objective setting, and program designing stages, keeping in mind a system view is as important as it was in beginning this effort. There will be related problems which will overlap the central problem and spill over into other areas, e.g., the family or the community. No single action will provide a solution. Preserving the larger association is a necessity; it can provide needed connections for a well-designed program. Some mechanism--a regular meeting, a report, or a series of newspaper articles--has to be set up to keep the larger associations and, thus, the community informed. The problem must not be allowed to slide underground. It is the pressure exerted by the larger community's interest and involvement which will keep up the impetus toward finding a solution.

The initial step will probably be an experiment, an exception to the prevailing situation, which is permitted to occur as a way of testing the idea. For example, for the problem of youth who are leaving school early, the assessment and program design might lead to a program which includes (1) some revised curricula and procedures carried out by "early adoptees" of the innovation in the schools; (2) an experimental halfway school, using volunteers and other students as tutors, designed to

help ex-students re-enter the school system; and (3) a program mounted by the welfare department to help involve families in supporting the education of their children.

It is critical that the experiment be documented and evaluated well. If, as is hoped, improvement and change start to occur, it is important that there is good documentation to demonstrate to others how to carry out the program, and good evaluation to prove that it works.

B. EXPANDING THE EXPERIMENT

Assuming that the evaluation shows that the experiment works, it is time to go public. The small experiment has to move towards becoming normal universal practice. The experiment will have taken time. It could take a year for a program within the school (1) to demonstrate that a revised curriculum was attracting young people who were predicted to be future dropouts; or (2) for an experimental school to get several children back into school at their grade level or higher; or (3) for the welfare program to report that some mothers are more likely to get up to get their children to school each day. The successes might be small, but they will be concrete, and they must be seen to be predictable, knowable, and practicable. The experiment must be made replicable and should not require major new resources. Efforts should be made to use what resources are present.

One basic problem is being addressed, but this cannot be done in isolation, and forming many small links with the larger community will be some assurance that the program will flourish. Expanding the

program will take time, and there must be a major sustained effort to ensure that it remains a community priority.

C. MOVING TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL MAINTENANCE

Once the experiment has been proven, accepted and adopted, the task is to "refreeze" the situation and institutionalize the change as a permanent feature of the community. If the experiment extended to broad adoption, most people are now doing it, but maybe not as a habit. There could be some counter-forces which are working against the permanence of the change. A change becomes permanent when it becomes a habit and the expected way to operate, based on widespread agreement. It also becomes permanent to the extent that:

1. Temporary budgets become permanent budgets;
2. Temporary staff become permanent staff;
3. Temporary assignments become permanent assignments;
4. Volunteer clerical work becomes paid clerical work;
5. In-service training starts to reflect the changed procedure;
6. Practices become policies and standards;
7. Experiments for a few become a permanent option for many; and
8. New arrangements come to be justified in terms of original and less changeable values.

D. APPLICATION TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WORK

Our sequence of change focused on the school system. We could just as easily have looked at problems young people face in procedures of the juvenile justice system or the labor market. Some

of the above would be relevant to these two areas, but there are major differences.

The juvenile justice system is different from the school system in that it has a very visible, pervasive statutory base. In dealing with the juvenile justice system, an understanding of the confines of the law and the need for legal expertise should be kept in mind.

During the phase of community analysis, emphasis should be placed on discovering the attitudes of the local judges. It is possible that the change agent group will discover judges or officials who are actively in favor of the desired change. Gaining the support of a judge who deals with juvenile offenders as individuals and treats them fairly, could smooth the path.

The extent of prejudice encountered will be greater than that encountered when tackling a problem in the schools. Juvenile "delinquents" who have reached the courts are not viewed as sympathetically as youth who play truant. Most adults have at least contemplated playing truant, but "delinquency" conjures up images of anti-social behavior, and the majority can see only the labels "violent," "uncooperative," "sullen," or "thief."

In planning for change in the juvenile justice system, these factors, the statutory base and need for legal expertise, and the possibility of strongly felt opposition, have to be given thought. More energy and a bigger organization may be needed in the early stages. In attempting to change legislation, it helps if there is a widespread agreement on the basic principles in the community. A senator might be willing to introduce or support a bill, but to ensure the result, others may have

to do most of the leg work. It should be pointed out that the argument is *not* that all youth are innocent victims of a cruel system, but rather that police and court reactions to *some* types of behavior do more harm than good; that the degradation process is often out of proportion to the offense committed; and that an adjudication sentence is often only the beginning of a more subtle, on-going process of social punishment and ostracism.

A special problem in changing the juvenile justice system is including the police. Police departments have a relatively more rigid hierarchy than most organizations; the opinions of the upper levels of command may be those that matter. A policeman in a patrol car might have developed sympathy for and understanding of young people in trouble, but his actions are likely to follow the forms laid down by his superiors. A statement by Likert (1967, p. 46), made in writing of organizational management, seems applicable to the situation in the police force:

Because of the restraints and rewards imposed by their immediate superiors and by higher echelons, many managers at middle and lower levels do not deviate from the prevailing management style of the firm even though they, themselves, believe that better performance would be achieved if they did so.

In approaching members of the juvenile justice system, it would be very easy to assume that there would be opposition and resistance, but this does not have to be the case. A generalization of Rothman's is pertinent here (Rothman, 1974, p. 103): "Human-service professionals tend to underestimate the extent to which approval of radical roles exists in the profession." It is a fair assumption that most people in the juvenile justice system would welcome a sound method of diverting young people from

the judicial system, and will be early participants in the change efforts. Of the three areas which concern young people and in which it might be possible to effect change, the juvenile justice system will need the most time. Apart from the time-consuming legal aspects, it would not be easy to set up informal programs to demonstrate ideas.

In the world of work this approach would be much easier. The problems will seem smaller in this sphere. The change agent can be initially as small as an employer or organization, and if successful, can institute a program without community support. This, however, is a disadvantage as well. It is harder to institutionalize changes based on personal goodwill or special relationships. For example, as managements change, a youth/work program can be dropped or downgraded, and the change agent is back to square one.

The major difference between the world of work and the school system is that the area of operations in the former is so diffused and there is no captive audience. Young people are not seen as part of the business or the employment sector except in sporadic attempts to get business to provide summer jobs. Getting young people jobs is a worthwhile project, but the overall picture must not be ignored. Small successes are likely to come easily, but the main thrust of the change program should be in the understanding of the need to allow youth to participate fully in the institution of work.

Whichever arena is chosen--the schools, the juvenile justice system, or the world of work, this basic participative model of operation appears to apply if differences in the arenas of action are taken into account.

SUMMARY

In an attempt to facilitate thinking about institutional change, this chapter has reviewed some basic notion of society and institutions, some general images of change of the past, and some more specific current ideas about the determinants and processes of change and about the role of the change agent. The last part of the chapter presented a view of a rational, participative process of change directed toward education, work, and juvenile justice.

The idea of the change agent was prominent in the change process presented. The change agent was defined not as a person, but as a collective, an association of persons, who together possess the information, positions, and the connections to facilitate fundamental change in a community. At one point, the change agent was represented as a "large temporary organization," cutting across existing organizational forms, drawing membership from a variety of sectors in the community, making it possible to affect those sectors and to take them into account.

Several possible functions for the collective change agent were mentioned, among them initiating the change attempt, sponsoring whatever program emerges, designing the program, carrying out its specifications, conducting evaluation, and using experience and findings to renew and redirect the effort. In all these functions, the collective change agent, the large temporary organization, appeared to have real advantage in being able to work from the broad base of support of its constituency. its membership--and in being able to address the simultaneity and complexity of needs and issues which are beyond the scope or responsibility of any single existing organization.

The change agent was presented in the context of a process, through which could emerge broadly shared and focused concerns, which could lead to an intent to make changes, and from which could emerge a "program," some set of activities to bring about the desired outcomes, and ultimately a "refreezing," an institutionalizing of new practices and policies which are supported by the same widely shared agreements and expectations which supported the old.

An alternate way of looking at the change agent is to look at its structure, at the membership and at the kinds of relationships among the members: the way in which the relationships of the members become relationships of the various organizations to which those members also belong. The joint membership of a high school principal, a member of the Chamber of Commerce, and a director of a CETA youth manpower program in the collective change agent has the potential to become more than that; there is the potential to establish a new relationship between schools and employers which will sustain expanded education--work opportunities for youth.

Taking this idea further, one might ask how the interaction of persons who represent local government, the schools, law enforcement, the courts, social services (both public and private), business, industry, labor, and neighborhoods, can change the interactions of those organizations in desirable ways. Could they make it possible for those organizations to join in new alliances capable of concerted, deliberate improvements in the support for young people?

Put another way, if we were to generalize from a hundred instances of the change process presented in this chapter--if we were to sort out the relationships between and among organizations which emerged in these instances--what resemblance might they bear to those presented as a "youth services system" in the next chapter?


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CHAPTER THREE

Youth Services Systems

ELEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN AN
INTEGRATING STRUCTURE FOR CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMMING



IV.

COMMUNITY PROGRAMS

YOUTH SERVICES SYSTEMS

INTRODUCTION

In the Office of Youth Development's Youth Services System Program, it was argued that an appropriate means for implementing the Strategy, and for seeking other benefits of efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability, would be to assist local governments to define and to cultivate a youth services system--a network of relationships among youth-serving organizations--which would be capable of a coherent, coordinated, and comprehensive approach to the problems of youth. This chapter discusses the initial assumptions and recommendations for youth services systems; examines how some of the circumstances which youth services systems were to have addressed may have changed; reviews the approach to coordination which emerged from the work; and concludes by examining the viability of, and qualifications to, the idea of a youth services system.

It should be pointed out that the development of organizational and interorganizational theory, which the youth services system idea inevitably brings into play, has not reached a point permitting tight, measurable connections to be made between organizational form and process and the Strategy outcomes being sought. Considerable work has gone into preparing measures of interorganizational relationships, and significant progress has been made. There have been attempts to assess intermediary outcomes, such as the diffusion of the Strategy, the consistency of system development project goals with the Strategy, and the formation of

interagency relationships. It remains, however, that on no occasion have changes in interorganizational relations been linked in a tight objective evaluation with particular outcomes for youth. What follows therefore is a review, not of empirical findings, but of logical or plausible cases, and of experience.

I. ASSUMPTIONS AND INITIAL VIEWS

The youth services system notion started from the ordinary idea that somehow youth services had to be coordinated. The Strategy was based on considerations which took the idea in a not-so-ordinary direction. A supporting logic developed once there was the intent to make something of the terms. Central to this logic were certain assumptions about the political ideology of decentralization, about shifts in management and expenditure within the federal system, and about increasing demands for long-range planning, accountability, and deliberate management of the interconnections among the various parts of the youth-serving network. The following selections from papers produced in the course of the program express the logic and the recommendations for coordination structures to which that logic led.

A. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT*

While it may not yet be apparent to the person on the street, it is becoming increasingly clear to elected state and local officials that the federal government is attempting to find new ways to

*Excerpted from Youth Work Experience Process: Capacity Building for Youth Programs, National Office for Social Responsibility, U.S. Department of Labor Manpower Administration, Volume 3, 1975.

relate to governors, county commissioners, mayors, the legislative bodies with whom they work, and the agencies that they all oversee in the delivery of services to the citizenry. The changing relationship has to do with the federal tax dollar and the introduction of general and special revenue sharing.

There is general agreement among elected officials that federal resources are inadequate to help make ends meet given the problems generated by inflation and a flagging economy. Rather, the change has to do with the way in which the federal tax dollar enters the state and community.

Ten years ago, federal agency personnel from Washington, D.C. or from one of their ten regional offices frequently dealt directly with private agencies and organizations in a community-bypassing general purpose government. During the 1960's War on Poverty, federal employees often sought out and recruited nonprofit community groups (if none existed, they helped organize them), solicited applications for federal funds, awarded grants, and intervened in program implementation and administration without even informing, let alone consulting, representatives of local government.

Whether or not Congress intended to create such a situation is as questionable and problematic as the products that the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 can be said to have achieved. (Moynihan, 1969)

That this pattern of federal intervention has changed can be attested to by finance committees of state legislatures, county commissioners, and city councils. Since 1970, budget sessions have been

attended by hundreds of once federally-supported groups requesting appropriations to continue a wide variety of community social programs. In many instances, local elected officials were not even aware of the programs being conducted in their jurisdictions.

The problem elected officials face is not so much the result of doubts about the importance of the various social programs once funded directly by the federal government. Rather, they lack the technical staff assistance and information base which is required to sort out conflicting claims to priority for the sparse federal funds flowing to and through local government budgets from both general and special revenue sharing and block grants.

. . . [Community leaders,] recognizing increased demands for accountability and efficiency, focus on their need for practical technology and assistance which can assist them in the broad planning process. They want practical information and assistance in: needs analysis, priority setting, program analysis, and evaluation techniques. Recognizing the shortage of resources and the magnitude of the problems facing America's youth, all acknowledge the need for strategies and structures which will permit a coordinated and integrated approach; one which incorporates all agencies and organizations, public and private, and includes young people themselves.

. . . In the early spring of 1973, a thirty page memorandum was developed in one federal agency, which described the rethinking that has been going on for several years regarding human services programs. These ideas are summarized below.

In general, human development programs have not held up well under critical evaluation because: (1) program objectives are given vague or shifting definitions, (2) program objectives cannot be achieved because they are directed at problems in which the program has a limited impact, (3) program objectives may not or cannot be assessed well by the available measures, and (4) responsibility for the management of programs has been diffuse.

1. Federal Objectives and Means

The federal government ought to attempt *only* those objectives in human services which can be judged appropriate and practicable on three grounds:

Equity. The federal government has responsibilities to protect groups suffering discrimination, poverty, or other forms of deprivation.

Externalities. The federal government should not attempt to reach objectives, no matter how laudable, which experience has shown it cannot achieve. Large scale policy shifts, enforcement of federal legal guarantees and strengthening of state and local responsibilities may be the most effective federal role.

If a program serves a legitimate and practicable end, the next question is how best to organize it. The basic choices concern:

The form of service. The federal government can provide service directly to those who need it, provide cash with which to buy the service, or provide vouchers or insurance.

The form of organization. The federal government can administer the program directly or can transfer the resources to an intermediary level such as the states and localities.

2. Options for Reform

The above choices generate four main options for the reform of human services.

Increased federal presence. Greater federal intervention can take the form of direct provision of services, additional categorical grant programs, and elimination of state discretion in program content. The advantage of this option is that it provides a concrete, uniform response to a problem. In the social services, it is difficult to justify this approach because of the belief that services are tailored to individual needs and the inefficiency created by the complexity of the added service programs.

Status quo with improvements. Most agency proposals for reform call for maintaining the current program structure, but improving the management of programs by: specifying where flexibility is allowed the states; monitoring to assure good management; and by improving the measures of program outcomes. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it does not address the basic question of the efficiency of the structure.

Different form of organization. Subfederal centralization and capacity building. Under this option, the federal government increasingly delegates responsibility for social programs to the states

or local governments. Resources of several kinds are provided to these units, but they are increasingly responsible for management of the programs. Only those interests which can be defined as federal concerns are protected by regulation of state activities. *A change in organization under this option is not decentralization, but a centralization of programs under state and local governments.* Federal controls remain to protect legitimate federal interests. An administrative burden is removed from the federal level.

This option requires *an effort to help states and localities to improve their capacity to plan and manage social services.* Capacity building is the aspect of social policy which remains most completely under federal control. The federal government concerns itself less with the direct provision of services, and more with the development of institutions to provide the services through state and local governments.

The advantages of the last option are that the state and local institutions are strengthened through attention to *capacity building*, federal involvement in the details of service provision is decreased, federal protection of specified national interests is enhanced and responsiveness of programs to individual needs is improved. The major disadvantage of this option is that it requires an orchestrated set of changes simultaneously at the federal, state, and local level.

B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY: THE YOUTH SERVICES SYSTEM*

The tactic for the implementation of the Strategy, the youth services system, was based upon three assumptions:

1. The federal government will continue to decentralize decision-making authority to its regional offices and to the states;
2. The trend toward revenue sharing will continue; and
3. The drive in government for efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability will increase.

If these three assumptions are correct, the *elected officials of the political jurisdiction* (1)** who will control allocation of revenue sharing resources in the municipality, state, or county, are key figures in system building; therefore, at the head of any youth services system model is the elected political official or body. The youth services system must be legitimated by the political jurisdiction it serves. Such legitimation may begin as a ~~set~~ of formal agreements, signed by agency heads to advise and serve as consultants, but ultimately, the youth services system should be legitimated by statute or ordinance. If the formal agreements are based on previously negotiated informal agreements, they reflect more accurately the perceptions and needs of the groups involved, and this tends to be more efficacious.


The second element of a youth services system is the *key agencies which have statutory responsibility for serving youth* (2): at

*Excerpted from Robert M. Hunter's "Assumptions Behind and Structural Requisites for a Youth Services System," 1973.

**Number refer to Figure 2, "Generalized Model of a YSS" (following page).

Figure 2

GENERALIZED MODEL OF A YOUTH SERVICE SYSTEM



the minimum, courts, schools, police, and welfare. In virtually every community, county, and state in the United States, these four agencies have responsibility for the vast majority of the funds allocated for youth development. In any given community, additional agencies may be significant: parks and recreation, community health and hospitals, and employment.

One of the major problems inherent in building an inter-agency effort is that the policy-making authority frequently resides at different governmental levels between agencies: the police are municipal; the welfare department and courts are either county or state. Schools are governed by local boards, but their accountability to any local authorities is problematic. Lack of a single authority to which all agencies are accountable means that no one in the community can command coordination of all agencies; therefore, building a coordinated, integrated service delivery system must be a voluntary activity on the part of the agencies. Recognizing that the demands for efficiency and accountability will govern the distribution of revenue sharing monies, these agencies appear to be increasingly more willing to cooperate to subordinate their traditional desire to be independent through agreements, with policies decided by a board which can be fully supportive of the budgetary request that is submitted to the revenue sharing allocator.

One handles the difference in authority and in policy-making by the *creation of formal and informal agreements* (3), to which the mayor, county commissioner, or governor is a signatory, agreeing to perform in a particular way, to coordinate and integrate. Experience

suggests that a promising starting point for formulating agreements will be commitments for new ways of handling status offenders. Because the implications for policy-making and resource allocation are unclear in such agreements, the next step in the creation of a system is the formation of a *youth services advisory board or council* (4) with the authority to make recommendations about programming and resources allocation. Representatives from the agencies, client population, and the private sector (business, industry, organized labor, and lay persons who are interested) should sit on the board. Because this board makes policy regarding who provides what kind of service and controls funding, the chairman of the board should ideally be the mayor or the governor or his appointee. The organization and determination of type of services to be offered should be based upon the three criteria discussed in the Strategy: an increase of access to desirable social roles and reduction of labeling and alienation.

This kind of board inevitably has failed in the past because board membership has seldom had the time to carefully study and think through all the various theoretical and practical issues that are brought before them. Thus, the next component of the system is a *joint staff of technicians* (5) whose function is to inform the board regarding the services needed and offered and the allocation of resources. This involves an examination of statutes, regulations, policies, and practices; a determination of programs to be implemented; and an assessment of program responsiveness to youth needs.

The staff would be directed by an executive director, appointed by the mayor with the advice and consent of the youth council or board, so that he is legitimized. He must understand the nature of planning, programming, evaluation, analysis, and inter- and intra-institutional research, in order to best determine the way in which policy decisions made by the board should be implemented. Agency personnel familiar with the planning process and with agency budget and program considerations would jointly analyze interagency agreements to identify present agency practices, determine where blockages to service may occur, and determine the actions necessary for implementation of these agreements. This is a process of joint negotiation, a political process, not simply an administrative one, in which resources are reallocated and agency responsibilities for delivery of a particular type of service are defined. (In addition to agency staff on loan to the youth services system technical group, there should be technicians who are independent of the agencies--planners or specialists in evaluation who will work on the development of monitoring.) Ultimately, political decision makers at the top, who accept or reject the recommendations of this board in terms of the reallocation of resources, must be knowledgeable in order to make intelligent policy. This calls for continuing emphasis through board training on the Strategy.

(6) *The private sector*, particularly business and organized labor, should be very deeply engaged. High level corporate

directors are concerned about their social responsibility to the community and how most effectively to allocate resources to maintain not only their corporate image, but to begin to solve certain kinds of social problems that effect the way the corporation operates in the community and survives. The private sector provides occupational roles for youth and should be represented on the board. Business and industry have personnel with knowledge and expertise that would be extremely useful in teaching managerial skills to the research-technical support staff. Corporate employees can make valuable contributions of human energy as volunteers at the program level as well.

With encouragement, the major expansion in employment opportunities in this country in the next ten years will be in the service sector, yet training opportunities now available are limited. It is conceivable that the private sector would furnish half the salary of youth to work under the supervision of a human service agency in new roles imaginatively created by the joint efforts of the public and private sectors, with the school providing credit. Examples of new roles for *youth serving youth* could be counselors, tutors, and apprentice project administrators. Organized labor has one of the most positive labeling processes called a union card and numerous opportunities for access to a desirable social role. In addition, organized labor in many communities has the political strength to support favorable institutional change.

II. CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE

A key argument in the case for youth services systems was that state and local governments would need the expanded political and technical capabilities which the system would provide in order to implement the Strategy, particularly if they were to be able to cope with new responsibilities which would come with general and special revenue sharing, bloc granting, and similar changes in patterns of intergovernmental relations and funding. Those considerations are still very relevant, and it may be worthwhile to examine the history and future implications of some of those intergovernmental and funding shifts.

Our three-tiered federal system of government was characterized by a balanced distribution of power between federal, state, and local jurisdictions for the first 150 years. This balance has been altered in the last 50 years by increasing centralization and consolidation of power, and by shifts of traditional state and local functions to the federal level. State and local governments in many cases have become administrative branch offices for the implementation of national policy. There has been a "significant loss of local control over governmental decisions and actions despite large increases in local budgets and in the number of local government employees." (State of California, 1970)

Grant-in-aid categorical federal programs have increased fourfold between 1945 and 1972 (Thompson, 1973). There are now over 600 separate federal departments, agencies, and bureaus administering,

monitoring, and developing regulations and guidelines for over 600 separate programs. In response to federal programming, the administrative and accounting functions of local governments have increased tremendously in both volume and complexity. In many cases, the local capacity to initiate policy relevant to local problems has correspondingly decreased.

Policy makers of all political persuasions have become alarmed at the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the current system of federal, state, and local relations. There has been a growing effort in the past ten years to reverse, or at least slow down, the current trend towards federal dominance. This effort to decentralize (termed, among other things, the "New Federalism") has had a limited, yet significant, impact on the composition and functions of state and local governments. The following will analyze the current state of "federalism" and its implications for the future of state and local governments.

The federal domestic program spending inventory for the remainder of this decade is likely to consist of four major funding patterns: (1) general revenue sharing; (2) grant consolidation (sometimes referred to as "special revenue sharing"); (3) bloc grants; and (4) categorical program funding (categorical funding most likely will account for 75% of all federal funds spent on domestic programs for the remainder of this decade) (National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, 1975). These four federal funding approaches, as we shall see, have

important implications for state and local governments. Local governments, in particular, must considerably upgrade their planning, management, evaluation, and policy-making capacity, if we are to rebuild a balanced, three-tiered federal system.

A. GENERAL REVENUE SHARING

General revenue sharing (the State and Local Assistance Act of 1972) has had a limited impact on the decentralization of federal power. Revenue sharing was passed by Congress for various reasons; it contains two basic assumptions, however, that influence the distribution of power in our governmental system. The first assumption is ideological or political and stems from widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of large centralized government. It assumes that government closest to the people is best, and that private citizens and their state and local governments should have more freedom to come to grips with their own problems. The second assumption is managerial, and stems from a powerful trend in management theory towards decentralization to promote maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

The final version of general revenue sharing was the result of exceedingly complex congressional compromises. The final bill was supported by a Republican president, a Democratic congress, and most of America's mayors, governors, and county officials; all had different reasons for doing so.

The strongest supporters for general revenue sharing were the mayors of large cities who were facing a financial squeeze of rising local property taxes and funding shortages. They were organized into

increasingly powerful coalitions, including the U.S. Conference of Mayors, which launched a strong lobbying campaign. Supporting this lobbying effort were the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, and the International City Management Association. These organizations and their lobbyists reached every member of Congress with a plea not only for fiscal relief, but for more control of the actual expenditures.

Governors in various coalitions supported general revenue sharing, especially the "no strings" concept of direct state funding. The governors felt that states had surrendered a great deal of fiscal and policy-making independence through federal categorical grants. Their support centered around strengthening the position of state government in relation to federal and local jurisdictions.

Liberals in Congress supported revenue sharing because of the potential fiscal relief for their constituent communities. Conservatives supported it because revenue sharing allowed for more local control; it also avoided further enlargement of the federal bureaucracy, and marked the shift of policy powers back to state and local government and a possible return to traditional federalism.

Many economists, planners, and policy makers were concerned with the fiscal mismatch of the overall taxing structure. In 1930, state and local governments collected more income tax than the federal government. By 1970, the federal government collected two-thirds of all taxes in the United States, and although 37 states have enacted an income tax,

the federal government now receives 90% of all income tax collections (Thompson, 1973). Spending and control of fiscal resources moved to Washington.

The Great Depression and World War II provided impetus for further centralization of governmental functions in Washington. States and local governments surrendered more authority:

We must also remember that the growth of the federal role in social and economic affairs proceeded against the main current of American ideology, which champions state and local prerogatives. The collapse of the state role in depression times, the recognition of problems which states could not handle, and the recognition of social and economic inequities all contributed to a logic for federal expansion which rested on necessity and on efficiency. In each expansion that logic was pitted against state and local prerogatives (Hunter, 1974).

Washington and the federal executive branch grew tremendously. For example, in 1972 the State of California had almost twice as many federal employees (377,000, not including military personnel) as state employees (217,000) (Kimmelman, 1974). The federal payroll has become a major economic factor for many communities other than Washington, D.C.

With the predominance of the federal spending power and the near monopoly of the federal government on the income tax, states and local jurisdictions are presently in critical fiscal condition and dependent primarily on regressive sales and property taxes. Between 1946 and 1968, states and local communities multiplied their spending six and a half times and their debt seven times, but only increased their total tax collections five and a half times (Congressional Research Service, 1971). This decrease in state and local taxing powers and a concurrent

fourfold increase in federal categorical funding led to a situation where a new policy was clearly needed "which would effect a realignment of federal, state and local relationships that would permit essential national interests without undermining the state and local capacity and *will* to govern" (Kimmelman, 1974).

Revenue sharing became a tool of that needed policy. Revenue sharing is not a new idea--it was first mentioned in Thomas Jefferson's inaugural address of 1805. He urged a form of revenue sharing, or what he called "just repartition" of federal revenue among the states for the "promotion of canals, roads, arts, education and other great objects within each state." The first implementation of the concept the Surplus Distribution Act of 1836, which provided revenue sharing dollars amounting to some \$28 million.

Recent history shows that the concept of revenue sharing, or "tax sharing," was included in both the Republican and Democratic platforms in 1964. Walter Heller, President Kennedy's and President Johnson's chief economic advisor, and Joseph Pechman of the Brookings Institution recommended a revenue sharing plan in the early 60's. The tremendous costs of the Viet Nam war prevented the Johnson Administration from implementing the concept. Revenue sharing finally became a legislative package under President Nixon's "New Federalism" proposals of 1971.

Congressional support was strong. A Gallup Poll of 1971 reported 77% of Americans were in favor of the revenue sharing concept (Thompson, 1973). When the proposal reached Congress, a sizeable majority seemed to favor the idea; however, the chairman of the House

Ways and Means Committee opposed the concept and provided the first major roadblock for passage. After 18 months of intense lobbying, the House finally passed a bill. The House version had a distribution formula which favored high-population industrial states.

The Senate also passed a revenue sharing bill, but with a substantially different allocation formula and fewer "strings." The Senate formula favored low-income rural states. Both House and Senate formulas accounted for (1) population, (2) relative income, and (3) local taxing effort. The House added a list of priority expenditure categories and provided incentives for increasing state personal income taxation. The Senate deleted both of these provisions.

Finally, it was left to a conference committee to iron out the differences of House and Senate formulas. A unique and totally political solution was reached. Since a compromise could not be reached, House and Senate conferees agreed to accept both formulas, and allowed each state's allocation to be determined by whichever was highest. Other compromises finally resulted in the final State and Local Assistance Act of 1972.

1. Implementation of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972

Under the terms of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, a total of \$30.2 billion will be allocated over a five-year period (1972-1976). One third of the total is allocated to counties, townships and Indian tribes. There are no restrictions on state funding. The local allocations are to be used for "high priority expenditures,"

as determined by Congress. Those priorities are: (1) public safety, (2) environmental protection, (3) public transportation, (4) health, (5) recreation, (6) social services, (7) financial administration, and (8) libraries. There are no limits on local expenditures for capital expenditures.

General revenue sharing does have strings, but they are very loose and allow for a great deal of discretion and flexibility at the state and local levels. Reporting and auditing requirements are minimal. All state and local jurisdictions are required to spend funds 24 months of receipt. A minimum of paper work or red tape is required, "planned" and "actual use" reports are the only significant requirements. General revenue sharing thus became an important experiment of decentralization and a test for the "New Federalism."

2. Fiscal Effects of General Revenue Sharing

Local governments applied 57.5% of their first year's revenue sharing dollars towards *new* spending (mostly for capital construction and capital improvements). Forty-two and one-half percent of local general revenue sharing dollars were used for substitution purposes, which included substituting for withdrawn federal categorical programs, offsetting a local tax increase, program maintenance and avoiding further municipal debt. Larger jurisdictions were more likely to use more dollars for substitution purposes than small jurisdictions. Smaller communities spent the bulk of their first year's revenue sharing allotment on one-time capital expenditures (Nathan, et. al., 1975).

A study of communities in New Mexico exemplifies the national trend for first year general revenue sharing expenditures. New Mexico's largest city, Albuquerque, used 70% of its initial allocation for salaries of existing personnel (\$4 million for a salary increase for firemen, and \$1.5 million to train and pay for new policemen). Small communities, on the other hand, bought equipment. Des Moines, New Mexico, spent all of its funds on one tennis court. Artesis used two-thirds of its allocation to dig a water well. Portales spent it all for one Caterpillar tractor, while Jemez Springs (population 356) invested in a "radar gun" (perhaps to generate future revenue) (Cornelius, 1974). Buying "gadgets" was not that uncommon for small governmental units across the country.

New data show that in fiscal year 1974, there was a significant decline in the use of revenue sharing funds for new spending by local government--45.1%--(Nathan, 1974). With rapid inflation and the recent recession, revenue sharing expenditures will be more directed towards substitution purposes. Cities have become increasingly dependent on general revenue sharing to meet day-to-day operating and maintenance costs.

The fact that most of general revenue sharing has been used as a substitute for funds which would have been obtained from other sources does not indict the original concept. One must remember that many of the original proponents of revenue sharing were supportive of a fiscal bail-out for cities, and for reducing local tax pressures. These supporters were not necessarily interested in more local control or new

programs. General revenue sharing has relieved or, more likely, postponed, the urban fiscal crisis.

Many large local jurisdictions suffered from the so-called pincer effect (Nathan, 1974) Whether by design or coincidence, general revenue sharing dollars were first released during President Nixon's FY 1974 budget cuts and fund impoundments. This created a situation in which revenue sharing and concurrent budget cuts gave an impression of large amounts of new funding for new programs. This brought a great deal of attention to the state and local budgeting process, and raised expectations for new dollars. The expectations, in many cases, were false. Many policy makers and researchers were very critical of this dilemma.

Providing new funding under the rubric or improving local decision making and then cutting categorical funds shortly thereafter is tantamount to *forcing* local governments to base future local decisions upon past Federal actions, i.e., past Federal programs and their clientele may well force local governments to continue those programs which were previously encouraged by the Federal government (Heiss, 1974).

The above statement was all too true in many cities, as revenue sharing funds became replacement dollars for cutback federal programming. This greatly affected the decentralization and local determination of revenue sharing expenditures.

One way of measuring the impact of general revenue sharing is to examine its actual use with the aid of broad expenditure categories. The following table shows the tendency towards educational spending at the state level, while local jurisdictions emphasized public safety (Congressional Hearings, 1975).

Table 1

Use of Revenue Sharing Funds Reported by State and Local Government
(through 6/30/74)

	<u>All Jurisdictions</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Local Gov'ts</u>
1. Public Safety	23%	1%	36%
2. Education	22%	57%	1%
3. Transportation	15%	8%	19%
4. General Government	9%	6%	11%
5. Environmental Protection	7%	2%	10%
6. Health	7%	7%	7%
7. Recreation & Cultural Services	4%	1%	6%
8. Social Services for Poor and Aged	4%	7%	2%
9. Financial Administration	2%	1%	3%
10. Housing & Community Development	1%	1%	1%
11. Libraries	15%	--	1%
12. Economic Development	1%	--	2%
13. Corrections	--	1%	--
14. Social Development	--	--	--
15. Other	4%	9%	1%

3. Distributional Effects

The final distribution formulas of the State and Local Assistance Act helped to equalize the fiscal capacities of rich and poor states. Congress recognized that governmental units have different needs and different fiscal capacities. The general rule was that low fiscal

capacity governments (those with low per capita personal income) should be allocated relatively more than those with high fiscal capacity (high per capita personal income) (Merriam, 1975).

One provision in the act has had a profound distributional effect: "No county area or local government can receive less than 20% or more than 145% of the average per capita payment to local governments in the State." This provision shores-up very marginal units of government. Thousands of midwestern townships, that previously had only road-building and maintenance responsibilities, were given gifts of new money with no traditional authority to spend it beyond highway-related problems. In the small communities, the revenue sharing allocation merely provided fringe benefits (radar guns and tennis courts). A New Mexican small town's mayor said: "We'll take it if they're going to give it to us. We really don't need it, but we may as well be spending Federal money" (Cornelius, 1974).

Larger cities were penalized by the 145% ceiling of the same provision. Cities like Newark and Detroit, with low resident incomes and high local taxes, were especially hurt by the provision. There is now a strong lobbying effort to remove the upper ceiling. Many of those original supporters who were concerned about fiscal relief are pressing for a new distribution formula entirely, and, in some cases, considerably more federal control of expenditures.

There is no provision in the distribution formula for funding regional or metropolitan forms of government. Supporters of these governmental reform movements are especially critical of the shoring up effect of the lower 20% floor of the distribution formula. This "tends

to prop up certain duplicative, obsolete and/or defunct units of government--especially townships with very inactive governments," according to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Merriam, 1975). Movement towards consolidation of local governmental units can be hampered by increasing the spending capabilities of smaller obsolete units.

General revenue sharing is currently up for congressional renewal. Much of the testimony concerns the distribution formula. Significant changes in the formula, and more federal strings could jeopardize the political decentralization principles touted by many of the original supporters of general revenue sharing.

4. Political Effects of General Revenue Sharing.

The political effects of general revenue sharing are difficult the measure and controversial. Groups like the Center for Community Change regard "the initial rhetoric about return of power to the people as hogwash!" (Wall Street Journal, 1975). National civil rights groups have complained bitterly about the lack of enforcement for civil rights and antibias requirements. The "conceptual goals to allow people to work at solving their own problems and bringing government back to the people are not being achieved," according to another study (Cornelius, 1974).

The Brookings Institution (Nathan, 1975) reports somewhat more favorable political effects, based upon their sample of revenue sharing recipients. According to their analysis, the impact of general revenue sharing on federal decentralization depends on answering two major

questions: (1) does it cause more competition in, and raise the prominence of state and local budget decisions; and (2) does general revenue sharing "enhance the role of general officials as opposed to functional specialists?" (Are decisions made more by elected state and local officials, rather than by technical specialists within various administrative agencies?)

In over one half of the jurisdictions studied, the Brookings Institution reported that general revenue sharing stimulated more competition and more citizen involvement in the budgeting process. This new activity varied considerably in its nature and its overall impact. Many jurisdictions held special public hearings and open budget review sessions that were well-publicized and well-attended. In many communities, interest groups pressured elected officials to allocate general revenue sharing dollars to their favored programs, thus stimulating further public involvement in the decision-making process.

There is then some evidence that general revenue sharing had a favorable decentralizing effect. The Brookings report is clearly the most optimistic of the studies concerning the political impact of general revenue sharing, but even the Brookings Institution (Nathan, 1975) heavily qualifies their conclusions with the following three statements: (1) "Such developments appear in some places, but not others, with no apparent pattern"; (2) "The changes may not have a *sustained* effect"; and, most importantly, (3) "It would be wrong to characterize the observable effects to date of revenue sharing on state and local budgeting processes as deeply important where they have occurred or as pervasive in terms of their overall national impact."

The experience in Denver, Colorado supports many of the Brookings' conclusions (Heiss, 1974). The aim of Denver's first plan was to allocate all the first year's general revenue sharing allocation (\$23 million) for capital improvements. At the time the mayor announced his allocation plan, there was a concurrent and significant cutback in certain federal categorical funds for social services. Public citizens and social service constituent groups launched a highly visible lobbying effort to convince the mayor and city council to reallocate general revenue sharing funds for social services. A Denver Citizen's Advisory Group was formed, and extensive public hearings were well attended. Eventually, citizen pressure prompted the expenditure of \$2.5 million for social services.

The activity was extremely short-term, and highlights general revenue sharing's lack of sustained impact. Denver's operating budget dwindled so rapidly with "stagflation" and an eroding tax base, that by the second year of general revenue sharing, almost the entire allocation was used for existing program and maintenance costs. Revenue sharing funds for social services were drastically cut. Citizen input and competition for revenue sharing allocations were non-existent. The Grant Advisory Council was completely disbanded.

By 1976, Denver's operating budget had become dependent on general revenue sharing dollars just to balance a very tight budget. Elected officials drastically underestimate their dependence on these funds, and have very few funding alternatives if Congress fails to extend the State and Local Assistance Act. The Denver situation is very similar to that of middle and large-sized cities across the nation.

The same lobbying efforts, so visible in 1972, are gearing up for another full-scale campaign in Washington. This time, however, Congressional rhetoric will center almost entirely around urban fiscal relief versus the political decentralization ideals of the "New Federalism."

B. GRANT CONSOLIDATION (SPECIAL REVENUE SHARING)

Regardless of its final impact, general revenue sharing does signify a deliberate and important change in the method of allocating federal dollars. There are other important changes, all of which call for increased policy leadership, and increased planning and management capacities at the state and local levels of government. Grant consolidation, or decategorization, is one type of adjustment in the prevailing pattern of federal expenditures. This adjustment may well have more impact on the decentralization of our federal-state-local system than general revenue sharing.

Grant consolidation was coined "special revenue sharing" by the Nixon Administration in 1973. In that year, the administration proposed to consolidate 70 categorical grant programs into four special revenue sharing programs. The term, special revenue sharing, led to some immediate confusion and false expectations; it did not provide for increased federal assistance as many thought. Despite its title, it is solely a grant consolidation effort, rather than a new source of revenue. Grant consolidation if correctly designed, can streamline the administrative process by combining existing formula grant programs into broader areas of national concern, while cutting away the red tape of multiple regulations, guidelines, and reporting requirements.

Clearly, some consolidation is needed. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, for example, administers over 300 programs--54 of these programs overlap each other, and 36 more overlap programs of other federal departments. For those 300-plus highly prescriptive programs, there are 1,200 pages of regulations printed in the Federal Register, each page leading to an average of ten more pages of interpretive guidelines (Spencer, 1973). It is no wonder that the traditional planning function of state and local social service agencies is basically reactive, responding to and interpreting this confusing maze of federal program mandates. Under this categorical system, real and creative planning and policy initiation has often been secondary to compliance with the Federal Register.

Evaluation and research functions of state and local agencies have also suffered under the categorical approach. Often these functions are merely redundant and duplicative accounting procedures mandated by separate grant authorities at the federal level, vigorously enforced by administrators touting the virtues of the accountability ethic. The problem, of course, is that the current federal system of categorical aid is itself unaccountable--politically, managerially, and electorally.

This is not to discount the need for some federal categorical programming. Clearly, as we shall see later, the wholesale elimination of these programs would endanger principles of our federal system. The problem, as we said previously, is one of balance. The explosion of new federal categorical programs during the 1960's created an unbalanced

system. New efforts at grant consolidation may restore balance, and allow state and local governments to plan creatively for the needs of their constituents--aided by, rather than hindered by, federal financial support.

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), the Housing and Community Development Act, and the Title XX Amendments to the Social Security Act are all recent grant consolidation initiatives. The major purpose of these consolidations is to provide state and local governments the flexibility to meet the special needs of their constituents. Administrative discretion, and increased state and local authority are mandatory in such a process. Increased flexibility and discretion imply a concomitant need for increased competence and expertise. That has become the major challenge for state and local governments with the advent of grant consolidation and general revenue sharing. Building the capacity of state and local governments to plan, manage, and evaluate has also become a major new federal policy.

Grant consolidation and general revenue sharing can complicate the local management of competing demands and, thus, the entire functioning of the local political system. Under CETA, Title XX, and the Housing and Community Development Act, elected officials and their administrative cadre must make conscious, political, distributive decisions which were previously determined by highly prescriptive federal guidelines. In a sense, the heat is on local elected units of government. In some cases, "local political leaders will feel the absence of the federal scapegoat" (National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, 1975), especially if they are not equipped to handle their available discretion adequately.

Local authority under CETA, for example, "presumes a policy research capability, an ability to conduct labor market research and needs analysis, a statistical information base and trained personnel who can understand the technical planning required (National Office for Social Responsibility, 1975). Few communities have this capability, and are unable to take advantage of the flexibility of the CETA program:

"Preliminary indications suggest that despite the change from federal to local administration, the methods used in delivering services, the content of the program and the clients being served, have changed very little."

The same problems exist with other grant consolidation efforts, especially the Title XX, HEW program. In some cases, however, aggressive and skillful planners and politicians have seized the initiative and bridged the traditional gap between available discretion and actual performance. One of the major problems in this new setting of sharply increased state and local responsibility is the fact that, "the planning process is not effectively integrated with the political states of decision and implementation" (National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, 1975). Planners have worked for too long in the politically neutral confines of administrative agencies under the federal categorical system. A decentralized system of government necessitates the politicization of the planning process if planning is to maintain its effectiveness and credibility; conversely, however, planners must account for political realities of bargaining, negotiating, and arbitrating competing demands for increasingly scarce resources. A major

recommendation of the study by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering (1975) is to develop techniques which "mesh planning and management skills with the political decision-making system." Grant consolidation and general revenue sharing may provide opportunities to upgrade these needed skills.

C. BLOC GRANTS

Bloc grants do not necessarily involve grant consolidation; they represent a legislated approach which attempts to minimize federal intervention, while maximizing opportunities for states to set priorities and assume responsibility for managing programs. The LEAA bloc grant program is the precursor to more widespread use of the bloc grant approach. This provided states with a great deal of discretion and very generous appropriations. The program was intended to:

- (1) encourage states and units of general local government to prepare and adopt comprehensive plans based upon their evaluation of state and local problems of law enforcement
- (2) authorize grants to states and units of local government in order to improve and strengthen law enforcement and
- (3) encourage research and development directed toward the improvement and the development of new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and the detention and apprehension of criminals (U.S. Congress, 1972, p. 3).

Like grant consolidation and forms of revenue sharing, the success of the bloc grant program is contingent on the planning, management, and evaluation capacities of state and local governments. The LEAA program, particularly in its early years, found that capacity lacking. Severe criticism has been leveled at the neglect of comprehensive planning, especially at the state level:

In most of the states surveyed, the development of the annual comprehensive plan was a lengthy, time consuming process which frequently did little to improve the distribution of the action funds or to make the program effective. . . . The states tended to go to two extremes. Some developed overly detailed plans which in effect precluded localities from their own priorities by requiring them to fit into one of the states preferred categories. Others avoided planning responsibilities entirely by filing plans which were so general in nature that almost any subsequently submitted proposal could be tailored to fall within the plan (National Urban Coalition, 1975).

The above statement could actually be an indictment of most planning at the federal, state, and local levels. Rarely is that all-important balance reached between specificity and precision on the one hand, and generalities and flexibility on the other.

The LEAA bloc grant program has also been criticized for poor coordination, inadequate funding for planning activities, and for a lack of program evaluation throughout the program (National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, 1975). Interestingly enough, the program has been severely criticized for the over-reliance on outside consultants (U.S. Congress, 1972). Overdependence on consultants does not lead to capacity building; instead, it often delays the creation of internal program competence. The success of the bloc grant approach, as with the other approaches we've mentioned is contingent on the competence of the state and local governmental jurisdictions. This is not to say that in some cases competence is lacking--many of the "best and brightest" planners and managers are at the state and local levels of government. There is also ample evidence of the need to direct some of the capacity building efforts back toward the federal level.

D. FEDERAL CATEGORICAL GRANT PROGRAMS

While changes in federal funding patterns will occur, the basic reliance on categorical grants probably will continue (75% of federal domestic program spending through 1980). The major purpose of categorical grants has been to encourage state and local governments to provide more resources to a particular activity for which they were historically responsible, but which they were not supporting adequately to satisfy objectives of national policy (Ecker-Racz, 1970). The use of categorical grants attempts to stimulate a minimum level or standard of program operation in particular functions in every state. States and local communities are encouraged (not obligated) to buy this form of a federal-state-local partnership.

Project grants and formula grants are both types of categorical aid. Formula grants are distributed on the basis of a statutory formula. State and local units of government are entitled to these grants, based upon legislated criteria such as overall population of a jurisdiction, average per capita income, and numbers of persons with special problems. Governmental units, in a sense, have a "right" to share formula grant monies. Formula grants represent a uniform federal approach to raise the level of service of specific state and local programs.

Project grants are designated for specific problems, are not uniform, and depend more on state and local initiative. Project grants are awarded on a competitive basis from administrative levels of the federal government. As designated by legislation, federal administrators may use their judgment in awarding project grants. The

distribution of this direct form of categorical funding is dependent on the state or local government's initiative in applying for these funds. Larger and better-staffed states and cities have gained the upper hand in obtaining project grants because of their mastery of a new art form within the categorical funding system called "grantsmanship" (Ecker-Racz, 1970). This refers to the ability to comprehend complex series of federal guidelines, and to produce detailed proposals for expenditure of grant monies. Many communities, especially smaller ones, are increasingly dependent on consultants who are experts at grantsmanship. This form of federal assistance is not apolitical at the administrative level regardless of guidelines and objective criteria; influence from a strong congressman or even a key administrator has often determined the eventual award of grant monies, regardless of merit.

Categorical grants-in-aid, as we mentioned, have been severely attacked for their unmanageability. There are, however, some important arguments for their retention as a form of federal assistance. Equalization and redistribution of resources has always been an important federal responsibility. Categorical grants (both project grants and formula grants) are tools of equalization. Equalization here refers to those features "which are intended to recognize that some states or some communities need or ought to have more help than others in providing a desirable level of service in the function for which the federal or state grant is being made" (Ecker-Racz, 1970, p. 174). This form of equalization is voluntary; state and local governments have the right to reject federal

funds. Each state and community must still determine the overall extent of program intervention. Federal categorical grants do, however, promote a minimum level of service in some cases, and also seek compatibility with essential national objectives. The scope of those national objectives and the degree of local and state compatibility are the subjects of politics, and the reasons for constant adjustment of the federal-state-local system.

Some categorical funding can be justified by the appropriate federal responsibility of ensuring *equity*. The federal government has constitutional obligations "to protect groups suffering discrimination, poverty or other forms of deprivation" (National Office of Social Responsibility, 1975). Other forms of categorical funds may attack problems that go beyond one state, thus accounting for *externalities*. The promotion of basic research to solve national problems is also a function of many categorical programs. This includes the direct funding of demonstration programs at the state and local level.

The problem is not necessarily the intent of each of the federal categorical programs, but the massive proliferation of them, and the resultant inefficiency and confusion of purpose. In recent years, categorical funds also have become narrower and narrower, and the funding for each has, in many cases, decreased (Spencer, 1973, p. 10. This has created a confusing paradox wherein many categorical programs proclaim grand purposes, e.g., "to prevent and control juvenile delinquency across the nation," are given extremely limited resources (\$10 million nationally), and then narrowly prescribe program interventions by a complex series of guidelines.

General revenue sharing, grant consolidation, and bloc grants, represent changes in the traditional patterns of federal funding. However, state and local governments must still plan for the constructive use of categorical funds from the federal level. To integrate this four-pronged system of federal aid effectively is a major challenge for state and local government.

Changes in the federal government have directly affected the operations of local government. What must be remembered is that cities still generate nearly two-thirds of their own total revenues and depend more on state government for revenue than on the federal government (Lineberry and Sharkansky, 1974, p. 194). Concepts like capacity building and youth services system development then, must be directed towards the better use of existing local and state resources as well as federal resources.

III. RELEVANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES: THE SEARCH FOR A METHOD TO MANAGE COORDINATION

In the course of discussing the youth services systems idea with a variety of grantees and other interested persons, it became apparent that we were all improvising answers when it came to the question of coordination, and of building "linkages" among youth-serving organizations. The air was filled with models, sure-fire structures of uniform relevance in any situation, dissenting views, and the perennial--and often well-founded--views of local persons that their case was somehow unique.

The frustration produced a search for views of organization which might shed light on or support various recommendations, and

ultimately led to a theory of coordination which both took into account the complexities of the matter, and was amenable to measurement. A systematic experimental approach to the business of coordination was desired.

A. THEORY BACKGROUND

Organizational and interorganizational theories provide ideas of relevance to the coordination problem. The youth services system concept can be seen as an application of general systems theory to the goals, organizations, and processes of local youth development and delinquency prevention efforts. The systems approach provides a series of principles, perspectives, and eventual prescriptions for the management of organizations. It is a means to an end and can be applied to any set of goals.


The Office of Youth Development used the youth services system concept to accomplish the broad goals of the Strategy for Youth Development. The YSS concept was promoted for two major reasons, as has been mentioned: (1) local government needed a mechanism to better plan for, manage, and evaluate its services--in this case, programs serving youth; and (2) a systems approach could help correct the myriad of interrelated problems that appear to cause delinquency and interfere with youth development. (The section on the Strategy describes the nature of many of these problems.)

1. The Idea of Systems


Systems theory is rooted in the biological sciences (nervous system, circulatory system, glandular system, etc.). A system is a "unity consisting in mutually interacting parts" (Ackoff, 1959), or the "totality of elements in interaction with each other" (Bertalanffy, 1956).

Everyone has an idea of systems; systems is a way of seeing things as in some way *connected*. A simple explanation is that the pipes and fixtures and tubs and sinks in a house are referred to as the plumbing system or water system. All the pipes and valves, sinks, faucets, and water heater are somehow connected together so that we perceive them as a single whole: *a set of parts which are connected or interrelated in such a way as to form a whole.*

The house's plumbing system isn't the whole system. Water comes in from somewhere, sewage goes out to somewhere. There is a larger system, including water and sewer mains, water and sewage treatment plants, the watershed, and rain. For most practical purposes, we don't look at the whole system. Householders assume that water will come in and sewage will go out and worry about what's inside the house. If a faucet drips, no one goes up to inspect the watershed to look for the problem. *We draw boundaries around the part of the system most relevant to a given purpose at a given time.* But we know that there are relevant things outside that boundary: the water might stop coming to the house. We can draw a somewhat enlarged definition of system: *a system is a combination of two or more parts which interact or are related in such a way to form a whole, and the whole itself is interacting with some larger environment.* It could be graphed like this:




Or, in the case of the house plumbing system, like this:



The interconnections aren't all mechanical. The house's plumbing system is connected to the habits of the persons who live in the house. Who gets the shower first, whether the dishwasher and the clothes

washer can run at the same time, who does the dishes, and when the lawn is watered are all somehow tied to the house's plumbing system. These habits form a system of their own, a system of behavior rather than a system of pipes and valves. The system of habits is tied to yet larger systems: who gets the shower first may depend on when Mom has to get to work or when Junior has to get to school. Some of these connections could be traced out as follows:



These connections of habits and routines have been pointed out because, generally, they are *harder to see* than mechanical or physical connections. The connections between the hot water heater and the shower faucet can be traced by following the pipes; the connection between the shower faucet and the wage earner's disposition upon arriving at work is less concrete and more difficult to trace, but no less real.

For our immediate purposes, two characteristics of systems are especially relevant. One characteristic of systems is that *changes or*

events in one part of the system have consequences in other parts of the system. If the hot water heater stops working, no hot water flows from the shower faucet, the wage earner arrives at work grouchy, and co-workers are offended in some way or another. It is easy to anticipate the immediate effect of the water heater's breaking down; the more distant effects are more difficult to anticipate. The wage-earner's disposition doesn't depend on the shower alone, but also on breakfast or on whether or not there was a traffic jam on the way to work. The consequences throughout the system of a change in one part of the system may be difficult to see or to anticipate.

The second important characteristic of a system is that the system, as a system, has effects of its own, over and above the effects of the parts of the system. A water shortage in summer cannot be explained just by looking at the way the Joneses use water or how the Smiths use water, or at the rainfall, or at the water plant. "Shortage" is a product of the system as a whole. When trying to fix some problem, the systems view suggests a look at the system as a whole, as well as attention to the parts. The problem may be a "systems effect."


These two characteristics of systems--that changes in one part will be reflected in other parts and will not always be easily anticipated, and that the system as a whole has effects over and above the effects of its parts--require that we be careful in drawing the boundaries around the system we want to look at. If the boundary is drawn too narrowly, we may overlook important considerations; if the boundary is drawn too broadly, the problem will be too complicated to solve. At any

given time, the usefulness of the system boundaries we draw should be judged according to how well they help us to explain what is going on.

2. Youth Development in a Systems Perspective


Youth development in its various aspects can be seen in terms of systems. Where we draw the system boundaries, and what we see as a consequence, can make a great difference in what we conclude about the nature of the youth problems and needs.

Individual youth can be viewed as systems of thoughts, perceptions, emotions, and physical parts and functions, all changing and interacting with each other. Some perspectives on youth development focus very narrowly on the characteristics and behavior of individual youth, and tend to give little consideration to the interactions of youth with their environments. From the point of view of OYD's Strategy, this system boundary is drawn so narrowly that it is often misleading; interactions of youth with their environments must be given more attention than has been the case in the past.




Classrooms, families, peer groups, work settings, courtrooms, and service component programs such as counseling programs can be viewed as systems, in which youth and important others are interacting with each other in a pattern of recurring activities. Some views of youth development focus narrowly on these immediate settings in which youth are found,

drawing the system boundary close around them. Personal interactions among youth, between youth and teachers, and between youth and judges receive attention. Concerns with teaching methods, counseling methods, supervision methods, and courtroom procedures are examples of this perspective. Various types of training frequently are employed in an attempt to improve interpersonal interactions in these settings.



Additional understandings are gained by drawing this somewhat broader boundary, and considerable resources currently are devoted to work in these settings. At the same time, it must be recognized that these smaller-scale settings interact with each other, and with their


environments. A teacher's acts and what consequences those acts have may be partly understood by examining the interaction of teachers and students in classrooms. There are also powerful forces from outside the classroom which bear on what happens in the classroom. "Teacher" is a person, but is also a *role*, played in accordance with the expectations of other school personnel, of teachers as a professional group, of families, and of other youth program workers, played in accordance with a set of laws and policies and standard practices, and played within the limitations of budgets and physical facilities. There are powerful forces acting on what happens in the classroom, the courtroom, the counseling program, the work setting, and the family. Exclusion of those forces from consideration leaves the analysis of youth development incomplete.



Schools and school systems, police departments, courts, welfare departments, employment agencies, and other youth-servicing organizations can be viewed as systems of staff, clients, resources, offices, and equipment, all interacting in recurring patterns of programs and procedures, and in accordance with policies and habitual practices. Within each of these agency-systems, there are topics of concern. In schools, for example, the policies and practices of testing and tracking or ability grouping have been examined, and under some conditions have been found to contribute to delinquency. In police departments and courts, the negative labeling produced by juvenile justice system processing of status offenders has been the focus of considerable attention. The effectiveness of job development, job training, and job placement functions in employment agencies has been the subject of study and activity.

At the same time, these agencies interact with each other; schools and courts interact with youth who are habitually truant or troublesome; police and courts interact with youth who have been arrested; welfare and employment agencies interact with poor youth for whom jobs are to be found. A class of problems and activities is centered around these interactions. The agencies are interdependent in other ways as well. Many of them seek funds from the same sources; they have to decide what are the needs of each agency to determine what proportion of the available resources should go to each and for what purposes.

For all the agencies, their relationships with the public, with federal, state, and local funding sources, and with organizations which make laws and set standards, are important. The diagram below presents an idea of the interrelationships involved in the community.



The system boundaries relevant to youth development could be drawn more broadly to account for more factors and parts, such as federal and state agencies, but for the immediate purposes of this analysis, the above boundary, drawn at the level of a city or county, or

major sector of a city or county, is sufficient. Individual youth; immediate small-scale settings such as the classroom and the family; and major organizations such as the schools, police, courts, welfare, employment agencies, and the local governments have been included. Important connections between the community system and its environment have been noted. Each broadening of the view has added important understandings of youth development.

In addressing youth problems and needs, it is necessary to keep in mind the various system levels involved and the interconnections among them. It is especially necessary to make the most appropriate and most explanatory choice of boundaries for the analysis of problems, in order to include the critical factors without which the analysis would be inadequate or incorrect.

Failure to keep in mind the full range of issues has been the source of misdirection in youth development. Many programs and considerable resources have been occupied and preoccupied with the characteristics and conditions of individual youth. When youth have been perceived as truant, delinquent, maladjusted, troublesome or disturbed, frequently it has been assumed that the problem is within the youth. This conclusion has lead to a multitude of treatment programs such as counseling and therapy, all intended to change individual youth. While it is clear that some youth may be in a condition which warrants such treatments, in general they have been overused and inappropriately used and factors in the youth's environment have been ignored.

Likewise, many programs have concentrated attention on the immediate small-scale settings such as the family, the peer group, and the classroom. Teacher training, family counseling, and the various peer programs are examples of the work done from this perspective. Again, there is some validity to the perspective, but it overlooks, ignores, or gives low priority to forces outside those small-scale settings which can have powerful effects on what happens within those settings. A program of teacher training undertaken without simultaneous attention to school law and policy is a questionable effort.

Least attention has been paid to the broader scope of major organizations and their interaction with each other and with their environments. It is not hard to understand why this has been so--the broader questions are more difficult to address because there are more contingencies and complexities.

While the preoccupation with individual and smaller-scale considerations is understandable, it is not therefore less distressing. The larger-scale institutional character of many youth development problems has been ignored steadfastly. This has not, in reality, made the smaller-scale ventures more manageable. It has simply made them more likely to fail, because they fail to take important external forces into account.

The *system of reference*--the set of considerations around which we draw a boundary for purposes of analysis--for youth development must include the larger-scale issues of the major organizations of cities and counties, must include the interactions of these major organizations

with each other, and must include some of the important interactions of these agencies with entities outside the local system. Within such a system of reference, then, greater attention must be paid to the larger system-wide issues. If this is done, programs aimed at smaller-scale settings and at individual youth can be put in their proper perspective and applied more appropriately.

3. Organizations as Systems

All organizations can be regarded as systems. The following brief exploration of organizational theory will document the emergence of a systems approach to management.

The study of organizations was dominated for many years by a "closed system" perspective. This perspective failed to account for external or environmental factors and how they influence organizations. The closed system approach (often called the "scientific" or the "classical" school of management) was dominated by four major concerns: (1) the *division of labor* or work task specialization; (2) the *chain of command* and delegation of responsibility; (3) the *span of control* or the number of subordinates a supervisor can effectively supervise; and (4) the internal *structure* of the organization (Scott, 1961). Structures are logical relationships of functions arranged to accomplish goals.

The closed system approach assumes that: (1) everything in the organization is functional, (2) all resources are appropriate, (3) there is elimination of uncertainty, (4) all outcomes are predictable, (5) the ultimate criterion is efficiency and performance, and (6) the

organization only incorporates those values associated with goal achievement (Thompson, 1967). The closed system approach is characterized by a constant "thrust to routinize, limit uncertainty, increase predictability and centralize functions and controls. . . it is an incessant trend towards bureaucratization" (Perrow, 1970).

The closed system perspective for organizations is essentially obsolete, at least by itself. This approach could only be applied to organizations which are not affected by outside influences (almost an impossibility in modern times), and organizations which have a very routinized technology. Routine technology, in this case, means:

. . . that two conditions are present. . . there are well established techniques which are sure to work and these are applied to essentially similar raw materials. That there is little uncertainty about methods and little variety or change in the tasks that must be performed (Perrow, 1970).

Many modern organizations (certainly human service organizations) are vulnerable to outside influences, and they have very non-routine tasks to perform (preventing juvenile delinquency). We should not totally disregard, however, the principles of the closed system approach to management. Some organizations still adopt much of the closed system logic. For example, organizations that process social security forms and perform other income maintenance tasks can logically incorporate certain principles outlined by older closed system theorists. The technology is fundamentally routine and the program goals are fairly consistent over time.

Organizational theorists had to develop a better perspective. An "open systems" approach to management was needed to

account for factors other than internal structure and formal organizational principles. The neoclassical or human relations schools of management provided impetus for a more complex approach. The human relations school recognized that people who come into an organization as employees bring with them predispositions and needs generated by the larger social system. It was concerned with mediating the inevitable conflict within the organization between employee or human needs and organizational or structural needs. Studies of informal organization began to highlight factors unexplained by a closed system approach. Employee motivation, group behavior, professional loyalty, self-actualization, and other social-psychological factors began to dominate studies of organization. This approach was a first step toward recognizing influences that the extra-organizational environment has on internal operations. By acknowledging that employees are not puppets to be manipulated by management, it took account of one neglected external influence.

The approach still overlooked other critical factors affecting goal achievement, notably, general economic conditions, community sentiment, and interdependence (recognized or not) with other organizations. What still was needed (and to a large extent *is* needed today) was a mixed model, combining elements of the closed system approach, the human relations movement, and the newer concepts of general systems theory (the latter providing a broader view of interdependencies with the organization's environment):

The closed-system strategy seeks certainty by incorporating only those variables positively

associated with goal achievement and subjecting them to a monolithic control network. The open system strategy shifts attention from goal achievement to survival and incorporates uncertainty by recognizing organizational interdependence with the environment. A newer tradition enables us to conceive of the organization as an open system, indeterminate and faced with uncertainty but subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing certainty (Thompson, 1967, p. 13).

The above statement recognizes the influence of outside factors on an organization but also calls for the management of the impact of those factors to the extent possible.

An integrated systems view of organizations recognizes the following (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1973, p. 13). An organization is:

1. *a subsystem* of its broader environment; and
2. *goal-oriented*--people with a purpose; comprising
3. *a technical subsystem*--people using knowledge, techniques, equipment facilities;
4. *a structural subsystem*--people working together on integrated activities;
5. *a psychosocial subsystem*--people in social relationships and coordinated by
6. *a managerial subsystem*--planning controlling the overall endeavor.

To understand how an organization operates, or to discover why it is successful or not, one must thoroughly examine at least the above six components of an organization.

The following will examine three of the most critical factors which have an effect on the design and effectiveness of organizations: (1) *size* (the number of employees affects the operations and structure of an organization); (2) *technology* (the characteristic of the

work within an organization; and (3) the *environment* (the external factors and their impact on the organization's structure and function).

a. Organizational Size and Structure

The actual number of employees in an organization can directly affect its internal structure. Increasing size can be correlated with increasing numbers of organizational levels or hierarchical differentiation and the number of organizational divisions or horizontal differentiation (Blau, 1970).

Greater numbers of employees can increase the need for internal coordination and thus enlarge the administrative component of an organization. According to Blau (1970), increasing size leads to increased internal differentiation (increasing levels of hierarchy, more functional divisions and subunit sections and occupational specialities as reflected by official job titles or positions). This, in turn, necessitates a larger administrative apparatus: more managers and supervisors.

The overall effects of increasing size are somewhat contradictory and are also dependent on technological and environmental factors. For example, if the technology of an organization is routine (standardized and predictable), then increasing numbers of employees will affect the complexity and formality of its structure (Hall, 1972). This relationship between size and structure does not hold for non-routine technology (unstandardized and unpredictable).

In the development of youth services systems, we have examined numerous relationships between large and small organizations. In many cases grantee organizations vary their strategies for joint

endeavors, depending upon the actual size of the linking organization as well as upon its structure. The number of employees and effect of that number on structure should be accounted for in collaborative strategies for joint agency coordination. The interaction between the variables of size and technology can lead to a strong determinate of organizational structure.

b. Technology and Structure

The characteristics of the work itself in an organization can greatly determine not only the formal structure, but informal activities, individual behavior, and a number of other factors. Technology "is defined as a technique or complex of techniques employed to alter materials (human or non-human, mental or physical) in an anticipated manner" (Perrow, 1967). More simply, technology refers to those "methods used to obtain a result" (Scott and Mitchell, 1972).

There are a number of ways to classify different types of technology. Thompson identifies three types of technology (Thompson, 1967): (1) *long-linked technology*, which involves serial interdependence and is the sequence of a large number of inter-related tasks (assembly line); (2) *mediating technology*, which is a linking function between customers and clients who wish to be interdependent; and (3) *intensive technology*, which focuses a variety of techniques and skills to bring about a change, and in which the appropriate technique or skill is determined by examination of the specific subject at hand.

Increased technical complexity, as found in intensive technologies or unit or small batch production, can also lead to more

complex forms of organizational structure. The degree of uncertainty connected with technology affects structure. Uncertainty, according to Galbraith (1973):

. . . is defined as the difference between the amount of information required to perform the task and the amount of information already possessed by the organization.

The greater the task uncertainty (more complex technologies, such as planning for human service program reform, necessarily deal with uncertain, non-routine technologies), the "greater the amount of information that must be processed among decision makers during task execution to achieve a given level of performance" (Galbraith, 1973). The predictability or certainty of the work then is a "basic conditioning variable in the choice of organizational forms" or structures.

In some organizations, uncertain, non-routine technologies are a given day-to-day factor. Sayles and Chandler (1971), in describing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's program, mention the enormous structural problems associated with the highly uncertain technologies of the manned space program. The tremendous need for "organizational interdependence" seems to be the key variable associated with the uncertain technologies of NASA."

When NASA first started the scientists who dominated it then believed that controls, and especially of computer based information would run the system. They were soon disabused. . . . Personal relationships are the only thing that prevents breakdown in the systems structure. There is a constant need for arbitration of conflicts between various members of the system for adjudication of disputes on jurisdiction, on budgets, on people, on priorities and so on. The most important people regardless of their job descriptions spent most of their time keeping the machinery running (Drucker, 1974).

CONTINUED

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Preventing crime and delinquency may be a more complex and uncertain technology than putting a man on the moon. The NASA effort required the coordinated interdependence of hundreds of separate organizations. Preventing delinquency requires the interdependence of local institutions and agencies.

To complicate things further, organizations also have different types of technology within their structures. If we use Parson's approach (1960), technology varies within an organization between three distinct levels of organizational structure: *technical*, *managerial*, and *institutional*. Technology differs between these three levels by function and degree of routinization. Most organizations attempt to make the technical level the most routine or standardized. Rules and guidelines are tools used to standardize the work or behavior of employees at this level. The managerial level "standardizes the situation" for the technical level. The managerial level controls the technical level by the "factoring of the general goals into subgoals and these into subgoals and so on until concrete routines are reached" (Hampton, Sumner, and Webber, 1968). The institutional level determines broad goals, purposes, and direction for the entire organization. The institutional level, often called the executive level, also must constantly adjust the organization's relationship to the larger environment and insure adaptability and maintain societal relevance. This responsibility includes regulating relationships with other organizations, especially competitors. Technology is always inter-related with the impact of external factors (or the environment) on the organization.

c. Environmental Factors and Structure

Organizational success is largely determined by the ability to modify the goals and purposes of an organization in accordance with the demands of the environment. Organizations are always part of a much larger societal system.

Just as a living system organism survives by adapting to stimuli . . . a corporate organization survives by adapting its purpose, content and structure to changes taking place within itself and its eco-system (Erickson, 1969).

Transactions with elements of an organization's environment are the very essence of organizational effectiveness. The internal configuration or structure of an organization is contingent on the degrees of uncertainty or turbulence of the environment. For example, the decision to use a hierarchical or collegial structure should be dependent on the degree of outside pressure or external factors on an organization. When demands of the environment are clearly understood and relatively consistent, then a hierarchical structure may be more suitable (Katz and Kahn, 1966). If, on the other hand, the environment is changing rapidly, and the organization must be receptive to changing demands, then a more democratic or collegial structure is advisable (Katz and Kahn, 1966). Governmental research and planning organizations, for example, are more successful with a collegial design because they must relate directly to the dynamic, ever changing political system. A hierarchical structure for this kind of organization greatly impedes effectiveness.

The effects of economics and competition are environmental factors and are not limited to the private sector. Public agencies,

especially in times of budget cutting, must compete for limited public funds. Even in the planned economy of public expenditures, competition is fierce and often greatly resembles corporate competitiveness in the open market system. The concept "the public interest" is highly interpretive and left wide open for the marketing techniques of public service agencies:

It is not difficult for an administrator, even of a delinquency prevention program, to conclude that cooperation with another agency, unless it is on his own terms will threaten his autonomy and threaten the wisdom of his approach or program. We might even say that where the technology is not well developed, as in the case of delinquency prevention and juvenile rehabilitation, the basis for cooperation among organizations is most precarious. For each agency becomes wedded to its imperfect techniques, [and] is the more defensive the more they are not demonstrably effective, and have not rational basis of improving the inferiority of competing techniques (Perrow, 1970, p. 128).

The environment can be divided into three broad categories (Osborn and Hunt, 1974). The macro-environment is the general cultural context for the organization's specific geographical area. It contains those forces which influence organizational characteristics and outputs. Components of the *macro-environment* include economic, education, legal, political, and socio-cultural institutions. The *aggregation environment* consists of associations, interest groups, and constituencies operating within a given macro-environment. The *task environment* (Dill, 1958) is that "part of the total environment of management which is potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment." This environment includes customers or clients, suppliers of material (including labor, and materials), and competitors.

The effective organization manages, at the institutional level, the overall impact of environmental factors for the rest of the organization. The institutional level, as we have stated, must rationalize the effects of environment. It must be emphasized that the organizational environmental relationship is reciprocal; an organization has a dual relationship with its environment:

First the environment imposes certain constraints within which the system must more or less live. . . . But systems not only respond to their environments; they also act upon them (Child, 1972).

d. Organizational Interdependence

The study of organizational interdependence is relatively new, but crucial, to discovering solutions to modern complex problems.

Bluntly speaking, social purposes in modern society increasingly exceed the capacities of complex organizations and call instead for action by multi-organization complexes. . . what emerges. . . is a marshalling of resources from diverse sources in an effective sequence to bring about a result beyond the ability of any single organization (Thompson, 1967).

Organizational interdependence describes the relationships between organizations. It is a component of an organization's environment. It is discussed separately here because of its importance to the youth services system concept. Solutions to juvenile delinquency and crime are beyond the reach of one agency. The solution depends on the successful coordination and cooperation of numerous agencies. Although that is a very difficult undertaking, there is evidence that one can purposely design organizations to better deal with organizational interdependence. This requires systematically taking into account (and measuring) factors such

as size, technology, organizational environment, and structure. A number of writers have addressed this issue (See Appendix A). In its work on developing youth services systems, OYD has placed greatest emphasis on a series of propositions developed by Eugene Litwak. These are summarized in the next section of this paper.

B. TOWARD A MEASURED EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO COORDINATION

While it was apparent that relevant organization theory offered any number of fruitful avenues of investigation, the pressing practical problems remained: those of identifying a specific set of variables with a specific posited relation to interorganizational effectiveness, and finding ways to measure those variables in a procedure which would let organizations measure, experiment with their relations, measure again for change, and assess the desirability of the change. A way was needed to permit organizations to manage their relations systematically.

It happened that, under a contract with SRS/HEW, Eugene Litwak had assembled such a set of propositions (1970). In 1974, in the course of conversations with a YSS project, his work came to light, seminars were held, and a set of measures were produced. These measures were used both as part of standard reporting with YSS grantees (Planning and Reporting Formats, 1975), and later in assessment projects of other types (Oakland, California, CAR, Inc., 1975; Polk County, Iowa, CAR, Inc., 1975; BREC, Volume 12, 1975).

The coordination propositions being used examine several aspects of the setting in which organizations work and of their manner of

relating with each other. The first consideration in the setting is *interdependence*--the degree to which organizations must take each other into account in order to accomplish their goals. Some cases of interdependence are crystal clear, as when there is a strong public demand for a program which will require two or more organizations to work together. They must take each other into account in order to satisfy their goals of satisfying the public. Other cases are not so clear, as when there is a group of youth who need a joint program which could be, but is not, provided by two organizations. Unless there is some way to notice that those youth are worse off for the lack of the program, the interdependence between the organizations may never be noticed. Noticed or not, it still has consequences.

Organizations can be competitively or facilitatively interdependent. They are competitive if, to accomplish one organization's goals, another organization must be prevented from achieving its goals. They are facilitatively interdependent if neither organization can attain its goals without helping the other. Organizations which get funds from the same sources, for example, are competitively interdependent with respect to the funds needed to attain the goal of preservation and growth of the organization. They may be competitive, even though their announced service goals are in accord, and that competitiveness may be a barrier to their cooperation.

Interdependence is one aspect of the setting in which organizations operate. Other aspects are: (1) the degree to which they officially recognize their interdependence by taking steps, such as appointing

liaison personnel or providing policies for coordination; (2) the degree to which the exchange between the organization is standard, predictable, or routine; (3) the volume of exchanges between them; and (4) the type of internal structure each of the organizations has (some are more formal and bureaucratic, some more informal).

Each of these characteristics of the setting makes a difference in how the organizations relate to each other. One proposition says that the more standard, routine, and predictable the thing being exchanged, the more formal rules and procedures should be, in order to make the exchange more efficient and to minimize dependence on the memory of the person who has the job but may leave. If the exchange is non-routine, complex, and unpredictable, there should be fewer rules, and the exchanges should be handled by persons who can set precedents and commit the organization. This proposition may explain why many attempts at procedural coordination fail; they may be dealing with matters too unpredictable and complex.

Among the ways organizations relate to each other, the propositions OYD has adopted for testing deal with (1) the degree to which rules and formal procedures are used; (2) the level (rank) of the person who handles the exchange; (3) the type of occasion at which exchange takes place (board room or bar, for example); and (4) the type of communication which takes place (open free exchange of information as opposed to guarded or manipulated communication.) Different settings require different relations, with respect to clients, money, planning, information, and staff exchanges.

These propositions are not taken as gospel. Rather, they are used because they illuminate major aspects of interorganizational relationships, because they allow decision makers to consider many (possibly contradictory) possibilities at the same time, and because, using the instrument developed to measure the different characteristics, they allow decision makers to take charge of a deliberate, methodical adjustment of relationships and to know what has changed.

None of the work to date has produced empirical confirmation of the validity of the propositions as they were instrumented. The experience has shown that the information which is produced by using the measures and by invoking the appropriate propositions is a highly stimulating activity for persons concerned with coordination; it causes them to think about interorganizational relationships in new ways. The heuristic value of the procedure, if not the theoretical validity, has been established.

Research is continuing to strengthen the theoretical grounding for the work, to refine and extend the measures, and to find methods to test the initial propositions. This is a viable line of work which is likely to have general applicability to coordination problems in several fields in the future.

Because the procedure is reported nowhere else at present, we include a working description of the method, in its entirety, in Appendix B.

IV. REVIEW OF THE IDEA OF YOUTH SERVICES SYSTEMS

For historical reasons which were described in the Introduction, OYD's Youth Services System Program began by funding a variety of programs. Even at the time, the programs did not directly address the assumptions and propositions being made about youth services systems, and as the ideas evolved, the programs seemed to have less relevance to what was intended. This may have been an inevitable outcome of attempting programming with evolving ideas. In any case, while the variety of grantees did not uniformly address the propositions, many did provide the opportunity to conduct developmental work on the ideas, and on approaches and methods for coordination.

As has been mentioned, the techniques were not available to create research designs which would ask whether system development (interorganizational work) produced desirable specific outcomes for youth.

It is especially important to limit the discussion to the apparent technical products of the development work; no more than subjective (we hope plausible) arguments can be made about the utility of the youth services system as it has been viewed. Before going on to redescribe the youth services system notion in current terms, and before bringing up any conclusions about the relevance of the idea, it may be well to set out general criteria and possible evaluation approaches for any future efforts.

A. GENERAL RATIONALE AND POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING
THE UTILITY OF YOUTH SERVICES SYSTEMS

The success of youth services system development efforts should be judged first against a list of the goals which the system tactics are intended to attain. Failing that, a case for success would have to be based on the argument that there is a change which will lead to attainment of those goals in the future, or on the argument that the effort creates a generalized capability which supports efforts which attain those goals. If the judgment is favorable on one or more of these grounds, then an additional judgment could be made as to whether the new and desirable arrangements are likely to persist.

1. Impact

The ultimate impact of system development should be judged according to the degree to which:

a. It produces institutional change demonstrably consonant with the Strategy;

b. It increases the ability of youth serving programs to implement the Strategy, or to assist disabled or disadvantaged youth of various categories to assume or reassume a satisfactory course of development; and

c. It produces change by which services demonstrably are better aligned with need, e.g., less unnecessary service, fewer needs for which no service exists, or the same or more demonstrably effective service for a lower cost.

To link measured changes in system relationships (independent variables) with measured impact on youth (dependent variables) in a single objective evaluation is more than the current state of theoretical and procedural development can do. There are measures of some aspects of systems change, and there are measures of impact on youth; these measures have not been systematically or thoroughly linked in a single theoretical scheme with posited relations as independent and dependent variables. The best that seems possible is to use both sets of measures simultaneously, linking them with a thorough anecdotal history or description of the work, so as to establish some judgmental grounds for assessing whether system development work appears to have direct or indirect connections to the desired outcomes.

A combination of the system description measures (Appendix B) could be employed together with a detailed narrative history. To change measurably the relationship and flow of clients between the school and the juvenile court, and then to establish that the changed handling of youth had an improved impact, would come close to making a case, if properly supported by a chronological narrative.

2. Intermediate Outcomes

Failing a demonstration of ultimate impact, an assessment could be based on judgments or measures of whether the likelihood is increased that the system development will produce desirable impact in the future, or on judgments of the extent to which the system development effort has produced a *general* capability which supports effectively more specific efforts which do have the desired ultimate impact. Such judgments might be based on:

a. The degree to which system development work leads to instrumental use of Strategy ideas and measures to make observable, measured changes in specific programs;

b. An increased frequency of observable chains of action from statements of policy at high levels, to consistent plans and programs at mid-levels, to consistent activities at the service level, which can be and are evaluated;

c. Increased use of valid, reliable measurement tools in a systematic program development activity, in the participating agencies; and

d. By joint programming, a reduction of those perceived externalities which, for any given program, make sufficiently powerful program efforts impossible. In part, this judgment might be based on accounts describing that "loose ends" or "related problems" had been addressed by joining programs.

Again, while all the available, valid, and reliable measures and standards can and should be employed in such assessments, the information will have to be tied together by extensive anecdotal reporting.

B. RECAPITULATION OF THE PURPOSES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUTH SERVICES SYSTEMS

Before proceeding to any conclusion about the future utility of the youth services system idea, it is desirable to redescribe what that idea may be, drawing on the experience and work since the present effort started. Admittedly, this approach will base the assessment on

the plausibility of current statements of the idea, rather than on the demonstrated product of projects apparently undertaken toward the realization of the idea.

The purposes of youth services system development is to establish, in the network of youth development in local communities, new patterns of organization and procedure. These new patterns should be more capable than the old ones in dealing efficiently with a complex set of possibly inconsistent intentions, expectations, and demands.

1. Review of Assumptions

The assumptions underpinning youth services systems at the start, as well as those added since, attempt to characterize that complex set of intentions, expectations, and demands. Among the assumptions are the following:

The growing problem of financing all governments, especially cities and counties, makes it increasingly necessary to wring greater results from resources already committed. Hopes cannot be pinned on the prospect of large new commitments of public (or private) resources. Progress in youth development must come from an examination of and change in the use of already available resources. A systems perspective is intended as a mode of analysis and modification of standing systems. A major part of the change in the use of present resources will be to move resources from where they are not needed to where they are, based upon changing times and priorities. A system approach seeks the breadth and coherence which can notice the relevant relations and distributions, and make a sensible and deliberate change.

The validity of Strategy guided institutional change as a route to youth development has greater empirical support now than at the beginning of the youth services system effort. The Strategy identifies a class of needs which very often cannot be fulfilled in a single organization or on a small scale. A youth services system is intended to assemble the relationships necessary to address these needs, which, it has been demonstrated, must be taken into account in future youth programs.

Demands for greater effectiveness, greater coherence, and greater accountability in youth development, and in human services in general, remain in force and grow in strength. The youth services system idea includes the intention to develop within the system the technical capabilities and relationships which address those demands.

While the combination and direction of changes in patterns of federal relationships and funding have not been precisely as expected, emerging patterns of general and special revenue sharing, program consolidation, bloc granting, and categorical programming (and the federal-state-local relationships which accompany them), continue to place large and increasing demands on the political and technical abilities of states and local governments to plan and manage youth development. Youth services systems are intended to provide those capabilities.

Categorical federal programs, which apparently will persist in large numbers, continue to lack coherence with the more permanent lines of effort in states and localities, continue not to be assumed by local governments at the grant's end, and continue to be unable to address inevitable externalities which always are beyond the scope of the guidelines. The youth services system is intended to create a coherent

local context in which the federal priorities stated in categorical legislation could be addressed in an efficient, coherent, and supportive way.

2. Restatement of Youth Services Systems Structures and Processes

The communities and the society of the United States may be seen as a social system, a unity consisting of mutually interacting parts. This system can be neither understood nor changed except as a system; many social changes require taking into account the systemic nature of the problem being addressed, precisely because there are major interconnections, mutual limitations, and interdependencies.

Major elements of the social system of communities and of the American society are those key social institutions--the polity, the family, education, work, and justice--which are the primary arenas for youth development. These institutions may be described as systems or as subsystems of the whole. The Strategy indicates that substantial long-term progress in youth development must come from change in these major social institutions.

The youth services system idea is directed to the relatively enduring "technical subsystem" and the "managerial subsystem" of these major institutional systems. Access to the technical and managerial subsystems of an institution is most easily gained through major youth-serving organizations in the community that represent that institution: the polity in local government, education in the schools, justice in

law enforcement and the courts, work in manpower and employing organizations, and the family (in a less direct but relevant sense) in those agencies which protect the survival and integrity of the family, e.g., welfare agencies. The youth services system idea argues that a viable direct route to the desired institutional change is through work with the elected officials, the administrators, the technicians, and the workers of those organizations. While the natural change of social institutions may be seen to be complex, large-scale, and long-term, it can be argued that the functionaries of the key organizations, organized properly, are capable of making the sustained and skillful efforts by which the evolution of our social institutions can be shaped.

In order to find the right structure for joint work by local governments and key organizations, it will be necessary to take into account not only the size and complexity of the participating organizations, but particularly the technologies they have and must apply, and the environments in which they operate. While some important aspects of their work may be handled by long-linked and mediating technologies, which are relatively more routine, the bulk of the work will involve intensive technologies which require a variety of techniques and skills; deal with substantial uncertainty and nonrepetition; require choosing the appropriate technique based on information coming from the subject matter itself; and require a larger amount of information to be processed among decision makers during task execution. The structure of the youth services system must include the technical capability and relationships to apply advanced intensive technologies.

The efforts will have to involve the institutional, managerial, and technical layers of the relevant organizations. It will be necessary to determine new broad goals; to adjust organizational relationships to environments. If the organization is to adapt it will be necessary to factor goals into subgoals until new concrete routines are reached, and to carry these routines through in a systematic way.

It is predictable that these organizations will have to make adjustments to relevant sectors of their operating environments. The main organizations compose environments for each other. Another highly relevant feature of the task environment for these organizations is the federal and state governments which they must accommodate. The public and its many private organizations must be taken into account; they compose a critical feature of the macro-environment. Various cross-cutting associations of professionals and citizens must be taken into account, as parts of the aggregation environment. It is predictable that these environmental factors will affect the individual and the shared structure, the leadership, the styles of supervision, the degree of internal control, the choice of technology, the employee selection, and other aspects of the organization which must be created.

In addition, it will be necessary to find out whether conflict or cooperation are more useful in given instances and why certain types of cooperation work. While it will be desirable to employ both interpenetrating and boundary-spanning relationships, it will be desirable to avoid the proliferation of the supraorganizational units which seem only to complicate matters. That is, the intent is to establish new

relationships among the existing members, not to create a whole new player to complicate matters further. The effort seeks what is described as a high level of cooperation among the organizations. (For further discussion of these issues, see Appendix A.) Of course, these desired organizational arrangements ought to be sought in an experimental way, employing the best possible measures.

SUMMARY

The youth services system idea involves studying and systematically rearranging the structure and the procedures of managerial and technical subsystems of communities. The goals are to produce a greater capacity to effect needed institutional change, and to satisfy persistent demands for better use of existing resources, for greater effectiveness, for greater accountability, for accommodation to changing patterns of federal, state, and local relations and funding, and for timely and coherent responses to the national priorities often expressed in categorical programs.

All of these considerations add depth to the early view of youth services systems that began this chapter, without compromising that view in any fundamental way. The final form or structure of a youth services system is contingent upon an interactive political process which must include the following elements of the community: the elected officials within that jurisdiction; agencies with responsibility for serving youth and their families, client and community representatives; and the private sector. A highly skilled technical staff provides the information

upon which decisions can be made by the policy makers on the council or board. These decisions are not based solely upon cost-benefit data, but focus upon the goals of the Strategy (access to desirable social roles, elimination of negative labeling, and reduction of alienation). Delinquent behavior will be reduced if youth services are oriented toward both what is good and desirable and what is efficient.

A variety of federal agencies have expressed considerable interest in "capacity-building," which is defined to mean many things by many people, but has in common some intent to increase the capability of states and localities to plan and manage human and youth development. Our conclusion is that the Office of Youth Development's Youth Services System Program produced a set of usable ideas and methods appropriate for that organizational capability.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Planned Experimentation: The Viability of the Approach

PLANNED EXPERIMENTATION: THE VIABILITY OF THE APPROACH

This chapter examines the viability of the approach, three elements of which have been described in preceding chapters. The Strategy, institutional change, and systems development constitute a complex of ideas about appropriate goals and effective means. In assessing viability, these ideas are considered together. The question is whether the approach is *practically usable*. Does it guide persons to appropriate actions? Can it be applied in concrete situations? What resources are prerequisites for using the approach?

We wish to address these questions in the framework of what is the *fourth* element of the approach, a method of "planned experimentation, which we will argue should be used to guide application of the other elements. Planned experimentation sets tasks for implementation and makes demands on the ideas being employed. Against these demands and tasks, practicality will be judged.

I. IMPLEMENTATION TASKS AND PLANNED EXPERIMENTATION

Effective implementation of any approach to youth development and delinquency prevention, particularly the set of ideas in question, makes a series of stringent demands on the persons and organizations which apply the ideas:

Programs should be guided by valid theories concerning issues which are being acted upon.

The theories should provide criteria which guide practical judgments.

It will be necessary to adopt precise practical specifications for the desired outcomes, for desirable institutional arrangements, and for desirable interorganizational relations.

If the program is to be implemented or tested, there must be sufficient control to realize the specifications.

To assess the current situation, or to evaluate the extent and desirability of any changes in that situation, it will be necessary to measure Strategy variables, to measure institutional changes, and to measure aspects of system relationships.

Unless it is to be argued that desirable outcomes and effective methods should be discovered and rediscovered independently in each place an attempt is made, it must be possible to transfer information about outcomes and methods from one place to another well enough to permit replication.

Relationships among specific situations of interest and the relevant portions of their environments must be taken into account.

It is argued that to the extent that these demands are not satisfied, the intended outcomes will not be achieved, or will not be known, and no systematic improvement will occur in the means for implementation.

The demands and tasks can be seen together in the idea of planned experimentation (Figure 3, page 172), which can be defined as (1) development of *theory*, supporting (2) empirical *assessment* of *existing* situations, leading to (3) *objective setting*--adopting




Figure 3

measurable specifications for the *intended* situation. The task then turns to (4) *program designs* specifying the needed actions, and to (5) *implementation*, requiring the realization of specifications. The final steps (6) are *evaluation* of acts, their outcomes, and the impact on youth, which (7) in *feedback*, is used methodically to correct failings in the sequence.

The sequence is intended to take advantage of strong theory and of an empirical base to determine a very systematic approach to problems, and to derive maximum benefit from experience. Often the sequence does not occur in the order depicted. The exigencies of operation in any given place make it equally likely that any initiative will start at evaluation, objective-setting, or assessment. Further, this scientific procedure interacts with political and organizational concerns, which may be rational but still not accommodating to the approach.

In the youth services system structure presented earlier, there is an attempt to channel the political and technical considerations in an interaction between a powerful political forum and a technically capable, supporting staff. Even if that works, however, experience suggests that the literal sequence would not be guaranteed.

The argument may be made that the *logical*, if not *chronological* sequence should be pursued vigorously even in the midst of the inevitable ambiguity. Current research and demonstration operations may illustrate the problem. Descriptions of research and demonstration programming often suggests that if an idea can be tested and found suitable in one form and in some places, standards can be developed which will permit the idea to be implemented successfully in other places without the trouble of the extensive pre-planning, planning, design, monitoring, and evaluation. This is not always the case. To start, there may be unnoticed, unmeasured external factors in a test site which are necessary for the success of the program, but which are not duplicated in sites to which the demonstration is to be transferred. Second, the critical program ideas being transferred often are complex, and even subtle; the possibility of failing to convey the critical specifications of the program is always present. Third, any transferred program must adapt to its new environment, and that adaptation presents occasions for adjustments which remove or modify one or more critical characteristics of what was intended.

Taking such problems into account, it may be argued that, *in every locality, there should be at least a minimum capability to operate a planned experimental sequence on an empirical base.* The technical component of a youth services system is intended to provide this basic capability. The capability is as organizational as it is technical. Having the capability seems to provide two major advantages to a locality.

First, the facility for planned experimentation creates a *reception system* for programs tried in other places and thought to be

relevant to local conditions. Having the capability for planned experimentation permits careful screening and assessment of relevant ideas, permits appropriate planning to take place, and permits the evaluation which will allow the program to be adapted to the site and adjusted until it is determined that it works, or should be abandoned. Second, the same capability for planned experimentation offers the possibility of a continuous systematic pursuit of guided change. Conditions, needs, and resources are not constants in any locale; it is not possible to adopt some set of optimum programs, lock them in, and be set for the future.

Planned experimentation offers the prospect that changing conditions, needs, and resources may be detected and addressed in a continuous fashion. The capability for guided adaptation to inevitable change may be a critical innovation for the communities of the United States. So, while the chronological sequence may be troublesome, the logical sequence of planned experimentation should be pursued, and it is possible to propose a practical standard: *whatever their time order, the logical elements of the sequence should make sense in relation to each other, over reasonable periods of time.* If an evaluation is conducted, and the results are negative, over a reasonable period of time these should be addressed in objectives and in programs. If new and promising theoretical perspectives emerge, work should go on to instrument and apply them.

These are as much political and organizational matters as they are technical matters. The files are full of evaluations which were ignored, not because they were shoddy evaluations, but because the groundwork for their acceptance was not laid, because political machinery could

not facilitate their acceptance, or because the necessary organization had not been created to make systematic use of the findings. Promoting planned experimentation as a technical process, and then moving to create the organizational and political conditions needed to sustain it, will be a prerequisite for sensible programs in youth development.

II. PRACTICE: FACTORS BEARING ON IMPLEMENTATION

The vehicle for the implementation of the approach which has been presented has been a grant program from the Office of Youth Development. The Youth Services System Program provided funds to a variety of public and private grantees for staff, operating expenses, and services. As has been mentioned, most of these grants were let before very thorough articulation of the approach, and, in many cases, supported work only indirectly relevant to the approach which has been described here.

Further, many associated with the effort came to feel that the availability of the grant funds obscured a fundamental characteristic of the approach. To overstate the criticism a bit, staffs were so busy administering grant funds and services that they never got around to attempting change.

Currently, OYD is supporting work in which the ideas alone are made available to communities through technical assistance, with no provision of grant funds for staff or operating expense. So far, eleven states and communities have taken up the offer, and others are interested. It appears that the absence of grant funds does make it possible to have a more straightforward conversation about what is intended and how it will be done.

Despite problems, the Youth Services System Program provided many opportunities to observe "how it goes." Out of those observations, and with the expectation that it may guide future sponsors of such enterprises, we discuss here some factors which may bear on successful implementation of the approach.

A. PRACTICE

Youth services system grantees were asked to address five goals:

1. to increase youth access to desirable social roles,
2. to reduce negative labeling of youth,
3. to reduce youth alienation,
4. to assist disadvantaged and disabled youth to assume or resume a satisfactory course of development, and
5. to increase the general capacity of the youth services system.

Individual projects demonstrated understanding of and commitment to each of the five goals through objectives and action plans submitted as part of the quarterly reporting requirement. The format of the MBO (Management-by-Objectives) and the instructions and suggestions guiding its use were intended to promote activities consistent with the goals derived from the Strategy propositions.

Project plans for FY75 were coded and machine aggregated for the purposes of generalized reporting and of providing a sense of an overall planning effort within which to place the efforts of specific

projects. The aggregation procedure permitted judgments on the basis of a series of dimensions.

Definers: Those structural features, e.g., statutes, regulations, contracts, policies, routine practices, and community values, which support existing arrangements and which are, consequently, subject to systematic assessment and change.

Organizations: Those structures, organizations, and agencies which control youth service resources and govern the delivery of youth services in the community, including local government, schools, police, courts, welfare, employment agencies, and other (usually smaller) public and private social service organizations.

Functions: The day-to-day activities of organizations which are supported by statutes, policies, and practices, and which have a variety of consequences for youth. Functions include law making, policy making, planning, budgeting, program management, information processing, training, referral procedures, and the face-to-face handling of youth in organizational settings.

Strategy: The consistency of any given objective with the criteria generated by the theoretical propositions of the Strategy.

Feasibility: By definition, the degree to which the action plans which accompanied the objectives were sufficiently precise to serve as a weekly guide to staff activities. In practice, this dimension became distorted when coders brought to the plans their own knowledge of the project's likelihood of putting the plan into action.

Project priority: On a scale of 1 to 3, a project's assignment of low, middle or high priority to an objective.

Regional priority: On a scale of 1 to 3, the Regional Program Director's assessment (based on the Strategy) of the priority of an objective.

Progress: A classification which determined the action plan to be completed on schedule, behind schedule, or not yet due to start.

Assessment: An indication, on the basis of the action plan or the objective, that the objective was based on any empirical assessment procedure.

Evaluation: An indication, on the basis of the action plan, of whether the objective included Strategy-based evaluation criteria.

Review of the aggregation for the second quarter, FY 1975, (by which time most projects had initiated objective and had completed plans for the year) shows the following distribution of objectives by Strategy goal area:

- 287 objectives were directed toward the development of the youth services system structure, usually with a variety of organizations.
- 91 objectives were specifically oriented toward increasing access to roles, usually in the area of employment or education.
- 54 objectives were aimed at decreasing negative labeling, particularly as it is generated by the juvenile justice system.
- 36 objectives were directed toward reducing youth alienation, usually through some sort of service focused on the individual youth.
- 189 objectives captured project intentions to provide direct services to youth, either by allocation of project staff time or by purchase of service arrangements.
- 60 additional objectives could be considered to be simultaneous efforts at system-building and institutional change.
- 70 additional objectives indicated efforts to build a youth services system through direct service efforts, or as a result of direct service demonstrations.
- 67 objectives were found to be inconsistent with the Strategy.

The great majority of the objectives have been consistent with the Strategy, but rarely have been sufficiently elaborated to serve as documentation of the Strategy's practical viability.

Numerous objectives were directed at activities which represented change *only for the project*; where changes were anticipated on the part of other organizations, e.g., the schools, they were for the most part changes in day-to-day *practices*. In the arena of system-building, for instance, the aggregation shows the following distribution of objective "targets":

Change in statute	14		Local government	79
Change in regulation	8	in	Schools	107
Change in contract	36	these	Police	74
Change in policy	48	organizations:	Courts	63
Change in practice	182		Welfare	60
Change in values	32		Employment	32
			Other service org.	117
			YSS project itself	139
			Other organizations	81
			Community	40

The pattern demonstrated here is consequential. For instance, more than one-third of the objectives for institutional change through increasing access to meaningful social roles stressed the area of employment. The establishment of opportunities for productive work for youth in the community is sure to require concerted effort on the part of a YSS staff, local employer and employment agencies, and the schools. However, there is little evidence here that those structures already established to provide employment services and opportunities have been systematically considered as targets for system-building activities. Rather, objectives and the resulting programs have, by and large, focused on capturing already available "job slots" for a small number of

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youth and not on the possibilities for restructuring work opportunities for youth in the community.

Projects have engaged most frequently and most extensively in activities designed to build a youth services system structure. In the effort to create a structure capable of coordinating existing services, projects have developed advisory boards, interagency councils, task forces, and other policy-making units composed of key decision makers from the public and private sectors. Some projects have foreseen or been persuaded of the need for an empirical data base from which to offer recommendations, make decisions, and resolve disagreements, and these projects have gone about the development of technical capabilities among the staff. Where possible, projects have negotiated for permanence and continuity through passage of a local ordinance which establishes the project as a department or division of local government. Commitment of other agencies and organizations to the OYD concepts and to the coordinative role of the YSS staff has been tested through attempts to reach agreements on system-wide evaluation criteria, to engage in a comprehensive youth needs survey and other relevant data collection efforts, and to establish a local funding base.

Insofar as the system-building objectives reported by projects continue to be guided by the theory-generated criteria of the Strategy, they hold promise for the initiation of guided youth services planning in a number of local communities, and insofar as the system-building objectives are undertaken independently of concerns for institutional change and of the Strategy criteria, projects run the risk

of creating a system structure which can produce more negative consequences for youth, i.e., more failure with increased efficiency.

Projects have been less certain how to go about the initiation of institutional change objectives, and their uncertainty has been reflected in a lower volume of activity directed specifically toward joint change efforts with major youth serving agencies. In most cases, projects have demonstrated that they have a relatively sound idea of what is intended by institutional change, but have suffered from an absence of any clear strategies for accomplishing it. The "stab in the dark" objectives, which have frequently resulted, have not necessarily been inconsistent with the tenets of the Strategy, but they so rarely have been generated from a theory-based assessment and so rarely evaluated in terms of Strategy criteria as to supply very little information for the formulation of subsequent plans.

For example, projects often were able to negotiate changes in police-court policy regarding the processing of status offenders and misdemeanants, usually in the context of a diversion agreement by which the project took on the task of service provision or service brokerage. The diversion of youth from the justice system is consistent with the Strategy, given the research which demonstrates that contact with the justice system produces negative labels and increases delinquency. However, the diversion programs seldom started with a systematic documentation of current policies and practices and their consequences, and rarely were set up to test the impact of the change on either individual youth or on the system as a whole. Consequently, programs which served

diverted youth ran the risk of being seen as an extension of the courts and thus generating their own negative labeling of youth, and of missing institutional maintenance effect taking hold within the justice system. Similarly, projects which organized alternative schools frequently did so in the absence of a commitment from the schools to view the effort as a demonstration and to initiate planned change on the basis of the demonstration.

Projects frequently opted to engage in direct services or service brokerage, often in response to a perceived service need, or in an attempt to take seriously the system development imperative associated with the Strategy by entering into working relationships with existing agencies. Very often, the working relationship with an agency consisted of agreements by the project to take referrals and provide supplementary services. However, it is not clear that direct services, including those initiated under the rubric of institutional change, were organized as complements of or contributions to long range social change objectives.

Due perhaps to the influence of multiple funding, projects have frequently oriented the service component of their program to specific target groups composed of youth who have been seen to be troubled, troublesome, disadvantaged, or disabled in some way. These service components appeared to exist alongside (or in spite of) institutional system development and institutional change enterprises, and threatened the success of the overall program by their failure to account for origins or outcomes in Strategy terms.

B. FACTORS BEARING ON IMPLEMENTATION

The research undertaken during the past three years has produced findings which support statements of theoretical validity that are precise and defensible. Evidence which would support equally precise and defensible statements about the conversion of the Strategy into policy and practice, i.e., about its practical viability, has not been systematically documented.

The quality and quantity of documentation currently available on projects does not allow the *empirical* specification of conditions under which the approach can be most effectively implemented. Nevertheless, the experience of funded programs has been preserved through routine reporting, through technical assistance involvement, and through joint involvement of the Youth Development Program with BREC in national evaluation efforts. The record which has been created is not complete and does not constitute hard evidence, i.e., it was not collected systematically in the interest of measuring variables of anticipated or hypothesized importance. The record can, nonetheless, serve to inform ongoing project planning, to guide the delivery of technical assistance, and to formulate and organize needed research.

Experience accumulated and recorded over the past five years does suggest certain dimensions which bear upon the success (or lack of it) enjoyed by funded projects and which may be critical to the implementation process. These dimensions are elaborated and illustrated below, and may be treated as the source of hypotheses required to guide subsequent research.

1. The Setting

Projects funded by OYD represented, at least theoretically, an attempt to *intervene in an existing arrangement* by which the needs of youth were attended to in a variety of established ways, ranging from "doing nothing," to "institutional change," to "providing treatment," to "rehabilitation." The setting in which projects found themselves included an existing organization of needs and resources, sustained largely by those agencies, organizations, and structures whose job it was to notice problems and organize solutions.

The world into which projects entered was by no means a blank board on which no plays had been made, in which no players had a stake, and for which no rules had been negotiated. Pertinent features of the setting included: the local network of youth-serving agencies and the collection of practices and policies which they employ in handling youth; local sponsorship of the project, or where the project was located within the consequential decision-making structure; legislative support at the local, state, or federal level; the availability of TA facilities; and the conditions of the grant itself. All of these features can be seen as variables which in various combinations and strengths affected the probability that the Strategy would be adopted as a guide to community youth development.

a. The Resource Network

The place of a project within the context of currently available resources and within the structure of decision-making controlling those resources may determine the likelihood that the project will

be successful in formulating and initiating long-range institutional change objectives. The organization of the resources network has import *theoretically* in that some components are more consequential than others in their ability to influence access to desirable social roles, negative labeling, and alienation. The organization of resources has turned out to have import *strategically* as well, in that long-term change depends upon the commitment by key decision makers to an alternative mode of resource allocation.

Projects have generally recognized the theoretical relevance of the major resource allocators, specifically those agencies with statutory responsibility for youth development, and have made attempts to enter into relationships of one sort or another with representatives of the schools, police, courts, and welfare. Nevertheless, such relationships have tended not to be informed, other than casually, by knowledge of the existing resource allocation patterns, the current perceptions of youth need, the history of past solutions to continuing problems, or the way in which jurisdictional boundaries and responsibilities encourage or constrain substantial change. The absence of systematic knowledge about the resource network appears to have precluded methodical translation from theoretical relevance into strategic relevance.

Careful assessment of the existing resource network appears to be a prerequisite to the formulation of objectives of substance and consequence. Nevertheless, the emergence of salient questions and the development of adequate descriptive instrumentation for accomplishing such an assessment have been, to a large extent, products of the final phase. At the beginning of most project funding cycles, i.e., at

a time when interagency relationships were being initiated, the expertise and technology were not available to permit strategies grounded in precise and systematic assessment of the resource network and its bearing on the overall context of youth development.

b. Project Sponsorship

State government, local government units, major public agencies, large private service providers, and independent nonprofit corporations have all served as grantees for, or sponsors of OYD-funded projects. All grantees or sponsors had in common their inexperience in implementing the OYD Strategy or anything like it. After three years, experience suggests that none of the sponsorship types should receive blanket endorsement or blanket condemnation. Each kind of arrangement encountered its own set of problems in implementing the Strategy, and each arrangement demonstrated its own peculiar merits.

Grantees which were tied directly to units of local government enjoyed a measure of legitimacy and influence among a variety of agencies not usually possible for other grantee types. Nevertheless, these programs saw more than their share of political obstacles to making the Strategy work. Pressures from City Hall (or its equivalent) often put the hiring of staff as much on the basis of favoritism as competence, and ambitions of elected officials tended to get in the way of the Strategy.

Grantees with prior histories of providing counseling and mental health treatment enjoyed a measure of credibility based on past performance, but found it difficult to persuade staff of the merit of an

institutional change approach. In addition, projects located within one of the small-scale components of the existing service network frequently came to be seen as supplemental small-scale service providers, with no legitimate role in the planning, coordination, and integration of services. Grantees located within large private service organizations, such as the YMCA, found difficulty in overcoming the historical associations with direct service. They encountered problems in engaging in institutional change objectives while meeting community expectations for service.

Grantees which were independent of the major public or private service providers and independent of local government had the advantage of working outside the constraints of agency-specific loyalties. However, their location outside the mainstream made the initiation and maintenance of critical linkages problematic.

Included in a variety of working papers issued by OYD has been the notion that location under, or sponsorship by local government is expected to be a critical factor in determining long-range success of the Strategy-based institutional change approach. Regardless of the inevitable political problems surrounding the use of local government as an agent of social change, and although systematic comparisons are not warranted, it would still appear that local government sponsorship shows more promise than other sponsorship arrangements for the eventual adoption of a planned experimental model by the major human service providers.

c. Additional Structural Constraints

Some constraints stem from identification of many projects as single youth service bureaus or centers. As a YSB, the projects ran the risk of being seen only as small-scale service providers. The director of a neighborhood-based YSB rarely enjoyed sufficient status to negotiate substantial policy changes with heads of the major agencies--schools, courts, police, welfare--and was restricted to negotiating incremental changes in day-to-day practices through persuasion of fellow service deliverers.

While the accomplishment of changes in practices is essential to long-range and permanent change, it is not sufficient. Practices are governed by organizational policy, and substantial changes in practice must be supported and sanctioned by changes in policy. Where YSB's have been successful in influencing policy, they have generally had the mediating support of an administrative arm in local government or of a board composed of supportive agency representatives.

d. Legislation and Major Policy

OYD projects were distinct from earlier delinquency prevention efforts in a variety of ways, several of which have been artifacts of a particular legislative and policy environment specific to the 1970's. The development of the Strategy from a legislative base in the Delinquency Prevention Act of 1968 (amended 1972) preceded and anticipated the development of programs under revenue sharing, CETA, and Title XX. It did so by stressing programs which were (1) intended to be comprehensive, i.e., non-categorical; (2) grounded in theory-based

empirical assessment; and (3) accountable for the consequences of program design as well as fiscal management. The trend toward local responsibility for social services planning and programming marked by the recent federal legislation has created a sense of urgency in local, general purpose governments which have traditionally left human services to other jurisdictions. Federal legislation and federal capacity-building policy have constituted increasingly relevant grounds for claiming permission to engage in a variety of activities consonant with the Strategy. Though federal legislation is a constant feature of the context of all projects, the extent to which trends in federal allocation of funds (and responsibilities) have been invoked in each of the communities in which an Office of Youth Development project is located is unknown.

In addition, assessment, planning, and resource allocation for youth services have been variously controlled by legislation and policy at the local and state levels. Local legislative authority for patterns of policy and practice constitutes one of the critical elements of a project's setting, in that the outcomes of project objectives may depend on the extent to which legislation is (or can be made to be) supportive of the project's interests. Insofar as the practices which affect youth are governed ultimately by policy and legislation, changes at these levels must be negotiated.

e. The Availability of Technical Assistance, Training, and Evaluation Facilities

The sponsorship of the project and its location vis-a-vis the structure of resource allocation constitute matters of *political support* for the Strategy. The availability of technical assistance touches

upon the issue of *technical support*. The experience of those projects which have had consistently available technical assistance suggests the need for the training of locally available technical assistance personnel who are committed to the terms of the Strategy, and for technical assistance which is routine.

f. Conditions of the Grant

There appear to be three ways in which the conditions of the project grant constituted important elements of the setting. First, as a federally-funded program, the project was engaged in ongoing relationships with regional, federal, and sometimes with state offices which had a stake in the implementation of the Strategy and which influenced, in varying degrees, the project's compliance with the Office of Youth Development's expectations and interests. Secondly, the funding committed by the Office of Youth Development was for a specified and restricted period of time. The length of the funding cycle turned out to determine in many ways the sorts of activities undertaken, and the way in which they were undertaken. Although conclusive evidence is not available, it appears that the funding cycle was insufficient for the completion of thorough assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation required for an adequate test of the Strategy's viability. The experience of projects which attempted to implement the planned experimental method fully within the funding allotted indicates the need to reassess federal granting strategies in light of the increasing demand for valid and reliable policy research.

2. Intraorganizational Issues

Internal organization of a project appears to be an additional dimension which can determine in critical ways the sorts of objectives which are undertaken, the degree to which those objectives embody the intentions of the Strategy, the linkages which can be formed in support of objectives, and the probability that the project will change appropriately in response to ongoing assessment and evaluation. Key features of the intraorganizational dimension include program structure, staff, allocation of resources, and the use of support mechanisms such as advisory boards and councils.

a. Program Structure

Projects were most successful where the organizational structure permitted sustained rigorous attention to issues of propositionally-guided, long-term planning for institutional change. However, the majority of OYD-funded projects were funded initially with the expectation on the part of community sponsors that the supplementary funds would go toward increasing the direct service resources of the community. Most projects tried to meet these expectations by taking on both services and limited system development activities. Findings from the FY74 BREC evaluation, however, suggest that the decision to provide direct services may preclude work in system development and the initiation of institutional change objectives where all staff are involved in all efforts. Where programs were successful in engaging in service provision *and* in the sorts of activities directly supportive of the Strategy, project structure tended toward one of the following arrangements:

A program structure which included a central, administrative component, situated frequently within a local government unit, and responsible for training, evaluation, and policy guidance, and a separate service provision or service referral component. The functions of the components were aligned so as to complement each other: service activities contributed to long-range institutional change objectives, and administrative efforts supported negotiation of policy changes, support for demonstration efforts carried out by the service arm, and joint planning and resource allocation with other key agencies. This arrangement was rare, but promising and potentially powerful.

An internal functional division of labor among staff (a smaller scale version of the separate component arrangement), such that persons responsible for service delivery were not responsible for sustaining system development efforts, and persons responsible for initiating and maintaining system development and long-term objectives were not also expected to spend time counseling individual youth. Numerous projects made some effort to accomplish and sustain a division of labor of this sort, though the size of the staff in relation to the various service commitments often made functional differentiation problematic.

b. Project Staff

The relatively small size of the Office of Youth Development projects and the enormity of the task meant that the nature and quality of the staff was particularly important to the successful implementation of the Strategy. Specifically, the experience, orientation, and competence of the staff were discovered to bear substantially upon Strategy adoption and implementation.

(1) Experience--With relatively small budgets and a commitment, at least implicitly, to some direct service provision, youth services systems tended to attract (and hire) persons whose training and experience predisposed them to an

emphasis on and interest in "helping kids," usually by means of one-to-one service of some sort. Under these circumstances, staff who were introduced to the propositions of the Strategy frequently used the propositions to rename activities with which they were already familiar and in which they continued to engage. Over the last three years, the need for staff skilled in providing political and technical support has become increasingly apparent.

(2) Orientation--The orientation of the project staff toward the Strategy and toward its implications for long-range planning appear to be identifiable along the following dimensions. Each of the dimensions below has been found to contribute to the overall direction taken by a project, and to the likelihood that the Strategy will be implemented.

Acceptance of the theoretical propositions as plausible explanations of delinquency and as plausible grounds for program design. Where staff have reported the Strategy criteria, they have been less frequently tempted to generate visibility and credibility through supplementary direct services. Where competing explanations or theoretical models have prevailed, objectives which appear to be in line with the Strategy have been unsupported by staff activities.

A structural view of events, situations and relationships. To have a structural view means seeing the difference between changing a person in the school and changing the

school. It means the advantage of an officially sanctioned advisory position, in which recommendations offered must be attended to, over a position in which allies are present but not accountable. Structural interpretations seek to identify the features present in a situation which result in certain actions (including the success or failure of certain plans and strategies), and to sort out the changes which would be necessary in structures (not persons) to promote a different set of actions.

On a day-to-day basis, projects have frequently given in to the temptation of psychological interpretations which have then come to be translated into strategies based on personal influence, moral persuasion and good intentions. The sorts of long-range institutional change objectives which would be characteristic of a structural view of the world often have been absent from project plans. Where objectives have entailed a working relationship with any or all of the major agencies, the intended consequence most frequently has been an increase in available services, or "more of the same." The sorts of investigations and analyses which would necessarily proceed from a structural view, e.g., flow analysis, and which could support objectives oriented toward rearrangements of organizations have not been widely undertaken.

The introduction of a structural view of the world, and assistance in the practice of structural interpretations

of problems and events day-to-day turned out to be a task which was seriously underestimated. Ordinary persons on the street tend to interpret their world psychologically, to assign praise and blame, and to create angels and devils. Persons working in youth services system projects differed from ordinary persons only in that most of them were *consciously trained* in the psychological perspective. The success of an enterprise grounded in a structural perspective depended to a large extent on the success with which such a structural perspective came to replace the existing psychological one. Replacement tended to be accomplished most readily in projects where (1) no direct services were offered and project activities focused entirely on the development of coordinative and political/policy capacity, or (2) where a history of direct service brought staff to the point of seeing that the problems which they saw over and over again were not necessarily functions of the mental or emotional states of individual youth, and thus were not remediable by means of individual treatment. The latter occurrence was rare, and existed most likely where the provision of services coincided with administrative support for evaluative research and an experimental approach.

Willingness to engage in evaluative research--acceptance of the theoretical propositions of the Strategy were insufficient as a guide to planned change in any given community. Just as the rules of chess cannot account for their

use in any particular chess game, the propositions of the Strategy could not specify the way in which access to roles, negative labeling, and alienation were demonstrated in any particular community. There was no shortcut to finding out.

If the implementation of the Strategy implies the use of an empirically developed knowledge base, the only way to implement the Strategy is to engage in the sorts of research which will provide such a base. Nevertheless, even those projects which were most enthusiastic in their endorsement of the Strategy frequently placed evaluative research last on their list of priorities for project resource allocation. The efforts of the last year have been directed toward the development and testing of a battery of instruments which may make needed evaluative research a more routine undertaking for those projects which are inexperienced in this area and which, for reasons of fear, inexperience or misdirected humanism have assiduously avoided the development of a knowledge base guided by the criteria of the Strategy.

The experimental stance--projects which adopted an experimental (tentative) approach to their own activities generally did so when they ceased to believe in the inherent success attendant upon good intentions. The experimental stance is necessarily grounded in a sound empirical approach and requires thorough assessment, careful planning,

precise evaluation, and the willingness to fail. The experimental stance is characterized by a commitment to *finding out* what the consequences of a program are, which overrides any commitment to the survival of the program.

The absence of an experimental stance on the part of most projects was evident in the lack of preplanning assessment and in the failure to establish theory-based evaluation criteria tied to the outcomes of major objectives. In addition, few projects were successful in gaining commitments from the key public agencies to view the project's undertakings as "demonstrations," the successful features of which would serve as grounds for institutional change.

(3) Competence--The majority of project staff brought with them competence in the administration or delivery of social service programs. Staff members who were supportive of the Strategy were most effective where this support was coupled not only with expertise in service delivery, but also with expertise in evaluative research and its uses in political settings. Larger projects, especially those with both administrative and service components, were most likely to have made provision for research and evaluation staff (although the criteria employed in the work by such staff were not always those of the Office of Youth Development). Directors of smaller projects, upon recognizing the need for technical competence, were frequently forced to wait

for an empty slot or to contract for limited evaluation with an outside organization.

The centrality of technical competence in making the Strategy work was a discovery, not a presupposition. With the recent development of instrumentation necessary for assessment and evaluation tied to Strategy variables, it is increasingly likely that the contribution made to communities will be in the form of expertise and technology, not supplemental program (service) monies.

c. Allocation of Project Resources

The allocation of money, staff, time, and energy serves as an index of the degree of project support of the Strategy and of the translation of verbal support into substantive action. Acceptance by the project staff or a policy board of the tenets of the Strategy is a necessary first step in implementation, but is not in itself sufficient to guarantee the introduction of theory-guided youth service delivery in a community. Acceptance of the theory has turned out to be of little use where not supported internally by substantial resource commitments to system-building and institutional change objectives, and where not supported by efforts to alter the existing pattern of decision making outside the project. Resource allocation which is oriented largely toward ongoing service provision, independent of theory-based assessment and evaluation, and independent of agreements with the major public agencies to attend to outcomes of service "demonstrations," cannot support a sound test of the Strategy's viability.

In the three years of project funding under the imperatives of the Office of Youth Development's Strategy, project directors have become sufficiently familiar with the propositions of the Strategy to be able to use its vocabulary and to identify, sort out, and analyze problems in its terms. With less frequency, but increasingly, project staff have been able to accomplish the same tasks. In relatively few instances, however, has verbal acceptance of the Strategy been accompanied by the sort of resource allocation which, carried out and documented, could permit definitive statements about the sorts of operational steps required for successful Strategy implementation in a community.

d. The Use of Support Mechanisms

In a search for credibility, legitimacy and access to the decision-making structure, projects have formed advisory boards, management boards or interagency councils composed of private citizens (youth and adults) and agency representatives of both the private and public sector. Where boards or interagency councils have been effective mechanisms of support, they have generally:

- included persons who have sufficient status and decision-making authority to commit agencies or organizations or groups to action, or to cause such commitment to be forthcoming;
- included persons representative of each of the major public agencies with statutory responsibility for youth services--schools, police, courts, and welfare;
- taken seriously a policy-making function guided by the Strategy;
- been supported by a technical staff which is engaged in more than small-scale service provision. (Engagement in activities of substance can also solve the continuing membership/

involvement problem. Organizations involved in activities of substance and consequence, e.g., the schools, rarely have trouble getting people interested in their boards.);

-supported a period of empirical assessment, with low visibility, in the interest of long-term planning and pay-off.

Where boards have proved ineffective or troublesome, they have tended to be:

-composed of lower-level agency staff "assigned" to the board by a supervisor, but with no power to speak on behalf of the agency;

-composed largely of "interested citizens" with no agency connections or prospects for influencing changes in decision making and resource allocation;

-interested in pursuing various pet projects guaranteed to tie up staff time with activities peripheral to the intended program thrust;

-unconvinced of, uninterested in, or antithetic to the Strategy propositions as plausible explanations of delinquent behavior;

-uninformed about the Strategy propositions, and so unable to make policy consistent with Strategy implications;

-uninformed of the sort of data required for policy making consistent with the expectations of the Strategy;

-unsupported by a technical staff engaged in evaluative research, including youth needs assessment, community resources assessment, investigation of existing interagency relationships, internal decision-making processes within agencies (and their consequences for youth), and the way in which needs and resources are differentially distributed throughout the community.

In light of the tentative findings regarding sponsorship and the use of policy-making boards or councils, subsequent arrangements might take the following form:

<u>STRUCTURAL COMPONENT</u>	<u>MEMBERS</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
Local Government Unit	Elected officials & administrative staff	Issue policy on the allocation of youth resources
Advisory Board or Council	Public and private agency representatives, private citizens, youth	Make informed policy recommendations to local government.
Technical Unit	Staff specifically assigned to support the advisory board. May include an "extended staff" of technical personnel from major agencies.	Engage in evaluative research and to present findings to the advisory board. Aid in formulating interpretations which can be transformed into policy recommendations.

This arrangement is not markedly different from that recommended by the Office of Youth Development in 1972 (Hunter, 1973). However, two major discoveries have been made since that paper was originally issued. First, the role of local government sponsorship has been clarified; the support of local elective government appears to be essential to the legitimacy of the youth services system effort. The youth services system is expected to be most fruitfully established by ordinance under a unit of local government, thus establishing a certain degree of autonomy, permanence, and neutrality with regard to specific agency loyalties and pressures. (Without an ordinance or its equivalent, the youth services system is, of course, subject to the political vagaries of changing administrations.)

Secondly, and most critically, the experience of the last several years has demonstrated the necessarily empirical base of the youth services system. The technical unit, then, must have skills which go beyond administration and beyond competence in reporting. Implementation

and testing of the Strategy requires commitment to a process of rigorous evaluative research, starting with the implementation of systematic assessments and culminating in the evaluation of institutional change objectives. Staff hired to support the youth services system policy-making body must consequently be a technically competent staff.

While the structure of the youth services system does not appear markedly different from that proposed earlier, the functions performed by each component of the structure have been increasingly well defined. FY76 and subsequent years may be employed productively in the documentation and testing of these more specific notions of sponsorship and functional roles.

3. Interorganizational Issues

Agencies which provide services to youth in a community, ranging from the public schools to small, private, categorical service programs, vary in the extent to which they take each other into account, or in the extent to which they work together in an effort to change or improve the services which they offer. Joint efforts are likely to occur on a case-by-case basis. Youth services system projects differ from other community structures in that they have been funded to *deliberately and systematically* take into account the effects of existing agencies and organizations, and to deliberately and systematically engage in the sorts of relationships which could promote assessment and change of existing arrangements.

Adoption of the Strategy as a guide to project activities, then, necessarily implies the commitment of time, staff, and other resources to relationships with other agencies which support the

coordination of resources, to the assessment of current policies and practices affecting youth, and to the formulation of objectives for change. The ability (or willingness) to enter into such relationships has in many cases qualified the ability of a project to implement the approach.

A series of factors potentially bearing on implementing this approach have been presented. The next steps would be to specify in greater detail some of these factors, develop standards or measures, and test their relevance in an experimental design in which the apparently most relevant factors are systematically varied.

III. THE APPROACH JUDGED AGAINST THE TASKS OF PLANNED EXPERIMENTATION

In Section I, a series of implementation tasks and demands were listed. The approach is judged against those tasks.

A. THEORETICAL BASE

Programs should be guided by valid theories concerning the issues which are being acted upon.

The better tested, more valid, and more specific the theory, the more likely the actions will be specific and effective. The explanatory power of the Strategy--the ideas about access, labeling, and alienation--has been assessed with positive results. A strong base has been laid (See Chapter I). Continuing work is needed, however, to refine and specify the propositions, and particularly to develop measures for institutional characteristics which affect access, labeling, and alienation.

For system development, there is a theory of coordination, as was described in Chapter III. Measures have been prepared and used, and the propositions appear to have considerable heuristic value for those who

use them. It remains that the validity of the propositions has not been adequately tested. Needed are a more thorough grounding of the propositions in organizational and interorganizational theory, more and better measures, and the occasion for an adequate test.

While there is much to draw on in general, there is at present no specific theory of institutional change as applied to Strategy goals. Chapter II is the attempt to start that work.

B. PRACTICAL CRITERIA

The theories should provide criteria which guide practical judgments.

One kind of guiding criterion is a measurable variable. References have been given for the present sets of measured variables for the Strategy and the coordination propositions. Considerably less is presently available for Strategy-based institutional change. One measure which has been prepared is the "transitional probability," used in examining the flow of youth through various formal processing sequences such as those of the justice system. A change in the probability of a youth's transition past a certain decision point in a sequence is a measure of change in the statutes, regulations, policies, and practices which are thought to control those decisions. See "Flow Analysis Notes" (Appendix C) and BREC Handbook, Chapter 8, for descriptions of the procedure.

Another important criterion is a program specification which describes in practical terms what the intended situation should look like, or describes how persons should act to produce the situation.

Without these criteria theoretically specifiable situations cannot be realized in operation. In large part, the production of practical specifications is a matter of repeated program design efforts and tests. At present, specifications for youth employment and diversion have received the most attention. Appendix D (Youth and Work, Chapter Four, plus Supplemental Notes on Experimental Youth Employment Programs) and Appendix E (Notes on Diversion) contain two examples which the reader can judge.

C. APPLICATION

Persons must be disposed and able to apply the theories and the criteria in specific situations. It will be necessary to adopt precise practical specifications for the desired outcomes, institutional arrangements, and interorganizational relations.

Applying a theory requires numerous decisions on whether a given situation or outcome conforms to that theory or to the criteria which flow from it, and whether a given action is likely to affect characteristics which control the desired outcome or situation. Presumably, to make these decisions, persons must operate in a situation which permits and encourages such application, must regard the theory and its criteria as a standard of preference, and must be able to translate logically from theoretical ideas to practical circumstances. If the theoretical ideas are not applied, one might look to several explanations:

-a person does not understand logically that "access to desirable social roles" refers to overt responses to acts in situations, and does not refer to attitudes;

-a person works with persons who do not share a preference for the explanation in "access to desirable social roles," with persons who never employ the idea, and so has no support for doing so;

-a guideline requires a program to spend its money in ways which cannot address a prescription coming from the idea "access to desirable social roles," making its application impossible.

There have been substantial problems in assisting persons and in creating situations to support the application of the ideas in this approach. Section II describes in some detail factors which may bear on application of the ideas.

D. CONTROL

If the approach is to be implemented or tested, there must be sufficient control to realize the specifications.

Assuming adequate specifications, providing the control sufficient to implement those specifications is a serious matter. The stereotypical image of implementation in the youth services tends to be that associated with a direct service component. An allocation is made, a staff is hired and trained, facilities are arranged, doors are opened, and youth begin flowing through, with some presumed effect. Compared to this stereotype, implementation of the approach recommended in this paper is relatively more *political*, less familiar, occurs on a larger *scale*, and requires relatively greater attention to *interdependence* and *simultaneity*. The characteristics of implementation just presented involve substantial problems.

The institutional arrangements which are to be changed are traditional and habitual manifestations of basic values shared in the

culture. The traditional character of present arrangements and their value base make the changes inherently political; very fundamental cares and concerns are involved. The practical requirement of implementation is to be able to conduct a broad renegotiation of alternative ways to realize those values and concerns, and to be able to create broadly shared and powerfully supported agreements needed to sustain the new and desired relations. Not all, but some, of the desired changes are of the magnitude of desegregation, school consolidation, or the adoption of strict environmental controls. This comparison may give an indication of the character of the political movements, negotiations, and changes in perceptions which would be needed.

The scale of implementation is often quite large. It is one thing to ask whether a single small program component uses its funds efficiently. It is another thing to ask whether a *jurisdiction* is using its funds efficiently; to do so one must not only consider the efficiency of each component, but must also ask whether the components are appropriately related, and whether the relative allocations to different components are appropriate given some set of objectives and priorities. An important aspect of efficiency is systems efficiency, which must be judged in terms of the whole funding pattern in a jurisdiction, rather than on the parts separately. Frugal spending for services not needed, or not needed where they are, is not efficient. The question must be taken up on a larger scale.

Similar arguments may be made about efforts to rationalize referral patterns in a network of services, or about various attempts at institutional change: a program of change to improve the holding power

of schools is a large scale venture. Practically, the larger scale requires relatively more control, more power, more ability to deal with large amounts of information, more ability to specify and follow-up on large numbers of events, and more ability to deal with multiple organizations.

Similar problems stem from the necessity, in this approach, to take into account interdependencies among various program issues, and to undertake related efforts simultaneously. Many current, well-respected recommendations for the improvement of education, for example, call not only for changes in the curriculum and procedure of the schools, but also for greater student involvement in work and community affairs, and for an adjustment of interactions with the juvenile justice system. Practically, implementation requires tying implementing organizations together in such a way as to permit simultaneous consideration and action on related issues.

If it is felt that school referral to court is an inappropriate response to behavior such as truancy or minor but repeated disruption of school activities, to mount a different response requires adjustment not only in the use of the court and in the school-court referral procedure, but also requires mounting a new type of response within the school. The aspects of the problem are interdependent, and must be dealt with simultaneously. To expand the frequency with which school activities and work activities are integrated parts of development for students, it is necessary not only to increase the available jobs, but also to adjust curricula and employment processes so that jobs and schooling make the most productive use of each other. Again, interdependence and simultaneity are the key factors.

The approach described in this paper appears to make stringent demands that implementation deal with political matters, scale, interdependence, and simultaneity. However, these demands do not seem more stringent than those for many current efforts. Further, as has been discussed in Chapter III, an approach to meeting these demands is recommended, and methods for implementing it are growing.

E. NEED FOR MEASURES

To assess current situations, or to evaluate the extent and desirability of any changes in that situation, it will be necessary to measure Strategy variables, to measure institutional changes, and to measure aspects of systems relationships.

The available measures and the direction of their development have been described or referred to in several portions of the report so far. Our conclusion is that, in respect to this task, the approach does not suffer in comparison with other approaches to youth development, and is in better shape than most.

F. REPLICATION

It must be possible to transfer information about outcomes and methods well enough to permit replication.

It was argued earlier that *specific* transfer and replication of program ideas may not be possible. that only general specifications can be transferred, and that the discovery of specific outcomes and methods would indeed have to be the product of planned experimentation in a given locale. Whatever the judgment about how specific an effective

transfer can be, this approach appears to be at a disadvantage only to the extent that it is, in fact, unfamiliar. Practically, a training and information effort would be required to create a method for transferring tested products based on this approach.

G. SYSTEMS CONSIDERATIONS

Relationships among specific situations and the relevant portions of their environments must be taken into account.

The system principle notices that any given situation of interest (truancy) rests in a context of related issues, which make analysis of the situation more complex, more ambiguous technically, and more complicated to deal with. In typical services programs, technical clarity, or technical rationality, is achieved by simply excluding relevant factors. This is, in effect, what happens very often when someone sits down to counsel a youth about truancy. The relevance of school contributors to truancy is practically excluded, because it is not addressed. The counseling proceeds on its own terms, within a "bounded rationality" which excludes factors likely to be more influential on the students' behavior than the counseling is.

That the approach demands taking into account such relationships is not a disadvantage of the approach, but a virtue. Further, other elements of the approach are intended to clarify those relationships (for example, establishing a relation between school factors and truancy).

CONCLUSION

We have argued that the practical usability of the approach should be judged against implementation tasks contained in some overt view of the implementation process. We have proposed such a view: planned experimentation.

The preceding discussion has proposed a series of demanding tasks required to implement the approach or in implementing methods like it. Substantial difficulties in implementation have been revealed. That discussion should *not* lead to the conclusion that the approach suffers by comparison to other approaches currently being tried in youth development. This approach tries to deal systematically with a series of relevant considerations which often are not even addressed. In our experience, an "invisible yardstick" often is used to rate the approach. Persons tend to discuss the approach and its problems *as though* there exists some sure-fire, easy approach to youth development, already available, already tested. That is not the case.

Judging the approach against the tasks, we find that deliberate efforts have been made to satisfy those tasks, that substantial progress has been made, and that the approach compares favorably with other approaches, while at the same time addressing many often unattended issues.

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APPENDIX A

Selective Review of Theoretical Work
Bearing on Interorganizational Relationships
(Excluding Litwak)

Center for Action Research, Inc.
Boulder, Colorado

May, 1976

SELECTIVE REVIEW OF THEORETICAL WORK
BEARING ON INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
(EXCLUDING LITWAK)

Although OYD has drawn primarily from the work of Eugene Litwak in the field of interorganizational relationships, a number of writers have made useful contributions in this area. The following is a brief review of the work of some of them. The emphasis is on concepts and propositions most likely to carry implications for projects' efforts to develop youth services systems.

Power and dependent relationships are not necessarily "zero sum games." In some cases, organizations may be dependent on each other for a variety of reasons; one organization being dependent on another for one task while the dependence may reverse for other tasks.

Thompson (1967, pp. 29-39) provides a view of organizational interrelationships. A dichotomy between competition and cooperation is provided. Competition requires very little interaction between organizations while cooperation requires varying levels of interaction. Cooperative relationships can be subtyped into three strategies:

1. Bargaining. The negotiation of an agreement for the exchange of goods or services between two or more organizations.
2. Cooptation. The process of absorbing new elements or policy determining structure of an organization.
3. Coalition. The combination of two or more organizations for a common purpose.

The management of relationships with other organizations is usually the responsibility of the institutional level of the organizations (except in instances of extremely collegial structures). The management of interdependence is a political problem.

. . . it requires establishing a position in which diverse organizations in diverse situations find overlapping interests. The management of interorganizational relations is just as political as the management of a political party or of international relationships . . . And just as political parties and world powers move toward their objectives through compromise, complex purposive organizations find compromise inevitable (Thompson, 1967, pp. 23-31).

William Evan (1966) introduced the concept of the "organization set" as a means of describing interorganizational relationships. The organization set is composed of organizations in interaction with a focal organization. In juvenile justice diversion programs for example the focal organization may be the police department because police officers with their available discretion can greatly determine the referral patterns for juvenile offenders. The focal organization is surrounded by other organizations in interaction.

Some of these are input organizations, supplying stimuli in the form of raw materials, personnel or general expectations, while others are output organizations receiving things from the focal organization. The autonomy of decision-making in the focal organization is affected by the relationships with members of the set. The size of the set, overlapping and interlocking memberships and the similarity among the members of the set affect the interaction patterns (Hall, 1972, p. 316).

The actual relationships between organizations are determined by a number of political, cultural, ecological, technological, and economic conditions. Hall (1972, p. 322) classifies these conditions into three categories. The first is *external* to the interorganizational relationship

and consists of "legal or traditional expectations of contact and the general environmental factors which must be taken into account at any particular point in time" (Hall, 1972, p. 303).

Hall's second category concerns *internal* factors which affect organizational relationships. These factors include the development of joint programs, joint resource facilities, and the degree of professionalization of employees. The greater the number of joint programs "the more organizational decision-making is constrained through obligations, commitments or contracts with other organizations and the greater the degree of organizational interdependence" (Aiken and Hoge, 1968, p. 914). Members of similar professions (doctors, lawyers, social workers, law enforcement personnel) often maintain extraorganizational contacts through professional associations, conferences or friendship.

Hall's third category of interorganizational factors concerns *common units* such as clients, programs or financial authorities. Within the juvenile justice system many agencies may serve the same client. The degree of awareness of this situation between agencies may prompt a formal procedure for better serving the client. A complete lack of awareness of the situation may prompt needless duplication of effort and intense frustration on the part of the client. Reliance upon a common funding source should always lead to increased organizational interaction be it facilitative or competitive (Hall, 1972). Agencies funded by local government are acutely aware of each other during budget allocation times. They often form alliances or coalitions to promote further funding. In some cases, however, the same agencies become fiercely competitive with each other if one agency's survival is dependent on the city council's cutting

the budget of the other agency. In this case, there is an actual "zero sum game" phenomenon--there can be winners and losers in the finite and planned economy of local government. The common unit here is dollars and it is a pervasive factor for interorganizational relationships.

Goetzkow (1966, pp. 13-14) provides yet another view of organizational interrelationships. Frequency of interaction is a key variable to his analysis. He subdivides interaction into three categories: (1) *interpenetration* or relationships which are internally common to organizations such as a common labor union; (2) *boundary spanning* which is the function of an organization specifically designed to relate with other organizations, i.e., purchasing or marketing divisions; (3) which evolve as organizations interrelate at high levels and permanent units are set up which handle the interactions. Increased frequency of interaction among organizations is an important variable because it leads to the development of stable patterns of interaction.

Frequent interactions do not necessarily mean highly formalized or cooperative relationships. Interaction can be very frequent but highly competitive in nature. Interactions can be numerous but very informal, especially if the work exchanged is nonroutine.

Klonglan *et al* (1973) have developed six basic assumptions which underlie theories of organizational interdependence and the need for coordination of agency resources:

1. Organizations are faced with a situation of limited resources.
2. Organizations must obtain resources from other units in their task environment.
3. Drawing on outside resources reduces an organization's autonomy.

4. Organizations prefer autonomy and engage in interaction only when resource needs cannot be met within the unit.
5. Organizations prefer low levels of interorganizational relations and will engage in higher levels only after lower levels have failed to fulfill resource needs.
6. Different levels of interorganizational relations can be ordered in terms of form and intensity of interaction.

Klonglan and his associates state that recent analysis of specific activities sharpens focus on the *intensity of cooperative organizational interaction* as a key variable for organizational interdependence (1973).

Interorganizational activities can be categorized as being low, middle or high levels of cooperation. Klonglan's description is as follows:

Low Level Cooperation Between Organizations

1. Acquaintance with relevant personnel from other organizations.
2. Familiarity with relevant programs of other organizations.
3. Informal unscheduled communication.
4. Exchange of general information: program emphasis, etc.
5. Joint interagency council membership.

Middle Level Cooperation Between Organizations

6. Formal exchange of information, in-house newsletter reports.
7. Exchange of personnel, resources, materials, and equipment.
8. Joint projects between organizations.

High Level Cooperation Between Organizations

9. Joint budgetary considerations and money exchange or transfer.
10. Formal overlapping boards.
11. Joint ownership of facilities.
12. Formal written agreements regarding organizations' policy and programs.

The concept of interagency coordination which is so widely prescribed among human service agencies is considerably more precise when it is described with the above continuum. As we have mentioned in a previous section, the structure of interrelating organizations can greatly

facilitate interdependence. Certain structures seem to lend themselves towards better interorganizational relationships.

Organizations having many joint programs with other organizations tend to be more complex, more innovative, have more internal communication channels and have slightly more decentralized decision-making structures (Rothman, 1974, p. 126).

The implication of the above statement is that you can purposely design organizations to better deal with organizational interdependence. By incorporating structural elements such as professional diversification, decentralization, and intense internal communication into the organizational framework, organizations can better prepare for necessary interdependence. This would be especially crucial for organizations with complex goals involving many sectors of the community, i.e., promoting youth development and preventing delinquency.

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APPENDIX B

System Description:

Analyzing Inter-Organizational Relationships

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January, 1976

(For use with interview schedule 8.5)

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: ANALYZING INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Whether or not they regard themselves as parts of a network, organizations affecting youth in any community take one another into account. Referrals of young people, exchange of information and joint planning are examples of this. Willingly or grudgingly, virtually every youth-serving body coordinates to some degree with others.

Organizations rarely are able to apply the same level of precision to coordination that they use in handling their internal affairs. Patterns of interorganizational contact and referral often appear to be born out of a slapdash combination of folk knowledge and historical accident. Well intentioned attempts to transfer common sense rules for interpersonal relationships to organizations usually have fizzled. Working together in harmony and love is difficult enough to pull off in a single household; applying this ideal across the board to a network of organizations is an impossible dream.

In fact, the situational variations in interorganizational settings are so great that any one formula applied across the board probably is doomed to failure. What it takes to get joint work done effectively depends upon the nature of the task at hand and upon the respective goals, policies, and structures of the partner organizations. Making suggestions for improving any particular relationship requires finding out first about these dimensions of the interorganizational setting. This information

permits applying recommendations for preferred ways of handling exchange between organizations, given a specific setting.

By comparing existing practices with recommended ones, suggestions for improvement can focus on those aspects of a relationship that are most likely to be causing trouble. This means singling out particular ways of dealing with others that interfere with getting a job done, that waste resources or that fail to serve the interests of one or both organizations in a relationship.

Items on the System Description instrument are designed to yield information on several dimensions of both the interorganizational setting and existing manner of relating between organizations. A single interview cannot cover every element of complex linkages; the items focus on selected dimensions thought to be most generally critical. Selection is based on a theory of interorganizational linkages developed by Dr. Eugene Litwak.*

Guidelines drawn from Dr. Litwak's work indicate appropriate ways for organizations in given settings to relate to one another. Five factors are used to define setting: (1) the extent to which organizations in a relationship view each other's goals as either mutually supportive or competitive, (2) the respective internal structures of the organizations (how bureaucratic is each?), (3) the extent to which the organizations officially recognize

*"Towards the Multi-Factor Theory & Practice of Linkages Between Formal Organizations," U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, June 1970 (Final Report, Grant No. CRD-425-C1-9).

their interdependence with each other, (4) the extent to which exchange between them is standardized and routine, and (5) the volume of exchange. A high, average or low rating on any dimension carries with it at least one recommendation for the most suitable manner of relating in that situation, all other things being equal.

For both setting and manner of relating, the discussion that follows explains what each dimension consists of, why it is important, and how it is measured, scaled and interpreted.

Dimensions of the Setting

Facilitativeness (Mutual Support)/Competitiveness

- Definition:

The extent to which one organization's success in achieving its own goals either helps the other achieve its goals (facilitative), or hinders the other in achieving its goals (competitive).

- Importance of this dimension:

Representatives of different organizations may be either open or guarded in what they tell each other. Which form of communication is appropriate depends upon how facilitative or competitive the setting is. Where goals of two organizations are facilitative, each can help itself by helping the other solve its problems or overcome its weaknesses. The more competent and successful one organization is, the better off the other will be:

Facilitativeness/Competitiveness

their goals are mutually supportive. In a facilitative setting it usually pays each organization to openly share news of its difficulties and shortcomings; one can help the other with its needs only when it knows what those needs are.

In a non-facilitative or competitive setting, on the other hand, there is no gain for either organization in helping the other overcome weaknesses. Advertising your shortcomings in this kind of atmosphere not only may fail to elicit help, it may invite disaster. If the other organization's goals are in competition with yours, a rational response from there could be to use knowledge of your shortcomings to gain a tactical advantage or to discredit you. So in this setting it usually pays to be guarded in communication, keeping quiet when possible about your own organization's weaknesses and problems and instead emphasizing only strengths and successes. This is termed adversary communication. It becomes more and more appropriate, the less facilitative the inter-organizational setting.

Either form of communicating can be helpful when the setting calls for it, but counterproductive when used indiscriminately. For this reason it is important to have an accurate picture of how facilitative or competitive the setting is.

• Items on the instrument which measure this dimension (from page "h"):

A. Organizations sometimes depend on each other in ways which are not readily apparent, or are not accurately reflected in their contacts with each other. In order to get at these relationships, please imagine for a moment that the other organization closed down, or mysteriously vanished tomorrow. If the disappearance of statutory agencies (Police, Schools, etc.) is just not possible to imagine, substitute the assumption that the organization's employees go on an extended strike beginning tomorrow. What do you think would be the probable effects on your organization with respect to the following?

1. You would find it no different (2), harder (3) or easier (1) to secure funds for your organization.

2. You would encounter less (1), the same (2) or more (3) resistance to purposes (goals) of your programs.
3. There would be no change (2), increased difficulty (3) or less difficulty (1) in getting the information you need to conduct your program.
4. You would have an easier (1), no different (2) or harder (3) time meeting your obligations to those to whom your organization is accountable.
5. It would increase (1), have no effect (2) or decrease (3) your ability to develop a more integrated program for your service area.
6. Your ability to deal effectively with institutional blockages to youth development and with institutional sources of juvenile delinquency would improve (1), remain unchanged (2) or diminish (3).
7. You would find it no different (2), harder (3) or easier (1) to serve the number of clients most suited to your organization's purposes.
(Interviewer: Omit #7 when respondent represents school or police.)

B. If all ties were severed between your organization and theirs, do you feel that they would have a generally harder (3), no different (2) or easier (1) time in achieving their own goals?

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Sum the raw 1-2-3 scores for all items.

- Interpreting the scale:

The higher the total score, the more facilitative the setting.

"3" scores indicate that problems would increase if the other organization were not present. This implies that the other's pursuit of its goals supports the respondent organization's goals. If an interview is obtained from the other end of the linkage, a relatively strong inference can be drawn that the two organization's goals are or are not mutually supportive. Lacking this reciprocal interview, the rating should be stated as informed conjecture, with a notation as to whether or not the response to item "B" above goes in the same direction as the bulk of the other items.

Interdependence

- Definition:

The extent to which two organizations must take each other into account in achieving their own goals. (Interdependence can be high in either a facilitative or a competitive setting, and it can be high whether or not the organizations officially recognize it.)

- Importance of this dimension:

The higher the level of interdependence, the more is at stake in an interorganizational relationship in terms of goal achievement. High interdependence makes deliberate measures for working together effectively (or in some instances for maintaining effective distance) especially desirable. All of the recommendations drawn from the theory become more critical, the greater the interdependence.

A low level of interdependence in a relationship which is plagued by difficulties gives cause for considering limiting the resources devoted to trying to improve that relationship; it suggests that effort might produce greater return if diverted to other pursuits. Low interdependence especially signals the futility of working to increase official awareness.

- Items on the instrument which measure this dimension:

The same as the eight items used to measure facilitativeness/competitiveness ("A" and "B" on page 5 above).

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Recode "2" responses as "0", recode "3" responses as "1," and let "1" continue to equal "1". Sum the recoded scores.

- Interpreting the scale:

The higher the total, the greater the level of interdependence.

Internal Organizational Structure

- Definition:

The extent to which the reporting organization is organized along either bureaucratic or human relations lines. Bureaucratic, as compared with human relations, organizations tend to have (1) centralized hierarchical, rather than collegial, leadership; (2) internal guidance more through rules than committees; (3) very detailed specialization of jobs; and (4) wholly objective measures of merit. (For a more detailed definition and discussion, see Eugene Litwak's "Effects of Internal Organizational Structure on Interorganizational Linkages.")

- Importance of this dimension:

Their respective internal structures affect any relationship that two organizations have with each other. Other things being equal (including compliance with recommendations drawn from linkage theory), a relationship between two organizations with like structures will be more effective than one between organizations with unlike structures.

Organizations that have markedly different structures can expect for that reason alone to encounter special problems when dealing with one another. For example, a person who works for a human relations (relatively non-bureaucratic) agency is likely to become annoyed when the bureaucratic representative he is negotiating with repeatedly has to consult rule books or send matters requiring decisions up through a chain of command. Conversely, bureaucratic staff may have little

patience with human relations employees' seeming inability to make appointments ahead of time and keep them. In short, this kind of structural interface can complicate a relationship.

Particular combinations of structures affect recommendations about three kinds of practices.

1. Similarity or difference between structures of organizations in a relationship affects the kind of communication that is most likely to work to either organization's benefit.

Similarity of structure (where both ends of a linkage are bureaucratic or both are human relations) gives a green light for open communication, provided that the setting is reasonably facilitative with respect to goals. Where the setting is facilitative and structures are alike, an organization has double reason to be open in the relationship. Where setting is rated "average" on facilitativeness, likeness of structures still can give cause for moderately open communication. (In a competitive setting, guarded or adversary communication probably is appropriate, regardless of structural compatibility.)

A marked difference in internal structures (a human relations organization dealing with a bureaucratic one, or vice versa) is a potential source of conflict in itself, no matter how facilitative the two organizations' goals. For this reason structural difference gives cause for guardedness. Conflict can come from competing goals, or it can come from structural difference. In either case there is risk that one organization will use knowledge of the other's shortcomings to hurt it. Where the setting is competitive and structures

are different, adversary communication becomes especially important. Where the setting is "average" and structures are different, there still is reason for moderately guarded communication.

2. A recommendation for increased procedural formality (based on standardization and official recognition) takes on added importance when either or both organizations have bureaucratic structures. A recommendation for decreased formality becomes especially important when both organizations are human relations. Standardization of exchange still is the overriding factor, but recommendations based on this alone should be tempered by knowledge of the two organizations' internal structures. A bureaucratic organization has an affinity for formalized procedure; getting along with one may require extra effort to sort out some standardized elements in a predominantly unstandardized exchange. Putting up with "unnecessary" red tape can pay, where a human relations agency wishes to make inroads in a bureaucratic one.

3. A general recommendation (in the section on "Standardization," below) is that unstandardized activity requiring frequent decision-making be handled at high levels in an organization's hierarchy, and standardized exchange be handled at lower levels. This recommendation becomes less important where both organizations in a relationship have human relations structures (where decision making is less concentrated at the top).

However, the recommendation still should hold for both parties to a linkage, if either one of them has a bureaucratic structure.

It may seem silly to a human relations staff member to send his director on a decision-making errand that a lower level person could handle just as easily, but the other (bureaucratic) organization's representative may not see it this way. In a bureaucratic structure, the boss is the right person to make decisions. A person accustomed to this arrangement is likely to question the credentials of a human relations "flunkee" who shows up on policy-making business. A human relations organization at least should decide deliberately whether it wants cooperation badly enough to cater to the "whims" of the bureaucratic organizations it deals with.

- Items on the instrument which measure this dimension (from page "b"):

For a number of very good reasons organizations differ in the ways jobs are defined and decisions are made. Some of the statements which follow will apply more than others to your organization. For each question I would like you to tell me how frequently it applies -- always (5), most of the time (4), some of the time (3), seldom (2) or never (1).

The activities of most of the people who work here are determined by written rules, written forms or job specifications. (If you feel you can't answer for most of the people, answer for your own job only, and check here ☐.)

- * When one of your job activities requires a decision which is not covered in regulations or written procedures, the decision is made either by you alone or by consulting with your colleagues, rather than dictated from above.

In your job you do pretty much the same kinds of things from one day to the next.

- * A task which requires immediate attention is at least as likely to be handled by an administrator as by someone else on your staff.

- * Senior administrators take staff advice into account when making decisions.

You perform specialized duties which are officially prescribed for your category of job, but for none other.

An objective formal procedure is used for rating employees in this organization.

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Reverse code the starred (*) items (a high raw score on these indicates collegiality and absence of detailed division of labor, conditions which

characterize human relations rather than bureaucratic structures).


Take raw scores on the remaining four items (a high score on these indicates guidance by rules, detailed division of labor and use of objective merit ratings, conditions which characterize bureaucratic rather than human relations structures).

Sum the scores.

Interpreting the scale:

The higher the total score, the more bureaucratic the structure of the reporting organization. The lower the score, the closer the structure to the human relations end of the continuum. When interpreting data for an entire network, it is useful to rank order all respondent organizations along this continuum. According to the guidelines, those whose structural ratings are farthest apart from each other should be most susceptible to the sorts of mutual irritants described above.

Following collection of data, respondent organizations can be plotted by name along a continuum like the following:



Official Awareness of Interdependence

- Definition:

The extent to which an organization officially recognizes its relationship with another as legitimate and worthy of being made public. This can vary independently of actual level of interdependence as measured by some objective standard. Even where one organization's success in achieving its goals is affected substantially by activities of another, and even where staff of the two organizations engage in off-the-cuff exchange, either or both organizations may balk at officially sanctioning the relationship. Political concerns may make policy makers wish to keep visibility of the exchange low, or (less likely) they simply may be ignorant of the extent to which their goals are bound up with those of the other organization. The key element of this dimension is whether or not a linkage receives official organizational support. Such support is presumed to be present when employees who handle exchange with another organization perceive this activity as part of their official jobs.

- Importance of this dimension:

The level of official awareness partially determines how much procedural formality is appropriate, how formal a setting should be used for making contact and how much initiative should be taken by staff on one side of a relationship.

Procedural formality is desirable where organizations in their personnel practices or other policy officially recognize their interdependence. Where official recognition is high, written rules and standard procedures can provide continuity in a relationship that otherwise might fluctuate greatly with turnover of contact personnel. Developing this kind of formality can help institutionalize a relationship and assure that it

survives long after the excitement of a spirited push for coordination has faded away. Putting contact itself on a formal basis in the sense of meeting at offices or in committees, rather than at lunch or golf, also can help regularize a relationship.

While this approach is recommended where official awareness is high, it can be counterproductive where such awareness is low or absent. When an organization in its official personnel policies does not recognize its interdependence with another, an employee from there must step outside his defined job role in order to cooperate. If something goes wrong because of his cooperation, he can't get off the hook by saying, "I was only doing my job." There is no official support for the linkage or for that organization's contact person. This can produce uncertainty and anxiety. Anxiety can be reduced by a high level of trust, so trust becomes critical in a relationship where official support is low or absent. Trust develops more readily in an informal setting. Moreover, trying to push standard procedural rules on an organization which does not officially recognize that a relationship even exists is likely to be futile at best. Other things being equal, low official awareness calls for informality, both in contact and in procedure.

Where there is gross imbalance in level of official awareness (high for one organization in a relationship and low for the other), it makes sense for the side with higher awareness to display initiative, taking pains to feed the other with information designed to heighten its recognition of interdependence.

CONTINUED

3 OF 5

- Items on the instrument which measure this dimension:

When contact occurs, how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
[FOR EACH ITEM BELOW ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1)].

(Clients, page "c")

The person from there with whom you deal about youth referrals is officially designated by them as a contact person for your organization (handling the contact is part of his official job).

(Information, page "d"; repeated for planning, page "f")

The person from there whom you communicate with is officially designated by them as a contact person for your organization (handling the contact is part of that person's official job).

(Other exchange, page "g")

The person from that organization who handles this exchange is rated partly on how effectively he deals with your organization.

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Sum the raw 1-2-3-4-5 scores for all items.

- Interpreting the scale:

The higher the total score, the higher the level of official awareness of interdependence on the other side of the linkage. Inferences regarding appropriate level of formality should take account as well of standardization and volume of exchange and of internal structures of the two organizations (these are discussed elsewhere in this paper). In acting on a recommendation for increased or decreased formality, the reporting organization should consider its own official awareness of the relationship. Where interviews are obtained from both ends of linkages, each respondent organization can learn how its official awareness is perceived by those with which it has contact.

Standardization of Exchange

- Definition:

The extent to which exchange between two organizations is routine, uniform, predictable and free of surprise from one contact to the next.

- Importance of this dimension:

The more standardized or routine that transactions are between two organizations, the more desirable it is to have formal rules and procedures for handling these transactions, and the lower the level should be of staff who handle them. Conversely, low standardization makes formality and blanket delegation of work undesirable.

When applied to repetitive activities, rules save time by eliminating the need to continually rediscover how to do the same things. Standardization means that alternatives are limited; where this is the case, a procedural checklist can cover most of what is likely to happen. As the number of alternatives increases, exhaustive checklists and sets of rules necessarily get longer and longer; at some point the level of standardization is so low that these become counter-productive. With a cumbersome list in hand, staff increasingly may have to apply rules to cases which do not quite fit, to unusual situations which the rule makers did not envision. For highly standardized exchange procedural formality offers the advantages of saving time and increasing the likelihood of continuity (discussed in the preceding section). For relatively unstandardized exchange this kind of formality can produce annoying red tape, waste time and be disruptive to a relationship.

Delegating routine activity to worker-level staff allows an administrator to keep his or her time open for critical high-level

decision-making and avoid getting bogged down in repetitive day-to-day detail. But delegation generally should be limited to relatively standardized work.

Where standardization is low, unexpected issues are more likely to come up. A low-ranking person attempting to handle unstandardized exchange often is put in position of continually having to check with someone higher up for decisions. At best this arrangement will waste time on both sides of the linkage; at worst it can undermine trust.

The extent to which worker-level staff can handle non-routine tasks without risking the kind of trouble just described depends in large part upon the organization's internal structure. A collegial, or human relations, organization characteristically places fewer limits than a rationalistic one on the range of decisions which lower level staff are allowed to make. Where worker-level staff are empowered to make decisions on the spot, delegation of unstandardized work is less likely to create a problem.

● Items on the instrument which measure this dimension:

When contact occurs, how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
[FOR EACH ITEM BELOW ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1)].

(Clients, page "c")

* In order to decide whether any particular client should be referred from one organization to the other, your staff and theirs must first discuss with each other details of the individual case.

In the process of handling client referrals, the same predictable issues come up time and again.

*In the process of handling clients, unexpected issues arise.

(Information, page "e")

Their staff is able to figure out what your organization is doing without needing to be told.

The same predictable kinds of information are exchanged time and again.

*Unexpected issues arise in the exchange of information.

(Planning, page "f")

Their staff are able to figure out what your organization wants to do without being told.

In joint planning the same predictable issues come up time and again.

*Unexpected issues arise in the course of joint planning.

(Other exchanges, page "g")

In these exchanges the same predictable situations come up time and again.

*In these exchanges unexpected situations arise.

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Reverse code the starred (*) items, and take the raw 1-2-3-4-5 scores for the others. Sum the scores.

- Interpreting the scale:

The higher the total score, the more standardized the exchange. Inferences about appropriate degree of formality and level in hierarchy also should take into account official awareness of interdependence, internal structures of the two organizations and volume of exchange. Looking at all of these dimensions simultaneously may generate conflicting inferences regarding formality and level. Often the conflict can be resolved by making distinctions among types of exchange (client referral, information transfer, etc.) and if necessary, among kinds of transactions involved in each type. Standardization, official awareness, volume and sometimes even internal structure may vary by type of exchange; for example, client exchange between two organizations may be officially recognized and highly standardized, while joint planning is neither. Moreover, nearly any exchange of a given type involves both standardized and unstandardized transactions; client *intake* may be highly standardized, but from that point on each case may be treated as unique and non-routine. This last distinction is not captured by the instrument, but should be considered² before acting on recommendations. Procedural formality and delegation of work should be applied discriminately, specifically to those types of exchange and elements which are most standardized. By handling some parts of a relationship formally at lower staff levels and other parts informally at high levels, it is possible, for example, to achieve continuity and efficiency (tied to procedural formality and delegation) and at the same time to build trust and make decisions quickly (tied to informality and non-delegation).

Volume of Exchange

- Definition:

The frequency of contact between two organizations.

- Importance of this dimension:

Although usually less critical by itself than standardization or internal organizational structure, high volume can intensify problems associated with insufficient procedural formality or delegation of work. *Other things being equal*, high volume calls for an increase both in standard rules and procedures for handling the exchange and in the proportion of work handled by worker-level staff.

Time saved by using formal rules where appropriate obviously should be greater for an exchange involving thirty contacts per week than for an exchange involving only two. An administrator who can get by spending an hour a day on work which could be handled as well by lower ranking staff may become virtually ineffective for decision-making and planning when that kind of routine starts eating up his or her whole day.

Higher volume does more than simply multiply the cost benefits of suitable formality and delegation. Higher volume implies that more persons are interacting. The more people there are, the more difficult coordination becomes without some formal procedures covering both structure and content of the exchange. Lacking these, decisions may vary from one staff member to another, rendering the relationship less predictable. Where several staff of one organization are involved in the same exchange, inconsistency among decisions which they make individually can hinder the development of trust. Formal rules

are a means of reducing decision-making inconsistency. (Note that this applies to formality of rules only, not of the setting in which contact takes place. Trust develops most readily in an informal setting; this kind of informality can coexist with procedural formality.)

- Items on the instrument which measure this dimension:

(Clients, page "c")

During periods of referral activity, about how frequently does your organization have contact with them for this purpose? More than once a day (5), About once a day (4), Two or three times a week (3), About once a week (2), or Less than once a week (1).

(Item is repeated in essentially the same form for information, page "e"; planning, page "f"; and other exchange, page "g".)

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Sum the raw 1-2-3-4-5 scores.

- Interpreting the scale:

The higher the score, the higher the volume. Inferences about suitable formality and level in hierarchy also should take into account standardization, official awareness of interdependence and internal structures of the two organizations. Inferences from volume alone generally should not override contrary implications from these other dimensions, but the existence of a contradiction should give cause for added thought. For example, where a relationship involves a very high volume of unstandardized exchange, procedural formality would appear desirable if you looked at volume only and undesirable if you looked at standardization only. A recommendation here is to take pains to sort out those elements of the exchange which can be reduced to standard procedure and apply rules (and delegation) to them only.

A second cause for thought is a combination of low volume and high interdependence. This may be due to seasonal fluctuation (an item on the instrument deals with this for client exchange), low official awareness

of interdependence (also measured, see above) or to deliberate efforts by one organization to limit its dealings with the other (two items on page "i" of the instrument ask about distance maintenance). If evidence points to the latter, either member of the relationship might benefit from considering whether its aloofness serves a worthwhile purpose (such as maintaining purity of incompatible goals or assuring economies of small scale).

Manner of Relating

All of the measures discussed so far describe various dimensions of the interorganizational *setting*. This kind of information makes it possible to apply guidelines from the theory for recommended ways of handling particular relationships. The System Description instrument also measures the existing *manner of relating* between organizations. These measures are useful in assessing the extent to which the guidelines already are being followed. In most relationships the gap between existing practices and preferred ways of relating will be great enough to warrant comment with respect to only one or a few of the guidelines. Just as it does for interorganizational setting, the instrument contains items for describing existing manner of relating along several dimensions. This allows singling out those practices which are most likely to be counterproductive in any given relationship.

Open/Adversary Communication

- Definition:

The extent to which an organization either willingly divulges all information about its operation (open communication) or deliberately

keeps its guard up when communicating with another, selectively withholding information about internal weaknesses or problems while at the same time emphasizing strengths and successes (adversary communication).

- Importance of this dimension:


Open communication is appropriate where the respective goals of two organizations in a relationship are mutually supportive *and* their internal structures are similar (or where one wants cooperation strongly enough to genuinely adapt to the other's structure). These two conditions describe a setting which is potentially facilitative in both content and structure. Mutually supportive goals give each organization reason to assist the other in avoiding trouble and overcoming weaknesses. Structural similarity reduces the likelihood that either organization will feel pressure to alter its internal decision-making arrangement or customary ways of handling transactions; it also marks the absence of an important source of misunderstanding and staff irritation across the linkage. Being closemouthed or guarded in a setting like this means passing up a source of help, so open communication should be encouraged -- at least in pursuing selected goals.*

*Two organizations may be in a mixed setting, which is at once both facilitative and competitive, depending upon which of their goals are considered. Where some of the same two organizations' goals are mutually supportive and others are not, it makes sense for both to reveal shortcomings openly in the former arena and remain guarded in the latter. Pulling this off may require assigning separate contact persons to handle exchange associated with each kind of goal; one can be consistently open and the other consistently cagey.

Distinguishing among goals in this manner avoids the error of generalizing from a single highly visible goal to an entire interorganizational relationship. One arena of competition between two agencies does not rule out their working together cooperatively in some other pursuit which benefits them both (improving the lot of youth in their community, for example).

Conversely, adversary communication becomes appropriate where the respective goals of two relating organizations are competitive or (to a lesser degree) where their structures are markedly dissimilar. Competitive goals make the rendering of help across a linkage unlikely, and unlike structures can make mutual understanding and working together difficult. The interests of either organization may be served best by making trouble for the other, rather than by helping the other avoid trouble. The preferred course here is for each organization to convey information that puts itself in a favorable light and to avoid discussion across the linkage of its weak points, mistakes and failures.

ORGANIZATIONAL TUG-OF-WAR



Although they aren't pulling in exactly the same direction, the setting between A and B is facilitative, Neither can make a gain without helping the other. The setting between A and C is competitive; one's gain is the other's loss. If you were organization A and your rope started unravelling, which one of the others would you tell?

- Items on the instrument which measure this dimension:

When contact occurs, about how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
[FOR EACH ITEM BELOW ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1)].

(Clients, page "d")

*Concern for confidentiality or legal constraint makes it desirable for you to withhold certain information on clients from them.

The interests of your organization are served best by going out of your way to share your problems or weaknesses in handling clients with them.

*The interests of your organization are served best by maintaining confidentiality about your problems or weaknesses, discussing them only among your own staff.

(These three items are repeated in similar form for information, page "e"; and planning, page "f".)

(General, page "i")

*When you need information or help from them, there is difficulty in finding out who to contact.

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Reverse code the starred (*) items, take the raw 1-2-3-4-5 score of the unstarred item and sum the scores.

- Interpreting the scale:

The higher the total, the more open communication is across the linkage. Inspection for variation by type of exchange may be especially fruitful here. If the extent of openness is quite different, say, for clients and planning, responses to individual items measuring facilitativeness/competitiveness (page "g" of the instrument) can help in determining whether such variation by type of exchange is in accord with guidelines from the theory. An organization in a relationship where openness appears appropriate for some transactions and guardedness for others should consider the feasibility of segregating the two kinds of business by time, place and contact person (see footnote on page 21).

Procedural Formality

- Definition:

The extent to which written rules, standard forms and procedures, and formal decision-making guidelines are used to carry on exchange between two organizations.

- Importance of this dimension:

Formal procedure can save time, facilitate delegation of work, lend consistency and help assure continuity of an interorganizational relationship, but it can do these things only if the setting is right for it. Formality works where exchange is standardized enough to be reduced to rules and where organizations recognize their interdependence officially. It becomes especially desirable when both of these conditions are present and there is a high volume of exchange. It becomes more desirable yet, the more bureaucratic that organizations in a relationship are (see page 9 above).

The single most critical factor among these probably is standardization. Where formal procedure is applied in a setting marked by low official awareness, it may be ignored by one or both sides; where it is applied to unstandardized exchange, it is likely to be counterproductive.

- Items on the instrument which measure this dimension:

When contact occurs, how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
[FOR EACH ITEM BELOW ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1)].

(Clients, page "c")

Persons on both sides pretty much make up the rules as they go along.

Your organization follows some written or standard procedures in handling client referrals.

They follow some written or standard procedures in handling client referrals.

(These 3 items are repeated in similar form for information, page "d"; joint planning, page "f";
and other exchange, page "g".)

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Reverse code the first item (for each type of exchange), take the
raw 1-2-3-4-5 scores for the other items and sum.

- Interpreting the scale:

The higher the total score, the higher the level of procedural
formality. Scores should be looked at separately for each type of
exchange and considered in light of corresponding standardization and
official awareness ratings (also broken out by exchange type).

Formality of Contact

- Definition:

The extent to which contact between representatives of two organi-
zations takes place during working hours in offices, committees or
other official business settings, rather than over lunch, at home or
in conjunction with recreation.

- Importance of this dimension:

As discussed before (in the section on Official Awareness), in

the absence of official support for a relationship, trust becomes critical. Trust develops most readily in an informal setting, so where official awareness of interdependence is low, formality of contact also should be low. To a lesser extent low standardization, because of the unpredictability and uncertainty associated with it, also can make informality of contact worth considering.

Informal contacts often are most useful in early stages of a relationship and can be abandoned once they have served their purpose (that of establishing trust). Official awareness may increase as the relationship progresses, particularly if low awareness initially is due to ignorance rather than political considerations. Standardization may increase as well, as repetitive elements are perceived amid the complexity of ongoing exchange. Prolonging informality of contact beyond its period of usefulness poses a threat to continuity of the inter-organizational relationship. Where contacts are more personal than official, they are likely to cease as soon as the individuals making contact move on to other jobs. To assure that a relationship will withstand personnel turnover, it is desirable eventually to put contact on a formal basis. Ratings for trust, official awareness and standardization --all measured by the instrument-- can help in judging when the time is ripe for formalizing contact.

• Items on the instrument which measure this dimension:

When contact occurs, how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
[FOR EACH ITEM BELOW ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1)].

(Clients, page "c")

Contacts on matters involving youth referrals take place over lunch or in other non-business settings, rather than at offices, in committees, etc.

(This item is repeated in similar form for information, page "d" and joint planning, page "f")

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Reverse code the 1-2-3-4-5 responses to 5-4-3-2-1.

- Interpreting the scale:

The higher the reversed score, the greater the formality of contact. Where formality appears inappropriately low, consider the history of the relationship. Warm personal contact may have been effective initially in getting exchange off the ground, and sheer inertia may have kept the representatives from taking subsequent steps to get their respective organizations to institutionalize the relationship. Where formality appears inappropriately high, check the items on the instrument (page "i") dealing with trust. If trust already is at a satisfactory level, there may be no point in pressing for less formal contact.

Level in Hierarchy

- Definition:

The rank or position in their respective organizations of persons who typically handle interorganizational transactions with each other.

- Importance of this dimension:

For reasons discussed earlier (in the section on Standardization), uniform or routine exchange is best carried on by lower level staff, while unstandardized tasks requiring individual decision-making are best handled at higher levels. A high volume of exchange makes appropriate delegation of contact work especially critical.

Although this guideline generally is less critical for collegial, or human relations, organizations than it is for bureaucratic ones,

there is good reason for *both* parties to an interorganizational relationship to follow it when *either* of them has a bureaucratic internal structure. This can avoid the irritation which is likely to arise in non-uniform negotiation when one side's representative is empowered to make decisions and commitments on the spot and the other side's contact person is not allowed to say anything stronger than "Yes, we'll certainly consider that." Another advantage of having persons of comparable rank (whether high or low) handle exchange across a linkage is that trust develops more readily between persons who perceive that they have similar status and interests.

Items on the instrument which measure this dimension:

When contact occurs, about how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
[FOR EACH ITEM BELOW ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1)].

(Clients, page "c")

The person from your organization who handles contacts involving youth referrals is an administrator.

*The person from your organization who handles the contact is worker-level staff.

The person from there is an administrator.

*The person from there is worker-level staff.

(These four items are repeated in similar form for information, page "e"; joint planning, page "f"; and other exchange, page "g".)

- Scoring of these items to form a scale:

Reverse code the starred(*) items, take the raw 1-2-3-4-5 scores for the others and sum.

- Interpreting the scale:

The higher the score, the higher the typical level in their respective organizational hierarchies of persons who make contact. It is useful to check level for one kind of exchange at a time and (particularly where trust is rated as low) to look at items pertaining to each side of the relationship for an indication of who is relating to whom.

Linkage Effectiveness

An assumption underlying all of the preceding discussion is that an interorganizational relationship which conforms to the guidelines will be more effective than one which does not. By obtaining information about the setting in which two organizations relate to each other and applying the theory, we can predict what the ideal ways of handling exchange between them will be. By also collecting information on their existing manner of relating, we can assess the extent to which the guidelines already are being followed and diagnose specific practices which are likely to be causing trouble. This process can generate suggestions for one or both organizations to consider as possible means for improving their relationship.

There are imperfections in this approach. First, the theory we are working with needs further validation. Second, particular guidelines probably are more critical for some kinds of organizations than for others (schools, as compared with police, for example), and these distinctions have yet to be made. Third, the factors which the theory considers represent only a fraction of the total interorganizational atmosphere; local and personal idiosyncracies (not taken account of by the theory) can render some of the guidelines inappropriate.

As a first step in learning more about consequences of following the guidelines under varying conditions, some measures of linkage effectiveness are included in the instrument. Self reports (responses to the items here) have severely limited utility in this dimension; they should be supplemented by some objective measures of accomplishment. A relationship which follows the guidelines, yet is unsuccessful, or

Linkage Effectiveness

one which ignores the guidelines and still succeeds signals that some important dimension of the setting may be overlooked by the theory. Inspecting "exceptions" like these will allow further refinement of the guidelines.

Two sorts of effectiveness measures are included in the instrument.

Success in Achieving Objectives

It is in this dimension that an external, independent measure is needed most; the instrument can provide only an imprecise clue here. An accurate indication of this kind of success should be based on more than subjective judgements of participants in an interorganizational relationship, and the rating should include a statement of the value orientation and organizational perspective of the rater. A given relationship may be functioning well from the viewpoint of one member, but not the other; and it may be deemed either productive or counter-productive, depending on the criterion objective used in rating it.* A single item on the instrument (page "i") deals with this dimension; to repeat, it should be supplemented with a precise, independent assessment of achievement.

I would like you to tell me how frequently the following statement applies to the organizational relationship we have been talking about -- Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1).

As a result of contacts with them, your organization achieves the objectives it expects to.

*Consider, for example, a linkage between a school and a police department; assume that its consequence is a substantial increase in the rate of apprehension of youthful offenders. With efficient law enforcement or tight classroom discipline used as a criterion, the relationship would appear productive; with reduction of negative labeling used as a criterion, the same relationship would appear counter-productive.

Employee Satisfaction

A second indicator of linkage effectiveness, more suited to subjective judgements, is the extent to which an organization's representatives are satisfied with the relationship. Most of the guidelines presented can be viewed as ways of avoiding difficulties. By implication, for each one that is not followed, a particular kind of trouble is predicted. The instrument contains items dealing with employee satisfaction, allowing individual respondents to air complaints about their relationships with other organizations. The purpose of these is to assess the extent to which the problems that they perceive coincide with those that the theory predicts, given a particular set of existing practices in a given setting.

Ten items on page "i" address this dimension.

For each of the following items I would like you to tell me which term best describes your organization's contacts with the others---far too much (5), too much (4), about right (3), too little (2) or far too little (1) for maximum achievement of your organization's goals.

1. Their staff's concern for sticking to formal rules and regulations.
2. Their staff's demand on your organization for information from your files.
3. Their staff's efforts to apply uniform procedures in handling exchanges with your organization.
4. The extent to which their staff observe confidentiality requirements.
5. The authority of persons on their staff who are allowed to make decisions about these exchanges.
6. The amount of time their staff take in making decisions about these exchanges.
7. Demands on your organization's administrators to be directly involved in these exchanges.
8. The amount of time spent by your organization's worker-level staff in making decisions involved in day-to-day exchange with them.
9. The extent to which your organization's staff follow standard, uniform procedures in handling these exchanges.
10. Willingness of your staff to discuss your organization's problems with people from there.

Besides providing an indication of overall satisfaction, this series has embodied within it subscales that are tied to specific guidelines.

One of these subscales offers a measure of respondents' perception of adversary communication across a linkage. A high score on items 2, 4 and reverse-coded 10 indicates a complaint that communication is too guarded (adversary), while a low score on these items indicates that communication is perceived as too open. According to the guidelines, guarded communication is not appropriate in a facilitative (mutually supportive) setting. If a person handling a relationship that is characterized by both guardedness and facilitativeness complains that communication is too guarded, the basis for recommending more open communication is reinforced. Absence of this complaint may indicate that (1) something that the guidelines do not take into account is at work in the relationship, (2) the instrument failed to measure one or more of the factors adequately, or (3) the respondent's basis for complaining is something other than a perceived obstacle to effectiveness.*

A second subscale may be used in similar fashion, in conjunction with recommendations about procedural formality. Items 1, 3 and 9 record complaints (or the absence thereof) about too much or too

*Some respondents have appeared to complain simply because someone's style is different from their own, without reference to what works best in a given situation. Persons who report being guarded or formalistic themselves may on that count alone complain that people they deal with are not guarded or formalistic enough.

little attention to formal procedure in handling exchange with another organization.

Note that similar complaints may result either from not following the interorganizational guidelines or from differences in internal structures of interacting organizations. When the items dealing with satisfaction are used for testing propositions about manner of relating, internal structure should be controlled for.

Other Items on the Instrument

In addition to those already presented, the instrument contains items designed to provide simple measures of several other factors. Although less central to the theory of interorganizational relationships we are working with, they are useful in analyzing interorganizational relationships.

Trust: Informal contact and exchange between persons from comparable levels in their respective hierarchies were mentioned as means of developing trust. Trust was assumed to be especially critical in situations of low official awareness of interdependence. A recommendation to put contacts on a less formal basis becomes less important in the face of already high trust, and should be tempered accordingly. Conversely, a low level of reported trust is added reason for reducing this kind of formality (if official awareness is low and the existing level of contact formality is high). To help indicate the existing level of trust, two items on the instrument (page "i") deal specifically with it.

not necessarily equal) in decisions made. Consistent unilateral decisions by the same side imply that a single authority system is operating, and in effect there are not really two organizations at all. Two items on the instrument (page "f") address this factor.

(FOR EACH ITEM BELOW ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1).)

Decisions on planning issues involving controversy between your organization and theirs turn out just as your organization would like them to.

Decisions on planning issues involving controversy between your organization and theirs turn out just as they would like them to.

Referral Confidence: One organization may hesitate to make referrals to another because of uncertainty about what will happen to youth after they are sent. Four items (page "d") provide a measure of this dimension.

(FOR EACH ITEM BELOW ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1).)

When your organization makes a referral to them, you are confident that it will receive immediate attention.

You have complete confidence that the youth you send there will receive the kind of help he or she needs.

After you refer a youth there you are confident that his progress will be monitored closely.

Their staff see to it that you receive some follow-up on youth whom you have referred to them.

Name of Agency Interviewed _____ Type of Agency _____

Respondent's Title (give title, then specify "W" for worker or "A" for administrator): _____

Names of Organizations for which linkages are being reported:

Linkage A _____

Linkage B _____

Linkage C _____

Linkage D _____

Linkage E _____

Date of Interview _____

Interviewer's Name _____

First, I would like to ask some general questions about the overall youth services system of this community. Please respond to each of the following statements in terms of your agreement or disagreement with the statement. (INTERVIEWER: Circle appropriate response for each item.)

	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Agree</u>
1. The youth development and delinquency prevention services in this community are well coordinated.	1	2	3
2. The youth development and delinquency prevention services in this community are comprehensive.	1	2	3
3. The youth development and delinquency prevention services in this community evidence <u>singleness of direction</u> in their activities and efforts.	1	2	3
4. Troubled youth in this community are receiving good care.	1	2	3
5. The youth development and delinquency prevention services in this community are characterized by good follow-up mechanisms which allow for constant evaluation of goal attainment.	1	2	3
6. Great efforts are made by all of the service agencies dealing with troubled youth in this community to eliminate ineffective programs.	1	2	3

Always	Most of the time	Some of the time	Seldom	Never
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For a number of very good reasons, organizations differ in the ways jobs are defined and decisions are made. Some of the statements which follow will apply more than others to your organization. For each question, I would like you to tell me how frequently it applies -- always (5), most of the time (4), some of the time (3), seldom (2) or never (1).

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7. The activities of most of the people who work here are determined by written rules, written forms or job specifications. (If you feel you can't answer for most of the people, answer for your own job only, and check here <input type="checkbox"/> .) |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 8. When one of your job activities requires a decision which is not covered in regulations or written procedures, the decision is made either by you alone or by consulting with your colleagues, rather than dictated from above. |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 9. In your job you do pretty much the same kinds of things from one day to the next. |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 10. A task which requires immediate attention is at least as likely to be handled by an administrator as by someone else on your staff. |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 11. Senior administrators take staff advice into account when making decisions. |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 12. You perform specialized duties which are officially prescribed for your category of job, but for none other. |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 13. An objective formal procedure is used for rating employees in this organization. |

Now I would like to ask some questions about the relationships your organization has with others in the community (the five listed on the preceding page). Relationships may vary in terms of the kind, number, level, standardization and formality of exchange between organizations. Let's look at several types of exchange. First, referrals of youth between your organization and the others. Please consider each question, and give your response with reference to each organization. (INTERVIEWER: In the pages that follow keep a list of the five agencies at hand with their A-B-C-D-E identifiers, and let respondent look at it as he answers. Enter the appropriate response, 1-5, for each agency in the columns to the left of each item.)

Again, I would like you to tell me how frequently each of the following statements applies to the organizational relationships we have been talking about---always (5), most of the time (4), some of the time (3), seldom (2) or never (1).

Their people level with you about their thoughts, feelings and intentions.

This relationship is characterized by mutual trust.

Initiative: It was suggested that an organization display initiative in transferring information when dealing with others whose official awareness of interdependence is low. Comparing responses to the first and second items below (from page "e" of the instrument) provides a rough assessment of initiative by the reporting organization. (In the same fashion, comparable items for clients -page "c"- give information on direction of flow.)

When contact occurs, how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?

[FOR EACH ITEM BELOW ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:

Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1)].

They provide information to your organization.

Your organization provides them with information.

Distance Maintenance: Interdependent organizations that have limited or no contact with each other simply may never have thought of working jointly, or one or both of them may see good reason to restrict contact. Two items on the instrument (page "i") are intended to help in making this distinction.

Again, I would like you to tell me how frequently each of the following statements applies to the organizational relationships we have been talking about---always (5), most of the time (4), some of the time (3), seldom (2) or never (1).

They make a deliberate attempt to restrict areas of joint work with your organization.

Your organization makes a deliberate attempt to restrict areas of joint work with them.

Symmetry of Power: The interorganizational guidelines are intended to apply to relationships where each side has a say (although

ORGANIZATION

A B C D E

					14. Are clients ever referred between the two organizations, either from them to you or from you to them? Yes (1) or No (0). If yes, please answer the following: (If all responses are "No", skip to page 8.5e.)
					-- Are you involved personally in handling client referrals between your organization and theirs. Yes (1) or No (0).
					-- Is the rate of client referral fairly consistent all year round (1), or is it substantially more intensive during certain months (2)?
					15. During periods of referral activity, about how frequently does your organization have contact with them for this purpose? <u>More than once a day (5)</u> , <u>About once a day (4)</u> , <u>Two or three times a week (3)</u> , <u>About once a week (2)</u> , or <u>Less than once a week (1)</u> .

When contact occurs, how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
 [FOR EACH ITEM BELOW, ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1).]

A	B	C	D	E	
					16. They make referrals to your organization.
					17. Your organization makes referrals to them.
					18. The person from your organization who handles contacts involving youth referrals is an administrator.
					19. The person from your organization who handles the contact is worker-level staff.
					20. The person from there is an administrator.
					21. The person from there is worker-level staff.
					22. The person from there with whom you deal about youth referrals is officially designated by them as a contact person for your organization (handling the contact is part of his official job).
					23. In order to decide whether any particular client should be referred from one organization to the other, your staff and theirs first must discuss with each other details of the individual case.
					24. Concern for confidentiality or legal constraint makes it desirable for you to withhold certain information on clients from them.
					25. Contacts on matters involving youth referrals take place over lunch or in other non-business settings, rather than at offices, in committees, etc.
					26. Persons on both sides pretty much make up the rules as they go along.
					27. Your organization follows some written or standard procedures in handling client referrals.
					28. They follow some written or standard procedures in handling client referrals.
					29. Your organization has contracts, letters of agreement or statutory relations with them.
					30. In the process of handling client referrals, the same predictable issues come up time and again.

[FOR EACH ITEM BELOW, ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1).]

ORGANIZATION

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					31. In the process of handling clients, unexpected issues arise.
					32. The interests of your organization are served best by going out of your way to share your problems or weaknesses in handling clients with them.
					33. The interests of your organization are served best by maintaining confidentiality about your problems or weaknesses, discussing them only among your own staff.
					34. Your organization and theirs each opens its files on clients to the other.
					For the following four items: If your organization makes no referrals to them, enter "0".
A	B	C	D	E	
					35. When your organization makes a referral to them, you are confident that it will receive immediate attention.
					36. You have complete confidence that the youth you send there will receive the kind of help he or she needs.
					37. After you refer a youth there you are confident that his progress will be monitored closely.
					38. Their staff see to it that you receive some follow-up on youth whom you have referred to them.

A B C D E

- | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| | | | | | 39. Is information (not directly concerned with client referral or joint planning) ever exchanged between the two organizations, either from them to you or from you to them? Yes (1) or No (0). |
| | | | | | If yes, please answer the following: (If no, skip to next page.) |
| | | | | | 40. About how frequently does your organization have contact with them for the purpose of either giving or receiving information? <u>More than once a day (5)</u> , <u>About once a day (4)</u> , <u>Two or three times a week (3)</u> , <u>About once a week (2)</u> , or <u>Less than once a week (1)</u> . |

When contact occurs, how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
 [FOR EACH ITEM BELOW, ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1)].

A B C D E

- | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | | | | 41. They provide information to your organization. |
| | | | | | 42. Your organization provides them with information. |
| | | | | | 43. The person from your organization who handles exchange of information is an administrator. |
| | | | | | 44. The person from your organization who handles exchange of information is worker-level staff. |
| | | | | | 45. The person from there is an administrator. |
| | | | | | 46. The person from there is worker-level staff. |
| | | | | | 47. The person from there whom you communicate with is officially designated by them as a contact person for your organization (handling the contact is part of that person's official job). |
| | | | | | 48. Their staff are able to figure out what your organization is doing without needing to be told. |
| | | | | | 49. Concern for confidentiality makes it desirable for you to withhold certain information from them. |
| | | | | | 50. Information is exchanged over lunch or in other non-business settings, rather than at offices, in committees, etc. |
| | | | | | 51. Persons on both sides pretty much make up the rules as they go along. |
| | | | | | 52. Your organization follows some written or standard procedures in handling information exchange. |
| | | | | | 53. They follow some written or standard procedures in handling information exchange. |
| | | | | | 54. Your organization has contracts, letters of agreement or statutory relations with them. |
| | | | | | 55. The same predictable kinds of information are exchanged time and again. |
| | | | | | 56. Unexpected issues arise in the exchange of information. |
| | | | | | 57. The interests of your organization are served best by going out of your way to share problems or weaknesses with them. |
| | | | | | 58. The interests of your organization are served best by maintaining confidentiality about your problems or weaknesses, discussing them only among your own staff. |
| | | | | | 59. Your organization and theirs each makes it easy for the other's staff to get all the information they want. |

A B C D E

0.31

A	B	C	D	E	
					60. Does your organization ever engage in joint planning with them? Yes (1) or No (0).
					If yes, please answer to following: (If no, skip to next page.)
					61. About how frequently does your organization have contact with them for this purpose? <u>At least two or three times a week (5)</u> , <u>about once a week (4)</u> , <u>two or three times a month (3)</u> , <u>about once a month (2)</u> , or <u>less than once a month (1)</u> .

When contact occurs, how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
 [FOR EACH ITEM BELOW, ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
 Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (3), or Never (1).]

A B C D E

A	B	C	D	E	
					62. Decisions on planning issues involving controversy between your organization and theirs turn out just as your organization would like them to.
					63. Decisions on planning issues involving controversy between your organization and theirs turn out just as <u>they</u> would like them to.
					64. The <u>person</u> from your organization who handles planning contacts is an administrator.
					65. The <u>person</u> from your organization who handles planning contacts is worker-level staff.
					66. The <u>person</u> from there is an administrator.
					67. The <u>person</u> from there is worker-level staff.
					68. The <u>person</u> from there whom you communicate with is officially designated by them as a contact person for your organization (handling the contact is part of that person's official job.)
					69. Their staff are able to figure out what your organization wants to do without needing to be told.
					70. Concern for confidentiality makes it desirable for you to withhold certain information about your intentions from them.
					71. Contacts take place over lunch or in other non-business settings, rather than at offices, in committees, etc.
					72. Persons on both sides pretty much make up the rules as they go along.
					73. Your organization follows some written or standard procedures, such as regularly scheduled planning sessions, for the purpose of planning.
					74. They follow some written or standard procedures in this kind of exchange.
					75. Your organization has contracts, letters of agreement, or statutory relations with them, covering joint planning.
					76. In joint planning the same predictable issues come up time and again.
					77. Unexpected issues arise in the course of joint planning.
					78. The interests of your organization are served best by going out of your way to share your problems or weaknesses with them.
					79. The interests of your organization are served best by maintaining confidentiality about your problems or weaknesses, discussing them only among your own staff.
					80. Your organization and theirs each share internal plans and intentions whenever the other is interested.

ORGANIZATION

A B C D E

					81. Does your organization ever exchange anything else with them (besides youth, information and planning), such as money, staff time, etc.? Yes (1) or No (0).
--	--	--	--	--	---

If no, skip to next page; if yes, please indicate what is exchanged:

Organization A: _____ B: _____

C: _____ D: _____ E: _____

A B C D E

					82. About how frequently does your organization have contact with them for this purpose? <u>More than once a day (5)</u> , <u>About once a day (4)</u> , <u>Two or three times a week (3)</u> , <u>About once a week (2)</u> , or <u>less than once a week (1)</u> .
--	--	--	--	--	--

When contact occurs, how frequently does each of the following describe the nature of the contact?
[FOR EACH ITEM BELOW, ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF THE FREQUENCY WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE:
Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2), Never (1).]

A B C D E

					83. The person from your organization who handles this kind of contact is an administrator.
					84. The person from your organization who handles this kind of contact is worker-level staff.
					85. The person from there is an administrator.
					86. The person from there is worker-level staff.
					87. The person from that organization who handles this exchange is rated by them partly on how effectively he or she deals with your organization.
					88. In these exchanges the same predictable situations come up time and again.
					89. In these exchanges unexpected situations arise.
					90. Persons on both sides pretty much make up the rules as they go along.
					91. Your organization follows some written or standard procedures in handling this kind of exchange.
					92. They follow some written or standard procedures in handling this kind of exchange.
					93. Your organization has contracts, letters of agreement or statutory relations with them, covering this exchange.

Organizations sometimes depend on each other in ways which are not readily apparent, or are not accurately reflected in their contacts with each other. In order to get at these relationships, please imagine for a moment that the other organization closed down, or mysteriously vanished tomorrow. If the disappearance of statutory agencies (Police, Schools, etc.) is just not possible to imagine, substitute the assumption that the organization's employees go on an extended strike beginning tomorrow. What do you think would be the probable effects on your organization with respect to the following?

ORGANIZATION

A	B	C	D	E	
					94. You would find it <u>no different</u> (2), <u>harder</u> (3) or <u>easier</u> (1) to secure funds for your organization.
					95. You would encounter <u>less</u> (1), <u>the same</u> (2) or <u>more</u> (3) resistance to purposes (goals) of your programs.
					96. There would be <u>no change</u> (2), <u>increased difficulty</u> (3) or <u>less difficulty</u> (1) in getting the information you need to conduct your program.
					97. You would have an <u>easier</u> (1), <u>no different</u> (2) or <u>harder</u> (3) time meeting your obligations to those to whom your organization is accountable.
					98. It would <u>increase</u> (1), <u>have no effect</u> (2) or <u>decrease</u> (3) your ability to develop a more integrated program for your service area.
					99. Your ability to deal effectively with institutional blockages to youth development and with institutional sources of juvenile delinquency would <u>improve</u> (1), <u>remain unchanged</u> (2) or <u>diminish</u> (3).
					100. You would find it <u>no different</u> (2), <u>harder</u> (3) or <u>easier</u> (1) to serve the number of clients most suited to your organization's purposes.

(Interviewer: Omit #100 when respondent represents school or police.)

A	B	C	D	E	
					101. If all ties were severed between your organization and theirs, do you feel that <u>they</u> would have a generally <u>harder</u> (3), <u>no different</u> (2) or <u>easier</u> (1) time in achieving their own goals?

Again, I would like you to tell me how frequently each of the following statements applies to the organizational relationships we have been talking about---Always (5), Most of the time (4), Some of the time (3), Seldom (2) or Never (1).

ORGANIZATION

A	B	C	D	E	
					102. Their people level with you about their thoughts, feelings and intentions.
					103. This relationship is characterized by mutual trust.
					104. As a result of contacts with them, your organization achieves the objectives it expects to.
					105. They make a deliberate attempt to restrict areas of joint work with your organization.
					106. Your organization makes a deliberate attempt to restrict areas of joint work with them.
					107. When you need information or help from them, there is difficulty in finding out who to contact.

For each of the following items, I would like you to tell me which term best describes your organization's contacts with the others---far too much (5), too much (4), about right (3), too little (2) or far too little (1) for maximum achievement of your organization's goals.

A	B	C	D	E	
					108. Their staff's concern for sticking to formal rules and regulations.
					109. Their staff's demand on your organization for information from your files.
					110. Their staff's efforts to apply uniform procedures in handling exchanges with your organization.
					111. The extent to which their staff observe confidentiality requirements.
					112. The authority of persons on their staff who are allowed to make decisions about these exchanges.
					113. The amount of time their staff take in making decisions involved in these exchanges.
					114. Demands on your organization's administrators to be <u>directly</u> involved in these exchanges.
					115. The amount of time spent by your organization's worker-level staff in making decisions involved in day-to-day exchange with them.
					116. The extent to which your organization's staff follow standard, uniform procedures in handling these exchanges.
					117. Willingness of your staff to discuss your organization's problems with people from there.

(Interviewer: Detach the remaining pages of this schedule and ask respondent to fill them out. If feasible, this should be done while you wait.)

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

Handout A

Name of Agency _____ Respondent's Title _____

- I. In an ideal local system, without regard to existing or projected programs, how important would each of the following programs or actions be for delinquency prevention and youth development?

Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	A Little Important	Not Important
----------------	-----------	--------------------	--------------------	---------------

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. A program to evaluate existing services. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 2. Changes in school regulation relative to compulsory attendance laws. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 3. School programs to deal with problems of dropout and truancy. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 4. Recreation facilities made available at more times such as evenings and weekends. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 5. Multi-service counselling centers to serve entire families. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 6. Closing down most state training and correctional schools. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 7. Adoption of a hard line by the courts to convince youth the courts mean business. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 8. Programs enabling youth to speak with police and other public agency personnel. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 9. Programs of youth involvement in civic affairs. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 10. Organized recreation programs for youth. | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	A Little Important	Not Important
-------------------	-----------	-----------------------	-----------------------	------------------

11. Legislation to eliminate such juvenile offenses as incorrigibility, truancy, etc.	5	4	3	2	1
12. A program to provide an assessment of youth needs.	5	4	3	2	1
13. Group therapy to promote exchange of information and release of emotions.	5	4	3	2	1
14. Legal advocacy for youth in the community.	5	4	3	2	1
15. Increased police surveillance.	5	4	3	2	1
16. Youth-adult interaction programs.	5	4	3	2	1
17. Programs to increase youth involvement and participation in school related activities.	5	4	3	2	1
18. Destruction of records for youthful offenders.	5	4	3	2	1
19. Emergency or temporary crisis centers for runaway youth.	5	4	3	2	1
20. Work with labor unions to change restrictions on youth employment.	5	4	3	2	1
21. Plans for removal of known troublemakers from school.	5	4	3	2	1
22. Programs to assist parents and youth with communication skills.	5	4	3	2	1
23. Recreational programs that can be shared by youth and their families.	5	4	3	2	1
24. Youth controlled radio station.	5	4	3	2	1
25. A bill of rights for youth.	5	4	3	2	1
26. Provisions of legal services for youth.	5	4	3	2	1
27. Separation of known troublemakers into smaller classes.	5	4	3	2	1

8.5k

Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	A Little Important	Not Important
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28. An effort to provide joint planning for youth services.	5	4	3	2	1
29. Remedial programs for dropouts and potential dropouts.	5	4	3	2	1
30. Use of sensitivity or encounter groups for troubled children.	5	4	3	2	1
31. Diversion programs to remove juveniles from the juvenile justice system.	5	4	3	2	1
32. Elimination of tracking systems or ability grouping in school.	5	4	3	2	1
33. School extension programs for dropouts.	5	4	3	2	1
34. Programs to provide individual psychotherapy.	5	4	3	2	1
35. Hot lines or crisis centers to deal with individual youth problems.	5	4	3	2	1
36. An effort to coordinate existing youth services.	5	4	3	2	1
37. Programs to provide family counselling.	5	4	3	2	1
38. A program to provide individual counselling.	5	4	3	2	1

II. Scope

On this map, we would like you to indicate which agencies are working together to develop a coordinated program or system of youth programs and services. Place the number(s) of the organizations working most closely together in a service system in the center circle. Place the number(s) of those partly or peripherally involved in the next circle. Place the number(s) of uninvolved agencies in the outside circle. If you are not sufficiently familiar with a particular agency or institution, simply check Don't Know for that one.


Agencies & Institutions

Don't Know

Agencies & Institutions

Don't Know

- | | | | |
|----|-------|-----|-------|
| 1. | _____ | 6. | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | 7. | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | 8. | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | 9. | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | 10. | _____ |



Are there any agencies which are NOT working together in the interests of youth development, which you feel SHOULD be?

(list)

APPENDIX C

Flow Analysis Notes

Center for Action Research, Inc.
Boulder, Colorado

July, 1975


**Draft Copy
For Discussion Only**

FLOW ANALYSIS NOTES

As members of a large and complex society, we rely on social institutions to provide education, employment and other services which can no longer be handled within the family alone. The organizations and agencies which make up these social institutions are generally able to provide services which benefit the people who rely on them. Schools provide an education which enables most youth to enter productively into society. Police and courts operate reasonably well to maintain social order and resolve disputes. Nevertheless, some of the routine ways in which social agencies, organizations and institutions go about their business actually *create* problems for the persons they are supposed to serve. Some of the features of social institutions turn out to be harmful features. The remedy for such harmful features cannot be found in individual persons, either service providers or service recipients. The routines of the organization which are having harmful effects must be changed, and can be changed without trying to "change the whole society".

The biggest obstacle encountered by most of us when faced with an *institutional view* of "things gone wrong" is simply trying to *locate* which features of the particular institution may be destructive. It's common to ask "How do I see negative labeling?" or "What does access to a meaningful role look like?" These are fair questions. This paper represents one approach to the location of policies and practices of social institutions which are harmful to youth.

Consider the diagram below:




This is a picture of a fairly typical arrangement of the police and courts as they engage in processing youth. The policeman contacts a youth on the street, and either lectures and releases him or takes him to the station for booking. At the station it may be decided to release the youth to his parents without charges or to send the youth to court intake. At court intake a decision must be made to dismiss the case, make an informal adjustment or schedule the youth for a hearing. And a hearing may result in institutionalization, probation or the dismissal of the case. How does it come about that youth are handled this way by police and courts? First of all, the policeman is required by law to detain persons who appear to be acting in violation of the law. The policeman's responsibility is *legal* and is governed by statute. It may also be police department *policy* which determines which violations warrant an official arrest and which may be satisfied by a lecture and release. The policy may dictate how much latitude a policeman can exercise in releasing youth after initial contact. For example, in some places all contacts must be recorded, while in other cases many contacts remain "informal", i.e., unrecorded. In addition, there are the *practices* of the individual policemen as they go about doing their job,

putting into practice agreements, expectations and styles of handling offenders. Practices may vary depending upon the time of day, the part of town, the way a youth is dressed, whether the youth is alone or with others and so forth.

The juvenile justice system has certain responsibilities which it must carry out and it has developed certain routines for that purpose. Which of these routines have negative consequences for youth and are amenable to change? The answer to this questions requires a systematic examination of the statutes, policies and practices which determine how youth will be treated in schools, courts, police stations, welfare offices, etc., and an examination of their consequences for youth. In the case of our diagram above, we must consider what the effects will be if Suzy's neighbors see her being put into a police car or if she has to miss school to go to court. More generally, we must ask "What are the various paths into and through the juvenile justice system?" and "What difference does it make which path a youth follows?" There is evidence that offenders processed by the juvenile justice system are *more likely* to commit further offenses than offenders processed in some alternative way.

Consider another example. Youth from three junior high schools enter a high school. They arrive at the door with a variety of interests, backgrounds, abilities and achievements. Some of them have been in trouble but most have not. All of this information is available to counselors in the school who make a decision about each youth: they assign him/her to the college prep or general "track". These tracks are not neutral situations.

They are valued differently by teachers, administrators, students, parents, and employers.



The decision to assign new sophomores to a track is not a personal decision. It is a matter of school *policy* to group youth according to demonstrated ability. A number of rationales support this policy as reasonable, just and scientifically sound. If a youth is assigned to a low track, there are a number of *plausible explanations*.

"He must not have done well enough up to now to be in the college prep group."


"She obviously just doesn't have the IQ to go to college. It would put too much pressure on her to expect her to compete with brighter kids."

"Those kids should get training now to prepare them for the business world. They're just not motivated to go to college."


These explanations are based on the rationales which support the policy of tracking. They assume that counselors make decisions about track assignments based on measured ability (IQ scores) and demonstrated ability (grades). What if counselors made their decisions instead based on the youth's race and his/her's father's occupation (blue collar or white collar)? In fact, this *is* the way counselors were found to be making their decisions

(whether consciously or unconsciously) in a study¹ of two midwestern high schools. (All results of several tracking practices reported in this paper are from that study.) The diagrams below represent the difference between intentions of *policy* and the results of *practices* in those schools.


POLICY



PRACTICE



PRACTICE



¹Polk, Kenneth & Walter E. Schafer. Schools and Delinquency. Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1974.

The decisions made by counselors are the result of intuitive judgments about potential and character. They are not individually malicious judgments but they do consistently and clearly disadvantage whole groups of youth.

So, the idea's ok, it's just that it's gotten messed up in practice, right? If we just train the counselors how to make fair judgments about kids, based on their real ability, everything will be alright, right? Wrong.

What about the policy itself? The assumption is that it helps students to group them by ability. It permits college-bound students to take the special courses they need and it prevents them from being held back by slower students. It relieves the pressure on non-college bound students entering the work world following high school.

Those are the assumptions. What are the actual consequences for youth who are assigned to lower tracks? Does tracking *make a difference* in the grades a person gets, in the degree to which he participates in school activities, in whether he gets into trouble? Does it *make a difference* in later opportunities for employment or further education?

The answers to these questions can be discovered by means of flow techniques. For example, there are a number of locations in school where youth can be found. They are found in classrooms, or participating in extra-curricular activities, or in the principal's office. They show up on class rankings, according to grade point averages. All of these locations can be documented with the *number* of youth found in them during the year, and the number and *percentage* of those youth who come from the college prep or the non-college track.

It's both a commonsense notion and a scientific finding that kids in the lower status tracks *have lower grades, get in trouble more, participate in fewer school activities and have poorer chances of getting good jobs.*

And there are a number of plausible explanations for these happenings:

"That's no surprise. They've been getting lower grades all along and now they just can't keep up."

"The family doesn't value education. There's no reward in the home for good grades."

"They probably have a record of discipline problems in junior high."

"Her brother was a troublemaker, too. With him as an example, what can you expect?"

"It takes him all his time just to keep up with schoolwork. It wouldn't be a good idea to let him get involved in sports."

"They aren't interested in school as it is. Why would they want to get involved in extra stuff?"

These explanations all suggest that there *is something about some youth* which *causes* them to have low grades and trouble in school and lack of success on the job. The "something" is variously thought of as a lack of natural ability or personal motivation, a nutritional deficiency, a broken home or a failure to adjust to authority.

Solutions to these problems range from personal counseling to school breakfast programs to (at last) resignation. They are all solutions intended to change whatever it is about the youth which is causing his problems in school.

These explanations rely on notions about the *appropriateness* of the tracking in the first place. Youth who get low grades in the vocational track have always had low grades. Youth who are in trouble in high school are simply adding to an established record. But look again at the diagram on page 5. If what *counts* in assigning youth to the college prep track is not grades or IQ but rather a person's race or his father's type of occupation, then there must be youth in *both* tracks who have high (or low) IQ's or high (or low) grade point averages. Like this:

CHARACTERISTICS	COLLEGE PREP CURRICULUM	GENERAL CURRICULUM
Social Class	Mostly middle class	Mostly working class
Race	Mostly white	Mostly black
GPA	AVERAGE TO HIGH	AVERAGE TO HIGH
IQ	AVERAGE TO HIGH	AVERAGE TO HIGH


Take youth who are equal in terms of IQ, past grade record, and (to take care of explanations couched in terms of home influences) who come from the same social and economic background. Assign half of the kids to a college prep track and half to a general track. They all start out equal. Where do they end up? Does the *track assignment itself* make a difference to their grades, their school participation, their likelihood of dropping out and their chances of getting into trouble in school?

Of course, youth aren't randomly assigned to classes and it's too late to go back and rearrange the students in our example. But there are ways of making everything "equal" artificially. Statistical techniques are available which allow you essentially to neutralize the effects which history (in the form of family, grades, etc.) might have and to look only at the effects of the track assignment itself. In the study of the two mid-western high schools, that's just what was done.

The statistical procedure checks to see if the plausible explanations which are offered do, in fact, account for the differences between youth in the college prep track and youth in the general track. If the differences *can* be explained by differences in IQ, or differences in past achievement, or differences in social background, then the plausible explanations can be given due credit for being specifically and scientifically as well as intuitively right. On the other hand, the statistical procedure can *also* show if the intuitive judgments on which plausible explanations are based are specifically wrong.

When this procedure was followed in the study of the two high schools, it was found that the differences between the youth in the two groups could not be explained by appealing to "nature" or "history", i.e., by appealing to IQ or past grades or family backgrounds as the *causes* of youth problems. When all these sources of explanation were eliminated, the youth in the low status track *still had lower grades, more trouble and less involvement in school.*

Look at the diagram below:



Youth who are assigned to a college prep group *end up* in a more successful, more prestigious, more valued place in the world. They end up in the upper half of their class academically and they end up there *more often* than do youth assigned to the vocational track.

If we can't explain this outcome in terms of past grades, or in terms of native intelligence or social class background, then how does it happen?

Remember that the college prep curriculum and the vocational curriculum are not *seen* in the same way. The college prep track is seen as *better* by administrators, teachers, parents, potential employers and by the students themselves. It makes sense that the students in the college prep track are seen by those people as better, smarter, more conscientious and having more potential for future success *whether or not* there is evidence for those assumptions.

There is evidence to support the notion that teachers expect different things from a group they are told has "high potential" than they expect from a group they are told has "low potential". What's more, there is also

evidence to show that those groups *behave* according to teachers' expectations, regardless of what their real potential is.


No matter what a youth's IQ, previous grade record and social class background might be, assigning him to a status track in high school will often *result* in low performance. There is nothing which the youth typically brings with him to school (his background, his brains or his academic record) which we can point to as the sole *cause* of low performance (though persons frequently do and devise solutions accordingly). The only thing left to point to is not something the youth brings with him, but something that happens to him after he gets to school. The assignment to a low status track can by itself produce low performance in kids. And it can do it often enough and consistently enough and effectively enough that we can point it out as an *institutional policy which systematically produces negative labels*.

What are the consequences for youth who are negatively labeled in this way? The immediate consequence, of course, is that their teachers, friends and parents tend to see them as less competent, less worthy and more likely to be a "problem" than they see other youth. There are differences for youth in the general track in that they have less "status" *within the school* itself.

A second and more permanent consequence comes about as a result of the practice of schools (and any other bureaucratic organization) of keeping records. The record is an effective summary of all the things which people in authority take seriously, things which *count* in suggesting to a college or an employer if a person is a good risk. They are the things, like grade point averages, which are likely to be adversely affected by placing a

person in a group which is, from the start, seen as a bad place to be.

The amount of time which youth in the college track and youth in the non-college track spend participating in school activities is also strikingly different, and it is a difference which *remains* after explanations based on natural abilities, past achievements and family backgrounds have all been accounted for.



Youth in the general track are clearly not involved in the mainstream of school activities and could be considered "marginal" people within the school society. The youth who actively participate in school activities tend to be the ones who are seen as "popular" and "smart" and "athletic", that is, as successful in a variety of ways. The differences are lasting, however, because they are once again embodied in a formal and official shape by means of record. The record "stands for" the person when he later comes to apply for admission to higher education or a job. In this way the tracking turns out (whether intentionally or unintentionally, formally or informally) to restrict the *access* which some youth have to roles and opportunities in the school. Access may be denied because students in the general track have little contact with the teachers who sponsor activities or because they have come to understand that they are not "equipped" to compete with the students

who participate in those activities or because a school policy requires a certain grade average in order to participate. Whatever the reason, the policy of grouping youth in tracks turns out to *deny access to numerous desirable social roles and opportunities systematically* for those in the less desirable tracks.

If the results of assignment to a low track include the likelihood of academic failure (or at least non-success) and exclusion from school activities, it seems likely that students in those tracks will gradually lose any commitment to the school and its rules and expectations.


This notion is supported by the discovery that youth in the lower tracks have records of more violations and misbehavior both in school and out than do youth in the high status track. Of the students with three or more recorded violations of school rules, almost three-fourths were students assigned to the low status track. Of students suspended from school for violations of school rules, over half were students from the low status track.

Of course, it is also the responsibility of the school, which has the job of teaching people how to fit acceptably into society, to teach commitment to the laws of the community as well as the school itself. However, the same pattern of trouble for lower track students is repeated outside the school as well.

The "obvious" explanation is that these are the same kids who have been in trouble all along and it has something to do with a personality defect, a bad circle of friends, or the failure of parents to teach respect for law

and authority. In this event, it's also obviously the responsibility of the elementary schools and the parents to "nip it in the bud".

However, the findings summarized below suggest that the *policy of tracking* may itself contribute substantially to the amount of trouble experienced by youth in low tracks during high school. These findings are for youth *without prior records only*.*



Considering all of the consequences which follow from the assignment to a particular track, it is hardly surprising to find that youth in low status tracks also *drop out* of school with far greater frequency than do youth in high status tracks.

If what *causes* youth in low tracks to get bad grades, have trouble with teachers, little identification with the school and eventually drop out is the *track assignment*, then there is no solution to be found in the breakfast programs or personal counseling. It won't do (and won't work) to spend a lot of time and resources telling the kid it's all right, or it's his fault. At best it will be (and has been) ineffectual and at worst he may believe it. *If the cause is in the policy and practices of the school, then the solution must also be sought there.*

So, what's the next step? It's unlikely that wandering into the school superintendent's office to present him with proof that he's messing up youth

*Note that the percentages don't add up to 100%. The discrepancy is accounted for by youth who were delinquent both prior to and during high school.

is going to pay off in an invitation to design a new school system. The kinds of decisions which lead to this sort of investigative and evaluative research *in the first place* are decisions which come out of an organized planning process.

If the school is recognized as an agency which profoundly affects youth and which expends enormous amounts of resources for just that purpose, then a process of making things better for youth in the community must necessarily involve school representatives who themselves have sufficient status to commit their agency and their agency's resources to action (including the sort of research discussed in this chapter). Without the active involvement of the school, the *access* to the school and the school records required to do this sort of research would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. That means that the research in question must be seen as a *resource*, as constituting part of an important *information* base for planned change. It cannot be presented or undertaken as if it were an attempt to "expose" the schools and school personnel as agents of evil. There are no angels or devils in this game. Flow analysis is undertaken in search of an answer to this general question: "Are there features of the school (or court, or police, or welfare agency) itself which produce failure and even delinquency among youth?"

Of course, all organizations have routine ways of organizing their activities to make efficient use of time and resources. It would be an impossible task to consider *all* of the routine practices and *all* of the policies of an organization simultaneously to see if, perchance, one or more of them are having negative effects on youth. In our example, the focus on tracking

in schools proceeded from a "suspicion" that artificially placing youth in groups, some of which are highly valued and some of which are valued very little, may result in a series of consequences for youth. There is also the "suspicion" that the consequences for the youth in one of the groups will be substantially *different* from the consequences for youth in the other group in a number of important ways. These suspicions come from the perspective of a youth development strategy, which is brought to bear on the planning process (and the participants in it, including the superintendent of schools) from the start.*

So, assuming that we have critical agency decision-makers as participants in our research process and assuming therefore that our research has *credibility and legitimation* among those person we look to for introducing changes, how do we go about designing and implementing such changes? What do we do and how do we know it made things any better than what we had before?

Returning to our example, the first step is to state explicitly the desirable outcomes for youth attending school and participating in the school curriculum. The second step is to investigate those policies and practices which might be likely to produce negative labeling of youth, deny access to roles and opportunities in school and foster alienation from the school and its educational goals. In the example, researchers examined the consequences of a policy and a series of practices which profoundly affected all the youth in the school. The flow analysis procedure they used involved counting certain kinds of things.

What do you count for flow analysis? The things which are counted must

*Johnson, Grant, A Strategy for Youth Development, Youth Development Program, Boulder, Colorado.

be *appropriate measures* of the system process and must be relatively easily *available* from one sort of record or another.

For instance, in order to investigate the way in which the tracking policy operated in the two high schools, researchers counted:

1. The *number* of youth assigned to each of the curriculum tracks,
2. The *characteristics* of the youth assigned to each of the tracks,
3. Race,
4. Father's occupation,
5. Past grade record,
6. IQ scores,
7. Disciplinary records,
8. Participation in extracurricular activities (determined by the number of entries in the yearbook).

The information gathered and analyzed by the researchers provided reliable grounds for checking out the validity of the tracking policy. The research findings consequently could be used for making subsequent *policy* decisions.

Secondly, the same findings could be used to help establish next steps, what might be done to correct the harmful institutional effects of the previous school policy. To this extent, the research findings contribute not only to noticing what should be changed, but also how it should be changed. The research findings can contribute to *management* decisions. For the purposes of our example on the basis of the findings, school personnel might develop the following set of objectives:

1. To promote access to meaningful social roles for all students by eliminating the school policy of ability tracking and by engaging students, faculty and administration in the development of an experimental curriculum designed to represent the interests and needs of all youth in the school (within the limits of available resources). Access to any course would be contingent upon satisfaction of necessary prerequisites or demonstrated interest, but not upon "assignment" by counselors.

2. To reduce negative labeling of youth by making past IQ, grade and disciplinary records unavailable to teachers without the permission of the youth and his or her parents, i.e., by eliminating formal grounds for anticipatory "ability grouping" within classrooms.

3. To promote a planned experimental approach to school curriculum policy by providing for ongoing evaluative research guided by the criteria of access to desirable, acceptable and meaningful social roles and the elimination of inappropriate negative labeling. The same *counts* which were made in the initial assessment can be made at regular intervals to evaluate the consequences of planned experimental change.

The example which has been elaborated above has focused on the school system. With the exception of the family, any agency or organization representing any social institution (work, education, social control) can be examined by means of flow analysis procedures. Looking back at the diagram on page 2, you will notice that we have presented a typical juvenile justice system as if there were four points at which decisions are made or can be made: police contact, arrest, court intake and adjudication. The diagram

is not meant to represent a literal picture of all juvenile justice systems in the country, but to illustrate that there are locatable decision-making points which can be identified and examined and that policies and practices governing transitions between those points can also be systematically investigated. Any particular system may have numerous formal or informal decision-making points. For the purposes of flow analysis, however, it is important to identify decision-making points for which records are kept. What information is available on youth who find themselves in each of these decision-making locations? Here are some possible kinds of information which might be collected and counted to "discover" how the system is working:

1. The *number* of police contacts each month. If contact records are actually kept (and in many cases they are not) they may include countable things about the youth contacted, such as age, sex, race, even demeanor (cooperative, etc.).

2. The *number* of police arrests each month and the *characteristics* (age, sex, race, offense) of the youth arrested.

3. The number of youth following various "disposition paths" after arrest:

- a. The number who were lectured and released (and their characteristics).

- b. The number who were detained for intake and hearing.

- c. The number who were released into the custody of parents.

- d. The number who were referred to some service as an alternative to court.

4. The number of youth who *enter* court intake and their characteristics.
5. The number of youth (and their characteristics) who are:
 - a. Dismissed after an intake interview.
 - b. Referred to welfare, parents, service agency or some other location other than court.
 - c. Referred for court hearing.
6. The number (and characteristics) of youth who have a court hearing and who go from there to:
 - a. An institution.
 - b. Probation.
 - c. Service referral.
 - d. Home and the street (case dismissed).

These *numbers* can be used to identify paths and the frequency with which they are travelled and by whom. The numbers can also be used to come up with the *probability* a youth has of following each path and ending up in each location once he or she is contacted by the police.

On the basis of these *numbers* and *probabilities* researchers can keep track of changes in the juvenile justice system over time. On the basis of the youth development criteria discussed above, decision-makers can make judgments concerning the appropriateness of current policies and practices, and can identify those areas which might best be the target of planned experimental, i.e., evaluated, change.

Because institutions and bureaucratic organizations in particular are fairly stable beasts, that is, they settle into routines and don't change

much or often over the years, you can expect that things you're measuring won't change much either. Collecting this sort of information for the period of a year, or three or five years should give a fairly accurate picture about the way decisions are actually made. This picture can then be used as the point of comparison, the "baseline" against which you can measure what happens after the *deliberate and planned introduction of change* into this stable and routine world.

APPENDIX D.1

Toward an Approach to Youth Employment
(Chapter IV from Youth and Work)

Center for Action Research, Inc.
Boulder, Colorado
August, 1975

IV. TOWARD AN APPROACH TO YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

This chapter proposes an approach to youth employment and youth development and suggests how this approach could be implemented and tested. It is intended that these suggestions will lead both to action by persons interested in the well-being of youth and to the formulation of more rational and effective approaches to youth employment.

A. Basic Propositions

From the preceding examination of issues, we arrive at the following propositions about youth employment and youth development.

1. The opportunity to do useful work should be available to all youth.

Youth employment programs to date have concentrated on specific, limited target populations. Youth employment has been viewed as a reward for the deserving, a therapy for the troubled, a redemption for the wicked, an outlet for the troublesome, an alternative for the stupid, an income for the poor and an antidote for idle hands. These views only support the exclusion of most youth from work.

Viewing work as an end, as a means, as a privilege or as a right isn't helpful. We should view work as a fact: to work is to be useful, to be competent and to belong. Youth, as a class, don't work; most youth are dependents at home, wards of the state at school and useless except as consuming units in the economy. Their skills are limited to those of students and generally are not admired outside of school. Their

associations are only with those of their own kind. At best, membership in such an idle, unvalued class contributes nothing to growth, and at worst is the source of apathy, despair, deviance and delinquency. Limited target-group approaches used to date ignore and conceal the magnitude of the task. Thinking about youth employment should begin with the question, "How can *all* youth be usefully and productively employed?"

2. Youth employment ought to be viewed as part of a general program of youth development. Doing useful work is not an isolated experience for youth or for adults. Working is an occasion for, and usually requires, learning. Many work skills are, or ought to be, educationally certified. One's status as a worker is tied to one's status as a student or family member. Friendships and associations in the work setting intermingle with those in recreation and in school. All these interconnections should be addressed overtly in the design of youth employment. The most important connections to take into account are the connections between work and education.

3. Work experiences for youth need not (and probably should not) be thought of as preparing them for specific jobs. In many youth employment and vocational education programs, there is the implicit or explicit assumption that the youth in the program will be trained for and go on to hold a specific kind of job. This assumption generates problems. First, it leads to investment in the space, equipment and materials needed to create a proper training establishment which is then rendered obsolete

by changes in the local and national job markets. This is a problem especially for secondary school programs. Second, since the expensive facilities can handle only a limited number, the assumption leads to entrance criteria under which youth must choose a vocation at some early stage or be found to be "suited" for a vocation, in order to participate in work. Third, by the same set of mechanisms, standards and curricula are created which take away the options of the youth who are participating. This can be distressing for the youth who took advantage of training programs which turned out to be outmoded. Fourth, the idea that work experience for youth necessarily is preparation for some future negates the benefits of working *now*. Fifth, the assumption confuses the need for *general experience* in work with the need for specific skills needed to do specific jobs.

All this goes on in apparent ignorance of the changeability of the job market, in ignorance of the rate of job obsolescence and in presumption of a neat and consistent progression from education to life career.

The training in specific skills needed for specific jobs should be organized as a part of the *entrance* to those jobs, not as a part of the *exit* from somewhere else. Youth should be able to work now for benefits now.

4. Youth are competent and have a contribution to make. Youth may lack experience, but they are not incompetent. Electing a young worker chairman of the board may not be advisable because the youth has not had the necessary training and experience to operate effectively in that

position. This does not mean that youth should hold only those positions which require no training and supervision. Viewing youth as incompetent rather than as inexperienced is helpful neither to the youth nor to the employer. Assigning young workers to coffee-fetching when, with a little training and supervision, they could perform in ways which would be useful to an organization and to a community, is a losing game for everyone. The competence of youth should not be underestimated.

5. There is plenty of substantial work which needs doing and much of it can be done by young people. A hallmark of the employment of youth has been the tendency to create busy work, as though there was a shortage of problems to be solved, needs to be met or jobs to be done. This kind of approach ignores the many tasks which are perceived as useful and which are not being done. The result has been a proliferation of leaf-raking, coffee-fetching and similar busy work. This is not to demean any useful work, nor is it a statement that youth alone have this problem. However, failure to deal with the fact that many adults are "larger" than their jobs is not a reason to impose that same pattern on the young. Finding ways to organize meaningful work is a general dilemma and must be addressed for youth as well as for adults.

6. Most of the legal latitude needed for youth employment is present. Youth are not out of work simply because the law forbids their working. Most statutes dealing with minimum wages and working conditions serve

rational and necessary purposes. Within the existing restrictions there remains plenty of room for expanding the young work force.

7. There are sufficient resources for full youth employment. At minimum wage rates, it costs about \$1,000 per year to employ a youth two hours a day, year-round. In order to make the statement: "This organization cannot afford to hire one youth", a business grossing \$100,000 per year or an agency budgeted at \$100,000 per year would have to be budgeting within 1%. Nobody does that. In 1970, there were 20 million young people aged 15-19. To hire every one of those youth at \$1,000 per year would have cost \$20 billion--a sizable sum, just slightly smaller than the amount spent on tobacco and alcoholic beverages in that year.

B. Finding and Testing Forms for Youth Employment

This section is intended to help persons create youth employment. No "model" program will be presented; there are too many specific differences between communities to expect that a single model would work for all. There are, however, several general considerations which provide starting points for increasing youth employment.

There are three main questions which ought to be asked when undertaking any efforts in youth employment: (1) What are the intended *outcomes* of such an effort? (2) What *changes* will be required to achieve those outcomes? and (3) What *processes* should be used in implementing and judging those changes? The following pages argue that the outcomes should be to secure, specifically and thoroughly, the legitimating functions of work for youth; that these outcomes will require changes in those persistent patterns of laws, policies, practices and shared expectations which determine how society's business is done and who does it; and that the process should be a deliberately experimental cycle which is founded on the best empirical measures, and which, in each cycle, refines the understanding of the problems and the effectiveness of alternative solutions. Each action to increase youth access to work should be informed by these considerations.

1. What is to be Changed--Most efforts to increase youth employment begin with the application for, and receipt of a grant or contract by which some outside source--usually the federal government--pays the salaries

of a staff to run the program and pays the wages of the youth employed. This is the first mistake and will be avoided by persons who are serious about increasing youth employment.

Having a grant causes most of the substantial and long-term issues to be ignored. An independent source of funds--however temporary--makes it possible to ignore the fact that, in most communities, there is no value placed on youth employment, that lack of youth employment is not perceived as a problem and that no very high priority is placed on increasing youth employment. A grant makes it possible to ignore the fact that most budgets include no allocations for youth employment and makes it possible to put off doing anything about that. Grants make it possible to ignore the fact that few organizations have policies encouraging youth employment.

A typical outcome is that the grant-based employment program organizes and supervises most of the work; this greatly limits the kinds of work which can be done and tends to produce make-work jobs. The impact on other organizations is often inconsequential. A typical outcome is that organizations will agree to employ a youth so long as the young people are paid by the program; the jobs created are dead-end, with little interest, responsibility or utility. On-going practices and expectations do not change, and therefore, the young worker gets very little guidance, very little training, limited supervision and very little support for success.

In sum, the grant program, by ignoring existing conditions in the community, creates no "room" in the community for young workers. It tacks on an addition which is tolerated so long as an outside source continues

to foot the bill. The usual conclusion is the demise of the program when the grant funds run out to the dismay of no one except a few staff members who will have to find new jobs.

A different tack will be taken in what follows. It will be assumed that no grant funds or subsidies are available, but that there are persons--some of whom already work in some capacity in youth development--who want to increase youth employment. They must do so by making room for young workers within the existing arrangements. They must increase the value placed on youth employment and find local sources of wages. They must alter policies and practices and expectations so that, as a matter of routine, more and more youth can be employed and will continue to be employed over time. They must work through a process of change in what is already present so that when they go away, the products of their work will persist, sustained by the arrangements which have been made.

Youth employment, then, should not be an add-on. *Opportunities for youth to do useful work should be built into the on-going activities of a community, into the permanent structure of values, laws, regulations, policies, practices and shared expectations.*

Making room for young workers *within* the community requires expanding the existing support for youth employment: finding persons and organizations interested in youth employment and building from there. Involvement should not be limited only to potential employers--time, money, expertise, energy, training facilities and willingness to participate are all important elements of the effort. Persons and organizations in both the public

and private sectors are potential allies. Social service agencies, governments, service clubs, business and professional associations, businesses, youth organizations and youth-serving organizations all are potential participants and contributors. All have the sterling virtue of an existing location and function; they are likely to persist and youth employment built within them is likely to persist.

Creating room for young workers requires careful use and cultivation of the base of support. Too often, program "directors" assume total responsibility for creating youth employment; they become the leaders, they decide what should be done and they do it. The plans and strategies remain in their heads. The force of their personal energy often is successful in getting a project started, but their activities leave little room for the enthusiasm, commitment and energy of others to be used as a habit, and to become tradition. From the beginning, the most active persons in the effort should strive for broader participation, assuming the role of the catalyst through which *shared* agreements and *shared* action take shape and grow.

The initial support may consist entirely of interested individuals who do not have the "authority" to speak for their organizations: school teachers, businessmen, parents or individual youth. Many of these people will be able to use their organizational attachments to transform their individual support into *organizational* support. School teachers, for example, might persuade the school to create courses related to the jobs that are developed. Youth might persuade other members of their school

newspaper to provide extended publicity for the effort or they might convince their teachers and other members of their school class to study what kinds of work need to be done in the community, or what kinds of jobs other youth would like. Parents might enlist the support of the local PTA or convince the local media to provide free publicity for the employment effort. Businessmen might persuade their own companies to hire youth or convince the Rotary Club to support the expansion of youth employment opportunities.

Whether youth employment begins with a core group of 5, 10, 50 or 500 people or organizations, the task is the same: to change the existing structures within the community so that they come to support the employment of youth; to make changes in the existing statutes, regulations, policies, practices, shared expectations and values which will create "room" in the community for youth and youth employment.

Many of the required changes are within single organizations. For example, youth jobs might be created if a personnel director comes to adopt the practice of hiring youth or if a company which has a policy against hiring youth changes to a policy in favor of hiring youth.

Other changes will be larger than one organization and may effect changes in many organizations. Laws and regulations, for example, may stand in the way of youth employment. Useful work opportunities throughout the community may be increased by changing such laws. The quality of youth employment may improve if the expectation that youth can be productive and useful comes to be more widely shared by members of the community.

The relationships among statutes, regulations, policies, shared expectations and values should be kept in mind. It will be difficult for example, to sustain a practice of hiring youth if it goes against, or is not supported by an organization's policy, and difficult for an organization to maintain a policy in favor of hiring youth if it is in violation of the law. At the same time, enacting less restrictive laws will not guarantee that organizations will automatically begin to hire youth or that generally shared expectations about "youth" work will be changed. Multiple changes may be required, both within single organizations and throughout the community, to assure continued youth access to desirable work roles.

The changes should be made in the recurrent, matter-of-course patterns of activity in the community. Actions to increase youth employment should be planned and judged according to whether they change statutes, regulations, policies, practices, shared expectations or values, or some combination of these, and according to whether those changes are likely to increase and sustain youth employment opportunities over the long term.

2. The Desired Outcomes--Above it is argued that changes will need to be made in the recurring patterns of community activity. Below are presented a series of principles which describe what those changes ought to accomplish.

The word "program" occasionally will be used in the statements of these principles. Unfortunately, this perfectly good word has become a stereotype: it raises the image of a staff, an office, a telephone number,

cars and associated "stuff". The word has come to carry those misleading meanings which were criticized above in the discussion of grant programs, and, as it is often used, implies that we have to go out and build an addition on the house. We are proposing instead, some remodelling. When the word "program" is used in what follows, it does not refer to the stereotype, but means *that set of actions which attains the objective*. If an organization is persuaded to adopt a policy of hiring youth, that's part of the program. If arrangements are made so that youth routinely are able to find their way from school to a job, that's part of the program. Neither action requires the hiring of a staff, the establishment of an office or the renting of an electric typewriter.

Keeping this reservation about the use of the word "program" in mind, we propose the following principles for the functions of youth employment programs.

a. Locate work which is regarded as worth doing and worth paying for, which youth can do, and which has some intrinsic appeal or interest for young people. Assuring the usefulness of the work is a step toward assuring the usefulness of the person who does the work. Don't be too constrained by conventional definitions of youth work. Don't be too conservative in judging what young people can do; a fundamental purpose of the program is to build on, but also to expand, their competencies. Don't make casual assumptions about what appeals to and interests young people; like adults, they have diverse interests. Help persons and

organizations see that there are payoffs both for the youth and for themselves. By paying youth to do things which are being done now and could be done by youth, or which aren't being done now and should be done, both the employers and the youth will benefit.

b. Place the young workers in existing organizations which can supervise, train and legitimate them. For almost every type of work, there will be an organization operating in the same general field. If there isn't, the perceived usefulness of the work is in doubt. The presence of these organizations makes it possible for young people to work for someone who has knowledge and experience in the field. The benefit for the organization is that it may be able to extend its operations in ways that had been desired but not affordable. The work and the workers can be supervised and legitimated by the organization. Often, some reorganization of responsibilities or procedures may be desirable to incorporate the young workers more effectively. This may happen more readily if existing personnel can be helped to see the desirability and the feasibility of the reorganization.

c. Structure each job to provide the components of legitimacy: usefulness, competence and belonging. Coffee-fetching is coffee-fetching, and where you do it doesn't make much difference. The component of usefulness is addressed by selecting work which is regarded as useful by the persons for whom the work is being done. Confirm this by writing the duties into a job description which can be agreed on by all parties--the young person, the supervisor and the job developer. This will help

to assure that potentially fruitful work does not degenerate into useless activity. Examine carefully the skills required, and record those in the job description. Build into the agreements opportunities for competence to increase.

It is difficult for an inexperienced young person to go to a job where everyone is a stranger and no one takes an interest. The selection of the supervisor and discussions with existing employees when the job is first developed can help establish the basis for belonging. Again, the staff of the supervising organization may need help in making the appropriate arrangements.

d. Connect training and education to the growth of competence and responsibility on the job. Much of the training needed to do each job can be provided on the job by supervisors and other staff. Identify the skills and knowledge needed to do the job and to grow in competence and responsibility, and arrange a convenient schedule for training. The schedule makes the expectations clear to all, increases the likelihood that the training will occur and preserves the quality and integrity of the job.

Training and educational resources can be made available through the public schools. Taking courses specifically relevant to the work can be made a part of the expectations for growth in the job. If several young people are doing work which requires similar skills or knowledge, new courses can be created. Very seldom will this sort of specific educational

offering be found to be inconsistent with the objectives of the school. Work and education are mutually supportive; the work lends an immediate relevance to the studies, and the studies contribute to competence on the job. This has been done often, but usually backwards, as in the teacher's statement, "The work may provide good examples for what I had intended to teach." Try it the other way--let the job determine the curriculum.

A similar case may be made for some general education offerings in the schools. Reading, writing and computation are important skills contributing to, or necessary in the performance of many jobs. There are legitimate ties between progress in attaining such skills and the growth of competence and responsibility on the job. Caution should be exercised in making and proliferating these ties, however, and they should be limited only to those skills which are substantially and demonstrably relevant to the job. Over-eagerness on this score will produce the accurate perception by the young worker that the job is being used as coercion to do well in school.

e. Pay for the work, in accordance with the competence and responsibility expected. Initial wages and increases in pay for advancement in competence and responsibility confirm the legitimacy of the work. The work should be paid for by the persons or organizations for whom it is done. This also is a confirmation of legitimacy. It's curious how often a group of adults who are paid to do a job and whose status in large part comes from being paid, plan programs of volunteer work for kids without noticing any inconsistency.

At the start, supervisory organizations may not have money for young workers, but this can be worked into their budgets over time, given the small sums involved. Stimulation of interest in an employment program and temporary support of willing but temporarily impoverished supervisory agencies, are two legitimate and not-too-dangerous uses for external funds such as grants and contributions. The danger, of course, is that wage allocations don't get worked into budgets, temporary support becomes continued support and then the sources dry up.

f. The jobs created should be open to all youth and there should be a mix of different kinds of youth. Persons engaged in youth employment usually succumb to one of two kinds of recruitment and selection mistakes. One is "creaming": in order to placate critics, guarantee success and satisfy the sponsor or supervisor, the program establishes entrance competitions or requirements with standards such as grade point average, attendance at school, short hair and membership in the Pep Club or Young Whatever's Association. The effect of this practice is to perpetuate the current patterns of exclusion, inequity and lack of opportunity. To establish grade point average as a standard is to say to many young people: "You have not been useful and competent and belonging in your academic work; therefore, you are denied the opportunity to be useful, competent and belonging anywhere else."

This practice cuts off the nose to spite the face. Many persons start out intending to provide open opportunities for participation, but wind up

creaming because of various problems. It doesn't occur to anyone to change the program; they just get a fresh batch of kids.

The other recruitment problem is the "spoiled image". A program gets a spoiled image by serving *only* "bent", "delinquent", "troublemaking", "surly", "dumb", "maladjusted" and otherwise troublesome youth. The program comes to be known as serving "that element". Any youth served by the program is labelled--negatively--by participation in the program. Within ten minutes of walking through the front door, a youth knows that he is not in an employment program--he's in a "bad kid" program. He knows it and everyone else knows it. The *only* effect of such a program will be to reinforce what everyone already knows--the youth in the program are not competent and useful, they're "troublemakers".

Since there may be more applicants than jobs at any given time, some selection process will be needed. Picking names from a hat is a better procedure than most; it doesn't involve spurious illegitimate standards, it's equitable because everyone has an equal chance, and it will usually produce a good mix of kids.

g. Involve youth in the planning, operation and evaluation.

The basic assumption of this approach is that youth have skills and knowledge and talents to contribute; there's no reason to abandon that assumption in the administrative work. Youth can give advice on what kinds of work have interest and appeal, what kinds of expectations for the job and for related training and education will be seen as legitimate, what

kinds of support would be helpful and what kinds of outcomes are valuable. Hire youth to do necessary administrative and development work.

Youth should negotiate for jobs they are interested in and negotiate the expectations for their conduct. Arbitrary assignment to non-negotiable positions is a souring contradiction of the principles. Negotiation confirms the legitimacy of the work and makes participation more immediately engaging.

h. Involve members of the community. The responses, reactions or expressed perceptions of others make a particular activity or person legitimate. Part of the legitimation of the work is accomplished by choosing work which is useful to the persons or organizations for whom it is done, and by working with supervisors to establish expectations for usefulness, competence and belonging on the job. Since many of the organizations which employ youth may have very little public visibility, it is desirable to work for a broader base of legitimacy within that public, so that the positive definitions of youth at work are confirmed in other settings in which they will find themselves.

A first step is to get some publicity for the youth, their work and the organizations which employ them. Local media can help generate community interest and backing and recruit youth. A second step is to assure that especially relevant persons--family and school personnel, for example--are informed periodically of the work the youth are doing, of its contribution to the supervising organization, and of the growth of competence and responsibility of the youth. Such information can be accompanied by requests for specific kinds of support and encouragement.

A third step is to inform service organizations, neighborhood centers, block associations, recreation centers and other similar organizations through which broader, more immediate and credible connections with the general public may be achieved.

The involvement stimulated by these informational activities is more direct than it may seem. The effect of the communication is to convey credible, positive, legitimating definitions of youth, both as individuals and as a class. The information about some youth may not be new or surprising, but it will confirm and strengthen existing perceptions of and ways of dealing with the youth. Information on other youth will be surprising and new, and will contradict previously held negative views. The involvement comes when these new and more positive views start to affect the way the receivers of the information respond to and handle the youth. The purpose of the informational effort is to broaden and strengthen legitimate definitions of youth.

Other forms of involvement can be worked out. One powerful form is to engage youth and adults together in solving a problem or meeting a need which is of general interest and concern. As outlandish as it may seem, in some places teachers and students have worked together on the revision of the school curriculum without total collapse of the structure of the school. Youth and adults have worked together on community development, police-community relations, environmental quality and drug abuse prevention. Another way to involve community members in the program is to make use of

their skills, interests and connections to support job finding, training, coordination and public relations functions.

i. Avoid official negative labelling and avoid coercion. Some of the youth who want to work will have had previous contact with the juvenile justice system and others will come into contact with the juvenile justice system while they are working. The seriousness of this contact could range from a custody or neglect proceeding (in which the youth is not an offender); to detention for curfew violation (which would not be an offense for an adult); to arrest for burglary, auto theft, or assault; to recent release from a juvenile institution. All these contacts, to a greater or lesser degree, negatively label the youth involved (being a foster child or having a "bad" family is not a valued status), and negative labelling works against the positive legitimating functions of work.

Official negative labelling and its effects should be limited and reduced. To some extent, observance of the principles already cited will do this: having a mix of youth and deliberately structuring the work to produce and confirm positive definitions of youth tend to minimize the label and change the definition. For youth who come with official negative histories, the records can be suppressed. This is the purpose of existing regulations for the confidentiality of juvenile court records and for their destruction when youth attain majority age. Although many official records are available on a "need to know" basis to various youth service professionals, no one in the work program needs to know this information because

most conceivable uses of the information would violate the principles of the program.

For those youth who come into contact with the juvenile justice system while working, efforts should be made to limit official negative labelling. For some types of offenses--serious offenses and custody/neglect cases, for example, avoidance of law enforcement and court processing may not be possible. In many instances of juvenile justice contact, however, the rational response will be to short-circuit the official processing and to destroy or suppress the official records on the grounds that official processing and the negative labelling can only worsen the situation. With the participation of the police and courts, and with advocacy by persons associated with the work, official labelling can be avoided.

Because activities such as work are seen as "good for" youth, there is often a strong impulse to *require* some youth to participate. Coercion spoils the image, contradicts the principles and calls into question the legitimacy of the work. Participation should be genuinely voluntary. Statements such as "you are sentenced to the work program", "your choice is to go to court or to go to the program", and "go to the program or be expelled from school" destroy a program as fast as anything that can be done.

These warnings about official labelling and coercion apply not just to the juvenile justice system, but to the employment program itself. One way to label a participating youth negatively is to record and certify "failure" at work. Some jobs won't work out: the youth won't go to work;

the supervisor will reject the youth; the training won't occur; or the youth and the supervisor will fight. There is no reason to expect that all jobs will work for all youth the first time, the second time, or all the time. There is no reason to interpret or record the cases that don't work as "failures" of the youth, or to convey such interpretations to anyone else.

The preferable way to handle such problems is first to assume that the job didn't work out because the job was not properly organized and that the job must be reorganized. This assumption will very often be correct and will put a proper emphasis on correcting and improving the program.

In some cases, it will be found that an individual youth should change his or her behavior in order to make the job position work out. There is no reason to regard this need to change as a shortcoming or failure of the youth. The matter can be approached pragmatically without suggesting that something is wrong with the youth. Adjustments often will be needed if the job is to work out, but there is no need for, and several good reasons against, recording or conveying any of this as a failure or deficiency of the young person.

j. Involve needed supportive services. Some of the youth will need supportive or remedial services such as eye examinations, family casework, corrections of learning disabilities or intensive therapy. There are agencies and organizations which provide these services, and the employment program can work with these agencies to mutual advantage.

Very often, supportive and remedial service agencies have their own problems of spoiled image and of being inaccessible to youth. The employment program can help make those services accessible to the participating youth. Further, and perhaps more important, if the employment program has a good mix of youth and arranges the proper procedures, it can help service agencies perform in settings which avoid the spoiled image and the negative labelling that goes with it. When all kinds of youth are involved and a number are receiving services of various kinds, being a recipient of a service is a normal part of the routine. There are also some coordination and efficiency advantages to the arrangement.

There are problems to be avoided with remedial services. If the employment program itself has a spoiled image, its cooperation with other spoiled image programs will only perpetuate the perception. There is also the problem of inappropriate use or overuse of remedial services. Sometimes services are used simply because they are there; the services of a mental health center become available, and suddenly it is discovered that 24 youth in the employment program have bad mental health. The blaming-the-victim syndrome sets in. Every youth who "doesn't work out" is assumed somehow to be deficient, is sent somewhere to be fixed and potential problems in the organization of the program and of the job are ignored. Youth who genuinely need remedial services should get them promptly and reliably, but those services should not be used inappropriately or as a substitute for identification and correction of defects in the employment program.

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k. Use funds from outside sources carefully. Grants have been described above in rather negative terms. In the context of the principles just described, several valuable functions for such external funds can be identified. *Temporary* support to provide continuity or to provide impetus at early stages has already been mentioned. Within a larger and more permanent effort based on the principles given, grants could be used for interim support while budgets are being rearranged to include youth or during seasonal expansions. Temporary resources must be kept within some manageable proportion of the total effort so that permanent replacement sources can be found and so that fluctuations produced by temporary sources are not too great.

A second legitimate use of outside funds may be for training. It may be desirable in some cases to have an employer provide more training than would be reasonable to expect in the normal course of events. A subsidy could be given provided that the permanent sources of training support are carefully worked out. One such source might be the resources typically put into quickly outdated secondary school vocational programs. Such funds could be used to greater benefit as subsidies to employers who can train youth, on modern equipment, for jobs which exist.

* * * * *

The principles presented above describe a set of desirable outcomes: youth will be able to get useful work in existing organizations which can supervise and legitimate them, and education and training will support growth of work competence. It is expected that if these outcomes are

realized, if this situation is created, youth will be generally better off. The intended outcomes should be kept in mind; actions should be planned and judged according to whether they tend to produce the desirable outcomes

3. Helpful Procedures--In the preceding pages we presented a series of principles for youth employment programs. These should not be taken to be, nor are they claimed to be, the one and only way. They are intended to be working hypotheses about the purposes and methods of an effective youth employment program. They are tentative predictions that youth employment consistent with the principles will be effective in legitimating young people; in increasing their usefulness, their competence and their sense of belonging; and in increasing their participation in and attachment to their communities. It is also predicted that the beneficial effects of participation in youth employment organized on these principles will carry over to other settings, producing noticeable benefits in the schools, in the reduction of delinquency and in the provision of a variety of other services. The way to test these predictions is to implement the principles, to evaluate the results carefully and to revise and improve systematically.

The development of new approaches to youth employment ought to be done systematically, as in an experiment. The proper stance is one of skepticism: the outcomes of new attempts are not guaranteed and must be subject to evaluation. A typical experimental procedure includes the following six phases:

- (1) assessment of the existing situation to determine the nature and extent of the problem;
- (2) preparation of precise objectives to either sustain or change the existing situation;
- (3) design of program(s) to achieve the objectives;
- (4) implementation of the program;
- (5) evaluation of the results of program implementation; and
- (6) feedback of evaluation findings to revise, refine and improve the program.

An experimental approach begins with an *assessment of the situation*. The purpose of such an assessment is to establish the magnitude and nature of a problem so that appropriate solutions can be undertaken. Information necessary for planning a youth employment program might include:

- (1) the number of youth currently unemployed;
- (2) the number of jobs currently available;
- (3) the statutes which affect the employment of youth;
- (4) the number of youth working part-time and full-time;
- (5) community perceptions and values of youth employment;
- (6) organizations and agencies already interested and active in youth employment; and
- (7) jobs which the community sees as useful and is willing to employ youth to do.

Collecting this information is not always an easy task. Accurate information on the extent of youth unemployment, for example, is not readily available. Official statistics for local areas are collected too

infrequently to be of use and current information reflects only national statistics. Information on the local youth employment problem may come from persons within the community whose jobs require them to have at least an intuitive sense of the youth employment situation. These persons might include school vocational counsellors, state employment office personnel, local youth workers, the youth themselves and CETA prime sponsors.⁵¹ At times more accurate information will be desired and a formal survey may be required to determine the exact nature and magnitude of the youth employment problem.⁵²

Assessment will also involve the identification of potential opportunities and barriers within those community structures which determine the conditions for youth employment. This might include an examination of the practices and policies of local organizations with respect to hiring youth or an assessment of the resources which can be coordinated in support of the youth employment effort.

A recurring problem in assessment is that the information available or collected does not reveal critical characteristics of the prevailing situation. Rates of unemployment describe the non-working population,

⁵¹The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973 delegated (what were previously federal) employment-related responsibilities to representatives of local government, entitled prime sponsors. Prime sponsors are responsible for preparing and implementing comprehensive plans to meet the employment and training needs of their localities. They can be an extremely important resource for a youth employment effort.

⁵²Information on one type of youth needs survey can be obtained from The Center for Action Research, Inc., P.O. Box 600, Boulder, Colorado 80302.

but fail to describe policies or practices which increase or decrease youth access to work. Information about characteristics of unemployed persons is likely to lead to interventions with individuals. Information about policies and practices is likely to lead to interventions in organizations. The difference in the consequence could be substantial.

The second stage of an experimental approach is the *preparation of precise objectives*. Careful interpretation of the information collected in the assessment phase provides the basis for these statements of the desired outcome. For example, the assessment might indicate that large numbers of youth are unemployed, while at the same time other data indicate the existence of unfilled jobs. These seemingly contradictory facts can be interpreted by asking such questions as:

- (1) Are there legal barriers to the hiring of youth?
- (2) Are the work hours structured to exclude young workers?
- (3) Does public transportation need to be improved to get young workers from their homes to their places of work?

Answers to these and other similar questions provide the basis for the preparation of objectives. If, for example, analysis shows that there is a problem with public transportation, an objective might be:

In six months add a new bus route to enable youth to get from their homes or school to the industrial district five miles out of town.

If the assessment is that an existing practice of requiring prior experience excludes most youth from available jobs, an objective might be:

In three months, in five organizations to arrange trainee/apprentice situations accomodating 30 youth.

There are some recurring problems in preparing objectives. One frequent problem is lack of precision. If 25 different outcomes will satisfy the objective, it is doubtful whether the objective is a good guide to action, or whether success in attaining the objective can be evaluated properly. A second frequent problem in writing objectives is "slippage": the objective, for a variety of "practical" reasons, fails to address the situation assessed. An alternative version of the second sample objective given above could be:

In three months, secure a grant for a training program which will prepare 30 youth for available positions.

It may be that getting a grant is the only way to start a demonstration of routes to existing employment. It also may be that the grant is used to avoid what appears to be a tougher problem of rearranging school and employer practices so that routes to employment are built in.

At issue is the permanence of the solution. It should be asked whether the objective has slipped away from the important issue, thereby misdirecting effort.

The third phase of an experimental approach is *program design*--the planning of actions necessary to meet the objectives. In this phase various actions are examined for their benefits and shortcomings. If, for example, an objective is adopted which states the need for additional public transportation, the program design phase might consider alternative approaches to this end:

- (1) approaching the management of the bus company;
- (2) petitioning the city council;
- (3) getting the employers to provide the needed service; or
- (4) getting parents together to confront the public utilities board.

The trade-offs are considered among the resources required, the products which might be expected, and the pragmatic and political considerations which affect each option. The usual outcome of program design is the selection of a *combination* of programs which most effectively address a *set* of objectives.

A recurring problem in program design is finding those actions which actually do affect the desired outcomes. Too often, this is left to

presumption and habit. Of necessity, actions will be selected and taken; whether they actually do produce the desired outcome should be examined. In the program principles given earlier, it was proposed that writing job descriptions will help to assure usefulness, competence and belonging in the job. That is an hypothesis; it should be tested.

The fourth phase is *program implementation* in which the plan takes shape in action. Day-to-day decision making takes over and the realism of plan is tested. Approaching the management of a bus company may have been chosen as the most appropriate means for obtaining transportation for youth to their jobs. Preliminary conversations with the head of the company may reveal that, without pressure from the city council, the company would be unwilling to expand their service. The existing problems and opportunities are being managed toward the desired outcome.

A recurring problem in implementation is that day-to-day decisions tend to be based on habit, opportunity and circumstance more than on the plan. Such decisions tend to produce actions which bear no resemblance to those intended, leading to outcomes bearing no resemblance to those intended. The changes may be for very good reasons, or they may simply have been inadvertent. As much as possible, deviations from the plan should be deliberate; they should be considered carefully before they are undertaken and recorded systematically. To discover which actions produced which outcomes, it is necessary to remember what those actions were. Too often, planning and operation continue in merry ignorance of each other.

An additional consideration has to do with problems of size or scale. Some program components will benefit by expansion and centralization; others will not. One recurrent problem with large programs is the tendency, in the name of efficiency, to over-centralize functions. This helps put control into the hands of a few and makes functions such as job development (where there is little benefit as a result of economy of scale) more impersonal. Benefits from "economies of scale" should be sought with caution; expansions in the scope of the program and centralization of functions should be considered carefully.

The next phase is *evaluation of results*: success in attaining program objectives, the change in the pre-existing situation and especially the effect of that change on the well-being of youth. Comparisons are made between the original situation, as determined during the assessment phase, and the present situation. The initial assessment might have indicated the need for expanded bus service as a way to improve the employment condition of youth. Based on this assessment, an objective was adopted and a program was designed and implemented. These actions should be evaluated to determine how the employment situation was changed.

A recurring problem in this phase is that evaluation fails to measure the effect on the well-being of youth and settles for lesser, probably easier, measures. Often, the evaluation asks only whether the outcomes conformed to the plan. It would be typical for an evaluation to measure whether job descriptions were written for young employees, but not measure whether the perceived usefulness, competence and belonging of the young

workers was increased.⁵³ The vital piece of information which allows for judgment and improvement of the program is missing.

Evaluation information is of little utility unless it is used in a final phase, *feedback*. Program objectives and operations are revised and refined according to how effective they were in affecting the overall employment situation of youth in an area. Feedback revitalizes the entire planning and operation process and provides for program accountability.

A recurring problem in feedback is a lack of procedures for *deliberate* use of evaluation findings to improve the program. The connection between evaluation findings and subsequent objectives is left to chance and individual initiative. Too many evaluation reports sit in files, having made no mark on plans and actions. Only sometimes is this because they contain no useful information.

The programming sequence discussed above is typical of its kind and will be familiar to many. It has been described as a neat, orderly sequence. More likely, in the political and organizational contexts in which it must be worked out, it will be ragged and simultaneous. Two problems recur.

Often, all the elements of the sequence are going on, but they don't make sense in relation to each other, over reasonable periods of time, or at any time. Assessment and planning are done from time to time. Implementation proceeds. Occasionally there is an evaluation. But the connections

⁵³Information on one type of instrument to measure program impact on youth is available from The Center for Action Research, Inc., P.O. Box 600, Boulder, Colorado 80302.

between those activities and their products are difficult, if not impossible to trace. The objectives do not make sense in light of the assessment, the programs do not make sense in light of the objectives, implementation does not make sense in light of the plan and evaluation findings are not used to revise and improve the program.

More often than not, this is an organizational shortcoming, rather than an individual's failure. The assessment, the planning, the implementation and the evaluation are done by different persons who are not organized or provided with procedures which allow them to put it all together.

Often, all elements of the sequence are going on, but they are based on unquestioned opinion, experience and training, rather than on facts collected in ways allowing agreement on valid interpretations of the existing situation and on effective means to change or maintain that situation. Opinion, experience and training are all useful and necessary foundations for decision-making. Like all forms of understanding and insight, they have their distinct limitations. They are selective, changeable and often imprecise, and it is difficult or impossible for a person of different opinions, experience and training to accept or verify them. Existing methods for collecting and analyzing information are designed precisely to overcome these limitations, and therefore should be used as much as is practicable, keeping in mind that they have limitations of their own.

More often than not, the lack of verifiable facts is due to failure to use the methods, rather than to a shortage of methods.⁵⁴ Using them, among other things, requires accomodation with the likelihood that opinions, experience and training will have to be revised and requires learning the skills or learning how to deal with the persons who have the skills.

* * * * *

This section discussed three main considerations in increasing youth access to work: desirable outcomes, changes necessary to achieve those outcomes and processes helpful in effecting change. Proposals and suggestions were made, with the expectation not that they will be regarded as a "model" to be copied, but that together they compose a view of the task which may be used to guide and judge each action which will be taken.

⁵⁴Information on several instruments which have been developed to assist youth planners is available from The Center for Action Research, Inc.; P.O. Box 600, Boulder, Colorado 80302.

APPENDIX D.2

Supplemental Notes on
Experimental Youth Employment Programs

Center for Action Research, Inc.
Boulder, Colorado

April, 1976

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES ON EXPERIMENTAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS

(See *Youth and Work*, Center for Action Research, August, 1975, especially Chapter IV.)

1. The youth employment programs are to be planned and evaluated experiments, which means that:

a. The program design will be derived through a disciplined application of the Strategy, rather than through a process of rationalizing pre-existing "good ideas" with Strategy language. The ideas of access to desirable social roles, negative labelling, and alienation rest in a theoretical context of explanatory and illustrative ideas. These should be applied to derive the specifications for the action program.

b. A staff highly trained and committed to the Strategy will be used to implement the program, so as to increase the probability that the inevitable accommodations and elaborations are drawn from the Strategy, or are at least inoffensive to it.

c. The staff will produce an extensive record of the operation of the program and of the situations in which the youth employed find themselves, so as to increase the probability that the outcomes of the program can be attributed, with some systematically-gathered evidence, to a characteristic of a program or other situation. This record-keeping would cover such things as the language used to present eligibility requirements, the form of the recruitment, promises made, arrangements with employers, etc. This recording feature will support correction and replication of the program.

d. The evaluation of outcomes will include randomly assigned experimental and control groups which are administered repeated measures on the Impact scales, which measure Strategy variables.

2. All the objectives of the youth employment programs should be measurable, and progress in attaining each objective should be measured. These may be some of the objectives of the program:

a. Compared to the control group, the experimental group should show significant favorable change on all the Impact scales.

b. Compared to the control group, the experimental group should show significantly improved status at school, as marked by reductions in officially recorded truanting, reductions in officially recorded trouble or disciplinary action, and improved grades.

c. Compared to the control group, the experimental group should not only show a reduction in self-report delinquency, but also show a reduction in surveillance by the police (as marked by fewer arrests) and show less penetration of the juvenile justice system if they are arrested, controlling for sex, race and offense.

d. Compared with the control group, the experimental group should experience fewer negative events such as being kicked out of the house, being expelled from schools, etc.

Less formally, perhaps through interview, the project staff could gather supplemental information about the program--whether it meets employer, parent and youth expectations, what they'd like to see done differently, etc.

3. Chapter IV. Part B.2 of *Youth and Work*, plus Ken Polk's talk at the institutional change conferences (attached) provide adequate principles on which to base the program design. In applying the principles to prepare a design, and in implementation at least two major problems arise:

a. If the youths' salaries are being provided by a grant, it will be difficult thoroughly to operationalize rules a, c and d, in Chapter IV, Part B. 2 of the Work paper, about usefulness, structuring legitimacy and training. The organizations which agree to hire the kids are likely to feel virtuous simply because they agree to "give the kid something to do." They will have to share the project's concerns about the intended functions of work and how to secure them, and will have to be encouraged (pushed) and assisted to participate knowledgably in arranging and carrying out the design for a given job. Each job should be designed in some detail, and there should be follow-up to detect "slippage" and problems. The interim informal interviews noted above could be a part of this follow-up.

b. It will be difficult to preserve, in operation, an orientation to intervening with social environments rather than intervening with kids. Grant projects typically are not making institutional changes. They are making *provisional* organizational changes which are to some extent exceptional, for the purpose of finding out whether it is possible to create work situations which function as intended. If they do, then one worries about the path to institutionalizing those situations on an expanding scale. In the meantime, the project will have to buck pressures to slip back into a preoccupation with the characteristics of youth.

The strategy for retaining an orientation to social environment may be characterized in four parts:

(1) The primary method for producing the intended outcomes is the original design and its faithful execution, creating situations which function as intended, for all the youth in the program.

The program does not start with the assumption of the need for remediation. All such an assumption can do is label the youth, presume the negative, and divert attention from the design. The program should be constructed in such a way as to make the work opportunities maximally accessible to all youth, where they are when they apply for the jobs. For instance, each job should be structured so that a person can start with an absolute minimum of prerequisite skills and there should be a plan for increasing responsibility, skills, authority and activity at the fastest rate possible given a supported growth of competence. Education and training supports can be designed with the kind of non-ability grouped and individualized procedures that permit the largest number of persons interested in a topic to address that topic.

(2) If some situations appear not to be functioning as intended, the first response will be to adjust the situation, *not* to treat the youth. Changes can be made in jobs, tasks, duties, work hours, supervision, training, course work, etc. This should be the first response to a finding that a situation is not working.

(3) If a solid case can be made that the changes in situations have reached the practical limit, and that some change in a youth is all that will make the situation work, this should be undertaken as a *practical* matter. It is hard to define all that is meant by the word "practical" in that sentence. To start, it means that any action is not based on the conclusion--value judgment--that the youth is deficient, or that there is a "problem." The action is based on the practical conclusion, arrived at jointly by the youth, the project staff and the employer, that the intended outcomes will more likely be achieved if there are some practical changes. The intent is to avoid "accentuating the negative."

Interventions in this category will avoid attention to internal states of young people, concentrating on instrumental behavior and instrumental skills, falling mainly in three areas:

- arriving at correct perceptions of the opportunities which have been created.

- mounting the correct presentation of self (POS) to take maximum advantage of the opportunities (being careful to characterize the needed, probably middle-class) POS as simply different and useful in the case, but not "better" than, the POS the youth has been using.

- improving tool skills--reading, writing, computation, speaking, listening, following directions, making decisions, etc.

The foregoing statements do not preclude a form of "affirmative action" with respect to the POS and skills and of the youth. The program may be enhanced, for example, if, in placing youth in jobs, there are some practical conversations with them about the nature of the opportunities the staff tried to create, and about appropriate POS for taking advantage of those opportunities.

(4) No treatment which assumes that the problem is the youth's and especially which is directed to internal states, should be permitted unless a very solid case is made that the "problem" is the youth's and that the probability of "remediation" offsets the dangers of isolation and labelling. The case should be made and cleared at the highest levels of the project before the treatment is permitted (physical facts, such as poor eyesight, fit more in category 3, practical matters, above.)

4. The design and implementation schedule should be arranged to give the best possible chance for very deliberate design and implementation of the project. Here are some considerations:

a. All the necessary elements of the program design should be worked out and integrated at a very specific level with the evaluation design before staff are hired. Perhaps the repeated measures design for Impact should be scheduled in a way which allows isolating any "job-ending despair", if that is suspected.

b. Then, the staff can be hired. The job should be presented as that of an implementor of an experiment. That is, the staff should not be hired because of previous experience in youth programs, but because of a willingness and the skills to carry out the program as it was intended to be carried out. This provision should be a main part of the hiring interviews, so that it is a part of the commitment on taking the job. There is room for creativity within the conceptual boundaries, but avoid having staff interaction turn a distinct design into an indistinct amalgam of past perspectives. In effect, the staff are being asked to suspend that part of their experience which does not jibe with the design, for the sake of the experiment.

The staff should be hired at a time which will permit them to be trained very thoroughly in the Strategy and in the program design, and then permit them to participate in the final practical adaptations of the design to the site, *all before they start any "work."*

c. Youth should be on the project staff, in equally carefully designed jobs. Their important functions are helping to determine whether jobs which are created are appealing, maintaining a special liaison, perhaps, with the youth employed. Otherwise, they take an equal share in all the work of the project.

d. The "extended staff"--teachers who provide the educational component and the supervisors and trainers in the employing organizations--should have

the best chance to learn and like the principles and methods of the program, and to design their own parts in accord. (It may already be too late to get the educational component, in the schools, that is desirable. Schools may already be locked in for next year.)

e. There is a role for a "Stranger-Monitor" who knows the Strategy, knows the design principles, and knows the design, but who is not involved in the implementation. The role gives some chance of detecting slippage away from the principles as a consequence of conditions at the site.

f. An integral portion of the evaluation design must be procedures for the systematic description of situations, both in jobs and in other sectors where the youth employed are found. The program should begin with provisions for "overkill" in this matter. They will erode quickly enough to what is "manageable."

5. Here are some unorganized comments on some aspects of the program design itself:

a. The only way the project can be expected to have a favorable impact on *all* the Impact scales is if the work situations function as intended *and* if the "good news" which this generates is *heard* and believed and acted on in the school, at home and among peers. There must be a systematic procedure for sending good news and suppressing bad news (the latter has no useful function except as confidential in-house cues for how the staff must act to change situations).

If the connections between work, education and training are designed properly, the good news generated should be credible at least at home and in the schools. Good news sending should be systematic, starting with writings

(reports to teachers and parents, newspaper articles, etc.) and following to other forms which legitimate the news.

The good news sending is both a designed intervention and a method for gathering relevant information. For example, following a written report to teachers, credible staff should follow-up interviewing those teachers:

"Did you get our report?"

"Unh."

"What did you think of it?"

"Not much."

"Well, how's Priscilla doing in your class?"

"Same as usual, she's blowing it, except she's been more than usually impertinent lately."

"Oh. Miss Jenkins (a respected teacher who teaches a class for the young employees) was saying just the other day that Priscilla is now making good progress on her writing, turned in a couple of fine reports. Now that you mention it, Mr. Jones (Priscilla's work supervisor) told me that she's prompt and very interested and helpful in her work."

"Oh? Well . . ."

This conversation is both an intervention and a report about success in using work to legitimate kids in settings other than work.

b. It would be good if the applicants got to select and negotiate for their jobs, in the context of a conversation in which they learn about the jobs in detail, learn the staff's and employer's perceptions of the opportunities present, and discuss the POS and skills which may be needed in the jobs. This feature of the program might be posited to have several functions. One is simply to increase the kid's power. Another is that, by the selection

procedure, the kids are likely to get the jobs which, for them, have the most appeal and interest, with the hypothetical result that they will be more likely to succeed in those jobs. The third is that the youth may be more likely to have a "correct" perception of the opportunity, and be more likely to know how, and be disposed to, take advantage of that opportunity.

This feature may meddle with the best selection procedure for evaluation. The evaluation should compromise.

c. Other than the intended reduction in the commission of "troublesome" acts by kids, the main way that the program can address the objectives for reduced surveillance and arrest by juvenile authorities, reduced penetration of the juvenile justice system, reduced disciplinary action by the school, or reduced expulsion by the schools is to have an action program aimed at the appropriate decision-makers in those settings. Perhaps these persons can be part of the "extended staff", with knowledge of the objectives, with agreement to participate in specific ways as an experiment, and with a list of the kids in the program.

d. If it can be done without jeopardizing the design, the program as much as possible should be accomplished as a joint effort of organizations. Given the propensity to stray, there will have to be effective contact work, education and follow-up of the members of the extended staff.

e. The provision that the youth employed must be "low income" can be suspected, on labelling grounds, to contribute to a "spoiled income" for the program. This might be suspected to be more of a problem in communities (perhaps smaller ones) where the low income status is more visible and less admired, and where the low income criterion will be likely to be perceived as unfairly dispossessing or ignoring other young people.

Efforts should be made to control the spoiled image possibility. The naming and presentation of the program in all ways to the community can be regulated. Special attention should be paid to controlling perceptions of devalued statuses which may be thought to accompany the status of low income: on welfare, lazy, unwilling to work, the lower-class delinquency stereotype, etc. Special attention should be paid to the perception of and response to non-middle class styles and POS. The efforts here should be neutralizing in effect, should work first on the situations in which the youth will find themselves, and then work, *again as a practical matter*, on the youth employed, but only as a last resort to failure on the prior types of intervention and adjustment.

**OPTIONS FOR
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE**

OPTIONS
FOR
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

KENNETH POLK

This presentation might have a subtitle that would use the word "recipe." The intent of this discussion is to share with you some thoughts on "how to do" programs that might be included within a strategy of youth development or youth involvement. The form of the discussion may appear a bit odd at first, because you will find that it starts with some suggested solutions, and ends with a theoretical discussion. The ordinary way of proceeding intellectually is to lay out a theoretical base, and then draw upon that foundation to make suggestions. In an oral presentation, especially, this may prove to be poor technique. What follows is based on the premise that while theory is fundamental, the abstract principles can best be understood after the listener has some grasp of the specific situations to which the theory applies. What we will start with will be a set of suggested "rules" or guidelines within which programs can be developed, then there will be a discussion of types of programs that fit within the categories, "youth development/institutional change", then at the end there will be a brief statement of a theory of institutional change. All of these will be brief, and should be considered as an "outline" to be filled in by later discussions and questions.

A. Some Rules

A first rule is to start with the assumption that young people are competent. To turn it around, don't create a program that assumes that young people are damaged. The problem with programs that start with the assumption that kids are damaged is that they are invented for youth with problems, and in a short period of time the young people "catch" the problem they're supposed to have in order to be there. Start with the assumption that young people are competent and that your task is to demonstrate that competence. This should be underscored as the starting premise.

The second assumption is that when you involve youth in meaningful activities the young people should be paid. The task is to find ways of employing kids, and of providing them money for that employment. The reason for this is simple: we need models of employment. This society has forgotten how to usefully employ 14, 15, and 16 year olds. We literally no longer know how to employ adolescents usefully. One of our jobs is to model that for people, to show employers how to do it. A starting point is to make sure that persons are paid when they work with you.

Three, in working with adolescents, provide for educational involvement. Having educational involvement means at least two different things. One is, make sure the youth get school credit (including good grades) for what they do. Second, make sure you've got teachers involved in what you're doing. The credit is important because you're trying particularly for the outsider kids, to increase the access to credentials. The third thing is involving teachers in an expansion of the definition of what education consists of, what learning is all about. We want to try to show the schools that there are other ways of learning things than in the classroom. Institutional change within the school must involve, as partners in that change, teachers.

The fourth suggestion is that when you work with young people, make sure that they are mixed. One kind of mixing is to mix young people with adults. Provide settings in which young people and adults come together and work together to solve common problems and to do all kinds of things together. . . . A tragedy of our times is that young people are separated from the real world of work and politics . . . they grow up simply not knowing what the world is about.

The second issue in mixing is to make sure that you mix all kinds of adolescents together. One of the worst things we do is to segregate kids according to their academic performance, according to their community performance on dimensions of smart and dumb, good and bad. These, in turn, become built into the ongoing identities and become difficult to break out of, given the natural forces operating within organizations. Many previous programs have shown that it's easy to put different young persons together and they can work together well.

The fifth rule is that the activities provided, the jobs, should be worthwhile. These should be things which are important, rewarding and meaningful. Make it something that you would find worthwhile. If you are trying to find ways of creating a sense of success, a sense of contribution, a sense of belonging, a necessary requirement is that the work activity contribute to a sense of worth.

The sixth suggested rule is to find activities where young people can bring some competence to that activity. For example, it's very important when we engage in drug education that we're able to talk the language of kids. Young people can tell us how to talk with young people. They possess a linguistic competence that is needed if the task is to be accomplished well.

A seventh suggestion is that when you organize activities, try to pick the institutional targets in your community where you have some reason to believe that the activity can be carried on on a permanent basis. What is hoped is that there is going to be some institutional support for what you're doing. The task of institutional change should be viewed as a long range process, and we should start where we have some reason to suspect that initial access is available, and will be followed by later, developmental change.

An eighth rule: organize the activities around groups. You want to put the young people together so that they can work together and develop group advocacy and group support. The young people are then able to share their concerns. We are talking here about altering institutional networks, and that can be scary business. Don't put a young person where he feels alone to work that out.

A ninth rule is: do what you can about providing supports for cultural pluralism. Many of you work in communities where there are significant ethnic minorities, and thus the problem should be very visible to you (although the issue is everywhere in this society). One of the important foci of the work can be building support for cultural identity and different cultural life styles.

A tenth rule is: be political. Remember that all change is political. Being political means many things. For example, don't fight dumb battles. Don't get involved in what the political scientists call "zero-sum games," where your wins are someone's losses--maximize friends, not enemies. Create collaborative, cooperative ventures. A second part of being political is remember to use the media. When you've got a good thing make sure the local newspapers get pictures of it.

An eleventh rule is to start small. One might keep in mind what Pearl (Atrocity of Education, 1972) calls the "beachhead" approach, where small, well-run, and successful programs lead to ever widening institutional effects. It is necessary to make sure that the initial efforts are managed effectively, and the management of programs that are new and institutionally different becomes very problematic if the activities involve large numbers of persons.

A twelfth rule, as you work, training young people in rules of bureaucratic survival and functioning. Try to figure out ways to help young people understand how to survive and function in bureaucracies. Bureaucratic agents--and I think the young people themselves are going to be that--should be negotiable, should be accountable, they should be able to cope with conflict. They should learn that rules are means and not ends.

A suggested thirteenth rule: avoid coercion and negative labelling. It's really implied in everything that's gone before, but let's make it a special rule. If you're relating to the juvenile justice system, make sure that how they (the youthful "clients") function in the program has no bearing on what's going to happen to them in the juvenile justice system.

A fourteenth rule: have fun, enjoy yourself. Make sure that you're having a good time and that the people involved feel that they're going somewhere and enjoying themselves. If you're not enjoying it, don't do it.

A fifteenth rule is: make sure that you evaluate. Gather good evidence of what you're doing. You need it for political purposes. You also need good solid social scientific evidence that answers the question, "Are you really helping?" That requires that you state your objectives, that you create a setting and a way of evaluating, that you gather data. It's easy to do, but we don't do it, and that's a tragedy.

A final rule: Let me finish the set of rules with the one that I started off with: believe in kids. If you can't believe in kids, don't be in this business.

B. Some Forms of Programs

1. Education Action Teams. One form that programs of youth development can take is something we can call education action teams. These teams are relatively small groups (maximum suggested size around ten) formed to deal with a community issue or problem. Ideally, the groups should have a highly specific task to perform, and the task should be able to be accomplished in a short period of time, e.g., within a month or two. The tasks should be designed around an issue that young persons have a competence to contribute. For example, a drug education team in Boise was formed with small groups of young persons from a high school working with a teacher, a policeman, supportive help from the health professions, the team having both "straights" and "freaks" within it. The task of the team(s) was to prepare an hour presentation to be given in the sixth grade classes throughout the city. The youngsters were paid, and they did receive school credit for the seminar around which the activity was planned and prepared. Similar action teams can deal with such topics as working with elderly to develop a "local history" project, plan a festival or activity around an ethnic holiday, the development of a rumor control program in the high school, airing of police-youth conflicts, development of a youth and the law pamphlet, and many others. Note, again, that such activities are highly focused, and can be accomplished in a relatively short time period.

2. Youth Service Teams. Youth Service Teams can be formed as vehicles whereby youth can be usefully employed in individual service roles. The kinds of services that youth can provide include functioning as tutors, kindergarten aides, child care aides, hospital aides, recreational group leaders and helpers, and similar activities. Here, by and large, the young persons function in the work role independently, i.e., the work task is not accomplished in a group. With such service groups it becomes especially important that there be a group setting where the young persons can come together both to share the learning and their concerns/anxieties. In the Boise program for Kindergarten Aides, this was accomplished by creating a seminar within the high school setting which not only was the framework for sharing, but also was the vehicle for training--so that specialists in a variety of child care areas were brought in as trainers.

3. New Careers for Youth. A basic model that might be followed is that suggested for adults by Pearl and Riessman which they called "new careers." The basic ideal of the new careers programs is to create new avenues to professional, human service employment through extensive redefinition of work and school roles. New steps are created where persons start by working at relatively low levels of skill, with progressive training and educational experiences being built into the job description such that the individual is able to build credential upon credential, opening access even to the highest terminal point within the profession. The logic of the need for such a model for economically vulnerable adults holds for youth as well, i.e., the emergence of a credentialed society results in the occupational exclusion of the young from work generally, and work/education experiences in economically viable fields especially. Furthermore, the suggested realignment of work and education is vital for so many young persons whose experiences lead them to discredit formal education and educational institutions.

4. Youth Consultant Teams. A further form that programs can take is the formation of youth consultant teams. Groups of relatively small numbers can be created to serve in an advisory capacity to a variety of decision-making bodies, including county commissioners, city councils, recreation planning boards, or regional planning councils. Another form that this program can take is to have youth serve as trainers to such groups as probation officers, policemen, counselors, or teachers.

5. Youth Participation Planning Groups. A final form that can be suggested consists of involving young persons and adults in a joint effort to plan for a widening of youth involvement in decision-making and planning functions within the community. Serving as an ad hoc group, the committee may generate a number of more specific planning forms to function in the local settings.

C. Some Possible Steps in the Implementation

It might be helpful to sketch out in brief form some steps for the implementation of such activities. First, one should do a careful job of "checking out the turf." This would involve floating around the community, finding both persons and settings where cooperation is possible. What should be kept in mind at this stage is that what is being sought are that handful of persons willing to try to move the community, and that setting where something positive might happen.

Second, begin to conduct informal, pre-planning meetings, with a handful of trusted friends. The idea here is to bring persons together on a highly informal basis, to share ideas about what might be possible, and how best to go about creating youth development programs in the neighborhood.

Third, form a formalized, pre-planning group that consists of the handful of persons who have been identified as those needed to successfully carry out the initial planning process. At this point, the group begins to go public, you let people begin to know that something is taking shape in the community.

Four, it may now be appropriate to bring together a fairly large group which represents a variety of constituencies within the neighborhood to begin the process of developing legitimacy and support within the constituent groups. Thus, a program may need to have support from the schools, police, juvenile court, probation, mental health clinic, private agencies, parents, and youth, to name but a few of the constituencies. Such a meeting would involve a large number of persons, and should be seen as a consequence as an information sharing and question raising session, rather than as a hard, problem-solving session. The group which adequately covers so many constituency bases, cannot serve as a small, working, planning committee. What the large group can do, however, is to create the necessary support base, and also to identify those persons to be part of later stage efforts.

Five, the community may at this stage be ready for the focusing of planning, i.e., for the generation of an action planning group or groups who have the specific task of creating some form of youth action programs. Such a planning group would have a definitive target for planning, it should function for a relatively short period, and make sure that community action begin, say, within a month or two.

Six, the final stage is the implementation of one or another of the youth development action forms mentioned above.

D. Some Notions About Theory and Its Importance

The above ideas may appear to have a pragmatic, even practical, sound, at least that is what is hoped. Nonetheless, these suggestions emerge as a result of a theory which has evolved over time as a way of both describing the problem of youthful deviance, and as a way of suggesting some steps that might make a difference. Let's start this by distinguishing between two very different kinds of institutions that relate to young persons. In the delinquency field much of what we do is concentrated within what can be termed "social control" institutions that comprise the justice system: the police, courts, probation, training schools, and parole. These institutions are fundamentally coercive, and exist in order to provide formal control of behavior defined as unacceptably deviant. The labels that such institutions possess are negative and coercive (arrestee, probationer, inmate, parolee, etc.).

Another very different set we might call the socializing or legitimizing institutions, and it is within these that persons are provided access to labels that define one as successful and legitimate: work, school, and family being of central importance. Positive, meaningful experiences are to be found within these settings, especially work and school.

Over time, key arenas of these socializing institutions have been organized around the principle of limiting the access of youth, especially in the work arena. Young persons in this society are excluded from direct participation in work.



Some young people are especially vulnerable to this process of exclusion. The school today functions basically as a "gatekeeper," recruiting and preparing some for elite status, de-selecting others. Those who have been de-selected, who receive poor grades, who are in the "non-college" tracks, have a special problem because of their doubled exclusion: they are denied jobs, but they are also denied the feeling of success and meaning in school as well.

Much of the foregoing is premised on the idea that these processes of exclusion are: (1) institutional in nature, and (2) create the basic conditions of youthful alienation and apathy that become reflected in rebellion and delinquency. The institutional premise is intended to reinforce the idea that the exclusionary procedures are a direct consequence of organizational functioning, being based on decisions which create an organizational shortage of jobs for young persons, and on decisions to prepare persons through a complex institutional and bureaucratic process of grading and tracking. (See Chart 1.)

The above suggestions are intended to direct policy issues around restructuring of the socializing institutions. It is in the arena of schools, work, and political involvements that we can begin to build in young persons' feelings of competence, belongingness, usefulness, and the idea that what they do makes a difference. If one wants to build a sense of success, it will have to take place within the arena that we have called the socializing institutions.

Emerging correctional policy, on the other hand, tends to be concentrated strictly within the control institutions, as evidenced in the move toward de-institutionalization, de-criminalization, and diversion. As important as these processes might be, reflection will reveal that as long as the activities remain within the domain of the control institutions, they will probably only have minimal impact. The control institutions are only a small part of the vulnerability that characterizes the "serious" offender. Much of the vulnerability, in fact, results from problematic experiences within the socializing institutions.

The rules and programs which have been suggested are advanced specifically as procedures to bring about institutional change to reduce vulnerability. The emphasis on jobs and education can be seen as illustrative. New patterns are needed whereby youth can work, and can experience success both occupationally and educationally. These suggestions, in other words, are modest proposals toward institutional change for youth development.



APPENDIX E

Notes on Diversion

Center for Action Research, Inc.
Boulder, Colorado

August, 1975

If I understood you correctly, you and your colleagues are in the middle of designing a new special emphasis program for diversion, for which several millions of dollars will be available. I've arranged these notes in what are for me convenient steps of a planning/implementation sequence, which I hope also fills in a platform on which the immediate task of writing regulations and guidelines can be based.

1. State the Guiding Propositions.

The case for diversion rests on one main argument: For many classes of offenders, juvenile justice processing is an inappropriate response. The negative labelling (stigmatization) associated with juvenile justice processing leaves many offenders more likely to commit a subsequent offense, rather than less likely. This argument appears to hold most strongly for status offenders, and may be applied to misdemeanors and felonies as well, though with varying degrees of qualification.

If one takes that argument seriously, there are several possible responses to the troublesome behavior of youth:

-Ignore the behavior. Eliminate the offense from statute, and take no official or programmatic notice of it in any way. Define the behavior as non-problematic.

-Decriminalize the behavior. Eliminate the offense from statute, but make other arrangements for response to the behavior, e.g., eliminate truancy as an offense, but make increasing attendance a school problem.

-Divert. Let the behavior be classified as an offense, but make arrangements so that youth initially contacted by police or court will be handled outside the justice system.

-Soften the blow. Let the behavior be classified as an offense and continue juvenile justice supervision, but let it be in settings more humane and more conducive to rehabilitation.

In the context of these possible responses, diversion is a temporary recourse for some classes of offenders, and a permanent one for others. For behavior which ought to be ignored or decriminalized, but where there is unwillingness to ignore or decriminalize it, diversion may be a way to demonstrate that non-justice responses are more appropriate and more successful. This demonstration may lead to changes. For offenses unlikely to be struck from statute, permanent diversion arrangements allow selective application of non-justice responses to particular classes of offenders, e.g., first-time petty misdemeanors.

Some definitional notions are needed to design a diversion program:

a. The objective (and the ultimate measure) of diversion is success (compared to non-diversionary options) in reducing the rate at which youth commit delinquent acts. Acts are chosen rather than official rates (from which acts may vary by multiples) as being truer measures of what is happening to youth and to their communities. The criterion measure, then, is self-reported delinquency, a tested and satisfactory measurement method. Rates of recidivism can be a complementary measure.

We needn't ask the question "what is delinquency?" Delinquency is what the law says it is, and that varies from place to place, often in the guise of "CHINS", "PINS", etc., etc. The question remains, what kind of response is appropriate to what kind of behavior? For some situations, one possible response is that of the juvenile justice system, and that response we have an obligation to examine.

b. The functions of diversion are to increase the probability that, for specified classes of offenders, juvenile justice system processing will be terminated without prejudice at specified points, and to provide diverted youth with access on a voluntary basis to a non-stigmatizing agency network which can employ and judge empirically responses ranging from (1) ignoring the behavior, to (2) providing one or more of a variety of treatments demonstrably correcting disadvantages and disabilities of various sorts, to (3) providing one or more of a variety of opportunities demonstrably supporting assumption or resumption of a more satisfactory course of development.

This definition is full of cryptic qualifiers, which will be elaborated.

(1) Diversion should terminate juvenile justice system processing. The case should end, and the youth should be removed from the justice system, its procedures and its agents, at the point the decision to divert is made. The negative effects of juvenile justice processing --negative labelling, stigmatization, alienation, subsequent delinquency --come from appearing in the records of, being associated with, being one of, being the ward or prisoner of, being visited by, or having to report to, justice agencies, their agents, and their clients. The offender and the records of his processing for that offense, at best, should disappear without a trace.

(2) Diversion should terminate juvenile justice processing, without prejudice. The offense which brought the youth into the justice system should be dropped permanently. The decision to divert should

follow the decision to drop the case forever. Leaving the case "open", "pending" or "conditional on results of diversion" automatically defines diversion as a disposition backed by the punitive power of the state, usually without benefit of counsel, hearing, or due process. This specification is related closely to the specification for voluntary participation in diversion programs. A youth's decision to participate is unlikely to be voluntary when the case remains open.

(3) Diversion should increase the probability that juvenile justice system processing will terminate. It is quite unlikely that any juvenile justice system, at least at first, will absolutely and uniformly divert all members of a given class of offenders. Persons will insist on making differential decisions based on appearance, demeanor, part of town, or whatever. Furthermore, they have been making such decisions, so that it is also true that some proportion of most offender classes is being "lectured and released", "informally adjusted", etc.

An adequate measure of the effect of a diversion program on juvenile justice processing is to calculate the change, over time, in the probability that members of a given class of offenders who arrive at a given point in processing will go on to a subsequent point. For example, by collecting the appropriate data, it may be found that, of every 1000 status offenders (locally defined) who are contacted by patrolmen, 300 are taken in for booking at the precinct. It may be found that this situation has persisted over time. The probability of transition from patrol contact to booking is .30. The probability is a reflection of the justice system's operation. Diversion should change that probability.

(4) Diversion should increase the probability that juvenile justice system processing will be terminated, for specified classes of offenders. The probabilities of transition from one point to another in the system are not necessarily the same for status offenders and misdemeanants, for males and for females, for blacks and for whites. The probabilities should be calculated separately for classes of offenders defined by offense, age, sex, ethnicity, and perhaps other factors which may determine how they are processed. Diversion should increase the probability of case-termination for these specified groups, separately considered.

(5) Diversion should increase the probability that juvenile justice system processing will be terminated, at specified points in the system. The transition probability from police contact to booking may not be the same as the transition probability from booking to court intake. Different persons employing different policies and practices make those decisions. Diversion should be aimed to specific points, and should measure the probabilities at those points, separately.

At the same time, however, the interdependence of the various transition points should be kept in mind. Suppose that 1000 status offenders come to police contact, 500 go on to booking and 250 go from there to court intake. The two transition probabilities are .50 and .50. Now suppose that the booking officer's practices remain the same, but that the transition probability for the patrolmen goes up to .60. An additional 100 kids come to the booking office, and an additional 50 kids go on to court intake, even though the booking officer's practices have not changed.

Probabilities for adjacent decision points should be measured and reviewed along with the probabilities for the points to which diversion is directed.

The specifications above may sound nit-picking, but aren't. There have been some disconcerting outcomes in "diversion" programs which didn't attend to those specifications. Some programs concern themselves mainly with the number of referrals from justice system sources. Each case from the justice system is counted as "one diverted kid". Some of these agencies are receiving kids who otherwise would have been lectured and released or informally adjusted: The diversion programs did not increase the probability of case termination.

Further, it is not clear that the kids are better off being served than being lectured and released. There is some evidence that kids served in diversion were not better off at the end of a year than kids in probation, and some evidence that kids who were lectured and released were better off (less likely to repeat contact with the justice system) than kids who were served.

I think I know of one case (and suspect others) in which the provision of a diversion option served to increase the rates of penetration of the justice system. That is, policemen had been ignoring things they saw and had been lecturing and releasing some kids they came in contact with, on the grounds that they couldn't help the kids, but could only increase the problem. When the diversion option became available, the officers started picking up those kids, on the grounds that now they could "help them", by getting them to a service

(6) Diversion should provide diverted youth with access to a non-stigmatizing agency network. The objective of diversion is to avoid the

negative labelling/stigmatization/alienation accompanying juvenile justice processing, and thereby to reduce the commission of delinquent acts.

Some diversion programs have a "spoiled image" of sufficient power that kids who go there continue to be negatively labelled. The reasons may be the kind of service provided (therapy for "crazy" people, remedial education for "retarded" people, etc.), the kinds of clients (that service is for "delinquents", "crazies" or "mentals"), or failure to stop the flow of labelling information (I see in the case file that this is a delinquent, referred because he is slightly crazy and needs therapy). In these situations, the diverted youth may not escape the stigmatizing situation, but instead continue in it, old wine in new jugs, and thereby are prevented from assuming roles likely to increase their commitment to law-abiding behavior.

Agencies can regulate their images, by changing their description of themselves and their clients, by regulating their intake (never admitting more than half "delinquents") and by regulating the flow of information (shredding and burning referral records). By having more options, agency networks have more capability to regulate their images than do individual agencies.

(7) Diversion should provide diverted youth access to an agency network on a voluntary basis. The function of the agency network is to assist the diverted youth to solve problems and to regain, or gain, a commitment to conformity which insulates against delinquency. It is difficult to see how this may be accomplished when the starting point is punitive unilateral coercion.

(8) Diversion should provide access to an agency network which can employ responses and judge them empirically. The bulk of services applied to youth are designed, operated and perpetuated on the basis of personal subjective judgments by individuals. Personal subjective judgments are important and useful kinds of information, but they are not adequate as the sole basis for programming. Personal subjective judgments are biased by experience, predilection, training and selectivity. They are difficult, if not impossible to share, especially with persons of different experience, predilection, training and selectivity. Selection of program responses should be continuously monitored by comparative evaluations with objective measures, to determine the outcomes of various services on various youth. Subsequent planning, programming and service should be guided by the findings.

(9) Diversion should provide youth access to an agency network which can employ a range of responses including ignoring the problem, treating the problem, and providing opportunity. There is a kind of singlemindedness in delinquency prevention programs which insists on defining certain kinds of behavior as problems which must be addressed, and then insists that the problems are in fact defects in the youth involved, which must be "fixed" somehow, through an individual treatment.

It is not at all clear that treatment is uniformly better than doing nothing. The diversion program should help to clarify this matter, and doing nothing should be as legitimate and frequently used an option as treatment, pending some appropriate findings about their differential effects on different youth.

Neither is it clear that treatment is uniformly better than increasing access to opportunities for legitimate desirable roles. There is a tendency to regard straightforward programs (such as those to place diverted youth back in school in a satisfactory curriculum) as insufficient and unpowerful. That is followed by a tendency to put diverted youth through various hoops (remedial reading rituals, for example) before they are re-admitted to legit society. There is plenty of reason to argue that, for many youth, programs which deliberately and precisely return youth to desirable and attractive main line situations are sufficient to support a return to a normal satisfactory course of development.

2. Assessment.

I took from what you told me that some persons in your outfit have done an assessment, drawing on their own observations and on whatever data presently are available about past diversion efforts. I took it that they found reasons to be dissatisfied with, or at least skeptical of, diversion programs in the past, and perhaps with diversion programs which LEAA funded.

You mentioned items such as violation of due process, coercion, further stigmatization in the service end of the programs, lack of coordination, etc. I take it that there has been prepared some list of key questions about diversion.

At the same time, I have the sense that one of the main problems they found is that the information about diversion, about different types of diversion programs, and about their effects on delinquency, is inadequate, that there are too few solid findings to go on in further programming.

Organizing the new program as a nationally-directed discretionary (demonstration?) program makes especially good sense on that count.

3. Set Objectives.

It appears to me that the program has two main objectives, applying equally to your outfit and to the prospective grantees:

a. To reduce the rate at which youth who come in contact with the justice system commit delinquent acts, and to reduce rates of repeat arrests. (This argument has been made.)

b. To produce replicable, transferable findings about the methods and effects of diversion with sufficient detail, reliability and validity that they can be used to guide subsequent programming at both national and local levels.

These two objectives seem to me to be equally important. It's unacceptable to succeed in reducing delinquency if you're not able to prove it and to show exactly how. It's unacceptable to fail without gathering the information which would allow you to do better next time.

4. Program Design.

Several options should be compared before choosing a design. I'll try to give one option.

This program is better thought of as a joint venture between LEAA and some skillful grantees, than as the typical grant program. Not knowing exactly what's right, it's necessary to start with hypotheses and to test them. Almost by definition, the ideas will change during the program, as problems are encountered and findings come in. Needed is a relationship

between the LEAA people and the grantee people which is more flexible than the usual guidelines permit, but which preserves accountability.

It appears that the guidelines and regulations should accomplish three critical things:

- state the objectives against which the products will be judged.

Two have been given above. I think they're enough.

- state the critical parameters of a diversion program. In this way the guidelines will contain LEAA's hypotheses about effective diversion, which also serve as the main criteria for judging responsiveness of proposals.

- state the critical assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation procedures which will make this an experimental demonstration which produces the desired findings, rather than an ordinary grants program with some evaluation laid on.

Besides the problem of not knowing exactly what works, there is the added problem of variability among sites. Different sites will process offenders differently, have different definitions of offenses, etc. Too little detail in guidelines dissolves accountability; too much detail either makes it hard for the grantee to adapt appropriately to local conditions, or forces the grantee to lie about what is being done.

The guidelines should contain the few well-chosen parameters which the national staff are sure of, stated with enough precision to allow determinations whether proposals are being responsive, and to guide the development of measures of those parameters. Other issues should be left as questions which grantees will be applauded for exploring.

I would be satisfied with a set of guidelines in which the sections on objectives and critical parameters contained (in cleaner form) no more than I have already given in these notes, provided the section on assessment, planning and evaluation procedures is adequate. There are two middling precise objectives and twelve critical parameters. These probably are more than can be operationalized in the field, certainly are more than enough to keep the program operations staff busy monitoring, and are enough to tax the measurement capabilities likely to be affordable with any reasonable cut of each grant. By any practical standard, it's already a complex guideline: (See page 13.)


When you consider that each of the parameters must be measured in order to produce defensible transferable findings about the worth of those parameters, you have more than enough work cut out.

So far, not a word has been said about the kinds of services to be provided, which specific offenders are to be diverted, etc. Nor should the guidelines say anything about that. Leave those questions to be determined by the grantee in accord with local patterns. Whatever services are chosen, they must satisfy the parameters for range and the parameter for outcome, e.g., adjustment of a disability or resumption of a satisfactory course of development.

As each parameter is spelled out, there will come a point at which you stop refining the parameter and begin to tell the potential grantee how to satisfy it operationally. Quit writing before you do that. Shift, to specification of the planning and measurement standards to be employed in operationalizing the parameter in the field.

PARAMETERS

OBJECTIVES



A couple of examples to illustrate this, and then I'll let it go. One of the parameters says that the service network should be non-stigmatizing, by which we mean that the diverted youth should not be defined and treated in those negative ways which lead to increased alienation and subsequent delinquency. Ways to measure negative labelling, self-esteem, and alienation are available. The guidelines should define "non-stigmatizing", leaving the means to the grantee, then shift to the section on planning and measurement and write a standard for measurement and planning for non-stigmatization. The grantee will be able to adopt the means appropriate to his site; you will have the means to find whether the grantee succeeded.

One of the parameters requires that the service network be able to provide treatments which correct disabilities, where that is appropriate. Having defined "correct disabilities where appropriate" (remove barriers which demonstrably prevent resumption of a normal course of law-abiding development), the guidelines should shift to the standards for assessing what are demonstrable disabilities of the population to be diverted, for planning the treatment, and for evaluating the result, all in ways which are independently verifiable and transferable. (The usual case, of course, is that the same worker identifies a "disability", treats it, and determines whether the treatment "worked", all in ways which defy independent verification and transfer.)

Confining the program guidelines to the three sections on objectives, critical parameters and planning and measurement standards, restricting the guidelines to the few critical points, and confining them to appropriate

levels of detail will allow the standards to be written much more precisely and carefully, and they will be sufficient.

Confining the guidelines to precisely stated fundamentals provides the base for accountability while also providing greater flexibility to reinterpret, revise, and refine in response to the problems and findings of implementation. Detail which is not included in the guidelines is supplied in the grantee's plans--the function of the grant negotiation is to make sure that that detail, consistent with the critical parameters, is there. In effect, the grantee is being asked to buy in on a concept of the task, and is being helped to operationalize it locally through the grant negotiation process.

While this pattern provides flexibility, it also makes greater demands on the staff who negotiate the grants, monitor the programs and provide technical assistance. They have to be able to apply each of the parameters in a variety of local situations. If they do this well and in agreed ways, the combination of guidelines, grantee plans and reports demonstrate rather specific accountability for performance toward precise goals.

5. Implementation.

In past efforts of this sort with which I've been associated, there have been noticable problems in implementation which tend to weaken accountability and weaken the experiment. One problem involves the orientation and training of the staff responsible for granting, monitoring and TA. These persons are professionals, and part of their ethic is to apply their personal judgments to make programs come out better. They

may or may not agree with or regard as important all the parameters of the experiment as given in the guidelines. It has happened that these persons --often employing "local variation" as the rationale--selectively interpret or ignore some of the parameters. The effect is to diffuse and redirect the experiment, with the effect that the program does not test what it set out to test. Sometimes, the skewing can be enough to make any test at all impossible.

To these persons I would be tempted to say something such as: "We all have our opinions about what works best. None of us have very much hard information with which we could back those opinions up to convince each other. These guidelines are not the only program which can be tested; they may not even be the best program which can be tested. However, can we agree that we must test a program thoroughly in order to get hard sharable information about what does or doesn't work?" I'd be trying to build the program's staff organization around the idea of experimentation rather than around competing versions of a program. I'd be trying to get them to "just try it, and give it a fair shot". Everybody can win in this situation: either they like the guidelines, or they have the satisfaction of knowing that enough data will be collected to show that they were "right" all along.

The better and stronger these agreements can be made, the more likely the design is to be implemented precisely and as intended in the field. When these agreements are reached, "training" becomes an acceptable exercise, intended not to suggest that the staff aren't knowledgable, but to rehearse the program to a fine tune. It is important to conduct good trainings or "rehearsals" on the implementation of the guidelines, to increase the

likelihood that the guidelines will be applied precisely and with a standard of uniformity which supports comparative analysis of the different projects.

A second kind of skewing of the experiment comes at the grantee level. Even supposing that the grant proposal is specifically and precisely responsive to the guidelines, there is the recurring problem that the proposal sits in a file while the grantee revises it daily, by taking action in response to the local problems and opportunities. Over time, greater or lesser deviations occur, so that what is implemented is not what was planned. All the deviations may be quite warranted; that isn't the main problem. The main problem is that no overt or careful decision was made whether the deviation was warranted, and no replanning was done. There is no up-to-date picture of the program which actually was operated. The problems created for evaluation and comparison mount up.

It may be advisable to adopt a procedure in which the proposal is the operational plan for the grantee project, and to adopt procedures by which that plan is the instrument of day-to-day management, so that deviations are noticed and replanning is done when necessary. Around copies of this evolving plan LEAA staff and grantee staff can negotiate the changing shape of the project, so that it continues to be a guided experiment. Since many of the revisions in the plan also require budget changes and changes in the evaluation design, this procedure is additionally warranted.

6. Evaluation

Earlier it was stated that, to test whether the critical parameters actually do determine the outcome, it would be necessary to have measures on each of the parameters and on the objective. This may be more evaluation than you had in mind; I don't know your arrangements in LEAA. Sometimes, agencies have separate R and D units, whose obligation is thought to be the running of heavily evaluated experimental programs which then are the model for the programs of operating branches, who employ only modest evaluations.

I took it that this is an operating program. However, it appears that, with any amount of money likely to be available, this program is best thought of as an R and D type of effort. I assume that the level of effort might be on the same scale as deinstitutionalization, less than \$10 million and fewer than 15 sites. With that limited scope, compared to the millions already being spent by the numerous jurisdictions around the country, the program can't be regarded as a national general operating program, but must be regarded as a demonstration, the main purpose of which is to produce findings likely to improve the practices in those other jurisdictions.

If this is a correct picture of the program's function, then evaluation necessarily should be a substantial component of each grant, and measures should be developed for each parameter.

Fortunately, much of what will be needed already is available in some form. I am appending as an example a document with which you probably are familiar. I understand it was prepared for the deinstitutionalization

program by Sol Kobrin and his associates. There are relevant issues both in the purposes and in the methods.

KINDS OF DATA TO BE COLLECTED

I. Input Baseline Data

A. Characteristics of all juveniles handled by the Juvenile Justice System in your jurisdiction for two periods: 1972-74 and 1975-77. (These data may be gathered as a representative sample of all juveniles in a large jurisdiction or as a total enumeration of all cases in a small jurisdiction). This information would include the following:

1. Characteristics of offenses charges
2. Characteristics of offenders: age, race, sex, etc.
3. Nature of disposition for each offense
 - a. by police: counsel and release, agency referral, court petition
 - b. by courts: dismissal, informal probation, referral, probation, institutional placement

B. Breakdown of complaints against juveniles initiated in the two time periods, 1972-74 and 1975-77, by each of the following:

1. the police
2. the schools
3. others in the community: parents, citizens, agencies

C. A record of all school expulsions during the two time periods as a proportion of the total school population.

II. Process Data

A. Ongoing description of program: A detailed account of the problems of implementation, their solutions, and the program adaptations entailed in the solutions. An analysis of the extent to which the program is able to operate consistently with its original design. This program history will be developed collaboratively by the project director and the evaluator.

B. Reactions to program by clients and parents.

C. Reactions to program by key public opinion leaders, representatives of the juvenile justice system, school personnel, etc.

III. Outcome Data

A. Recidivism rates: Experimental vs. Comparison Groups

1. Random assignment and Comparison
2. Post program comparison with matched group

B. Recidivism rates, 1972-74 vs. 1975-77.

Pre-post comparison of baseline data with project period data.

EVALUATION INFORMATION FOR THE STATUS OFFENDER
PROGRAM APPLICANTS

PURPOSE OF EVALUATION COMPONENT:

To gather information that will be of assistance to project staff and LEAA in understanding the problems and successes associated with the operation of new programs designed to deinstitutionalize the treatment of status offenders.

PROGRAM GOALS:

To make things happen:

1. Increase the stake of status offenders in conformity.
2. Increase the stake of non-legal institutions in absorbing status offenders in the community.
3. Change prior methods of handling status offenders in the Juvenile Justice System--primarily reductions in detention and institutionalization.

RESEARCH GOALS:

To add to knowledge: What combination of services realize program goals most effectively? Why?


1. Measure the extent to which a stake in conformity is enhanced.
2. Determine the extent to which programs increase the commitment of non-legal, community institutions to help youth with problems.
3. Measure the extent to which contacts with the Juvenile Justice System are diminished.
4. Determine what program models are most transferable.
5. Determine cost-effectiveness of various program models.

POSSIBLE EVALUATION DESIGNS

1. The Standardized Pre-Post Comparison Design

Each project will be expected to provide access to records on referrals to the court and on the disposition of all status offenders dealt with in the jurisdiction from 1972-74, inclusive. This population will constitute the comparison group for estimating delinquency trends for those not included in the program. Differences in frequency, type, and seriousness of offense between project client members and the comparison group will constitute the measure of delinquency reduction impact. The pre-program comparison group should embrace the age range established by the juvenile offender statute of the jurisdiction, such that the nonprogram cases are drawn from the age cohort identical with those included in the program.

Figure 1. Pre-Post Comparison Design for Measurement of Delinquency Reduction Effect of Program



The Pre-Post study design is commonly employed in situations where some members of a test population may become exposed to programs and some may not. In most projects it is likely that all adjudicated

status offenders will be selected in to the program groups. The groups most comparable to the program groups would then be status offenders in the same jurisdiction who prior to the initiation of the project were accorded preprogram standard dispositions, including detention and institutionalization. The design thus provides exposed and nonexposed groups similar with respect to the crucial criterion of adjudication as status offenders.

The implementation of the procedure is clearly dependent on the availability of appropriate records and on the project manager's success in obtaining permission to make them accessible to the evaluator.


2. The Controlled Experimental Design

In its most desirable and effective form, experimental design requires that the total status offender population of the jurisdiction be established as the pool from which individuals are assigned on a random basis to program and to standard dispositions. If this design is difficult to implement, it may be more feasibly employed with respect to that part of the project client population who represent "borderline" candidates for referral to the program. Each jurisdiction is highly likely to be confronted with a substantial number of cases in which the genuine question exists whether they should be dealt with as delinquent or as status offenders. They would typically include probationers or parolees initially adjudicated delinquents who have been returned for a status offense, and status offenders on probation or parole subsequently returned for a delinquent offense. To these would be added those appearing before the court for the first time with police or probation department investigative reports of combined status and delinquent offenses. Many

are likely to leave uncertain what the appropriate adjudication should be. In brief, in both the returned and the first appearance cases there will be a subset whose record of delinquent and status offenses may be so equally weighted as to defy a confident judgment respecting an appropriate disposition.

As applied in the evaluation of delinquency reduction impact, this well known design is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Experimental Design: Marginal Subgroup



END