

Army Regulation

AR 190-

No. 190-

HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Washington, DC

MILITARY POLICE

COUNTERING TERRORISM AND OTHER MAJOR DISRUPTIONS ON

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Effective \_\_\_\_\_

Supplementation of this regulation is permitted. If supplemented at major Army command level, one copy will be furnished HQDA (DAPE-HRE), Washington, DC 20310.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

1-1. General. a. Recent worldwide increases in attacks against individuals and property by terrorist elements and supporters of hostile political causes pose new threats to the protection of military members, their dependents, civilian employees and government property.

b. Despite the pervasiveness of this threat, alert agencies and individuals prepared for countering major disruptions can thwart such efforts by understanding the nature of terrorism and by taking basic security precautions.

c. Analysis of past incidents indicates that terrorists often attack facilities or destroy equipment and material as a symbolic act to gain publicity and to discredit organizations. Acts directed against individuals are often successful because of unawareness or careless disregard of the terrorist threat. To ensure continuity of operation, security consciousness must be emphasized by commanders and practiced by the individual.

1-2. Purpose. This regulation implements Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, Protection of DOD Personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts. It establishes DA policy on counter-terrorism and personal protective measures against terrorist acts and provides planning guidance for handling major disruptions on military installations.

1-3. Applicability. a. The provisions of this regulation apply to all major Army commands.

b. This regulation applies to US Army Reserve (USAR) components and Army National Guard (ARNG) components, when Federalized.

1-4. Explanation of terms. a. Terrorism. The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, often political or ideological in nature, through instilling fear, intimidation or coercion. It usually involves a criminal act often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.

b. International terrorism. Terrorism transcending national boundaries in the carrying out of the act, the purpose of the act, the nationalities of the victims, or the resolution of the incident. These acts are usually designed to attract wide publicity to focus attention on the existence, cause, or demands of the terrorists.

c. Terrorist group. A politically oriented subnational entity which uses terrorism as its prime mode of operation.

d. Major installation disruptions. Acts occurring on military installations that have potential for widespread publicity requiring special response and/or tactics. Included are threats or attempts to commit such acts as kidnapping, blackmail, bombings, hijacking, ambushing, sabotage, major weapons thefts, extortion, assassination and taking hostages.

e. Special threat. Any situation involving a sniper, barricaded criminal(s)/terrorist activity, or hostage taker(s) that requires special reaction/response, manpower and training.

f. Special reaction team. Any team of military/security personnel specially trained, armed and equipped to contain and neutralize a special threat.

g. Negotiations. A mutual discussion between authorities and a offender leading to an agreement concerning the release of hostages or the surrender of the offender.

h. Hostage. Any person held against his will as a security for the performance or nonperformance of specific actions.

i. Crisis management team. Teams found at major command or formed at various command installation levels concerned with plans, procedures, techniques, policies and controls for dealing with sudden, violent acts of terrorism or other major disruptions occurring on government installations/facilities. This team considers the local, national and international implications of major disruptions and establishes contact with the Army Operations Center (see Appendix C) if the situation escalates requiring higher level involvement and guidance.

j. Threat management force (TMF). An action force from installation resources that responds to major installation disruptions. The force may be squad, platoon or company size and is composed of a forward support element which includes the unit leader, a security element to provide close in cover to the force, a negotiation team, and an action element to search for and neutralize the threat.

1-5. Policies. a. The Department of State has the primary responsibility for dealing with terrorism involving Americans abroad and for handling foreign relations aspects of domestic terrorism incidents.

b. The Department of Justice is the primary agency for coping with domestic terrorism. Investigative and operational responsibility rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Procedures for Army assistance to the FBI are outlined in Appendix B.

c. Actions to combat terrorism in overseas areas will comply with applicable international agreements. Subject to instructions issued by commanders of unified commands, reactions to incidents of a political nature will be coordinated with the US Embassy in the host nation.

d. Although the FBI has overall responsibility for combating and investigating domestic terrorism and host countries have the responsibility overseas, the planning, coordination and implementation of precautionary measures to prevent terrorist acts and to provide proper initial response on US Army installations worldwide, remain a local command responsibility.

e. Protection of Army personnel and dependents stationed abroad requires special emphasis. Personnel will receive training, information, and assistance based on mission and threat evaluation by the local command in defensive measures. Personnel will be aware of the provisions of DA Pam 190-

f. Procedures, guidance and policies for the protection of all US personnel and property will be established and maintained at all Army installations and activities.

g. Since absolute protection against terrorist acts is virtually impossible, protective plans and procedures must consider the vulnerability of the installation, manpower and fiscal constraints, and mission requirements.

h. All Army personnel traveling abroad will be informed of the local terrorist threat and instructed in protective procedures.

i. Subject to instructions issued by commanders of unified commands, measures for protection from terrorist activities abroad will be coordinated with appropriate host country officials.

j. The acquisition, processing and storing of information pertaining to known terrorist groups or persons is prohibited except as authorized in accordance with procedures outlined in AR 380-13 and DOD Directive 5200.27.

1-6. Responsibilities. a. At DA level, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) has primary staff responsibility for the development of policies and procedures for combating terrorism and other major disruptions occurring on military installations.

b. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) provides support as required pertaining to operation of Army Operations Center.

c. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) has primary staff responsibility for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information concerning terrorist plans/activities posing a direct threat to Army personnel and property. (See para 1-5j, above).

d. The Chief of Public Affairs (CPA), OSA, has primary DA responsibility to provide public affairs guidance and to authorize local response to news media queries concerning counter-terrorism.

e. Commander, TRADOC will--

(1) Develop appropriate training programs as directed which address those facets of the terrorist threat that require specialized training beyond that normally conducted for contingency planning and establish or modify courses as required.

(2) Increase coordination among US Army Military Police School/ Training Center, US Army Intelligence/Training Center and US Army Institute for Military Assistance in preparation of operational guidance, development of doctrine and command guidance in response to major disruptions on installations and personal protective measures.

(3) Develop a model contingency plan for handling major disruptions on installations. Particular emphasis will be placed on crisis management planning and incident control responsibilities of installation elements supporting the command. Any available material which offers procedural guidance to field commanders should be disseminated immediately.

f. Commanders at all levels will--

(1) Ensure that current security procedures include appropriate precautionary measures to deter attacks against individuals and property on US Army installations.

(2) Establish contingency plans to respond to any major disruption on installations to include threats and acts.

(3) Ensure that Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) training (AR 381-12) include instructions on the nature of the terrorist threat, the vulnerabilities of military personnel and their dependents to terrorist acts and defensive measures that can be employed to thwart such acts.

(4) Designate specific responsibility to key staff personnel in coping with special threats.

(5) Develop procedures to ensure that all Army personnel traveling abroad in either a leave or TDY status are informed of the provisions of DA Pamphlet 190- .

(6) Incorporate specific guidance on planning and actions to be taken in response to demands, threats, or actions by terrorist groups in their physical security plans.

(7) Be authorized maximum flexibility in establishing negotiations with hostage takers. However, major demands placed on the commander that are related to the safety and welfare of hostages will be referred through channels for resolution/guidance from Headquarters, Department of the Army (see Appendix C). Neither additional weapons nor munitions will be given a terrorist.

g. CONUS commanders will assist the FBI as outlined in Appendix B

h. OCONUS commanders will--



(1) In accordance with applicable Status of Forces Agreements and subject to instructions issued by commanders of unified commands, seek the cooperation of host country officials in delineating areas of responsibility in handling major disruptions on military installations.

(2) Subject to instructions issued by commanders of unified commands, develop and implement procedures, guidance and instructions for the protection of permanently assigned and temporary duty military personnel, civilian employees and dependents.

(3) Subject to the restrictions described in paragraph 1-5j, above, collect and analyze information concerning local terrorist elements that pose a direct threat to the Army to ensure programs provide for adequate response.

(4) Coordinate protective measures and terrorist reaction plans with host country officials and US State Department officials.

i. The Commander, US Army Criminal Investigation Command will, collect, evaluate and disseminate criminal information, investigate major disruptions on installations and provide advice and assistance to local commands, as required.

1-7. Reports. a. Commanders will report acts of terrorism and other major installation disruptions IAW AR 190-40, with immediate telephonic notification to the Army Operations Center, AUTOVON 851-1800, followed by an initial priority (or higher) electrical message to HQDA (DAPE-HRE).

b. Ongoing hostage incidents involving demands for ransom or having political ramifications will be reported to the Army Operations Center where a Crisis Management Team will be formed to evaluate the situation and provide guidance (see Appendix C).

(1) The initial report will provide a narrative description of the event by the fastest means available, usually by unclassified voice or telephonic transmission to the AOC. The report will include the time and location of occurrence, number of personnel involved (hostages and abductors), specifics of demands and current status.

(2) An unclassified amplifying report by message will be submitted to the AOC within 30 minutes after the initial report.

(3) Supplemental reports will be transmitted electrically on the hour every two hours for the duration of the incident.

## CHAPTER 2

### PLANNING GUIDANCE

2-1. General planning considerations. a. AR 190-10, AR 190-13 and AR 380-5 establish policy and provide Army-wide guidance on the physical security of personnel, materiel, equipment, facilities and documents and will be used as a planning guide. FM's 19-15 and 19-30 provide doctrinal concepts for physical security and training of special reaction teams (SRT). FM 19-10 contains additional doctrinal concepts concerning the composition and employment of SRTs and requirements for the employment of negotiators in a hostage or terrorist situation. DA PAM 190- describes the nature of the terrorist threat, and provides guidance on personal protective measures to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks.

b. The outcome of terrorist acts and other installation disruptions can impact on the highest levels of government; therefore, the planning for and conduct of countermeasures must be emphasized.

c. Close coordination with civil authorities should be established to exchange information which indicates a threat to individuals or property on military installations/facilities. The provisions of AR 380-13 are applicable to the acquisition of such information.

d. Installation contingency plans will provide for swift, effective reaction to major disruptions, particularly those that develop into hostage/barricade incidents. Some or all of the following reactions may be required depending on the severity of the disruption:

(1) Notify military police, criminal investigations (CID), SJA, military intelligence and FBI personnel.

- (2) Isolate the area with close-in perimeter security.
  - (3) Establish an outer perimeter of control.
  - (4) Alert special reaction teams.
  - (5) Establish an on-site command post.
  - (6) Obtain all available intelligence.
  - (7) Alert EOD teams, facilities engineers and hospital officials.
  - (8) Interview personnel who have knowledge of the situation to establish the number and identity of perpetrators, victims and weapons, and the background and medical histories of both perpetrators and victims.
  - (9) Activate Installation Emergency Operations Center (IEOC) if situation escalates.
  - (10) Direct all news inquiries to the installation/public affairs office.
  - (11) Contingency plans should consider the use of CID agents as hostage negotiators.
    - e. Special reaction teams should be trained, equipped and prepared to respond to any major installation disruption.
    - f. Bomb scenes should be controlled similar to fires. The entire area should be secured and steps taken to evacuate personnel, organize search teams, assess damage and determine causes.
- 2-2. Hostage negotiations. a. An increasing number of criminal and terrorist incidents produce hostages to gain demands. Installation commanders should carefully select negotiators when these events occur.
- b. There is no formula that guarantees success; however, time tested methods indicate negotiators:
- (1) Must be a volunteer wearing civilian clothes.

- (2) Demonstrate empathy without becoming emotionally involved.
- (3) Have an ability to role play.
- (4) Be persuasive.
- (5) Have an ability to accept tension between conflicting views while maintaining perspective.
- (6) Possess moral courage and integrity.
- (7) Be a good listener.
- (8) Be patient.
- (9) Should not be decision makers.
- (10) If required, possess certain language skills and/or background which would lend insight into the terrorist, criminal, or mentally ill psyche.

(11) Be knowledgeable in the psychology of aggressive human behavior.

c. Negotiations with terrorists often involve matters of legal significance both during and subsequent to the negotiations. SIAs must be consulted in planning for and reacting to terrorist demands.

d. All negotiations must focus on the safety of hostages, the public, the security reaction forces and the apprehension of the subjects, in that order.

e. Every effort must be made to buy time and to prolong negotiations. Creating delays in a hostage barricade incident is desirable. It permits the hostages time to interact with the subjects while facilitating the decision making process. Disruptions in correctional institutions may be the one exception to this rule.

f. Rules of engagement and priorities for use of force should be reviewed and understood by all personnel (AR 190-28).

g. All participating personnel must be kept informed of plans and developments.

h. If, during the course of negotiations the hostages are harmed, it can be assumed that the safety of other hostages is in jeopardy. Plans to assault must remain a viable alternative when other options have failed.

i. The prospect of a mobile hostage situation cannot be dismissed; hence, thorough coordination with local, city, county, and state officials to facilitate movement, continued security, and jurisdictional responsibility must be considered in advance.

j. Negotiation means the willingness to establish dialogue to arrive at a settlement; it does not imply yielding to demands. Food, drink, personal comforts, transportation and freedom may be items that are negotiable trade offs; however, every concession should be tied to gaining something in return (e.g., the release of sick, disabled, or elderly hostages). Providing transportation may have the advantage of releasing hostages; however, it must be weighed against the disadvantage of providing mobility. Neither additional weapons nor munitions will be given a terrorist. Police officers should not be exchanged for hostages because they present a threat to the subjects. Exchange of any hostage is often dangerous and has psychological disadvantages.

2-3. Other planning considerations. a. Installations/activities confronted with hostage incidents must determine whether the hostage takers are criminals, political terrorists, or mentally ill. The latter category is the most unpredictable. Psychiatrists and psychologists

should be consulted for advice and assistance in dealing with the mentally disturbed.

b. It must be noted that hostages not only fear their captors, but the police response as well. Hence, a well balanced, disciplined approach is reassuring to the hostages and best serves the public interest.

c. Released hostages will be debriefed at the earliest practicable time.

d. Subject to the restrictions described in paragraph 1-5j, above, intelligence collection on the background of the hostage takers will be intensified during the event.

e. Maintaining current data on the progress of the confrontation, records of conversation, observation reports, journals and radio logs is recommended.

f. Strategies to be employed may vary depending on the abductor(s) involved; however, the following general rules apply:

- (1) Keep the hostage taker talking as long as possible.
- (2) Avoid accepting deadlines.
- (3) Be certain the hostage taker understands the negotiator does not make major decisions.
- (4) Negotiators should have the ability to make minor rewards.
- (5) Negotiators should also have the ability to withhold rewards (e.g., denial of food, water, electrical power, access to news media).

g. Strategy for criminally-oriented abductor:

- (1) Strong display of police/security force presence.

- (2) Clearly state limits of your cooperation.
- (3) Keep calm maintain eye/voice contact, be business-like.
- (4) Avoid setting time limits unless they can be met.
- (5) Look for face saving means the criminal can release hostages and surrender.

h. Strategy for the mentally disturbed abductor:

- (1) Maintain a low police profile.
- (2) Listen to the subject; allow him to vent frustrations.
- (3) Attempt to gain empathy by "playing back what he/she has said."
- (4) Stay with subject's topic; show genuine concern.
- (5) Never argue.
- (6) Give the individual time.
- (7) Suggest solutions in terms of the problem as he/she described it.
- (8) Constantly evaluate progress.

i. Strategy versus the terrorist/revolutionary abductor:

- (1) Demonstrate no visible police presence.
- (2) Remain emotionally detached.
- (3) Argue only according to plan.
- (4) Listen to the abductor's arguments. Look for points of agreement and common ground for compromise.

(5) Do not dismiss impossible demands; rather, offer reasonable alternatives.

(6) If dealing with a group, try to identify the one who wields the most influence over the others.



(7) Do not attempt to answer hypothetical questions. Keep discussion on the reality of the situation.

(8) Attempt to depoliticize the situation.

j. Assault strategy. While it is difficult to describe in detail how an assault should be mounted once a decision is made to forcibly free victims, general guidance is as follows:

(1) Maximize the element of surprise by using diversionary tactics (e.g., an explosion in opposite direction of assaulting force, the sudden presence of an armored car, the use of sirens.)

(2) Use of smoke, CS and concussion grenades in conjunction with the attack.

(3) Maximize noise and light. This tends to disorient the defender.

(4) Use only selected, well armed, protected and trained personnel.

(5) Plan alternative attack entries. Once assault is launched it must be forceful and swift. Qualified personnel may be required to blow down doors.

(6) Fit the caliber of weapon to the task and threat.

(7) Rehearse the assault in advance until timing is precise and predictable.

2-4. Public Affairs. a. Because publicity is a principal terrorist objective, the Public Affairs Office (PAO) plays a key role in the counter-terrorist program. The PAO must be included in all planning and operational activities relating to terrorism and other major installation disruptions.

b. The PAO provides an improved basis for effective cooperative efforts during a crisis through periodic command level news media conferences or use of other similar approaches. In this regard, the PAO can serve the critical function of rumor control to allay unwarranted apprehension and fear.

c. Should terrorists demand media coverage, the PAO should be prepared to react effectively and in a manner that facilitates the counter-terrorist plan.

d. The PAO should ensure that media personnel receive an accurate, current account of the terrorist event without interfering with ongoing operations. News releases at all levels of command must be consistent.

## APPENDIX A

### REFERENCES

DODD 2000.12 Protection of DOD Personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts

AR 15-15 DA Physical Security Review Board

AR 50-5 Nuclear Surety

AR 50-6 Chemical Surety Program

AR 190-10 Security of Government Officials

AR 190-11 Physical Security of Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives

AR 190-12 Military Police Working Dogs

AR 190-13 The Army Physical Security Program

AR 190-14 Carrying of Firearms

AR 190-18 Physical Security of US Army Museums

AR 190-22 Search, Seizure and Disposition of Property

AR 190-28 Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties

AR 190-31 Department of the Army Crime Prevention Program

AR 190-40 Serious Incident Report

AR 190-49 Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives In Transit

AR 190-50 Physical Security for Storage of Controlled Medical Substances and other Medically Sensitive Items

AR 210-10 Administration

AR 380-5 Department of the Army Supplement to DOD 5200.1-R (DODISPR)

AR 381-12 Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations (SAEDA)

AR 380-13 Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations

AR 415-22 Protection of Petroleum Installations and Related Facilities

AR 500-1 Aircraft Piracy Emergencies

AR 500-50 Civil Disturbances

FM 19-15 Civil Disturbances

FM 19-30 Physical Security

FM 19-10 Military Police Operations

DA Civil Disturbance Plan - Garden Plot

DOD C-2000.12-H Handbook for Protection of Department of Defense Personnel  
Abroad Against Terrorist Acts

## APPENDIX B

### ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN COMBATING TERRORISM

#### B-1. References.

- a. DOD Directive 3025.12, Employment of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances.
- b. DOD Executive Agent Memorandum, Employment of Military Resources to Assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Event of Terrorist Incidents, 30 Jul 73.
- c. AR 500-1, Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources - Aircraft Piracy Emergencies, 6 Oct 72.
- d. AR 500-50, Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources - Civil Disturbances, 21 Apr 72
- e. DA Civil Disturbance Plan - Garden Plot.

B-2. Purpose. To provide Department of Defense (DOD) assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in combating acts of terrorism in the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and United States possessions and territories.

B-3. Definitions. Terrorist incident (a form of civil disturbance) is defined as a distinct criminal act committed or threatened to be committed by a group or single individual in order to advance a political objective, and greatly endangers safety or property. This definition does not include aircraft piracy emergencies which are governed by the provisions of Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 29 June 1972, subject: Support of Civil Authorities in Airplane Hijacking Emergencies, and AR 500-1. Reference a, above, defines assistance to the FBI in combating terrorism as a civil disturbance matter, for which the Secretary of the Army is the DOD Executive Agent.

B-4. Policy. a. The President has directed Federal departments and agencies to cooperate in an attempt to thwart terrorist incidents, and the FBI has been given overall jurisdictional responsibility at the scene of a terrorist incident wherever it occurs, including military installations. Department of Defense components are authorized as described below to respond to certain reasonable requests of the FBI for military resources for use in combating acts of terrorism. Assistance may include requests for materiel, facilities and technical personnel acting in an advisory capacity. Military personnel may not be used in a law enforcement role outside a military installation without Presidential authorization. If the President approves, troops may be made available for missions designated by the FBI pursuant to its responsibility for overall direction of operations, but actual command and operational control of the troops will remain with the military.

b. Department of Defense resources may be provided only upon request of the Director, FBI, or the senior FBI official present at the scene of a terrorist incident. In those cases where it is difficult to determine whether a particular incident falls in the category of terrorist activity, commanders are authorized to accept the judgment of the FBI official making the request if it is supported by the available facts.

c. When FBI requests for DOD resources are not based on an actual or imminent threat or do not arise directly from an ongoing terrorist incident, (such as requests for training support or long term loans), the requestor should be advised to forward the request through FBI and Department of Justice (DOJ) channels for submission by DOJ to the Secretary of the Army.

B-5. Procedures. a. In order to respond to those requests described in paragraph B-4, above, the loan procedures and policies as prescribed in Annex K (Loan of DOD Military Resources) of the Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan apply except as modified below:

(1) Requests for Group Two and Three resources may be granted by secretaries of the military departments, commanders in chief of unified and specified commands outside the continental United States or commanders of military installations or organizations who have been delegated such authority by the appropriate service secretary or commander in chief.

(2) The Secretary of the Army has delegated authority to approve requests indicated in paragraph B-5a(1), above, to Army commanders in the chain of command down to and including installation commanders. The Secretary of the Navy has delegated authority to approve such request to Naval district commandants. The Secretary of the Air Force has delegated authority to approve such requests to commanders in the chain of command down to and including base commanders. Directors of Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Communications Agency, Defense Mapping Agency) may delegate authority to approve such loans down to installation/activity commanders.

(3) Requests for equipment which involve technical/operating personnel, excluding fire fighting and explosive ordnance disposal, will be processed as a Group One resource by all DOD components. These requests must be approved by the DOD Executive Agent, and should be forwarded by the most expeditious means available to Chief, Army Operations Center (AOC), HQDA, Washington, DC 20310, for processing.

(4) If requested Group Two and Three resources are not available on the installation, the request will be referred to other DOD facilities in the areas and to the next higher echelon in the chain of command, and provided from the source which assures the most expeditious delivery.

b. In the event of a terrorist incident on a military installation, commanders will notify the nearest FBI field office and continue to restore law and order in accordance with appropriate service regulations and directives.

B-6. Funding. a. All DOD assistance provided to the FBI under the provisions of this Appendix will be on a reimbursable or reclaimable basis as appropriate in accordance with the Economy Act, 31 USC 686.

b. Costing procedures. Reimbursement will be limited to incremental costs, which are those costs which would not have been incurred in the absence of a terrorist incident. Standard pricing will be used to the maximum extent possible. Costs for use of aircraft will be in accordance with established DOD costs per flying hour schedules. Accessorial and administrative costs will be in accordance with established service regulations. Installations/activities providing support will accumulate costs for each incident from the time the first action is taken to provide resources until such resources are withdrawn and forward a report of costs as indicated in paragraph B-7c, below.

B-7. Reporting. a. General. All support provided under the provisions of this Appendix will be reported telephonically to AUTOVON

851-1800 indicating actions taken as soon as possible. If for any reason a request cannot be satisfied locally or if the requirement involves a Group One resource, the AOC, HQDA, will be advised at once.



b. The format for reporting all support provided is contained in Appendix 1 (Request and Report Format to Annex K (Loan of DOD Military Resources) of the Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan.

c. The supporting activity will forward a report of costs to the DOD Executive Agent using the basic format in Appendix 11 (Report of Civil Disturbance Operations Costs) to Annex J (Reports) of the Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan.

## APPENDIX C

### CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM

C-1. General. The political overtones of most terrorist acts focus a great deal of attention on the event that can involve the military community and US Government at every level. Complete coordination and cooperation, in coping with these events, must occur at every level to ensure proper response and solidarity. Hence, a steady flow of accurate, timely information is an absolute necessity.

C-2. Crisis management structure. a. The Army Operations Center (AOC) is manned 24 hours a day monitoring and passing routine traffic to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the major Army commands (MACOMs). The AOC is capable of lateral communications with other service components.

b. The MACOMs maintain an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) that serve the same purpose as the AOC for Department of the Army.

c. At installation level there are varying forms of EOC often maintained in a standby, on-call status. All Army installations should designate an EOC area with standby communications to be activated for 24-hour operation in the event of a major ongoing incident requiring communication with higher levels of command (see paragraph 1-7).

d. The basic network mentioned in paragraphs C-2 a-c, above, will form the nucleus for an expanded crisis management command and control structure.

C-3. Procedures. a. Ongoing hostage incidents involving demands for ransom or having political implications will be reported to the Army Operations Center by the most expeditious means and as defined in paragraph 1-7b of this regulation.

b. When it becomes apparent during such situations that the capabilities of the AOC will be exceeded, the permanent staff of the AOC will be augmented by selected personnel from Army Staff agencies.

c. Augmentation of the AOC may be accomplished in two stages. These are: The activation of a Crisis Response Cell (CRC), and the activation of a Crisis Management Team (CMT).

(1) The CRC is a small element composed of the AOC operations watch team, intelligence watch team, and the primary action officers from ODCSPER, ODCSOPS, ODCSLOG, OACSI and any other DA Staff agency directly concerned with the crisis. The division chief having primary staff responsibility for the situation will be designated Coordinator, CRC.

(2) The CMT will be activated when intensive management of the crisis becomes necessary as recommended by Coordinator, CRC.

d. The CMT is a team of flexible size and composition representing appropriate agencies of the Army Staff (ODCSOPS, ODCSPER, ODCSLOG, OACSI), selected major Army commands and support activities, and is tailored to meet requirements of a specific crisis. In a crisis which involves threats to the maintenance of law and order within the perimeters of Army installations, the ODCSPER makes the determination to activate the CMT in conjunction with the ODCSOPS. Representation on the CMT is dependent on the situation/crisis.

e. Functions of the CMT.

(1) Operate under the direction of the Army Staff agency directing the augmentation.

(2) Function as the DA operating staff for monitoring the crisis situation and implementing decisions of the command group.

(3) Serve as the HQDA point of contact for matters pertaining to the crisis situation.

(4) Operate in close coordination with and exchange appropriate operational information with higher, lateral, and subordinate operations centers concerning the crisis.

(5) Task DA Staff agencies and subordinate commands to provide information necessary to maintain a current status of requirements and respond to queries from the command group.

(6) Conduct briefings.

(7) Maintain operations and intelligence situation maps, the status of personnel and logistics, and pertinent information on the crisis situation.

(8) Publish situation reports and other reports as required.

(9) Prepare necessary operations orders and directives.

(10) Continue to maintain the journal, message synopsis book, and record of significant events begun by the AOC watch team, and establish such other records as are necessary to compile a complete account of the emergency operation.

## APPENDIX D

### CHECKLIST

- D-1. Respond to hostage incident with Threat Management Force (TMF). Keep the situation confined, contained, and cleared of disinterested personnel who might become involved.
- D-2. Summon required assistance and establish a location for the command post.
- D-3. Clear the entire line of fire completely around and outside the hostage incident.
- D-4. Establish a perimeter around the incident and cordon the area with necessary vehicles and personnel.
- D-5. Summon medical and engineer support personnel with appropriate equipment and vehicles.
- D-6. Interview people who have knowledge of the situation to establish:  
Number and identity of abductor(s) and weapons; number and identity of victims; personal, criminal, and medical histories of perpetrators and victims.
- D-7. Bring to the scene, but keep out of sight, the spouse, parents and siblings of the abductor, if possible, in order to gain further insight into the abductor's behavior and reasoning process.
- D-8. Have professional practitioners at the command post or available for consultation (psychologist, clergyman, lawyer, or probation/parole officer) who may have dealt with the hostagetaker.
- D-9. Deploy PAO to handle inquiries from the news media.
- D-10. Ensure that the lighting of the scene of action is adequate.
- D-11. Establish communication with the hostage-taker as soon as possible by closed-line telephone or provide him with a communications device.

- D-12. Attempt to obtain multi-views of the hostage's and abductor's location, behavior and movements.
- D-13. If possible, set up a listening system into the abductor's area of control.
- D-14. Establish who will communicate and negotiate with the abductor and make certain that the abductor knows with whom he is negotiating.
- D-15. Ensure that audio communication with the abductor is being maintained.
- D-16. Set no demands, other than agree to trade the release of the hostage for the abductor's safety.
- D-17. Accept no deadlines from the abductor.
- D-18. Obtain anything within reason the abductor requests, except ammunition and weapons.
- D-19. Establish appropriate liaison to provide food and beverages to the abductor and hostages.
- D-20. Establish with the perpetrator a manner by which food and beverages will be made available.
- D-21. Make certain that nourishment provided is ample and attractive, reflecting a concern for the abductor's physical condition.
- D-22. Do not introduce drugs into food or beverages.
- D-23. Avoid providing alcohol.
- D-24. Do not permit anyone to enter the barricaded area. Exceptions might include a doctor who is volunteering to treat injured or stricken individuals.

D-25. Ask to see the hostages so that an assessment of their well being and movement potential can be determined.

D-26. Do not show over-concern for the welfare of the hostages.

D-27. Be prepared to move in on the abductor if he/she begins to seriously harm the hostage, weighing the decision of the action against the likelihood that the abductor will proceed to kill the hostage.

D-28. Use deadly force only if you are convinced the perpetrator is prepared to kill the hostage, with no regard for his own life (AR 190-28).

D-29. Conduct, on a continuing basis, assessments on the abductor's willingness and ability to negotiate and his rationality.

D-30. Note the following indicators of the abductor's willingness and ability to negotiate: His/her continued participation in the negotiating process, lessening of demands, the uneventful passage of deadlines set by him/her and considerate treatment of the hostage.

D-31. Keep the abductor talking as long as possible.

D-32. Recognize that as long as the abductor is talking, the opportunity remains for a successful conclusion of the event.

D-33. Prepare for assault if there is reason to believe the abductor has become irrational and destructive.

D-34. Continue to do everything possible to consume time, in the expectation that the abductor will be worn down into agreement or be led to miscalculation on his/her part, which would facilitate his/her capture.

D-35. Settle with the abductor on his negotiable demands by convincing him to yield the hostage(s) for his own safety during surrender.

D-36. Agree to arrange a meeting with media personnel if the abductor insists on it and it will bring the individual to yield the hostage and surrender.

D-37. Introduce to the abductor the idea of meeting with the media.

D-38. If the abductor demands an escape vehicle and will release some or all of the hostages in return, the advantage immediately swings to the authorities even though the event becomes mobile. The likelihood is very great that additional opportunities will develop to recover hostages alive.

D-39. Equip the escape vehicle provided to the abductor with electronic tracking devices and mark the rooftop.

D-40. The release of any individuals from your custody is not usually negotiable. Negotiators when pressured will indicate that this decision is beyond local authorities to decide.

D-41. Conduct advance coordination with host country or appropriate Federal and state officials in the event the jurisdiction of the incident changes.

D-42. If the negotiation moves to this level and the abductor is permitted to leave the country, seek to secure the release of additional hostages as a precondition for departure.

D-43. If the abductor is permitted to leave the country with hostage(s), it must be recognized that the likelihood is overwhelming that governments of any nation to which the abductor flees will release the hostage.





**END**