

PONTIAC, MICHIGAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

"Integrated Criminal Apprehension Project"  
(LEAA 77-DF 050012)

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FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .....	ii
Executive Summary .....	iii
CHAPTER I: Project History and Overview .....	1
CHAPTER II: Process and Output Evaluation .....	9
CHAPTER III: Impact Evaluation .....	51
CHAPTER IV: Project Planning and Management .....	56
CHAPTER V: Project Congruence With ICAP Model .....	60
CHAPTER VI: Conclusions and Recommendations .....	68
APPENDIX A: Patrol Survey Comparisons .....	72
APPENDIX B: Preliminary D-Run Analysis .....	79

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ACQUISITION

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Chief William Hanger and his staff at the Pontiac Police Department have yet to deny the evaluator access to any source of information. Considering the various crises and general turmoil that has beset the Department during the last two years, such openness is remarkable and greatly appreciated by the evaluator. Because of the complete access, it is unfair to single out individuals, but Chief Hanger, Captain Skrobeck, Sergeant Burns, Detective Roek, Dave Braunschneider, and the entire staff of the Planning & Analysis Unit have been especially helpful and considerate of the evaluator's whims and requests.

Any "outside" evaluator needs a home base of support, which in this instance is supplied by the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. Thanks are extended to colleagues there, for their assistance and indulgence, including Tim Bynum, Ken Christian, Steve Edwards, Jack Greene, and John Hudzik.

The evaluator must also thank previous co-workers Larry Hoover and Dennis Lund for general guidance and the introduction to Pontiac. Finally, the evaluator must acknowledge the formative and continuing influence of Robert Sheehan.

Naturally, no one but the evaluator bears responsibility for the report that follows.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation report discusses the Pontiac, Michigan Police Department's Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP) for the project year October 1977 through September 1978. The project cost, which paid the salaries of ten people, was \$216,651, of which \$194,986 was federal assistance from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).

The Pontiac ICAP project had four explicit goals, which were stated as follows in the grant application:

1. improve the preliminary investigations of crimes conducted by patrol;
2. improve and expand the crime analysis function;
3. coordinate the crime analysis and crime prevention functions with patrol, to develop strategic planning to increase criminal apprehensions;
4. coordinate the investigative and patrol functions to develop improved career criminal identification and apprehension.

In order to achieve these goals, a number of project activities were planned. The major activities are summarized below.

1. A Court Activities Coordinator was to work closely with the court to avoid unnecessary police appearances, thus saving patrol time and expense.
2. Patrol involvement in preliminary crime investigations was to be early and continued.
3. A crime prevention officer was to formulate alternative patrol utilization strategies and train patrol officers to undertake greater crime prevention work themselves.
4. Patrol and overall operational strategic planning was to be expanded.

5. Crime analysis was to be expanded.
6. Directed patrol, a plain clothes saturation strategy based on crime analysis, was to be continued.
7. D-runs, a uniformed patrol strategy based on crime analysis, was to be continued.
8. Detectives were to continue to attend patrol roll-calls for the purpose of disseminating and soliciting information.

None of the four project goals were completely achieved. No change was made in patrol preliminary investigations, and the already institutionalized crime analysis unit undertook no major new responsibilities. The crime prevention function was not closely coordinated with patrol and crime analysis, but the latter two functions did work closely together, particularly with respect to patrol targets and tactics. No major new efforts were undertaken to coordinate the patrol and investigative functions, and career criminal identification and apprehension was not improved as a result of the ICAP project.

Several of the ICAP project activities were continuations of positions and functions established under a previous Patrol Emphasis Project (PEP). The Court Activities Coordinator position was a continuation, and the activities undertaken by the incumbent apparently did result in some savings to the Department, although a decrease in the number of persons formally charged makes it difficult to determine the exact savings attributable to the coordinator. The directed patrol strategy was another continuation activity, and a preliminary analysis suggests that a higher portion of the arrests produced by the strategy are for target crimes than is the case for the Department as a whole. D-runs were also continued from PEP, although a new system incorporating increased participation in run creation by patrol personnel and increased provision of tactical and crime information was

successfully implemented. A preliminary analysis based on incomplete data suggests that the D-run strategy may produce more arrests per man hour than other patrol strategies. The productivity findings for the directed patrol and D-run strategies are very tentative, but based on them it does seem valid to conclude that patrol strategies informed by crime analysis are capable of producing arrests differently than regular patrol.

Detective attendance at patrol roll-calls was continued from the PEP project, and the level of implementation seems to have steadily decreased from an initial 20 appearances per week. Patrol officers reported that information sharing between patrol and investigations had not increased during the project year.

The crime prevention officer position was continued from the PEP project, but the functions to be performed were intended to change from direct service delivery to patrol support. This change in function did not take place, apparently largely because the crime prevention officer was unaware of the intended duties of the position under the ICAP project.

As noted in the discussion of goal achievement, intended improvements and/or expansions of preliminary investigations and crime analysis did not occur. The role of patrol officers with respect to preliminary investigations was not changed during the ICAP project, and the improvement effort was limited to a short training session. The crime analysis unit in the Pontiac Police Department has been in operation for several years and regularly produces a variety of reports, bulletins, and maps for management and operational personnel. These activities were continued during the ICAP project, and some initial efforts at intelligence analysis were begun, but it would not be accurate to say that the function was improved or expanded significantly during ICAP.

Project planning and management, and the extent of congruence between Pontiac's ICAP project and the national ICAP model, are also addressed briefly in the evaluation report. In general, project planning was not sufficiently attentive to the need for clear objectives and planned implementation. Project management was lacking in direction and control, possibly because the responsibility for various project components was delegated to the division commanders, some of whom may have lacked either commitment to or understanding of the project. When compared to the national ICAP model, Pontiac's project was substantially incomplete; the cause of this was apparently a lack of understanding of ICAP when the grant application was originally submitted, so that the project would be better characterized as a continuation of PEP. The continuation project now in progress in Pontiac does rectify most of the discrepancies, and if successfully implemented will be much closer to the national ICAP model.

## CHAPTER I: Project History and Overview

With an application dated March 11, 1977 the Pontiac, Michigan Police Department requested funding of an Integrated Criminal Apprehension Project by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The anticipated cost of the project was \$216,651, of which \$194,986 was requested federal funding. The application was approved for funding by LEAA, and the one-year grant became effective on October 1, 1977.

By way of a request for proposal, the Pontiac Police Department solicited bids for an evaluation of the project, and on October 6, 1977 Gary W. Cordner was notified that he had been selected as the project evaluator. A contract for evaluation services became effective on November 22, 1977.

In an earlier grant application, the City of Pontiac and its police department were described in some detail. Those descriptions are reproduced below for the benefit of the reader unfamiliar with the setting of the project.

The City of Pontiac, Michigan is a medium-sized, industrial community of approximately 85,000 population, located 30 miles north of Detroit. Serving as the seat of Oakland County and included as part of the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, Pontiac's economy revolves around three major auto manufacturing plants, and several additional satellite industries, and provides nearly 40% of the industrial employment for the more than one million residents of the County.

Pontiac encompasses 27.1 square miles of land and is governed by a home-rule, council-manager form of local government, which employs approximately 1500 service workers on an annual operating budget of 22 million dollars. Pontiac's newest addition to its revenue generating acquisition is the 55 million dollar Pontiac Metropolitan Stadium, which is the home of the National Football League's Detroit Lions professional football team.



Unfortunately hard-hit by the general decline in the economy, which has adversely affected the auto industry, Pontiac also has a 29.1% unemployment rate, with 7.8% of its families on welfare incomes and a full 10% with incomes below poverty levels established by the U.S. Department of Labor.

Pontiac also has the unenviable distinction of having the fourth highest crime rate in the nation for cities of 50-100,000 population as reported in the F.B.I. Annual Report for 1974. While crime has decreased slightly in the City of Pontiac over the last two years, especially in the area of violent crime, the Pontiac Police Department investigates over 10,000 Crime Index Crime reports annually and responds to over 60,000 calls for service.

The Pontiac Police Department has a total complement of 269 employees, including 201 sworn personnel and 68 non-sworn. It has an annual budget of approximately 6 million dollars and operates on a July-June fiscal year.

The Department is divided into four divisions: Uniformed Services; Investigational Services; Technical Services; and Administrative Services. The Office of the Chief of Police also encompasses the Police/Community Relations Unit. Each of the four divisions has its individual areas of responsibility as follows:

- a. Uniformed Services - all patrol and traffic responsibilities
- b. Investigational Services - all criminal investigation
- c. Technical Services Division - all technical support services and operations
- d. Administrative Services - all administrative functions

The current rank structure within the department is as follows:

Chief of Police  
Captain  
Lieutenant  
Sergeant  
Detective  
Senior Patrolman  
Patrolman

A separate rank of Policewoman is the equivalent of Detective and refers to a specific assignment within the Youth Section and does not encompass females on patrol who are ranked as Patrolmen.

This description, though now about two and one-half years old, remains essentially accurate. The economic conditions of city residents have probably improved in the meantime, reported Part I offenses per year have decreased,

total annual calls for service have increased, and the number of police department employees increased to about 300. In general, however, the description holds true.

The inception of Pontiac's Integrated Criminal Apprehension Project (ICAP) directly followed a one-year Patrol Emphasis Project (PEP), which had also been funded by LEAA. At the national level, PEP was the forerunner of ICAP, both administratively and substantively. Consequently, Pontiac's ICAP project was in many respects a continuation of its PEP project. Both projects focused on patrol improvement and enhancement, with impact goals of increased arrests and decreased crime.

The specific project goals of Pontiac's ICAP project were identified as follows in the grant application:

1. improve the preliminary investigations of crimes conducted by patrol;
2. improve and expand the crime analysis function;
3. coordinate the crime analysis and crime prevention functions with patrol, to develop strategic planning to increase criminal apprehensions;
4. coordinate the investigative and patrol functions to develop improved career criminal identification and apprehension.

A set of project objectives were also identified in the grant application, as follows:

1. the patrol force will undertake a greater involvement and responsibility for the crime prevention and service needs of the community;
2. the patrol officers will have an early and continued involvement in preliminary crime investigations;
3. the crime analysis function of the Department will continue to be developed;
4. overall operational strategic planning will be improved and expanded.

As a result of project activities aimed at these goals and objectives, the Pontiac Police Department expected several beneficial consequences, according to their grant application. These included increased apprehensions (especially of repeat offenders and career criminals), a reduction in suppressible crimes, increased officer job satisfaction, and improved feelings of security among citizens. The "suppressible" target crimes for the ICAP project, and its PEP predecessor, were burglary, larceny, and auto theft.

The entire cost of Pontiac's ICAP project was for the salaries of ten people. The positions occupied by these people, and the costs per project component, are noted below.

Planning & Analysis: 4 Cadets	\$ 51,673
Crime Prevention: 1 Patrolman	\$ 27,149
Directed Patrol: 3 Patrolmen, 1 Sergeant	\$106,363
Court Activities Coordinator: 1 Sergeant	\$ 31,466

According to the grant application, the primary responsibilities of the four Planning & Analysis cadets were for the dissemination of data generated by their unit to field officers. The primary responsibilities of the crime prevention officer were described as formulating alternative patrol utilization strategies and training patrol officers to undertake greater crime prevention work themselves. The patrolmen and sergeant funded for Directed Patrol were to supplement an already established unit that operated primarily in plain clothes by saturating areas identified by crime analysis. The responsibilities of the Court Activities Coordinator were to coordinate and expedite court appearances by Pontiac officers, so as to avoid unnecessary appearances and their attendant costs. Each of these positions had previously been funded under the PEP project.

Before moving into the evaluation of Pontiac's ICAP project, several

conditions and events that may or may not have influenced the success of the project need to be mentioned. In later sections of this report some of these will be discussed again, insofar as they have a clear bearing on the project, but they are mentioned here as part of the overview to give the reader a greater understanding of the setting of the project.

One such condition already discussed was the Patrol Emphasis Project that directly preceded the ICAP project. A second pertinent grant project was the Investigative Emphasis Project (IEP) that ran concurrently with both PEP and ICAP. The IEP grant funded nine positions in the Investigational Services Division, and had apprehension and crime suppression goals similar to those of PEP and ICAP.

During the ICAP project year (October 1977 to September 1978) the City of Pontiac was beset by a fiscal crisis that has yet to be resolved. On July 1, 1978 thirteen patrolmen were laid off, and none of these officers have been rehired to date. As a result of the layoffs, the staffing of the Uniformed Services Division decreased, and morale was generally agreed to have dropped substantially. Because the city's fiscal crisis continues, more layoffs are apparently a possibility, and job insecurity is a serious concern of many Department employees.

The layoffs of the thirteen patrolmen created a second crisis, this one revolving around the CETA program. After the layoffs, the Department learned that CETA funds cannot be used to employ people doing the same job as people who have been laid off. The Department has numerous CETA funded patrolmen, some of whom have considerable seniority. In order to avoid losing their CETA funds, the Department assigned all CETA patrolmen to a special unit in September, 1978. The duties of CETA patrolmen are now solely to perform crime

deterrent runs - these officers no longer answer calls for service. This change in duties, and the resulting confusion, came very near the end of the ICAP project, and thus should not have much influence on the evaluation, except as it reflects and reinforces the sense of fiscal uncertainty that pervaded the city during 1977-78.

Another sort of crisis and uncertainty beset the Police Department and its relations with the county prosecutor's office. In August a Pontiac patrolman was arrested on bribery charges, and allegations of bribery were made against a Pontiac police lieutenant, both reportedly as a result of a lengthy investigation conducted by the prosecutor and federal and state law enforcement agencies. Spokesmen for the Department suggested that the prosecutor had ulterior political motives, as the charges surfaced shortly before his primary election for United States Senator (he lost), and the prosecutor stated that the Pontiac Chief of Police could conceivably face obstruction of justice charges for his handling of the matter. All of the charges were subsequently dismissed in state court. As a result, however, police officers in Pontiac feel that they are getting less assistance and cooperation with criminal prosecutions, due to the conflict. Previous efforts to interest the county prosecutor in the LEAA prosecutorial counterpart to ICAP (Career Criminal Prosecutions) had been totally unsuccessful, and the official relations between the police and the prosecutor are now very strained.

The bribery allegations and resulting publicity also contributed to the perceived deterioration in police morale, although the extent of this deterioration and the impact of the publicity are difficult to accurately measure. Although the dismissal of the charges in state court was regarded by some as an exoneration of the Department, on November 15, 1978 indictments were returned in federal court against the same patrolman and lieutenant, and

also against the Captain in charge of the Investigational Services Division.

Finally, during the project year several Department employees attended ICAP national cluster conferences, which resulted in clearer understanding of the ICAP model and continual refinement of project-related activities. In addition, planning for a continuation ICAP grant was undertaken during this project year, the process of which also contributed to an ever increasing understanding of what LEAA means by ICAP. It would be accurate to say that at the beginning of the project year in Pontiac very few of the people involved in the project had any real understanding of ICAP, and that as the year progressed the situation improved markedly.

The next chapter of this report is the most important, in the evaluator's view. Although Pontiac's project and ICAP in general have crime suppression goals, these are secondary for very important reasons. Probably the key reason is that there is not a clear relationship between police activities and crime rates. What the police do is but one variable in a very complex social setting, and no aspect of that social setting was controlled during Pontiac's ICAP project. Any change in crime rates could be attributable to economic, demographic, political, or sociological causes, or to efforts of the courts or correctional agencies, just as easily as it could be attributable to the efforts of the police. If, for the sake of argument, some portion of a crime change were to be attributed to Pontiac Police efforts, it would still be extremely difficult if not impossible to show that ICAP deserved the credit. The credit might as easily be given to the Investigative Emphasis Project, to a STING operation, or to any other aspect of the Department's operations.

These matters of project impact will be addressed, cautiously, in Chapter III. Prior to that, however, in Chapter II, an evaluation of project process

and output will be presented. This is regarded as the most important section of the report because ICAP is, first and foremost, an effort at organizational change. As a result of ICAP certain police jobs are to be performed differently, the status of patrol is to be enhanced, the role of crime analysis and operations analysis is to be enlarged, and in general the management of the police department is to become less crisis-oriented and more planning-conscious. These kinds of changes do not happen automatically. The focus of Chapter II is on the extent to which Pontiac was able to implement the kinds of activities described in their ICAP application, the reasons why they were or were not successful, and the immediate outputs of project activities.

## CHAPTER II: Process and Output Evaluation

This chapter of the final evaluation report is divided into four main sections. The first two sections pertain to improving patrol operations; one discusses efforts to make more patrol time available, while the other is addressed to the attempt to make better use of patrol time. In the third section of the chapter overall operational improvement efforts are discussed, and in the final section some information on the job satisfaction of Pontiac patrol officers is presented.

### Improving Patrol Operations: Increasing Patrol Time

The primary means by which the Pontiac Police Department attempted to increase available patrol time during the ICAP project was through the efforts of the Court Activities Coordinator. This position was fully funded by the project, and was a continuation from the PEP project. Under PEP, the position had been titled Court Liaison Officer, and had been designed with the intention that the incumbent would seek early notification from the court of dismissals and postponements, so that officers involved could be advised not to appear as originally scheduled. This effort was expected to save the time of officers on duty, and overtime costs for officers off duty. Under PEP the Court Liaison Officer performed these notification duties, and also expanded his original role considerably. In addition to notifying officers that they did not need to appear, the Court Liaison Officer also undertook to notify them when their appearance was required, he assured that police evidence and



Table 1. Persons Formally Charged, Traffic Tickets Issued, and Court Overtime Hours for Pre-Projects, PEP, and ICAP Periods.

	10/75-9/76	10/76-9/77	10/77-9/78	<u>Changes</u>	
	Pre-Projects	PEP	ICAP	Pre/ ICAP	PEP/ ICAP
Persons Formally Charged, Part I Crimes	1180	713	777	-34.2%	+ 9.0%
Persons Formally Charged, Part II Crimes	2864	2549	2163	-24.5%	-15.1%
Persons Formally Charged, Total Part I & II	4044	3262	2940	-27.3%	- 9.9%
Traffic Tickets Issued	12575	14074	15119	+20.2%	+ 7.4%
Court Overtime Hours (12/12 to 9/30 each year)	9342	7568.4	6471.8	-30.7%	-14.5%

police reports were available as needed, he began checking directly with defendants and defense counsel in order to anticipate postponements, and he became an overall coordinator for the timely appearances of police officers, prosecutors, victims, witnesses, and defense counsel. Thus the change in position title under ICAP from Court Liaison Officer to Court Activities Coordinator largely reflected the duties undertaken by the PEP incumbent. The same individual held the position during both projects.

District Court overtime hours charged to the Pontiac Police Department during pre-projects, PEP and ICAP periods are shown in the bottom row of Table 1.

As shown in the last two columns, court overtime hours during ICAP were down 14.5% from the PEP year, and down 30.7% from the pre-projects year, during which there was no Court Activities Coordinator or Court Liaison Officer. Based on ICAP year salaries, the decrease in court overtime costs from the PEP year was about \$15,000, and the decrease from the pre-projects year was approximately \$39,200. No figures are available for on duty time savings during the ICAP year, but it seems justified to expect that these would have followed the same pattern as off duty time savings.

The other rows of Table 1 contain various measures of the potential court demand for police time during the three years of interest. These measures are important because it cannot be assumed that decreases in police court-time were solely the result of the efforts of the Court Activities Coordinator. Rather, they could also reflect changes in the number of cases brought to the court by the Police Department, which might change the court demand for police time. As shown in the first three rows of the table, the number of persons formally charged with Part I and Part II offenses by the Pontiac Police Department during the period of interest did generally decrease. The total number of persons charged with these offenses decreased by 27.3% from the pre-projects to ICAP year. This figure is quite close to the 30.7% decrease in court overtime hours for the same period, and suggests that the overtime decrease can be largely accounted for by the decrease in persons formally charged. Off-setting this interpretation to some extent is the 20.2% increase in the number of traffic tickets issued by the Pontiac Police Department during this period. The relative weights that should be assigned to Part I charges, Part II charges, and traffic tickets, in terms of court demand for police time, are not precisely known, but it does seem that traffic tickets


require less court-time per case, less officers per case, and are less susceptible to the time savings efforts of the Court Activities Coordinator. A reasonable interpretation of all the figures in Table 1, then, would be that the Court Activities Coordinator has been successful in averting some wasted police court-time, but that much of the decrease in court overtime hours from the pre-projects year to the ICAP year is attributable to the decrease during that period in the number of persons formally charged by the Pontiac Police Department. This conclusion is essentially identical to that reached by the PEP evaluation of the activities of the then Court Liaison Officer.

As noted earlier, the tasks undertaken by the Court Activities Coordinator went beyond simply avoiding wasted police court-time. This ICAP evaluation was not specifically focused on these other duties, but their worth should be noted. The timely appearance of police officers, evidence, and reports was reportedly improved, and court and prosecution officials stated that the Coordinator was of assistance to them in assembling all of the individuals and documents needed for various judicial proceedings. It may be noteworthy that the Pontiac Police Department has maintained the Court Activities Coordinator position for the 1978-79 year, even though it is not funded under the continuation ICAP grant.

Patrol Time: General Considerations      Despite the efforts of the Court Activities Coordinator, the amount of patrol time available to the Pontiac Police Department decreased during the ICAP project year. As demonstrated vividly in Figure 1, the total number of calls for service handled by the Pontiac Police Department has increased considerably over the last ten years, and increases in personnel have not kept pace. Consequently, each officer's

Figure 1

# Numbers of Reported Crimes and Miscellaneous Calls, By Year



workload has increased, while the amount of patrol time left for each officer and for the entire Department has decreased.


Information more directly related to the ICAP project year is displayed in Figure 2. The average percent of each patrol officer's time consumed by calls, assigned details, and self-initiated tasks was 42.1% in the pre-project year, 44.9% during PEP, and 56.0% during ICAP. Considering that during ICAP the number of officers on patrol also decreased, due to the lay offs, it is clear that total patrol time for the Department decreased considerably during ICAP.

Several other means of increasing patrol time presently utilized or being considered by the Pontiac Police Department should be noted, though they are not ICAP project components. The Department presently employs several community service officers whose sole function is to answer non-primary calls, thus freeing some patrol officer time. Also, the Department continually monitors the time-of-day and day-of-week distribution of patrol workload and allocates its personnel accordingly, so that the amount of patrol time is fairly even across shifts and days. Finally, the Department is now planning to implement a teleserve capacity, by which certain reports would be taken over the telephone by cadets, thus avoiding the need to send a patrol officer to the scene of every problem.

Presently the Pontiac Police Department deploys both one-man and two-man mobile patrol units, and so a potential means of increasing total patrol time would be to increase the number of one-man units deployed. Due to the city's fiscal crisis, however, during the times of the day when the most patrol officers are working there are often not enough serviceable patrol cars available to significantly increase the number of one-man units deployed.

# Percent of Patrol Time Consumed By Calls, Assigned Details, and Self-Initiated Tasks, By Month

Figure 2



Improving Patrol Operations: Making Improved Use of Patrol Time

Apart from the effort to increase the amount of available patrol time, Pontiac's ICAP project also intended to use that time in somewhat different, and presumably better, ways. The success of implementation and the direct products of these alternative approaches to the use of patrol time are assessed in this section.

Better Preliminary Investigations According to Pontiac's ICAP grant application, a project goal was to improve the preliminary investigations conducted by patrol officers, and a project objective was for patrol officers to have an early and continued involvement in preliminary crime investigations. The grant application did not specify how the improvement was to be achieved, but indicated that the result would be increased criminal apprehension capabilities due to improved data gathering by patrol officers at the scenes of crimes.

There is no evidence to suggest that during the ICAP project year the Pontiac Police Department undertook any substantial efforts to improve patrol preliminary investigations. The only specific attempt seems to have been a one hour session on report writing during in-service training. The instructor for this session was a detective lieutenant, who emphasized the necessity of obtaining accurate and complete information during preliminary investigations.

The role of patrol officers in criminal investigations did not change during the project year. That role, as described by Department officials, is essentially to exhaust all possibilities at the scene of the crime, except as detectives may respond and perform certain duties at the scenes of major crimes. Patrol officers are not expected to carry their investigations beyond the scene, but rather file their reports for later action by investigators.

The review of patrol officer reports, and thus of patrol preliminary investigations, is performed by shift sergeants and lieutenants as part of their regular supervisory duties. No change in this procedure occurred during the project year, although the results of the procedure are generally deemed unsatisfactory by Department officials. The reports actually receive only the most cursory review, and reports reflecting inadequate preliminary investigations are regularly forwarded by the supervisors. As part of the continuation ICAP grant report review is to be significantly upgraded, but the activity remained unchanged during the project year under consideration in this evaluation report.

The general opinion of Department officials and investigators, frequently expressed, is that patrol preliminary investigations are seriously substandard. As noted, the Department undertook no substantial efforts during the project year to improve the situation. This finding is supported by the responses to a patrol survey administered by the evaluator during the last month of the project. (Responses were obtained from 75 officers, representing about 81% of the effective strength of the regular uniformed patrol force.) The question that dealt with preliminary investigations, and the mean response, are noted below. The responses clearly indicate that, as far as the patrol officers

During the last year, preliminary investigations of crimes conducted by patrol officers have improved.	50.6
(0 = strongly disagree to 100 = strongly agree)	

themselves are concerned, preliminary investigations by patrol officers neither improved or worsened during the project year, but instead remained the same.

Although this aspect of the ICAP project was not successfully implemented, it seems to have been a very worthy objective, and deserves greater attention in the future. Several recent research projects and project evaluations have



concluded that actions taken by the first units at the scenes of crimes are potentially much more productive than detective follow-ups conducted hours or days later. Also, much detective time can be saved when patrol officers collect complete and accurate information during preliminary investigations. In the future, the Pontiac Police Department should clarify what it means by improved preliminary investigations, and it should take concerted action to achieve the goals and objectives formulated for this ICAP project.

Greater Crime Prevention Involvement      One of the objectives cited in the ICAP grant application was a greater involvement by the patrol force in the provision of crime prevention services to the community. The ICAP grant funded a crime prevention position, as had the PEP grant. Under ICAP the funded crime prevention officer was to have two primary responsibilities: first, formulating alternative patrol strategies aimed at crime prevention; and second, training patrol officers to perform crime prevention duties themselves.

Generally, the ICAP crime prevention objective was not attained, nor were the responsibilities described in the grant application assumed to any significant degree by the funded crime prevention officer. The funded crime prevention officer primarily undertook direct crime prevention service delivery activities, rather than the patrol support activities originally intended. Three particular reasons for this turn of events can be offered. One is that a change of personnel in the crime prevention position took place early in the project year (due to the promotion of the incumbent to detective), which resulted in some discontinuity and retraining, and possibly some role confusion. A second reason is that the crime prevention unit receives numerous requests for security inspections and public presentations, and since

Table 2. Various Crime Prevention Activities Conducted During Pre-Projects, PEP, and ICAP Years.

	<u>Changes</u>				
	10/75-9/76 Pre-Projects	10/76-9/77 PEP	10/77-9/78 ICAP	Pre/ ICAP	PEP/ ICAP
Premise Surveys	112	414	769	+586.6%	+ 85.7%
Operation ID	312	278	242	- 22.4%	- 13.0%
Survey Follow-ups	84	57	425	+406.0%	+645.6%
Security Consultations	122	99	66	- 45.9%	- 33.3%
Alarm Follow-ups	201	259	170	- 15.4%	- 34.4%

it is a small unit, these requests constitute a demanding workload of their own. A third reason is that the officers filling the crime prevention position may never have been fully aware of the patrol support emphasis described in the grant application. It is highly likely that the crime prevention officers assumed that they were supposed to perform direct service delivery activities.

Information summarizing some of the activities performed by the crime prevention unit during the pre-projects, PEP, and ICAP years is presented in Table 2. Two of the rows need to be discussed in some detail. The great increases in the premise survey figures reflect "short-form" surveys conducted by patrol officers during the PEP and ICAP years. These short-form surveys, filled out by patrol officers at burglary scenes and otherwise as relevant, were instituted during the last month of PEP and phased out during the second half of ICAP. Apparently, they were considered insufficient as premise surveys,

and patrol officers were not considered sufficiently skilled in crime prevention to successfully conduct the surveys. Thus, a tremendous number of premise surveys were recorded as having been performed between September, 1977 and May, 1978, after which the use of the "short-forms" was ended. This pattern of premise survey performance is shown as the solid line in Figure 3.

The figures for survey follow-ups, which show the same dramatic increases as the premise survey figures, can be similarly explained. These figures parallel the premise survey figures, though they lag a month or two behind. The survey follow-ups were activity taken by crime prevention personnel based on the patrol "short-forms." Though the figures suggest a tremendous workload, most of the follow-ups consisted only of telephone calls that failed to reach the people who had been served by the "short-forms." The intention of the follow-ups was to arrange a complete premise survey, but apparently few of the follow-ups were successful in this regard.


In place of the patrol "short-forms" the use by patrol of "courtesy citations" was instituted during the second half of ICAP. A copy of the citation is left at the site of the observed security weakness, and a second copy is forwarded to the crime prevention unit. Thus the role of patrol was changed from one of direct delivery of crime prevention service to one of notifying crime prevention of problems to be dealt with by specialized personnel.

The role of the crime prevention officer in training patrol officers to perform crime prevention tasks was apparently limited to three hours of in-service training. This training focused on general crime prevention information, the new "courtesy citation form" and new information on bicycle safety. During the previous year each officer had received 16 hours of



# Numbers of Crime Prevention Activities, By Month

Figure 3



in-service crime prevention training, after which the "short-form" had been instituted.

Since June, 1978 the performance of various crime prevention activities has returned to the pattern and levels in effect prior to September, 1977. As part of the patrol survey, officers were asked about their crime prevention involvement, and they responded as noted below. The average response would

During the last year, patrol has assumed a greater involvement and responsibility for crime prevention. (0 = strongly disagree to 100 = strongly agree.)	55.6
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seem to support the observation of some temporary increase in patrol crime prevention responsibilities, but not a major alteration in duties. Responses to another survey question suggest that patrol officers are somewhat receptive to the value of crime prevention work, as noted below. This item was part of

If police put as much effort into crime prevention as they do into investigation <u>after</u> a crime has been committed, we would be farther ahead in reducing crime. (0 = strongly disagree to 100 = strongly agree.)	1976 - 60.8
	1977 - 59.9
	1978 - 61.4

each of three patrol surveys conducted at one-year intervals, the last of which served specifically the ICAP evaluation.

In general, there is not a close working relationship between the crime prevention and patrol units in the Pontiac Police Department. As mentioned, the crime prevention unit has assumed primarily a direct service delivery role, rather than a patrol support role. The organizational placement of the crime prevention unit in the Community Relations Unit, a separate division under the Chief's Office, probably contributes to the distant relations with patrol. For these and the other reasons mentioned above, the ICAP project objective

of greater patrol involvement in crime prevention was not significantly or permanently achieved.

Improved Strategic Planning for Patrol

A goal of Pontiac's ICAP

project was to coordinate the crime analysis and crime prevention functions with patrol, in order to develop strategic planning aimed at increased criminal apprehensions. This goal was presumably related to but not identical with the intended primary responsibility of the crime prevention officer, that of formulating alternative patrol strategies focused on crime prevention.

The intended participation of the crime prevention officer in strategic patrol planning was not achieved. As noted in the last section, it is very likely that the crime prevention officer never understood the patrol support emphasis intended for the position. Also, there does not exist in general a close working relationship between the crime prevention and patrol units, so that coordination and joint participation in planning are not natural occurrences. Further, it is not obvious what role a crime prevention officer could or should play in apprehension oriented patrol strategic planning - this is not spelled out in the grant application, and other ICAP cities are known to be stumbling over the same sort of problem.

It is not clear what is meant by patrol strategic planning, but in general the crime analysis and patrol functions work closely together. The crime analysis unit has been in operation for several years, and collects, analyzes, and disseminates a wide variety of operational and management information. The office of the crime analysis unit is physically located adjacent to the office of the patrol commander, facilitating collaboration in problem solving and planning. Several of the special patrol strategies discussed later in this chapter are almost completely based on crime analysis information and

Table 3. Number of On-Scene Arrests for Target and All Part I Crimes During Pre-Projects, PEP, and ICAP Years.

	<u>Changes</u>				
	10/75-9/76 Pre-Projects	10/76-9/77 PEP	10/77-9/78 ICAP	Pre/ ICAP	PEP/ ICAP
Burglary On-Scene Arrests	125	103	103	-17.6%	0.0
Larceny On-Scene Arrests	430	358	326	-24.2%	- 8.9%
Auto Theft On-Scene Arrests	12	13	29	+141.7%	+113.1%
All Part I On-Scene Arrests	706	575	630	-10.8%	+ 9.6%

recommendations.

The objective of the strategic patrol planning was increased criminal apprehensions by patrol. Patrol apprehensions are primarily of the on-scene variety, and in Table 3 information concerning on-scene arrests in Pontiac for the years of interest is presented. For the total three year period, auto theft on-scene arrests increased, while burglary, larceny, combined target offense, and total Part I on-scene arrests all decreased. From the PEP to ICAP years, burglary on-scene arrests were unchanged, auto theft and Part I on-scene arrests increased, and larceny and combined target offense on-scene arrests decreased. The decreases for combined target offenses (burglary, larceny, and auto theft), not shown in the table, were 19.2% for the entire period, and 3.4% from PEP to ICAP. Monthly totals of on-scene arrests for the combined target offenses, along with annual averages, are displayed in Figure 4.





# Number of On-Scene Arrests for Burglary, Larceny and Auto Theft, By Month

Figure 4




Table 4. Percent of Reported Target and All Part I Offenses For Which On-Scene Arrests Were Made During Pre-Projects, PEP, and ICAP Years.

	<u>Changes</u>				
	10/75-9/76 Pre-Projects	10/76-9/77 PEP	10/77-9/78 ICAP	Pre/ ICAP	PEP/ ICAP
Burglary	4.8%	4.2%	4.1%	-14.6%	- 2.4%
Larceny	10.0%	9.1%	9.1%	- 9.0%	0.0
Auto Theft	2.1%	2.4%	4.4%	+109.5%	+83.3%
Combined Target	7.6%	6.8%	6.7%	-11.8%	- 1.5%
Total Part I	7.9%	6.9%	7.5%	- 5.1%	+ 8.7%

The figures shown in Table 4 present perhaps a somewhat truer picture of the on-scene arrest effectiveness of the Pontiac Police Department during the pre-projects, PEP, and ICAP years. Rather than raw numbers of on-scene arrests, Table 4 reports percentages of offenses for which on-scene arrests were made. As can be seen in the Table, according to this measure the on-scene arrest effectiveness of the Department declined over the three year period for all categories except auto theft, and declined from PEP to ICAP for burglary and the combined target offenses. Monthly percentages of on-scene arrests for the combined target offenses are displayed in Figure 5.


A general conclusion based on all these figures is that patrol arrests for target offenses did not increase during the ICAP project. As this was a goal of patrol strategic planning, success was not achieved. However, police departments all over the country are in the same situation of wanting to increase apprehensions for targeted crimes, but not being successful. In the



# Percent of Reported Burglaries, Larcenies, and Auto Thefts for Which On-Scene Arrests Were Made,

## By Month

Figure 5



police field there is a general lack of solid information about the relative effectiveness of various patrol strategies, despite increased research in recent years. Therefore, it is recommended that Pontiac continue its efforts at strategic patrol planning. It is also recommended that these efforts include a wide spectrum of Department personnel, and that every effort be made to keep informed of research findings from other jurisdictions.

Improve and Expand Crime Analysis      A goal of the Pontiac ICAP project was to improve and expand the crime analysis function. As noted earlier, the Pontiac Police Department has had a crime analysis unit for several years; how the activities of this unit were to be improved and expanded during the ICAP project is not clear.

For the most part, the activities of the crime analysis unit continued during the ICAP project as they had during the PEP project. The unit regularly supported all patrol units with crime information, and to a lesser extent also supported investigative units. The primary focus of the crime analysis remained on the time and location of offenses, but during the ICAP project year increasing attention was also given to MO and suspect analysis. This latter activity created some controversy in the Department concerning the kinds of information that could be legally and ethically collected and disseminated, but it became clear that suspect analysis would have to be an integral part of any career criminal focus in the ICAP project. This became well enough accepted that the ICAP continuation grant now funds a career criminal sergeant whose responsibilities include suspect analysis.

As part of the regular activities of the crime analysis unit, the four project funded cadets continued to attend all patrol roll-calls, in order to disseminate information on crime patterns, major incidents, stolen property,

and similar matters. In addition to disseminating information verbally, the crime analysis unit also regularly produced a variety of written reports, bulletins, and maps concerning crime problems in Pontiac. Finally, as noted earlier, patrol officers and supervisors regularly consulted with crime analysis personnel when designing their tactics and selecting their target areas and crimes. Two special patrol strategies that were closely tied to crime analysis are discussed in the next sections of this chapter.

Directed Patrol      Nearly one-half of Pontiac's ICAP grant funds were allocated to the operational Directed Patrol Unit, which is located organizationally in the Uniformed Services Division. The grant funds paid the salaries of three patrolmen and one sergeant, giving the unit a total complement of ten patrolmen and two sergeants.

Directed patrol in Pontiac does not refer to the same strategy as directed patrol in the New Haven mold. In Pontiac, directed patrol is a primarily plain clothes saturation strategy. The plain clothes officers work in areas identified by crime analysis on the basis of crime patterns, and their normal tactics are field interrogations of suspicious people, surveillances of suspicious people, and surveillances of likely crime targets. The officers work primarily in the evenings, and each evening a different officer works in uniform in a marked car. The main purposes of the uniformed officer are stopping suspicious cars for the plain clothes units, and generally providing a uniformed presence during field interrogations and arrests.

The New Haven model of directed patrol, in which regular patrol units are given directed assignments during their free patrol time, is practiced in Pontiac, but under a different name. The directed assignments are called D-runs, or crime deterrent runs, and the whole strategy itself is referred to by the D-run label. In the rest of this section Pontiac's plain clothes

directed patrol strategy will be discussed, and in the next section the uniformed D-run strategy will be discussed.

Although the plain clothes directed patrol strategy is expected to have some indirect and secondary crime suppression impact, it is primarily oriented towards apprehensions, and particularly to on-scene apprehensions. As noted in the last section, for the Department total on-scene arrests, and the portion of reported crimes for which on-scene arrests were made, have generally declined over the last three years for the target offenses. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare directed patrol arrests made during ICAP with directed patrol arrests during previous years, due to a change in record keeping procedures. It should be noted, though, that directed patrol under ICAP and PEP was a continuation of a strategy already in use prior to the grant projects, with the effects of the projects being to add personnel to the unit.

During the ICAP project year, directed patrol personnel made 211 arrests. Some information about those arrests is summarized below.

Arrest Location

118 (55.9%) in the section assigned by crime analysis  
40 (19.0%) in sections adjacent to assigned section  
53 (25.1%) in other sections

Arrest Relatedness

16 ( 7.6%) directly related to crime analysis assignment  
76 (36.0%) generally related to crime analysis assignment  
119 (56.4%) unrelated to crime analysis assignment

Arrest Offense

12 ( 5.7%) crimes against persons  
77 (36.5%) crimes against property  
122 (57.8%) crimes against public order (includes weapon  
possession, traffic arrests, drug arrests, etc.)

The figures indicating that the directed patrol unit made three-quarters of their arrests in assigned or adjacent sections is strong evidence that they



followed the advice of the crime analysis unit. The directed patrol and crime analysis units were observed to have a close working relationship, with free exchange of information and mutual confidence. The one-quarter of arrests made in other sections are partially accounted for by the movement of subjects being surveilled, by officers following up on information obtained in assigned sections, and by officers leaving their assignments to answer emergency and back-up calls. In addition, several arrests were made by directed patrol officers while driving to and from their assigned areas, and several arrests were made at restaurants by officers on their meal breaks.

The fact that less than eight percent of directed patrol arrests were directly related to crime analysis assignments may or may not reflect a weakness in the strategy as implemented. A directly related arrest was defined as an arrest made in the assigned section for the criminal offense being targeted by the assignment. A generally related arrest was one made for an offense similar to that targeted, or as the result of checking out a suspicious person acting in accordance with the targeted crime. The frequency of generally related arrests reflects the common occurrence in which, for example, an officer on a burglary assignment stops someone lurking around closed stores, and finds that the person is wanted for failing to appear in court on an assault charge, or a traffic charge. Many police officers will argue that the resulting arrest, though not for burglary, is related to the assignment, and that the subject arrested may have intended to burglarize a store, in which case the crime was at least temporarily averted. These kinds of arrests are very frequent. Another typical example occurs when officers stop a car that has been driven suspiciously through an area several times, and find that the driver is not properly licensed. The resulting arrest is for a traffic offense, but the reason for the inquiry was assignment related.

Beyond these generally related arrests, however, it remains that over half of the arrests made by the directed patrol unit during the ICAP year were unrelated to crime analysis assignments. Whether this situation constitutes a problem depends on the goals and objectives of the unit, which are not clear. To some extent, officers on patrol in plain clothes cannot be faulted for observing instances of intoxicated driving, reckless driving, disorderly conduct, or public consumption of illegal drugs, and taking enforcement action. It may well be a distinct achievement that 43.6% of the unit's arrests were directly or generally related to crime analysis assignments.

Most of the directed patrol assignments concerned the target crimes of burglary, larceny, and auto theft. The figures noted above indicate that 36.5% of directed patrol arrests were for property offenses, which although a larger category includes the target crimes. Figures for a comparable period for the entire Pontiac Police Department indicate that 15.6% of arrests were for property crimes. The property crime portion of arrests was therefore more than twice as large for the directed patrol unit as for the Department as a whole. This would seem to indicate that the combination of assignment to areas identified by crime analysis and plain clothes saturation patrol resulted in a higher portion of arrests for target offenses than would have occurred through the use of normal patrol and investigative tactics.

Ideally, the evaluation of the directed patrol strategy should involve a comparison of its arrest effectiveness with that of other alternative strategies. Done correctly, this kind of comparison would entail a careful and detailed analysis of a large sample of arrests, in order to uncover the true contributions of officer behaviors and tactics to arrests. This kind of

sophisticated analysis was planned for the ICAP evaluation, but for technical, time, and cost reasons was not conducted.

In lieu of a detailed analysis, a somewhat superficial and tentative comparison is offered, with a strong disclaimer that it is only exploratory and suggestive of the utility of a more complete study. The 211 directed patrol arrests were the result of 17,831 man hours of activity, which yields a figure of .012 arrests per man hour for directed patrol. This productivity figure is low compared to similarly computed estimates for other units/strategies: two separate estimates of .026 and .021 for D-runs; .023 for property crime investigators; and .028 for the entire Department. These figures suggest (and only suggest) the possibility that directed patrol is less productive than other strategies in terms of total arrests. A similar computation procedure yields a property crime arrest per man hour figure of .004 for directed patrol, which compares with estimates of .007 for D-runs and .004 for the entire Department. Since the entire Department figure includes investigators whose arrests are almost all for property crimes, these figures suggest that directed patrol may be somewhat more productive than regular, traditional patrol in terms of numbers of property crime arrests.

These figures and comparisons must be viewed very skeptically until a much more careful study is conducted. The raw numbers of arrests cannot be accepted with confidence, because in some cases they may reflect charges placed, in other cases people detained, and in general their reliability is low. The attribution of arrests to different units introduces inaccuracies as well. Detectives may be listed as arresting officers when their only function was to secure a warrant the morning after a patrol arrest, and officers responding as back-ups may be given equal arrest credit to that given officers whose tactics uncovered the offense originally. Also, some units

have arrests as their sole objectives, whereas other units or strategies may also aim to prevent crime, provide services, or enforce traffic laws. For these important reasons the preliminary comparisons presented above should not be regarded as verified evidence of the superiority or inferiority of any particular strategy.

What can be concluded? The directed patrol unit deployed its resources in accordance with the recommendations and assignments developed by the crime analysis unit, and made most of its arrests in or adjacent to assigned areas. The vast majority of arrests made by the unit were unrelated or only generally related to crime analysis assignments - whether this constitutes a problem is a matter of judgment left to the Department. The portion of arrests that were made for property offenses was more than twice as high for directed patrol than for the Department as a whole, and this suggests that in one sense the strategy was effective. Compared in a very superficial way to other units and strategies, however, directed patrol appears less effective in obtaining arrests per man hour. The resolution of some of these uncertainties is possible through more careful analysis, but others depend on judgments about the appropriateness of certain activities and the objectives of strategies and units. These latter judgments must be left to the Department.

D-Runs As noted in the previous section, the strategy known as directed patrol in New Haven and other cities is used in Pontiac and referred to as D-runs. These D-runs are assignments, based on crime analysis, that are given to regular uniformed patrol units to perform during their uncommitted patrol time. The primary contribution of the ICAP grant to the D-runs was in the form of the four cadets, who assisted in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of the information on which the D-runs were based.

The D-run strategy was initiated in Pontiac during the PEP project that preceded ICAP. During the PEP project and the first four months of ICAP, the D-runs were designed by the crime analysis unit. The runs were produced at the rate of one per hour, around the clock, and given to the dispatcher, who made the assignment to an available patrol unit. In general, the runs consisted of a location and a type of crime for which to be on the lookout. Information was not generally provided concerning the specifics of the crimes being committed in the target areas, the tactics to be used during the D-run, or the length of time to devote to the run. Also, the officers performing the runs were not required to report on the activities performed or observations made. Also, the priority to be given to the D-runs, as compared with other types of details and calls, was not clear, and as a result there was confusion and variation among the dispatchers in their practice of assigning the runs.

Early in the ICAP project the shortcomings of the D-run process were recognized by the Department, and in February a new system was instituted. In this system, the crime analysis unit continues to collect and analyze information to be used in the design of D-runs, but run design itself is the responsibility of operational patrol personnel. Once each week a supervisor and a patrolman from each platoon meet with personnel from the crime analysis unit. The patrol personnel are given data on the crime problems occurring during their shifts, and they design D-runs to respond to the problems. The new D-runs specify target area and target crimes, the time period for run execution, minimum run duration, and the tactics to be used, as well as providing information on the target crimes such as methods of operation, suspects, and suspect vehicles. Also, officers are required to file reports on the completion of their D-runs, describing actions taken, time expended, and observations made.

In the new D-run system, assignment of the runs can be made by either the dispatcher or a platoon supervisor. In either event, the runs are officially given high priority, and officers are expected to expend at least the minimum recommended time.

The implementation of the new system was relatively smooth. Few conflicts between patrol and crime analysis personnel occurred; the responsibility for run design was left with patrol and their efforts were unchallenged except in a very few instances of blatant disregard of clear crime patterns. The quality of information reported by the officers performing the D-runs has gradually improved since the inception of the new system. The crime analysis unit takes these reports very seriously, and they have become a useful source of crime- and intelligence-related information. Also, the crime analysis unit ensures that reports about security problems in the community are forwarded to the crime prevention unit, and the officers filing the reports are advised that subsequent action is being taken.

Under the former D-run system, it was impossible to know if the runs were actually being performed, the runs did not seem to have high official priority, and the runs had very little credibility among the patrol officers who were expected to perform them. The new system clarified the priority of the runs, established reports to assess implementation, and sought to improve the credibility of the runs by involving patrol personnel in their creation. Two questions in the patrol survey elicited information from patrol officers concerning the perceived value of the new system, and the responses are noted below.

The new D-run system, as compared with the former practice of giving D-runs over the radio, is an improvement.  
(0 = strongly disagree to 100 = strongly agree)

55.4

Having platoon sergeants and patrol officers devise the D-runs is an improvement over the former D-run system. (0 = strongly disagree to 100 = strongly agree) 63.5

These two responses indicate a fairly strong feeling among patrol officers that the new D-run system is an improvement over the former system. Two survey questions asked twice each, however, clearly indicate that patrol officers in Pontiac are less than enthusiastic about the usefulness of D-runs with respect to both crime prevention and apprehensions. These two questions and mean responses are presented below.

D-runs, based upon crime trend analysis by the Planning & Analysis Unit, are an effective crime prevention strategy. (0 = strongly disagree to 100 = strongly agree) 1977 - 45.2  
1978 - 46.0

D-runs are more likely to produce on-scene arrests for property offenses than are traditional routine patrol practices. (0 = strongly disagree to 100 = strongly agree) 1977 - 41.7  
1978 - 35.9

As the responses to these two questions indicate, patrol officers feel that the D-run strategy is more effective in preventing crimes than in leading to on-scene arrests. From PEP to ICAP, and from the former to the new system, patrol officers' evaluations of the crime prevention effectiveness of the D-runs did not change appreciably, but their assessment of the on-scene arrest effectiveness of D-runs declined. And as noted above, the patrol officers do not attribute a great deal of either kind of effectiveness to the strategy.

The reports generated under the new D-run system make it possible to describe the implementation of the runs, at least since February, 1978. A sample of the runs was carefully examined for the ICAP evaluation. The sample consisted of all the D-runs for one sample week from each of the eight ICAP months during which the new system was in operation; in other words, all the

D-runs for eight sample weeks were examined.

During the sample weeks, 889 runs were recommended for implementation, or an average of about 16 per day. This daily run recommendation figure is about one-third lower than the average of one run per hour during the former D-run system. Of the recommended runs, 682, or 76.7%, were actually performed. It is not possible to compare this rate of performance with that under the former system, as reporting had not yet been initiated.

The average recommended minimum run duration during the sample weeks was 28 minutes, and the average time actually spent performing the runs was 38 minutes. This figure of over a half an hour spent per D-run is evidence that substantial patrol time was made available for the runs (approximately ten hours per day). Another measure of organizational commitment to the strategy is evidenced by the fact that during the sample weeks units were pulled off their D-run assignments to handle other matters in only 23 instances, representing 2.6% of the runs. Again comparison with the former system is not possible, except that it seems clear from conversations with patrol personnel that the time spent per run during the old D-run system was much less than under the new system.

During the sample weeks 65% of the D-runs were targeted exclusively at burglaries, while most of the rest were aimed at robberies, larcenies from autos, larcenies of autos, or combinations of these target crimes. For about three-quarters of the runs at least some suspect information was provided, and for most of these at least some of the suspects listed were named. No suspect vehicle information was provided for three-quarters of the D-runs, while description and license tag number was provided for 10% of the runs. No method of operation (MO) information was provided for 16% of the runs, and in most instances when it was provided the information was only general in nature.



The tactics recommended for use during the D-runs were frequently combinations: field interrogations of suspicious people were recommended for 80% of the runs; stopping suspicious vehicles was recommended in 55% of the cases; just driving through an area was the recommendation in about 18% of the cases; and for 6% of the runs checking property was recommended.

With respect to the implementation of the D-run strategy in Pontiac during the ICAP project, the following conclusions seem well-founded based on observations, interviews, and the data just discussed. The D-runs were much more fully implemented during the ICAP project than they had been during PEP. The time allocated for the runs was more substantial, and patrol officer performance of the runs was more complete. The runs as provided to the patrol officers contained much more information than they had previously, and the patrol officers regarded the new system as an improvement.

In terms of an evaluation of the new D-run process, the primary weakness is the routinization of the recommended tactics and crime information provided. For at least some of the platoons, all runs came to bear the same recommended tactics - "FI suspicious people, stop and check suspicious vehicles," and so on. The litany was so all-encompassing that it might just as well have read "do police work." Recommendations to talk to neighborhood residents, attempt to locate crime witnesses, attempt to develop sources of information, record information on vehicles in the area, and provide crime prevention suggestions were infrequent, especially for some platoons. To the extent that tactics recommendations become routinized they would seem to lose their crime-specific quality and reflect less intensive crime analysis, as well as decrease the credibility of the runs in the eyes of patrol officers.

In a similar fashion, the quality of the crime information provided with the runs is extremely important. For many of the D-runs a list of from five

to ten suspects, complete with descriptions and addresses, was provided. The listing of so many suspects may well be counterproductive, as the patrol officer is given the impression that the so-called suspects are really only people who could possibly have been involved in the crimes. On the other hand, MO information provided with the runs was rarely as specific as would be desirable from the standpoint of the patrol officer. Specific information concerning points of entry, methods of entry, types of buildings attacked, points of exit, and types of property taken would seem to be very valuable to the patrol officer on a burglary D-run, for example. But the MO information provided was not usually so detailed or complete.

As a result of the reporting procedure instituted as part of the new D-run system, it is possible to assess some of the immediate outputs, or products, of the runs. A summary of the reported outputs of the 682 runs actually performed during the eight sample weeks is presented in Table 5. As can be seen, the most numerous outputs were public relations contacts, followed by field interrogations and traffic tickets. A total of nine arrests were made during the sample D-runs, for an average of one arrest per 76 runs. In two cases two arrests were made during one run, so that the number of D-runs resulting in arrests was actually seven. Of these seven arrest instances, one concerned burglary, two concerned outstanding warrants, and four concerned public order offenses. Six of the seven arrest instances were officer-initiated, while one (the burglary) resulted from the D-run officer responding to an in-progress call in the D-run target area. Using the categories described in the previous section on directed patrol, four of the arrest instances were generally related to the run assignment, and three were unrelated to run assignment. Thus no D-run arrests directly related to crime analysis assignment were made during the sample weeks, and in fact instances

Table 5. Direct Outputs of D-Runs Performed During Eight Sample ICAP Weeks  
(Number of D-Runs = 682)

	N	N per Run
Field Interrogations	89	.13
Vehicles Stopped	21	.03
Vehicles Checked	23	.03
Open Premises Found	20	.03
New Information Developed	19	.03
Traffic Tickets Issued	41	.06
Arrests	9	.01
Crimes Discovered*	4	.01
Public Relations Contacts	111	.16

\* excludes those for which arrests were made or  
tickets were issued

of these have generally been very infrequent.

As reported in the last section, the overall arrest productivity of the D-runs, per time expended, seems to be higher than for the Department as a whole. It must again be emphasized that these productivity figures are based on inadequate data and analysis, and therefore must be regarded very suspiciously. Nevertheless, the D-runs do not seem to be as poor a strategy vis-a-vis arrests as the patrol officers seem to believe.

It seems clear that in several respects the new D-run system is an improvement over the former system, even in the eyes of the patrol officers. These officers still regard the strategy as less effective than traditional

routine patrol, however. To what extent their analysis is correct, and to what extent their opinions merely reflect the fact that under the D-run strategy their patrol time is less discretionary, is not completely known. A detailed analysis comparing the productivity, along several dimensions (arrests, crime prevention, officer motivation, citizen feelings of security), of D-runs, directed patrol, traditional patrol, and other strategies would have to be performed in order to completely settle the issue, at least for a time. Such an analysis has not been performed anywhere, and would be a tremendous undertaking, probably requiring an experimental design.

For the present, though, this evaluation of directed patrol and D-runs in Pontiac has produced evidence that suggests that these strategies, based as they are on crime analysis, produce arrests differently than traditional practices. Over twice as many of directed patrol's arrests were for target property offenses as would have been expected based on all Departmental arrests, and the arrest productivity of D-runs may be higher than routine patrol practices. The common denominator of these two strategies is their basis on crime analysis, which serves to direct officers to crime-prone areas and provides them with information on the crimes and on tactics. Some means by which the crime analysis information provided might be improved in quality have been suggested in this section, and the data indicate that the overall arrest productivity of directed patrol is not high. Nevertheless, the overall evaluation findings favor the retention of these two strategies.

#### Improving Overall Operations

In its ICAP grant application, the Pontiac Police Department identified as one of its objectives the improvement and expansion of overall operational strategic planning, and as one of its goals the coordination of the

investigative and patrol functions in order to improve career criminal identification and apprehension. In order to achieve these ends, an increase in the exchange of information between patrol and investigative personnel was deemed necessary. The primary method for achieving this was to be the maintenance of a system in which detectives regularly attended patrol roll-call sessions, with the express purpose of disseminating and soliciting crime-related information.

During the ICAP project attendance by detectives at patrol roll-calls decreased substantially from the levels maintained during the PEP project. During PEP the procedure was for detectives, on a rotating basis, to attend all four patrol roll-calls Monday through Friday, for a total of twenty per week. The PEP evaluation estimated that for the duration of that project the average weekly attendance was less than the specified twenty roll-calls, but somewhat more than half the objective. Toward the end of PEP a procedure was instituted whereby the Planning & Analysis cadets, who routinely attended all patrol roll-calls, disseminated some information for the detectives. The PEP evaluation found that this cadet activity was useful, but that it could not serve all of the purposes intended for detective attendance at roll-calls. Information disseminated by the cadets did not possess the same credibility as that information had when it came from a detective's lips. Also, patrol officers could not question the cadets about the validity and implications of the information in the same way that they could engage in such a discussion with a detective. In addition, the solicitation of information from the patrol officers could not proceed as effectively when conducted by the cadets as when the detective was actually present. In general, because the cadets are young, inexperienced, and non-operational, they are not as effective a vehicle for the interchange of information between patrol and investigations as are the

detectives themselves.

During ICAP detective attendance at roll-calls decreased to less than ten per week. Exact figures are not available, but it seems clear that as the project progressed detective attendance at roll-calls became less and less frequent. As had begun during the PEP project, cadet dissemination of crime and suspect information at all patrol roll-calls continued, and as noted just above, this activity partially compensates for the absence of detectives. But also as noted, the kind of interchange of information envisioned for the project could not be effected solely by the cadets.

Another method used by the Pontiac Police Department to enhance information sharing is regular apprehension-oriented meetings of operational and support personnel. These meetings, held twice weekly, include patrol, investigative (regular detectives, juvenile, vice, surveillance), and crime analysis personnel. During the meetings recent crimes are reviewed, suspects and possible suspects are discussed, and operational strategies and tactics are considered. The patrol personnel attending the meetings ordinarily use the information gained in devising their directed patrol and D-run activities for the upcoming days.

The evaluator and the meeting participants are in general agreement that the meetings are very useful, although some problems surfaced during the ICAP project year. For a period of several months it became standard practice for some of the attendants, as their contributions to the meetings, to merely read aloud from the crime recap sheets passed out to everyone. This practice added nothing new, and was regarded by many participants as a waste of their valuable time. The attendance of some other key participants was less than regular, and this also detracted from the perceived value of the meetings. In addition, conflict developed over control of the meetings and the proper roles

of some participants. Each of these problems served as an impediment to the achievement of the objective of the meetings, which was information sharing.

To some extent these problems have been or are being ameliorated. The chief and his top commanders have expressed their concern that the meetings were degenerating; this expression itself served to improve attendance and participation. The top commanders have also begun to attend some of the meetings. This has tended to deter the practice of merely reading from the recap sheets, and also reinforces the official importance placed on the sharing of information. This latter effect is extremely important. In any police department, the natural tendency of patrol officers and detectives is to jealously guard their information, so that they themselves can make the arrests that win favor in the organization. The Pontiac Police Department wants to alter that natural tendency, but it will not happen just by hoping for it. The establishment of structures such as the apprehension-oriented meetings, and detective attendance at roll-calls, can facilitate information sharing, but they are not enough. Department officials have to demonstrate that they value the sharing of information, and that the way to win favor and get ahead is through the sharing, and not the hoarding, of information. This message has not been forcefully communicated by the Department to its employees.

In order to assess their perception of information sharing, patrol officers were asked as part of the evaluation survey about their relations with detectives during ICAP. The question and mean response are cited below.

During the last year, interchange of  
information between patrol and  
investigative personnel has increased. 43.7  
(0 = strongly disagree to 100 =  
strongly agree)

Thus, as far as patrol officers are concerned, the interchange of information between patrol and detectives has moderately deteriorated during the ICAP

project.

A somewhat related question was included in each of the surveys of patrol officers conducted over the past three years in Pontiac. The question pertained to the efficacy of appraising officer performance on the basis of arrests and tickets; the responses might be interpreted as an indication of the feasibility of appraising officers instead on their willingness to share information, making the matter of who made the arrests less salient. The question and the mean responses by year are presented below. It seems fairly

An officer's efficiency record should	
take into account the number of arrests	1976 - 39.7
he makes or the tickets he issues.	1977 - 48.1
(0 = strongly disagree to 100 =	1978 - 36.9
strongly agree)	

clear that the patrol officers are not wedded to a system that equates worth with arrest and ticket productivity. Given clear direction and sufficient incentive, it seems possible that officers would be willing to more freely share crime-related information.

Police work, and particularly apprehension-oriented work, is wholly based on information. Within the police organization, a good deal of crime-related information is located in official documents and files, but a great deal more is lodged inside police officers' heads. In Pontiac, detective attendance at roll-calls and apprehension-oriented meetings were instituted in an effort to increase the sharing of this information, and to some extent they were successful. Instances in which one officer's knowledge supplemented another's to the degree that new suspects were identified, locations of known suspects were realized, and patterns of criminal activity were suddenly "seen" were observed by the evaluator. As noted earlier in this section, the implementation of these two structural approaches to information sharing was not complete, and problems were encountered. Certainly, there are finite



limits on the kinds of information that can or should be shared, the extent to which all the information known to a police organization and its members can be managed, and the results that can be obtained through the sharing of apprehension-oriented crime-related information. But the implementation problems and the practical limits should not be seen as reasons for decreasing information sharing efforts. The benefits potentially to be gained, and the apparent feasibility of the efforts, strongly suggest that information sharing should remain a high priority of the Pontiac Police Department.

The primary objective of the information sharing between patrol and investigative units, according to the ICAP grant application, was increased identification and apprehension of career criminals. Career criminality is not defined in the application, nor has an operational definition been developed for general use by the Department. The information sharing activities described above were not specifically focused on repeat or career offenders, but rather on apprehensions for certain crimes (mostly robberies, burglaries, and auto thefts) regardless of suspect identity. The crime analysis unit did begin to collect and analyze some suspect information during the ICAP project year, for the purpose of identifying repeat offenders, but the collection and use of this information was not widespread. As noted earlier, some conflict developed concerning the legality of collecting and disseminating certain kinds of suspect information, and the conflict probably also reflected some difference of opinion regarding what unit should properly perform the activity. The considerations pertaining to information sharing in general certainly were operating in the midst of this conflict. Overall, then, little activity was undertaken as part of the ICAP project to increase the identification and apprehension of career criminals.

In Table 6, some data is presented concerning the career criminal

Table 6. Repeat Offender Composition of Sample Arrests for Target Offenses During Pre-Projects, PEP, and ICAP Years.

	10/75-9/76 Pre-Projects	10/76-9/77 PEP	10/77-9/78 ICAP
<u>Burglary Arrests</u> (Total N=100)			
% with no prior convictions	34.2%	29.2%	50.0%
% with prior misdemeanors	21.1%	14.6%	14.3%
% with prior felonies	44.7%	56.2%	35.7%
% with prior incarceration	34.2%	25.0%	28.6%
Average # of prior felonies	1.1	1.2	1.1
<u>Larceny Arrests</u> (Total N=74)			
% with no prior convictions	66.7%	66.7%	55.2%
% with prior misdemeanors	14.3%	25.0%	10.3%
% with prior felonies	19.0%	8.3%	34.5%
% with prior incarceration	19.0%	0.0%	24.1%
Average # of prior felonies	.38	.12	.62
<u>Auto Theft Arrests</u> (Total N=52)			
% with no prior convictions	22.7%	30.4%	42.8%
% with prior misdemeanors	27.3%	26.1%	14.3%
% with prior felonies	50.0%	43.5%	42.8%
% with prior incarceration	31.8%	26.1%	14.3%
Average # of prior felonies	1.0	1.2	.43

composition of a sample of target offense arrests made during pre-projects, PEP, and ICAP years. The figures are not very clear or conclusive. In general, it seems that the composition of burglary arrests has changed relatively little over the three year period, while persons arrested for larceny are increasingly repeat offenders with previous incarcerations, and persons arrested for auto theft are increasingly new offenders less likely to

have been incarcerated previously. It should be noted that some of the offense by year samples were not very large, so that relatively large fluctuations could be attributable to sampling error.

It should also be kept in mind that, as previously discussed, very little project activity was undertaken specifically directed at career criminals. As a result, fluctuations in the composition of arrests over the years in question cannot be used as evidence of successful achievement of project goals and objectives.

#### Increased Patrol Officer Job Satisfaction

One of the expected benefits of the project mentioned in Pontiac's grant application was increased patrol officer job satisfaction. Presumably this improvement was expected due to the patrol emphasis inherent in the ICAP project. This patrol emphasis included increased roles in preliminary investigations, crime prevention, and strategic planning. As discussed earlier in this section, however, the role of patrol officers did not actually change very substantially with respect to preliminary investigations and crime prevention as the project was implemented. Also, as noted before, patrol officers reported that information interchange with detectives had not increased during the project year, and their assessment of the effectiveness of the D-run strategy was rather low. The D-runs were the aspect of the ICAP project that most directly influenced the daily activities of patrol officers, and the effect of these runs was to decrease the amount of free patrol time available to the officers. This job freedom limiting consequence of the D-runs would seem more likely to result in decreased patrol officer job satisfaction than in an increase.

Three job satisfaction questions asked as parts of the three patrol

Table 7. Job Satisfaction Questions and Mean Responses From Three Patrol Surveys.

	<u>Averages (0-100 Scale)</u>		
	1976	1977	1978
Are you satisfied with your career as a police officer? (0 = not at all to 100 = very much)	81.3	81.6	68.2
Are you satisfied with your current assignment? (0 = not at all to 100 = very much)	75.4	74.4	66.9
In the last month, how satisfied were you compared to a year ago with your opportunity to do interesting and rewarding work? (0 = much less satisfied to 100 = much more satisfied)	62.0	62.9	46.3

surveys, along with mean responses, are presented in Table 7. Clearly, the value associated with each measure declined during the ICAP project year, after having remained relatively unchanged from the pre-projects to PEP years. Since the ICAP and PEP projects were so similar, it does not seem likely that the decreases in job satisfaction among patrol officers can be attributed in any substantial way to the projects. It seems most likely that the decreases during the ICAP year reflect the city's fiscal crisis, which necessitated lay-offs of patrol officers and contributed to a feeling of job insecurity among many officers. In addition to the lack of job security, many patrol officers now feel overworked and endangered due to the lay-offs, and these feelings are the most likely causes of the reported decrease in job satisfaction. Whatever the cause, however, it cannot be said that the ICAP objective of increased patrol officer job satisfaction was achieved.

### CHAPTER III: Impact Evaluation

In its ICAP grant application the Pontiac Police Department stated that as a result of the project suppressible crimes would be reduced and citizen feelings of security would be increased. The reduction in crime was expected due to increased crime prevention activity, increasingly directed patrol activity, and the deterrent effect of increased criminal apprehensions. These same project activities were also expected to contribute to the impact on citizen feelings of security.

It was noted in the last chapter that some of the intermediate objectives expected to contribute to impact goals were not achieved. In particular, overall arrests and on-scene arrests for the targeted suppressible crimes decreased during the ICAP project year, and the anticipated increased roles for patrol in preliminary investigations and crime prevention were not implemented. Due to the continuation of directed patrol and the new D-run system, though, it probably is accurate to say that patrol activity during ICAP was more directed, and more closely based on crime analysis, than during previous years.

Chapter I was concluded with a brief discussion of the inappropriateness of high expectations for an impact evaluation of a project such as this one, and some of those comments must be reiterated here. First, as has been shown, the implementation of this project was incomplete, so that the achievement of impact goals would not be expected based on the theory behind the project. More importantly, other factors in the social setting (patrol officer job satisfaction, city finances, demographic factors, general economics) may have

Table 8. Reported Target and Other Part I Offenses for Pre-Projects, PEP, and ICAP Years.

	<u>Changes</u>				
	10/75-9/76 Pre-Projects	10/76-9/77 PEP	10/77-9/78 ICAP	Pre/ ICAP	PEP/ ICAP
Burglary	2598	2447	2539	- 2.3%	+ 3.8%
Larceny	4292	3923	3512	-16.3%	- 8.4%
Auto Theft	560	551	664	+18.6%	+20.5%
<u>Total Target</u>	7450	6921	6795	- 8.8%	- 1.8%
Murder	14	18	19	+35.7%	+ 5.5%
Forcible Rape	56	59	89	+58.9%	+50.8%
Aggravated Assault	848	889	952	+12.3%	+ 7.0%
Robbery	533	423	518	- 2.8%	+22.4%
<u>Total Part I</u>	8901	8310	8373	- 5.9%	+ 0.8%

changed and had some effect on crime rates and feelings of security. The evaluator simply does not feel competent to attribute increases or decreases in crime to police activities in general, or to ICAP project activities.

Table 8 contains a summary of reported crimes in Pontiac during the pre-projects, PEP, and ICAP years. There was an overall decrease in target and Part I crimes from the pre-projects to ICAP year, while from the PEP to ICAP year the total figures change very little. The largest single offense category is that of larceny, and it decreased substantially over both periods. If larceny was excluded from the comparisons, the totals from pre-projects to ICAP would show a modest increase, while from PEP to ICAP they would increase rather substantially. In Figure 6 monthly totals for the combined target



# Number of Reported Burglaries, Larcenies, and Auto Thefts, By Month

Figure 6






Table 9. 1973-1977 Reported Part I Offense Comparison With Neighboring Communities.

	Part I Offenses		% Change 1973-1977
	1973	1977	
Pontiac	8864	8477	- 4.4%
Oakland County*	4610	5835	+26.5%
Waterford Township*	4481	4533	+ 1.2%
Bloomfield Township*	1342	1388	+ 3.4%
Pontiac Township*	629	841	+33.7%
West Bloomfield Township	1046	1168	+11.7%
Troy	2853	3004	+ 5.3%

\* these communities border on the City of Pontiac

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offenses are displayed, along with annual averages. As can be seen, there is considerable monthly variation, as well as something of a regular pattern.

In Table 9 some comparisons are made between Pontiac and neighboring communities in terms of the change in Part I offenses from 1973 to 1977. These figures do not pertain to the ICAP project year, but they do show a long-range decrease in Part I offenses in Pontiac while the same offenses increased in the neighboring areas. These figures might suggest some displacement effect, although it is probably also true that these neighboring communities have grown in population during the five-year period.

An analysis of the effect of ICAP on citizen feelings of security is not possible as community surveying was not conducted as part of the evaluation, and also because citizen feelings of security are influenced by a great many

factors, only one of which is police activity, and only part of that could be attributed to this project. The City of Pontiac did conduct a citizen survey in December, 1977 (the third month of the ICAP project), and some of the findings may be worth noting. When asked to rate the seriousness of a number of possible citywide problems, drug addiction, teenage crime, and crime were most frequently characterized as very severe problems. When asked to rate the problems confronting their own neighborhoods, however, loose dogs, places for children to play, and traffic were the most oft-cited serious problems. When asked about how safe they felt walking in their own neighborhoods, 92.5% said they felt at least reasonably safe in the daylight, while 67.4% felt at least reasonably safe walking at night. When asked if there were some parts of Pontiac in which they would not feel safe, 81.8% said that there were. With respect to crimes committed against members of the households of survey respondents, one-quarter had not been reported to the police, for a wide variety of reasons. With respect to contacts between Pontiac police and members of respondents' households, 69.5% of respondents rated the general treatment by the police as good, 15.1% as fair, and 13.8% as poor. Finally, when respondents were asked to rank order a number of possible city problems in terms of how they would spend tax dollars, protecting persons and property was the clear first choice.

## CHAPTER IV: Project Planning and Management

In this chapter the planning and management of Pontiac's ICAP project will be briefly discussed. These comments will be entirely more subjective than those found in the previous two chapters, and should be recognized as such. Nevertheless, project planning and management are certainly important factors in project success, and particularly in project implementation. For this reason, the following observations are presented.

### Project Planning

Pontiac's ICAP project was largely a continuation of its PEP project. The planning for the PEP project had largely been done by the command staff of the Department, without significant participation by other members of the organization. The subsequent implementation of the project was not well prepared for, in the sense that new project components were put into effect without previous training or much other preparation.

Planning for the ICAP project was similarly conducted, but inasmuch as most project components were simply continuations of PEP activities, planning for the ICAP project amounted to little more than writing the continuation grant application. Still, the ICAP application called for an increased patrol role in preliminary investigations and crime prevention, a clear support role for the crime prevention officer, and other changes from PEP and traditional practices. These changes apparently were not arrived at after lengthy discussions involving a wide spectrum of interested parties, but rather were conceived by a small group of agency planners and commanders. Further, the

changes called for in the grant application were not, in at least some instances, clearly communicated to the people expected to carry them out. This seems to have been particularly the case with the crime prevention officer, who assumed the role of direct delivery of crime prevention services, while the grant application specified a patrol support and strategic planning role.

A second weakness in ICAP project planning was the failure to clearly define project goals and objectives. Goals such as improving and expanding the crime analysis function simply do not convey very much information about what the Department actually wants to achieve. Is more information to be collected, or different analyses conducted with existing information? Are more reports to be issued, different kinds of reports to be issued, or less reports with more information to be issued? Or will crime analysis expansion be demonstrated through greater use of their products by detectives? In the project planning phase, the Department should carefully think through what it wants to achieve, and what it means by words such as improve, expand, and coordinate. The evaluator now realizes that one of his first activities should have been to require such clarification of project goals and objectives.

A related project planning problem is the failure to adequately specify how goals and objectives will be achieved. For example, Pontiac's ICAP project had as one goal the improvement of patrol preliminary investigations. Assuming that the problem of defining what the goal meant had been solved, a second problem arises in identifying how the improvement is to be achieved. The grant application says only that better use will be made of preliminary investigation procedures, and that patrol officers will have an early and continued involvement in preliminary crime investigations. From this it is not clear whether the role of patrol officers with respect to preliminary

investigations was to be expanded, or if patrol officers were simply going to perform their traditional role better. In either case, the means by which the change was to be effected were not specified. Some combination of role redefinition, revision of operating procedures, and training would seem to have been necessary, but the grant application was silent about these matters. This failure to provide the means by which goals and objectives are to be achieved contributes to project implementation and evaluation problems.

#### Project Management

Management responsibility for Pontiac's ICAP project was decentralized. A project coordinator had monitoring and coordination responsibilities, and reported directly to the chief of police, who served as project director. The primary management responsibilities for project components were delegated to the division commanders under whom the funded positions were organizationally assigned.

One general management weakness of Pontiac's ICAP project was a deficiency in direction. This is most clearly evident with the crime prevention officer, as noted before. It is also true with respect to the D-runs, as each new D-run system begins with considerable confusion because of the failure to provide advance direction on new procedures and practices. The successful implementation of projects such as ICAP would seem to be dependent upon clear advance communication about changes to be made, and for the more substantial changes, training in new procedures and practices. This kind of advance management direction is not always provided in Pontiac.

The other side of management direction is control. Once direction has been provided, so that employees know what they are supposed to do, it becomes important for management to ensure that proper performance is

produced. In terms of Pontiac's ICAP project, control was also deficient, again as evidenced by the crime prevention officer, who apparently spent the entire grant period engaged in activities not consonant with those originally intended. The cessation of detective attendance at patrol roll-calls, or at least the substantial decrease in that activity, again was apparently allowed to take place in contravention of the grant application. In general it seems that the delegation of project management responsibility resulted in giving management control to individuals who in some cases either lacked commitment to or understanding of the project and its objectives. As a result, to some extent the project operated apart from management control.

These comments will appear to be critical of certain managers in the Pontiac Police Department, and they are not meant to be unduly so. It should be recognized that police management is a very difficult business, and that hindsight provides observations not obvious at earlier moments. More specifically, the Pontiac Police Department was beset by a number of crises during the project year, including layoffs and alleged scandal, that clamored for the attention and energy of the agency's managers. It would be accurate to characterize the administration of the Department during the year as literally crisis management. The time of the chief of police was largely consumed with external relations, leaving him little time to provide direction, control, and leadership for the Department. None of the other managers in the Department had responsibility for the entire ICAP project, so that the deficiencies in planning, direction, and control are not hard to understand. To the degree that these comments are critical, they are meant to be constructive; as with the rest of this evaluation, it is hoped that these comments can be used in the future to avoid old pitfalls, design more effective programs, and generally inform the project planning and management process.

## CHAPTER V: Project Congruence With the ICAP Model

The purpose of this chapter is to compare Pontiac's ICAP project with the general ICAP model promulgated by LEAA and its technical assistance advisors. In Chapter II the process evaluation compared Pontiac's project as implemented against the goals, objectives, and intentions of the project as presented in the original grant application. These two comparisons may not be identical because the LEAA ICAP program is very broad and diverse, with numerous and varied components. Any single ICAP project, such as Pontiac's, might well include only a portion of the many components of the general ICAP program. Some departments might not include certain ICAP components in their projects for the simple reason that the ICAP activities concerned are already routinely performed, for example.

It should be recognized that the comparisons discussed in this chapter are based on the evaluator's understanding of the general ICAP model. This understanding, though informed, is more general than detailed, and should not be taken to represent the official policy of LEAA.

### Management Decision Model

LEAA considers the ICAP concept to be a systematic approach to police service delivery, with an emphasis on planning and operational integration. Planning for and managing police service delivery systems are seen to be wholly dependent on information for effective problem solving and decision making. This emphasis on information is reflected in the formal ICAP model, in which the activities of data collection, analysis, planning, and service

delivery are arranged in linear succession, with the final stage connected back to the first by a feedback loop.

The data collection phase of ICAP is important because succeeding activities make use of the information collected. Obviously, analysis and planning are dependent for success on the timely availability of good data. The information, or data, referred to in ICAP is primarily operational, as opposed to administrative, reflecting the service delivery focus of the model.

The data to be used in ICAP analysis and planning comes mainly from reports regularly filed by police operational personnel. These include both reports describing crimes and incidents and reports of officer activity, or time utilization. These reports are ordinarily received and stored in a records unit, and are retrievable in various ways. Also, the reports may be edited and reviewed for accuracy, completeness, and general quality before final storage.

Prior to ICAP the Pontiac Police Department had in operation a reporting and records system, which remained unchanged during the PEP and ICAP projects. The reporting forms themselves are not considered deficient, and the system of storing and retrieving the reports is believed to be satisfactory. Somewhat questioned, however, is the quality of the information provided by the reports, particularly those crime reports filed by patrol officers. Important pieces of information are frequently missing from the crime reports. It is unclear whether the information was collected but not reported, sought but not available, or not sought, in such cases. The consequence is that certain types of analyses and operations are hampered.

This information quality problem suggests weaknesses both in preliminary investigations and in report review. Pontiac's ICAP project had as one objective the improvement of preliminary investigations, which presumably



would improve information collection, but the objective was not achieved. Pontiac's report review procedure gave full responsibility for the activity to the regular patrol supervisors. Whether because of a lack of incentive, a lack of time, or some other reason, these patrol supervisors generally failed to review the reports, merely signing off on them instead. So, during the ICAP project, and for some years before, reports by patrol officers were not reviewed in any meaningful sense. In terms of data collection quality, then, Pontiac fell short of the ICAP model.

The ICAP analysis phase refers to the review and manipulation of collected data conducted in order to turn the raw information into a form useful for planning and decision making. The three types of analysis involved in ICAP are crime analysis, intelligence analysis, and operations analysis.

For ICAP, crime analysis refers primarily to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information pertaining to crime trends and patterns. It is primarily interested in the spatial and temporal aspects of crimes. In Pontiac, crime analysis of this sort has been conducted for several years, and seems to conform completely to the ICAP model. The only weakness observed was with respect to the quality of temporal information concerning crimes; it is often difficult to specify when a crime actually occurred, as opposed to when it was reported, and this data quality problem is compounded on occasion by patrol officers who either fail to distinguish between the two times, or who fail to elicit information that would permit estimation of time of occurrence.

Intelligence analysis is also concerned with crimes, and focuses on the suspects and perpetrators of offenses. The activity involves the collection and collation of information on suspects and criminals, the provision of information on a case-by-case request basis, and in-depth studies of criminal relationships and activity. It is this kind of analysis in Pontiac that was

probably most severely hampered by the data quality problem. The activity itself was begun during the project year by the crime analysis unit, but never completely implemented. Conflict arose over legal problems with respect to the collection and dissemination of information concerning mere suspects, and the intelligence analysis operation never got completely underway.

Operations analysis in ICAP pertains primarily to the study of resource allocation and deployment problems. The data utilized for this kind of analysis relates primarily to workload and time utilization. In Pontiac, a form of this kind of operations analysis has been regularly conducted for several years. The staffing of patrol platoons is regularly compared to the distribution of patrol workload, and necessary adjustments are made. Also, information is collected on the workload and time utilization of investigative personnel, and analysis of this data has been in progress under a separate project for over a year. An integration of this data into a coherent operations analysis of the allocation and deployment of all Departmental personnel has yet to be achieved, however.

The third phase of the ICAP model, planning, is also described as structured decision making. Basically, it is an activity that takes the results of the various analyses and uses them in tactical and strategic decision making. Of central importance in this process is the role of objectives and priorities. The results of the various analyses can greatly inform the planning, or structured decision making, process but they cannot tell the police manager what decisions to make, or what alternatives to choose. These choices and decisions must be based instead on the objectives and priorities of the department, which should be clearly stated and understood by all.

In general, planning and decision making in the Pontiac Police Department, as in almost any organization, falls short of the highly rational process

described in the ICAP model. Such things as union contracts, budgetary limitations, crises, and human frailty constrain the extent to which objectives and rational analysis can govern decision making. It is true, however, that the Department has not clearly identified and defined its missions and priorities. Some evidence of this is found in the Pontiac ICAP application, in which the project goals and objectives are not stated in a specific fashion. On the other hand, tactical decision making in particular was closely based on analysis, especially crime analysis. Overall, planning and decision making in the Department certainly bore some relation to analysis and objectives, but the connection was not as tight or structured as suggested by the ICAP model.

In the ICAP model the service delivery phase is the outcome of planning and decision making. The essential feature is that services delivered must be considered from an integrated perspective, even if different organizational units are involved for different services. And this integrated perspective must again be closely tied to the objectives and priorities of the Department. The actual programmatic elements of this phase of the model are discussed in the next section.

#### Major ICAP Program Elements

One important program element in the ICAP model is analysis, as discussed earlier. In Pontiac crime analysis was fully implemented and in keeping with the ICAP model, intelligence analysis was begun but not fully implemented, and operations analysis with respect to patrol was quite advanced. Operations analysis with respect to the investigative function was not as fully implemented, and overall Departmental operations analysis had not been achieved.

A second major ICAP program element is patrol management. One aspect of

ICAP patrol management is that it should be based on data collection and analysis; in Pontiac, information on crimes and patrol workload is regularly made available to patrol managers for planning and decision making purposes. The ICAP model also specifies an intricate and structured process by which patrol managers should set objectives and priorities, organize tasks, and schedule work. This aspect of ICAP patrol management has not been implemented in Pontiac. The Department does espouse a directed patrol philosophy, however, and significant resources are deployed on the basis of crime analysis. In general, patrol management in Pontiac is done in cognizance of crime and operations analysis, but the process is not nearly as rational or zero-based as that recommended by the ICAP model.

Another key ICAP component is investigations management. This is taken to include an increased role for patrol preliminary investigations, the use of formal case screening, the monitoring of continuing investigations, and enhanced police-prosecutor relations. Pontiac's ICAP project had as one objective the improvement of patrol preliminary investigations, but this was not achieved, and in general the patrol role is restricted to activities at the scenes of crimes. Formal case screening procedures have yet to be implemented in Pontiac, and all crimes are assigned to detectives and receive at least some follow-up. The relations between the Pontiac Police Department and the county prosecutor have not been close in the recent past, and deteriorated greatly during the project year due to cross-allegations of impropriety. Overall, investigations management as described in the ICAP model has not been implemented in Pontiac.

A fourth ICAP component is the focus on the repeat or career criminal. Police department activities for this component include intelligence analysis, pre-arrest identification of habitual offenders, serious offender apprehension

strategies, and case follow-through for successful prosecution. In Pontiac intelligence analysis and pre-arrest identification were begun but not fully implemented, and aside from routine operations no serious offender apprehension strategies were used. The linkage with the prosecutor was not possible as discussed above. Thus, Pontiac's ICAP project did not substantially attain the career criminal focus of the ICAP model.

The final major element of the ICAP model is management of the call-for-service (CFS) workload. This element is closely related to operations analysis, but in a larger sense encompasses the entire ICAP model. The essential idea is that a police department has at its disposal a given finite amount of resources, which can be applied in a variety of ways to handle the workload of the agency. Traditionally, the CFS aspect of the workload has been allowed to dictate resource allocation and deployment, strategies, and tactics. But the ICAP model suggests that the CFS workload is manageable, in the sense that response can often be delayed, calls can be handled over the telephone, citizen expectations can be altered, and so on. Once freed from complete enslavement by the CFS workload, the police manager has the opportunity to actually manage resources. The kinds of rational planning and decision making based on analysis, objectives, and priorities envisioned in the ICAP model become feasible. Integrated operations analysis, which deals with resource allocation and deployment of all field services, rather than just patrol, becomes necessary and useful.

Once again, Pontiac during its ICAP project did not fully incorporate the CFS management concept. The CFS workload did allow the use of some special patrol tactics, and a formal decision was made to give D-runs higher priority than non-emergency calls-for-service. Also, for several years Pontiac has employed community service officers who handle less serious calls, freeing

some patrol time. The entire concept of managing the workload and resources, however, was not instituted.

The preceding comparison of Pontiac's ICAP project with the ICAP model has indicated a number of areas of incongruence. The primary reason for this probably is that Pontiac's ICAP project was essentially a continuation of their PEP project and, although on the national level ICAP grew out of PEP, the general ICAP and PEP models were not intended to be identical. Whereas PEP was avowedly a patrol emphasis program, ICAP is intended to be an agency-wide apprehension emphasis program. This change in focus at the national level from PEP to ICAP was not clearly understood at the project level in Pontiac.

Pontiac's second-year ICAP project, which began in October, 1978, seeks a much greater congruence with the ICAP model. The new ICAP project in Pontiac includes a number of components of the ICAP model previously missing, such as report review, suspect analysis, an ICAP task force for structured planning, case screening, pre-arrest identification of career criminals, career criminal apprehension strategies, and teleserve. If these components are successfully implemented the Pontiac Police Department will come much closer to fitting the ICAP model.

## CHAPTER VI: Conclusions and Recommendations

In the first part of this chapter project conclusions will be presented. Following the conclusions, implementation and programmatic recommendations for future projects and regular operations are presented.

### Goal and Objective Achievement

Pontiac's ICAP project had four stated goals. The first goal was improvement of patrol preliminary investigations, which was not achieved. The second goal was improvement and expansion of the crime analysis function. The meaning of this goal is not clear; prior to the project crime analysis was regularly and effectively performed, and this situation continued during ICAP. The crime analysis unit did begin to undertake intelligence analysis during the project, but this activity was not fully implemented, and other examples of improvement or expansion were not found. Overall, this second project goal was not substantially achieved.

The third goal of the ICAP project was the development of apprehension-oriented strategic planning through coordination of crime analysis, crime prevention, and patrol personnel. The participation of crime prevention in this activity was not realized. Crime analysis and patrol personnel did work closely together, although more on a tactical than a strategic level. The goal of increased apprehensions as a result of the strategic planning was not achieved.

The fourth goal of the ICAP project in Pontiac was the development of improved career criminal identification and apprehension through coordination

of the patrol and investigative functions. Neither the desired coordination nor the improved identification and apprehension of career criminals was achieved.

#### Project Implementation

Several aspects of Pontiac's ICAP project were not effectively implemented. These included changes in patrol preliminary investigations, a patrol support role for the crime prevention officer, and detective attendance at patrol roll-calls. In terms of the preliminary investigations, the primary cause of the failure to implement seems to have been a lack of commitment on the part of the command staff of the Department. With respect to the crime prevention officer, the failure to assume the patrol support role seems to have resulted mainly from a lack of communication to the officer about the intended role. The incomplete implementation of detective attendance at patrol roll-calls was a continuation of a trend established during the PEP project, and was caused by a lack of commitment and management control.

The court activities coordination, directed patrol, and D-run components of the ICAP project were effectively implemented. The first two were purely continuations of activities established under PEP. The third, D-runs, was also initiated under PEP, but underwent considerable revision during the ICAP project. The new D-run system was satisfactorily implemented, and patrol officers regard the new system as an improvement over its predecessor.

The relative productivity and effectiveness of directed patrol, D-runs, and other operational strategies was not sufficiently analyzed in this project evaluation. Preliminary findings suggest, though, that strategies based on crime analysis produce somewhat different results than un-directed strategies. In particular, the directed patrol strategy produced fewer non-target crime



arrests than other strategies, and D-runs seemed to produce more arrests per man hour than other strategies. It must be stressed that these preliminary findings are based on unsatisfactory data and analysis, so that project and resource allocation decisions cannot yet be based on them.

### Recommendations

The evaluation findings presented in the previous chapters, and the conclusions just discussed, lead to the following recommendations. As were any criticisms contained in this report, these recommendations are made with the sole and sincere intention of informing and improving future decision making.

1. The planning process should be more open, with greater participation by the command staff and other personnel to be effected by projects and changes.
2. Planning should be more explicitly based on the goals of the Department, and project goals and objectives should be more carefully thought out and specified.
3. Planning should include preparation for implementation, in that changes to be made in order to pursue project goals should be carefully planned in advance.
4. Changes to be made, whether as project components or standard procedures, should be communicated in advance to all personnel concerned, and where necessary, training should be used to prepare personnel for changes in behavioral expectations.
5. The project director should devote more time and energy to the project, and assert more management direction and control.
6. The Court Activities Coordinator position should be continued, but a detailed study of the changing court-demand for Pontiac police time should be undertaken, in order to assess real savings attributable to the coordinator's activities.
7. Careful attention should be given to patrol preliminary investigations, in order to clarify responsibilities at the scene, identify present weaknesses, and consider the desirability of extending the patrol role.

8. Careful consideration should be given to the patrol role in crime prevention activities, in order to clarify patrol responsibilities and the desired role of the crime prevention officer.

9. Current crime analysis activities should continue.

10. Current operations analysis activities should continue, but with an integrated approach that considers all service delivery functions, rather than just patrol.

11. Intelligence analysis should be expanded, as is now being done under the ICAP continuation grant.

12. For the immediate future directed patrol should be continued as at present. Careful attention should be given to the deployment and tactics of the unit, however, in order to ensure that resources are being productively utilized.

13. For the immediate future D-runs should be continued. More attention should be given to recommended tactics and to the quality of criminal information provided with the runs, however.

14. An in-depth analysis of the differential productivity of patrol strategies and tactics should be undertaken, in order to gain information to guide decisions about how to use resources.

15. Every effort should be made to manage the CFS workload, so that the workload does not manage the Department. This must include an integrated operations analysis and an integrated approach to patrol and investigations management.

16. Despite the fiscal and other crises confronting the Department, the command staff should strive to plan ahead and proactively manage their agency, whatever the pressures to merely seek day to day survival.

APPENDIX A

Patrol Survey Comparisons: 1976, 1977, 1978

# Patrol Survey Comparisons: 1976, 1977, 1978

Surveys Administered: November 1976  
August/September 1977  
September 1978

Note: Figures in this report are based on responses from patrol officers only.

## A. Number of Patrol Officer Respondents

1976 - 63  
1977 - 72  
1978 - 75

## B. Respondents By Platoon

	1976	1977	1978
Platoon 1	15	16	23
Platoon 2	12	18	12
Platoon 3	21	22	21
Platoon 4	12	15	19

## C. Age of Respondents

	1976	1977	1978
Under 25	14 (22.2%)	16 (22.2%)	8 (10.7%)
25-29	26 (41.3%)	31 (43.1%)	30 (40.0%)
30-34	19 (30.2%)	18 (25.0%)	31 (41.3%)
35-39	3 (4.8%)	3 (4.2%)	2 (2.7%)
40-44	0	2 (2.8%)	3 (4.0%)
45-49	0	0	0
50-54	0	1 (1.4%)	0
55-59	1 (1.6%)	1 (1.4%)	1 (1.3%)

Approximate Average	28 yrs	29 yrs	30 yrs
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D. Education of Respondents

	1976	1977	1978
No HS Degree	0	0	0
HS or Equiv.	2 (3.2%)	2 (2.8%)	4 (5.3%)
1 Yr College	3 (4.8%)	6 (8.3%)	7 (9.3%)
2 Yrs College	11 (17.7%)	16 (22.2%)	16 (21.3%)
3 Yrs College	13 (21.0%)	20 (27.8%)	18 (24.0%)
4 Yrs College	23 (37.1%)	20 (27.8%)	17 (22.7%)
5 Yrs College	8 (12.9%)	5 (6.9%)	10 (13.3%)
6 Yrs College	2 (3.2%)	3 (4.2%)	3 (4.0%)
Approximate Avg Yrs College	3.4 yrs	3.1 yrs	3.1 yrs

E. Major Field of College Study

	1976	1977	1978
Law Enf/Police Ad	19 (48.7%)	17 (35.4%)	11 (28.2%)
Criminal Justice	10 (25.6%)	10 (20.8%)	13 (33.3%)
Social Science	5 (12.9%)	8 (16.7%)	3 (7.7%)
Liberal Arts	1 (2.6%)	5 (10.4%)	2 (5.1%)
Education	0	0	1 (2.6%)
Business/Mgt	2 (5.1%)	4 (8.3%)	5 (12.8%)
Science/Engineering	2 (5.1%)	3 (6.3%)	4 (10.3%)
Other	0	1 (2.1%)	0
No Response	24	24	36

F. Years of Police Experience

	1976	1977	1978
Less Than 1	4 (6.3%)	10 (13.9%)	0
1-3	25 (39.7%)	21 (29.2%)	16 (21.6%)
4-6	17 (27.0%)	23 (31.9%)	32 (43.2%)
7-10	15 (23.8%)	14 (19.4%)	18 (24.3%)
11-15	1 (1.6%)	1 (1.4%)	4 (5.4%)
16-20	0	1 (1.4%)	3 (4.1%)
21-25	1 (1.6%)	1 (1.4%)	1 (1.4%)
26+	0	1 (1.4%)	0
Approximate Average	4.4 yrs	4.4 yrs	6.1 yrs

G. Job Satisfaction Questions

	<u>Average (0-100 Scale)</u>		
	1976	1977	1978
Are you satisfied with your career as a police officer? (0=Not at all to 100=Very much)	81.3	81.6	68.2
Are you satisfied with your current assignment? (0=Not at all to 100=Very Much)	75.4	74.4	66.9
In the last month, how satisfied were you compared to a year ago with your opportunity to do interesting and rewarding work? (0=Much less satisfied to 100=Much more satisfied)	62.0	62.9	46.3

H. General Attitude Questions

	<u>Average (0-100 Scale)</u>		
	1976	1977	1978
Citizens in your patrol area report crimes they observe. (0=Never to 100=Always)	49.9	52.8	45.1
Most people in your patrol area do not respect policemen. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	50.5	50.8	56.3
What type of support do you think residents of your patrol area provide police? (0=Very poor to 100=Excellent)	49.1	50.5	45.1
Patrol is undermanned. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	56.6	70.8	86.0
The policeman's role in society should be that of a crime fighter. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	63.7	64.4	66.5
The policeman's role in society should be that of coping with social change. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	56.5	55.7	57.0
As a general rule the policeman must remain aloof from the community. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	27.7	33.0	37.3
Many people look upon a policeman as an impersonal cog in the governmental machinery rather than as a fellow human being. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	68.3	70.8	71.1
The good policeman is one who gives his commanding officer unquestioning obedience. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	34.6	33.9	29.3
The best officer is one who knows when to depart from standard operating procedures in order to get the job done. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	61.9	68.9	69.9

H. General Attitude Questions (cont.)

	<u>Average (0-100 Scale)</u>		
	1976	1977	1978
An officer's efficiency record should take into account the number of arrests he makes or the tickets he issues. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	39.7	48.1	36.9
If police put as much effort into crime prevention as they do into investigation <u>after</u> a crime has been committed, we would be farther ahead in reducing crime. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	60.8	59.9	61.4
As long as a law is on the books, police must enforce it. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	43.8	51.4	43.3

I. Most Important Problem the Department Faces

	1976	1977	1978
Lack of manpower; inability to recruit.	6 (10.2%)	9 (14.1%)	28 (41.8%)
Inadequate equipment and facilities.	4 (6.8%)	5 (7.8%)	4 (6.0%)
Reliance on old fashion methods and decisions.	8 (13.6%)	2 (3.1%)	2 (3.0%)
Lack of modern technology.	2 (3.4%)	0	0
Inadequate training.	4 (6.8%)	8 (12.5%)	2 (3.0%)
Lack of understanding and support by citizens.	6 (10.2%)	8 (12.5%)	2 (3.0%)
Lack of clear cut policies.	14 (23.7%)	11 (17.2%)	3 (4.5%)
Political interference in the operations of the department.	15 (25.4%)	21 (32.8%)	26 (38.8%)





**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

J. Most Important Problem the Officer Faces

	1976	1977	1978
Too much paper work.	11 (18.3%)	19 (28.4%)	17 (24.6%)
Not enough freedom of judgment - too many orders, rules, and regulations.	18 (30.0%)	8 (11.9%)	16 (23.2%)
Boredom.	3 (5.0%)	2 (3.0%)	2 (2.9%)
Many officers don't know what they are doing.	9 (15.0%)	14 (20.9%)	7 (10.1%)
Physical danger - brutality against the police.	3 (5.0%)	4 (6.0%)	3 (4.3%)
Ineffective supervision.	6 (10.0%)	9 (13.4%)	10 (14.5%)
Not enough chance for advancement.	10 (16.7%)	11 (16.4%)	14 (20.3%)

K. D-Run Effectiveness Questions

	Average (0-100 Scale)	
	1977	1978
D-runs, based upon crime trend analysis by the Planning & Analysis Unit, are an effective crime prevention strategy. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	45.2	46.0
D-runs are more likely to produce on-scene arrests for property offenses than are traditional routine patrol practices. (0=Strongly disagree to 100=Strongly agree)	41.7	35.9

APPENDIX B

Preliminary D-Run Analysis

## Preliminary D-Run Analysis

### A. Sampling Procedure

One sample week was randomly drawn from each month since the inception (2/78) of the new D-run system (the system of D-run reports, with sergeants creating the runs, etc.). For the sample weeks all D-run reports were analyzed, with data collected on run recommendations, implementation, and results.

### B. Recommended Runs By Sample Week

<u>Week</u>	<u># of Runs Recommended</u>
February 14-20, 1978	117 (13.2%)
Feb. 28-March 6, 1978	135 (15.2%)
April 25-May 1, 1978	98 (11.0%)
May 9-15, 1978	133 (15.0%)
June 20-26, 1978	112 (12.6%)
July 4-10, 1978	119 (13.4%)
August 22-28, 1978	98 (11.0%)
September 12-18, 1978	77 ( 8.7%)
Total	889

### C. Recommended Runs By Patrol Area

<u>Patrol Area</u>	<u># of Runs Recommended</u>
1	209 (23.5%)
2	343 (38.6%)
3	175 (19.7%)
4	162 (18.2%)

### D. Recommended Runs By Platoon

<u>Platoon #</u>	<u># of Runs Recommended</u>
1	165 (18.6%)
2	184 (20.7%)
3	276 (31.0%)
4	264 (29.7%)

E. Recommended Runs By Target Crimes

<u>Target Crime</u>	<u># of Runs Recommended</u>
B&E	578 (65.0%)
Robbery	49 ( 5.5%)
LFA	56 ( 6.3%)
LOA	21 ( 2.4%)
B&E/LFA	52 ( 5.8%)
B&E/Robbery	30 ( 3.4%)
LFA/LOA	36 ( 4.0%)
Traffic	67 ( 7.5%)

F. Recommended Runs By Minimum Recommended Duration

<u>Minimum Recommended Duration</u>	<u># of Runs Recommended</u>
None	21 ( 2.4%)
5 Minutes	7 ( 0.8%)
10 Minutes	87 ( 9.8%)
15 Minutes	77 ( 8.7%)
20 Minutes	121 (13.6%)
30 Minutes	408 (45.9%)
45 Minutes	140 (15.7%)
60 Minutes	28 ( 3.1%)

Average \* 28 min.

G. Recommended Runs By Suspect Information Provided

<u>Suspect Information Provided</u>	<u># of Runs Recommended</u>
None	170 (19.1%)
Vague Descriptions	70 ( 7.9%)
Good Descriptions	28 ( 3.1%)
Suspects Named	284 (31.9%)
Suspects Named + Hangouts or Associates	21 ( 2.4%)
Suspect Addresses Given	253 (28.5%)
Not Applicable (Traffic)	63 ( 7.1%)

H. Recommended Runs By Vehicle Information Provided

<u>Vehicle Information Provided</u>	<u># of Runs Recommended</u>
None	669 (75.3%)
Vague Description	59 ( 6.6%)
Good Description	7 ( 0.8%)
Description + Tag #	91 (10.2%)
Not Applicable (Traffic)	63 ( 7.1%)

I. Recommended Runs By MO Information Provided

<u>MO Information Provided</u>	<u># of Runs Recommended</u>
None	147 (16.5%)
General	567 (63.8%)
Specific	175 (19.7%)

J. Recommended Runs By Tactics Recommended

<u>Tactics Recommended</u>	<u># of Runs Recommended</u>
Drive Through	142 (16.0%)
Drive Slow Use Spotlight	17 ( 1.9%)
Conduct FIs	182 (20.5%)
Stop Vehicles	1 ( 0.1%)
Check Property	17 ( 1.9%)
Conduct FIs and Stop Cars	492 (55.3%)
Conduct FIs and Check Property	35 ( 3.9%)

K. Was The Run Performed?

Yes - 682 (76.7%)  
No - 207 (23.3%)

L. Numbers of FIs Conducted For Runs Performed

<u># of FIs</u>	<u># of Runs</u>
0	634 (93.0%)
1	24 ( 3.5%)
2	12 ( 1.8%)
3	8 ( 1.2%)
4	3 ( 0.4%)
5	1 ( 0.1%)

Total FIs = 89

FIs per Run = .13

M. Numbers of Vehicles Stopped For Runs Performed

<u># of Vehicles Stopped</u>	<u># of Runs</u>
0	661 (96.9%)
1	21 ( 3.1%)

Total Stops = 21

Stops per Run = .03

N. Numbers of Vehicles Checked For Runs Performed

<u># of Vehicles Checked</u>	<u># of Runs</u>
0	662 (97.1%)
1	17 ( 2.5%)
2	3 ( 0.4%)

Total Checks = 23

Checks per Run = .03

O. Numbers of Open Premises Found For Runs Performed

<u># of Open Premises</u>	<u># of Runs</u>
0	664 (97.4%)
1	16 ( 2.3%)
2	2 ( 0.3%)

Total Finds = 20

Finds per Run = .03

P. Numbers of New Information Developed For Runs Performed

<u># of New Info</u>	<u># of Runs</u>
0	667 (97.8%)
1	12 ( 1.8%)
2	2 ( 0.3%)
3	1 ( 0.1%)

Total New Info = 19

New Info per Run = .03



Q. Numbers of Tickets Issued For Runs Performed

<u># of Tickets</u>	<u># of Runs</u>	
0	658 (96.5%)	Total Tickets = 41
1	16 ( 2.3%)	
2	2 ( 0.3%)	
3	4 ( 0.6%)	Tickets per Run = .06
4	1 ( 0.1%)	
5	1 ( 0.1%)	

R. Numbers of Arrests For Runs Performed

<u># of Arrests</u>	<u># of Runs</u>	
0	675 (99.0%)	Total Arrests = 9
1	5 ( 0.7%)	
2	2 ( 0.3%)	Arrests per Run = .01

S. Numbers of Crimes Discovered For Runs Performed  
(Excluding those for which arrests were made or  
tickets were issued.)

<u># of Crimes Discovered</u>	<u># of Runs</u>	
0	678 (99.4%)	Total Discoveries = 4
1	4 ( 0.6%)	Discoveries per Run = .01

T. Numbers of Public Relations Contacts For Runs Performed

<u># of PR Contacts</u>	<u># of Runs</u>	
0	628 (92.1%)	PR Contacts Total = 111
1	17 ( 2.5%)	
2	21 ( 3.1%)	
3	13 ( 1.9%)	PR Contacts per Run = .16
4	2 ( 0.3%)	
5	1 ( 0.1%)	

U. Crimes For Arrest Instances

Burglary - 1  
Warrant - 2  
Public Order - 4

V. Situations For Arrest Instances

Officer Initiated - 6  
Responding to Call - 1

W. Arrest Relation to D-Run

Peripherally Related - 4  
Unrelated - 3

X. Instances of Other Occurrences

Building Security Follow-ups Recommended - 5  
Building Security Follow-ups Performed - 8  
Run Alterations Recommended - 10  
Run Elimination Recommended - 3  
Units Pulled Off D-Runs - 23  
Runs Cancelled - 1

Y. Time Actually Spent Performing D-Runs

<u>Run Duration</u>	<u># of Runs</u>
1-15 Minutes	54 ( 8.6%)
16-30 Minutes	178 (28.4%)
31-45 Minutes	208 (33.2%)
46-60 Minutes	132 (21.1%)
61-120 Minutes	55 ( 8.8%)
Not Available	55

Average = 38.1 min.



**END**