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SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT

GEORGE P. TIELSCH, Ph.D.

Chief of Police

MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

Field Test Evaluation

5506

Prepared by

HARLEIGH JOHNSTON

LEAA GRANT NO. 76-NI-09-0001

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Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test

An Evaluation
of
The Santa Monica Police Department, California

by

Harleigh Johnston

October 1978

Prepared under Grant Number 76-NI-09-01
Local Evaluation of the Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test, from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or of the Santa Monica Police Department.

TABLES OF CONTENTS

		Page
I.	BACKGROUND	1.
	Investigations Bureau Prior to MCI	6
	The Routine	10
	Investigator's Training	11
II.	IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM	13
	Training	20
	Instruments of Change	23
III.	THE INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU AFTER MCI	35
	Organization	35
	Case Flow and Decision Points	37
	Management Control and Monitoring	38
IV.	ANALYSIS OF THE SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT'S MCI PROGRAM	40
	Organization	40
	Clearance Rates	42
	Prosecution Filing Rates	44
	Arrest Rates	45
	Costs of Operation	49
	Public Relations	51
	Conviction Rate	53
	Implications of the MCI Program	54
APPENDIX		56

TABLES, DIAGRAMS, AND EXHIBITS

Map of the Region	2
Santa Monica Police Department Bureau Chart	4
Exhibit 1, Descriptive Statistics	5
Diagram 3, Bureau Prior to MCI	7
Diagram 4, Program Model	14
Exhibit 5, MCI Case Flow	25
Diagram 6, Bureau Prior to MCI	27
Diagram 7, MCI Organization Chart	28
Diagram 8, MCI Monitoring System	32
Diagram 9, Post MCI Organization Chart	36
Table 1, Caseload	42
Table 2, Clearance Rates	43
Table 3, Prosecutor Filing Rates	44
Table 4, Ratio of Arrests to Crimes	45
Diagram 10, Graph, All Part I Crimes	46
Diagram 11, Graph, Burglary	47
Diagram 12, Graph, Robbery	48

TABLES, DIAGRAMS, AND EXHIBITS (CONTINUED)

Diagram 13, Bookings for 1976,1977.....50
Citizen Survey.....56
Crime Reports, Old and New.....60
Case Information Form.....62
Case Check List.....64
Optical Scanning Form.....65

I. Background

1. Santa Monica Police Department

The City of Santa Monica is a Southern California beach city of something less than 100,000 people. It is surrounded by the City of Los Angeles and is a residential suburb of the greater Los Angeles area. Santa Monica has light industry and is also the home of the Rand Corporation and Systems Development Corporation, two of the better-known "think-tanks" in the United States.

Santa Monica shares most of the characteristics of other beach cities in Los Angeles County: the population is roughly 90% White with Black and Latin populations of 3% and 7% respectively. During the summer the beaches may attract as many as 200,000 people on a busy day. The transient population is quite young with a high percentage of teenagers. The resident population is approximately 80% renters, and while Santa Monica once has a disproportionately high number of elderly people, their numbers have shrunk over the past decade.

To the north of Santa Monica lies Pacific Palisades, a Los Angeles suburb which is a high income area with predominately single-family dwellings. To the south lies another Los Angeles suburb called Venice. Venice is somewhat unusual in that it has large minority populations for a Los Angeles Beach city. Venice crime rates are high and spill across the border into Santa Monica.

Santa Monica is also the western terminus for the Santa Monica Freeway which allows easy access to other parts of the



Diagram 2

SANTA MONICA and the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area

BASE MAP PREPARED BY
LOS ANGELES REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, 1971

Los Angeles metropolitan area. The proximity to the freeway allows the random "hit" of burglary and robbery to be high.

The Santa Monica Police Department whose descriptive characteristics are shown below has as Chief George P. Tielsch. In 1974 Chief Tielsch came to Santa Monica from Seattle where he was Chief of Police. Chief Tielsch is one of the very few Ph.D.'s among chiefs of police and has applied modern management techniques to a department which had remained innocent to new techniques since the 1940's.

The Santa Monica Police Deparment was organized into four administrative Bureaus: Administrative Services, Operations, Investigations, and Technical Services. The organization is shown below in Diagram 2. The four Bureaus are fairly straightforward in their duties. Administrative Services oversees departmental personnel activities, relations with the other departments in the city government, and the planning and budgeting functions; Operations is the uniformed officer component which comprises the day-to-day operations of the Department in keeping order and apprehending criminals; the Investigations Bureau investigates crimes, gathers information, performs special investigations not necessarily of a criminal nature (licenses, and the like), and works with those juveniles who have run afoul of the law; Technical Services is chiefly concerned with record-keeping, stenographic services, and maintenance of the police station and the fleet of police cars.

Each Bureau has a Captain as its head: Captain is the



POSITIONS - CLASSES

1	POLICE CHIEF	1	JUNIOR CLERK	11	PARKING CHECKERS	1	YOUTH SERVICES COUNSELOR
4	POLICE CAPTAINS	1	SECRETARY TO POLICE CHIEF	4	PARKING STRUCTURE ATNDS.	1	SR. ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER
4	POLICE LIEUTENANTS	1	SECRETARY	9	COMMUNICATION OPERATORS II	5	ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICERS
21	POLICE SERGEANTS	1	PRINCIPAL CLERK	8	JAILERS	26	CROSSING GUARDS (As needed)
99	POLICE OFFICERS	13	STENOGRAPHERS	1	CUSTODIAN I	18	CADETS (Part time)
2	POLICEWOMEN	10	INTERMEDIATE CLERKS	1	STOREKEEPER		
1	SR. I.D. TECHNICIAN	3	TELEPHONE OPERATORS I	1	WAREHOUSE WORKER		
6	I.D. TECHNICIANS	1	PARKING SUPERVISOR	1	SENIOR CLERK		

Diagram 2
Bureaus of the Santa Monica Police Department

highest civil service rank in the Santa Monica Police Department; the Chief of Police serves at the discretion of the City Manager who is in turn responsible to the City Council.

As the description above would indicate, the Santa Monica Police Department falls heir to the problems and crime rates of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area. Exhibit 1 shows selected crime rates over a four year period.

Exhibit 1

Descriptive Statistics
of the
Santa Monica Police Department

	UCR Part 1	Burglary	Robbery
1975	8,344 (100%)	2,092 (25%)	330 (4%)
1976	8,287 (100%)	2,077 (25%)	433 (5%)
1977	8,730 (100%)	2,340 (27%)	445 (5%)

	1975	1976	1977	1978(Estimated)
Population	93,000	93,000	93,000	93,000
Square Miles	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3
Part 1 Officers	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Number Officers	133	134	133	131
Number Civilians	60	73	75	77
Percent Sworn	0.69	0.65	0.64	0.63
Percent Investigators	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.21
Total Budget	4.7 mil	5.0 mil	5.2 mil	5.3 mil
Part 1 Arrest/Offense	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Part 1 Clearance/Officer	8.59	8.88	8.90	9.05
Part 1 Clearance/Arrest	1.36	1.26	1.52	1.40

As shown in Exhibits 1 and 10, Santa Monica has sustained generally rising crime rates with roughly the same number of sworn personnel. In order to augment the sworn force, there has been a policy of replacing sworn officers with civilians where applicable. Thus dispatchers, jailers, and matrons are now civilians. This policy has been in effect since 1974 and has continued to put more officers in the field.

Concurrent with "civilianization" was the growing awareness that other methods would have to be found to either allow police officers to become more efficient or to alter the various operations within the Department in a way that would allow higher productivity. The two most likely candidates for change were Operations and Investigations.

The Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test thus came at a time when systematic changes were considered as necessary (1976). The MCI Field Test allowed a program to be implemented in a systematic fashion, while at the same time providing enough money to make changes which were outside the reach of the Police Department's annual budget.

2. The Investigations Bureau Prior to MCI.

Prior to the MCI program (and after), the Investigations Bureau was one of the four administrative bureaus in the Santa Monica Police Department, the other three being the Administrative Services, Operations, and the Technical Services. The staffing of the Investigations Bureau prior to MCI was comprised of one Captain



Diagram 3

Investigations Bureau Prior to MCI

as Bureau Commander, one Lieutenant as Executive Officer, two Sergeants, and thirty Officers who acted as the Investigators. In the Santa Monica Police Department, there is no special rank or pay differential for Investigators.

The primary function of the Investigations Bureau is the identification and prosecution of the perpetrator(s) for a given crime or set of crimes. Most of the other functions are ancillary to this primary function. Such things as background checks for prospective employees while falling outside the general purview of criminal investigation, do, nonetheless, require investigative skills and therefore fall quite naturally into the general tasks in the Bureau. Arrest warrants for wanted felons also require investigative skills and are thereby included in the general flow of the Bureau. The Investigative Bureau also provides information to patrol regarding wanted suspects, crime trends, and potential areas which might be crime-prone.

As Diagram 3 shows for the Investigations Bureau, it was organized along the lines of being "crime specific", that is, an investigator is assigned to work certain types of crime: burglary, robbery, etc., rather than being a generalist. The assignment is further assigned by geographic area. Hence, each case is assigned by crime and by district to an investigator, the exception being burglary which is assigned on the basis of "odd or even" addresses to prevent workload inbalances.

The work that the investigators do can be considered a "second order" level of operation, the "first order" being normally

the work of the patrolman in the field. The investigator has traditionally been thought of as an elite officer whose expertise is honed by years of experience and by meriting assignment to the Investigations Bureau from Patrol.

While the detective mystique has not disappeared from the role of the investigator, in recent years the role has changed considerably. Probably the basis of the change was rooted in the changing role of the police officer, the requirements for evidence in prosecution, and in the highly mobile nature of today's criminal element which has afforded the investigator less opportunity to know the criminals he investigates.

The reports which the Investigator receives are part of a general legal process in which all cases of a criminal nature acted upon with varying degrees of attention, based on what is known about the crime, its seriousness, and the general policies of the police department, the prosecutor's office, and the courts.

All cases of a non-trivial nature were sent to the Investigations Bureau from Operations by way of Technical Services, if typing was required. In 1975, there were approximately 8,300 UCR Part 1 crimes sent to the Investigations Bureau. In addition to the UCR Part 1 crimes, approximately 3,000 other cases were sent to the Bureau which required some action by an investigator. There were 330 and 2,100 robberies and burglaries respectively.

Prior to MCI the Santa Monica Police Department had a policy of "working" each non-trival case that was forwarded to the Investigations Bureau. "Working" a case meant that even in those

cases where there was no evidence, contact was made with the victim, if for nothing more than for the sake of good public relations.

What occurred was an informal screening system, with each Investigator separating those cases in which a clearance seemed likely from those cases in which a clearance was unlikely. The separation was made on a subjective basis. Likewise, those cases in which there were quick clearances became part of the "caseload" which in some cases reached as many as fifty separate crimes. Although the likelihood for clearance was quite low in those cases which were not solved in the first week, many investigators would not close out unpromising cases, often keeping the cases for several months, and in one case for as long as two years.

3. The Routine.

The work of the Investigator in the Santa Monica Police Department like many other police departments is mostly routine: forms are filled out, legal requirements satisfied, and routine checks for critical information in the crime reports are maintained. As mentioned above, prior to the establishment of the MCI program, virtually every case which came across an investigator's desk had to somehow be "worked"; that is, checked for details with respect to finding or identifying a suspect in the crime. If a suspect had been identified, then evidence had to be culled which would allow the case to be filed with the prosecutor's office.

The routine is broken only when an exceptional case occurs

which demands more than the normal effort put forth for a case. In Santa Monica, a non-routine case would be a murder, a robbery or burglary of large worth, or a crime which might otherwise attract media attention.

The routine and the non-routine cases are differentiated not by the method by which an officer investigates a case, but rather by the amount of time which is devoted to each case, an investigation might take anywhere from a few minutes to two hours. The non-routine case might take forty hours or more.*

4. The Investigator's Training.

One of the more difficult problems encountered in any police department is the question of specialization which takes place in the investigative function. While the same principles of investigation are consistent regardless of the crime, many crimes require special information and techniques. One example is that of forgery and bad checks. Considerable training is required that enables the investigator to become familiar with the techniques used in check-cashing schemes. Other crimes also have their peculiarities and special techniques, and thus, it is beneficial to a department to have investigators skilled at the solution of a given crime.

At the same time there are other pressures within a department which are cause for the generalist officer and invest-

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* Based on selected non-routine cases for 1977.

igator. Among these are the desire to give younger officers a "chance" at many positions within the department other than standard patrol duties. It is also a method of removing the so-called "dead-wood" from positions that become institutionalized by individuals. Officers who change rank or positions also leave vacancies through the normal process of attrition and promotion.

Within the Santa Monica Police Department, those officers who score high on the Sergeant's examination are those who are considered for replacement at the vacant investigator positions. Thus, the selection as an investigator is regarded as something of a reward for a high score on the examination. The selection process presents problems as well as benefits. While a high standard is maintained for investigators, the time that a new investigator might have at his position is limited by the time that it takes for him to succeed to the rank of Sergeant. There was, therefore, a tendency to have a high turn-over rate among the younger officers. This problem will be discussed later in the section on analysis.

The policy in the Santa Monica Investigations Bureau has generally evolved in such a way that the positions of burglary, auto theft, and robbery investigator are generally given to the younger officers who score high on the Sergeant's examination. The positions of homicide/assault, forgery, bad checks, warrants, and juveniles are retained by seasoned investigators who have been at the position normally for several years.

II. Implementing the Program.

1. Chronology of the Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test in Santa Monica.

Late in June 1976, the Santa Monica Police Department received a Request for Proposal (RFP) from the National Institure of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The RFP sought to test the results of several years of research that had been done on the investigative process at various institutions.[1]

Prior to the RFP, the Santa Monica Police Department had been contacted by LEAA consultant Jack Kenney about the possibility of entering into a grant which would seek to streamline the investigative process.

Towards the end of July 1976 the Santa Monica Police Department sent a proposal on the Managing Criminal Investigation Field Test to LEAA for consideration. The proposal was successful and in September 1976, LEAA awarded the Santa Monica Police Department the Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test grant for $135,000 to be funded over an eighteen month period.

During October and November of 1976 a Program Design was formulated. The Program Design was a planning document on what and how changes in the investigative process were to be carried out in the Santa Monica Police Department over the life of the

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[1] Among these were the Rand Corporation, the Stanford Research Institute, and the Police Foundation.

PROGRAM ELEMENTS

OUTCOMES



Diagram 4

SANTA MONICA MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAM MODEL

grant.

The Program Design was prepared for a conference held in Washington, D.C. at the end of November, 1976. The conference was the first meeting of the five grant cities in the Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test. The conference was held under the direction of the University Research Corporation who was given the responsibility for training and methods development for the five grant police departments.

From September 1976 through December 1976, Santa Monica developed the basic components which were to become the foundation for the program. These components were comprised of (1) the case screening system, (2) a shift of personnel, (3) the initiation of a major crimes unit, (4) establishing a new police-prosecutor working relationship, and (5) the beginning of the monitoring system.

The basic components were accompanied by technical innovations which facilitated the operation of the program.

The most far-reaching and difficult of the innovations was the design of a new crime report. The main object of the new crime report was to assemble and organize pertinent information about any given case so that a quick review would predict with a reasonable degree of probability whether or not a case could be "solved". "Solved" in this case means that the perpetrator(s) are able to be identified, and some official action taken. A secondary object was to develop a chain of responsibility which would filter out mistakes made in the reporting procedure. By

requiring supervisors to "sign-off" on the reports, responsibility was placed on the supervisors to see that reports were correctly filled before submission to the Investigation Bureau.

A second innovation was the development of a computerized monitoring system in which optical scanning was used to record the data. Optical scanning is a technique in which typewritten materials are recorded on magnetic tape for use on a computer. The information is then analyzed for management reports and the monitoring of each case.

These two technical innovations, while not objectives in themselves, served to radically alter the development of the Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test. The nature and effects of the innovations will be discussed in Section 7.

During the last three months of 1976, the major intent was to lay a foundation on which the full program would rest. An important managerial impetus during this period was a series of senior staff meetings which lent the authority of the Chief's office to the program. The program was integrated into the department as a whole rather than as an "add on" which would disappear after the termination of the grant.

Chosen as Project Director was Lieutenant Billy T. King who had previously directed a planning and research grant for the Department. He had as his staff a research analyst and a secretary. The Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI) staff was given a separate office and integrated as an addition into the Investigations Bureau. Also serving as a resource to the MCI staff was the

Department's systems analyst who was to do the necessary computer programming.

During the first quarter of 1977, the major parts of the program which were installed were:

- The development of case decision criteria (solvability factors)
- Citizen information bulletins
- Prosecution filing check list
- Meetings with Prosecutor's staff
- Computerized Tracking System (within department)

The program elements listed above were essentially refinements of the original program design.

By the second quarter of 1977, the remainder of the essential elements were in place. These included:

- Computerized Tracking System (prosecution)
- Computerized officer performance reports
- Management Information System (MIS)

These last elements served as part of the monitoring system, but in fact later became much more; they allowed experimentation to test which configurations worked more efficiently in regard to case clearances and costs of operation.

2. Preparation for the MCI Field Test.

As was mentioned in Section 1, the MCI Field Test was regarded not only as a method of improvement, but also as an agent of change - a method of trying new techniques which might otherwise not be tried. The underlying theme behind the grant was that

the Investigations Bureau would require rather profound changes if improvements were to be made.

At the onset of the program, the Chief of Police, George P. Tielsch, made it clear to all those involved in the grant that he expected many changes to be made in the Investigations Bureau in order for improvement to be made. A new Bureau commander was selected, Robert Morgan, to take the place of Clarence Hansen, who was close to retirement. Captain Morgan had been the Investigations Bureau commander four years previous to the grant, and therefore understood the Investigative function of the Department as well as its problems.

The Project Director, Lieutenant Billy T. King, was chosen both for his administrative experience with a grant and his background in research-oriented police work. Lieutenant King was the Project Director for a previous grant which set up a Department Planning and Research unit and which had been quite successful. In this grant Lieutenant King was given a staff of a research analyst and a secretary. The MCI staff was attached to the Investigations Bureau as a new entity and worked directly under the supervision of Captain Morgan.

A trip to Washington, D.C. was sponsored by LEAA at the end of November, 1976. All of the grant city police departments in the national program attended the conference which was intended to set forth the philosophy, goals, and the methods which were to be used in the program. The principal administrative staffs from each grant police agency attended and sought to establish

the "ground rules" for the grant with the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, that part of LEAA which sponsored the national Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test.

The general attitude on the part of the Santa Monica Police Department was one of experimentation with the suggested techniques. While the output of the national program was oriented towards higher arrest rates and more convictions, Santa Monica's emphasis was more oriented towards internal efficiencies and managerial control. Thus, these techniques which were found to work in a relatively short period of time would be kept while the others would be discarded. Although the attitude was very pragmatic, the staff realized that some trends became apparent only after long periods of time. The monitoring system that was devised was to collect and process data that would allow serious, long-term research into the mechanisms and behavior of the police department. Relative to the other components, the monitoring was by far the most sophisticated and research-oriented.

While the major components of the grant were prescribed by LEAA, the implementation was left to the discretion of the Santa Monica Police Department. The method in which the grant was implemented was critical to its success. It was felt at the onset of the program that a harshly imposed system would meet resistance from both the detectives and the supervisors; hence, a methodolgy was initiated which served to educate line personnel in the MCI concept. Feedback was encouraged into how the program was being

accepted, difficulties in implementation, and areas for improvement.

During the first three months of the grant, several meetings per week were held among the staff. Methods of operation, personnel, and technical problems were the topics of discussion. The staff sought concensus views on how the program should be implmented with the understanding that mistakes would be made and that revisions would be necessary as the grant progressed.

Once the bulk of the program was in place, the meetings became less frequent. During the last half-year, staff meetings were only used as a basis for information dissemination more than anything else.

3. Training.

Santa Monica has both an advantage and disadvantage in the size of its investigations bureau. The advantage lay in the relative logistical ease with which new assignments or structural reorganization could take place. The reordering of investigators would not require a great amount of time nor money to effect.

The disadvantage lay in that if mistakes were made, even the movement of a few investigators could have a disastrous result on the performance of the Bureau.

Since changes were to be made, the real question became what sort of changes and how were they to be implemented? As the starting point, the Bureau commander, Captain Robert Morgan organized a task force composed of the Project Manager, Lieutenant

Billy King, the Bureau Lieutenant, Michael McClary and others in supervisiorial or technical positions.

The task force felt that as a starting point the recommendations of the "Rand Report" should be tried first to see if they worked.[1] Among the recommendations from the Rand Report were:

- Incorporating prosecutorial standards for evidence in the investigation cases
- Separating the "promising" cases from unpromising cases for investigation
- Incorporating a "strike force" for non-routine investigations
- Reallocation of investigative resources

The methods by which these recommendations were implemented was to restructure the whole of the Investigations Bureau. A "Case Screening" Officer (CSO) was established whose job it was to separate the promising cases from the unpromising cases. The separation of the cases was enhanced considerably by a revision in the standard Department Crime report form. The revision of this form will be discussed later. The CSO also made the tentative assignment of cases to individual investigators.

The second revision was in the area of the investigative process itself. The Rand Report made a strong case for submitting only those crimes to the prosecutor where there was "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". In terms of the investigative process, a check-list was devised which corresponded to the needs of the

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[1] See Greenwood, Chaiken, and Petersilia, The Criminal Investigation Process, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1977, pp. 237 ff.

prosecutor. Before a felony case was "filed" with the prosecutor, the check-list had to be submitted to a reviewing supervisor.

In addition, a single officer became responsible for virtually all the cases submitted to the prosecutor's office. The exceptions were those cases in which specialized knowledge was required. It was felt that using a single officer had the advantage of not tying up several investigators at the same time. In addition, once the standards of the prosecutor's office were known, a single officer would be more likely to develop a "feel" for what would be rejected and what would not.

The formation of a "strikeforce" and the reallocation of investigative resources were related. The staff knew that fewer cases would be reaching the individual investigators because of case screening. It was not known, however, how many fewer cases and what types of crimes (robbery, burglary, etc.) would be filtered out in the case screening process. An arbitrary decision was made to reduce the burglary investigators by 2, the juvenile investigators by 1, the robbery investigators by 1, and the general investigators by 2. These investigators were then incorporated into the strike force which was to be used for "proactive" or non-routine cases. Examples of this usage might be a rash of burglaries whose modus operandi (MO) was similar but on whom there was no clear identification, or a notorious crime.

The change in organizational structure is shown in Exhibits 1 and 2. The total complement of investigative officers and support

in staff showed virtually no change before and during the MCI grant. The reduction in investigative positions was taken up by the addition of the MCI staff for the duration of the grant. After the grant was finished, however, there was a reduction of four people in overall staffing: from 40 to 36. The point will be viewed more thoroughly under the section on costs.

4. The Instruments of Change.

4.1 New Report Form

One of the major changes that was made by the Santa Monica Police Department was in its Crime Report form. The form that was used before the MCI grant was a standard form which was a facsimile of a State (California) form recommended for municipal police departments by the Attorney General's Office.

Although the information contained in the State form was both pertinent and comprehensive, it was organized in a fashion which took a great deal of time to extract the important data. LEAA recommended several other formats, among them the one used by the Rochester, New York, Police Department. This was the one adopted by the Santa Monica MCI staff; it was chosen because of its simplicity and its ability to quickly organize pertinent information.

The purpose of the form change was to tell quickly if a case had a high probability for a successful investigation or not. The two forms, old and new, are both shown in the Appendix.

The second instrument of change was case screening. As was mentioned previously, prior to the MCI program each new case

was automatically directed to an investigator regardless of the merits of the case. Each morning the individual investigator would leaf through the new arrivals directed to him and screen those cases himself on the basis of available clues, evidence, and witness. Those cases which had a high probability for success (based on each investigator's subjective determination) were investigated first, while the others were relegated to lesser priorities.

Each case, however, required some "follow up" action, that is, some form of mandatory investigation, regardless of how minimal it was. The net result was a system whereby the investigator made a thorough investigation on some, and little or no investigation on others, while having responsibility for all. It was, in short, a system which "robbed Peter to pay Paul". The time spent in selecting the cases and then in writing "follow ups" on the worthless cases was time that was unavailable for the cases which had a high probability for a successful solution. "Case screening" sought to eliminate those cases from the investigator's workload which had little or no probability for success. By eliminating the cases before the investigator ever saw them would give the investigator that time which was previously spent in screening cases himself and in doing the follow ups for the worthless cases.

A system was implemented (Exhibit 5) in which an experienced officer would make a determination of whether each case should be investigated or not. The case selection system was based on previous research in successful outcomes dependent on the crime report data. The system functioned on the basis of the new crime report

Diagram 5

MCI CASE FLOW



(Form 3.1.1 NEW, see Appendix) which specified the pertinent data required for a succsssful solution to a crime. A successful solution was defined as the identification of the perpetrator(s) of a specific crime.

The new crime report and the case screening system represented a decision process which formalized a previously informal system. In the crime report the critical data were required of the reporting officer if they existed. Furthermore, the data were organized in a way that made an evaluation of the case's merits quite simple. In addition, everything that was to appear in the narrative was summarized on the face sheet.

The case screening officer became the second point in the decision making process in that he separated on the basis of previously defined criteria the "workable" cases from the "non-workable". As will be shown later in the evaluation, the process allowed more than half of the cases received by the Investigations Bureau to be suspended - i.e. not investigated unless further pertinent information was received about the case.

5. Organizational Restructuring.

The organizational restructuring that took place was based on anticipated changes rather than any analysis that had been done in the Bureau. The anticipated changes were:

- Case screening would reduce the caseload thereby requiring fewer officers, particularly in burglary.
- Those officers who were displaced by the case-screenign



Diagram 6
Investigations Bureau Prior to MCI

POLICE - INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU



Diagram 7
Investigations Bureau During MCI

system would be more useful in a new Major Crimes Unit. The new unit would concentrate its efforts on the solution of crimes designated by the Bureau commander (these might include a series of crimes with similar characteristics or on a particular problem).

- To retain more control over the investigators and their work, the supervisors (Sergeant and Lieutenants) would review cases before the cases are given to the investigator and after the investigation has been completed.

Eventually, two divisions were set up where previously one had existed. The two divisions were "Crimes Against Persons" and "Crimes Against Property". The changes are reflected in the organization charts before, during, and after the MCI program had been implemented. The staff also felt that the organizational structure was the one instrument in which trial and error could be used the most often, with fewer effects on the overall productivity in the Bureau.

6. Case Preparation.

Although it has been suggested that much of what the investigator does is routine and administrative, there exists great differences in the strategies of investigation. The strategy is contingent on the relationship that exists between the police agency and the prosecutor's office. One strategy is to gather a great number of facts about a case and then to "dump" the case on the prosecutor, requiring his office to sort and sift the evidence to determine if a good case exists. This strategy is employed (often at the request of the prosecutor!) when the investigative resources of the police agency are meager or unskilled. It is employed by the police agency when the agency does not want the

responsibility for not taking a case to court. The implication in this strategy is that police agency did all they could but that it was the fault of the prosecutor if the perpertrator(s) of a crime were not brought to justice. In short, it is a strategy of passing-the-buck.

A second strategy is to take only those cases to the prosecutor which the agency feels has a reasonable chance for successful prosecution. In this strategy the police agency performs the investigation to the best of its abilit and then selects the cases which look promising to take to the prosecutor. This strategy is the normal and most often used one in the United States and reflects a competence on both sides.

A newer strategy which has gained strength in increasing numbers of agencies is an outgrowth of the second strategy. This strategy is to assume that the police and prosecutor should act in concert since they are essentially parts of the same process. In this mode , the police determine what standards will and will not be accepted by the prosecutor. These standards are made explicit between the police and the prosecutor's office, rather than having them be assumed as in the second strategy.

The Santa Monica Police Department sought to establish the third strategy through a series of conferences with the prosecutor's office. The prerequisites for "filing" a case (that is, accepting a case for prosecution) were worked out with the understanding that cases would not be submitted to the prosecutor's office unless the standards were met. Obviously, honest differences existed in

interpreting the standards. In these instances, conferences were held to settle the matter. While the rhetoric of the grant termed this phase "police-prosecutor relations", the concrete result was to enhance the quality of the cases sent to the prosecutor.

The enhancement was made by creating a checklist which had to be filled out before a case was submitted to the prosecutor (Appendix 3). The checklist corresponded closely to a list created by the Rand Corporation. The list consisted of thirty-nine of the most frequently asked questions of various phases of the investigative process. With the checklist, each felony case presented for prosecution made the prosecutor's assessment both easier and more predictive of the eventual outcome.

7. The Monitoring System.

Both the most difficult and the most sophisticated part of the MCI program was the monitoring system. As envisioned by the Santa Monica Police Department, the monitoring system would be much more than a method of following cases; it would be used as a management information system (MIS) for the Investigations Bureau and would measure productivity as well as counting cases.

The purpose of the monitoring system was to follow the progress of each case through the Investigations Bureau to its final disposition in the court. Virtually every action taken on each case was recorded. Included were the results of case screening, action taken on the case by the investigator, how long



Diagram 8

MCI Monitoring System

it took to move through the Bureau, what actions were taken by the prosecutor and by the courts.

In addition to being a case tracking system, the monitoring system also showed what the output of each investigator was, what work inbalances existed, what the clearance rates were, what the prosecution rates were, and gave a ten-day inventory of active cases. The system allowed for continual updating so that every ten days, a new series of inventory reports were generated.

The monitoring system had two separate components which were complementary to each other: The Case Management and Prosecution Management Systems. Case Management followed the course of the case from its entry into the Investigations Bureau until its exit to the Prosecutor. All those cases which did not merit advancement to the Prosecutor were included in the system as well. The Prosecution Management System took all those cases which were forwarded to the Prosecutor and traced each case through the Prosecutor's office and the Courts.

The data was recovered for the monitoring system by using Case Management and Prosecution Management forms (See Appendix) which were filled in by the investigators and checked by the supervisors. The information from these forms was transferred to special Optical Character forms (See Appendix) by the MCI secretary. The MCI secretary utilized an OCR (Optical Character Readable) "element" in her typewriter to fill in these forms. They were then sent to a private company which "read" the forms and the information was transferred to magnetic computer tape. The outside

company also produced the Case Management part of the reports. The tapes were used for producing the Prosecution Management reports and for further research into the mechanisms of the investigative process.

III. The Bureau After MCI

The MCI grant funding ended in June 1978, and in its wake, there were several changes made in the Investigations Bureau. This section deals with what was left after the grant had ended, why the changes were made, and what the general results have been in the post-grant period.

1. Organization

The Investigations Bureau was divided into two divisions (see Diagram 9), one for crimes against persons, the other for crimes against property. The divisions were each headed by a Lieutenant, with the Lieutenant who heads the Crimes Against Property division assuming the responsibilities of the MCI functions.

These changes were made for several reasons. The Lieutenant who headed the MCI Project from its inception, Billy T. King, was moved back to Operations for career advancement reasons. Captain Robert Morgan who headed the Bureau retired from the Department and took a position with a private security firm. In addition, the secretary for the Project from its inception also quit. In short, virtually each member of the original Project staff had either been transferred to another part of the Department or had left the Department completely. The only member of the original grant staff was the Research Analyst; the Case Screening Officer was also retained, and although he was not part of the

POLICE - INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU



Diagram 9
Post-MCI Organization Chart

original grant staff, he was well-seasoned in the MCI program.

The loss of many of the key members of the MCI and Bureau meant that something of a "re-building" program would be necessary. The new Bureau head, Captain Eugene McCarthy opted for a system in which the two Lieutenants in the Bureau would each learn the MCI system, trading positions after a six-month period. A new secretary for the MCI staff was hired, and the program generally operated in the same fashion as it did during the grant period.

The total number of people in the Bureau was 36, 4 less than the Bureau had prior to the MCI grant. The Major Crimes Section was retained, although its function has been altered; Major Crimes is now used for robbery suppression and as auxilliary help for specific crimes designated by the Captain.

2. Case Flow and Decision Points.

The case flow and decision points remained essentially the same in the post MCI grant period (see Exhibit 5). The CSO continued to separate the cases into the workable and non-workable cases. Thus, the case load reflected no changes save those which were caused by the general crime trends in the City of Santa Monica.

The Lieutenants maintain operational control over each case flowing into and out of the two pools of investigators. The system still acts as a case quality control process which allows only the high-probability-for-conviction cases to be filed with the prosecutor.

The police-prosecutor relationship has been maintained

through the prosection liason officer, and no changes have occurred in this area. The same standards are required for filing a case with the prosecutor in the post grant period as during the grant period, and the prosecution check sheet has been retained.

3. Managerial Control and Monitoring.

The area which experienced the most change in the post-grant period was that of monitoring. The MCI grant provided funds for processing the OCR Case Management and Prosecution Management sheets. In this system each case which entered the Bureau was tracked until its ultimate disposition with the courts. The cost of processing was such that only those cases which were sent to an investigator were tracked; the cases which were not assigned were never recorded.

In Addition, the ten-day case review was allowed to lapse. Now the review occurs only once a month. It was felt that the Lieutenants could exercise sufficient control over their divisions to make periodic checks for late or forgotten cases. To date, there has been little slippage in this area. A cadet is used to determine the productivity measures on a monthly basis. The productivity measures include:

- Cases (as a percentage) cleared per month
- Cases filed per month
- Caseload (total cases assigned)
- Average time spent per case

While the loss of the information has not improved the

research capabilities of the Department, there seems to have been no noticeable change in overall Bureau perfomance. The greatest difficulty encountered during the post-grant period was that of teaching those new to the MCI concept how the system worked and what their tasks were in the system. After three months in the post-grant period, a smooth transition seemed to have been effected.

IV. Analysis of the Santa Monica MCI Program.

Several areas were analyzed in order to: (1) determine if the MCI program achieved its stated objectives; (2) determine what second-order effects the program had on the Investigations Bureau and on the Department as a whole; (3) determine what future impact the program might have on the Investigations Bureau and the Department as a whole.

The areas analyzed were:

- Investigations Bureau Organization
- Caseload and Assignment
- Crimes, Clearances, and Arrests
- Prosecutor Filing Rates
- Conviction Rates
- Costs of Operation
- Effect on Public Relations

1. Organization of the Investigations Bureau.

Since one of the components of the MCI Program was to reassign the investigators to non-traditional tasks, the implication was that the original complement of investigators could be reduced. How and in what way the restructuring would take place was left up to the individual departments participating in the MCI Field Test. Based on the Rand Report and the success of the Long Beach (California) Police Departmen's SOB unit, the Santa Monica Police Department decided to restructure in two ways:

- form a major crimes unit
- experiment with a reduction in the number of Investigators working at traditional tasks

Diagrams 7 and 9 show a "before and after" look at the reorganization that took place in the Bureau with the advent of MIC. The organizational changes presumed changes in the caseload as a result of case screening. Although it was not known before the changes were made what reduction in caseload would occur, the assumption was that at least half of the burglary cases would be screened out. Thus, the changes in staffing took place on the basis of anticipated caseload reduction. Other staffing changes were made on the basis of policy decisions about the relative effectiveness of the units.

The case in point is that of the Narcotics section of the Investigations Bureau. Narcotics investigation had ceased in being as important as it had been in previous years because of more lenient laws passed in regard to sentencing. This was no doubt the result of the relatively widespread use of marijuana among the young. In addition, there had been an increased reliance by local agencies on Federal and State agencies for the more serious narcotics trafficking.

While the decision to form a Major Crimes Unit and reduce the number of officers working on the traditional tasks of the Investigator was arbitrary, it proved to be fairly conservative guess in regards to the amount of case screening that would take place as we shall see in the next section.

2. Caseload and Assignment

Although the staffing changes were based on anticipated caseload reduction, the 50% reduction appeared to be a conservative estimate once case screening had been initiated. During 1977, the first full year of MCI, 72% of the UCR Part 1 crimes had been screened out, that is, unlikely to produce a clearance. Of this, 67% of the burglaries were screened out and 63% of the robberies were screened out.

While the case screening concept was the basis for a reduction in personnel at some of the positions in the Bureau, it did not necessarily allow more time in the investigation of the individual cases, on the average. In the instance of burglaries, no anticipated reduction in caseload occurred.

Table 1

Caseload Before and After Case Screening

		1975	1976	1977 (MCI)
(Average cases per week per Investigator)	Robbery	1.27	1.67	1.35
	Burglary	10.06	10.00	10.05

3. Comparative Clearance Rates and Counts.

One of the most commonly used measures of police productivity is the clearance rate. Although the Rand Report found clearance rates suspect as a performance measure, its widespread usage offers a comparative if inaccurate yardstick. During the year of

1977, the Investigations Bureau posted a marginal increase in the UCR Part 1 crimes that were cleared.

A rather paradoxical situation occurred in the case of the burglary clearance rates. One of the hypotheses of the MCI Program was that the increased time to devote to cases because of the reduced workload would result in higher clearance rates. Yet in the case of Burglary for 1977, the same workload led to a higher clearance rate. One possible explanation for this may lay in that the quality of the cases were such that an increase in clearances rate was likely. In any case, during the MCI program, the clearance rates robbery and burglary were the highest ever achieved by the Santa Monica Police Department since 1953.

Table 2

Clearance Rates and Counts (1975, 1976, 1977)

	1975	1976	1977 (MCI)
Robbery	.20 (65)	.23 (99)	.27 (118)
Burglary	.15 (316)	.12 (254)	.21 (488)
UCR Part 1	.19 (1553)	.18 (1501)	.20 (1770)

4. The Effect of MCI on Prosection Filing Rates.

The second goal of the MCI Program was to increase the number of UCR Part 1 cases accepted for prosecution. The following table shows the acceptance rates for all felonies and misdemeanors

by the prosecutor's office for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977 (MCI).

Table 3

Prosecutor Filing Rates

	1975	1976	1977 (MCI)
All Arrest Dispositions	.91 (778)	.91 (654)	.98 (590)
Felonies	.31	.34	.28
Misdemeanors	.60	.57	.70

The effects of MCI on the filing rates were clearly improved over the previous two years. Although the rates improved, the number of cases for which complaints were requested diminished over the three year period. There are two explanations for the decreased number of cases over the three year period. First, the Los Angeles County Prosecutor's Office had increasingly stringent policies regarding the cases which it would accept for prosecution. This was caused in part by new (then) determinate sentencing laws which tightened the requirements for evidence. Second, after the inception of the MCI program in the Santa Monica Police Department, the Investigations Bureau no longer sent those cases to the prosecutor which had a high probability for denial.

In effect, the Investigations Bureau was screening its own cases a second time. In this screening process, the cases which lacked evidentiary merit were never sent to the prosecutor's office for consideration. The overall effect was to increase the

quality of the cases sent to the prosecutor's office with a resultant higher filing rate.

5. The Effect of MCI on Arrest Rates.

One of the specific goals of the MCI Program was to increase clearances by arrest or more simply put, to increase arrest rates. The hypothesis was that the higher the quality the investigation, the more likely there would be an arrest. In the case of the Santa Monica Police Department, less than 5% of the arrests for UCR Part 1 crimes are made by the Investigations Bureau. Since the predominant number of arrests made by the Department are on-scene arrests, even a large improvement in the number of arrests by the Investigations Bureau would not significantly affect the arrest to offense ratios.

Table 4

Ratio of Arrests to Reported Crimes

	1975	1976	1977 (MCI)
UCR Part 1	.14	.14	.14
Robbery	.23	.32	.25
Burglary	.16	.16	.14

Except for the ratios in robbery, the changes have been marginal. It is important to note that in each of the years there has been a successively greater number of crimes committed (Part 1)

ALL PART I CRIMES

Diagram 10







B U R G L A R Y

Diagram 11







ROBBERY

Diagram 12







so that the relatively static ratios reflect a larger real number of arrests.

6. The Effects of MCI on the Costs of Operation.

One of the more serious questions in the study was how much the MCI Program would cost after the termination of the grant. While the performance measures were all positive, a pressing question was whether the improved performance was worth the increased costs. Shown below are the increased costs to the Santa Monica Police Department for the continuation of the MCI program.

1 Analyst	$1200/month
1 Stenographer	350/month
Computer Cost	148/month
Outside Services	125/month
	$1823/month increase

Balanced against these increased costs were the reduction in sworn officers in the Bureau:

4 times Officers = 4 times $1600/month (minimum)
= $6400/month (minimum)

The increased costs are more than justified by the continuation of the MCI program when looked at from a cost-effectiveness stand-

SANTA MONICA BOOKINGS 1976-1977

Distribution of people with and without previous records and, for those with records, description of type of crime for which they were last booked.

Diagram 13



OPEN COLUMN = W/Prev. Record

SHADED COLUMN = Without Prev. Record

point. The ratio of Cost to Benefit in this case is approximately 2.5. Everything else being equal, the Investigations Bureau achieved a marked increase in efficiency by adhering to the MCI program.

7. The Effect of MCI on Public Relations.

One of the overriding concerns of the Santa Monica Police Department was what the effect would be of MCI on public relations. Rather than following the policy of telephoning each victim of a Part 1 crime as had been the practice prior to the MCI program, a brochure was sent to them which gave them their case number and told them what was being done on the case, i.e., whether or not it would be given a follow-up investigation or not.

After one full year of operation, no complaints had been received by the Department. Rather than leave the issue alone with the assumption that "no news was good news" in the case of receiving no complaints, a random sample of one hundred victims of crime were called by telephone and asked a series of questions regarding their service by the Santa Monica Police Department (see Appendix 1).

The results were quite positive. Fully 87% of the victims were either "Satisfied" or "Extremely Satisfied" by the services rendered them. When questioned further, 71% said that they preferred to be contacted by mail because they than had some record of the services rendered. In addition, they had a source of information for their insurance company, should one be required.

Since most of the victims were burglarized, their most

immediate concern was getting their property back, although only 12% expected to get anything back.

Contrary to the fears of the Administration, the system of sending brochures to the victims appears to have been a public relations improvement rather than causing harm.

While there were no specific complaints that would cause any changes in the present system of sending brochures to the victims of crimes, there was a general concern that the victim of a crime is generally the forgotten element in the legal process. Several Victims mentioned that they had heard about a program that the Santa Monica Police Department in which police officers went from door to door in a neighborhood, showing the residents how to prevent easy entry into a house or apartment. This program was done as a research project by two Santa Monica Police Officers and has not been instituted as a regular program. The community relations division of the Santa Monica Police Department does much the same thing, but does not go door to door. The information bulletin tells the victim whom to contact in the Department for burglary prevention checks and other crime prevention measures. In addition, a new crime prevention specialist has been added to the Community Relations staff to meet the increased demands for information by the community-at-large.

8. MCI and the Conviction Rate.

Another primary goal of the MCI Program was to imporove the conviction rate for those cases submitted to the prosecutor. This one goal was an area in which the Investigator had the least control over the final product. The logic of the goal was that the improved method of collecting evidence and the rigorous screening that preceeded the submission of a case to the prosecutor's office would tend to lead to more convictions.

On the other hand, the Investigator had no control over the skills of the prosecutor; while the Investigator could offer some assistance to the prosecutor, in the end, the conviction was in the prosecutor's hands and not the investigator's. The table below shows the results of the conviction rates for the two years preceeding the MCI Program.

Three Year Conviction Rates
(All Felonies and Misdemeanors)

	1975	1976	1977	Average	Standard Dev.
Percent	66%	71%	75%	71%	5%

It is not possible to tell from the above information what the contribution of the MCI Program was to the conviction rate; at the very least it did not hinder the conviction rate.

When the prosecutors were asked if they felt that the quality of the cases had improved due in part to the MCI program, the majority of them felt that the structure of the evidence had greatly improved, which in turn improved the quality of the officers' testimony as well.

9. Implications of the MCI Program for the Santa Monica Police Department.

In the preceeding pages of the analysis, we have seen that the MCI program has equalled or bettered the performance of the Investigations Bureau for the years immediately preceeding the grant. While the Santa Monica Police Department looked at the MCI Program largely as an experiment, the program was strong enough to continue all of the component parts after the grant had ended.

In terms of the program content, the work that was carried on in the Santa Monica Police Department must rate as an unqualified success. In addition, the Department now feels that it has gained enough information through the data collection system that more experimentation can be done in the Bureau.

The Santa Monica Police Department did not look at the MCI Program as a series of techniques to be added piecemeal to their Investigations Bureau, but rather as a management control system in which changes could be made at a later date should conditions warrant them. In this sense, the MCI Program was used as a vehicle for structural change within the department which would not have been possible without the grant from LEAA.

The success of the Program at the Santa Monica Police Department has not gone unnoticed in other police departments in the State of California. To date, some 148 other departments have asked for information and many have come for on-site visits to see the system in operation.

In short, the MCI Program exceeded the expectations that the department had for it in that many of the performance characteristics were affected by variables outside the control of the department. Since the program worked well and relatively quickly, it is felt that this system has merit for the vast majority of police departments throughout the United States. While more work needs to be done to refine the research in the area of Investigative resources, it appears that this program will be one of the more influential changes in current law enforcement technique.

Appendix 1

Santa Monica Citizen Survey

1. When you realized a crime had been committed in your _____, who did you first call?

   1. police
   5. other (specify)_____
   8. DK
   9. NA

2. After the police were called was the second contact you had with them a patrol officer or detective (uniformed or plainclothes)?

   1. patrol or uniform officer came to scene
   2. detective or plainclothes investigator
   5. other_____
   8. DK
   9. NA

3. What information did the police give you at that time?

   _____

   _____

4. Have you heard from the police since then?

   1. yes
   2. no.....skip to #11
   8. DK.....skip to #11
   9. NA.....skip to #11

5. (If yes) How many contacts (mail, phone, personal) were there? _____

6. How did they contact you?

   1. phone.....go to 7
   2. mail.....go to 7
   3. personal; visit
   8. DK.....go to 7
   9. NA
   0. Inappropriate

6a. (if In-person) Could the information been effectively taken over the phone?

1. yes
2. no (probe: Why?_____)
8. DK
9. NA
0. Inappropriate

7. Who initiated the contact?

1. respondent
2. police
8. DK
9. NA
0. Inappropriate

8. Did a uniformed officer or a detective contact you?

1. Uniformed officer
2. Detective
3. Other
8. DK
9. NA
0. Inappropriate

9. Had that same person contacted you before?

1. yes
2. no
8. DK
9. NA
0. Inappropriate

10. What additional information did the police give you?

_____

_____

11. After the police first contacted you, were you asked to answer mostly the same questions when you heard from them again, or were these questions mostly different?

1. Mostly the same
3. Some the same, some different
4. Mostly different
8. DK
9. NA

12. Was the property stolen from you covered by insurance?

1. yes
2. no.....skip to #15
8. DK.....skip to #15
9. NA.....skip to #15

13. (If yes) Would you have called the police if this property had not been covered by insurance?

1. yes
5. no
8. DK
9. NA
0. Inappropriate

14. When you called the police about the recent burglary in your home, what results did you expect?

_____

_____

_____

15. How do you feel about the service you have received from the police? Would you say you are satisfied or dissatisfied?

If satisfied: Would you say you are extremely satisfied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied?

If dissatisfied: Would you say you are extremely dissatisfied, dissatisfied, or somewhat dissatisfied?

1. Extremely satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Somewhat satisfied
4. Unsure; don't know
5. Somewhat dissatisfied
6. Dissatisfied
7. Extremely dissatisfied
9. NA

16. Would you be willing to assist the police in investigating your case if needed by

    a. going to a police lineup? 1. yes 2. no
    (If no, why not?)

    b. answering questions from the prosecutor out of court? 1. yes 2. no
    (If no, why not?)

    c. appearing in court? 1. yes 2. no
    (If no, why not?)

17. Do you know the final status of your case?

18. Do you want to know about the final action of your case?

19. How long have you lived at this address?

    1. less than 1 year
    2. 1-2 years
    3. 3-5 years
    4. more than 3 years
    8. DK
    9. NA

20. As of your last birthday, how old are you?

    _____(code exact number of years)

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION!!!!!!!!!!

SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Check (√) if Priority	CRIME REPORT	Steno. Initials	Dr. No.

1. Date & Time Rptd. to P.D.	2. Classification	3. Rpt. Dist. Crime Occrd.	4. Day of Wk. Crime Occrd.
5. Date & Time Crime Occurred	6. Location of Occurrence	7. No. of Recorder	8. EAP
9. Victim's Name (Firm name if business) 1.	10. Residence Address (Firm address if Business) Zip		Res. Phone
	Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700
11. Victim's Name (Firm Name if Business) 2.	12. Residence Address (Firm Address if Business) Zip		Res. Phone
	Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700
13. Person Reporting Crime to Police Dept.	14. Complete Residence Address Zip		Res. Phone
	Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700
15. Person Who Secured Premises or Vehicle	16. Complete Residence Address Zip		Res. Phone
	Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700
17. Witness(es): Name 1.	18. Complete Residence Address Zip		Res. Phone
	Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700
19. 2.	20. Complete Residence Address Zip		Res. Phone
	Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700
21. Victim's Occupation Sex Race Age 1.	22. Investigative Bureau or Units Notified (Bureau of Unit and Person Contacted)		23. Street Lights Yes ☐ No ☐
24. 2.	25. Evidence Tagged? (Yes or No) — if yes, Locker number or Person Released To		
26. Type of Premises	27. Instrument, Weapon, Force or Means Used	28. Point Where Entrance Made	
29. Method Used to Gain Entrance	30. Were Occupants Present or Absent?	31. Vehicle Locked Yes ☐ No ☐	32. TT YES NO Form #26 made ☐☐ Form #38 made ☐☐
33. Type of Property Taken	34. Exact Location of Property on Premises		
35. Victim's Vehicle — Year, make, type, color, license number			36. Amount of Loss

37. Suspect's vehicle — Year, make, type, color, license number and any other identifying features

38. Trademarks of Suspect(s) (Unusual Feature of Crime That is most Apt to recur from Crime to Crime)

Dr. No.

39. Susp. No. 1	Sex	Race	Age	Height	Weight	Hair	Eyes	Compl.	Clothing

Name and Address. Identifying marks and characteristics. (If arrested, suspect's full name, booking number and age only.)

40. Susp. No. 2	Sex	Race	Age	Height	Weight	Hair	Eyes	Compl.	Clothing

Name and Address. Identifying marks and characteristics. (If arrested, suspect's full name, booking number and age only.)

Supervisor Approving	Serial No.	Officer(s) Reporting	Serial No.	On Tape
				☐ ☐

SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT
CRIME REPORT

1. Check (✓) if Priority	2. Steno Initials	3. DR. NO.

4. Classification | 5. Location of Occurence

6. Time of Occurence	M	D	Y	Time	7. When Reported	M	D	Y	Time	8. Day of Wk. Occrd.	9. Rpt. Dist. Crime Occrd.

10. Victims Name (Last, First) or Firm Name) | 11. Victims Address (House number, Street Name) | 12. Residence Phone Day Night

13. Victims Sex	14. Race	15. Age	16. Victims Occupation	17. Victims place of employ or School Name	18. Business Phone Day Night

Indicate with proper code in boxes provided persons relationship to investiaation: W-1 witness W-2 witness, R/P reporting party, etc.

19. WAS THERE A WITNESS TO THE CRIME? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "A"** ☐

20. Name	21. Res. Address	22. Information Provided

23.	24. Res. Phone	25. Bus. Phone	26. Bus. Address

27. Name	28. Res. Address	29. Information Provided

30.	31. Res. Phone	32. Bus. Phone	33. Bus. Address

34. IF ARREST IS MADE: NAME ARRESTEE(S) IN NARRATIVE — **IF NONE PLACE AN X IN BOX "B"** ☐

35. CAN A SUSPECT BE NAMED? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "C"** ☐

36. Suspect #1	37. Suspect #2	38. Suspect #3

39. CAN A SUSPECT BE LOCATED? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "D"** ☐

40. Suspect #1 may be located at	41. Suspect #2 may be located at	42. Suspect #3 may be located at

43. CAN A SUSPECT BE DESCRIBED? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "E"** ☐

44. Suspect #1 Description	45. Suspect #2 Description	46. Suspect #3 Description

47. CAN A SUSPECT BE IDENTIFIED? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "F"** ☐

48. CAN THE SUSPECT VEHICLE BE IDENTIFIED? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "G"** ☐

49. License Number	State	50. Model/Make	51. Year	52. Type	53. Color Top/Bottom	54. Identifying Characteristics

55. WAS THERE A MAJOR INJURY OR RAPE VICTIM INVOLVED? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "H"** ☐

56. Where Hospitalized	57. Attending Physician	58. Date/Time	59. EAP #	60. Nature of Injury

61. IF THE STOLEN PROPERTY IS TRACEABLE INDICATE IN THE NARRATIVE — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "I"** ☐

62. Type of Property Taken

63. Exact Location of Property on Premises | 64. Property Report Yes ☐ No ☐ | 65. Amount of Loss

66. IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT M.O. PRESENT? IF YES DESCRIBE IN NARRATIVE — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "J"** ☐

67. Trademarks of Suspect(s) (Unusual Feature of Crime that is most apt to recur from crime to crime)

68. Type of Premises	69. Method to Gain Entry	70. Point of Entry	71. Type of Weapon, Instrument or force

72. Were Occupants Present or Absent? Yes ☐ No ☐	73. Premises Locked Yes ☐ No ☐	74. TT Yes No	75. TT Yes No
76. Inv. Bur. or Units Notified & Persons Contacted		Form #26 made ☐ ☐ Form #38 made ☐ ☐	Serial # Items ☐ ☐ Inscribed Items ☐ ☐

77. IS THERE SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE PRESENT? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "K"** ☐

78. Evidence Tagged? (Yes or No) If yes, Locker # or Person Released To

79. I.D. Tech Involved Yes ☐ No ☐

80. HAS AN EVIDENCE TECHNICIAN BEEN CALLED? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "L"** ☐

81. IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT REASON TO BELIEVE THAT CRIME MAY BE SOLVED WITH A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF INVESTIGATIVE EFFORT? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "M"** ☐

82. WAS THERE A DEFINITE LIMITED OPPORTUNITY FOR ANYONE EXCEPT THE SUSPECT TO COMMIT THE CRIME? — **IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "N"** ☐

83. Is one or more of the Solvability Factors Present in this Report?
☐ Yes (Follow Up)
☐ No (Office Review)
☐ Yes (Office Review)

84. Inv. Bureau Screening
☐ Concur Recommend _____
Reviewer _____

85. Supervisor Review
☐ Concur ☐ Close ☐ O/R ☐ Follow Up

Date & Time Signed

86. Supervisor Approving | Serial No.

87. Officer(s) Reporting | Serial No.

88. On Tape Yes ☐ No ☐

DR. NO.

3.1.1 Rev. 1-77

INTERVIEWS

	YES	NO	DNA	COMMENTS
1. Victim, initial report				
2. Victim, follow up report				
3. Witness, initial report				
4. Witness, follow up report				
5. Suspect, initial report				
6. Suspect, follow up report				

OFFENSE

7. Is there a verbatim report of the offense?				
8. Is there a verbatim report of the force used?				
9. What was the physical harm to the victim?				
10. Is there a detailed description of the property taken?				
11. What was the method of suspects escape?				
12. What type of vehicle was used by suspect?				
13. What type of weapon was used by suspect?				
14. If gun was used, was it loaded?				
15. If gun was used, when was it acquired?				
16. Where is the location of the weapon now?				

SUSPECT

17. Was S under the influence of alcohol or drugs?				
18. What are the details of S's defense?				
19. What is S's economic status?				
20. Was S advised of constitutional rights?				
21. If multiple suspects, what is their relationship?				
22. Is there evidence of prior offenses by Susp.?				
23. Is there evidence of Susp. motives?				
24. Is there evidence of past psychiatric treatment of Susp.?				
25. What is susp. parole or probation status?				
26. Does Susp. have an alcohol of drug abuse history?				
27. Where is Susp. employed?				
28. Does susp. have a history of violence?				

VICTIM/WITNESSES

29. What is the relationship between S and V ?				
30. What is the credibility of the Woman				
31. Can the Wit. make a contribution to the case prosecution?				
32. Were mug shots shown to Vic. or Wit.?				
33. If shown, are the procedures and results adequately described?				
34. Was a line-up conducted?				

	YES	NO	DNA	COMMENTS
35. If conducted, are the procedures and results adequately described?				
36. Was an effort made to lift fingerprints at the scene?				
37. If made, were usable fingerprints obtained?				
38. Were photos taken at the crime scene?				
39. Is the exact location from where the photos and prints taken given?				
40. Did Vic. verify his statements in the crime report?				
41. Did Vic. have improper motives in reporting the offense?				

ARREST

42. What was the legal basis for search and seizure?				
43. How was the location of evidence learned?				
44. How was the location of Susp. learned?				
45. How was the arrest of Susp. made?				

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

Victim's Address | Res. / Bus.

CR# | J# | FBI# | CII# | H.D. #

Date & Time Occurred | Location Occurred | Other I.D.'s | Priors

Suspect's Name (Last, First) | Booking #

AKAs

Address

Sex	Descent	DOB	Height	Weight	Hair	Eyes

Physical Oddities

Suspect Vehicle | Stored | Rel. Date

Oper. Lic. # | Soc. Sec. #

Date & Time Arrested | Location Arrested

Charge | Arrested By

Filing/Who	Charge	Date	Dispo

Arraigned Date | Court Division | Bail

Prelim Date | Court Division | Dispo

Juv. Dispo | Court Division | Dispo

Trial Date | Court Dept.

Follow up Rpt./Date Made

Investigator

INVESTIGATOR'S CHECK LIST

TELETYPES

- CII
- FBI
- AWWS
- NCIC
- AWDI
- DMV Veh. 10-29
- DMV Veh. 10-28
- DMV Veh. to Suspect
- DMV Lic. Phy. Data
- DOJ Firearms
- DOJ Stolen Articles
- DOJ Other
- APB
- TT Other
- TT Canceled
- Misc./Daily Bulletin
- Property Held
- Property Reviewed
- Property Released

SOURCE CHECKS

- SMPD Records/Wants
- Pawns
- F.I.s
- Crime Logs
- MO. Check/Maps
- Mug Photos
- Known Offenders
- Parole
- Probation
- Other Depts.
- ID/Prints Photos
- ID Tech. Reports

CONTACTS

- Visit Crime Scene
- Contact Victim
- Contact Witness/es
- Interrogate Suspect/s
- Informants
- Line-up on suspects



SANTA MONICA

END