

Manual of Policies and Procedures



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National Sheriffs' Association



COURT SECURITY

A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures



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


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FOREWORD

With the exception of certain "notorious" criminal trials in our recent history, court security as we know it today is a product of the past decade. The sharp rise in acts of violence in the courts, used as a means of expressing dissent, has caused us to reevaluate our methods of safeguarding the judicial process. Attacks on the courts have ranged from minor disturbances and physical assaults to senseless acts of murder.

Many sheriffs, bailiffs, marshals, and others charged with court security were not fully prepared to meet this challenge. It was, after all, a new threat and little formal preparation had been made to counter it. Emergency measures were initiated with full support of the courts in places where incidents had occurred. But many sheriffs and judges have again become somewhat complacent, since they have not directly experienced violence in their courts. Regardless of past experience, there is no assurance that violence will not happen in your court — the potential is there.

Violence is not limited to our larger urban areas. Incidents have occurred in such diverse locations as Virginia, Washington, Maryland, and South Dakota. No area has the right to believe it is immune to violence by virtue of geographic location. All law enforcement officers who are responsible for protection of the judicial process ought to implement basic practi-

cal procedures to provide a reasonable level of security for courts in their jurisdictions.

A recent National Sheriffs' Association's Annual Informative Conference included a panel presentation by federal, state, and county officials responsible for court security. Out of this discussion came the realization that there was no single document suitable for general use as a guide for practical court security procedures. To fill this void, the Association, with the support of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, undertook a year-long study of court security problems with the objective of preparing this manual. The National Sheriffs' Association is proud to have taken the lead in this field.

I am confident sheriffs and court security officers will find this manual a useful compendium of a broad spectrum of court security planning topics, brought together for the first time in a single volume. The manual presents viable courses of action and is intended to stimulate the thinking of imaginative security planners when developing their own solutions to localized problems.

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In court security, the emphasis is on prevention, containment, and control—all directed towards the protection of life and property and the preservation of the judicial process. Sheriffs are often responsible for planning, implementing, and administering security in their jurisdictions' courts. To do this, sheriffs need an awareness of potential threats and methods to cope with the diverse incidents affecting courts today. They need to develop plans to meet these problems.

This manual provides the principal elements of court security planning. It discusses current problems and tells how to develop a security program and prepare security procedures and bailiffs' manuals. It describes routine and special occurrences and how to deal with them, physical security procedures and surveys, equipment and its procurement, personnel and training, and the security implications in remodeling and building courthouses.

This manual will be sent to every county in the United States, as well as to each state court administrator. Sheriffs' departments range considerably in size, and their ability to carry out court security varies accordingly. Preparing guidelines that can be used by such a diverse group presents a challenge which the authors believe has been successfully met. The innovative security planner, whether sheriff or court-appointed officer, will find much in this manual to adapt in developing a complete security plan. (Throughout this manual "sheriff" and "security planner" are used interchangeably. The sheriff may be the planner, administrator or manager, and security officer at the same time.)

Funds and personnel limitations required the research for this project to be limited to those areas reporting many court security incidents or those where the potential for incidents was great. Thus, many examples throughout this manual are from California. Other states could have provided equally valid examples.

The authors are grateful to those who offered assistance and encouragement in the course of the study, including sheriffs

and their staffs, court-appointed officers, judges, prosecutors, and court administrators interviewed during the project. The authors also wish to thank the following persons:

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Project Director

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

At one time, court security was usually considered only during high-risk or controversial trials. However, in the last 10 years or so, court security has become a daily concern of many law enforcement officers.

Increased court violence has been brought to public attention by a few sensational court incidents, such as bombings, kidnappings, demonstrations, and assaults—all part of increasingly violent behavior throughout society. However, most law enforcement officers in charge of court security recognize the need to prevent not only these isolated, usually spontaneous events, but also daily incidents that can hamper the administration of justice. Such incidents include emotional outbursts in the courtroom, destruction or theft of court records, and prisoner escape attempts.

WHO CAN USE THIS BOOK

This manual offers guidelines to help the officers in charge of court security plan for both daily problems and rare, sensational events. Those officers usually are sheriffs, but could be court-appointed or other law enforcement personnel, whose departments may range from one- or two-man offices to large metropolitan organizations with hundreds of officers.

Other court officials with security concerns, such as judges and court administrators, will also find this manual useful. With such a diverse audience, the guidelines and recommendations in this manual cannot be all inclusive. Instead, the suggestions here are meant to raise issues to be considered in current security plans and to offer possible ways to deal with those issues.

HOW TO USE THIS BOOK

This book was written to provide solutions to existing and possible security problems. To use this book as a preventive security aid, the security planner should read it entirely. However, it can also be used as a continuous reference source. For example, if a jurisdiction is planning to build a new courthouse, chapter 7 should be read for guidelines and sources of additional information.

The topics covered in this book are closely related. Many chapters cover the same feature from different viewpoints. Certain topics (e.g., records and evidence, jury deliberation rooms, and judge's chambers) are discussed in chapter 3 (procedural aspects) and chapter 7 (architectural considerations).

The table of contents and index should be used to locate material on individual topics.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

Before writing this manual, researchers from the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA) collected information from both existing court security literature and field interviews. The literature review identified some of the security practices and procedures now used and produced a list of major court security incidents. That list was used to determine the sites visited for field interviews.

THE LITERATURE

The literature review showed a lack of material dealing comprehensively with court security. Most publications made only brief comments on the subject, usually from a narrow perspective. The materials listed in the annotated bibliography to this manual deal with the subject in greatest detail.

Literature on court security is also relatively recent; no sources published before 1970 were found. Most of the works deal with technology, procedures, and architecture as solutions to court security problems. However, very little literature offers guidelines for assessing security problems, weighing various solutions, and deciding on the best solution under specific circumstances (such as judicial and fiscal limitations). None of the publications reviewed could be used by law enforcement planners as a single comprehensive guide to security planning; this manual should help fill that gap.

INTERVIEW FINDINGS

NSA visited 22 locations for the field interviews. The sites were chosen based on their reported incidents, geographical spread, and jurisdiction size. At each location, NSA interviewed the sheriff's staff (or other agency in charge of court security), judges, prosecutors, and the court administrator. The purpose of the survey was to gather information on the following:

- Existing physical and procedural security programs and problems;
- Special circumstances or community pressures likely to cause or aid an incident;
- Views on the possibility of violence;
- Additional security measures taken after an incident occurred;

- The use of armed security officers in the courtroom;
- General information, such as the age of the courthouse, number of security personnel, training in and shared responsibility for court security.

Following is a summary of major conclusions by project staff, based on the interviews. Later chapters discuss these findings in detail.

Violence in Civil Courts

About half the court incidents occurring today are in civil and domestic courts. The level of security awareness and the precautions taken in these courts are often less than in criminal courts. Throughout the following chapters, civil courts are discussed in terms of the problems likely to occur and guidelines for improving security.

Impact of Serious Incidents on Security Procedures

In its interviews, NSA found intense security awareness usually only right after a serious incident, when the immediate response generally was more security procedures, funding, and manpower. In many cases, these measures were either reduced or stopped completely after a few months, and the preincident level of security was resumed. Such reactions are difficult to change, but this manual tries to make the security planner aware of daily preventive measures that can be taken.

Use of Existing Security Measures

A major problem in some courthouses was that security procedures and equipment were often adequate but not maintained or used effectively. For example, magnetometers (metal detectors) were understaffed, alarms were assumed to be false and thus not responded to, closed-circuit television (CCTV) was not monitored, and expensive equipment was inoperable because of poor maintenance. In many jurisdictions, security could be greatly improved by reallocating personnel and/or strictly enforcing procedures already in effect.

Courthouse Construction

A serious problem during courthouse construction is the frequent lack of input from security personnel, often resulting in costly changes. This manual discusses that problem and suggests ways for a security planner to be involved in courthouse construction, renovation, and remodeling.

Training

Every sheriff interviewed during this project noted the need for well-trained bailiffs and security officers. A well-trained staff able to anticipate and respond to different situations is one of the best deterrents to court incidents; thus, some formal court security training should be available for every law enforcement agency responsible for court security, as described later.

HIGHLIGHTS OF MANUAL

This manual discusses court security in terms of policy and procedures, physical security (including equipment and architecture), and personnel. Key issues in some of these areas are listed in appendix A for easy reference, and many are discussed in more detail in later chapters. The issues and answers were developed by project staff. Major topics and recommendations for each section are as follows.

Chapter 2 discusses court security today, including (1) the relationship of security to the criminal justice system, (2) threats to court processes, (3) measures taken to counter threats, and (4) responsibility for court security. This chapter makes these major points:

1. "Court security" means the procedures, technology, and architectural features needed to ensure both the safety of people and property within the courthouse and nearby grounds and the integrity of the judicial process.

2. Security is needed daily, not just during special trials. However, it must not be so visible that it becomes repressive.

3. Effective court security helps preserve constitutional rights, although court security staff also must consider legal guidelines and restrictions before carrying out security measures.

4. One person should be responsible for overall courthouse security.

Chapter 3, the most comprehensive part of the manual, gives the security planner information about developing policy and preparing two key publications—the security procedures and bailiffs' manuals. These specific guidelines and recommendations are included in the chapter:

1. Prepare written court security policy statements.

2. Search the courtroom and related areas both before and after court convenes.

3. Provide adequate visitor control through directories, floor plans, receptionists, and special search operations, if necessary.

4. Prepare a contingency plan for hostage situations and special plans for high-risk trials. Also develop procedures for a fire, bomb threat, natural disaster, civil disorder, power or utility failure, or any other situation requiring a general building evacuation.

5. Provide for postevent review of the response to any special situations.

6. To ensure security for judges, guard their parking spaces and assign parking by number rather than name, escort judges through public corridors, provide an alarm button in their chambers, and search chambers daily.

7. Provide private witness waiting areas if possible.

8. Give bailiffs detailed written instructions for courtroom procedures and for handling juries both under normal circumstances and when sequestered.

9. Transport incustody defendants between jail and court by vehicle if a secure tunnel or bridge is not available.

10. When incustody defendants are expected to present a high security risk in the courtroom, suggest additional security measures for the judge's approval.

11. Be aware of critical times when incidents may be expected—e.g., (1) at the appearance of an antagonistic witness or codefendant; (2) during prisoner movement between various points; (3) at arraignment and sentencing; (4) when commitment is ordered in juvenile court; (5) when a verdict is rendered in a domestic or small claims court; and (6) when unruly spectators are present.

The focus of chapter 4 is the physical security survey and how to conduct it. These are some of the chapter's recommendations:

1. The survey should include all building spaces, including both public and restricted or controlled areas, regardless of their tenants.

2. A survey should be conducted by a team rather than by one person.

3. The survey team should meet with the department heads of tenant agencies before the survey to answer questions and ask for cooperation, and after the survey to review with them the draft findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

4. Managers should draw up detailed plans to carry out all recommendations. Followup inspections are needed to find out if actions have begun.

Chapter 5 discusses equipment that may be needed in a court building and standards for choosing the right items, including ways to improve procurement procedures. These are some of the topics covered:

1. A suggested method to estimate and compare equipment and personnel costs;

2. Standards for selecting equipment, including need, suitability, performance, reliability, obsolescence, availability, design limitations, compatibility, cost, manpower impact, space needs, installation, and maintenance;

3. Guidelines to prepare detailed equipment design or performance specifications;

4. Special provisions to include in the invitation for bid (IFB).

Chapter 6 discusses personnel selection, assignment, use, and training, including these topics:

1. Guidelines for developing job descriptions and standards for court security personnel selection and assignment;

2. Factors influencing training such as available funds, training resources, and space; the number of people who can be taken away from their assignments temporarily; and state training requirements.

3. Steps a manager should take in developing a new training program, including selection standards for training officers.

Chapter 7 takes up architectural matters that will help security officers make recommendations to planners and become involved in the planning phase as early as possible. A few key recommendations follow:

1. Choose an architect with court design experience.

2. Set up separate entrances and circulation routes for incustody defendants, judges and court staff, and the public.


3. Locate public offices on lower floors in multistory buildings, near public entrances, and away from courtrooms to reduce noise and unnecessary traffic.

4. Carefully design the prisoner reception area. Ideally, it should be a sally port, or passageway, with the entrance not visible to the public and opening directly into a secure or restricted passage.

5. Improve courtroom security through design features or duress alarms for the judge, clerk, or bailiff to summon help.

6. Design temporary holding areas to include provisions for separating prisoners, an observation port on the door of the holding room, privacy screens for toilet facilities, and any other special features needed. One or more cells can be wired for sound and CCTV for use when an unruly defendant is removed from the court.

Security can be maintained in most court buildings by taking a few basic precautions. This manual is designed to make court security planners aware of the potential for disruption and solutions available to deal with the problem. Even if no incidents have occurred, every jurisdiction should carry out adequate planning.



Chapter 2

COURT SECURITY

This chapter describes court security in terms of the following:

1. The relationship of security to the criminal justice system;
2. Threats to court processes;
3. Measures taken to counter the threats;
4. Responsibility for court security.

The chapter discusses general relationships between court security and the criminal justice system and some legal restrictions and guidelines on certain security measures. The chapter analyzes threats in terms of types of incidents, who is most likely to cause court violence, how trial participants view threats, and when and where threats are likely to occur. Measures taken to counter these threats include architecture, equipment, and procedural innovations. Responsibility for court security is discussed in terms of key courthouse areas and the role and relationships of various court personnel.

The chapter gives background information on court security and sets the stage for the following chapters, which deal with these aspects of court security planning: procedural guidelines, physical security factors, equipment selection and purchase, personnel and training requirements, and architectural considerations.

BACKGROUND

COURT SECURITY DEFINED

Depending upon context, environment, and purpose, "security" has many meanings. A sample of definitions follows:

- Security is an intangible quality which can only be measured by its lack.¹
- Security is the absence of security failures in the face of security threats.²
- Security means preventing or detecting a dangerous incident and limiting the damage it causes.³
- Security provides either active or passive means to

help protect and preserve an environment in which activities are not disrupted.⁴

- Security is a process of setting up barriers that combine to increase detection and apprehension, thus making criminal or violent acts too dangerous or costly.⁵

In this manual, the term *court security* includes the procedures, technology, and architectural features needed to ensure (1) the safety of people and property within the courthouse and nearby grounds and (2) the integrity of the judicial process. Thus, court security is an effort to prevent or control such problems as verbal abuse or insult, disorderly conduct, physical violence, demonstrations, theft, fire, bomb threats, sabotage, hostage situations, prisoner escapes, kidnappings, and assassination.

The key word here is "prevention." Throughout this manual, court security is discussed in terms of what can be done to prevent incidents or hazards. Prevention involves procedures, adequate and sufficient equipment, checking building conditions and equipment, and designing a building to prevent theft and disorder within the courthouse. All policy and procedure should aim to reduce the opportunity for loss or threat of loss. As a minimum, they should reduce the amount of any loss suffered.

NEED FOR COURT SECURITY

The need for adequate court security is not new. Celebrated cases and notorious defendants did not begin with campus radicals, the black power movement, or the Manson family; court incidents go back at least to the trial of British soldiers after the Boston Massacre. However, modern court security is a relatively new activity, caused by a dramatic increase in court-related violence in the past 10 years.

Increased court violence has been brought to public attention by a few sensational court incidents such as bombings, kidnappings, demonstrations, and assaults. This violence has been a part of increasingly violent behavior throughout society — behavior often directed at social change. The courts, as highly visible symbols of authority, have become logical targets.

Security is needed in daily operations as well as celebrated trials. Dramatic, widely publicized trials and violent acts have obscured the more numerous problems related to emotional outbursts, destruction or theft of court documents and records, prisoner escapes, fire, and general disruptions of the judicial process.

¹ F. Michael Wong, *Space Management and the Courts: Design Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1973), p. 83.

² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Richard S. Post and Arthur A. Kingsbury, *Security Administration: An Introduction* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970), p. 14.

⁵ Allan Greenberg, *Courthouse Design: A Handbook for Judges and Court Administrators* (Chicago: American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, 1975), p. 53.

SECURITY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Courts protect the freedom and property of all citizens by punishing those who violate the law. Yet this process must preserve the civil liberties of all persons, for the alternative to a fair and effective legal system is either mob rule or tyranny. As Supreme Court Justice William Brennan has written:

History has known the breakdown of lawful penal authority — the feud, the vendetta, and the terror of penalties meted out by mobs and roving bands of vigilantes. It has known, too, the perversion of that authority. In some societies the penal arm of the state has reached individual men through secret denunciation followed by summary punishment. In others the solemn power of condemnation has been confided to the caprice of tyrants. Down the corridors of history have echoed the cries of innocent men convicted by other irrational or arbitrary procedures.⁶

If the courts are to preserve constitutional rights, effective security is essential. Court disturbances threaten an orderly system of justice by interrupting the trial process and making it difficult for a defendant to obtain a fair trial. Disturbances also undermine public confidence in and respect for the legal process and may interfere with significant reform in the judicial system. In almost every way, disruption is inconsistent with the rule of law in a democratic society.⁷

Courtroom incidents have a profound impact on the administration of justice and, conversely, failings in the criminal justice system may stimulate disruptive behavior. Two presidential commissions have expressed shock at the lack of both fairness and efficiency in the lower criminal courts, particularly in urban centers. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice made the following comments in 1967, and they are also true today:

The commission . . . has seen cramped and noisy courtrooms, undignified and perfunctory procedures, and badly trained personnel. It has seen dedicated people who are frustrated by huge caseloads, by the lack of opportunity to examine cases carefully, and by the impossibility of devising constructive solutions to the problems of offenders. It has seen assembly-line justice.⁸

The following year, another national commission reported as follows:

The belief is pervasive among ghetto residents that lower courts in our urban communities dispense "assembly-line" justice; that from arrest to sentencing, the poor and uneducated are denied equal justice with the affluent; that procedures such as bail and fines have been perverted to perpetuate class inequities. . . . Too often the courts have operated to aggravate rather than relieve the tensions that ignite and fire disorders.⁹

The security measures needed to deal with disruptions and threats in modern courts should be viewed in terms of the negative influence they may have upon judicial proceedings. Security should be present, but not so visible that it becomes repressive. It is important to balance the safety of all trial participants against the need for fair and neutral proceedings.

LEGAL RESTRICTIONS

Court rulings and state laws have set guidelines for court security measures allowed in certain circumstances. This discussion illustrates only a few of these guidelines, including methods to deal with unruly defendants and visitor control.

In 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a judge has three alternatives for dealing with unruly defendants in the courtroom. The decision stated the following:

No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant . . . (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.¹⁰

Many state laws and rules in the early 1970s were based on this ruling and dealt with different aspects of unruly court behavior. New York State amended its criminal procedure law to permit the trial of a defendant removed from the court for disorderly or disruptive conduct.¹¹ Nevada and Minnesota passed similar laws, and Massachusetts made disrupting court proceedings a criminal offense.

Legal precedent for searching all persons entering the courtroom and requiring them to register for identification purposes was set in 1934, when the Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that these measures did not amount to excluding the public. The court wrote as follows:

In the instant case it does not appear that the public was excluded from the courtroom; but every person who desired to enter the courthouse and pass the cordon of soldiers was required to have a pass signed by either the judge or the Brigadier General in command of the militia, or both. It does not appear that any one was excluded who, after search and inquiry, was found to be a person of lawabiding intentions. We think the right to a public trial was not denied the defendant in this case.¹²

Many other court rulings deal with the security measures that can be used during trial proceedings. A few examples are listed here.

1. Additional guards may be ordered for courtroom security or to prevent disruption.
 - People v. Burwell, 44 Cal. 2d 18, 14 (1955)
 - People v. Santo, 43 Cal. 2d 331 (1954)
 - People v. Stabler, 202 Cal. App. 2d 862, 864 (1962)
 - People v. Harris, 98 Cal. App. 2d 662 (1950)
2. Restraints may be ordered to prevent physical violence or disruption.
 - People v. Kimball, 5 Cal. 2d 609 (1936)
 - People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165 (1871)
 - People v. Burnett, 251 Cal. App. 2d 651 (1967)
 - California Penal Code, section 688
3. The court may order the defendant to be committed "at any time after his appearance for trial."
 - California Penal Code, section 1129
 - People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94 (1969)
4. A court may control the use of its facilities during protests or demonstrations "to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."
 - Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)

THREATS TO COURT PROCESSES

Potential threats to court processes must be identified; then measures can be taken to reduce or eliminate those threats. This section identifies types of threats that may occur and then discusses the people likely to create them, how trial participants see threats and danger, and where threats are likely to

⁶ Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347-348 (1970).

⁷ Norman Dorsen and Leon Friedman, *Disorder in the Courts* (New York, New York: Pantheon, 1973), p. 17.

⁸ President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 128.

⁹ *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam, 1968), p. 337.

¹⁰ Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-344 (1970).

¹¹ New York Crime Pro Law, 260.20, 340.50 (McKinney 1972), chapter 789, 1971, laws of New York.

¹² Pierpont v. State, 195 N.E. 264, 267-268 (1934).

take place. Much of this information is based on field interviews conducted by the NSA project staff.

TYPES OF THREATS OR INCIDENTS

Many types of threats are likely to involve courthouses and trial participants. An NSA analysis of more than 200 court security incidents¹³ showed that the most frequent ones were, in the following order:

- Escape or escape attempt;
- Disorderly conduct;
- Physical assault with a firearm;
- Physical assault with no weapon used;
- Bomb threat;
- Bomb explosion;
- Threat other than with bomb;
- Demonstration;
- Suicide or suicide attempt;
- Hostage situation;
- Physical assault with weapon other than firearm;
- Theft;
- Fire.

Some of the incidents discovered in the NSA survey were these:

1. One criminal court defendant leaped to the bench and hit the judge on the head and shoulders with his shoe.
2. Another defendant kicked his court-appointed lawyer in the face and shoulders, knocking him to the floor.
3. A man involved in a civil lawsuit suddenly pulled out a gun and began shooting, killing a lawyer and wounding the judge and a witness.
4. A violent confrontation occurred between demonstrators protesting a trial and police outside a courthouse.
5. A fire in a court building destroyed several thousand court reporter tapes of trial testimony.
6. A judge was killed by a letter bomb sent through the mail.
7. A bomb exploded in the probation department of a courthouse.

This list illustrates the diversity of problems facing today's security planner.

INDIVIDUALS LIKELY TO CAUSE THREATS

Most court disturbances and disruptions are caused by three kinds of people: the criminal, the disturbed or demented person, and the so-called "political activist." Persons in all three categories may play various roles in a trial, such as defendant, witness, and friend or relative of either the defendant or the victim. NSA field interviews identified the following trial participants as most likely to cause a security incident: first, defendants and second, their friends or relatives. However, some incidents were caused by people with no known relationship to the judicial process. These individuals were usually responsible for phony bomb threats or for actually hiding bombs in court buildings.

A strong threat to court security occurs with very emotional defendants who are disturbed about serious criminal charges

facing them, sometimes unhappy with their lawyers, or concerned that the proceedings are somehow "stacked" against them. Factors that might contribute to their unruly behavior include revocation of bail, prosecution tactics, the judge's attitude, the presence of friends or relatives in court, and a long prison term or death sentence.

IDEAS ABOUT THREATS AND DANGER

The NSA asked court personnel about the most dangerous people during a trial and those who were in the most danger. The response indicated that defendants or spectators were most likely to cause an incident, although different types of trials and situations generated different threats. In gang-related cases, gang members might cause the greatest threat, while in other trials the victims or their families or friends might be the ones to cause an incident. In "political" trials,¹⁴ where a cause or controversy is involved, spectators might present a greater threat than during normal criminal trials. Court personnel also believed that so-called "revolutionaries" pose greater threats than professional criminals because their actions are more unpredictable. Juveniles present similar unpredictable behavior.

Judges, lawyers, and bailiffs were considered the trial participants most in danger, based on the fact that the judge is the most visible person in the courtroom, and the bailiff or defense attorney is physically closest to the defendant. However, some court personnel believed that danger could only be determined by individual circumstances. For example, in a civil case the participant most in danger would probably be the winning litigant or attorney. During an armed escape attempt, the bailiff or anyone in the way would be the main target, and in a hostage situation the judge would be the most likely victim.

DANGEROUS AREAS

Threats can occur anywhere in or near the courthouse, which is divided into four areas in this discussion: the courtroom, nonpublic areas near the courtroom, public areas in the courthouse, and public areas outside the building.

The Courtroom

Possible security problems in the courtroom include escapes or escape attempts, disruptions, and assaults. Escapes are a critical problem during trials, and attempts are especially likely at sentencing time. In highly publicized trials, or when defendants or their followers have a "cause" to make known, verbal disturbances may occur. Then too, defendants may try to assault trial participants because they are displeased with the trial or want to show disrespect for the proceedings.

In addition to these general threats, there are special security risks in the four courts discussed next.

Courts of First Appearance. The courtroom where a person first appears for a hearing, arraignment, or other action is a very active area, and the large number of people in or near this courtroom often presents a security problem. Sheriffs or court officers, complainants, police officers, relatives and friends of defendants, attorneys, prison guards, spectators, and defendants all may be in the courtroom at one time.

A common problem during arraignment is the defendant's emotional state. Prisoners may wish to say goodbye to their families, turn over valuables for safekeeping, or give last-

¹³ Incidents were defined to include any event, either in the courthouse or on the nearby grounds, which had a disruptive effect on the judicial process, whether or not that effect was intended. Also included were events which occurred at the home of a trial participant or during transport to court.

¹⁴ See the discussion of criminal trials later in this chapter.

minute instructions on personal matters. Yet defendants are being rushed into custody and must clear the bench area for the next case. Only rarely does a court have the facilities and personnel to handle these "last-chance" meetings. However, if those meetings are denied or cut short, the result may be a disturbance.¹⁵

Criminal Trial Courts. Compared to an arraignment court, a criminal trial court is calmer, even for felony cases. However, there are certain security problems here, too. Well-known trials usually have a large number of spectators, and crowd control may be a problem. Moreover, press coverage, defense and prosecution tactics, and background issues often heighten emotions. Finally, many courtrooms simply were not designed for trials with several defendants. Courtroom space becomes crowded when many attorneys and court officers are present, and security risks increase.

A particular type of criminal trial is the so-called "political" trial. Although the offense for which the defendant is being tried is actually criminal, the trial may have political overtones. Security problems during these trials may first arise when defendants try to complain about the indictments. If they believe the government is prosecuting for political purposes, they will complain publicly in the courtroom.

Often, such defendants assume a defiant attitude throughout their trials, and such behavior usually attracts media attention. This gives the defendants an opportunity to convey a "political" message to a wide audience. The more disruptions, the more attention the trial will attract, and the more people will hear the message.

Civil Courts. Functions common to the civil courts include appellate matters, probate, small claims, landlord and tenant actions, civil disputes between individuals and businesses, divorces, and claims against government agencies. In civil, as compared to criminal, matters a major security difference is that people generally are not detained; therefore, guards, prisoners, and weapons usually are not in the courtroom. The greatest security threat during civil proceedings usually stems from the intense emotions that may be involved, as in divorce, child custody, eviction, and similar situations.

Juvenile Courts. Juveniles in the court process present a special problem, mainly because of their unpredictable behavior. Thus, security officers must be constantly alert. Incidents in these courts may be irrational or involve a sudden angry outburst against parents or others, and an escape attempt may occur. These problems are discussed more fully in chapter 3.

Nonpublic Areas Near the Courtroom

These areas include judges' chambers, jury deliberation rooms, attorney-client conference rooms, witness waiting rooms, and temporary holding areas for incustody defendants. The primary security concern here should be to prevent easy access by the general public. Measures are needed to protect judges, isolate juries and witnesses from those who may threaten them, and prevent escapes from attorney-client conference rooms and temporary holding areas, as well as assaults among hostile groups in the holding areas.

Public Areas in the Courthouse

Public areas in the courthouse are vulnerable to certain security problems, such as fire and demonstrations. Further, some areas (e.g., public rest rooms, busy offices, hallways) may be used to hide explosives, and public hallways used as witness waiting areas outside courtrooms may be the scene of intimidation or assaults on witnesses.

Certain offices within the court building, such as the clerk of the court or the county treasurer, have unique security needs. The clerk's office is responsible for the safety and security of all court records, documents, case files, and, usually, trial exhibits. These items are vulnerable to fire, theft, and vandalism. Moreover, offices that collect fees, such as the clerk's office and the county treasurer, require special security precautions to prevent theft of the money.

Public Areas Outside the Building

The security needs of public areas outside the court building should not be neglected. For example, the sidewalks and grounds of court buildings are possible sites of demonstrations, and threats or assaults may occur in parking areas.

MAJOR SECURITY MEASURES TO DATE

Traditionally, the courts have taken security measures only during certain high-risk trials. An example in 1933 involved the escape from an Ohio jail of John Dillinger, who was helped by three other men. During the escape, the sheriff was killed. The three accomplices were eventually caught and tried, and at the trial, the National Guard surrounded the courthouse, allowing entry only to individuals with a pass signed by the judge or the National Guard commander.¹⁶ All persons admitted to the courthouse were searched and required to register for identification purposes. Current high-risk trials have very similar provisions for visitor control.

During the past 10 years, security has become a daily concern in many court operations and is being considered in court building and renovation, equipment purchase, and general procedures. In designing courthouses and courtrooms, planners have included key security features to protect judges, special corridors and holding areas for incustody defendants, and courtrooms with both the necessary decorum and security measures to protect all trial participants.

Equipment is another daily concern in the courts. A later chapter in this manual discusses alarms, both simple and sophisticated; metal detectors to keep weapons out of the courtroom; closed-circuit television (CCTV); miniature communications equipment; and various types of weapons.

Close coordination now exists among judges, other court officials, and security departments. In some cases, judges have formed security committees to consider actions to improve security. These committees focus on defendants' rights, court decorum, how various security measures will affect the trial process, and how appropriate those measures are to meet possible threats. In some cases, the committees even propose specific security measures. In any event, the committees give security officers the chance to solicit the understanding and cooperation of judges in carrying out effective security plans.

Contingency planning has become the rule rather than the exception in recent court security operations. For example, high-risk trial plans include detailed procedures and identify

¹⁵ Wong, p. 85.

¹⁶ See *Pierpont v. State*, discussed earlier in this chapter under Legal Restrictions.

who is responsible for each. There are special plans for bomb threats, plans to prevent weapons from being brought into court, and plans for such events as natural disasters, medical emergencies, and building evacuations.

Many jurisdictions have found it necessary to develop mutual aid agreements with neighboring communities to meet equipment or manpower needs in certain emergencies. For example, most court security units do not have personnel skilled in bomb disposal, so they may seek help from a nearby sheriff's or police department, or a military installation.

A major change in recent years is the upgrading of court security personnel capabilities. In some cases, this has meant new performance requirements and selection standards for court assignment, including such factors as physical ability, skill in handling violent persons, ability to cope with emergency situations, a psychological profile to determine those best suited for court work, and knowledge of the security officer's role in the trial process.

SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES

Responsibility for security in the courtroom and courthouse varies considerably throughout the country. In some cases, no one is specifically assigned either task, though some state laws assign the responsibility for one or both to the sheriff. In other jurisdictions, sheriffs have assumed responsibility because they are the most logical choices and the best prepared people available. In still other cases, court security seems to be the responsibility of everyone, with no clear authority given.

Even when overall responsibility is given to one person, others have authority for specific areas and operations. Figure 2-1 presents a typical situation found in larger jurisdictions.

When discussed in this manual, court security refers to the entire courthouse and its grounds. This chapter now looks at security responsibility in the four "danger" areas mentioned before. More than one official may be concerned about each area, since each has different problems. If responsibility is shared, coordination is needed between officials responsible for various types of security. However, the following analysis suggests that overall responsibility could effectively be given to a single official.

COURTROOM

In the courtroom, responsibility should be clearly defined, indicating who provides security both during a trial and when court is not in session. During a trial, a deputy sheriff or court-appointed officer usually is present as a bailiff to maintain order and deal with any violent incidents that occur. In addition, a deputy sheriff is usually responsible for the security of incustody defendants and for taking convicted defendants into custody.

When the court is not in session, responsibility for securing the room should be given to the department in charge of trial security. After hours, courtroom security may be provided by private guards if they are used for evening building security.

NONPUBLIC AREAS NEAR THE COURTROOM

These areas include the judges' chambers, jury deliberation rooms, witness waiting rooms, and restricted passageways. The sheriff is usually responsible for security in these areas. However, the chambers may be a personal concern of the judge, whose interests must be reflected in security planning.

**Figure 2-1
TYPICAL AREAS OF AUTHORITY FOR COURT SECURITY
IN
LARGE JURISDICTIONS**

Official	Area of Authority
Sheriff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Courtroom security and order • Transport of incustody defendants within the courthouse • Public area security • Nonpublic area security
Court administrator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building structure changes • Supervision of court officers • Purchase of equipment
Judge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Courtroom procedures • Structural changes in chambers • Equipment used in chambers • Changes in passageways, gates, and parking facilities
County administrator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security of space for tenants other than the court • Public area security • Contract negotiations and performance standards for private guards
City police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law enforcement and protection for sidewalks and areas next to courthouse

PUBLIC AREAS IN THE COURTHOUSE

These areas include public hallways, rest rooms, elevators, stairs, and county offices. Here security is sometimes given to the sheriff, who incorporates procedures to protect public areas in an overall building security plan. Or responsibility may go to a county administrator, who usually works closely with the sheriff.

As noted earlier in this chapter, public hallways outside courtrooms present a special security problem. In many courthouses, witnesses wait there to be called, and their security should be assured. The sheriff is the most logical official to be responsible for this area.

County offices such as the treasurer, clerk of the court, and assessor are often located in courthouses. Some of these offices are potential crime targets because money is collected there; others are targets for people determined to disrupt the trial process. Often, too little attention is given to the security needs of these offices. County administrators usually are responsible for security, but in some cases they are uninformed about possible threats or the courses of action available. In other cases, the administrator hires private guards or works closely with the sheriff in developing security plans for these offices.

After hours, the security of these areas must be maintained. Methods currently used include contracting with private guard services or making the sheriff or county public works department responsible. Private guards may offer a cost-effective solution, but the sheriff should participate in preparing the work statement and help in contract negotiations. In addition, the sheriff should clear any guards chosen by the private company before they are assigned.

PUBLIC AREAS OUTSIDE THE BUILDING

These are areas next to the building, such as sidewalks, plazas, courtyards, and parking areas. In many cases, the city police department handles security here, but sometimes the sheriff has responsibility. In either case, there should be close coordination between the two agencies. For example, in case of a public demonstration, the city police will often be able to provide manpower and equipment to contain the demonstration, while the sheriff will be concerned with preventing the demonstrators from entering the courthouse.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that one person should be responsible for overall courthouse security. This

person should provide protection and security for all the areas discussed here and should ensure the necessary coordination with other agencies, such as the city police department. As a professional security specialist, the sheriff is the logical choice for this responsibility. Thus, the sheriff should have the right professional perspective, training, and resources to prepare and execute sound security plans and make sure all requirements are met. Frequently, this responsibility is assigned by state law; otherwise, the presiding judge should make the assignment in a written order.

Court security means more than a modern building with the latest equipment. It means an understanding of the role court security plays in the criminal justice system, an evaluation of the threats to that system, and plans for an effective response to those threats.

Chapter 3

SECURITY PLANNING AND PROCEDURES

This chapter will give the security planner general information about developing a security planning effort as part of a systems approach to security, and will recommend subjects for both security procedures and bailiffs' manuals. These two manuals will provide clear-cut, step-by-step instructions for court security personnel during both emergency and day-to-day operations.

SYSTEMS APPROACH TO COURT SECURITY PLANNING

When starting or revising a court security program, it makes sense to use what planners call the "systems approach." This means taking several separate but interrelated parts and looking at the way they interact. In the security field, this kind of systematic analysis is easy; just follow the steps described in this section. First, some important terms will be defined.

Policies are general statements that guide people as they make decisions at various levels of an organization.¹ Policies are broad, comprehensive guidelines, while *procedures* are the specific methods to carry out those guidelines. The general goal of a comprehensive court security policy should be to establish appropriate protection for court staff and facilities, the general public, and the judicial process as a whole.

The planning process will result in specific procedures to carry out court security policy. Sheriffs or court-appointed officers responsible for court security must allocate limited resources to the areas with the greatest need. To do this successfully, they need to identify and rank security needs by a thorough assessment of threats and vulnerable areas in the courthouse.

The development of a security program can be broken down into five steps:²

1. Determine both short-term objectives and long-range goals.
2. List security problems to be remedied.
3. Consider possible solutions to those problems, including operational, technological, and architectural remedies.
4. Test and analyze alternative solutions, then decide which one to try.
5. Prepare written policy and procedures statements.

¹ H.S. Ursic and L.E. Pagano, *Security Management Systems* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1974), p. 194.

² Richard S. Post and Arthur A. Kingsbury, *Security Administration: An Introduction*, 3rd ed. (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1977), p. 666.

GOALS, PROBLEMS, AND SOLUTIONS

To follow these steps, the first thing needed is a meeting of such key people as the sheriff, court security officer, presiding judge, and court administrator. At this meeting, the program's overall goal and its objectives can be determined. For example, the goal may be to protect life, property, and the judicial process. The objectives may be to increase security for judges and jurors or to improve emergency response time. Any specific policies and procedures developed later must agree with those goals and objectives.

The second step is to identify and set priorities for the security problems within a building. This step should be started at the meeting and followed by a comprehensive survey of the courthouse, its occupants, and their duties.

Finally, this meeting will contribute to a positive security attitude among those running the court and will help gain cooperation with the security measures eventually adopted.

An important aspect of the systems concept is choosing among alternative solutions to problems. In general, there are three types of solutions to court security problems: operational (through procedures and manpower); technological (such as installing an alarm system or using metal detectors); and architectural (new construction or renovation). The method finally chosen might involve only one category or it could be a combination of two or more.

Choosing the proper mix of manpower, materials, architecture, and procedures for a court facility is not always easy. For example, even in the most active court building, it is not necessary to make more than one courtroom suitable for high-risk trials because of limited demand and the high cost involved. One West Coast court spent more than \$700,000 to improve security for a single trial; obviously, most jurisdictions cannot afford such expenditures. However, significant improvements are possible through low-cost measures such as changing procedures, improving the quality of hardware, locking unnecessary doors, securing windows, and installing other devices that might be thought of after a comprehensive security study.

Many security measures overlap one another as good choices. For example, when judges and incustody defendants use the same restricted corridor, the result is a high security risk that can be prevented by somehow separating the two groups. An architectural solution to this problem would mean two separate corridors, while a procedural method would prevent prisoners from being in the corridor while it is used by a judge. The systems approach means looking at the limitations


in each alternative before deciding on a plan. For instance, the architectural solution might not work because of the way the building is constructed, while the procedural method might require more manpower. The eventual choice also will depend on such factors as cost and judges' attitudes toward the idea, as explained later.

The following general guidelines can help the security planner decide on solutions:³

1. Space planning mainly deters or prevents dangerous situations, though this planning also helps court people detect security threats and can limit the damage from any incidents that occur.
2. Technology mainly helps court personnel detect security threats. The mere presence of technical equipment also can prevent incidents and help limit any damage.
3. Operational security measures, such as adding more security personnel, can deter and detect potential security problems, and can contain and control any situations that may occur.

KEY PLANNING FACTORS

The security program is subject to both internal and external influences that affect both policies and the procedures to carry out those policies. Figure 3-1 shows various influences on the security program, and this section describes some major ones.



Community Pressures and Attitudes of Judges

The attitude of local citizens is important in many jurisdictions. A rural midwestern sheriff explained the effect of public attitude on security measures this way:

In our community, where almost everyone knows one another by name, there is a limit on the restrictions that will be acceptable. The courthouse and courtroom have been traditional meeting places and always have been maintained in a fully accessible manner to all.

Situations like this require much skill on the part of the courts and law enforcement officials to "sell" legitimate and

reasonable changes in the way courts are run. Another critical factor is the attitude of judges to security plans. Any plan, regardless of its merits, is useless if judges do not accept the idea. Thus, the security planner should work closely with the court and argue effectively for any new procedures that may meet resistance.

Legal and Budget Restrictions

Legal authorities should review draft security plans to make sure those plans comply with federal and state statutes. A primary legal concern is to respect constitutionally guaranteed civil rights. Next, a cost analysis is needed to determine which alternative security method is most economical. Cost enters a security analysis in several ways. First, how much money will a proposed security measure involve over the expected lifetime of the building? Second, how much do alternative measures cost? Finally, will expenses be offset by personnel reductions? All of these figures must be calculated for the expected lifetime of the building.

Getting more public funding for security might be difficult because the public cannot see the results as easily as they can when highways, schools, parks, or other public facilities are built. When nothing visible or dramatic happens, security seems adequate, and legislative bodies traditionally are reluctant to spend funds on areas with little or no visibility.

Another major limitation, building design, is related to cost. When built 50 or more years ago, most court buildings lacked security features. Now many of these structures are unsuitable for remodeling or renovation to meet security needs, or the cost involved would be too great.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

To carry out the security program, written policy statements and procedures are necessary. A written policy is important because it (1) reduces the possibility of misinterpretation and error; (2) is a useful teaching tool;⁵ and (3) gives a framework for detailed procedures, thus providing a procedures checklist. Policy statements can be located for easy reference in both the procedures and bailiffs' manuals described later. For example, a manual section on handling in custody defendants should have an introductory policy statement followed by a set of instructions.

It is often necessary to obtain court orders to carry out the program in specific situations, as shown in figure 3-2. The sheriff or security officer should keep a list of these and any other appropriate situations and should be sure that the necessary court orders are obtained, distributed to key personnel, and prominently posted for public examination.

SECURITY PROCEDURES MANUAL

The sheriff or court security officer should be responsible for maintaining the integrity of the court, the safety of building occupants, and the security of the building. To help achieve these objectives, all security personnel should have a security procedures manual that gives comprehensive, written instructions. The NSA study has found that many jurisdictions, especially smaller ones, do not have such documents. Other areas have manuals that need updating. Although most court security departments have written instructions on certain aspects of their operation, such as handling bomb threats, few

³ F. Michael Wong, *Space Management and the Courts: Design Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1973), p. 89.

⁴ Adapted from Post and Kingsbury, 3rd ed., p. 667.

⁵ Post and Kingsbury, 3rd ed., p. 666.

Figure 3-2
CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS REQUIRING COURT ORDERS

1. Setting up a search operation to screen members of the public who seek admittance to the courtroom. This operation may include use of a metal detector or a physical search; it may require excluding people who refuse to submit to an authorized search;
2. Restricting public access to the court building;
3. Limiting the number of spectators and media people allowed in the courtroom;
4. Forbidding cameras and other recording devices in the courtroom or court building;
5. Using restraints in the courtroom on dangerous prisoners or incustody witnesses;
6. Using cameras to record unruly behavior in the courtroom;
7. Taking extra precautions for witness security;
8. Forbidding discussion of trial-related matters by security personnel (the "gag order");
9. Sequestering the jury;
10. Denying jury access to the media;
11. Taking extraordinary security measures for multidefendant or high-risk trials.

have comprehensive procedures for security throughout the courthouse. Therefore, each jurisdiction should prepare a security procedures manual. This section presents general guidelines on how to write one and suggests topics to be included.

Since the completed manual will contain much sensitive information, strict control of all copies is important. In the wrong hands, this document provides information that can be used to defeat security measures.

There are many advantages to having a well-designed security manual, and figure 3-3 lists several important purposes that a written manual serves.

Figure 3-3
ADVANTAGES OF WRITTEN SECURITY PROCEDURES MANUAL

1. Reduces response time when dealing with security threats and emergencies and ensures early control of such situations;
2. Increases the likelihood of preventing loss of life or injury because security personnel know what to do under stress situations;
3. Pinpoints responsibility and helps prevent the need for repetitive judgments on routine matters;
4. Encourages and promotes cooperation by defining work relationships clearly and also explains the work procedure, thereby reducing confusion and doubt;
5. Helps instruct supervisors and employees in their routine tasks, thus reducing lost time when a person moves to a new position or a new person is brought in;
6. Helps a supervisor play a more positive role and improve staff operations by becoming more fully involved in how the work is done;
7. Helps prepare people for changes that will occur within the department by presenting the plan in writing before it goes into effect.

DESIGN

The following recommendations are useful in developing a manual.⁶

- *Use a looseleaf binder.* The binder has advantages over a permanently bound volume. The user can insert revisions or additions by substituting revised pages and discarding obsolete ones.
- *Identify types of instructions and group by subject.* Make it clear whether the policy or procedure being discussed is permanent or temporary. Permanent instructions have a continuing reference value and stay in the manual. Temporary instructions will be used a short time and destroyed, to help reduce the volume of material in the manual. Finally, grouping all instructions on a given subject in one place eliminates lengthy searching and reduces reliance on cross-referencing.
- *Number by a prearranged system.* After choosing the manual subjects, assign numbers to them. The system used must be flexible enough to cover the various types of procedures, to distinguish between continuing instructions on the same subject, and to allow expansion of any one subject. Numbering each set of instructions will make a subject easier to locate, simplify control, establish a uniform sequence in the binder, and provide an automatic grouping by subject. The scheme selected should allow revisions as they become necessary. Figure 3-4 shows six methods of classification.⁷

Note that a device for identifying paragraphs is important to ensure accurate location. This can be done by numbering paragraphs and/or by indenting subordinate paragraphs.

Figure 3-4
SEGMENTS OF SEVERAL CLASSIFICATION TABLES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PERSONNEL	100	A	I	A	Pers	1
Employment	110	Aa	I-1	A/1	Pers-1	1.1
recruitment	111	AaA	I-11	A/11	Pers-1-1	1.1.1
appointment	112	AaB	I-12	A/12	Pers-1-2	1.1.2
promotion	113	AaC	I-13	A/13	Pers-1-3	1.1.3
demotion	114	AaD	I-14	A/14	Pers-1-4	1.1.4
separation	115	AaE	I-15	A/15	Pers-1-5	1.1.5
Training	120	Ab	I-2	A/2	Pers-2	1.2

- *Make the format standard.* A standard format is needed because usually more than one person will be preparing the manual. This format will help readers find information and understand the relationships of different sections of the manual.

The heading for the first page of each set of procedures should include the agency or division issuing the instructions, a subject classification number, the effective date, the subject, and any approvals needed. (For example, some procedures may require a court order.) The policy statement should be separated from and followed by the procedures to implement it. A suggested paragraph sequence would be: purpose (which includes the policy statement), procedures, and a list of attachments (such as forms).

- *Use reference aids.* Aids that make the manual easier to use include cross-references, alphabetical subject index, numerical index, table of contents, tabbed divider sheets,

⁶ See General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, Office of Records Management, *Communicating Policy and Procedure, Records Management Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: General Services Administration, 1967), for useful suggestions on preparing a manual.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

and copies of any forms used. The size of the manual should determine which, if any, of these aids is appropriate.

- *Draft the manual.* The responsibility for writing procedures should be assigned to individuals with expertise in the subject matter.

- *Date the instructions.* Date each list of instructions to show when the list takes effect and to ensure that all manuals are current.

- *Schedule periodic review and revision.* As conditions change, parts of the manual will need to be revised, so schedule a comprehensive review every year or two.

- *Avoid the following when revising the manual:*

- Unneeded supplements or those with separate paragraph numbers. Instead, make revisions or additions to the original instructions.

- Pen and ink changes. Avoid this because of the cost in time and the possibility for error or misunderstanding.

- Paste-in changes. Often these are torn off and lost, so it is better to issue completely revised pages.

- *Establish master files.* A background file of all instructions provides a continuous record of policies and procedures and an easy reference to cancelled or revised guidelines. Also keep a complete set of current procedures.

CONTENTS

The subjects listed in figure 3-5 and discussed in this section are suggested for inclusion in the procedures manual. These recommendations are not all-inclusive; instead, they are meant to stimulate thinking on particular subjects and to point out issues and areas of concern that the security planner might otherwise neglect. The planner can decide which topics to include and how much detail is necessary. Individual circumstances will dictate whether some topics are more appropriate in a separate bailiffs' manual.⁸

Figure 3-5
PROPOSED OUTLINE FOR
SECURITY PROCEDURES MANUAL

1. General information
 - a. Key personnel and agencies
 - b. Security staff organization and post assignments
2. Regular security procedures
 - a. Records and evidence
 - b. Judges
 - c. Witnesses and their waiting areas
 - d. Normal jury procedures
 - e. Sequestered juries
 - f. Handling in custody defendants
 - g. Special courtroom considerations (arraignment and sentencing, domestic court, unruly spectators, searches of litigants and defendants on bond, etc.)
3. Special operations plans
 - a. Search of courtroom and related spaces
 - b. Visitor control
4. Hostage situations
5. High-risk trials
6. Emergency procedures (fire, bomb, disaster, etc.)
7. Postevent review

⁸ A bailiff is defined in this book as a court officer who guards the jurors, maintains order in the courtroom, keeps custody of prisoners, announces the opening and closing of the court, calls witnesses and other persons to appear in court, and attends to other matters under the court's direction.

General Information

Key Personnel and Agencies. A list of emergency contacts should include names, titles, and 24-hour telephone numbers. For easy reference, the following subheadings are recommended:

- Sheriff's department
- Police services
- Federal agencies
- Fire department
- Medical services: ambulance, hospital, doctors
- Judges
- Court administrator
- Clerk of the court
- Building maintenance engineers
- Utility emergency services: gas, power, water, phone
- Other courthouse tenants

Prepare a directory of building occupants, arranged either alphabetically or by agency and function. Schematic floor plans should show all occupants and include all openings such as doors, windows, and service or access panels, with fire exits clearly identified. If possible, show in the drawing all utility control points, shutoff valves, elevator control panels, heating and air-conditioning systems, and firehose and extinguisher locations. If this is not possible, attach a description of these locations to each floor plan.

Security Staff Organization and Post Assignments. Show the organization of the security detail, and list names and telephone numbers where these officers can be reached at all times.

If security personnel are assigned to specific posts on a routine basis, draw up an instruction sheet for each post giving the following information: assignment area, duties, responsibilities, normal business hours, condition of doors and windows (i.e., locked, unlocked, opened, or closed), lights on or off in specific locations during and after normal business hours, and any special information for each post.

Regular Security Procedures

The next sections on the security procedures manual describe the more normal, nonemergency court activities and offer some day-to-day guidelines on the safety of judges, juries, witnesses, defendants, and records. Note that these sections occasionally repeat some of the material in earlier parts of this chapter. Obviously, some recommendations are appropriate under both emergency and regular situations.

Also note that the following sections often stress the bailiff's role. Some jurisdictions may prefer to incorporate this kind of detail in a bailiff's manual rather than in the security procedures manual.

Records and Evidence. The clerk of the court has primary responsibility for all material entered as evidence in court proceedings. This office is also responsible for the safety and security of all court records and related documents. However, the sheriff or court security officer can offer valuable professional advice on ways to improve overall security. Chapter 7 discusses some proposed structural measures if records and evidence storage areas are to be built or remodeled.

Several measures can ensure evidence security in jurisdictions that lack special facilities for this purpose.

- Reinforce a small closet in or near the courtroom. Provide a push-button combination lock. The clerk should change the combination periodically and keep it a secret.

- Use a large office safe.
- For more sensitive items such as drugs and large sums of money, make arrangements with a local bank for use of the vault or a safety deposit box.
- Arrange to use space in the county treasurer's safe or vault.

Access to any storage area should be strictly controlled.

Records should be protected from tampering, theft, and loss or damage by fire. The clerk's office needs a system of administrative controls when making files available to attorneys or the general public. After-hours storage should be in controlled access rooms that can be locked and have fire protection devices such as automatic sprinklers and alarms.

Judges. Protection for judges is usually minimal except in the case of an overt threat or when the possibility of danger exists. Everyday practices for judges' security include guarding their parking spaces; assigning their parking by number, not name; escorting them through public corridors; providing an alarm button in their chambers; and searching those chambers daily for contraband.

Crank or threatening letters received by judges should always be forwarded to the sheriff. Searches of chambers should be done by bailiffs or judges' secretaries, who may be more familiar with the routine contents of the chambers and able to identify suspect items quickly. Visitors are usually identified and screened by bailiffs, clerks, or secretaries to ensure that they have legitimate business with the judges.

Judges are usually reluctant to have highly visible security measures instituted unless they are absolutely necessary. They fear that those measures might isolate them from the public and their constituency.

Higher levels of security for judges are discussed in the later section in this chapter on high-risk trials.

Witnesses and Their Waiting Areas. Threats to witnesses often occur in the hallways before entry into court. These threats can be eliminated by providing separate witness waiting rooms for prosecution and defense witnesses. Admittance to these areas should be strictly controlled and access should be denied to all except witnesses and court staff.

Attempts also are made to frighten witnesses while they testify. Examples include reports of spectators making throat-cutting gestures or similar threatening movements. The bailiff should report any such occurrences to the judge, who will usually order the persons removed or direct that they be arrested for prosecution.

More serious threats against witnesses or family members may require escort or bodyguard protection. If protection is required outside the courthouse, local law enforcement agencies may be called upon for assistance. Higher levels of security for witnesses are discussed later under high-risk trials.

Normal Jury Procedures. The conduct of bailiffs responsible for jury security is vitally important for the impartial administration of justice. The bailiff must have precise instructions for handling juries, whether those rules are based on the guidelines recommended here or on state code requirements. During the field visits for this project, a case was cited where the bailiff told a juror: "We don't arrest innocent people and bring them into court." This statement forced the judge to rule a mistrial and order another trial.

This section of the procedures manual should give precise instructions for routine handling of juries. Bailiff respon-

sibilities for sequestered jury security are discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.

Jury Orientation. On their first day of appearance, all prospective jurors should be given a general orientation. Ideally, this would be a brief lecture by a judge or bailiff. The orientation should outline what is expected of jurors and the responsibilities of the courts and bailiffs toward them. Points to emphasize include warnings not to converse with nonjurors about a trial, the possibility of sequestration, and general measures to ensure the jurors' security. Bailiffs' jobs will be much easier if they have the cooperation and understanding of the jurors.

Site Viewing. When the judge decides a jury should leave the courtroom to view the scene of the crime or immovable evidence, the jury is normally escorted by the bailiff or sheriff to the site, where a court-appointed person usually shows the jury the evidence. The escort officer is usually sworn (1) to allow no one to communicate with the jury, nor to do so himself, on any subject connected with the trial, and (2) to return the jurors to court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time. The site visit is a common occurrence in land condemnation cases, where it is necessary to separate jurors, lawyers, and appraisers.

Custody During Deliberation. When attorneys have made their final arguments and a case is concluded, the judge will instruct jurors, then place them in the bailiff's charge. The bailiff is under oath to keep the jury together day and night, if necessary, and to abide by the communications restrictions mentioned under *Site Viewing*. Sequestered jury care is discussed later in this chapter.

For the benefit of women jurors, a female bailiff, deputy, or matron should be assigned during both day and evening hours. Jurors sequestered for the night are under the same restrictions as during the day, but they can send messages to their families through the bailiff. Detailed notes should be given to the bailiff, who will relay the message by phone, keeping juror notes for the record.

Juror Illness. Bailiffs must know what to do when jurors become ill, especially when a juror may need to be hospitalized. Until the nature of the illness is known, it will be necessary to provide constant security for the juror, to make sure communications restrictions are maintained. If the illness happens while the court is hearing testimony and a quick recovery is expected, the judge may adjourn the trial until the juror returns. Otherwise, the judge may replace the ill juror with an alternate.

If a juror becomes ill during deliberation or while sequestered, the bailiff should notify the court immediately of any action taken. It is wise to have a list identifying doctors on call, an ambulance service, and nearby hospitals with emergency facilities. Medical personnel should be cautioned to limit their conversation with the juror to the medical problem at hand. Finally, the bailiff should prepare a report for the court describing any medical incidents involving jurors on a particular case.

Emergency Evacuation of Jurors From the Courtroom. Emergency evacuation during a court session should happen only on the judge's order. The bailiff is then responsible for moving the jurors to a predetermined place and assuring their safety. They will stay there until ordered to return to the court or to move to another location. During this time, the jury should be instructed not to discuss the case nor to speculate on why they were evacuated; the court will advise and

instruct them on this issue when they return. It may also be necessary to isolate the jury from media information about their trial during this time.

If an emergency arises while jurors are in the courtroom but court is not in session, or while they are in the deliberation room, the bailiff takes the same course of action as just described, consulting the judge first if possible. However, if the judge is not available, bailiffs should act on their own, notifying their superiors and the judge as soon as possible. If the jury is deliberating and has evidence in hand, the bailiff is usually responsible for the security of that evidence and any notes or ballots until those materials can be turned over to the clerk of the court.

Jury Deliberation Room. This room should directly adjoin the courtroom or be nearby and only accessible by a restricted passageway. The room should be soundproof to prevent eavesdropping on the deliberation. The area also should be carefully examined before use and kept locked at all times. Jurors are locked in for deliberation and may summon the bailiff at any time by means of a buzzer or knock on the door. All questions should be in writing to the judge, who may write a response or direct the jury to return to court for further information and/or instructions.

The bailiff should not communicate with jurors on any matters except to ask if they have reached a verdict. When the room is vacated, all notes and other materials used in deliberation should be removed and then safeguarded, destroyed, or treated according to other established procedures.

Sequestered Juries. Sequestering juries is costly because jurors must be protected 24 hours a day, since security risks are much higher than in ordinary trials. Extreme caution is needed so that improper procedures do not result in a mistrial or provide grounds for reversing a decision in an appeal. The following guidelines will help simplify sheriffs' and bailiffs' jobs.

Security Plans. Security plans and procedures for each trial should agree with existing court rules and should be presented to the presiding judge for approval. Deviations from the approved plans should be reported to the judge before they are carried out.

A supervisory bailiff should be responsible for the jury and for security personnel assigned to the bailiff. Such personnel should fully understand their duties and their relationships with jurors.

The court order for sequestration should discuss the conduct of jurors, plus appropriate restrictions and control measures (see appendix B for a sample order). Violations or suspected violations of the court order or any suspected attempt to influence a juror should be reported to the judge immediately and a written record made of the incident.

Personal Conduct of Bailiff. Bailiffs and security personnel should maintain a professional and courteous manner towards the jurors at all times. They should not discuss trial-related subjects nor allow others to do so, except by court order, and they should never express an opinion about the trial.

Access to Jurors. Access to juror's quarters should be given only to the security staff, those providing essential services, or other persons authorized by the court. A visitor's identity, purpose of visit, and time of arrival and departure should be recorded in a log. Written authorization for visits should be retained for the record, and entries should be made in the log for verbal authorizations.

Service personnel such as waiters and cleaning staff should be logged in and accompanied by a bailiff at all times while in the jurors' quarters. They should be told not to talk to jurors. It is also a good practice to find out if any of the service personnel are related to trial participants. Finally, jurors' laundry should be inspected by the bailiff before it is sent out and before being returned to the jurors.

Accommodations and Meals. Some sheriffs argue that arrangements for meals and quarters for sequestered juries should be their responsibility because sheriffs are most aware of security requirements. Others believe this is mainly an administrative function more properly performed by the trial clerk with some guidance from the sheriff. If sheriffs make these arrangements, they should select hotels, restaurants, and other accommodations fairly, impartially, and based solely on security considerations.

To maintain security and control, hotels are better than motels because the court can get a block of rooms on a single floor that is isolated from the general public. An upper floor in the building is best, to reduce the possibility of communications from outside sources. The following recommended guidelines should then be followed:

- Remove or disable television sets and radios in jurors' rooms.
- Control telephones so there are no unmonitored incoming or outgoing calls.
- Generally assign two persons to a room, with the sexes kept separate.
- If a private dining room is not available, use a spare room on the jury floor for meals. Escort jurors from the dining room to rest rooms.
- At the discretion of the court, jurors may have a limited number of cocktails in the evening — usually two — at their own expense and only if they are not returning to court or deliberations that evening. Bailiffs should never drink alcoholic beverages while on duty.
- Keep accurate financial records of meals, according to the court's standard procedures and payment policies.

Transporting Juries. During transportation to and from the courthouse, jurors are subject to possible physical harm and outside influences. If there is some reason to suspect an attempt on the jurors' physical well-being, an advance security force should scout the route and recommend detours or other tactics.

Precautions are needed to make sure the jurors do not see newspapers, posters, banners, and the like during the trip. Transport vehicles should be searched in advance for such materials, and jurors should not hear commercial radio broadcasts nor walk by newsstands or newspaper dispensers. It may even be necessary to cover vehicle windows with opaque material to keep jurors from accidentally seeing newspapers or similar materials.

Drivers should be told not to talk to jurors at all about the trial, and escort officers will need to prevent jurors from being interviewed during transport.

Emergency Evacuation From Sequestration Site. In case of fire, bomb threat, or any other emergency situation that might harm jurors, the bailiff should immediately evacuate them to a predetermined location. As mentioned before, jurors need not be informed of the reason for the move, only that it is necessary; they should be cautioned not to discuss the move or speculate as to the reason for it.

Whenever a jury is sequestered or retired for the night during deliberations, suitable transportation should be available on a standby basis in case an emergency arises.

Access to Media. Court orders should specify which types of media sequestered jurors may see and hear. If authorized, a television may be set up in a common lounge; however, the bailiff ought to monitor the set continually and turn off scheduled newscasts, bulletins, and captions. Programs the jurors watch should not have a theme similar to the case being tried. If possible, videotapes can be made to ensure that no unauthorized material is seen, and there should be a record of all programs viewed. The television set controls should be locked when not in use or when the room is unoccupied, and jurors may not have radio receivers or transmitters.

The court may approve newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and books for the jury's use, provided those materials are censored first and records are kept showing the items made available. Preferably two persons should review the publications beforehand, removing and filing any material about the trial or similar incidents.

Communications with Others. Occasionally the court may permit visits between jurors and family members on weekends or off-duty days. A record should be kept of all visitors, and a bailiff should be present to make sure there is no conversation on trial-related matters.

Only court-authorized telephone calls should be permitted. These calls should be dialed and monitored from the bailiff's room using special phones with monitoring features, which the telephone company usually can provide. Bailiffs should dial the numbers, identify themselves, warn the answering parties not to discuss the case, and advise both parties that the call is being monitored and will be terminated immediately if the warning is not heeded. Incoming calls should be handled simi-

larly, after they are directed to the bailiffs' stations. Bailiffs should keep logs of all incoming and outgoing calls.

All mail and packages should be given to the bailiff for examination and censoring before they go to the jurors. Likewise, outgoing mail should be censored before mailing. If jurors do not agree to this procedure in writing, their mail may be withheld until the end of the case, or as ordered by the court.

During a prolonged trial, the judge may permit recreational trips, attendance at religious services, shopping, or business meetings. If so, recreational areas should be secluded and adequately protected. Clergy should be advised in advance of a juror's attendance and asked not to mention the trial in the service. Business meetings should be conducted only under close and constant security. Generally, the bailiff should do all shopping for jurors, being sure to keep a written record of expenses and money received. If allowed to shop for themselves, jurors must be under close supervision.

The court may authorize barber or hairdresser services. If possible, this should be done in the juror's room and under close supervision, with service people advised not to discuss the trial. In a shop, the bailiff should be sure the juror has no access to newspapers or publications that have information about the trial.

Medical Services. It is wise to have a first aid kit available at the sequestration site. The court should be advised of the medications prescribed for jurors, possible medical problems, and medication that might be required. Otherwise, the medical procedures here are similar to those mentioned before under **Juror Illness.**

Records and Forms. Many materials are needed to document the care and safekeeping of a sequestered jury. Examples are listed in figure 3-6 and shown in appendix C, figures C-1 through C-11.

Figure 3-6 RECORDS AND FORMS FOR SEQUESTERED JURY*

1. **Personnel log** (figure C-1) — lists personnel assigned to each shift on a daily basis, showing date, time of arrival and departure, and any comments about personnel, such as temporary absences, illnesses, and days off.
2. **Sequestered jury register** (figure C-2) — records data about each juror such as name, address, phone number, name and other information about next of kin, and the room number of the juror's quarters. Jurors should be listed first, then the alternates.
3. **Transportation log** (figure C-3) — records any movement of jurors, showing dates, times, locations, names of drivers, and escorts.
4. **Telephone call log** (figure C-4) — lists every incoming and outgoing call, naming both juror and the other party, their relationship, the topic, date, time, and name of monitor.
5. **Visitor register** (figure C-5) — gives each visitor's name and relationship to the juror (also named), the date and time of the visit, and the monitor's name.
6. **Mail censorship consent form** (figure C-6) — is completed by all jurors who are authorized by the court to receive and send mail and who agree to the censorship involved. The form should be signed and witnessed. If a juror does not agree to the censorship, the form provides instructions for disposition of mail, packages, and other matter according to the juror's wishes.
7. **Incoming mail register** (figure C-7) — lists all mail received and censored before delivery to the juror.
8. **Outgoing mail register** (figure C-8) — lists juror's name, the addressee, name of censor, and date mailed.
9. **Newspaper and periodical register** (figure C-9) — records court-authorized materials by title, date of publication, number of copies provided, and the censor's name.
10. **Medication register** (figure C-10) — shows all prescription and other medication used by jurors and tells what supplies may be needed. Gives a juror's name, medication, the quantity on hand, name and address of the prescribing doctor, plus prescription number and pharmacy for refillable items.
11. **Incident report** (figure C-11) — describes any incidents that affect jurors, such as threats, attempts to harm them, or efforts to influence their decision. Bailiff prepares this report for both court and sheriff.

* All figures cited are in appendix C.

Handling Incustody Defendants. Incustody persons appearing in court generally fall into three categories: (1) defendants being tried or sentenced, (2) prisoners being tried for additional offenses committed while in prison, and (3) prisoners appearing as witnesses. People in custody think of escape at one time or another, and convicted felons serving lengthy sentences often are preoccupied with thoughts of escape.

An analysis of the custodial system shows that its weakest link — the most likely time for escape attempts — is when the prisoner is outside the jail. This means during transport from jail to courthouse, in the temporary holding area, and in the courtroom. During these times, the jail's trained custodial force is replaced by a limited number of transportation officers and bailiffs. The prisoner is usually guarded by only one bailiff, who is often occupied with many other trial-related duties.

Movement To and From Jail. If a secure tunnel or bridge is not available for prisoner movement between jail and court, a vehicle should be used — even for short distances. Movement by foot through public areas increases the risk of an escape attempt and also makes the security force and prisoner vulnerable to attack. All transport vehicles should be properly marked and should contain standard emergency equipment such as portable lights, fire extinguishers, first aid kits, tear gas dispensers, flares, and communications gear. Transport vehicles should be searched for contraband before loading the prisoner. High-risk trials may call for additional precautions, as discussed under that section of this chapter.

Prisoners should be placed in restraint devices before leaving jail; the devices should be removed in the temporary holding area. If such an area is not available, restraints should be removed immediately before the prisoners are taken into the courtroom and replaced immediately after they leave.

Weapons should not be worn by officers directly handling prisoners. They may be worn if more than one person is guarding the prisoner; however, the armed guard should always be in a position to avoid being overpowered and disarmed. A single officer should never be required to move more than one prisoner at a time.

Temporary Holding Areas. Temporary holding areas should be designed to confine defendants and reduce escape attempts but should not have features that violate an individual's constitutional rights. For instance, these areas should have separate facilities for juvenile and female prisoners, as well as space to provide various degrees of prisoner isolation and protection. Female deputies or matrons can be assigned to observe female prisoners and search them when necessary.

In the holding area, security personnel should search prisoners when they arrive from a custodial institution and before they are returned; prisoners are not to have any personal property. Moreover, there should be clear rules and instructions on prisoner monitoring and on dealing with escapes. Temporary holding areas should be examined daily for the soundness of walls, floors, doors, and windows, and for adequate ventilation.

Escape Attempts. A simple plan is needed to deal with escape attempts. Most attempts are spontaneous and triggered by apparent weaknesses in the security system; they usually happen in one of these four places while prisoners are away from jail:

1. During transit between jail and courthouse;
2. Moving through public hallways;

3. In the courtroom; or

4. In the temporary holding area.

Specific plans to deal with escapes depend almost exclusively on the physical layout and manpower resources of each court. Also, each location presents different problems and requires advance planning to reduce successful escapes. However, basic procedures can be developed, including the following:

- **Activate an alarm.** If the attempt is made in the courtroom, the clerk or judge should activate the alarm, since the bailiff will be in pursuit. In the holding and other secured areas and in public hallways, a police whistle can be used to alert other security personnel, who can join the pursuit or go to prearranged posts to secure doors and try to catch the prisoner.

- **Notify key people.** The clerk should notify the security officer in charge, who in turn should notify the sheriff. If the prisoner is not caught immediately, state and local police agencies should be given complete details, including a physical description. These agencies should have plans to establish roadblocks and surveillance of possible escape routes.

Fire and Bomb Threats. The sheriff's department should have a policy on handling incustody defendants in case of fires or bomb threats. Usually, the prisoners should not be removed from holding facilities unless an immediate threat exists. If removal is necessary, full restraints should be used and adequate personnel assigned. Deputies assigned to this duty should be vigilant for possible escape attempts, since the threat may be a hoax designed to aid an escape. Prisoners should be returned to the detention facility as soon as the area has been thoroughly searched.

Medical Treatment. A physician should be on call to provide medical aid to incustody defendants when necessary. Prisoners removed from holding cells for transportation to medical facilities should be under restraints, and transport officers will want to be alert to possible escape attempts.

Segregation of Hostile Groups of Prisoners. Bailiffs and security officers should be aware of possible serious problems that could develop between prisoners if hostile factions are not segregated in the holding areas and the courtroom. Examples include an informant appearing as a witness and members of hostile gangs appearing as defendants in the same case. Vigilance must be maintained in the courtroom, where witnesses may be the object of attack. Trials with several defendants also may involve problems among the defendants.

Prisoner movement should be planned so that hostile factions do not come into contact, even while passing in a corridor. Well-planned movements will reduce opportunities for threats or physical violence.

Appearance and Control in Court. The possibility of an attempt to escape from the courtroom should always influence the actions of bailiffs and security personnel. If there is reason to believe a prisoner will try to escape or resort to violence or unruly conduct, the bailiff should stay behind the prisoner to provide better control.

In cases where a prisoner or group of prisoners presents an unusual security risk, the judge should always be advised, and additional courtroom security measures can be suggested for the judge's approval. Permission is needed to keep the prisoner in restraints in the courtroom, and usually only unobtrusive restraints will be approved in jury trials. Some court-

rooms have dealt with this problem by providing special chairs at the defense table and the witness stand. (See chapter 7 for more on these chairs.)

Incustody defendants should not be allowed to carry personal property into the courtroom, although exceptions may be made for legal material pertaining to the case.

Policy on Restraint Devices. This policy should be set by the sheriff and uniformly applied to all prisoners. The policy should include minimum levels of restraint such as handcuffs, leg irons, and restraint belts or chains. Having a policy eliminates the need for each officer to make decisions in this area. However, individual judges must also be consulted because many have their own policies on restraints in their courtrooms. Finally, deviation from established policy should be only by court order or with approval of a competent authority. A written record of any deviations should give complete details.

Disruptive Conduct. As noted in chapter 2, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued guidelines for handling unruly criminal defendants in the courtroom.⁹ When defendants are so disorderly that their trials cannot proceed, the court has three alternatives: cite them for contempt, shackle and gag them, or remove them from the courtroom.

The Supreme Court held that shackling and gagging should only be used as a last resort because that action prejudices a defendant in the eyes of the jury and offends the dignity of the court. Removing defendants from the courtroom is preferable to binding and gagging, though the defendants must first be warned that they will be removed if the disruptive conduct continues. Once removed, they should be allowed to remain nearby to consult with attorneys and should receive a standing order to return if their conduct improves.

A secure, soundproof holding room should be next to the courtroom for the use of defendants removed for being disorderly. Many courts already provide such rooms for the custody of incarcerated witnesses waiting to testify and for defendants during recess. Closed-circuit television or a loudspeaker will allow the defendant to see or hear the proceedings.

Finally, in the courtroom, telephones or duress alarms should be available for the bailiff, clerk, or judge to summon help in case of a serious disturbance by prisoners.

Communications with Others. Particular care must be taken to prevent unauthorized communications by incustody defendants, or attempts at such communications. Both actions are usually illegal, and many courts post notices to this effect, citing possible penalties. Defendants may confer with their attorneys in the courtroom with the consent of the court, but should do so in a manner that will not disturb the proceedings. No other persons are allowed to visit a prisoner in court without the judge's permission. A prisoner should never be allowed to accept any money, clothing, or other items directly from anyone in court. Such items should be presented to the jail for control and examination for contraband.

Attorney-Client Conference. Attorney-client conference areas adjacent to the courtroom holding rooms allow attorneys and clients or witnesses to discuss testimony and a case's progress. These are restricted areas, and must be secure enough to prevent escapes. Before and after use, the rooms should be

searched for contraband, especially when the court has allowed visits by relatives and friends.

Multidefendant Trials. The special circumstances of trials with several defendants may require additional security precautions. These should be discussed with judges, who can approve any recommendations or issue court orders if necessary. Multidefendant trials generally mean more security manpower; normally, there should be one bailiff or security officer for each defendant. In the courtroom, these officers should be positioned to prevent an escape attempt or to control each prisoner in case of a disturbance. Note that defendants may be antagonistic towards one another and may require segregated seating.

Female Defendants. Female defendants should be subject to the same policy approved for males regarding use of restraint devices. If separate policies are in force, they should be clearly defined and in writing. Uniform application of restraints on all prisoners regardless of sex will reduce unrest and charges of favoring some groups. Any deviation from this policy should be made only with the approval of a competent authority and also made a matter of record. Some departments may have a modified policy for use of restraints on female prisoners. However, security personnel are reminded that female prisoners can be just as dangerous as their male counterparts, and they too commit acts of violence, causing serious injury to themselves or the custodians.

If there is no separate temporary holding area for females, they may be held in the courtroom. These defendants should be seated close to the bailiff's station, where they can be kept under constant observation and control.

If a female deputy, bailiff, or matron is not available, at least two male officers should be present at all times to reduce or prevent charges of an individual's misconduct towards a prisoner.

Juveniles. As noted in chapter 2, security officers must be constantly alert in these cases, since incidents caused by juveniles are usually unpredictable. Many juvenile court incidents are sudden outbursts of anger, often directed toward parents, or they may involve an attempt to escape.

Bailiffs and security officers should not view juveniles as merely underage adults to be handled like adult offenders. True, many youths are clever, cunning, and very intelligent, but there are also many whose delinquent behavior can be directly linked to a serious learning problem, a low IQ, or an emotional disturbance. Usually, one of these factors has caused the conduct that brought the juvenile into court.

It is important to identify children who may have emotional or learning problems. Case workers and probation officers should take the time to develop data from schools, medical records, and other sources. If these problems exist, the bailiff and custody staff should be told, to help them decide how to deal with the young people involved.

Children with these problems will usually respond to a situation they cannot understand or cope with either by silence or a violent reaction. Fear of the unknown should be met with reassurance, through communication with a bailiff who has special training and the right attitude. The bailiff should be both sensitive to the special problem child and also aware of the possibility of being deceived by the "streetwise" offender.

From the first contact with the juvenile, the bailiff should offer clear and simple explanations of what will happen to the youth while in custody. The bailiff needs to cover each situa-

⁹ Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).

tion step by step, making sure the young person understands. If not, the explanation should be repeated.

If restraints are used, the youth should be told why. If the juvenile is in a temporary holding area, the bailiff will want to explain why and describe the area. When court proceedings are finished, the bailiff should escort the child out of the courtroom, explain what has happened, and answer questions as fully as possible. Clear, simple explanations and low-key reaction will do much to control a potential problem.

Mentally Ill Persons. On occasion, the mentally ill must appear in court. Thus bailiffs need to be emotionally mature people who can cope successfully with unusual behavior. In each instance, a check with institutional officials is important, to find out what behavior to expect. There may be special requirements for straitjackets or seat pads, or cleaning materials to handle someone who spits or drools. It is advisable and often mandatory that a doctor or medical attendant be present at these appearances.

Bailiffs should be attentive and give these people as much assurance as possible. If they show violent or erratic behavior, the bailiff must subdue them and call for any necessary help from medical attendants. Bailiffs should be aware that these patients might exhibit strange and unpredictable behavior and may not respond to the usual warnings.

Handicapped Defendants. Particular care is needed with handicapped defendants, and any improper conduct by the bailiff may prejudice the case in the eyes of the jury and cause a reprimand from the judge. Deaf-mutes, for instance, require a high degree of visual contact with the bailiff to assure compliance with instructions. Another special concern is how restraints are used, for both the prisoner's condition and the need to assure proper control are important.

New court facilities have ramps or inclines to aid the movement of wheelchairs. In older buildings, more people may be needed to move the prisoner. Particular attention is advised when searching both prisoner and wheelchair for contraband. Also, sympathy for the handicapped should not mean reduced vigilance, for even a crutch can be a formidable weapon in the hands of a determined person.

In handling a handicapped defendant, the best advice is "plan ahead." In some buildings, it is impossible to move a wheelchair between jail and court by the usual means. Steep, narrow stairs that do not allow a wheelchair to pass may mean bringing the prisoner into the courthouse through a public entrance — a situation that presents a high security hazard. Both an assault on the prisoner and an escape are possible at that time, so extra security precautions are recommended. The route to be followed should be checked in advance, and additional personnel should accompany the prisoner.

Security staff will also need to plan ahead if the nature of a person's infirmity is such that medical attention may be needed. Inability to handle the unexpected always creates a weak security operation.

Defendants Representing Themselves.¹⁰ In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the right of defendants to represent themselves if they understand the nature of the charges against

them.¹¹ Thus, bailiffs must be familiar with certain privileges for incustody defendants who act as their own lawyers.

San Diego County has dealt with these permitted privileges in some detail.¹² There, the presiding judge of the superior court approved the following recommendations of a judge's executive committee dealing with *pro per* defendants in jail:

- Provide case-related work areas for the defendants;
- Provide books, supplies (e.g., subpoena forms), and equipment (e.g., tape recorders);
- Allow the defendant use of the jail library, telephone privileges, and interviews with witnesses;
- Allow the defendant to receive mail related to the case;
- Make provisions for legal researchers and investigators, spelling out how they will be assigned and paid;
- Provide for suspension of the above privileges when necessary.

When defendants act as their own lawyers in court, there are unique security problems. In cases where dangerous weapons are introduced into evidence, the court may rule that defendants, even though representing themselves, may not touch the evidence. In one case reported during field research for this manual, the defendant approached a prosecution witness on the stand during cross-examination and suddenly assaulted the witness. The court then ruled that the defendant had to remain at counsel table at all times.

Each jurisdiction should form a committee of judges, prosecutors, sheriff's representatives, and others to draft policy on *pro per* defendants both in jail and in court.

Special Courtroom Considerations. During the judicial process, there are times when the potential for incidents is greater than usual. At these critical periods, the bailiffs and security officers should be alert to the possibility of disruptions or escape attempts. A few of the critical times already discussed in this chapter include (1) the appearance of an antagonistic witness or codefendant; (2) prisoner movement to and from jail, or between temporary holding areas and the court; and (3) when commitment is ordered in juvenile court.

Other critical times to address in the procedures manual include the following:

- During arraignment and sentencing;
- When a verdict is rendered in a domestic or small claims court;
- During convening of a psychiatric court;
- When dealing with unruly spectators;
- When litigants and defendants who are on bond can bring weapons into court because they were not searched.

In these situations, incidents will usually be in the form of a physical assault, possibly coupled with an escape attempt.

Factors which contribute to disruption in court include these:

- Attitude and conduct of both judge and bailiff;
- Prosecution tactics;
- Presence in court of friends or relatives of the victim or defendant;
- Any damaging testimony;
- Dissatisfaction with defense attorney's conduct of the case;
- Unwillingness of defendant to accept the court's authority;
- Defendant's values or political beliefs;

¹⁰ The legal term here is *in propria persona* (*pro per*) or *pro se*.

¹¹ *Faretta v. California*, 415 U.S. 975.

¹² San Diego County Sheriff's Department, Court Services Operation, *Superior Court Bailiff's Manual* (San Diego, California, 1977).

- Desire to gain publicity for either an individual or a cause;
- Mental instability;
- Fear of confinement;
- Sentencing to a long prison term.

Many of these factors can be recognized and addressed by a change in attitude and conduct or by increased security awareness and suitable precautions.

Arrest and Sentencing. Arrest and sentencing are often hectic times. Large numbers of lawyers, friends, and relatives are present, along with both in-custody defendants and those on bail. If the court revokes bail or sentences someone, there is an abrupt separation of defendants from relatives. Emotions will often run high, for example, as a wife tries to have "one last talk" with her husband before he is taken away. Defendants not expecting to be confined frequently are shocked into violent outbursts, and unless the overall situation is well controlled, the courtroom will be the scene of general disorder. The need for more than one bailiff or security officer at this time is obvious.

Civil and Domestic Court. One finding of the interview phase of this project was the fact that almost half the incidents reported took place in either civil or domestic courts. Emotions peak, for example, when rulings are made on separations, divorces, and custody of children. The disappointed person may use a firearm on an attorney or the successful litigant. In Florida, a woman who lost her house in a suit took a gun from her purse and killed her adversary before a horrified judge and spectators.

Because violence occurs more often in civil and domestic than in criminal courts, bailiffs should be specially trained for those types of problems.

Small Claims Court. Many assaults are committed in small claims courts, usually at the time of a decision. Several judges interviewed during this study recounted assaults by losing litigants over as little as a \$25 claim. Many jurisdictions now notify litigants of small claims decisions by mail to avoid the often violent reaction of the loser. Bailiffs or security officers in small claims courts must be aware of the types of problems that can occur and be prepared to handle them.

Psychiatric Court. Psychiatric courts are convened to hear a number of matters: a defendant's mental competence to stand trial; whether or not a defendant is addicted or in danger of becoming addicted to a drug; and whether or not a defendant is predisposed, by reason of a mental illness, to commit sexual or other crimes. This court may also hear civil matters — e.g., putting people in the care of conservators appointed to look after their interests. In certain instances, because of a defendant's condition, the court may convene a bedside hearing, which is governed by normal courtroom procedures.

Bailiffs in psychiatric courts must be sensitive to the needs of mentally disturbed persons, must give people assurance during the proceedings, and must recognize the fact that violent or erratic behavior can be expected during a hearing.

Unruly Spectators. There is a danger of overreaction in dealing with unruly spectators, and this response could make an otherwise minor and controllable incident more serious. In most cases, a simple warning by the bailiff or judge will control the situation. In some instances, the bailiff may be instructed to bring the offender to the bench, where the judge issues a warning and explains the consequences of further unruly conduct.

Judges and their bailiffs usually have an "understanding" on how these matters will be handled. Many judges interviewed for this project said they always gave the unruly spectator the benefit of the doubt. Then too, some disruptive incidents are committed by people with mental disorders and require an appropriate response. If a person's conduct does require removal from the courtroom, that action should be taken quickly.

Searches of Litigants and Defendants On Bond. Many serious incidents have occurred because weapons were brought into the courtroom. Thus, discreet searches of litigants and on-bond defendants are needed before they enter the courtroom, especially for trials involving highly emotional situations. However, this search requirement is a sensitive issue, and a clear policy on the matter obviously is needed. This means looking at the issue's legal aspects and getting both guidance and approval from the presiding judge. Still, many jurists now support the search idea in principle, and the U.S. Marshals Service recommends such a procedure.

Special Operations Plans

Search of Courtroom and Related Spaces. A thorough, systematic search of these areas by trained personnel should be mandatory both before and after the court convenes. Trained officers can quickly identify locations where contraband is likely to be hidden. In particular, areas near the defendant should be thoroughly searched. After finding one piece of contraband, the searchers should not stop their work nor relax their vigilance, for there may be more. Any suspicious items found should not be moved or handled until technicians have had the opportunity to check for fingerprints or other evidence.

After the courtroom is searched before its use, the room should be under constant surveillance by the bailiff or security officer until the proceedings start.

Judges' secretaries often can help search judges' chambers because they are familiar with the area and can quickly identify strange or unusual items. However, primary responsibility for conducting searches should remain with the security officer.

Visitor Control. The simplest way to control visitor movement is to provide easily read directories and floor plans at building entrances and by elevators, in addition to well-marked corridors and office doors. Another measure is an information or reception desk staffed by a civilian who can serve as a lookout for potential problems and warn security officers of any troublesome or potentially disruptive people entering the building.

Under normal conditions, courthouses are freely accessible to the public. However, access to certain areas such as judges' chambers should be controlled at all times, through either architectural design, locked doors, or guarded checkpoints. Sometimes it might be necessary to control entrances to the building or courtroom, perhaps including package searches or the use of metal detectors — tactics commonly referred to as a "search screen." However, these measures should not be applied indiscriminately because they might be challenged on the grounds of prejudice to individual rights. Usually a court order is required for these procedures, and that order should be prominently displayed for public examination.

Basically, a search screen identifies those admitted to the courtroom and locates contraband and metal objects which

may be used as weapons. General recommendations for a search screen operation include the following:

- A barrier should isolate the operation from the general public.
- A minimum of three security officers is recommended for processing spectators.
- A female officer or matron should be part of the team.

Depending on the anticipated risk, any or all of the following elements may be used in a search screen. These are graphically displayed in figure 3-7.

- *Receiving or starting point.* All persons enter at a certain point controlled by a uniformed officer. If body or metal detector searches are part of the screen, people empty their pockets into containers, and purses are inspected or emptied.
- *Search booths.* Two booths are recommended, one staffed by a male and the other by a female officer. Within the booth, the officer examines the personal belongings in the container and does a close body search.
- *Metal detector (magnetometer) station.* A walk-through magnetometer is desirable, though a hand-held model may be used instead. After examination, people may repocket all personal property except identification.
- *Photography station.* A technician should photograph all court spectators and their identification documents.
- *Seat assignment and recording.* A uniformed officer should identify and record information about all persons entering the courtroom and should assign seats based on a seating chart. Identification such as a driver's license may be retained by the officer, with the assigned seat number attached to make readmittance easy after a recess. While escorting spectators to their seats, the officer should warn them that if they move to an unassigned seat they may be removed from the courtroom, and that they will not be able to return if they leave the courtroom at any time except during recess.

One California sheriff's department required that fingerprints be taken as part of the screening process for a high-risk trial. This requirement was successfully challenged in court. The trial judge saw the need for fingerprinting as a means of positive identification but said that, in view of the appellate decision, the measure could only be required through legislative action.

Hostage Situations

The act of taking hostages in the courtroom or the courthouse is rare. In one dramatic incident, a judge and others were kidnapped from a California courtroom, and the judge was later killed by his captors.

Although hostage taking is rare, it is nevertheless a contemporary criminal tactic, and must be considered as a potential means of escape once a person is brought to trial. Being prepared for a hostage event will prevent overreaction that might endanger the lives of the hostages as well as security personnel.

The field study phase of this project gathered information on the expected characteristics of a hostage situation in a court setting. Figure 3-8 is based on the data gathered and indicates what might be expected from three types of hostage takers: defendants (or incustody prisoners), spectators, and mentally deranged persons.

A defendant's choice of a hostage will generally depend on whoever is most convenient, but an armed bailiff may be particularly favored because the bailiff's weapon can aid an escape. Spectators who take hostages generally bring weapons into court, though good screening could prevent this. Except in high-risk trials, screening is generally lax, thus increasing the possibility that a weapon could be brought in successfully.


High-risk trials have great potential for incidents involving hostages. Therefore, the importance of gathering intelligence cannot be overemphasized in planning the right response to prevent violence from defendants or their supporters in the spectator group.

Following is a discussion of preventive actions and training programs for security personnel to consider as a response to hostage incidents.

Being Prepared. There are three phases in the hostage control program. The first is the *preevent phase*, when planning occurs and administrators make sure that people are trained and the right equipment is available. The second phase is the *event itself*, when the plan is put into effect. The third is the *postevent period*, when those who carried out the plan evaluate how well it worked. Figures 3-9, 3-10, and 3-11 show actions during each of these periods.

Many law enforcement agencies do not have the special skills and resources needed to deal with hostage situations and will need help. In many cases, nearby larger sheriff's or city police departments, or perhaps the state police, will have contingency plans and trained hostage negotiators. In other cases the FBI may be able to help. However, in some areas no one force will have these resources; thus, pooling and coordination among law enforcement organizations will be needed. This section offers general guidelines that individual departments or regions can tailor to their needs when help must come from outside the department.

**Figure 3-7
POSSIBLE SEARCH SCREEN PATHS***



**Figure 3-8
LIKELIHOOD OF A HOSTAGE INCIDENT**

	Hostage Taker		
	Defendant	Spectator	Mentally Deranged Defendant
1. Objective	1. Escape	1. Release of defendant and/or others being held	1. Escape 2. Revenge
2. Most likely hostage	1. Bailiff 2. Court official 3. Juror 4. Attorney 5. Judge 6. Spectator	1. Spectator 2. Bailiff 3. Court official 4. Juror 5. Attorney 6. Judge	1. Court official 2. Attorney 3. Juror 4. Judge 5. Bailiff
3. Most likely weapon used	1. Bailiff's gun 2. Knife	1. Firearm 2. Knife 3. Bomb 4. Bailiff's gun	1. Knife 2. Firearm
4. Most likely time of attack	1. During transport 2. At time of sentencing	1. While trial is in progress	1. While on trial 2. During transport
5. Circumstances leading to event	1. Trial of member of politically motivated dissident group 2. Sentencing time where death or life is the sentence 3. Time of court decision for domestic disputes 4. Sentencing time for juveniles	1. Trial of member of politically motivated dissident group	1. Time of sentencing 2. Domestic dispute

**Figure 3-9
HOSTAGE PLANS: PREEVENT ACTIONS**





Figure 3-10
HOSTAGE PLANS: THE EVENT



<p align="center">Figure 3-11 HOSTAGE PLANS: POSTEVENT ACTIONS</p>	
First step	Press release
Critique	<p>Intensive review of the contingency plan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operation plan updated • Policies reviewed, modified • Training plan updated <p>Report prepared on the incident for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political officials • Sheriff • Commander, assisting force
Participants	<p>Control officer</p> <p>Negotiator</p> <p>Mobilization center commander</p> <p>Psychologist</p> <p>Press officer</p>

Preevent Actions. Joint planning by two or more law enforcement agencies (the response force) should be geared to producing an "operations plan" for a hostage situation. The following elements should be part of that plan.

Policies and Objectives. Figure 3-9 shows the objectives of a hostage plan. Also critical are policies on how members of the response force will work together. These policies are especially important where the resources of one group will be used in the legally defined jurisdiction of another. Thus, matters of liability and responsibility should be considered. In addition, the following are some key policy questions to ask on what will and will not be negotiable:

- Should captors be allowed to leave the courthouse? Should they be given transport away from the courthouse with the hostage? Without?
- Should an exchange of hostages be allowed? What other demands — e.g., for weapons or more hostages — should be met? What is the right response in these cases?
- Should food, drink, cigarettes, etc. be provided to captors?
- If hostage takers demand interviews with the press or want to publish "manifestos" about their grievances, should the press be allowed or encouraged to go along with these demands? Also, what is the relationship between the press and security forces?

Large departments with hostage experience have formulated policies to deal with some of these questions. For example:

- Movement of the captors to another location is negotiable.
- Except when a vehicle and driver are provided to move the captor to another location, another person is never substituted for the hostage.
- Food, drink, cigarettes, etc. are given captors in exchange for concessions.
- Press interviews are sometimes allowed after the release of the hostage. These are usually permitted only if they were promised to the captor by the negotiator, or if the commander promised interviews to the press.
- Press cooperation is a must.

The policy that results from answering these kinds of ques-

tions should be consistent with the primary objectives of the hostage plan. The negotiator must fully understand the policy, which also should be included in the training program for members of the hostage control group. Obviously, certain sensitive details about the policy should not become common knowledge nor be given to the press.

Initial Contact Procedures. The hostage plan should identify the people to be notified when a hostage event takes place, including both office and home telephone numbers for those people. The sheriff, commanders of other police forces involved, and possibly political officials (who may be notified by the sheriff directly) should be on this list.

Responsibilities. The plan identifies the main person (and an alternate) who will direct the operation and run the control center seen in figure 3-10. This person will decide on actions during the negotiation stages and will bring together all the resources needed to deal with the event.

Joint Force Coordination. The plan also describes the roles of each cooperating law enforcement agency. Usually, a sheriff will be the first to learn about a problem in the courthouse or courtroom. The sheriff may then assume the role of overall commander, with help from outside resources. Or an assisting force may be asked to control the operation, with the sheriff helping in various ways (for example, securing the building's outer perimeter). Decisions on the most effective use of manpower will depend on the capabilities of the various departments involved.

Equipment, Materials, and Training. Examples of what may be needed are communications and personal protection equipment, electronic sensors, and special weapons. Further, the response forces should be trained to use such equipment. Also needed are floor plans of the courthouse and enlargements of any courtrooms involved in the hostage incident.

Once the plan is final, personnel can be assigned from the law enforcement agencies involved. Some departments prefer officers who have served in the military, since they are accustomed to the high level of discipline required. These people should have intensive training, including field exercises, in the plan and its operation. This joint training can build up trust between departments; that trust is an intangible benefit that adds to the chances of success in a hostage case.

The Event. To the extent possible, the contingency plan will anticipate what is needed for an effective response. However, each hostage situation is different, and good plans will reflect the need for commanders to make decisions on the spot. Thus, the control officer's job is extremely important.

Figure 3-10 shows areas of control during the hostage negotiation stage and the relationships of various parts of the response force. At first, the overall commander, usually the sheriff, will be responsible for confining the captor to as small a space as possible and preventing an escape. The sheriff will want to ensure that firearms discipline is maintained and that no one acts independent of the team. At the outset, he will be concerned with the inner perimeter and will determine whether to evacuate or not, and if so, how much. The sheriff will put the contingency plan in motion by relaying all information about the event to the joint force commander, the appropriate political official, and the control center commander.

Control Center. The control center commander and assisting staff are stationed in this predesignated communications area. The control center commander will do the following:

- Inform the response force commanders of the operation's status and receive guidance from them;
- Inform political officials and receive guidance from them (the sheriff could do this if desired);
- Keep in touch with the negotiator and offer information and advice;
- Receive intelligence from various department sources;
- Keep the press officer informed so that he or she can provide appropriate information to the media;
- Receive technical assistance from the psychologist, if one is involved;
- Through the mobilization center (described later), direct the use of manpower for special details not included in the operations plan.

Negotiator. The purpose of negotiation is to save human life by buying time, using people trained in the psychological techniques of hostage negotiations.¹³ Time is the important factor, for as a rule, the more time captors spend with hostages the less likely they are to kill them.

Experience shows that the best negotiators are those who have had street experience during their law enforcement careers. Negotiators should look mature, so the captors will see them as people with authority. However, negotiators should not portray themselves as the final decision makers; thus, they will be able to defer decisions and gain time. When demands are delayed or refused, a relationship can be maintained because the negotiator is not the person denying the captor's request.

Negotiators must be able to communicate with captors. The ability to use informal or "street" language and to sympathize with the captors' problems is helpful. The negotiator should be the only person allowed to talk to the captor, except when an agreed-upon demand involves someone else (a captor's family member, for example).

Mobilization Center. This is a predesignated point where manpower from the various forces begin their work. Here they obtain briefings, assignments, and equipment. The commander of this center receives instructions from the control center commander for special details and provides the necessary support (such as specially equipped vehicles or food and drink).

Press Officer. The news media are an important element in any hostage incident. Unfortunately, experience shows that the media can become a problem in these situations. Thus, it is important to assure that media needs are met, while preventing reporters from intruding into efforts to release the hostage safely.

Information should be made available to the news media by the control center commander through the press officer. In nearly all cases, the success of security force operations will not be helped by media people who try to get interviews or television footage of captors and hostages. The key concerns, then, are what will help get the hostage released safely, but also what can be done to help meet media needs. The press officer's role thus becomes very important. It also would be helpful to (1) discuss with media representatives those aspects of the contingency plan that affect the media and (2) try to get their cooperation before an incident occurs.

Perimeters. The outer perimeter is loosely defined in an actual hostage situation, but generally surrounds an area where only security personnel are allowed. The inner perimeter marks an area that only the negotiator and the containment/assault team can enter.

Postevent Actions. Officials often overlook the significance of the postevent period. After a hostage case, certain actions are important, as discussed in this section.

News Release. All persons involved in the event should help prepare a news release, so the complete story is available to the public. The story may be released by the sheriff, a political official, or someone else, but it should be complete, factual, and accurate.

Critique. Officials who participated in the event should review the following: all security force actions and how well prepared the forces were for each; the contingency plan and any changes needed in it; all policies on hostage incidents; and the effectiveness of the training plan for those situations.

Officials who participated in the event should write a report on the incident, describing in detail both the situation and the response to it. This report should go to the political officials concerned, the sheriff, and the chief administrators of any outside resources involved.

High-Risk Trials

A high-risk trial is one that provokes a strong emotional response from the general public or interested groups. That response may threaten the safety of those involved or lessen the integrity of the judicial process. Thus, special efforts are needed to make high-risk trials safe, fair, and open. To do this, courts need a well-organized, detailed operating plan.

Each high-risk trial examined during the field study phase of this project had two common characteristics. First, careful and detailed security planning was evident. Second, incidents were few or nonexistent and usually were limited to verbal outbursts by defendants or unruly spectators. In few cases were there serious disruptions of the judicial process or acts of violence. The sheriffs, judges, and prosecutors interviewed believed that well-prepared and thorough plans were mainly responsible for this lack of serious incidents.

The following elements of an operational plan are drawn from one that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department uses.¹⁴ All these elements should be included in high-risk trial planning; however, some may have to be changed, based on the size of the sheriff's department and available resources.

Responsibilities and Coordination. One officer should be in charge and have full authority and responsibility for the operation, though a second in command can help if the unit is large. The commanding officer should control special communications and monitor the performance and conduct of assigned personnel. As a member of a special *security committee*, the commander helps design the operational plan and coordinates the work of all agencies involved (sheriff's office, state and local police, federal agencies, the court, fire and medical units, etc.).

The commanding officer and the trial judge may be the only members of the security committee, though larger jurisdictions may add the presiding judge, court administrator, and people from other law enforcement and emergency aid agencies.

Along with its coordinating job, the security committee also establishes policy and procedures, such as the right amount of security for juries, special precautions in handling high-risk de-

¹³ New York City Police Department, *Tactical Manual for Hostage Situations* (New York: New York City Police Department, undated), p. 6.

¹⁴ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Civic Center Security Unit, *Major Security Trial Operation* (Los Angeles, undated).

defendants, and the level of security to be imposed for entry into the courthouse and courtroom. Finally, the committee selects a suitable courtroom and drafts the necessary court orders to take all the steps just mentioned.

Personnel. High-risk trial security operations take place under stressful conditions. Thus, it is important that well-trained, physically able, and mentally alert personnel be assigned to these duties. High marksmanship standards also are important. Role playing and "walk-through" exercises (mock drills) are needed until the commander is satisfied that officers know their assignments. In addition, clear-cut instructions should be written to outline the duties for each post in the plan. These instructions should guide individual conduct for normal as well as emergency situations.

Intelligence and Communication. Good intelligence information is vital to an operational plan. Court security staff should collect and analyze data for trends or indicators that might affect overall security planning. Such trends could appear, for instance, in disrupted trials involving defendants with similar backgrounds or group affiliations. Information on those cases might help identify the disruptive followers or associates of the defendant so that court personnel could be alert to their presence.

Gather information on each high-risk trial and include the data shown in figure 3-12. Such data are available from court and departmental records, the news media, criminal records systems, and various law enforcement agencies. In trials with a change of venue, the sheriff's department of original jurisdiction may have much of this information already collected.

Figure 3-12
SAMPLE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

1. Case number
2. Court location
3. Defendant(s)
 - a. Name and physical description
 - b. Custody location
 - c. Booking number
4. Court personnel
 - a. Judge
 - b. District attorney
 - c. Defense attorney
5. Charge(s)
6. Background of case
 - a. Description of crime
 - b. Defendant information
7. Situation
 - a. Court/trial status
 - b. Available intelligence information
 - c. Anticipated problems or hazards
8. Recommendations
 - a. Extent of security
 - b. Number of personnel needed
 - c. Possible security-related activity

Along with intelligence, communication is vital to an effective operational plan, and efficiency is reduced if one part of the security system cannot communicate readily with another. All communications should tie into the command center, which can be a specially created post or the sheriff's radio dispatch room.

Arrest and Reporting Procedures. Procedures for making and reporting on arrests should be worked out in advance. For instance, when multiple arrests are expected, procedures must be well-defined and approved by the court beforehand. This kind of planning can keep those arrests from being invalidated on appeal and helps prevent suits for false arrest. Good intelligence also should indicate whether or not multiple arrests are likely to happen.

Courthouse and Perimeter Security. For high-risk trials, 24-hour security coverage of the court building and its surrounding area is recommended. During normal business hours, expected threats would be disruptive demonstrations, mass movement into the courthouse and courtroom, and efforts to bring contraband into the building. After-hour threats would most likely be attempts at surreptitious entry for destructive purpose.

When the courthouse is open, the following measures are advised to ensure security in the courthouse and perimeter:

- Patrol the outside of the building.
- Provide guards for judges and jury parking.
- Inspect shrubbery and other places where explosives or contraband could be hidden.
- Monitor all entrances.
- Patrol inside the court building, especially public areas near courtrooms.
- Frequently check basement, engineering spaces, heating and air-conditioning equipment, and potential entry points such as roof openings, utility tunnels, and locked doors and windows.
- Equip all patrol units with two-way radios to reduce response time and permit better coordination and control.

After-hour building security can be provided by good outside lighting, an intrusion alarm system that alerts the appropriate law enforcement office and, if needed, a civilian security guard. If these measures are not feasible, it may be possible to arrange for periodic outside checks of the building by state or local police or the sheriff's department.

When a situation causes complete or partial closing of a building to the public, it is important that all tenants receive enough notice and are aware of the procedures to be followed. As noted earlier under **Visitor Control**, measures to limit public access will require a court order that is available for public inspection and states the procedures, restrictions, and requirements for entry. These measures may mean setting up a search screen operation for the building entrance. If so, requirements for entry should apply to all, with exceptions made only for properly identified law enforcement officers who have legitimate business in the building.

Courtroom Security. The courtroom is the focus of high-risk trial activity, and the potential for disruption there is great. Courtroom selection is critical in jurisdictions lacking a room with special security features for high-risk trials. Criteria for selecting a suitable courtroom include the following:

- Isolation from public activities and circulation;
- No public access to restricted areas;
- Several means of entry and exit;
- Structural features that serve as barriers and reduce manpower requirements;
- Secure entry and exit for defendants, preferably from a holding cell next to the courtroom;
- Effective alarm and communications systems.

Recommended measures within the courtroom include those seen in figure 3-13.

Defendant Security. One of the most critical and vulnerable points in the custodial process is the time at which defendants are moved between jail and court. Among the possible incidents that can occur at this time are attempted escapes, assaults on prisoners or the security force, and self-inflicted injury or suicide efforts. Basic procedures to follow during high-risk trials when moving defendants by vehicle include these:

1. Assign one security officer to remain with each defendant at all times outside the jail or the temporary holding cell.
2. Coordinate defendant movement with jail and courthouse staff. All must be aware of the status and location of the defendant.
3. Assign escort vehicles as advance and rear guard for the transport vehicle. Survey the route in advance for possible problem areas. Vary routes on a random basis as often as possible to avoid establishing a pattern.
4. Maintain constant communications with the base and/or operations center while enroute.
5. Use the sally port (guarded entry) system when moving defendant from the transport vehicle into the courthouse. Additional security personnel should be placed around the building entrance, and a trained marksman with a rifle can be on a high vantage point overlooking the entrance and general area.
6. Restrain the defendant according to departmental policy at all times except in court, where restraint may be used only under court order.

When not in court, prisoners should be confined to holding cells. Search the cells before placing the prisoners there and again when they leave. Escorting officers should accompany prisoners to their cells and keep them in sight at all times. To ensure alertness, escort officers should be rotated after one or two hours. Defendants should be fed in the holding cell rather than returned to jail. A procedure also should be established for quick removal of a prisoner to the jail in an emergency.

The cell should be equipped with toilet facilities. Closed-circuit television and audio equipment can be placed there to let defendants see and hear the proceedings if it is necessary to remove them from court because of disruptive or unruly conduct.

The potential for disruptive incidents in the courtroom can be reduced with careful planning. The search screen process should reduce the possibility of spectators bringing dangerous weapons into the courtroom. The defendant's seat, as well as the witness chair, should be designed to allow the unobtrusive use of restraining devices, if so ordered by the court.¹⁵ An adequate supply of restraint equipment should be available near the courtroom.

All items that could be used as weapons should be kept out of the defendant's reach. During one trial, a defendant stabbed an attorney in the eye with a pencil. Evidence such as knives or other potential weapons should be kept out of reach. Ammunition should be removed and kept separate from firearms, and trigger locks should be used. The escort officer should be

stationed nearby and to the rear of the defendant to act as a barrier between prisoner and spectators.

Judge's Security. During the field study phase of this project, many of the 33 judges interviewed admitted they had received verbal and/or written threats. With few exceptions, these threats were ignored and seldom reported to the sheriff. However, in high-risk trials, threats should receive more critical treatment, although the degree of security provided for both judges and their families is dictated by the judges' wishes as well as the nature of the threat.

Judges should receive all available information about threats and should know what security measures are available. A procedure for quick and safe exit from the courtroom and escort to a safe location is advisable. At a minimum, the judges should be escorted from their automobiles to their chambers and when passing through public corridors. While parked, their vehicles should be guarded.

Escort services and/or security officer drivers should be made available during the trials. Chambers should be searched for contraband before a judge arrives each day and at other times, as needed. At the judge's home, security may take the form of outside surveillance or placing security personnel in the house. Local police may provide periodic checks; however, this should be coordinated by the officer in charge of the detail involved. Temporary alarms also can be installed, but it is important that these and other measures do not unnecessarily disrupt the personal lives of judges and their families.

Jury Security. Threats to the jury may occur in the courthouse, at home, or while the jury is sequestered. In and around the courthouse, security can be improved by guards, guarded parking spaces, and escorts to and from the courthouse, the courtroom, or the deliberation room — preferably through nonpublic corridors. In court, the jury is subject to threats from spectators, while at home jurors may be the targets of both threats and actual violence. Judges should immediately learn of any threats to jurors so they can decide whether or not to sequester juries. The prosecutor's office should be notified of any threats and can decide, along with the judge, whether or not to prosecute individuals responsible for threats.

Sheriffs may think that more security measures are needed than can be provided by their departments. If so, they should ask for help from local law enforcement agencies to ensure adequate protection of jurors and their families. However, additional security measures should be approved by the judge before they are used.

Witness Security. Witnesses are often the target of threats. The responsibility for witness security in criminal cases usually rests with the sheriff. During high-risk trials, it may be necessary to provide special protection for witnesses and their families. When extra protection is needed, a court order will authorize the use of special deputies, will direct the county to pay the costs of that protection, and may protect the sheriff from civil liability for false imprisonment. In many states a *capias* or legal writ is issued to sheriffs directing them to keep witnesses sequestered. For example, some county jails have *capias* sections to house witnesses and other noncriminals who are being detained. Witness security may include an escort service, bodyguard (either part-time or round-the-clock), or relocation to a temporary residence.

Policy on News Media. Any high-risk trial will generate interest by the media, sometimes resulting in national or inter-

¹⁵ See chapter 7, figure 7-7.

Figure 3-13
COURTROOM SECURITY MEASURES FOR HIGH-RISK TRIALS

1. Establish a search procedure. Courtroom searches should be made before the court opens and whenever the room is vacated. Put the room under constant surveillance by a security officer during recess. Lock all courtroom doors when the room is not occupied.
2. Set up a daily search procedure for all areas the defendant is expected to occupy.
3. Test alarms and communications daily. Use portable radios as well as alarms and telephones.
4. Establish a search screen operation to control spectator entry (described before; see *Visitor Control*).
5. Assign spectator seating and separate potentially troublesome individuals or groups. (This can be done as part of the search screen.) Allow no standing in spectator area nor movement from assigned seats.
6. Set a policy on carrying weapons into court. Weapons should be restricted to security officers on duty. Department policy should determine whether or not law enforcement witnesses, bailiffs, or others are armed.
7. Place armed, plainclothes security officers in the spectator section. Also station a response force outside the courtroom.
8. Reserve the front row of spectator seating for law enforcement officers and members of the press, to place a buffer between the spectators and the courtroom well, or main area.
9. Review emergency and special operations procedures, especially for hostage situations, demonstrations, disruptions, and medical emergencies.

national coverage. It is important that a fair and impartial policy be carried out, and all accredited media representatives receive equal consideration. In short, the conduct of security personnel towards media people should be positive, fair, and cooperative — within the limits of security planning.

During lengthy trials in particular, security personnel are in daily contact with the media. Some sheriff's departments recommend "gag orders" from the court prohibiting discussion of the trial or related matters by security personnel. This action channels requests for information to the proper, designated source (such as the sheriff or a public information officer) and protects individual officers from difficult situations.

In large jurisdictions, a court administrator usually handles courtroom admission and the seating of the press. Sometimes the sheriff may be required to make the arrangements. In either case, at least 25 to 30 percent of available seating should be reserved for the media. If more media people want admittance than there are seats, then the media should select representatives to be admitted each day. This practice shifts the burden from the authorities and should reduce charges of unfair allocation.

As a courtesy, seats nearest the well usually are reserved for artists. Moreover, special admittance passes can be issued if necessary. It is best to issue these passes in the name of an agency rather than an individual reporter, since agencies may wish to have several different reporters cover the proceedings. Any unclaimed reserved seats should be available to the general public no later than 15 minutes after the proceedings begin.

The courts will usually support recommendations to exclude all photographic and recording equipment from the courtroom or courthouse; to prohibit interviews with defendants inside the courthouse; and to ban all interviews with court officials and the jury. A list of such restrictions should be part of any court order obtained.

Emergency Procedures

This chapter recommends procedures for six types of emergencies: fire, bomb threat, general evacuation, natural disaster, civil disorder, and power/utility failure. Many jurisdictions will not need to develop procedures for floods or earthquakes, but if the potential for a particular hazard does exist, a written plan can best guide the staff in its response to the emergency.

Written procedures can increase the chances of saving lives or reducing injuries, and they allow control over potentially disruptive incidents with minimum delay. These plans should not be complex, lengthy, or difficult to carry out. If so, they may be self-defeating.

Emergency procedures are only effective when key personnel are fully aware of their responsibilities. Periodic briefings and training sessions conducted by the sheriff's office can ensure understanding of each assignment and procedure. For larger courthouses, it may be necessary to hold briefings and practice evacuations for all building occupants once or twice a year. Proper orientation will help reduce the incidence of panic reaction.

General guidelines for the six emergency plans are in figure 3-14. Identical recommendations need not be repeated in the individual plans. Rather, some of the basic information should be listed at the beginning of the security manual — for example, emergency phone numbers, personnel and agencies to be notified, people responsible for evacuation, and schematic floor plans of the building. Other recommendations will require unique responses based on the particular emergency. For example, during a bomb threat the security plan for a judge might be evacuation; during a civil disorder the plan might include protection in the judge's chambers.

General recommendations for handling emergency situations include the following:

- Have the sheriff or a designated security officer coordinate all plans, with help from the heads of other agencies in the building.
- Send copies of the emergency plans to the local fire and police departments.
- Set up liaison with local law enforcement agencies to ensure cooperation and coordination during emergency situations.
- Test the response time of the fire department, police agencies, and ambulance service.
- Make the same personnel responsible for all building evacuations, rather than having different people handle evacuation during a fire, bomb threat, natural disaster, etc.

In addition to these general guidelines, specific recommendations for the various emergency plans are listed in the next sections.

Fire. The fire emergency plan should also include (1) instructions on how to report a fire and whom to notify, and (2)

Figure 3-14
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR EMERGENCY PLANS

Plan should include:	Emergency Plans					
	Fire	Bomb Threat	General Evacuation	Natural Disaster	Civil Disorder	Power/Utility Failure
Circumstances that create an emergency situation, who can declare it, who is in charge	x	x	x	x	x	x
Circumstances for partial or total building evacuation and who may order it		x	x	x	x	x
List of emergency phone numbers:						
• Fire	x	x	x	x	x	
• Police	x	x	x	x	x	
• Medical	x	x	x	x	x	
• Utilities	x	x	x	x	x	x
• Bomb disposal facilities		x				
• Disaster relief agencies				x		
Schematic floor plans	x	x			x	x
List of personnel and agencies to be notified	x	x	x	x	x	x
List of persons responsible for evacuating and accounting for personnel	x	x	x	x	x	
Procedures for evacuating prisoners	x	x	x	x	x	
Checklist of areas to be secured and persons responsible:						
• Safes and vaults	x	x	x	x	x	x
• Treasurer's office	x	x	x	x	x	x
• Weapons supply	x	x	x	x	x	x
Security plans for judges, prosecutors, jurors, others	x	x	x		x	
Coordination and communication with other law enforcement agencies	x	x	x	x	x	
Plans in case of utility disruption	x	x		x	x	x
Instruction to personnel to remove personal effects at time of evacuation and prohibition of reentry until authorized	x	x	x	x	x	

a description of primary and alternative alarm methods, such as electrical bell or siren, telephone notice, or use of a messenger or manually operated alarm in case of power and phone failure.

Have the local fire marshal or department chief review the plan to ensure compliance with local codes. Fire exits and fire-fighting equipment need to be clearly marked and periodically inspected.

Bomb Threat. Bomb threats and actual bombings of courthouses pose serious problems for security officers. The FBI

has compiled figures on the number of reported bombing incidents involving courthouses. Figure 3-15 shows data for 1972 through 1976.

Bomb threat procedures should have the following purposes:¹⁶

- Find the bomb and remove it.
- Identify a hoax and reduce search time.
- Prevent panic and injury.
- Prevent publicity that might cause crank calls.
- Gather information and evidence leading to the identification, arrest, and conviction of the perpetrator(s).

The U.S. Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) offers an excellent free publication which includes the following guidelines for dealing with a bomb threat:¹⁷

¹⁶ California Office of Emergency Services, *Bomb Threats* (Sacramento, California, 1971), p. 2.
¹⁷ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, *Bomb Threats and Search Techniques* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 6-7.

Figure 3-15
COURTHOUSE BOMBING INCIDENTS, 1972-1976

Year	Total Attempted	Actual Explosions	Motive		
			Extremist/ Political	Personal Animosity	Other or Unknown
1976	5	5	4	1	—
1975	4	3	3	—	1
1974	7	2	1	4	2
1973	1	1	—	—	1
1972	8	4	1	1	6

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Bomb Summary for the years 1972-1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice), 1972, pp. 3, 8; 1973, pp. 3, 9; 1974, pp. 3, 9; 1975, pp. 6, 16; 1976, pp. 12, 18.

- Identify all resources available for bomb disposal: local police, fire department, nearby military post, or law enforcement agencies.

- Set up a way to handle bomb threat telephone calls. Record information as shown in the suggested form in appendix D.

- Establish search procedures that identify search teams and their areas of responsibility. See appendix E for an example.

- Decide what to do when a suspicious object is located.

The search is the most important part of any procedure, and searches by trained professionals are the best kind. However, large buildings with few trained professionals available can be searched more quickly by selected volunteers from the building staff. These volunteers have the advantage of familiarity, knowing what items are strange or unusual in their areas. Thus, volunteers need specialized training in search procedures and bomb recognition and should be teamed with a trained security officer whenever possible. Figure 3-16 describes three search systems, showing their advantages, disadvantages, and relative degrees of thoroughness.

See appendix F for information on federal assistance provided for bomb detection and disposal.

General Evacuation. A partial or total building evacuation may be necessary for reasons other than a fire or bomb threat, such as a gas leak or presence of a noxious chemical. Evacuation plans should follow the guidelines in figure 3-14.

Natural Disaster. Many areas are particularly prone to earthquake, flood, or forest and brush fire. Plans for such disasters should concentrate on lifesaving aspects. Court security personnel are also responsible for the safety of judges and court staff, safeguarding and retaining custody of prisoners, and protecting records and evidence in certain circumstances.

In addition to the guidelines in figure 3-14, disaster plans should include (1) the location and availability of resources such as heavy equipment and manpower to aid rescue efforts in the event of major structural damage, and (2) alternate means of communication, usually a radio with a self-contained power source. The plan should describe the frequencies or channels used and should identify the agencies on that channel.

In many jurisdictions, the likelihood of disasters is remote, and elaborate planning is thus not required. In these cases, elements of other existing emergency procedures will cover most situations.

Civil Disorder. There are two general types of disorders. In both, coordination with other law enforcement agencies is vital. First are disorders of a serious, long-term nature. These are general in scope, with widespread disturbances and possible curfews. Second are disorders that may have high levels of violence, but the incidents are of short duration and usually occur only during business hours.

During the first type of disorder, all nonessential services are suspended. The courts will usually remain open only to process demonstrators, looters, and others associated with the disorder. The second type of disorder may involve large groups of demonstrators who try to disrupt the judicial process through militant actions, to the point of trying to enter the courthouse. A sheriff's response to this situation is complicated by large numbers of people within the courthouse.

Civil disturbance procedures should include the following:

- Plans to secure or control all entrances and windows providing access to the courthouse;
- Policy on who is authorized to issue and use supplemental weapons such as shotguns, tear gas, and rifles;
- Policy on safeguarding prisoners and plans to protect vehicles;
- Mobilization plans for additional manpower;
- Feeding, relief, and housing procedures in case of a prolonged demonstration;
- Arrest procedures, including an operations plan and documentation procedures;
- Policy for use of photography (both still and movie) for record keeping.

Power/Utility Failure. In most cases, a power or utility failure is more an inconvenience than a true emergency. Some panic can develop in windowless courtrooms without emergency lighting, and people trapped in elevators need immediate attention and reassurance. Then too, some electrical locks will need to be unlocked by hand.

A power or utility failure plan should include (1) a list of the day and night emergency service numbers of all utilities and building engineer personnel; (2) the locations of all main electrical panels and cutoff points for gas, water, electricity, phones, and steam; and (3) emergency lighting for courts in session, key offices, temporary holding areas, and other designated locations.

Postevent Review of High-Risk Trials and Emergencies

As in hostage situations, a postevent review is important

Figure 3-16
BOMB SEARCH SYSTEMS¹⁸

	SEARCH BY: Supervisors	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES	THOROUGHNESS
SUPERVISORY	BEST for covert search POOR for thoroughness POOR for morale if detected	1. Covert 2. Fairly rapid 3. Loss of working time of supervisor only	1. Unfamiliarity with many areas 2. Will not look in dirty places 3. Covert search is difficult to maintain 4. Generally results in search of obvious areas, <i>not</i> hard to reach ones 5. Violation of privacy problems 6. Danger to unevacuated workers	50-65%
OCCUPANT	BEST for speed of search GOOD for thoroughness GOOD for morale (with confidence in training given beforehand)	1. Rapid 2. No privacy violation problem 3. Loss of work time for shorter period of time than for evacuation 4. Personal concern for own safety leads to good search 5. Personnel conducting search are familiar with area	1. Requires training of entire work force 2. Requires several practical training exercises 3. Danger to unevacuated workers	80-90%
TEAM	BEST for safety BEST for thoroughness BEST for morale POOR for lost work time	1. Thorough 2. No danger to workers who have been evacuated 3. Workers feel company cares for their safety	1. Loss of production time 2. Very slow operation 3. Requires comprehensive training and practice 4. Privacy violation problems	90-100%

here, too. If this review produces candid, constructive criticism, management can assess the value of existing procedures for special situations. The purpose of any review is to improve the quality of operations by ensuring that concerned parties know what was done properly and what was not. Suggested guidelines for conducting a review follow:

1. Hold a meeting of key personnel as soon as possible

after an incident occurs. The officer in charge should describe the incident and the procedures used to control it. This meeting is necessary because all participants may not be aware of what happened outside their own areas of responsibility.

2. Evaluate each procedure used during the incident in terms of its suitability for accomplishing its purpose. The need for procedural change can be identified here.

3. Evaluate individual performances in carrying out assigned tasks in a professional manner, being careful not to

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Treasury, p. 18.

“talk down” to anyone. Offer positive steps for improvement.

4. Briefly summarize the review findings.
5. Prepare a detailed report of the incident, problems encountered, and steps taken to overcome them, with recommendations for improved planning and procedures.
6. Revise the security plan, using the report as a basis.

BAILIFFS' MANUAL

This section discusses a recommended format and contents for preparing a bailiffs' manual. The information here is a combination of similar manuals developed and used by sheriffs' departments throughout California. The format and outline apply equally to court-appointed bailiffs and deputy sheriffs assigned as bailiffs.

Officers responsible for writing or revising a bailiffs' manual should use the contents section as a guide that they can change to fit individual circumstances. In jurisdictions with much courtroom activity — in terms of both caseloads and the number of courtrooms — the manual may be a major document exceeding 100 pages. In jurisdictions with limited activity, the book may be much smaller and could even be incorporated into an overall security procedures manual. This is especially true if the larger document spells out bailiffs' duties in particular cases, such as the manual described in the previous section of this chapter.

PURPOSE AND DESIGN

A bailiffs' manual provides clear, concise information and guidance. It is basically a “how to” document and describes many actions taken during the court process. The manual helps people who do not perform these duties on a full-time basis and is a ready reference for resolving the problems that may arise in daily activities.

During the field visits it was learned that many jurisdictions, particularly smaller rural departments, have either obsolete manuals or none at all. This puts the person serving as bailiff — especially a part-time person — at a decided disadvantage.

As noted before in this chapter, improper conduct by a bailiff has often been used successfully as the basis of a motion for mistrial or reversal in the appellate courts. Such incidents can be reduced if the bailiff can study and refer to comprehensive written instructions.

A well-prepared manual will do the following:

- Describe a bailiff's duties and responsibilities;
- Provide a source of information and reference that helps bailiffs better understand their role as court officers;
- Give basic background information on the legal and organizational framework within which the bailiff operates;
- Explain general procedures for courtroom and building security.

Bailiffs' manuals from different areas of the United States show no set format; rather, each has evolved to suit local circumstances. Although many bailiffs' manuals are permanently bound, the use of a looseleaf or similar temporary binder

should be considered. This format allows easy addition, removal, or change without the expense of a new printing, thus keeping the manual current. Detailed suggestions for manual design are included under the earlier section on the procedures manual.

CONTENTS

The first step is to prepare a topical outline, following the California model shown in appendix G as a general guide. Substitutions and deletions can be made freely, as needed. The topical outline should have enough detail so that the user can easily find a particular section of immediate interest.

The following discussion is a partial listing of subjects to include in the manual and is based on the bailiffs' manuals generally in use throughout California. A complete list of subjects is in the outline in appendix G.¹⁹

State Judicial System

As officers of the court, bailiffs should be generally familiar with the structure of the state judicial system. It is not necessary for them to memorize details, but pertinent data should be available for reference in the manual. This section also should have a good description of the state jury system, though the description need not be as comprehensive as the California model. However, in describing that system, the manual's authors should consult the district attorney to ensure completeness and accuracy.

Legal Requirements

In most states, legal requirements cover court responsibility for sheriffs or court-appointed officers. These requirements should be cited and quoted. Matters involving quotes of state statutes, state or U.S. court decisions, or anything with legal implications should be reviewed by a lawyer for accuracy and completeness. State codes are subject to periodic revision, and the manual should say that all codes cited were in effect when a manual was written or revised.

Organizational Structure and Responsibilities

If the size of a department warrants, the organization of the major division under which the bailiff's service falls should be shown. For each subdivision, prepare a diagram showing the rank and responsibilities of the unit commander and list those under that commander. For smaller departments, a detailed breakdown may not be necessary.

Bailiff's Duties

A bailiff's work can be described as both clerical and security duties. The first duty may include preparing various forms and keeping records on defendants and court activities. The scope of these duties should be clearly defined in writing. The bailiff must not be overburdened with clerical duties that are more appropriate for other court staff. Otherwise, a bailiff's effectiveness in security-related responsibilities is reduced. Of course, this view does not apply to those court-appointed bailiffs who may have minimal security tasks.

The bailiff may have primary court security responsibility or may share it with a security officer. These duties should be clearly defined in writing. They will vary among jurisdictions, but a typical list of duties would include the following:

- Bailiffs should promptly and properly obey all lawful orders and directions of the court.

¹⁹ Note that many of the items in the California outline are discussed in the earlier section of this chapter on the security procedures manual. As said before, each jurisdiction will have to decide whether to write two separate manuals or merge the bailiffs' and security procedures efforts. This chapter obviously gives fewer details about the bailiffs' manual than the one on overall procedures does.

- Bailiffs should maintain order in the courtroom to make sure that litigants, attorneys, court staff, and spectators conduct themselves properly.

- Bailiffs should cooperate with the court clerk and staff to assure that court proceedings run smoothly.

- Bailiffs must be alert and ready at all times to control unusual or unexpected situations in the courtroom.

- If they are law enforcement officers, bailiffs are not limited to courtroom duties. They also must be alert to violations of law outside the court.

- Bailiffs should be informative and courteous but, as noted before, they should not attempt to give legal advice or discuss the relative merits of a case. Such action might jeopardize or influence the results.

- Bailiffs should promptly submit all required reports and forms and relay any unusual circumstances or information to supervisors for evaluation and action.

The bailiffs' manual also could cover special considerations, such as responsibilities for jury security and care, how to handle in custody defendants, and the problems presented by situations such as juvenile hearings and hearings on mental competency. These and other special circumstances are discussed in detail under the procedures manual section of this chapter.

However, each locality must decide whether those topics are more suited to the bailiffs' manual or the security procedures manual.

A final point on content: For the sake of clarity and accuracy, all abbreviations used in the manual should be listed in a glossary. For example, CCP = Code of Civil Procedures, GC = Government Code, and PC = Penal Code.

CONCLUSION

The goal of an effective court security operation is to establish appropriate protective responses for all persons who are using the building and are part of the judicial process. To achieve this goal, it is important to have clear written policies and procedures. This chapter has provided general information and guidelines for developing both.

The major recommendation in this chapter is that each jurisdiction prepare or update both an overall security procedures manual and instructions for bailiffs. The latter can be either a separate document or part of the broader manual, but both guides are necessary for a truly effective court security operation.

Chapter 4

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Physical security is only one aspect of a total security program and usually has three elements: building structure, hardware or personnel used against intruders, and fire protection and safety. Physical security can be defined as a system of barriers designed to (1) *detect* intruders within protected areas and inform security forces of the intruders' presence, (2) either *delay* the arrival of intruders at their targets or *prevent* them from taking any action, and (3) *deter* potential intrusion. "System" is a key word in this definition; the systems approach to security requires that policy and procedures work together to achieve a unified effort.

This chapter examines certain aspects of physical security and how they fit into an overall court security plan. Architecture, equipment, security procedures, and personnel are discussed only briefly, since each is covered in a separate chapter. Rather, this chapter focuses on physical security surveys and how to conduct them. Using the methods outlined in this chapter, sheriffs can do a comprehensive security survey in any courthouse.

PHYSICAL SECURITY BARRIERS

Physical security involves setting up such barriers as fences, locks, gates, vaults, alarm systems, sensory devices, and lighting, in addition to using guards, watchmen, and dogs. Barriers define the physical limits of an area and prevent entry. They should be considered the "time delay" part of a security program because they make entry into a building or area more difficult and thus more time consuming.¹

This chapter discusses physical security barriers in these five general categories:

1. Natural
2. Structural
3. Electrical or energy
4. Human
5. Animal

Natural barriers include rivers, cliffs, mountains, ravines, steep grades, and similar topographical conditions. An architect can sometimes take advantage of these natural features, but a determined intruder usually can overcome these barriers easily. Thus, natural barriers are often more effective when used with one or more of the other types of barrier.

Structural barriers are man-made and usually include fences, walls, doors, gates, grilles, and windows. These barriers control entry into a building and key areas inside it.

Electrical or energy barriers include lights, sensory devices, alarms, closed-circuit television, and electrically operated communications systems.

Human barriers, the core of any physical security system, include law enforcement officers, guards, and watchmen.

As **animal barriers**, dogs have been used widely in law enforcement and security work. They can be patrol animals accompanying the handler and acting only on command. Or they might be trained to act independently within a building or an enclosed area, such as a storage yard. When used without a handler, dogs can learn to attack any intruder on sight. Note that dogs must be used regularly and also retrained as needed, so they will keep their specialized skills. Their use in court security has been limited to search situations involving persons and explosives and on occasion to augmenting control of demonstrations outside a courthouse, directed at a specific trial.

PHYSICAL SECURITY IN COURTS TODAY

A court security program is somewhat different from industrial or governmental security programs, where one must protect both a building and sensitive or classified information, with the latter perhaps requiring security clearances for certain personnel. For example, court and county records, unless sealed by court order, are in the public domain. Moreover, the employees who handle those records are hired under a state or county civil service program or a merit program and seldom have thorough background checks. Some large sheriffs' departments, where increasing stress is placed on the officer, may use background checks and even psychological evaluations in personnel selection. However, in smaller jurisdictions, employment may be based on personal knowledge of the person applying, and sheriffs' departments usually have no formal background investigation programs.

Whatever the differences in security programs, in the last 10 years violence directed at public institutions, including courthouses, has shown the need for protective security systems. However, those systems should not interfere with the activities of the institutions they protect. Therefore, as noted elsewhere in this manual, the security planner must set up a

¹ Richard Post and Arthur A. Kingsbury, *Security Administration: An Introduction*, 3rd ed. (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1977), p. 478.

system that strikes a balance between physical security and building operations.

Court security can be improved by simple physical changes for reasonable costs. The checklist in appendix H gives some ideas for inexpensive security improvements, such as external lights, quality locks and hardware on doors and windows, intrusion alarms, and duress alarms and emergency lighting in the courtroom.

Many jurisdictions have recognized court security requirements and have taken effective steps to meet those needs. On the other hand, some people have viewed sophisticated equipment as a single answer to most security problems. Actually, a balanced mix of architecture, manpower, and equipment is necessary, as discussed in the following sections.

ARCHITECTURE

The most cost-effective way to improve overall security is to incorporate security features in the design of a courthouse. Courthouses built before the mid-1970s show few, if any, security considerations, but incidents during the late 1960s and early 1970s caused a major shift in thinking, and renovations became necessary. Older courthouses were modified, with all but the necessary entrances closed and entry to judges' chambers restricted. For a brief period, overreaction caused large sums of money to be spent hastily and sometimes unwisely. For example, one western courthouse is reported to have spent \$700,000 to change one courtroom for a high-risk trial. In some cases, funds appropriated for a certain year had to be spent or they were lost; this situation resulted in an emphasis on spending rather than getting the best value.

Many architects designing courthouses today are concerned with security. Better prisoner circulation is being planned, public circulation is more clearly defined, and restricted or controlled areas are isolated to increase security for judges, their staff, and jurors. However, despite the new security awareness, many unnecessary and costly mistakes are still being made and must be corrected after construction (see chapter 7). For example, even some of the newer courthouses do not have witness waiting rooms where witnesses are separated from possible encounters with prisoners or their relatives and friends.

MANPOWER IMPACT

Personnel are the key to a physical security program for courts. They guard buildings and some occupants, operate or monitor equipment, apprehend intruders, and respond to any security problem within a building. However, court violence in recent years showed that security personnel often were not able to cope with such situations. For example, many security officers and bailiffs were older and not physically or psychologically prepared to deal with violence.

This problem was solved through personnel selection and training. First, younger, more agile men were assigned to courts where incidents were likely. Also, there was emphasis on selecting officers who were psychologically prepared and had shown sound judgment and self-control in times of stress. Second, there was greater emphasis on specialized training to

help officers deal with a variety of incidents. This training focused on such areas as civil disturbance control, dealing with disturbed persons, bomb threats and high-risk trial procedures, special weapons training, first aid, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).

EQUIPMENT

With the increased security awareness in recent years, many new developments have occurred in the equipment field. Following is a list of equipment most likely to be used for protecting courthouses and courtrooms. Chapter 5 discusses these items in greater detail.

- Perimeter and exterior building lights to help deter and detect intruders (note that lighting is more valuable if combined with periodic inspection or patrol of an area);
- Door and window locks and improved electrical and mechanical lock systems;
- Alarm systems to protect a building at night or serve the courtroom in emergencies;
- Closed-circuit television (CCTV) to monitor large spaces with limited personnel;
- Magnetometers (metal detectors) available in three basic models: portable walk-through, hand-held, and units permanently installed in courtroom door frames;
- Cameras to photograph spectators before they are admitted to high-risk trials (part of a search screen operation).

IDEAS ABOUT PHYSICAL SECURITY

The lack of unified opinions on physical security makes the security planner's job more difficult, since the planner must deal with the different views of judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, court administrators, and interested groups in the general public.

Judges are particularly conscious of the need to protect the individual rights of all involved in the trial process. Thus, they may not support all of the security planner's recommendations. Prosecutors generally have a similar view; however, when directly threatened, both groups may want the strongest possible security measures taken. Defense attorneys usually object to many physical security measures, which they believe create a bad image for their clients and thus prejudice their cases. The general public tends to accept "reasonable" measures with few complaints, while some groups strongly oppose certain measures.

Within each group, there are often differences of opinion. For example, judges who have been exposed directly or indirectly to court-related violence are more receptive to physical security measures than those who have never come in contact with such violence. Some judges in the first group may actually prefer to be armed when on the bench.

THE PHYSICAL SECURITY SURVEY

This survey is a critical onsite examination and analysis of the court building. It determines the present security status, identifies a lack or excess of security, determines what protection is needed, and recommends ways to improve the situation.² Two key factors in any physical security or crime prevention survey are identifying risks or opportunities for crime and recommending ways to address these weaknesses.³ A comprehensive physical security survey will provide the facts needed to develop a good security plan.

¹ Raymond M. Mombasse, *Industrial Security for Strikes, Riots, and Disasters* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1968), p. 13.

² Arthur A. Kingsbury, *Introduction to Security and Crime Prevention Surveys* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1973), p. 6.

The following information will give the security planner some basic ideas on how to conduct physical security surveys. Note, however, that any survey must be designed to fit individual circumstances, and these suggestions may have to be adjusted to particular needs.

SURVEY ELEMENTS

A comprehensive physical security survey takes into account all aspects of a building and its nearby grounds, including both internal and external spaces, structural features, equipment, and the activities of building occupants. Appendix H lists many topics to consider in the survey.

Structure

This includes all outside and inside building elements—e.g., lighting, doors, windows, entrances, hallways, stairways, offices, courtrooms, service areas, temporary holding cells, safes, vaults, and records storage areas. The survey should include all spaces, including both public and restricted or controlled areas, regardless of their tenants.

Equipment

The availability and use of equipment is a key aspect of physical security. Different types of equipment available for courthouse use are discussed in chapter 5. A survey should identify the types of equipment used, their effectiveness, and possible equipment needs.

Perimeter

Areas near the court building that may influence security include parking spaces, public parks around the courthouse (often found in smaller communities), fences, gates, and lighting.

Noncourt Tenants

When a courthouse is also occupied by noncourt agencies, it is better to conduct a comprehensive, buildingwide survey rather than one limited to court areas. Many jurisdictions limit the study to courts and their related functions, but this could cause serious gaps in overall building security. The needs of all occupants can best be met by including them all in the survey. It is important to convince noncourt agencies of the benefits of participating, and that the security survey can perform a needed service at minimal cost by identifying weaknesses and potential problems. Tenants with a strong internal security operation should participate through a joint venture arrangement, for example, as their special skills may contribute significantly to the overall study.

Work Schedules

Survey personnel should be thoroughly acquainted with the normal operating hours of all building occupants. Also important are the hours for closing all or part of a certain floor or the entire building, weekend operations, and any special considerations (such as use of building space for civic functions).

SURVEY ACTIVITIES

The survey's success depends largely on how complete basic presurvey activities are. To build a good foundation for the study, security planners must take the following actions.

Prepare a Needs Statement

There may be many reasons for conducting a survey. For example, such an effort may never have been done before and is needed to revise the current security plan. Or a previous study may be obsolete because of later structural or procedural changes. Then too, there may be recent incidents or evidence of serious deficiencies to consider, and a survey could point out ways to correct those problems.

Describe Survey Goals and Objectives

The goals statement should be general—for example, “to improve overall physical security by identifying specific areas needing attention and by recommending necessary courses of action.”

The objectives statement identifies specific actions to meet survey goals. Objectives must be realistic (i.e., based on an assessment of actual security needs) and within the limits of funding and manpower levels set by legislative authority. Objectives may include increasing security for the courtrooms, judges, and jurors; defining circulation patterns for prisoners, court officials, and the public; reducing thefts; developing a comprehensive alarm system; improving emergency response time; upgrading the system by purchasing equipment; and improving temporary detention facilities.

Identify Authorizing Agency or Individual and Determine Responsibility for Carrying Out Recommendations

The survey may have been authorized by the presiding judge, sheriff, court administrator, or board of supervisors, and one of those authorities may have to carry out survey recommendations. There should be a clear intent to act on those recommendations, which may mean spending money and/or making manpower adjustments.

Those requesting the study should understand that costs for implementing recommendations should be included in a regular budget or a special appropriation request. Similarly, the agency that will carry out survey recommendations needs a thorough understanding of the budget process and any fiscal limits that may affect implementation. For example, funds may be needed for more than one year.

Select the Team

The best qualified people available should be on the survey team. The group should include persons with specialized skills (e.g., in communications or alarms) and those with experience in managing and conducting security programs. Technical knowledge in court security methods and special community requirements would be desirable, and previous survey experience is helpful but not required. Team members may be drawn from other government agencies or private consultants.

The individuals selected need sound judgment and reasoning, should speak well and communicate effectively with others, and should be good writers. They need to be mature enough to deal with judges, court administrators, and senior members of tenant agencies; often they will need tact and diplomacy to overcome resistance and gain cooperation.

Develop a Format

Physical security experts have tried to develop a single model survey format and have concluded that this is not possible. No two surveys are the same, and the willingness to try new approaches is important. Basic elements are common to

every comprehensive survey, but each one develops from the unique circumstances of the building involved.

As a first step in developing a survey format, the survey team should prepare a list of major areas of concern. Figure 4-1 divides those areas into two general categories: physical and procedural. (The procedural areas can be identified by reviewing a security procedures manual, if one exists.) This division offers an orderly source of information for presenting findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and will make the survey report easier to write.

For each area, security or security-related questions should be worded so that the response can be a simple "yes" or "no," although sometimes a narrative response may be more appropriate. Good surveys will require both kinds of questions. Usually, the question "why" does not need to be asked after a "no" response. For example, a negative answer to the question: "Are functioning locks provided for all doors to the

courtroom?" does not require further explanation. The purpose of the survey is to offer recommendations, not to explain why the locks are not there. In this example, the recommendation might be to purchase six key-operated, dead-bolt, cylinder locks for the courtroom doors at an estimated cost of \$120.

Appendix H lists examples of survey questions. When developing a security questionnaire, there is no set order for listing the questions; whatever works best should be used. For example, going from general subjects to specific ones is a possible approach. At any rate, the format used should make it easy to divide responsibility among the surveyors. Finally, the survey questionnaire format should provide a clear, simple picture of conditions, and any detailed notes taken during the survey will add to that picture.

Gather Data

Much information about a building is already available and

**Figure 4-1
AREAS OF CONCERN IN A PHYSICAL SECURITY SURVEY**

Physical	Procedural
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exterior <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perimeter (e.g., fences, gates) Lights Parking areas Access roads Landscaping Building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Doors, windows, other openings Ceilings, walls Interior lights (including main switches and fuses) Emergency power system Alarm systems Safes and vaults Fire protection Utility control points Attics, basements, crawl spaces, air-conditioning and heating ducts Elevators, stairways Storage areas for arms and dangerous substances Communications areas Records storage areas Conference rooms Public areas (waiting areas, rest rooms, hallways) Food service areas Offices handling money Noncourt offices Courtrooms and related areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Courtrooms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Location Doors, windows, other openings Lights Furnishings Security devices Chambers and related offices (e.g., secretaries, clerks) Clerk of the court Witness waiting rooms Attorney-client conference rooms Jury deliberation rooms Grand jury room Prisoner reception area Restricted and secure passageways Temporary holding areas Security equipment storage area 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emergency plans (e.g., fire, bomb threat, evacuation) Visitor control <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Courthouse Courtroom Separate circulation routes (for prisoners, court staff, and general public) Alarm response General court security procedures Night court requirements Building security procedures Building fire and safety codes Key and lock control Employee security orientation and training Shipping, receiving, and trash disposal Cash transfer Package inspection Tenant activity requirements (e.g., hours, number of visitors)

can be gathered by the team before the actual survey. These data may include the following:

- Previous survey reports or studies;
- Floor plans from the building's engineers, manager, or architect;
- Inventory of all security equipment;
- Incident reports from sheriffs or other local law enforcement or peace officers;
- Operating regulations for the building;
- Traffic volume (number of visitors, defendants, etc.) and number of trials (jury, nonjury);
- Security or operating procedures established by the sheriff or building tenants;
- The community's fire code.

This represents the survey's initial data base. Previous surveys or studies are particularly important, since they should reveal prior security problems and recommendations. At this time, or as the survey goes on, it is possible to find out how many previous recommendations were implemented or even why certain ones were not. This information is important to the current survey because it may identify obstacles that otherwise are not readily apparent.

Meet with Department Heads of Tenant Agencies

No matter what their purpose, surveys often meet with suspicion and resistance, which are usually overcome by laying the proper groundwork. This can be done through a meeting of the sheriff and survey team members with all concerned tenant managers to explain the survey, answer all questions, and ask for their cooperation and ideas about security risks and possible solutions. This meeting, to be held when the survey team is ready to begin, should identify who requested and authorized the effort; introduce survey team members and cite their special skills; and explain how the survey will work. Tenants also should be told when to expect the team to visit their offices.

During the meeting, tenants should be asked to cooperate by providing information about their operations. This may include copies of operating orders and a statement of what their offices do, the number of personnel and daily visitors, special security problems (e.g., involving records or money), and any other data needed to complete the survey. This information should be gathered before the onsite visit.

The tenants should be informed that more meetings will be held after the draft findings and recommendations are completed, to ensure accuracy and provide an opportunity to discuss matters individually before final recommendations are made. This point often assures the tenants that the survey is meant to help them, too.

Based on this meeting, the team should try to assess the attitudes and willingness of individual department and agency heads to implement change.

Conduct the Survey

Two or more people should conduct the survey whenever possible. This encourages the use of specialized skills in evaluating specific areas—e.g., fire safety and prevention, communications, and alarms. Teamwork also reduces the time needed to conduct the survey, evaluate findings, develop recommendations, and prepare the final report. The team concept helps stimulate thoughts and ideas, allowing professionals to

discuss their ideas with one another. Better recommendations often result.

It is important to have a system that allows the most complete collection of information. A small building may be surveyed by a two-person team, while larger buildings may require more people. The number needed to conduct the survey will be determined by the scope and depth of the effort.

Along with the questionnaire, other aspects of the survey are personal observation, interviews, and gathering documents not previously collected. In large, multistory buildings, it is usually better to conduct the survey floor by floor. This may seem repetitious, but the procedure usually gives a clearer understanding of findings and recommendations and offers a logical separation by tenant areas. The equipment inventory should be verified at this time.

All notes and questionnaires should be saved as part of the permanent record and as reference material. These data should be combined with information collected in the presurvey activities; the combined materials will be the basis for the report.

SURVEY REPORT

The report is the most important part of the survey. It is a permanent record of findings, conclusions, and recommendations and may include an implementation plan. The report gives management a clear understanding of current security conditions and what changes are needed. It provides a basis for improving security through additional manpower, training, and equipment, and through changes in structure and procedures.

Format

This is a matter of preference, and there are many acceptable styles. However, remember that the value of a report is lessened if it is not clear, concise, easy to read, and well organized. The outline in figure 4-2 has been used for many studies; persons writing the survey report may find this outline a helpful guide.

Contents

The **background** section provides information gathered before the survey, including the following:

- The requesting authority and purpose of the survey (discussed earlier under **Survey Activities** in this chapter);
- Members of the survey team (include parent agency and a brief summary of experience and technical specialties);
- Dates the survey was started and completed;
- Previous surveys and studies and an assessment of future security threats. This assessment helps define security problems and can be based on (1) past trial experience, including common factors in trials; (2) data such as population density, distribution, ethnic breakdown, and economic status; and (3) the potential for criminal acts such as burglary and for natural or man-made disasters common to the area;
- A brief description of the facility, including outside grounds, type of building construction, age, number of floors, approximate square footage, and any other significant descriptions (details should be included later in the report);
- Tenant agencies and the number of employees working in the facility. If the number of agencies is small, staff members can be listed by title. If there are many agencies in the building, it may be better to list them in an appendix;

- The agency responsible for courthouse and courtroom security (describe security provided for both working and nonworking hours);
- Summary of security incidents in the building during the past five or more years. If many incidents occurred, they may be included in an appendix.

Figure 4-2
SURVEY REPORT FORMAT

- I. Background
 - A. Requesting agency and authority to conduct survey
 - B. Purpose of survey
 - C. Survey team
 - D. Dates survey conducted
 - E. Previous surveys and studies and preliminary assessment of security threats
 - F. The facility
 1. Description
 2. Agency responsible for security
 3. Tenant agencies
 4. Summary of security incidents
- II. Summary of findings and conclusions
- III. Summary of recommendations
- IV. Detailed findings, conclusions, and recommendations
- V. Appendices
 - A. Tenant agencies
 - B. Courtroom sketches
 - C. Security equipment inventory
 - D. Funding implications (by agency and category)
(Others as needed)

The summary of findings and conclusions should be presented in one or two paragraphs, and the summary of recommendations should briefly list major points. Examples of the latter: "Window and door hardware and locks on the first floor should be replaced (estimated cost \$700)" or "Additional equipment for court security should be provided (estimated cost \$4,500)." Funding implications for the agencies concerned should be listed in appendices, with a breakdown by agency of costs for manpower, training, equipment, and structural change.

The presentation of detailed findings, conclusions, and recommendations depends on the size and structure of the courthouse. For multistory buildings, it may be best to present details floor by floor or by functional groups (i.e., those with similar activities). Recommendations can be grouped together at the end of the narrative or presented throughout the text but should always be specific and easy to understand, with alternative courses of action suggested whenever possible. All recommendations should be numbered in sequence.

Any supplemental material should be included in appendices to reduce the volume of the main text. Appendices may include office sketches (architects' floor plans are not necessary), statistical data, and inventories.

Draft Report

The team should use all the data gathered to draft the findings and conclusions, then carefully review this section for accuracy and obtain any additional data needed. Team members can use the findings and conclusions as a basis for developing recom-

mendations, including various alternatives. In recommending equipment, they should not specify brand names, and should remember that certain security devices, such as doors and locks, must be approved by the local fire marshal. Surveyors should give both complete cost estimates and personnel data when training programs are suggested. Structural recommendations should include time and cost factors and any anticipated interference with normal building operations. Finally, a plan for implementing the recommendations can be included with the draft.

When the draft report is ready, the team should have individual conferences with the officers and tenants responsible for different procedures or areas. This allows those groups to express different opinions, clarify points, and correct errors. Offering managers the opportunity to review recommendations on their activities before the final report is written is a matter of courtesy and good management. It may also prevent minor errors of fact or interpretation which could adversely affect acceptance of the overall report. Moreover, many managers will start implementing the recommendations based on this review, a fact that can be noted in the final report. When these conferences are completed, the final report should be written.

Final Report

The team should notify the requesting agency or individual when the report is complete. All key personnel responsible for carrying out recommendations should be invited to an oral presentation of the final report by the team members. Some departments give advance copies of the report to persons attending this meeting, while others prefer to distribute the report after the presentation; this is a matter of individual preference. At the presentation, survey team members should be prepared to defend their ideas with facts and must be familiar with the results and impact of each recommendation on both the security program and daily building operations.

POSTSURVEY ACTIVITIES

Carrying Out Recommendations

Usually, all managers in a surveyed building will be asked to review security recommendations affecting their operations and to indicate, preferably in writing, which ones they are prepared to implement. The managers should give written explanations for those that will not be carried out. However, remember that only departments of the requesting authority and the sheriff's office can be *required* to prepare implementation plans. Other tenants can only be *encouraged* to do so, and their actions may need approval from parent organizations.

Implementation plans should state basic objectives and resources (e.g., manpower, money, time, professional services, space), though the plans need not be highly detailed. Especially helpful is a work plan, in the form of a chart showing dates to start and complete major activities. If a department lacks the skill to prepare this plan, it should seek help from the county planning officer.

Followup Inspection

Finally, many excellent surveys have had little effect because there was no followup review of the actions taken to carry out recommendations. The requesting authority should be urged to require periodic inspections and reports on whether actions have begun. Later, it will be important to develop an ongoing monitoring system to evaluate the effects of those actions.

Chapter 5

EQUIPMENT

Equipment is an important part of court security. It may include electronic or mechanical devices, such as a basic intrusion alarm system or walk-through or hand-held magnetometers, as well as more sophisticated items such as microwave alarms, closed-circuit television (CCTV), and infrared viewing and photography devices. However, equipment alone is not the solution to a security problem; at best, it is a supportive tool when used by trained personnel in a well-prepared plan or procedure.

This chapter gives guidance on what equipment is needed and standards for choosing the right items. The chapter also suggests ways to improve procurement procedures and discusses various types of equipment used for court security.

BACKGROUND

STATE OF THE ART

During the past 20 years, rapid advances have occurred in all fields of technology, especially in specialized security equipment. Transistors and microminiature circuitry have made possible devices that were considered science fiction only a few years ago: intrusion detection systems, night viewing devices that use amplified star light, and individual transceivers (transmitter-receivers) and weapons that easily fit into a pocket or can be hidden in even smaller areas.

Figures 5-1 through 5-3 show the current state of the art for detection devices, signalling and communications systems, and protective technology that can be used in courthouses. However, the state of the art is constantly changing and should always be evaluated, since most items have built-in obsolescence. Developments are so rapid that by the time one idea is put into production a new and improved one is underway.

KEY PLANNING ISSUES

Planners must consider many factors before they install a protection system. To prevent serious budget problems, planners should evaluate needs, cost effectiveness, and manpower requirements. A security systems expert can design a secure, sophisticated protection system using the latest developments in alarms, CCTV, sensor devices, and physical barriers. However, it does not make sense to have a \$25,000 system guarding \$2-3,000 worth of assets.

In addition, image building should never be the main reason for getting equipment. For example, buying an expensive X-ray screening device to impress others can backfire when

the unit is almost never used. This kind of waste could affect future efforts to get approval and funds for essential equipment, especially high-cost items such as CCTV and sophisticated electronic systems.

Equipment is seldom a complete substitute for manpower. For instance, alarm systems require a security force response, and a CCTV camera is of little value if no one is available to monitor it and respond when necessary. More equipment often means a reduction in manpower, but cost comparisons should be made first. Figure 5-4 shows how to estimate costs for both equipment and manpower.

To determine the cost effectiveness of a piece of equipment, compare the total estimated costs for both equipment and people performing the same function. An example of this type of comparison is in figure 5-5, using the equations in figure 5-4. Note that manpower costs are involved in both estimates, since personnel are needed to monitor and operate equipment and respond to an emergency situation. When the two total estimated costs are computed over the expected lifetime of the equipment (perhaps 10 years), one can determine which solution will cost less.

To summarize, major equipment purchases should be part of a thorough and well-documented budget plan. Required manpower estimates should be in line with equipment procurement projections to keep the security department from having too much equipment and not enough manpower to use it properly.

Finally, all equipment and supplies issued to a department should be recorded in a proper accountability record system, which will be the basis for inventories and audits. Records should be kept of all requisitions, purchases, deliveries, and related correspondence. Good records will provide a supervisor with readily available information on quantities in stock, what has been issued to whom, and what needs to be reordered.

EQUIPMENT SELECTION STANDARDS

To select the best equipment at the lowest cost, security planners should follow certain standards or guidelines. Figure 5-6 lists some suggested standards, which are discussed in the following sections.

NEED

The need for equipment may be apparent after a security

Figure 5-1

DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

TECHNIQUE	OPERATION	COMMENT
<i>At building perimeters or boundaries</i>		
Photoelectric beams Visible light Infrared light	Establish light beams from point to point along outside boundaries of courthouse; person or object interrupting beams activates alarm through light source and receiver	Works during hours of darkness
Floodlights	Light building exterior decoratively and allow personnel or TV monitor surveillance	Personnel must observe directly or on monitors
Closed-circuit television (CCTV)	Normal TV cameras for daylight or floodlit buildings and ultrasensitive cameras for unlit night surveillance; monitors also can be fitted with automatic detectors to activate alarms	Unless automatic detector used, requires constant attention
<i>At building entrances</i>		
Door alarms Magnetic switch Mechanical switch Open or closed circuit	Applied to doors, windows, gates, etc.; alarms locally (buzzer on door), remotely, or both when door opened by key or force	Can be connected to commercial, police, or security staff central office; alarm location identified by central office equipment
Wall vibration pickups	Applied to walls to sense and amplify unusual vibration levels, send remote or local alarm; sensitive to sledge hammer blows, boring drills, etc.	Main use: vaults, safes, prone to false alarm at normal building vibration levels
Light sensors	Detect light entering when safe or closed dark space is opened; remote alarm routine	Very sensitive and reliable
<i>Inside building</i>		
Switch cords and mats	Placed near entrance, sounds local or remote alarm when depressed	Signals entrance
Ultrasensitive microphone	Picks up indistinct room sounds; can give possible false alarm by detecting rodents, cats, birds, street noises	Best used in vacated buildings; otherwise false alarm given on normal activity
Microwave	Small wall transmitters and receiver(s) flood corridors and rooms with "radar-like" energy; adjusted and calibrated to space; detects movement of greater than set minimum velocity and objects of greater than set minimum size. Signals locally or remotely when beam disturbed	Possible false alarms on electrical interference from radios, elevators, etc.; can be jammed and deceived
Ultrasonic	Similar to microwave but emits sound energy of higher than audible frequency; has transmitter (loudspeaker) and receiver (microphone)	Prone to false alarm on air movement from heat, wind, vibration, vents, blowers; can be jammed and deceived
CCTV	Similar to "building perimeter" application	Similar to "building perimeter" comments
Capacitance	Safes, file cabinets; detects change in electronic capacitance to ground when person touches it	Not too reliable; setup may be too complex

**Figure 5-1
DETECTION TECHNOLOGY (Continued)**

TECHNIQUE	OPERATION	COMMENT
Door alarms Wall vibration pickup Light sensors <i>At doorways, turnstiles, desks, gates, search point, and in corridors</i>	Similar to operation at building entrances	Similar to "building entrance" comments
Magnetometer	Senses alteration in normal magnetic field when magnetic metals (steel, iron) brought near	No radiation from devices; when sensitive enough to detect weapons reliably, it can also detect keys, coins
	Can detect concealed guns, knives, metal combs, tools, ice picks, etc., that are carried on persons or in packages; alarm signals audible or visual, local or remote	Can fail to detect weapons when made insensitive to false alarms; useful to screen possible weapons carriers and limit number of personal searches
	Models are hand-held (nightstick size) and fixed (two tall tubes); aimed at person or walk between tubes—immediate reaction	Can be useful to locate metallic objects, but frisking still necessary
X-ray	Compact machine radiates into packages; X-ray film, including Polaroid, used for indicator	Can detect weapons hidden in items ordinarily not opened: portable radios, tape recorders, briefcases with false bottoms, etc. Not useful if packages can be opened. Film must be developed; relatively slow indication. Trained interpreter must read picture for dynamite, bomb components, other eye discrimination. Cannot be used on persons (X-rays harmful)

Source: F. Michael Wong, *Space Management and the Courts: Design Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1973), p. 109.

**Figure 5-2
SIGNALLING AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY**

TECHNIQUE	OPERATION	COMMENT
<i>Duress alarms</i>		
Alarm button concealed and fixed to bench, desk, chair, etc.	Connected by wire or radio system (see below) to remote courthouse location. About 4" x 2" x 1". Connects to central office where space identified; alarm network can cover many spaces	Useful in courtrooms, chambers, other offices; unobtrusive; reliable and precise, usually difficult to activate false alarm. Location depends on personal judgment—in court, probably at bench. Courtroom/courthouse must be wired, if wire device used; to connect each location; can give local alarm (in courtroom) if desired
		<i>Remote surveillance: transmission of courtroom procedures and remote space activity for observation elsewhere</i>
Alarm button concealed on person	Similar to above; cigarette-pack size radio transmitter signals to receiver and relays to central station; transmitting frequency and possibly other signal characteristics identify unit, person carrying it, and assumed location; not restricted to one location; can be transferred to another person	Similar to above except does not directly identify location, only bearer; simpler to install than wired alarms; needs additional equipment to activate local alarm

Figure 5-2
SIGNALLING AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (Continued)

TECHNIQUE	OPERATION	COMMENT
Closed-circuit television (CCTV)	TV cameras fixed to walls, ceilings; operated from remote location; zoom or turret lenses; transmits picture of space to monitor via wires. In courtroom application, as for defendant tried <i>in absentia</i> , can be manually operated in studio-type situation. A monitor panel for camera network throughout courthouse is feasible, as are automatic monitors to detect movement; normal cameras ultrasensitive for low light levels	Manual or automatic/manual monitoring needed (continual manual monitoring is fatiguing); can reduce security manpower patrol duties. When used for <i>in absentia</i> trials, may require special legal precaution; should not be subject to possibility of unauthorized recording
Film cameras	As in banks, automatically operated, remotely activated cameras photograph persons in emergencies for subsequent identification	Possible use as evidence and identification for apprehension
Audio	Emergency-activated system transmits courtroom situation to central security office. Can be used effectively in secured private areas and to monitor other public zones	Possible right to privacy complaints
<i>Communications</i>		
A. Point-to-point, wired: telephones, intercom	Emergency signalling with special dial codes to and from security offices; party-line broadcasts of emergency messages from central security office to all others	Telephone on cradle also used in system to pick up and transmit sounds to prearranged receiver under local or remote control
B. Sound broadcasting: audio public address (PA) system	Broadcasts to public in crowd- and riot-control operations or to security personnel control operations; gives notice of evacuations, fires; in selected spaces and times, gives public information on calendars, court locations; can call participants into court	
C. Mobile: Radio Portable "walkie-talkie" Fixed or portable central station Broadcast or two-way operation Voice transmissions or alarm signals	Broadcast messages throughout courthouse from central transmitter to unlimited number of portable receivers—voice or alarm signals; two-way transmissions throughout courthouse between central transmit/receive station and limited number of portable transceivers; multichannel capability to handle multiple communications simultaneously, either broadcast or two-way; coverage throughout courthouse, including all closed rooms, sub-basements, elevators; selective calling capacity to address specific receivers	Requires FCC license and frequency allocations; portable units are battery operated, can be small and secreted, if desired; system can connect to PA or telephone systems; courtroom alarms can feed system; integrates into courthouse communications for normal (nonsecurity) operations; receivers can be silent (visual alarm notifies bearer to phone or take other specific action) or squelched (silent except when called)

Source: Wong, p. 110

**Figure 5-3
PROTECTIVE TECHNOLOGY**

TECHNIQUE	OPERATION	COMMENT
Mechanical locks	Conventional lock-and-key systems with hierarchical mastering	Various devices using mechanical and magnetic keys inserted in lock activate it; function only to lock and unlock access (no record keeping); locks difficult to alter; difficult to limit availability of keys; most keys easily duplicated
Electrical locks	Lock operated by electrical solenoids, not conventional key; activated by switch (push-button on desk, etc.) or insert of magnetically coded card; lock measures magnetic code and activates itself, if set for that code; key cards issued to personnel as keys can also be ID cards; hierarchical mastering possible; control of all or some courthouse locks from central office possible, i.e., to seal off particular area	Magnetic keys difficult to duplicate; code usually cannot be changed; new key card must be made if lock code is changed by rewiring or inserting a permanent or temporary code card; standby power source required; locks can be networked into door alarm system, replacing separate alarms
Computer-controlled locks	As above, but with coded control and recording capability provided by small digital computer wired to all courthouse locks. Computer determines key cards allowed to activate each lock, according to memory-stored list; hierarchical mastering associated with key card code also can be assigned to bearer for predetermined access; one key per person for any number of doors; lock time control by central computer can be programmed to lock public doors after hours; status of all locks (open or closed) computer-monitored; custodial operations included	Record kept, printed out each time lock opened and by which key; list of key/door authorizations can be modified at central computer in real time. Overriding control by computer can open or close any lock selectively; locked doors automatically re-lock and cannot be left open; computer will automatically signal malfunction, blocked door, etc.; feasible to check automatically from central office any door left open. Systems will capture bogus key cards.

Source: Wong, p. 111.

**Figure 5-4
ESTIMATED MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT COSTS**

Estimated manpower cost

(Salary + overhead + cost of living increase) x no. of persons involved x no. of years = TOTAL ESTIMATED MANPOWER COST

Estimated equipment cost

Initial cost + installation + operating costs + maintenance = TOTAL ESTIMATED EQUIPMENT COST

Salary = Average annual deputy sheriff's salary
 Overhead = 25 to 30 percent of average salary (includes retirement, health and liability insurance, unemployment compensation, etc.)
 Cost of living = Estimated annual increase
 Number of years = Projected life of equipment
 Operating costs = Estimated annual cost for supplies, power, etc. x estimated equipment life in years
 Maintenance = Estimated or actual cost of annual service contract x estimated equipment life in years

Figure 5-5
SAMPLE COST COMPARISON

Security problem: How to maintain security in a restricted corridor

Solution no. 1: Use CCTV to monitor the corridor.

Estimated cost:

Initial cost	\$ _____
Installation	_____
Operating cost	_____
Maintenance	_____
Manpower costs to monitor equipment, respond in case of emergency	_____
TOTAL ESTIMATED EQUIPMENT COSTS	\$ _____

Solution no. 2: Have deputies patrol corridors.

Estimated cost:

(Salary + overhead + cost of living increase) x no. of persons to patrol halls and respond to an emergency x no. of years = **TOTAL ESTIMATED MANPOWER COST**

survey or change in operating procedures. The determination can be made independently or with the aid of a security equipment expert, who often can help prevent needless expenditure. The need should be clear and easy to explain, so that the right equipment can be matched to that need. This is important to assure the purchase of an effective item that does not have costly extra features.

SUITABILITY AND PERFORMANCE

Performance specifications should be drafted from the needs statement. These detailed requirements will define what a piece of equipment is expected to do and will help determine the best kind of equipment to buy. Performance specifications are discussed in more detail later in this chapter in the **Guide to Procurement Procedures**.

Matching the performance specifications against a technical data sheet for the item being considered should determine whether the equipment can do the job needed. This review will also alert planners to sales agents who may be selling them unnecessary items or features.

Figure 5-6
EQUIPMENT SELECTION CRITERIA

Need	Compatibility
Suitability	Cost
Performance	Manpower impact
Reliability	Space needs
Obsolescence	Installation
Availability	Maintenance
Design limitations	

RELIABILITY, OBSOLESCENCE, AND AVAILABILITY

The items purchased should have proven reliability. Ask other buyers about their experiences. A new product may have unexpected "bugs" which show up after purchase and

installation and may mean excessive maintenance. A courthouse cannot afford to be the test site for those new items.

Items purchased should be within the state of the art and not currently or nearly obsolete. Bargain prices are often offered for items going out of production or being substantially changed in design. Such items seem like bargains but may become useless in the long run because service and parts are unavailable.

If possible, limit procurement to a product offered as a standard shelf item and available within a reasonable time. Some items have such a limited demand that they are only manufactured by special order, which can greatly delay installation.

DESIGN LIMITATIONS

All electromechanical equipment has built-in design limits. These should be identified before purchase and a judgment should be made as to whether the limitations will keep the devices from doing a job well. For example, to function properly, much electronic equipment needs a constant power supply without fluctuating voltage. Interruptions in power or voltage changes can cause incorrect instrument readings or other malfunctions. Also, most tear gas canisters are easily affected by extreme temperature and humidity, and magnetometers may locate metallic weapons but not such objects as plastic or wooden knives and letter openers.

COMPATIBILITY

Compatibility with existing equipment is a prime consideration for new purchases. For example, all communications equipment should be on a common frequency or capable of being linked by a repeater unit. If separate frequencies are required, there should be a point where the various nets can be monitored and coordinated.

Compatibility reduces inventory requirements for items such as portable lights, desk lamps, battery-operated equipment, cameras, and office machines that use expendable supplies. Some agencies tie up large sums of money by stock-

ing different types of spare parts and other inventory items because their equipment is not similar.

COST

The cost of an item should be calculated through a formula such as the one in figure 5-4. Note that the most cost-effective item often has a higher initial cost. For example, key-operated door locks with replaceable cylinders are more expensive but also more practical than locks which must be replaced entirely in order to change keys.

MANPOWER IMPACT

Most major pieces of equipment have manpower requirements which must be considered before purchase. For instance, walk-through magnetometers require at least three operators (two men and a woman) so that both men and women can be searched when something suspicious appears. In addition, CCTV must be monitored constantly, although grouping all monitoring jobs (for alarms, CCTV, etc.) at one location can reduce personnel needs.

Equipment also should be examined in terms of its ease of operation and maintenance and any training that might be needed. Sophisticated equipment such as mobile laboratories may require either specially trained and skilled laboratory technicians or maintenance personnel for proper use. Many sheriffs' departments provide at least routine maintenance of vehicles, weapons, radios, and alarm equipment. Unless this is done by civilian staff, it takes sworn officers away from their primary law enforcement duties.

SPACE NEEDS

Both operating and storage space are important. For example, adequate and secure space must be available for the terminal points of CCTV and alarm systems. In addition, there must be space to store and protect equipment that is not being used. Bulky items not in constant use should be kept near the place of use if possible. Similarly, walk-through magnetometers and other items used in a search screen should be stored where they are readily available.

If space is not available in the courthouse, it may be necessary to store certain equipment elsewhere. In this case, the additional factors of transportation and time must be considered.

INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE

The ease and cost of installation should be factors in equipment selection. A special installation team means more expense, and long delays may occur if there is an installation waiting list for the equipment. Check the backlog of installations and decide whether the waiting period is acceptable.

Select equipment that does not need frequent servicing. Ask current users of the equipment how often service is required and how long it takes. New equipment almost always requires some servicing, but long-term maintenance needs can be reduced. Avoid items that may need frequent maintenance because of faulty engineering or sensitivity to heat, cold, or shock, or those that are easily damaged by unskilled operation.

Service should be readily available, and done locally if possible, especially for routine maintenance. More complex and regular service may require a service contract. Many national companies provide service for several states. This type of coverage increases the service costs and the possibility of excessive delays, both of which have a negative effect on security programs.

The service company should have enough spare parts. A good company can accurately estimate the failure rate of components in the equipment it services and will usually maintain an adequate inventory of spare parts. However, some firms try to save money by getting spares from a main supplier; this nearly always results in delay. Moreover, foreign products may involve ordering parts from another country, which could cause months of waiting.

GUIDE TO PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES

A county purchasing authority usually buys equipment; only rarely is a sheriff authorized to make direct purchases. Complaints that the purchasing agent did not buy what was needed are sometimes heard as excuses for faulty or inadequate equipment. However, a close look usually reveals a breakdown in communications between the sheriff and the purchasing agent. This problem can be overcome with a little effort and understanding of what the agent needs to know to do an effective job. The problem might be resolved by an action as simple as giving the purchasing agent more complete details and specifications for the item needed.

Experience has shown several pitfalls in the purchasing process that can be avoided. Some of these are discussed in the guidelines presented here.

PREPARING SPECIFICATIONS

Preparing detailed performance specifications should be the first step in the procurement procedure. For some items, it may be necessary to describe in detail a precise design, measurement, tolerance, material, or method of testing or inspection.¹ Suppliers will offer an item which meets only the minimum requirements specified in the invitation for bid (IFB). They will not cut their profits by offering more than is actually specified. For example, a small police department ordered a camera without detailed specifications. The camera body was received without lens, carrying case, or other accessories. These items were not included because they are not built-in parts of the camera and are always ordered separately, through technical descriptions that were not specified; in this instance, it took several more weeks to order and receive the necessary lens and accessories.

Procurement is usually done competitively, and specifications should not favor one supplier over others. However, the department may contact several potential suppliers for informal discussions and product information. The purchasing agent may be able to furnish reference lists of reputable suppliers, and both professional security journals and telephone directories are also good sources. It is important to use more than one or two sources in looking for a supplier.

Most county purchasing agents will help draft specifications. Many counties have procurement regulations and directives on preparing specifications, and the sheriff should provide the appropriate technical information. Some purchasing agencies use standard specifications for items purchased regularly. If these

¹ Coordinating Committee on a Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments, *A Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments, Preliminary Working Papers No. 2* (Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association, June 1977), p. 73.

do not meet departmental needs, the sheriff should provide data to justify changing the specifications and insist that they be changed.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS IN THE INVITATION FOR BID (IFB)

The invitation for suppliers to bid should show complete specifications and any special conditions affecting the procurement which cannot be added after the IFB is issued. The latter may include these:

- Time limit for delivery;
- Phased delivery schedule;
- Requirement for vendors to provide a sample of the item offered for testing and evaluation;
- Requirements for final inspection before acceptance and delivery;
- Citation of minimum standards established by a recognized authority, such as Underwriters' Laboratories;
- Conditions for warranty certification by vendors, such as ability and willingness to contract for service and maintenance and the availability of service locally or within a specified distance.

Only the purchasing agent can approve requests for exceptions to the IFB, and any exceptions on technical matters should have the sheriff's agreement. If exceptions to the provisions are granted to one or more bidders, all bidders should be notified.

If specialized training by the successful bidder is needed to maintain and operate new equipment, this requirement should be included in the IFB. Training should be scheduled to be completed by time of delivery. Suppliers often provide training during the manufacturing phase so that trainees learn by working on the actual equipment they will be using.

OTHER PROVISIONS

First, arrangements should be made with the purchasing agent for the sheriff's department to review all bids submitted. This allows a technical overview and is not meant to preempt the purchasing agent's authority to award the contract.

Second, service and maintenance contracts should be bought from the seller of the equipment. That firm should have the best product experience, trained service staff, and spare parts inventory.

In some cases, a purchase from a specific company may be appropriate, rather than receiving competitive bids from several companies. County policy on this "proprietary procurement" should be carefully reviewed before it is requested. This type of procurement might be justified under one of the following circumstances:

- The proposed purchase is part of an approved equipment standardization plan.
- The item is not available from any other source.
- Only the item supplied by a specific firm meets the required specifications.
- Spare parts and special tools are on hand, and buying the item from a different source would require an additional stock of parts and tools.

EQUIPMENT USED FOR COURT SECURITY

In the past 10 years, the demand for improved security equipment has increased rapidly, as has competition among manufacturers and distributors. Research and development have resulted in many new or improved products. However, the market also is flooded with shoddy, poorly functioning items primarily designed to cash in on the boom by selling to the uninformed or unsuspecting. This section discusses some of the more common types of equipment in use today, focusing only on court security rather than all types of security equipment.

HARDWARE AND LOCKS

An easy and inexpensive way to improve security is to replace inferior locks and hardware with quality items. During remodeling or new construction, the additional cost is usually negligible if security planners insist on these items. The following types of equipment should be considered:

- Key-operated locks on windows;
- Door locks with removable cylinders that allow keys to be changed periodically;
- Dead-bolt locks with at least a one-inch throw;
- Specially armored locks made virtually breakproof for external use;
- High-quality padlocks with changeable combinations;²
- Keyless push-button locks to secure entry into restricted areas (preset combinations can easily be changed by installing replacement slides).

Adequate security does not depend solely on having the right equipment; proper use also is critical. For example, padlocks should always be locked onto the hasp when a door is open to prevent unauthorized substitution of a similar-looking lock. All keys should be under a key-control system managed by the security officer. Simple systems are available from commercial sources for as few as 25 or more than 2,500 keys.

LIGHTING

Interior fixtures should not be used outdoors because they are not weather resistant and are highly susceptible to vandalism. It is best to seek advice from an electrical contractor to select proper fixtures, cable, wattage output for lamps, and the best means of installation. Fixtures placed at an improper location or at the wrong angle may make coverage inadequate by creating areas of darkness in the overall illumination pattern.

Within the courthouse and courtroom, a wide variety of portable lamps is available for emergency lighting. A commonly used and economical auxiliary or reserve lighting system consists of battery-operated, wall-mounted lamps connected to the existing electrical circuit. The batteries in these lamps are rechargeable and on a constant trickle charge. When the main power system fails, the lamps automatically switch on. Interior courtrooms without windows are often wired with two circuits so that even when the primary lights are switched off, the second circuit will sustain sufficient illumination. The use of key-operated switches for courtroom and holding area lights also is recommended. These prevent disruption by unauthorized persons switching off the lights.

BARS, GRILLES, AND DOORS

Extra protection should be provided for windows and other

² These are in use throughout the federal government and meet rigid standards.

openings that are not normally guarded. Expanded metal grilles or steel bars offer the most economical way to secure these openings. Glass bricks are an alternative method in window openings not needed for ventilation.

Most forced entries are made through windows or doors. If a door is too fragile, it can be broken easily or the lock forced from its strike plate. Solid wooden doors should be at least 1¾ inches thick for all exterior doors; metal or metal-reinforced doors offer even better protection. Any window needed in a door should be of tempered glass or shatter-resistant plastic. Double-cylinder, double-keyed locks should be used on doors that have any glass. Local fire codes must be considered.

SAFES AND VAULTS

Safes have been rated by the Underwriters' Laboratories for resistance to fire and penetration (see appendix I). If possible, safes should be securely fastened to a surface of the building; this is easiest to do in newer facilities with concrete floors. Upon request, safe manufacturers can offer additional advice on immobilizing safes.

Vaults are expensive and should be built by professionals and only if a cost effectiveness study supports the need for them. Manufacturers of vault doors often give advice on design and construction and may even provide architectural drawings to ensure that their products will fit properly and function well.

ALARMS

The Underwriters' Laboratories³ also have approved alarm standards, developed by a committee that included representatives from alarm manufacturers, insurance companies, and the Underwriters' Laboratories. The standards are revised periodically and represent the *minimum* acceptable requirements for the design and performance of alarm equipment. Actually, products often exceed these standards, so one system may be far superior to another in actual performance although both are rated the same.

Alarm systems usually fall into these four categories:⁴

1. *Local Alarm System.* A system in which the protective circuits in the secured area are directly connected to a bell or siren. The sounding device is prominently displayed on the outside of the building. The bell is fully protected against weather and tampering, connected to the control panel by tamper-proof cable, and audible for at least 400 feet.

2. *Central Station Alarm.* A system in which the secured area is directly connected, via a pair of leased telephone wires, to an alarm panel in a centrally located alarm receiving station. Generally, this system is run by a private security firm. Upon receiving an alarm, the company dispatches its guards to the secured area and notifies the police. Alarm installations of this type can only be approved by Underwriters' Laboratories when the protected premises are within 10 minutes traveling time from the central station.

3. *Proprietary Alarm.* An installation similar to a central station alarm, except the alarm panel is located within a guard room maintained for the owner's internal security operations. The guards operate the system and respond to all alarms.

4. *Police Connection.* An alarm monitor installed in a nearby police station and directly connected to the alarm system via a pair of telephone wires. The alarm also can be connected to local or proprietary systems for additional protection.

Alarm systems used for courtroom security have features from one or more of the above categories. Many courtrooms are equipped with duress alarms, which the judge, bailiff, or clerk can use to summon help during emergency situations. These alarms are inaudible in the courtroom and sound at a manned post that can dispatch a response force. Or the alarm in a courtroom may be a simple buzzer terminating in the sheriff's office, jail, or communications or command center.

For multicourtroom buildings, many options are available in a wide price range. Many large jurisdictions use the "Executone" system, which allows two-way voice communication and audio monitoring of the courtroom when the alarm is activated. In another system, courtroom telephones become microphones when the alarm is activated to allow audio monitoring at a terminal point.

Other jurisdictions use a panel of colored lights to alert a monitor and show what kind of incident is taking place—e.g., escape attempt, disorder, or hostage situation. However, many systems in use today only alert the security force that an incident has occurred, with no other information given. The alarm monitor should show the origin of the alarm (e.g., the courtroom, chambers, or treasurer's office).

As far as technology will allow, a system should include a means to confirm that the signal is not a false alarm. After all, the effectiveness of an alarm system is directly related to how believable it is, and systems with very high false alarm rates eventually may be disregarded by those who must respond to them.

Because of the variety of alarms and alarm systems available, it is important for planners to pinpoint their needs and state their performance requirements clearly before any purchase. Without this caution, it is possible to purchase either too much or too little alarm capability.

Following are a few general guidelines for buying an alarm or alarm system:

- Deal with a reputable company. These will usually be listed by the Underwriters' Laboratories or reputable trade journals.
- There is no such thing as a burglar-proof system, so be suspicious of any sales agent who claims to sell one.
- The system must have a reserve power source in case the main power is shut off.
- Do not buy or lease a system from a company that does not offer a contract for continuing maintenance and service, usually on a two- to five-year basis.

The next sections describe different types of alarm systems for court buildings.⁵

Premise Alarms

Premise alarms protect doors, windows, and other openings by means of contact devices, switches, and metallic foil tape. In some instances, wired wood dowel screens are used instead

³ The standards are set forth in several pamphlets available from the Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., Publications Stock Department, 333 Pfingsten Rd., Northbrook, Ill. 60062. See, for example, #609 and 610, *Burglar Alarm Systems, Local*; #611, *Burglar Alarm Systems, Central Station*; #636, *Hold-up Alarm Systems*; #681, *Installation, Classification, and Certification of Burglar Alarm Systems*.

⁴ Robert Rosberg, *Guide to Security Alarm Systems* (Wayne, N.J.: Mosler, Electronic Systems Division, 1978), p. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-15.

of metallic foil to protect windows, transoms, or similar openings. The screens are arranged to form a continuous closed-circuit loop connected to alarm relays in a control cabinet in the secured area. If anyone tries to enter through one of the protected points, the circuit will be broken and the alarm set off.

Capacitance Alarms

The protected object acts as part of the capacitance of a tuned circuit (as a capacitor or condenser). If a change occurs in the region of the protected object (e.g., if someone approaches), there will be a sufficient change in the capacitance magnitude to upset the balance of the system and cause an alarm. Capacitance alarms are used to protect objects that require a high degree of security, such as safes, file cabinets, and other metallic storage containers. The system is fairly flexible and can be used to connect several items in the same area to one alarm.

Photoelectric Alarms

Photoelectric cells or electric eyes normally are used with other forms of alarm equipment. Their operation depends upon the interruption or breaking of a beam of light between a projector and a light-sensitive receiver some distance away. When the light is cut off from the receiver, an alarm relay is activated in a control cabinet within the secured area. Since white light is easily detected, infrared beams are better for these systems.

Ultrasonic Systems

The protection of an enclosed space can often be achieved effectively by using space alarm equipment. The best known type of system in this category is popularly called ultrasonic, although it actually operates just within the upper limits of the audio frequency spectrum. The apparatus generates a train of high-frequency sound waves (too high for humans to hear) which fill an enclosed area with a pattern of standing waves. A sensitive receiver connected to an electronic amplifier picks up the waves; if they are of the same frequency as the sound emitted by the transmitter, the system will not sound an alarm. Any motion within the protected area will send back a reflected wave differing in frequency from the original transmission. This change in frequency is detected and amplified in the control unit, and the alarm signal is then activated.

Audio Systems (Rooms)

Audio systems, unlike ultrasonic, can tolerate air movement and other types of motion as long as the noise created is relatively low. Where fans or other noise-producing items are a fixed part of the room, cancellation microphones located close to the noise-producing items can nullify those sounds. The sensitivity of these systems can be adjusted to detect a very small amount of noise; however, in most installations this adjustment will result in false alarms.

Audio Systems (Vaults)

The detection of sound or vibration caused by an attack

upon the walls, ceiling, or floor of a protected structure is the primary function of this system. A microphone and amplifier are installed within the secured enclosure. Sensitivity is adjusted so that normal sounds will not trip the alarm. However, noises above this level will be amplified enough to activate the alarm relay.

Because the system responds to all noises within the audible range, it is best adapted to vaults or other solid-walled enclosures which require a reasonable amount of force to enter. Most bank vaults are protected by audio alarm systems. These bank installations represent the highest grade of alarm systems recognized by Underwriters' Laboratories.

Radar or Microwave Systems

Radar units are generally used to protect interior areas. The principles used in this system closely parallel the operation of the ultrasonic system, with some notable exceptions. Radio waves are highly penetrating and not easily confined within a closed area, such as a room or building. A train of waves is produced and partially reflected back to the antenna. If all objects within the range are stationary, the reflected waves return at the same frequency; if they strike a moving object, the waves return at a different frequency. The difference in the transmitted and received frequency appears as a low frequency signal which is detected and used to trip an alarm relay. The area covered by the radiation field may be controlled by the number or placement of antennas, while sensitivity is controlled by adjusting the amplifier.

COMMUNICATIONS

So many types of communications equipment are available today that it is important for planners to assess their needs and the performance they want. Many manufacturers will provide free consultation to help in this task. The following questions should be considered when adding communications equipment to a court security system.

- Is the new equipment compatible with existing systems?
- Are maintenance and repair easily available at local facilities, or must items be returned to the factory for service?
- Is the equipment powerful enough to function effectively in the courtrooms and courthouse?

Ideally, each court security officer should have a portable, hand-held transceiver (radio transmitter-receiver) which is linked to a central command station or the sheriff's base station. If traffic is heavy on the sheriff's assigned frequency, another compatible frequency should be obtained and monitored by the base station. In larger departments, transceivers are usually supplied to supervisory personnel and key officers only. The Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory of the National Bureau of Standards has developed standards for personal portable FM transceivers; these are available upon request.⁶

If transceivers are beyond the department's budget, less expensive one-way receivers are available. Even lower in price are the individual "pager" or "beeper" units that, when activated, notify the wearer to call a predetermined phone number or take certain actions.

Also available are devices that can be worn unobtrusively or carried in a pocket. When activated, they transmit a radio signal notifying a base station of an emergency situation. These

⁶ NILECJ-STD-0203.00, October 1974, *Personal/Portable FM Transmitters and Receivers*; NILECJ-STD-0208.00, October 1975, *Personal/Portable FM Receivers*. See appendix J for information on obtaining copies.

devices have been used by judges and others under the threat of kidnapping or physical violence. They have obvious limitations, including their high cost and short range of signal transmission. Also, since those wearing the devices may be on the move, determining their exact location is not usually possible.

MAGNETOMETERS

Magnetometers come in three basic models: permanently installed, portable walk-through, and hand-held. Figure 5-7 lists some advantages and disadvantages for each model. Some of these detectors locate only ferrous or iron-bearing metal, while others locate both ferrous and nonferrous metal. Costs vary widely according to quality and performance.

A combination of walk-through and hand-held models is sometimes used in courthouses. The first type signals the presence of a metallic item, and the second determines its exact location.

The quality of magnetometers varies widely. The U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Marshals Service have tested various models and identified the ones meeting their requirements. In addition, the National Bureau of Standards has developed standards for magnetometers; these are available upon request.⁷

X-RAY SCREENING DEVICES

These devices are used throughout the world and come in many configurations. Small portable units for screening mail and small packages use drawers that can accommodate items up to 18" x 12" x 16". Larger units are stationary and pass items by the screening device on a conveyor belt. Although these devices are highly effective, cost is the principal factor limiting their use. Thus, they are not practical for departments with limited budgets. Only densely populated urban jurisdictions have a large enough volume of items to screen to justify such equipment.

EXPLOSIVES DETECTORS

Explosives detectors are usually portable and the size of small suitcases. They are highly sensitive to vapors emitted by explosives and respond to vapor traces preprogrammed into a unit's memory. Some early models gave false reactions to such items as shoe polish, deodorants, and perfume. However, later developments have increased sensitivity and selectivity, largely eliminating this problem.

TEAR GAS

Tear gas has been standard equipment for law enforcement agencies for a number of years. The CN gas formula largely has been replaced by a more potent and faster reacting CS gas. Manufacturers supply both types in many configurations and delivery systems, the most common being grenades, projectiles fired from special guns, high-volume bulk dispensers, and hand-held dispensers.

Adequate storage space with temperature and humidity control is necessary. Most tear gas items have a known shelf life and their effectiveness and reliability diminish when these limits are passed.

Many courts have strong feelings about tear gas, and it should only be used in accordance with established policy. Similarly, many sheriffs' departments make the hand-held dispenser either optional or required personal equipment; others forbid its use. Officers interviewed for this project who have used this dispenser reported varying degrees of effectiveness. All said they were also affected by fumes to some degree when dispensing the liquid tear gas.

BULLET-RESISTANT PLASTIC

Court security planners are increasingly using transparent bullet-resistant plastic shields in courtrooms. For some high-risk trials, a temporary or permanently fixed barrier is placed between the spectator section and the well of the court. A 12- to 18-inch shield is sometimes placed around the top of the bench for the judge's protection.

The two principal plastics used are polycarbonate and acrylic. Acrylic sheets can be shaped to various forms, while polycarbonate is a rigid molded plastic. Acrylic also offers better light transmission: 92 percent, compared to 66 percent for polycarbonate. By comparison, bullet-resistant glass transmits only 55 percent of white light. Underwriters' Laboratories have rated both plastics for bullet resistance, and 1/4-inch acrylic is rated highest for resisting bullets from medium-power small arms, including .45 ACP, .38 super auto, and 9 mm Luger. Note that both these plastics are combustible; building codes should be checked before they are used.

BODY ARMOR

Body armor comes in many forms, including metal or ceramic inserts, chain mail, and ballistic cloth. Information is available from suppliers of police equipment and manufacturers of the basic material used. A recent development in the body armor field is the fabrication of synthetic cloth fibers with ballistic characteristics. When woven into cloth and configured for body protection, this material allows a freedom of movement not previously possible.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) sponsored a program in July and August 1977 to develop lightweight, continuous-wear, inconspicuous, and limited-protection garments for public officials and law enforcement personnel. The program led to recommendations on materials and the construction of body armor to meet these objectives.⁸

BOMB DISPOSAL ITEMS

The recent increase in bombings of public installations has resulted in many new devices to dispose of explosives. Some are gimmicks, but most are serious attempts to give law enforcement agencies additional tools to handle this dangerous problem. The devices range from simple bomb blankets and baskets for moving suspected explosives to remote-controlled, self-propelled vehicles that, when operated by qualified technicians, can open suspicious packages and remove their contents.

Unless the potential bomb threat is significant, only minimal disposal equipment should be bought. An experienced bomb disposal technician should help develop a list of required items. If the sheriff's office does not have such specialist skills, nearby resources should be tapped, such as another sheriff's department or a U.S. military base.

CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION

CCTV systems are available in all price ranges and

⁷ NILECJ-STD-0601.00, June 1974, *Walk-Through Metal Detectors for Use in Weapons Detection* and NILECJ-STD-0602.00, October 1974, *Hand-Held Metal Detectors for Use in Weapons Detection*. See appendix J for information on obtaining copies.

⁸ *Body Armor Program: Executive Summary*, presented by the Aerospace Corporation for LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, July-August 1977.

**Figure 5-7
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF GENERAL TYPES OF MAGNETOMETERS**

Types of Magnetometers	Advantages	Disadvantages
Permanently installed model	Not obtrusive	Immobile
Portable walk-through model	Movable High visibility may have psychologically deterrent effect	Needs storage space
Hand-held model	Indicates exact location of metal objects	More time consuming

capabilities and are usually designed to meet individual needs. Cameras range from simple, fixed installations to remote-controlled units requiring minimal light and equipped with a telephoto or zoom lens. Some systems also have audio capabilities.

For certain purposes, the CCTV system should be operated 24 hours each day. However, for the court security system, the need is usually only for the hours the court is in operation. Still, there is a built-in requirement for people to monitor CCTV systems. Thus, CCTV is not a simple answer to a problem and should be considered only after careful study. As with other equipment, the availability of service, maintenance, and repair facilities should be considered before purchase.

FIREFIGHTING AND DETECTION EQUIPMENT

Increased incidents of arson in public buildings make installation of firefighting and detection equipment a good investment. Although the purchase and maintenance of this kind of equipment is the primary responsibility of a building engineer, manager, or custodian, the security officer should ensure that minimum local fire codes are met. The National Fire Protection Association has available, for a nominal cost, standards for various types of fire alarm systems.⁹

DOGS

Dogs also can be used effectively in a court security operations plan. The animals can help deputies in weapons, drugs, and bomb searches, building patrol, and crowd control. However, the expenses and other problems incurred by the need for retraining, feeding, housing, and general maintenance limit the suitability of dogs for most departments.

CONCLUSION

Equipment purchases can be made more cost-effective by observing the suggested guidelines in this chapter. To summarize, procurement can be placed on sound footing by following a few general guidelines:

- Identify needs.
- Prepare clear and complete specifications.
- Seek professional guidance when needed.
- Balance manpower and specialized training needs against equipment purchases.
- Develop sound maintenance and service contracts.
- Maintain a good working relationship with the county procurement officer.

⁹ Contact the National Fire Protection Association, 470 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, Mass. 02210.

Chapter 6

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

This chapter tells security administrators how to develop standards for personnel selection, assignment, and use, and how to update or start a training program. The guidelines here are addressed to managers, while details for the training officer are in supplemental training material (see NSA's 1978 publication, *Court Security Training Guidelines*).

Good personnel and effective training practices, policies, and procedures are essential to any organization. Yet standards for both personnel and training vary greatly among criminal justice organizations. Many states have recognized this and have set minimum training standards for law enforcement personnel. However, state training programs often have little, if any, discussion of court security.

A 1977 survey of the 50 NSA state directors showed that only one state required court security training. The survey also indicated that, while some states include court security employees in the state's merit system for personnel selection, others have excluded security staff.

One reason for the differences in selecting and training court security personnel is the number of different agencies that may be responsible for court security. Even within a single jurisdiction, specific court security responsibilities may be unclear or shared by judges, court administrators, court clerks, local law enforcement agencies, and the sheriff. Moreover, the managers involved often have different ideas of what kinds of skills and people the job requires. For example, some managers may want to fill a job with law enforcement officers, while others want civilians. This makes it hard to establish uniform standards for personnel and training.

PERSONNEL

SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT

Standards for personnel selection and assignment should be considered within the overall requirements of the judicial system. The need for integrity, discipline, and dignity in the courtroom means security staff should be aware of certain laws, customs, and standards of conduct. For example, an inappropriate remark by a bailiff to a juror can cause a mistrial, and unnecessarily rough handling of a defendant in court can produce a violent response. Proper personnel selection and training programs can prevent such situations.

Specific responsibility for court security should be identified and assigned to a single department, if possible. Then, as a first step in developing standards for court security personnel

selection and assignment, managers can identify tasks and responsibilities for each position.

Next, managers should develop detailed court security position descriptions, including the following information:

1. Specific description of work to be performed, by tasks;
2. Operating responsibilities and authority;
3. Requirements for communication and coordination among security personnel;
4. Supervisory responsibilities and lines of authority;
5. Experience, skill, and education requirements and standards for both new personnel and individuals being considered for reassignment or promotion.

County officials, such as civil service officers, should be consulted to make sure these position descriptions are consistent with county personnel practices.

In a sheriff's department, officers assigned to court security usually will be selected from within the department. Other agencies responsible for court security probably will have to recruit new people. Whether court security officers are new or reassigned employees, selection standards should be carefully detailed and should reflect appropriate federal, state, and local laws, including requirements for equal job opportunities.

Unusually high standards may discourage potential candidates from applying for vacant positions or may be so unrealistic that many applicants are unfairly eliminated from consideration. Then too, the people hired may find the work does not match their expectations. As a result, both finding and keeping competent persons can be a challenging task for a manager.

Selection standards should reflect the minimum qualifications needed to perform a job. The recruitment base should be as broad as possible, since personal interviews and written examinations will identify the best qualified applicants.

To get people with the right skills, recruitment should be aimed at university graduates, other law enforcement agencies, and military personnel. Selection and placement standards should focus on psychological makeup, attitudes, and the ability to cope with stress, as well as physical ability and intelligence. Once an individual is hired, a good training program can help develop or improve the skills needed to perform certain tasks, but few training programs can successfully overcome individual psychological problems.

In many courtrooms, the security officers are not able to respond well to physically and mentally strenuous situations because of age, physical condition, or lack of proper training.

These situations are potentially hazardous not only to the officer but to everyone else in the courtroom. Court security is only as good as its weakest link, and using unqualified personnel is risky.

Criteria now used to assign court security officers include (1) physical inability for other assignment, (2) assignment as a disciplinary measure, (3) the personal preferences of judges or the officers themselves, and (4) efforts to make the assignment part of overall career development. These may or may not be valid points to consider in assigning an individual to a position, but personnel should meet established standards or their work may be inadequate.

EFFECTIVE USE

After selection and assignment standards have been set, personnel must be used properly if an operation is to be effective. Sometimes court security officers are used for nonsecurity tasks, including court clerk duties and personal tasks for judges, court clerks, or court administrators. This practice not only contributes to job dissatisfaction and possible high turnover rates but also decreases the number of officers available for security.

Managers should view court security assignments as an important position in the career development of all officers. Ideally, a department's career development programming should include individual counseling and assignment to various tasks within the department. The objective will be to develop a broad base of experience and increase promotions. Assignment as a court security officer should be considered a part of career development, with the length of assignment determined by departmental policy or experience. The absence of such a program may eventually cause a lack of personal interest in professional development.

EVALUATION

Many court security officers are not evaluated regularly, and even departments that have an evaluation program often fail to recognize its value as a management instrument. A personnel evaluation system administered fairly to all employees can identify (1) people with leadership and/or problem-solving abilities, including those ready to assume greater responsibility, and (2) employees who are having problems with interpersonal relationships or high-pressure situations. Evaluation gives both employees and supervisors a chance to discuss their problems. For example, an officer may feel he is being denied a promotion because of duties with little or no relationship to court security. Thus, all duties should be described in the evaluation, even such tasks as running personal errands for a judge. That description provides a guide for judging performance.

If the department does not have an evaluation system, the manager should find out if one exists for other county employees. If so, the manager may be able to adapt that system to court security personnel.

TRAINING

Most administrators of security-oriented agencies know that training is critical. However, this key activity depends upon

such factors as the availability of funds, training resources, and space; the number of people who can be taken away from their assignments; and state training requirements.

The importance of court security training was underscored recently in a report of the LEAA-sponsored Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism:

The selection and training of court security personnel may be the most critical single determinant of the success of a court security plan. Capabilities to perform a variety of routine and nonroutine duties, such as taking accurate magnetometer readings, dealing tactfully with the public, applying physical force to remove disorderly persons with minimum injury, and maintaining unobtrusive surveillance of trials in progress, must be combined in the relatively few individuals who constitute court security staffs.¹

Even when states require a specific number of training hours for law enforcement officers, court security usually is not included. One exception is Virginia, where state law requires 60 hours of training in court security, including 24 hours of firearms training.

Almost all sheriffs contacted during this project acknowledged the importance of court security training, and even the most sophisticated departments recognize the need for a more structured training program. In most jurisdictions, instruction now given on court security is limited to on-the-job training.

MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

The manager must examine any training program in terms of department needs, costs, and how effective the proposed training will be. This section sets forth key training considerations and guidelines.

The more effective the training program, the more able personnel will be to carry out their responsibilities at the least cost to the department. With good training, managers have maximum flexibility in using personnel, since they can assign staff on the basis of both ability and need.

At the same time, an important aspect in personnel assignment is the manager's awareness of strengths and weaknesses among employees. Some are more adept at certain tasks than others, regardless of the amount of training. A sound training program will measure those strengths and weaknesses and will allow managers to assign personnel where they can be most effective. Or managers can take steps to correct weaknesses and develop or improve employee capabilities, either through further training or career development assignments.

An important and often overlooked management consideration is the liability that department administrators assume for the actions of those working under them. If an employee causes injury or property damage, either by action or inaction, both employee and supervisors may be legally liable. However, liability can be limited if a manager can show that the employee was properly trained and adequately supervised. Therefore, departmental files must include information on the kind of training provided, when it occurred, training scores (e.g., firearms qualification scores), and other examination results.

A manager should see that a department operates at the least cost. Training costs should be included in the annual budget for space, staff salary, and operating expenses, and the administrator should review those costs before the budget is final.

Initial costs for a training program include equipment, reference books, and related supplies and materials. Note that it

¹ National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *Disorders and Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, December 1976), p. 275.

may be more efficient to get training aid from someone outside the department; in that case, the cost should be examined after a complete evaluation of a department's resources and the need for training, to make sure the expenditure is essential.

DEVELOPING A TRAINING PROGRAM

Managers should take the following initial steps in developing a new training program:

Describe the importance and priority of the program in a department policy statement. Because training involves all personnel, they should be prepared to participate in the program and should recognize the priority given to training by the administration.

List the goals of the training program and groups within the department that will benefit. A typical overall goal statement would be: "The goal of our training program is to provide essential instruction each year to all members of the department on the broad duties and responsibilities of the department." The statement should also identify specific objectives to meet the overall goal.

Training often is considered useful only to new staff. However, all employees need to update skills and abilities. Even supervisors can benefit from training, which helps them keep informed of the latest techniques and procedures for management, administration, and supervision. Thus, a training program should be based on both the goals statement and the identification of target groups that will benefit from the effort.

Select a training officer. In larger departments, it may be necessary to assign this key role to a person who has no other duties. In smaller departments, this may not be possible, but in either case, it should be clearly understood that the training officer will do the following:

1. Be directly responsible to the department administrator;
2. Communicate with all department units, keeping them informed of what the training program involves and seeking their views on training needs;
3. Develop the training plan and get it approved by the administrator;
4. Be responsible for determining program costs and preparing specifications for all supplies and equipment to be purchased;
5. Develop the program design;
6. Assign personnel to the training classes, with guidance from appropriate department officials (e.g., the personnel officer);
7. Manage the delivery of training, conduct class examinations, and keep performance records;
8. Evaluate the training program at the end of the course and write a post-training report (if required) for the administrator.

The following criteria can be used to select a training officer.

Some states require certification of law enforcement instructors within the state education system. Training officers should be state certified when appointed, or they should become certified as soon as possible thereafter, since certification is usually necessary to obtain academic credit for the training.

Some people seem to have a natural talent as trainers. Standards to identify those persons often are intangible, but gen-

erally include their attitudes toward training and the degree of satisfaction they get from being trainers.

Training officers should have field experience in the subjects they might teach. While the training officer in a large department may not do much direct teaching, this will not be the case in most jurisdictions. Thus, the trainer should be an experienced officer who has the professional respect of the class.

Ideally, training officers will have senior rank in the department. They will be links to senior department staff and to appropriate court officials, including judges, court administrators, and prosecutors. They will sometimes be principal assistants to chief administrators. A senior, experienced officer will be most able to command the respect needed in these relationships.

Sometimes employees will feel that full-time assignment to training can provide professional opportunities and a greater opportunity for advancement. But the opposite may be the case, and training officers may feel they are outside the mainstream of promotion opportunities. An administrator should take any necessary steps to lessen such fears and ensure that no one's career development suffers by being heavily involved in running a training program.

Locate available training resources. Managers should look at several sources of information and possible assistance, including nearby sheriffs' and police departments, federal agencies, or universities with criminal justice programs. These sources may be able to suggest ways to plan and carry out court security training programs. Nearby jurisdictions also may have equipment or visual aids, such as films or slide presentations, and these could be borrowed to reduce the training program's cost.

THE TRAINING PLAN

The first major responsibility of the training officer is to develop a training plan, which involves the following steps:

1. Do a work or job analysis of prospective trainees and learn required performance objectives.
2. Define the goals of the training program, as learned from the work analysis and other management requirements.
3. List training targets—i.e., names or categories of people to be trained, along with subjects to be taught (see figure 6-1).
4. Describe the training topics, including the scope and nature of each.
5. Define the training resources needed, such as instructors' names (biographical data in some cases) and supplies.
6. Describe the training strategy, including ideas for achieving the department's training goals and a discussion of the planning considerations that led to the proposed training program. For example, the training strategy may be to train everyone in the department. To do this in the shortest possible time, one approach may be to offer both recruit training for new personnel and refresher training for existing employees, including supervisors.

7. Prepare a training schedule, showing the time each subject is to be taught (see figure 6-2). Training might be needed in shorter time periods or during off-hours if trainees cannot be spared during work hours. This practice will usually involve overtime pay, so the administrator may want to discuss other options with the training officer before approving this step.

**Figure 6-1
TRAINING TARGETS**

Target	Subject
Recruits	Court security responsibilities of the department; emergency preparedness
Inservice personnel	Review of court security procedures and current threat analysis; emergency plans and preparedness
Supervisors	Review of court management requirements for security procedures; emergency plan exercises and training measures

8. Prepare an estimate of costs for the entire program, including those for overtime (if needed), travel, subsistence, lecture fees, supplies, printing, and visual aids. If a yearly plan is submitted, these costs can be included in the department's budget after approval by the administrator.

9. Evaluate the program by drawing up a plan for "before-and-after" testing to look at the training program's effectiveness in meeting departmental goals.

MANAGEMENT CONTROL

If administrators give training high priority and make this view known to their staffs, the department generally will reflect that attitude. Obviously, the reverse is also true. Thus,

administrators play a major role in convincing department staff of the importance of training and in assuring that training contributes to effectiveness and efficiency in their departments.

An administrator also controls the ongoing development of the training program through frequent meetings with the training officer and by approving each training plan. In this way, the administrator makes sure the program will meet department needs at the least cost.

The administrator's approval of the training plan, including the cost estimates, represents a step in the budget preparation process. The budget's line item for training reflects the approved estimates; by listing those costs as a line item, the administrator can better decide priorities and necessary funding levels.

Finally, the evaluation process is very important. Here again, administrators have a major task because they must review the results of the evaluation and be sure that changes are in line with department priorities and effectively meet training needs.

CONCLUSION

People are the main factor in any security program. Equipment, procedures, and architectural security measures are meaningless without capable and trained staff to use them. Thus, effective selection, assignment, and training are vital parts of a successful security program, as are sound management and control of all training efforts.

**Figure 6-2
SAMPLE TRAINING SCHEDULE**

Time	First Day	Second Day	Third Day	Fourth Day	Fifth Day
0900-1000	Introduction, administrative matters	The bailiff	Physical security	Bomb threat response	Personal security procedures
1000-1100	The trial process				
1100-1115	Break	Break	Break	Break	Break
1115-1215	The trial process	The bailiff	Physical security	High-risk trial procedures	Special security considerations
1215-1330	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch
1330-1530	The sheriff's office	Prisoner transport	Emergency preparedness	Hostage situation control	Defense tactics
1530-1545	Break	Break	Break	Break	Break
1545-1700	Liability	Crowd control	Emergency preparedness	Hostage situation control	Review and examination

Chapter 7

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS IN ARCHITECTURE

The people who build or renovate courthouses often ignore key security matters. First, court personnel may pass on to planners and architects the personal preferences of judges and other court officials, rather than bona fide building design requirements. Second, budget and contract offices may neglect security in order to reduce costs, and architects may do so in the interest of more attractive buildings.

Until the past decade, security was not a serious issue in courthouse design. Today, many court officials see the need for security measures but do not want those measures to interfere with judicial proceedings. The security officer must deal with this attitude and must persuade building planners to incorporate effective security features from the start, so costly changes will not be needed later. Moreover, during final planning and construction, security features often are eliminated or modified so that they are ineffective or in conflict with other parts of the security system. Thus, a competent security officer should be on the court's building committee and should monitor all phases of a construction program.

This chapter will discuss only those architectural matters that security officers need to know in making design recommendations to planners. The chapter will not treat the total design of any part of a courthouse. Only the planners and the architect can do this, as they work with full knowledge of the client's requirements, operation, anticipated work loads, and many other factors. Thus, this chapter is not all-inclusive but is meant to stimulate thinking about the full range of security considerations in building or renovating courts.

BACKGROUND

Many—perhaps most—county courthouses are suffering from old age.¹ They are crowded, environmentally defective,

¹ In a remarkable effort, Paul Goeldner visited, photographed, and gathered data on all courthouses built before 1900 in 12 states: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. His manuscript, "Temples of Justice: Nineteenth-Century County Courthouses in the Midwest and Texas" (Columbia University Doctoral Thesis, 1970; available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan) lists about 500 pre-1900 courthouses. According to Goeldner, more than 60 percent of the county courthouses in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were more than 75 years old; of the 1,257 counties in the states he studied, close to 40 percent had courthouses built in the 19th century.

² Allan Greenberg, *Courthouse Design: A Handbook for Judges and Court Administrators* (Chicago, Illinois: American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, 1975), p. 1.

³ National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, *Guide for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities*, Monograph B-5: *Trial Court Facility* (Champaign, Illinois, University of Illinois, 1976), pp. 22-23.

and poorly planned to accommodate modern judicial processes and technologies. As counties grow, government services and programs expand. In responding to these and other changes in our legal and social structures, county government officials and judges face facility planning problems. Generally, the main issue is whether to keep using an old structure by remodeling or adding space or to replace it with a new building.

Security demands in courthouse construction and renovation have increased dramatically over the past 10 years. Yet there has been a serious lag in communicating these demands to the public works office, which, by law, is usually the contracting authority and the direct contact with the architect and builder.

In private construction, the principal user or client usually works closely with the architect and builder to make sure user needs are satisfied. However, when a governmental function is involved, the architect deals with the contracting authority—i.e. the public works division—and not the eventual occupant. Most errors in building design can be traced to a failure to consider the user's point of view in the planning process.²

Those most concerned with security are usually the sheriff or the court-appointed security officer (also called a security planner in this manual). However, these officials must remember that the court itself is mainly responsible for decisions on design features, while the security officer acts in a supportive or advisory role.

Although the need for early security input is evident, it is also important to balance this need against others, as pointed out in a National Clearinghouse study:

While the concern for security is real, one should not overreact in the planning stage and emphasize security as the major feature of the design concept. A courts building does not need to be a fortress or a bomb shelter.

A building design that only emphasizes the security of its staff and operations may separate itself from the very community it is intended to serve. Security is one important performance measure of a trial court building, yet it is only one of the many and should not dominate other factors.³

A humane and unabrasive environment is needed for a court's successful operation. In most cases, the proper degree of restraint may result simply from the formality of the proceedings, the judge's demeanor, or the solemnity of the setting. Then too, tactics such as separate circulation routes for court staff, defendants, and the general public can protect but also contribute to efficient operation. Perfect security is impossible, but flexibility in design, if imaginatively introduced,

can provide better security without significantly impeding the court's other goals.⁴

Each security design feature must be considered in terms of how it affects other requirements. For example, is the entrance to the judge's chambers so limited that there is only one way to go in and out, thus preventing alternative routes during emergencies? Do security passages allow emergency movement if the primary passage is blocked? Do security doors have locks that violate fire and safety codes? Are office spaces (such as for the clerk of the court) located so that attorneys must use security passages to reach those offices?

Of course, security hardware should not be ignored. The technology in this field is advancing, and as chapter 5 noted, yesterday's science fiction devices are in today's catalogs: magnetometers (metal detectors), microwave and ultrasonic intrusion alarms, electronic capacitance alarms, computer lock systems, low light-level television cameras with closed-circuit systems and automatic monitors, miniaturized communications gear, and many other items. Architects should evaluate the cost effectiveness of these devices as complements to overall safety design efforts.⁵ However, too much reliance on the latest "gadget" can be disappointing.

Court facilities are often the product of misinformed amateurs taking care of special interests. The unique needs of these facilities have been recognized only in the last 10 years or so. Such matters as the space needs of the courts and other parts of the criminal justice system, proper arrangements for jurors, the traffic between courtrooms and offices, and the control of prisoners are fairly recent concerns, not only for judges and lawyers, but even for most architects.⁶

SECURITY INPUT IN PLANNING

This manual emphasizes the need for cooperation and coordination. In building or remodeling a court facility, these goals are important, but hard for security planners to meet. Often these planners must deal with uninformed and sometimes indifferent people. Acting only as advisers, security personnel have no real authority to inject themselves into the overall planning process. Thus, their degree of success depends on how well they prepare recommendations and "sell" their ideas to the courts, the program planners, and the contracting authority. In effect, security officers must be ready to defend their views, present alternatives, and possibly compromise in case of conflict.

ARCHITECT SELECTION

This is one of the first areas in which the security officer should try to influence planning. Only a few architects have courthouse design experience, and they can be identified with a little research. Those with an awareness of modern court security requirements are especially desirable; most of these architects know they must strike a balance between looks and

usefulness in a building. Security planners should urge that the initial selection process for architects include a requirement for security design experience.

In 1974, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) prepared a useful brochure for planners on *How to Find, Evaluate, Select and Negotiate With an Architect*.⁷ In addition, both the federal⁸ and some state governments have formally adopted architect selection procedures that base contract awards on demonstrated competence and qualification for the type of professional services required. Also useful is information from two U.S. government questionnaires, General Services Administration (GSA) Standard Forms 254 and 255, which ask architectural firms about their experience and personnel.

THE PROGRAM APPROACH

To ensure that a courthouse will be functional, attractive, comfortable, and safe for both court staff and the public, a comprehensive approach is needed to define space requirements and the services to be provided. This approach involves research and a written *architectural program* that describes what will be built.⁹ The program also helps determine the feasibility of renovation or building additions as alternatives to a new court structure. To prevent costly delays, this document should be written and approved before the design stage. Following is a discussion of key program aspects.

Security Planner's Input

The responsibility for developing a program has traditionally belonged to the client, and in government buildings this means the public works department. However, that department now tends to delegate the duty to the architect or an operations research specialist. Security planners cannot depend on these individuals, who are often unfamiliar with special security requirements despite the planner's best efforts to assure such familiarity. Thus, security officers must work closely with the people who are actually writing the program and should draft language to satisfy building security needs.

The security input would cover both general and specific points such as clustering operations that need the same level of security; putting offices with heavy public use close to the building entrances; examining the size and location of ductwork that might be used for escape; putting rest rooms and other public facilities away from courtrooms; and eliminating removable ceiling panels where explosives can be hidden.

Finally, the quality of the architectural program means the difference between a functional, efficient courthouse and one plagued by poor security, badly located departments, unpleasant work areas, and other problems. Thus, it is imperative that the security planner be involved at this critical stage.

Program Scope and Contents

This section can guide security planner's inputs into the architectural program.

First, the program is a precise description of the court's organizational structure. Therefore, security planners should contribute information about their own departments, including the managerial hierarchy, relationships with other departments, external and internal operations, information processing, and communications. Also important are the movement pattern of court staff, prisoners, judges, witnesses, attorneys, and the public in the building being planned. Finally, the pro-

⁴ American Bar Association and American Institute of Architects Joint Committee on the Design of Courtrooms and Court Facilities, *The American Courthouse* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1973), p. 219.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Institute for Court Management, *State Court Administrative Systems: Perspectives and Relationships* (Denver, Colorado: Institute for Court Management, 1975), p. 100.

⁷ Order this brochure from AIA at 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

⁸ See the Architect and Engineer Selection Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-582).

⁹ The program approach idea is discussed in Greenberg, pp. 15-19.

gram explores future organizational developments and anticipates their requirements as much as possible.

Second, the program is a quantitative description of activities carried on in the building. Here security planners should provide data on the volume of work in their departments and the number of staff involved. The planners also should help collect data on the number of visitors, litigants, attorneys, prisoners, jurors, judges, and witnesses in the building.

Third, the program projects growth in a court's volume of business over the next 10 to 15 years and assesses the impact of that growth on the court's structure, organization, management, and personnel. The security planner may want to add estimates of the security needs that will accompany this growth.

Fourth, the program translates the three factors just described into space units, asking how large a room should be, and what combinations of different size courtrooms, temporary holding cells, and other rooms are required. Here again, the security point of view will be useful.

Fifth, the program defines the arrangement of space within each building department. This arrangement is based on the first two descriptions outlined before. (Later parts of this chapter will discuss space arrangement with security in mind.)

Sixth, the program describes the location of various departments in the building. The optimum site for each is determined by the movement of information, materials, and people in and out of the building. Several questions should be asked here: Which department can take best advantage of a first floor location and direct access to the street? Where is public access a key factor? Where should courtrooms be located? As described later in this chapter, the security officer has valuable insights in answering these kinds of questions.

Seventh, the program's gross area projection provides a basis for calculating the budget. Here the security planner will want to make sure that cost-cutting efforts do not cause security problems.

Eighth, the program is a set of instructions the client presents to the architect. In this sense, the program is a tool that can be used to evaluate the finished building, indicating responsibility for any oversights or errors.

Ninth, the program assesses some less tangible but equally crucial factors. For example, are the proposed building and its surroundings attractive? Is the structure overwhelming in size? Is the interior comfortable and convenient, especially for those who work there? Does the overall environment produce or add to tension?

Stress factors are important in maintaining security and comfort in the courtroom and courthouse. For example, the lobby outside a sentencing, family, or arraignment court may be the scene of emotional outbursts and should be larger than usual, to prevent aggravated tension because of crowding. In addition, tension in the courtroom can be reduced by providing space for persons awaiting arraignment to consult with their lawyers and be with their families.

For multistory, multicourtroom facilities, extra professional help may be needed to prepare the architectural program. For

the average jurisdiction, however, existing court staff can develop each program section. In fact, most of the nine factors just mentioned may already be part of the current planning process in many jurisdictions.

COST CONSIDERATIONS

Alternative solutions to security problems must be weighed against cost considerations. Many security requirements can be satisfied by architectural, manpower, or technological solutions, but careful cost analysis is important for long-term or permanent needs. While architectural solutions may seem expensive at first, over the life of a building the long-term burden lies in personnel costs. If additional manpower is considered in place of architectural measures, planners should compute both direct costs (salaries) and indirect costs over the life of the building (fringe benefits, administrative overhead, uniforms, weapons, equipment allowance, etc.)¹⁰ for the additional manpower involved. Those figures should then be compared to the architectural cost.

During courthouse construction or remodeling, the installation of technological devices may also be a way to augment security systems and improve the response time of security personnel. Costs vary widely based upon specifications, quantity, and the level of competition in the open market, and the uninformed can make serious and costly errors in this area. Unless security planners are competent in a technical field, they should hire professionals, who will be cheaper in the long run.

As noted in chapter 5, all equipment costs should include a factor for recurring maintenance and, in some cases, for spare parts or expendable supplies. Comparing architectural inputs to operational or technological change is hard at best, and such estimates should be carefully reviewed before a final decision is made.

SECURITY AND DESIGN

NEW CONSTRUCTION

Jurisdictions with enough funds to build new courthouses offer excellent opportunities for good security officers. These planners should get involved at the site selection phase; as a project develops, they can influence the ultimate building design by giving project designers specific data to include in their submissions to architects, who then prepare drawings.

This section outlines major concerns for security planners. Along with the guidelines presented here, planners should be aware of the appropriate court planning and design literature, cited in the bibliography of this manual. Three publications are especially important:

- *Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities*, Volume B, an 11-part monograph prepared by the National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, University of Illinois, 1976.
- *The American Bar Association's Courthouse Design: A Handbook for Judges and Court Administrators*, by Allan Greenberg, 1975.
- *Space Management and the Courts: Design Handbook*, by F. Michael Wong, 1973.

Security planners are not expected to be fully knowledgeable in such fields as communications, alarm systems, and security hardware. However, their input must be detailed and

¹⁰ These indirect or overhead costs can be estimated at about 30 percent for organizations with more than 25 persons. See F. Michael Wong, *Space Management and the Courts: Design Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1973), p. 99. For smaller organizations, a somewhat higher percentage would be appropriate.

accurate, so they should consult known experts in various technical areas.

During the design process, all activities and services can be identified according to the following security categories:

Low security. These areas of a trial court building have significant public access and contact. Such areas include public lobbies, public hallways, vertical movement systems (e.g., stairs, elevators, escalators), waiting areas, the clerk's office, probation offices, general concessions, and rest rooms.

Medium security. These areas have certain levels of public contact, yet court and other agency staff are often the prime users. Examples are the legal library, prosecutors' offices, jury assembly and lounge areas, other restricted circulation areas, and courtrooms.

High security. These are areas where infrequent or highly restricted public access is necessary. They include judges' chambers, jury deliberation rooms, high-risk trial courtrooms, temporary holding facilities, and circulation areas for in-custody defendants.

Once these spaces are identified, they can be accommodated in the design concept. While the range of services included in the low- and medium-security categories may overlap in some jurisdictions, zoning different areas according to security requirements can be very helpful in the design development stages. At that time, planners should consider room location and separate entrances, exits, and circulation routes for the three areas to avoid contacts among the public, judges, witnesses, defendants, and other groups.

Following are some security guidelines for new construction, though many apply equally to remodeling projects.¹¹

- During the site selection process, try to predict the needs of certain user groups—for example, the location and arrangement of their access pathways, parking and drop-off points, and waiting areas. Judges and court staff have fairly predictable access and parking needs. However, because the number of jurors and witnesses varies a good deal over the normal work day, accurate predictions of their needs are fairly difficult.

- If defendants are transferred from a detention facility by vehicle, provide special sally ports (secured passages) and drop-off points separate from the entrance for court personnel and the general public. Special transfer bridges and tunnels may be needed to move defendants when the detention facility is right next to the trial court facility.

- Make areas outside the court facility (e.g., parking, bus stops, drop-off points) highly visible and well-defined both day and night. Identify the boundaries of the court environment by using fences, shrubs, or similar features; these boundaries should also be well-lighted at night.

- If law enforcement agencies are to be included in a building complex with the courts, clearly distinguish and separate as much as possible the entry and exit points for both groups.

- Floodlight the building exterior to discourage intruders.

- Provide an emergency power system to operate security lights and alarms automatically in case of a power failure or disruption.

- Provide an automatically activated sprinkler system for fire protection, even if local building codes do not require such a system.

- Provide an intrusion alarm system to (1) detect an unauthorized person in the building after it is locked, and (2) inform security forces without an alarm being heard by an intruder. The system should be programmed to record an intruder's movements; this information will help officials find the person and/or any hidden explosive device.

- Reduce the number of hiding places in the building by fitting all doors into restricted areas with security locks, providing doors to janitor's closets with automatic door closers and locks, restricting access to staff toilets to personnel with keys, and keeping empty offices locked.

- Close off all office areas and their waiting rooms from public corridors, lobbies, and general waiting rooms. Receptionists can communicate with people in the waiting rooms through sliding glass windows. Where necessary, equip doors from waiting rooms to interview rooms or offices with electrically controlled locks operated from receptionists' desks. A hidden, foot-activated alarm to summon help should be available at each receptionist's desk.

- Restrict access to storage areas and janitor's closets; vaults and boiler rooms; the elevator, electric, and telephone equipment rooms; and all other machine rooms.

RENOVATION/REMODELING

Often budgets will not support new courthouse construction, and renovation or remodeling of existing facilities is the only way to satisfy current needs. In that case, the comprehensive physical security survey discussed earlier, coupled with a review of current operational procedures, will identify weaknesses that may be corrected by the renovation.

The decision to remodel an existing building into a court facility also presents an opportunity to devise architectural solutions to security problems. Any structure about to be remodeled for court use should be inspected for suitability from a security point of view. If the building is not adequate, the security officer should formally notify the planners and ask them to reconsider their selection.

SEPARATING CIRCULATION ROUTES

Separating circulation patterns should be a primary consideration in all kinds of construction projects. The people in a courthouse can be divided into three general groups: the public, judges and court attaches, and prisoners. Separating the movement of these groups should be a high priority, but often it is impossible to have three separate circulation systems. When this is not possible, try to combine the movement of prisoners, judges, and court personnel in one controlled system away from the public. In that case, it is important to make people constantly aware that prisoners may be nearby. Then too, a standard procedure for prisoner movement can help prevent any unnecessary confrontations (see figure 7-1).

Key guidelines on separate circulation patterns follow:¹²


- Limit the number of public entrances to the building. Having only one is preferable, so that the general public's movement is well-defined and easily controlled.

- Separate private and secured areas from public ones whenever possible. In multistory buildings, this can be done by placing similar functions on one or more floors and

¹¹ Many of these guidelines are in Wong, p. 103, Greenberg, pp. 51-55, and the National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, Monograph B-5, pp. 2, 49.

¹² Ibid.

Figure 7-1
GENERAL CIRCULATION ROUTES



The general circulation system of a courthouse consists basically of public and security circulation routes. As shown above, the two systems should not intersect. Prisoners should be brought in and moved through the facility without ever coming in contact with the public. In this case, there is a holding space on the lower level and offenders are moved to courtrooms via a security elevator.

Source: National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, *Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities, Monograph B-5: Trial Court Facility* (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976), p. 79. All figures are reproduced with permission of the clearinghouse.


denying the general public access to certain areas by using locked doors and elevators programmed for override (i.e., they will not stop at some floors). In contrast, group the offices with a high volume of general use (e.g., clerk of the court, registrar of deeds) on lower floors near the building entrances (see figures 7-2 and 7-3).

Making courtrooms and other restricted areas remote limits the need for movement of the general public there. In emergencies, such an arrangement also allows tighter con-

trol of those areas and reduces opportunities for disruption. However, it might be useful for courtrooms and related facilities that operate after working hours to be located on the entrance level and the lower floors. All upper floors could then be closed to the public to reduce vandalism and theft. For single-story buildings, designers would need to set up zones of activity for restricted and public spaces.

- Set up control points for all areas of contact between public and restricted or secure circulation systems. These

Figure 7-2
GENERAL CIRCULATION: EXAMPLE 1



This building section illustrates some of the important relationships to remember in the layout and planning of a courts building. Higher volume activities such as the clerk's office, dining and cafeteria, jury assembly, information, and public services should be on the lowest floors. Probation and the district attorney's offices should be near the main entrance. The courts and chambers areas should be on the upper floors, away from the higher volume activities. Parking and security access should be on the lowest floor, away from the general entrance and circulation spaces.

In many situations, a separate floor might be considered as part of the initial construction process, so that if space needs have been underestimated new courtrooms or offices can be built quickly.

Source: National Clearinghouse, Trial Court Facility, Monograph B-5, p. 85.

points can be controlled by a receptionist area, a guarded door, or a door that is locked at all times. Depending on the building's physical layout, some of these doors can be equipped with so-called "panic" hardware to permit their use as emergency exits. However, local building and fire code requirements must be considered here.

- For buildings of more than one story, have a central movement system (stairways or elevators) and utility service trunk rather than a system located along a perimeter wall. The former allows more control over traffic and hence promotes security.

- In multifloor buildings, devise a secure system to move

prisoners by using a low-ceiling mezzanine built between two high-ceiling court floors, with stairways leading to the courtrooms and a temporary holding area.¹³


- Provide enough security and restricted passages. If fiscal constraints or building limitations rule out separate passageways for prisoners and for judges and staff, the building security plan should aim for minimal contact between prisoners and these people, perhaps by assigning more escort personnel.

- Where possible, group courtrooms, jury deliberation rooms, and judges' chambers so that movement in these areas can be controlled.

- In a criminal courthouse, put trial courtrooms on levels above and/or below detention floors.

¹³ This concept is used in the Hayward Hall of Justice, Hayward, California (Alameda County).

Figure 7-3
GENERAL CIRCULATION: EXAMPLE 2



This plan shows a courthouse scheme in which both courts and judicial offices are located on the same floor. Centered on an open courtyard, the public circulation areas are in the middle of the building. Judicial offices are on a perimeter, to give exterior views. This design allows for a private corridor to serve the judicial staff and also provides access for the public.

Source: National Clearinghouse, Trial Court Facility, Monograph B-5, p. 84.

COURTHOUSE DESIGN GUIDELINES

Public Facilities

Rest rooms, lounges, conference rooms, and similar areas should not directly adjoin the courtroom or sensitive spaces such as judges' chambers or temporary holding areas. Relocating some existing facilities would be hard, but there is no excuse for repeating mistakes in new construction.

One western courtroom was severely damaged by a bomb detonated in the plumbing shaft of a rest room located next to the courtroom. Entry took place from the floor above, with the bomb suspended on a wire and lowered to the courtroom level. This case also shows the need to consider spaces above and below the courtroom, as well as those on the same floor.

Trash receptacles should not be easy hiding places for bombs or other devices. Moreover, public facilities should not have removable ceiling panels, and all service accesses should be locked or sealed and checked often. Removable ceiling panels may be preferred because of budget limits and because they provide easier access to wiring, ducts, and other equipment. However, rest rooms are favorite spots for hiding explosive devices, which can be put in removable ceiling panels or plumbing access spaces. Bombing incidents in the U.S. Capitol, the U.S. State Department, and many other public buildings and courthouses show that security concerns should outweigh cost factors in these critical design areas.

Elevators

If courthouses have elevators, there are several ways to improve security. Separate elevators for the public, court personnel, and prisoners are ideal. In a new building, the architect should locate these separate systems in key areas. Prisoner elevators should go directly from the reception area to passages that lead to temporary holding areas. Judges' elevators next to private entrances can be programmed to respond only to a key and located to open only into restricted areas. If public elevators must also be used for prisoners, their initial engineering should include operation by key and the override feature mentioned before. If elevators are required for jury movement, more service and larger elevator lobbies may be needed.

Public Offices

As noted before, public offices should be some distance from courtrooms to reduce both the flow of unnecessary traffic and the noise level. The closer such areas are to lower levels and public entrances, the less effect their activities will have on the courtroom.

A key example of a public office is the clerk of the court. The clerk's office collects, sorts, and classifies all documents and court records, transcribes and otherwise records courtroom events, and usually stores all exhibits presented as evidence during court proceedings. This office also is responsible for court accounting, juror selection and management, and statistical reports. In addition, the clerk usually collects any fines and fees that may be levied by a court. In short, the clerk

of the court is the central processing point for paperwork and documentation.¹⁴

The volume of traffic through this office is usually high and includes both court personnel and the general public; therefore, the office should be located near public entrances. In making records and case files available upon demand, the clerk also is charged with the overall security of those materials. Thus, public contact should be at only one point: a public desk where supervised reading space is available.

Records may be stored either in vaults or open-shelf units but should be protected against fire in any case. Locked doors and files, barred windows, and other barriers can help keep people from losing or tampering with stored materials. In designing storage and other office areas, a security officer can help the clerk by suggesting changes in both layout and operation. Figure 7-4 shows a suggested layout for a small office with supervised public reading space and maximum use of limited storage space.

The clerk's evidence storage area rates special concern. There a variety of items and materials are received, indexed, stored, or otherwise processed. Because of the need to preserve sensitive materials in their original condition, an evidence storage room should be designed carefully.

To maintain security, the evidence storage room should be located in a remote or otherwise inconspicuous part of the office, so that access can be restricted. If the room must be open rather than locked, its entrance should be watched carefully by a clerical staff member.

In most situations, evidence storage should consist of two distinct areas to promote better space management: a temporary storage room for current cases, and a long-term storage room for settled cases in which evidence must still be kept.¹⁵ The latter could be located outside the clerk's office or in another part of the building, with substantial space available for expansion.

Neither room should admit exterior light because of the sensitive nature of some evidence and the need to preserve it in its initial state.¹⁶ In designing both areas, specific provisions should be made for storing weapons, drugs, perishables, flammables, explosives, and large bulky items.

Prisoner Reception

Prisoner reception into the courthouse may be through a tunnel or bridge connected to the jail, by means of a sally port arrangement, directly through a basement entrance, or from the street. As noted in the discussion on new construction design, if prisoners are brought from another place by vehicle, it is desirable to use a sally port or a drive-in basement arrangement. A sally port should have an outer door or gate that can be closed before a prisoner is removed from the vehicle. Ideally, that entrance should restrict vision from the outside and should open directly into a security or restricted passage. This is one of the critical points in prisoner movement, where an escape may be attempted or an assault made on either the prisoner or the transport officer. Thus, plans for new construction or remodeling should incorporate the best possible reception system.

Security/Restricted Passages


It is important to understand the difference between security passages and restricted passages. The first are used exclusively to move prisoners; their entry and exit points are re-

¹⁴ National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, *Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities*, Monograph B-8; *Clerk of the Court* (Charampaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976), p. 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Figure 7-4
CLERK OF THE COURT'S OFFICE



This plan shows a layout for a small office. It is highly accessible to the public, with a form table and reading area adjacent to the public desk. The desk itself is divided into separate activity areas and is served by clerks positioned at right angles to the desk. The chief clerk's office, conferencelounge space, and microfilm/copy room are in areas having little public access. Movable file shelves, on tracks to reduce space needs, are centrally located for the convenience of the entire office.

Source: National Clearinghouse, Clerk of the Court, Monograph B-8, p. 19.

stricted to bailiffs, security personnel, or transportation officers. Security passage entries are from a sally port, jail, or jail tunnel and lead to temporary holding areas and the courtrooms. These passages are an extension of the custodial function of the jail or prison.¹⁷

Restricted passages are intended for the use of judges, court staff, and those who have legitimate court business. These passages are closed off from public circulation by a series of locked doors and by people such as receptionists, bailiffs, or clerks in the courtroom. In actual practice, restricted passages also may be used to move prisoners. In that case, they require a system to ensure minimum contact with judges and other court personnel.

Many old and small courthouses do not allow for even a minimum of circulation separation; thus, alternate security measures must be developed, using current architectural features. Among the possibilities are a side or rear entrance that can be locked to the general public, or back stairways that can be easily cleared or closed off.

COURTROOM DESIGN GUIDELINES

Entrances

There should be separate entrances for (1) the general public, (2) the judge, (3) court staff and witnesses, and (4) in-custody defendants. Public entrances should be designed so they can be locked if the court so orders. Some courts prefer the use of a vestibule arrangement, which acts as both a sound buffer and an area where some security control can be exercised over spectators (see figures 7-5 and 7-6).

Packages and bulky handbags or the like should be excluded from the courtroom and the vestibule area. Judges' entrances should be adjacent to the bench so they can enter or leave the courtrooms quickly. The defendants' entrance should not be near the bench and should be far enough away from the spectator section to preclude the passing of any goods.

Windows

Windows should be fastened with quality hardware. If they are not of translucent glass, windows should be draped to prevent a clear view of the well area—particularly the judge's bench. This precaution might have saved a New Jersey judge killed on the bench in 1974 by a sniper whose view was unobstructed as he fired a rifle from across the street. For windows on lower floors or those easily accessible from the outside, heavy-gauge grilles or bars are advisable.

Judge's Bench

Each end of the bench should be closed off with 3½ to 4 foot partitions. One end may be a gate with a release on the inside to give the judge access to the rest of the courtroom well. A planner might even consider reinforcing the bench with steel plating or bullet-resistant plastic. However, these are costly items, and some jurisdictions have substituted a packed-sand barrier capable of resisting small-caliber gunfire.

Bailiff's Station

The bailiff's station should allow a maximum view of the

courtroom and entrances and should be near the door to the temporary holding area. A telephone to answer all incoming calls to the courtroom is desirable and serves as a communications channel for possible calls for help. A drawer with a suitable lock should be available for temporary storage of the bailiff's firearm and the weapons of law enforcement witnesses, if the court does not allow them to carry firearms in the courtroom.

Entry into Well

The courtroom should have an obvious barrier restricting entry from the spectator area into the well. A gate allowing passage into the well may be equipped with either a catch lock or an electric lock controlled from the bailiff's station.

Furniture

Spectator seating should be of solid wooden or plastic construction and fixed to the floor, like church pews. This will allow periodic searches for contraband. Upholstered seating, though more comfortable, can allow people to hide small explosive devices or other contraband. Items such as water carafes and ashtrays, which can be used as weapons, should be kept out of the defendant's reach. Many courtroom incidents have involved the use of such objects on the counsel tables as weapons or missiles.

It may be useful to anchor one chair at the defense counsel's table to the floor and provide a way to restrain the defendant, if the court so orders, through a waist chain and handcuff arrangement. This can be done unobtrusively (see figure 7-7). The same arrangement should be repeated for the witness chair. Finally the defense counsel's table should be located nearest the door used for the defendant's entry; this will reduce the number of people who come in contact with the defendant.

Duress Alarms

Alarm buttons should be installed so that in an emergency the judge, clerk, or bailiff can summon help without being noticed. The alarm, which should not be audible in the courtroom, may be an "Executone"-type system, which allows audio monitoring of the courtroom only when activated and can initiate a two-way voice communication. The alarm may activate closed-circuit television, or it may be a simple buzzer arrangement linked to the nearest sheriff's office or local police department. Some sort of alarm system can and should be devised for every courtroom. (For further discussion, see chapter 5.)

Lights


If natural lighting from windows is not available, emergency lighting is needed in case of either a power failure or deliberate switch-off, although key-controlled light switches can help prevent the latter. Emergency lighting could come from strategically-placed, battery-operated lanterns which automatically turn on in case of power failure and can be manually switched on from the bench or the clerk's or bailiff's station. An emergency generator should be available to operate security lighting and alarm systems throughout the building. Some interior courtrooms are wired on two circuits so there is a minimum of light round-the-clock.

Magnetometers

Magnetometers generally are used only in high-risk trials

¹⁷ Chapter 3 discusses the handling of prisoners in security passages.


Figure 7-5
LAYOUT OF COURTROOM AND NEARBY SPACE



This plan shows a cluster of two courtroom spaces with attorney/client conference rooms and a joint vestibule entrance. The public circulation area has alcove waiting and lounge areas. The judges' chambers are connected to the courtrooms via a security corridor, along which the witness waiting rooms are also located.

Source: National Clearinghouse, Trial Courtroom Environment, Monograph B-6, p. 38.


Figure 7-6
ADJACENT COURTROOM AREAS



This plan for a single courtroom shows some of the important considerations for a trial courtroom environment. A small alcove space off the public circulation route lets people wait comfortably for court proceedings. The vestibule entry to the courtroom provides an acoustical buffer to prevent corridor noises from interrupting proceedings when someone enters the courtroom. The attorney/client conference space opens off the vestibule, allowing use from both the courtroom and corridor areas.

Source: National Clearinghouse, *Trial Courtroom Environment*, Monograph B-6, p. 42.

Figure 7-7
ANCHORED DEFENDANT'S CHAIR WITH PLATE FOR WAIST CHAIN AND HANDCUFFS



(Courtesy of Marin County, California, Sheriff's Department)

and usually by a written court order. As explained in chapter 5, these devices may be portable walk-through or hand-held models, as seen in airports. Some newer installations have such devices built into the entry door frame. Although these models are less obvious than others, some argue that the portable unit has (1) a deterrent effect simply because it is visible and (2) greater utility because it may be used in more than one courtroom.

DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR ANCILLARY COURTROOM AREAS

Judges' Chambers

Examples of security measures to consider in designing judges' chambers include the following:

- Provide chambers with more than one exit.
- Put automatic closers and locks on doors to ensure privacy and provide more security by restricting entry.
- If windows are transparent, drape them to restrict clear vision of the judge at his desk.
- Although many judges do not want alarm buttons in their chambers, it is a good idea to recommend such an installation, which should be connected to the same terminal as the courtroom alarm. The terminal monitor should clearly identify the chambers as the source of the call for help.
- Make sure that entry into a judge's chambers is controlled by either the bailiff or a secretary. Direct public access is not advisable.
- Make courtrooms accessible for judges, clerks, and staff directly from the judges' chambers or restricted hallways; passage through public spaces should not be necessary. For larger courthouses, some planners recommend grouping all chambers and related spaces in one area next to the courtrooms, or preferably on a separate floor with public access limited to one controlled point.

Figure 7-8 gives a suggested layout for judges' chambers. Some suggested features may not be practical for smaller courthouses, but every effort should be made to provide at least two entries/exits.

Temporary Holding Areas

These spaces present design problems. Regardless of courthouse size, a holding area often is used both for persons whose guilt has not yet been determined and for convicted prisoners who are either on trial on additional charges or appearing as witnesses. Large courthouses have a general holding area for sizable numbers of prisoners and smaller temporary holding cells near courtrooms. Smaller courthouses, on the other hand, usually have only one holding area near the courtroom, and many of these courts bring prisoners directly from jail and hold them in a room or hallway, or even in the courtroom itself.

The door of the holding room should have an observation port, or glass panel, for frequent viewing. No potentially harmful furnishings or fixtures should be used. Benches should be permanently installed and preferably made of cast concrete.

With the advent of female deputies as bailiffs, many toilet facilities in holding cells have been modified to provide privacy screens. The security officer in one new California courthouse insists that those screens be constructed so that he

can always see both the head and feet of the person using the facility. His primary concern is to prevent suicide attempts.

For conventional toilet facilities, doors should have observation ports and should open outward so they cannot be barricaded from within. Plumbing should be of approved institutional design, with cutoff valves to control flooding located outside the toilet or the entire holding area.

In larger courthouses, holding areas should be between two courtrooms or located to serve a cluster of several courtrooms. Separate holding rooms for females and juveniles are advisable. Both single- and multiple-occupancy units may be needed to isolate certain individuals. One or more holding cells may be wired for sound and CCTV for use when an unruly defendant is removed from the court. A heavy glass panel can be placed in the door of a holding cell leading to the court or in an adjacent wall; this will allow the unruly prisoner to see the proceedings. A chair permanently fastened to the floor in front of this viewing port is suitable to restrain the prisoner.

An example of a special architectural feature built into a temporary holding area can be found in a new courthouse in California. There a double system of doors helps prevent a group assault upon a bailiff who is removing or returning a prisoner. Inside the solid outer door, which has a glass viewing port, is a small area with bars. Similar to a sally port, this area has an electrically controlled door operated from the corridor. A prisoner is called and enters the barred area; the inner door is locked behind him, the outer door is opened, and the person is taken into court. On return, the process is reversed.

Without the knowledge of the security officer in this court, a budget review committee decided to economize during construction of this building. The committee eliminated the inner door's electrical locking mechanism and replaced it with a manual lock, thus removing the security aspect of the inner barred area. Without the electric lock, the bailiff opening the inner door was again in direct contact with all the occupants of the holding cell. At the sheriff's urgent request, the electric locks were reinstalled at some additional cost. Monitoring security concerns during construction could have prevented this.

Jury Deliberation Rooms

These rooms usually open directly into or are adjacent to courtrooms. A jury room should be soundproof to ensure privacy during deliberations. Toilets should be connected by vestibules, which help cut down noise. Windows should be draped or made of translucent glass. The doors should be locked and opened only after a summons from the jury by means of a knock or buzzer. The bailiff needs enough space to be stationed in view of the deliberation room door, to control movement in and out. Entry into the deliberation room from the courtroom should not require passage near or through the spectator section nor through public corridors.


Witness Waiting Rooms

Often witness waiting rooms are considered a luxury courts cannot afford, usually because of a space shortage. However, if such facilities are provided, separate spaces should be available for defense and prosecution witnesses. If possible, access to the rooms should be only from a restricted passage, and the general public should be denied entry at all times.

Attorney-Client Conference Rooms

Attorney-client conference rooms have particular security

Figure 7-8
 JUDGE'S CHAMBERS WITH TWO EXITS



This plan of a judge's chamber includes areas to accommodate all persons and functions associated with a judge's activities: secretarial/waiting space, personal work and relaxation area, conference room for discussions and meetings, and separate work space for law clerks. The spaces are interconnected and there are two entry/exit points out of the chambers—one for general and more formal use, and one for the judge's private use. A clear view of the judge at his desk or in the conference room (see arrows) is restricted by landscaping. The secretary/waiting area has a window to enable viewing and screening of individuals wanting to enter the chambers (see arrow).

Source: National Clearinghouse, Trial Courtroom Environment, Monograph B-6, p. 92.

needs. Each door should have a glass observation port allowing the bailiff to inspect the room but not hear what is said between attorney and client. These rooms require a high level of security: locks on doors, grilles on windows, table and chairs fastened to the floor if possible, and light switches that are key-controlled or located outside the door. Again, removable ceiling panels should be avoided because they provide hiding places for contraband or a means of escape. Finally, the rooms should be easily accessible from courtrooms and temporary holding areas. One option, usually influenced by the court's ruling, is to build these rooms so that physical contact during conferences is not possible.

Figure 7-9 shows that many of the preceding design considerations can be incorporated effectively into a single court facility in a rural jurisdiction with limited overall floor space.

MODEL COURT FACILITIES

Except for the use of a prisoners' dock in some courts in the northeast, the basic physical layout of U.S. courts has been the same for more than 150 years. The judge is on a raised bench at center front, facing defendants and the prosecution, coequal participants at a lower level. The jury sits to the side and plays a passive role, while witnesses testify facing the lawyers. Spectators are removed from the activity of the well and sit at the rear.¹⁸ In recent years, however, a few courtroom designers have been relying less upon this tradition and seem to favor more innovative designs that combine functional considerations with such concerns as looks and atmosphere.

Judge George H. Boldt, a federal judge for the State of Washington, can take credit for one of the most remarkable recent efforts to improve courtrooms.¹⁹ His changes in Tacoma's federal building are described in an article in the *Journal of the American Judicature Society*,²⁰ and his ideas are the basis of the floor plan shown in figure 7-10. The basic plan was to shift the judge's bench from the center front to a corner in order to give the judge a better view of witnesses and exhibits.

Judge William S. Fort developed the concept of the courtroom-in-the-round and implemented it in Lane County, Oregon (see figure 7-11). This grouping of all participants in a circle, with spectators seated on the outer arcs, is a radical departure from the traditional arrangement.²¹

The courtroom-in-the-round idea has been used in three recent efforts to improve courtrooms in the District of Columbia's Superior Court, at the McGeorge School of Law in Sacramento, California, and for the renovation of a Georgia courthouse. A discussion of these three approaches follows.

A MODEL COURTROOM

The D.C. Superior Court's Model Courtroom was made possible by a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. When the District of Columbia received these funds to build a new 45-courtroom facility, court officials

chose Judge Fort as a consultant to work with the building committee and the architectural firm. One result of this work was the model courtroom, built in an existing courthouse and put into use on June 23, 1975. The room now serves as a model for 31 of the 45 courtrooms in the new facility. (See figure 7-12 for the model's floor plan.)

Figure 7-13 shows more physical security features which could be added to the basic design of this model courtroom. However, in most cases, a courtroom incorporating all these features may not be needed or desirable.

The U.S. Marshals Service handles security in this D.C. court under federal mandate. From the first planning for the new facility, there has been a close and constant positive relationship among the Marshals Service, the architect, the builder, and the D.C. Department of General Services (which awarded and supervised the contract). This cooperation has meant including security considerations at minimum cost and will also preclude many costly changes later.

A complete evaluation of this courtroom was done by the National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, at the University of Illinois. The study concluded that, in general, the courtroom design did not seem to add to any unusual feelings by participants of insecurity or danger while in the room. In fact, a majority of participants preferred this type of courtroom to the traditional type.²²

THE COURTROOM OF THE FUTURE

This courtroom was conceived in 1966 by Dean Gordon D. Schaber, of the McGeorge School of Law, as an educational courtroom project. The idea was to provide a trial courtroom on the law school campus to teach students the basic skills of trial advocacy. In designing the model facility, one goal was to make security "not just a functioning, but an unobtrusive reality." Structural design factors were considered first for their utility and then for the security provided all courtroom litigants, personnel, and visitors. Figure 7-14 shows the final design. Construction started in 1971. After imperfections were worked out and changes made, the "Courtroom of the Future" opened in 1973.

Dean Schaber has described the security features of his model courtroom as follows:

At the McGeorge Courtroom, security is present but unobtrusive. All spectators pass through a double-doored vestibule leading to the courtroom. Concealed within the walls are metal detectors which will lock the two sets of doors if the preset metallic level is exceeded. The spectator is then requested by the court technician sitting in a booth with one-way glass to place the metal article in a drawer similar to drive-up windows at banks. Once cleared, the spectator receives a receipt for the article and the doors to the courtroom are unlocked.

Within the courtroom itself, spectator chairs are made of clear plastic so the court technician, seated in his booth at the rear, can keep an eye out for any furtive movements by spectators. The judge, before entering from a separate corridor, can view the entire courtroom through a special wide-angle lens concealed in the wall. The judge and bailiffs also have buttons near their positions to lock all doors leading in or out of the courtroom. These doors can be unlocked by the court technician from within his secure booth.

Finally, the court technician has the ability to monitor the entire courtroom via seven concealed TV cameras, as well as the adjacent corridors and security cell from four other cameras. . . . Besides enabling the court technician to monitor courtroom proceedings in progress, TV cameras have two purposes: (1) to make a videotape record of the proceedings, and (2) to broadcast by closed circuit into adjacent courtroom

¹⁸ Greenberg, p. 43.


¹⁹ See Greenberg, p. 64, figures 24-29, and table B for an analysis of Judge Boldt's courtroom layout.

²⁰ Richard Monaghan and George H. Boldt, "A New Courtroom Arrangement" vol. 47, no. 10 (March 1974), pp. 209-212.

²¹ See Greenberg, pp. 64-65, figures 30-35, and table C for a discussion of the advantages and limitations of this idea.

²² National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, *District of Columbia Superior Court Model Courtroom Evaluation* (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976), p. 55.

Figure 7-9
DESIGN FOR LIMITED SPACE




This floor plan was designed for a rural Indian jurisdiction which had a very small space, yet needed to provide for the judge's chambers, jury deliberation and judge's conference area, a flexible trial courtroom, clerk's offices, and public services. The courtroom areas are right next to the jail, and secure passage between the jail and courthouse was required. The above polygon courtroom scheme successfully provides for most of the design features required today in a modern courthouse.

Source: National Clearinghouse, Trial Courtroom Environment, Monograph B-6, p. 24.

facilities. The latter purpose has enormous security potential. If, for example, judicial authorities know that a trial has some security or crowd control risk, they can simply telecast the proceedings into a nearby auditorium. Spectators will see and hear everything that takes place, but only the necessary trial participants will be in the courtroom, secure from danger by outsiders and free from the distractions of a disruptive crowd.²³


Figure 7-10
REDESIGNED CRIMINAL COURTROOM*



* Developed by Judge George H. Boldt, federal judge for Washington state.

Source: Allan Greenberg, *Courthouse Design: A Handbook for Judges and Court Administrators* (Chicago, Illinois: American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, 1975), figure 15 (reprinted with author's permission).


Figure 7-11
COURTROOM IN THE ROUND*



* Architects: Lyons, Mather, and Lechner, AIA

Source: Greenberg, figure 14.

Figure 7-12
MODEL COURTROOM




Source: National Clearinghouse, District of Columbia Superior Court Model Courtroom Evaluation, p. 5.

A VOCATIONAL SCHOOL PROJECT

In 1975, extensive repairs were needed at the 26-year-old Pickens County, Georgia, courthouse. The county commissioner asked the Pickens Area Technical School to undertake the renovation. The school decided to adapt the "Courtroom of the Future" design to the Pickens County courtroom. Students, instructors, and one full-time journeyman carpenter used donations from local building supply firms and finished

²³ "Courtroom of the Future: Balancing Security and Justice," *The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (May 1974), pp. 16-21. Reprinted courtesy of the *Bulletin*.

Figure 7-13
MODEL COURTROOM WITH ADDITIONAL SECURITY FEATURES



Source: National Clearinghouse, District of Columbia Superior Court Model Courtroom Evaluation, p. 41.

the job in six months for less than \$50,000. A local contractor installed the central heating/air-conditioning system, and the school did the rest.

Minimal security problems were discovered upon completion; they may have been avoided had overall security aspects been considered before construction. However, the commissioner said it was unlikely that these minor items would cause serious security problems in a jurisdiction such as Pickens County.


It is important to be aware of the skilled and semiskilled labor that a vocational school can offer. This remodeling job would not have been possible otherwise because of the high

costs involved, and the project shows that problems can be solved without total dependence on the usual funding procedures.

CONCLUSION

Recent innovative planning for and construction of new courtrooms, plus changes in existing buildings, have been guideposts for those interested in modern courthouse design. Fortunately, security has played a role in those efforts; the aim of this chapter is to promote and expand that role in the future.

Figure 7-14
"COURTROOM OF THE FUTURE": A CENTER FOR LEGAL ADVOCACY



Source: Diagram provided by and reproduced with the permission of Dean Gordon D. Schaber, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, Sacramento, California.

Appendix A

COURT SECURITY ISSUES

MANAGEMENT

1. *Should there be a single designated security officer for each courthouse?*

Yes, each courthouse in a given jurisdiction should have an officer responsible for security. The officer may be the sheriff or his designee, but it is important that responsibility and authority for security be well-defined.

2. *Should there be a comprehensive bailiffs' manual with detailed standard operating procedures, including security?*

Yes. Because of the sensitive nature of many bailiff functions, these court officers need a comprehensive manual to guide them. This is especially true for part-time bailiffs, since verbal instructions may not be complete nor remembered entirely.

3. *Should there be written plans and procedures covering both normal court security operations and emergency conditions?*

Yes. Written plans and procedures are desirable because they leave little room for misinterpretation, are useful in stating policy, pinpoint responsibility, and offer continuity when personnel are reassigned.

4. *Should a written court order be requested for any non-routine court security procedure?*

Yes. Both sheriffs and judges generally agree that a written court order is desirable for nonroutine procedures. Written orders provide a record of the court's wishes and some protection against legal action. These orders also prevent misinterpretation and clearly show that sheriffs' actions are in response to court directions and are not taken independently.

5. *Should funding for security measures be determined by the number of days the court is usually in session?*

Generally, yes. Funds for security measures usually are a significantly smaller percentage of the overall budget when court is in session for only a few days a year, whereas increased levels of funding are justified for courts operating all year. For example, budgeting for major equipment items may not be appropriate for a session of 10-15 days a year.

6. *Should there be a central control center for monitoring and serving all court communications and alarm systems?*

Yes. In terms of both space and manpower, a central control center is the most economical way to monitor and control communications and alarms, and such a center provides easy coordinating capabilities for responding to alarms and communicating with others.

7. *What response procedures and capabilities should be used in a central communications center?*

The center should be able to dispatch a reaction force to respond to courtroom alarms, summon additional backup help, notify other concerned persons and agencies, and serve as a command center during emergencies.

8. *What role should the judges' security committee have in security policy and planning?*

This committee may, for example, approve policy recommendations made by the sheriff. The committee also should support the sheriff in security planning, policy setting, and overall operations.

9. *Should judges, court administrators, and responsible security staff play an active role in building or remodeling courthouses?*

Yes, each of these groups has a role to play in planning for courthouse renovation or construction. Many architects active in the criminal justice field recognize the need for security input in the earliest stages of planning and encourage participation by these groups. Judges and court administrators should provide information about current and future space needs, and sheriffs need to coordinate security and space requirements.

10. *Who should set court security policy?*

Sheriffs should play a major role because they, more than anyone else, will carry out policy. Some courts prefer the sheriff to set policy, subject to court approval. Other courts prefer to make policy based on the recommendations of sheriffs, security committees, and sometimes court administrators.

11. *Who should make decisions on carrying out policy?*

The sheriff, who has primary responsibility, should make these decisions. However, in cases such as building evacuation and bomb searches, certain actions may have to be coordinated with other agencies.

12. *Should labor contracts be excluded from courtroom or courthouse security functions?*

Courtroom and courthouse security functions, particularly those dealing with prisoners, require carefully selected and trained personnel — usually sworn peace officers. Security needs may be contrary to existing labor agreements (e.g., labor contracts may not allow personnel background checks), and hazardous situations can result if those needs are not met.

13. *What role should a court administrator have in court security?*

The role varies from state to state, but court administrators

may be involved in preparing the budget, communicating with judges, and planning for courthouse renovation or construction.

14. *Should access to and use of court records be strictly controlled?*

Yes. Although court records are the responsibility of the clerk of the court, the sheriff can offer useful suggestions on protecting records from fire and theft and for controlling access and use through a checkout system and reading room that the clerk's staff controls.

15. *Who should be primarily responsible for arranging lodging and meals for sequestered juries?*

Opinions vary widely. Some believe the court clerk or administrator should be responsible; others think the sheriff should make the arrangements. The sheriff's minimum responsibility should be to examine selected lodgings from a security viewpoint, and a sheriff should have the authority to veto a selection which lacks adequate security.

16. *Do certain types of trials not routinely require the presence of a bailiff or deputy?*

If manpower and funds are available, bailiffs or security officers should be present in all courts because unexpected actions can occur.

17. *Should all security-related expenses be included in one budget – either the sheriff's, the court's, or the county or state budget? Or should those expenses be included in a combination of these budgets, with clearly defined areas of responsibility?*

In many jurisdictions, these expenses are included in the budget of the responsible agency. However, some states are adopting a single state budget for all court operations, including security.

18. *Is security planning necessary or even desirable in all jurisdictions?*

Someone in every jurisdiction is responsible for court security. Some security planning, no matter how limited, is needed to meet this responsibility.

19. *When state prisoners are defendants, should the state pay some of the cost of the trial, including the cost of special security measures?*

In some jurisdictions that have state correctional institutions, the cost of trials for offenses committed within these institutions is disproportionately larger than the cost for all other trials. Many jurisdictions obtain partial or total state payment for these trials.

PERSONNEL

1. *Should sworn peace officers be used as bailiffs?*

Sheriffs responsible for court security usually prefer to use sworn officers as bailiffs because personnel assignments can then be rotated among patrol, jail, civil processes, and the courts. Some jurisdictions use court-appointed bailiffs, who usually are not sworn peace officers or have limited authority. One advantage in using sworn officers is that the judge can order the arrest of persons in court and can place defendants immediately in the custody of the sheriff for detention.

2. *Should bailiffs be assigned permanently to a particular court or be on rotation for a fixed term?*

Ideally, sheriffs' deputies should be assigned to bailiff duties as part of a career development program and thus only for a

certain period of time. It is not advisable to have a deputy permanently assigned to a specific judge.

3. *Should judges be encouraged to regard their bailiffs as professional aides rather than personal assistants?*

Judges should be encouraged to regard their bailiffs as professional aides who are members of a department career program and subject to periodic reassignment. Bailiffs should not be viewed as personal assistants.

4. *Should female bailiffs be routinely assigned to courts on an unrestricted basis?*

Some courts use female bailiffs only for civil, domestic, and juvenile cases. Women deputies are sometimes preferred when the defendant is female. Some courts simply require that the assigned person be professionally and physically qualified for the job. This question is increasingly important because of equal opportunity requirements for personnel hiring and use. Court security planners should decide on an appropriate policy.

5. *Should armed, uniformed personnel be assigned to patrol public areas in a courthouse during normal working hours?*

For large courthouses with a heavy flow of traffic by the general public, a mobile patrol can help detect and control unruly persons and can protect witnesses who must wait in public corridors.

6. *Should specialized training be required for court security personnel?*

Yes, there is a need for specialized, structured training to improve the quality of court security. A badly trained or poorly informed person may jeopardize the physical well-being of the defendant, other members of the trial process, and the public.

7. *Should armed bailiffs periodically be required to requalify with a firearm?*

Yes, all personnel carrying firearms should periodically requalify as part of department policy.

8. *Should minimum standards be established for bailiffs in terms of physical fitness, psychological makeup, deportment, and firearms proficiency?*

Yes, departments should establish realistic minimum standards for personnel selection, assignment, and promotion. The factors just listed can be included in those standards.

9. *At what level – federal, state, or county – should court security training be offered to bailiffs?*

In most cases, court security training should be included in existing county training programs. Sometimes state institutions provide training; their programs can be expanded to include court security. Specialized training (e.g., for bomb threat response and hostage situation control) may be available through federal programs. The departmental training officer should always try to participate in all programs, wherever they are offered.

10. *Should sworn peace officers be used after normal business hours for building security?*

As a rule, after-hour building security should be the responsibility of a guard or custodial service. Sworn officers should be limited to a periodic check as part of a routine patrol.

PROCEDURES

1. *Should deputies/bailiffs be armed in the courtroom?*

This is a very controversial issue, and equally sound argu-

ments are presented for each view. Judges often let the sheriff decide whether these officers are armed, but some judges have strong feelings on the subject and have set a policy for their courts.

2. *Should incustody defendants be kept under restraint at all times when away from jail, except when in court or in temporary holding areas?*

Many sheriffs prefer to do this. Departments should have a well-defined policy on this matter, and exceptions to that policy should be made only with the approval of a designated authority.

3. *Should defendants free on bond or bail be routinely searched before each entry into the courtroom?*

Usually, the decision to search an on-bond defendant before a court appearance is made selectively and often with court approval, based on the sheriff's assessment of potential threat by the defendant.

4. *Should deputies be armed when transporting prisoners between jail and court?*

Usually, deputies are armed when transporting prisoners. However, in the courthouse and restricted passages, deputies usually put weapons in secure, locked boxes.

5. *Should inmates brought directly to court from a state or federal institution (without processing through the county jail) remain in the custody of the institutional transport officers?*

Sheriffs usually prefer to process these prisoners through the jail system and assume custody for the period that the prisoners are to appear in court. When prisoners are from a maximum security institution, the sheriff sometimes arranges for that institution to have custody at all times. This happens primarily when the number of prisoners involved and their violent conduct would tax the manpower capability of the sheriff.

6. *Should magnetometers or metal detectors be used only during high-risk trials or in all trials?*

Magnetometers are not routinely used because of the additional manpower needed to use them properly. Exceptions may be made in jurisdictions where past experience or the type of spectators involved warrants the routine use of magnetometers. The general public's reaction should be considered before using such equipment, as citizens may react negatively if such actions seem unnecessary.

7. *Should extraordinary security precautions be taken for potentially high-risk trials?*

Yes. Whenever the potential for an incident is high, it is the sheriff's duty to take special precautions, as approved by the court, to ensure the integrity of the judicial system.

8. *Should special security precautions be taken for certain types of civil cases?*

This is a matter of individual judgment and should be based on the circumstances, subject to court approval. It is wise, though, to expect and guard against possible emotional outbursts in these cases.

9. *Should all spectators be routinely searched?*

No. A physical search of all spectators without due cause is unwarranted, time consuming, and requires extra manpower. Thus, it is unlikely that judges would approve such action. However, a restriction on bringing packages and certain other items into the courtroom should be considered.

10. *Should tear gas or "mace" be used in the courtroom as a means of nonlethal force?*

The use of a liquid tear gas dispenser in courtrooms is a matter of court and department policy. Some officers find it an

effective method of controlling unruly persons; however, tear gas can affect everyone else in the courtroom, too.

11. *Should all mail and packages be subject to X-ray screening for dangerous or explosive devices?*

In most jurisdictions, the high cost of X-ray equipment prevents its use. Suspicious mail and packages can be examined by alternative means, such as physically examining the contents, if X-ray equipment is not available.

12. *In a large building, should security personnel be used exclusively to search the building during a bomb threat, or should volunteers be recruited from among building employees?*

For large buildings, the exclusive use of security personnel to conduct bomb searches is time consuming but more thorough. The use of well-trained volunteers from various offices to work with a security officer is helpful because volunteers generally are familiar with the work areas and can quickly identify strange items.

13. *Should plans for emergency situations and/or high-risk trials routinely include coordination with other law enforcement agencies or services in the jurisdiction for possible help?*

Yes, coordination of plans in such situations is essential. Security efforts may fail if these agencies are not aware of their role and have not had the chance to make the necessary plans within their own organizations.

BUILDING STRUCTURE

1. *Should the physical design of a courtroom and its nearby areas determine the use of that courtroom?*

In multicourt buildings, the physical design of the courtroom and nearby areas should influence the types of cases heard in that room. For example, a courtroom with an adjoining holding area for incustody defendants should be used for criminal cases.

2. *Should a high-risk courtroom have a portable or fixed physical barrier separating spectators from the well of the court, or separating defendants from other people in the well?*

Jurisdictions with many high-risk trials usually have such barriers, either fixed or temporary. Judges who have conducted trials in courtrooms with barriers have interviewed jurors and found no negative juror reaction toward defendants as a result of the barriers. In some instances, jurors felt more secure.

3. *Should attempts be made to separate the circulation patterns of the public; incustody defendants; and judges, jurors, and court staff?*

Yes, security planners should always try to separate these three groups. If traffic cannot be separated into three systems, it should be divided into public and private, or restricted, zones.

4. *Should witness waiting rooms be provided and, if so, should defense and prosecution witnesses be separated?*

Yes. Witness waiting rooms should be provided in a controlled area to reduce the possibility of threats or violence, and prosecution and defense witnesses should be separated. All construction and renovations should provide for these areas wherever possible.

5. *Should courthouses and courtrooms not be used for noncourt functions?*

Yes, if possible. Using courtrooms and courthouses exclusively for court-related purposes is most desirable from a secu-

urity viewpoint. However, civic and local government requirements, particularly in rural jurisdictions that use courthouses as meeting places, usually make this practice impossible.

6. *Should new courthouses be constructed with the stipulation that the court and related offices are to be the sole tenants?*

Ideally, security planners prefer new buildings to be used only by courts. However, a recent study¹ concluded that such use was not always practical.

7. *Should the courts and security officers/sheriffs provide*

security input from the beginning of any renovation or construction planning?

Yes. For both practical and economic reasons, it is essential that security be considered from the beginning of planning for renovation or construction. Architects with past experience in criminal justice design support this idea as the only practical way of avoiding costly changes later. The District of Columbia Superior Court building, finished in 1977, is an excellent example of this kind of participation by security planners.

¹ *Report of the New Hampshire Court Accreditation Commission on the Accreditation of Court Facilities* (Concord, New Hampshire, September 1973).

Appendix B

SAMPLE COURT ORDER FOR SEQUESTERED JURIES

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF _____
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF _____

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF _____

v.

CRIMINAL NO. _____

ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED this _____ day of (month, year), that the jurors and alternate jurors in this case shall be sequestered and shall thereafter be kept in the custody of the Sheriff of _____ County for the duration of this trial, or until further notice from this Court.

It is further ORDERED as follows:

- 1. The Sheriff shall make arrangements for appropriate accommodations for the jury during the trial, and shall provide for adequate security in the jurors' quarters beginning _____ day of _____.
2. The Sheriff shall make satisfactory arrangements to assist the jurors in securing apparel and personal items from their homes.
3. The Sheriff shall make appropriate arrangements for the furnishing of vehicles (including the hiring of vehicles, if necessary) for the transportation of jurors between their place of lodging and the County Courthouse.
4. During the period of sequestration, the Sheriff shall provide to each of the jurors and alternate jurors so sequestered, breakfast, lunch, and dinner, a maximum of two cocktails during, or following, the evening meal (dinner) if they are not to return to the Courthouse following the meal.
5. The Sheriff shall maintain appropriate records during the trial providing:
(a) A record of deputies' assignments to shifts and duty stations.
(b) A record of jurors' quarters.
(c) A record of persons entering the area of the jurors' quarters.
(d) A record of telephone calls to and from the jurors' quarters.
The assigned Sheriff's personnel shall make certain that no member of the jury:
(a) Has any unauthorized contact with any outside person.
(b) Reads newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or listens to radio or television newscasts or bulletins pertaining to the trial or programs where the theme resembles the case being heard or decided upon.
(c) Has any discussion with any outside person pertaining to the case.
(d) Has any discussion of the case with other jurors before the case is submitted for deliberation.
(e) Has written or telephone communication with any person, except under the direct supervision of the assigned Deputy Sheriff, on matters not pertaining to the case.
(f) Any communication with the Court shall be made in writing and placed in a sealed envelope by the jury or individual juror, and upon being turned over to sheriff's personnel will be promptly delivered to the Court.
6. The sheriff shall make appropriate arrangements for suitable recreation for the jury.
7. Mail and packages, to and from jurors, shall be censored to ensure that no information relative to the trial is transmitted.
8. The Sheriff shall make arrangements to provide, at county expense, a nonalcoholic beverage (coffee, tea, milk, soda) on court days during the morning and afternoon recess, and also at the place of lodging after the evening meal.
9. The Sheriff, if necessary, shall provide laundry services to the jurors at county expense.
10. The Sheriff shall make provisions to transport any juror who has previously made such arrangements with the court to such medical doctors whose names the jurors shall furnish the Sheriff.
11. The Sheriff shall make provisions for the videotaping of television programs which will subsequently be shown to the jurors, thereby eliminating the possibility of hearing or seeing news bulletins.
12. The Sheriff shall, to the extent feasible, make suitable arrangements for jurors to attend religious services if such arrangement can be made under custodial supervision.
13. The Sheriff shall make satisfactory arrangements for barber shop and/or beauty salon services for the jurors, but always under proper custodial supervision.
14. The Sheriff shall make provisions at county expense for recreational activities of the jurors, including: attendance at athletic events, the theater, picnics, and short trips for dining purposes, or to historical or scenic sites where overnight travel is not involved.
15. This Order may be altered, amended, and/or changed from time to time as in the Court's judgment conditions warrant.

Judge of the Superior Court

Appendix C

SEQUESTERED JURY FORMS

1. Personnel Log for Sequestered Jury Security
2. Sequestered Jury Register
3. Transportation Log
4. Telephone Call Log
5. Visitor Register
6. Mail Censorship Consent Form
7. Incoming Mail Register
8. Outgoing Mail Register
9. Newspaper and Periodical Register
10. Medication Register
11. Incident Report Form

Figure C -1

PERSONNEL LOG FOR SEQUESTERED JURY SECURITY

Judge _____ Case Number _____

Day Shift:
(Duty Hours)

Night Shift:
(Duty Hours)

Personnel Assigned:

- 1. _____
- 2. _____
- 3. _____
- 4. _____
- 5. _____

- 1. _____
- 2. _____
- 3. _____
- 4. _____
- 5. _____

Date	Day	Time		Remarks
		In	Out	


Figure C-2


SEQUESTERED JURY REGISTER

Case No. _____ State v. _____ Judge _____

Date Sequestered _____ Date Concluded _____ Housing Site _____

Room Number	Juror		Next of Kin	
	A. Name		D. Name	
	B. Address		E. Address	
	C. Phone Number		F. Phone Number, Relationship	
	A.		D.	
	B.		E.	
	C.		F.	
	A.		D.	
	B.		E.	
	C.		F.	
	A.		D.	
	B.		E.	
	C.		F.	
	A.		D.	
	B.		E.	
	C.		F.	
	A.		D.	
	B.		E.	
	C.		F.	
	A.		D.	
	B.		E.	
	C.		F.	
	A.		D.	
	B.		E.	
	C.		F.	
	A.		D.	
	B.		E.	
	C.		F.	
	A.		D.	
	B.		E.	
	C.		F.	





CONTINUED

1 OF 2

Figure C-4

TELEPHONE CALL LOG

Case No. _____

State v. _____

Date	Time		Juror	Second Party and Relationship to Juror	Incoming (✓)	Outgoing No. Called	Topic of Conversation	Monitor
	Began	Ended						




Figure C-6

MAIL CENSORSHIP CONSENT FORM

State v. _____

Case No. _____

Superior Court _____ County of _____.

I, _____, do hereby authorize and consent to the opening of any and all incoming or outgoing mail matter, packages, correspondence, or other items addressed to me, marked for my attention or written by me, and to the censoring of the contents therein by the County Sheriff or his designee during the course and continuation of my sequestration in the above captioned trial.

Signature of Witness

Signature

Title

Date


I, _____, do hereby request the County Sheriff to forward or otherwise secure any and all mail matter, packages, correspondence, or other items addressed to me or marked for my attention in the following manner: _____


Signature of Witness


Signature

Title

Date







Appendix D

BOMB THREAT REPORT FORM¹

INSTRUCTIONS: BE CALM. BE COURTEOUS. LISTEN, DO NOT INTERRUPT THE CALLER. NOTIFY SUPERVISOR/SECURITY OFFICER BY PREARRANGED SIGNAL WHILE CALLER IS ON LINE.

Date _____ Time _____

Exact Words of Person Placing Call: _____

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

- 1. When is the bomb going to explode? _____
- 2. Where is the bomb right now? _____
- 3. What kind of a bomb is it? _____
- 4. What does it look like? _____
- 5. Why did you place the bomb? _____

TRY TO DETERMINE THE FOLLOWING (CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE)

Caller's Identity: Male Female Adult Juvenile Age _____ years

Voice: Loud Soft High Pitch Deep Raspy Pleasant Intoxicated Other _____

Accent: Local Not Local Foreign Region

Speech: Fast Slow Distinct Distorted Stutter Nasal Slurred Lisp

Language: Excellent Good Fair Poor Foul Other

Manner: Calm Angry Rational Irrational Coherent Incoherent Deliberate

Emotional Righteous Laughing Intoxicated

Background Noises: Office Machines Factory Machines Bedlam Trains Animals Music

Quiet Voices Mixed Airplanes Street Traffic Party Atmosphere

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: _____

ACTION TO TAKE IMMEDIATELY AFTER CALL: Notify your supervisor/security officer as instructed. Talk to no one other than instructed by your supervisor/security officer.

RECEIVING TELEPHONE NUMBER

PERSON RECEIVING CALL

¹San Diego County Sheriff's Department, *Manual of Policies and Procedures* (San Diego, California: 1975), No. 3.3.9, p. 2.

Appendix E

BOMB SEARCH PROCEDURE

Once the decision has been made to search for a reported bomb on the premises, the search parties or teams are vital to the mission's success. Usually, the search party is made up of volunteer employees or supervisors most familiar with the area; they work under supervision of a security officer. No one knows an area better than the people who work there; they can spot unfamiliar items at once.

Each team should have one person in charge. The room or area to be searched should be divided into one section for each person. Figure E-1 shows how to divide the room into three levels based on height. The first height selected and the first room-searching sweep should start at the end of the room division line. This starting point will be the same for each successive searching sweep (see figure E-2).



The searchers should start back to back and look around the room, with each person working toward the other, checking all items on the floor near the wall and on the wall up to waist height. Next, there should be a check of all items in the middle of the room up to waist height.

The second room sweep usually consists of searching the area from the waist to the chin or top of the searcher's head. The third sweep will cover areas above the searcher's head, up to the ceiling. A fourth sweep may be needed to check false or suspended ceilings.

Each search team must make one of two reports to the security officer:

1. The area is found to be clear of suspicious objects, or
2. The location and description of a suspicious object.

Security officers should immediately notify the command post of all reports.



Appendix F

BOMB DETECTION AND DISPOSAL ASSISTANCE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BOMB DATA CENTER

The FBI Bomb Data Center (BDC) provides up-to-date statistical and technical information and training to participating law enforcement agencies responsible for responding to and investigating bombings and bomb threats.

Services offered to participating agencies by the BDC include:

1. Testing and dissemination of results of selected items for bomb handling and detection;
2. Dissemination of results of tests conducted by participants in the BDC program;
3. Collection, analysis, and distribution of data on bomb incidents;
4. Publications with information about explosives and improvised explosive devices;
5. Training assistance:
 - a. Loan of 35mm slide presentation
 - b. Regional specialized training for investigators and bomb technicians;
6. Response to written inquiries;
7. Rapid dissemination of selected information via the Law Enforcement Teletype Service (LETS).

For information on how to participate in the BDC program, contact the nearest FBI Field Office.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS EXPLOSIVES ACADEMY

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) has established the Explosives Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center at Glynco, Georgia to train primarily ATF agents in explosives detection and handling. After 1978, the program will be expanded to include state and local law enforcement agencies. However, local field training is now offered to law enforcement agencies.

For further information about the Explosives Academy and local field training programs, contact the nearest ATF District Office, Special Agent in Charge.

Appendix G

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR A MODEL BAILIFFS' MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES

Part I

BAILIFF DETAIL OPERATION

CHAPTER I *GENERAL PROVISIONS*

- 100. Title
- 101. Purpose of Manual
- 102. Abbreviations
- 103. Code Sections

CHAPTER II *OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION
OF BAILIFF UNIT*

- 200. Policy of the Section
- 201. Attendance at Superior Court
- 202. Sheriff to Act as Court Crier
- 203. Responsibilities of Detail
- 204. Organization of Section

CHAPTER III *RESPONSIBILITIES OF BAILIFF'S
UNIT PERSONNEL*

- 300. Divisional Supervision
- 301. Bailiff's Detail Lieutenant
- 302. Deputy Sheriff — Supervising Bailiff
- 303. Deputy Sheriff — Bailiff

Part II

JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF STATE

CHAPTER IV *STATE COURT SYSTEM*

- 400. History of State Superior Court System in County
- 401. Divisions of Judicial System
- 402. Jurisdiction of the Courts

CHAPTER V *STATE JURY SYSTEM*

- 500. Trial by Jury — Authority for
- 501. Jury Defined
- 502. Types of Juries
- 503. Grand Jury — Authority for
- 504. Grand Jury Defined
- 505. Selection of Grand Jurors
- 506. Grand Jury Foreman: Appointment of
- 507. Foreman Pro Tem
- 508. Grand Jury Oath
- 509. Powers and Duties of Grand Jury

- 510. Indictment Defined
- 511. Fees for Grand Jury
- 512. Period of Grand Jury Service
- 513. Trial Jury Defined
- 514. Number of Members: Trial Jury
- 515. Panel Defined
- 516. Persons Competent to Act as Jurors
- 517. Persons Not Competent to Act as Jurors
- 518. Exemptions From Service
- 519. Selection of Jurors: County
- 520. Selection System
- 521. Selection and Listing of Jurors
- 522. Duties of Sheriff or Marshal in Summoning Jurors
- 523. Trial Procedure Summation
- 524. Fee for Trial Jurors
- 525. Jury of Inquest Defined

Part III

BAILIFF'S DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

CHAPTER VI *GENERAL DUTIES OF BAILIFF*

- 600. General Rules and Regulations
- 601. Courtroom Procedures
- 602. Court Trials (Nonjury)

CHAPTER VII *THE BAILIFF AND JURY TRIALS*

- 700. Formation of Trial Jury
- 701. Jury Panels
- 702. Clerk to Prepare Calendar
- 703. Order of Disposing of Issues on Calendar
- 704. Drawing Names of Jurors
- 705. Definition and Division of Challenges
- 706. Panel Defined
- 707. Challenge Defined
- 708. What Challenge is Founded Upon
- 709. When and How Challenge Taken
- 710. Defendant: Right to Challenge
- 711. Kinds of Challenge to Individual Jurors
- 712. Preemptory Challenge
- 713. Challenge for Cause
- 714. Examination of Jurors
- 715. Seating Jurors
- 716. Jury to be Sworn
- 717. Presence of Defendant

- 718. Order of Trial (Criminal)
- 719. Instruction to Jury: Criminal Trial
- 720. Order of Trial (Civil)
- 721. Court Recesses
- 722. Jury Admonished at Adjournment
- 723. View of Premises by Jury
- 724. Proceedings If Juror Becomes Ill
- 725. Instructions to Jurors
- 726. Bailiff's Oath
- 727. Bailiff's Oath : Alternate Jurors
- 728. Alternate Juror (Female)
- 729. Custody of Jury Before Submission
- 730. Decision or Retirement of Jury
- 731. Order to Deliberate
- 732. Papers and Exhibits That May Be Taken to Jury Room
- 733. Verdict and Instruction Forms
- 734. Bailiff to Direct Jurors With Signal System
- 735. Bailiff to Acquaint Jurors With Signal System
- 736. Bailiff's Duty to Inform Court
- 737. Return of Jury for Information
- 738. Return of Jury for Polling
- 739. Jury Not To Be Discharged After Case Submitted (Exceptions)
- 740. Manner of Taking Verdict
- 741. Polling Jury (Further Deliberation)
- 742. Recording of Verdict
- 743. Presence of Defendant on Return of Verdict
- 744. Grounds for New Trial

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- 800. Accommodations for Jury
- 801. Juries to be Supplied with Food and Lodging
- 802. Jurors' Fees
- 803. Report of Expense for Jury Maintenance
- 804. Allowances for Expenses
- 805. Notification — Requirements for Meals
- 806. Notification — Overnight Jury
- 807. Hotel Cancellation
- 808. Court Policy Toward Jurors
- 809. Alcoholic Beverages — Jurors
- 810. Alcoholic Beverages — Bailiff
- 811. Notification — Jury to be Locked Up
- 812. Transportation of Jurors — From Court
- 813. Jurors' Hotel Rooms
- 814. Recording of Room Assignments
- 815. Feeding Overnight Jurors
- 816. Purchases for Jurors
- 817. Jurors' Room Security
- 818. Bailiff to Attend Jury at All Times
- 819. Bailiffs or Matron: Visiting
- 820. Posting of Jury Guards
- 821. Bailiffs Ready for Emergencies
- 822. Illness of Juror
- 823. Transportation for Return to Court

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- 900. Ordering Prisoners
- 901. Disposition of Case
- 902. Late Order for Prisoners
- 903. Notification: Failure of Prisoner to Appear
- 904. Defendant on Bail
- 905. Security and Availability of Prisoners to Courtrooms
- 906. Security of Prisoners in Court
- 907. Conferring with Prisoners in Court During Calendar: Who Allowed
- 908. Security of Prisoner During Trial
- 909. Security of Prisoners During Court Calendar
- 910. Security During Court Recess
- 911. Lunch Arrangements for Prisoners
- 912. Prisoners Considered Security Risks
- 913. Side Arms in Court
- 914. Prisoner Escape
- 915. Escape in Transit While in Custody of Bailiff
- 916. Immediate Followup of Escape
- 917. Written Report of Escape
- 918. Sick Prisoners

CHAPTER X *SPECIALIZED BAILIFF ACTIVITIES*

- 1000. Incustody Defendants: Ordered Released
- 1001. Defendant on Bail: Not Guilty or Case Dismissed
- 1002. Defendant on Bail: Found Guilty, Judgment Suspended, Probation Ordered, etc.
- 1003. Remanded Defendants
- 1004. Return of Prisoners to Courthouse Jail After Calendar
- 1005. Juvenile Court Operation
- 1006. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
- 1007. Juvenile Court Bailiff
- 1008. Predetention Hearings: Juvenile
- 1009. Regular Court Hearings
- 1010. Psychiatric Court
- 1011. Bailiff's Responsibility: Psychiatric Court

Part IV

SECURITY ALARM SYSTEMS

CHAPTER XI *COURT SECURITY ALARM SYSTEMS*

- 1100. Location of Security Alarm Buttons
- 1101. Location of Security Alarm Response Stations

CHAPTER XII *COUNTY TREASURER'S OFFICE ALARM SYSTEM*

CHAPTER XIII *DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S EVIDENCE ROOM ALARM*

Appendix H

SAMPLE PHYSICAL SECURITY CHECKLIST

	Yes	No
EXTERIOR		
<u>Perimeter</u> (e.g., fences, gates)		
1. Is the perimeter of the courthouse grounds clearly defined by a fence, wall, or other type of physical barrier?	_____	_____
2. Briefly describe the barrier and its condition.		

3. Does the barrier limit or control vehicle or pedestrian access to the courthouse?	_____	_____
4. Are gates solid and not in need of repair?	_____	_____
5. Are gates locked properly?	_____	_____
6. Are gate hinges secure?	_____	_____
<u>Lights</u>		
1. Is the entire perimeter lighted?	_____	_____
2. Are lights on all night?	_____	_____
3. Are light fixtures suitable for outside use (i.e., weather- and tamper-resistant)?	_____	_____
4. Are lights and wiring inspected regularly?	_____	_____
5. Lights are controlled:		
a. automatically	_____	_____
b. manually	_____	_____
6. Are control switches inaccessible to unauthorized persons?	_____	_____
7. Do any exterior or perimeter lights have an auxiliary power source?	_____	_____
8. Excluding parking areas, describe lighting of the building grounds:		
a. fully illuminated	_____	_____
b. partially illuminated	_____	_____
c. not illuminated	_____	_____
9. Is the exterior of the building (particularly entry points) sufficiently lighted to discourage unlawful entry attempts or placement of explosives against the walls?	_____	_____

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 10. Are public areas (including parking spaces and walkways) sufficiently lighted to discourage attacks against persons or vehicles? | _____ | _____ |

Parking Areas

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Is entry to and exit from parking areas controlled by: | | |
| a. guard | _____ | _____ |
| b. an electrically operated gate | _____ | _____ |
| c. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 2. Who provides the guard service? | | |
| _____ | | |
| 3. What hours are guard services provided? | | |
| _____ | | |
| 4. Are parking areas watched by CCTV? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are frequent inspections made of parking area and vehicles not guarded or monitored through CCTV? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Is a reserved parking lot on courthouse grounds? | _____ | _____ |
| 7. Is the reserved area closed or locked during nonbusiness hours? | _____ | _____ |
| 8. Is the reserved area protected by a fence? | _____ | _____ |
| 9. Are signs posted there? | _____ | _____ |
| 10. Do reserved parking spaces block access to the courthouse by fire or other emergency vehicles? | _____ | _____ |
| 11. Is there reserved parking for judges? | _____ | _____ |
| 12. Is there reserved parking for court staff? | _____ | _____ |
| 13. Is there reserved parking for jurors and witnesses? | _____ | _____ |
| 14. Does any one else have reserved parking? (specify) _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 15. Are parking spaces reserved by name? | _____ | _____ |
| 16. Are parking spaces reserved by number? | _____ | _____ |
| 17. Is access to the garage strictly controlled? | _____ | _____ |
| 18. Are there adequate communications equipment and an alarm at the guard station in the garage? | _____ | _____ |
| 19. Is there direct access for judges from the garage to nonpublic elevators or restricted corridors? | _____ | _____ |

Landscaping

1. Do landscape features provide places for potential intruders to hide?
2. Are there items such as bricks, stones, or wooden fence pickets which could be used by intruders as weapons, missiles, or tools?
If so, describe items. _____

Yes No

BUILDING

Doors, Windows, Other Openings

1. Are all exterior doors at least 1 3/4 inch solid core wood, metal clad, or metal?
2. Are all exterior doors properly equipped with cylinder locks, deadbolts, or quality padlocks and hasps?
3. Are doors with windows equipped with double-cylinder locks or quality padlocks?
4. Are all exterior doors equipped with intrusion alarms?
5. Are all hinge pins internally located, welded, or otherwise treated to prevent easy removal?
6. Are doors with panic, or emergency, hardware also fitted with anti-intrusion bars?
7. Do doors with panic locks have auxiliary locks for use when the building is not occupied?
8. Are exterior locks designed or exterior door frames built so that the door cannot be forced by spreading the frame?
9. Are exterior locks firmly mounted so that they cannot be pried off?
10. Are exterior door bolts protected or constructed so that they cannot be cut?
11. Are exterior padlocks in place when doors are unlocked?
12. Are exterior door padlock hasps installed so that the screws cannot be removed?
13. Are exterior door padlock hasps made with a grade of steel difficult to cut?

	Yes	No
14. Are all unused doors permanently locked?	_____	_____
15. Are windows that could be used for entry protected with:		
a. locking devices	_____	_____
b. metal bars	_____	_____
c. mesh	_____	_____
d. intrusion alarms	_____	_____
e. other (specify) _____		
16. Are window bars and mesh securely fastened to prevent easy removal?	_____	_____
17. Are windows on the ground floor made of tempered glass or ballistic plastic?	_____	_____
18. Are all windows not needed for ventilation permanently sealed or locked?	_____	_____
19. Are openings to the roof (doors, skylights, etc.) securely fastened or locked from the inside?	_____	_____
20. Is internal access to the roof controlled?	_____	_____
21. Is the roof accessible by means of:		
a. fire escape	_____	_____
b. another building	_____	_____
c. a pole or tree	_____	_____
d. other (specify) _____		
22. Do roof openings have intrusion alarms?	_____	_____
23. Are openings to the building (e.g., tunnels, utility and sewer manholes, culverts, service ports) properly secured?	_____	_____
24. Is a key-control system in effect?	_____	_____
25. Who is responsible for the key control system? _____		
26. Are building entrance keys issued on a limited basis?	_____	_____
27. Are master keys kept securely locked and issued on a strictly controlled basis?	_____	_____
28. Can the key-control officer replace locks and keys at his discretion?	_____	_____
29. Must duplication of keys be approved by the key-control officer?	_____	_____

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 30. Is the number of entrance doors in use reduced to the minimum necessary? | _____ | _____ |
| 31. Do judges and court officers have a private entrance to the building? | _____ | _____ |

Ceilings, Walls

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Do all walls extend to the ceiling? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are drop or removable ceilings used in the courthouse? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Where? _____ | | |

Emergency Power System

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is the main power source dependable? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Is there a dependable auxiliary power source for emergencies? | _____ | _____ |

Alarms

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Does the courthouse have an intrusion alarm system? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Does the system meet Underwriters' Laboratories standards? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Is the system regularly tested? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. How often? _____ | | |
| 5. Is the system covered by a service and maintenance contract? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. If not under contract, who provides the service and maintenance?
_____ | | |
| 7. Was the alarm system properly installed? | _____ | _____ |
| 8. Where does the system terminate? | | |
| a. sheriff's department | _____ | _____ |
| b. local law enforcement office | _____ | _____ |
| c. commercial control station | _____ | _____ |
| d. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 9. Is there an emergency power source for all alarms? | _____ | _____ |
| 10. Does the emergency power source cut in automatically? | _____ | _____ |
| 11. Are records maintained of all alarm signals (e.g., time, date, location, cause, and action taken)? | _____ | _____ |

Yes No

- 12. Who keeps these records? _____
- 13. What is the response capability (in time and manpower)?

- 14. What are the weaknesses or gaps in the existing alarm system?

Safe and Vaults

- 1. Are safes and vaults equipped with an alarm system? _____
- 2. What type of alarm system? _____

Fire Protection

- 1. Does the courthouse comply with local fire codes? _____
- 2. Does the fire marshal routinely inspect the courthouse? _____
- 3. When was the courthouse last inspected by the fire marshal?

- 4. Did the fire marshal approve the building?
If not, why? _____
- 5. Does the building have fire alarms? _____
- 6. Does the building have smoke detectors? _____
- 7. Does the building have a sprinkler system? _____
- 8. Does the building have fire extinguishers? _____
- 9. Does the building have emergency fire hoses? _____
- 10. Does the building have an adequate water supply? _____
- 11. Does the building have standpipes? _____

Utility Control Points

- 1. Are utility and plumbing access plates and doors locked or sealed when not in use? _____

Attics, Basements, Crawl Spaces, Air-conditioning and Heating Ducts

- 1. Do basement doors have intrusion alarms? _____
- 2. Are basement doors securely fastened or locked when not in use? _____
- 3. Are doors to basements, utility rooms, boiler rooms, crawl spaces, and attics locked when not in use? _____

Yes No

- 4. Are crawl spaces secured from unauthorized entry? _____
- 5. Are air-conditioning and heating vent openings in public areas secure from tampering? _____

Elevators

- 1. Are private elevators provided for judges? _____
- 2. Are certain elevators used exclusively to move prisoners? _____
- 3. Are prisoner elevators marked "Not for Public Use"? _____
- 4. Are prisoner elevators controlled by key? _____
- 5. Are prisoner elevators programmed to bypass floors? _____
- 6. Do elevators separate prisoners from escorts by metal bars or grilles? _____
- 7. Are prisoner elevators equipped with:
 - a. alarms _____
 - b. telephones _____
 - c. CCTV _____
 - d. other (specify) _____

Storage Areas for Arms and Dangerous Substances

- 1. Which of the following dangerous substances are stored in the courthouse?
 - a. weapons _____
 - b. ammunition _____
 - c. tear gas _____
 - d. other (specify) _____
- 2. Are dangerous substances stored in a restricted area? _____
- 3. Are dangerous substances stored in a secure room? _____
- 4. Does the storage area have an intrusion alarm? _____
- 5. Is the door there solidly constructed? _____
- 6. Are hinge pins concealed or welded to prevent removal? _____
- 7. Does this door have an adequate cylinder lock? _____
- 8. Does this door have an adequate padlock? _____
- 9. Do windows in the storage area have steel bars, or mesh, or are they permanently sealed? _____
- 10. Is the storage area well ventilated? _____

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 11. Does the storage area have fire detection equipment? | _____ | _____ |
| 12. Does the storage area have a sprinkler system? | _____ | _____ |

Communications

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Are communications adequate? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. If not, what is needed? _____ | | |
| 3. What communications are available in the courthouse? | | |
| a. telephone | _____ | _____ |
| b. radio | _____ | _____ |
| c. telegraph | _____ | _____ |
| d. teletype | _____ | _____ |
| e. public address system | _____ | _____ |
| f. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 4. Is there more than one communications system used exclusively by security personnel? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Is there more than one communications system used exclusively for security purposes? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Who operates the public address system?
_____ | | |
| 7. Radios in the courthouse consist of: | | |
| a. sheriff's base station | _____ | _____ |
| b. unit in security or bailiff's office netting to sheriff's base station | _____ | _____ |
| c. hand-held portables used by bailiffs | _____ | _____ |
| d. hand-held portables used by security officers | _____ | _____ |
| e. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 8. Can radios net with: | | |
| a. local police | _____ | _____ |
| b. state police | _____ | _____ |
| c. other sheriffs' departments | _____ | _____ |
| d. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 9. Is maintenance of radio equipment adequate? | _____ | _____ |
| 10. Do base stations have an auxiliary power source? | _____ | _____ |
| 11. Is there a duress code signal? | _____ | _____ |
| 12. Do all telephones go through a building switchboard? | _____ | _____ |
| 13. Does the switchboard have any security safeguards? | _____ | _____ |
| 14. Can teletypes communicate with outside security agencies? | _____ | _____ |
| 15. Which agencies? _____ | | |

	Yes	No
<u>Storage Areas for Records</u>		
1. Are fire detection devices in the records storage area?	_____	_____
2. Is a sprinkler system in the records storage area?	_____	_____
3. Are current records stored during nonbusiness hours in locked rooms or locked filing cabinets?	_____	_____
4. Are records storage areas inaccessible to unauthorized persons?	_____	_____
5. Are there checkout procedures for all records?	_____	_____
6. Is space available in or near the clerk's office for the public to review documents?	_____	_____
<u>Public Areas (Waiting areas, rest rooms, hallways)</u>		
1. Are public waiting rooms routinely searched?	_____	_____
2. Are waiting rooms next to courtrooms?	_____	_____
3. Are drop or removable ceilings used in waiting rooms?	_____	_____
4. Are public rest rooms routinely searched?	_____	_____
5. Are rest rooms next to courtrooms?	_____	_____
6. Are drop or removable ceilings used in rest rooms?	_____	_____
7. Do any trash receptacles allow easy concealment of contraband?	_____	_____
8. Are directions (directories and floor plans, if appropriate) clearly posted in all public areas?	_____	_____
<u>Offices Handling Money</u>		
1. Does the cashier's window have security features?	_____	_____
2. Is a large amount of cash in the office overnight or on weekends?	_____	_____
3. Is there an adequate safe, vault, or strongbox?	_____	_____
4. Is the safe approved by Underwriters' Laboratories?	_____	_____
5. Are safes weighing less than 750 pounds securely fastened to the floor, wall, or set in concrete?	_____	_____
6. Are combinations changed when personnel leave?	_____	_____
7. When was the combination last changed?	_____	_____

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-------|-------|
| 8. Is the safe or vault protected by an intrusion alarm? | _____ | _____ |
| 9. Where does the intrusion alarm terminate?
_____ | | |
| 10. What is the response to an alarm (in time and manpower)?
_____ | | |
| 11. Is there a duress alarm in these offices? | _____ | _____ |
| 12. Where do the duress alarms terminate? | _____ | _____ |
| 13. Who escorts the employee carrying money to the bank? | | |
| a. sheriff | _____ | _____ |
| b. local police | _____ | _____ |
| c. state police | _____ | _____ |
| d. other (specify) _____ | _____ | _____ |
| e. no one | _____ | _____ |

Courthouse Procedures

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is there a security procedures manual for the courthouse? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are all data current and correct? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are emergency plans current? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Is responsibility for declaring an emergency clearly fixed? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Is the authority and chain of command in emergency plans clear and accurate? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Are all emergency plans subject to periodic review and updating? | | |
| 7. Is there a procedure for handling medical emergencies involving the general public? | _____ | _____ |
| 8. Is first aid equipment, including oxygen, provided throughout the courthouse? | _____ | _____ |
| 9. Is that equipment periodically checked and tested? | _____ | _____ |
| 10. Is there a designated security officer for the courthouse? | _____ | _____ |
| 11. Is there a security guard on duty after normal working hours? | _____ | _____ |

Yes No

12. If so, when and what hours?

13. Is there a procedure for routine daily inspection of the courthouse?

14. Are tenants given periodic instruction about the various emergency procedures?

15. Are support agreements with other agencies written or informal?

16. Are periodic fire and evacuation drills held?

17. Are periodic security conferences held with:
a. judges
b. attorneys
c. tenants
d. supervising personnel
e. custodial personnel

18. Are security plans coordinated with appropriate local, state, and federal agencies?

19. Are public, private, and prisoner circulation patterns separated and well defined?

20. Is there a routine inspection of packages and shipments entering the courthouse?

COURTROOMS AND RELATED AREAS

Courtrooms: Location

1. Do spaces above, below, and next to the courtroom present a security hazard?

Courtrooms: Doors, Windows, Other Openings

1. Are all unused doors secured?

2. Are the keys to all doors strictly controlled?

3. Are there separate entrances into the courtroom for:
a. judges
b. incustody defendants
c. spectators

4. Is the prisoner entry door far enough from the public seating area to prevent passing contraband?

5. Are all windows draped to obscure vision (particularly of the bench) from outside?

Yes No

Courtrooms: Lights

1. Is there emergency lighting? _____
2. Are lights key controlled? _____

Courtrooms: Furnishings

1. Is the main area or well separated from the spectators by a barrier? _____
2. Is the judge's bench closed at both ends to restrict access from the well? _____
3. Are the defendant's chair and the witness chair built to allow use of restraints? _____
4. Are spectator seats solidly built and fastened to the floor? _____
5. Are potential weapons, such as drinking glasses, water carafes, and ash trays, kept out of the defendant's reach? _____

Courtrooms: Security Devices

1. Are routine checks made of:
 - a. alarms _____
 - b. emergency lighting _____
 - c. metal detectors _____
2. Are metal detectors available for use? _____
3. Is the bench reinforced to make it bullet resistant? _____
4. With what? _____
5. Is there a duress alarm in the courtroom? _____
6. Are duress alarm buttons installed at:
 - a. the bench _____
 - b. clerk's station _____
 - c. bailiff's station _____
 - d. chambers _____
 - e. judge's secretary's desk _____
 - f. other (specify) _____
7. Does this alarm have an audio-monitor capability? _____
8. Is there an acceptable response capability for courtroom duress alarms? _____
9. Does the courtroom have a telephone? _____
10. Does the courtroom have a public address system? _____

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 11. Does the courtroom have a radio transmitter? | _____ | _____ |
| 12. Is the bailiff equipped with a portable transceiver? | _____ | _____ |
| 13. Does the transceiver net with: | | |
| a. sheriff's base station | _____ | _____ |
| b. security office | _____ | _____ |
| c. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 14. Are additional restraining devices available for use in the courtroom? | _____ | _____ |

Courrooms: Security Procedures

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is there a policy for firearms to be carried into the courtroom by: | | |
| a. bailiffs | _____ | _____ |
| b. law enforcement officer witnesses | _____ | _____ |
| c. law enforcement officer spectators | _____ | _____ |
| d. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 2. Are bailiffs armed in the courtroom? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are bailiffs in uniform? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are prisoners kept in restraints except when in the courtroom? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation from the courtroom of: | | |
| a. prisoners | _____ | _____ |
| b. judges | _____ | _____ |
| c. jurors | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Do bailiffs understand procedures for emergency evacuation of prisoners from the courtroom? | _____ | _____ |
| 7. Is there a procedure for a search screen operation for entry to courtrooms? | _____ | _____ |

Judges' Chambers and Related Offices

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Are judges' chambers routinely searched for contraband by bailiffs or secretaries? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Is visitor access controlled by clerks, bailiffs, and/or secretaries? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Which? _____ | | |
| 4. Are suspicious packages or letters examined before delivery to judges? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Do these chambers have more than one means of entry and exit? | _____ | _____ |

	Yes	No
6. Do doors have automatic closing and locking hardware?	_____	_____
7. Are the chambers routinely locked when the judge is not present?	_____	_____
8. When occupied by the judge, are the chambers' doors usually:		
a. open	_____	_____
b. closed	_____	_____
c. locked	_____	_____
9. Are outside views, particularly of judges' desks, obscured?	_____	_____
10. Are judges routinely escorted between parking areas, chambers, and the courtroom?	_____	_____
11. Are judges escorted between parking areas, chambers, and the courtroom during high-risk or sensitive trials?	_____	_____
12. Do chambers have duress alarms?	_____	_____
13. Is there acceptable response capability for these alarms?	_____	_____
14. Do any judges carry firearms?	_____	_____
15. Do any judges keep firearms in their chambers?	_____	_____
16. Do any judges keep firearms at the bench?	_____	_____
<u>Witness Waiting Rooms</u>		
1. Are witness waiting rooms provided?	_____	_____
2. Is it possible to separate prosecution and defense witnesses?	_____	_____
3. Is public access to waiting rooms restricted?	_____	_____
4. Are light switches located outside the waiting rooms?	_____	_____
<u>Attorney-Client Conference Rooms</u>		
1. Are rooms provided in the courthouse for attorney-client conferences?	_____	_____
2. Are these rooms secure?	_____	_____
3. Do the rooms have drop or removable ceilings?	_____	_____
4. Can the rooms be locked?	_____	_____
5. Are the rooms routinely searched for contraband before and after use?	_____	_____
6. Are conferences visually observed at all times?	_____	_____

Jury Deliberation Room

1. Is the jury deliberation room next to the courtroom or accessible through a controlled passage?
2. Are the windows draped?
3. Are rest rooms provided as an integral part of the deliberation area?
4. Is the deliberation room soundproofed well enough to prevent unauthorized persons from eavesdropping?
5. Is the deliberation room routinely searched for contraband before occupancy?
6. Is the deliberation room locked when unoccupied?

Yes No

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

Prisoner Reception Area

1. Are prisoners brought from jail to the reception area in the courthouse by:
 - a. elevator
 - b. stairway
 - c. tunnel
 - d. bridge
 - e. vehicle
 - f. foot
2. Do prisoners brought from outside the courthouse enter through a:
 - a. public entrance
 - b. private entrance
 - c. sally port
3. Is the area equipped with gates that can close the area to the public?
4. Is there more than one means for vehicles to exit from the area?
5. Are gates electronically controlled from a remote station?
6. Is an interlocking system used so that the outer gate can be closed and locked before the door to the building is opened?
7. Is this area monitored by CCTV?
8. Is this area used exclusively for prisoner movement?
9. Is the entrance for prisoners out of public view?

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

Yes No

Restricted and Secure Passageways

1. Do prisoners walk through public areas when going from temporary holding areas to court? _____
2. Are restricted passages also used by judges and court staff? _____
3. Are restricted or secure passageways monitored by CCTV? _____
4. Are law enforcement officers required to leave guns in locked cabinets before entering restricted or secure passages? _____
5. Are restricted passageways locked with keys that cannot normally be duplicated commercially? _____
6. Are keys to secure passageways issued to people other than sheriff's personnel? _____
7. Are security staff forbidden to remove secure passageway keys from the building? _____
8. Are the stairways used for prisoner movement adequately lighted? _____
9. Are stairways and stairwells enclosed with protective metal grilles? _____
10. Are stairways monitored by CCTV? _____

Temporary Holding Areas

1. Are temporary holding facilities located in the court building? _____
2. If not, where are prisoners held?

3. How many temporary holding cells are there?

4. Are prisoners moved from the reception area to a temporary holding area by a secure or restricted:
 - a. elevator _____
 - b. stairway _____
 - c. tunnel _____
 - d. bridge _____
5. Do temporary holding cells open directly into:
 - a. the court _____
 - b. a restricted passage _____
6. Are adequate toilet facilities available for prisoners? _____

COURT SECURITY

Appendix H

	Yes	No
7. Are lights for the holding area controlled from outside the cells?	_____	_____
8. Do cells have emergency lights?	_____	_____
9. Do cell doors have observation ports?	_____	_____
10. Is at least one holding cell equipped for audio and/or visual coverage of courtroom proceedings?	_____	_____
11. How are cell doors locked:		
a. electrically	_____	_____
b. manually	_____	_____
12. Are cell doors locked and unlocked from:		
a. a remote command center	_____	_____
b. directly	_____	_____
c. both	_____	_____
13. Are keys to temporary holding cells issued to people other than sheriff's personnel?	_____	_____
14. Are temporary holding areas locked with keys that cannot normally be duplicated commercially?	_____	_____
15. Are cells and areas used by prisoners routinely searched for contraband before and after use?	_____	_____
16. Are cells built securely and in a way that reduces opportunities for self-inflicted injuries by prisoners?	_____	_____
17. Are law enforcement officers required to leave guns in locked cabinets before entering temporary holding areas?	_____	_____
18. Are prisoners kept in restraints except when in the cell?	_____	_____
19. Are additional restraining devices available?	_____	_____
20. Are telephones available?	_____	_____
21. Are juveniles routinely separated from other prisoners?	_____	_____
22. Are females routinely separated from other prisoners?	_____	_____
23. Do prisoner feeding procedures present escape opportunities?	_____	_____
24. Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation of prisoners from temporary holding areas?	_____	_____

25. Do security and transportation officers understand procedures for emergency evacuation of prisoners from temporary holding areas?

Yes No

Security Equipment Storage Area:

- 1. Are the number of gun cabinets adequate?
- 2. Are storage areas locked with keys that cannot normally be duplicated commercially?

Prisoner Procedures

- 1. Is there a procedure for handling the medical emergencies of prisoners?

Appendix I

SAFE CLASSIFICATIONS AND FIRE RATINGS*

SAFE CLASSIFICATIONS

Classification**	Doors	Walls
A	Steel less than 1 inch thick, or iron	Body of steel less than ½ inch thick
B	Steel at least 1 inch thick	Body of steel at least ½ inch thick
BR	Steel at least 1½ inches thick, safe or chest bearing the label UL Tool-Resisting Safe TL-15	Body of steel at least 1 inch thick
C	Steel at least 2 inches	Body of steel at least 2 inches thick
D	Steel at least 2 inches	Body of steel at least 2 inches thick
E	Steel at least 2 inches. Within a vault: steel at least 2 inches	Body of steel at least 2 inches thick. Within a vault: body of steel less than ½ inch thick, or iron
F	At least two: Steel aggregating 5 inches or more in thickness and no door less than 1 inch thick	Body of steel at least 2 inches thick
G	Round lug-type steel at least 1½ inches thick, equipped with at least a two-movement time lock	Body of steel at least 1 inch thick encased in at least 6 inches of reinforced concrete

Also included are safes or chests bearing one of the following labels:
 UL Tool-Resisting Safe TL-30
 Torch and Explosive-Resisting Safe TX-60
 Torch-Resisting Safe TR-60
 Torch and Tool-Resisting Safe TRTL-30

*classifications and ratings are independent

**based on ratings by Underwriters' Laboratories, Northbrook, Ill.

Classification
I

Safe or chest bearing one of the following labels:
Torch and Tool-Resisting Safe TRTL-60
Tool-Resisting Safe TXTL-30

Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), "Safes and Vaults," The Public Security Center (Gaithersburg, Maryland: 1973), p. 2

FIRE RATINGS FOR SAFES

1. General fire-resistance index based on fire conditions

<i>Rating</i>	<i>Fire Condition</i>
one hour	light fire
two hours	moderate fire
four hours	severe fire

2. Fire resistance classification

Class C: One-hour resistance to fire reaching 1700° F, with internal temperature remaining less than 350° F. The safe is also tested for combined explosion and impact. In one test, the units are preheated to 2000° F for 30 minutes, then hoisted 30 feet and dropped. After cooling, the safe is again heated to 1500° F.

Class B: Two-hour resistance to 1850° F, with interior temperature not going above 350° F. In addition, the same explosion and impact tests are conducted as in class C.

Class A: Minimum four-hour resistance to 2000° F before the interior temperature goes above 350° F. The class A safes are also tested for explosion and impact.

Source: IACP, p. 3

Appendix J

SELECTED STANDARDS, REPORTS, AND GUIDELINES PREPARED BY THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS LAW ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS LABORATORY

The following were available from the National Bureau of Standards as of October 1977. Single copies are free from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20531. Buy multiple copies

from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. GPO orders should cite the document stock number and include remittance. There is a minimum charge of \$1.00 for each mail order.

STANDARDS

- NILECJ-STD-0101.00, March 1972. *Ballistic Resistance of Police Body Armor* (stock no. 2700-00155; price \$.25)
- NILECJ-STD-0103.00, May 1974. *Portable Ballistic Shields* (stock no. 2700-00253; price \$.55)
- NILECJ-STD-0104.00, October 1974. *Riot Helmets* (stock no. 2700-00286; price \$.65)
- NILECJ-STD-0106.00, September 1975. *Ballistic Helmets* (stock no. 027-000-00370-2; price \$.35)
- NILECJ-STD-0201.00, September 1974. *Fixed and Base Station FM Transmitters* (stock no. 2700-00283; price \$.65)
- NILECJ-STD-0202.00, October 1974. *Mobile FM Transmitters* (stock no. 2700-00287; price \$.70)
- NILECJ-STD-0203.00, October 1974. *Personal/portable FM Transmitters* (stock no. 027-000-00293; price \$.70)
- NILECJ-STD-0204.00, December 1976. *Fixed and Base Station Antennas* (in press)
- NILECJ-STD-0205.00, May 1974. *Mobile Antennas* (stock no. 2700-00250; price \$.55)
- NILECJ-STD-0206.00, September 1975. *Fixed and Base Station FM Receivers* (stock no. 027-000-00358-3; price \$.55)
- NILECJ-STD-0207.00, June 1975. *Mobile FM Receivers* (stock no. 027-00344-3; price \$.65)
- NILECJ-STD-0208.00, October 1975. *Personal/Portable FM Receivers* (stock no. 027-000-00366-4; price \$.45)
- NILECJ-STD-0211.00, June 1975. *Batteries for Personal/Portable Transceivers* (stock no. 027-000-00342-7; price \$.65)
- NILECJ-STD-0213.00, December 1976. *FM Repeater Systems* (in press)
- NILECJ-STD-0301.00, March 1974. *Magnetic Switches for Burglar Alarm Systems* (stock no. 2700-00238; price \$.65)
- NILECJ-STD-0302.00, May 1974. *Mechanically Actuated Switches for Burglar Alarm Systems* (stock no. 2700-00258; price \$.55)
- NILECJ-STD-0303.00, May 1974. *Mercury Switches for Burglar Alarm Systems* (stock no. 2700-00254; price \$.55)

- NILECJ-STD-0304.00, June 1975. *Passive, First-Generation Night Vision Devices* (stock no. 027-000-00325-7; price \$.80)
- NILECJ-STD-0305.00, June 1975. *Active Night Vision Devices* (stock no. 2700-00346; price \$.95)
- NILECJ-STD-0306.00, May 1976. *Physical Security of Door Assemblies and Components* (stock no. 027-000-00402-4; price \$.85)
- NILECJ-STD-0308.00, March 1977. *Sound Sensing Units for Intrusion Alarm Systems* (stock no. 027-000-00452-1; price \$.45)
- NILECJ-STD-0601.00, June 1974. *Walk-Through Metal Detectors for Use in Weapons Detection* (stock no. 2700-00256; price \$.65)
- NILECJ-STD-0602.00, October 1974. *Hand-Held Metal Detectors for Use in Weapons Detection* (stock no. 2700-00285; price \$.65)
- NILECJ-STD-0603.00, June 1975. *X-Ray Systems for Bomb Disarmament* (stock no. 027-000-00343-5; price \$.45)

REPORTS

- LESP-RPT-0203.00, June 1973. *Technical Terms and Definitions Used with Law Enforcement Communications Equipment (Radio Antennas, Transmitters, and Receivers)* (stock no. 2700-00214; price \$1.55)
- LESP-RPT-0204.00, May 1974. *Voice Privacy Equipment for Law Enforcement Communication Systems* (stock no. 2700-00260; price \$.65)
- LESP-RPT-0206.00, October 1974. *Repeaters for Law Enforcement Communication Systems* (stock no. 027-000-00288-9; price \$.65)
- LESP-RPT-0305.00, October 1974. *Terms and Definitions for Intrusion Alarm Systems* (stock no. 027-000-00290-1; price \$.65)
- LESP-RPT-0309.00, October 1975. *Directory of Security Consultants* (stock no. 027-000-00372-9; price \$1.25)
- LESP-RPT-0603.00, March 1977. *Test of Hand-Held Metal Weapons Detectors* (stock no. 027-000-00454-7; price \$.35)

NBS Special Publication 480-4, June 1977. *LEAA Police Equipment Survey of 1972, Volume IV: Alarms, Security Equipment, Surveillance Equipment* (stock no. 003-003-01745-1; price \$2.75)

NBS Special Publication 480-6, June 1977. *LEAA Police Equipment Survey of 1972, Volume VI: Body Armor and Confiscated Weapons* (stock no. 003-003-01748-5; price \$2.20)

NBS Special Publication 480-13, August 1977. *Police Communications Equipment Survey of 1976* (stock no. 003-003-01818-0; price \$2.00)

GUIDELINES

NILECJ-GUIDE-0301.00, December 1974. *Selection and Application Guide to Fixed Surveillance Cameras* (stock no. 027-000-00281-1; price \$.85)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

American Bar Association and American Institute of Architects Joint Committee on the Design of Courtrooms and Court Facilities. *The American Courthouse*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1973.

Briefly summarizes existing operations in the federal and state judicial systems, outlines planning requirements for the general trial court. Courts of special jurisdiction (appellate, criminal, juvenile, and family relations) are given separate planning requirements. Discusses in detail establishing criteria for a satisfactory physical environment, using technology to provide efficient handling of information, and including adequate security provisions. Surveys representative courthouses through photographs, drawings, and plans, offers guidelines for improving future courthouses through community action.

Obtain copies from the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, The University of Michigan Law School, Hutchins Hall, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.

Comptroller General of the U.S., Report to the Congress. *U.S. Marshals Service: Actions Needed to Enhance Effectiveness*. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, July 1976.

Summarizes the work by the U.S. Marshals Service in judicial security, process serving, and federal arrest warrants. Suggests ways in which the Congress and the Department of Justice can improve the Service's efforts in these areas.

Obtain copies from the Comptroller General of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20548.

Courthouse Reorganization and Renovation Program. *Space Management and Courthouse Security*. New York, 1972.

Examines the relative value of architecture and space management in achieving courthouse security and demonstrates the advantages of architecture over an operational approach when planning for renovation or construction. Analyzes courthouse security in terms of risks and dangers, and discusses personnel movement within the building. Model security systems are outlined and costs estimated. The study concludes that architectural solutions are preferable to operational ones because of cost advantages, per-

formance improvements, and a more efficient use of overall spaces. In situations where it is possible only to modify operations, useful procedures are presented to arrive at a cost and effectiveness comparison of the alternate methods.

Obtain copies from Courthouse Reorganization and Renovation Program, 111 Center Street, New York, New York 10013.

_____. *A Systems Approach to Courthouse Security*. New York, 1972.

Defines courthouse security and describes the problem in various courts. The security systems concept, its analysis, and application are supplemented by examples.

Obtain copies from the Courthouse Reorganization and Renovation Program.

Dorsen, Norman and Friedman, Leon. *Disorder in the Courts*. New York: Pantheon, 1973.

Discusses routine incidents which occur in courts. Gives recommendations to assure fair and efficient justice without courtroom disorder, including regulating the conduct and defining the responsibilities of defendants, lawyers, prosecutors, and judges, and clarifying each's role as a cause of and contribution to courtroom disorder. Defines and suggests guides for using "contempt power."

Obtain copies from Pantheon Books, Division of Random House Inc., 201 East 50th Street, New York, New York 10022.

Greenberg, Allan. *Courthouse Design: A Handbook for Judges and Court Administrators*. Chicago, Illinois: American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, 1975.

Discusses the architect-client contract and reviews the phases of court construction planning: legislative appropriation, program development, budget authorization, and site acquisition. Analyzes basic characteristics of the modern courthouse, looks at plan development, evaluates courtroom performance, and offers guidelines on security and facilities to hold prisoners. The focus is on the trial court of general jurisdiction, but the text is also relevant to the more specialized problems of a police-court building or criminal

courthouse. The criminal courtroom for jury trials is discussed in greater detail than other courts. Has a comprehensive bibliography.

Obtain copies from the American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637.

Institute of Continuing Legal Education. *ICLE Procedural Guide for the Evaluation and Accreditation of Court Facilities*. Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1977.

Describes the background, purpose, and procedures for the evaluation and accreditation of court facilities. Included are comments and addresses given at a national meeting by noted experts, plus specific descriptions and evaluations of facilities.

Obtain copies from the Institute of Continuing Legal Education (see American Bar Association entry).

Kingsbury, Arthur A. *Introduction to Security and Crime Prevention Surveys*. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1973.

Covers specific areas of survey methodology, including planning, design, and implementation. Includes examples of specific surveys and a section on crime prevention management.

Obtain copies from Charles C. Thomas, Bannerstone House, 301-327 East Lawrence Avenue, Springfield, Illinois 62703.

Maher, George F. *Hostage: A Police Approach to a Contemporary Crisis*. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1977.

Deals with hostage, barricade, and suicide situations. Covers agency policy, police responses, psychological assistance, negotiation theory, and the role of the negotiator in these situations. Details the planning and formation of a police hostage negotiating team, gives suggestions for selecting and training that team. Discusses approaches, equipment, and critiques of hostage situations.

Obtain copies from Charles C. Thomas (see previous entry).

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. *Private Security: Report of the Task Force on Private Security*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, December 1976.

Deals with all aspects of private security: people, alarm systems, and concepts for environmental protection. Includes recommendations for selecting and training private security personnel; technology and procedures for crime prevention systems, such as burglar alarms; and the relationship of the private security industry to law enforcement agencies. Suggests ways to improve the quality of private security services.

Obtain copies from the U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D.C. 20531.

National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and

Architecture. *Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities*. Monograph B5: *Trial Court Facility*. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976.

Gives an overview of important planning factors and an understanding of their impact on the design process. Location, scale, flexibility, economics, impact, conservation, engineering, technology, security, and image are presented as instrumental factors in the design process of a trial court facility.

Obtain copies from the National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61826.

_____. *Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities*. Monograph B6: *Trial Courtroom Environment*. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976.

Deals with courtrooms and the areas which functionally support them. Discusses how the quality and quantity of those supporting areas affect daily courtroom operations. Detailed recommendations for courtrooms and supporting areas are presented in terms of interrelationships between spaces; circulation problems are emphasized.

Obtain copies from the National Clearinghouse (see previous entry).

_____. *Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities*. Monograph B7: *Courtroom Design*. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976.

Recommends important courtroom design factors and evaluates courtroom schemes according to each factor. Design factors include security, location, scale, flexibility, economics, impact, conservation, engineering, technology, and image.

Obtain copies from the National Clearinghouse (see first Clearinghouse entry).

_____. *Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities*. Monograph B8: *Clerk of the Court*. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976.

Addresses general operations and environment of the clerk's office for a court of general jurisdiction. Mentions specific operations relating to traffic, juvenile, and other special divisions of the trial court.

Obtain copies from the National Clearinghouse (see first Clearinghouse entry).

_____. *Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities*. Monograph B9: *Jury Facilities*. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976.

Discusses important factors in the design of jury facilities to achieve the proper environment. Presents alternative design guidelines.

Obtain copies from the National Clearinghouse (see first Clearinghouse entry).

_____. *Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State*

Court Programs and Facilities. Monograph B10: *Auxiliary Court Facilities*. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976.

Emphasizes the importance of auxiliary court spaces to security and other factors. Discusses architectural principles governing the design and layout of auxiliary court spaces.

Obtain copies from the National Clearinghouse (see first Clearinghouse entry).

Pike, Earl A. *Protection Against Bombs and Incendiaries: For Business, Industrial and Educational Institutions*. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1972.

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Obtain copies from the National Sheriffs' Association, 1250 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 320, Washington, D.C. 20036.

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
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
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