



REDUCING RESIDENTIAL CRIME & FEAR

The Hartford
Neighborhood Crime Prevention
Program

Executive Summary

U. S. Department of Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice



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Residential Crime and Fear:**

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Neighborhood Crime Prevention
Program**

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by
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U. S. Department of Justice
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PROJECT DOCUMENTS

The following documents have been produced by the Hartford project:

REDUCING CRIME AND FEAR: THE HARTFORD NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM: TECHNICAL RESEARCH REPORT.

This is the principal document, providing the most thorough and technical description of the research. Sections of the report present detailed discussions of (1) the background, conceptual framework, and objectives of the program; (2) the data sources, methods, and findings utilized in identifying and analyzing target area crime problems; (3) the design of a comprehensive program for reducing target area crime, including strategy components for the physical environment, the police, and the community residents; (4) the implementation and monitoring of program strategies; (5) the evaluation methodology and findings for assessing program impact on target area crime and fear; and (6) the conclusions and implications of the Hartford project experience for crime control program design and implementation in other urban residential settings. Finally, extensive data tables and research instruments are presented in appendices to the report. This technical document is of primary interest to the research and academic communities.

REDUCING CRIME AND FEAR: THE HARTFORD NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM: AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT.

This document is a summary of the technical research report, described above, presenting an overview of the major project concepts, objectives, findings, and implications. It necessarily omits much of the technical detail of the research and is of interest to a broader, non-technical audience of urban planners, program implementers, and criminal justice personnel.

The Appendix of the Executive Summary consists of two related working papers which describe problems and special issues relating to the project. The first, entitled "Implementation of the Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program," describes the special problems encountered in implementing the program and suggests procedures for implementing future programs. The second, entitled "Evaluation of the Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program," addresses some of the special problems and issues encountered in the research and should be of primary interest to program evaluators and other researchers.

A limited number of copies of both published reports are available from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, P. O. Box 6000, Rockville, Maryland 20850. Copies are also available for sale from the Government Printing Office in Washington, D. C.

ABSTRACT

The Hartford project was an experimental program intended to reduce residential burglary and street robbery/pursesnatch, and the fear of those crimes in an urban residential neighborhood. The program combined changes in the physical characteristics of the neighborhood with police and resident activities in an integrated effort to increase resident control of their neighborhood and to reduce criminal opportunities.

The neighborhood, Asylum Hill, is located near the retail and commercial center of Hartford. In 1973, when the program was initially undertaken, its population consisted primarily of single, working individuals, young and old, with a high rate of transiency and an increasing number of minority residents. Most of the population resided in low-rise apartment houses or two- and three-family houses. Once a choice residential neighborhood, the area was beginning to show signs of incipient decline.

Analysis of the crime in the area was undertaken by a team of specialists in urban design, crime and law enforcement analysis, and survey research. The team's task involved two elements: first, to develop an understanding of the ways in which residents, potential offenders, police, and the physical environment interacted to create criminal opportunities; second, to design inexpensive strategies that could be quickly implemented to interrupt a pattern of rising crime.

The analysis showed that a number of features of the physical environment were working to destroy the residential character of the neighborhood. Vehicular and pedestrian traffic passing through the area dominated the streets and depersonalized them. The streets belonged more to outsiders than to the residents, creating an ideal environment for potential offenders.

In 1974 the team designed a three-part program intended to respond to those problems in order to reduce crime in Asylum Hill and its attendant fear. This program, which was implemented in 1975 and 1976, included:

- a) closing entrances to some residential streets and narrowing others at their intersections with arterial streets in order to reduce outside traffic on the streets and thus enhance the residential character of the area;
- b) instituting a neighborhood team police unit with strong relationships with the residents;
- c) creating community organizations and encouraging them to work with the police and to initiate resident efforts to improve the neighborhood and reduce criminal opportunities.

A careful evaluation of the program was carried out after the program had been in operation a year. Findings indicated a substantial reduction in burglary and fear of burglary while a pattern of increasing robbery/pursesnatch was halted and may have undergone a reduction. All of the program components had a role to play and contributed to the positive results of the program. However, among the various changes observed, increased resident use of and efforts to control the neighborhood appeared to be the most important reasons for the initial success of the program in reducing crime and fear. The physical changes appeared to be essential to achieving those results.

FOREWORD

This report presents the results of an experimental crime prevention program in Hartford, Connecticut, sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, and designed to reduce residential burglary, street robbery, and the concomitant fear of these offenses in a neighborhood showing signs of increasing crime accompanied by physical and social deterioration.

The program was based on a new "environmental" approach to crime prevention: a comprehensive view addressing not only the relationship among citizens, police, and offenders, but also the effect of the physical environment on their attitudes and behavior. Prior to Hartford, the National Institute had funded a number of studies which had included physical design concepts in crime prevention programming. However, the Hartford project and its evaluation was the first attempt at a comprehensive test of this environmental approach to crime control.

As a pioneering effort in the integration of urban design and crime prevention concepts, the Hartford project expanded the field of knowledge about the role of the physical environment in criminal opportunity reduction. Many of the theoretical advances that were made in the project have now been widely adopted in the field of environmental crime prevention.

In addition to its theoretical contributions, the project generated considerable practical knowledge about the implementation of an integrated crime prevention program. As an example of the successful application of theoretical principles to an existing physical setting, it provides a realistic test of the practical utility of its underlying concepts and should thus represent a valuable model to urban planners and law enforcement agencies in other communities.

Finally, the Hartford project has important implications for evaluation. The data collected before, during, and after the experiment were extensive and methodologically sophisticated. As a result, the evaluation is an especially rigorous, thorough, and scientifically sound assessment of a comprehensive crime control project, providing an excellent model for future program evaluators.

Although only the short-term (one year) evaluation has been completed, the early findings offer encouraging preliminary evidence in support of the major project assumption: that changes made in the physical environment of a neighborhood can produce changes in resident behavior and attitudes which make it more difficult for crimes to occur unobserved and unreported. A substantial reduction in residential burglary and fear was observed in the experimental area and, while less conclusive, there appears to have been an effect on street robbery and fear as well.

It must be remembered, however, that these findings reflect only short-term program impact and thus provide only tentative indications of potential program success. More definitive conclusions will be possible only after a re-evaluation of the program -- currently in its initial stages -- has measured the long-term effects on crime and fear in the target area.

Lois Mock
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The planning and the evaluation of the Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program was funded by grant numbers 73-NI-99-0044-G and 75-NI-99-0026 from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

The program lasted five years, went through many phases, and involved numerous organizations and individuals whose work was essential. Because of the number of people contributing to this program, it is inevitable that some will not receive their due acknowledgment. However, we will attempt to identify as many of the most critical people as possible.

As grantee, the Hartford Institute of Criminal and Social Justice had the responsibility for coordinating all aspects of the program. However, its most important role involved working within the community to facilitate and coordinate the implementation of the program.

Brian L. Hollander, then President of the Hartford Institute, was personally involved in all phases of the project. Other Institute staff members involved in the project include Francis X. Hartmann, who took considerable responsibility for the Institute's role in monitoring activities in Hartford; Robert Wiles and Richard Pearson, who had primary responsibility for working with the neighborhood groups and monitoring their activities; Megan O'Neill and Louella Mayo, who worked with the community organizations to coordinate public safety activities; Rudolph Brooks, who worked closely with the Hartford Police Department and was responsible for collecting police record data; Rinda Brown, who played an important role in producing the written products from the Hartford Institute; and Diane Marshall, who typed this report and who had primary clerical responsibility for the written products from the Hartford Institute.

The Center for Survey Research (formerly the Survey Research Program), a facility of the University of Massachusetts/Boston and the Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University, had overall responsibility for evaluation of the program. Floyd J. Fowler, Director of the Center, had primary responsibility for the Center's role in the program. Mary Ellen McCalla and Thomas W. Mangione

worked closely with him on design and analytic tasks. Ellen Rothman, who served as a research assistant on the project during the first two years; Barbara Cardillo, who served in the same capacity in the final year; and Alice Fehlhaber, who served as field supervisor during all four waves of survey interviewing deserve special mention for their contributions.

Richard A. Gardiner and Associates, a land planning and urban design firm, was responsible for the physical design component of the program. Staff members from RAGA had specific responsibility for analysis of the physical environment and its contribution to crime, development of a general physical design plan to reduce criminal opportunities, design of specific site plans for the physical changes, and development of considerable conceptual and theoretical work which has been used not only in the Hartford project, but also in more recent efforts throughout the country. Besides Richard Gardiner himself, Dr. Sanford Low, cultural anthropologist; Allen Moore, architect; and Bruce Tsuchida and Tom Kirvan, landscape architects, contributed most to the physical design component of the project.

Initially, as a research associate at Urban Systems Research and Engineering and later as a faculty member at John Jay College (CUNY), Thomas A. Reppetto played a central role in the analysis of the crime problem and in the early draft of the crime control model that was eventually tested. His previous research in Boston and his personal efforts played a major role in the formation and inception of this project.

James M. Tien of Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., took responsibility for monitoring the police component of the project during the evaluation year, and also made numerous contributions to early drafts of the project reports.

In the City of Hartford itself, many persons contributed to the implementation and evaluation of this project. The Hartford Police Department deserves substantial credit. Under the leadership of Chief Hugo Masini, the Department gave full cooperation to the implementation of the police component. The Department also permitted on-site monitoring of police operations, provided record data, and facilitated the distribution and collection of questionnaires from members of the police teams. Of the many police officers who were

helpful, we particularly want to mention Neil Sullivan, currently Deputy Chief, who was the original Commander of the experimental district and who contributed to the successful implementation of the police effort in innumerable ways. Lieutenants LeRoy Bangham and Daniel Ward, who headed the two experimental teams, also deserve special mention.

Politically, the entire project would have been impossible without the support of the Hartford City Council and Edward M. Curtin, then City Manager. These people were willing to take a chance on an unproven program despite vocal opposition in the hopes that something important could be learned about how to reduce urban crime. Also, Jonathan Colman, Director of the Planning Department, spent considerable time with the architects working out the details of the physical changes, and John Sulik, then Director of Public Works, was responsible for the overall coordination of the City's role in their construction. Robert Messier of the Department of Public Works deserves special mention for his role as construction site supervisor.

Thanks are owed to some 3,000 residents of Hartford who cooperated by giving their time to the various surveys which were an essential part of this project. Thanks are also due the more than 200 interviewers who carried out these surveys.

Special mention should be made of the contribution of Lois Mock, the Project Monitor at NILECJ, and Fred Heinzelmann, Director of the Community Crime Prevention Program, which funded the evaluation of the project. This project took much longer than anyone had envisioned at the start, and their support of the project through the various delays kept it from foundering. They were intimately involved in all phases of the project, particularly its evaluation. Richard Rau of NILECJ, the original monitor for the project, also should be acknowledged for his role in the initial development of the project.

The document, which was prepared by the staff of the Hartford Institute, is based on early versions of the Technical Research Report prepared by the Center for Survey Research. This report is dependent on the Center and other contractors for analytic conclusions and other conceptual work; however, the Hartford Institute had final responsibility for putting together this summary document.

INTRODUCTION

A major premise underlying the Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program was that there is a direct correlation between the design and functioning of the residential physical environment and stranger-to-stranger crimes of opportunity such as burglary and street robbery.¹ This premise holds that the physical environment and the way it is used can create conditions which facilitate or hinder crime opportunities. Therefore, the study of the environment and its use by residents, police, and others is essential to a full understanding of opportunity creation and reduction. The Hartford project was the first attempt to implement and evaluate this environmental approach to crime prevention.

A second major premise upon which the Hartford program is based is that a program must be crime-specific and site-specific, both in problem analysis and solution design, in order to produce successful results. Different kinds of crime are caused by various factors which differ from location to location. Although a crime- and site-specific program design approach may trigger conditions which lead to a total reduction in crime, attempts to effect widespread crime reduction of a variety of unrelated types of crime in one or more locations often result in dispersion of effort and minimal accomplishment.

A third major premise was that a comprehensive set of integrated solutions would produce a better result than any single solution. An approach that integrated solutions focusing on the physical environment, police and residents was believed more likely to succeed in reducing crime opportunities than an approach that omitted any of these three elements. While the overall success of the integrated program would depend on the success of each individual component, it was intended that the elements would reinforce each other through the development of a set of mutually supportive relationships among the physical environment, police, and residents to achieve a maximum impact on crime. It was expected that a synergistic effect would be produced in which the combination of components would result in the leveraging of each component to an effectiveness beyond its individual capacity.

¹ The use of the term "robbery" throughout this document is intended to include the FBI index crime of pursesnatch as well. "Burglary" refers to residential burglary only.

Given this conceptual background, the Hartford project was designed to test the following hypotheses:

1. The crime rate in a residential neighborhood is a product of the linkage between offender motivation and the opportunities provided by the residents, users, and environmental features of that neighborhood.
2. The crime rate for a specific offense can be reduced by lessening the opportunities for that crime to occur.
3. Opportunities can be reduced by:
 - a. Altering the physical aspects of buildings and streets to increase surveillance capabilities and lessen target/victim vulnerability, to increase the neighborhood's attractiveness to residents, and to decrease its fear-producing features;
 - b. Increasing citizen concerns about and involvement in crime prevention and the neighborhood in general; and
 - c. Utilizing the police to support the above.
4. Opportunity-reducing activities will lead not only to a reduction in the crime rate but also to a reduction in fear of crime. The reduced crime and fear will mutually reinforce each other, leading to still further reductions in both.

In 1973 an interdisciplinary team of specialists began an assessment of the nature of crime and the contributing factors in two residential areas of Hartford. This team included specialists in urban design and land use planning, police operations and criminal justice issues, research and evaluation methodology, and implementation of public policy change. Combining data from police incident reports; an extensive questionnaire survey of residents; physical site and land use analyses; and interviews with offenders, community leaders and police officials, the team assembled a composite picture of crime and fear in the target areas. The intention was to determine the extent and nature of the crime and fear problems in these neighborhoods in order to identify the factors facilitating crime and fear.

Residential burglary and street robbery/pursesnatch were chosen to be the target offenses. Burglary is among the most common serious property crimes, while robbery and pursesnatch are the most common serious crimes against persons. Both types of crimes are usually "stranger-to-stranger" in which the victim and offender do not know each other, and both present a threat to individual security. Because burglary involves breaking into the victim's home and thus is personally threatening (an element of a crime against the person), it is more fear producing than other larceny crimes such as automobile theft.

Hartford was chosen as the site for this project for three reasons. First, Hartford had high crime neighborhoods that were typical of urban neighborhoods nationwide, and thus met an essential criterion for testing a demonstration project which could be replicated in cities throughout the nation. Second, the Hartford Institute of Criminal and Social Justice provided an ideal organization to carry out such an experiment. As a private organization outside city government, with strong working relationships with city officials, the police department, and the business community, it provided a resource for successfully implementing a complex demonstration program. Third, the project required independent funding for the implementation of the proposed crime control program, including any physical design changes required. NILECJ could fund only the planning and evaluation of the experiment. In Hartford there was an expressed willingness on the part of private and public interests to make capital investments in an existing neighborhood, if a feasible and convincing program could be developed.

The two neighborhoods of Hartford chosen for initial analysis were Clay Hill/South Arsenal and Asylum Hill. These two neighborhoods were chosen because they were representative of other urban neighborhoods nationwide which were experiencing rises in crime and fear rates and which might benefit from this type of anti-crime program. Clay Hill/South Arsenal was representative of high density, inner city neighborhoods and experienced problems commonly found in those neighborhoods; Asylum Hill was representative of older urban residential neighborhoods just on the verge of decline.

Located adjacent to Hartford's central business district, Clay Hill/South Arsenal in 1973 was primarily a large ghetto area. It suffered the myriad problems typically found in a seriously declining neighborhood, including deteriorating housing, high unemployment, and poor resident/police relationships. Its predominantly black and Puerto Rican populations lived in older public and private low-rise family housing. Clay Hill/South Arsenal had a high robbery rate and the highest residential burglary rate in Hartford.

Asylum Hill is a residential area near the retail and commercial centers in Hartford. In the early 1970's Asylum Hill was inhabited primarily by single, working individuals, young and old, with a high rate of transiency. The population was mostly white but with an increasing number of minority residents. By 1973, this once attractive area, consisting primarily of low-rise, multi-unit buildings and one- to three-unit wood frame structures, was beginning to show the characteristics of a deteriorating urban neighborhood. Landlords were reluctant to maintain the housing stock. Long-time residents were leaving. Remaining residents were avoiding public places such as an area park and public streets. Major factors in this incipient decline were thought to be rising rates of residential burglary and street robbery (Asylum Hill had a higher than average robbery rate) and the fear engendered by those crimes.

The team soon concluded that it could not develop an environmental program for the Clay Hill/South Arsenal area. Because the neighborhood was greatly deteriorated, the cost of physical changes that would make even a modest difference was prohibitive, and both residents and community leaders felt there were more urgent renovation needs in the area than those addressing crime. There was also considerable hostility in this neighborhood to the concept of attempting to solve crime problems through environmental changes, since residents felt that the improvement of police attitudes and operations in the area was of greater importance.²

A cursory examination of Asylum Hill showed that physical deterioration and crime rates were greater in the north section, North Asylum Hill, than in the south section, South Asylum Hill. The North Asylum Hill neighborhood was large enough and had enough crime to provide the research opportunities needed for such a project. Yet it was small enough to accommodate a manageable project. It was bounded by census lines, which aided in data collection, in monitoring, and in manageability. It was experiencing serious crime and was located in proximity to other sections which exported considerable crime, not only to North Asylum Hill but to downtown and other sections as well. The neighborhood's central location and the variety of housing types representative of other sections of the city rendered it an ideal area in which to

² Although the full program as originally planned was not carried out in Clay Hill/South Arsenal, a partial program was implemented involving improved policing and increased citizen participation which paralleled those efforts in Asylum Hill.


test a project which would have transferability to other areas of the city. It was also representative of older, urban residential neighborhoods nationwide, and as such provided an ideal opportunity to test a project of nationwide significance. Furthermore, the business community had already initiated a planning process for large-scale physical improvements in North Asylum Hill. The team concluded that the experiment as conceived with the National Institute could be tried in North Asylum Hill.

The entire crime prevention program occurred in four primary stages. The first stage, which began in July, 1973, and lasted six months, consisted of data collection and analysis for the purpose of defining the problems and developing solutions. The second stage, which encompassed a second six months, was devoted to designing the program.

The implementation stage, which began in autumn of 1974, involved presenting the proposed program to the community for their review and recommendations, and putting the final program as accepted into operation. The program as implemented consisted of a three-element approach to reducing criminal opportunities: (1) changing the physical environment, (2) reorganizing the police, and (3) increasing the involvement of community residents. Police reorganization and community organizing efforts began early in 1975. However, proposed changes in the physical environment immediately became embroiled in controversy during the presentation phase, and the changes were not actually constructed until the summer of 1976.

The final stage, evaluation, lasted from July, 1976, through June, 1977. The following sections of this document discuss all stages of the project.

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS OVERVIEW



^a NOTE: Crime rates took the entire year -- July 1976 - June 1977 -- as the evaluation period. However, most measures from the surveys and observations essentially measured key variables -- fear, use of streets, etc. -- as of June 1977.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Data Collection

Various types of information were needed to develop a complete picture of crime in North Asylum Hill; to identify the ways in which the physical environment, offenders, police operations, and residents' behavior contributed to crime opportunities; and to examine resident fear and its relationship to crime and other social and physical conditions of the area.

To obtain this information, five major data collection techniques were utilized. First, in order to determine the features and condition of the physical environment and the ways this environment was being used, urban designers conducted physical site and land use surveys in the area. Second, a random sample survey of residents was conducted in the target area and in the rest of the City in order to obtain up-to-date socio-demographic data; to gather information about the community's experiences, fears, perceptions, and behavior with respect to crime-related issues; and to obtain victimization information. The rest of the City was broken down geographically with some areas serving as control areas for evaluation purposes. Third, special in-depth interviews were conducted with local businessmen, realtors, and other community leaders to supplement the resident surveys. Fourth, interviews with police personnel were conducted to collect information on police operations, attitudes, and relationships to community residents. Finally, to collect information on reported crime itself, (e.g., type, frequency, offenders, location) police incident reports were examined in detail, supplemented by interviews with forty convicted robbers.

Problem Analysis

The analysis focused on the ways in which the physical environment, police, and area residents contributed to opportunities for residential burglary and street robbery, and assessed the current and potential roles of each in opportunity reduction. Each set of data was initially examined individually by the team members responsible for its collection and then collectively by all project team members. Thus each team member was able to bring from his area of specialization insights into the problems, causes, and possible solutions. During their collective review of the data, the team attempted to identify those areas where there was agreement concerning the data's implications and those areas where there was disagreement. When there was disagreement, the team attempted either to collect additional data or to further analyze the data at hand


in order to come to an agreement as to cause and effect of crime and fear in the neighborhood. In this way they were able to correlate the crime and fear data in terms of the overall functioning of the neighborhood. The following conclusions were drawn from the data.

The functioning of the residential area within North Asylum Hill was severely impaired by the large amount of non-resident vehicular and pedestrian traffic that passed through each day. This factor, coupled with the presence of large, open parking areas for the employees of large, commercial complexes in the area, created an environment where offenders could comfortably enter and wander about the residents' streets and private yards, find hiding places, commit burglaries and robberies, and escape, all with relative ease. (See Map I, "North Asylum Hill Community Area Problem Map", page 9.)

The Hartford police were very well regarded by Asylum Hill residents. However, their pattern of rotating assignments within a centralized system hindered their development of intimate knowledge of the physical characteristics of the neighborhood, the patterns of crime, and the residents and their concerns. Changes in police operation were thus also dictated.

Finally, the residents themselves contributed to an environment which was favorable to criminal activity by adopting a lifestyle in which they avoided using their streets and yards, minimized their interactions with and knowledge of their neighbors, and refrained from exercising control over outsiders who were present in their neighborhood.

All of the identified conditions were considered to be important in the creation of favorable opportunities for burglary and robbery offenders in North Asylum Hill. It was concluded that many if not all of these conditions would have to be corrected in order to reduce the identified crime problems.



HARTFORD ANTI-CRIME PROJECT


Hartford, Connecticut

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NORTH ASYLUM
COMMUNITY AREA
PROBLEM MAP



DESIGN OF THE PROGRAM

The major purpose of the program was to effect a comprehensive multi-faceted approach to crime control for the target area. The program would involve the integration of physical redesign, improved policing, and increased resident participation to reduce the incidence of residential burglary and street robbery and fear of those crimes. It was thought that the improved physical environment combined with the introduction of a policing program which was geared to the neighborhood and which emphasized a strong relationship with the residents would create an environment which residents could enjoy using and could control. It was expected that these factors would combine to produce an unattractive target area for offenders, and that the incidence of burglary and robbery would thus decrease.

The design of the program was accomplished in several steps. Very early in the analysis process the program design concepts began to emerge in the form of preliminary conclusions and design concepts which seemed to respond to the identified problems. Following completion of the data analysis, full preliminary designs were developed for each of the three (physical design, police, and resident) strategies. Each strategy was developed with reference to the other two in order to create an integrated approach in which all strategies worked supportively toward the goal of reducing crime opportunities in the neighborhood.

These initial designs were then reviewed to determine whether they were feasible for implementation. Factors considered in this determination were political and community acceptability, cost, and length of time for implementation. These considerations necessitated changes in the original plans which had represented the staff's ideal response to the crime problem analysis.

After each of the above-described steps was completed, the proposals were submitted to city government and the community for scrutiny and comment. Project staff expected that significant additional changes would have to be made before implementation could begin.

Physical Environment Strategies

It was decided that important improvements in the neighborhood could be produced by some relatively simple, inexpensive changes to the public ways. The changes were intended to restrict non-resident vehicular traffic through the area and to channel most remaining through-traffic onto two major streets

by blocking or narrowing key intersections. The street treatments were intended to visually define the boundaries of the area and its residential parts, to discourage non-resident pedestrian traffic from interior residential streets, and to make the area more attractive for residential living.

The design for the physical changes included three primary treatments:

- (1) perimeter street cul-de-sacs and intersection narrowings interdicted through vehicular traffic on the east, west, and south boundaries of the neighborhood. These treatments were intended to define the transition from the exterior to the interior residential streets and to discourage pedestrian through traffic as well as to prevent access to vehicles;
- (2) interior and mid-street cul-de-sacs and narrowings diverted the flow of interior vehicular traffic away from certain residential streets in order to define smaller sub-neighborhoods within which residents could feel a heightened sense of control;
- (3) private property fencing was encouraged among the neighborhood residents in order to further reduce the porosity of the area and to further define its residential character.

These physical design treatments were expected to produce a sense of resident ownership and control of their neighborhood by increasing their use of yards, sidewalks, and park areas, and discouraging outside pedestrian use of those spaces, thus heightening resident interest and ability to maintain surveillance. It was expected that these changes would also increase resident interaction, leading to greater neighborhood cohesion.

Police Strategies

The objective for the police strategy was to create an effective neighborhood-centered team. This team should have the autonomy necessary to establish priorities and procedures to address neighborhood public safety problems. It should develop a full understanding of the neighborhood physical and social environments and should establish a cooperative working relationship with the neighborhood residents. Finally, it should establish procedures for the systematic collection, analysis, and use of data about the neighborhood. It was intended that this neighborhood-centered approach to policing would provide an

opportunity for increased communication between police and residents so that each could support the efforts of the other more effectively within the facilitating structure of the physical changes.

Neighborhood team policing was chosen as the vehicle to improve police responses.³ The three major elements of the proposed strategy consisted of the geographic assignment of officers, a decentralized authority of command, and increased interaction with the local community residents. Also included in the model program was a plan to improve police data gathering and analysis capabilities. Geographic assignment would create a stable, permanent team of officers in the project area; decentralized authority would allow decision making at the team level; interaction with the community would allow the formation of an active working relationship between police and community on both formal and informal levels; and systematic collection and utilization of data would allow for more effective utilization of personnel.

Neighborhood team policing was expected to have the following effects. Permanent geographic assignment would allow police to understand the physical and social characteristics of their assigned area in order to more effectively respond to neighborhood needs. Decentralized authority would permit the District Commander to use his superior knowledge of the area in making operational decisions without the need for prior approval from headquarters. The establishment of a mutually supportive relationship between police and community residents would allow the police to better understand and respond to resident concerns, and would in turn give the

³ Classic team policing differs from the Hartford model in that it also incorporates full service responsibilities and participatory management. Full service team policing places at the team level administrative and special services as well as routine field personnel; participatory management gives all police personnel a voice in decision making. Full service team policing was not planned because Hartford's small geographic size made city-wide specialized units impractical; participatory management, although desirable, was not seen as an essential ingredient in the improvement of police services to the community.

residents a better understanding of police problems and limitations and of their own citizen responsibilities in crime prevention. Finally, the plan also anticipated that improved data collection and analysis capabilities of the team would help focus their insights and understanding of the area and would allow for the setting of priorities which would be consistent with those of the neighborhood residents.

Resident Strategies

The plan for resident involvement was directed toward creating community organizations and changing traditional attitudes and behavior patterns, rather than toward producing a detailed program of specific activities for residents to implement. The strategy for organizing the community included: (a) identifying existing community organizations in North Asylum Hill which represented neighborhood concerns; (b) creating community organizations where none existed; and (c) involving the community in the planning of the physical environment changes, the determination of neighborhood policing priorities, and the planning and implementation of resident-operated crime prevention programs.

It was anticipated that these efforts would motivate residents to initiate their own activities directed toward crime reduction and the physical improvement of the neighborhood and that these initial neighborhood activities would lead to increased interaction and cohesion among residents. However, the purpose of the community organization component of the program was not simply or primarily to mobilize residents around community crime prevention activities. This component was seen as essential to implementing all three elements of the program plan. It was expected that resident involvement would serve to integrate the three strategies -- changes in the physical environment, new policing strategies, and formal resident crime reduction activities -- into a single coordinated effort to reduce neighborhood crime and fear.

IMPLEMENTATION

Preparation for program implementation began in the autumn of 1974 with a series of discussions of the proposed plan involving the project staff, City officials, police, residents of the target area, and members of the business community. The discussions were intended to enable staff to explain the program proposals to these various audiences and to elicit their reactions and recommendations. Since it was intended that these groups would be responsible for implementing the program, it was imperative that they feel comfortable with the plan.

Implementation did not begin on a particular day, nor was it a single event. For all program components it was a gradual process. The police and community components were implemented during the first six months of 1975, and were in operation a full year before implementation of the physical changes began. This represented a change from the initial intention to implement all program elements simultaneously.

Physical Design Strategies

The physical design component of the plan was received with considerable skepticism by the community. Initially there was little receptivity to the recommendation that traffic patterns in and about the neighborhood be significantly changed. After the first round of public presentations, it became clear that the proposed physical changes could not gain resident approval without major adjustments in the overall design. Many persons were skeptical that robbery and burglary could be reduced by closing streets and rerouting vehicular traffic. In fact some believed that the closing of some streets would make it easier for offenders to monitor entry and egress and thus identify crime opportunities. Residents believed that crime could be reduced only by increasing the number of police in the area and by having a more responsive judiciary. In addition to their skepticism, residents were concerned about such inconveniences as having to drive around the block to get to and from their homes, or having to walk farther to the nearest bus stop due to a planned rerouting of the buses.

Service providers also objected to the street changes. City staff expressed concern that the changes would impede sanitation trucks and snowplows. More important, although the cul-de-sacs were designed with "knock-down" barriers that would allow passage by emergency vehicles, the police and fire departments and ambulance services voiced concern that the proposed changes would interfere with fast service in emergency situations and that the barriers would damage their vehicles upon impact.

Others objected to the changes as well. A manufacturing company on the northeast side of the area disapproved of the rerouting of its delivery trucks off residential streets. A hospital on the west side felt the proposed plan conflicted with its capacity to accommodate increased hospital traffic expected to be generated by a planned expansion. Some landlords were concerned that the proposed changes would interfere with the marketing of rental units.

The most pressing concerns were raised by small merchants and businessmen in North Asylum Hill who feared that the rerouting of traffic would damage their businesses. Most felt that their businesses depended on non-resident customers who drove through the neighborhood en route to and from work.

A lengthy process of negotiation and compromise proved to be necessary before the physical changes could go forward. This process resulted in compromises which included a reduction in the number of streets to be changed and the abandonment of the plan to use "knock-down" barriers in constructing the cul-de-sacs. It was decided that cul-de-sacs would be constructed with no physical barriers; instead, through vehicular traffic would be interdicted through the use of curbing and traffic signs.

Despite significant adjustments to the plan, which resulted in several additional blocks remaining open, the merchants brought a lawsuit in 1975 to stop the city from implementing the physical changes. The lawsuit, which sought to restrain any changes in traffic patterns, was resolved in the summer of 1976 with an agreement which permitted construction of the changes to go forward but with the understanding that they would be removed if unacceptable to the residents and businessmen after a six-month test period.

A problem also arose in financing the construction of the physical changes. The declining economy eliminated the possibilities of receiving private corporate contributions and of financing the changes out of tax revenues. The consequent necessity of using federal Community Development Act (CDA) funds for materials and Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) funds for labor caused further delays and constraints in implementation, as construction could not begin until all federal approvals were obtained. CDA funds for materials were limited; CETA regulations resulted in the hiring of inexperienced, out-of-work laborers.


Despite these delays, the street treatments were almost fully completed by the fall of 1976. The remaining work, cosmetic improvements and installation of traffic signs, was completed in the spring of 1977. Four streets were changed into cul-de-sacs and seven others were narrowed at their intersections with more highly trafficked streets. Traffic was rerouted either around the project area or onto two key through-streets, one running east-west and one running north-south. (See Map II, page 17.)

Police Strategies

Neighborhood team policing was implemented in Asylum Hill in early 1975, after several meetings with Chief Hugo J. Masini. Chief Masini, who had recently moved from the New York City force to become Chief in Hartford, was receptive to the implementation of neighborhood team policing in North Asylum Hill with modifications to take into account the needs of Hartford's other police districts.

North Asylum Hill was too small an area to be established as a separate police district. The project staff had therefore recommended that a new special district be created consisting of all of Asylum Hill and Clay Hill/South Arsenal, the two areas initially researched by the project team. This would enable the project to implement neighborhood team policing in the project area almost immediately, yet at the same time would be consistent with the Police Department's ultimate goal of city-wide implementation of neighborhood team policing.

District 5 was created in early 1975 and was divided into two team areas, one each serving Asylum Hill and Clay Hill/South Arsenal. Because the Chief was reluctant to single out one district of the City to receive special treatment, it



HARTFORD ANTI-CRIME PROJECT


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NORTH ASYLUM
COMMUNITY AREA

STREET TREATMENTS



was agreed that the Police Department would adopt a system dividing the City into five districts. Thus, while generally being able to maintain district integrity in the use of personnel, District 5 from the beginning had to function within the confines of the city-wide system. This approach was consistent with the project's intention to design a policing system for the target area which would be applied to policing throughout Hartford, rather than an elitist, non-replicable system.

Implementation did not come about easily. There was an initial inability to maintain geographic stability of assigned personnel due to the smallness of the newly established districts, the central location of Asylum Hill and District 5, and the level of manpower in the department. This caused some concern on the part of project staff. Although decentralized authority had been approved by the Chief, team officers were frequently dispatched temporarily to areas outside their assigned district to relieve manpower shortages elsewhere. It was feared that this "crossover" dispatching would seriously hamper the ability of the District Commander to make decisions regarding utilization and deployment of manpower within the district. The inability to vary working hours or to provide overtime pay for attendance at meetings after working hours also precluded regular team meetings, thus making it more difficult for the District Commander to involve line officers in policy making. It also prevented sufficient training time in which the North Asylum Hill officers could begin to understand and learn to take advantage of the physical environment strategies in their day-to-day work. As a result, the concept of considering physical design factors as well as community factors when planning police operations was never fully clarified for or utilized by team members.

After many meetings and compromises between the Chief, the District 5 Commander, and project staff, a system of neighborhood policing began to emerge. Geographic stability of the assigned team of officers was substantially accomplished. The District Commander and his two team commanders began to exercise more authority. In general, the District 5 teams were successful in strengthening their relationship with the community, in joining with community groups to implement several crime prevention activities, and in improving their response to community priorities. They did not give sufficient consideration to the physical environment changes, however, in the routine development and carrying out of their day-to-day operations.

From the beginning of the implementation period the District 5 police were involved in helping the community define its role in the project. During the three months prior to the creation of District 5, the future District Commander and Hartford Institute staff held many meetings with community groups. Their purpose was to explain the program's emphasis on community responsibility in crime reduction and to stress the importance of community input into police planning. These early meetings were intended to form a foundation for a constructive, problem-solving relationship between the police and the community.

Through their increased interaction with community residents and especially through their active involvement with the Police Advisory Committee (see below), the neighborhood police team began to set priorities in response to community concerns. The team instituted walking beats in the area of Sigourney Square Park to discourage loitering, drinking and gambling in the park; it initiated an anti-prostitution squad which arrested "johns" as well as prostitutes; and it implemented anti-robbery and anti-burglary squads which resulted in increased arrests for those crimes. Also as a result of this increased police-community interaction, the neighborhood police took an active part in such community crime prevention activities as Operation Identification and block watch projects, providing supplies and training sessions where needed.

Resident Strategies

The community's role in the project developed in close cooperation with the neighborhood police. It was intended that these two components would function independently. The objective was to test the expectation that a strong relationship between the police and the community would improve the quality of policing in the area, and that community crime prevention efforts would be more successful if they received strong support and assistance from the police.

There was only one community organization in the neighborhood when implementation began. Two community organizations were formed in the spring of 1975 as a result of organizing efforts by the Hartford Institute and the District 5 Police Commander. These new organizations -- Central Asylum Hill Association and Western Hill Organization -- joined with the established Sigourney Square Civic Association to form a Police Advisory Committee which held regular meetings with the District Commander and the Asylum Hill Team Commander. The function of this Committee was to review and define

problems and to plan appropriate police and community strategies. Through this and other mechanisms the three organizations worked jointly to increase the involvement of North Asylum Hill residents in police decision making and in related efforts intended to reduce opportunities for crime in the target area.

Individually the community organizations initiated such crime control efforts as block watch and burglary prevention programs. The block watch programs consisted of pairs of volunteers who walked the streets armed with citizen band two-way radios and reported suspicious situations to a citizen operator located in the Asylum Hill police field office. The operator then notified the police, who were prepared to respond. The burglary prevention program utilized volunteers to canvass the neighborhood, educating residents about burglary prevention and enlisting them in Operation Identification. Private funds were provided for the citizen band radios used in the block watch programs; the police provided engravers used in the Operation Identification programs.

The community organizations were also involved in the planning and implementation of the physical design strategies. Not only did their membership vote in favor of the street changes, but the organizations took an active role in persuading the City Council and City administration to implement the changes. Once the program had been approved, a monitoring committee was established which included representation of the three organizations to oversee construction and other aspects of the physical changes.

In addition to their direct involvement in crime prevention activities, the organizations initiated other programs designed to increase resident involvement in community improvement in general. These included programs to welcome new neighbors to the area and to invite them to join the community organizations; clean-up campaigns to spruce up the neighborhood; recreational programs for youth; and social functions such as block parties and potluck dinners to which all neighborhood residents were invited, regardless of their membership in the civic associations. Finally, the three organizations were also involved in efforts to stabilize

housing conditions in North Asylum Hill and to improve Sigourney Square Park, a centrally located park in North Asylum Hill which was feared by residents as an unsafe location. ⁴

Integration of the Three Elements

The police and resident components were easiest to integrate. Police and community leaders were in agreement that both would benefit from a close working relationship. This relationship was carried out almost on a daily basis. To facilitate discussion of those problems identified in the research, the Hartford Institute employed two new staff people in Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) slots provided by the City of Hartford. These persons worked under the direction of Institute staff and were involved in the project from the beginning. One staff member worked with the neighborhood police team, assisting police in planning and implementing strategies addressing community concerns. The second staff member worked with Asylum Hill residents, developing resident-initiated programs and assisting the community organizations in their interactions with the police. ⁵

⁴ In addition, after the end of the evaluation year, the organizations were able to raise monies to fence off the railroad cut bounding North Asylum Hill to the north. Until fenced, this privately owned open area had provided easy entry and escape routes for offenders.

⁵ A third CETA employee was hired to work with residents of Clay Hill/South Arsenal in their community effort which paralleled the resident strategies adopted in Asylum Hill.

Although the police did not systematically incorporate the physical environment changes in planning their routine operations, both the police and the residents did make use of the physical changes to support or facilitate their activities. For example, residents in North Asylum Hill concentrated most of their activities on those streets on which cul-de-sacs had been constructed. They also put pressure on the police to enforce traffic laws and arrest drivers who drove through closed off streets. The police often assigned additional walking patrols to curtail loitering in and around Sigourney Square Park, which was bounded on three sides by cul-de-sacs. On a few occasions they were able to develop strategies of apprehension around the presence of the closed streets.

Final Comment About Implementation

The programs that were actually implemented varied considerably from the initial intentions of the project team. Compromises were made which had both negative and positive impacts. Negative consequences included a delay in implementation which could be critical in some environments, and the possibility of a less positive impact on crime and fear than the original proposed program was expected to produce. In addition, because of the elimination of some of the proposed physical changes, it was more difficult to evaluate the impact of the physical changes as a discrete element of the project.

However, in the absence of willing, interested and committed partners like the police, residents, merchants, politicians, and others, the project team would have mistakenly insisted that their initial strategies be implemented without change. While the process of compromise was time consuming and often painful, it served to strengthen implementation. Each compromise resulted in increased participation by those who would have to make the program work and increased responsiveness to the needs of those toward whom the program was directed.

EVALUATION

Introduction

The theory on which this project was based posits that the design of the physical environment and its use by police and residents can create conditions which either promote or inhibit criminal opportunities. Prior to program implementation the physical environment of North Asylum Hill and its impact on police operations and on area residents had fostered conditions in which crime opportunities were prevalent. Thus, the goals of the project were to modify the design and use of the physical environment in order to reduce criminal opportunities and to promote police and resident behavior that would act to control neighborhood crime and fear. The program was evaluated in order to determine (1) its degree of successful implementation; (2) its effectiveness in achieving the desired impacts on crime (burglary and robbery) and fear in the target area; and (3) the degree to which these impacts occurred through promotion of police and resident crime control behavior.

The formal evaluation took place during the period from July, 1976 through June, 1977, and was comprised of the following three separate but related parts:

1. A detailed documentation and assessment of the implementation process, comparing the program actually undertaken with the program initially developed by the project staff and explaining the disparities between them;
2. An assessment of the impact of the program on crime and fear; and
3. An evaluation of the validity of the underlying theory that the program would produce changes in the behavior and attitudes of the residents and police which would contribute to a reduction in crime and fear.

Assessment of Program Implementation

The information for assessing program implementation came from four sources. First, the Hartford Institute provided periodic written reports describing (a) community organization activities; (b) the progress made in implementing the physical design and police strategies; and (c) other

events in Hartford that might affect the experiment. Second, police activities were monitored through on-site visits every six weeks by an outside observer who is an experienced consultant to police departments. Third, both the changes in the physical environment and the resultant changes in the use of these spaces were also monitored systematically on several occasions. Precise data on vehicular traffic, pedestrian use, etc., was collected. Fourth, a panel of about thirty individuals, including community leaders, businessmen, realtors and residents who had not participated in project activities, were interviewed twice during the experimental year regarding events in the neighborhood. These sources were supplemented by periodic meetings between the evaluation staff and the Hartford Institute staff to discuss project problems and accomplishments and to monitor neighborhood incidents which might have an effect on program implementation or impact.

Assessment of the Effect on Crime and Fear

The assessment of the program's impact on crime and fear, was based primarily on the following quantitative measures:

1. Citizen surveys including victimization counts "before" (in 1973, 1975, and 1976) and "after" program implementation (in 1977);
2. Police record data for all five years, including number of incidents by crime, location of offenses, arrests, and characteristics of arrested offenders;
3. Police officer questionnaires completed "before" (late in 1975) and "after" program implementation (in the spring of 1977);
4. Vehicular and pedestrian traffic counts on key streets taken "before" the street changes were implemented (in 1975 and early 1976) and "after" (in 1977); and
5. Use of space surveys conducted "before" (in 1975 and 1976) and "after" implementation of the street changes (in 1977).

The evaluation utilized these data in two types of analytic comparisons:

1. A comparison of crime rates for burglary and street robbery/pursesnatch in North Asylum Hill "before" (1973, 1975, and 1976) and "after" (1977) program implementation; and
2. A comparison of these crime rates in North Asylum Hill with those in a number of control areas and in the City of Hartford as a whole in 1973, 1975, 1976, and 1977.

Assessment of the Effect on Police and Resident Behavior

In structuring the evaluative tools the program team was aware that there should be intermediate linkages between the program goals to reduce crime and fear and the actual results. Changes would have to occur in police and resident attitudes and behavior which would influence the program outcome. Therefore, the program evaluation should measure these sub-results in order to establish that any reductions in crime and fear were the direct result of the program.

The same sources of quantitative data, especially the citizen surveys, police interviews, and use of space surveys, were used to measure the degree to which the program effected the expected changes in police and resident behavior theoretically relevant to crime and fear. Anticipated behavioral modifications included changes in resident ability to recognize strangers; changes in the number of residents who had agreements with neighbors to watch each other's residences; changes in resident use of neighborhood streets; changes in police attention to community concerns; and changes in the degree of police interaction with neighborhood residents.

FINDINGS

This section will discuss the findings of the program based on the types of evaluation described above. First, the impact of the overall program on the target crimes and their attendant fear is discussed. Second, the effect of the physical, police, and resident strategies on police and resident attitudes and behavior is examined, as is the interactive relationship of the three program strategies.⁶

Impact on Crime and Fear

Using the year ending June 30, 1976 as the base year (1976) and the year ending June 30, 1977 as the evaluation year (1977), it was determined that the rates of these crimes have in fact begun to turn around. Burglary rates showed a substantial reduction. Robbery rates have at least stopped climbing, and may have also undergone a reduction. There have been corresponding reductions in fear levels and little evidence of displacement to other geographic areas or to other crimes.

Crime Rates. Based on the victimization surveys, it was determined that burglary rates dropped from 18.4 per 100 households in 1976 to 10.6 per 100 households in 1977. This represented a 42% decrease. (See Table 1, page 27.) Had burglary continued to increase in 1977 at the same rate as in the three years ending in 1976, the 1977 rate would have been 22 per 100 households. Thus the 1977 rate represents less than half of what would have been predicted.

⁶ The terms "significant"/"statistically significant" are used with caution by the Center for Survey Research evaluators and in this summary. The criterion used was that the change or difference observed had to be large enough that it could have happened by chance fewer than 5 times in 100. Changes or differences that would have occurred by chance only 1 in 5 times are sometimes noted, but readers are warned to treat them with caution. The calculations on which these probabilities are based take into account the specific sample design used in this project.

TABLE 1
BURGLARY VICTIMIZATION BY AREA
(rates per 100 households)

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>			<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1973^a</u>	<u>1975^a</u>	<u>1976^a</u>	<u>1977^a</u>
North Asylum Hill	7.5	14.8	18.4	10.6
South Asylum Hill	2.2	4.6	7.8	7.7
North and west adjacent area	8.2	10.2	b	13.7
Total City	9.8	12.1	b	15.3

^a 1973 rates are for the calendar year; other rates are for fiscal years, with 1975 running from July 1, 1974 to June 30, 1975; 1976 from July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1976; and 1977 from July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1977.

^b Data not available for this time period.

Robbery/pursesnatch victimization decreased from 5.1 persons per 100 in 1976 to 3.7 per 100 in 1977, a decrease of 27.5%. (See Table 2, page 29.) In 1975 this rate had been 3.6 per 100. If the 1975-76 trend had continued through 1977, the rate would have been 6 per 100. Although the number of incidents reported in the victimization survey is insufficient to provide statistically significant evidence of a reduction, it is apparent that the rising trend was halted and may even have been reduced somewhat. Police incident data for the two years seems to confirm this reduction. Police incident data also confirms that between 1976 and 1977 there was a significant shift of street robbery/pursesnatch from interior residential streets to main thoroughfares. (See Table 3, page 30.) 7

7 Unlike victimization data which report only those robberies in which victims were neighborhood residents, police incident data reflect all robberies which took place in a neighborhood regardless of the victims' places of residence. Thus, police incident data is valuable in confirming the victimization data for robberies. Also, the finding that there was a shift in robberies from interior to main streets was based on police incident reports.

TABLE 2
ROBBERY/PURSES/NATCH VICTIMIZATION BY AREA
(rates per 100 persons)

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>			<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1973^a</u>	<u>1975^a</u>	<u>1976^a</u>	<u>1977^a</u>
North Asylum Hill	2.7	3.6	5.1	3.7
South Asylum Hill	0.8	4.1	3.6	7.9
North and west adjacent area	2.0	2.0	b	2.2
Total City	1.0	2.1	b	6.5

^a 1973 rates are for the calendar year. Other rates are for fiscal years. See Table 1.

^b Data are not available for this time period.

TABLE 3
LOCATION OF STREET ROBBERIES IN ASYLUM HILL

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>	<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>Target Area (North Asylum Hill)</u>		
Main Street	36%	58%
Side Street	<u>64%</u>	<u>42%</u>
TOTAL %	100	100
 <u>Control Area (South Asylum Hill)</u>		
Main Street	42%	52%
Side Street	<u>58%</u>	<u>48%</u>
TOTAL %	100	100

Displacement. There is no evidence of geographic displacement of burglary from North Asylum Hill to adjacent areas. Burglary rates in South Asylum Hill and in areas north and west remained relatively stable. Further, it appears unlikely that the reduction in target area burglary led to displacement to other types of crime since there were no significant increases in crime rates for other property crimes.

There was a significant increase in the rate of robbery in South Asylum Hill in 1977, more than would be expected from a continuation of an increasing trend of previous years. Whether this increase represented displacement of robbery from North Asylum Hill must remain conjecture. Since evidence of reduction of street robbery in North Asylum Hill is inconclusive, a corresponding increase in street crime in adjacent areas may or may not be attributable to displacement. Assuming the program was in fact successful in reducing robbery opportunities in North Asylum Hill, the observed increase in robbery in South Asylum Hill could be the result of displacement from North Asylum Hill, because South Asylum Hill is similar to North Asylum Hill and is located adjacent to it.

Fear.⁸ The decline in residential burglary was accompanied by a significant decline in the fear of burglary. (See Table 4, page 32.) Residents were asked three types of questions regarding their perceptions and concerns about burglary: (1) their rating of the severity of the problem in their neighborhood; (2) the degree to which they worried about becoming a victim; and (3) the likelihood of their being a victim within a year. Except for the rate at which residents worried about becoming a victim, responses showed a significant reduction in fear of burglary, a pattern consistent with the observed decline in the burglary rates.

⁸ The term "fear of crime" is not used here in a precise way. As is the case with its use in the literature, it includes a variety of aspects of the subjective perceptions and emotional responses to the threat of crime. To use "subjective response" to crime seemed needlessly pendantic. However, interested readers should know that the researchers were careful in their measurements to differentiate among the various elements of which "fear of crime" consists.

TABLE 4
PERCEPTION OF BURGLARY AS A NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PROBLEM ^a

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>			<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1973</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>				
Big problem	21%	35%	46%	31%
Some problem	33	46	35	44
Almost no problem	<u>46</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>25</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
<u>South Asylum Hill</u>				
Big problem	20%	17%	25%	25%
Some problem	31	41	52	42
Almost no problem	<u>49</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>33</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
<u>Total City</u>				
Big problem	19%	28%	b	21%
Some problem	37	41		40
Almost no problem	<u>44</u>	<u>31</u>		<u>39</u>
TOTAL	100	100		100

^a See Table 1 for explanation of dates

^b Data not available for this time period

A parallel set of questions was asked about robbery, as well as a question concerning how safe residents felt walking alone on their streets during the day. Although not statistically significant, there appeared to be slightly less fear of robbery in 1977 than in 1976, indicating a possible reduction in the level of fear which paralleled the possible reduction in the robbery rates. (See Table 5, page 34.) There was also slightly less fear on the part of residents when walking alone, although again the change from 1976 to 1977 was too small to be statistically significant. (See Table 6, page 35.)

TABLE 5

PERCEPTION OF ROBBERY AS A NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PROBLEM ^a

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>			<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1973</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>				
Big problem	20%	21%	34%	26%
Some problem	38	41	30	45
Almost no problem	<u>42</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>29</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
<u>South Asylum Hill</u>				
Big problem	22%	20%	35%	35%
Some problem	36	44	37	53
Almost no problem	<u>42</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
<u>Total City</u>				
Big problem	14%	17%	b	15%
Some problem	32	25		30
Almost no problem	<u>54</u>	<u>58</u>		<u>55</u>
TOTAL	100	100		100

a See Table 1 for explanation of dates.

b Data not available for this time period.

TABLE 6
DEGREE OF SAFETY FELT WHEN ALONE IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD IN THE DAYTIME

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Very safe	32%	30%	31%
Reasonably safe	58	41	50
Somewhat safe	7	20	13
Very unsafe	<u>3</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
<u>South Asylum Hill</u>			
Very safe	44%	38%	27%
Reasonably safe	41	48	51
Somewhat safe	4	10	17
Very unsafe	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
<u>Total City</u>			
Very safe	43%	a	37%
Reasonably safe	41		46
Somewhat safe	10		11
Very unsafe	<u>6</u>		<u>6</u>
TOTAL	100		100

^a Data not available for this time period.

Summary of Impact on Crime and Fear

The following summarize the major program impacts on crime and fear for the two target crimes of burglary and robbery:

Burglary:

1. A significant (42%) reduction in burglary rate in the target area between 1976 ("before") and 1977 ("after" program implementation), reversing a pre-program trend of increasing burglary (up 145% between 1973 and 1976);
2. A parallel (33%) reduction in fear of burglary in the target area following program implementation, again reversing a pre-program pattern of increasing fear (up 54% between 1973 and 1976);
3. A marked difference in target area and control area burglary rate patterns following program implementation.⁹ Although their pre-program patterns show a similar burglary rate increases (between 1973-5 and 1975-6), the significant post-program (1976-7) reduction in target area burglary is in contrast to the control area pattern, which showed no decrease in burglary for the same post-program period.

⁹ The design of this project was not to use a single matched control area with which to compare North Asylum Hill. Rather, data were collected city-wide and for areas adjacent to North Asylum Hill. Areas were used which provided a reasonable basis of comparison with North Asylum Hill.

Robbery:

1. A 27.5% reduction in robbery rate in the target area between 1976 ("before") and 1977 ("after" program implementation). Although smaller than the reduction in burglary rate, and although too small to be statistically significant, these findings seem to reverse a pre-program trend of increasing robbery (up 89% between 1973 and 1976);
2. A parallel 24% reduction in fear of robbery in the target area following program implementation. Again, these findings are less marked than for fear of burglary (in line with robbery's smaller reduction in actual crime rate), but they reverse a pre-program pattern of increasing robbery fear occurring between 1973 and 1976;
3. A difference in target area and control area robbery rate patterns following program implementation. Although their pre-program patterns showed overall increases in robbery (Refer to Table 2, page 29), the post-program (1976-7) reduction in target area robbery is in contrast to the control area pattern, which showed a continued increase in robbery for the same post-program period.

Impact of Physical, Police, and Community Strategies on Police and Resident Behavior

Effects of the Physical Environment Strategies. It was expected that the changes in the physical environment would discourage through vehicular traffic from interior residential streets and force it onto streets intended for heavier use. The improved definition of neighborhood boundaries was expected to increase resident use of and control over the neighborhood and to increase resident cohesion and interaction.

The street treatments did have the expected impacts on the use of the physical environment. Vehicular traffic diminished throughout the area. Those streets that were changed into cul-de-sacs had marked decreases in vehicular traffic (up to 80%); narrowed interior streets also showed reductions. As anticipated the two streets left open to carry traffic through the area showed a modest increase in traffic. (See Table 7, page 38.)

TABLE 7

CHANGE IN VEHICULAR TRAFFIC BY TYPE OF STREET TREATMENT ^a

Type of Treatment ^b	Vehicles Counted		Percent Change
	1976	1977	
Blocked ¹	7,343	1,850	-75
Narrowed			
Entrance to cul-de-sac ²	2,303	2,780	+21 ^c
Other ³	6,123	4,185	-32
Total narrowed	8,426	6,965	-17
Untreated			
Interior residential ⁴	8,219	6,963	-15
Interior collector ⁵	24,296	26,424	+ 9
Border streets ⁶	38,886	41,229	+ 6
Total border/collector	63,182	67,653	+ 7
Total untreated	71,401	74,616	+ 5
Totals			
Interior residential	23,988	15,778	-34
Interior	48,284	42,202	-13
All streets	87,170	83,431	- 4

¹ Includes Sargeant and Ashley Streets west of Sigourney

² Includes May and Willard Streets

³ Includes Ashley Street (east of Sigourney) and Huntington Street

⁴ Includes Atwood Street and Sargeant Street (east of Sigourney)

⁵ Includes Sigourney and Collins Streets

⁶ Includes Woodland Street, Asylum Avenue, and Garden Street

^a See Map II, page 17.

^b Streets with both types of treatments are categorized according to the treatment nearest the counter.


^c This increase in traffic reflects the absence of other entrance to those streets with cul-de-sacs, and thus the fact that vehicles were counted twice -- upon entry into the street and upon exit.

Analysis of the pedestrian counts indicates a possible restructuring of pedestrian traffic, particularly the routes used by students commuting to and from school. Although the east-west patterns remained unchanged, the north-south patterns became more concentrated, indicating less dispersion and random wandering through North Asylum Hill. (See Map III, page 40.)

At the same time that outside vehicular traffic decreased, there was increased use of the streets and parks by residents. In response to survey questions, significantly more North Asylum Hill residents in 1977 said they walked in the neighborhood at least a few times a week than in 1976. (See Table 8, page 41.)¹⁰ There was also a modest increase in the number who said they liked to use Sigourney Park, located in the center of the neighborhood.

¹⁰ The pedestrian counts yielded inconclusive evidence of increased use of streets by residents. Although there appeared to be slight increases in the use of the streets by people over 35, females, and whites, the differences were too small to be statistically reliable. Moreover, it was impossible for the persons conducting the counts to differentiate between residents and non-residents. In addition, the same people may have been counted more than once. For these reasons the survey responses were considered a much more reliable indication of resident use of the streets than the pedestrian counts.

PRIMARY TO/FROM SCHOOL ROUTE



NORTH ASYLUM HILL COMMUNITY AREA

TABLE 8
FREQUENCY OF WALKING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD DURING THE DAYTIME

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Almost daily	35%	34%	49%
Few times a week	18	20	21
Once a week	10	13	10
Less often	12	18	9
Never	<u>25</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>11</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
<u>South Asylum Hill</u>			
Almost daily	34%	a	34%
Few times a week	24		24
Once a week	11		12
Less often	13		14
Never	<u>18</u>		<u>16</u>
TOTAL	100		100

a Data not available for this time period.

Effects of Police Strategies. Neighborhood team policing was expected to produce a more effective deployment of police resources in the project area. It was anticipated that the police team would develop a better understanding both of the area's social and physical features and of its problems and that police policies and operations would be tailored to community needs. These improvements were expected to improve overall police effectiveness and, finally, to result in reductions in burglary and robbery rates.

There was in fact a substantial increase in arrests for burglary and robbery by the neighborhood police team, providing concrete evidence of enhanced police effectiveness against the target crimes. (See Table 9.)

TABLE 9
NUMBER OF ARRESTS FOR RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY
AND STREET ROBBERY IN ASYLUM HILL

	Before Program Completion	After Program Completion	
	1975 ^a	1976 ^a	1977 ^a
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Residential burglary	30	57	58
Street robbery	5	37	40
<u>South Asylum Hill</u>			
Residential burglary	10	14	20
Street robbery	2	15	41
<u>Total Asylum Hill</u>			
Residential burglary	40	71	78
Street robbery	7	52	81

^a See Table 1 for explanation of dates. Although the program was not completely implemented until late 1976, the police component was fully operational by July 1, 1975.

The project produced some striking changes in police attitudes about their own effectiveness, about the community, and about their relationship with its residents. According to the results of questionnaires answered by team officers, there was a perceived marked improvement in their overall success in reducing crime, their rate of clearing cases, and the extent to which burglary and robbery were diminished as problems in the neighborhood. Police team members indicated substantial improvements in their perceptions of the neighborhood as a place to live, of the willingness of residents to assist the police, and of resident input into police operations in North Asylum Hill. (See Table 10.)

TABLE 10

ASYLUM HILL POLICE RATING OF OVERALL RELATIONS
BETWEEN POLICE AND CITIZENS IN TEAM AREA

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>	<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>Fall, 1975</u>	<u>Spring, 1977</u>
Very good	0%	9%
Good	18	50
Fair	58	36
Poor	<u>24</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%

The relationship between police activities and the physical environment did not develop as intended, however. Patrol officers questioned the connection between the physical changes and crime prevention. Officers felt that the physical changes impeded routine patrol efforts; they did not believe that the changes were of significant use to them in their efforts to prevent crime and apprehend criminals. As noted earlier, the relevance of the physical changes to crime prevention had never been emphasized; instead this aspect of the program had been overshadowed by emphasis on the importance of developing a strong relationship with community residents.

Effects of the Resident Strategies. The resident strategies revolved around the community organizations. The organizations, two of which had been formed during implementation, initiated community crime prevention activities, attempted to involve the North Asylum Hill community in crime control efforts, and were intended (as were the physical changes) to serve as vehicles for spurring social interaction among neighborhood residents. In addition to the community organizations, the Asylum Hill Police Advisory Committee was created to provide a forum for police-community communication and cooperation.

It was intended that these organizations and activities would cause changes in resident behavior which would lead to a reduction in crime. First, they were expected to foster an awareness of citizen responsibility in preventing crime. Second, through these organizations resident interaction was expected to increase, leading to a greater sense of neighborhood unity. Third, the increased resident interaction was expected to lead to greater resident use of the neighborhood, thus making the neighborhood less attractive to offenders. Finally, the Police Advisory Committee was expected to bring police and residents together to mutually resolve crime-related problems. It was hoped that this increased interaction between police and residents would foster a mutual understanding and appreciation.

An increase in assumption of individual responsibility for crime prevention by neighborhood residents is evidenced by an increase in housewatch agreements between neighbors. In 1977 residents were almost twice as likely as in 1976 to have routine arrangements with neighbors to watch each others' dwelling units. (See Table 11, page 45.)

TABLE 11

FREQUENCY OF MAKING ARRANGEMENTS WITH NEIGHBORS TO WATCH
EACH OTHERS' HOUSES

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
Target Area (North Asylum Hill)			
All the time ^a	17%	14%	26%
Special occasions	25	21	16
No special arrange- ments made (or type not ascertained)	<u>58</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>58</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100

^a Although the total percentage of those who made special arrangements shows no increase over 1975, the percentage of those who routinely ("all the time") make arrangements shows a substantial increase.

This increase in housewatch agreements is also an indicator of increased resident interaction. In addition, a significant increase in stranger recognition by community residents was also found, indicating that residents were getting to know each other well enough to discriminate between residents and outsiders. (See Table 12, page 46.) However, other than the increase in housewatch agreements and an improved ability to differentiate between residents and outsiders, there is little evidence of improved resident interaction and relationships. Although slightly more residents were positive about the neighborhood in 1977 than in 1976, there was little difference in responses to questions concerning whether residents feel part of the neighborhood and whether residents are helpful to each other. (See Table 13, page 47; Table 14, page 48; and Table 15, page 49.) This lack of change in such fundamental attitudes and behavior, however, could be due to the short evaluation period of less than a year. Some of the anticipated benefits, particularly basic changes in resident attitudes and behavior, would reasonably

take longer to materialize. An evaluation at the end of two or three years would provide a more conclusive measure of the effectiveness of the project in bringing about such fundamental changes in resident behavior.

TABLE 12

EASE OF STRANGER RECOGNITION IN NEIGHBORHOOD

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Pretty easy	26%	25%	32%
Pretty hard	<u>74</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>68</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
<u>Total City</u>			
Pretty easy	48%	a	53%
Pretty hard	<u>22</u>		<u>47</u>
TOTAL	100		100

^a Data not available for this time period.

TABLE 13

CHANGE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD AS A PLACE TO LIVE IN
THE PAST YEAR

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Better	19%	12%	18%
About the same	45	38	42
Worse	<u>36</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>40</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
 <u>Total City</u>			
Better	7%	a	13%
About the same	57		59
Worse	<u>36</u>		<u>28</u>
TOTAL	100		100

^a Data not available for this time period.

TABLE 14

HOW RESIDENTS FEEL ABOUT THE NEIGHBORHOOD

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Feel part of a neighborhood here	39%	24%	33%
Just a place to live	<u>61</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>67</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
<u>Total City</u>			
Feel a part of a neighborhood here	46%	a	50%
Just a place to live	<u>54</u>		<u>50</u>
TOTAL	100		100

^a Data not available for this time period.

TABLE 15
PERCEPTION OF HELPFULNESS OF NEIGHBORS

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Help each other	46%	21%	35%
Go their own ways	<u>54</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>65</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
 <u>Total City</u>			
Help each other	48%	a	48%
Go their own ways	<u>52</u>		<u>52</u>
TOTAL	100		100

^a Data not available for this time period.

As pointed out earlier, there was evidence of increased use of the neighborhood by residents with the percentage of those who said they walked in the neighborhood almost daily during the daytime climbing from 34% in 1976 to 49% in 1977. (Refer to Table 8, page 41.)

Stranger recognition was also linked to increased use of the neighborhood. The more frequently people said they walked in the neighborhood, the more likely they were to recognize strangers. (See Table 16, page 50.) This increased use of the neighborhood by residents and increased stranger recognition may have made the neighborhood less attractive to offenders and thus may have been a causal factor in the reduction of crime in North Asylum Hill.

TABLE 16

EASE OF STRANGER RECOGNITION IN NEIGHBORHOOD BY FREQUENCY
OF WALKING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD FOR 1977 NORTH
ASYLUM HILL RESIDENTS

<u>Frequency of Walking</u>	<u>Stranger Recognition</u>	
	<u>Pretty Easy</u>	<u>Pretty Hard</u>
A few times a week or more ^a	82%	63%
Once a week or more ^a	<u>18</u>	<u>36</u>
TOTAL	100	100

^a Combined response categories.

Although there was an improvement in police attitudes toward the neighborhood, its residents, and the police-community relationship (see page 43), resident attitudes about the police did not improve during the test year. Instead, there was a decline in the number of positive resident ratings of police performance, as measured by responses to three key questions concerning quickness with which police respond to calls for help, effectiveness in protecting people, and treatment of people. (See Table 17, page 51; Table 18, page 52; and Table 19, page 53.) Two phenomena may have contributed to the decline in citizen ratings of the police. First, there was a reduction in police manpower in the target area (and in Hartford in general) which residents may have perceived as reflecting a reduced police effectiveness. This possibility is supported by the survey findings that residents saw the police in the neighborhood less frequently during the test period. Second, most of the negative ratings of police occurred among black residents, many of whom were new residents in the neighborhood. It is conceivable that these lower ratings by blacks were reflecting their previous experiences with police in other parts of Hartford where ratings of the police have traditionally been lower than those in Asylum Hill. If so, their ratings would be expected to improve with length of residence in the target area.

TABLE 17

PERCEPTION OF POLICE RESPONSE TIME WHEN SOMEONE
IN NEIGHBORHOOD CALLS FOR HELP

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Come right away	72%	49%	53%
Take a while	9	25	26
Don't know	<u>19</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>21</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
 <u>Total City</u>			
Come right away	60%	a	56%
Take a while	19		24
Don't know	<u>21</u>		<u>20</u>
TOTAL	100		100

^a Data not available for this time period.

TABLE 18

RATING OF JOB HARTFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT DOES IN
PROTECTING PEOPLE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Very good	27%	14%	21%
Good enough	53	47	40
Not so good	13	25	28
Not good at all	<u>7</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>11</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
<u>Total City</u>			
Very good	29%	a	19%
Good enough	45		53
Not so good	18		22
Not good at all	<u>8</u>		<u>6</u>
TOTAL	100		100

^a Data not available for this time period.

TABLE 19
PERCEPTION OF HOW HARTFORD POLICE TREAT PEOPLE
IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

	<u>Before Program Completion</u>		<u>After Program Completion</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Very well	30%	28%	25%
Well enough	56	54	44
Not so well	12	9	22
Not well at all	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100
 <u>Total City</u>			
Very well	36%	a	27%
Well enough	48		55
Not so well	11		12
Not well at all	<u>5</u>		<u>6</u>
TOTAL	100		100

a Data not available for this time period.

Interactive Effects of the Physical, Police, and Resident Strategies. A basic concept of the program was that the interaction of the physical, police, and resident strategy components was essential to overall success. Because of the complementarity established among these components, it is difficult to dissociate the effects of one from the others. Each component not only made a direct impact on crime and fear but also increased the impact of the other program components.

The most controversial and innovative part of the program was its physical design component. A basic question, therefore, was whether the program would have worked as well without street changes. The process of implementation provided evidence that the physical design strategies made the crucial difference between presence and absence of program impact. The police and community organization components were implemented in North Asylum Hill at least a year before the physical design component. However, with the exception of the increase in police arrests, none of the positive impacts on the neighborhood discussed in this section occurred until the physical changes had been completed.

The police and resident strategies began implementation at the same time and in concert with each other. In fact, it is difficult to treat the two strategies as separate components. The thrust of Hartford's neighborhood team policing program was toward developing an understanding of the area, a strong relationship with its residents, and an ability to gear its priorities to correspond to the concerns of the target community. Examples of police responsiveness to resident concerns include the anti-prostitution effort, the work to reduce loitering and control the use of the parks and nearby streets, and the anti-burglary and anti-robbery campaigns. The increased arrests for burglary and robbery provide evidence not only of police effectiveness in responding to resident concerns, but also of an increased understanding of the target area as a whole.

In developing and implementing crime prevention activities the community organizations relied on police support and resources. The block watch programs depended on the police team for support and training services, without which they might not have gained the momentum which has enabled them to continue to be strong crime prevention efforts. Without police endorsement and engravers, Operation Identification might have

been less well received by area residents. Without the Police Advisory Committee to provide a forum for police-community discussion, the police might not have learned about those problems of concern to Asylum Hill residents and thus might not have developed strategies to address those problems.

As pointed out above, although the police and resident strategies contributed to the achievement of the program goal, the changes did not come about while only those two strategies were in operation. However, this does not mean that the physical environment strategy was the most important or the only important program component. It does lead to the conclusion that this component created an atmosphere in which the effectiveness of the other two strategies could be maximized and thus that all three components working in concert were necessary to the success of the program.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Implementing a neighborhood crime prevention program which includes changes in the physical environment, police operations, and community responses to crime is not a simple task. Because the city government, the police department and the community itself all have primary responsibility for implementation, they all must be willing to cooperatively undertake that responsibility and to subordinate individual interests to those of the overall program. However, the Hartford program has shown for the first time that an integrated project that uses urban design concepts to reduce criminal opportunities can be implemented in older urban neighborhoods without exorbitant expense and with positive results.

Although full implementation occurred over a period of two years, the police and community participation elements were in place within six months. Furthermore, once approval for construction of the physical changes was obtained, the process took less than six months. The greatest difficulty was in selling the program initially. However, as there was no precedent for such a program when the Hartford project was undertaken, this should not be surprising.

The cost of the physical changes was about \$100 per housing unit, which is reasonable indeed when considering the substantial reduction in burglary. Furthermore, the program entailed no increase in police resources devoted to the area. In fact, due to a city-wide cutback, fewer police officers served North Asylum Hill during the experimental year than during previous years.

Considerable effort was devoted to resident strategies, both during and after the initial implementation stage. It was necessary to help form two organizations and to assist them in defining an agenda. Providing consultation and technical assistance to these groups continued as an essential task throughout the project.

The community organization effort in Asylum Hill took place under relatively difficult conditions. The ideal neighborhood for a citizen-based crime control effort would consist of a stable, homogeneous population with common interests and several existing community organizations. North Asylum Hill was neither stable nor homogeneous. It had an extraordinarily high rate of transiency, and fewer than five percent of the housing units were owner-occupied. Both of these factors would indicate a less than long-term interest in the neighborhood, and should have made it difficult to find common interests around which to organize. However, the community organization effort has succeeded in bringing together people with diverse backgrounds and interests around a common goal -- improving the neighborhood.

While the program's feasibility is important to other communities, its value rests primarily on whether it is a better way to reduce crime than alternative approaches. The program's success in reducing residential burglary presents a clear indication of its merit. Police efforts alone have seldom been found to directly affect burglary. Likewise, formal community programs have proven unsuccessful over extended periods. Criminologists generally believe that only residents themselves can control burglary. In the Hartford experience, as in Newman's experience in public housing projects, a physical environment which encouraged informal efforts of individual residents (such as using neighborhood spaces and watching one another's homes) appears to have been the key to the reduction that occurred. Such resident efforts may also have been supported by police efforts to relate to the community and by the community organizations' efforts; however, the change in the crime rate occurred only after the physical changes were made.

This observation leads to the most important potential virtue of the project. The central hypothesis of the project is that physical changes provide a catalyst for fundamental changes in the way residents use their neighborhoods and relate to one another. If this hypothesis is correct, the positive changes observed in Asylum Hill should be enduring ones -- not dependent on any particular community organization, police tactics, or zeal by residents or police. The concept of synergism should perpetuate the positive changes observed, helping them build upon one another to produce even more positive outcomes in years to come.

Unfortunately, the central hypothesis has not yet been tested. It is possible that the effects observed in North Asylum Hill resulted from a short-term response of citizens and police to the unusual attention to crime, as symbolized by the physical changes. A test of the long-term effects would require a re-evaluation after the program has been in place for two or three years.

A second evaluation should enable us to choose between two competing hypotheses. According to the theory on which the project was based, the modest changes observed should provide an environment in which additional positive changes will occur. The effects should be more evident with the passage of time. The most obvious alternative theory would predict that the improvements should disappear as interest in the program wanes, thus allowing burglary and street crime rates to return to previous levels.

Until that later evaluation is completed, our conclusions about the significance of the Hartford project must remain tentative. However, even in the short period the program has been in effect, positive changes have occurred. The rate of burglary was reduced by nearly half, accompanied by a significant decline in fear of burglary. A pattern of rising robbery/purse-snatch was halted in North Asylum Hill and has shifted from interior residential streets to main streets. Residents began to use their neighborhood more and to take responsibility for crime prevention. Police developed a more positive attitude toward the neighborhood and its residents. These facts plus the feasibility of implementing this program in other communities make the Hartford program one of the most promising models for neighborhood crime prevention yet developed.

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX A

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HARTFORD NEIGHBORHOOD
CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION

The Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program represented a new approach to crime prevention. Although each of the three components -- changes to the physical environment, improved policing, and resident involvement in crime prevention efforts -- had been implemented individually in other sites, the Hartford program was the first to integrate them into a single crime reduction approach.

As a pioneer project, the Hartford program was a learning experience for its implementors. Valuable knowledge was gained from the five-year project, about crime and fear and their causes and about the operation of neighborhood-oriented anti-crime efforts. Problems were encountered which would not be problems today. Approaches were chosen which would not be appropriate today. Throughout the program operation issues arose which should be considered by anyone planning to undertake a similar project. These are highlighted by this document.

THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of the Hartford project began in January, 1975. Discussions were held in fall of 1974 with City officials, the police, residents of the project area, and members of the business community. These discussions were necessary to present the project to those who would be involved in and/or affected by the program's implementation. The project designers had developed a program of solutions directly responding to their research findings. This "pure" model had been designed without outside input. Therefore, the Hartford Institute, representing the project team, was charged with explaining the research findings and the proposed strategies, and with developing support for their implementation.

The "selling" phase was critical. The major goal during this period was to ensure that all three program strategies would be carried out as closely to the design as possible. The Hartford Institute would remain actively involved in the program, by providing assistance, encouragement, and advice, and by monitoring the progress of the three strategies. However, neither the Hartford Institute nor the other designers had a direct role in or authority over implementation. Because others -- the City administration, the Police Department, and the neighborhood residents -- would actually be operating the program, it was important that these groups understand the program, believe in its premises, accept it as their program, and be willing to operate it with as few changes as possible. It was expected that the preliminary discussions would cause some initial confusion and controversy, but it was hoped that compromises could be made which would result in a workable plan of action acceptable to all.

Physical Environment Strategies. The anticipated resistance to the physical design proposals surfaced immediately when the proposals were discussed in the public forums in the area. Non-residents, particularly black non-residents, charged that the proposals were intended to keep minority persons out of the area. Although few resident non-whites participated in the discussions, those who did participate expressed support. Most area residents were more concerned about being inconvenienced: about having to drive around the block to get to and from their homes or having to walk farther to the nearest bus stop due to a proposed rerouting of the buses from one street to another. Furthermore, many residents were skeptical that robbery and burglary could be reduced by closing streets and rerouting vehicular traffic. In

fact, some believed that the closing of some streets would make it easier for offenders to monitor entry and egress and thus identify crime opportunities. Residents believed that crime could be reduced only by increasing the number of police in the area and by having a more responsive judiciary.

Other parties objected to the changes as well. A manufacturing company on the northeast side of the area disapproved of the rerouting of its delivery trucks off residential streets. A hospital on the west side felt the proposed plan conflicted with its capacity to accommodate increased hospital traffic expected to be generated by a planned expansion. Some landlords feared that the proposed changes would interfere with the marketing of rental units.

The City government generally agreed to the plan for the physical design component. However, it was concerned about the effect of rerouting traffic. City officials worried that the construction of cul-de-sacs and the narrowing of intersections without adjustments to other streets outside the area would cause overcrowding on adjacent streets and even daily traffic jams. Of particular concern was the plan to close off a north-south arterial street which ran through the middle of Asylum Hill. Because Hartford's geographic shape is long and narrow, running north to south, there are fewer routes to handle the north-south traffic. It was feared that closing off this street would cause serious traffic flow problems on Hartford's other north-south thoroughfares.

There was also concern that the delivery of emergency and other public services would be impaired. City staff expressed concern that the changes would impede sanitation trucks and snowplows. More important, the Police Department, Fire Department and ambulance services worried that cul-de-sacs would interfere with fast emergency service.

The staunchest opposition to the physical design proposals came from small businessmen and merchants in North Asylum Hill, who feared that the rerouting of traffic would damage their businesses. They felt that their businesses depended on non-resident customers who drove through the neighborhood en route to and from work. This group remained unyielding in their opposition throughout the development process.

The various objections to the physical changes were addressed separately through a mixture of persuasion and compromise. It was necessary to persuade the community that the physical changes were a logical response to crime and that reducing crime should be more important than inconvenience caused

by driving around the block because the street normally used had been closed to through traffic. At the same time, compromises were made. A street which was planned to be closed to buses would remain open for bus traffic due to residents' objections to moving the route.

Because of the concerns of emergency service providers, cul-de-sacs were to be constructed without physical barriers; instead, curbing and traffic signs would be used to interdict through vehicular traffic. Because of the City's concerns about closing Asylum Hill's north-south artery, that street would remain open to through traffic. Although the project designers had seen this highly trafficked street as cutting the area in half and disturbing the residential character of all North Asylum Hill, the benefit to Asylum Hill of closing the street was outweighed by the benefit to the rest of Hartford of leaving it open.

Gradually the residents began to accept the model and were willing to test the physical strategies. Eventually, through their community organizations, the residents voted by a narrow margin to support the changes. Despite continued opposition among some of the resident population, these votes of support were sufficient to convince the Hartford City Council to fund and construct the recommended street changes.

Without this community support, construction of the physical design strategies could not have proceeded. Although NILECJ could fund the analysis, design and evaluation of the program, funding for implementation would have to come from other sources. Because of the economic situation in 1974 and 1975, the private sector was unwilling to provide these monies; therefore local public funding was necessary. Since construction was to be financed with public funds, the City Council required a showing of public support.

Despite significant adjustments to the plan, which resulted in several additional blocks remaining open, a group of merchants brought a lawsuit in 1975 to stop the City from implementing the physical changes. The lawsuit, which sought to restrain any changes in traffic patterns, was resolved in the summer of 1976 with an agreement which permitted construction of the changes with the understanding that they would be removed if unacceptable to the residents and businessmen after a six-month test period. Although the lawsuit was favorably resolved, its effect was a one-year delay in implementation of the physical design component.

The businessmen had effectively exposed a major problem associated with the attempt to sell physical changes to the public ways as an effective way to reduce crime. Like the area residents, the businessmen viewed a larger police force and tougher judges as the only way to reduce crime; they could not understand how crime would be reduced by reducing traffic in the area. The street changes undoubtedly would have been more acceptable if promoted as part of a broad effort to upgrade the area rather than as part of a narrow effort to reduce crime.

A problem also arose in financing the construction of the physical changes. The declining economy, which had eliminated the possibilities of receiving private corporate contributions, had also made it impossible to finance the changes out of tax revenues. The consequent necessity of using federal Community Development Act (CDA) funds for materials and Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) funds for labor caused further problems and delays.

Construction could not begin until all federal approvals were obtained. CDA monies for materials were limited. Furthermore, the use of CETA funds for labor resulted in the hiring of unskilled workers who lacked experience in construction work. Except for supervisors, construction crews were composed entirely of CETA personnel. Because of their inexperience, the CETA employees worked more slowly than a regular construction crew; mistakes had to be corrected, causing further delay. Along with supervisors from the City's Public Works Department, it was necessary for the Hartford Institute and the urban design consultants to closely monitor implementation of the physical design strategies. In addition, a Street Change Monitoring Committee was formed which was composed of representatives of the Institute, the community and the City.

Despite these delays, the street treatments were completed by the end of 1976 with the exception of certain cosmetic improvements and traffic signs. The original design had called for nine cul-de-sacs and fourteen narrowings. By the time of implementation the final plan had been revised to include only four cul-de-sacs and seven narrowings. Traffic was rerouted either around the project area or onto two key through streets, one running east-west and one running north-south. Following a visit to Oak Park, Illinois, to review how public officials in that city dealt with problems related to the closing of many streets with cul-de-sacs, the planners and City officials decided that the traffic problems would correct

themselves. The primary purpose of this visit had been to learn about Oak Park's experience. However, the exposure of Hartford's public officials to other public officials who had undertaken similar changes also provided reassurance that such a program could be implemented without adverse effects.

Police strategies. Neighborhood team policing was implemented in Asylum Hill in early 1975, after several meetings between the project planners and Chief Hugo J. Masini. Chief Masini was receptive to the implementation of neighborhood team policing in North Asylum Hill with modifications to take into account the needs of Hartford's other police districts.

North Asylum Hill was too small an area to be established as a separate police district. The project staff had therefore recommended that a new special district be created consisting of all of Asylum Hill and Clay Hill/South Arsenal, the two areas initially researched by the project team. This arrangement would enable the project to implement neighborhood team policing in the project area almost immediately, yet at the same time would be consistent with the Police Department's ultimate goal of city-wide implementation of neighborhood team policing.

The district was divided into two teams, one serving both North and South Asylum Hill and the other serving Clay Hill/South Arsenal. The district had a total complement of 59 men assigned as follows: one District Commander; two Team Commanders, one to supervise each team; six sergeants, evenly divided between the two teams; and 50 uniformed patrolmen, 25 per team. The teams were to maintain separate field offices and to consider themselves as separate entities.¹

¹ In contrast to precinct houses, which serve as satellite police stations, the field offices were established solely for the purpose of enhancing the police-community partnership. Meetings with the community are held there; community-based crime prevention activities operate from the offices; and residents are encouraged to visit or call to get to know their neighborhood police. All other police operations, such as handling complaints and booking arrested persons, are conducted at headquarters.

The project team had planned for this district to receive special attention and support. However, the Chief, while receptive to the establishment of an experimental policing component in this area, was reluctant to single out one area of the City to receive special treatment. It was agreed that the Police Department would adopt a system to divide the City into five districts. Thus, while generally being able to maintain district integrity in the use of personnel, District 5 had to function within the confines of the city-wide system.

The basic organizational structure of team policing -- geographic stability, decentralization of authority, and integration with the local community -- was to remain uncompromised. The assignment of 59 officers was made according to a Police Department assessment of manpower city-wide and represented no extra allocation of manpower to the team policing area. The project team had also recommended that the department assign average officers to the team rather than establishing "supersquads". The department adhered to this recommendation.

Implementation did not come about easily, however. A very traditional department was being asked to experiment with a new style of policing and one which might erode the power of the existing command structure. Although headquarters command had expressed agreement with the concept of team policing, in practice they were unwilling to relinquish their control of the team and refused to allow the District Commander the necessary autonomy to make operational decisions within his district. Headquarters was wary of creating a special group that would consider itself separate from the rest of the department. This fear was reflected in the refusal to allow the team to hold separate roll calls away from headquarters. Regular team meetings were precluded due to an inability to vary working hours or to provide overtime pay for attendance at meetings after working hours. The lack of team meetings made it difficult for the District Commander to involve line officers in policy making or to foster team spirit. It also prevented sufficient training time for the North Asylum Hill officers to understand and to learn to utilize the physical environment strategies in their day-to-day work. As a result, the concept of considering physical design factors as well as community factors when planning police operations was never fully clarified for or utilized by team members.

The resistance to change was reflected at lower levels as well. Dispatchers ignored district boundaries and continued to dispatch officers city-wide. It was feared that this "crossover" dispatching would further hamper the ability of the District Commander to make decisions regarding utilization and deployment of manpower within the district.

The Hartford Institute was concerned that unless the District Commander was given broad decision-making power to deploy manpower and resources, team policing as initially envisioned would not take place. Therefore, early in the implementation period, the Institute met several times with the Chief of Police, the Commander of Field Services, and the District Commander in order to define the level of authority of the District Commander. These discussions led to a system of regularly scheduled meetings intended to define both the management structure for the team and the relationship of the project staff to the Police Department.

Through the meetings initiated by the Institute, problems were worked through as they arose. The Institute made efforts to recognize what could not be changed, what would have to be compromised, and how to make team policing work in spite of problems and compromises. The department became more willing to allow the Team Commander decision-making authority over team operations. Special anti-prostitution, burglary and robbery units were allowed to be formed. Dispatchers were ordered to observe district boundaries. Although pure team policing, in which all police operations are carried out at the team level, was unacceptable to the Hartford Police Department, a program of very responsive neighborhood oriented policing was gradually implemented.

Under the Hartford model as implemented, the police came to understand the value of responding to community needs and the importance of communicating police limitations and community responsibilities on public safety matters. The community came to better understand the role and limits of the police and how to work closely and effectively with the police.

Recognizing that the community wanted an ongoing working relationship with the police, the police leaders adopted a formal mechanism for police/community involvement. From the beginning of the implementation period the District 5 police leaders were involved in helping the community define its role in the project. During the three months prior to the creation of District 5, the future District Commander and Hartford Institute staff held many meetings with community groups. Their

purpose was to explain the program's emphasis on community responsibility in crime reduction and to stress the importance of community input into police planning. These early meetings were intended to form a foundation for a constructive, problem-solving relationship between the police and the community.

Through their increased interaction with community residents and especially through their active involvement with the Police Advisory Committee (see below), the neighborhood police team began to set priorities in response to community concerns. The team instituted walking beats in the area of Sigourney Square Park to discourage loitering, drinking and gambling in the park; it initiated an anti-prostitution squad which arrested "johns" as well as prostitutes; and it implemented anti-robbery and anti-burglary squads which resulted in increased arrests for those crimes. As an additional result of this increased police-community interaction, the neighborhood police took an active part in such community crime prevention activities as Operation Identification and block-watch projects, providing supplies and training sessions where needed.

Resident Strategies. During the three months prior to implementation of team policing, the Hartford Institute staff and the recently appointed District Commander initiated efforts to create a foundation for the police-community relationship. The District Commander and Hartford Institute staff arranged a series of meetings with the Sigourney Square Civic Association (SSCA), the only existing neighborhood organization at that time. At these meetings they discussed the team policing concept, explained the larger project and its emphasis on community responsibility, and stressed the importance of community input into police planning. The meetings resulted in an agreement by SSCA to form a volunteer Police Advisory Committee. This committee would meet regularly with the District Commander to review and define problems and to plot appropriate police and community responses. The committee met with the District Commander regularly through the spring of 1975. These early meetings, which were intended to form a foundation for a constructive, problem-solving relationship between the police and the community, also represented the beginning of community participation.

Also during this period the Hartford Institute staff and the District Commander began a series of discussions with a group of concerned residents of central Asylum Hill. These

meetings resulted in the formation in early 1975 of a new community organization, the Central Asylum Hill Association (CAHA). Following SSCA's lead, CAHA also established a Police Advisory Committee to meet regularly with the neighborhood police team.

The discussions held with the SSCA and CAHA committees soon disclosed both a substantial community interest in the team policing program and a commonality of concerns about public safety in the neighborhoods. Noting the common interests of the two groups and the police objective to establish a strong base for interaction with the community, the District Commander and Institute staff suggested that the SSCA and CAHA committees combine. In April, 1975, the two committees merged to form the Asylum Hill Police Advisory Committee (AH/PAC).

The creation of AH/PAC was important in establishing a solid police-community relationship. It provided police and community leaders with a formal structure in which to share ideas and information regarding public safety concerns in Asylum Hill. AH/PAC made it possible for the community to have a voice in the development of police team policy, and to work with the police to develop a meaningful role for citizens in crime prevention efforts designed to complement the strategies adopted by the police team.

The Advisory Committee increased both community understanding and support of team policing and police understanding of resident concerns. Through these meetings, the police learned that although the target crimes were fear producing, resident fear was also being caused by other neighborhood conditions such as prostitution, loitering teenagers, loitering and drinking among adult males, and drug dealing. A local park and a corner drug store frequented by "undesirable elements" were considered crime generators. In addition to burglary and robbery, these conditions would have to be addressed in order to have a meaningful impact on fear levels. Police institution of the anti-prostitution unit and the establishment of walking beats in these fear generating areas were in direct response to these resident concerns.

The community activities also resulted in the implementation of crime prevention programs. With the support and technical assistance of the Hartford Institute and the Police Department, a group of 25 residents of western Asylum Hill developed a block watch program in the spring of 1975. The program volunteers formed a nucleus around which a third community organization developed in the late summer of 1975, called Western Hill Organization (WHO). Shortly after its creation WHO also became a member organization of AH/PAC.

Individually each of the community organizations initiated such crime control efforts as block watch and burglary prevention programs. The block watch programs consisted of pairs of volunteers who walked the streets armed with citizen band two-way radios and reported suspicious situations to a citizen operator located in the Asylum Hill police field office. The operator then notified the police, who were prepared to respond. The burglary prevention program utilized volunteers to canvass the neighborhood, educate residents about burglary prevention and enlist them in Operation Identification. Private funds were provided for the citizen band radios used in the block watch programs; the police provided engravers used in the Operation Identification programs.

In addition to their direct involvement in crime prevention activities, the organizations initiated other programs designed to increase resident involvement in community improvement in general. These efforts included programs to welcome newcomers to the area and to invite them to join the community organizations; clean-up campaigns to spruce up the neighborhoods; recreational programs for youth; and social functions such as block parties and potluck dinners to which all neighborhood residents were invited. Finally, the three organizations were also involved in efforts to stabilize housing conditions in North Asylum Hill and to improve Sigourney Square Park, a centrally located park in North Asylum Hill which was feared by residents as an unsafe location.

The expansion of these organizations into other areas of concern was expected and encouraged. Crime and fear are good organizing issues. Prior to this Crime Prevention Project, Asylum Hill was considered impossible to organize; without the crime and fear issues to establish the necessary bond, it might have remained unorganized. However, these issues cannot be the life blood of a community organization. Neighborhood organizations must be encouraged to grow and to take on a broader focus which includes other issues affecting neighborhood life.

As the Hartford Institute encouraged expansion into other areas, it also encouraged independence on the part of the new community organizations. In 1975, in order to maintain a close relationship with the community, the Hartford Institute had hired a new staff member to work with the Asylum Hill organizations. This person who was recommended by the community organizations after an extensive recruiting effort, worked directly with the organizations through 1975. The community organizer attended meetings, provided technical assistance, and monitored the public safety programs. As these organizations developed and stabilized, however, the Institute began

to feel that its direct involvement in community organization activities was no longer necessary and was possibly counter-productive. The community organizations had become fully capable of self-government but continued to depend on the Hartford Institute out of habit and expedience rather than need. The Hartford Institute saw this dependency as an obstacle to their development as self-reliant organizations capable of surviving and developing under their own power and initiative. In addition, the Hartford Institute was concerned that rather than enhancing the police-community relationship, it was becoming buffer between the neighborhood groups and the police. Therefore, in 1976, the Institute withdrew from its close association with the community organizations and instead maintained informal contact, remaining available to assist when needed.

ISSUES ENCOUNTERED DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of this project was itself an experiment. It was the first time a complex crime control project was to be implemented which involved physical environmental design, the police, and the community in an integrated effort to reduce crime. It was to be conducted in an urban neighborhood which had not asked for this type of program and was to be implemented by third parties instead of by the developers. Each of the three components was to be operated separately by parties with differing and sometimes conflicting agendas. In addition, the implementing parties had other business than the crime control project, which lessened their capacity to concentrate solely on the operation of the project.

The Role of the Coordinator. The first task to be undertaken was promoting the program design and guiding the three components into the implementation phase. To effectively perform this task, one agency needed to play a coordinating role. The Hartford Institute assumed this role. Having initiated the development of the project and having been involved in the design of all three components, the Hartford Institute was in the best position to assume this coordinating role between design and implementation. Furthermore, as a private agency, the Hartford Institute had the flexibility to devote considerable staff time and resources to the operation of a single project. Although the Hartford Institute lacked authority to enforce implementation, it had a successful track record in designing and facilitating the implementation of other pilot projects in the areas of criminal and social justice. Past success, an ability to persuade, and a reputation for getting things done provided the Institute substantial influence with those responsible for implementing the program.

As an entity with the authority to require implementation, the City Administration might have assumed the coordinating role. However, City governments have other constraints which might impede the progress of such a project. First, city administrations lack the money and flexibility to devote staff to ongoing projects outside the day-to-day responsibilities for which they are answerable to the taxpayers. In addition, it is difficult for a public agency to justify devoting special attention and resources to a single geographic area within their jurisdiction, even though the money to be spent came

primarily from federal sources. It would be easier for the City to justify spending primarily federal funding on a demonstration project operated by a private agency, especially a project which would be applicable to other areas if successful.

Developing a Program for Third Party Implementation. The normal approach to the implementation of this type of project would have been for the City to determine the need for a crime control project and to hire the Hartford Institute (and any consultants that the Hartford Institute might hire) to study the problem and design a program to be implemented by the City. In this case, although there was concern about crime and crime-generating problems in Asylum Hill, no formal efforts aside from traditional policing had been made by the City to address those problems. Instead, the Hartford Institute initiated the development of the project; obtained agreement by the City to allow and to participate in implementation; obtained funding; and developed a program to be implemented by the City government, the Police Department, and the community. Thus, the Hartford Institute, an uninvited outsider, was in the position of designing and selling a multi-faceted crime control project in a community which had not asked for the program.

Therefore, even during the design stage, the planners realized the need to design a model which the implementors would be capable of implementing and willing to implement, which allowed for compromises, and yet which applied sufficient checks to ensure that the program would be implemented basically as envisioned. In designing each component, the planners had considered the strengths and limitations of those who would ultimately implement it. The completed draft design was then to be presented to its future implementors for their reactions and recommendations. Through this process, the planners hoped to be able to revise each model until acceptable to its implementors, and yet to control the model design, and prevent excessive alterations.

A more appropriate approach would have been to design the program with input from those who would have to make the program work and who would have to live with it. Today it would be impossible to develop such a program without the early involvement of the residents of the target community and others to be affected by the program. Neighborhood residents today are more sophisticated and have developed their own agenda of neighborhood improvement so that a crime prevention program would have to be integrated with that agenda.

Selling the Program. Because the plan had been arbitrarily determined by the project team at the outset without prior input from those who would be implementing the program, the selling of the program was crucial. Although City officials, the Police Department, and community leaders had been in contact with the Hartford Institute during the data collection and model design phases, the majority of the residents were unaware that such a program was even being contemplated for Asylum Hill. Although many recognized the need for the project and saw the project as an indication that City officials were interested in revitalizing their neighborhood, others were wary of outside involvement in their community. The community had not asked for the program, they had not invited the Hartford Institute to plan their future, and many disagreed with the Institute's proposed solutions to their crime and fear problems. The Institute could not impose its model on an unwilling community; the community would have to agree to the program to be implemented.

The program would have been easier to sell if it had been presented in terms of broader strategies for neighborhood improvement. Today such a program would probably be linked to a more comprehensive neighborhood improvement plan. With the availability of HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) money for neighborhood improvement, crime reduction strategies are increasingly linked with programs for the overall betterment of the community.

Negotiations and Compromises. Extensive negotiations and compromises on all three elements of the program were inevitable. Because of the compromises, the programs that were actually implemented varied considerably from the initial intentions of the project team. Compromises were made which had both negative and positive impacts. Negative consequences included a delay in implementation which might have reduced the impact of the proposed program on crime and fear. Elimination of some of the proposed physical changes rendered it more difficult to evaluate the impact of the physical changes as a discrete element of the project.

While the process of compromise was time consuming and often painful, it served to strengthen implementation. Each compromise resulted in increased participation by those who would have to make the program work and increased responsiveness to the needs of those toward whom the program was directed. However, if all those who were to be part of the project had been given a role in the decision-making at an

early stage in the project, there probably would have been greater receptivity to the project, greater willingness to get the program underway, and possibly fewer changes in the original design due to a clearer understanding of the underlying rationale.

Hartford Institute's Lack of Authority. The Hartford Institute's lack of authority over the program implementors caused a tightrope situation for the Hartford Institute. On one hand, as recipient of the project's funding, the Hartford Institute was responsible for designing a workable program and ensuring implementation of that program. On the other hand, it lacked the necessary control to ensure implementation. To compensate for its lack of control, the Hartford Institute maintained close contact with all implementing parties, responded to community concerns and priorities, provided technical assistance, facilitated communication among the three components, and monitored all facets of the project.

Unforeseen Problems. Because of the innovative nature of this project, problems arose which were unanticipated and which were outside the control of the project. The physical design component was affected by the businessmen's lawsuit and by economic problems. The effect of the lawsuit was a one year's delay in beginning construction of the physical changes. Economic problems which had forced the City to find outside funding caused further delays. Red tape involved in obtaining CDA money was time consuming. The hiring of unskilled and inexperienced CETA workers to supplement the CDA funding further contributed to the delays.

The delay in implementation of the physical design component affected the entire project. The police and community components were operating a full year before construction of the physical design component was begun. Because this component was to be the cornerstone of the project, the project as planned was not in operation until late in 1976, two years behind the target start-up date.

The economic problems also affected the functioning of the Police Department and thus the police component. Due to budgetary cutbacks, manpower was allowed to decrease. Vacant positions caused by resignations and retirements remained unfilled. As the force shrank, line personnel were pulled into headquarters from the field to perform administrative duties. This practice affected the manpower and functioning of the

Asylum Hill team. The manpower cutbacks on the team caused curtailment of all but necessary patrol. Walking beats were discontinued; special prostitution, robbery and burglary squads were disbanded; and losses among sergeants on the force caused a shortage of sergeants in District 5. Not only did this hamper the project operations, but it lowered morale and reduced prospects for the development of team spirit. This problem was never resolved. In planning similar projects, police departments should be apprised of the minimum manpower needed to operate a viable team policing component and should be persuaded to commit the necessary manpower and resources for the duration of the project.

An unforeseen condition that might have posed a problem was the rapidly changing character of North Asylum Hill. This area was both highly transient and transitional. Residents, who primarily were renters, moved in and out frequently and those moving out were being replaced by persons with little stake in the neighborhood. Of particular concern was an apparent influx into the neighborhood of known offenders. In short, a program had been designed for an entirely different population than the population living in North Asylum Hill during the implementation. The planners were concerned that the outcome would be ineffective.

Fortunately, the project had been designed for quick and simple implementation in order to stabilize the crime problem and reduce fear. By making the residents an integral part of the project, it sought to increase their stake in the neighborhood and enhance their confidence in the viability of their neighborhood. If crime and fear could be turned around, perhaps the physical and social decline could be turned around. This proved a successful tactic. Evaluation findings indicate that after a year of program implementation, residents had begun to have an increased stake in the neighborhood. Furthermore, not only were fewer crimes committed in North Asylum Hill, but persons arrested for committing crimes in Hartford have tended to reside in neighborhoods other than North Asylum Hill.

SUMMARY

The Hartford program was unusual in that the program had been developed by outsiders for a neighborhood which had not requested it; the neighborhood residents, who would be affected by the program, had not been consulted for their input into the program design; and those who were to implement the program had played no role in the planning process. Some decisions made during prior stages of program development adversely affected program implementation. Some of those could be avoided by anyone undertaking a similar project today. The major issues to be faced during implementation are listed below.

1. In a project involving a number of key actors, one party must assume responsibility for shepherding the plan into implementation. This coordinating role may be performed by the city government or an office within the city government. However, this responsibility may be assumed with less difficulty by a private organization similar to the Hartford Institute.
2. It is difficult to ask the community to implement a completed program model into which the community had no prior input. Selling a completed package causes delays and obstacles which could have been minimized at an earlier stage. A community is more likely to be receptive to a program in the design of which it had played a significant role.
3. Compromises between the program model and the implemented program should be expected. The program model should be sufficiently strong and sufficiently flexible to allow for compromises without destroying the intent and ultimate effectiveness of the program.
4. If the coordinating agency lacks authority to control implementation, it must be willing and able to spend the time and effort necessary to persuade the various implementors of the value of working together to ensure effective program implementation.
5. Unforeseen problems and obstacles will occur. The program should be sufficiently flexible to respond to these problems when they arise without sacrificing the integrity or the effectiveness of the program.

APPENDIX B

THE EVALUATION OF THE HARTFORD EXPERIMENT:
A RIGOROUS, MULTI-METHOD EFFORT TO LEARN SOMETHING

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Introduction

Evaluation means many different things. The goals of the evaluation of a program can include:

- a. describing the activities;
- b. assessing the impact of the program, the way things are different because of the program;
- c. learning about the reasons for the program's success or failure.

Usually some information is gathered or collated. The amount and type of information collected, as well as the methodological rigor, varies, of course, from project to project.

The Hartford project was complex, as is usual for environmental design programs; therefore, it was relatively difficult from an evaluation design point of view. The goals of the evaluation included all three of those listed above: detailed description of the programs implemented, an assessment of the program impact on crime and fear, and, most important, an effort to further general knowledge about crime reduction or control. The design was comparatively elaborate and the methods were comparatively rigorous.

For these reasons, the evaluation of the Hartford experiment provided an unusual opportunity to learn about some strategies for evaluation that were successful and may be useful in other evaluations. The purpose of this paper is to present some of the lessons that can be learned.

The Nature of the Program

In order to understand the research, it is first necessary to understand the program.

The Hartford Project was an experiment in how to reduce residential burglary and street robbery/pursesnatch and the fear of those crimes in an urban, residential neighborhood. Its most distinctive feature was its integrated approach to crime control: police, community organization, and physical design changes were all used to increase the willingness and ability of residents to control the neighborhood to reduce criminal opportunities.

The initial planning for this project occurred in 1973. Analysis of the crime in the area was undertaken by an interdisciplinary team. Its task was to understand the way residents, potential offenders, police and the physical environment interacted to create criminal opportunities; and to design inexpensive strategies that could be quickly implemented to intervene in the pattern of rising crime.

A principal conclusion of the analysis was that a number of features of the physical environment were working to destroy the residential character of the neighborhood. Cars and pedestrians passing through the area dominated the streets and depersonalized them. The streets belonged more to outsiders than to residents, creating an ideal environment for potential offenders.

Based on this analysis, a lengthy planning and implementation period ensued. In 1976, a three-part program was fully implemented that included:

- a. closing and narrowing streets as a main strategy for reducing outside traffic and increasing the residential character of the neighborhood;
- b. instituting a neighborhood police unit with strong relationships with the residents; and
- c. creating and encouraging area organizations to work with the police and to initiate resident efforts to improve the neighborhood and reduce criminal opportunities.

Five features of the experiment were particularly important because they complicated the evaluation.

1. The program was implemented in only one neighborhood area which had a population of approximately 5,000 people. Therefore, there was only one test of the concepts and ideas.
2. As noted above, one essential component of the Hartford experiment was its multi-faceted nature. Perhaps the cornerstone of the project was the street changes, by which the planners hoped to limit vehicular traffic in the neighborhood. However, the police and community organization components of the project were important as well. Each was seen as a potential catalyst to resident

initiatives to crime control, both formal and informal. Describing the implementation and, more importantly, assessing the significance of each program component added considerably to the complexity of the project.

3. A related but different point is that the way the program was supposed to reduce crime and fear was complex and involved a chain of events. The fundamental premise of the program was that the residents themselves, through their informal efforts, could reduce crime and thereby fear, by taking control of events in their neighborhood. Each of the program components was intended to increase the ability or willingness of the residents to control the neighborhood. Such a model is complicated conceptually and analytically.

The best example of this complexity is the role of the street closings in crime control. Many residents, and even some of the police, could never get over the notion that the purpose of the street closings was to keep out offenders. Properly skeptical that anyone who wanted to enter the neighborhood would be deterred, such people could not believe that the program would have any effect on crime. They failed to grasp a chain of logical steps: that the effect of a lot of traffic in residential areas was to depersonalize them; that a reduction in traffic would make the outside spaces more pleasant and attractive for use by residents; that if residents used the outside spaces more, it would increase the likelihood that they would take an interest in and become involved in what went on in the public and semi-private spaces near their homes; that such an interest would make it less likely that offenders would lurk in the neighborhood, waiting for criminal opportunities.

In essence, the street changes were one important part of an effort to restore the residential character of the neighborhood and give the area back to the residents. Part of the evaluation goal was to learn more about whether the hypothesized chain of events really worked. The analytic complexities of accomplishing that were considerable.

4. The planning and implementation of the program took place over a three-year period. This is fairly typical of environmental design programs. However, such a time period provides considerable opportunity for other, unplanned events to occur to further confuse the evaluation.
5. The program, including the physical changes, was in place less than a year when its impact was evaluated. Timing has considerable effect on evaluation. On the one hand, an early evaluation can show the effects of attention, regardless of the content of the program (Hawthorne Effect). On the other hand, some of the goals of the program, such as increased commitment to the neighborhood, might well take longer than a year to develop.

Each of the above points basically meant that the program was complicated to evaluate. In order to evaluate a complicated program, one is likely to need a complicated evaluation scheme.

Types of Measures

Two goals guided the research design. First, an attempt was made to measure each important concept or variable in at least two different ways using different methods. Second, although there was a commitment to quantitative evidence regarding the program, the design provided a variety of opportunities for qualitative feedback as well.

The multi-method approach to measurement is cited as desirable in almost any text on methodology. It is well known that any particular way of measuring something has its limits and likely biases. Conclusions based on different ways of measuring the same thing are likely to be sounder because they transcend the limits of any particular method. A distinctive characteristic of the Hartford experiment was not that the multi-method approach was valued but rather the extent to which the project team was successful in finding more than one way to measure the same phenomena.

Victimization rates and fear were measured by a sample survey of residents. Since the purposes of the program were primarily to produce improvements in crime and fear of crime, some sort of resident survey was essential. However, the

survey also was used to measure a wide range of resident perceptions and behaviors. In fact, for almost every aspect of the program and its effects that were studied, a useful set of measures came out of the resident survey.

Fear of crime was one of the few variables for which a second source of quantitative data was not developed. It is hard to measure fear except by talking to people. However, the views and observations of a panel of community leaders were solicited via semi-structured interviews to supplement the survey data.

With respect to crime, a second available source of information is, of course, police records. In this regard, the Hartford experience provides a good example both of the value of a multi-method approach to measurement and, in particular, of how essential victimization surveys are in assessing crime control programs.

It has long been known that a considerable portion of crimes that occur are not reported to police. Rates of burglary and robbery/pursesnatch derived from surveys are routinely two or three times the comparable rates derived from police records. However, it has been argued that for the measurement of trends over time, police records will provide a meaningful indicator of whether crimes are going up or down.

In Hartford, there was an opportunity to carry out victimization surveys over a five-year period, and to compare the figures from the victimization surveys with comparable figures from police records. The results of this comparison are not surprising to those who have studied factors which affect police record estimates. However, they provide a warning to those who would rely on police record data alone as indicators of rates of crime.

During the five-year period in which Hartford crime was monitored, the study showed not one but two different occasions when, for reasons which had nothing to do with the rate of crime, the trends in crime based on police record data were very misleading.

The first case parallels a classic police anecdote. The introduction of a new Chief of Police in Hartford in 1974 was accompanied by an apparently massive increase in crime. Victimization survey data showed that the increase was largely due to improved reporting practices on the part of police officers.

Three years later, the police record data showed a city-wide drop in burglary, while the victimization survey showed an increase. Some further research revealed that one of the symptoms of some continuing contract negotiation problems between the police and the city had been a sharp decline in the rate at which calls for service had yielded reports of actual crimes.

This experience illustrates two points. First, what shows up in the police records as a reported crime is dependent on both the behavior of citizens and the behavior of police officers. Extraneous factors which affect the behavior of either can have important affects on police record data and, consequently, on comparisons over time based on such figures. Although victimization survey estimates are not perfect by any means, the sources of bias or error should be consistent from time to time if a survey is properly done. Comparative statements based on victimization surveys should be reliable.

The second point to note is the value of the multi-method approach. In this case, the survey and the police record data did not produce the same conclusion. When this is the case, the discrepancy can make the researcher do further investigation. If only one method is used, the results are likely to be taken as accurate. Many evaluation studies, unfortunately, provide little potential for seeing inconsistency because of the lack of overlapping measures. Obviously, the more such overlap can be built in, the less likely the researcher is to make an error, and the more convincing will be the conclusions based on the research.

Measuring the use of spaces proved to be one of the most complex parts of the evaluation. In their initial analysis of the area, the urban designers had made numerous observations about the relationships between residents, non-residents and the spaces in the area: The neighborhood is depersonalized. Strangers dominate the streets. There does not appear to be any social cohesion. The parks are not used in an appropriate way.

Changing such things was an essential intermediate goal of the program. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the evaluation team to be able to make statements about whether and how much such changes occurred. To do that, it was necessary to quantify, or at least systematize, the observations of the urban design team.

Counts of vehicular traffic on Asylum Hill streets, which entail only the placement of counting machines for 24 hours, were one obvious source of information about vehicular traffic. The pattern of pedestrians' use of those streets was quantified by using human counters stationed at strategic spots for five different hour-long periods during the day. Days were standardized in that they had to be at least minimally attractive for walking; i.e., the temperature had to be above 50 degrees with no precipitation. Counters not only counted the number of persons passing their spot; they also coded them into sex, age, and ethnic categories by observation.

A third important source of information about the use of the neighborhood came from the survey residents, of course. Their perceptions of the vehicular and pedestrian traffic as well as their reports of their own behaviors were important input into understanding how the neighborhood was being used.

Finally, the urban design team attempted to codify their observations. Based on a series of systematic walking trips through the area at specified times of day, they put on maps the people observed and their activities. The goal was not necessarily to produce a statistical basis for conclusions, but to systematize their observations, to provide some basis against which to compare observations at a later point.

In fact, there were significant problems in actually reaching conclusions based on changes in their coded observations from one time to another. Relatively little analytic use was made of these data. However, figuring out some way to codify observations of use of space is important to studies of environmental design programs. More work is needed to figure out how to do it well.

In summary, analysis of the way the land was used and how that might have changed as a result of the program was based qualitatively on the observations of the urban designers and the reports of people in the community; it was based quantitatively on traffic and pedestrian counts and standardized survey measures administered before and after implementation.

Data on police were gathered in a similar way. Qualitative information was available on police operations from at

least two sources. First, on a routine basis, the team leaders met with Hartford Institute¹ staff to review plans and problems. The Hartford Institute staff, in turn, produced routine summaries of significant happenings with respect to policing in the area. In addition, an outside monitor, experienced in police operations, spent a couple of days every two months visiting with the police team: talking with leaders and patrol officers, riding in patrol cars and reviewing record data. Both of these were extremely important to having an accurate, up-to-date picture of the police component of the program.

In addition, there were three more quantitative sources of information about the police. First, the police officers themselves filled out a questionnaire shortly after the police team was established and again near the end of the evaluation period. The resident survey included a number of questions both about resident perceptions of the police and about their own behavior with respect to the police. Included were items about reporting crimes to police, the amount and quality of contacts with police as well as citizen perceptions of response time, responsiveness and police effectiveness.

Finally, the police department's own records provide a quantitative indicator of police activity. Calls for service, arrests, and reported crimes all provide information which can be useful to an overall analysis.

The activities of the community groups that were formed in Asylum Hill were monitored in several ways. The Hartford Institute provided a good deal of information about these groups. Staff members attended most early meetings and had frequent contact with the groups throughout the project. Their knowledge about activities and problems was periodically summarized.

In addition, a set of people knowledgeable about the community was interviewed in a semi-structured way on two occasions. Officers and leaders of the formal organizations in Asylum Hill were among those in the panel, and one of their particular contributions was to provide additional information about the groups and their activities.

¹The Hartford Institute of Criminal and Social Justice was responsible for implementation of the projects.

Finally, of course, the resident survey once again was an invaluable source of information about residents' participation in and knowledge of the community organizations that were trying to help them.

Thus, for each component of the program, the evaluation was able to draw on multiple sources of information. In some cases, exactly comparable measures were available from two different sources. In other cases, the data were complementary. In almost all cases, however, the fact that there were multiple sources of information significantly reduced the likelihood of an inadvertent error about what was going on and significantly increased the strengths of the conclusions that could be reached.

Analysis Strategies

There were two basic kinds of analytic conclusions that the evaluation was asked to come up with. The first question to be answered was whether or not the program was successful in reducing burglary and robbery/pursesnatch in Asylum Hill and the fear of those crimes. Second, regardless of the outcome, was there something to be learned from the experience in Hartford that would help others to design a crime reduction program in existing neighborhoods?

The impact analysis actually turned out to be two questions. Did crime and fear improve in Asylum Hill? and, was the program responsible for the improvement?

It is evident from the fact that the second question had to be asked that the answer to the first question was affirmative: at the end of a year, burglary and the fear of burglary had dropped to a level of approximately half of what one would have expected without intervention. Statistically, that was a highly unlikely chance event. In addition, although the data on robbery and pursesnatch were less conclusive because of the comparatively low rates of those crimes, the odds were better than 2 out of 3 that those crimes and the fear of those crimes had also improved.

But was it the program that was responsible for this reduction, or was something else at work? It turns out to be extremely difficult in social science to prove that there is not a mysterious unidentified factor responsible for results. However, in this situation, the presence of the extensive Hartford data base was a tremendous asset in making alternative hypotheses less plausible.

One set of hypotheses was ruled out by analysis of city-wide data. The harshness of the winter, a change in economic climate or the inception of a city-wide offender work program all could have been plausible alternative reasons for a reduction in burglary. However, they would have affected the city as a whole. The decline observed in Asylum Hill occurred in the context of an overall 10 percent increase in crime throughout Hartford.

Having data on Asylum Hill in 1973, 1975, 1976 and 1977 helped to address other hypotheses. The improvement that was observed occurred in the experimental year of 1976-1977, not before. Prior to the experimental year, crime rates and fear in Asylum Hill had been rising steadily. Only events that would not have affected the crime prior to 1976 but then would have had a dramatic effect just during that year needed to be considered as plausible alternatives.

This logic was quite important in addressing one of the most compelling alternative ideas: that the offender population that had worked in Asylum Hill had moved away. A public housing project which had produced a disproportionate number of criminals working in Asylum Hill had been "thinned out". There also had been quite a bit of abandonment and demolition in an area north of Asylum Hill where offenders had been known to live. It was, of course, not known exactly how many offenders had moved, nor whether they had moved far. However, that at least some of them had moved somewhere was almost certain.

There were, however, two facts which argued against this change being a major factor in the observed reductions in crime in Asylum Hill. First, the thinning out of the public housing project and the housing abandonment had been going on for at least a year prior to the experimental year. One would have expected to see effects of this prior to the 1976-1977 year if it was significant. Second, detailed victimization data on areas around Asylum Hill did not show declines in burglary and robbery such as those found in North Asylum Hill. Since these areas were within reach of the same offenders who worked in North Asylum Hill, one would expect a significant change in the offender population to have affected these adjacent areas as well. Thus, the data permitted one to rule out a change in the offender population as a significant factor in the observed crime reduction with a considerable degree of confidence. Had the data been less rich, that hypothesis might well have seriously undermined confidence in the conclusion that the program affected crime.

The above deals with negative arguments, trying to rule out alternative hypotheses. Another approach is to produce documentation that the program produced changes which could plausibly reduce crime.

It will be recalled that the key to crime reduction was thought to be increased resident control over the neighborhood. There was considerable evidence that things had moved in a positive direction in this respect: vehicular traffic had clearly been restructured and reduced overall; there had been some reduction of pedestrian traffic on residential streets, though that was not always the case; residents reported that they were doing significantly more walking in the area and were using the parks more; they reported that their stranger recognition had improved; they reported more frequent arrangements with neighbors to watch out for one another's houses.

These changes, most of them statistically significant, helped to buttress the notion that the program had succeeded in starting a chain of events that plausibly could lead to crime reduction. On the other hand, there were some changes that were expected but not observed. Optimism about the neighborhood's future had not improved. While fear of the target crimes had gone down, there were a number of neighborhood problems which, in the view of residents, had not improved.

Of course, data alone, no matter how good, do not eliminate the role of judgment. Were the changes observed dramatic enough to have produced a 50 percent reduction in burglary? Some reviewers will be more convinced than others. However, because of the extensive data base, critics of the conclusion that the program reduced crime and fear during its first year have a difficult case to make. The possible alternatives identified by the research team do not hold up under scrutiny. Could there have been an heretofore unnoticed event that occurred at roughly the same time as the street closings, affected North Asylum Hill but not surrounding areas, and had the exact effect the program was designed to have?

In social science, it is difficult to prove anything definitively. However, the case for a program impact seems much stronger than the case against.

To produce generalizable knowledge was the other analytic goal of the evaluation. Based on one demonstration, there is no statistical basis for generalizing. The foundation on which one generalizes from a single experiment is conceptual rather than statistical. It is in this context, again, that the complex data base developed in Hartford both before and after program implementation was critical to the value of that experiment to others.

There are two kinds of questions that a person considering the Hartford model would want answered. First, was the situation identified in North Asylum Hill sufficiently similar that one could apply the analysis to another community? Second, did the apparent success of the intervention in North Asylum Hill say anything about the likely success or failure of other similar interventions: Through detailed description of the "before" situation, a good evaluation should enable a person to answer the first question. Through analysis of the dynamics of the intervention, and detailed description of what was implemented and with what effect, a reader should be able to begin to address the second question.

The analytic value of good, comprehensive data was once again demonstrated in connection with the question of the role of the three components - physical changes, police and community organizations - in the program's success. Fortunately, two unplanned natural experiments occurred that permitted a fairly definitive answer.

In the target area, the police and community organization components were begun a year before the street changes were made. However, it was only after the street changes that crime and fear declined.

An area adjacent to the target area was served by the Asylum Hill police team and also developed a significant crime-oriented community organization. However, no street changes were made in this area, and no decreases in crime or fear occurred.

Although the role of the other components cannot be assessed fully, it is clear that the physical design changes were necessary to the success of the program. Being able to make that statement is very important to those who would learn from the Hartford experience. The answers will seldom be definitive or unassailable. However, the better the quality of description and understanding that an evaluation produces, the more likely it is to be useful to others.

Conclusion

The evaluation of the experiment in Hartford was unusually full and complete. Even so, there were desirable steps not taken because of limited funding. For example, although offender interviews were conducted in the planning stages of the project, none were done after implementation. There were ways in which the monitoring of some of the community activities was not as detailed as it could have been. More money and more time would have reduced the number of gaps in the analysis, but clearly would not have eliminated them all. Social science evaluations do not produce certainty very often, and this one was no exception.

Having made that point, perhaps it is appropriate to close with a more general comment about the importance of good methodology in evaluation research.

The jumping-off point for evaluation research was probably the experimental designs outlined by Campbell and Stanley many years ago. Those faced with the task of evaluating real projects soon found that the conditions for true experiments were seldom met. Moreover, it was observed that often the results of even careful evaluations were inconclusive.

There have always been those who considered research a waste of time and money. There have always been practicing researchers who, through lack of sophistication or for other reasons, did methodologically weak research. Such people have found support from methodologists who focus on the limits of evaluation and understate the achievements, both real and potential. From the statement that definitive conclusions are unlikely to result from evaluations, it is an easy leap to decide that the quality of an evaluation does not matter.

There are many programs that are so poorly conceived or implemented that they warrant little or no investment in evaluation. However, at any point in time, there is extant a set of ideas about how to deal with a certain kind of problem, in this case, community crime control. When a program is implemented which provides the opportunity to learn something about the validity of those ideas and how to apply them, a serious, careful research evaluation effort is a very good investment. There is no possibility that even a tiny fraction of the funds spent on poor or ineffective programs will ever be spent on research.

To criticize evaluations that do not meet strict statistical requirements for experimental generalization is to hold up an artificial standard. The goal of evaluation research is to learn. Learning means to reduce uncertainty about the way things are and the way things work. It does not matter how well a research evaluation is carried out; whether the effort be large or modest, the better the methodology, the more uncertainty will be reduced.

The Hartford project was not a perfect evaluation. It was a good one. Most important, the rigorous and comprehensive approach to evaluation that was utilized was essential to the general value that can be derived from the project. It was a serious attempt to learn something important. More such efforts are needed.