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INTRODUCTION

The first phase funding of Project Decentralization began September 8, 1975 and terminated September 30, 1978. Although the initial termination date was established as September 7, 1976, a number of factors required the Detroit Police Department to request several extensions which resulted in the recent termination date.

During the grant period, implementation of Project Decentralization has proceeded in an exacting and deliberate manner. The grant programs were constantly evaluated and, although goals and objectives remained constant, strategies were amended in order to utilize grant funds in a more expedient manner.

ABSTRACT

Although program strategies were revised, project goals continued unaltered. The Project Decentralization goals were and remain:

- 1. Reduce crime in general.
- · · 2. Increase the overall efficiency of the department.
 - 3. Improve relations between the police department and the citizens of Detroit and reduce the fear of crime.

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ACQUISITIONS

Following is an overview of the program strategies which relate to the goals of the Project Decentralization effort.

GOAL 1: Reduce Crime in General

Achievement of this goal required reassignment of personnel, equipment and other resources to the neighborhood precincts. As a result, Investigative Response Units (IRU's), which are primarily responsible for responding to radio calls likely to require immediate crime scene investigation, were established. Two IRU's per shift were situated in each of Detroit's thirteen precincts. Hardware, such as vehicles, mobile and portable radios, emergency roof lights and distinctive decals to mark the vehicles were purchased to equip the IRU's. Not only was this equipment necessary to establish the IRU's, it also increased the "visibility" of previously low visibility investigative units in the field. Except for those types of investigations requiring zero-visibility, all investigative personnel, by virture of visibility hardware and blazer uniforms, became readily identifiable to the public.

The second program in this goal area involved the formation of a centralized Crime Analysis Unit.

During the first funding phase, program activity has been limited to developing a general design system for computerized crime analysis, including objectives, approach, and implementation plan.

The operation of the Crime Analysis program was and still is dependent upon the installation and operation of the Law Enforcement Information System (LEIS) with its integrated data base.

GOAL 2: Increase Overall Efficiency of the Department

Several programs were instituted in order to attain this objective. The first program, the Law Enforcement Information System (LEIS), is a computer system which is designed to provide timely crime incident and case control data for line, staff, and managerial personnel within the department. This is a basic system which includes direct data entry via terminals located in precinct stations, a data base management system (d.b.m.s.) and flexible d.b.m.s. applications.

The first funding phase also provided for implementation of a computerized Financial Information Control System (FICS). This system was designed to satisfy the need for improved collecting, processing, and reporting of financial data related to department operations and to provide the capability at the precinct level to relate budgetary allotments to program planning.

Several strategies, although included in the initial application, were not implemented for several reasons. Initially, this department has requested funding for implementing a Fleet and Equipment Control

System, as well as a computerized identification system. However, these applications were not initiated as sufficient funds were not available. In addition, strategies, such as a computerized manpower utilization/allocation system, a computerized management resource library, and a project to identify police positions that could be filled by civilian personnel have not been actualized. On a prioritized scale, these items are not highly ranked.

As previously indicated, the goals of Project Decentralization remain unaltered. However, the strategies which were proposed as means of achieving those goals have been restructured.

ACHIEVEMENT

The Project Decentralization grant has impacted the rate of crime in the city of Detroit. Since the decentralization of a number of singularly located investigative sections and units, and the increase in visibility as a result of the visibility hardware and blazer uniforms, the rate of crime has steadily decreased.

Certainly, the decrease in the rate of crime can not be attributed soley to the advent of Project Decentralization, as there are numerous factors which impact criminal activity. However, it is significant that the increase in crime began

to level off and subside shortly after the start-up of Project Decentralization.

There is no doubt that the increased visibility realized from blazer uniforms, decals, and emergency "Kojak" lights has promoted public confidence in the police department. The readily identifiable identification cards confirms for the citizen the identity of the bearer and insures the citizen that the card-holder will perform his duties in an efficient and courteous manner. The business cards render police personnel more accessible to the public and reinforce the departments commitment to render the community a more viable entity in which to live. Greater public accessibility is highly commensurate with the department's commitment to protect and serve the community. This heightened visibility has instilled feelings of security in the public, that, in turn, has increased its willingness to maintain that security through cooperative efforts. There is little doubt that the decrease in crime was affected by these factors.

An anticipated benefit of the decentralization program was the hope that the department's commitment to improve police service would be recognized by the public and that citizen support for crime reduction programs would increase proportionately. As a result of this greater trust and confidence between citizens and officers, the ability of the system to impact the level and frequency of serious crime through solution, prosecution and incarceration of perpetra-

tors would undoubtedly increase. The establishment of the investigative response units (IRU's) which consist of trained investigators in marked vehicles responding along with emergency response units to felony crime scenes, has resulted in immediate investigative attention to serious crimes. In addition, these units have enabled the department to more efficiently utilize its precinct personnel. This approach affords an opportunity to improve police-community relations. Because the IRU's appearance at the scene of serious crimes is almost simultaneous to arrival of the enforcement units, investigation of the citizen's complaints commences concurrently with the reporting of the crime. As a result, the citizen is made aware of the concern the department has for his plight. This, in turn, has produced increased citizen confidence and has resulted in an increase in citizen-police cooperation. The most apparent confirmation of this fact has been the dramatic decrease in crime in the city of Detroit.

Part I crimes, as determined by the Uniform Crime Reports, have declined steadily since July 1976, ten months after the inception of the grant project. Several factors which may have tended to affect the crime rate between project inception in September, 1975 and July, 1976 were the higher than national average unemployment rates and a substancial cutback (19%) in the amount of police personnel due to a budgetary crisis.

In comparing Part I crimes statistics for the calendar years 1975 and 1976 for the city of Detroit, a 1.8% decrease

was realized. The rate of incidents per 100,000 persons fell from 11,972 in 1975 to 11,746 in 1976. Thus, despite the man-power cutbacks indicated above, serious crime did decrease.

A comparison of the 1976 and 1977 calendar years provides figures which are statistically significant. The 1977 rate of incidents per 100,000 persons dropped to 9,503 as compared to the 1976 rate of 11,746 per 100,000 persons. This decline of 2,243 crimes per 100,000 represents a 19.1% decrease from 1976 crime rates.

An analysis of crime statistics for the first nine months of 1978 indicates that the rate of decrease has continued. The rate per 100,000 persons declined to 8,420. This represents an 11.4% decrease over the 1977 figures. It is expected that this decline will hold constant for the remainder of 1978 (see attached Part I crime rate chart).

The decrease in the rate of Part I crimes is parallelled by a decrease in the Part II crime rate. Part II crimes decreased at approximately the same rate as Part I crimes during the first ten months subsequent to the grant inception period, realizing a decline of 1.3% from 1975 levels. The rate per 100,000 persons decreased by 39 to 2895 in 1976. It should be noted hat this miniscule decline was also affected by the high unemployment rate. However, more significant was the layoffs of police personnel. Most often police personnel are the complainants in a large number of Part II crimes (i.e. D.U.I.L.,

gambling, liquor violations, etc.). Thus, the reduction of police personnel, undoubtedly, had an adverse effect on the annual statistics, reducing the decrease to its indiscernible level.

The 1977 statistics indicate that Part II crimes decreased 12.3% when compared to the previous year. The rate per 100,000 persons decreased from 2,895 in 1976 to 2,539 in 1977.

During the first nine months of 1978, the rate of crime per 100,000 for Part II crimes decreased by 430 to a rate of 2,109, a 4.3% decrease (see attached Part II crime chart).

Increased citizen confidence has also elevated citizen interest and pride in the community and has generated increased citizen participation in the criminal justice system as evidenced by citizen support of anti-crime programs and an increased citizen willingness to report crime.

Not only has Project Decentralization brought increased citizen awareness of the impact of crime on society, it has provided this department with the wherewithal to handle the increased radio runs which have resulted. By virtue of the fact that this department was able to purchase prep radios and mobile radios, the increase in the emergency calls to 911 has not overwhelmed our ability to contend with these emergencies.

Access to this equipment has made additional radio equipped patrol units available to answer calls for service. This equipment has enabled this department to equip for patrol large numbers of officers who were made available through the decentralization of investigative sections. Further, since the IRU's have reduced the time enforcement units spend at crime scenes awaiting investigative units to assume command, more patrol units are available to answer calls for service.

As citizen confidence in the ability of its police department to function as a sympathetic and concerned entity as opposed to an enforcement unit has increased, their willingness to aid the department in improving city conditions multiplied as evidenced by the rise in reports to the "911" emergency center. During 1975, these calls totalled 1,803,151. This number increased by 91,849 to 1,895,000 in 1976. A slight decrease lowered the number of calls to 1,775,000 in 1977. This decrease is the result of the severe winter weather which engulfed the city of Detroit during the early months of 1977. As a result, citizen calls to "911" decreased during those early months of 1977, as did the rate of crime.

It is expected that 1978 will end with an increase in calls to "911". Through August, 1978, the "911" emergency center has received a total of 1,241,000 calls. It should be noted, however, that this increase has no correlative in the crime rate statistics which, as previously indicated, continues on a downward trend. This trend tends to support the conclusion

that factors other than the harsh weather affected the decline in the rate of crime.

While the Detroit Police Department has made significant in-roads in attaining the goals of general crime reduction, reduction of the fear of crime and increasing citizen-police cooperation, the goal of increasing department efficiency has proven more elusive. The department's extremely high ambitions in this area led to an overly ambitious undertaking. In order to attain the goal of heightened efficiency, the project was divided into several programs. These were Police Management and Accounting System (PMACS), Law Enforcement Information System (LEIS) and Crime Analysis Program (CAP), and Criminal Records and Identification System (CRIS).

The CRIS was deleted as a component of development. A large factor which contributed to this change was the fact that the monies initially budgeted were not sufficient to implement such a massive undertaking. Thus, in order to realize a more efficacious utilization of those funds, we received approval to utilize those funds for such items as Mobile Data Terminals (MDT's) which will be used in conjunction with our implemented Computer-aided Dispatch System.

The PMACS has been implemented and, although problems have been encountered, this system is operating relatively well.

The major problems have been encountered in the area of the LEIS and the CAP. Although a great amount of effort and

diligence have been expended in these areas, full implementation has yet to be achieved. A number of factors have been attributed to non-implementation. One major obstacle lies in the fact that the two systems (LEIS and CAP) were viewed as separate, stand-alone systems. Although the CAP was to utilize the LEIS data base, development of these programs were dissociated. This led to a fragmented development of the two systems. This lack of coordinated system effort coupled with an extremely broad and unrealistically comprehensive scope has significantly affected systems development. The most basic difficulty associated with the development of LEIS and Crime Analysis is a difficulty that is commonly associated with the design of any large computer system. That is, from the outset, the requirements of the system were never defined in view of available resources. While it would be ideal to capture all crime related data, the constraints present in the actual every day environment should have precluded such an ambitious undertaking. Consequently, a good deal of system development effort was unnecessarily devoted to defining data elements and identifying data to be captured without ever formally and realistically defining the system outputs. In our efforts to achieve a state of the art system we simply failed to identify the hardcopy end product we desired.

In May, 1978, the department took corrective action in that the scope of the systems were modified. In lieu of the separate system development, LEIS is now viewed as the overall

system of which GSAC (formally CAP) is a component. Prior to that time, the development teams were oriented to a large field of data capture. A reduction of data captive requirements and modulation of LEIS to include not only GSAC, but data entry, data base management and design have effectuated a procedural work-plan. The work-plan has delineated steps for orderly progression and project management.

As a result of program modification, LEIS Phase I implementation of the data base management system is complete. At present the system can edit, store, and retrieve data regarding incidents, complaints, arrested persons, police officers, case status, and court dispositions.

Although the data base management and design is complete, the method for data capture has yet to be finalized. Our concept of data capture was based on the precinct patrol officers and the investigators ability to collect, record and update data, and, further that this information would be entered on a timely basis from the remote precinct locations via the data entry CRT's. This system would require that police officers currently assigned to operate limited CRT operations to absorb a minimal additional work load of expanded precinct on-line entry. It would further require that civilian clerks be hired to specifically effect this task at precincts around the clock. As budgetary considerations and management decisions have ruled out these possibilities, the data entry module had to be scaled down. The abridged data entry module was finished in August 1978 and is presently being tested for

accuracy, response time, and reliability. This scaled down version will require the on-line entry of a limited number of crime data elements at precinct locations. After assignment to an investigator, the incident now residing on the data base, will be up-dated in a batch mode. Depending on the availability of additional resources, the up-date function may be accomplished on line either through the precincts or a centralized unit.

The scope of the GSAC program has remained relatively unchanged. Because the scope of LEIS has been down-scaled, the GSAC component is realistic in terms of the data captive requirements of LEIS. Development of the GSAC system has been concentrated in the most critical areas. These areas include Batch Input, On-Line Input, Data Files Update and Data Files Retrieval Modules. It was highly critical to system function that these programs be developed.

Although much success has been achieved in GSAC, there have been numerous delays in output implementation. Thus, we have necessarily limited the output of the initial system.

These outputs have been identified as:

- Parameter Driven Lists of Matched Suspects/Offenses
- . Discreet Symbol Maps
 - . Crime Symbol Maps
 - . Service Call Maps
- . Statistical Representation Maps (Patterning)
- Fixed Format Reports/Graphs

- . Dynamically Formatted Reports/Graphs
- . Statistical Analysis

Of the above, we have limited GSAC Version 1.0 to include only 90-95% of the Parameter Driven Lists of Matched Suspects/Offenses and the Discreet Crime Symbol Mapping. These two forms of output will sell the system; they will encourage cooperation in the task of data collection and significant enhancement to present capability.

Because a major thrust in GSAC development has been to generate a computer graphics capability and a highly detailed M.O. data base, we have encountered major difficulty in the area of field data capture. As the ability to generate computer graphics and maintain a detailed M.O. data base is highly dependent on an even greater field data capture ability, the fact that this capability has not been realized has severely affected system support. As previously indicated, GSAC is, in part, dependent on the LEIS data base. We are highly confident that the downscope which has been engendered in the LEIS field data capture retrieval mechanism and data captive requirements will have positive impact on the GSAC ability to generate the required computer graphics and maintain the M.O. data base.

The concluding months of the Project Decentralization grant funding period (July 1, 1978 through September 7, 1978) have

been devoted to efforts in the further development and implementation of the work-plan for the modulated LEIS program with its data entry, data base management and design, and Crime Analysis components. The "tasking-out" of an orderly road of progression has certainly produced a synchronized effort in program development. As a result a consolidated project team modality has been developed. This has resulted in more efficient productivity and, undoubtedly, will have great impact on program success.

EVALUATION

The impact of Project Decentralization on the criminal justice system can be more readily observed via the precinct development program. The intent of this program was to render the Detroit Police Department more accessible to the public thereby improving police-community relations, reducing the fear of crime, and aiding in the reduction of crime in general. It is our belief that these goals were accomplished. The reduction in the rate of crime and the increase in citizen willingness to report crime tends to support the fact that the Project Decentralization program met these goals. As previously indicated, it is not entirely possible to attribute these successess totally to the decentralization effort. Since many factors affect crime statistics, it would be unwise to attribute all reductions to Project Decentralization. It is significant, however, that the crime rates began to level-off and

continue on a downward trend subsequent to inception of the grant program.

In July and August 1976, the Planning Department of the city of Detroit conducted a "Victimization Study." A comparison between selected questions from that study and the Michigan Office of Criminal Justice Programs study "Michigan Public Speaks Out on Crime" (January, 1974) indicated that perceptions of neighborhood safety (fear of crime) had improved by July 1976. In 1974, only 22% of those polled felt safe in their neighborhoods. 61% of those polled in 1976 felt they were reasonably safe in their neighborhoods.

Actual victimization decreased slightly in 1976 from 1974 polling. 25% of those polled in 1974 indicated that they or members of their household were victims of crime during the previous year. 23% of those polled in 1976 indicated they had been crime victims.

In comparing the two surveys, the latter survey indicated a marked increase in those respondents who rated the police in Detroit as good or excellent in the delivery of service. In 1976, the Planning Department experienced a response rate of 60% for those who rated police service good or excellent. The 1974 study indicated a 38% favorable response rate in the same category.

Although the 1976 Planning Department study coincided

with the 1976 layoffs, the results, nevertheless, are favorable in terms of the impact of Project Decentralization. The study indicates that the fear of crime decreased in the city of Detroit in the first ten months subsequent to the inception of the decentralization program. Although further surveys in this area have not been finalized (the results of a survey conducted by the Planning Department in August and September, 1978 are not yet available), it can be deduced from the still decreasing crime rate that fear of crime is more than likely on the decline.

The impact of the LEIS program on the criminal justice system can not be adequately measured at this time. As indicated previously, the initial LEIS program was overly broad and unrealistically comprehensive. Until such time as the system is fully operational, its impact on the criminal justice system can not be quantitatively measured.

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