



# ROBBERY EVENTS


A RISK REDUCTION MANUAL FOR POLICE

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


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ACQUISITIONS

# ROBBERY EVENTS

## A RISK REDUCTION MANUAL FOR POLICE



LAW ENFORCEMENT  
ASSISTANCE  
ADMINISTRATION

U. S. DEPARTMENT  
OF JUSTICE



A REPORT FUNDED BY THE  
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-32332


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# Foreword

The well-trained and experienced police officer generally acquires attitudes and skills that permit him to cope with most physical assaults without exposure to harm. There are, however, extremely high risks associated with robbery events. The indication of a crime involving armed suspects and the usual presence of victims and witnesses pose serious risks of casualty.

Confronted by this critical threat, the law enforcement community has urgently sought needed information on how to deal with the risks associated with robbery events. In response to this and similar requirements, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice initiated a major long-range research program, the Police Assaults Study, incorporating the problem-oriented analysis of assaults in robbery cases as an important research objective. The International Association of Chiefs of Police was given the responsibility for national casualty data collection and analysis with an emphasis on immediate risk reduction in contemporary robbery event situations, primarily through improved police tactical procedures, equipment, and training. This task was accomplished by staff assigned to the IACP Police Weapons Center who traveled throughout the United States gathering information and discussing specific incidents with police personnel at all levels.

The following findings and recommendations for reducing the risks associated with robbery events are a product of this effort. This document, however, should be considered a beginning rather than a final product. I would urge all users of this manual to provide us with their suggestions and comments regarding the problem of casualty risk reduction, a matter of vital concern to the law enforcement community.



Glen D. King  
Executive Director  
International Association  
of Chiefs of Police



# Acknowledgements

The International Association of Chiefs of Police is extremely grateful for the assistance so unselfishly rendered by the following law enforcement agencies in the completion of this project:

Alexandria Police Department, Virginia  
Anaheim Police Department, California  
Arlington County Police Department, Virginia  
Atlanta Police Department, Georgia

Baltimore Police Department, Maryland  
Berkeley Police Department, California

Castroville Police Department, Texas  
Clearwater Police Department, Florida  
Cleveland Police Department, Ohio  
Columbia Police Department, Georgia  
Columbus Police Department, Ohio

Dallas Police Department, Texas  
Dayton Police Department, Ohio  
Denver Police Department, Colorado  
Des Moines Police Department, Iowa  
Detroit Police Department, Michigan

East Orange Police Department, New Jersey  
East St. Louis Police Department, Illinois  
Edgewood Police Department, Pennsylvania  
Edwardsville Police Department, Illinois

Fairmont Police Department, Indiana  
Fort Worth Police Department, Texas  
Fresno Police Department, California

Hattiesburg Police Department, Mississippi  
Hollywood Police Department, Florida

Jacksonville Police Department, Florida  
Joliet Police Department, Illinois  
Junction City Police Department, Kansas

Kershaw County Police Department, South Carolina  
King County Department of Public Safety, Washington



Los Angeles Police Department, California  
Louisville Police Department, Kentucky  
Loveland Police Department, Colorado

Marine City Police Department, Michigan  
Maywood Police Department, California  
Memphis Police Department, Tennessee  
Miami Police Department, Florida  
Milwaukee Police Department, Wisconsin  
Minneapolis Police Department, Minnesota

Nassau County Police Department, New York  
New Haven Police Department, Connecticut  
New Orleans Police Department, Louisiana  
New York Police Department (City), New York  
Norfolk Police Department, Virginia

Parma Heights Police Department, Ohio  
Philadelphia Police Department, Pennsylvania  
Prince George's County Police Department, Maryland

Revere Police Department, Massachusetts  
Richmond Police Department, Virginia

Safety Harbor Police Department, Florida  
Salt Lake City Police Department, Utah  
San Antonio Police Department, Texas  
San Diego Police Department, California  
San Francisco Police Department, California  
San Jose Police Department, California  
Selma Police Department, Alabama  
Shreveport Police Department, Louisiana  
St. Louis Police Department, Missouri  
Strongsville Police Department, Ohio

Turlock Police Department, California


Washington Police Department, District of Columbia  
Watertown Police Department, Massachusetts  
Woodbine Police Department, New Jersey

While space does not permit the listing of the scores of public safety officials who contributed valuable information and insights regarding risk reduction in robbery events, a special note of thanks is due the following individuals for the exceptional nature of their cooperation and contribution:

- Sergeant Rod Bock  
Metropolitan Division  
Los Angeles Police Department
- Lieutenant James F. McCarthy, Commander  
Police Attack Prevention Unit  
New York City Police Department
- Robert M. Conger, Chief  
Uniform Crime Report Section  
Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Lieutenant Francis McGee, Commander  
Firearms Training Section  
New York City Police Department
- Sergeant Alan Devin, Commander  
Planning and Research Unit  
Hollywood, Florida Police Department
- Commissioner D. D. Pomerleau  
Baltimore Police Department
- Deputy Commissioner Francis B. Looney  
New York City Police Department
- Sergeant Henry Schaaff  
Office of Programs and Policy  
New York City Police Department
- Inspector Robert W. Martin, Commander  
Armory and Firearms Section  
Philadelphia Police Department

Finally, it is appropriate to recognize the members of the Police Casualty Analysis project team:

Frank A. Zunno	Project Director
Edward L. Lee	
Ross L. Morgan	
John T. Sheely	Field Data Collection
Jeffrey J. Steger	
Carl J. Tucker	
Chrystal O'Hagan	
Richard D. Engler	Data Analysis
Jerilyn K. Gibbs	
Glenda E. Heredia	
Diana Busman	Secretarial Support


  
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# Table of Contents

	Page
SECTION ONE: AN OVERVIEW OF ROBBERY EVENTS .....	1
INTRODUCTION .....	1
ROBBERY EVENT CHARACTERISTICS .....	2
Officer Casualties .....	2
Location .....	4
Day and Time .....	5
Robbery Sites .....	6
Circumstances .....	10
VICTIM LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL .....	10
Geographic Distribution .....	10
Agency Category .....	15
Jurisdiction Populations .....	16
Rank or Position .....	16
Duty Status and Dress .....	16
On Duty/In Uniform .....	18
On Duty/In Plainclothes .....	18
Off Duty/In Uniform .....	18
Off Duty/In Plainclothes .....	18
Duty Assignments .....	19
Age .....	20
Race .....	20
Length of Service .....	21
Training Received .....	22
Basic Recruit Training .....	22
In-Service Training .....	22
Specialized Courses .....	24
Physical Fitness .....	26
ASSAILANT PROFILES .....	26
Suspects Involved In Casualty Events .....	26
Suspects Apprehended or Killed .....	26
Personal History .....	27
Weapons Employed .....	27
Suspects Involved in Non-Casualty Events .....	27
Suspects Apprehended or Killed .....	27
Personal History .....	27
Weapons Employed .....	28

	Page
SECTION TWO: RISK REDUCTION MEASURES IN ROBBERY EVENTS .....	29
INTRODUCTION .....	29
ROLE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGER .....	30
Setting the Example .....	30
Taking Charge .....	31
Field Supervision .....	32
TACTICS .....	33
Complaint and Dispatch .....	33
Threat Identification .....	34
Crime Analysis .....	34
Crime and Incident Reporting .....	35
Site Surveys .....	35
False Alarm Control .....	40
Communications Security .....	43
Interagency Coordination .....	44
On View/Off Duty .....	45
Off Duty Employment .....	47
In Pursuit Of Robbery Suspects .....	50
Roadblocks .....	52
Barricade/Hostage Situations .....	53
Stakeout .....	57
The Risk Reduction Program .....	59
The Risk Reduction Officer .....	59
Policies and Procedures .....	60
Action Plans .....	61
INTELLIGENCE .....	61
TRAINING .....	67
Recruit Training .....	67
In-Service Training .....	71
Roll Call Training .....	73
Firearms Training .....	73
Specialized Training .....	76
Training Resources .....	77
Physical Conditioning .....	78
The Role of the Supervisor in Training .....	78
The Role of Management in Training .....	79

	Page
EQUIPMENT .....	79
Armor .....	79
Soft Armor .....	80
Rigid Armor .....	80
Styles .....	80
Armor Shields .....	85
Upper Torso Protection .....	88
Head Protection .....	90
Vehicle Armor .....	91
Firearms .....	92
Handguns .....	93
Shotguns .....	95
Holsters .....	97
Uniform Wear .....	98
Plainclothes Wear .....	98
Extra Ammunition Carriers .....	99
Ammunition .....	100
Identification Of Plainclothes Officers .....	103
Armband or Sash .....	104
Vest .....	104
Communications Equipment .....	104
Radio .....	105
Mobile Digital Terminal .....	106
Scramblers .....	106
Teleprinters .....	107
APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY .....	A-1
APPENDIX B: A CASUALTY RISK REDUCTION PROGRAM .....	B-1
APPENDIX C: CASUALTY DATA COLLECTION FORM .....	C-1
APPENDIX D: MODEL COMBAT PISTOL COURSES .....	D-1
APPENDIX E: MODEL ROLL CALL LESSON PLAN .....	E-1
APPENDIX F: A SUMMARY OF ALERT BULLETIN GUIDELINES .....	F-1



# ROBBERY EVENTS

## SECTION ONE

### AN OVERVIEW OF ROBBERY EVENTS

#### INTRODUCTION

A drastic increase in assaults upon police over the last seven years has resulted in nearly doubling the number of officers killed in the line of duty. A major number of these assaults occurred in connection with robbery events. Between 1963 and 1967, 208 police officers were killed, 48 of them in robberies. Between 1968 and 1972, 488 police officers were killed, 107 of them in connection with robbery crimes, an increase of 123 percent. In 1972 alone, 25 officers were killed in connection with robberies, the largest number among the ten classification of activities<sup>1</sup> defined by the Uniform Crime Reports Section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These figures indicate the high risks associated with officers answering robbery calls, pursuing robbery suspects, or becoming involved in robbery events while on or off duty.

For the purposes of this study, an assault is defined as any overt physical act that an officer perceives or has reason to believe is intended to cause him harm. The definition of a robbery event involves the crime or attempt that takes place in the presence of a victim to obtain property or a thing of value from the victim by use of force or fear (the threat of force). The crime of robbery may be committed with or without a weapon; the majority of robbery crimes involve armed offenders.

This manual will focus on robbery events in which an assault by a suspect resulted in at least one officer being a *casualty*, whether killed or wounded. A selected number of robbery events in which the assault against the officer(s) produced *no casualties* will also be studied. Since many casualty events involved a number of officers, some of whom were not injured, the following classifications are employed:

- Officers killed
- Officers wounded
- Officers uninjured<sup>2</sup>

In the non-casualty events, although all officers were assaulted, none was injured or killed.

---

<sup>1</sup>Other classifications include: responding to disturbance calls; burglaries; attempting other arrests; civil disorders; transporting prisoners; investigating suspicious persons or circumstances; ambush; mentally deranged; and traffic stops.

<sup>2</sup>This classification refers to a companion officer who was uninjured even though fellow officers were killed or wounded during the same robbery event.



During the 12-month period from September 1972 to August 1973, 23 officers were killed in connection with robbery events. In addition, 55 officers were wounded and 11 escaped injury in events that resulted in at least one officer casualty. Another 36 officers were involved as assault victims in 27 events that resulted in no casualties.

	Casualty	Non-Casualty	Total
Events	67	27	94
Officers	89	36	125

The IACP staff made actual site visits to examine the circumstances surrounding the 94 robbery incidents<sup>3</sup> in which these 125 officers had been assaulted. In selecting events for study, site visits were made in all but two events involving a police fatality<sup>4</sup>, in all serious casualty events; and in a selected number of major robbery incidents where officers were assaulted, but not injured. The major objectives were to identify the risks to officers involved in robbery events and to recommend the means necessary to reduce those risks through improved training, tactics, and equipment. The examination of a number of non-casualty events was undertaken simply as a means of determining if any significant factors exist that could explain why some officers in robbery events become casualties and others do not. Section One of this Manual provides an overview of the circumstances surrounding these 94 robbery events, including an analysis of the incidents, the victim officers, and the assailants. Section Two deals specifically with measures that will reduce risks inherent in robbery events.

## ROBBERY EVENT CHARACTERISTICS

### Officer Casualties

One hundred and twenty-five police officers were assaulted in the 94 robbery events studied. In the 67 casualty events, 23 officers were killed, and 55 were wounded—a total of 78 casualties; 11 companion officers were uninjured in these casualty events. In 27 non-casualty events, a total of 36 officers, although assaulted, escaped injury.

---

<sup>3</sup>Sixty-seven were casualty events and 27 were non-casualty events.

<sup>4</sup>See Appendix, Methodology.

The casualties, with one exception, were the result of gunfire; some officers sustained multiple gunshot wounds. In the one remaining case, an officer was stabbed 22 times with a file. Wounds in the head and torso region (20) caused the majority of deaths; however, another 19 head wounds were non-fatal. The distribution of major wounds sustained by victim officers is tabulated in Figure 1.

Wound Location	Fatalities	Injuries	Totals
Head	11	9	20
Shoulder		4	4
Torso	9	12	21
Arms		4	4
Hands		5	5
Legs		6	6
Feet		1	1
Multiple	3	14	17
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>78</b>

**Figure 1**  
**DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR WOUNDS AMONG**  
**OFFICER CASUALTIES**

Although victim officers were able to fire approximately the same average number of shots in both casualty and non-casualty events, suspects fired only half as many shots, on the average, in the non-casualty events as they did in the casualty events. In most cases, the officers who escaped

injury fired first. The average number of shots fired per event is listed in the table below:

	Casualty Events	Non-Casualty Events
Officers	4	3.5
Assailants	3.7	1.7

**Location**

In more than half of the 67 events in which an officer casualty occurred, the officer(s) and suspect(s) first came into contact at the robbery site. The greatest number (13) of the 27 events in which no officer injury occurred involved the officer pursuing the suspect either on foot or in a police vehicle. The totals<sup>5</sup> in Figure 2 represent a breakdown by event of the nature of the contact between officer(s) and suspect(s) in both casualty and non-casualty events.

LOCATION	CASUALTY EVENTS				NON-CASUALTY EVENTS	
	Number of Events	Officers			Number of Events	Number of Officers
		Killed	Injured	Uninjured		
At the Site	37	15	25	5	11	16
In the Vicinity	14	5	11		5	7
In Pursuit	17	3	19	6	13	13
TOTALS	68	23	55	11	29	36

**Figure 2  
LOCATION OF VICTIM PERSONNEL AT TIME OF ATTACK**

As shown in Figure 2, of the 125 law enforcement personnel involved in the 94 events, most officer casualties (40) occurred when the suspects were confronted at the robbery site. The officers

<sup>5</sup>These numbers do not reflect the total number of 67 casualty and 27 non-casualty events since, in events which involved multiple suspects, contact may have been made at more than one site.

were either quick to arrive at the scene or were already at the site when the robbery was perpetrated. In either case, suspect and officer came into contact at close range, where an exchange of gunfire would be more likely to result in an injury or a fatality.

Of the 11 uninjured companion officers in all casualty events, five were assaulted at the robbery site and six while in pursuit of the suspects. Of the 36 officers assaulted in the 27 non-casualty events, 16 encountered suspects at the site, seven in the vicinity, and 13 while in pursuit.

### Day and Time

The greatest number of robbery events took place on a Friday (21) or a Saturday (18). Nearly one half (33) of the 67 casualty events and eight of the 27 non-casualty events occurred during

WEEKDAY	CASUALTY EVENTS				NON-CASUALTY EVENTS	
	Number of Events	Officers			Number of Events	Number of Officers
		Killed	Injured	Uninjured		
Sunday	1	1			4	6
Monday	11	4	7	2	2	3
Tuesday	6	2	4	2	3	4
Wednesday	11	6	7	1	5	7
Thursday	9	2	7	1	3	3
Friday	14	5	15	2	7	8
Saturday	15	3	15	3	3	5
TOTALS	67	23	55	11	27	36

**Figure 3**  
**ROBBERY EVENT OCCURRENCE BY DAY OF WEEK**

these two days. See Figure 3. This indicates, as might be expected, that most robbery events (41 percent of the 94 studied) occurred at the end of the week, when business activity is at a peak. The smallest number of events, five, or five percent of the 94 events, took place on Sunday.

Of the 89 officers involved in casualty cases, eight were killed and 30 were wounded during events that occurred on a Friday or Saturday. In addition, five of the 11 non-injured companion officers were assaulted in casualty events which occurred on a Friday or a Saturday. On the other hand, only 13 of the 36 officers involved in non-casualty events confronted suspects on these two days of the week. See Figure 3.

Figure 4 illustrates that a concentration of the 94 robberies occurred during two distinct time periods: between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. (28); and again between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. (30). The single hour during which most robbery events took place was 7:00 in the evening. Of the 67 casualty events, eight occurred at this hour, however, none resulted in a fatality. Two of the 27 non-casualty incidents also took place at this time. This concentration of events essentially reflects an effort by the suspect to commit a robbery at an optimum time: banking hours (10 a.m. - 2 p.m.) for banks and other similar establishments when the facility is more accessible, or closing hours (6 - 10 p.m.) for stores and similar mercantile places where the day's receipts will be at a maximum.

Of the 89 officers involved in casualty events, 20 encountered suspects during early evening hours—6:00 and 7:00 p.m. In events at these hours, one officer was killed, 16 were wounded, and three non-injured companion officers were assaulted. In an analysis of the 27 non-casualty events, however, the time period during which officers most frequently confronted the suspect was between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. Fifteen of the 36 officers involved in non-casualty events interdicted the event during these hours. (See Figure 5.)

### Robbery Sites

Ninety-two of the 94 robbery events took place in urban settings; only two occurred in rural areas. Because of the urban nature of robbery incidents, the great majority took place in stores, banks, and taverns as shown in Figure 6. Grocery stores (12) and banks (11) were the most frequent targets of the 15 types of sites noted. Eighteen of the 67 casualty events and five of the 27 non-casualty events occurred in these two types of establishments.

In two events, although the robbery occurred in a commercial area, the actual contact and resultant assault upon the officer took place on an isolated roadway after a vehicle chase. Each of those incidents resulted in an officer fatality.

Of the 125 officers involved in the 94 events studied, most officers were investigating robberies that took place in grocery stores (17), liquor stores (16), or banks (14). Of the 89 officers involved






Figure 4  
TIME OF ROBBERY EVENT OCCURRENCE




Figure 5  
 TIME PERIODS POSING HIGH RISKS TO  
 OFFICERS IN ROBBERY EVENTS






Figure 6  
ROBBERY SITE CATEGORIES

in casualty cases, most were injured in grocery store robberies (13). Bank robberies, however, accounted for the most fatalities (5). Two of the 11 non-injured companion officers were assaulted during a grocery store robbery and a bank robbery respectively. Similarly, these same robbery site categories accounted for seven of the 36 officers who were assaulted in non-casualty events.

### **Circumstances**

Of the 125 officers in the 94 robbery events, 65 were dispatched to respond to the event, 43 happened to be on-view when the robbery was perpetrated, nine were informed by passersby, and eight officers were on stake-out duty. See Figure 7.

Of the 65 officers who were dispatched, 42 became casualties. Most of those casualties (14) were officers who had responded to a silent alarm call. Thirteen officers became casualties after responding to a robbery-in-progress call. The remaining 15 casualties were involved in burglary, armed robbery, and barricaded suspect calls.

Of the 43 officers who were on-view, 26 became casualties. Most of those casualties (15) occurred to officers who were on duty. Officers who were functioning off duty as security guards also experienced a high risk: all six of those included in this study became casualties. Five other off duty officers also became casualties.

Of the remaining 17 officers, ten became casualties when they were either on stake-out duty or informed by passersby.

Of the 11 non-injured officers involved in casualty events, seven accompanied officers who were dispatched to respond to the event. The other four uninjured officers were either on-view, on stake-out duty, or informed by passersby.

## **VICTIM LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL**

### **Geographic Distribution**

Most of the 94 robbery events occurred in the South Atlantic region, which had 23 incidents. As illustrated in Figure 8, this region also accounted for the greatest number (16) of the 67 casualty events, six of which were fatality incidents. Most of the 27 non-casualty events were clustered in each coastal region: seven in the South Atlantic, and six in the Pacific region.

The 125 officers involved in the 94 robbery events were employed by 62 agencies in 30 states and the District of Columbia. As shown in Figure 9, New York accounted for the greatest number

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	OFFICERS IN CASUALTY EVENTS			OFFICERS IN NON-CASUALTY EVENTS	OFFICERS IN ALL EVENTS
	Killed	Injured	Uninjured		
DISPATCHED:					
Robbery-in-progress	2	11	2		15
Silent Alarm	5	9	3	7	24
Burglary Report	1	1	1		3
Armed Robbery	3	6	1	7	17
Barricaded Suspect	1	3		2	6
DISPATCHED TOTAL	12	30	7	16	65
ON VIEW:					
On Duty	6	9	2	12	29
Off Duty	1	4		3	8
Security Guard	2	4			6
ON VIEW TOTAL	9	17	2	15	43
INFORMED BY PASSERBY		5	1	3	9
STAKEOUT	2	3	1	2	8
TOTALS	23	55	11	36	125

**Figure 7  
CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFICERS IN ROBBERY EVENTS**




Figure 8  
ROBBERY EVENTS BY REGION



JURISDICTION	POPULATION	OFFICERS IN CASUALTY EVENTS			OFFICERS IN NON-CASUALTY EVENTS	TOTALS
		Killed	Injured	Uninjured		
New York City, N.Y.	8,000,000	1	8	2	1	12
Los Angeles, CA	2,816,000		1	1	2	4
Philadelphia, PA	1,949,000	1	1		1	3
Detroit, MI	1,511,000	1				1
King County, WA	1,157,000		2			2
Baltimore, MD	905,760		4	1	3	8
Dallas, TX	844,000		1			1
Washington, D.C.	752,010		3			3
Cleveland, OH	751,000		3	4		7
Milwaukee, WI	717,000		1			1
San Francisco, CA	715,700				2	2
San Diego, CA	696,769				2	2
Prince Georges County, MD	660,527				1	1
San Antonio, TX	654,150	1				1
Memphis, TN	623,500	1				1
Saint Louis, MO	622,236	1	1		6	8
New Orleans, LA	593,470				5	5
Columbus, OH	539,680		2		2	4
Denver, CO	515,000		1			1
Atlanta, GA	496,973		2	1		3
San Jose, CA	445,800				1	1
Minneapolis, MN	435,000	1				1
Fort Worth, TX	393,500	1				1
Louisville, KY	361,500	1		1	1	3
Miami, FL	335,000		1			1
Norfolk, VA	307,951				3	3
Richmond, VA	249,600	1				1
Dayton, OH	243,600		1			1
Des Moines, IA	200,587		1			1
Shreveport, LA	182,000		1			1
Salt Lake City, UT	176,000	1				1
New Haven, CT	176,000		1			1
Arlington County, VA	174,300	1				1
Columbus, GA	167,000		1			1
Anaheim, CA	166,701				1	1
Fresno, CA	166,000	1				1
Berkeley, CA	117,000		2			2
Alexandria, VA	111,000	1			1	2
Hollywood, FL	107,000	1	1			2
Joliet, IL	80,378		1	1		2
East Orange, NJ	75,500		1			1
East St. Louis, IL	70,000	1				1
Clearwater, FL	52,000		2			2
Revere, MA	43,159	1				1
Watertown, MA	39,300		1			1
Hattiesburg, MS	38,300	1				1
Kershaw County, WA	34,700	1				1
Selma, AL	27,400		1			1
Parma Heights, OH	27,200	1				1
Nassau County, NY	20,700	1				1
Junction City, KS	19,000		2			2
Maywood, CA	17,000		1			1
Loveland, CO	16,220				2	2
Strongsville, OH	15,182				2	2
Turlock, CA	14,000	1				1
Edwardsville, IL	11,000		1			1
Edgewood, PA	5,100		1			1
Marine City, MI	4,567		2			2
Fairmont, IN	3,500		1			1
Safety Harbor, FL	3,103		1			1
Woodbine, NJ	2,625	1				1
Castroville, TN	1,900		1			1
TOTALS	62	23	55	11	36	125

**Figure 9**  
**LAW ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION OF VICTIM PERSONNEL**




Figure 10  
 OFFICERS INVOLVED IN ROBBERY EVENTS  
 BY REGION







(9) of the 78 officer casualties, all of which occurred in New York City. The one state which accounted for the greatest number of officers killed was Virginia with three police fatalities. As indicated in Figure 10, nearly one quarter of the victim officers were from the South Atlantic region. The largest regional groupings of the 36 officers involved in non-casualty incidents was in the South Atlantic (8) and Mountain regions (8).

### Agency Category

“Municipal” describes police agencies with jurisdictional responsibility in a city or town—an urban setting—as opposed to county-wide police agencies or state agencies. Accordingly, municipal jurisdictions of all sizes are similarly grouped and represent a range in population size from 2,000 to eight million.

Since the crime of robbery is essentially characteristic of urban settings, members of city police departments are more likely to become involved in both casualty and non-casualty robbery incidents (95 percent) than officers or deputy sheriffs of county jurisdictions or troopers of state police jurisdictions (five percent combined). See Figure 11. Of six officers who were employed by a state or county jurisdiction, three became fatalities, two were wounded, and one was assaulted in a non-casualty event.

AGENCY CATEGORY	OFFICERS IN CASUALTY EVENTS						OFFICERS IN NON- CASUALTY EVENTS		OFFICERS IN ALL EVENTS	
	Killed		Injured		Uninjured		No.	%	No.	%
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%				
Municipal	20	87	53	96	11	100	35	97	119	95
County	2	9	2	4			1	3	5	4
State	1	4							1	1
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>100</b>

**Figure 11**  
**OFFICERS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY**

## **Jurisdiction Populations**

Figure 12 presents a listing by population of all police jurisdictions in which the 125 officers were assaulted in the 94 robbery events. As indicated, the 67 casualty events which occurred in the period being studied, although in urban locations, were not primarily found in the large metropolitan areas. While 16 percent of the 67 casualty events took place in six major cities varying in population from 1.5 million to 2.8 million, 16 percent also occurred in towns of less than 25,000. Fifty-seven percent of all the 67 casualty events took place in towns of 400,000 or less. The largest concentration of the 27 non-casualty events occurred in areas populated by 500,000 to 700,000 people (41 percent).

Overall, the 78 police casualties of the 89 officers in casualty events were fairly evenly distributed among the population groupings. As might be expected, 15 of the 78 took place in large metropolitan areas. A surprisingly large number (13), however, occurred in towns of less than 25,000. Another concentration of casualties (11) is present in towns with populations between 100,000 and 200,000. This population grouping also accounts for five of the 23 fatalities. Four, or more than one-third of the 11 non-injured companion officers, were involved in events which took place in the 700,000 to 900,000 grouping.

The number of officers assaulted in the non-casualty events was also fairly evenly distributed with 17 officers involved in incidents which took place in towns of less than 25,000 and 22 in metropolitan areas of over one million inhabitants.

## **Rank or Position**

Of the 125 police officers assaulted in 94 robbery events, the overriding majority, in each of four categories, were patrolmen. See Figure 13.

All four of the command officers involved in robbery events became casualties; three were killed. Although 101 of the 125 officers involved were patrolmen, only 14 became fatalities. Twenty-nine of the 36 officers assaulted in non-casualty events, and all 11 of the non-injured companion officers in casualty events, were patrolmen.

## **Duty Status and Dress**

Figure 14 provides a breakdown of the duty status and dress of the 125 officers involved in the 94 robbery events.

POPULATION GROUP	NUMBER OF POLICE JURISDICTIONS	CASUALTY EVENTS	NON-CASUALTY EVENTS	OFFICERS IN CASUALTY EVENTS			OFFICERS IN NON-CASUALTY EVENTS
				Killed	Injured	Uninjured	
1,900- 25,000	13	11	2	3	10		4
25,000- 50,000	6	6		4	2		
50,000- 100,000	4	4		1	4	1	
100,000- 200,000	10	11	2	5	6		2
200,000- 300,000	3	3		1	2		
300,000- 400,000	4	3	3	2	1	1	4
400,000- 500,000	3	2	1	1	2	1	1
500,000- 600,000	3	2	5		3		7
600,000- 700,000	5	4	6	3	1		9
700,000- 800,000	4	5	1		7	4	2
800,000- 900,000	1	1			1		
900,000-1,000,000	1	3	3		4	1	3
1,000,000-1,500,000	1	1			2		
1,500,000-2,000,000	2	3	1	2	1		1
2,000,000-2,500,000							
2,500,000-3,000,000	1	1	2		1	1	2
8,000,000	1	7	1	1	8	2	1
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>36</b>

**Figure 12**  
**VICTIM PERSONNEL LAW ENFORCEMENT**  
**JURISDICTION POPULATIONS**

RANK OR STATUS	A Killed	B Injured	WITH A OR B	NON-CASUALTIES	TOTALS
Patrolmen	14	47	11	29	101
Detective	3	2		2	7
Sergeant	3	4		4	
Detective Sergeant				1	12
Command Rank					
Lieutenant	1	1			
Captain	1				4
Chief	1				
Other		1			1
TOTALS	23	55	11	36	125

**Figure 13**  
**VICTIM RANK OR STATUS**

**On Duty/In Uniform.** Among the 91 officers on duty and in uniform, 15 (16 percent) were killed, 40 (44 percent) were injured. Thus, 60 percent of those on duty and in uniform were casualties. Seven (8 percent) uninjured companion officers who were assaulted, and 29 (80 percent) of the 36 officers involved in non-casualty events, were on duty and in uniform.

**On Duty/In Plainclothes.** Among the 18 officers in this category, ten (55 percent) were casualties. Of the eight uninjured officers, four were assaulted in casualty events and four in non-casualty events.

**Off Duty/In Uniform.** All four of the officers in this category were casualties.

**Off Duty/In Plainclothes.** Nine (75 percent) of the 12 officers in this category were casualties; three (25 percent) were assaulted in non-casualty events.

DUTY STATUS AND DRESS	OFFICERS IN CASUALTY EVENTS			OFFICERS IN NON-CASUALTY EVENTS	TOTAL
	Killed	Injured	Uninjured		
On Duty/In Uniform	15	40	7	29	91
On Duty/In Plainclothes	4	6	4	4	18
On Duty Totals	19	46	11	33	109
Off Duty/In Uniform	2	2			4
Off Duty/In Plainclothes	2	7		3	12
Off Duty Totals	4	9		3	16

**Figure 14**  
**DUTY STATUS AND DRESS OF VICTIM OFFICERS**

### Duty Assignments

Ninety-two of the 125 officers were assigned to motor patrol duty. Although 52 percent of those officers patrolled in a two-man unit, most of the casualties (56 percent) occurred among officers assigned to one-man units. Of the 29 officers on motor patrol in non-casualty events, 18 were assigned to two-man units. See Figure 15. Only five officers encountered robbery suspects while on foot patrol.

Officers working off duty as security guards appear to occupy a high risk position. All six officers employed in this capacity were casualties in the robbery events that were examined in this study: four officers were injured; two were killed.

DUTY ASSIGNMENT	OFFICERS IN CASUALTY EVENTS			OFFICERS IN NON-CASUALTY EVENTS
	Killed	Injured	Uninjured	
MOTOR PATROL				
One-Man Unit	13	17		11
Two-Man Unit	4	19	7	18
Three-Man Unit		1	2	
FOOT PATROL	1	2	1	1
STAKEOUT	2	3	1	2
OFF DUTY				
Security Guard	2	4		
Other	1	6		3
FIXED POST OR HEADQUARTERS		3		1
TOTALS	23	55	11	36

**Figure 15  
DUTY ASSIGNMENT OF VICTIM OFFICERS**

### Age

The average age of the 125 law enforcement officers involved in both casualty and non-casualty events was 31.4 years. See Figure 16. The average age of those officers above the rank of patrolman who were not injured in the non-casualty cases was 32.4, 11 years younger than the average age of higher ranking officers who were casualties (43.4). Similarly, the non-injured patrolmen in both casualty and non-casualty events averaged three years younger than the casualty victims of that rank. Regardless of rank, all non-injured victims in both casualty and non-casualty events were an average of five years younger than those officers who became casualties.

VICTIM RANK OR STATUS	OFFICERS IN CASUALTY EVENTS						OFFICERS IN NON-CASUALTY EVENTS		OFFICERS IN ALL EVENTS	
	Killed		Injured		Uninjured		No.	Av. Age	No.	Av. Age
	No.	Av. Age	No.	Av. Age	No.	Av. Age				
Above Patrolmen	9	47.7	8	39.1			7	32.4	24	40.4
Patrolmen	14	31.0	47	29.8	11	29.3	29	27.6	101	29.3
TOTALS	23	36.4	55	31.1	11	29.3	36	28.6	125	31.4

**Figure 16  
AVERAGE AGE OF OFFICERS**

**Race**

Of the 125 law enforcement personnel who were assaulted in the 94 robbery events studied, 116 were white, eight were black, and one was oriental. All of the 23 officers who were killed were white. Of the 55 officers who were injured, 49 were white, five were black, and one was oriental. Of the officers who were not injured in the casualty event grouping, ten were white, one was black. Of the 36 officers who were assault victims in the events where no one was injured or killed, 34 were white and two were black. See Figure 17.

**Length of Service**

The length of service for the 125 police officers involved in the 94 robbery events ranged from one-half year to 27 years. The following table illustrates average length of service of these officers according to the severity of the assault.

	Casualty Event	Non-Casualty Event
Fatalities	10.17 years	
Injuries	5.99 years	
Non-Casualties	4.12 years	5.24 years

Fifty-six percent of the officers who died and 31 percent of the officers wounded had more than six years of police service. Only ten percent of the officers uninjured in a casualty event had more

RACE	OFFICERS IN CASUALTY EVENTS			OFFICERS IN NON-CASUALTY EVENTS	TOTALS
	Killed	Injured	Uninjured		
White	23	49	10	34	116
Black		5	1	2	8
Other		1			1
TOTALS	23	55	11	36	125

**Figure 17  
OFFICERS BY RACE**

than six years of police service, while 23 percent of the officers in non-casualty events had at least six years of police service. See Figure 18.

### Training Received

**Basic Recruit Training.** The recruit training received by the 125 officers involved in the 94 robbery assault events studied by the IACP field investigators ranged from no recruit training at all for 13 officers, who became casualties, to 24 weeks for one officer who became a casualty. See Figure 19.

Of the 78 officers who were casualties, 17 percent (13 officers) received no formal recruit training. Of the 47 officers who were uninjured, all had received a minimum of four weeks of recruit training. The majority of the officers involved in non-casualty events received between 14-17 weeks of training. Training for the remainder in the non-casualty category ranged from 23 weeks of training for one officer to four weeks for five others.

**In-Service Training.** At least 16 of the 62 agencies visited provided no type of *in-service training*. In addition, approximately 40 percent of the 125 officers had not received any *firearms training* within the year preceding the attack. Several officers last qualified with their service revolvers from 18 months to five years prior to the event in which they were involved. Two never had a chance to qualify with their service revolvers. On the other hand, at least 12 percent of the 125 officers were deemed "expert shots" or "expert marksmen" by their agencies. Several victims were actually instructors or assistant firearms instructors in their respective departments.








Figure 18  
OFFICERS' LENGTH OF SERVICE



- *Firearms Training.* Two of the officers who were killed were members of police departments which required firearms training, but in each case the required PPC practice was on a 50 foot indoor range (one in the basement of the police station) which is not necessarily suited for Practical Pistol Course (PPC) training.

In at least two events, although the assaulted officer was armed with a *shotgun*, he had never received formal instruction in its loading, functioning, or firing. This lack of shotgun training was noted for the majority of victims, at least one third of whom had access to a shotgun during their tour of duty.

- *Firearms Qualification.* The modified PPC course appears to be used most frequently by those agencies which require *firearms qualification*. In several instances, officers received extra firearms training, either during recruit training or during in-service sessions, to enable them to qualify.

Apparently a dozen officers who could not qualify on a PPC (or modified PPC) course where such updating of skills was mandatory had no remedial firearms training available to them, and were not required to meet minimum standards in order to continue their active patrol status. In one instance, there was no requirement for qualification, although it was the department's policy to have its officers shoot the PPC each year.

In only a very few instances was there an indication that officers were required to qualify with their off-duty handguns. With respect to instruction in the use of *off duty* revolvers<sup>6</sup>, shotguns, and rifles, the following information was compiled:

Off duty revolver instruction	One agency
Shotgun instruction	Five agencies (including the above)
Rifle instruction	Three agencies (including one of the five)

**Specialized Courses.** Training courses for risk reduction in robbery events, appear to be specialized courses rarely made available to trained police officers. However, several departments had provided related courses including: "Patrol Procedures;" "Auto Theft;" "Response Cases;" "Sniper Defense;" "Defensive Tactics;" and "Burglary Investigation."

In several of the 94 events analyzed, *hostages* were involved, particularly in retail sales establishments. Few police agencies were found to provide specialized training courses relating to problems peculiar to robbery hostage situations. One notable exception, the New York City Police Department, has developed an excellent training program for dealing with this problem. Elements of this program are disseminated through the medium of video cassette tapes for viewing by units in the field.

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<sup>6</sup>At least two officers' lives were probably saved because they had ready access to ankle-holstered guns.






Figure 19  
EXTENT OF RECRUIT TRAINING



Few agencies offered training courses designed to increase the officer's ability to handle barricaded suspects. Few agencies had specialized units equipped to cope with situations involving hostages or barricaded suspects.

**Physical Fitness.** Since many of the 125 officers involved in the 94 robbery events were in close physical contact with their assailants, ongoing *physical fitness classes and/or mock* exercises in which both physical alacrity and a variety of defenses are tested, are particularly important. At least one of the 13 officers who died was unable to defend himself from an unexpected stabbing because he was physically unfit.

### ASSAILANT PROFILES

A total of 144 suspects were involved in the 94 robbery events. Of those 144, 136 were identified and 132 apprehended or killed. The following description of robbery assailants is given in two parts:

- those 95 identified suspects involved in the 67 events in which an officer casualty occurred
- those 41 identified suspects involved in the 27 non-casualty events

#### Suspects Involved in Casualty Events

**Suspects Apprehended or Killed.** Although a total of 102 suspects assaulted officers in the 67 casualty events, only 95 were identified. The other seven, involved in six events, escaped apprehension. In the remaining 61 events, 17 armed suspects were killed, and 74 apprehended, a total of 91. The remaining four suspects, who were identified, escaped. The percentages for those suspects apprehended or killed in casualty events are as follows:

### CASUALTY EVENTS

	Number of Suspects	Percentage
Killed	17	18.69
Apprehended	74	81.31
<hr/>		
TOTAL	91	100.00
Number of Wounded Among Those Arrested	23	31.08

**Personal History.** Sixty-four of the 91 suspects apprehended or killed had extensive criminal records for offenses committed either as an adult or as a juvenile. Twenty-nine of those with extensive criminal records had previously been arrested for crimes of armed robbery. Incidents of previous crimes of assault were recorded for 29 suspects, and 25 had criminal records that reflected involvement with narcotics. Seventy-three suspects were black; 18 were white. Sixty-three suspects were in their twenties; 12 were teen-agers; 16 suspects were at least 30 years or older. Eight were characterized by police reports as exhibiting some kind of mental disorder. The physical characteristics of all suspects were outwardly normal.

**Weapons Employed.** Weapons used by suspects ranged from a stabbing instrument to a submachine gun. The .38 Special handgun, employed by 28 assailants, was by far the most commonly used weapon. The following chart gives the breakdown of weapons according to type, caliber, and frequency of use.

Handguns Caliber	Shotguns Bore Size	Rifles Caliber	Submachine guns Caliber	Stabbing Instruments
.22 (8)	.410 (1)	.30 Carbine (2)	.45 ACP (1)	Knife (3)
.25 ACP (3)	20 (1)	.30-30 (1)		
.32 ACP (3)	16 (1)			
.32 (11)	12 (7)			
.38 Special (28)				
.38 ACP (1)				
9mm (6)				
.45 ACP (4)				
.357 Magnum (3)				

**Suspects Involved in Non-Casualty Events**

**Suspects Apprehended Or Killed.** A total of 43 suspects assaulted officers in the 27 non-casualty robbery events. Six armed suspects were killed, 35 apprehended, and two escaped unidentified. Of those arrested, 15 were wounded by police gunfire prior to apprehension; one was wounded by an employee of the establishment being robbed. In contrast to seven casualty cases for which no suspects were apprehended, at least one suspect was arrested in each of the 27 non-casualty robbery events. The percentage of suspects killed or apprehended in non-casualty events is provided on the next page.

**Personal History.** Twenty-five of the 41 suspects apprehended or killed had extensive criminal records for offenses committed as an adult or juvenile. Eleven suspects had committed prior armed robberies; assault was recorded in 11 criminal histories and the records of 15 suspects reflected an involvement with narcotics. Thirty-three assailants were black; eight were white. Twenty-five were in their twenties; 11 were teen-agers. The remaining five suspects were between 30 and 35 years of age. Two of the suspects were characterized by police reports as exhibiting some kind of mental disorder. The physical characteristics of all suspects were outwardly normal.

## NON-CASUALTY EVENTS

	Number of Suspects	Percentage
Killed	6	14.63
Apprehended	35	85.36
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TOTAL	41	100.00
Number of Wounded		
Among Those Arrested	16	45.71

**Weapons Employed.** The weapon most commonly utilized by assailants in non-casualty events was the .38 Special handgun (7). Although the assailants employed a wide variety of weapons, as did the suspects in the casualty events, no rifles or submachine guns were used. Two imitation handguns were carried. The following table gives the breakdown of weapons according to type, caliber, and frequency of use in non-casualty events.

Handguns Caliber	Shotguns Bore Size	Imitation Weapons	Stabbing Instrument
.22 (5)	20 (1)	.38 (blank) (1)	Knife (1)
.25 (1)	12 (3)	Toy revolver (1)	
.32 ACP (2)			
.36 (1)			
.38 Special (7)			
.38 (6)			
9 mm (4)			
.45 ACP (1)			
.357 Magnum (2)			



## **SECTION TWO**

### **RISK REDUCTION MEASURES IN ROBBERY EVENTS**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

The crime of robbery is not new. The practice by a few of taking things of value from the person of another by means of force or fear has been evident in most societies for centuries. When undertaken by armed individuals the potential for victim death or injury is great. Police who interdict a robbery, or who are in immediate pursuit of robbery suspects, face similar if not greater risk. In the last 10 years, the number of officers killed in connection with robbery events has increased 123 percent. The volume of robbery crimes, however, in proportion to all other crimes and activities likely to involve police action, is low. In terms of the seven Index offenses, robbery accounts for only four percent of the total. The high risk, therefore, is certainly disproportionate to the volume. Of all of the crimes of violence, however, robbery events account for nearly one half of the total. Every effort must be made to make officers aware of the serious potential for casualty inherent in responding to robbery events or in pursuit of robbery suspects.

Although the crime of robbery is characteristic of an urban setting, it does not always involve officers in large metropolitan areas. Over one-half of the casualty events occurred in cities of 400,000 or less. Ninety-five percent involved officers of a municipal agency and the great majority were patrolmen assigned to patrol duty.

Just as an increase in the patrol strength of an agency may produce an increase in the number of reported crimes, a parallel may be drawn with response time or deployment and the risk of casualty. The hypothesis is that as an agency increases its ability to respond more quickly to major crimes in progress, the risk of casualty also increases. Agency heads, and Commanders, must insure that the proper measures of accomplishing risk reduction are consistent with all other efforts to develop overall agency effectiveness.

To be practical and productive, tactics, equipment, and training for risk reduction in robbery events must complement the requirements of the total law enforcement mission and the effective procedures for accomplishing that mission. Fortunately, such measures can realistically be approached through the application of conventional law enforcement capabilities and resources in tactics, equipment, and training that are, for the most part, now at hand or readily available. In most instances, the application and refinement of standing operational procedures and tactics, the proper employment of items of police equipment now in inventory, and, especially, the orientation of current training programs to include the problem of risks inherent in robbery events should produce a substantial measure of risk reduction.

Sound tactics and procedures backed by adequate equipment and good training can reduce risks. A straightforward common sense approach to the problem will produce a number of new and improved policies, procedures, and tactics that will increase the protection of law enforcement personnel and assist them in safely handling and responding to robbery events.

The following discussion is based upon interviews with experienced and knowledgeable police officers, many of whom were involved in robbery situations; a search, review, and analysis of recent robbery events; and a survey and evaluation of practical law enforcement technology. The opportunities for risk reduction are considered in such critical tactical and procedural areas as: the role of the law enforcement manager, complaint and dispatch, threat identification, site surveys, false alarm control, and communication security. In addition, the areas of intelligence, training, and equipment are also discussed in the same perspective. The overall objective of this discussion is to present a definitive framework for engaging in a risk reduction effort consistent with individual agency needs and requirements.

## **ROLE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGER**

Armed robberies are now among the most common high risk situations encountered in law enforcement activities. Immediate, effective action must be taken by law enforcement managers to reduce this threat to officer safety, and the exercise of good leadership is one of the most basic tools needed to accomplish this pressing task. Policies and procedures also must be developed and implemented to insure that officer actions and field tactics are carried out safely and effectively. Although the exercise of common sense and good judgment are much sought after qualities in the personnel recruited by the law enforcement manager, proper guidelines must be established to insure expected performance.

### **Setting the Example**

If law enforcement managers and supervisors fail to follow risk reduction practices in the field, it cannot be expected that their men will, nevertheless, perform their duties in a safe and correct manner. The following are a few examples of failures among leadership personnel involved in armed robberies:

- A captain on routine patrol stopped a suspect vehicle that had been involved in an armed robbery. Upon receiving the driver's license and vehicle registration slip, the officer placed his revolver in the waistband of his trousers. While the officer's attention was diverted, the suspect drew a hand gun from between the seat cushions and fired five shots at point-blank range, striking the captain four times in the head and upper torso.

- A lieutenant was off duty and in a tavern when three heavily armed suspects entered and attempted a robbery. Although he was covered by a suspect holding a sawed-off shotgun, and numerous customers and employees were nearby, the lieutenant drew his weapon and began firing at the suspects. The officer and a customer sitting next to him were wounded by shotgun fire from the suspect covering him.
- A sergeant dispatched to investigate a silent alarm at a bank parked in clear view and then exited his vehicle on the side nearest the bank. At this instant, a robbery suspect holding a hostage came through the rear door, caught the officer in the open between his vehicle and the robbery suspect, and killed him.
- A sergeant dispatched to the home of an armed robbery suspect parked directly in front of the suspect's home, and was killed by shots in the face and neck.
- Three sergeants, one working off duty as a security guard, another responding to a silent hold-up alarm, and the third following a suspect vehicle, were surprised and disarmed by armed robbery suspects in three separate events.
- A police chief, unarmed and alone, stopped a suspect vehicle in the early morning hours and while his attention was diverted, was stabbed 32 times.

Risk reduction must begin with law enforcement managers and supervisors. Their conduct sets the standard of performance for their agency or department. As these events illustrate, any law enforcement officer, regardless of rank, is apt to become involved in an armed robbery event. For self-preservation as well as for the safety of those they supervise, leadership personnel must know and apply risk reducing practices.

### **Taking Charge**

Effective field supervisors must be willing and able to take control of fast developing tactical situations. Armed robbery tends to be a multiple participant crime that requires a coordinated response if police intervention is to be carried to a successful conclusion with a minimum of risk.

The importance of effective on-site deployment of police manpower is illustrated by the fact that the majority of all officer injuries were inflicted upon personnel who were alone at the instant of the assault, though frequently, other officers were nearby in numbers equal to or greater than those of the robbery suspects. In these events, a lack of command and control, hasty ill-advised action, or

a breakdown in coordination rendered officers unable to assist one another in times of critical need. Thus, the risk-reducing potential of superior manpower was never realized.

## Field Supervision

Officer complacency was one of the greatest causes of death or injury in the armed robbery events investigated in this study. The effects of complacency psychologically disarm the officer and prevent him from detecting or avoiding threats to his safety.

Aggressive and forceful supervision is required to counteract this tendency and to reinforce a good risk reduction program and the application of professionally informed common sense. Two of the events studied offer telling examples of the destructive effects of unwarranted complacency. In the first of these events, an officer who was alert to the potential hazard of his situation nevertheless ignored every elementary precaution. This officer observed a man running away from an all night service station. Although the officer knew that this service station had been robbed twice during the previous two weeks, he failed to notify his dispatcher, left his shotgun in his vehicle, and, with his revolver holstered, approached to within a few feet of the suspect. The suspect opened fire at close range, critically wounding the officer.

In the second event, the officer was also aware that the location had been robbed a month before. As in the first event, the officer observed a man running away from a service station. Failing to notify his dispatcher, the officer left his vehicle with his service revolver still holstered, and began to question the suspect who had one hand in his coat pocket holding a pistol. The suspect drew his weapon and killed the officer.

These cases illustrate a blind disregard of the most obvious danger signals. But as another event demonstrates, even an officer who determines to follow the best procedures can slip into complacency. In this event, the officer's first actions were exemplary. While operating a one-man unit, this officer observed a man running from the parking lot of a convenience market. Because he knew that this store had been robbed on previous occasions, the officer was alert to the possibility of an extremely dangerous confrontation. He drew his service revolver and blocked the suspect's path with his patrol car. The officer pointed his revolver at the suspect and ordered him to remove his hands from his pockets and step away from the patrol car. After the suspect complied, the officer exited his vehicle while still holding the suspect at gunpoint. To this moment in the event, with the exception of a failure to notify his dispatcher, the officer proceeded correctly and with caution. Unfortunately, the officer's vigilance then lapsed. Observing that the suspect did not have a weapon in his hand, the officer holstered his revolver and searched the suspect. When the officer attempted to handcuff the suspect, a struggle ensued in which the suspect grabbed the officer's service revolver and, though wounded by shots from the officer's back-up gun, fled the scene. In this event, the officer could have been seriously injured or killed by his own gun.

As these examples illustrate, supervisors must be constantly on the alert to counter complacent attitudes and failures to carry out risk-reducing policies, procedures, and tactics. Without the constant watchfulness and constructive criticism of supervisory personnel who should be in constant contact with officers in the field, every possible approved technique of risk reduction will at some time or another be defeated by the effects of officer complacency. It is the job of the law enforcement managers to see that this requirement for strong supervision and corrective action is fully satisfied. If supervisors fail in this area, all of their other efforts to reduce risks will be greatly hampered and, in many instances, will be useless.

## TACTICS

### Complaint and Dispatch

Law enforcement complaint and radio dispatch personnel must make every effort to gather all of the information possible concerning a reported robbery event and to insure that this information is passed on without delay, omission, or distortion to dispatched officers. A failure to properly perform these functions greatly increases the likelihood of police casualties. In one armed robbery event examined in this study, the officer was not advised that an alarm had been activated but only that there was "some type of disturbance" at a bank. Upon arriving at the scene, the officer parked his vehicle in front of the building and paused to say hello to a friend. When the officer reached the bank entrance, a suspect knocked him to the ground and shot him in the face, killing him instantly.

Complaint reception personnel must be trained to gather all the vital information they can from callers. If possible, the caller should be kept on the line in critical situations to continually expand the information until police units actually arrive at the scene. When interrogating callers, complaint reception personnel should use short, simple, and direct questions. This technique helps prevent confusion, helps the person taking the complaint to maintain control of the conversation, and usually saves time.

From the standpoint of risk reduction in robbery calls, during or immediately following the event, quickly securing the following information is most important:

1. Where is the robbery taking place?
2. Where are you calling from? (Number and Location)
3. What is your name and telephone number?
4. Can you see the scene?
5. Are the suspects armed?
6. How many suspects are there?
7. What do the suspects look like?
8. Are there any other persons involved?
9. If so, how many?
10. Is an officer already there or approaching the scene?

Information regarding the robbery suspects is, of course, highly critical, but data on bystanders is also important. Their presence clutters the observations of responding officers, and as a result, precious time is lost in interpreting the scene. Law enforcement officers must never assume that any person at a robbery scene is an innocent bystander. In addition, information regarding how much the caller saw and at what time he saw it can help determine the completeness of the information. Although the caller should be kept on the line, a call-back number should be taken as a precaution against a broken connection or a crank call.

Radio dispatch personnel are responsible for transmitting clearly and quickly all information regarding the armed robbery that they have been furnished by complaint reception personnel. It is essential that dispatchers do not reformulate or subjectively interpret information.

Because of the importance of proper radio dispatch in reducing risks, rigorous standards must be used when selecting and assigning dispatch personnel. Radio dispatch is not a routine administrative function; it is a vital part of all police activity. The radio dispatch function merits the constant attention of law enforcement managers and supervisors.

### **Threat Identification**

Like many other crimes, robbery events will occasionally exhibit recurring patterns of frequency, time, place, and manner of occurrence. Since knowledge of these patterns can assist in risk reduction, police agencies should analyze all pertinent data regarding recent robberies to provide field personnel with timely caution alerts and threat estimates.

A police officer who is enroute to an alarm or following up a report of a disturbance will tend to be more cautious if he knows that the site or area that he is approaching has recently been the target of armed robbers. Similarly, if the officer is aware that a number of armed robberies have occurred during the late evening hours and on the weekends, he is likely to mark these times as periods of increased risk and proceed with greater caution. In addition, if the officer knows that a group of suspects operating in his area often employ an armed accomplice posing as a patron, the officer might be more likely to call for assistance at the scene before taking police action.

The key is the exercise of informed caution. An officer, if forewarned, can often be depended upon to take steps to increase his safety in a potentially dangerous situation. To be effective, however, threat identification must be part of an integrated program for risk reduction.

**Crime Analysis.** One of the great weaknesses in police operational activity is a lack of definitive information regarding crime. This information is vital to patrol commanders who must make deployment decisions for effective patrol coverage. Merely supplying information about volume and

location forces each commander to literally follow the pattern after the fact, a situation analogous to "locking the barn after the wagon has been taken".

A more intelligent view would be for each agency or group of agencies within a metropolitan area to engage in an in-depth program of analysis of crime within their respective jurisdictions. Such a program should include the study of a wide range of relevant inputs to spot trends and common elements and, if possible, identify factors that tend to be associated with crime. An important feature of any crime analysis program should also include information on suspects—people in and out of the community who have engaged or are likely to engage in criminal activity in the jurisdictions.

Access to the facility of electronic data processing would be most helpful since large amounts of data would be involved. In the absence of such capability, manual manipulation of the data can still result in very useful information. In both modes, careful study and thoughtful analysis must eventually be employed to unlock the information contained in the data. The final step in the process would be to provide patrol commanders with the results of the analysis so that appropriate measures can be taken.

Risk reduction does not necessarily follow a reduction in crime. There is merit to the thought that as we increase the capability of police to reduce crime through faster response and more frequent interdiction, we also increase the risk of casualty.

**Crime and Incident Reporting.** A system of complete incident reporting will greatly enhance any program of crime analysis and thus, threat identification. All too often, valuable information is not collected simply because the system or agency policy does not encourage complete reporting.

Incident control begins with the receipt of the initial complaint and continues until a report or proper disposition is made of that incident. In many cases, agencies need not do much more than they are doing now with reporting and recording of information. Greater utility of this data, however, should be sought by maximizing the control and completeness of information taken or supplied by complaint reception personnel, radio dispatcher, and secured from field officers. This data should then be integrated into the total crime and incident reporting system of the agency to provide a sound base for crime analysis and threat identification.

### Site Surveys

The police officer is more likely to survive an encounter with armed gunmen if he is familiar with the surroundings in which the robbery event takes place. Officers must be able to quickly determine

the exact location of the robbery and must be familiar with the surroundings, building construction and fixtures of the establishment, bank, store, or business involved. Criminals often take great care to obtain this kind of information before attempting an armed robbery, and if officers are not at least as well prepared, they are apt to be at a tactical disadvantage.

The fatal results of two robbery events best illustrate the critical need for this kind of orientation. In one bizarre robbery event, two suspects entered a Western Union office. The clerk, who had been talking to a local radio station, was ordered to drop his headset, but in doing so, he did not break the connection. The employees of the radio station notified the police and officers were dispatched knowing that a robbery was actually in progress. The first two officers on the scene were not aware of the exact location of the Western Union office which was situated in a motel complex. The officers went to the motel office and mistakenly took the motel manager into custody. Another officer, who knew the location of the Western Union office, approached the robbery scene while the event was in progress. He was shot in the head and killed instantly. The other officers, though only a short distance away, did not locate the Western Union office until they heard the shot.

In another event, two patrolmen and a detective responded to investigate a silent holdup alarm at a local tavern. The officers knew that this tavern had a very low false alarm rate and that it usually maintained a large sum of money to cash checks for local residents. The two patrolmen arrived first and observed two armed robbers inside the building. The detective then arrived and proceeded to enter the tavern through the front door. One patrolman ran to the rear of the building to cover an exit. The other patrolman stationed himself outside the front of the building. An exchange of gunfire occurred within the tavern. At this critical moment, the patrolman at the rear of the tavern was guarding an exit that had been securely nailed shut. Though this officer had previously patrolled the back of the tavern on numerous occasions, he had failed to obtain any information on the serviceability of that exit. As the detective, who was mortally wounded, fell backward through the front door, the robbers escaped by an alternate rear exit that was out of the view of the two patrolmen.

In the first of these events, because of their unfamiliarity with the locality, two officers were prevented from assisting another officer who was killed. In the second event, one officer was rendered ineffective at a critical moment through a lack of knowledge of the physical characteristics of the premises. He was not able to help the officer who was killed nor was he able to apprehend the killers.

There are two ways in which to reduce risks and prevent a recurrence of these errors. First, the police officer must make every effort to inspect and familiarize himself with the area to which he is assigned. The vital knowledge gained firsthand by on-the-spot surveys of locations and buildings can prevent surprise and isolation, and greatly increase the feasibility and effectiveness of mutual



cooperation and support. As it will be impossible to learn and remember everything about a locality, the officer should concentrate his attention on the following:

- Buildings equipped with alarm systems
- Places having a recent or recurring history of robbery in the neighborhood.
- Business establishments that because of location, business hours, cash on hand, and clientele may be inviting targets for robbers.

Second, officers should look for things that are the most important for reducing risks during the critical first moments of a confrontation. During patrol, officers should identify:

- Peculiarities in location or the surrounding area that might make a high risk premises difficult to find or approach.
- Distinguishing characteristics in construction or decoration that might help other officers to quickly identify the building.
- Cover and concealment outside the establishment. (See Figures 20 and 21.)
- Places for observation that could be used by a lookout or other accomplices.
- Likely spots for a getaway vehicle to be parked.
- Windows and glass doors that may provide a view into the interior of the establishment.
- Obstructed entrances and exits.
- Interior layout including corridors, aisles, stairs, and doors.
- Interior fixtures such as large display cases or cabinets, manager's booths, check-out stands, teller's cages, counters, storage rooms, produce or meat lockers, and the like that afford readily available cover and concealment.



**Figure 20**  
**POSSIBLE EMERGENCY LOCATIONS FOR CONCEALMENT**  
**OR COVER IN RESIDENTIAL AREA**

When conducting surveys, officers should note especially those things about the location or construction of an establishment that would pose the greatest dangers or difficulties in a robbery event. For example, a supper club that has a high robbery rate may have an entrance that opens into a short corridor with an enclosed coat room or perhaps a check stand and counter. Obviously this kind of arrangement poses great hazards for any officer who rushes down the corridor and past the coat room or check stand without first pausing to check these areas for the presence of a concealed suspect. But if he has noted this hazard beforehand, the officer will know what to expect and can take preventive action to reduce risks.

This kind of information is especially important when the layout of a building does not permit officers to observe the interior before entering. In one of the robbery events studied, two officers investigating a silent holdup alarm at a grocery store in a high crime area attempted to enter the




Figure 21  
POSSIBLE EMERGENCY LOCATIONS FOR CONCEALMENT  
OR COVER IN COMMERCIAL AREA

store through the front entrance. Due to the design of the building, it was impossible to see the inside of the store from the street. As the first officer carrying a shotgun came through the door, a suspect concealed behind a nearby meat counter opened fire, grazing the officer in the head. The injured officer fired two shots and fell backward through the door onto the sidewalk. While the injured officer was getting to his feet, the suspect ran through the front door, shot the injured officer a second time, and fled the scene. In this event, an armed robbery suspect was able to exploit the advantages of a concealed position to obtain a decisive tactical advantage and effect a successful escape.

Of course, on-the-spot surveys will not always be possible. An officer may be assigned on short notice to patrol a neighborhood or commercial district where he has never been before, or he may be dispatched to assist at a location lying outside of his normal area of responsibility. And it must

not be assumed that even an officer who is a veteran of a particular beat will know or remember every important fact about his area. The preparation of site survey cards for use by dispatch officers is one of the most effective ways to overcome unfamiliarity and lack of first hand knowledge. As illustrated in Figure 22, site survey cards should be prepared according to the criteria previously outlined, and then indexed in data banks or files organized for quick retrieval in an emergency. Thus, when an officer is enroute to the scene of a robbery event, the file can be instantly searched, the appropriate card extracted, and pertinent information communicated to the officer in the most timely and complete manner possible. Many fire departments utilize similar information systems to guide fire fighters as they approach the scene of an alarm.

### **False Alarm Control**

False alarms are indirectly probably one of the greatest causes of police casualties in robbery events. Large numbers of false alarms cause officers to be complacent when responding to alarm calls. If an alarm system is effective and transmits a signal without delay, response time is greatly reduced. However, this increases the possibility of a confrontation with robbery suspects who may be heavily armed. Of course, if officers contact suspects at or near the scene of the robbery, the chances of apprehension are also potentially very good. But if the officers have been lulled into a false sense of security by previous false alarms, the result of this encounter is likely to be disastrous.

In the robbery events studied, 24 officers responded to an actual alarm. Nine of these officers were injured and five were killed. In most of these events, the officers had been mentally disarmed by high false alarm rates and were not psychologically prepared to cope with the presence of armed robbery suspects.

Two events are particularly indicative of the lack of caution many officers display when answering alarm calls. In one event, an officer in a one-man unit volunteered to respond to an alarm at a jewelry store. Without pausing to survey the scene, or to draw his service revolver, the officer entered the store and was shot in the back at point blank range by one of the suspects. He died at a local hospital three hours after being shot. In the nine months prior to the death of this officer, the jewelry store in which he was killed had been the source of twenty-one false alarms. In the year in which the officer was killed, over 2,900 false alarms were recorded for that city alone.

In the other event, a detective, responding to a silent bank alarm, parked his car in full view of the bank, and without making any attempt to observe the interior of the building, approached the bank carrying a portable radio in his gun hand. The detective was immediately shot and killed by a waiting robbery suspect standing just six feet away. The city in which this fatality occurred normally experiences at least one false alarm accidentally set off each day from one of its thirty-four banking institutions.

Merchants Fur Shop

FILE: Patrol B  
Main Street  
126 North

Address: 126 North Main Street

Phone: 123-4567

Patrol/Beat Area: B

Business Hours: 9 a.m. - 6 p.m. except Sunday

Alarm: None

Owner: I. M. Merchant

Address: 126 East Suburban Drive

Phone: 456-7890

Floor Plan:




Figure 22  
SITE SURVEY CARD

There are a number of actions that can be taken to lower false alarm rates and reduce risks. A good program must be based upon cooperation among the police, the individual user, and the alarm industry. User negligence or accident is the single greatest cause of false alarms. Police agencies should educate users as to the risks posed by high false alarm rates, suggest employee orientation designed to prevent the accidental triggering of an alarm system, and stress the importance of obtaining a complete program of user instruction—to include periodic refresher training—from the alarm vendor.

Several cities have adopted or are considering ordinances levying “service charges” upon users who negligently or accidentally trigger alarms at their business locations or private residences. Although this measure might induce users to take greater care with their systems, it discriminates against small businesses that are least able to afford fines for inevitable human error. For these reasons, a less coercive approach of user education may be preferable.

Most other false alarms are caused by the faulty installation or design of alarm equipment. To reduce false alarms from system malfunctions, police agencies should consider monitoring the alarm firms in their area. An effective program of inspection and regulation can deter fly-by-night vendors, the sale of faulty equipment, or inadequate installation practices. A city ordinance giving the police the authority to license alarm system vendors is perhaps the best way to get this kind of program underway. Additionally, building code statutes could establish standards for installation. To be licensed, vendors could be required to provide the following information on a continuing basis:

- Name and address of vendor at principal place of business
  
- Complete technical descriptions of each model of alarm device sold
  
- Names and addresses of persons or businesses in the city for whom alarm devices have been sold

Every alarm system could be inspected and tested by police or city technicians after the installation had been completed. If misrepresentations as to the system’s capability or major deficiencies in the function of the system were found, the vendor would be required to take satisfactory corrective action. If he failed to do so, the vendor’s license would be revoked and he would be prohibited from conducting further business in the city.

Although the risks inherent in false alarms might be reduced by verifying the alarm by telephone, this procedure is not always reliable. If there is no answer, this is a good indication that the alarm is genuine. But even if there is an answer, the robbery victim may have been coerced into answering

telephone calls to maintain an appearance of normalcy. And of course, there is nothing to prevent an imaginative armed robber from taking the call. Simply put, an alarm verification telephone call which is unanswered is a reasonably reliable indication of a valid alarm; but an answer, no matter how cooperative, proves nothing. Officers must never assume an alarm is false.

The use of codes, a prearranged exchange of simple question and answer signals, also has limited application, since the effects of excitement or the presence of a new officer or employee personnel unfamiliar with the signals can defeat these codes.

A more reliable method for distinguishing false alarms from those that are genuine is to instruct a responsible employee, preferably the manager of the establishment or a supervisor, 1) to step outside the establishment and wait the arrival of responding police units, and 2) when the units arrive, to walk to the location of the responding officers to advise them that the alarm was inadvertently triggered. If the manager or supervisor refuses to do this, or agrees but fails to do so, it is likely that a robbery is in progress. But once again, even if the manager or supervisor complies with their instructions, officers who are at the scene must continue to exercise caution. Until a conclusive determination is made, the officers at the scene must continue to treat the alarm as genuine.

### Communications Security

The vulnerability of most police radio transmissions to interception is a well-known but frequently ignored problem. Yet the tactical intelligence gained by criminals who conduct low level intercept operations against police radio frequencies can significantly increase the risk of death or injury to officers attempting to intervene in violent crimes. In one well-planned bank robbery, the suspects entered the bank wearing police uniforms complete with stolen badges. A stolen automobile equipped with a siren, emergency lights, and police magnetic decals was to be used as an escape vehicle. One suspect, carrying a portable radio equipped with an earphone and a crystal set on the frequency of the police department radio network, was able to monitor the status of all responding police officers as they proceeded to the scene to investigate a silent alarm. Realizing that he was about to be trapped inside the bank, he attempted to flee using a hostage as a shield. The robbery suspect shot and killed an officer immediately outside the bank before being shot and killed himself. A search of the suspect's home revealed numerous two-way radios and receivers all set to police frequencies. At least four other unsolved robberies were attributed to this suspect.

The use of codes, multi-channel radio telephones, extra tactical frequencies, scramblers, and mobile digital terminals can greatly increase the difficulties of obtaining tactical intelligence through low level intercept operations or render intercept operations impossible altogether.

It may not be practical however, to equip all police patrol radio equipment with scramblers. Aside from the expense involved, the loss of one radio equipped with a scrambler can compromise the whole system. The availability of extra frequencies offers some advantage in relieving the major frequency of radio traffic for a single major event. This alone will make monitoring and intercepting more difficult unless the specific frequency likely to be used is known or similar equipment with multi-channel capability is used.

In addition to the use of particular equipment designed to reduce or eliminate interception, most agencies can develop tactical plans that can be transmitted in clear voice through the use of pre-designated codes. For example, if two units are dispatched to the scene of a robbery, a prearranged plan may call for one to cover the front and one the rear, while the dispatcher gets more information, or while a third unit is dispatched to make contact inside. The assignment for each may be predetermined and understood through the use of code, order of dispatch, or other prearranged means. Similar deployment for any occurrence or situation may be accomplished through the use of signals and "plays" much the same as a football, hockey, or basketball team might employ. The following is an excerpt from one such plan:

*Whenever a supervisor or radio dispatcher transmits the command, "Squad (identify) Execute Plan Q at (name of specific location)," that squad designated will respond and deploy in a quadrant arrangement according to the following schedule:*

*#-go to the scene, make investigation, report situation.*

*#-deploy to the northeast quadrant.*

*#-deploy to the northwest quadrant.*

*#-deploy to the southeast quadrant.*

*#-deploy to the southwest quadrant.*

## **Interagency Coordination**

A standard procedure for coordinating law enforcement activities among officers of different jurisdictions is extremely valuable to risk reduction. First, officers from smaller agencies with limited resources may, as a matter of course, be dependent upon other agencies' emergency assistance. Second, it could be that timely assistance to an officer in danger can be provided only by officers from other agencies who may be nearby. Third, when robberies occur near the borderlines of neighboring jurisdictions, officers from different agencies are likely to respond to the scene. Unless some provisions are made for command and control, this extra manpower is apt to create confusion and increase the threat to officer safety.



The necessity for interagency coordination among different jurisdictions can be best demonstrated by what occurs when coordination is lacking. In one event, a city marshal, the only sworn member of a department which had no radio dispatcher, was alerted to a robbery-in-progress at a liquor store. Accordingly, the marshal advised the dispatcher of another department of his situation and then proceeded to the scene. At the store, the marshal took two suspects into custody. Realizing that a third suspect might be nearby and armed, he again radioed to report his status and request assistance. Meanwhile, the third suspect rushed the marshal from behind. After being disarmed and shot several times by the fleeing suspects, the wounded officer again radioed his status; he also provided a description of the suspect vehicle. Soon afterward, a chase ensued with gunfire being exchanged between the suspects and officers from three other jurisdictions. The critically injured marshal was removed from the scene of the robbery and taken to a hospital by a citizen in a private automobile. Even then, police assistance had not yet arrived on the scene.

If effective coordination is to be achieved, standing arrangements must be accomplished well in advance and problems that may hinder inter-agency coordination must be identified. In many instances, a careful management review of communications capabilities, dispatch procedures, and tactical instructions for each agency will be necessary. Joint contingency plans allocating personnel and equipment according to foreseeable emergency requirements must be prepared and distributed. Provisions for centralized command and control must also be set forth in well-defined directives to be implemented in the field as the need arises. The availability of a common frequency, so officers from different jurisdictions can talk to each other, is an important consideration. If the activities of the officers from different jurisdictions who respond to a call for emergency assistance are well-integrated and purposeful, risks from armed robbery suspects can be minimized.

### **On View/Off Duty**

The off duty law enforcement officer armed and dressed in plainclothes, is extremely vulnerable if he unexpectedly encounters an armed robbery and elects to take aggressive police action. This potential is increased when the officer is employed off duty as a private guard or security watchman. Three events provide especially good examples of what usually occurred and illustrate the high risks inherent in these situations.

In the first event, an off duty patrolman, accompanied by his two-year-old son, was standing in line inside a crowded bank. While he waited in line, a suspect climbed over the protective plexiglass shield of the cashier's area and announced a holdup. The patrolman drew his revolver as he pushed his son aside and identified himself as a police officer. At this moment, another robbery suspect sitting in the business area behind the officer pointed a handgun at the officer and shouted for him to drop his gun. Shots were then exchanged between the officer and the second suspect at a range of five feet, and both were wounded. The first suspect came to the aid of his accomplice and fatally shot the police officer who lay wounded and helpless on the bank floor.

In another event, a patrolman was seated at a bar in a small neighborhood cafe when four armed suspects, one with a shotgun, entered and announced a robbery. The officer attempted to draw his weapon when the armed suspect nearest him was distracted. During an exchange of gunfire which ensued, both the officer and a nearby customer were wounded. All four suspects made a successful escape.

In the third event, an off duty patrolman was in a clothing store obtaining his paycheck for part-time employment as a security guard. A suspect armed with a revolver approached and demanded money. As the floor manager dropped to the floor (a tactic previously devised between the officer and manager), the patrolman drew his weapon, identified himself as a police officer, and grabbed the armed robber with his left arm. As the officer pulled the robber against him, a second suspect positioned behind a rack of clothing began shooting at the officer. Using the first suspect as a shield, the patrolman returned the fire. Both the officer and the suspect shooting at him were wounded in this exchange of fire.

As these events indicate, an off duty officer is at an extreme disadvantage whenever he acts hastily in an attempt to interdict an armed robbery. In most cases, the decisive tactical advantages inherent in surprise, cover and concealment, rapid target identification, a good field of fire, mutual support, and superiority in numbers and firepower are all likely to be held by the robbery suspects. Pausing briefly to devise a plan of action can significantly increase the officer's opportunities to escape death or serious injury when he initiates police action; but even then, the potential for casualty is high.

In one event examined in this study, an officer, while shopping with his wife and child, saw a single suspect committing an armed robbery at the liquor department of a supermarket. The officer waited until his suspicions were confirmed. He decided upon a plan of action, quickly approached the suspect from behind, utilizing the floor displays for cover and concealment as he moved, and followed the suspect into an area clear of customers. He then attempted to take the suspect into custody. The suspect suddenly spun to the left and the officer heard a shot fired. Believing that the suspect was firing at him, the officer fired two shots at point blank range, fatally wounding the suspect. The first shot, however, came from a second suspect concealed near the store exit. Although that suspect fired shots as he fled, the officer was not injured.

The off duty officer who attempts to stop an armed robbery almost always acts singly without the support of officers nearby. If wounded, he is at the mercy of the armed suspects. Generally, the officer has no means of radio communication and is usually dependent on the possibility that other people will recognize him as a police officer and summon police assistance. He is usually armed with an off duty weapon—one that may sacrifice fire power for light weight and concealability. Moreover, his proficiency with such a weapon may never have been tested. Generally, the off duty officer gives little thought to the possibility that an armed robbery may be attempted in his presence.

When a robbery is initiated, the off duty officer is as surprised as anyone else. In many events, the officer's actions are simply a reflex action to stop the robbery. At the moment the officer draws his weapon and identifies himself, he is in the worst possible tactical position. Additionally, the officer may have members of his family with him; if so, their safety must be considered. The officer's visual and psychological perception of his surroundings can be distorted by the presence of innocent bystanders and a concern for their safety. His judgment may be clouded and his reactions slowed or confused by the sudden interruption of the normal situation. In such situations, the officer's attention is drawn automatically to the suspect(s) that are plainly visible and nearest him. Often this concentration is so intense that little or no consideration is given to the possibility of a nearby accomplice. Thus, he becomes a "sitting duck" and vulnerable to attack from unexpected quarters. If this occurs, it is almost certain the officer will become a casualty.

When an off duty officer unexpectedly encounters a robbery, his first course of action—unless it is necessary to immediately intervene to protect the life of another or his own life—is to pose as a bystander and allow the robbery to progress. As the situation develops, the officer will gain the time required to accurately estimate the situation and begin to formulate a plan of action. He will have an opportunity to locate and observe the suspects, noting their descriptions, method of operation, and any other identifying characteristics. As each second passes, the officer can learn more about the situation and suspects. When satisfied that he has a good estimate of the situation and knows the whereabouts of all the suspects, the officer should consider identifying himself and taking overt police action. This option, however, should be rejected if the officer is at great tactical disadvantage, or if innocent bystanders could be hurt. Any doubts should suggest that the officer remain in a passive, watchful role. The information he gains as an observer can prove of great significance in apprehending the suspects after the robbery.

**Off Duty Employment.** In robbery events examined by the Police Casualty staff, six off duty officers have been injured or killed while working for local merchants in a security capacity. In these six cases, two officers were killed, and four sustained minor wounds. Many contributing risk factors were identified. The circumstances of the following case are consistent with those prevalent in the remaining events.

Off duty and alone, a police detective was employed in a security capacity at a small convenience market. The merchant had recently experienced three robberies during a two-week period. The officer, working with the permission of his department, was directed to apprehend any suspects attempting a robbery. Working in plainclothes, armed only with his off duty weapon—a five-shot short barreled revolver—the officer took up a hidden position in the back room of the market. After a while, the officer observed two subjects enter the store and commit an armed robbery. Upon reporting the incident to the police dispatcher on his hand-held radio, the officer left the store through a side door and confronted the suspects as they left the store. With his weapon drawn, he identified himself and ordered the suspects to halt. One suspect fired a revolver, seriously wounding the officer. The officer then returned the fire with all five shots from his revolver, missed his assailants, and now out of ammunition, sought cover behind a nearby car. The gunman and his accomplice then fled after firing five more rounds at the officer.

In most cases involving off duty employment, the officers had departmental permission to accept the off duty employment; however, complete operational and administrative control by the agency was lacking. The off duty employment request was generally handled in a perfunctory manner with attention devoted toward conflict with duty hours and whether or not a conflict of interest was involved. In no case was the job site itself examined or supervision required. As a general rule, the agencies involved approved all off duty employment as long as the job site did not dispense alcoholic beverages. In three events, the victim establishment had been robbed recently. In another event an officer was shot while staking out a particular store in a chain of local convenience stores, all of which had been robbed recently. Thus, in each of these situations, although the potential for robbery was clearly greater than normal, a lone officer was allowed to accept off duty employment without supervision.

The lack of overall planning strategy and critical review of the employment request is a major risk factor regarding officers in off duty security employment. Findings indicate a need for a formal and comprehensive standard operating procedure regarding off duty employment. This policy or procedure should outline practical measures to assist in identifying those risk factors that pose a potential threat to the officer requesting the off duty employment. Risk factors should be identified by the appropriate command officer and submitted to the approving authority for review. Off duty job sites should also be inspected and an evaluation of the proposed site submitted. The approving authority must be aware of pertinent factors such as prior robberies, that might indicate the police objective sought: deterrence or stakeout.

If the method of employment is to be a stakeout, with a view towards interdiction and apprehension of robbery suspects, the choice of firearms is a major consideration. The stake-out method is used when the probability of robbery and confrontation is quite high. Should the confrontation result in a firefight, the use of a shotgun is highly desirable. Moreover, an officer using a shotgun could psychologically inhibit robbers from attempting to take action or resist. In two stake-out situations, the officers were equipped only with revolvers, one of which was a short-barrelled five-shot weapon. In both cases, officers had limited accessibility to extra ammunition.

In only two of the off duty employment events were officers utilizing hand-held radios. Both of these events employed a stake-out mode. In one case, the officer confronted an armed suspect without notifying the dispatcher that a robbery was in progress. The proper use of communications equipment is critical to officer safety. This factor is not altered during off duty employment; it actually becomes more critical. Officers employed in off duty situations should be provided with suitable communications, adequate weapons, and proper protective equipment. Moreover, when high risk situations are recognized and departmental equipment is utilized in off duty activity, it is appropriate to develop a suitable plan of action to coordinate that activity with regular duty operations.

In none of the events involving officers employed in a security capacity, was a plan of action developed in the event of an armed robbery. Neither the officer nor the employing merchant knew what action each would take if a robbery actually did occur. This fact increased the risk of injury to the officer. Although the victim officers were hired by the merchant to protect the business from robberies, a general lack of understanding about strategy and objective prevailed. The officer's mode of employment was not stipulated.

In three cases, the officers were in uniform, and it was assumed that they were employed to simply deter robberies by their conspicuous presence. One uniformed officer alone in a grocery store manager's booth was not visible to four suspects who were attempting to rob the store. When the officer stood up to get a better look at the subjects whose actions appeared suspicious, he was immediately identified by the suspects and fired upon. Unable to employ a plan of action or return the suspect's fire because of the presence of numerous shoppers, the officer took cover as the suspects exited the store and escaped.

In another case, a coordinated plan of action might have saved the officer's life. A merchant observed two subjects loitering in his store. The subjects had spent some time roaming about the store without making a purchase and the merchant thought the subjects appeared to be nervous. Without notifying the off duty uniformed officer of his observations and suspicions, the merchant approached the suspects and asked if he could assist them. Simultaneously, one of the subjects circled behind the officer and was able to take him by surprise while the merchant fled to the back of the store to trigger a holdup alarm. The scuffle that ensued between the officer and the suspect cost the officer his life. In most cases, the use of a planned course of action can do much to reduce risk. The essential elements include: planning, communications, and coordination.

In addition to a planned course of action, appropriate manpower and equipment is essential. In two events, a lone officer was employed as a stakeout in an attempt to apprehend robbery suspects. In both cases, two suspects were involved and the officer was shot. Although a stakeout seemed to be the appropriate mode to employ, the elements of manpower and protective equipment apparently were not given adequate consideration. Robbery, which is usually a violent crime, suggests the employment of at least two officers in a stake-out situation. Appropriate weapons should also be considered. Although handguns are still the primary weapon utilized in the commission of armed robberies, the officer(s) must usually act against a suspect who has drawn a weapon and is pointing it at someone. In such cases, the advantage of a shotgun is obvious for both its psychological effect and firepower advantage.

In each of the off duty employment cases, on-site supervision was lacking. No field supervisor made an on-site inspection of the job site to ensure that the officer was not being placed in a vulnerable situation. The general practice of direct payment by the merchant may be a confusing factor for both the merchant and the officer. The merchant may not know what his status is as far

as having control over the officer. Does he tell the officer how he is to be employed or does he just assume that the officer knows what he is doing and can handle any contingency? The officer probably asks similar questions: should I tell the merchant how I am to be employed or do I let him dictate my method of employment since he pays me? Since direct payment by the merchant to the officer may undermine supervisory control, it may be better if the merchant is billed by the agency for the officer's services.

A plan of action, appropriate manpower, protective equipment, and supervisory control are all necessary to reduce risks. It is suggested that agencies examine their existing procedures, or develop procedures where none exist, to deal with the high risks prevalent in many off duty jobs where police officers are working in a security capacity. Police officers who work off duty in a police-security capacity should be supervised and under the control of the duty operations commander. Moreover, aside from the general prerequisites for off duty employment that an agency may require, all such requests should be reviewed by operational authority, the job site physically examined, and a proper plan of action developed before any officers are assigned. Merchants and other private users of off duty police should be billed by the agency at a rate consistent with direct and indirect costs.

### **In Pursuit of Robbery Suspects**

Aside from the necessary but usual concerns of caution and safety, not too much can be said to cover the myriad of circumstances likely to be encountered during a foot or vehicle pursuit of robbery suspects. On the other hand, this categorization of events accounted for 21 casualties of the 89 officers involved in 67 casualty events. Three were killed and 19 injured in 17 casualty events. A review of some selected events will help focus attention on the hazards and circumstances common to this category.

In one incident an officer in a patrol car was talking to a pair of foot patrol officers when they were told by a passerby of an armed robbery. Simultaneously, the suspects drove by and were recognized. The foot patrol officers then got into the patrol car and all three pursued the suspects. Twelve shots fired at the suspect vehicle by the officers succeeded in deflating one rear tire. The officers' vehicle then was parked alongside and parallel to the suspect vehicle. Immediate shotgun fire from the suspects wounded two officers. The officers wounds were not serious; they were able to wound two of five suspects with further shots. However, their failure to exercise even routine vehicle stop tactics is obvious. Moreover, shooting at a moving vehicle cannot be condoned even under the most pressing circumstances. Throughout the event, no effort was made to notify the dispatcher or to seek backup assistance.

Vehicle stops should be made so that the patrol vehicle is always behind the suspect vehicle about one car length and to the left about two feet. The dispatcher should be notified of the situation, the

location, and the license number of the vehicle. Officers should take advantage of their vehicle's head and spot lamps to illuminate the suspects' car and to have suspects exit from the right side, one at a time, to be inhibited from action by lying face down in view of both officers. After all have exited, the driver can advance to the rear of the suspect vehicle to ensure that the vehicle is empty. Then using the vehicle for cover, the officer should continue to keep the suspects under guard while the other officers handcuff the suspects or call for assistance. If shotguns are carried in the patrol vehicle, the passenger officer should use this weapon to cover the suspects. See Figures 23 & 24.




Figure 23  
PARKING POSITION OF STOPPED VEHICLES




Figure 24  
COVERING THE SUSPECT—TWO OFFICERS

In another event, two uniformed officers in a marked patrol car observed a one-passenger vehicle with tags matching those of one used the previous day in an armed robbery. The officers immediately notified the dispatcher, asked for backup, and proceeded to chase the car. When the suspect stopped, both officers exited their vehicle, at which time the suspect turned, fired, and ran away. One officer was wounded. However, both officers pursued the suspects. Later, as the suspect left a concealed position, the non-injured officer fired at him with both a shotgun and a revolver, killing the suspect. In this instance, if the officers had remained behind the cover of their vehicle and covered the suspect as he exited, an otherwise flawless pursuit and stop may not have resulted in a casualty.

Foot pursuit of robbery suspects must also be considered. In one event, a two-man team responded to a "*robbery-in-progress*" call. After a foot chase in which officers exchanged fire with two suspects, wounding one, the second suspect ran into a dead-end alley. One of the two officers ordered him to "drop your gun and place your hands on your head." Instead, the suspect attempted to flee from the alley, striking the other officer (who was nearer to him) over the head with what appeared to be a short rifle which fired one projectile. In an attempt by both officers to grab the weapon, the second officer was injured. Each officer then shot the assailant, killing him.

A later analysis of this event disclosed that one of the officers, although armed with a shotgun, had difficulty loading and functioning the weapon. The inability to use this weapon properly may have forced the officers to get too close to the suspects. In any case, the officers did not secure backup assistance or report the status of the incident before initiating foot pursuit. The need for coordinated action—the team response—must become a part of the underlying philosophy of all training. It is a key element of any casualty risk reduction program.

## **Roadblocks**

Although only a small number of events involved the use of this tactic, it, nevertheless, remains basic to plans and strategies for coping with fleeing robbery suspects. In one of the events studied, officers in plainclothes and in an unmarked vehicle set up a roadblock in an effort to stop fleeing robbery suspects. The officers remained in their vehicle which was sideswiped by the suspect's vehicle. One of the officers was injured in the collision. Although a shotgun was carried in the vehicle and available to the officers, neither used it during an exchange of gunfire with the suspects.

Use of unmarked vehicles and plainclothes officers for roadblocks is hazardous. In the event such action is necessary, as an expedient, ample road flares should be deployed much the same as would be considered necessary for any disabled vehicle in the traffic flow. In addition, plainclothes officers should use recognition devices—armbands, sash, or vest—to promote easy identification. (These devices are discussed in another part of this Manual).



In most attempts at using roadblocks currently, the volume and speed of traffic create great secondary hazards. The complete blockage of traffic while car occupants are examined and vehicles searched may not be practical, nor for that matter, always safe. An alternate method suggests that an initial observation post be established to visually screen passing vehicles. Information on suspect vehicles should then be passed along to a secondary post where officers can take steps to stop the suspect vehicle. The current deployment of fixed radar teams is a good example of this tactic.

Stopping fleeing suspects who are armed is no easy task. Nor are there any simple ways that this can always be accomplished. Safety to the officers as well as bystanders must be a paramount consideration. The selection of a location for the roadblock must consider the safety factors as well as the need to stop the suspects.

Use of parked cars, trucks, and nail/spike tracks across the road are extreme measures that, perhaps should be preceded by some buffer or less severe effort. In the event the buffer effort fails, the backup or alternate measure will prevail. Traffic from the opposite direction should be diverted, or if that is not possible, halted some distance from the roadblock area until the potential for interdicting the suspects is realized or abandoned.

Officers manning roadblocks should be in uniform and equipped with body armor and ballistic helmets. Use of the vehicle for protection from suspect fire should be limited to the front, engine compartment area. Officers should realize that bullet penetration of a vehicle is possible, especially from high velocity weapons. As illustrated in Figure 25, placing the engine compartment area between the officer and the assailant provides considerable bulk and maximizes the capability of a vehicle to defeat or deflect the assailant's fire.

### **Barricade/Hostage Situations**

Hostages are most often taken during robbery events to be used as shields. This frequently occurs because police have arrived on the scene and the robbers feel trapped. The hostage is a passport, enabling the robber to escape without injury. If police are not visible while the robbery is still in progress, the suspects are less likely to take hostages. The better tactic is for the police to allow the suspects to leave the robbery location and then to initiate pursuit. This not only reduces the likelihood of hostages, but also reduces the risk of injury to police officers (32 percent of officer casualties occurred at the site; only 18 percent occurred while the officers were in pursuit).

If coercive bargaining is necessary, the watchword is to back-off. Most recent barricaded suspect-hostage situations were successfully culminated through the patient efforts of police who contained the scene, sealed off the exits, and negotiated with the suspect(s) until the futility of continued resistance became apparent to them. Although robbery suspects may have control of




Figure 25  
OFFICER USING VEHICLE FOR COVER


hostages, police can control the outside environment. This places the suspect(s) in a psychologically dependent state.

Wherever possible, an attempt must also be made to secure knowledge about the internal environment; floor plans and personal information on the suspect(s) give police a better understanding of what they are up against. This information also serves as a backdrop for more effective communications with the suspect. In some cases, the use of a ploy—police officers acting the part of doctors, repairmen, janitors, or officials—may offer some advantage in securing this information. It may also be possible through the use of a ploy to capture the suspects. Care must be taken, however, not to endanger the lives of the hostages or to incur excessive risks to the safety of the officers.

On the basis of an evaluation of the external and internal environment and of the results of initial communications with the suspect, a plan must be developed along one of two lines: either set up continuous communications with the suspect and wait him out, or force him out with either non-lethal gas or controlled fire. See Figure 26. This latter action is, of course, a last resort when the lives of hostages are at stake.

Generally, it is best not to allow the suspect to leave with his hostages. However, this determination must be made according to whether movement increases or decreases the potential for casualties. Often, a trade-off must be made: one or two lives endangered within the confines of the robbery location, or potentially many more endangered with the suspects allowed to move at large.


These decisions are easier for those faced with a barricaded suspect who has no hostages. In that case, the same procedures should be followed, but the suspect has very little bargaining power. If the suspect is secure in his position and the waiting period extended, officers could use non-lethal gas or controlled fire to force him out without fear of harming innocent captives. Most importantly, command of the situation must be taken, the area evacuated, special weapons teams (SWAT) and communications equipment should be brought to the scene.



**Figure 26**

Depicted above is a plan which, when properly executed, will force the fugitive from his location and out of the building via uncontaminated routes. (Adapted from the Federal Laboratories Training Manual.)

In the use of chemical agents, care must be exercised regarding the incendiary capability of some types of munitions. This would be of special concern in homes and wood frame buildings constructed without benefit of fireproof materials. Most manufacturers of chemical munitions clearly indicate with appropriate labels, those products that have incendiary capability. See Figure 27.



**Figure 27**  
**CHEMICAL AGENT LABELS**

In one event examined in this study, a detective wearing plainclothes and driving an unmarked car, responded to a barricaded robbery suspect call. Other officers, and the detective, walked down a narrow alley (three feet wide) between two brick walls next to the house where the suspect was barricaded in the basement. The suspect fired at the officers, but missed. An exchange of gunfire followed during which the detective was wounded in the knee by a bullet that had ricocheted off the wall in the alley. The suspect was later killed. Chemical agents were available, but not used.

A later analysis of the situation disclosed that nearly twenty officers were at the scene when the detective chose to respond. He did not notify the dispatcher or his supervisor, nor had anyone at the scene taken charge and organized the police effort. No plan was evident, no protective equipment was employed, nor was suitable communications equipment used. The narrow alley made officers extremely vulnerable to the suspect's fire, especially ricocheting bullets. Moreover, the plainclothed detective could have been mistaken for a suspect.

In a bizarre case involving hostages, an extremist group held up a sporting goods store stocked with high-powered rifles. Clerks and shoppers were taken as hostages when police answered the alarm and sealed off the area. Although some gunfire was exchanged, and one officer was killed and another was wounded, police waited out the situation. During that period, the hostages managed to escape to the roof.

In this particular incident, officers knew that the suspects could employ high powered rifles—the store had an ample supply. Unfortunately, the officer who was killed was shot in the head; he was wearing a bulletproof vest but did not have a ballistic helmet.

Another event illustrates the need for pre-planning, training, discipline, and coordinated command in hostage situations. Two armed suspects robbed a bank, taking two employees as hostages. As police arrived at the scene, one suspect told them to stay back or they would kill the hostages. The other suspect fired a shot at the officers before forcing the hostages into a getaway vehicle. The suspects and hostages then left the bank with police units in pursuit. Since the vehicle that the suspects commandeered had little gasoline, the suspects drove into a service station. Although they obtained no gas, the suspects remained at the station for five to ten minutes enabling police units to encircle the station. An attempt was made to communicate with the suspects over a public address system, but they did not respond. Instead, the suspects drove away, firing several shots at the officers.

The hostage who was driving the escape vehicle then drove into a ditch. Again police units surrounded the vehicle and attempted to coax the suspects out of the vehicle. The suspect who was in the front seat surrendered and released his hostage, but the other suspect remained in the rear seat of the vehicle with a weapon pointed to the head of another hostage. An officer approached the vehicle and fired one shot through the closed right rear window, striking the suspect in the head, immediately disabling him.

From an analysis of this situation, it was evident that officers used good judgment in not exchanging gunfire with the suspects and possibly injuring one of the hostages. At each of the stops, however, officers approached the suspect vehicle with shotguns—a poor choice of weapon in such situations, because if an officer had fired he might have injured a hostage as well. Although it turned out well, the officer who shot the second suspect not only risked his own life unnecessarily, but also that of the hostage. A proper estimate of the situation would have recognized that the situation was finally contained and that the odds favored waiting out the suspect.

**Stakeout.** A frequent tactic employed to combat a high incidence of robbery involves the use of police officers disguised or hidden from view, waiting in or near a potential robbery target. This type of “stakeout” has but one objective: to interdict a robbery and apprehend the suspects. Confrontation with armed suspects is no simple matter. The risks for casualty are high. Great

attention must be given to safety for officers and bystanders. Plans for employment of a robbery stakeout should be reviewed by operational command authority regardless of whether the task is going to be performed by on or off duty personnel.

In one of the robbery stake-out events examined in this study, an officer was working off duty, but in uniform, as a security guard in a supermarket. Four armed men entered the store and separated. To examine the situation, the officer stood up and looked out of the manager's booth through a glass partition. In doing so, he exposed himself to the robbers. One suspect grabbed a checkout girl as a shield and shot at the officer through the partition. The officer, cut in the face by glass fragments, did not return fire because the risk to the hostage was too great. The suspects fled and the officer pursued, but the suspects escaped.

The object of the officer's employment in this situation was not clear. Since he was in uniform and not totally concealed, he might have been used as a deterrent to potential robbers. But no plan of action had been developed to cope with a determined attack. Moreover, the officer lost sight of the suspects and had no portable radio with which to alert other officers in the area. If the intent was to capture robbery suspects in the act, a stake-out team approach should have been used. Disguise, manpower, hidden vantage, firepower, and protective equipment should have been employed.

In another event, two detectives in plainclothes and armed with shotguns, were assigned concealed positions inside a massage parlor. Other officers remained outside. When two men, one armed with a sawed off rifle, entered the lobby of the parlor and demanded money, the armed suspect was ordered to drop his weapon. Instead, he turned toward the detectives as if to fire. The detectives then fired their shotguns killing the armed suspect and wounding the other. No injury was sustained by the officers.

Although in this event appropriate manpower, adequate firepower, hidden vantage, and a good communications net all insured the success of the stakeout, many risk reduction factors were not utilized. These included lack of protective equipment and the use of an outside observer.

In another event, a carefully planned strategy for stakeout resulted in the shooting of one of two officers. In this case, the victim officer had removed his armored vest to leave the hidden vantage point. When he returned, he did not re-don his equipment. Shortly thereafter, armed suspects were engaged in an exchange of gunfire which resulted in the shooting of the victim officer.

Officers hidden from view in stake-out situations should be in uniform and armored vests and helmets should be worn. If the vests are worn as outer garments, the word *Police* in large block letters should be stenciled on the outer covering both front and back. Helmets should be similarly

marked. At least two officers should always be assigned to any stake-out situation; one should always be armed with a shotgun. A portable radio should also be employed.

Whenever officers are on stakeout and concealed from view inside a store, bank, or business location, an outside "lookout" or observer should be part of the team. The role of the observer is to communicate to the stake-out crew any indications of possible attack and to identify and isolate any means of escape that might be employed. If necessary, the observer should also summon any backup assistance.

Sites for stakeout should be examined by command officers who should also review the request for employment of this tactic. Prior to implementation, any improvisations necessary to achieve success consistent with officer and citizen safety, should be made. For example, it may be necessary to install partitions to insure a hidden vantage. Installation of one way viewing glass is another temporary modification that can be made. In large open store or warehouse areas, special portable booths can be erected to permit concealed viewing and accessibility where none exists.

### **The Risk Reduction Program**

A sound investment of resources in specific risk reduction will pay large dividends in increased officer safety. A concrete management response to such critical threat areas as armed robbery is urgently needed in many departments. To meet this need, the law enforcement managers should initiate and direct the establishment of a structured risk reduction program. This program must also receive the attention and full support of law enforcement managers on a continuing basis. And if the potential benefits of the risk reduction program are to be fully realized, the program has to be wholly integrated within the overall organization and functions of the parent agency. This requires close cooperation and continuing liaison among various personnel, divisions, units, or offices. This kind of mutual assistance can be achieved only through the positive efforts of managers who are committed to achieving significant risk reduction.

**The Risk Reduction Officer.** An experienced and knowledgeable officer should be selected and appointed as a Risk Reduction Officer. This officer will serve as 1) a specialist providing expert advice and assistance to the managers involved in the decision-making process, and 2) a staff officer charged with the hands-on development, implementation, and servicing of the risk reduction program in accordance with appropriate directives and instructions. The Risk Reduction Officer's duties should include but are not limited to:

- Conducting field investigations and collecting data from other sources regarding "lessons learned from proper and improper police tactical actions in armed robbery events."

- Inspecting current practices in training, organization, planning, communications, field operations, and equipment procurement and issue to identify problem areas.
- Developing new and improved ways and means of increasing officer safety in armed robbery events.
- Formulating findings and recommendations for review and action by responsible decision-makers.
- Preparing and disseminating policies, procedures, tactics, and plans for risk reduction.
- Production of specific risk reduction training materials.
- Conducting periodic assessments of the impact and effectiveness of the program at the field level.

**Policies and Procedures.** One of the specific objectives of the risk reduction program is to formulate, test, and put into practice the policies and procedures required to reduce risks to officers in armed robbery events. Specific instructions and guidance are necessary to equip law enforcement personnel to perform their duties. Carefully stipulated and well thought out policies and procedures are the single most productive means by which to impart risk-reducing knowledge to officers in the field. Too often, however, law enforcement managers underestimate the critical importance of these means as tools for risk reduction. Undoubtedly, some managers simply believe that when the time comes the officer will know what to do.

The Police Casualty Analysis staff found that many of the sixty-two law enforcement agencies visited had failed to develop policies or procedures, to reduce officer risks in armed robbery events. Approximately half of the agencies visited had invested some thought and effort to satisfy this requirement, but frequently the incompleteness or vagueness of the efforts that had been formulated greatly limited their usefulness in reducing risks in the field.

When satisfactory instruction and guidance are not available, officers who become involved in armed robberies are forced to resort to on the spot expedient solutions. If capable and experienced officers are present and if circumstances happen to be favorable, some of these emergency solutions may work out. But frequently this is not the case. In any event, the risks are too high. This is not surprising. Inadequate or non-existent policies and procedures required to reduce risks adversely impacts on every facet of the law enforcement mission and presence, beginning with training and



ranging through organization and administration to field operations and equipment procurement. Sound, well-documented policy and procedure should be seen as among the most necessary and desirable elements of an effective risk reduction program.

**Action Plans.** To perform any law enforcement activity effectively, police officers must follow logical plans of action. The task may vary from quelling a domestic disturbance, or issuing a traffic citation, to apprehending an armed robbery suspect. But the key to success is always the same: knowing what must be done; who is to do it; the when, where, and how of accomplishing it; and then taking timely, decisive action to fulfill the law enforcement mission. Basic tactical plans are one of the most important components of the risk reduction program and are essential end products of any complete set of policies and procedures. These plans are simple but highly effective command and control tools. Their objective is to structure the police response with a certainty and economy of effort that would not be possible otherwise. They achieve this objective by:

- Allocating specific tasks to responding officers
  
- Assigning areas and locations of primary tactical responsibility for on-site deployment
  
- Providing a starting point and framework for the flexible, controlled development of the tactical situation.

A good tactical plan picks up officers in an ordered sequence as they are assigned to the call and as they approach the scene and places them on-site according to an integrated task breakdown. A tactical plan might be briefly outlined as illustrated in Figure 28.

Basic tactical plans as shown in Figure 29 are not intended to be detailed statements of grand strategies, nor can they substitute for the exercise of good judgment and common sense. These plans are straightforward standing action drills that will provide a framework or foundation upon which to build an effective police response to a high risk situation. By everyone knowing what to do, tactical plans eliminate confusion and permit officers to respond with coordinated power and advantage.

## INTELLIGENCE

The development, implementation, and servicing of an effective intelligence function is an essential requirement of the police mission. An indispensable tool in accomplishing traditional law enforcement objectives, the intelligence cycle is a valuable in-house resource that, if effectively used, can play an important role in police casualty risk reduction.

**PLAN AR-1: Confirmed Robbery-in-Progress Call "Response"**

- R  
E  
S  
P  
O  
N  
S  
E**
- react with caution
  - establish plan
  - select course of action
  - protect against surprise
  - observe and estimate the situation
  - never take hasty action
  - secure entrances and exits
  - execute tactical plan

**Figure 28  
RESPONSE TO ROBBERY-IN-PROGRESS CALL**

The establishment of additional intelligence collection requirements directed specifically toward the threat of casualty attack is the first step in applying the standard intelligence cycle to risk reduction. Threat indicators must be determined whenever possible and then translated into concrete specifications for primary data-essential elements of information signifying the existence of circumstances and probabilities for an ambush attack.

Law enforcement agencies normally gather large amounts of information pursuant to routine police operations. Data regarding arrests, wanted persons, suspect persons, outstanding warrants, the release of convicted felons, stolen vehicles, firearms, field incidents, and criminal activities are important to officer safety in many encounters that occur in daily law enforcement activity between the officer and the public. For example, an officer responding to a disturbance call would certainly exercise more caution if he knew that an occupant of the house had a history of resisting arrest for simple assault when intoxicated. And an officer making a routine traffic stop would be far more cautious if he were aware that the owner or driver of the vehicle had an arrest record for firearms offenses, assault and battery, armed robbery, or similar crimes.

In some instances, the formulation of special threat indicators and special intelligence collection requirements will be necessary to supplement normal data acquisition categories. The presence in the community of former mental patients previously afflicted with violent psychoses, the local establishment of an element of a national extremist political organization, or reports of arms caches

**THREAT LEVEL:**

Very high-probable confrontation with heavily armed suspects.

**ACTIONS OF RESPONDING UNITS:****Unit Assigned Call**

- Primary Mission
  - Investigates call
  - Estimates situation
  - Takes tactical control
  - Directs activities of all other officers on-site
- Tactical Area Of Responsibility
  - Front entrance and immediate vicinity

**Follow-up Unit #1**

- Primary mission
  - Interdicts escape routes
  - Provides area security and observation
  - Assists unit assigned call as directed
- Tactical Area of Responsibility
  - Rear and side exits and immediate vicinities

**Follow-up Unit #2**

- Primary mission
  - Acts as emergency reserve for intervention or interdiction
  - Provides supplementary observation and security
  - Establishes and maintains radio communications as required.
- Tactical Area of Responsibility
  - As directed

**Figure 29**  
**BASIC TACTICAL PLANS**

and contraband sales of military weapons are the most dramatic examples of extraordinary danger signals that might be detected by the intelligence cycle. There are other possible threat indicators of this kind, and each police agency must fix its own special intelligence collection requirements based upon a flexible in-depth assessment of its distinctive situation and the unique conditions prevailing in its community. For example, knowledge that a group is planning or carrying out a systematic series of robberies must be given immediate attention. Counteraction must be undertaken. Intelligence is of little value if not acted upon.

Priorities must be assigned to identified threat indicators for the intelligence cycle to best accommodate the assault problem and to continue functioning with maximum utility and economy of effort. Any assignment of priorities must be guided by the realistic evaluation and integration of

numerous possible descriptions of personality and circumstances that can single the intent, capability, and method of operation of potential assailants. The key questions are: "Will it happen?, Who will do it?, and How will it be attempted?" Common sense is a necessary and fundamental tool by which to accomplish the task of delineating and ranking threat criticality. The following is a simplified and noninclusive example of one possible listing of precedence for intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination:

- Data regarding casualty and assault of police officer, places of occurrence, appearance of propaganda advocating police killings, and critical periods of officer vulnerability.
- Data regarding individuals who have themselves threatened police officers, injured police officers, or otherwise overtly evidenced a violent animosity directed specifically toward law enforcement personnel.
- Data regarding felons or misdemeanants who have repeatedly engaged in general criminal activity involving the use of force or the threat of force.
- Data regarding citizens whose past or present behavior indicates a disordered and aggressive antisocial personality lacking self-control in normal life situations.

Sources of information must be cultivated to support intelligence collection requirements in priority. The base from which to begin is to employ a comprehensive intelligence collection plan that lists all sources that may be feasibly developed and exploited, allocates responsibilities and resources to the collection function, and outlines procedures by which collection may be achieved. Since it is a supplement or subcomponent modification to current collection planning, the potential assault collection plan must be skillfully integrated into the overall plan and reflect all possible ways and means of gathering information on potential casualty related events or persons.

Sources of information may exist locally or on state and national levels. These sources can be independent of the law enforcement agency, closely allied with it, or within the department itself. Offense and incident reports, field interrogation reports, and similar materials prepared by law enforcement personnel are an excellent place to begin the collection process. The records and activities of other agencies within the criminal justice mechanism, such as probation and parole departments, prosecutors' offices, courts, and penal facilities, are also lucrative sources of information. Public welfare, health and social service agencies are especially valuable sources for information on human problems likely to flare into violence against the police. The Chamber of Commerce can provide information regarding business establishments that pose potential for robbery.

The "common knowledge" of the community, if skillfully assessed and collected by police officers moving about the populace, is a highly cost-effective source for the continuous input of useful information. Additionally, the use of clandestine informants may be absolutely necessary in developing useful information regarding potential robbery events and robbery suspects likely to assault police.

The National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a national computer information system developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, provides real-time access to information of critical importance in risk reduction. Information regarding federal fugitives, persons wanted on local felony or misdemeanor charges, vehicles used in the commission of felonies, and stolen vehicles can be obtained very quickly. Similar systems are also in operation or being planned at many state and local levels.

The continual painstaking application of good management skills and techniques is required to implement the collection plan—it will not run itself. Practical experience has demonstrated that tactical intelligence collection is particularly difficult to manage. This has been true in law enforcement agencies, in the military, and even within the specialized intelligence community. The difficulties inherent in efficient collection are increased considerably when an ongoing collection effort attempts to gather information on a problem whose frequency and circumstances are out-of-the ordinary. In some instances, the introduction of additional requirements of this nature is viewed as an unwanted irritant to the smooth functioning of a collection system considered fully comprehensive and adequate. More frequently, newly introduced requirements are inadvertently submerged or drained of emphasis and specificity by more compelling considerations of system orthodoxy and uniformity. This problem is best dealt with by continual monitoring and direction by responsible managers and supervisory personnel.

Once collected, information must first be processed into a finished intelligence product in accordance with the overall scheme for threat evaluation and then disseminated in a timely comprehensive fashion. Effective dissemination is of great importance in crime prevention and risk reduction. Everyone must know about potential risks. This cannot be overstressed, imperfections in dissemination are a recurring difficulty in the performance of any intelligence cycle.

Equipping the intelligence cycle to provide information on the risks inherent in robbery events does not necessarily require a heavy investment of additional assets. Given its low cost and the potential payoff that will in many instances be realized, the intelligence cycle must not be overlooked by law enforcement managers and decision makers. As depicted in Figure 30, with a little extra effort, intelligence can be oriented to risk reduction, not only from potential robbery events, but from all casualty prone police activity.




Figure 30  
THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION IN RISK REDUCTION

## TRAINING

Technological advances have often highlighted police practices to a point that laymen, and even some policemen, think that good police work is largely mechanical and scientific—that good results are always achieved through laboratory assistance and fictional deductive logic. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Regardless of the scientific and technological innovations currently available, good police practices are the result of many things and good training heads the list.

Police officers who are generally identified by peers and supervisors as “good officers” are those who have benefitted from good training. Similarly, agencies that have good training programs are generally recognized for their achievements and superior performance. The common denominator in all cases can be easily determined. It is training.

Training to achieve risk reduction must, on one hand, be considered separately, yet, on the other hand, must be included in all aspects of training. Frequently, training is considered on a subject-by-subject basis to establish good fundamental understanding. Care must be taken, however, to insure that sufficient effort is made to blend these learning components together into a well-integrated body of knowledge. Moreover, any training to reduce risks inherent in robbery events, must be related to a myriad of patrol and investigative activities, and to some degree, include off duty situations as well.

In this Manual we have attempted to highlight and stress some of the most significant training areas that relate to robbery events. These areas are often covered in basic recruit training, inservice training, or in one or more specialized training programs. Risk reduction techniques suitable in robbery events should be stressed throughout the entire training program in each agency.

### Recruit Training

The initial phase of recruit training in the career of a police officer is very important. It provides a base or foundation upon which the officer must link and absorb all future training and experience. To expect officers to function effectively without proper base knowledge creates distortions and misconceptions when coupled with the lessons of day-to-day experiences. Moreover, the dangers inherent in “trial and error” learning, while safeguarding the rights and security of the society, is all too obvious. Throughout all of this, the safety of the officer must also be an important consideration.

Apart from the quality of training, which is not easily measured, the extent to which recruit officers are exposed to their initial indoctrination, provides a comparative yardstick. Figures 31 and

32 identify the extent of recruit training received by all officers who were involved in the robbery events which formed a basis for this study.

It is obvious that 19 of the 78 officers who were casualties had two weeks or less of recruit training. Thirteen had none. On the other hand, non-injured companion officers in these same events reflect minimum training exposure of at least five weeks. Similarly, officers in the non-casualty events, all reflected training from a minimum of four weeks to a maximum of twenty-three weeks. In all cases, a four week threshold appears significant as the level for casualty risk. In other words, officers with a minimum of four weeks training have a greater chance of not becoming a casualty.


Although in all cases examined in this study, agency recruit curricula generally addressed a crime of robbery—law, evidence, and reporting—none covered risk reduction measures in connection with robbery events. This does not mean that officer safety was totally ignored. On the contrary, many agencies had specific safety programs. It merely means that the risks inherent in robbery events were not specifically addressed, nor were specific strategies and risk reduction measures properly identified and taught within the context of the robbery event.

Armed robbery is a serious crime. Victims under immediate threat of harm are forced to give up valuables. An officer who interdicts a suspect in the commission of that crime is highly vulnerable. His actions pose threat of harm for himself as well as the original victim(s). In addition, the threat of apprehension for the suspect while armed and committing a robbery inevitably produces panic and often unpredictable aggression on his part when confronted by the presence of police. Although no "game plan" can possibly achieve 100 percent success and address all possible situations, risks can be materially reduced if the hazards inherent in robbery events are properly identified and basic risk reduction techniques employed.

Recruit training in all subject areas must stress to the recruit that at times he will find himself in situations of great physical danger. The emphasis should be applied in an effort to create a motivation for self-protection consistent with the accomplishment of the police mission. For example, if the recruit is only made aware of his personal safety during periods of training that cover the arrest situation, or during instruction in defensive tactics, he is likely only to equate personal risk to a limited number of situations. Although the thought may exist that the officer may at some time actually walk in on a robbery and become a hero by making a timely felony arrest, his vulnerability may not be fully outlined. The tendency to treat such potential chance occurrences as simply favorable opportunities for the police officer to function at the optimum level without thought for the risks involved is inconsistent with safety and good strategy. The recruit must be made aware of the extreme hazards involved, he must be taught how to anticipate such occurrences, and this type of training must be integrated with good sound policy and strategies likely to reduce risks but still get the job accomplished.







**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

	Number of Weeks of Recruit Training																									TOTALS	
	No Tng.	1 wk. or less	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		25
<b>Fatalities</b>	6	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	2	0	2	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	23
<b>Injuries</b>	7	2	1	0	2	1	4	3	2	3	2	3	1	1	4	2	1	4	0	0	2	0	2	7	1	0	55
<b>Total Casualties</b>	13	4	2	0	2	1	5	3	3	5	2	3	3	1	6	5	3	4	0	0	2	0	2	8	1	0	78
<b>Non-Casualties</b>	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	11
<b>Total Casualties/ Non-Casualties</b>	13	4	2	0	2	2	5	4	5	5	2	3	4	1	7	8	3	4	0	0	4	0	0	9	2	0	89

**Figure 31**  
**RECRUIT TRAINING RECEIVED BY OFFICERS**  
**IN CASUALTY EVENTS**

69

	Number of Weeks of Recruit Training																									TOTALS	
	No Tng.	1 wk. or less	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		25
<b>Non-Casualties</b>	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	4	0	1	2	3	0	4	3	7	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	36

**Figure 32**  
**RECRUIT TRAINING RECEIVED BY OFFICERS**  
**IN NON-CASUALTY EVENTS**

In all of the victim/officer agencies visited during the course of this study, it was noted that where recruit instruction was conducted, it included essentially the basic topics of departmental policies and procedures, the handling and investigation of various specific crimes, general patrol techniques, reporting practices, equipment, firearms instruction, and in some cases, basic elements of self-defense. These subjects are highly relevant and necessary to basic police practice and should form the core of any recruit training program. But, as mentioned earlier, many of these subjects deserve particular attention from the standpoint of reducing risks inherent in robbery events. Many possibilities exist while on patrol to detect and interdict actual robbery situations. The frequent response to a false alarm at a bank or merchantile establishment gives rise to serious questions about the hazards of conditioning that this imposes upon officers. The routine checking of banks, liquor stores, and convenience markets frequently produces a distorted impression that this activity is largely related to a program of public relations rather than its intended purpose: to deter robberies.

The more such patrol practices are utilized, the greater the opportunity exists to interdict a robbery at one of these places. Plans and strategies, therefore, for dealing with such a potential must be formulated and imparted to recruit officers if risks are to be reduced in situations of this type. Similarly, if basic firearms instruction is merely geared to developing some type of scoring ability amid an atmosphere of competitive and sportsmanslike behavior, it is not likely to effectively condition an officer who may have to use his weapon in a combat-like situation. Officers who continually perform in a ritual like series of maneuvers while engaged in firearms practice, are likely to become so conditioned that they are unable to effectively use their weapon except in that manner.

The realization must be made that combat like situations rarely permit or encourage ritual like firing opportunities. Officers must be taught to use their weapons in realistic situations and at all times to seek the best available cover and protection. Above all, it must be understood that there can be no substitute for accuracy. Marksmanship, therefore, must be pursued in a manner akin to all threshold level performance requirements. In other words, officers who cannot effectively meet minimum requirements in firearms proficiency, should not be permitted to perform patrol tasks until such time as their firearms proficiency meets minimum standards.

Specific risk reduction measures must be incorporated throughout the whole matrix of each agency's training program. Since general safety programs are not likely to produce an omnipresence of attitude in all areas of the police mission, police administrators and training coordinators should attempt to insure that the following topics are integrated wherever possible in the recruit training programs in their respective agencies:

- Sites subject to robbery attack
- Tactics commonly employed by robbery suspects

- Profiles of robbery suspects
- Profiles of usual victims of robbery attack
- Weapons generally employed in robberies
- The role of extremist groups in committing robberies
- Patrol strategies useful in preventing robbery
- Officer deployment at robbery events
- Use of available cover
- Specific ways and means of self-protection
- Communications and coordination in response to robbery call
- The use and capabilities of weapons in robbery events
- The value and use of protective equipment
- Game plans for a tactical response to a robbery situation
- What to do when an officer is wounded
- Handling robbery situations while off duty
- Officer identification
- The false alarm problem
- Backup support and area coverage
- Closing suspect exit and escape routes

This listing is not intended to be all inclusive. It merely suggests the scope and some of the potential topics that should be addressed throughout the recruit training program as a means toward reducing risks inherent in robbery events. Police administrators should examine recruit training programs in their respective agencies and make whatever adjustments or emphasis that is necessary to maximize the training capabilities for risk reduction.

### **In-Service Training**

The attitude of many police administrators and practitioners in the police field is that training be simply relegated to a once-in-the-career time of a police officer. This position gives no credence to

the need for the continuation of the initial training imparted at the recruit level. It assumes that the day-to-day learning experiences will provide sufficient opportunity for everyone to become a master of his craft. This could be the case if officers were always in the company of other officers and supervisors who could engage in a continual transfer of knowledge. The day-to-day mechanics of police work, however, rarely permit this opportunity, and more frequently, pair one inexperienced officer with another. Supervisors confronted with a spatial distribution of their squad rarely have sufficient time to permit adequate counsel and instruction for inexperienced officers. The result, therefore, creates a pressing need for ongoing instruction to advance the basic knowledge learned at the recruit school.

In-service training as a means of continuing or expanding or even refreshing an officer's knowledge, as well as maintaining his proficiency and skill in certain areas that require manual performance, can include a wide range of techniques and practices. For example, the technique of roll call training has met with considerable success in a variety of agencies during the last decade. Other types of in-service training may simply involve monthly firearms practice. In other cases, an occasional seminar, shift meeting, departmental meeting, or any other formal type of training sessions conducted for individuals, groups, or the entire force may be construed as in-service training.

As noted in another section of this Manual, in at least 16 of the 62 agencies visited during the course of this study, no type of in-service training was provided. In the area of firearms training, it was noted that approximately 40 percent of the 125 officers had not received any firearms practice or training within the year preceding their assault. In some cases officers had not qualified with their service revolver for a period of five years prior to the event in which they were involved. Considering that the officer must use his weapon not only for his own personal defense, but for the defense and safety of other people, firearms proficiency should occupy a high priority among training needs. Only 12 percent of the 125 officers involved in events which form the basis for this study, were officers deemed expert shots or expert marksmen by their agencies.

In-service training is probably the simplest method of exposing current officers to risk reduction measures since it is not likely that these officers will ever re-enter the recruit academy. Care must be taken, however, not to rely solely on this medium since effective risk reduction training measures must permeate the entire agency. Although many detractors of in-service training have frequently raised the issue that they can neither secure the funds nor sacrifice the manpower necessary for training, programs can be developed, nevertheless, that can be implemented on duty time which will incur little or no expense. Simply scheduling changes, using instructors from other agencies, or merely providing training on a volunteer basis, can do much for creating an opportunity to provide knowledge in an area that requires significant risk reduction. Training sessions can be held before or after tours of duty. Training aids can be developed in-house with the assistance of outside experts in audiovisual preparation. Instruction through the medium of the lecture, the discussion method, or a combination of both, properly enhanced with simple training aids, can do much to impart the necessary knowledge, provided well-motivated instructors are utilized. Blocks of instruction can be

employed that become progressive in nature and reinforce previous instruction. Agencies can combine in-service training and maximize utility of instructors on a regional basis. In some cases, suitable units of in-service training may be coupled with blocks of academic instruction at local community colleges to permit a thoroughly integrated risk reduction program. In any event, every effort must be made to employ a wide variety of training strategies and techniques to insure that officers are consistently exposed to timely information regarding ways to reduce risks inherent in robbery events.

**Roll Call Training.** This type of in-service training usually conducted as an adjunct to the regular briefing for inspection prior to the beginning of the tour of duty—roll call training—is easily undertaken by most departments. A short 5, 10, or 15 minute training period may be employed once or twice a week to insure full coverage, or once or twice a month depending upon agency needs. Instructors may be selected from officers assigned to the staff training function, or supervisors at the squad and shift levels may be employed. In the latter case, the role of the supervisor as a trainer is greatly enhanced. Formal roll call training is greatly advanced when a training bulletin is distributed to each officer on a regular basis. A particular topic covered in the bulletin then becomes the subject of discussion during the roll call training period. This provides an opportunity for the instructor to amplify and highlight the main points, for officers to question and discuss areas that they do not understand, and for the agency and its members to amass a documented body of doctrine useful to all.

Despite the simplicity and ease of implementing roll call training, less than ten percent of the agencies visited during the course of this study provided formal roll call training on a regular basis. In most cases, time spent during briefing sessions was largely concerned with operational information and matters. Although in many agencies roll call training takes on the guise of briefing sessions, where pictures of suspects and strategies involved in certain tactics are discussed, these sessions are essentially refinements of operational briefings and must not be construed as formal roll call training.

In none of the agencies visited did any kind of formal roll call training exist that specifically addressed measures to be taken to reduce risks in robbery events. In two agencies, however, training briefings were conducted regarding the problems of hostages in robbery cases. In both cases, the agencies had reacted quickly and decisively to establish policy and training following specific situations in their respective cities.

**Firearms Training.** An almost universal subject of recruit training is firearms instruction. Naturally, such instruction varies with the attitude and standards of the agency and also with the length of the recruit training program. Firearms training initiated at the recruit level must be continued throughout an officer's career if an acceptable level of proficiency is to be expected. Of overall importance, in addition to proficiency, is instruction on when an officer should use his weapon. A police officer must be able to use his weapon decisively and effectively. In order to do



this he must be trained. In addition, departmental policy and strategic guidelines must exist and be included with the firearms training program. And if risk reduction measures are to be effective, they must be integrated in the training program and become part of the overall risk reduction effort.

Firearms training must not be limited solely to the police officer's duty sidearm; it must include training and practice in the use of all weapons likely to be made available to the officer. This should include other sidearms that the officer is likely to employ both on and off duty, the police shotgun and rifle, and any chemical agents and devices available to the officer.

- *Duty sidearm.* The majority of agencies visited issued officers the .38 Special revolver as a duty sidearm. A few agencies permitted officers to carry any type of revolver or autoloading handgun, and a few other agencies issued double action autoloading pistols.

Although 13 of the 125 victim officers never received any recruit training, and thus no formal basic firearms instruction, the majority of the officers did. Unfortunately, the maintenance of acceptable firearms proficiency was not evident in a majority of the agencies. For example, over 40 percent of the 125 victim/officers had not received any firearms training or practice in the year preceding the assault. Several officers had not had an opportunity to practice or train in the five years prior to the robbery event in which they were involved.

In agencies that require the regular firearms qualifications, the PPC (Practical Pistol Course) was generally employed. This type of course is well-suited to developing combat proficiency. Care must be taken, however, that such training does not become ritualistic and thus condition officers in such a fashion that they can only shoot five rounds at a time, only shoot on command, and only shoot in one or more prescribed positions. Naturally, safety and objective scoring on the range reduce the options for flexibility. Range officers should make every effort, however, to utilize sufficient variations in the periodic firearms retraining and refresher sessions to permit officers to acquire flexibility and versatility of use with their sidearms.

Variations of the PPC that permit officers to fire six rounds, eject and reload, and fire an additional six rounds are efforts in this direction. Use of an old vehicle as a barricade position is also highly desirable. Since most combat shooting occurs at distances under 25 yards, it is not realistic to continue to require officers to shoot at distances of 50 and 60 yards. The two-hand pistol grip should be encouraged wherever possible. Firing under dim lighting conditions should also be practiced.

- *Shotgun Training.* In none of the agencies visited were regular periodic sessions conducted for shotgun training. As a matter of fact, very few agencies engaged in this type of training at the recruit level. Yet, in almost all cases, the availability of the shotgun was quite apparent. In a majority of the agencies, shotguns were carried in patrol vehicles and used daily by officers. In

other cases, shotguns were available for issue whenever officers deemed such armament necessary. In all other agencies visited, shotguns were available in the armory.

During the course of field examinations of incidents which resulted in death or serious injury to officers, it became readily apparent that there was an appalling lack of training in the use of the shotgun. In many instances, officers carrying shotguns had neither fired the weapon nor knew how to function the weapon. In one tragic incident, an officer was seriously wounded when he became confused with the safety bolt and the slide release button on his shotgun. He could neither chamber a round nor release the safety bolt. In other instances, officers were unable to chamber rounds, were ejecting loaded rounds because they did not realize that a live round had been chambered, or were engaged in pursuit and strenuous physical exertion while carrying a shotgun with the safety off.

Shotgun familiarization should become a part of the curriculum of every recruit training program. Periodic shotgun refresher sessions should be conducted routinely in conjunction with regular firearms training programs. Officers who regularly carry shotguns in patrol vehicles should be required to demonstrate proficiency periodically similar to that required with any service sidearm. Firing should be conducted at 15 and 25 yard ranges, at multiple targets, and under circumstances that require the reloading of at least two rounds. Wherever possible, point shoulder shooting should be encouraged. The cardboard silhouette target similar to that used in the PPC is ideally suited for shotgun practice as well.

- *Rifle Training.* None of the agencies visited regularly conducted rifle firearms training as part of their recruit or in-service training programs. Except for special anti-sniper squads or swat teams, this type of training is generally unnecessary for most patrol officers. Where rifles are carried in certain vehicles in the field, however, and available for emergencies, supervisors should regularly insure that familiarization with these kinds of weapons is conducted. Familiarization should include ability to load and unload the weapon, function the weapon, and shoot the weapon with sufficient accuracy to qualify at the basic level. Having weapons available to officers who are ignorant of the weapon's functioning and shooting capabilities is hazardous.
- *Chemical Agents Training.* Aside from aerosol projector devices, there is little need to train all officers to become proficient in the delivery of tear gas and other chemical agent munitions. In some cases, however, a full range of chemical agents complete with shotgun launcher or 1.5 inch tear gas gun are carried in vehicles deployed in the field. Under these conditions familiarization and the use of chemical agents should be conducted for patrol personnel.

The use of tear gas grenades or long range launchers is not a frequent occurrence and in many agencies this equipment is relegated to specialized squads. Under emergency conditions,

however, officers may be forced to employ such equipment. A basic familiarization should be conducted at the recruit level together with periodic refresher for all officers. A more intensive practical program should be conducted if chemical agents are regularly deployed in field patrol vehicles. Confusion regarding the relative effectiveness of various chemical agents can only increase the hazards of risk to the officer.

In all instances of availability and use of chemical agents, training should be conducted with gas masks. In no case should chemical agents be deployed in patrol or specialized vehicles without sufficient masks. Even familiarization training with chemical agents should require that officers handle, use, hurl, and fire chemical agents while wearing a protective gas mask, not to insure the officer's freedom from contamination, but to acquaint the officer with the difficulties of such actions while wearing a gas mask.

- *Counter Firearms Training.* In a total firearms training program, the realities of attack situations must consider counter firepower as well. For example, officers who interdict an armed robbery are immediately confronted with a combat situation and will undoubtedly receive fire from the suspect(s). Officers in pursuit of robbery suspects may eventually trap the suspect in a defensive position where he will engage the officers from a barricaded position. Suspects who fire at officers under the protection of hostages or human shields, present unique problems that require skill and understanding in handling. Such reality should be addressed in practical exercises during the course of regular firearms training.

In one agency, recruits are thoroughly conditioned to the hazards involved in a myriad of routine situations by training staff officers armed with blank shot weapons. In these cases, the training mission is largely devoted towards the development of judgment, the realization of a wide range of possibilities, and a full understanding of the hazards inherent in such situations. Firearms proficiency under these circumstances is not important. What *is* important is a better realization on the part of the officer of the need for clear, deliberate, well-coordinated action.

## Specialized Training

Agencies that engage in training activity beyond that of their recruit stage generally are concerned with specific problems or a specific activity. The thrust in these agencies is to cope with a particular situation by providing specific instruction. When undertaken as a part of an overall training program that recognizes training needs and reacts in an appropriate fashion, the utility of specialized training frequently and periodically enhances overall agency effectiveness. Unfortunately, the use of specialized training frequently takes on the aspect of panic reaction, is not integrated into the regular training program, and is employed on an interim basis or too infrequently to have much effect on overall agency results.

Specialized training conducted in the two agencies noted previously is an exception. In these cases, the need was identified as part of an ongoing practice of determining training needs, and the training was conducted and coordinated with dissemination of overall agency strategy and policy guidelines for dealing with such situations.

Many of the risk reduction measures discussed elsewhere in this Manual require effective training in order to be successfully implemented. For example, all of the measures designed for response to, and deployment at the scene of a robbery, should be practiced by patrol forces under the direction of a supervisor until a teamlike precision is attained. Effective role playing sessions should be conducted under realistic or mock like conditions to simulate a wide variety of situations likely to be encountered at the scene of a robbery. The use of early morning hours or other periods of limited police need is an ideal opportunity for field forces to make the most out of what occasionally may be a very boring tour of duty. The use of warehouse districts on Sundays or holidays offers another potential site for training and tactics likely to reduce risks inherent in robbery incidents. Risk reduction in robbery events can easily become the subject of a specialized training program.

### Training Resources

A number of resources can be developed and utilized by police agencies, individually or in combination, to assist in the overall training effort. These include, but are not limited to:

- The creation of a risk reduction specialist in each agency to collect and analyze information regarding the hazards inherent in robbery events.
- The review and analysis of FBI reports on law enforcement officers killed while handling robbery matters or in pursuit of robbery suspects. (These reports are available through the National Law Enforcement teletype system and the annual summary published by the FBI.)
- The use of appropriate films and film slides available from commercial sources. (These can be secured and used on a regional basis to minimize expense. In many instances, agencies are capable of making their own films for training in risk reduction.)
- The use of the IACP Police Weapons Center on an inquiry response basis for assistance in planning training programs.
- The employment of the Alert Bulletins issued under this program as an interim measure in overall risk reduction effort.

## Physical Conditioning

Good physical conditioning is paramount to effective police operations in all areas of activity. Good health and a strong healthy body are welcome assets to any police officer under stress or great physical strain. An officer in good physical health is generally mentally alert and capable of fast intelligent reaction. In addition, officers unfortunate enough to be injured have much greater chances for survival and complete recovery. Should an officer become injured, he also has, if in good physical condition, capability to remain in action to protect himself from further injury or to continue effective police action.

Few agencies today stress physical training. Apart from some close order drills or brief periods of track and field activity during recruit training, little opportunity exists for the officer to engage in a continuing program of physical conditioning unless he undertakes one himself. Despite a lack of available facilities, many agencies could provide simple outlines and courses of instruction that officers could follow at home at their leisure. In place exercises, jogging, and proper diet could do much to foster good physical conditioning. Such simple programs, when coupled with periodic physical examinations, could become a valuable asset to the overall agency training program.

## The Role of the Supervisor in Training

Supervision and training go hand in hand. In any organization, police or otherwise, most of the on-the-job and day-to-day training activities are carried out by supervisors. Sergeants and other first line supervisors in a police agency can play a significant role in reducing the risk inherent in robbery events. By virtue of his assignment, the first line supervisor has an excellent opportunity to identify training needs, to provide the actual training, even on an individual basis, to observe officer performance, and to take corrective action. Unfortunately, the dynamics of police operations also involve the first line supervisor in the myriad of other tasks and responsibilities as well.

In discussions with many of the victim/officers regarding the role that their supervisors played in training, it was quite evident that most supervisors are neglecting their responsibilities in this particular area. In discussions with supervisors, the complaint was almost universal that supervisors rarely have time remaining from day-to-day tasks to provide the necessary training to their subordinates. In such cases, management must carefully examine the tasks assigned to supervisors to insure that sufficient time remains to permit supervisors to adequately provide necessary on-the-job training in fulfillment of the supervisor's basic role. There is no justification for not using first line supervisors to conduct roll call training or to coach their men on an individual basis. Many opportunities exist while the supervisor is providing backup on certain calls, during coffee and lunch breaks, and meetings in the patrol area which are deliberately arranged for that purpose.

The first line supervisor is a vital part of the risk reduction effort in any agency. Only the first line supervisor can observe and insure that his men are properly trained and are carrying out risk reduction practices on a day-to-day basis. The routine of daily operations can quickly dull the sharp edge of alertness of even the best training program if not continuously honed by good supervision.

### **The Role of Management in Training**

In recent years, most police administrators have come to realize the importance of training in improving overall efficiency in operations. Most administrators given sufficient funds and time, will inevitably select and implement training programs. Unfortunately, time and funds are not always available and it takes a clever and resourceful administrator to accomplish his training objectives within these constraints.

An administrator faced with the mounting concerns of rising crime and increased work loads, will frequently opt for more personnel and equipment. These options may be short sighted in the long run, given the considerations that proper training has the capability to increase individual skills in overall departmental efficiency and thus achieve the same objective. Considering the liabilities inherent in maintaining a force of untrained officers and the personal vulnerabilities and hazards untrained officers face, police administrators and managers should reexamine their budget needs to insure that sufficient training dollars are secured. A balanced budget is one that provides management with all of the resources necessary to accomplish the police mission. Training is one important resource that should not be overlooked.

## **EQUIPMENT**

### **Armor**

The utilization of various types of armor would greatly reduce injuries in robbery events according to information gathered during this study. Although there may be some practical limitations to the large scale employment of body armor, two factors weigh heavily in favor of its use. First, 52 percent of the 125 officers assaulted in the cases studied were dispatched and thus would have had time to don body armor if it had been available. Second, over half of the 78 officers who became casualties were wounded either in the head or torso—areas where armor would be most effective.

In only one of the cases examined in this study did an officer utilize body armor in attempting to apprehend armed robbery suspects. The suspects, barricaded in a store, began firing at the police

who were surrounding the building. The victim officer, who was wearing a protective vest, was fatally wounded in the head. He was not wearing protective head gear.

Body armor is manufactured in two general modes: soft and rigid. Each is available in a variety of configurations, materials, or combinations of materials. The ability of each to provide a known threat level of protection must be equated with area of coverage, weight, and comfort. Although lifesaving is certainly not a factor suitable for negotiation, the cost must also be considered.

**Soft Armor.** Flexible cloth armor is generally made from ballistic nylon cloth, and more recently, from a tough, strong yarn called "Kevlar". Threat levels of protection vary with the type of weave and the number of layers of cloth employed. Armor made with Kevlar generally has higher protection levels per weight due to the unique properties of this cloth. The ballistic properties of soft armor are reduced when it absorbs moisture. To counter this problem, some types are encapsulated in plastic coverings. Examples of soft armor are illustrated in Figures 33-36.

**Rigid Armor.** A number of types of rigid armor are available. These include configurations of glass reinforced plastic (GRP), polycarbonate plastic, ceramic, and steel. In addition, some configurations are available with a combination of materials. For example, steel inserts may be added to both soft and rigid armor to increase the level of protection. Both outerwear and undercover type configurations of rigid armor are available from a number of manufacturers.

The value of rigid armor may be assessed in terms of a trade off: added weight and reduced flexibility for high resistance to deformation. In terms of blunt trauma, rigid armor has the greater capability to resist deformation and spread the force of impact over a greater surface area of the body than does any of the soft armor products. Ceramic armor, although capable of defeating a caliber .30-06 threat, is very fragile and will not withstand multiple hits or rough handling. Examples of rigid armor are shown in Figures 37-39.

**Styles.** Most armor vests are configured as "sandwich board" or sleeveless jacket types with a carrier garment that contains removable panel inserts for front chest, back, and side protection. The use of web straps and velcro type fasteners is popular with most manufacturers. Garments are made for wearing over regular clothes or uniforms and also in unobtrusive styles for wearing under conventional clothing.

Upper torso body armor is also available as semi or fully integrated protection in certain times of uniform and regular apparel. In addition, certain experimental models exist of conventional outerwear made entirely from soft ballistic resistant material. Undergarments configured as underwear are also being tested for comfort and wearability. With the use of Kevlar cloth, the capability exists, within acceptable constraints of weight, cost, and utility, to fabricate all types of conventional apparel as ballistic resistant. See Figure 40.



**Figure 33**

Ballistic vest, light weight, designed for concealed wear under clothing. Material: "Impervium." Weight: 4 pounds. Rated against: .44 Magnum.



**Figure 34**


Ballistic jacket, medium weight. Material: ballistic nylon. Weight: 10 pounds. Rated against: .38 Special, .45 AR (lead nose bullet) and .22 handgun.






**Figure 35**

Ballistic vest, light weight, designed for concealed wear under clothing. Material: "Kevlar." Weight: 3 pounds, 2 ounces. Rated against: .357 Magnum and 9mm SP.



**Figure 36**

Ballistic vest, medium weight, can be worn under clothing. Material: ballistic nylon. Weight: 6 pounds, 4.5 ounces. Rated against: .38 Special, .45 ACP, .357 Magnum, .41 Magnum.



**Figure 37**

Ballistic vest, medium weight, designed to be worn as an undergarment. Material: glass reinforced plastic. Weight: Front-3.75 pounds; back-5 pounds. Rated against: 22 LR, 9mm, .38 Special and .357 Magnum.



**Figure 38**

Ballistic vest/shield, light weight. Material: steel, ballistic nylon, and ethofoam, with covering of vinyl coated nylon. Weight: 5½ pounds, 2.8 pounds per square foot. Rated against: .357 Magnum, 9mm, .44 Magnum.



**Figure 39**

Ballistic vest, designed primarily for external wear. Material: glass reinforced plastic. Weight: front-5.5 pounds; back-5.5 pounds; groin-2.5 pounds. Rated against: .22 LR, 9mm, .38 Special, and .357 Magnum.



**Figure 40**

Ballistic vest, incorporating deceptive styling is designed to be worn in the same manner as any suitvest. Material: "Kevlar." Weight: 3 pounds, 7 ounces. Rated against: .357 Magnum, 9mm SP.

**Armor Shields.** In recent years, officers' writing clip boards have been fabricated from rigid ballistic resistant materials—glass reinforced plastic, polycarbonate, and composites—to provide a type of shield capable of stopping or deflecting a handgun bullet. The justification for this medium is that an officer will generally always have and use such a device for routine car stops, citizens contacts, and report takings and thus be in a position to quickly shield his upper chest area, should the need arise. Examples are illustrated in Figures 41 & 42.

Although ballistic tests confirm the bullet resistant capabilities of these various devices, the myriad of factors involving shock of impact and deflection have not been assessed. Moreover, the constancy of officer utility suffers the same problems inherent in the discretionary use of seat belts, helmets, and other gear. In one fatal event examined in this study, an officer, who was highly motivated regarding his own safety to the point that he carried approved but optional equipment purchased at his own expense, stopped a car with two robbery suspects. He did not use his shotgun or carry his ballistic clipboard and was fatally shot.

Interest in full-body portable ballistic shields has been generated in police agencies. New ballistic materials, as illustrated in Figures 43 & 44 have made it possible for officers to make practical use of shields in situations where armed encounters are imminent.


Full-sized ballistic body shields are limited in applicability. In the few barricaded and hostage situations examined by the PWC staff in which robbery suspects were involved, full body shields would have prevented most of the injuries sustained by officers. At the present time, full-body shields that afford the wearer Threat Level I protection are bulky and heavy. The cumbersome nature of these shields discourages maneuverability. This ballistic shield's intended use is to provide cover from gunfire when other cover is not available. The shield allows the employment of officers at strategic vantage points where they could not normally be employed without ballistic protection.

Many shields are available in the police market today, but the majority are designed for nonballistic protection in civil disorders, riots, and similar incidents. Although some riot shields do offer a degree of ballistic protection, most fall short of meeting Threat Level I.

Agencies should not negate the flexibility of using vests also as shields. In fact, a lightweight vest (Figure 38) is also advertised as a ballistic shield. The vest is easily donned and has a hand strap for use as a shield.


Another new item on the ballistic shield market is the ballistic portfolio. The portfolio (shown in Figure 45, like the clipboard, serves an ordinary functional purpose as well as affording ballistic protection. The portfolio is made of ballistic nylon.

Different protective shields and their many methods of employment should be considered by interested police agencies. These shields afford various degrees of ballistic protection while offering the flexibility not inherent in many designs in police body armor.




**Figure 41**

Ballistic clipboard, designed as a clipboard and a ballistic shield. Material: polycarbonate plastic. Size: 12x18 inches. Weight: 56 ounces. Thickness: .357 inch. Rated against: .22 LR to .45 ACP.




**Figure 42**

Ballistic clipboard, can be used as a conventional clipboard as well as a ballistic shield. Material: glass reinforced plastic. Size: 10x15 inches, 12x18 inches. Weight: 29 ounces; 42 ounces. Thickness: .156 inch. Rated against: .22 Magnum, .45 ACP, and .38 Special.




**Figure 43**

Ballistic protective shield, designed to afford maximum body protection. Material: glass reinforced plastic. Size: 4 feet high. Weight: 70 pounds. Rated against: calibers up to and including the Super-Vel, .44 Magnum, and .12 gauge shotgun.



**Figure 44**

Ballistic protective shield, lightweight, with small transparent window designed to afford maximum body protection and good viewing capability. Material: glass reinforced plastic. Size: 18 inches wide, 40 inches high. Weight: 18 pounds. Rated against: all Class I threats (up to and including caliber .357 Magnum).



**Figure 45**

Ballistic portfolio designed to be used as a ballistic shield should the need arise. Material: ballistic nylon. Size: 12 inches by 16.5 inches. Weight: 1.75 pounds. Rated against: .38 Special, .45 ACP and .22 handgun.

**Upper Torso Protection.** Seventy-eight of the 125 officers who were assaulted in the robbery events studied were wounded. Twenty-three died as a result of their wounds. As shown in Figure 46, 1 of the 78 injured officers sustained wounds to the upper torso; nine of those wounds were fatal. Torso armor would have prevented all of those casualties.

The usual complaints against the wearing of torso armor, such as inconvenience and discomfort, generally arise in connection with continuous use under the conditions of daily police experience. These complaints are less applicable to situations in which an officer is forewarned of the event and thus can don the appropriate armor upon being dispatched. Sixty-five of the 125 officers were dispatched to the scene of the robbery and thus were alerted as to the possible danger that awaited them. Forty-three officers, however, were on view at the time the robbery was perpetrated. Since there is no time to don armor in these circumstances, only those officers who had been routinely wearing armor while on duty would have been protected.

Certain types of torso armor are available in sizes, shapes, weights, and materials which lessen the discomfort associated with continuous wearing. Generally, increased weight must be expected with increased coverage and threat protection. Thus, for procurement purposes, a decision must be made which takes into account both the degree of protection required and the comfort of the officer.

Police armor worn over uniform or conventional clothing should have the word *Police* stenciled plainly across front and back in block letters at least four inches high. Use of the agency seal or




Figure 46  
 DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR WOUNDS  
 AMONG VICTIM PERSONNEL



shoulder patch is also desirable above the letters. This feature will help improve recognition when vests are worn over uniforms, in dimly lighted areas, and at night.

All police armor that is available for issue should be plainly marked with the name of the manufacturer, the size of the garment, and the threat level for which the garment is rated. Use of a label similar to that illustrated in Figure 47 is recommended.

MANUFACTURER:	XYZ Armor Company Anyplace, U.S.A.
MATERIAL:	Ballistic Nylon
SIZE:	Large - (No other size available)
RATING:	Protects Against .38 Special, .357 Magnum, and 00 Buckshot


**Figure 47**  
**BALLISTIC LABEL CAUTION NOTICE**

**Head Protection.** Eleven of the 23 officer fatalities in this study and nine of the 55 casualties were caused by wounds to the head. None of the officers killed or injured was wearing protective headgear at the time of the assault.

The fact that the majority of the 78 casualties occurred to officers answering robbery-in-progress or silent alarm calls indicates that head protection is needed for officers answering such high risk calls. When responding to these, officers should be wearing protective equipment, including headgear, since it is most likely that their initial contact with the suspects will be immediately upon reaching the site. In fact, 38 percent of the 78 casualties in this study sustained their injuries at the crime scene.


The use of general duty type helmets has been popular with some agencies for over ten years. Helmets of this type are chiefly designed to provide protection to the head from blows rendered by clubs, rocks, etc. They are not capable of providing even basic threat level ballistic protection.

Helmets capable of defeating Class I or II ballistic threats are generally too heavy for continuous everyday wear. Nevertheless, the high vulnerability of this part of the body indicates that law enforcement agencies should make an effort to make available, on a selective basis, bullet resistant helmets. Officers in high risk areas should carry equipment of this type and don it when responding to, or encountering high risk situations. Examples are shown in Figures 48 & 49.



**Figure 48**

Ballistic helmet made from glass reinforced plastic and designed to defeat all Class I threats.



**Figure 49**

Ballistic helmet made of glass reinforced plastic and designed to resist penetration of .22 LR and .38 Special.

**Vehicle Armor.** Eighty-nine officers were on motor patrol duty at the time of the event. Upon responding to the scene, 14 of those officers engaged in vehicle pursuit; another ten officers were assaulted in or near their patrol cars.

Standard police patrol vehicles offer little ballistic protection; only the engine area affords a notable degree of ballistic resistance. Armoring all patrol cars may not be necessary or practical; however, some armored vehicles could be effectively used by a special tactical team in responding to high risk situations.

To adequately armor a patrol vehicle, both the windows and the body must have ballistic protection. Metallic and non-metallic materials can be used separately or in combination to provide bullet resistance for the vehicle body. Transparent materials which are bullet resistant and might be

considered as replacements for the standard safety glass are:

- Bullet-proof glass
- Acrylic plastic
- Polycarbonate plastic
- Composite of glass and plastic laminate

Some problems, however, might be encountered in using these materials. Bullet-proof glass, for instance, must be over an inch thick before any notable bullet resistancy is realized. Also, some materials have a tendency to spall or fragment. Polycarbonate plastic scratches easily but may be suitable for windows if laminated with bullet-proof glass.

The comfort of the occupants must also be considered. Since the windows of cars equipped with ballistic protection have to remain closed at all times, air conditioning would be required. Other difficulties that surround bullet resistance and visibility concern the windshield and door windows. Most windshields and door windows are curved and moulded to fit the overall vehicle design. In most cases, the thickness of transparent bullet resistant materials would not permit simple substitution or supplementary addition without extensive modifications to window frames. Window wipers, defrosters, and window regulator mechanisms would also be affected.

The installation of materials that can defeat bullet penetration does not pose great difficulties for those portions of the vehicle that are not required to be transparent. The roof, door, trunk panels, and engine compartment can easily be modified to accommodate the addition of bullet resistant panels. These panels can be metallic or non-metallic or in combination. Such materials include: ballistic nylon and Kevlar cloth, glass reinforced plastic, steel, armor, and titanium alloy. Applications can be made inside of the vehicle to secure a permanent unobtrusive appearance, or outside, as simple emergency "add on" panels that can easily be removed or transferred to other vehicles as the need requires.

## Firearms

Firearms are used by police essentially as defensive weapons. The potential for such defense is high whenever officers interdict robbery events, since, in most cases, robbery suspects are armed. Defensive weapons employed by police fall into the following categories: handguns, shotguns, rifles, and weapons capable of delivering chemical agents.

**Handguns.** The handgun has been the law enforcement officer's major defensive weapon for over a century. So it is today. In the numerous visits made to public safety agencies throughout the United States, the PWC staff found four conditions to be most prevalent regarding acquisition of on-duty handguns:

- Handguns issued by the agency—officers have no option in choosing weapons
- Handguns issued by the agency—officers also have option of choosing own weapon
- Officers provide own weapons—agency guidelines and standards in force
- Officers provide own weapons—no agency guidelines or policy

Most of the agencies visited by the robbery analysis unit fell into the first category. The majority of these agencies issued a .38 Special revolver in four, five, or six inch barrel lengths, usually manufactured by one of the two most popular firearms companies. In very few agencies, the .357 Magnum revolver was issued or permitted as an option to officers, but generally, use of Magnum ammunition was prohibited. In a few agencies, autoloading pistols were issued or permitted as an option for carrying as service handguns.

In the second and third categories, a wide range of handguns were found to be in use. Policy on handguns varied in these agencies, but, as a general rule, on-duty weapon caliber was specified by regulation to be at least a .38 Special. In a few of these agencies, policy did not dictate a limit on the caliber or the handgun. The only control factor exercised was that the agency required a firearms instructor or armorer, or a command officer, to inspect each weapon before an officer would be allowed to carry it. This inspection process was common in the vast majority of agencies visited in which officers were given some latitude in choosing their own on-duty handguns. Ineffective handguns were not a contributing risk factor in the casualty cases examined.

- *Uniformed Officers.* Officers on duty and in uniform were generally required to carry handguns with at least a four inch barrel. Although the four inch revolver was found to be the most popular weapon carried by uniformed officers, a six inch revolver was carried by approximately five percent of the officer casualties either as an agency issued weapon or the officer's own selection.

The PWC staff found that in over 95 percent of casualty and non-casualty robbery events involving uniformed officers, the officers were carrying a .38 Special revolver, usually a Colt or Smith & Wesson model, with a four inch barrel. Magnum handguns were used only in a few

events by uniformed officers. Shotguns, which will be discussed later, were used more often than magnum handguns.

The PWC staff feels that the .38 Special revolver is still an adequate sidearm for police work. With improved + P loadings and bullet configurations, the .38 Special has become even more practical. In some individual cases it may be desirable to employ the .357 Magnum revolver for the additional weight and stability that the weapon offers without using .357 Magnum cartridges. In firing the .357 Magnum, .41 Magnum, or .44 Magnum rounds, the muzzle flash and recoil cause flinching and second round inaccuracy for most shooters. It takes considerable skill and discipline to be able to consistently fire Magnum rounds with accuracy. Although many tales have been told about the ineffectiveness of the .38 Special, few of the officers involved in the 94 robbery events examined complained about the stopping power of the .38 Special.

- *Off Duty and Plainclothes Officers.* A wider range of handguns, in caliber and make, was found to be in use among plainclothes personnel than among uniformed officers during this project. This can be explained by the differing firearms policies governing the two groups. Plainclothes officers were not as restricted in their choice of handguns as uniformed officers.

The majority of plainclothes officers injured in the casualty events were carrying short-barreled .38 Special caliber revolvers, some of which had a five-round rather than a six-round capacity. In only one event was a five-shot revolver a contributing risk factor. In that case, the officer, who was seriously wounded, expended all the rounds from his weapon before the suspect fired. Fortunately, the suspect fled without taking advantage of the situation.

A few plainclothes officers that were injured or killed in robbery events were carrying single-action revolvers. The PWC staff considers this a dangerous practice for any police officer on duty, off duty, uniformed, or in plainclothes. Agency regulations should prohibit the use of such weapons.

A significant number of off duty and plainclothes officers were injured or killed in robbery events. The PWC recommends that the following standards be taken into consideration when selecting a weapon for off duty personnel as well as on duty plainclothes officers:

- *Threshold Caliber of the Weapon.* Any weapon of less than .380 ACP is considered too weak to be effective. Although certain small caliber weapons may be easier to carry and conceal, their capability to provide deadly force, whenever such force is necessary and justified, may be poor.
- *Weapon Round Capacity.* A minimum five-round capability is desired. Weapons with only

one or two-round capability pose severe risk for the officer when he empties the weapon and cannot easily reload. Moreover, many small weapons of two-round capacity pose an extreme hazard--if dropped, they will fire.

- *Inspection.* Inspection of all off duty weapons should be conducted by a competent firearms officer within the agency, who can certify that the weapon functions safely. This also applies to plainclothes officers who have chosen their own service weapon. Weapons that may discharge when accidentally dropped should not be considered.
  
- *Method of Carrying.* Odd-shaped, ill-fitted, or gadget-like holsters should not be employed. The practice of concealing a weapon under the trousers belt without any other restraint should be discouraged.
  
- *Qualification.* Officers must be required to qualify with off duty weapons, firing the same course and under the same conditions as with the service weapon. The logic here is simply that no weapon is any good if it cannot be employed accurately, effectively, and safely.

If these criteria are met, a three-fold objective is realized. First, the officer is provided with sufficient firepower to stop a suspect and thus reduce possible injury to himself. Second, the individual officer has a wide latitude in the selection of his off duty weapon. Third, the risk of accidents and the resultant liability by the department is reduced.

**Shotguns.** The shotgun is one police tool which is universally respected by professional law enforcement personnel. It is the shotgun's versatility and adaptability which account for its popularity. Not to be overlooked, however, is the considerable psychologically deterring effect of the weapon. The slide action shotgun was the type found to be used most often by the police.

Approximately 13 percent of all the officers who were injured or killed in robbery events during the course of this research were utilizing shotguns. This fact is somewhat ironic since approximately the same percentage of suspects used shotguns. Shotguns, particularly the sawed-off models, appear to have become a favorite weapon of the armed robber. The sawed-off shotgun, concealed under a coat or jacket, presents quite a psychological effect upon the victim, much as the police shotgun does to the robbery suspect. In both cases, the shotgun inhibits retaliatory action.

A limited accessibility to shotguns was found to be a contributing risk factor for officers responding to robberies. Some agencies which utilized shotguns in patrol work limited access of this weapon to the patrol officer. Weapons were only available for specific situations or were carried in supervisors' or special vehicles. In other agencies where shotguns were utilized, the following conditions existed:

- All patrol officers were required to carry a shotgun in their vehicle.
- Patrol officers could secure shotguns for their tour of duty if desired.
- Command officers and sergeants carried shotguns in their vehicles. These were made available to officers when needed.
- Only specialized tactical units were issued shotguns.
- Patrol officers were allowed to carry their own shotgun.
- A combination of two or more of these conditions.

In very few of the larger agencies visited were shotguns issued to all patrol units. In these agencies, usually the specialized units or command units or both carried shotguns. Due to the large volume of patrol units in these agencies, cost was considered to be a prohibitive factor for issuing shotguns to all patrol units and need was also difficult to justify.

Smaller agencies tended to issue patrol units shotguns or to allow patrol officers to carry their personal shotgun. Most of these agencies were small county sheriff's offices, or borough, town, or township police departments.

- Policies regarding the method of carrying shotguns differed from agency to agency. Shotguns were usually mounted in an electric or mechanical locking device in the cab of the patrol vehicle or in the trunk. In those few agencies that required officers to carry shotguns in the trunk, three major reasons were given to justify this policy:

- Prevention of theft
- Out of citizens' observation
- Prevent accidental discharge of weapon.

Officers interviewed by the robbery analysis team who were required to carry the shotgun in the trunk, complained about the impracticality of this measure. The need for quick accessibility when

answering robbery calls is a critical risk factor. It was found that in many cases, officers would not have had the opportunity to remove a shotgun from the trunk. The PWC encourages the mounting of shotguns in the front passenger area of the car in a position affording rapid accessibility. A survey of locking shotgun mounts, electrical and mechanical, should be conducted before attempting procurement. Both mounts offer distinct advantages. A mounting position on the floor of the vehicle with the weapon horizontal and easily available from either side of the front seat is the safest and most desirable. If seat adjustment is deemed a problem, mounts are available that secure to the front of the seat and move with the seat. The use of shotguns with folding stocks or in the new short coupled mode facilitates the carrying and storage problem.

Limited accessibility was again noted as a factor when only command officers were allowed to carry shotguns. In most of the events examined where this policy existed, the initial confrontation between armed suspect and officer had occurred before a command officer could arrive at the scene. In a few of these cases, officers were seriously wounded before a backup unit arrived.

The advantage of a shotgun for specialized robbery teams or patrol officers answering robbery calls was displayed in many instances throughout the project. Stakeout teams utilizing shotguns were particularly successful in apprehending robbery suspects in non-casualty events. The close range shock effect of the shotgun was found to give the officer a significant psychological and firepower advantage, especially over suspects armed only with handguns. Handguns, from .22 caliber to .357 Magnum, were used in over 85 percent of the robbery events.

The PWC encourages the use of police shotguns in situations that warrant high casualty risk. Also, in barricaded situations involving armed robbery suspects, shotguns can be of considerable value. Equipped with special launching devices, shotguns can be used to deliver chemical agents some distance away with reasonable accuracy. The AAI multi-purpose grenade and the Ferret liquid tear gas round are two good examples.

Use of the shotgun must be coupled with sufficient initial training and periodic refresher practice in order to insure safe and effective performance. The shotgun is a powerful and versatile weapon. Its value in reducing risks in robbery events should not be ignored, nor compromised because of lack of training and safety.

## **Holsters**

In none of the 94 robbery events examined was handgun inaccessibility a contributing factor to the injury or death of an officer. Holsters generally afforded the officer the capability of drawing his handgun without delay. In all but a few events, holsters offered adequate security from suspects attempting to remove the officer's handgun.



The holster most commonly used was the Border Patrol type worn on a Sam Browne belt. Uniformed officers without an exception wore a holster with a safety strap or a safety flap. These measures were found to be of value to officers involved in foot pursuit situations or when grappling with a resisting suspect. Very few Break-front or Clamshell type holsters were found to be in use. Other than offering reasonable security and quick accessibility to the handgun, a holster should be durable in design, construction, and materials. And in the final analysis, the holster selected should agree with the established requirements of the department, and should meet the prerequisites of security, comfort, reliability, speed, and safety.

**Uniform Wear.** Although great strides have been made in the design of uniform holsters over the past ten years, the uniform or duty holster presently being issued by most departments has not changed significantly in twenty years.

When appraising the merits of a uniform holster for the purpose of departmental standardization, it is important that certain prerequisites be met. With few exceptions, the main points of consideration are:

- The holster must hold the weapon securely.
- It must be comfortable to wear.
- It must be reliable.
- It should be durable.
- It must be compatible with the type of work performed by the wearer.
- If possible, the holster should not present the weapon in a manner considered offensive by the general public.
- It must be safe to the wearer, as well as to those around him.
- Above all, it should permit drawing the weapon with maximum speed consistent with safety and security.

**Plainclothes Wear.** None of the events studied offered significant comment for casualty risk connected with the holster used for plainclothes or off duty wear. One off duty officer employing

an ankle holster was able to reach his weapon while seated at a table in a restaurant during a robbery. His resultant use of the weapon, however, increased his risk in that particular situation.

Undercover and plainclothes officers have special requirements for the carrying of handguns which differ from those of uniform officers. The very nature of their duties dictates that the factors for selecting a uniform holster be carefully evaluated and modified to meet those characteristics considered desirable and necessary in a concealment holster. Concealment is perhaps one of the most important considerations of the individual engaged in a plainclothes or undercover operation.

When appraising the merits of a concealment holster, it is essential that certain prerequisites be met. The main points of consideration are:

- The holster must hold the weapon securely.
- The holster must be capable of being concealed under normal wearing apparel.
- The holster design should permit the weapon to be carried in a manner that compliments the natural contours of the body.
- The holster should not excessively add to the bulk of the weapon.
- The holster must be comfortable to wear.
- It should be durable.
- It must be safe to the wearer, as well as to those around him.
- It must permit the drawing of the weapon with speed and assurance, consistent with safety and security.

### **Extra Ammunition Carriers**

Although few robbery events examined by the PWC staff required the need for officers to reload their service handguns, two events point out the need for quick accessibility to extra ammunition. In both cases, the officers were not wearing cartridge holders on their person. One officer left his

extra ammunition still boxed inside a building when he confronted two suspects outside. He expended all the rounds in his revolver and was unable to reload because of the inaccessibility of extra ammunition. In the other event, the officer was carrying a pocketful of extra ammunition. Attempting to remove these rounds from his trouser pocket to load his weapon wasted precious time.

Although there are many types of extra ammunition carriers, drop pouches may be the most practical. They afford quick accessibility while insuring that the ammunition is secure. Speed loaders are not practical since all rounds must be expended or ejected before the speed loader can be used. These devices were essentially developed to serve in competitive type shooting matches. Belt loops for ammunition are too time consuming and insecure for practical use. Ammunition removal is usually a one-by-one task. In addition, ammunition is exposed and subject to the effects of weather.

Officers should carry at least six extra rounds, and preferably twelve. The ammo container should be accessible with either hand and dispense six cartridges at a time. Loading each pouch with an extra cartridge is a good practice in the event one is dropped during re-loading. Cartridges should be placed in the pouch or container so that they are oriented or positioned for ease in loading with the normal hand.

## **Ammunition**

There has been little change in the .38 Special cartridge over the last 60 years. The .38 Special cartridge with the 158 grain, round nose lead bullet was first developed by the Smith and Wesson Company around the turn-of-the-century as an improvement of the .38 Long Colt which was proven ineffective by the U.S. Army during the Moro native uprising in the Philippines. The .38 Special was found to be accurate, comfortable to shoot, and ideally suited for police use. It has remained the most popular cartridge among law enforcement personnel.

With few exceptions, officers involved in the robbery events examined by the PWC were carrying .38 Special revolvers as a sidearm. Cartridges had bullet configurations of round nose lead, with a few wadcutter and semi-wadcutter shapes. The 158 grain bullet was most often used.

Extensive tests with different bullet configurations conducted by the Firearms Section of the New York City Police Department revealed the 158 grain semi-wadcutter to be a more appropriate round for police work. The advantage over the conventional round nose bullet was:

- Greater uniform "mushrooming" effect upon striking target.
- Greater tendency to stay in target making clean distinct wound channel while continuing in a straight line path.

- Less tendency to be deflected.
- Less tendency to ricochet.
- Less tendency for penetration of wall or similar object and strike someone on the other side.

The last three advantages of the semi-wadcutter are particularly relevant in densely populated urban environments.

Magnum cartridges of caliber .357 and above may provide the shooter with greater "stopping power," but increased recoil and noise associated with these calibers causes a tendency to flinch and requires additional recovery time. This factor is a considerable disadvantage in a fast-moving firefight. The increased flash effect is also a factor that may cause shooter discomfort and flinching. These disadvantages, along with the great penetrating power of magnum ammunition, should be factors to consider before magnum ammunition is secured by an agency. For obvious reasons, uniform handgun ammunition is a necessity in a police agency. Officer safety calls for it.

The appropriateness of the .38 Special cartridge is a source of continuing interest and disagreement. Agencies should consider the environment, whether rural or urban, and weigh the advantages against the disadvantages of proposed ammunition before making a selection. The recent introduction of + P ammunition especially designed for police use makes the .38 Special a more effective weapon than ever before. Extra velocity and variety of bullet configurations and weights permit considerable flexibility.

Although the IACP has no official policy concerning police ammunition, the staff of the Police Weapons Center has examined this question and reached some conclusions. A brief overview may help put things in perspective.

During the past ten years, there has existed an apparent growing dissatisfaction with the .38 Special revolver as a police weapon. Many instances are recounted by police of assailants, who, although hit in vulnerable areas of the body, continued their attack. Since a more powerful sidearm seemed necessary, police began to examine the merits of the .357 Magnum, the .44 Special, and the .45 ACP. Coincident with this trend, the .41 Magnum and .44 Magnum were developed and offered as "ideal" police revolver calibers. As it then stood, one had to continue to use the .38 Special revolver with the 158 grain round nose lead bullet, or discard that weapon in favor of one with a more powerful cartridge.

In the mid 1960's, an innovative ammunition manufacturer introduced a more powerful .38 Special cartridge with a hollowpoint bullet configuration expressly designed to transfer greater

energy or force to the target. By stepping up the velocity and by employing the hollowpoint bullet design, expansion of the bullet on impact was virtually assured. With greater expansion, the bullet was stopped within the target, thereby releasing or transferring all energy to the target. This is the so called "knock down power" that some people loosely refer to when discussing the merits of one caliber or cartridge over another. As a result, other ammunition manufacturers followed suit, so that a variety of .38 Special cartridges is now available with a choice of bullet configurations as well.

The question still remains: which one is best. Although no simple solution is possible, some generalizations can be made. In general, the hollowpoint bullet configuration is most effective. However, a number of different hollowpoint bullet configurations are offered by manufacturers. The following table identifies current manufacturers of police service cartridges with hollowpoint bullets. Specific calibers and bullet weights are grouped by manufacturer.

Manufacturers	Hollowpoint Bullet	Weight in Grains							
		90	95	100	110	115	125	140	158
3-D Company, Inc. Box 142 Doniphan, NE 68832	.38 Spec. .357 Mag. 9mm				X (not manufactured)	X			X
Federal Cartridge Corp. 2700 Fishay Tower Minneapolis, MN 55402	.38 Spec. .357 Mag. 9mm					X		X X	
Norma Precision, Inc. South Lansing, NY 14882	.38 Spec. .357 Mag. 9mm				X	X			X X
Remington Arms Co. 939 Barnum Avenue Bridgeport, CT 06602	.38 Spec. .357 Mag. 9mm		X			X		X X	X
S&W Ammunition Co. 3040 Seminary Road Alton, IL 62002	.38 Spec. .357 Mag. 9mm			X	X	X		X X	X X
Speer Incorporated P.O. Box 896 Lewistown, ID 83501	.38 Spec. .357 Mag. 9mm			X	X		X X	X X	
Super-Vel Cartridge Co. Box 40 Shelbyville, IN 46176	.38 Spec. .357 Mag. 9mm	X			X X				X
Winchester-Western 275 Winchester Avenue New Haven, CT 06504	.38 Spec. .357 Mag. 9mm			X	X				X X

From all accounts, there does not appear to be any justification for using Magnum weapons as long as the effectiveness of the .38 Special can be improved by using the +P cartridges and hollowpoint bullet configurations. Regular use of +P .38 Special ammunition should be restricted to revolvers of medium and large frame steel construction. Use of +P loadings in lightweight or alloy frame revolvers is dangerous and not recommended.

Shotguns, when used by officers in robbery events during the project, were most often loaded with 00 buckshot or 00 magnum buckshot. This form of ammunition afforded the officers the close range shocking power usually needed in robbery situations. In a few cases, rifled slugs were used effectively. There were times when the shotgun could not be discharged without risking injury to bystanders. The 00 buckshot round was found to be most effective in stakeout situations.

The PWC encourages the use of the 00 buckshot and 00 magnum buckshot rounds in most situations. The rifled slug would be more appropriate when accuracy is needed at greater ranges.

#### **Identification of Plainclothes Officers**

Eighteen of the 125 officers in this study were on duty and in plainclothes at the time of the robbery event. In one robbery incident, a plainclothes officer on a stakeout was shot and killed by a fellow officer when mistaken for a robbery suspect. This tragic death might have been prevented if the slain officer had been wearing some form of identification. Twelve officers of the 125 were off duty and in plainclothes at the time of a robbery event covered in this study. The potential for lack of recognition is great for all officers who are out of uniform and attempting police action.

Most officers attempt to employ their badge or I.D. card in face to face situations as a means of identification. Generally, these situations do not involve force or the use of weapons, and seldom occur where officers are not known to each other or the suspects. Problems occur in situations where armed plainclothes officers are not easily distinguishable from other armed officers and/or armed suspects. Should an armed citizen/victim also exist, the resultant confusion and potential for hazard is obvious.

Officers in plainclothes and off duty who are confronted with an armed robbery and who attempt to take police action are extremely vulnerable to casualty. This condition is aggravated when the event occurs in a restaurant, tavern, or bar where the officer may have been drinking.

Consider also the hazards for non-recognition in the following situation. An armed plainclothes officer is running after a suspect. A victim is lying on the ground in a pool of blood. An

off duty officer in plainclothes driving by stops and is told by witnesses that a man with a gun ran away. He drives in pursuit, overtakes the plainclothes officer still running, and holding his weapon. He yells, "Police officer, halt!" The first officer stops, turns around in frustration at being interrupted from catching the suspect. The second officer sees the weapon and fires—a tragedy results.

A group of plainclothes officers conducting a raid in pursuit of robbery suspects pose similar potential for non-recognition and casualty. This situation can easily be aggravated when officers of several jurisdictions are involved. The need for temporary plainclothes officer recognition is critical. But more importantly, the hazards of non-recognition must be clearly understood by all officers who take police action while not in uniform.

Conversely, the need for plainclothes officers to remain unidentified at times must also be clearly understood. In one event in this study, a plainclothes officer responded to a bank alarm and walked into the bank during a holdup. Unfortunately, he was holding his police radio in his hand in full view. The robbers immediately identified him as an officer and shot him.

**Armband or Sash.** In an effort to cope with this problem, some agencies have resorted to the use of bright colored armbands, or sashes, marked with the word "Police" to aid in recognition. As an expedient for the plainclothes or off duty officer, this technique is better than nothing and an improvement over attempting recognition through simple use of a badge pinned to a coat or shirt pocket. Armbands or sashes can be easily carried and quickly donned. If made with fluorescent and reflective materials, they provide a measure of safety in areas of poor light or in traffic congested situations. One disadvantage of the armband may be that it is not always visible in all directions.

**Vest.** Another medium that produces good recognition is the use of a small vest similar to that worn by street maintenance workers. Fabricated from thin, lightweight nylon, it could be easily carried in a pocket and take up no more space than a handkerchief. The word *Police* could be stenciled on the front and back in reflectorized lettering to increase recognition.

In either case—armband or vest—the device can be quickly brought into play with no greater effort than that taken to affix a badge or ID card to an outer garment. In both cases, risks promoted by lack of recognition are likely to be sharply reduced. See examples in Figure 50.

### **Communications Equipment**

In robbery situations, communications equipment can be utilized to forewarn officers of escape routes and other information obtained from witnesses; to enable officers to summon



Figure 50  
IDENTIFICATION OF PLAINCLOTHES OFFICERS

assistance after surveying the situation; and to facilitate coordination among officers responding to the call, either within the same agency or between agencies.

**Radio.** Although communications equipment, such as portable radios, can be used to effectively reduce risk, some problems arise when this equipment is used carelessly or at an inappropriate time. In two cases examined in this study, the misuse of a portable radio contributed to the death of an officer. In one event, the victim officer, although in plainclothes, virtually announced his presence to the suspects in the bank when he walked into their view with a portable police radio in his hand. In the second event, as a uniformed officer approached a jewelry store in answer to a robbery alarm, a transmission emanated from his radio which was overheard by the robbers. He was shot as he entered the store. Both fatalities might have been avoided, if the officers had carried their radios in an unobtrusive manner, out of the sight and hearing of the suspects.

More frequently officers neglect to use their portable radios at all. Left in the patrol car or at a particular vantage point, the portable radio is useless to perform its most important function: prevent the isolation of the police officer. Without it, the officer is a lone individual frequently



confronting unknown circumstances and uneven odds. He has no way of calling for assistance, of warning other officers at the scene of the suspects' position, or of relaying escape routes and other identifying information should the suspects escape. In one stakeout event, the officer left his radio and, without notifying the dispatcher, confronted an armed suspect. The officer was shot and the suspect escaped before assistance could be summoned.


The vehicle radio is also very important and useful. Officers receive dispatch information to respond to the scene, can coordinate their arrival and deployment with their supervisor and other officers, and also receive additional information regarding the event before they arrive. The vehicle radio, the dispatcher, the supervisor, and the officers exist as a team linked by the communications capability of the radio. As soon as the officer or supervisor leaves his vehicle, this link is broken and communications are interrupted. Officers must recognize and understand their vulnerability whenever they are away from their radio or other means of communication.

**Mobile Digital Terminal.** Means currently exist in vehicle as well as with portable hand held units to communicate through the medium of mobile digital terminals that feature cathode ray tube read out display panels. These devices are generally incorporated into an overall computer based information and communications system. Coded messages can be sent and received in micro-seconds. An emergency code permits officers to request help merely by depressing a single key on the terminal board. Normal messages are composed first with the text registering on the display screen. If it is satisfactory, the message is sent by depressing the function key. Since the signals travel in micro-seconds, the message is not capable of interception. Another safeguard against interception exists in that each terminal receives messages only intended for that terminal. Mobile digital terminal equipment, as shown in Figure 51, can provide considerable advantages in overall risk reduction.

**Scramblers.** Voice scrambling devices are employed as a means of providing privacy on police two-way radio systems. These devices generally use techniques that encode voice signals for transmission and decode them at the receiver. Interception without proper decoding results in garbled and unintelligible signals.

The simplest of scrambling devices interchanges low voice frequencies and high ones, thus the classification, inverter. Other means involve band-splitting, masking, and time division. Unit costs range from \$300.00 to \$3,000.00 depending upon the type of equipment and special features or options.

The use of scrambling devices for general patrol work does not seem indicated. Although in at least one robbery event examined in this study the suspect secured an advantage by monitoring the radio frequency, this does not appear to be a common threat. Moreover, use of multiple frequencies, codes, prearranged tactical plans, and simple caution should do much to reduce risks in robbery situations without need of voice scrambling devices.




**Figure 51**  
**MOBILE DIGITAL TERMINAL**



**Figure 52**  
**TELEPRINTER**

**Teleprinters.** Another mode of the mobile digital terminal used in conjunction with a computer backed dispatching and information retrieval system is the teleprinter, illustrated in Figure 52. These devices, instead of a CRT display, employ a printed tape hard copy of messages sent and received. Use of mobile digital terminals enhances message security and results in faster transmission of data. Properly employed, teleprinters, as well as any other mode of a mobile or portable digital terminal can provide a sound advantage in reducing risk of casualty.



# APPENDIX A

## METHODOLOGY

This study was limited to robbery events that occurred between September 1, 1972 and August 30, 1973. Events for field visits were selected by the PWC Casualty Analysis staff in several ways. The Federal Bureau of Investigation made available teletype messages and bulletins announcing all police fatalities. A newsclipping service continuously screened approximately 8,750 daily and weekly news publications and supplied news accounts of incidents involving police assaults. A brochure describing the project was prepared and distributed to all known police agencies in the U.S. requesting them to forward reports or information on assaults against police officers.

All reports received were carefully reviewed by the PWC staff who sought to identify specific robbery events which resulted in assaults against law enforcement officers. Occasionally, the agency concerned would be contacted for additional information. If the event appeared qualified for examination, a letter was sent to the agency head describing the program and requesting to visit the agency to secure information about the event, to interview the principals involved, and also to examine relevant policies, procedures, and training programs.

Regions	Number of Agencies Visited	Number of Events
New England	3	3
Mid Atlantic	5	14
East North Central	13	15
West North Central	3	9
South Atlantic	15	23
East South Central	4	5
West South Central	6	9
Mountain	3	3
Pacific	10	13
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>94</b>

Figure 1  
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ON-SITE VISITS

A total of 104 reported robbery events were selected for examination, of which 96 were subsequently determined to fall within the study definition of robbery event. Sixty-nine on-site visits to 62 law enforcement agencies were performed during the field study effort. The agencies visited ranged in size from one officer to more than 30,000.

A positive reply from an agency led to arrangements for the visit and a field study of the reported ambush attack event.<sup>1</sup>

Each field study was conducted by a member of the IACP Police Weapons Center staff. Normally, each event required a two to three day visit to gather information. In each instance, the staff member sought to obtain documents and information by the following means:

- Review of the offense and follow-up reports concerning the event
- Review of the personnel records of the victim officer
- Review of the training record of the victim officer
- Review of the firearms proficiency record of the victim officer
- Interview with the victim officer, if possible
- Interview with other police participants
- Interview with investigative personnel
- Interview with supervisory personnel

---

<sup>1</sup>One department declined to participate in the study, thus eliminating from the study two events in which two officers were killed. The following summaries of these events are drawn from media reports:

- While off duty, the victim officer observed two men robbing a man in a parking lot. After identifying himself as a policeman, the victim officer ran toward the two suspects. One suspect fled on foot; the other took the robbery victim's car. The victim officer followed in his vehicle until the chase ended as the suspect's car skidded on wet pavement and crashed into a fence. The suspect then fatally wounded the victim officer who was unarmed.
- Working off-duty as a security guard in a sandwich shop, the victim officer intervened in an armed robbery attempt. During an exchange of gunfire, the victim officer was shot once in the head. He was pronounced dead on arrival at a local hospital.

- Visual examination of the event site
- Securing photographs and/or sketches of the scene
- Review of the arrest record of the suspect(s)
- Review of the description of weapon(s) used by the suspect(s) and the officer(s)

The results of this information gathering process often led to further interviews with firearm instructors, training personnel, criminal justice planners, prosecutors, parole officers, and others who might contribute to the research effort.

Upon completion of each field visit, the staff prepared several primary and interim documents. Additionally, reports were prepared and sent to the University of Oklahoma Research Institute to provide data for a detailed quantitative study of the variables in the assault process:

- *Physical Contact Summary* – a University of Oklahoma form requesting basic information that was to be assimilated with data submitted by other agencies and computer analyzed to determine causes and countermeasures for assaults on police officers. (Appendix D).
- *Incident Summary* – a factual summary report of the incident, a roster of persons contacted, and a list of materials collected for later analysis.

Other documents prepared and retained at IACP Headquarters for in-depth examination and analysis included:

- *Casualty Analysis Report* – a specific analysis of each event describing and evaluating the development, initiation, and execution of the ambush attack with major emphasis upon the identification of significant risk reduction factors.
- *Wound Chart* – a visual description and location of the wound(s) suffered by the victim officer.
- *Weapons Report* – a description of the weapon(s) and ammunition used by each participant in the event and the manner in which the weapons were employed.


Robbery Events	Victim Personnel	Assailant/Suspects
Prior planning and preparation	Geographic distribution	How apprehended
Possible indications of assault/casualty	Agency classification	Age
	Professional standing	Race
Entrapment	Duty assignment	Physical characteristics
Role of extremist groups	Duty status and dress	Arrest record/criminal history
Triggering mechanism	Age	Previous history of emotional disturbance
Tactics of execution	Length of service	
Range & number of suspects	Training	Weapon used
Number of rounds fired	Initial reaction of victim officer(s)	Circumstance of attack
		Casualties
Direction of fire	Evasive action taken	Wound distribution
Time of event	Ability to locate assailant(s)	Criticality of wound
		Number of assailants
Physical characteristics, construction, and population density of area of occurrence	Accuracy of defensive fire	Weapon(s)/type(s)
	Casualties	
Community attitudes toward police	Wound distribution	Availability and use of escape routes
	Location and activities of victim	
Response of other law enforcement personnel	Number of victims	Use of hostages
Profile of victims and victim locations	Weapon(s)/type(s)	
	Availability and use of escape routes	
	Availability and effectiveness of communications equipment	
	Rescue of wounded officer	

**Figure 2**  
**DATA CATEGORIES**

These materials provided the basis for analysis and comparative review of all field data. A large number of interactive variables regarding the scenario and structure of identified robbery events, the behavior of event participants and victims, and outstanding environmental considerations were isolated, extracted, and then applied to direct further examination. The variables were clustered within three major subject categories. Primary data was processed within these categories in Figure 2.

The findings derived from this phase of the research effort were tabulated and arranged to generate initial recommendations for risk reduction in robbery events through new or improved tactics and procedures, equipment, and training. In turn, these recommendations were studied and tested against known operational and resource constraints of law enforcement. Recommendations that could not be realized within the constraints were modified or discarded. Final recommendations and discussions presented in this report are designed to provide a comprehensive effort toward risk reduction in robbery events.





# APPENDIX B

## A CASUALTY RISK REDUCTION PROGRAM

Any law enforcement agency seriously interested in reducing the risk of injury or death to its personnel should consider the implementation of an internal casualty risk reduction program.

Although an effective risk reduction program must receive the support and cooperation of all members of the department, especially those in supervisory and command positions, a risk reduction officer or team should be designated to formulate and guide the implementation of improved tactics, training, and equipment intended to reduce casualties. The risk reduction function should have staff authority and responsibility for finding and implementing solutions to the problem of attacks on police officers.

In the case of reducing risks connected with robbery events, for example, the risk reduction officer or team might be held responsible for:

- Familiarity with all pertinent materials on risk reduction and robbery crimes.
- Field study and analysis of contemporary robbery events.
- The development of effective policies, procedures, and tactics to cope with robbery events.
- Evaluation of current department practices from the standpoint of reducing risks inherent in robbery events.
- The recommendation of corrective actions to increase officer safety.
- The preparation and distribution of risk reduction materials.
- The provision of advice and assistance in developing personal safeguards to reduce risk of casualty for all members of the department.

Naturally, the level of effort to be assigned to risk reduction in a department is a management decision which will be based upon such considerations as available resources, casualty experience, and the perceived seriousness of the problem.

In a small agency the chief or sheriff may elect to devote some of his time to executing a risk reduction program. In larger, low-risk agencies the risk reduction function may be a part-time assignment. Where the risk of police assaults is considered high, a full-time officer may be required. In very large or very high-risk agencies, a risk reduction team may be appointed on a permanent or task-force basis.

### **Selection Criteria for Risk Reduction Assignments**

The selection criteria for risk reduction duty assignment must be rigorous. Any attempt to economize in qualifications will produce poor results and in the end prove to be the most expensive possible course of action. The officer who is chosen must be well trained and have solid expertise built upon proven field experience. It is especially important that this officer have the ability to approach risk reduction in a straightforward and practical manner. He must be capable of knowing and appreciating the realities of everyday field operations. If he cannot do this, his findings and recommendations will be unrealistic and have little or no credence with field personnel.

The officer must also have the capability to collect and evaluate data regarding assaults on police personnel. This is where the problem solving process begins. Higher education may be helpful, but it is not a mandatory requirement. Logic and common sense are the most critical skills.

The risk reduction officer should have some experience and aptitude as an instructor in formal law enforcement training programs. A great deal of his work will require knowledge of training materials and techniques. Since training matters often can become very time consuming, this officer must have the background and attitudes required to provide the capability to produce or contribute to training manuals, schedules, and classes in the most efficient manner possible.

Finally, the officer chosen must have the desire and ability to cooperate with other officers. Extensive communications and liaison may be necessary with other personnel and offices in his law enforcement agency.

### **The Role of the Risk Reduction Function**

The risk reduction officer or team is responsible for the development and execution of a positive risk reduction program and provides advice, assistance, and recommendations regarding casualty risk

reduction to law enforcement decision-makers, supervisors, and field personnel. His overall responsibilities and duties can be divided into four basic steps toward risk reduction:

**Investigation.** The investigation of police assault events to determine the Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How is the first step in the risk reduction program. Incident reports, field interviews, tactical bulletins, and liaison and communication with other agencies are just a very few of the basic sources of readily available information that can be exploited by the risk reduction officer to obtain knowledge of assault situations. The search should be as thorough as possible, for a comprehensive data collection effort can turn up a great deal of information that can be profitably used both now and later to reduce risks without "re-inventing the wheel"—a very wasteful and common difficulty in any problem-solving activity. When collecting and analyzing data, the risk reduction officer must give special attention to drawing forth "lessons learned."

It is especially important that the risk reduction officer conduct his own field investigations of casualty and assault situations since formal reports frequently do not include the kind of information that is useful in assessing the nature and validity of the tactics and equipment employed. Routine incident or criminal investigation reports almost never contain the type of data needed to support the risk reduction program.

**Evaluation.** Successes and failures in defending against previous attacks or the various recommendations to reduce risks that have been isolated and identified in the investigation phase must carefully be reviewed and analyzed. As local conditions and the field environment vary according to participants, locations, and times, it is not always possible to say that because an attempt to reduce risks worked or failed before, it will do so again. But a continuing critique of current and past practices to reduce risks from attack can often suggest new and improved concepts and recommendations.

Building upon what experience and thinking is available, realistic tactical scenarios and operational exercises and models can be developed as tools by which to formulate and test possible means of risk reduction. An input of field experience from knowledgeable personnel within the department is necessary to determine the suitability of recommendations developed by the risk reduction program.

The policies, procedures, and tactics of the department must be surveyed and assessed from the standpoint of effective attack defense. Do contemporary practices increase the risk attack? If so, how and why? Are overriding operational constraints or mission considerations involved? The risk reduction officer should prepare a threat estimate in light of the deficiencies discovered and determine how the countermeasure policies, procedures, and tactics he has developed can be best fitted into the organization and activities of his department or agency. The objective is maximum risk reduction with a minimum of friction in implementation. Coordination with appropriate levels

of authority, offices, and personnel within the department must be effected; and plans, training materials, tactical bulletins or manuals and the like prepared for review, approval, and dissemination.

**Implementation.** The risk reduction officer must insure a complete dissemination of approved measures for defense against attack. The importance of the risk reduction program must be brought home to all personnel in positions of leadership, and their positive cooperation solicited to get a viable, substantive effort underway. Policies, procedures, and tactics must be continuously monitored and subjected to a comprehensive periodic assessment to make certain those measures for risk reduction that have been promulgated have, in fact, been implemented. The risk reduction officer must make himself readily available to answer questions and receive and review suggestions concerning risk reduction in robbery events. The implementation phase must be recognized as a continuous effort.

### **Support for the Risk Reduction Program**

**Internal.** Law enforcement executives and other agency decision makers must exert every effort to make the risk reduction program a truly effective means for increased officer safety, including the provision of full staff assistance to the risk reduction function. Management must also prepare to support a long term effort; a brief display of concern and enthusiasm will not be sufficient. The threat of attack is an everyday risk and it must be combatted on a daily basis. Further, there are no complete lasting solutions to the problem of assaults on police. New and improved countermeasures must be developed and put into practice in accordance with new threats and changes in the tactical environment. The interest and commitment of law enforcement leaders is essential to making any program work.

**External.** Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the International Association of Chiefs of Police have long been concerned about the problems of assaults on law enforcement officers. Both agencies will respond to specific requests for assistance in the development and execution of risk reduction programs at the local, county, and state levels of law enforcement. Such requests may be addressed:

- Clarence M. Kelley  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20535
- International Association of Chiefs of Police  
Police Casualty Analysis Unit  
Research Division  
11 Firstfield Road  
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760

# **APPENDIX C**

## **CASUALTY DATA COLLECTION FORM**

The "Physical Contact Summary" report form illustrated on the following pages is a prototype developed in conjunction with this study as an experimental means of gathering assault data for use in risk reduction programs. Although by no means complete, it may serve as a useful tool for agencies to record and analyze attacks made against police officers. Risk reduction programs should provide for the routine collection and analysis of assault data and the establishment of staff responsibility for this purpose.

# PHYSICAL CONTACT SUMMARY

Do not use this space

1. Study File No.

2. Population Code

3. NCIC No. (O.R.I.)

## PART I

4. Name of Reporting Agency: \_\_\_\_\_

1.  City Police Dept. 2.  Sheriff's Office 3.  Highway Patrol or State Police 4.  Univ. Police

5.  Other \_\_\_\_\_  
(specify)

## PART II ABOUT THE OFFICER ASSAULTED

<b>1. Sex:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Male 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Female	<b>2. Years of Police Service:</b> _____	<b>3. Rank:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Patrolman, Deputy, Trooper 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Detective 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Sgt. or Field Supervisor 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Above Sgt. 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ (specify)	<b>4. Race:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> White 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Mexican-American 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Negro 4. <input type="checkbox"/> American Indian 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ (specify)
<b>5. Height:</b> ____ feet ____ inches		<b>6. Build:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Slender 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Medium 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Heavy	
<b>7. Date of Birth:</b> ____ / ____ / ____ mo day year		<b>11. Was Officer In:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> One-Man Unit 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Two-Man Unit 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Assignment, describe _____	
<b>8. Assignment:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Auto Patrol 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Foot Patrol 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Traffic 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Juvenile 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Vice 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Detective 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Jail 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ (specify)		<b>9. Duty Status:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> On Duty 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Off Duty	<b>10. Dress At Time of Assault:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Uniform 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Plain Clothes
<b>12. Others Present at Time of Assault:</b> 1. Number of other officers ____ 2. Number of other suspects ____ 3. Number of civilian witnesses ____			
<b>13. Involvement of Witnesses:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> None Present 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Present, Not Involved 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Agitated Suspect 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Assisted Suspect 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Assisted Officer		<b>14. Other Officer(s) Assaulted?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No	<b>15. Was Officer Ambushed?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>16. Was the Incident a Sniping Incident?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No		<b>17. Was the Incident a Bombing Incident?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No	

## PART III ABOUT THE SUSPECT

<b>1. Suspect:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Known 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown	<b>2. If Known and Arrested, Name:</b> _____ last first middle	<b>3. Date of Birth:</b> ____ / ____ / ____ mo day year	<b>4. Sex:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Male 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Female	<b>5. Race:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> White 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Mexican-American 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Negro 4. <input type="checkbox"/> American Indian 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ (specify)
<b>6. Height:</b> ____ feet ____ inches	<b>7. Employed?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No	<b>8. If Yes, Give Usual Occupation:</b> _____		
<b>9. Build:</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Slender 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Medium 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Heavy	<b>10. Police Ident. No. (if known)</b> 1. Local _____ 2. State _____ 3. FBI _____	<b>11. Did the Officer Know the Identity of the Suspect Prior to the Assault?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No		
<b>12. Did Suspect Appear to be Under the Influence of Alcohol?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		<b>13. Did Suspect Appear to be Under the Influence of Drugs?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		
<b>14. Did Suspect Appear Mentally Deranged?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		<b>15. Had Suspect Been Drinking?</b> 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		
<b>16. If Subject was Arrested, Specify Charge(s):</b> _____				

PART IV ABOUT THE ASSAULT

1. Date of Assault: \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_ 2. Day of Week: 1.  Sun 2.  Mon 3.  Tues 4.  Wed 5.  Thur 6.  Fri 7.  Sat

3. Approximate Time: \_\_\_ am \_\_\_ pm 4. Where did it Happen? (be as specific as possible) (Street, House No., Mile Post, Intersection, Etc.)

- 5. Location of Assault: (Type of Location)
1.  Private Residence
2.  Hotel-Motel
3.  Private Club
4.  Other Commercial Premises
5.  Recreational Facility
6.  In jail, booking area
7.  Open Area
8.  Street-Highway
9.  School or College grounds
10.  Other (specify)

- 6. Officer's Action Prior to Assault:
1.  Transporting, booking prisoner
2.  Transporting Suspected Mentally Ill Person
3.  Routine Patrol Duties
Investigating or Enforcing:
4.  Traffic Laws
5.  Drug Laws
6.  Drunkenness Laws
7.  Liquor Laws
8.  Offense Against Property
9.  Offense Against Person
10.  Public Disturbance
11.  Family Disturbance
12.  Suspicious Person or Circumstances
13.  Civil Disorder (riot, demonstration)
14.  Other (specify)

7. What was the Last Thing the Officer Said or Did Before He was Assaulted? (please be specific)

- 8. Assaulted From:
1.  front
2.  side
3.  rear

- 9. Suspect's Action Prior to Assault:
1.  Traffic Violation
2.  Committing Crime
3.  Suspicious Behavior
4.  Interfering With Officer
5.  Being Transported
6.  Attempting Escape
7.  In Custody
8.  Appeared Mentally Deranged
9.  Other (specify)

10. What was the Last Thing the Suspect Said or Did Prior to the Assault? (please be specific)

- 11. Weapon Used by Suspect:
1.  Officer's Stick or Sap
2.  Hands, Fists, Teeth, Feet, etc.
3.  Rock, Brick, or Bottle
4.  Clubbing Instrument
5.  Cutting or Stabbing Instrument
6.  Motor Vehicle
7.  Spray Can Contents
8.  Other (specify)

- 12. Firearms Used by Suspect:
1.  Officer's Own Handgun
2.  Officer's Rifle or Shotgun
3.  Suspect's Handgun
4.  Suspect's Rifle or Shotgun
5.  Other Handgun or Rifle
6.  Set-Bomb or Trap

13. Caliber and Make: \_\_\_\_\_

14. Was Suspect Handcuffed?
1.  Yes 2.  No

- 15. Level of Violence by Suspect:
1.  Threat and Attempt Only
2.  Wrestled Officer
3.  Struck Officer
4.  Cut or Stabbed Officer
5.  Shot At Officer
6.  Shot Officer

- 16. Weapon Used by Officer:
1.  Officer's Stick or Sap
2.  Hands or Feet
3.  Firearm
4.  Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

17. Was Suspect Using a Stolen Firearm?
1.  Yes 2.  No 3.  Unknown

18. If Firearm Used, How Many Shots? \_\_\_\_\_



**PART V INJURIES**

<p><b>1. Police Officer:</b></p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> None</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Bruise</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Cut or Puncture</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Fractured or Broken Bones</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Gunshot Wounds</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Killed</p> <p>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Other (describe)</p> <p>_____</p>	<p><b>2. Suspect:</b></p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> None</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Bruise</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Cut or Puncture</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Fractured or Broken Bones</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Gunshot Wounds</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Killed</p> <p>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Other (describe)</p> <p>_____</p>	<p><b>3. If Officer Injured, Where Injured?</b></p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Head</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (body)</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Hands or Feet</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Arms or Legs</p> <hr/> <p><b>4. If Suspect Injured, Where Injured?</b></p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Head</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (body)</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Hands or Feet</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Arms or Legs</p>
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**PART VI TRAINING COURSES**

Please indicate below those Training Courses that you have completed, indicating whether that training was completed during the past 6 months, 12 months, or longer:

COURSE TITLE	LAST 6 MONTHS	LAST 12 MONTHS	LONGER
1. Basic Recruit Training	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Firearms Training	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Arrest Procedures	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Prisoner Handling	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Riot Control	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Police Community Relations	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
7. Defensive Tactics	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
8. Defensive Driving	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
9. Pursuit Driving	1. <input type="checkbox"/>	2. <input type="checkbox"/>	3. <input type="checkbox"/>
10. Never had any Police Training	1. <input type="checkbox"/>		

**PART VII WHAT WAS UNUSUAL ?**

In the following spaces, please write in any information you have about unusual weapons, unusual assault techniques, notable circumstances (unusual events, particular people present, situational factors, etc.) , or anything you believe is important that is not covered elsewhere or that needs further explanation. You may wish to attach a copy of the Police Incident Report.

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Thank you for completing this summary. This information will be used to help you and your fellow officers. The information you have given in this summary will be assimilated with information submitted by other officers and computer analyzed to determine causes and countermeasures for assaults on police officers. No individual officer will be identified in this study.

# APPENDIX D

## MODEL COMBAT PISTOL COURSES

### COMBAT PISTOL COURSES

#### Combat Pistol Course I

A more realistic approach to combat survival is offered in two combat pistol courses, CPC I and II, that have been devised by the PWC staff using the best of the PPC and other similar courses. In both CPC courses, shorter range, multiple targets, full cylinder loadings, double-action, and increased speed are emphasized. The positions used on this new CPC are basically the same as the ones employed in the standard PPC. On the CPC, a total of 60 rounds are fired in 6-shot increments. Each increment is timed and fired in three phases: the 7 yard line, the 25 yard line, and the 50 yard line.

Shooters start at the 7 yard line with weapons loaded and holstered. On command, shooters draw and fire double-action six rounds, reload and fire another six rounds without interruption. This phase is shot in 25 seconds at a single kill-zone silhouette target. This phase is then repeated—this time utilizing two targets per shooter. Each six round string is split at three rounds per target. The one or two handed hip-shooting position is employed.

At the completion of the 7 yard phase, all shooters move to the 25 yard line. Here again, shooters start with loaded, holstered weapons and fire 24 rounds at a single target in the following sequence:

- six rounds point shoulder position
- six rounds kneeling
- six rounds standing right barricade
- six rounds standing left barricade

During this phase, all 24 rounds are fired without interruption. This phase is fired double-action except at the point shoulder position, which may be fired single action. Shooters may employ a one or two hands weapon-hold. The total time for this phase is 3 minutes.

The last phase of the CPC I is at 50 yards. Once more, shooters stand with loaded holstered weapons. Each shooter fires a total of 12 rounds at one target in the following sequence:

- six rounds sitting
- six rounds prone

All firing done at the 50 yard line is single-action, two-handed. Time allotted for this phase is one minute 15 seconds.

Since only kill-zone silhouettes are used, the minimum qualification is 42 hits out of 60 possible. Scoring for the Combat Pistol Course is based on the total number of hits.

## **Combat Pistol Course II**

For individuals equipped with a short barreled weapon, a modified version of the CPC is offered. The course is divided into three separately timed phases with an overall firing time of 6 minutes 30 seconds.

Shooters start at the seven yard line with loaded, holstered weapons. On command, shooters draw and fire double-action five rounds, then reload and fire another five rounds without interruption at one target. This phase is shot in 20 seconds. The phase is then repeated utilizing two targets per shooter. Each five shot string is fired at a separate target.

When all shooters have completed the seven yard phase, they move back to the 15-yard line. Starting with loaded, holstered weapons, each shooter fires 15 rounds, double-action, in the following sequence:

- five rounds standing--right handed
- five rounds standing--left handed

- five rounds kneeling


The total time allotted for this phase is two minutes.

Shooters, upon completing the 15 yard phase, move to the 25 yard line and fire 15 rounds single-action, in the following sequence:

- five rounds kneeling
- five rounds right barricade
- five rounds left barricade

Again, the time allotted for this phase is two minutes.

The minimum qualification for the short barrel course is 35 hits out of a total of 50. Where indoor range limitations exist, the 25 yard or 50 yard elements are eliminated. Comments on these combat police courses are encouraged.



# APPENDIX E

## MODEL ROLL CALL LESSON PLAN

### RISK REDUCTION OVERVIEW IN ROBBERY EVENTS

Total Time: 15 Minutes

Instructional Time: 15 Minutes

Site: Roll Call

Description: Provides field personnel with information on the basic procedures, tactics, and equipment necessary to reduce risks inherent in robbery events.

Performance Objective: Development of the ability of each trainee to prevent, avoid, or sharply minimize the risk of becoming a casualty when dealing with a robbery event or in pursuit of a robbery suspect.

Equipment: Optional

Instructor References: 1. Law Enforcement Officers Killed, Annual Summary (Federal Bureau of Investigation).  
2. Robbery Events: A Risk Reduction Manual for Police (IACP).

Student Handout Materials: 1. Physical Contact Summary.

Outline of Major Points of Instruction:

- I. Introduction and Objectives
- II. Why Victim Officers are Killed or Injured in Robbery Events
  - A. Local and National Statistics
  - B. Identify Common Patterns and Cases
  - C. The False Alarm Problem
  - D. Complacency Kills
- III. Off Duty Action and Employment
  - A. Departmental Approval

- B. Planned Action and Coordination
- C. Identification For Plainclothes Officers
- D. Proper Equipment
- E. When Officer is Victim

IV. Use of Site Survey

- A. Know Your Area
- B. Crime Analysis
- C. Identify Hazards
- D. Seek Information From Dispatcher

V. In Pursuit of Robbery Suspects

- A. Hazards and Vulnerability
- B. Communication
- C. Stopping Suspect Vehicle
- D. Backup Assistance

VI. Barricade/Hostage Situation

- A. Avoid Hasty Action
- B. Plan and Wait
- C. Coordination and Command
- D. Protective Equipment
- E. Use of SWAT
- F. Use of Chemical Agents

# **APPENDIX F**

## **A SUMMARY OF ALERT BULLETIN GUIDELINES FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS**

### **AGENCY HEAD**

- Route and inform major commands.
- Execute overall policy and procedure.

### **PLANNING OFFICER**

- Develop policy and standard procedure regarding off duty employment.
- Identify locations with high false alarm experience.
- Analyze reasons for alarm activity.
- Develop methods and procedures to reduce false alarms.
- Review, revise, or establish specific plans and procedures concerning the use of portable radio equipment Alert Bulletin.
- Review, revise, or establish specific plans and procedures concerning the use of shotguns.

### **TRAINING OFFICER**

- Insure that both recruit training and in-service training programs emphasize the potential for serious consequences in routine operations.
- Stress risk reduction tactics in handling all types of calls.



- Establish recruit and in-service curriculum emphasizing procedure on policy regarding off duty employment and the need for adherence to that policy or procedure.
- Insure that recruit training reflects a minimum of 8 hours instruction in the handling and use of the shotgun. Periodic refresher practice should also be conducted coincident with regular firearms practice.
- Insure that both recruit training and in-service training curricula reflect safe and correct practices in the tactical use of portable radio equipment.

## **PERSONNEL/INTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER**

- Review all requests for off duty employment.
- Inspect off duty job sites before making recommendations to approving authority.
- Require adequate coverage consistent with objectives desired.
- If approved, notify appropriate field supervisor.

## **OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS**

- Inspect patrol units frequently to insure that proper utility is achieved with shotguns.
- Follow-up on felony situations where shotguns are likely to be employed and determine if the shotgun is used safely and effectively.
- Inspect to insure that proper utility is achieved with portable radio equipment.
- Report tactical effectiveness.
- Insure adherence to departmental policy or procedure regarding off duty employment.

- Require field supervisors to inspect off duty personnel who are engaged in authorized off duty employment, to insure that the site is adequately covered, that objectives are understood, that a plan has been established, and that the proper equipment is employed.
- Identify any off duty employment situation that presents hazards; correct the situation or recind authorization for such employment.
- Inspect to insure that all officers are fully briefed on situations likely to expose officers to risk of injury.
- Inspect to insure that sound tactical procedures are followed in responding to alarms.
- Stress caution and coordinated action in all situations.
- Develop and implement team strategies.

## **PROCUREMENT AND PROPERTY OFFICERS**

- Insure that all shotguns are capable of being used safely; and that each fires without apparent malfunction.
- Set up and implement a standard practice of shotgun inspection: take down, clean, replace worn parts, oil, and reissue.
- Insure that all new portable radio equipment is capable of being securely carried in a variety of ways to suit different tactical requirements.
- Modify and improve existing equipment to conform to new equipment requirements.

## **PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER**

- Develop discrete and suitable program to inform alarm users about the problem.
- Assist alarm users in setting up procedures and employee training programs to help reduce incidence of false alarms.







**END**